instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(Array, offsetGet)
{
zval *index, *value;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "z", &index) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
value = spl_array_read_dimension_ex(0, getThis(), index, BP_VAR_R TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_ZVAL(value, 1, 0);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void ArrayObject::offsetSet(mixed $index, mixed $newval)
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabLifecycleUnitSourceTest()
: scoped_context_(
std::make_unique<base::TestMockTimeTaskRunner::ScopedContext>(
task_runner_)),
scoped_set_tick_clock_for_testing_(task_runner_->GetMockTickClock()) {
base::MessageLoopCurrent::Get()->SetTaskRunner(task_runner_);
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int apply_subtract_green_transform(WebPContext *s)
{
int x, y;
ImageContext *img = &s->image[IMAGE_ROLE_ARGB];
for (y = 0; y < img->frame->height; y++) {
for (x = 0; x < img->frame->width; x++) {
uint8_t *p = GET_PIXEL(img->frame, x, y);
p[1] += p[2];
p[3] += p[2];
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 64,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string TestURLLoader::TestTrustedCorbEligibleRequest() {
std::string cross_origin_url =
GetReachableCrossOriginURL("corb_eligible_resource.json");
pp::URLRequestInfo request(instance_);
request.SetURL(cross_origin_url);
request.SetAllowCrossOriginRequests(true);
std::string response_body;
int32_t rv = OpenTrusted(request, &response_body);
if (rv != PP_OK)
return ReportError("Trusted CORB-eligible request failed", rv);
ASSERT_EQ("{ \"foo\": \"bar\" }\n", response_body);
PASS();
}
Commit Message: Fix one implicit 64-bit -> 32-bit implicit conversion in a PPAPI test.
../../ppapi/tests/test_url_loader.cc:877:11: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision: 'int64_t' (aka 'long long') to 'int32_t' (aka 'int') [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
total_bytes_to_be_received);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BUG=879657
Change-Id: I152f456368131fe7a2891ff0c97bf83f26ef0906
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1220173
Commit-Queue: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600182}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 156,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RunLoop::QuitCurrentDeprecated() {
DCHECK(IsRunningOnCurrentThread());
tls_delegate.Get().Get()->active_run_loops_.top()->Quit();
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SWFInput_buffer_getChar(SWFInput input)
{
if ( input->offset >= input->length )
return EOF;
else
return ((unsigned char *)input->data)[input->offset++];
}
Commit Message: Fix left shift of a negative value in SWFInput_readSBits. Check for number before before left-shifting by (number-1).
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 89,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GtkMenu* webkit_web_view_get_context_menu(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView), 0);
#if ENABLE(CONTEXT_MENUS)
ContextMenu* menu = core(webView)->contextMenuController()->contextMenu();
if (!menu)
return 0;
return menu->platformDescription();
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mount_entry(const char *fsname, const char *target,
const char *fstype, unsigned long mountflags,
const char *data, int optional)
{
#ifdef HAVE_STATVFS
struct statvfs sb;
#endif
if (mount(fsname, target, fstype, mountflags & ~MS_REMOUNT, data)) {
if (optional) {
INFO("failed to mount '%s' on '%s' (optional): %s", fsname,
target, strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
else {
SYSERROR("failed to mount '%s' on '%s'", fsname, target);
return -1;
}
}
if ((mountflags & MS_REMOUNT) || (mountflags & MS_BIND)) {
DEBUG("remounting %s on %s to respect bind or remount options",
fsname ? fsname : "(none)", target ? target : "(none)");
unsigned long rqd_flags = 0;
if (mountflags & MS_RDONLY)
rqd_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
#ifdef HAVE_STATVFS
if (statvfs(fsname, &sb) == 0) {
unsigned long required_flags = rqd_flags;
if (sb.f_flag & MS_NOSUID)
required_flags |= MS_NOSUID;
if (sb.f_flag & MS_NODEV)
required_flags |= MS_NODEV;
if (sb.f_flag & MS_RDONLY)
required_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
if (sb.f_flag & MS_NOEXEC)
required_flags |= MS_NOEXEC;
DEBUG("(at remount) flags for %s was %lu, required extra flags are %lu", fsname, sb.f_flag, required_flags);
/*
* If this was a bind mount request, and required_flags
* does not have any flags which are not already in
* mountflags, then skip the remount
*/
if (!(mountflags & MS_REMOUNT)) {
if (!(required_flags & ~mountflags) && rqd_flags == 0) {
DEBUG("mountflags already was %lu, skipping remount",
mountflags);
goto skipremount;
}
}
mountflags |= required_flags;
}
#endif
if (mount(fsname, target, fstype,
mountflags | MS_REMOUNT, data)) {
if (optional) {
INFO("failed to mount '%s' on '%s' (optional): %s",
fsname, target, strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
else {
SYSERROR("failed to mount '%s' on '%s'",
fsname, target);
return -1;
}
}
}
#ifdef HAVE_STATVFS
skipremount:
#endif
DEBUG("mounted '%s' on '%s', type '%s'", fsname, target, fstype);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 1 | 166,715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntRect WebGLRenderingContextBase::SentinelEmptyRect() {
return IntRect(0, 0, -1, -1);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ff_mpeg_update_thread_context(AVCodecContext *dst,
const AVCodecContext *src)
{
int i, ret;
MpegEncContext *s = dst->priv_data, *s1 = src->priv_data;
if (dst == src)
return 0;
av_assert0(s != s1);
if (!s->context_initialized) {
int err;
memcpy(s, s1, sizeof(MpegEncContext));
s->avctx = dst;
s->bitstream_buffer = NULL;
s->bitstream_buffer_size = s->allocated_bitstream_buffer_size = 0;
if (s1->context_initialized){
ff_mpv_idct_init(s);
if((err = ff_mpv_common_init(s)) < 0){
memset(s, 0, sizeof(MpegEncContext));
s->avctx = dst;
return err;
}
}
}
if (s->height != s1->height || s->width != s1->width || s->context_reinit) {
s->context_reinit = 0;
s->height = s1->height;
s->width = s1->width;
if ((ret = ff_mpv_common_frame_size_change(s)) < 0)
return ret;
}
s->avctx->coded_height = s1->avctx->coded_height;
s->avctx->coded_width = s1->avctx->coded_width;
s->avctx->width = s1->avctx->width;
s->avctx->height = s1->avctx->height;
s->coded_picture_number = s1->coded_picture_number;
s->picture_number = s1->picture_number;
av_assert0(!s->picture || s->picture != s1->picture);
if(s->picture)
for (i = 0; i < MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++) {
ff_mpeg_unref_picture(s->avctx, &s->picture[i]);
if (s1->picture && s1->picture[i].f->buf[0] &&
(ret = ff_mpeg_ref_picture(s->avctx, &s->picture[i], &s1->picture[i])) < 0)
return ret;
}
#define UPDATE_PICTURE(pic)\
do {\
ff_mpeg_unref_picture(s->avctx, &s->pic);\
if (s1->pic.f && s1->pic.f->buf[0])\
ret = ff_mpeg_ref_picture(s->avctx, &s->pic, &s1->pic);\
else\
ret = ff_update_picture_tables(&s->pic, &s1->pic);\
if (ret < 0)\
return ret;\
} while (0)
UPDATE_PICTURE(current_picture);
UPDATE_PICTURE(last_picture);
UPDATE_PICTURE(next_picture);
#define REBASE_PICTURE(pic, new_ctx, old_ctx) \
((pic && pic >= old_ctx->picture && \
pic < old_ctx->picture + MAX_PICTURE_COUNT) ? \
&new_ctx->picture[pic - old_ctx->picture] : NULL)
s->last_picture_ptr = REBASE_PICTURE(s1->last_picture_ptr, s, s1);
s->current_picture_ptr = REBASE_PICTURE(s1->current_picture_ptr, s, s1);
s->next_picture_ptr = REBASE_PICTURE(s1->next_picture_ptr, s, s1);
s->next_p_frame_damaged = s1->next_p_frame_damaged;
s->workaround_bugs = s1->workaround_bugs;
s->padding_bug_score = s1->padding_bug_score;
memcpy(&s->last_time_base, &s1->last_time_base,
(char *) &s1->pb_field_time + sizeof(s1->pb_field_time) -
(char *) &s1->last_time_base);
s->max_b_frames = s1->max_b_frames;
s->low_delay = s1->low_delay;
s->droppable = s1->droppable;
s->divx_packed = s1->divx_packed;
if (s1->bitstream_buffer) {
if (s1->bitstream_buffer_size +
AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE > s->allocated_bitstream_buffer_size) {
av_fast_malloc(&s->bitstream_buffer,
&s->allocated_bitstream_buffer_size,
s1->allocated_bitstream_buffer_size);
if (!s->bitstream_buffer) {
s->bitstream_buffer_size = 0;
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
}
s->bitstream_buffer_size = s1->bitstream_buffer_size;
memcpy(s->bitstream_buffer, s1->bitstream_buffer,
s1->bitstream_buffer_size);
memset(s->bitstream_buffer + s->bitstream_buffer_size, 0,
AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
}
if (!s->sc.edge_emu_buffer)
if (s1->linesize) {
if (ff_mpeg_framesize_alloc(s->avctx, &s->me,
&s->sc, s1->linesize) < 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Failed to allocate context "
"scratch buffers.\n");
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
} else {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Context scratch buffers could not "
"be allocated due to unknown size.\n");
}
memcpy(&s->progressive_sequence, &s1->progressive_sequence,
(char *) &s1->rtp_mode - (char *) &s1->progressive_sequence);
if (!s1->first_field) {
s->last_pict_type = s1->pict_type;
if (s1->current_picture_ptr)
s->last_lambda_for[s1->pict_type] = s1->current_picture_ptr->f->quality;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 81,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: flatpak_proxy_add_policy (FlatpakProxy *proxy,
const char *name,
FlatpakPolicy policy)
{
guint current_policy = GPOINTER_TO_INT (g_hash_table_lookup (proxy->policy, name));
current_policy = MAX (policy, current_policy);
g_hash_table_replace (proxy->policy, g_strdup (name), GINT_TO_POINTER (current_policy));
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436 | 0 | 84,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PermissionsData::AllUrlsIncludesChromeUrls(
const std::string& extension_id) {
return extension_id == extension_misc::kChromeVoxExtensionId;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 151,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iasecc_pin_get_policy (struct sc_card *card, struct sc_pin_cmd_data *data)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct sc_file *save_current_df = NULL, *save_current_ef = NULL;
struct iasecc_sdo sdo;
struct sc_path path;
unsigned ii;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_pin_get_policy(card:%p)", card);
if (data->pin_type != SC_AC_CHV) {
sc_log(ctx, "To unblock PIN it's CHV reference should be presented");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
}
if (card->cache.valid && card->cache.current_df) {
sc_file_dup(&save_current_df, card->cache.current_df);
if (save_current_df == NULL) {
rv = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
sc_log(ctx, "Cannot duplicate current DF file");
goto err;
}
}
if (card->cache.valid && card->cache.current_ef) {
sc_file_dup(&save_current_ef, card->cache.current_ef);
if (save_current_ef == NULL) {
rv = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
sc_log(ctx, "Cannot duplicate current EF file");
goto err;
}
}
if (!(data->pin_reference & IASECC_OBJECT_REF_LOCAL) && card->cache.valid && card->cache.current_df) {
sc_format_path("3F00", &path);
path.type = SC_PATH_TYPE_FILE_ID;
rv = iasecc_select_file(card, &path, NULL);
LOG_TEST_GOTO_ERR(ctx, rv, "Unable to select MF");
}
memset(&sdo, 0, sizeof(sdo));
sdo.sdo_class = IASECC_SDO_CLASS_CHV;
sdo.sdo_ref = data->pin_reference & ~IASECC_OBJECT_REF_LOCAL;
sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_pin_get_policy() reference %i", sdo.sdo_ref);
rv = iasecc_sdo_get_data(card, &sdo);
LOG_TEST_GOTO_ERR(ctx, rv, "Cannot get SDO PIN data");
if (sdo.docp.acls_contact.size == 0) {
rv = SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
sc_log(ctx, "Extremely strange ... there is no ACLs");
goto err;
}
sc_log(ctx,
"iasecc_pin_get_policy() sdo.docp.size.size %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
sdo.docp.size.size);
for (ii=0; ii<sizeof(sdo.docp.scbs); ii++) {
struct iasecc_se_info se;
unsigned char scb = sdo.docp.scbs[ii];
struct sc_acl_entry *acl = &data->pin1.acls[ii];
int crt_num = 0;
memset(&se, 0, sizeof(se));
memset(&acl->crts, 0, sizeof(acl->crts));
sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_pin_get_policy() set info acls: SCB 0x%X", scb);
/* acl->raw_value = scb; */
acl->method = scb & IASECC_SCB_METHOD_MASK;
acl->key_ref = scb & IASECC_SCB_METHOD_MASK_REF;
if (scb==0 || scb==0xFF)
continue;
if (se.reference != (int)acl->key_ref) {
memset(&se, 0, sizeof(se));
se.reference = acl->key_ref;
rv = iasecc_se_get_info(card, &se);
LOG_TEST_GOTO_ERR(ctx, rv, "SDO get data error");
}
if (scb & IASECC_SCB_METHOD_USER_AUTH) {
rv = iasecc_se_get_crt_by_usage(card, &se,
IASECC_CRT_TAG_AT, IASECC_UQB_AT_USER_PASSWORD, &acl->crts[crt_num]);
LOG_TEST_GOTO_ERR(ctx, rv, "no authentication template for 'USER PASSWORD'");
sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_pin_get_policy() scb:0x%X; sdo_ref:[%i,%i,...]",
scb, acl->crts[crt_num].refs[0], acl->crts[crt_num].refs[1]);
crt_num++;
}
if (scb & (IASECC_SCB_METHOD_SM | IASECC_SCB_METHOD_EXT_AUTH)) {
sc_log(ctx, "'SM' and 'EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATION' protection methods are not supported: SCB:0x%X", scb);
/* Set to 'NEVER' if all conditions are needed or
* there is no user authentication method allowed */
if (!crt_num || (scb & IASECC_SCB_METHOD_NEED_ALL))
acl->method = SC_AC_NEVER;
continue;
}
sc_file_free(se.df);
}
if (sdo.data.chv.size_max.value)
data->pin1.max_length = *sdo.data.chv.size_max.value;
if (sdo.data.chv.size_min.value)
data->pin1.min_length = *sdo.data.chv.size_min.value;
if (sdo.docp.tries_maximum.value)
data->pin1.max_tries = *sdo.docp.tries_maximum.value;
if (sdo.docp.tries_remaining.value)
data->pin1.tries_left = *sdo.docp.tries_remaining.value;
if (sdo.docp.size.value) {
for (ii=0; ii<sdo.docp.size.size; ii++)
data->pin1.stored_length = ((data->pin1.stored_length) << 8) + *(sdo.docp.size.value + ii);
}
data->pin1.encoding = SC_PIN_ENCODING_ASCII;
data->pin1.offset = 5;
data->pin1.logged_in = SC_PIN_STATE_UNKNOWN;
sc_log(ctx,
"PIN policy: size max/min %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u/%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u, tries max/left %i/%i",
data->pin1.max_length, data->pin1.min_length,
data->pin1.max_tries, data->pin1.tries_left);
iasecc_sdo_free_fields(card, &sdo);
if (save_current_df) {
sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_pin_get_policy() restore current DF");
rv = iasecc_select_file(card, &save_current_df->path, NULL);
LOG_TEST_GOTO_ERR(ctx, rv, "Cannot return to saved DF");
}
if (save_current_ef) {
sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_pin_get_policy() restore current EF");
rv = iasecc_select_file(card, &save_current_ef->path, NULL);
LOG_TEST_GOTO_ERR(ctx, rv, "Cannot return to saved EF");
}
err:
sc_file_free(save_current_df);
sc_file_free(save_current_ef);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gst_asf_demux_reset_stream_state_after_discont (GstASFDemux * demux)
{
guint n;
gst_adapter_clear (demux->adapter);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "reset stream state");
gst_flow_combiner_reset (demux->flowcombiner);
for (n = 0; n < demux->num_streams; n++) {
demux->stream[n].discont = TRUE;
demux->stream[n].first_buffer = TRUE;
while (demux->stream[n].payloads->len > 0) {
AsfPayload *payload;
guint last;
last = demux->stream[n].payloads->len - 1;
payload = &g_array_index (demux->stream[n].payloads, AsfPayload, last);
gst_buffer_replace (&payload->buf, NULL);
g_array_remove_index (demux->stream[n].payloads, last);
}
}
}
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssh_init_forwarding(void)
{
int success = 0;
int i;
/* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
debug("Local connections to %.200s:%d forwarded to remote "
"address %.200s:%d",
(options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ?
options.local_forwards[i].listen_path :
(options.local_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
(options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
options.local_forwards[i].listen_host,
options.local_forwards[i].listen_port,
(options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ?
options.local_forwards[i].connect_path :
options.local_forwards[i].connect_host,
options.local_forwards[i].connect_port);
success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(
&options.local_forwards[i], &options.fwd_opts);
}
if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure)
fatal("Could not request local forwarding.");
if (i > 0 && success == 0)
error("Could not request local forwarding.");
/* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to "
"local address %.200s:%d",
(options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ?
options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path :
(options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
"LOCALHOST" : options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host,
options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
(options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ?
options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path :
options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
options.remote_forwards[i].handle =
channel_request_remote_forwarding(
&options.remote_forwards[i]);
if (options.remote_forwards[i].handle < 0) {
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
fatal("Could not request remote forwarding.");
else
logit("Warning: Could not request remote "
"forwarding.");
} else {
client_register_global_confirm(ssh_confirm_remote_forward,
&options.remote_forwards[i]);
}
}
/* Initiate tunnel forwarding. */
if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
if (client_request_tun_fwd(options.tun_open,
options.tun_local, options.tun_remote) == -1) {
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
else
error("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crc32_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
u32 *crcp = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
*crcp = __crc32_le(*crcp, data, len);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_fxsave(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct fxregs_state fx_state;
size_t size;
int rc;
rc = check_fxsr(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt);
rc = asm_safe("fxsave %[fx]", , [fx] "+m"(fx_state));
ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
if (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_OSFXSR)
size = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, xmm_space[8 * 16/4]);
else
size = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, xmm_space[0]);
return segmented_write(ctxt, ctxt->memop.addr.mem, &fx_state, size);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std
Introduces segemented_write_std.
Switches from emulated reads/writes to standard read/writes in fxsave,
fxrstor, sgdt, and sidt. This fixes CVE-2017-2584, a longstanding
kernel memory leak.
Since commit 283c95d0e389 ("KVM: x86: emulate FXSAVE and FXRSTOR",
2016-11-09), which is luckily not yet in any final release, this would
also be an exploitable kernel memory *write*!
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 96051572c819194c37a8367624b285be10297eca
Fixes: 283c95d0e3891b64087706b344a4b545d04a6e62
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 168,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fix_collisions(ASS_Renderer *render_priv, EventImages *imgs, int cnt)
{
Segment *used = ass_realloc_array(NULL, cnt, sizeof(*used));
int cnt_used = 0;
int i, j;
if (!used)
return;
for (i = 0; i < cnt; ++i) {
ASS_RenderPriv *priv;
if (!imgs[i].detect_collisions)
continue;
priv = get_render_priv(render_priv, imgs[i].event);
if (priv && priv->height > 0) { // it's a fixed event
Segment s;
s.a = priv->top;
s.b = priv->top + priv->height;
s.ha = priv->left;
s.hb = priv->left + priv->width;
if (priv->height != imgs[i].height) { // no, it's not
ass_msg(render_priv->library, MSGL_WARN,
"Event height has changed");
priv->top = 0;
priv->height = 0;
priv->left = 0;
priv->width = 0;
}
for (j = 0; j < cnt_used; ++j)
if (overlap(&s, used + j)) { // no, it's not
priv->top = 0;
priv->height = 0;
priv->left = 0;
priv->width = 0;
}
if (priv->height > 0) { // still a fixed event
used[cnt_used].a = priv->top;
used[cnt_used].b = priv->top + priv->height;
used[cnt_used].ha = priv->left;
used[cnt_used].hb = priv->left + priv->width;
cnt_used++;
shift_event(render_priv, imgs + i, priv->top - imgs[i].top);
}
}
}
qsort(used, cnt_used, sizeof(Segment), cmp_segment);
for (i = 0; i < cnt; ++i) {
ASS_RenderPriv *priv;
if (!imgs[i].detect_collisions)
continue;
priv = get_render_priv(render_priv, imgs[i].event);
if (priv && priv->height == 0) { // not a fixed event
int shift;
Segment s;
s.a = imgs[i].top;
s.b = imgs[i].top + imgs[i].height;
s.ha = imgs[i].left;
s.hb = imgs[i].left + imgs[i].width;
shift = fit_segment(&s, used, &cnt_used, imgs[i].shift_direction);
if (shift)
shift_event(render_priv, imgs + i, shift);
priv->top = imgs[i].top;
priv->height = imgs[i].height;
priv->left = imgs[i].left;
priv->width = imgs[i].width;
}
}
free(used);
}
Commit Message: Fix line wrapping mode 0/3 bugs
This fixes two separate bugs:
a) Don't move a linebreak into the first symbol. This results in a empty
line at the front, which does not help to equalize line lengths at all.
b) When moving a linebreak into a symbol that already is a break, the
number of lines must be decremented. Otherwise, uninitialized memory
is possibly used for later layout operations.
Found by fuzzer test case
id:000085,sig:11,src:003377+003350,op:splice,rep:8.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 73,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> cachedAttribute2AttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.cachedAttribute2._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
RefPtr<any> result = imp->cachedAttribute2();
v8::Handle<v8::Value> wrapper = result.get() ? getDOMObjectMap(info.GetIsolate()).get(result.get()) : v8::Handle<v8::Object>();
if (wrapper.IsEmpty()) {
wrapper = toV8(result.get(), info.GetIsolate());
if (!wrapper.IsEmpty())
V8DOMWrapper::setNamedHiddenReference(info.Holder(), "cachedAttribute2", wrapper);
}
return wrapper;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AudioRendererAlgorithmTest()
: bytes_enqueued_(0) {
}
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 118,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OfflinePageModelImpl::OnStoreInitialized(const base::TimeTicks& start_time,
int init_attempts_spent,
bool success) {
init_attempts_spent++;
if (success) {
DCHECK_EQ(store_->state(), StoreState::LOADED);
ReportInitializationAttemptsSpent(init_attempts_spent);
store_->GetOfflinePages(
base::Bind(&OfflinePageModelImpl::OnInitialGetOfflinePagesDone,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), start_time));
return;
}
DCHECK_EQ(store_->state(), StoreState::FAILED_LOADING);
if (init_attempts_spent >= kInitializeAttemptsMax) {
FinalizeModelLoad();
return;
}
const base::TimeDelta delay = base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(100);
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&OfflinePageModelImpl::RetryDbInitialization,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), start_time,
init_attempts_spent),
delay);
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_pull_ofp15_buckets(struct ofpbuf *msg, size_t buckets_length,
enum ofp_version version, uint8_t group_type,
struct ovs_list *buckets)
{
struct ofp15_bucket *ob;
ovs_list_init(buckets);
while (buckets_length > 0) {
struct ofputil_bucket *bucket = NULL;
struct ofpbuf ofpacts;
enum ofperr err = OFPERR_OFPGMFC_BAD_BUCKET;
size_t ob_len, actions_len, properties_len;
ovs_be32 watch_port = ofputil_port_to_ofp11(OFPP_ANY);
ovs_be32 watch_group = htonl(OFPG_ANY);
ovs_be16 weight = htons(group_type == OFPGT11_SELECT ? 1 : 0);
ofpbuf_init(&ofpacts, 0);
ob = ofpbuf_try_pull(msg, sizeof *ob);
if (!ob) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&bad_ofmsg_rl, "buckets end with %"PRIuSIZE
" leftover bytes", buckets_length);
goto err;
}
ob_len = ntohs(ob->len);
actions_len = ntohs(ob->action_array_len);
if (ob_len < sizeof *ob) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&bad_ofmsg_rl, "OpenFlow message bucket length "
"%"PRIuSIZE" is not valid", ob_len);
goto err;
} else if (ob_len > buckets_length) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&bad_ofmsg_rl, "OpenFlow message bucket length "
"%"PRIuSIZE" exceeds remaining buckets data size %"
PRIuSIZE, ob_len, buckets_length);
goto err;
} else if (actions_len > ob_len - sizeof *ob) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&bad_ofmsg_rl, "OpenFlow message bucket actions "
"length %"PRIuSIZE" exceeds remaining bucket "
"data size %"PRIuSIZE, actions_len,
ob_len - sizeof *ob);
goto err;
}
buckets_length -= ob_len;
err = ofpacts_pull_openflow_actions(msg, actions_len, version,
NULL, NULL, &ofpacts);
if (err) {
goto err;
}
properties_len = ob_len - sizeof *ob - actions_len;
struct ofpbuf properties = ofpbuf_const_initializer(
ofpbuf_pull(msg, properties_len), properties_len);
while (properties.size > 0) {
struct ofpbuf payload;
uint64_t type;
err = ofpprop_pull(&properties, &payload, &type);
if (err) {
goto err;
}
switch (type) {
case OFPGBPT15_WEIGHT:
err = ofpprop_parse_be16(&payload, &weight);
break;
case OFPGBPT15_WATCH_PORT:
err = ofpprop_parse_be32(&payload, &watch_port);
break;
case OFPGBPT15_WATCH_GROUP:
err = ofpprop_parse_be32(&payload, &watch_group);
break;
default:
err = OFPPROP_UNKNOWN(false, "group bucket", type);
break;
}
if (err) {
goto err;
}
}
bucket = xzalloc(sizeof *bucket);
bucket->weight = ntohs(weight);
err = ofputil_port_from_ofp11(watch_port, &bucket->watch_port);
if (err) {
err = OFPERR_OFPGMFC_BAD_WATCH;
goto err;
}
bucket->watch_group = ntohl(watch_group);
bucket->bucket_id = ntohl(ob->bucket_id);
if (bucket->bucket_id > OFPG15_BUCKET_MAX) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&bad_ofmsg_rl, "bucket id (%u) is out of range",
bucket->bucket_id);
err = OFPERR_OFPGMFC_BAD_BUCKET;
goto err;
}
bucket->ofpacts = ofpbuf_steal_data(&ofpacts);
bucket->ofpacts_len = ofpacts.size;
ovs_list_push_back(buckets, &bucket->list_node);
continue;
err:
free(bucket);
ofpbuf_uninit(&ofpacts);
ofputil_bucket_list_destroy(buckets);
return err;
}
if (ofputil_bucket_check_duplicate_id(buckets)) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&bad_ofmsg_rl, "Duplicate bucket id");
ofputil_bucket_list_destroy(buckets);
return OFPERR_OFPGMFC_BAD_BUCKET;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
uint64_t val)
{
uint64_t valid_bits = to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits;
return !(val & ~valid_bits);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,113 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::OpenInternetOptionsDialog() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("OpenInternetOptionsDialog"),
profile_);
ShowOptionsTab(chrome::kInternetOptionsSubPage);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void documentTypeAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::documentTypeAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *netdev_drivername(const struct net_device *dev)
{
const struct device_driver *driver;
const struct device *parent;
const char *empty = "";
parent = dev->dev.parent;
if (!parent)
return empty;
driver = parent->driver;
if (driver && driver->name)
return driver->name;
return empty;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int FS_Delete( char *filename ) {
#if 0 // Stub...not used in MP
char *ospath;
if ( !fs_searchpaths ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "Filesystem call made without initialization\n" );
}
if ( !filename || filename[0] == 0 ) {
return 0;
}
if ( Q_strncmp( filename, "save/", 5 ) != 0 ) {
return 0;
}
ospath = FS_BuildOSPath( fs_homepath->string, fs_gamedir, filename );
if ( remove( ospath ) != -1 ) { // success
return 1;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mailimf_unstrict_char_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx, char token)
{
size_t cur_token;
int r;
cur_token = * indx;
r = mailimf_cfws_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if ((r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) && (r != MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE))
return r;
r = mailimf_char_parse(message, length, &cur_token, token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
return r;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 66,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void setup_mode2(void)
{
int dev;
max_synthdev = num_synths;
for (dev = 0; dev < num_midis; dev++)
{
if (midi_devs[dev] && midi_devs[dev]->converter != NULL)
{
synth_devs[max_synthdev++] = midi_devs[dev]->converter;
}
}
for (dev = 0; dev < max_synthdev; dev++)
{
int chn;
synth_devs[dev]->sysex_ptr = 0;
synth_devs[dev]->emulation = 0;
for (chn = 0; chn < 16; chn++)
{
synth_devs[dev]->chn_info[chn].pgm_num = 0;
reset_controllers(dev,
synth_devs[dev]->chn_info[chn].controllers,0);
synth_devs[dev]->chn_info[chn].bender_value = (1 << 7); /* Neutral */
synth_devs[dev]->chn_info[chn].bender_range = 200;
}
}
max_mididev = 0;
seq_mode = SEQ_2;
}
Commit Message: sound/oss: remove offset from load_patch callbacks
Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
uninitialized value, and signedness issue
The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return
-EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result
in an unintentionally large loop.
On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument
from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar
issues in opl3. Compile tested only.
v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 27,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sapi_remove_header(zend_llist *l, char *name, uint len) {
sapi_header_struct *header;
zend_llist_element *next;
zend_llist_element *current=l->head;
while (current) {
header = (sapi_header_struct *)(current->data);
next = current->next;
if (header->header_len > len && header->header[len] == ':'
&& !strncasecmp(header->header, name, len)) {
if (current->prev) {
current->prev->next = next;
} else {
l->head = next;
}
if (next) {
next->prev = current->prev;
} else {
l->tail = current->prev;
}
sapi_free_header(header);
efree(current);
--l->count;
}
current = next;
}
}
Commit Message: Update header handling to RFC 7230
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 56,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_handle_sRGB(png_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
{
png_byte intent;
png_debug(1, "in png_handle_sRGB");
if ((png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IHDR) == 0)
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "missing IHDR");
else if ((png_ptr->mode & (PNG_HAVE_IDAT|PNG_HAVE_PLTE)) != 0)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "out of place");
return;
}
if (length != 1)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "invalid");
return;
}
png_crc_read(png_ptr, &intent, 1);
if (png_crc_finish(png_ptr, 0) != 0)
return;
/* If a colorspace error has already been output skip this chunk */
if ((png_ptr->colorspace.flags & PNG_COLORSPACE_INVALID) != 0)
return;
/* Only one sRGB or iCCP chunk is allowed, use the HAVE_INTENT flag to detect
* this.
*/
if ((png_ptr->colorspace.flags & PNG_COLORSPACE_HAVE_INTENT) != 0)
{
png_ptr->colorspace.flags |= PNG_COLORSPACE_INVALID;
png_colorspace_sync(png_ptr, info_ptr);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "too many profiles");
return;
}
(void)png_colorspace_set_sRGB(png_ptr, &png_ptr->colorspace, intent);
png_colorspace_sync(png_ptr, info_ptr);
}
Commit Message: [libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 79,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BrowserCommandController::ExecuteCommandWithDisposition(
int id, WindowOpenDisposition disposition) {
if (!SupportsCommand(id) || !IsCommandEnabled(id))
return false;
if (browser_->tab_strip_model()->active_index() == TabStripModel::kNoTab)
return true;
DCHECK(command_updater_.IsCommandEnabled(id)) << "Invalid/disabled command "
<< id;
switch (id) {
case IDC_BACK:
GoBack(browser_, disposition);
break;
case IDC_FORWARD:
GoForward(browser_, disposition);
break;
case IDC_RELOAD:
Reload(browser_, disposition);
break;
case IDC_RELOAD_CLEARING_CACHE:
ClearCache(browser_);
FALLTHROUGH;
case IDC_RELOAD_BYPASSING_CACHE:
ReloadBypassingCache(browser_, disposition);
break;
case IDC_HOME:
Home(browser_, disposition);
break;
case IDC_OPEN_CURRENT_URL:
OpenCurrentURL(browser_);
break;
case IDC_STOP:
Stop(browser_);
break;
case IDC_NEW_WINDOW:
NewWindow(browser_);
break;
case IDC_NEW_INCOGNITO_WINDOW:
NewIncognitoWindow(profile());
break;
case IDC_CLOSE_WINDOW:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("CloseWindowByKey"));
CloseWindow(browser_);
break;
case IDC_NEW_TAB: {
NewTab(browser_);
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_DESKTOP_IN_PRODUCT_HELP)
auto* new_tab_tracker =
feature_engagement::NewTabTrackerFactory::GetInstance()
->GetForProfile(profile());
new_tab_tracker->OnNewTabOpened();
new_tab_tracker->CloseBubble();
#endif
break;
}
case IDC_CLOSE_TAB:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("CloseTabByKey"));
CloseTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SELECT_NEXT_TAB:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_SelectNextTab"));
SelectNextTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SELECT_PREVIOUS_TAB:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_SelectPreviousTab"));
SelectPreviousTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_MOVE_TAB_NEXT:
MoveTabNext(browser_);
break;
case IDC_MOVE_TAB_PREVIOUS:
MoveTabPrevious(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_0:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_1:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_2:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_3:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_4:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_5:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_6:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_7:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_SelectNumberedTab"));
SelectNumberedTab(browser_, id - IDC_SELECT_TAB_0);
break;
case IDC_SELECT_LAST_TAB:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_SelectNumberedTab"));
SelectLastTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_DUPLICATE_TAB:
DuplicateTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_RESTORE_TAB:
RestoreTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_AS_TAB:
ConvertPopupToTabbedBrowser(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FULLSCREEN:
chrome::ToggleFullscreenMode(browser_);
break;
case IDC_OPEN_IN_PWA_WINDOW:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("OpenActiveTabInPwaWindow"));
ReparentSecureActiveTabIntoPwaWindow(browser_);
break;
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
case IDC_VISIT_DESKTOP_OF_LRU_USER_2:
case IDC_VISIT_DESKTOP_OF_LRU_USER_3:
ExecuteVisitDesktopCommand(id, window()->GetNativeWindow());
break;
#endif
#if defined(OS_LINUX) && !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
case IDC_MINIMIZE_WINDOW:
browser_->window()->Minimize();
break;
case IDC_MAXIMIZE_WINDOW:
browser_->window()->Maximize();
break;
case IDC_RESTORE_WINDOW:
browser_->window()->Restore();
break;
case IDC_USE_SYSTEM_TITLE_BAR: {
PrefService* prefs = profile()->GetPrefs();
prefs->SetBoolean(prefs::kUseCustomChromeFrame,
!prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kUseCustomChromeFrame));
break;
}
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
case IDC_TOGGLE_FULLSCREEN_TOOLBAR:
chrome::ToggleFullscreenToolbar(browser_);
break;
case IDC_TOGGLE_JAVASCRIPT_APPLE_EVENTS: {
PrefService* prefs = profile()->GetPrefs();
prefs->SetBoolean(prefs::kAllowJavascriptAppleEvents,
!prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kAllowJavascriptAppleEvents));
break;
}
#endif
case IDC_EXIT:
Exit();
break;
case IDC_SAVE_PAGE:
SavePage(browser_);
break;
case IDC_BOOKMARK_PAGE:
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_DESKTOP_IN_PRODUCT_HELP)
feature_engagement::BookmarkTrackerFactory::GetInstance()
->GetForProfile(profile())
->OnBookmarkAdded();
#endif
BookmarkCurrentPageAllowingExtensionOverrides(browser_);
break;
case IDC_BOOKMARK_ALL_TABS:
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_DESKTOP_IN_PRODUCT_HELP)
feature_engagement::BookmarkTrackerFactory::GetInstance()
->GetForProfile(profile())
->OnBookmarkAdded();
#endif
BookmarkAllTabs(browser_);
break;
case IDC_VIEW_SOURCE:
browser_->tab_strip_model()
->GetActiveWebContents()
->GetMainFrame()
->ViewSource();
break;
case IDC_EMAIL_PAGE_LOCATION:
EmailPageLocation(browser_);
break;
case IDC_PRINT:
Print(browser_);
break;
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINTING)
case IDC_BASIC_PRINT:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_Advanced_Print"));
BasicPrint(browser_);
break;
#endif // ENABLE_PRINTING
case IDC_SAVE_CREDIT_CARD_FOR_PAGE:
SaveCreditCard(browser_);
break;
case IDC_MIGRATE_LOCAL_CREDIT_CARD_FOR_PAGE:
MigrateLocalCards(browser_);
break;
case IDC_TRANSLATE_PAGE:
Translate(browser_);
break;
case IDC_MANAGE_PASSWORDS_FOR_PAGE:
ManagePasswordsForPage(browser_);
break;
case IDC_CUT:
case IDC_COPY:
case IDC_PASTE:
CutCopyPaste(browser_, id);
break;
case IDC_FIND:
Find(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FIND_NEXT:
FindNext(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FIND_PREVIOUS:
FindPrevious(browser_);
break;
case IDC_ZOOM_PLUS:
Zoom(browser_, content::PAGE_ZOOM_IN);
break;
case IDC_ZOOM_NORMAL:
Zoom(browser_, content::PAGE_ZOOM_RESET);
break;
case IDC_ZOOM_MINUS:
Zoom(browser_, content::PAGE_ZOOM_OUT);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_TOOLBAR:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_Focus_Toolbar"));
FocusToolbar(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_LOCATION:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_Focus_Location"));
FocusLocationBar(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_SEARCH:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_Focus_Search"));
FocusSearch(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_MENU_BAR:
FocusAppMenu(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_BOOKMARKS:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_Focus_Bookmarks"));
FocusBookmarksToolbar(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_INACTIVE_POPUP_FOR_ACCESSIBILITY:
FocusInactivePopupForAccessibility(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_NEXT_PANE:
FocusNextPane(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_PREVIOUS_PANE:
FocusPreviousPane(browser_);
break;
case IDC_OPEN_FILE:
browser_->OpenFile();
break;
case IDC_CREATE_SHORTCUT:
CreateBookmarkAppFromCurrentWebContents(browser_,
true /* force_shortcut_app */);
break;
case IDC_INSTALL_PWA:
CreateBookmarkAppFromCurrentWebContents(browser_,
false /* force_shortcut_app */);
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS:
ToggleDevToolsWindow(browser_, DevToolsToggleAction::Show());
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS_CONSOLE:
ToggleDevToolsWindow(browser_, DevToolsToggleAction::ShowConsolePanel());
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS_DEVICES:
InspectUI::InspectDevices(browser_);
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS_INSPECT:
ToggleDevToolsWindow(browser_, DevToolsToggleAction::Inspect());
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS_TOGGLE:
ToggleDevToolsWindow(browser_, DevToolsToggleAction::Toggle());
break;
case IDC_TASK_MANAGER:
OpenTaskManager(browser_);
break;
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
case IDC_TAKE_SCREENSHOT:
TakeScreenshot();
break;
#endif
#if defined(GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD)
case IDC_FEEDBACK:
OpenFeedbackDialog(browser_, kFeedbackSourceBrowserCommand);
break;
#endif
case IDC_SHOW_BOOKMARK_BAR:
ToggleBookmarkBar(browser_);
break;
case IDC_PROFILING_ENABLED:
Profiling::Toggle();
break;
case IDC_SHOW_BOOKMARK_MANAGER:
ShowBookmarkManager(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_APP_MENU:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_Show_App_Menu"));
ShowAppMenu(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_AVATAR_MENU:
ShowAvatarMenu(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_HISTORY:
ShowHistory(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_DOWNLOADS:
ShowDownloads(browser_);
break;
case IDC_MANAGE_EXTENSIONS:
ShowExtensions(browser_, std::string());
break;
case IDC_OPTIONS:
ShowSettings(browser_);
break;
case IDC_EDIT_SEARCH_ENGINES:
ShowSearchEngineSettings(browser_);
break;
case IDC_VIEW_PASSWORDS:
ShowPasswordManager(browser_);
break;
case IDC_CLEAR_BROWSING_DATA:
ShowClearBrowsingDataDialog(browser_);
break;
case IDC_IMPORT_SETTINGS:
ShowImportDialog(browser_);
break;
case IDC_TOGGLE_REQUEST_TABLET_SITE:
ToggleRequestTabletSite(browser_);
break;
case IDC_ABOUT:
ShowAboutChrome(browser_);
break;
case IDC_UPGRADE_DIALOG:
OpenUpdateChromeDialog(browser_);
break;
case IDC_HELP_PAGE_VIA_KEYBOARD:
ShowHelp(browser_, HELP_SOURCE_KEYBOARD);
break;
case IDC_HELP_PAGE_VIA_MENU:
ShowHelp(browser_, HELP_SOURCE_MENU);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_BETA_FORUM:
ShowBetaForum(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_SIGNIN:
ShowBrowserSigninOrSettings(
browser_, signin_metrics::AccessPoint::ACCESS_POINT_MENU);
break;
case IDC_DISTILL_PAGE:
DistillCurrentPage(browser_);
break;
case IDC_ROUTE_MEDIA:
RouteMedia(browser_);
break;
case IDC_WINDOW_MUTE_SITE:
MuteSite(browser_);
break;
case IDC_WINDOW_PIN_TAB:
PinTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_COPY_URL:
CopyURL(browser_);
break;
case IDC_OPEN_IN_CHROME:
OpenInChrome(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SITE_SETTINGS:
ShowSiteSettings(
browser_,
browser_->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents()->GetVisibleURL());
break;
case IDC_HOSTED_APP_MENU_APP_INFO:
ShowPageInfoDialog(browser_->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents(),
bubble_anchor_util::kAppMenuButton);
break;
default:
LOG(WARNING) << "Received Unimplemented Command: " << id;
break;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <ellyjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool rxrpc_kernel_is_data_last(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
ASSERTCMP(skb->mark, ==, RXRPC_SKB_MARK_DATA);
return sp->hdr.flags & RXRPC_LAST_PACKET;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FramebufferManager::FramebufferInfo* GetFramebufferInfo(
GLuint client_id) {
FramebufferManager::FramebufferInfo* info =
framebuffer_manager()->GetFramebufferInfo(client_id);
return info;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
unsigned long base = mm->brk;
unsigned long ret;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64
/*
* If we are using 1TB segments and we are allowed to randomise
* the heap, we can put it above 1TB so it is backed by a 1TB
* segment. Otherwise the heap will be in the bottom 1TB
* which always uses 256MB segments and this may result in a
* performance penalty.
*/
if (!is_32bit_task() && (mmu_highuser_ssize == MMU_SEGSIZE_1T))
base = max_t(unsigned long, mm->brk, 1UL << SID_SHIFT_1T);
#endif
ret = PAGE_ALIGN(base + brk_rnd());
if (ret < mm->brk)
return mm->brk;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_mq_getsetattr(int mqdes, struct mq_attr *new, struct mq_attr *old)
{
struct fd f;
struct inode *inode;
struct mqueue_inode_info *info;
if (new && (new->mq_flags & (~O_NONBLOCK)))
return -EINVAL;
f = fdget(mqdes);
if (!f.file)
return -EBADF;
if (unlikely(f.file->f_op != &mqueue_file_operations)) {
fdput(f);
return -EBADF;
}
inode = file_inode(f.file);
info = MQUEUE_I(inode);
spin_lock(&info->lock);
if (old) {
*old = info->attr;
old->mq_flags = f.file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK;
}
if (new) {
audit_mq_getsetattr(mqdes, new);
spin_lock(&f.file->f_lock);
if (new->mq_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
f.file->f_flags |= O_NONBLOCK;
else
f.file->f_flags &= ~O_NONBLOCK;
spin_unlock(&f.file->f_lock);
inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
}
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
fdput(f);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mqueue: fix a use-after-free in sys_mq_notify()
The retry logic for netlink_attachskb() inside sys_mq_notify()
is nasty and vulnerable:
1) The sock refcnt is already released when retry is needed
2) The fd is controllable by user-space because we already
release the file refcnt
so we when retry but the fd has been just closed by user-space
during this small window, we end up calling netlink_detachskb()
on the error path which releases the sock again, later when
the user-space closes this socket a use-after-free could be
triggered.
Setting 'sock' to NULL here should be sufficient to fix it.
Reported-by: GeneBlue <geneblue.mail@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 63,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DownloadFile* DownloadFileFactoryImpl::CreateFile(
DownloadCreateInfo* info,
scoped_ptr<content::ByteStreamReader> stream,
DownloadManager* download_manager,
bool calculate_hash,
const net::BoundNetLog& bound_net_log) {
return new DownloadFileImpl(
info, stream.Pass(), new DownloadRequestHandle(info->request_handle),
download_manager, calculate_hash,
scoped_ptr<content::PowerSaveBlocker>(
new content::PowerSaveBlocker(
content::PowerSaveBlocker::kPowerSaveBlockPreventAppSuspension,
"Download in progress")).Pass(),
bound_net_log);
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spnego_gss_wrap(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
int *conf_state,
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_wrap(minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
input_message_buffer,
conf_state,
output_message_buffer);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 36,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ns_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, u_int length, int is_mdns)
{
register const HEADER *np;
register int qdcount, ancount, nscount, arcount;
register const u_char *cp;
uint16_t b2;
np = (const HEADER *)bp;
ND_TCHECK(*np);
/* get the byte-order right */
qdcount = EXTRACT_16BITS(&np->qdcount);
ancount = EXTRACT_16BITS(&np->ancount);
nscount = EXTRACT_16BITS(&np->nscount);
arcount = EXTRACT_16BITS(&np->arcount);
if (DNS_QR(np)) {
/* this is a response */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%d%s%s%s%s%s%s",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&np->id),
ns_ops[DNS_OPCODE(np)],
ns_resp[DNS_RCODE(np)],
DNS_AA(np)? "*" : "",
DNS_RA(np)? "" : "-",
DNS_TC(np)? "|" : "",
DNS_AD(np)? "$" : ""));
if (qdcount != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [%dq]", qdcount));
/* Print QUESTION section on -vv */
cp = (const u_char *)(np + 1);
while (qdcount--) {
if (qdcount < EXTRACT_16BITS(&np->qdcount) - 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ","));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " q:"));
if ((cp = ns_qprint(ndo, cp, bp, is_mdns)) == NULL)
goto trunc;
} else {
if ((cp = ns_nskip(ndo, cp)) == NULL)
goto trunc;
cp += 4; /* skip QTYPE and QCLASS */
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d/%d/%d", ancount, nscount, arcount));
if (ancount--) {
if ((cp = ns_rprint(ndo, cp, bp, is_mdns)) == NULL)
goto trunc;
while (cp < ndo->ndo_snapend && ancount--) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ","));
if ((cp = ns_rprint(ndo, cp, bp, is_mdns)) == NULL)
goto trunc;
}
}
if (ancount > 0)
goto trunc;
/* Print NS and AR sections on -vv */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (cp < ndo->ndo_snapend && nscount--) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ns:"));
if ((cp = ns_rprint(ndo, cp, bp, is_mdns)) == NULL)
goto trunc;
while (cp < ndo->ndo_snapend && nscount--) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ","));
if ((cp = ns_rprint(ndo, cp, bp, is_mdns)) == NULL)
goto trunc;
}
}
if (nscount > 0)
goto trunc;
if (cp < ndo->ndo_snapend && arcount--) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ar:"));
if ((cp = ns_rprint(ndo, cp, bp, is_mdns)) == NULL)
goto trunc;
while (cp < ndo->ndo_snapend && arcount--) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ","));
if ((cp = ns_rprint(ndo, cp, bp, is_mdns)) == NULL)
goto trunc;
}
}
if (arcount > 0)
goto trunc;
}
}
else {
/* this is a request */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%d%s%s%s", EXTRACT_16BITS(&np->id), ns_ops[DNS_OPCODE(np)],
DNS_RD(np) ? "+" : "",
DNS_CD(np) ? "%" : ""));
/* any weirdness? */
b2 = EXTRACT_16BITS(((const u_short *)np)+1);
if (b2 & 0x6cf)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [b2&3=0x%x]", b2));
if (DNS_OPCODE(np) == IQUERY) {
if (qdcount)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [%dq]", qdcount));
if (ancount != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [%da]", ancount));
}
else {
if (ancount)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [%da]", ancount));
if (qdcount != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [%dq]", qdcount));
}
if (nscount)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [%dn]", nscount));
if (arcount)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [%dau]", arcount));
cp = (const u_char *)(np + 1);
if (qdcount--) {
cp = ns_qprint(ndo, cp, (const u_char *)np, is_mdns);
if (!cp)
goto trunc;
while (cp < ndo->ndo_snapend && qdcount--) {
cp = ns_qprint(ndo, (const u_char *)cp,
(const u_char *)np,
is_mdns);
if (!cp)
goto trunc;
}
}
if (qdcount > 0)
goto trunc;
/* Print remaining sections on -vv */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (ancount--) {
if ((cp = ns_rprint(ndo, cp, bp, is_mdns)) == NULL)
goto trunc;
while (cp < ndo->ndo_snapend && ancount--) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ","));
if ((cp = ns_rprint(ndo, cp, bp, is_mdns)) == NULL)
goto trunc;
}
}
if (ancount > 0)
goto trunc;
if (cp < ndo->ndo_snapend && nscount--) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ns:"));
if ((cp = ns_rprint(ndo, cp, bp, is_mdns)) == NULL)
goto trunc;
while (nscount-- && cp < ndo->ndo_snapend) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ","));
if ((cp = ns_rprint(ndo, cp, bp, is_mdns)) == NULL)
goto trunc;
}
}
if (nscount > 0)
goto trunc;
if (cp < ndo->ndo_snapend && arcount--) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ar:"));
if ((cp = ns_rprint(ndo, cp, bp, is_mdns)) == NULL)
goto trunc;
while (cp < ndo->ndo_snapend && arcount--) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ","));
if ((cp = ns_rprint(ndo, cp, bp, is_mdns)) == NULL)
goto trunc;
}
}
if (arcount > 0)
goto trunc;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%d)", length));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|domain]"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12995/Check for DNS compression pointers that don't point backwards.
This is what BIND 9.11.0-P2 does; it not only detects pointers that
loop, as "point backwards" means "point before anything we've processed
so far, including what we're processing right now", so the pointer can't
point to itself (as that's what we're processing right now).
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
Also, add some infinite-pointer-loop captures.
More checks should be done. We might, for example, want to make sure
the upper 2 bits of the label length/pointer byte are 00 or 11, and that
if we encounter a pointer and jump backwards to what we think is a label
the label ends before the beginning of the last label we processed, to
make sure the pointer doesn't point backwards into the *middle* of a
label, and also make sure the entire name is <= 255 bytes long.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 62,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(getArchiveComment)
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *self = getThis();
zend_long flags = 0;
const char * comment;
int comment_len = 0;
if (!self) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, self);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "|l", &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
comment = zip_get_archive_comment(intern, &comment_len, (int)flags);
if(comment==NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRINGL((char *)comment, (zend_long)comment_len);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 54,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int irda_sendmsg_dgram(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct irda_sock *self;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "%s(), len=%zd\n", __func__, len);
if (msg->msg_flags & ~(MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_CMSG_COMPAT))
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
err = -EPIPE;
goto out;
}
err = -ENOTCONN;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
self = irda_sk(sk);
/*
* Check that we don't send out too big frames. This is an unreliable
* service, so we have no fragmentation and no coalescence
*/
if (len > self->max_data_size) {
IRDA_DEBUG(0, "%s(), Warning to much data! "
"Chopping frame from %zd to %d bytes!\n",
__func__, len, self->max_data_size);
len = self->max_data_size;
}
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, len + self->max_header_size,
msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
err = -ENOBUFS;
if (!skb)
goto out;
skb_reserve(skb, self->max_header_size);
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "%s(), appending user data\n", __func__);
skb_put(skb, len);
err = memcpy_fromiovec(skb_transport_header(skb), msg->msg_iov, len);
if (err) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto out;
}
/*
* Just send the message to TinyTP, and let it deal with possible
* errors. No need to duplicate all that here
*/
err = irttp_udata_request(self->tsap, skb);
if (err) {
IRDA_DEBUG(0, "%s(), err=%d\n", __func__, err);
goto out;
}
release_sock(sk);
return len;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: irda: Fix missing msg_namelen update in irda_recvmsg_dgram()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about irda_recvmsg_dgram() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,659 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int snd_timer_new(struct snd_card *card, char *id, struct snd_timer_id *tid,
struct snd_timer **rtimer)
{
struct snd_timer *timer;
int err;
static struct snd_device_ops ops = {
.dev_free = snd_timer_dev_free,
.dev_register = snd_timer_dev_register,
.dev_disconnect = snd_timer_dev_disconnect,
};
if (snd_BUG_ON(!tid))
return -EINVAL;
if (rtimer)
*rtimer = NULL;
timer = kzalloc(sizeof(*timer), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!timer)
return -ENOMEM;
timer->tmr_class = tid->dev_class;
timer->card = card;
timer->tmr_device = tid->device;
timer->tmr_subdevice = tid->subdevice;
if (id)
strlcpy(timer->id, id, sizeof(timer->id));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&timer->device_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&timer->open_list_head);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&timer->active_list_head);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&timer->ack_list_head);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&timer->sack_list_head);
spin_lock_init(&timer->lock);
tasklet_init(&timer->task_queue, snd_timer_tasklet,
(unsigned long)timer);
if (card != NULL) {
timer->module = card->module;
err = snd_device_new(card, SNDRV_DEV_TIMER, timer, &ops);
if (err < 0) {
snd_timer_free(timer);
return err;
}
}
if (rtimer)
*rtimer = timer;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 52,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EditorClientBlackBerry::respondToSelectionAppearanceChange()
{
m_webPagePrivate->m_selectionHandler->selectionPositionChanged();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::queryCommandEnabled(const String& commandName, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
if (!isHTMLDocument() && !isXHTMLDocument()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(InvalidStateError, "queryCommandEnabled is only supported on HTML documents.");
return false;
}
return command(this, commandName).isEnabled();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::SetSwappedOut(bool is_swapped_out) {
is_swapped_out_ = is_swapped_out;
is_waiting_for_beforeunload_ack_ = false;
is_waiting_for_unload_ack_ = false;
has_timed_out_on_unload_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_emulate_halt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
kvm_x86_ops->skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return kvm_vcpu_halt(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSValue jsTestObjCONST_VALUE_8(ExecState* exec, JSValue, const Identifier&)
{
UNUSED_PARAM(exec);
return jsNumber(static_cast<int>(8));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aura::Window* GetContainerById(int id) {
return Shell::GetInstance()->GetContainer(id);
}
Commit Message: Removed requirement for ash::Window::transient_parent() presence for system modal dialogs.
BUG=130420
TEST=SystemModalContainerLayoutManagerTest.ModalTransientAndNonTransient
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10514012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@140647 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 105,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t aio_run_iocb(struct kiocb *req, unsigned opcode,
char __user *buf, bool compat)
{
struct file *file = req->ki_filp;
ssize_t ret;
unsigned long nr_segs;
int rw;
fmode_t mode;
aio_rw_op *rw_op;
struct iovec inline_vec, *iovec = &inline_vec;
switch (opcode) {
case IOCB_CMD_PREAD:
case IOCB_CMD_PREADV:
mode = FMODE_READ;
rw = READ;
rw_op = file->f_op->aio_read;
goto rw_common;
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITE:
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITEV:
mode = FMODE_WRITE;
rw = WRITE;
rw_op = file->f_op->aio_write;
goto rw_common;
rw_common:
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & mode)))
return -EBADF;
if (!rw_op)
return -EINVAL;
ret = (opcode == IOCB_CMD_PREADV ||
opcode == IOCB_CMD_PWRITEV)
? aio_setup_vectored_rw(req, rw, buf, &nr_segs,
&iovec, compat)
: aio_setup_single_vector(req, rw, buf, &nr_segs,
iovec);
if (!ret)
ret = rw_verify_area(rw, file, &req->ki_pos, req->ki_nbytes);
if (ret < 0) {
if (iovec != &inline_vec)
kfree(iovec);
return ret;
}
req->ki_nbytes = ret;
/* XXX: move/kill - rw_verify_area()? */
/* This matches the pread()/pwrite() logic */
if (req->ki_pos < 0) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (rw == WRITE)
file_start_write(file);
ret = rw_op(req, iovec, nr_segs, req->ki_pos);
if (rw == WRITE)
file_end_write(file);
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FDSYNC:
if (!file->f_op->aio_fsync)
return -EINVAL;
ret = file->f_op->aio_fsync(req, 1);
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FSYNC:
if (!file->f_op->aio_fsync)
return -EINVAL;
ret = file->f_op->aio_fsync(req, 0);
break;
default:
pr_debug("EINVAL: no operation provided\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (iovec != &inline_vec)
kfree(iovec);
if (ret != -EIOCBQUEUED) {
/*
* There's no easy way to restart the syscall since other AIO's
* may be already running. Just fail this IO with EINTR.
*/
if (unlikely(ret == -ERESTARTSYS || ret == -ERESTARTNOINTR ||
ret == -ERESTARTNOHAND ||
ret == -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK))
ret = -EINTR;
aio_complete(req, ret, 0);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: AIO: properly check iovec sizes
In Linus's tree, the iovec code has been reworked massively, but in
older kernels the AIO layer should be checking this before passing the
request on to other layers.
Many thanks to Ben Hawkes of Google Project Zero for pointing out the
issue.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Acked-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::ResetFeaturePolicy() {
RenderFrameHostImpl* parent_frame_host = GetParent();
const blink::FeaturePolicy* parent_policy =
parent_frame_host ? parent_frame_host->feature_policy() : nullptr;
blink::ParsedFeaturePolicy container_policy =
frame_tree_node()->effective_frame_policy().container_policy;
feature_policy_ = blink::FeaturePolicy::CreateFromParentPolicy(
parent_policy,
*DirectivesWithDisposition(
blink::mojom::FeaturePolicyDisposition::kEnforce, container_policy),
last_committed_origin_);
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dfaerror (char const *mesg)
{
error (EXIT_TROUBLE, 0, "%s", mesg);
/* notreached */
/* Tell static analyzers that this function does not return. */
abort ();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 6,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int be32_gt(__be32 a, __be32 b)
{
return (__force u32) a > (__force u32) b;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static boolean str_suffix(const char *begin_buf, const char *end_buf, const char *s)
{
const char *s1 = end_buf - 1, *s2 = strend(s) - 1;
if (*s1 == 10)
s1--;
while (s1 >= begin_buf && s2 >= s) {
if (*s1-- != *s2--)
return false;
}
return s2 < s;
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 76,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_push_read_sig(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr)
{
png_size_t num_checked = png_ptr->sig_bytes,
num_to_check = 8 - num_checked;
if (png_ptr->buffer_size < num_to_check)
{
num_to_check = png_ptr->buffer_size;
}
png_push_fill_buffer(png_ptr, &(info_ptr->signature[num_checked]),
num_to_check);
png_ptr->sig_bytes = (png_byte)(png_ptr->sig_bytes + num_to_check);
if (png_sig_cmp(info_ptr->signature, num_checked, num_to_check))
{
if (num_checked < 4 &&
png_sig_cmp(info_ptr->signature, num_checked, num_to_check - 4))
png_error(png_ptr, "Not a PNG file");
else
png_error(png_ptr, "PNG file corrupted by ASCII conversion");
}
else
{
if (png_ptr->sig_bytes >= 8)
{
png_ptr->process_mode = PNG_READ_CHUNK_MODE;
}
}
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void JSFloat64Array::putByIndex(JSCell* cell, ExecState* exec, unsigned propertyName, JSValue value, bool)
{
JSFloat64Array* thisObject = jsCast<JSFloat64Array*>(cell);
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(thisObject, &s_info);
thisObject->indexSetter(exec, propertyName, value);
return;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: KURL AXLayoutObject::url() const {
if (isAnchor() && isHTMLAnchorElement(m_layoutObject->node())) {
if (HTMLAnchorElement* anchor = toHTMLAnchorElement(anchorElement()))
return anchor->href();
}
if (isWebArea())
return m_layoutObject->document().url();
if (isImage() && isHTMLImageElement(m_layoutObject->node()))
return toHTMLImageElement(*m_layoutObject->node()).src();
if (isInputImage())
return toHTMLInputElement(m_layoutObject->node())->src();
return KURL();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(curl_exec)
{
CURLcode error;
zval *zid;
php_curl *ch;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "r", &zid) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(ch, php_curl *, zid, -1, le_curl_name, le_curl);
_php_curl_verify_handlers(ch, 1);
_php_curl_cleanup_handle(ch);
error = curl_easy_perform(ch->cp);
SAVE_CURL_ERROR(ch, error);
/* CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE is returned by HEAD requests */
if (error != CURLE_OK && error != CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE) {
smart_str_free(&ch->handlers->write->buf);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!Z_ISUNDEF(ch->handlers->std_err)) {
php_stream *stream;
stream = zend_fetch_resource(&ch->handlers->std_err, -1, NULL, NULL, 2, php_file_le_stream(), php_file_le_pstream());
if (stream) {
php_stream_flush(stream);
}
}
if (ch->handlers->write->method == PHP_CURL_RETURN && ch->handlers->write->buf.s) {
smart_str_0(&ch->handlers->write->buf);
RETURN_STR(zend_string_copy(ch->handlers->write->buf.s));
}
/* flush the file handle, so any remaining data is synched to disk */
if (ch->handlers->write->method == PHP_CURL_FILE && ch->handlers->write->fp) {
fflush(ch->handlers->write->fp);
}
if (ch->handlers->write_header->method == PHP_CURL_FILE && ch->handlers->write_header->fp) {
fflush(ch->handlers->write_header->fp);
}
if (ch->handlers->write->method == PHP_CURL_RETURN) {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
} else {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit MockScreenshotManager(content::NavigationControllerImpl* owner)
: content::NavigationEntryScreenshotManager(owner),
encoding_screenshot_in_progress_(false) {
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 144,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SynchronousCompositorImpl::~SynchronousCompositorImpl() {
SynchronousCompositorRegistryInProc::GetInstance()->UnregisterCompositor(
routing_id_, this);
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int claim_swapfile(struct swap_info_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
{
int error;
if (S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) {
p->bdev = bdgrab(I_BDEV(inode));
error = blkdev_get(p->bdev,
FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE | FMODE_EXCL,
sys_swapon);
if (error < 0) {
p->bdev = NULL;
return -EINVAL;
}
p->old_block_size = block_size(p->bdev);
error = set_blocksize(p->bdev, PAGE_SIZE);
if (error < 0)
return error;
p->flags |= SWP_BLKDEV;
} else if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
p->bdev = inode->i_sb->s_bdev;
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
if (IS_SWAPFILE(inode))
return -EBUSY;
} else
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Huff_setBloc(int _bloc)
{
bloc = _bloc;
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY EnumerateSecurityPackagesW(ULONG* pcPackages, PSecPkgInfoW* ppPackageInfo)
{
int index;
size_t size;
UINT32 cPackages;
SecPkgInfoW* pPackageInfo;
cPackages = sizeof(SecPkgInfoW_LIST) / sizeof(*(SecPkgInfoW_LIST));
size = sizeof(SecPkgInfoW) * cPackages;
pPackageInfo = (SecPkgInfoW*) sspi_ContextBufferAlloc(EnumerateSecurityPackagesIndex, size);
for (index = 0; index < (int) cPackages; index++)
{
pPackageInfo[index].fCapabilities = SecPkgInfoW_LIST[index]->fCapabilities;
pPackageInfo[index].wVersion = SecPkgInfoW_LIST[index]->wVersion;
pPackageInfo[index].wRPCID = SecPkgInfoW_LIST[index]->wRPCID;
pPackageInfo[index].cbMaxToken = SecPkgInfoW_LIST[index]->cbMaxToken;
pPackageInfo[index].Name = _wcsdup(SecPkgInfoW_LIST[index]->Name);
pPackageInfo[index].Comment = _wcsdup(SecPkgInfoW_LIST[index]->Comment);
}
*(pcPackages) = cPackages;
*(ppPackageInfo) = pPackageInfo;
return SEC_E_OK;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 58,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline double get_dither_value(VignetteContext *s)
{
double dv = 0;
if (s->do_dither) {
dv = s->dither / (double)(1LL<<32);
s->dither = s->dither * 1664525 + 1013904223;
}
return dv;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tracing_read_pipe(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct trace_iterator *iter = filp->private_data;
ssize_t sret;
/*
* Avoid more than one consumer on a single file descriptor
* This is just a matter of traces coherency, the ring buffer itself
* is protected.
*/
mutex_lock(&iter->mutex);
/* return any leftover data */
sret = trace_seq_to_user(&iter->seq, ubuf, cnt);
if (sret != -EBUSY)
goto out;
trace_seq_init(&iter->seq);
if (iter->trace->read) {
sret = iter->trace->read(iter, filp, ubuf, cnt, ppos);
if (sret)
goto out;
}
waitagain:
sret = tracing_wait_pipe(filp);
if (sret <= 0)
goto out;
/* stop when tracing is finished */
if (trace_empty(iter)) {
sret = 0;
goto out;
}
if (cnt >= PAGE_SIZE)
cnt = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
/* reset all but tr, trace, and overruns */
memset(&iter->seq, 0,
sizeof(struct trace_iterator) -
offsetof(struct trace_iterator, seq));
cpumask_clear(iter->started);
iter->pos = -1;
trace_event_read_lock();
trace_access_lock(iter->cpu_file);
while (trace_find_next_entry_inc(iter) != NULL) {
enum print_line_t ret;
int save_len = iter->seq.seq.len;
ret = print_trace_line(iter);
if (ret == TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE) {
/* don't print partial lines */
iter->seq.seq.len = save_len;
break;
}
if (ret != TRACE_TYPE_NO_CONSUME)
trace_consume(iter);
if (trace_seq_used(&iter->seq) >= cnt)
break;
/*
* Setting the full flag means we reached the trace_seq buffer
* size and we should leave by partial output condition above.
* One of the trace_seq_* functions is not used properly.
*/
WARN_ONCE(iter->seq.full, "full flag set for trace type %d",
iter->ent->type);
}
trace_access_unlock(iter->cpu_file);
trace_event_read_unlock();
/* Now copy what we have to the user */
sret = trace_seq_to_user(&iter->seq, ubuf, cnt);
if (iter->seq.seq.readpos >= trace_seq_used(&iter->seq))
trace_seq_init(&iter->seq);
/*
* If there was nothing to send to user, in spite of consuming trace
* entries, go back to wait for more entries.
*/
if (sret == -EBUSY)
goto waitagain;
out:
mutex_unlock(&iter->mutex);
return sret;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: test_bson_append_code (void)
{
bson_t *b;
bson_t *b2;
b = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_code (b, "code", -1, "var a = {};"));
b2 = get_bson ("test29.bson");
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL (b, b2);
bson_destroy (b);
bson_destroy (b2);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 77,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppListController::LoadProfileForWarmup() {
if (!IsWarmupNeeded())
return;
ProfileManager* profile_manager = g_browser_process->profile_manager();
base::FilePath profile_path(GetProfilePath(profile_manager->user_data_dir()));
profile_loader().LoadProfileInvalidatingOtherLoads(
profile_path,
base::Bind(&AppListController::OnLoadProfileForWarmup,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 113,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadPNGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
logging,
status;
MngInfo
*mng_info;
char
magic_number[MaxTextExtent];
ssize_t
count;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Enter ReadPNGImage()");
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
mng_info=(MngInfo *) NULL;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile");
/*
Verify PNG signature.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) magic_number);
if (count < 8 || memcmp(magic_number,"\211PNG\r\n\032\n",8) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Allocate a MngInfo structure.
*/
mng_info=(MngInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(MngInfo));
if (mng_info == (MngInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Initialize members of the MngInfo structure.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(mng_info,0,sizeof(MngInfo));
mng_info->image=image;
image=ReadOnePNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
mng_info=MngInfoFreeStruct(mng_info);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadPNGImage() with error");
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadPNGImage() with error.");
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
if ((IssRGBColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
((image->gamma < .45) || (image->gamma > .46)) &&
!(image->chromaticity.red_primary.x>0.6399f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x<0.6401f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y>0.3299f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y<0.3301f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x>0.2999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x<0.3001f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y>0.5999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y<0.6001f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x>0.1499f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x<0.1501f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y>0.0599f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y<0.0601f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x>0.3126f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x<0.3128f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y>0.3289f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y<0.3291f))
SetImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" page.w: %.20g, page.h: %.20g,page.x: %.20g, page.y: %.20g.",
(double) image->page.width,(double) image->page.height,
(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"exit ReadPNGImage()");
return(image);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 1 | 167,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: krb5_init_creds_set_password(krb5_context context,
krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
const char *password)
{
if (ctx->password) {
memset(ctx->password, 0, strlen(ctx->password));
free(ctx->password);
}
if (password) {
ctx->password = strdup(password);
if (ctx->password == NULL)
return krb5_enomem(context);
ctx->keyseed = (void *) ctx->password;
} else {
ctx->keyseed = NULL;
ctx->password = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auritor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320 | 0 | 89,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QuotaManager::GetAvailableSpace(const AvailableSpaceCallback& callback) {
if (is_incognito_) {
callback.Run(kQuotaStatusOk, kIncognitoDefaultTemporaryQuota);
return;
}
make_scoped_refptr(new AvailableSpaceQueryTask(this, callback))->Start();
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct in6_addr *ndp_msg_opt_rdnss_addr(struct ndp_msg *msg, int offset,
int addr_index)
{
static struct in6_addr addr;
struct __nd_opt_rdnss *rdnss =
ndp_msg_payload_opts_offset(msg, offset);
size_t len = rdnss->nd_opt_rdnss_len << 3; /* convert to bytes */
len -= in_struct_offset(struct __nd_opt_rdnss, nd_opt_rdnss_addresses);
if ((addr_index + 1) * sizeof(addr) > len)
return NULL;
memcpy(&addr, &rdnss->nd_opt_rdnss_addresses[addr_index * sizeof(addr)],
sizeof(addr));
return &addr;
}
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <julien.bernard@viagenie.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 53,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gsicc_open_search(const char* pname, int namelen, gs_memory_t *mem_gc,
const char* dirname, int dirlen, stream**strp)
{
char *buffer;
stream* str;
/* Check if we need to prepend the file name */
if ( dirname != NULL) {
/* If this fails, we will still try the file by itself and with
%rom% since someone may have left a space some of the spaces
as our defaults, even if they defined the directory to use.
This will occur only after searching the defined directory.
A warning is noted. */
buffer = (char *) gs_alloc_bytes(mem_gc, namelen + dirlen + 1,
"gsicc_open_search");
if (buffer == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
strcpy(buffer, dirname);
strcat(buffer, pname);
/* Just to make sure we were null terminated */
buffer[namelen + dirlen] = '\0';
str = sfopen(buffer, "r", mem_gc);
gs_free_object(mem_gc, buffer, "gsicc_open_search");
if (str != NULL) {
*strp = str;
return 0;
}
}
/* First just try it like it is */
str = sfopen(pname, "r", mem_gc);
if (str != NULL) {
*strp = str;
return 0;
}
/* If that fails, try %rom% */ /* FIXME: Not sure this is needed or correct */
strlen(DEFAULT_DIR_ICC),"gsicc_open_search");
if (buffer == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
strcpy(buffer, DEFAULT_DIR_ICC);
strcat(buffer, pname);
/* Just to make sure we were null terminated */
buffer[namelen + strlen(DEFAULT_DIR_ICC)] = '\0';
str = sfopen(buffer, "r", mem_gc);
gs_free_object(mem_gc, buffer, "gsicc_open_search");
if (str == NULL) {
gs_warn1("Could not find %s ",pname);
}
*strp = str;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 165,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebViewPrivate::didRelaunchProcess()
{
qWarning("WARNING: The web process has been successfully restarted.");
webPageProxy->drawingArea()->setSize(viewSize(), IntSize());
updateViewportSize();
updateUserScripts();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nm_ip4_config_get_dbus_path (const NMIP4Config *config)
{
NMIP4ConfigPrivate *priv = NM_IP4_CONFIG_GET_PRIVATE (config);
return priv->path;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iterate (const char *filename,
enum grub_fshelp_filetype filetype,
grub_fshelp_node_t node,
void *closure)
{
struct grub_ext2_dir_closure *c = closure;
struct grub_dirhook_info info;
grub_memset (&info, 0, sizeof (info));
if (! node->inode_read)
{
grub_ext2_read_inode (c->data, node->ino, &node->inode);
if (!grub_errno)
node->inode_read = 1;
grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
if (node->inode_read)
{
info.mtimeset = 1;
info.mtime = grub_le_to_cpu32 (node->inode.mtime);
}
info.dir = ((filetype & GRUB_FSHELP_TYPE_MASK) == GRUB_FSHELP_DIR);
grub_free (node);
return (c->hook != NULL)? c->hook (filename, &info, c->closure): 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 64,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderMessageFilter::OnCheckNotificationPermission(
const GURL& source_origin, int* result) {
#if defined(ENABLE_NOTIFICATIONS)
*result = GetContentClient()->browser()->
CheckDesktopNotificationPermission(source_origin, resource_context_,
render_process_id_);
#else
*result = WebKit::WebNotificationPresenter::PermissionAllowed;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 116,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rc_free_profile_array(gs_memory_t * mem, void *ptr_in, client_name_t cname)
{
cmm_dev_profile_t *icc_struct = (cmm_dev_profile_t *)ptr_in;
int k;
gs_memory_t *mem_nongc = icc_struct->memory;
if (icc_struct->rc.ref_count <= 1 ) {
/* Decrement any profiles. */
for (k = 0; k < NUM_DEVICE_PROFILES; k++) {
if (icc_struct->device_profile[k] != NULL) {
if_debug1m(gs_debug_flag_icc, mem_nongc,
"[icc] Releasing device profile %d\n", k);
rc_decrement(icc_struct->device_profile[k],
"rc_free_profile_array");
}
}
if (icc_struct->link_profile != NULL) {
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc,mem_nongc,"[icc] Releasing link profile\n");
rc_decrement(icc_struct->link_profile, "rc_free_profile_array");
}
if (icc_struct->proof_profile != NULL) {
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc,mem_nongc,"[icc] Releasing proof profile\n");
rc_decrement(icc_struct->proof_profile, "rc_free_profile_array");
}
if (icc_struct->oi_profile != NULL) {
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc,mem_nongc,"[icc] Releasing oi profile\n");
rc_decrement(icc_struct->oi_profile, "rc_free_profile_array");
}
if (icc_struct->postren_profile != NULL) {
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc, mem_nongc, "[icc] Releasing postren profile\n");
rc_decrement(icc_struct->postren_profile, "rc_free_profile_array");
}
if (icc_struct->spotnames != NULL) {
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc, mem_nongc, "[icc] Releasing spotnames\n");
/* Free the linked list in this object */
gsicc_free_spotnames(icc_struct->spotnames, mem_nongc);
/* Free the main object */
gs_free_object(mem_nongc, icc_struct->spotnames, "rc_free_profile_array");
}
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc,mem_nongc,"[icc] Releasing device profile struct\n");
gs_free_object(mem_nongc, icc_struct, "rc_free_profile_array");
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rfcomm_get_dev_list(void __user *arg)
{
struct rfcomm_dev *dev;
struct rfcomm_dev_list_req *dl;
struct rfcomm_dev_info *di;
int n = 0, size, err;
u16 dev_num;
BT_DBG("");
if (get_user(dev_num, (u16 __user *) arg))
return -EFAULT;
if (!dev_num || dev_num > (PAGE_SIZE * 4) / sizeof(*di))
return -EINVAL;
size = sizeof(*dl) + dev_num * sizeof(*di);
dl = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dl)
return -ENOMEM;
di = dl->dev_info;
spin_lock(&rfcomm_dev_lock);
list_for_each_entry(dev, &rfcomm_dev_list, list) {
if (test_bit(RFCOMM_TTY_RELEASED, &dev->flags))
continue;
(di + n)->id = dev->id;
(di + n)->flags = dev->flags;
(di + n)->state = dev->dlc->state;
(di + n)->channel = dev->channel;
bacpy(&(di + n)->src, &dev->src);
bacpy(&(di + n)->dst, &dev->dst);
if (++n >= dev_num)
break;
}
spin_unlock(&rfcomm_dev_lock);
dl->dev_num = n;
size = sizeof(*dl) + n * sizeof(*di);
err = copy_to_user(arg, dl, size);
kfree(dl);
return err ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in ioctl(RFCOMMGETDEVLIST)
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
rfcomm_dev_list_req inserted for alignment before copying it to
userland. Additionally there are two padding bytes in each instance of
struct rfcomm_dev_info. The ioctl() that for disclosures two bytes plus
dev_num times two bytes uninitialized kernel heap memory.
Allocate the memory using kzalloc() to fix this issue.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 169,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_check_drain_fc_complete(struct nfs4_session *ses)
{
if (!test_bit(NFS4_SESSION_DRAINING, &ses->session_state)) {
rpc_wake_up_first(&ses->fc_slot_table.slot_tbl_waitq,
nfs4_set_task_privileged, NULL);
return;
}
if (ses->fc_slot_table.highest_used_slotid != NFS4_NO_SLOT)
return;
dprintk("%s COMPLETE: Session Fore Channel Drained\n", __func__);
complete(&ses->fc_slot_table.complete);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NetworkThrottleManagerImpl::OnThrottlePriorityChanged(
NetworkThrottleManagerImpl::ThrottleImpl* throttle,
RequestPriority old_priority,
RequestPriority new_priority) {
if (throttle->IsBlocked() && new_priority != THROTTLED) {
UnblockThrottle(throttle);
}
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 156,311 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_available_mechs(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_name_t name, gss_cred_usage_t usage,
gss_const_key_value_set_t cred_store,
gss_cred_id_t *creds, gss_OID_set *rmechs, OM_uint32 *time_rec)
{
unsigned int i;
int found = 0;
OM_uint32 major_status = GSS_S_COMPLETE, tmpmin;
gss_OID_set mechs, goodmechs;
gss_OID_set_desc except_attrs;
gss_OID_desc attr_oids[2];
attr_oids[0] = *GSS_C_MA_DEPRECATED;
attr_oids[1] = *GSS_C_MA_NOT_DFLT_MECH;
except_attrs.count = 2;
except_attrs.elements = attr_oids;
major_status = gss_indicate_mechs_by_attrs(minor_status,
GSS_C_NO_OID_SET,
&except_attrs,
GSS_C_NO_OID_SET, &mechs);
if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
return (major_status);
}
major_status = gss_create_empty_oid_set(minor_status, rmechs);
if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
(void) gss_release_oid_set(minor_status, &mechs);
return (major_status);
}
for (i = 0; i < mechs->count && major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE; i++) {
if ((mechs->elements[i].length
!= spnego_mechanism.mech_type.length) ||
memcmp(mechs->elements[i].elements,
spnego_mechanism.mech_type.elements,
spnego_mechanism.mech_type.length)) {
major_status = gss_add_oid_set_member(minor_status,
&mechs->elements[i],
rmechs);
if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
found++;
}
}
/*
* If the caller wanted a list of creds returned,
* trim the list of mechanisms down to only those
* for which the creds are valid.
*/
if (found > 0 && major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE && creds != NULL) {
major_status = gss_acquire_cred_from(minor_status, name,
GSS_C_INDEFINITE,
*rmechs, usage,
cred_store, creds,
&goodmechs, time_rec);
/*
* Drop the old list in favor of the new
* "trimmed" list.
*/
(void) gss_release_oid_set(&tmpmin, rmechs);
if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
(void) gssint_copy_oid_set(&tmpmin,
goodmechs, rmechs);
(void) gss_release_oid_set(&tmpmin, &goodmechs);
}
}
(void) gss_release_oid_set(&tmpmin, &mechs);
if (found == 0 || major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
*minor_status = ERR_SPNEGO_NO_MECHS_AVAILABLE;
map_errcode(minor_status);
if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
return (major_status);
}
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-18 | 0 | 43,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int napi_poll(struct napi_struct *n, struct list_head *repoll)
{
void *have;
int work, weight;
list_del_init(&n->poll_list);
have = netpoll_poll_lock(n);
weight = n->weight;
/* This NAPI_STATE_SCHED test is for avoiding a race
* with netpoll's poll_napi(). Only the entity which
* obtains the lock and sees NAPI_STATE_SCHED set will
* actually make the ->poll() call. Therefore we avoid
* accidentally calling ->poll() when NAPI is not scheduled.
*/
work = 0;
if (test_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state)) {
work = n->poll(n, weight);
trace_napi_poll(n);
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(work > weight);
if (likely(work < weight))
goto out_unlock;
/* Drivers must not modify the NAPI state if they
* consume the entire weight. In such cases this code
* still "owns" the NAPI instance and therefore can
* move the instance around on the list at-will.
*/
if (unlikely(napi_disable_pending(n))) {
napi_complete(n);
goto out_unlock;
}
if (n->gro_list) {
/* flush too old packets
* If HZ < 1000, flush all packets.
*/
napi_gro_flush(n, HZ >= 1000);
}
/* Some drivers may have called napi_schedule
* prior to exhausting their budget.
*/
if (unlikely(!list_empty(&n->poll_list))) {
pr_warn_once("%s: Budget exhausted after napi rescheduled\n",
n->dev ? n->dev->name : "backlog");
goto out_unlock;
}
list_add_tail(&n->poll_list, repoll);
out_unlock:
netpoll_poll_unlock(have);
return work;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sk_buff *llcp_allocate_pdu(struct nfc_llcp_sock *sock,
u8 cmd, u16 size)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
if (sock->ssap == 0)
return NULL;
skb = nfc_alloc_send_skb(sock->dev, &sock->sk, MSG_DONTWAIT,
size + LLCP_HEADER_SIZE, &err);
if (skb == NULL) {
pr_err("Could not allocate PDU\n");
return NULL;
}
skb = llcp_add_header(skb, sock->dsap, sock->ssap, cmd);
return skb;
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *arch_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
return (vma == &gate_vma) ? "[vectors]" : NULL;
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 58,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FrameTreeNode* FindOpener(const WebContents::CreateParams& params) {
FrameTreeNode* opener_node = nullptr;
if (params.opener_render_frame_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* opener_rfh = RenderFrameHostImpl::FromID(
params.opener_render_process_id, params.opener_render_frame_id);
if (opener_rfh)
opener_node = opener_rfh->frame_tree_node();
}
return opener_node;
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,692 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandlePathParameteriCHROMIUM(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
static const char kFunctionName[] = "glPathParameteriCHROMIUM";
const volatile gles2::cmds::PathParameteriCHROMIUM& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::PathParameteriCHROMIUM*>(
cmd_data);
if (!features().chromium_path_rendering)
return error::kUnknownCommand;
GLuint service_id = 0;
if (!path_manager()->GetPath(static_cast<GLuint>(c.path), &service_id)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, kFunctionName,
"invalid path name");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLenum pname = static_cast<GLenum>(c.pname);
GLint value = static_cast<GLint>(c.value);
bool hasValueError = false;
switch (pname) {
case GL_PATH_STROKE_WIDTH_CHROMIUM:
case GL_PATH_MITER_LIMIT_CHROMIUM:
hasValueError = value < 0;
break;
case GL_PATH_STROKE_BOUND_CHROMIUM:
value = std::max(std::min(1, value), 0);
break;
case GL_PATH_END_CAPS_CHROMIUM:
hasValueError = !validators_->path_parameter_cap_values.IsValid(value);
break;
case GL_PATH_JOIN_STYLE_CHROMIUM:
hasValueError = !validators_->path_parameter_join_values.IsValid(value);
break;
default:
DCHECK(!validators_->path_parameter.IsValid(pname));
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR_INVALID_ENUM(kFunctionName, pname, "pname");
return error::kNoError;
}
DCHECK(validators_->path_parameter.IsValid(pname));
if (hasValueError) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, kFunctionName, "value not correct");
return error::kNoError;
}
api()->glPathParameteriNVFn(service_id, pname, value);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlSAXParseDTD(xmlSAXHandlerPtr sax, const xmlChar *ExternalID,
const xmlChar *SystemID) {
xmlDtdPtr ret = NULL;
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
xmlParserInputPtr input = NULL;
xmlCharEncoding enc;
xmlChar* systemIdCanonic;
if ((ExternalID == NULL) && (SystemID == NULL)) return(NULL);
ctxt = xmlNewParserCtxt();
if (ctxt == NULL) {
return(NULL);
}
/* We are loading a DTD */
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD;
/*
* Set-up the SAX context
*/
if (sax != NULL) {
if (ctxt->sax != NULL)
xmlFree(ctxt->sax);
ctxt->sax = sax;
ctxt->userData = ctxt;
}
/*
* Canonicalise the system ID
*/
systemIdCanonic = xmlCanonicPath(SystemID);
if ((SystemID != NULL) && (systemIdCanonic == NULL)) {
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* Ask the Entity resolver to load the damn thing
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->resolveEntity != NULL))
input = ctxt->sax->resolveEntity(ctxt->userData, ExternalID,
systemIdCanonic);
if (input == NULL) {
if (sax != NULL) ctxt->sax = NULL;
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
if (systemIdCanonic != NULL)
xmlFree(systemIdCanonic);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* plug some encoding conversion routines here.
*/
if (xmlPushInput(ctxt, input) < 0) {
if (sax != NULL) ctxt->sax = NULL;
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
if (systemIdCanonic != NULL)
xmlFree(systemIdCanonic);
return(NULL);
}
if ((ctxt->input->end - ctxt->input->cur) >= 4) {
enc = xmlDetectCharEncoding(ctxt->input->cur, 4);
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
}
if (input->filename == NULL)
input->filename = (char *) systemIdCanonic;
else
xmlFree(systemIdCanonic);
input->line = 1;
input->col = 1;
input->base = ctxt->input->cur;
input->cur = ctxt->input->cur;
input->free = NULL;
/*
* let's parse that entity knowing it's an external subset.
*/
ctxt->inSubset = 2;
ctxt->myDoc = xmlNewDoc(BAD_CAST "1.0");
if (ctxt->myDoc == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, "New Doc failed");
if (sax != NULL) ctxt->sax = NULL;
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(NULL);
}
ctxt->myDoc->properties = XML_DOC_INTERNAL;
ctxt->myDoc->extSubset = xmlNewDtd(ctxt->myDoc, BAD_CAST "none",
ExternalID, SystemID);
xmlParseExternalSubset(ctxt, ExternalID, SystemID);
if (ctxt->myDoc != NULL) {
if (ctxt->wellFormed) {
ret = ctxt->myDoc->extSubset;
ctxt->myDoc->extSubset = NULL;
if (ret != NULL) {
xmlNodePtr tmp;
ret->doc = NULL;
tmp = ret->children;
while (tmp != NULL) {
tmp->doc = NULL;
tmp = tmp->next;
}
}
} else {
ret = NULL;
}
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
if (sax != NULL) ctxt->sax = NULL;
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,519 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EnsureCompositorIsLockedForOrientationChange() {
if (!orientation_compositor_lock_) {
ui::Compositor* compositor =
widget_->GetNativeWindow()->layer()->GetCompositor();
orientation_compositor_lock_ = compositor->GetCompositorLock(
this, base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kOrientationLockTimeoutMs));
}
}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 137,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: component_loc(png_byte loc[4], png_uint_32 format)
{
/* Given a format return the number of channels and the location of
* each channel.
*
* The mask 'loc' contains the component offset of the channels in the
* following order. Note that if 'format' is grayscale the entries 1-3 must
* all contain the location of the gray channel.
*
* 0: alpha
* 1: red or gray
* 2: green or gray
* 3: blue or gray
*/
png_byte channels;
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR)
{
channels = 3;
loc[2] = 1;
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_BGR_SUPPORTED
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_BGR)
{
loc[1] = 2;
loc[3] = 0;
}
else
# endif
{
loc[1] = 0;
loc[3] = 2;
}
}
else
{
channels = 1;
loc[1] = loc[2] = loc[3] = 0;
}
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA)
{
# ifdef PNG_FORMAT_AFIRST_SUPPORTED
if (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_AFIRST)
{
loc[0] = 0;
++loc[1];
++loc[2];
++loc[3];
}
else
# endif
loc[0] = channels;
++channels;
}
else
loc[0] = 4; /* not present */
return channels;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Textfield::HandleAccessibleAction(const ui::AXActionData& action_data) {
if (action_data.action == ax::mojom::Action::kSetSelection) {
if (action_data.anchor_node_id != action_data.focus_node_id)
return false;
const gfx::Range range(action_data.anchor_offset, action_data.focus_offset);
return SetSelectionRange(range);
}
if (read_only())
return View::HandleAccessibleAction(action_data);
if (action_data.action == ax::mojom::Action::kSetValue) {
SetText(action_data.value);
ClearSelection();
return true;
} else if (action_data.action == ax::mojom::Action::kReplaceSelectedText) {
InsertOrReplaceText(action_data.value);
ClearSelection();
return true;
}
return View::HandleAccessibleAction(action_data);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ipgre_tap_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
ether_setup(dev);
dev->netdev_ops = &ipgre_tap_netdev_ops;
dev->destructor = free_netdev;
dev->iflink = 0;
dev->features |= NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL;
}
Commit Message: gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void phar_entry_remove(phar_entry_data *idata, char **error TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
phar_archive_data *phar;
phar = idata->phar;
if (idata->internal_file->fp_refcount < 2) {
if (idata->fp && idata->fp != idata->phar->fp && idata->fp != idata->phar->ufp && idata->fp != idata->internal_file->fp) {
php_stream_close(idata->fp);
}
zend_hash_del(&idata->phar->manifest, idata->internal_file->filename, idata->internal_file->filename_len);
idata->phar->refcount--;
efree(idata);
} else {
idata->internal_file->is_deleted = 1;
phar_entry_delref(idata TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (!phar->donotflush) {
phar_flush(phar, 0, 0, 0, error TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 4,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static s64 __kpit_elapsed(struct kvm *kvm)
{
s64 elapsed;
ktime_t remaining;
struct kvm_kpit_state *ps = &kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state;
if (!ps->pit_timer.period)
return 0;
/*
* The Counter does not stop when it reaches zero. In
* Modes 0, 1, 4, and 5 the Counter ``wraps around'' to
* the highest count, either FFFF hex for binary counting
* or 9999 for BCD counting, and continues counting.
* Modes 2 and 3 are periodic; the Counter reloads
* itself with the initial count and continues counting
* from there.
*/
remaining = hrtimer_get_remaining(&ps->pit_timer.timer);
elapsed = ps->pit_timer.period - ktime_to_ns(remaining);
elapsed = mod_64(elapsed, ps->pit_timer.period);
return elapsed;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PIT: control word is write-only
PIT control word (address 0x43) is write-only, reads are undefined.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: futex_wake(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags, int nr_wake, u32 bitset)
{
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
struct futex_q *this, *next;
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
int ret;
if (!bitset)
return -EINVAL;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key, VERIFY_READ);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
hb = hash_futex(&key);
/* Make sure we really have tasks to wakeup */
if (!hb_waiters_pending(hb))
goto out_put_key;
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &hb->chain, list) {
if (match_futex (&this->key, &key)) {
if (this->pi_state || this->rt_waiter) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* Check if one of the bits is set in both bitsets */
if (!(this->bitset & bitset))
continue;
wake_futex(this);
if (++ret >= nr_wake)
break;
}
}
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
out_put_key:
put_futex_key(&key);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 38,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass)
{
int len;
int utype;
int usetag;
int ndef = 0;
utype = it->utype;
/*
* Get length of content octets and maybe find out the underlying type.
*/
len = asn1_ex_i2c(pval, NULL, &utype, it);
/*
* If SEQUENCE, SET or OTHER then header is included in pseudo content
* octets so don't include tag+length. We need to check here because the
* call to asn1_ex_i2c() could change utype.
*/
if ((utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || (utype == V_ASN1_SET) ||
(utype == V_ASN1_OTHER))
usetag = 0;
else
usetag = 1;
/* -1 means omit type */
if (len == -1)
return 0;
/* -2 return is special meaning use ndef */
if (len == -2) {
ndef = 2;
len = 0;
}
/* If not implicitly tagged get tag from underlying type */
if (tag == -1)
tag = utype;
/* Output tag+length followed by content octets */
if (out) {
if (usetag)
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, len, tag, aclass);
asn1_ex_i2c(pval, *out, &utype, it);
if (ndef)
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
else
*out += len;
}
if (usetag)
return ASN1_object_size(ndef, len, tag);
return len;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
fwd_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(0);
inv_txfm_ = GET_PARAM(1);
version_ = GET_PARAM(2); // 0: high precision forward transform
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void run_event_gtk_alert(const char *msg, void *args)
{
GtkWidget *dialog = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(g_wnd_assistant),
GTK_DIALOG_MODAL | GTK_DIALOG_DESTROY_WITH_PARENT,
GTK_MESSAGE_WARNING,
GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
"%s", msg);
char *tagged_msg = tag_url(msg, "\n");
gtk_message_dialog_set_markup(GTK_MESSAGE_DIALOG(dialog), tagged_msg);
free(tagged_msg);
gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(dialog));
gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
log_request_response_communication(msg, NULL, (struct analyze_event_data *)args);
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,857 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double_unlock_hb(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb2)
{
spin_unlock(&hb1->lock);
if (hb1 != hb2)
spin_unlock(&hb2->lock);
}
Commit Message: futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 38,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int l2tp_ip6_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int flags)
{
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED))
return 0;
return __udp_disconnect(sk, flags);
}
Commit Message: l2tp: fix racy SOCK_ZAPPED flag check in l2tp_ip{,6}_bind()
Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind().
Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between
the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way,
a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bind_table. Releasing it
would then leave a stale pointer there, generating use-after-free
errors when walking through the list or modifying adjacent entries.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 at addr ffff8800081b0ed8
Write of size 8 by task syz-executor/10987
CPU: 0 PID: 10987 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #39
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
ffff880031d97838 ffffffff829f835b ffff88001b5a1640 ffff8800081b0ec0
ffff8800081b15a0 ffff8800081b6d20 ffff880031d97860 ffffffff8174d3cc
ffff880031d978f0 ffff8800081b0e80 ffff88001b5a1640 ffff880031d978e0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff829f835b>] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8174d3cc>] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156
[< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194
[<ffffffff8174d666>] kasan_report_error+0x1f6/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283
[< inline >] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303
[<ffffffff8174db7e>] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:329
[< inline >] __write_once_size ./include/linux/compiler.h:249
[< inline >] __hlist_del ./include/linux/list.h:622
[< inline >] hlist_del_init ./include/linux/list.h:637
[<ffffffff8579047e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:239
[<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Object at ffff8800081b0ec0, in cache L2TP/IPv6 size: 1448
Allocated:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c9ad>] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cee2>] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817476a8>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2721
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4f6a9>] sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:1326
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c58ac8>] sk_alloc+0x38/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:1388
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851ddf67>] inet6_create+0x2d7/0x1000 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:182
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4af7b>] __sock_create+0x37b/0x640 net/socket.c:1153
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sock_create net/socket.c:1193
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1223
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4b46f>] SyS_socket+0xef/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1203
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d685>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc6
Freed:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cf61>] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81748b28>] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x330 mm/slub.c:2973
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1369
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c541eb>] __sk_destruct+0x32b/0x4f0 net/core/sock.c:1444
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5aca4>] sk_destruct+0x44/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1452
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5ad33>] __sk_free+0x53/0x220 net/core/sock.c:1460
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5af23>] sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1471
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5cb6c>] sk_common_release+0x28c/0x3e0 ./include/net/sock.h:1589
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8579044e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x1fe/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:243
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8800081b0d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8800081b0e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8800081b0e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8800081b0f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8800081b0f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
The same issue exists with l2tp_ip_bind() and l2tp_ip_bind_table.
Fixes: c51ce49735c1 ("l2tp: fix oops in L2TP IP sockets for connect() AF_UNSPEC case")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 70,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __fput(struct file *file)
{
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_path.mnt;
struct inode *inode = file->f_inode;
might_sleep();
fsnotify_close(file);
/*
* The function eventpoll_release() should be the first called
* in the file cleanup chain.
*/
eventpoll_release(file);
locks_remove_flock(file);
if (unlikely(file->f_flags & FASYNC)) {
if (file->f_op->fasync)
file->f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0);
}
ima_file_free(file);
if (file->f_op->release)
file->f_op->release(inode, file);
security_file_free(file);
if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL &&
!(file->f_mode & FMODE_PATH))) {
cdev_put(inode->i_cdev);
}
fops_put(file->f_op);
put_pid(file->f_owner.pid);
if ((file->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
i_readcount_dec(inode);
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
drop_file_write_access(file);
file->f_path.dentry = NULL;
file->f_path.mnt = NULL;
file->f_inode = NULL;
file_free(file);
dput(dentry);
mntput(mnt);
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 46,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vtnr_from_tty(const char *tty) {
int i, r;
assert(tty);
tty = skip_dev_prefix(tty);
if (!startswith(tty, "tty") )
return -EINVAL;
if (tty[3] < '0' || tty[3] > '9')
return -EINVAL;
r = safe_atoi(tty+3, &i);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (i < 0 || i > 63)
return -EINVAL;
return i;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255 | 0 | 92,421 |
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