instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t ACodec::requestIDRFrame() {
if (!mIsEncoder) {
return ERROR_UNSUPPORTED;
}
OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = kPortIndexOutput;
params.IntraRefreshVOP = OMX_TRUE;
return mOMX->setConfig(
mNode,
OMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraVOPRefresh,
¶ms,
sizeof(params));
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int aac_ioctl(struct scsi_device *sdev, int cmd, void __user * arg)
{
struct aac_dev *dev = (struct aac_dev *)sdev->host->hostdata;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
return -EPERM;
return aac_do_ioctl(dev, cmd, arg);
}
Commit Message: aacraid: missing capable() check in compat ioctl
In commit d496f94d22d1 ('[SCSI] aacraid: fix security weakness') we
added a check on CAP_SYS_RAWIO to the ioctl. The compat ioctls need the
check as well.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 28,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int oplidt(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
switch (op->operands_count) {
case 1:
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY ) {
data[l++] = 0x0f;
data[l++] = 0x01;
data[l++] = 0x18 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else {
return -1;
}
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return l;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 75,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_init_dec_mb_grp(dec_struct_t *ps_dec)
{
dec_seq_params_t *ps_seq = ps_dec->ps_cur_sps;
UWORD8 u1_frm = ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag;
ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs << ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag;
ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp_pair = ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp >> 1;
if(!ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp)
{
return ERROR_MB_GROUP_ASSGN_T;
}
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_prev_nmb = ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fixed error handling for dangling fields
In case of dangling fields with gaps in frames enabled,
field pic in cur_slice was wrongly set to 0.
This would cause dangling field to be concealed as a frame, which would
result in a number of MB mismatch and hence a hang.
Bug: 34097672
Change-Id: Ia9b7f72c4676188c45790b2dfbb4fe2c2d2c01f8
(cherry picked from commit 1a13168ca3510ba91274d10fdee46b3642cc9554)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 162,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterTGAImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("ICB");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadTGAImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteTGAImage;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString("Truevision Targa image");
entry->module=ConstantString("TGA");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("TGA");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadTGAImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteTGAImage;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString("Truevision Targa image");
entry->module=ConstantString("TGA");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("VDA");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadTGAImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteTGAImage;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString("Truevision Targa image");
entry->module=ConstantString("TGA");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("VST");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadTGAImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteTGAImage;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString("Truevision Targa image");
entry->module=ConstantString("TGA");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/pull/359
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 68,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static dev_t ashmem_rdev()
{
static dev_t __ashmem_rdev;
static pthread_mutex_t __ashmem_rdev_lock = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
pthread_mutex_lock(&__ashmem_rdev_lock);
dev_t rdev = __ashmem_rdev;
if (!rdev) {
int fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open("/dev/ashmem", O_RDONLY));
if (fd >= 0) {
struct stat st;
int ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(fstat(fd, &st));
close(fd);
if ((ret >= 0) && S_ISCHR(st.st_mode)) {
rdev = __ashmem_rdev = st.st_rdev;
}
}
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&__ashmem_rdev_lock);
return rdev;
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 163,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetVertexAttribfv(
GLuint index, GLenum pname, GLfloat* params) {
VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info =
vertex_attrib_manager_.GetVertexAttribInfo(index);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glGetVertexAttribfv: index out of range");
return;
}
switch (pname) {
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_BUFFER_BINDING: {
BufferManager::BufferInfo* buffer = info->buffer();
if (buffer && !buffer->IsDeleted()) {
GLuint client_id;
buffer_manager()->GetClientId(buffer->service_id(), &client_id);
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(client_id);
}
break;
}
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_ENABLED:
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(info->enabled());
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_SIZE:
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(info->size());
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_STRIDE:
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(info->gl_stride());
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_TYPE:
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(info->type());
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_NORMALIZED:
*params = static_cast<GLfloat>(info->normalized());
break;
case GL_CURRENT_VERTEX_ATTRIB:
params[0] = info->value().v[0];
params[1] = info->value().v[1];
params[2] = info->value().v[2];
params[3] = info->value().v[3];
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static NTSTATUS do_map_to_guest(NTSTATUS status,
auth_serversupplied_info **server_info,
const char *user, const char *domain)
{
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
if ((lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_USER) ||
(lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD)) {
DEBUG(3,("No such user %s [%s] - using guest account\n",
user, domain));
status = make_server_info_guest(NULL, server_info);
}
}
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD)) {
if (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD) {
DEBUG(3,("Registered username %s for guest access\n",
user));
status = make_server_info_guest(NULL, server_info);
}
}
return status;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_snd_codec_id(audio_format_t format)
{
int id = 0;
switch (format & AUDIO_FORMAT_MAIN_MASK) {
default:
ALOGE("%s: Unsupported audio format", __func__);
}
return id;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: KeyboardOverlayHandler::~KeyboardOverlayHandler() {
}
Commit Message: Add missing shortcut keys to the keyboard overlay.
This CL adds the following shortcuts to the keyboard overlay.
* Alt - 1, Alt - 2, .., Alt - 8: go to the window at the specified position
* Alt - 9: go to the last window open
* Ctrl - Forward: switches focus to the next keyboard-accessible pane
* Ctrl - Back: switches focus to the previous keyboard-accessible pane
* Ctrl - Right: move the text cursor to the end of the next word
* Ctrl - Left: move the text cursor to the start of the previous word
* Ctrl - Alt - Z: enable or disable accessibility features
* Ctrl - Shift - Maximize: take a screenshot of the selected region
* Ctrl - Shift - O: open the Bookmark Manager
I also deleted a duplicated entry of "Close window".
BUG=chromium-os:17152
TEST=Manually checked on chromebook
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7489040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93906 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 99,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fib_flush_external(struct net *net)
{
struct fib_table *tb;
struct hlist_head *head;
unsigned int h;
for (h = 0; h < FIB_TABLE_HASHSZ; h++) {
head = &net->ipv4.fib_table_hash[h];
hlist_for_each_entry(tb, head, tb_hlist)
fib_table_flush_external(tb);
}
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 54,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: write_key_file (const int nkeys, const char *filename)
{
struct gc_arena gc = gc_new ();
int fd, i;
int nbits = 0;
/* must be large enough to hold full key file */
struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (2048, &gc);
struct buffer nbits_head_text = alloc_buf_gc (128, &gc);
/* how to format the ascii file representation of key */
const int bytes_per_line = 16;
/* open key file */
fd = platform_open (filename, O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
if (fd == -1)
msg (M_ERR, "Cannot open shared secret file '%s' for write", filename);
buf_printf (&out, "%s\n", static_key_head);
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; ++i)
{
struct key key;
char* fmt;
/* generate random bits */
generate_key_random (&key, NULL);
/* format key as ascii */
fmt = format_hex_ex ((const uint8_t*)&key,
sizeof (key),
0,
bytes_per_line,
"\n",
&gc);
/* increment random bits counter */
nbits += sizeof (key) * 8;
/* write to holding buffer */
buf_printf (&out, "%s\n", fmt);
/* zero memory which held key component (will be freed by GC) */
memset (fmt, 0, strlen(fmt));
CLEAR (key);
}
buf_printf (&out, "%s\n", static_key_foot);
/* write number of bits */
buf_printf (&nbits_head_text, "#\n# %d bit OpenVPN static key\n#\n", nbits);
buf_write_string_file (&nbits_head_text, filename, fd);
/* write key file, now formatted in out, to file */
buf_write_string_file (&out, filename, fd);
if (close (fd))
msg (M_ERR, "Close error on shared secret file %s", filename);
/* zero memory which held file content (memory will be freed by GC) */
buf_clear (&out);
/* pop our garbage collection level */
gc_free (&gc);
return nbits;
}
Commit Message: Use constant time memcmp when comparing HMACs in openvpn_decrypt.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 32,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xfrm_get_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct xfrm_policy *xp;
struct xfrm_userpolicy_id *p;
u8 type = XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN;
int err;
struct km_event c;
int delete;
struct xfrm_mark m;
u32 mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
delete = nlh->nlmsg_type == XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY;
err = copy_from_user_policy_type(&type, attrs);
if (err)
return err;
err = verify_policy_dir(p->dir);
if (err)
return err;
if (p->index)
xp = xfrm_policy_byid(net, mark, type, p->dir, p->index, delete, &err);
else {
struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX];
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
err = verify_sec_ctx_len(attrs);
if (err)
return err;
ctx = NULL;
if (rt) {
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx = nla_data(rt);
err = security_xfrm_policy_alloc(&ctx, uctx, GFP_KERNEL);
if (err)
return err;
}
xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(net, mark, type, p->dir, &p->sel,
ctx, delete, &err);
security_xfrm_policy_free(ctx);
}
if (xp == NULL)
return -ENOENT;
if (!delete) {
struct sk_buff *resp_skb;
resp_skb = xfrm_policy_netlink(skb, xp, p->dir, nlh->nlmsg_seq);
if (IS_ERR(resp_skb)) {
err = PTR_ERR(resp_skb);
} else {
err = nlmsg_unicast(net->xfrm.nlsk, resp_skb,
NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
}
} else {
xfrm_audit_policy_delete(xp, err ? 0 : 1, true);
if (err != 0)
goto out;
c.data.byid = p->index;
c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type;
c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
c.portid = nlh->nlmsg_pid;
km_policy_notify(xp, p->dir, &c);
}
out:
xfrm_pol_put(xp);
if (delete && err == 0)
xfrm_garbage_collect(net);
return err;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size harder
Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to
wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN
structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported
by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same.
CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 67,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit nf_tables_module_exit(void)
{
unregister_pernet_subsys(&nf_tables_net_ops);
nfnetlink_subsys_unregister(&nf_tables_subsys);
rcu_barrier();
nf_tables_core_module_exit();
kfree(info);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 57,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::OpenURL(
content::SiteInstance* site_instance,
const content::OpenURLParams& params,
const base::RepeatingCallback<void(content::WebContents*)>& callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(ShouldAllowOpenURL(site_instance, params.url));
content::BrowserContext* browser_context = site_instance->GetBrowserContext();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
ServiceTabLauncher::GetInstance()->LaunchTab(browser_context, params,
callback);
#else
NavigateParams nav_params(Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context),
params.url, params.transition);
nav_params.FillNavigateParamsFromOpenURLParams(params);
nav_params.user_gesture = params.user_gesture;
Navigate(&nav_params);
callback.Run(nav_params.navigated_or_inserted_contents);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sco_recv_scodata(struct hci_conn *hcon, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sco_conn *conn = hcon->sco_data;
if (!conn)
goto drop;
BT_DBG("conn %p len %d", conn, skb->len);
if (skb->len) {
sco_recv_frame(conn, skb);
return 0;
}
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: SCO - Fix missing msg_namelen update in sco_sock_recvmsg()
If the socket is in state BT_CONNECT2 and BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP is set in
the flags, sco_sock_recvmsg() returns early with 0 without updating the
possibly set msg_namelen member. This, in turn, leads to a 128 byte
kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix this by updating msg_namelen in this case. For all other cases it
will be handled in bt_sock_recvmsg().
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pgp_parse_hist_bytes(sc_card_t *card, u8 *ctlv, size_t ctlv_len)
{
struct pgp_priv_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
const u8 *ptr;
/* IS07816-4 hist bytes: 3rd function table */
if ((ptr = sc_compacttlv_find_tag(ctlv, ctlv_len, 0x73, NULL)) != NULL) {
/* bit 0x40 in byte 3 of TL 0x73 means "extended Le/Lc" */
if (ptr[2] & 0x40) {
card->caps |= SC_CARD_CAP_APDU_EXT;
priv->ext_caps |= EXT_CAP_APDU_EXT;
}
/* bit 0x80 in byte 3 of TL 0x73 means "Command chaining" */
if ((ptr[2] & 0x80) &&
(priv->bcd_version >= OPENPGP_CARD_3_0)) {
priv->ext_caps |= EXT_CAP_CHAINING;
}
}
if ((priv->bcd_version >= OPENPGP_CARD_3_0) &&
((ptr = sc_compacttlv_find_tag(ctlv, ctlv_len, 0x31, NULL)) != NULL)) {
}
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int usb_set_configuration(struct usb_device *dev, int configuration)
{
int i, ret;
struct usb_host_config *cp = NULL;
struct usb_interface **new_interfaces = NULL;
struct usb_hcd *hcd = bus_to_hcd(dev->bus);
int n, nintf;
if (dev->authorized == 0 || configuration == -1)
configuration = 0;
else {
for (i = 0; i < dev->descriptor.bNumConfigurations; i++) {
if (dev->config[i].desc.bConfigurationValue ==
configuration) {
cp = &dev->config[i];
break;
}
}
}
if ((!cp && configuration != 0))
return -EINVAL;
/* The USB spec says configuration 0 means unconfigured.
* But if a device includes a configuration numbered 0,
* we will accept it as a correctly configured state.
* Use -1 if you really want to unconfigure the device.
*/
if (cp && configuration == 0)
dev_warn(&dev->dev, "config 0 descriptor??\n");
/* Allocate memory for new interfaces before doing anything else,
* so that if we run out then nothing will have changed. */
n = nintf = 0;
if (cp) {
nintf = cp->desc.bNumInterfaces;
new_interfaces = kmalloc(nintf * sizeof(*new_interfaces),
GFP_NOIO);
if (!new_interfaces)
return -ENOMEM;
for (; n < nintf; ++n) {
new_interfaces[n] = kzalloc(
sizeof(struct usb_interface),
GFP_NOIO);
if (!new_interfaces[n]) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
free_interfaces:
while (--n >= 0)
kfree(new_interfaces[n]);
kfree(new_interfaces);
return ret;
}
}
i = dev->bus_mA - usb_get_max_power(dev, cp);
if (i < 0)
dev_warn(&dev->dev, "new config #%d exceeds power "
"limit by %dmA\n",
configuration, -i);
}
/* Wake up the device so we can send it the Set-Config request */
ret = usb_autoresume_device(dev);
if (ret)
goto free_interfaces;
/* if it's already configured, clear out old state first.
* getting rid of old interfaces means unbinding their drivers.
*/
if (dev->state != USB_STATE_ADDRESS)
usb_disable_device(dev, 1); /* Skip ep0 */
/* Get rid of pending async Set-Config requests for this device */
cancel_async_set_config(dev);
/* Make sure we have bandwidth (and available HCD resources) for this
* configuration. Remove endpoints from the schedule if we're dropping
* this configuration to set configuration 0. After this point, the
* host controller will not allow submissions to dropped endpoints. If
* this call fails, the device state is unchanged.
*/
mutex_lock(hcd->bandwidth_mutex);
/* Disable LPM, and re-enable it once the new configuration is
* installed, so that the xHCI driver can recalculate the U1/U2
* timeouts.
*/
if (dev->actconfig && usb_disable_lpm(dev)) {
dev_err(&dev->dev, "%s Failed to disable LPM\n.", __func__);
mutex_unlock(hcd->bandwidth_mutex);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto free_interfaces;
}
ret = usb_hcd_alloc_bandwidth(dev, cp, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
if (dev->actconfig)
usb_enable_lpm(dev);
mutex_unlock(hcd->bandwidth_mutex);
usb_autosuspend_device(dev);
goto free_interfaces;
}
/*
* Initialize the new interface structures and the
* hc/hcd/usbcore interface/endpoint state.
*/
for (i = 0; i < nintf; ++i) {
struct usb_interface_cache *intfc;
struct usb_interface *intf;
struct usb_host_interface *alt;
cp->interface[i] = intf = new_interfaces[i];
intfc = cp->intf_cache[i];
intf->altsetting = intfc->altsetting;
intf->num_altsetting = intfc->num_altsetting;
intf->authorized = !!HCD_INTF_AUTHORIZED(hcd);
kref_get(&intfc->ref);
alt = usb_altnum_to_altsetting(intf, 0);
/* No altsetting 0? We'll assume the first altsetting.
* We could use a GetInterface call, but if a device is
* so non-compliant that it doesn't have altsetting 0
* then I wouldn't trust its reply anyway.
*/
if (!alt)
alt = &intf->altsetting[0];
intf->intf_assoc =
find_iad(dev, cp, alt->desc.bInterfaceNumber);
intf->cur_altsetting = alt;
usb_enable_interface(dev, intf, true);
intf->dev.parent = &dev->dev;
intf->dev.driver = NULL;
intf->dev.bus = &usb_bus_type;
intf->dev.type = &usb_if_device_type;
intf->dev.groups = usb_interface_groups;
/*
* Please refer to usb_alloc_dev() to see why we set
* dma_mask and dma_pfn_offset.
*/
intf->dev.dma_mask = dev->dev.dma_mask;
intf->dev.dma_pfn_offset = dev->dev.dma_pfn_offset;
INIT_WORK(&intf->reset_ws, __usb_queue_reset_device);
intf->minor = -1;
device_initialize(&intf->dev);
pm_runtime_no_callbacks(&intf->dev);
dev_set_name(&intf->dev, "%d-%s:%d.%d",
dev->bus->busnum, dev->devpath,
configuration, alt->desc.bInterfaceNumber);
usb_get_dev(dev);
}
kfree(new_interfaces);
ret = usb_control_msg(dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(dev, 0),
USB_REQ_SET_CONFIGURATION, 0, configuration, 0,
NULL, 0, USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (ret < 0 && cp) {
/*
* All the old state is gone, so what else can we do?
* The device is probably useless now anyway.
*/
usb_hcd_alloc_bandwidth(dev, NULL, NULL, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < nintf; ++i) {
usb_disable_interface(dev, cp->interface[i], true);
put_device(&cp->interface[i]->dev);
cp->interface[i] = NULL;
}
cp = NULL;
}
dev->actconfig = cp;
mutex_unlock(hcd->bandwidth_mutex);
if (!cp) {
usb_set_device_state(dev, USB_STATE_ADDRESS);
/* Leave LPM disabled while the device is unconfigured. */
usb_autosuspend_device(dev);
return ret;
}
usb_set_device_state(dev, USB_STATE_CONFIGURED);
if (cp->string == NULL &&
!(dev->quirks & USB_QUIRK_CONFIG_INTF_STRINGS))
cp->string = usb_cache_string(dev, cp->desc.iConfiguration);
/* Now that the interfaces are installed, re-enable LPM. */
usb_unlocked_enable_lpm(dev);
/* Enable LTM if it was turned off by usb_disable_device. */
usb_enable_ltm(dev);
/* Now that all the interfaces are set up, register them
* to trigger binding of drivers to interfaces. probe()
* routines may install different altsettings and may
* claim() any interfaces not yet bound. Many class drivers
* need that: CDC, audio, video, etc.
*/
for (i = 0; i < nintf; ++i) {
struct usb_interface *intf = cp->interface[i];
dev_dbg(&dev->dev,
"adding %s (config #%d, interface %d)\n",
dev_name(&intf->dev), configuration,
intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber);
device_enable_async_suspend(&intf->dev);
ret = device_add(&intf->dev);
if (ret != 0) {
dev_err(&dev->dev, "device_add(%s) --> %d\n",
dev_name(&intf->dev), ret);
continue;
}
create_intf_ep_devs(intf);
}
usb_autosuspend_device(dev);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jpc_validate(jas_stream_t *in)
{
int n;
int i;
unsigned char buf[2];
assert(JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK >= 2);
if ((n = jas_stream_read(in, (char *) buf, 2)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
if (jas_stream_ungetc(in, buf[i]) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
}
if (n < 2) {
return -1;
}
if (buf[0] == (JPC_MS_SOC >> 8) && buf[1] == (JPC_MS_SOC & 0xff)) {
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ParamTraits<gfx::Vector2d>::Log(const gfx::Vector2d& v, std::string* l) {
l->append(base::StringPrintf("(%d, %d)", v.x(), v.y()));
}
Commit Message: Beware of print-read inconsistency when serializing GURLs.
BUG=165622
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11576038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173583 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 117,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void br_multicast_query_expired(unsigned long data)
{
struct net_bridge *br = (void *)data;
spin_lock(&br->multicast_lock);
if (br->multicast_startup_queries_sent <
br->multicast_startup_query_count)
br->multicast_startup_queries_sent++;
br_multicast_send_query(br, NULL, br->multicast_startup_queries_sent);
spin_unlock(&br->multicast_lock);
}
Commit Message: bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <ihands@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Browser::Type SessionService::BrowserTypeForWindowType(WindowType type) {
switch (type) {
case TYPE_POPUP:
return Browser::TYPE_POPUP;
case TYPE_TABBED:
default:
return Browser::TYPE_TABBED;
}
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 108,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void qcow2_free_clusters(BlockDriverState *bs,
int64_t offset, int64_t size,
enum qcow2_discard_type type)
{
int ret;
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_CLUSTER_FREE);
ret = update_refcount(bs, offset, size, -1, type);
if (ret < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "qcow2_free_clusters failed: %s\n", strerror(-ret));
/* TODO Remember the clusters to free them later and avoid leaking */
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParserEntityCheck(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, size_t size,
xmlEntityPtr ent, size_t replacement)
{
size_t consumed = 0;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE))
return (0);
if (ctxt->lastError.code == XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP)
return (1);
/*
* This may look absurd but is needed to detect
* entities problems
*/
if ((ent != NULL) && (ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY) &&
(ent->content != NULL) && (ent->checked == 0) &&
(ctxt->errNo != XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP)) {
unsigned long oldnbent = ctxt->nbentities;
xmlChar *rep;
ent->checked = 1;
++ctxt->depth;
rep = xmlStringDecodeEntities(ctxt, ent->content,
XML_SUBSTITUTE_REF, 0, 0, 0);
--ctxt->depth;
if (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP) {
ent->content[0] = 0;
}
ent->checked = (ctxt->nbentities - oldnbent + 1) * 2;
if (rep != NULL) {
if (xmlStrchr(rep, '<'))
ent->checked |= 1;
xmlFree(rep);
rep = NULL;
}
}
if (replacement != 0) {
if (replacement < XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH)
return(0);
/*
* If the volume of entity copy reaches 10 times the
* amount of parsed data and over the large text threshold
* then that's very likely to be an abuse.
*/
if (ctxt->input != NULL) {
consumed = ctxt->input->consumed +
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
}
consumed += ctxt->sizeentities;
if (replacement < XML_PARSER_NON_LINEAR * consumed)
return(0);
} else if (size != 0) {
/*
* Do the check based on the replacement size of the entity
*/
if (size < XML_PARSER_BIG_ENTITY)
return(0);
/*
* A limit on the amount of text data reasonably used
*/
if (ctxt->input != NULL) {
consumed = ctxt->input->consumed +
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
}
consumed += ctxt->sizeentities;
if ((size < XML_PARSER_NON_LINEAR * consumed) &&
(ctxt->nbentities * 3 < XML_PARSER_NON_LINEAR * consumed))
return (0);
} else if (ent != NULL) {
/*
* use the number of parsed entities in the replacement
*/
size = ent->checked / 2;
/*
* The amount of data parsed counting entities size only once
*/
if (ctxt->input != NULL) {
consumed = ctxt->input->consumed +
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
}
consumed += ctxt->sizeentities;
/*
* Check the density of entities for the amount of data
* knowing an entity reference will take at least 3 bytes
*/
if (size * 3 < consumed * XML_PARSER_NON_LINEAR)
return (0);
} else {
/*
* strange we got no data for checking
*/
if (((ctxt->lastError.code != XML_ERR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY) &&
(ctxt->lastError.code != XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY)) ||
(ctxt->nbentities <= 10000))
return (0);
}
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP, NULL);
return (1);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 59,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unmount_mount_callback (GObject *source_object,
GAsyncResult *res,
gpointer user_data)
{
UnmountData *data = user_data;
GError *error;
char *primary;
gboolean unmounted;
error = NULL;
if (data->eject)
{
unmounted = g_mount_eject_with_operation_finish (G_MOUNT (source_object),
res, &error);
}
else
{
unmounted = g_mount_unmount_with_operation_finish (G_MOUNT (source_object),
res, &error);
}
if (!unmounted)
{
if (error->code != G_IO_ERROR_FAILED_HANDLED)
{
if (data->eject)
{
primary = f (_("Unable to eject %V"), source_object);
}
else
{
primary = f (_("Unable to unmount %V"), source_object);
}
eel_show_error_dialog (primary,
error->message,
data->parent_window);
g_free (primary);
}
}
if (data->callback)
{
data->callback (data->callback_data);
}
if (error != NULL)
{
g_error_free (error);
}
unmount_data_free (data);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void acpi_pcihp_reset(AcpiPciHpState *s)
{
acpi_pcihp_update(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,555 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nodelist_add_microdesc(microdesc_t *md)
{
networkstatus_t *ns =
networkstatus_get_latest_consensus_by_flavor(FLAV_MICRODESC);
const routerstatus_t *rs;
node_t *node;
if (ns == NULL)
return NULL;
init_nodelist();
/* Microdescriptors don't carry an identity digest, so we need to figure
* it out by looking up the routerstatus. */
rs = router_get_consensus_status_by_descriptor_digest(ns, md->digest);
if (rs == NULL)
return NULL;
node = node_get_mutable_by_id(rs->identity_digest);
if (node) {
if (node->md)
node->md->held_by_nodes--;
node->md = md;
md->held_by_nodes++;
}
return node;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 69,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Browser::SupportsWindowFeatureImpl(WindowFeature feature,
bool check_fullscreen) const {
bool hide_ui_for_fullscreen = false;
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
hide_ui_for_fullscreen = check_fullscreen && window_ &&
window_->IsFullscreen();
#endif
unsigned int features = FEATURE_INFOBAR | FEATURE_DOWNLOADSHELF;
if (is_type_tabbed())
features |= FEATURE_BOOKMARKBAR;
if (!hide_ui_for_fullscreen) {
if (!is_type_tabbed())
features |= FEATURE_TITLEBAR;
if (is_type_tabbed())
features |= FEATURE_TABSTRIP;
if (is_type_tabbed())
features |= FEATURE_TOOLBAR;
if (!is_app())
features |= FEATURE_LOCATIONBAR;
}
return !!(features & feature);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSTestCustomNamedGetter::JSTestCustomNamedGetter(Structure* structure, JSDOMGlobalObject* globalObject, PassRefPtr<TestCustomNamedGetter> impl)
: JSDOMWrapper(structure, globalObject)
, m_impl(impl.leakRef())
{
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gsicc_check_device_link(cmm_profile_t *icc_profile)
{
bool value;
value = gscms_is_device_link(icc_profile->profile_handle);
icc_profile->isdevlink = value;
return value;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::DidNavigate(uint32_t next_source_id) {
current_content_source_id_ = next_source_id;
if (enable_surface_synchronization_) {
if (view_)
view_->DidNavigate();
next_resize_needs_resize_ack_ = resize_ack_pending_;
resize_ack_pending_ = false;
WasResized();
} else {
if (last_received_content_source_id_ >= current_content_source_id_)
return;
}
if (!new_content_rendering_timeout_)
return;
new_content_rendering_timeout_->Start(new_content_rendering_delay_);
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RuleBasedHostResolverProc* rules() { return host_resolver_.rules(); }
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::runJavaScriptAlert(Frame* frame, const String& message)
{
if (m_webView->client()) {
if (WebUserGestureIndicator::isProcessingUserGesture())
WebUserGestureIndicator::currentUserGestureToken().setJavascriptPrompt();
m_webView->client()->runModalAlertDialog(
WebFrameImpl::fromFrame(frame), message);
}
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlAddEntityReference(xmlEntityPtr ent, xmlNodePtr firstNode,
xmlNodePtr lastNode)
{
if (xmlEntityRefFunc != NULL) {
(*xmlEntityRefFunc) (ent, firstNode, lastNode);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseEncodingDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *encoding = NULL;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CMP8(CUR_PTR, 'e', 'n', 'c', 'o', 'd', 'i', 'n', 'g')) {
SKIP(8);
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (RAW != '=') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_EQUAL_REQUIRED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (RAW == '"') {
NEXT;
encoding = xmlParseEncName(ctxt);
if (RAW != '"') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_STRING_NOT_CLOSED, NULL);
xmlFree((xmlChar *) encoding);
return(NULL);
} else
NEXT;
} else if (RAW == '\''){
NEXT;
encoding = xmlParseEncName(ctxt);
if (RAW != '\'') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_STRING_NOT_CLOSED, NULL);
xmlFree((xmlChar *) encoding);
return(NULL);
} else
NEXT;
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_STRING_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
}
/*
* Non standard parsing, allowing the user to ignore encoding
*/
if (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_IGNORE_ENC) {
xmlFree((xmlChar *) encoding);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* UTF-16 encoding stwich has already taken place at this stage,
* more over the little-endian/big-endian selection is already done
*/
if ((encoding != NULL) &&
((!xmlStrcasecmp(encoding, BAD_CAST "UTF-16")) ||
(!xmlStrcasecmp(encoding, BAD_CAST "UTF16")))) {
/*
* If no encoding was passed to the parser, that we are
* using UTF-16 and no decoder is present i.e. the
* document is apparently UTF-8 compatible, then raise an
* encoding mismatch fatal error
*/
if ((ctxt->encoding == NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->buf != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->buf->encoder == NULL)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_ENCODING,
"Document labelled UTF-16 but has UTF-8 content\n");
}
if (ctxt->encoding != NULL)
xmlFree((xmlChar *) ctxt->encoding);
ctxt->encoding = encoding;
}
/*
* UTF-8 encoding is handled natively
*/
else if ((encoding != NULL) &&
((!xmlStrcasecmp(encoding, BAD_CAST "UTF-8")) ||
(!xmlStrcasecmp(encoding, BAD_CAST "UTF8")))) {
if (ctxt->encoding != NULL)
xmlFree((xmlChar *) ctxt->encoding);
ctxt->encoding = encoding;
}
else if (encoding != NULL) {
xmlCharEncodingHandlerPtr handler;
if (ctxt->input->encoding != NULL)
xmlFree((xmlChar *) ctxt->input->encoding);
ctxt->input->encoding = encoding;
handler = xmlFindCharEncodingHandler((const char *) encoding);
if (handler != NULL) {
if (xmlSwitchToEncoding(ctxt, handler) < 0) {
/* failed to convert */
ctxt->errNo = XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING;
return(NULL);
}
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING,
"Unsupported encoding %s\n", encoding);
return(NULL);
}
}
}
return(encoding);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 59,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FidoMakeCredentialTaskTest() { scoped_feature_list_.emplace(); }
Commit Message: [base] Make dynamic container to static span conversion explicit
This change disallows implicit conversions from dynamic containers to
static spans. This conversion can cause CHECK failures, and thus should
be done carefully. Requiring explicit construction makes it more obvious
when this happens. To aid usability, appropriate base::make_span<size_t>
overloads are added.
Bug: 877931
Change-Id: Id9f526bc57bfd30a52d14df827b0445ca087381d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1189985
Reviewed-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586657}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 132,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnDisplayTypeChanged(
WebMediaPlayer::DisplayType display_type) {
if (surface_layer_for_video_enabled_) {
vfc_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&VideoFrameCompositor::SetForceSubmit,
base::Unretained(compositor_.get()),
display_type == WebMediaPlayer::DisplayType::kPictureInPicture));
}
if (!watch_time_reporter_)
return;
switch (display_type) {
case WebMediaPlayer::DisplayType::kInline:
watch_time_reporter_->OnDisplayTypeInline();
break;
case WebMediaPlayer::DisplayType::kFullscreen:
watch_time_reporter_->OnDisplayTypeFullscreen();
break;
case WebMediaPlayer::DisplayType::kPictureInPicture:
watch_time_reporter_->OnDisplayTypePictureInPicture();
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: box_copy(BOX *box)
{
BOX *result = (BOX *) palloc(sizeof(BOX));
memcpy((char *) result, (char *) box, sizeof(BOX));
return result;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsWindow::FileSystemsLoaded(
const std::vector<DevToolsFileHelper::FileSystem>& file_systems) {
ListValue file_systems_value;
for (size_t i = 0; i < file_systems.size(); ++i)
file_systems_value.Append(CreateFileSystemValue(file_systems[i]));
CallClientFunction("InspectorFrontendAPI.fileSystemsLoaded",
&file_systems_value, NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: e1000e_write_lgcy_rx_descr(E1000ECore *core, uint8_t *desc,
struct NetRxPkt *pkt,
const E1000E_RSSInfo *rss_info,
uint16_t length)
{
uint32_t status_flags, rss, mrq;
uint16_t ip_id;
struct e1000_rx_desc *d = (struct e1000_rx_desc *) desc;
assert(!rss_info->enabled);
d->length = cpu_to_le16(length);
d->csum = 0;
e1000e_build_rx_metadata(core, pkt, pkt != NULL,
rss_info,
&rss, &mrq,
&status_flags, &ip_id,
&d->special);
d->errors = (uint8_t) (le32_to_cpu(status_flags) >> 24);
d->status = (uint8_t) le32_to_cpu(status_flags);
d->special = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 6,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void avsubtitle_free(AVSubtitle *sub)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sub->num_rects; i++) {
av_freep(&sub->rects[i]->data[0]);
av_freep(&sub->rects[i]->data[1]);
av_freep(&sub->rects[i]->data[2]);
av_freep(&sub->rects[i]->data[3]);
av_freep(&sub->rects[i]->text);
av_freep(&sub->rects[i]->ass);
av_freep(&sub->rects[i]);
}
av_freep(&sub->rects);
memset(sub, 0, sizeof(*sub));
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: Check close before calling it
Fixes: NULL pointer dereference
Fixes: 15733/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_IDF_fuzzer-5658616977162240
Reviewed-by: Paul B Mahol <onemda@gmail.com>
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: | 0 | 87,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataEntry::ToProto(GDataEntryProto* proto) const {
ConvertPlatformFileInfoToProto(file_info_, proto->mutable_file_info());
proto->set_base_name(base_name_);
proto->set_title(title_);
proto->set_resource_id(resource_id_);
proto->set_parent_resource_id(parent_resource_id_);
proto->set_edit_url(edit_url_.spec());
proto->set_content_url(content_url_.spec());
proto->set_upload_url(upload_url_.spec());
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _krb5_pk_mk_ContentInfo(krb5_context context,
const krb5_data *buf,
const heim_oid *oid,
struct ContentInfo *content_info)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
ret = der_copy_oid(oid, &content_info->contentType);
if (ret)
return ret;
ALLOC(content_info->content, 1);
if (content_info->content == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
content_info->content->data = malloc(buf->length);
if (content_info->content->data == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
memcpy(content_info->content->data, buf->data, buf->length);
content_info->content->length = buf->length;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auritor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320 | 0 | 89,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
const uint32_t command,
const unsigned char *ononce,
const unsigned char *key1,
unsigned int keylen1,
const unsigned char *key2,
unsigned int keylen2, ...)
{
uint32_t bufsize;
uint16_t tag;
uint32_t ordinal;
uint32_t result;
unsigned char *enonce1;
unsigned char *continueflag1;
unsigned char *authdata1;
unsigned char *enonce2;
unsigned char *continueflag2;
unsigned char *authdata2;
unsigned char testhmac1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
unsigned char testhmac2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
struct sdesc *sdesc;
unsigned int dlen;
unsigned int dpos;
va_list argp;
int ret;
bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
ordinal = command;
result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET);
if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND)
return 0;
if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND)
return -EINVAL;
authdata1 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1
+ SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
authdata2 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
continueflag1 = authdata1 - 1;
continueflag2 = authdata2 - 1;
enonce1 = continueflag1 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
enonce2 = continueflag2 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
}
ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result,
sizeof result);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal,
sizeof ordinal);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
va_start(argp, keylen2);
for (;;) {
dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
if (dlen == 0)
break;
dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen);
if (ret < 0)
break;
}
va_end(argp);
if (!ret)
ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1,
TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2,
TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
ret = -EINVAL;
out:
kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Editor::UnappliedEditing(UndoStep* cmd) {
EventQueueScope scope;
DispatchEditableContentChangedEvents(cmd->StartingRootEditableElement(),
cmd->EndingRootEditableElement());
DispatchInputEventEditableContentChanged(
cmd->StartingRootEditableElement(), cmd->EndingRootEditableElement(),
InputEvent::InputType::kHistoryUndo, g_null_atom,
InputEvent::EventIsComposing::kNotComposing);
const SelectionInDOMTree& new_selection = CorrectedSelectionAfterCommand(
cmd->StartingSelection(), GetFrame().GetDocument());
ChangeSelectionAfterCommand(new_selection,
SetSelectionData::Builder()
.SetShouldCloseTyping(true)
.SetShouldClearTypingStyle(true)
.Build());
last_edit_command_ = nullptr;
undo_stack_->RegisterRedoStep(cmd);
RespondToChangedContents(new_selection.Base());
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IndexedDBDispatcher::~IndexedDBDispatcher() {
g_idb_dispatcher_tls.Pointer()->Set(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Add DCHECK to ensure IndexedDBDispatcher doesn't get re-created.
This could happen if there are IDB objects that survive the call to
didStopWorkerRunLoop.
BUG=121734
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9999035
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131679 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 171,040 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AddSubResourceSizeSpec(void *value,
XID id,
RESTYPE type,
void *cdata)
{
ConstructResourceBytesCtx *ctx = cdata;
if (ctx->status == Success) {
xXResResourceSizeSpec **prevCrossRef =
ht_find(ctx->visitedSubResources, &value);
if (!prevCrossRef) {
Bool ok = TRUE;
xXResResourceSizeSpec *crossRef =
AddFragment(&ctx->response, sizeof(xXResResourceSizeSpec));
ok = ok && crossRef != NULL;
if (ok) {
xXResResourceSizeSpec **p;
p = ht_add(ctx->visitedSubResources, &value);
if (!p) {
ok = FALSE;
} else {
*p = crossRef;
}
}
if (!ok) {
ctx->status = BadAlloc;
} else {
SizeType sizeFunc = GetResourceTypeSizeFunc(type);
ResourceSizeRec size = { 0, 0, 0 };
sizeFunc(value, id, &size);
crossRef->spec.resource = id;
crossRef->spec.type = type;
crossRef->bytes = size.resourceSize;
crossRef->refCount = size.refCnt;
crossRef->useCount = 1;
++ctx->sizeValue->numCrossReferences;
ctx->resultBytes += sizeof(*crossRef);
}
} else {
/* if we have visited the subresource earlier (from current parent
resource), just increase its use count by one */
++(*prevCrossRef)->useCount;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nsc_encode_subsampling(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
{
UINT16 x;
UINT16 y;
BYTE* co_dst;
BYTE* cg_dst;
INT8* co_src0;
INT8* co_src1;
INT8* cg_src0;
INT8* cg_src1;
UINT32 tempWidth;
UINT32 tempHeight;
tempWidth = ROUND_UP_TO(context->width, 8);
tempHeight = ROUND_UP_TO(context->height, 2);
for (y = 0; y < tempHeight >> 1; y++)
{
co_dst = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * (tempWidth >> 1);
cg_dst = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * (tempWidth >> 1);
co_src0 = (INT8*) context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + (y << 1) * tempWidth;
co_src1 = co_src0 + tempWidth;
cg_src0 = (INT8*) context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + (y << 1) * tempWidth;
cg_src1 = cg_src0 + tempWidth;
for (x = 0; x < tempWidth >> 1; x++)
{
*co_dst++ = (BYTE)(((INT16) * co_src0 + (INT16) * (co_src0 + 1) +
(INT16) * co_src1 + (INT16) * (co_src1 + 1)) >> 2);
*cg_dst++ = (BYTE)(((INT16) * cg_src0 + (INT16) * (cg_src0 + 1) +
(INT16) * cg_src1 + (INT16) * (cg_src1 + 1)) >> 2);
co_src0 += 2;
co_src1 += 2;
cg_src0 += 2;
cg_src1 += 2;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 169,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t EncodeImage(Image *image,const unsigned char *scanline,
const size_t bytes_per_line,unsigned char *pixels)
{
#define MaxCount 128
#define MaxPackbitsRunlength 128
register const unsigned char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
repeat_count,
runlength;
unsigned char
index;
/*
Pack scanline.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(scanline != (unsigned char *) NULL);
assert(pixels != (unsigned char *) NULL);
count=0;
runlength=0;
p=scanline+(bytes_per_line-1);
q=pixels;
index=(*p);
for (i=(ssize_t) bytes_per_line-1; i >= 0; i--)
{
if (index == *p)
runlength++;
else
{
if (runlength < 3)
while (runlength > 0)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) index;
runlength--;
count++;
if (count == MaxCount)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) (MaxCount-1);
count-=MaxCount;
}
}
else
{
if (count > 0)
*q++=(unsigned char) (count-1);
count=0;
while (runlength > 0)
{
repeat_count=runlength;
if (repeat_count > MaxPackbitsRunlength)
repeat_count=MaxPackbitsRunlength;
*q++=(unsigned char) index;
*q++=(unsigned char) (257-repeat_count);
runlength-=repeat_count;
}
}
runlength=1;
}
index=(*p);
p--;
}
if (runlength < 3)
while (runlength > 0)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) index;
runlength--;
count++;
if (count == MaxCount)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) (MaxCount-1);
count-=MaxCount;
}
}
else
{
if (count > 0)
*q++=(unsigned char) (count-1);
count=0;
while (runlength > 0)
{
repeat_count=runlength;
if (repeat_count > MaxPackbitsRunlength)
repeat_count=MaxPackbitsRunlength;
*q++=(unsigned char) index;
*q++=(unsigned char) (257-repeat_count);
runlength-=repeat_count;
}
}
if (count > 0)
*q++=(unsigned char) (count-1);
/*
Write the number of and the packed length.
*/
length=(size_t) (q-pixels);
if (bytes_per_line > 200)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) length);
length+=2;
}
else
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) length);
length++;
}
while (q != pixels)
{
q--;
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,*q);
}
return(length);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1269
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 77,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_sched_domain(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct sched_domain *sd = container_of(rcu, struct sched_domain, rcu);
/*
* If its an overlapping domain it has private groups, iterate and
* nuke them all.
*/
if (sd->flags & SD_OVERLAP) {
free_sched_groups(sd->groups, 1);
} else if (atomic_dec_and_test(&sd->groups->ref)) {
kfree(sd->groups->sgc);
kfree(sd->groups);
}
kfree(sd);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
{
int i,idx;
long alg_k,alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh;
#endif
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/* we don't have a certificate */
if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
return(1);
sc=s->session->sess_cert;
if (sc == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
#endif
/* This is the passed certificate */
idx=sc->peer_cert_type;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC)
{
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,
s) == 0)
{ /* check failed */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
else
{
return 1;
}
}
#endif
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#endif
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
if (rsa == NULL
|| RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
if (dh == NULL
|| DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
err:
return(0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void fixup_slab_list(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
struct kmem_cache_node *n, struct page *page,
void **list)
{
/* move slabp to correct slabp list: */
list_del(&page->lru);
if (page->active == cachep->num) {
list_add(&page->lru, &n->slabs_full);
if (OBJFREELIST_SLAB(cachep)) {
#if DEBUG
/* Poisoning will be done without holding the lock */
if (cachep->flags & SLAB_POISON) {
void **objp = page->freelist;
*objp = *list;
*list = objp;
}
#endif
page->freelist = NULL;
}
} else
list_add(&page->lru, &n->slabs_partial);
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __ext4_get_inode_loc(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_iloc *iloc, int in_mem)
{
struct ext4_group_desc *gdp;
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
ext4_fsblk_t block;
int inodes_per_block, inode_offset;
iloc->bh = NULL;
if (!ext4_valid_inum(sb, inode->i_ino))
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
iloc->block_group = (inode->i_ino - 1) / EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb);
gdp = ext4_get_group_desc(sb, iloc->block_group, NULL);
if (!gdp)
return -EIO;
/*
* Figure out the offset within the block group inode table
*/
inodes_per_block = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_inodes_per_block;
inode_offset = ((inode->i_ino - 1) %
EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb));
block = ext4_inode_table(sb, gdp) + (inode_offset / inodes_per_block);
iloc->offset = (inode_offset % inodes_per_block) * EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb);
bh = sb_getblk(sb, block);
if (unlikely(!bh))
return -ENOMEM;
if (!buffer_uptodate(bh)) {
lock_buffer(bh);
/*
* If the buffer has the write error flag, we have failed
* to write out another inode in the same block. In this
* case, we don't have to read the block because we may
* read the old inode data successfully.
*/
if (buffer_write_io_error(bh) && !buffer_uptodate(bh))
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
if (buffer_uptodate(bh)) {
/* someone brought it uptodate while we waited */
unlock_buffer(bh);
goto has_buffer;
}
/*
* If we have all information of the inode in memory and this
* is the only valid inode in the block, we need not read the
* block.
*/
if (in_mem) {
struct buffer_head *bitmap_bh;
int i, start;
start = inode_offset & ~(inodes_per_block - 1);
/* Is the inode bitmap in cache? */
bitmap_bh = sb_getblk(sb, ext4_inode_bitmap(sb, gdp));
if (unlikely(!bitmap_bh))
goto make_io;
/*
* If the inode bitmap isn't in cache then the
* optimisation may end up performing two reads instead
* of one, so skip it.
*/
if (!buffer_uptodate(bitmap_bh)) {
brelse(bitmap_bh);
goto make_io;
}
for (i = start; i < start + inodes_per_block; i++) {
if (i == inode_offset)
continue;
if (ext4_test_bit(i, bitmap_bh->b_data))
break;
}
brelse(bitmap_bh);
if (i == start + inodes_per_block) {
/* all other inodes are free, so skip I/O */
memset(bh->b_data, 0, bh->b_size);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
goto has_buffer;
}
}
make_io:
/*
* If we need to do any I/O, try to pre-readahead extra
* blocks from the inode table.
*/
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_inode_readahead_blks) {
ext4_fsblk_t b, end, table;
unsigned num;
__u32 ra_blks = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_inode_readahead_blks;
table = ext4_inode_table(sb, gdp);
/* s_inode_readahead_blks is always a power of 2 */
b = block & ~((ext4_fsblk_t) ra_blks - 1);
if (table > b)
b = table;
end = b + ra_blks;
num = EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb);
if (ext4_has_group_desc_csum(sb))
num -= ext4_itable_unused_count(sb, gdp);
table += num / inodes_per_block;
if (end > table)
end = table;
while (b <= end)
sb_breadahead(sb, b++);
}
/*
* There are other valid inodes in the buffer, this inode
* has in-inode xattrs, or we don't have this inode in memory.
* Read the block from disk.
*/
trace_ext4_load_inode(inode);
get_bh(bh);
bh->b_end_io = end_buffer_read_sync;
submit_bh(READ | REQ_META | REQ_PRIO, bh);
wait_on_buffer(bh);
if (!buffer_uptodate(bh)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE_BLOCK(inode, block,
"unable to read itable block");
brelse(bh);
return -EIO;
}
}
has_buffer:
iloc->bh = bh;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cssp_gss_get_service_name(char *server, gss_name_t * name)
{
gss_buffer_desc output;
OM_uint32 major_status, minor_status;
const char service_name[] = "TERMSRV";
gss_OID type = (gss_OID) GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE;
int size = (strlen(service_name) + 1 + strlen(server) + 1);
output.value = malloc(size);
snprintf(output.value, size, "%s@%s", service_name, server);
output.length = strlen(output.value) + 1;
major_status = gss_import_name(&minor_status, &output, type, name);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status))
{
cssp_gss_report_error(GSS_C_GSS_CODE, "Failed to create service principal name",
major_status, minor_status);
return False;
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &output);
return True;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutocompleteController::NotifyChanged(bool notify_default_match) {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->OnResultChanged(notify_default_match);
if (done_) {
content::NotificationService::current()->Notify(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_AUTOCOMPLETE_CONTROLLER_RESULT_READY,
content::Source<AutocompleteController>(this),
content::NotificationService::NoDetails());
}
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long dgnc_mgmt_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
unsigned long flags;
void __user *uarg = (void __user *)arg;
switch (cmd) {
case DIGI_GETDD:
{
/*
* This returns the total number of boards
* in the system, as well as driver version
* and has space for a reserved entry
*/
struct digi_dinfo ddi;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dgnc_global_lock, flags);
ddi.dinfo_nboards = dgnc_NumBoards;
sprintf(ddi.dinfo_version, "%s", DG_PART);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dgnc_global_lock, flags);
if (copy_to_user(uarg, &ddi, sizeof(ddi)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
}
case DIGI_GETBD:
{
int brd;
struct digi_info di;
if (copy_from_user(&brd, uarg, sizeof(int)))
return -EFAULT;
if (brd < 0 || brd >= dgnc_NumBoards)
return -ENODEV;
memset(&di, 0, sizeof(di));
di.info_bdnum = brd;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dgnc_Board[brd]->bd_lock, flags);
di.info_bdtype = dgnc_Board[brd]->dpatype;
di.info_bdstate = dgnc_Board[brd]->dpastatus;
di.info_ioport = 0;
di.info_physaddr = (ulong)dgnc_Board[brd]->membase;
di.info_physsize = (ulong)dgnc_Board[brd]->membase
- dgnc_Board[brd]->membase_end;
if (dgnc_Board[brd]->state != BOARD_FAILED)
di.info_nports = dgnc_Board[brd]->nasync;
else
di.info_nports = 0;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dgnc_Board[brd]->bd_lock, flags);
if (copy_to_user(uarg, &di, sizeof(di)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
}
case DIGI_GET_NI_INFO:
{
struct channel_t *ch;
struct ni_info ni;
unsigned char mstat = 0;
uint board = 0;
uint channel = 0;
if (copy_from_user(&ni, uarg, sizeof(ni)))
return -EFAULT;
board = ni.board;
channel = ni.channel;
/* Verify boundaries on board */
if (board >= dgnc_NumBoards)
return -ENODEV;
/* Verify boundaries on channel */
if (channel >= dgnc_Board[board]->nasync)
return -ENODEV;
ch = dgnc_Board[board]->channels[channel];
if (!ch || ch->magic != DGNC_CHANNEL_MAGIC)
return -ENODEV;
memset(&ni, 0, sizeof(ni));
ni.board = board;
ni.channel = channel;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ch->ch_lock, flags);
mstat = (ch->ch_mostat | ch->ch_mistat);
if (mstat & UART_MCR_DTR) {
ni.mstat |= TIOCM_DTR;
ni.dtr = TIOCM_DTR;
}
if (mstat & UART_MCR_RTS) {
ni.mstat |= TIOCM_RTS;
ni.rts = TIOCM_RTS;
}
if (mstat & UART_MSR_CTS) {
ni.mstat |= TIOCM_CTS;
ni.cts = TIOCM_CTS;
}
if (mstat & UART_MSR_RI) {
ni.mstat |= TIOCM_RI;
ni.ri = TIOCM_RI;
}
if (mstat & UART_MSR_DCD) {
ni.mstat |= TIOCM_CD;
ni.dcd = TIOCM_CD;
}
if (mstat & UART_MSR_DSR)
ni.mstat |= TIOCM_DSR;
ni.iflag = ch->ch_c_iflag;
ni.oflag = ch->ch_c_oflag;
ni.cflag = ch->ch_c_cflag;
ni.lflag = ch->ch_c_lflag;
if (ch->ch_digi.digi_flags & CTSPACE ||
ch->ch_c_cflag & CRTSCTS)
ni.hflow = 1;
else
ni.hflow = 0;
if ((ch->ch_flags & CH_STOPI) ||
(ch->ch_flags & CH_FORCED_STOPI))
ni.recv_stopped = 1;
else
ni.recv_stopped = 0;
if ((ch->ch_flags & CH_STOP) || (ch->ch_flags & CH_FORCED_STOP))
ni.xmit_stopped = 1;
else
ni.xmit_stopped = 0;
ni.curtx = ch->ch_txcount;
ni.currx = ch->ch_rxcount;
ni.baud = ch->ch_old_baud;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ch->ch_lock, flags);
if (copy_to_user(uarg, &ni, sizeof(ni)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: staging/dgnc: fix info leak in ioctl
The dgnc_mgmt_ioctl() code fails to initialize the 16 _reserved bytes of
struct digi_dinfo after the ->dinfo_nboards member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speirofr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 166,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport ModuleInfo *AcquireModuleInfo(const char *path,const char *tag)
{
ModuleInfo
*module_info;
module_info=(ModuleInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*module_info));
if (module_info == (ModuleInfo *) NULL)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(module_info,0,sizeof(*module_info));
if (path != (const char *) NULL)
module_info->path=ConstantString(path);
if (tag != (const char *) NULL)
module_info->tag=ConstantString(tag);
module_info->timestamp=time(0);
module_info->signature=MagickSignature;
return(module_info);
}
Commit Message: Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 71,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ConvertHexadecimalToIDAlphabet(std::string* id) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < id->size(); ++i) {
int val;
if (base::HexStringToInt(base::StringPiece(id->begin() + i,
id->begin() + i + 1),
&val)) {
(*id)[i] = val + 'a';
} else {
(*id)[i] = 'a';
}
}
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 114,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
unsigned char *out, int olen)
{
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_prf_md(s);
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
int ret = 0;
size_t outlen = olen;
if (md == NULL) {
/* Should never happen */
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF, NULL);
if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md(pctx, md) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret(pctx, sec, slen) <= 0)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed1, seed1_len) <= 0)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed2, seed2_len) <= 0)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed3, seed3_len) <= 0)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed4, seed4_len) <= 0)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed5, seed5_len) <= 0)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &outlen) <= 0)
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 69,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ikev1_cr_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi0 _U_,
uint32_t proto0 _U_, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev1_pl_cert *p;
struct ikev1_pl_cert cert;
static const char *certstr[] = {
"none", "pkcs7", "pgp", "dns",
"x509sign", "x509ke", "kerberos", "crl",
"arl", "spki", "x509attr",
};
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_CR)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_cert *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&cert, ext, sizeof(cert));
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", item_len - 4));
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", STR_OR_ID((cert.encode), certstr)));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < item_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), item_len - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_CR)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13689/IKEv1: Fix addr+subnet length check.
An IPv6 address plus subnet mask is 32 bytes, not 20 bytes.
16 bytes of IPv6 address, 16 bytes of subnet mask.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GraphicsContext::setPlatformFillColor(const Color& color, ColorSpace colorSpace)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
platformContext()->setFillColor(color.rgb());
}
Commit Message: [skia] not all convex paths are convex, so recompute convexity for the problematic ones
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75960
Reviewed by Stephen White.
No new tests.
See related chrome issue
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=108605
* platform/graphics/skia/GraphicsContextSkia.cpp:
(WebCore::setPathFromConvexPoints):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104609 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 107,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __perf_event_init_context(struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
raw_spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
mutex_init(&ctx->mutex);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->pinned_groups);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->flexible_groups);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->event_list);
atomic_set(&ctx->refcount, 1);
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&ctx->orphans_remove, orphans_remove_work);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 50,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void out_string(conn *c, const char *str) {
size_t len;
assert(c != NULL);
if (c->noreply) {
if (settings.verbose > 1)
fprintf(stderr, ">%d NOREPLY %s\n", c->sfd, str);
c->noreply = false;
conn_set_state(c, conn_new_cmd);
return;
}
if (settings.verbose > 1)
fprintf(stderr, ">%d %s\n", c->sfd, str);
/* Nuke a partial output... */
c->msgcurr = 0;
c->msgused = 0;
c->iovused = 0;
add_msghdr(c);
len = strlen(str);
if ((len + 2) > c->wsize) {
/* ought to be always enough. just fail for simplicity */
str = "SERVER_ERROR output line too long";
len = strlen(str);
}
memcpy(c->wbuf, str, len);
memcpy(c->wbuf + len, "\r\n", 2);
c->wbytes = len + 2;
c->wcurr = c->wbuf;
conn_set_state(c, conn_write);
c->write_and_go = conn_new_cmd;
return;
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,184 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::cancelPendingSubstituteLoad(ResourceLoader* loader)
{
if (m_pendingSubstituteResources.isEmpty())
return;
m_pendingSubstituteResources.remove(loader);
if (m_pendingSubstituteResources.isEmpty())
m_substituteResourceDeliveryTimer.stop();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool IsValidFileExtension(const String& type) {
if (type.length() < 2)
return false;
return type[0] == '.';
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DelayedExecutor::DelayedExecutor(const KServiceAction &service, Solid::Device &device)
: m_service(service)
{
if (device.is<Solid::StorageAccess>()
&& !device.as<Solid::StorageAccess>()->isAccessible()) {
Solid::StorageAccess *access = device.as<Solid::StorageAccess>();
connect(access, &Solid::StorageAccess::setupDone,
this, &DelayedExecutor::_k_storageSetupDone);
access->setup();
} else {
delayedExecute(device.udi());
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 10,842 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bta_av_dereg_comp(tBTA_AV_DATA* p_data) {
tBTA_AV_CB* p_cb = &bta_av_cb;
tBTA_AV_SCB* p_scb;
tBTA_UTL_COD cod;
uint8_t mask;
BT_HDR* p_buf;
/* find the stream control block */
p_scb = bta_av_hndl_to_scb(p_data->hdr.layer_specific);
if (p_scb) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: deregistered %d(h%d)", __func__, p_scb->chnl,
p_scb->hndl);
mask = BTA_AV_HNDL_TO_MSK(p_scb->hdi);
p_cb->reg_audio &= ~mask;
if ((p_cb->conn_audio & mask) && bta_av_cb.audio_open_cnt) {
/* this channel is still marked as open. decrease the count */
bta_av_cb.audio_open_cnt--;
}
p_cb->conn_audio &= ~mask;
if (p_scb->q_tag == BTA_AV_Q_TAG_STREAM && p_scb->a2dp_list) {
/* make sure no buffers are in a2dp_list */
while (!list_is_empty(p_scb->a2dp_list)) {
p_buf = (BT_HDR*)list_front(p_scb->a2dp_list);
list_remove(p_scb->a2dp_list, p_buf);
osi_free(p_buf);
}
}
/* remove the A2DP SDP record, if no more audio stream is left */
if (!p_cb->reg_audio) {
#if (BTA_AR_INCLUDED == TRUE)
bta_ar_dereg_avrc(UUID_SERVCLASS_AV_REMOTE_CONTROL, BTA_ID_AV);
#endif
if (p_cb->sdp_a2dp_handle) {
bta_av_del_sdp_rec(&p_cb->sdp_a2dp_handle);
p_cb->sdp_a2dp_handle = 0;
bta_sys_remove_uuid(UUID_SERVCLASS_AUDIO_SOURCE);
}
#if (BTA_AV_SINK_INCLUDED == TRUE)
if (p_cb->sdp_a2dp_snk_handle) {
bta_av_del_sdp_rec(&p_cb->sdp_a2dp_snk_handle);
p_cb->sdp_a2dp_snk_handle = 0;
bta_sys_remove_uuid(UUID_SERVCLASS_AUDIO_SINK);
}
#endif
}
bta_av_free_scb(p_scb);
}
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: audio 0x%x, disable:%d", __func__, p_cb->reg_audio,
p_cb->disabling);
/* if no stream control block is active */
if (p_cb->reg_audio == 0) {
#if (BTA_AR_INCLUDED == TRUE)
/* deregister from AVDT */
bta_ar_dereg_avdt(BTA_ID_AV);
/* deregister from AVCT */
bta_ar_dereg_avrc(UUID_SERVCLASS_AV_REM_CTRL_TARGET, BTA_ID_AV);
bta_ar_dereg_avct(BTA_ID_AV);
#endif
if (p_cb->disabling) {
p_cb->disabling = false;
bta_av_cb.features = 0;
}
/* Clear the Capturing service class bit */
cod.service = BTM_COD_SERVICE_CAPTURING;
utl_set_device_class(&cod, BTA_UTL_CLR_COD_SERVICE_CLASS);
}
}
Commit Message: Check packet length in bta_av_proc_meta_cmd
Bug: 111893951
Test: manual - connect A2DP
Change-Id: Ibbf347863dfd29ea3385312e9dde1082bc90d2f3
(cherry picked from commit ed51887f921263219bcd2fbf6650ead5ec8d334e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ucma_query_route(struct ucma_file *file,
const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_query cmd;
struct rdma_ucm_query_route_resp resp;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
struct sockaddr *addr;
int ret = 0;
if (out_len < sizeof(resp))
return -ENOSPC;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
memset(&resp, 0, sizeof resp);
addr = (struct sockaddr *) &ctx->cm_id->route.addr.src_addr;
memcpy(&resp.src_addr, addr, addr->sa_family == AF_INET ?
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) :
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
addr = (struct sockaddr *) &ctx->cm_id->route.addr.dst_addr;
memcpy(&resp.dst_addr, addr, addr->sa_family == AF_INET ?
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) :
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
if (!ctx->cm_id->device)
goto out;
resp.node_guid = (__force __u64) ctx->cm_id->device->node_guid;
resp.port_num = ctx->cm_id->port_num;
if (rdma_cap_ib_sa(ctx->cm_id->device, ctx->cm_id->port_num))
ucma_copy_ib_route(&resp, &ctx->cm_id->route);
else if (rdma_protocol_roce(ctx->cm_id->device, ctx->cm_id->port_num))
ucma_copy_iboe_route(&resp, &ctx->cm_id->route);
else if (rdma_protocol_iwarp(ctx->cm_id->device, ctx->cm_id->port_num))
ucma_copy_iw_route(&resp, &ctx->cm_id->route);
out:
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(unsigned long)cmd.response,
&resp, sizeof(resp)))
ret = -EFAULT;
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BubbleManager::CloseAllBubbles(BubbleCloseReason reason) {
DCHECK_NE(reason, BUBBLE_CLOSE_ACCEPTED);
DCHECK_NE(reason, BUBBLE_CLOSE_CANCELED);
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK_NE(manager_state_, ITERATING_BUBBLES);
CloseAllMatchingBubbles(nullptr, nullptr, reason);
}
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <msw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 155,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ocfs2_dir_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return ocfs2_init_file_private(inode, file);
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()
we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
process 1 process 2 process 3
truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
ocfs2_setattr
ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
ocfs2_inode_lock_full
inode_dio_wait
__inode_dio_wait
-->waiting for all dio
requests finish
dlm_proxy_ast_handler
dlm_do_local_bast
ocfs2_blocking_ast
ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
dio_end_io
dio_bio_end_aio
dio_complete
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_inode_lock
__ocfs2_cluster_lock
ocfs2_wait_for_mask
-->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
flag to be cleared, that is waiting
for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
inode_dio_end
-->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
be called, so a deadlock happened.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59F81636.70508@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 85,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void avcc_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_AVCConfigurationBox *ptr = (GF_AVCConfigurationBox *)s;
if (ptr->config) gf_odf_avc_cfg_del(ptr->config);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void common_timer_get(struct k_itimer *timr, struct itimerspec64 *cur_setting)
{
const struct k_clock *kc = timr->kclock;
ktime_t now, remaining, iv;
struct timespec64 ts64;
bool sig_none;
sig_none = (timr->it_sigev_notify & ~SIGEV_THREAD_ID) == SIGEV_NONE;
iv = timr->it_interval;
/* interval timer ? */
if (iv) {
cur_setting->it_interval = ktime_to_timespec64(iv);
} else if (!timr->it_active) {
/*
* SIGEV_NONE oneshot timers are never queued. Check them
* below.
*/
if (!sig_none)
return;
}
/*
* The timespec64 based conversion is suboptimal, but it's not
* worth to implement yet another callback.
*/
kc->clock_get(timr->it_clock, &ts64);
now = timespec64_to_ktime(ts64);
/*
* When a requeue is pending or this is a SIGEV_NONE timer move the
* expiry time forward by intervals, so expiry is > now.
*/
if (iv && (timr->it_requeue_pending & REQUEUE_PENDING || sig_none))
timr->it_overrun += kc->timer_forward(timr, now);
remaining = kc->timer_remaining(timr, now);
/* Return 0 only, when the timer is expired and not pending */
if (remaining <= 0) {
/*
* A single shot SIGEV_NONE timer must return 0, when
* it is expired !
*/
if (!sig_none)
cur_setting->it_value.tv_nsec = 1;
} else {
cur_setting->it_value = ktime_to_timespec64(remaining);
}
}
Commit Message: posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify
timer_create() specifies via sigevent->sigev_notify the signal delivery for
the new timer. The valid modes are SIGEV_NONE, SIGEV_SIGNAL, SIGEV_THREAD
and (SIGEV_SIGNAL | SIGEV_THREAD_ID).
The sanity check in good_sigevent() is only checking the valid combination
for the SIGEV_THREAD_ID bit, i.e. SIGEV_SIGNAL, but if SIGEV_THREAD_ID is
not set it accepts any random value.
This has no real effects on the posix timer and signal delivery code, but
it affects show_timer() which handles the output of /proc/$PID/timers. That
function uses a string array to pretty print sigev_notify. The access to
that array has no bound checks, so random sigev_notify cause access beyond
the array bounds.
Add proper checks for the valid notify modes and remove the SIGEV_THREAD_ID
masking from various code pathes as SIGEV_NONE can never be set in
combination with SIGEV_THREAD_ID.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 169,371 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __d_drop(struct dentry *dentry)
{
if (!d_unhashed(dentry)) {
struct hlist_bl_head *b;
/*
* Hashed dentries are normally on the dentry hashtable,
* with the exception of those newly allocated by
* d_obtain_alias, which are always IS_ROOT:
*/
if (unlikely(IS_ROOT(dentry)))
b = &dentry->d_sb->s_anon;
else
b = d_hash(dentry->d_parent, dentry->d_name.hash);
hlist_bl_lock(b);
__hlist_bl_del(&dentry->d_hash);
dentry->d_hash.pprev = NULL;
hlist_bl_unlock(b);
dentry_rcuwalk_invalidate(dentry);
}
}
Commit Message: dcache: Handle escaped paths in prepend_path
A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent
will never reach it's mnt_root. For lack of a better term
I call this an escaped path.
prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path,
d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd.
__d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes
in. So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error.
d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to
some root. Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so
d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater
than 1. So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily
unmounted mounts.
getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs
prepend_path to return an error.
d_path is the interesting hold out. d_path just wants to print
something, and does not care about the weird cases. Which raises
the question what should be printed?
Given that <escaped_path>/<anything> should result in -ENOENT I
believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty
paths. As there are not really any meaninful path components when
considered from the perspective of a mount tree.
So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error
code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 94,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::vector<uint8_t> GetTestSignResponse() {
return fido_parsing_utils::Materialize(test_data::kTestU2fSignResponse);
}
Commit Message: [base] Make dynamic container to static span conversion explicit
This change disallows implicit conversions from dynamic containers to
static spans. This conversion can cause CHECK failures, and thus should
be done carefully. Requiring explicit construction makes it more obvious
when this happens. To aid usability, appropriate base::make_span<size_t>
overloads are added.
Bug: 877931
Change-Id: Id9f526bc57bfd30a52d14df827b0445ca087381d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1189985
Reviewed-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586657}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 132,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean netscreen_read(wtap *wth, int *err, gchar **err_info,
gint64 *data_offset)
{
gint64 offset;
char line[NETSCREEN_LINE_LENGTH];
/* Find the next packet */
offset = netscreen_seek_next_packet(wth, err, err_info, line);
if (offset < 0)
return FALSE;
/* Parse the header and convert the ASCII hex dump to binary data */
if (!parse_netscreen_packet(wth->fh, &wth->phdr,
wth->frame_buffer, line, err, err_info))
return FALSE;
/*
* If the per-file encapsulation isn't known, set it to this
* packet's encapsulation.
*
* If it *is* known, and it isn't this packet's encapsulation,
* set it to WTAP_ENCAP_PER_PACKET, as this file doesn't
* have a single encapsulation for all packets in the file.
*/
if (wth->file_encap == WTAP_ENCAP_UNKNOWN)
wth->file_encap = wth->phdr.pkt_encap;
else {
if (wth->file_encap != wth->phdr.pkt_encap)
wth->file_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_PER_PACKET;
}
*data_offset = offset;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Don't treat the packet length as unsigned.
The scanf family of functions are as annoyingly bad at handling unsigned
numbers as strtoul() is - both of them are perfectly willing to accept a
value beginning with a negative sign as an unsigned value. When using
strtoul(), you can compensate for this by explicitly checking for a '-'
as the first character of the string, but you can't do that with
sscanf().
So revert to having pkt_len be signed, and scanning it with %d, but
check for a negative value and fail if we see a negative value.
Bug: 12396
Change-Id: I54fe8f61f42c32b5ef33da633ece51bbcda8c95f
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15220
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 94,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void store_tree(struct tree_entry *root)
{
struct tree_content *t;
unsigned int i, j, del;
struct last_object lo = { STRBUF_INIT, 0, 0, /* no_swap */ 1 };
struct object_entry *le = NULL;
if (!is_null_sha1(root->versions[1].sha1))
return;
if (!root->tree)
load_tree(root);
t = root->tree;
for (i = 0; i < t->entry_count; i++) {
if (t->entries[i]->tree)
store_tree(t->entries[i]);
}
if (!(root->versions[0].mode & NO_DELTA))
le = find_object(root->versions[0].sha1);
if (S_ISDIR(root->versions[0].mode) && le && le->pack_id == pack_id) {
mktree(t, 0, &old_tree);
lo.data = old_tree;
lo.offset = le->idx.offset;
lo.depth = t->delta_depth;
}
mktree(t, 1, &new_tree);
store_object(OBJ_TREE, &new_tree, &lo, root->versions[1].sha1, 0);
t->delta_depth = lo.depth;
for (i = 0, j = 0, del = 0; i < t->entry_count; i++) {
struct tree_entry *e = t->entries[i];
if (e->versions[1].mode) {
e->versions[0].mode = e->versions[1].mode;
hashcpy(e->versions[0].sha1, e->versions[1].sha1);
t->entries[j++] = e;
} else {
release_tree_entry(e);
del++;
}
}
t->entry_count -= del;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void reset_output_levels(void)
{
int j;
memset(info_levels, 0, sizeof info_levels);
memset(debug_levels, 0, sizeof debug_levels);
for (j = 0; j < COUNT_INFO; j++)
info_words[j].priority = DEFAULT_PRIORITY;
for (j = 0; j < COUNT_DEBUG; j++)
debug_words[j].priority = DEFAULT_PRIORITY;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintRenderFrameHelper::PrintPageInternal(
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& params,
int page_number,
int page_count,
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
PdfMetafileSkia* metafile,
gfx::Size* page_size_in_dpi,
gfx::Rect* content_area_in_dpi) {
double css_scale_factor =
params.scale_factor >= kEpsilon ? params.scale_factor : 1.0f;
gfx::Size original_page_size = params.page_size;
PageSizeMargins page_layout_in_points;
ComputePageLayoutInPointsForCss(frame, page_number, params,
ignore_css_margins_, &css_scale_factor,
&page_layout_in_points);
gfx::Size page_size;
gfx::Rect content_area;
GetPageSizeAndContentAreaFromPageLayout(page_layout_in_points, &page_size,
&content_area);
if (page_size_in_dpi)
*page_size_in_dpi = original_page_size;
if (content_area_in_dpi) {
*content_area_in_dpi =
gfx::Rect(0, 0, page_size_in_dpi->width(), page_size_in_dpi->height());
}
gfx::Rect canvas_area =
params.display_header_footer ? gfx::Rect(page_size) : content_area;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
float webkit_page_shrink_factor = frame->GetPrintPageShrink(page_number);
float scale_factor = css_scale_factor * webkit_page_shrink_factor;
#else
float scale_factor = css_scale_factor;
#endif
cc::PaintCanvas* canvas =
metafile->GetVectorCanvasForNewPage(page_size, canvas_area, scale_factor);
if (!canvas)
return;
MetafileSkiaWrapper::SetMetafileOnCanvas(canvas, metafile);
if (params.display_header_footer) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
const float fudge_factor = 1;
#else
const float fudge_factor = kPrintingMinimumShrinkFactor;
#endif
PrintHeaderAndFooter(canvas, page_number + 1, page_count, *frame,
scale_factor / fudge_factor, page_layout_in_points,
params);
}
float webkit_scale_factor = RenderPageContent(
frame, page_number, canvas_area, content_area, scale_factor, canvas);
DCHECK_GT(webkit_scale_factor, 0.0f);
bool ret = metafile->FinishPage();
DCHECK(ret);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::SetBackgroundColor() {
Profile* profile = browser()->profile();
GtkThemeService* theme_provider = GtkThemeService::GetFrom(profile);
int frame_color_id;
if (UsingCustomPopupFrame()) {
frame_color_id = ThemeService::COLOR_TOOLBAR;
} else if (DrawFrameAsActive()) {
frame_color_id = browser()->profile()->IsOffTheRecord()
? ThemeService::COLOR_FRAME_INCOGNITO
: ThemeService::COLOR_FRAME;
} else {
frame_color_id = browser()->profile()->IsOffTheRecord()
? ThemeService::COLOR_FRAME_INCOGNITO_INACTIVE
: ThemeService::COLOR_FRAME_INACTIVE;
}
SkColor frame_color = theme_provider->GetColor(frame_color_id);
GdkColor frame_color_gdk = gfx::SkColorToGdkColor(frame_color);
gtk_widget_modify_bg(GTK_WIDGET(window_), GTK_STATE_NORMAL,
&frame_color_gdk);
gtk_widget_modify_bg(contents_vsplit_, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &frame_color_gdk);
gtk_widget_modify_bg(contents_hsplit_, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &frame_color_gdk);
color_utils::HSL hsl = { -1, 0.5, 0.65 };
SkColor frame_prelight_color = color_utils::HSLShift(frame_color, hsl);
GdkColor frame_prelight_color_gdk =
gfx::SkColorToGdkColor(frame_prelight_color);
gtk_widget_modify_bg(contents_hsplit_, GTK_STATE_PRELIGHT,
&frame_prelight_color_gdk);
gtk_widget_modify_bg(contents_vsplit_, GTK_STATE_PRELIGHT,
&frame_prelight_color_gdk);
GdkColor border_color = theme_provider->GetBorderColor();
gtk_widget_modify_bg(toolbar_border_, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &border_color);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t ProCamera2Client::deleteStream(int streamId) {
ATRACE_CALL();
ALOGV("%s (streamId = 0x%x)", __FUNCTION__, streamId);
status_t res;
if ( (res = checkPid(__FUNCTION__) ) != OK) return res;
Mutex::Autolock icl(mBinderSerializationLock);
if (!mDevice.get()) return DEAD_OBJECT;
mDevice->clearStreamingRequest();
status_t code;
if ((code = mDevice->waitUntilDrained()) != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: waitUntilDrained failed with code 0x%x", __FUNCTION__, code);
}
return mDevice->deleteStream(streamId);
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::freeNode(OMXMaster *master) {
CLOG_LIFE(freeNode, "handle=%p", mHandle);
static int32_t kMaxNumIterations = 10;
if (mHandle == NULL) {
return OK;
}
mDying = true;
OMX_STATETYPE state;
CHECK_EQ(OMX_GetState(mHandle, &state), OMX_ErrorNone);
switch (state) {
case OMX_StateExecuting:
{
ALOGV("forcing Executing->Idle");
sendCommand(OMX_CommandStateSet, OMX_StateIdle);
OMX_ERRORTYPE err;
int32_t iteration = 0;
while ((err = OMX_GetState(mHandle, &state)) == OMX_ErrorNone
&& state != OMX_StateIdle
&& state != OMX_StateInvalid) {
if (++iteration > kMaxNumIterations) {
CLOGW("failed to enter Idle state (now %s(%d), aborting.",
asString(state), state);
state = OMX_StateInvalid;
break;
}
usleep(100000);
}
CHECK_EQ(err, OMX_ErrorNone);
if (state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
break;
}
}
case OMX_StateIdle:
{
ALOGV("forcing Idle->Loaded");
sendCommand(OMX_CommandStateSet, OMX_StateLoaded);
freeActiveBuffers();
OMX_ERRORTYPE err;
int32_t iteration = 0;
while ((err = OMX_GetState(mHandle, &state)) == OMX_ErrorNone
&& state != OMX_StateLoaded
&& state != OMX_StateInvalid) {
if (++iteration > kMaxNumIterations) {
CLOGW("failed to enter Loaded state (now %s(%d), aborting.",
asString(state), state);
state = OMX_StateInvalid;
break;
}
ALOGV("waiting for Loaded state...");
usleep(100000);
}
CHECK_EQ(err, OMX_ErrorNone);
}
case OMX_StateLoaded:
case OMX_StateInvalid:
break;
default:
LOG_ALWAYS_FATAL("unknown state %s(%#x).", asString(state), state);
break;
}
ALOGV("[%x:%s] calling destroyComponentInstance", mNodeID, mName);
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = master->destroyComponentInstance(
static_cast<OMX_COMPONENTTYPE *>(mHandle));
mHandle = NULL;
CLOG_IF_ERROR(freeNode, err, "");
free(mName);
mName = NULL;
mOwner->invalidateNodeID(mNodeID);
mNodeID = 0;
ALOGV("OMXNodeInstance going away.");
delete this;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,561 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigate(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
LoadCommittedDetails* details,
bool is_navigation_within_page,
NavigationHandleImpl* navigation_handle) {
is_initial_navigation_ = false;
bool overriding_user_agent_changed = false;
if (GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
details->previous_url = GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetURL();
details->previous_entry_index = GetLastCommittedEntryIndex();
if (pending_entry_ &&
pending_entry_->GetIsOverridingUserAgent() !=
GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetIsOverridingUserAgent())
overriding_user_agent_changed = true;
} else {
details->previous_url = GURL();
details->previous_entry_index = -1;
}
bool was_restored = false;
DCHECK(pending_entry_index_ == -1 || pending_entry_->site_instance() ||
pending_entry_->restore_type() != RestoreType::NONE);
if (pending_entry_ && pending_entry_->restore_type() != RestoreType::NONE) {
pending_entry_->set_restore_type(RestoreType::NONE);
was_restored = true;
}
details->did_replace_entry = params.should_replace_current_entry;
details->type = ClassifyNavigation(rfh, params);
details->is_same_document = is_navigation_within_page;
if (PendingEntryMatchesHandle(navigation_handle)) {
if (pending_entry_->reload_type() != ReloadType::NONE) {
last_committed_reload_type_ = pending_entry_->reload_type();
last_committed_reload_time_ =
time_smoother_.GetSmoothedTime(get_timestamp_callback_.Run());
} else if (!pending_entry_->is_renderer_initiated() ||
params.gesture == NavigationGestureUser) {
last_committed_reload_type_ = ReloadType::NONE;
last_committed_reload_time_ = base::Time();
}
}
switch (details->type) {
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_NEW_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateToNewPage(rfh, params, details->is_same_document,
details->did_replace_entry,
navigation_handle);
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_EXISTING_PAGE:
details->did_replace_entry = details->is_same_document;
RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage(rfh, params, details->is_same_document,
was_restored, navigation_handle);
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_SAME_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateToSamePage(rfh, params, navigation_handle);
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_NEW_SUBFRAME:
RendererDidNavigateNewSubframe(rfh, params, details->is_same_document,
details->did_replace_entry);
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_AUTO_SUBFRAME:
if (!RendererDidNavigateAutoSubframe(rfh, params)) {
NotifyEntryChanged(GetLastCommittedEntry());
return false;
}
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_NAV_IGNORE:
if (pending_entry_) {
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
delegate_->NotifyNavigationStateChanged(INVALIDATE_TYPE_URL);
}
return false;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
base::Time timestamp =
time_smoother_.GetSmoothedTime(get_timestamp_callback_.Run());
DVLOG(1) << "Navigation finished at (smoothed) timestamp "
<< timestamp.ToInternalValue();
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
DCHECK(params.page_state.IsValid()) << "Shouldn't see an empty PageState.";
NavigationEntryImpl* active_entry = GetLastCommittedEntry();
active_entry->SetTimestamp(timestamp);
active_entry->SetHttpStatusCode(params.http_status_code);
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry =
active_entry->GetFrameEntry(rfh->frame_tree_node());
if (frame_entry && frame_entry->site_instance() != rfh->GetSiteInstance())
frame_entry = nullptr;
if (frame_entry) {
DCHECK(params.page_state == frame_entry->page_state());
}
if (!rfh->GetParent() &&
IsBlockedNavigation(navigation_handle->GetNetErrorCode())) {
DCHECK(params.url_is_unreachable);
active_entry->SetURL(GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL));
active_entry->SetVirtualURL(params.url);
if (frame_entry) {
frame_entry->SetPageState(
PageState::CreateFromURL(active_entry->GetURL()));
}
}
size_t redirect_chain_size = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < params.redirects.size(); ++i) {
redirect_chain_size += params.redirects[i].spec().length();
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("Navigation.RedirectChainSize", redirect_chain_size);
active_entry->ResetForCommit(frame_entry);
if (!rfh->GetParent())
CHECK_EQ(active_entry->site_instance(), rfh->GetSiteInstance());
active_entry->SetBindings(rfh->GetEnabledBindings());
details->entry = active_entry;
details->is_main_frame = !rfh->GetParent();
details->http_status_code = params.http_status_code;
NotifyNavigationEntryCommitted(details);
if (active_entry->GetURL().SchemeIs(url::kHttpsScheme) && !rfh->GetParent() &&
navigation_handle->GetNetErrorCode() == net::OK) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Navigation.SecureSchemeHasSSLStatus",
!!active_entry->GetSSL().certificate);
}
if (overriding_user_agent_changed)
delegate_->UpdateOverridingUserAgent();
int nav_entry_id = active_entry->GetUniqueID();
for (FrameTreeNode* node : delegate_->GetFrameTree()->Nodes())
node->current_frame_host()->set_nav_entry_id(nav_entry_id);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct nfs_page * nfs_setup_write_request(struct nfs_open_context* ctx,
struct page *page, unsigned int offset, unsigned int bytes)
{
struct inode *inode = page_file_mapping(page)->host;
struct nfs_page *req;
req = nfs_try_to_update_request(inode, page, offset, bytes);
if (req != NULL)
goto out;
req = nfs_create_request(ctx, inode, page, offset, bytes);
if (IS_ERR(req))
goto out;
nfs_inode_add_request(inode, req);
out:
return req;
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int asepcos_set_security_attributes(sc_card_t *card, sc_file_t *file)
{
size_t i;
const amode_entry_t *table;
u8 buf[64], *p;
int r = SC_SUCCESS;
/* first check whether the security attributes in encoded form
* are already set. If present use these */
if (file->sec_attr != NULL && file->sec_attr_len != 0)
return asepcos_set_sec_attributes(card, file->sec_attr,
file->sec_attr_len, file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF ? 0:1);
/* otherwise construct the ACL from the opensc ACLs */
if (file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF)
table = df_amode_table;
else if (file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF)
table = wef_amode_table;
else if (file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF)
table = ief_amode_table;
else
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
p = buf;
for (i = 0; table[i].am != 0; i++) {
const struct sc_acl_entry *ent = sc_file_get_acl_entry(file, table[i].sc);
if (ent == NULL)
continue;
*p++ = 0x80;
*p++ = 0x01;
*p++ = table[i].am & 0xff;
if (ent->method == SC_AC_NONE) {
*p++ = 0x90;
*p++ = 0x00;
} else if (ent->method == SC_AC_NEVER) {
*p++ = 0x97;
*p++ = 0x00;
} else if (ent->method == SC_AC_CHV) {
sc_cardctl_asepcos_akn2fileid_t st;
st.akn = ent->key_ref;
r = asepcos_akn_to_fileid(card, &st);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
*p++ = 0xa0;
*p++ = 0x05;
*p++ = 0x89;
*p++ = 0x03;
*p++ = (st.fileid >> 16) & 0xff;
*p++ = (st.fileid >> 8 ) & 0xff;
*p++ = st.fileid & 0xff;
} else {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "unknown auth method: '%d'", ent->method);
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
}
}
if (p != buf)
r = asepcos_set_sec_attributes(card, buf, p-buf, file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF ? 0:1);
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fz_new_indexed_colorspace(fz_context *ctx, fz_colorspace *base, int high, unsigned char *lookup)
{
fz_colorspace *cs = NULL;
struct indexed *idx;
idx = fz_malloc_struct(ctx, struct indexed);
idx->lookup = lookup;
idx->base = fz_keep_colorspace(ctx, base);
idx->high = high;
fz_try(ctx)
cs = fz_new_colorspace(ctx, "Indexed", FZ_COLORSPACE_INDEXED, 0, 1, fz_colorspace_is_icc(ctx, fz_device_rgb(ctx)) ? indexed_to_alt : indexed_to_rgb, NULL, base_indexed, clamp_indexed, free_indexed, idx, sizeof(*idx) + (base->n * (idx->high + 1)) + base->size);
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_free(ctx, idx);
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
return cs;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int powermate_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev (intf);
struct usb_host_interface *interface;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *endpoint;
struct powermate_device *pm;
struct input_dev *input_dev;
int pipe, maxp;
int error = -ENOMEM;
interface = intf->cur_altsetting;
endpoint = &interface->endpoint[0].desc;
if (!usb_endpoint_is_int_in(endpoint))
return -EIO;
usb_control_msg(udev, usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, 0),
0x0a, USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
0, interface->desc.bInterfaceNumber, NULL, 0,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
pm = kzalloc(sizeof(struct powermate_device), GFP_KERNEL);
input_dev = input_allocate_device();
if (!pm || !input_dev)
goto fail1;
if (powermate_alloc_buffers(udev, pm))
goto fail2;
pm->irq = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pm->irq)
goto fail2;
pm->config = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pm->config)
goto fail3;
pm->udev = udev;
pm->intf = intf;
pm->input = input_dev;
usb_make_path(udev, pm->phys, sizeof(pm->phys));
strlcat(pm->phys, "/input0", sizeof(pm->phys));
spin_lock_init(&pm->lock);
switch (le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct)) {
case POWERMATE_PRODUCT_NEW:
input_dev->name = pm_name_powermate;
break;
case POWERMATE_PRODUCT_OLD:
input_dev->name = pm_name_soundknob;
break;
default:
input_dev->name = pm_name_soundknob;
printk(KERN_WARNING "powermate: unknown product id %04x\n",
le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct));
}
input_dev->phys = pm->phys;
usb_to_input_id(udev, &input_dev->id);
input_dev->dev.parent = &intf->dev;
input_set_drvdata(input_dev, pm);
input_dev->event = powermate_input_event;
input_dev->evbit[0] = BIT_MASK(EV_KEY) | BIT_MASK(EV_REL) |
BIT_MASK(EV_MSC);
input_dev->keybit[BIT_WORD(BTN_0)] = BIT_MASK(BTN_0);
input_dev->relbit[BIT_WORD(REL_DIAL)] = BIT_MASK(REL_DIAL);
input_dev->mscbit[BIT_WORD(MSC_PULSELED)] = BIT_MASK(MSC_PULSELED);
/* get a handle to the interrupt data pipe */
pipe = usb_rcvintpipe(udev, endpoint->bEndpointAddress);
maxp = usb_maxpacket(udev, pipe, usb_pipeout(pipe));
if (maxp < POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MIN || maxp > POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MAX) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "powermate: Expected payload of %d--%d bytes, found %d bytes!\n",
POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MIN, POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MAX, maxp);
maxp = POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MAX;
}
usb_fill_int_urb(pm->irq, udev, pipe, pm->data,
maxp, powermate_irq,
pm, endpoint->bInterval);
pm->irq->transfer_dma = pm->data_dma;
pm->irq->transfer_flags |= URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP;
/* register our interrupt URB with the USB system */
if (usb_submit_urb(pm->irq, GFP_KERNEL)) {
error = -EIO;
goto fail4;
}
error = input_register_device(pm->input);
if (error)
goto fail5;
/* force an update of everything */
pm->requires_update = UPDATE_PULSE_ASLEEP | UPDATE_PULSE_AWAKE | UPDATE_PULSE_MODE | UPDATE_STATIC_BRIGHTNESS;
powermate_pulse_led(pm, 0x80, 255, 0, 1, 0); // set default pulse parameters
usb_set_intfdata(intf, pm);
return 0;
fail5: usb_kill_urb(pm->irq);
fail4: usb_free_urb(pm->config);
fail3: usb_free_urb(pm->irq);
fail2: powermate_free_buffers(udev, pm);
fail1: input_free_device(input_dev);
kfree(pm);
return error;
}
Commit Message: Input: powermate - fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
The powermate driver expects at least one valid USB endpoint in its
probe function. If given malicious descriptors that specify 0 for
the number of endpoints, it will crash. Validate the number of
endpoints on the interface before using them.
The full report for this issue can be found here:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/85
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 1 | 167,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static IWTSPlugin* dvcman_get_plugin(IDRDYNVC_ENTRY_POINTS* pEntryPoints,
const char* name)
{
int i;
DVCMAN* dvcman = ((DVCMAN_ENTRY_POINTS*) pEntryPoints)->dvcman;
for (i = 0; i < dvcman->num_plugins; i++)
{
if (dvcman->plugin_names[i] == name ||
strcmp(dvcman->plugin_names[i], name) == 0)
{
return dvcman->plugins[i];
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID: | 0 | 74,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType GetTIFFInfo(const ImageInfo *image_info,
TIFF *tiff,TIFFInfo *tiff_info)
{
const char
*option;
MagickStatusType
flags;
uint32
tile_columns,
tile_rows;
assert(tiff_info != (TIFFInfo *) NULL);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(tiff_info,0,sizeof(*tiff_info));
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:tile-geometry");
if (option == (const char *) NULL)
return(MagickTrue);
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(option,&tiff_info->tile_geometry);
if ((flags & HeightValue) == 0)
tiff_info->tile_geometry.height=tiff_info->tile_geometry.width;
tile_columns=(uint32) tiff_info->tile_geometry.width;
tile_rows=(uint32) tiff_info->tile_geometry.height;
TIFFDefaultTileSize(tiff,&tile_columns,&tile_rows);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH,tile_columns);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH,tile_rows);
tiff_info->tile_geometry.width=tile_columns;
tiff_info->tile_geometry.height=tile_rows;
tiff_info->scanlines=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
tile_rows*TIFFScanlineSize(tiff),sizeof(*tiff_info->scanlines));
tiff_info->pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
tile_rows*TIFFTileSize(tiff),sizeof(*tiff_info->scanlines));
if ((tiff_info->scanlines == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(tiff_info->pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL))
{
DestroyTIFFInfo(tiff_info);
return(MagickFalse);
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/196
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 71,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ext4_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
int error, rc = 0;
const unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
error = inode_change_ok(inode, attr);
if (error)
return error;
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID && attr->ia_uid != inode->i_uid) ||
(ia_valid & ATTR_GID && attr->ia_gid != inode->i_gid)) {
handle_t *handle;
/* (user+group)*(old+new) structure, inode write (sb,
* inode block, ? - but truncate inode update has it) */
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, (EXT4_MAXQUOTAS_INIT_BLOCKS(inode->i_sb)+
EXT4_MAXQUOTAS_DEL_BLOCKS(inode->i_sb))+3);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
error = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto err_out;
}
error = vfs_dq_transfer(inode, attr) ? -EDQUOT : 0;
if (error) {
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
return error;
}
/* Update corresponding info in inode so that everything is in
* one transaction */
if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_UID)
inode->i_uid = attr->ia_uid;
if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_GID)
inode->i_gid = attr->ia_gid;
error = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
}
if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
if (!(EXT4_I(inode)->i_flags & EXT4_EXTENTS_FL)) {
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
if (attr->ia_size > sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes) {
error = -EFBIG;
goto err_out;
}
}
}
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE &&
(attr->ia_size < inode->i_size ||
(EXT4_I(inode)->i_flags & EXT4_EOFBLOCKS_FL))) {
handle_t *handle;
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, 3);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
error = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto err_out;
}
error = ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode);
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = attr->ia_size;
rc = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
if (!error)
error = rc;
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (ext4_should_order_data(inode)) {
error = ext4_begin_ordered_truncate(inode,
attr->ia_size);
if (error) {
/* Do as much error cleanup as possible */
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, 3);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ext4_orphan_del(NULL, inode);
goto err_out;
}
ext4_orphan_del(handle, inode);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
goto err_out;
}
}
/* ext4_truncate will clear the flag */
if ((EXT4_I(inode)->i_flags & EXT4_EOFBLOCKS_FL))
ext4_truncate(inode);
}
rc = inode_setattr(inode, attr);
/* If inode_setattr's call to ext4_truncate failed to get a
* transaction handle at all, we need to clean up the in-core
* orphan list manually. */
if (inode->i_nlink)
ext4_orphan_del(NULL, inode);
if (!rc && (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE))
rc = ext4_acl_chmod(inode);
err_out:
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, error);
if (!error)
error = rc;
return error;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void free_abs_cgroup(char *cgroup)
{
if (!cgroup)
return;
if (abs_cgroup_supported())
nih_free(cgroup);
else
free(cgroup);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int off, int size)
{
/* Stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we
* can determine what type of data were returned. See
* check_stack_read().
*/
if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d",
tn_buf, off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
verbose(env, "invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 91,420 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
{
const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
size_t nmatch;
TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
CERT *c = s->cert;
unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
if (c->shared_sigalgs)
{
OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
}
/* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
{
conf = c->client_sigalgs;
conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
}
else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
{
conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
}
else
conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
{
pref = conf;
preflen = conflen;
allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
}
else
{
allow = conf;
allowlen = conflen;
pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
}
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
if (!nmatch)
return 1;
salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
if (!salgs)
return 0;
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
{
unsigned int i;
if (hash_alg == 0)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
return tls12_md_info + i;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: snmp_rfcv2_handler(__attribute__((unused)) vector_t *strvec)
{
global_data->enable_snmp_rfcv2 = true;
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 75,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~RendererURLRequestContextSelector() {}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __be16 sctp_get_asconf_response(struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack,
sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_param,
int no_err)
{
sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_ack_param;
sctp_errhdr_t *err_param;
int length;
int asconf_ack_len;
__be16 err_code;
if (no_err)
err_code = SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
else
err_code = SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
asconf_ack_len = ntohs(asconf_ack->chunk_hdr->length) -
sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t);
/* Skip the addiphdr from the asconf_ack chunk and store a pointer to
* the first asconf_ack parameter.
*/
length = sizeof(sctp_addiphdr_t);
asconf_ack_param = (sctp_addip_param_t *)(asconf_ack->skb->data +
length);
asconf_ack_len -= length;
while (asconf_ack_len > 0) {
if (asconf_ack_param->crr_id == asconf_param->crr_id) {
switch (asconf_ack_param->param_hdr.type) {
case SCTP_PARAM_SUCCESS_REPORT:
return SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
case SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE:
length = sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t);
err_param = (void *)asconf_ack_param + length;
asconf_ack_len -= length;
if (asconf_ack_len > 0)
return err_param->cause;
else
return SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM;
break;
default:
return SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM;
}
}
length = ntohs(asconf_ack_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_ack_param = (void *)asconf_ack_param + length;
asconf_ack_len -= length;
}
return err_code;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void perf_prepare_sample(struct perf_event_header *header,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct perf_event *event,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
u64 sample_type = event->attr.sample_type;
header->type = PERF_RECORD_SAMPLE;
header->size = sizeof(*header) + event->header_size;
header->misc = 0;
header->misc |= perf_misc_flags(regs);
__perf_event_header__init_id(header, data, event);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_IP)
data->ip = perf_instruction_pointer(regs);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN) {
int size = 1;
data->callchain = perf_callchain(event, regs);
if (data->callchain)
size += data->callchain->nr;
header->size += size * sizeof(u64);
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW) {
int size = sizeof(u32);
if (data->raw)
size += data->raw->size;
else
size += sizeof(u32);
WARN_ON_ONCE(size & (sizeof(u64)-1));
header->size += size;
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_STACK) {
int size = sizeof(u64); /* nr */
if (data->br_stack) {
size += data->br_stack->nr
* sizeof(struct perf_branch_entry);
}
header->size += size;
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER) {
/* regs dump ABI info */
int size = sizeof(u64);
perf_sample_regs_user(&data->regs_user, regs);
if (data->regs_user.regs) {
u64 mask = event->attr.sample_regs_user;
size += hweight64(mask) * sizeof(u64);
}
header->size += size;
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER) {
/*
* Either we need PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER bit to be allways
* processed as the last one or have additional check added
* in case new sample type is added, because we could eat
* up the rest of the sample size.
*/
struct perf_regs_user *uregs = &data->regs_user;
u16 stack_size = event->attr.sample_stack_user;
u16 size = sizeof(u64);
if (!uregs->abi)
perf_sample_regs_user(uregs, regs);
stack_size = perf_sample_ustack_size(stack_size, header->size,
uregs->regs);
/*
* If there is something to dump, add space for the dump
* itself and for the field that tells the dynamic size,
* which is how many have been actually dumped.
*/
if (stack_size)
size += sizeof(u64) + stack_size;
data->stack_user_size = stack_size;
header->size += size;
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 31,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> CreateAndNavigateWebContents() {
std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> web_contents =
CreateTestWebContents();
ResourceCoordinatorTabHelper::CreateForWebContents(web_contents.get());
content::WebContentsTester::For(web_contents.get())
->NavigateAndCommit(GURL("https://www.example.com"));
return web_contents;
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,132 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void voidMethodUint8ArrayArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("voidMethodUint8ArrayArg", "TestObjectPython", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Uint8Array*, uint8ArrayArg, info[0]->IsUint8Array() ? V8Uint8Array::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Uint8Array>::Cast(info[0])) : 0);
imp->voidMethodUint8ArrayArg(uint8ArrayArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,906 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct commit *get_revision_internal(struct rev_info *revs)
{
struct commit *c = NULL;
struct commit_list *l;
if (revs->boundary == 2) {
/*
* All of the normal commits have already been returned,
* and we are now returning boundary commits.
* create_boundary_commit_list() has populated
* revs->commits with the remaining commits to return.
*/
c = pop_commit(&revs->commits);
if (c)
c->object.flags |= SHOWN;
return c;
}
/*
* If our max_count counter has reached zero, then we are done. We
* don't simply return NULL because we still might need to show
* boundary commits. But we want to avoid calling get_revision_1, which
* might do a considerable amount of work finding the next commit only
* for us to throw it away.
*
* If it is non-zero, then either we don't have a max_count at all
* (-1), or it is still counting, in which case we decrement.
*/
if (revs->max_count) {
c = get_revision_1(revs);
if (c) {
while (revs->skip_count > 0) {
revs->skip_count--;
c = get_revision_1(revs);
if (!c)
break;
}
}
if (revs->max_count > 0)
revs->max_count--;
}
if (c)
c->object.flags |= SHOWN;
if (!revs->boundary)
return c;
if (!c) {
/*
* get_revision_1() runs out the commits, and
* we are done computing the boundaries.
* switch to boundary commits output mode.
*/
revs->boundary = 2;
/*
* Update revs->commits to contain the list of
* boundary commits.
*/
create_boundary_commit_list(revs);
return get_revision_internal(revs);
}
/*
* boundary commits are the commits that are parents of the
* ones we got from get_revision_1() but they themselves are
* not returned from get_revision_1(). Before returning
* 'c', we need to mark its parents that they could be boundaries.
*/
for (l = c->parents; l; l = l->next) {
struct object *p;
p = &(l->item->object);
if (p->flags & (CHILD_SHOWN | SHOWN))
continue;
p->flags |= CHILD_SHOWN;
gc_boundary(&revs->boundary_commits);
add_object_array(p, NULL, &revs->boundary_commits);
}
return c;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,997 |
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