instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t __nfs4_get_acl_uncached(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct page *pages[NFS4ACL_MAXPAGES] = {NULL, };
struct nfs_getaclargs args = {
.fh = NFS_FH(inode),
.acl_pages = pages,
.acl_len = buflen,
};
struct nfs_getaclres res = {
.acl_len = buflen,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_GETACL],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
unsigned int npages = DIV_ROUND_UP(buflen, PAGE_SIZE);
int ret = -ENOMEM, i;
/* As long as we're doing a round trip to the server anyway,
* let's be prepared for a page of acl data. */
if (npages == 0)
npages = 1;
if (npages > ARRAY_SIZE(pages))
return -ERANGE;
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pages[i])
goto out_free;
}
/* for decoding across pages */
res.acl_scratch = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!res.acl_scratch)
goto out_free;
args.acl_len = npages * PAGE_SIZE;
args.acl_pgbase = 0;
dprintk("%s buf %p buflen %zu npages %d args.acl_len %zu\n",
__func__, buf, buflen, npages, args.acl_len);
ret = nfs4_call_sync(NFS_SERVER(inode)->client, NFS_SERVER(inode),
&msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
/* Handle the case where the passed-in buffer is too short */
if (res.acl_flags & NFS4_ACL_TRUNC) {
/* Did the user only issue a request for the acl length? */
if (buf == NULL)
goto out_ok;
ret = -ERANGE;
goto out_free;
}
nfs4_write_cached_acl(inode, pages, res.acl_data_offset, res.acl_len);
if (buf)
_copy_from_pages(buf, pages, res.acl_data_offset, res.acl_len);
out_ok:
ret = res.acl_len;
out_free:
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++)
if (pages[i])
__free_page(pages[i]);
if (res.acl_scratch)
__free_page(res.acl_scratch);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 165,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kmem_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *head)
{
struct kmem_cache *cachep;
struct page *page;
page = container_of(head, struct page, rcu_head);
cachep = page->slab_cache;
kmem_freepages(cachep, page);
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sk_buff *__build_skb(void *data, unsigned int frag_size)
{
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int size = frag_size ? : ksize(data);
skb = kmem_cache_alloc(skbuff_head_cache, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return NULL;
size -= SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info));
memset(skb, 0, offsetof(struct sk_buff, tail));
skb->truesize = SKB_TRUESIZE(size);
atomic_set(&skb->users, 1);
skb->head = data;
skb->data = data;
skb_reset_tail_pointer(skb);
skb->end = skb->tail + size;
skb->mac_header = (typeof(skb->mac_header))~0U;
skb->transport_header = (typeof(skb->transport_header))~0U;
/* make sure we initialize shinfo sequentially */
shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
memset(shinfo, 0, offsetof(struct skb_shared_info, dataref));
atomic_set(&shinfo->dataref, 1);
kmemcheck_annotate_variable(shinfo->destructor_arg);
return skb;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 67,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void VoidMethodDocumentTypeArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
V8ThrowException::ThrowTypeError(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("voidMethodDocumentTypeArg", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())));
return;
}
DocumentType* document_type_arg;
document_type_arg = V8DocumentType::ToImplWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), info[0]);
if (!document_type_arg) {
V8ThrowException::ThrowTypeError(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("voidMethodDocumentTypeArg", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::ArgumentNotOfType(0, "DocumentType")));
return;
}
impl->voidMethodDocumentTypeArg(document_type_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void wake_up_nohz_cpu(int cpu)
{
if (!wake_up_full_nohz_cpu(cpu))
wake_up_idle_cpu(cpu);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,692 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScopedRenderTo::~ScopedRenderTo() {
if (framebuffer_)
framebuffer_->OnDidRenderTo();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,074 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlAttrNormalizeSpace(const xmlChar *src, xmlChar *dst)
{
if ((src == NULL) || (dst == NULL))
return(NULL);
while (*src == 0x20) src++;
while (*src != 0) {
if (*src == 0x20) {
while (*src == 0x20) src++;
if (*src != 0)
*dst++ = 0x20;
} else {
*dst++ = *src++;
}
}
*dst = 0;
if (dst == src)
return(NULL);
return(dst);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::ScheduleUIUpdate(WebContents* source,
unsigned changed_flags) {
DCHECK(source);
int index = tab_strip_model_->GetIndexOfWebContents(source);
DCHECK_NE(TabStripModel::kNoTab, index);
if (changed_flags & content::INVALIDATE_TYPE_URL) {
if (source == tab_strip_model_->GetActiveWebContents()) {
UpdateToolbar(false);
} else {
window_->ResetToolbarTabState(source);
}
changed_flags &= ~content::INVALIDATE_TYPE_URL;
}
if (changed_flags & content::INVALIDATE_TYPE_LOAD) {
tab_strip_model_->UpdateWebContentsStateAt(
tab_strip_model_->GetIndexOfWebContents(source),
TabChangeType::kLoadingOnly);
}
if (changed_flags == 0)
return;
scheduled_updates_[source] |= changed_flags;
if (!chrome_updater_factory_.HasWeakPtrs()) {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&Browser::ProcessPendingUIUpdates,
chrome_updater_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kUIUpdateCoalescingTimeMS));
}
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int wc_ecc_get_curve_idx(int curve_id)
{
int curve_idx;
for (curve_idx = 0; ecc_sets[curve_idx].size != 0; curve_idx++) {
if (curve_id == ecc_sets[curve_idx].id)
break;
}
if (ecc_sets[curve_idx].size == 0) {
return ECC_CURVE_INVALID;
}
return curve_idx;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 81,888 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_decode_seek(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_seek *seek)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
status = nfsd4_decode_stateid(argp, &seek->seek_stateid);
if (status)
return status;
READ_BUF(8 + 4);
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &seek->seek_offset);
seek->seek_whence = be32_to_cpup(p);
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool SetMatShaper(cmsPipeline* Dest, cmsToneCurve* Curve1[3], cmsMAT3* Mat, cmsVEC3* Off, cmsToneCurve* Curve2[3], cmsUInt32Number* OutputFormat)
{
MatShaper8Data* p;
int i, j;
cmsBool Is8Bits = _cmsFormatterIs8bit(*OutputFormat);
p = (MatShaper8Data*) _cmsMalloc(Dest ->ContextID, sizeof(MatShaper8Data));
if (p == NULL) return FALSE;
p -> ContextID = Dest -> ContextID;
FillFirstShaper(p ->Shaper1R, Curve1[0]);
FillFirstShaper(p ->Shaper1G, Curve1[1]);
FillFirstShaper(p ->Shaper1B, Curve1[2]);
FillSecondShaper(p ->Shaper2R, Curve2[0], Is8Bits);
FillSecondShaper(p ->Shaper2G, Curve2[1], Is8Bits);
FillSecondShaper(p ->Shaper2B, Curve2[2], Is8Bits);
for (i=0; i < 3; i++) {
for (j=0; j < 3; j++) {
p ->Mat[i][j] = DOUBLE_TO_1FIXED14(Mat->v[i].n[j]);
}
}
for (i=0; i < 3; i++) {
if (Off == NULL) {
p ->Off[i] = 0;
}
else {
p ->Off[i] = DOUBLE_TO_1FIXED14(Off->n[i]);
}
}
if (Is8Bits)
*OutputFormat |= OPTIMIZED_SH(1);
_cmsPipelineSetOptimizationParameters(Dest, MatShaperEval16, (void*) p, FreeMatShaper, DupMatShaper);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: make_caption(struct table *t, struct html_feed_environ *h_env)
{
struct html_feed_environ henv;
struct readbuffer obuf;
struct environment envs[MAX_ENV_LEVEL];
int limit;
if (t->caption->length <= 0)
return;
if (t->total_width > 0)
limit = t->total_width;
else
limit = h_env->limit;
init_henv(&henv, &obuf, envs, MAX_ENV_LEVEL, newTextLineList(),
limit, h_env->envs[h_env->envc].indent);
HTMLlineproc1("<center>", &henv);
HTMLlineproc0(t->caption->ptr, &henv, FALSE);
HTMLlineproc1("</center>", &henv);
if (t->total_width < henv.maxlimit)
t->total_width = henv.maxlimit;
limit = h_env->limit;
h_env->limit = t->total_width;
HTMLlineproc1("<center>", h_env);
HTMLlineproc0(t->caption->ptr, h_env, FALSE);
HTMLlineproc1("</center>", h_env);
h_env->limit = limit;
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 84,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int nfs4_server_supports_labels(struct nfs_server *server)
{
return server->caps & NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, key)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_FILENAME)) {
RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);
} else {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 167,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vrrp_track_if_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
alloc_value_block(alloc_vrrp_track_if, vector_slot(strvec, 0));
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ftoa_bounded_extra(JsVarFloat val,char *str, size_t len, int radix, int fractionalDigits) {
const JsVarFloat stopAtError = 0.0000001;
if (isnan(val)) strncpy(str,"NaN",len);
else if (!isfinite(val)) {
if (val<0) strncpy(str,"-Infinity",len);
else strncpy(str,"Infinity",len);
} else {
if (val<0) {
if (--len <= 0) { *str=0; return; } // bounds check
*(str++) = '-';
val = -val;
}
if (((JsVarInt)(val+stopAtError)) == (1+(JsVarInt)val))
val = (JsVarFloat)(1+(JsVarInt)val);
JsVarFloat d = 1;
while (d*radix <= val) d*=radix;
while (d >= 1) {
int v = (int)(val / d);
val -= v*d;
if (--len <= 0) { *str=0; return; } // bounds check
*(str++) = itoch(v);
d /= radix;
}
#ifndef USE_NO_FLOATS
if (((fractionalDigits<0) && val>0) || fractionalDigits>0) {
bool hasPt = false;
val*=radix;
while (((fractionalDigits<0) && (fractionalDigits>-12) && (val > stopAtError)) || (fractionalDigits > 0)) {
int v = (int)(val+((fractionalDigits==1) ? 0.4 : 0.00000001) );
val = (val-v)*radix;
if (v==radix) v=radix-1;
if (!hasPt) {
hasPt = true;
if (--len <= 0) { *str=0; return; } // bounds check
*(str++)='.';
}
if (--len <= 0) { *str=0; return; } // bounds check
*(str++)=itoch(v);
fractionalDigits--;
}
}
#endif
*(str++)=0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix stack size detection on Linux (fix #1427)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 82,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: formatof(const char *arg)
{
char *ep;
unsigned long format = strtoul(arg, &ep, 0);
if (ep > arg && *ep == 0 && format < FORMAT_COUNT)
return (png_uint_32)format;
else for (format=0; format < FORMAT_COUNT; ++format)
{
if (strcmp(format_names[format], arg) == 0)
return (png_uint_32)format;
}
fprintf(stderr, "pngstest: format name '%s' invalid\n", arg);
return FORMAT_COUNT;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool is_class_idx_in_code_classes(RBinDexObj *bin, int class_idx) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < bin->header.class_size; i++) {
if (class_idx == bin->classes[i].class_id) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: fix #6872
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 68,104 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: distance_value(MinMax* mm)
{
/* 1000 / (min-max-dist + 1) */
static const short int dist_vals[] = {
1000, 500, 333, 250, 200, 167, 143, 125, 111, 100,
91, 83, 77, 71, 67, 63, 59, 56, 53, 50,
48, 45, 43, 42, 40, 38, 37, 36, 34, 33,
32, 31, 30, 29, 29, 28, 27, 26, 26, 25,
24, 24, 23, 23, 22, 22, 21, 21, 20, 20,
20, 19, 19, 19, 18, 18, 18, 17, 17, 17,
16, 16, 16, 16, 15, 15, 15, 15, 14, 14,
14, 14, 14, 14, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13,
12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 11, 11, 11, 11,
11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10
};
OnigLen d;
if (mm->max == INFINITE_LEN) return 0;
d = mm->max - mm->min;
if (d < (OnigLen )(sizeof(dist_vals)/sizeof(dist_vals[0])))
/* return dist_vals[d] * 16 / (mm->min + 12); */
return (int )dist_vals[d];
else
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Extension::HasHostPermission(const GURL& url) const {
for (URLPatternList::const_iterator host = host_permissions().begin();
host != host_permissions().end(); ++host) {
if (url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeUIScheme) &&
url.host() != chrome::kChromeUIFaviconHost &&
location() != Extension::COMPONENT)
return false;
if (host->MatchesURL(url))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Prevent extensions from defining homepages with schemes other than valid web extents.
BUG=84402
TEST=ExtensionManifestTest.ParseHomepageURLs
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7089014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87722 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void stdcbf(void *cb, char *buf, int inbuf){
int delay = 0;
int i;
for(i = 0; i < inbuf; i++){
switch(buf[i]){
case '&':
if(delay){
stdpr((struct printparam*)cb, buf+i-delay, delay);
delay = 0;
}
stdpr((struct printparam*)cb, "&", 5);
break;
case '<':
if(delay){
stdpr((struct printparam*)cb, buf+i-delay, delay);
delay = 0;
}
stdpr((struct printparam*)cb, "<", 4);
break;
case '>':
if(delay){
stdpr((struct printparam*)cb, buf+i-delay, delay);
delay = 0;
}
stdpr((struct printparam*)cb, ">", 4);
break;
default:
delay++;
break;
}
}
if(delay){
stdpr((struct printparam*)cb, buf+i-delay, delay);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix: out-of-bounds write and few more bugs in 'admin' configuration upload
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 88,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static LayoutRect MapLocalRectToAncestorLayer(
const LayoutBox& box,
const LayoutRect& local_rect,
const PaintLayer& ancestor_layer) {
TransformState transform_state(TransformState::kApplyTransformDirection,
FloatPoint(local_rect.Location()));
box.MapLocalToAncestor(&ancestor_layer.GetLayoutObject(), transform_state,
kApplyContainerFlip);
transform_state.Flatten();
return LayoutRect(LayoutPoint(transform_state.LastPlanarPoint()),
local_rect.Size());
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBindFragDataLocationIndexed(
GLuint program_id,
GLuint colorName,
GLuint index,
const std::string& name) {
const char kFunctionName[] = "glBindFragDataLocationIndexEXT";
if (!StringIsValidForGLES(name)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, kFunctionName, "invalid character");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (ProgramManager::HasBuiltInPrefix(name)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, kFunctionName, "reserved prefix");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (index != 0 && index != 1) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, kFunctionName, "index out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
if ((index == 0 && colorName >= group_->max_draw_buffers()) ||
(index == 1 && colorName >= group_->max_dual_source_draw_buffers())) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, kFunctionName,
"colorName out of range for the color index");
return error::kNoError;
}
Program* program = GetProgramInfoNotShader(program_id, kFunctionName);
if (!program) {
return error::kNoError;
}
program->SetProgramOutputLocationIndexedBinding(name, colorName, index);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RenderProcessHostCount() {
return content::RenderProcessHost::GetCurrentRenderProcessCountForTesting();
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::ShowBookmarkBubble(const GURL& url,
bool already_bookmarked) {
toolbar_->GetLocationBarView()->ShowStarBubble(url, !already_bookmarked);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lzss_offset_for_position(struct lzss *lzss, int64_t pos)
{
return (int)(pos & lzss->mask);
}
Commit Message: Issue 719: Fix for TALOS-CAN-154
A RAR file with an invalid zero dictionary size was not being
rejected, leading to a zero-sized allocation for the dictionary
storage which was then overwritten during the dictionary initialization.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco for
reporting this.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nvmet_fc_getassociationid(u64 connectionid)
{
return connectionid & ~NVMET_FC_QUEUEID_MASK;
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: arcmsr_request_irq(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
int i, j, r;
struct msix_entry entries[ARCMST_NUM_MSIX_VECTORS];
for (i = 0; i < ARCMST_NUM_MSIX_VECTORS; i++)
entries[i].entry = i;
r = pci_enable_msix_range(pdev, entries, 1, ARCMST_NUM_MSIX_VECTORS);
if (r < 0)
goto msi_int;
acb->msix_vector_count = r;
for (i = 0; i < r; i++) {
if (request_irq(entries[i].vector,
arcmsr_do_interrupt, 0, "arcmsr", acb)) {
pr_warn("arcmsr%d: request_irq =%d failed!\n",
acb->host->host_no, entries[i].vector);
for (j = 0 ; j < i ; j++)
free_irq(entries[j].vector, acb);
pci_disable_msix(pdev);
goto msi_int;
}
acb->entries[i] = entries[i];
}
acb->acb_flags |= ACB_F_MSIX_ENABLED;
pr_info("arcmsr%d: msi-x enabled\n", acb->host->host_no);
return SUCCESS;
msi_int:
if (pci_enable_msi_exact(pdev, 1) < 0)
goto legacy_int;
if (request_irq(pdev->irq, arcmsr_do_interrupt,
IRQF_SHARED, "arcmsr", acb)) {
pr_warn("arcmsr%d: request_irq =%d failed!\n",
acb->host->host_no, pdev->irq);
pci_disable_msi(pdev);
goto legacy_int;
}
acb->acb_flags |= ACB_F_MSI_ENABLED;
pr_info("arcmsr%d: msi enabled\n", acb->host->host_no);
return SUCCESS;
legacy_int:
if (request_irq(pdev->irq, arcmsr_do_interrupt,
IRQF_SHARED, "arcmsr", acb)) {
pr_warn("arcmsr%d: request_irq = %d failed!\n",
acb->host->host_no, pdev->irq);
return FAILED;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rose_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_rose *addr = (struct sockaddr_rose *)uaddr;
struct net_device *dev;
ax25_address *source;
ax25_uid_assoc *user;
int n;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED))
return -EINVAL;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_rose) && addr_len != sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_rose))
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->srose_family != AF_ROSE)
return -EINVAL;
if (addr_len == sizeof(struct sockaddr_rose) && addr->srose_ndigis > 1)
return -EINVAL;
if ((unsigned int) addr->srose_ndigis > ROSE_MAX_DIGIS)
return -EINVAL;
if ((dev = rose_dev_get(&addr->srose_addr)) == NULL) {
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "ROSE: bind failed: invalid address\n");
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
}
source = &addr->srose_call;
user = ax25_findbyuid(current_euid());
if (user) {
rose->source_call = user->call;
ax25_uid_put(user);
} else {
if (ax25_uid_policy && !capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
return -EACCES;
rose->source_call = *source;
}
rose->source_addr = addr->srose_addr;
rose->device = dev;
rose->source_ndigis = addr->srose_ndigis;
if (addr_len == sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_rose)) {
struct full_sockaddr_rose *full_addr = (struct full_sockaddr_rose *)uaddr;
for (n = 0 ; n < addr->srose_ndigis ; n++)
rose->source_digis[n] = full_addr->srose_digis[n];
} else {
if (rose->source_ndigis == 1) {
rose->source_digis[0] = addr->srose_digi;
}
}
rose_insert_socket(sk);
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "ROSE: socket is bound\n");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mailimf_ignore_field_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx)
{
int has_field;
size_t cur_token;
int state;
size_t terminal;
has_field = FALSE;
cur_token = * indx;
terminal = cur_token;
state = UNSTRUCTURED_START;
/* check if this is not a beginning CRLF */
if (cur_token >= length)
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
switch (message[cur_token]) {
case '\r':
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
case '\n':
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
}
while (state != UNSTRUCTURED_OUT) {
switch(state) {
case UNSTRUCTURED_START:
if (cur_token >= length)
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
switch(message[cur_token]) {
case '\r':
state = UNSTRUCTURED_CR;
break;
case '\n':
state = UNSTRUCTURED_LF;
break;
case ':':
has_field = TRUE;
state = UNSTRUCTURED_START;
break;
default:
state = UNSTRUCTURED_START;
break;
}
break;
case UNSTRUCTURED_CR:
if (cur_token >= length)
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
switch(message[cur_token]) {
case '\n':
state = UNSTRUCTURED_LF;
break;
case ':':
has_field = TRUE;
state = UNSTRUCTURED_START;
break;
default:
state = UNSTRUCTURED_START;
break;
}
break;
case UNSTRUCTURED_LF:
if (cur_token >= length) {
terminal = cur_token;
state = UNSTRUCTURED_OUT;
break;
}
switch(message[cur_token]) {
case '\t':
case ' ':
state = UNSTRUCTURED_WSP;
break;
default:
terminal = cur_token;
state = UNSTRUCTURED_OUT;
break;
}
break;
case UNSTRUCTURED_WSP:
if (cur_token >= length)
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
switch(message[cur_token]) {
case '\r':
state = UNSTRUCTURED_CR;
break;
case '\n':
state = UNSTRUCTURED_LF;
break;
case ':':
has_field = TRUE;
state = UNSTRUCTURED_START;
break;
default:
state = UNSTRUCTURED_START;
break;
}
break;
}
cur_token ++;
}
if (!has_field)
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
* indx = terminal;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 66,198 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_errorname(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, int code, ref * perror_name)
{
ref *perrordict, *pErrorNames;
if (dict_find_string(systemdict, "errordict", &perrordict) <= 0 ||
dict_find_string(systemdict, "ErrorNames", &pErrorNames) <= 0
)
return_error(gs_error_undefined); /* errordict or ErrorNames not found?! */
return array_get(imemory, pErrorNames, (long)(-code - 1), perror_name);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 2,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: print_lcp_config_options(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, int length)
{
int len, opt;
if (length < 2)
return 0;
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 2);
len = p[1];
opt = p[0];
if (length < len)
return 0;
if (len < 2) {
if ((opt >= LCPOPT_MIN) && (opt <= LCPOPT_MAX))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (0x%02x), length %u (length bogus, should be >= 2)",
lcpconfopts[opt], opt, len));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tunknown LCP option 0x%02x", opt));
return 0;
}
if ((opt >= LCPOPT_MIN) && (opt <= LCPOPT_MAX))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (0x%02x), length %u", lcpconfopts[opt], opt, len));
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tunknown LCP option 0x%02x", opt));
return len;
}
switch (opt) {
case LCPOPT_VEXT:
if (len < 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 6)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 3);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Vendor: %s (%u)",
tok2str(oui_values,"Unknown",EXTRACT_24BITS(p+2)),
EXTRACT_24BITS(p + 2)));
#if 0
ND_TCHECK(p[5]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", kind: 0x%02x", p[5]));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Value: 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < len - 6; i++) {
ND_TCHECK(p[6 + i]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", p[6 + i]));
}
#endif
break;
case LCPOPT_MRU:
if (len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be = 4)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(p + 2)));
break;
case LCPOPT_ACCM:
if (len != 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be = 6)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(p + 2)));
break;
case LCPOPT_AP:
if (len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 4)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s", tok2str(ppptype2str, "Unknown Auth Proto (0x04x)", EXTRACT_16BITS(p + 2))));
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(p+2)) {
case PPP_CHAP:
ND_TCHECK(p[4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s", tok2str(authalg_values, "Unknown Auth Alg %u", p[4])));
break;
case PPP_PAP: /* fall through */
case PPP_EAP:
case PPP_SPAP:
case PPP_SPAP_OLD:
break;
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", len);
}
break;
case LCPOPT_QP:
if (len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 4)"));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 2);
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(p+2) == PPP_LQM)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": LQR"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": unknown"));
break;
case LCPOPT_MN:
if (len != 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be = 6)"));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(p + 2)));
break;
case LCPOPT_PFC:
break;
case LCPOPT_ACFC:
break;
case LCPOPT_LD:
if (len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be = 4)"));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(p + 2)));
break;
case LCPOPT_CBACK:
if (len < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 3)"));
return 0;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": "));
ND_TCHECK(p[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Callback Operation %s (%u)",
tok2str(ppp_callback_values, "Unknown", p[2]),
p[2]));
break;
case LCPOPT_MLMRRU:
if (len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be = 4)"));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(p + 2)));
break;
case LCPOPT_MLED:
if (len < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 3)"));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK(p[2]);
switch (p[2]) { /* class */
case MEDCLASS_NULL:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Null"));
break;
case MEDCLASS_LOCAL:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Local")); /* XXX */
break;
case MEDCLASS_IPV4:
if (len != 7) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be = 7)"));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 3), 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv4 %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, p + 3)));
break;
case MEDCLASS_MAC:
if (len != 9) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be = 9)"));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 3), 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": MAC %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, p + 3)));
break;
case MEDCLASS_MNB:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Magic-Num-Block")); /* XXX */
break;
case MEDCLASS_PSNDN:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": PSNDN")); /* XXX */
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Unknown class %u", p[2]));
break;
}
break;
/* XXX: to be supported */
#if 0
case LCPOPT_DEP6:
case LCPOPT_FCSALT:
case LCPOPT_SDP:
case LCPOPT_NUMMODE:
case LCPOPT_DEP12:
case LCPOPT_DEP14:
case LCPOPT_DEP15:
case LCPOPT_DEP16:
case LCPOPT_MLSSNHF:
case LCPOPT_PROP:
case LCPOPT_DCEID:
case LCPOPT_MPP:
case LCPOPT_LCPAOPT:
case LCPOPT_COBS:
case LCPOPT_PE:
case LCPOPT_MLHF:
case LCPOPT_I18N:
case LCPOPT_SDLOS:
case LCPOPT_PPPMUX:
break;
#endif
default:
/*
* Unknown option; dump it as raw bytes now if we're
* not going to do so below.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 2)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t ", len - 2);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t ", len - 2); /* exclude TLV header */
return len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|lcp]"));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13029/PPP: Fix a bounds check, and clean up other bounds checks.
For configuration protocol options, use ND_TCHECK() and
ND_TCHECK_nBITS() macros, passing them the appropriate pointer argument.
This fixes one case where the ND_TCHECK2() call they replace was not
checking enough bytes.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hook_init_data (struct t_hook *hook, struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin,
int type, int priority, void *callback_data)
{
hook->plugin = plugin;
hook->type = type;
hook->deleted = 0;
hook->running = 0;
hook->priority = priority;
hook->callback_data = callback_data;
hook->hook_data = NULL;
if (weechat_debug_core >= 2)
{
gui_chat_printf (NULL,
"debug: adding hook: type=%d (%s), plugin=%lx (%s), "
"priority=%d",
hook->type, hook_type_string[hook->type],
hook->plugin, plugin_get_name (hook->plugin),
hook->priority);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 veth_get_tx_csum(struct net_device *dev)
{
return (dev->features & NETIF_F_NO_CSUM) != 0;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::FrameSwapped(const ui::LatencyInfo& latency_info) {
ui::LatencyInfo::LatencyComponent window_snapshot_component;
if (latency_info.FindLatency(ui::WINDOW_SNAPSHOT_FRAME_NUMBER_COMPONENT,
GetLatencyComponentId(),
&window_snapshot_component)) {
int sequence_number = static_cast<int>(
window_snapshot_component.sequence_number);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&RenderWidgetHostImpl::WindowSnapshotReachedScreen,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
sequence_number),
base::TimeDelta::FromSecondsD(1. / 6));
#else
WindowSnapshotReachedScreen(sequence_number);
#endif
}
latency_tracker_.OnFrameSwapped(latency_info);
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jas_image_t *bmp_decode(jas_stream_t *in, char *optstr)
{
jas_image_t *image;
bmp_hdr_t hdr;
bmp_info_t *info;
uint_fast16_t cmptno;
jas_image_cmptparm_t cmptparms[3];
jas_image_cmptparm_t *cmptparm;
uint_fast16_t numcmpts;
long n;
if (optstr) {
jas_eprintf("warning: ignoring BMP decoder options\n");
}
jas_eprintf(
"THE BMP FORMAT IS NOT FULLY SUPPORTED!\n"
"THAT IS, THE JASPER SOFTWARE CANNOT DECODE ALL TYPES OF BMP DATA.\n"
"IF YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEMS, PLEASE TRY CONVERTING YOUR IMAGE DATA\n"
"TO THE PNM FORMAT, AND USING THIS FORMAT INSTEAD.\n"
);
/* Read the bitmap header. */
if (bmp_gethdr(in, &hdr)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get header\n");
return 0;
}
/* Read the bitmap information. */
if (!(info = bmp_getinfo(in))) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get info\n");
return 0;
}
/* Ensure that we support this type of BMP file. */
if (!bmp_issupported(&hdr, info)) {
jas_eprintf("error: unsupported BMP encoding\n");
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return 0;
}
/* Skip over any useless data between the end of the palette
and start of the bitmap data. */
if ((n = hdr.off - (BMP_HDRLEN + BMP_INFOLEN + BMP_PALLEN(info))) < 0) {
jas_eprintf("error: possibly bad bitmap offset?\n");
return 0;
}
if (n > 0) {
jas_eprintf("skipping unknown data in BMP file\n");
if (bmp_gobble(in, n)) {
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return 0;
}
}
/* Get the number of components. */
numcmpts = bmp_numcmpts(info);
for (cmptno = 0, cmptparm = cmptparms; cmptno < numcmpts; ++cmptno,
++cmptparm) {
cmptparm->tlx = 0;
cmptparm->tly = 0;
cmptparm->hstep = 1;
cmptparm->vstep = 1;
cmptparm->width = info->width;
cmptparm->height = info->height;
cmptparm->prec = 8;
cmptparm->sgnd = false;
}
/* Create image object. */
if (!(image = jas_image_create(numcmpts, cmptparms,
JAS_CLRSPC_UNKNOWN))) {
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return 0;
}
if (numcmpts == 3) {
jas_image_setclrspc(image, JAS_CLRSPC_SRGB);
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 0,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_R));
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 1,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_G));
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 2,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_B));
} else {
jas_image_setclrspc(image, JAS_CLRSPC_SGRAY);
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 0,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_GRAY_Y));
}
/* Read the bitmap data. */
if (bmp_getdata(in, info, image)) {
bmp_info_destroy(info);
jas_image_destroy(image);
return 0;
}
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return image;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a sanitizer failure in the BMP codec.
Also, added a --debug-level command line option to the imginfo command
for debugging purposes.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 168,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int udp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
if (level == SOL_UDP || level == SOL_UDPLITE)
return udp_lib_getsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
return ip_getsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _bdf_readstream( FT_Stream stream,
_bdf_line_func_t callback,
void* client_data,
unsigned long *lno )
{
_bdf_line_func_t cb;
unsigned long lineno, buf_size;
int refill, hold, to_skip;
ptrdiff_t bytes, start, end, cursor, avail;
char* buf = 0;
FT_Memory memory = stream->memory;
FT_Error error = BDF_Err_Ok;
if ( callback == 0 )
{
error = BDF_Err_Invalid_Argument;
goto Exit;
}
/* initial size and allocation of the input buffer */
buf_size = 1024;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( buf, buf_size ) )
goto Exit;
cb = callback;
lineno = 1;
buf[0] = 0;
start = 0;
end = 0;
avail = 0;
cursor = 0;
refill = 1;
to_skip = NO_SKIP;
bytes = 0; /* make compiler happy */
for (;;)
{
if ( refill )
{
bytes = (ptrdiff_t)FT_Stream_TryRead(
stream, (FT_Byte*)buf + cursor,
(FT_ULong)( buf_size - cursor ) );
avail = cursor + bytes;
cursor = 0;
refill = 0;
}
end = start;
/* should we skip an optional character like \n or \r? */
if ( start < avail && buf[start] == to_skip )
{
start += 1;
to_skip = NO_SKIP;
continue;
}
/* try to find the end of the line */
while ( end < avail && buf[end] != '\n' && buf[end] != '\r' )
end++;
/* if we hit the end of the buffer, try shifting its content */
/* or even resizing it */
if ( end >= avail )
{
if ( bytes == 0 ) /* last line in file doesn't end in \r or \n */
break; /* ignore it then exit */
if ( start == 0 )
{
/* this line is definitely too long; try resizing the input */
/* buffer a bit to handle it. */
FT_ULong new_size;
if ( buf_size >= 65536UL ) /* limit ourselves to 64KByte */
{
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_readstream: " ERRMSG6, lineno ));
error = BDF_Err_Invalid_Argument;
goto Exit;
}
new_size = buf_size * 2;
if ( FT_RENEW_ARRAY( buf, buf_size, new_size ) )
goto Exit;
cursor = buf_size;
buf_size = new_size;
}
else
{
bytes = avail - start;
FT_MEM_COPY( buf, buf + start, bytes );
cursor = bytes;
avail -= bytes;
start = 0;
}
refill = 1;
continue;
}
/* Temporarily NUL-terminate the line. */
hold = buf[end];
buf[end] = 0;
/* XXX: Use encoding independent value for 0x1a */
if ( buf[start] != '#' && buf[start] != 0x1a && end > start )
{
error = (*cb)( buf + start, end - start, lineno,
(void*)&cb, client_data );
/* Redo if we have encountered CHARS without properties. */
if ( error == -1 )
error = (*cb)( buf + start, end - start, lineno,
(void*)&cb, client_data );
if ( error )
break;
}
lineno += 1;
buf[end] = (char)hold;
start = end + 1;
if ( hold == '\n' )
to_skip = '\r';
else if ( hold == '\r' )
to_skip = '\n';
else
to_skip = NO_SKIP;
}
*lno = lineno;
Exit:
FT_FREE( buf );
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nested_svm_exit_handled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
int vmexit;
vmexit = nested_svm_intercept(svm);
if (vmexit == NESTED_EXIT_DONE)
nested_svm_vmexit(svm);
return vmexit;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ext4_find_delalloc_cluster(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t lblk,
int search_hint_reverse)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
ext4_lblk_t lblk_start, lblk_end;
lblk_start = lblk & (~(sbi->s_cluster_ratio - 1));
lblk_end = lblk_start + sbi->s_cluster_ratio - 1;
return ext4_find_delalloc_range(inode, lblk_start, lblk_end,
search_hint_reverse);
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline void Splash::pipeInit(SplashPipe *pipe, int x, int y,
SplashPattern *pattern, SplashColorPtr cSrc,
SplashCoord aInput, GBool usesShape,
GBool nonIsolatedGroup) {
pipeSetXY(pipe, x, y);
pipe->pattern = NULL;
if (pattern) {
if (pattern->isStatic()) {
pattern->getColor(x, y, pipe->cSrcVal);
} else {
pipe->pattern = pattern;
}
pipe->cSrc = pipe->cSrcVal;
} else {
pipe->cSrc = cSrc;
}
pipe->aInput = aInput;
if (!state->softMask) {
if (usesShape) {
pipe->aInput *= 255;
} else {
pipe->aSrc = (Guchar)splashRound(pipe->aInput * 255);
}
}
pipe->usesShape = usesShape;
if (aInput == 1 && !state->softMask && !usesShape &&
!state->inNonIsolatedGroup) {
pipe->noTransparency = gTrue;
} else {
pipe->noTransparency = gFalse;
}
if (pipe->noTransparency) {
pipe->resultColorCtrl = pipeResultColorNoAlphaBlend[bitmap->mode];
} else if (!state->blendFunc) {
pipe->resultColorCtrl = pipeResultColorAlphaNoBlend[bitmap->mode];
} else {
pipe->resultColorCtrl = pipeResultColorAlphaBlend[bitmap->mode];
}
if (nonIsolatedGroup) {
pipe->nonIsolatedGroup = splashColorModeNComps[bitmap->mode];
} else {
pipe->nonIsolatedGroup = 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext3_sync_fs(struct super_block *sb, int wait)
{
tid_t target;
trace_ext3_sync_fs(sb, wait);
/*
* Writeback quota in non-journalled quota case - journalled quota has
* no dirty dquots
*/
dquot_writeback_dquots(sb, -1);
if (journal_start_commit(EXT3_SB(sb)->s_journal, &target)) {
if (wait)
log_wait_commit(EXT3_SB(sb)->s_journal, target);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 32,951 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void uas_shutdown(struct device *dev)
{
struct usb_interface *intf = to_usb_interface(dev);
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
struct Scsi_Host *shost = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
struct uas_dev_info *devinfo = (struct uas_dev_info *)shost->hostdata;
if (system_state != SYSTEM_RESTART)
return;
devinfo->shutdown = 1;
uas_free_streams(devinfo);
usb_set_interface(udev, intf->altsetting[0].desc.bInterfaceNumber, 0);
usb_reset_device(udev);
}
Commit Message: USB: uas: fix bug in handling of alternate settings
The uas driver has a subtle bug in the way it handles alternate
settings. The uas_find_uas_alt_setting() routine returns an
altsetting value (the bAlternateSetting number in the descriptor), but
uas_use_uas_driver() then treats that value as an index to the
intf->altsetting array, which it isn't.
Normally this doesn't cause any problems because the various
alternate settings have bAlternateSetting values 0, 1, 2, ..., so the
value is equal to the index in the array. But this is not guaranteed,
and Andrey Konovalov used the syzkaller fuzzer with KASAN to get a
slab-out-of-bounds error by violating this assumption.
This patch fixes the bug by making uas_find_uas_alt_setting() return a
pointer to the altsetting entry rather than either the value or the
index. Pointers are less subject to misinterpretation.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
CC: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
{
int error = may_create(dir, dentry);
if (error)
return error;
if ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) && !capable(CAP_MKNOD))
return -EPERM;
if (!dir->i_op->mknod)
return -EPERM;
error = devcgroup_inode_mknod(mode, dev);
if (error)
return error;
error = security_inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
if (error)
return error;
error = dir->i_op->mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
if (!error)
fsnotify_create(dir, dentry);
return error;
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 36,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FakeStreamRequest(RequestPriority priority,
HttpStreamRequest::Delegate* delegate,
WebSocketHandshakeStreamBase::CreateHelper* create_helper)
: priority_(priority),
delegate_(delegate),
websocket_stream_create_helper_(create_helper) {}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int add_oid_section(struct php_x509_request * req) /* {{{ */
{
char * str;
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) * sktmp;
CONF_VALUE * cnf;
int i;
str = CONF_get_string(req->req_config, NULL, "oid_section");
if (str == NULL) {
return SUCCESS;
}
sktmp = CONF_get_section(req->req_config, str);
if (sktmp == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "problem loading oid section %s", str);
return FAILURE;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sktmp); i++) {
cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sktmp, i);
if (OBJ_sn2nid(cnf->name) == NID_undef && OBJ_ln2nid(cnf->name) == NID_undef &&
OBJ_create(cnf->value, cnf->name, cnf->name) == NID_undef) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "problem creating object %s=%s", cnf->name, cnf->value);
return FAILURE;
}
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeBrowserMainPartsChromeos::PostDestroyThreads() {
dbus_services_.reset();
g_browser_process->platform_part()->ShutdownCrosComponentManager();
dbus_pre_early_init_.reset();
system_token_certdb_initializer_.reset();
ChromeBrowserMainPartsLinux::PostDestroyThreads();
DeviceSettingsService::Shutdown();
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
X509_STORE *store, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
{
CMS_SignerInfo *si;
STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sinfos;
STACK_OF(X509) *cms_certs = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
X509 *signer;
int i, scount = 0, ret = 0;
BIO *cmsbio = NULL, *tmpin = NULL, *tmpout = NULL;
if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
return 0;
if (dcont && !(flags & CMS_BINARY)) {
const ASN1_OBJECT *coid = CMS_get0_eContentType(cms);
if (OBJ_obj2nid(coid) == NID_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF)
flags |= CMS_ASCIICRLF;
}
/* Attempt to find all signer certificates */
sinfos = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms);
if (sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos) <= 0) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_SIGNERS);
goto err;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, &signer, NULL, NULL);
if (signer)
scount++;
}
if (scount != sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos))
scount += CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, certs, flags);
if (scount != sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos)) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
goto err;
}
/* Attempt to verify all signers certs */
if (!(flags & CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY)) {
cms_certs = CMS_get1_certs(cms);
if (!(flags & CMS_NOCRL))
crls = CMS_get1_crls(cms);
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
if (!cms_signerinfo_verify_cert(si, store, cms_certs, crls))
goto err;
}
}
/* Attempt to verify all SignerInfo signed attribute signatures */
if (!(flags & CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY)) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
if (CMS_signed_get_attr_count(si) < 0)
continue;
if (CMS_SignerInfo_verify(si) <= 0)
goto err;
}
}
/*
* Performance optimization: if the content is a memory BIO then store
* its contents in a temporary read only memory BIO. This avoids
* potentially large numbers of slow copies of data which will occur when
* reading from a read write memory BIO when signatures are calculated.
*/
if (dcont && (BIO_method_type(dcont) == BIO_TYPE_MEM)) {
char *ptr;
long len;
len = BIO_get_mem_data(dcont, &ptr);
tmpin = BIO_new_mem_buf(ptr, len);
if (tmpin == NULL) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err2;
}
} else
tmpin = dcont;
/*
* If not binary mode and detached generate digests by *writing* through
* the BIO. That makes it possible to canonicalise the input.
*/
if (!(flags & SMIME_BINARY) && dcont) {
/*
* Create output BIO so we can either handle text or to ensure
* included content doesn't override detached content.
*/
tmpout = cms_get_text_bio(out, flags);
if (!tmpout) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, tmpout);
if (!cmsbio)
goto err;
/*
* Don't use SMIME_TEXT for verify: it adds headers and we want to
* remove them.
*/
SMIME_crlf_copy(dcont, cmsbio, flags & ~SMIME_TEXT);
if (flags & CMS_TEXT) {
if (!SMIME_text(tmpout, out)) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
} else {
cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, tmpin);
if (!cmsbio)
goto err;
if (!cms_copy_content(out, cmsbio, flags))
goto err;
}
if (!(flags & CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY)) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
if (CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(si, cmsbio) <= 0) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_CONTENT_VERIFY_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (!(flags & SMIME_BINARY) && dcont) {
do_free_upto(cmsbio, tmpout);
if (tmpin != dcont)
BIO_free(tmpin);
} else {
if (dcont && (tmpin == dcont))
do_free_upto(cmsbio, dcont);
else
BIO_free_all(cmsbio);
}
if (out != tmpout)
BIO_free_all(tmpout);
err2:
sk_X509_pop_free(cms_certs, X509_free);
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 11,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CopyToOMX(const OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header) {
if (!mIsBackup) {
return;
}
memcpy(header->pBuffer + header->nOffset,
(const OMX_U8 *)mMem->pointer() + header->nOffset,
header->nFilledLen);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 174,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AcpiPsCompleteFinalOp (
ACPI_WALK_STATE *WalkState,
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *Op,
ACPI_STATUS Status)
{
ACPI_STATUS Status2;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE_PTR (PsCompleteFinalOp, WalkState);
/*
* Complete the last Op (if not completed), and clear the scope stack.
* It is easily possible to end an AML "package" with an unbounded number
* of open scopes (such as when several ASL blocks are closed with
* sequential closing braces). We want to terminate each one cleanly.
*/
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_PARSE, "AML package complete at Op %p\n", Op));
do
{
if (Op)
{
if (WalkState->AscendingCallback != NULL)
{
WalkState->Op = Op;
WalkState->OpInfo = AcpiPsGetOpcodeInfo (Op->Common.AmlOpcode);
WalkState->Opcode = Op->Common.AmlOpcode;
Status = WalkState->AscendingCallback (WalkState);
Status = AcpiPsNextParseState (WalkState, Op, Status);
if (Status == AE_CTRL_PENDING)
{
Status = AcpiPsCompleteOp (WalkState, &Op, AE_OK);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
}
if (Status == AE_CTRL_TERMINATE)
{
Status = AE_OK;
/* Clean up */
do
{
if (Op)
{
Status2 = AcpiPsCompleteThisOp (WalkState, Op);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status2))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status2);
}
}
AcpiPsPopScope (&(WalkState->ParserState), &Op,
&WalkState->ArgTypes, &WalkState->ArgCount);
} while (Op);
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
else if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
/* First error is most important */
(void) AcpiPsCompleteThisOp (WalkState, Op);
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
}
Status2 = AcpiPsCompleteThisOp (WalkState, Op);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status2))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status2);
}
}
AcpiPsPopScope (&(WalkState->ParserState), &Op, &WalkState->ArgTypes,
&WalkState->ArgCount);
} while (Op);
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
Commit Message: acpi: acpica: fix acpi parse and parseext cache leaks
I'm Seunghun Han, and I work for National Security Research Institute of
South Korea.
I have been doing a research on ACPI and found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI
early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI cache leak is as follows:
[ 0.352414] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
[ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
[ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
[ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
[ 0.356028] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
[ 0.356799] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)
[ 0.360215] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-State: Slab cache still has objects
[ 0.360648] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W
4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #10
[ 0.361273] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 0.361873] Call Trace:
[ 0.362243] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
[ 0.362591] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
[ 0.362944] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.363296] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
[ 0.363646] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b
[ 0.364000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
[ 0.364000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
[ 0.364000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
[ 0.364000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
[ 0.364000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.364000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
[ 0.364000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a
[ 0.364000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0
[ 0.364000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
[ 0.364000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
I analyzed this memory leak in detail. I found that “Acpi-State” cache and
“Acpi-Parse” cache were merged because the size of cache objects was same
slab cache size.
I finally found “Acpi-Parse” cache and “Acpi-ParseExt” cache were leaked
using SLAB_NEVER_MERGE flag in kmem_cache_create() function.
Real ACPI cache leak point is as follows:
[ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
[ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
[ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
[ 0.361043] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
[ 0.364016] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
[ 0.365061] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)
[ 0.368174] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Parse: Slab cache still has objects
[ 0.369332] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W
4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8
[ 0.371256] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 0.372000] Call Trace:
[ 0.372000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
[ 0.372000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x56/0x7b
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
[ 0.372000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
[ 0.372000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.372000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
[ 0.372000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a
[ 0.372000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0
[ 0.372000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
[ 0.372000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
[ 0.388039] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-ParseExt: Slab cache still has objects
[ 0.389063] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W
4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8
[ 0.390557] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 0.392000] Call Trace:
[ 0.392000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
[ 0.392000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
[ 0.392000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
[ 0.392000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.392000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
[ 0.392000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a
[ 0.392000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0
[ 0.392000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
[ 0.392000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI by calling acpi_terminate() function. The function calls
acpi_ut_delete_caches() function to delete local caches (acpi_gbl_namespace_
cache, state_cache, operand_cache, ps_node_cache, ps_node_ext_cache).
But the deletion codes in acpi_ut_delete_caches() function only delete
slab caches using kmem_cache_destroy() function, therefore the cache
objects should be flushed before acpi_ut_delete_caches() function.
“Acpi-Parse” cache and “Acpi-ParseExt” cache are used in an AML parse
function, acpi_ps_parse_loop(). The function should have flush codes to
handle an error state due to invalid AML codes.
This cache leak has a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows
memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users
could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR.
To fix ACPI cache leak for enhancing security, I made a patch which has
flush codes in acpi_ps_parse_loop() function.
I hope that this patch improves the security of Linux kernel.
Thank you.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 167,787 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jbig2_image_clone(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Image *image)
{
if (image)
image->refcount++;
return image;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_islice(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
UWORD16 u2_first_mb_in_slice)
{
dec_pic_params_t * ps_pps = ps_dec->ps_cur_pps;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_dec->ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
UWORD32 u4_temp;
WORD32 i_temp;
WORD32 ret;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Read remaining contents of the slice header */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* dec_ref_pic_marking function */
/* G050 */
if(ps_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc != 0)
{
if(!ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_dpb_commands_read)
ps_dec->u4_bitoffset = ih264d_read_mmco_commands(
ps_dec);
else
ps_dec->ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst += ps_dec->u4_bitoffset;
}
/* G050 */
/* Read slice_qp_delta */
i_temp = ps_pps->u1_pic_init_qp
+ ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if((i_temp < 0) || (i_temp > 51))
return ERROR_INV_RANGE_QP_T;
ps_slice->u1_slice_qp = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_qp_delta",
ps_slice->u1_slice_qp - ps_pps->u1_pic_init_qp);
if(ps_pps->u1_deblocking_filter_parameters_present_flag == 1)
{
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: disable_deblocking_filter_idc", u4_temp);
if(u4_temp > SLICE_BOUNDARY_DBLK_DISABLED)
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_slice->u1_disable_dblk_filter_idc = u4_temp;
if(u4_temp != 1)
{
i_temp = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf)
<< 1;
if((MIN_DBLK_FIL_OFF > i_temp) || (i_temp > MAX_DBLK_FIL_OFF))
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_alpha_c0_offset_div2",
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset >> 1);
i_temp = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf)
<< 1;
if((MIN_DBLK_FIL_OFF > i_temp) || (i_temp > MAX_DBLK_FIL_OFF))
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_beta_offset_div2",
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset >> 1);
}
else
{
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
}
}
else
{
ps_slice->u1_disable_dblk_filter_idc = 0;
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
}
/* Initialization to check if number of motion vector per 2 Mbs */
/* are exceeding the range or not */
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[0] = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[1] = 0;
/*set slice header cone to 2 ,to indicate correct header*/
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
if(ps_pps->u1_entropy_coding_mode)
{
SWITCHOFFTRACE; SWITCHONTRACECABAC;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
{
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cabac_mbaff;
}
else
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cabac_nonmbaff;
ret = ih264d_parse_islice_data_cabac(ps_dec, ps_slice,
u2_first_mb_in_slice);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
SWITCHONTRACE; SWITCHOFFTRACECABAC;
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
{
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff;
}
else
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff;
ret = ih264d_parse_islice_data_cavlc(ps_dec, ps_slice,
u2_first_mb_in_slice);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Return error when there are more mmco params than allocated size
Bug: 25818142
Change-Id: I5c1b23985eeca5192b42703c627ca3d060e4e13d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,909 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FrameLoader::allAncestorsAreComplete() const
{
for (Frame* ancestor = m_frame; ancestor; ancestor = ancestor->tree()->parent()) {
if (!ancestor->document()->loadEventFinished())
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u32 twd_fxsr_to_i387(struct fxregs_state *fxsave)
{
struct _fpxreg *st;
u32 tos = (fxsave->swd >> 11) & 7;
u32 twd = (unsigned long) fxsave->twd;
u32 tag;
u32 ret = 0xffff0000u;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++, twd >>= 1) {
if (twd & 0x1) {
st = FPREG_ADDR(fxsave, (i - tos) & 7);
switch (st->exponent & 0x7fff) {
case 0x7fff:
tag = FP_EXP_TAG_SPECIAL;
break;
case 0x0000:
if (!st->significand[0] &&
!st->significand[1] &&
!st->significand[2] &&
!st->significand[3])
tag = FP_EXP_TAG_ZERO;
else
tag = FP_EXP_TAG_SPECIAL;
break;
default:
if (st->significand[3] & 0x8000)
tag = FP_EXP_TAG_VALID;
else
tag = FP_EXP_TAG_SPECIAL;
break;
}
} else {
tag = FP_EXP_TAG_EMPTY;
}
ret |= tag << (2 * i);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: x86/fpu: Don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
On x86, userspace can use the ptrace() or rt_sigreturn() system calls to
set a task's extended state (xstate) or "FPU" registers. ptrace() can
set them for another task using the PTRACE_SETREGSET request with
NT_X86_XSTATE, while rt_sigreturn() can set them for the current task.
In either case, registers can be set to any value, but the kernel
assumes that the XSAVE area itself remains valid in the sense that the
CPU can restore it.
However, in the case where the kernel is using the uncompacted xstate
format (which it does whenever the XSAVES instruction is unavailable),
it was possible for userspace to set the xcomp_bv field in the
xstate_header to an arbitrary value. However, all bits in that field
are reserved in the uncompacted case, so when switching to a task with
nonzero xcomp_bv, the XRSTOR instruction failed with a #GP fault. This
caused the WARN_ON_FPU(err) in copy_kernel_to_xregs() to be hit. In
addition, since the error is otherwise ignored, the FPU registers from
the task previously executing on the CPU were leaked.
Fix the bug by checking that the user-supplied value of xcomp_bv is 0 in
the uncompacted case, and returning an error otherwise.
The reason for validating xcomp_bv rather than simply overwriting it
with 0 is that we want userspace to see an error if it (incorrectly)
provides an XSAVE area in compacted format rather than in uncompacted
format.
Note that as before, in case of error we clear the task's FPU state.
This is perhaps non-ideal, especially for PTRACE_SETREGSET; it might be
better to return an error before changing anything. But it seems the
"clear on error" behavior is fine for now, and it's a little tricky to
do otherwise because it would mean we couldn't simply copy the full
userspace state into kernel memory in one __copy_from_user().
This bug was found by syzkaller, which hit the above-mentioned
WARN_ON_FPU():
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at ./arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:373 __switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.13.0 #453
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0 task.stack: ffffa78cc036c000
RIP: 0010:__switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
RSP: 0000:ffffa78cc08bbb88 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9ba2b8bf2180 RCX: 00000000c0000100
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 000000005cb10700 RDI: ffff9ba2b8bf36c0
RBP: ffffa78cc08bbbd0 R08: 00000000929fdf46 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9ba2b8bf3680 R15: ffff9ba2bf5d7b40
FS: 00007f7e5cb10700(0000) GS:ffff9ba2bf400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004005cc CR3: 0000000079fd5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Call Trace:
Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 11 fd ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 e7 fa ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 c2 fa ff ff <0f> ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 d4 fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f
Here is a C reproducer. The expected behavior is that the program spin
forever with no output. However, on a buggy kernel running on a
processor with the "xsave" feature but without the "xsaves" feature
(e.g. Sandy Bridge through Broadwell for Intel), within a second or two
the program reports that the xmm registers were corrupted, i.e. were not
restored correctly. With CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y it also hits the above
kernel warning.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void)
{
int pid = fork();
uint64_t xstate[512];
struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = xstate, .iov_len = sizeof(xstate) };
if (pid == 0) {
bool tracee = true;
for (int i = 0; i < sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) && tracee; i++)
tracee = (fork() != 0);
uint32_t xmm0[4] = { [0 ... 3] = tracee ? 0x00000000 : 0xDEADBEEF };
asm volatile(" movdqu %0, %%xmm0\n"
" mov %0, %%rbx\n"
"1: movdqu %%xmm0, %0\n"
" mov %0, %%rax\n"
" cmp %%rax, %%rbx\n"
" je 1b\n"
: "+m" (xmm0) : : "rax", "rbx", "xmm0");
printf("BUG: xmm registers corrupted! tracee=%d, xmm0=%08X%08X%08X%08X\n",
tracee, xmm0[0], xmm0[1], xmm0[2], xmm0[3]);
} else {
usleep(100000);
ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
xstate[65] = -1;
ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
}
return 1;
}
Note: the program only tests for the bug using the ptrace() system call.
The bug can also be reproduced using the rt_sigreturn() system call, but
only when called from a 32-bit program, since for 64-bit programs the
kernel restores the FPU state from the signal frame by doing XRSTOR
directly from userspace memory (with proper error checking).
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.17+]
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Fixes: 0b29643a5843 ("x86/xsaves: Change compacted format xsave area header")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922174156.16780-2-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170923130016.21448-25-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 60,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xfer_addmbox(struct findall_data *data, void *rock)
{
if (!data) return 0;
struct xfer_list *list = (struct xfer_list *) rock;
if (!data->mbentry) {
/* No partial matches */
return 0;
}
if (list->part && strcmp(data->mbentry->partition, list->part)) {
/* Not on specified partition */
return 0;
}
/* Only add shared mailboxes, targeted user submailboxes, or user INBOXes */
if (!mbname_localpart(data->mbname) || list->allow_usersubs ||
(!mbname_isdeleted(data->mbname) && !strarray_size(mbname_boxes(data->mbname)))) {
const char *extname = mbname_extname(data->mbname, list->ns, list->userid);
struct xfer_item *mbox = xzmalloc(sizeof(struct xfer_item));
mbox->mbentry = mboxlist_entry_copy(data->mbentry);
strncpy(mbox->extname, extname, sizeof(mbox->extname));
if (mbname_localpart(data->mbname) && !list->allow_usersubs) {
/* User INBOX */
mbox->state = XFER_MOVING_USER;
}
/* Add link on to the list (reverse order) */
mbox->next = list->mboxes;
list->mboxes = mbox;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int crypto_shash_extsize(struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
return alg->cra_ctxsize;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProactiveTabFreezeAndDiscardParams GetTestProactiveDiscardParams() {
ProactiveTabFreezeAndDiscardParams params = {};
params.should_proactively_discard = true;
params.low_occluded_timeout = kLowOccludedTimeout;
params.moderate_occluded_timeout = kModerateOccludedTimeout;
params.high_occluded_timeout = kHighOccludedTimeout;
params.low_loaded_tab_count = kLowLoadedTabCount;
params.moderate_loaded_tab_count = kModerateLoadedTabCount;
params.high_loaded_tab_count = kHighLoadedTabCount;
params.freeze_timeout = kFreezeTimeout;
return params;
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void muscle_load_file_acls(sc_file_t* file, mscfs_file_t *file_data)
{
muscle_load_single_acl(file, SC_AC_OP_READ, file_data->read);
muscle_load_single_acl(file, SC_AC_OP_WRITE, file_data->write);
muscle_load_single_acl(file, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE, file_data->write);
muscle_load_single_acl(file, SC_AC_OP_DELETE, file_data->delete);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 78,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static StringInfo *ParseImageResourceBlocks(Image *image,
const unsigned char *blocks,size_t length,
MagickBooleanType *has_merged_image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const unsigned char
*p;
ssize_t
offset;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned char
name_length;
unsigned int
count;
unsigned short
id,
short_sans;
if (length < 16)
return((StringInfo *) NULL);
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const unsigned char *) NULL,length);
SetStringInfoDatum(profile,blocks);
SetStringInfoName(profile,"8bim");
for (p=blocks; (p >= blocks) && (p < (blocks+length-7)); )
{
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) p,"8BIM",4) != 0)
break;
p+=4;
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&id);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&name_length);
if ((name_length % 2) == 0)
name_length++;
p+=name_length;
if (p > (blocks+length-4))
break;
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&count);
offset=(ssize_t) count;
if (((p+offset) < blocks) || ((p+offset) > (blocks+length)))
break;
switch (id)
{
case 0x03ed:
{
char
value[MagickPathExtent];
unsigned short
resolution;
/*
Resolution info.
*/
if (offset < 16)
break;
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&resolution);
image->resolution.x=(double) resolution;
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%g",
image->resolution.x);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:XResolution",value,exception);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&resolution);
image->resolution.y=(double) resolution;
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%g",
image->resolution.y);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:YResolution",value,exception);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
break;
}
case 0x0421:
{
if ((offset > 4) && (*(p+4) == 0))
*has_merged_image=MagickFalse;
p+=offset;
break;
}
default:
{
p+=offset;
break;
}
}
if ((offset & 0x01) != 0)
p++;
}
return(profile);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1451
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 91,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
{
if (lock == NULL)
return;
DeleteCriticalSection(lock);
OPENSSL_free(lock);
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330 | 0 | 12,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<PreconnectPrediction> GetPreconnectPrediction(
const GURL& url) {
auto prediction = std::make_unique<PreconnectPrediction>();
bool has_prediction = loading_predictor_->resource_prefetch_predictor()
->PredictPreconnectOrigins(url, prediction.get());
if (!has_prediction)
return nullptr;
return prediction;
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: http_DissectResponse(struct worker *w, const struct http_conn *htc,
struct http *hp)
{
int j;
uint16_t retval = 0;
char *p;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(htc, HTTP_CONN_MAGIC);
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(hp, HTTP_MAGIC);
hp->logtag = HTTP_Rx;
if (http_splitline(w, htc->fd, hp, htc,
HTTP_HDR_PROTO, HTTP_HDR_STATUS, HTTP_HDR_RESPONSE))
retval = 503;
if (retval == 0 && memcmp(hp->hd[HTTP_HDR_PROTO].b, "HTTP/1.", 7))
retval = 503;
if (retval == 0 && Tlen(hp->hd[HTTP_HDR_STATUS]) != 3)
retval = 503;
if (retval == 0) {
hp->status = 0;
p = hp->hd[HTTP_HDR_STATUS].b;
for (j = 100; j != 0; j /= 10) {
if (!vct_isdigit(*p)) {
retval = 503;
break;
}
hp->status += (uint16_t)(j * (*p - '0'));
p++;
}
if (*p != '\0')
retval = 503;
}
if (retval != 0) {
WSLR(w, SLT_HttpGarbage, htc->fd, htc->rxbuf);
assert(retval >= 100 && retval <= 999);
hp->status = retval;
} else {
http_ProtoVer(hp);
}
if (hp->hd[HTTP_HDR_RESPONSE].b == NULL ||
!Tlen(hp->hd[HTTP_HDR_RESPONSE])) {
/* Backend didn't send a response string, use the standard */
hp->hd[HTTP_HDR_RESPONSE].b =
TRUST_ME(http_StatusMessage(hp->status));
hp->hd[HTTP_HDR_RESPONSE].e =
strchr(hp->hd[HTTP_HDR_RESPONSE].b, '\0');
}
return (retval);
}
Commit Message: Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that.
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QString IRCView::filter(const QString& line, const QString& defaultColor, const QString& whoSent,
bool doHighlight, bool parseURL, bool self, QChar::Direction* direction)
{
QString filteredLine(line);
Application* konvApp = static_cast<Application*>(kapp);
if (filteredLine[0] == ' ')
{
filteredLine[0] = '\xA0';
}
filteredLine.replace('<', "\x0blt;");
filteredLine.replace('>', "\x0bgt;");
if (filteredLine.contains('\x07'))
{
if (Preferences::self()->beep())
{
kapp->beep();
}
filteredLine.remove('\x07');
}
filteredLine = ircTextToHtml(filteredLine, parseURL, defaultColor, whoSent, true, direction);
QString ownNick;
if (m_server)
{
ownNick = m_server->getNickname();
}
else if (m_chatWin->getType() == ChatWindow::DccChat)
{
ownNick = static_cast<DCC::ChatContainer*>(m_chatWin)->ownNick();
}
if(doHighlight && (whoSent != ownNick) && !self)
{
QString highlightColor;
if (Preferences::self()->highlightNick() &&
line.toLower().contains(QRegExp("(^|[^\\d\\w])" +
QRegExp::escape(ownNick.toLower()) +
"([^\\d\\w]|$)")))
{
highlightColor = Preferences::self()->highlightNickColor().name();
m_tabNotification = Konversation::tnfNick;
}
else
{
QList<Highlight*> highlightList = Preferences::highlightList();
QListIterator<Highlight*> it(highlightList);
Highlight* highlight;
QStringList highlightChatWindowList;
bool patternFound = false;
QStringList captures;
while (it.hasNext())
{
highlight = it.next();
QStringList highlightChatWindowList = highlight->getChatWindowList();
if (highlightChatWindowList.isEmpty() ||
highlightChatWindowList.contains(m_chatWin->getName(), Qt::CaseInsensitive))
{
if (highlight->getRegExp())
{
QRegExp needleReg(highlight->getPattern());
needleReg.setCaseSensitivity(Qt::CaseInsensitive);
patternFound = ((line.contains(needleReg)) ||
(whoSent.contains(needleReg)));
captures = needleReg.capturedTexts();
}
else
{
QString needle = highlight->getPattern();
patternFound = ((line.contains(needle, Qt::CaseInsensitive)) ||
(whoSent.contains(needle, Qt::CaseInsensitive)));
}
if (patternFound)
{
break;
}
}
}
if (patternFound)
{
highlightColor = highlight->getColor().name();
m_highlightColor = highlightColor;
m_tabNotification = Konversation::tnfHighlight;
if (Preferences::self()->highlightSoundsEnabled() && m_chatWin->notificationsEnabled())
{
konvApp->sound()->play(highlight->getSoundURL());
}
konvApp->notificationHandler()->highlight(m_chatWin, whoSent, line);
m_autoTextToSend = highlight->getAutoText();
for (int capture = 0; capture < captures.count(); capture++)
{
m_autoTextToSend.replace(QString("%%1").arg(capture), captures[capture]);
}
m_autoTextToSend.remove(QRegExp("%[0-9]"));
}
}
if (!highlightColor.isEmpty())
{
filteredLine = QLatin1String("<font color=\"") + highlightColor + QLatin1String("\">") + filteredLine +
QLatin1String("</font>");
}
}
else if (doHighlight && (whoSent == ownNick) && Preferences::self()->highlightOwnLines())
{
filteredLine = QLatin1String("<font color=\"") + Preferences::self()->highlightOwnLinesColor().name() +
QLatin1String("\">") + filteredLine + QLatin1String("</font>");
}
filteredLine = Konversation::Emoticons::parseEmoticons(filteredLine);
return filteredLine;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int debug_shrink_get(void *data, u64 *val)
{
struct ion_heap *heap = data;
struct shrink_control sc;
int objs;
sc.gfp_mask = -1;
sc.nr_to_scan = 0;
objs = heap->shrinker.count_objects(&heap->shrinker, &sc);
*val = objs;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 48,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void amf_tag_contents(void *ctx, const uint8_t *data,
const uint8_t *data_end)
{
unsigned int size, nb = -1;
char buf[1024];
AMFDataType type;
int parse_key = 1;
if (data >= data_end)
return;
switch ((type = *data++)) {
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_NUMBER:
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, " number %g\n", av_int2double(AV_RB64(data)));
return;
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_BOOL:
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, " bool %d\n", *data);
return;
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_STRING:
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_LONG_STRING:
if (type == AMF_DATA_TYPE_STRING) {
size = bytestream_get_be16(&data);
} else {
size = bytestream_get_be32(&data);
}
size = FFMIN(size, sizeof(buf) - 1);
memcpy(buf, data, size);
buf[size] = 0;
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, " string '%s'\n", buf);
return;
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_NULL:
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, " NULL\n");
return;
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_ARRAY:
parse_key = 0;
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_MIXEDARRAY:
nb = bytestream_get_be32(&data);
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_OBJECT:
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, " {\n");
while (nb-- > 0 || type != AMF_DATA_TYPE_ARRAY) {
int t;
if (parse_key) {
size = bytestream_get_be16(&data);
size = FFMIN(size, sizeof(buf) - 1);
if (!size) {
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, " }\n");
data++;
break;
}
memcpy(buf, data, size);
buf[size] = 0;
if (size >= data_end - data)
return;
data += size;
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, " %s: ", buf);
}
amf_tag_contents(ctx, data, data_end);
t = ff_amf_tag_size(data, data_end);
if (t < 0 || t >= data_end - data)
return;
data += t;
}
return;
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_OBJECT_END:
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, " }\n");
return;
default:
return;
}
Commit Message: avformat/rtmppkt: Convert ff_amf_get_field_value() to bytestream2
Fixes: out of array accesses
Found-by: JunDong Xie of Ant-financial Light-Year Security Lab
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 63,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fwnet_receive_packet(struct fw_card *card, struct fw_request *r,
int tcode, int destination, int source, int generation,
unsigned long long offset, void *payload, size_t length,
void *callback_data)
{
struct fwnet_device *dev = callback_data;
int rcode;
if (destination == IEEE1394_ALL_NODES) {
kfree(r);
return;
}
if (offset != dev->handler.offset)
rcode = RCODE_ADDRESS_ERROR;
else if (tcode != TCODE_WRITE_BLOCK_REQUEST)
rcode = RCODE_TYPE_ERROR;
else if (fwnet_incoming_packet(dev, payload, length,
source, generation, false) != 0) {
dev_err(&dev->netdev->dev, "incoming packet failure\n");
rcode = RCODE_CONFLICT_ERROR;
} else
rcode = RCODE_COMPLETE;
fw_send_response(card, r, rcode);
}
Commit Message: firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows
The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.
So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.
In addition, ensure that
- GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
- the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.
Reported-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RendererSchedulerImpl::ResumeRendererImpl() {
helper_.CheckOnValidThread();
if (helper_.IsShutdown())
return;
--main_thread_only().renderer_pause_count;
DCHECK_GE(main_thread_only().renderer_pause_count.value(), 0);
UpdatePolicy();
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TemplateURL::EncodeSearchTerms(
const TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs& search_terms_args,
bool is_in_query,
std::string* input_encoding,
base::string16* encoded_terms,
base::string16* encoded_original_query) const {
std::vector<std::string> encodings(input_encodings());
if (std::find(encodings.begin(), encodings.end(), "UTF-8") == encodings.end())
encodings.push_back("UTF-8");
for (std::vector<std::string>::const_iterator i(encodings.begin());
i != encodings.end(); ++i) {
if (TryEncoding(search_terms_args.search_terms,
search_terms_args.original_query, i->c_str(),
is_in_query, encoded_terms, encoded_original_query)) {
*input_encoding = *i;
return;
}
}
NOTREACHED();
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: snd_compr_tstamp(struct snd_compr_stream *stream, unsigned long arg)
{
struct snd_compr_tstamp tstamp = {0};
int ret;
ret = snd_compr_update_tstamp(stream, &tstamp);
if (ret == 0)
ret = copy_to_user((struct snd_compr_tstamp __user *)arg,
&tstamp, sizeof(tstamp)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 58,094 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init sha1_generic_mod_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_shash(&alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hidp_send_ctrl_message(struct hidp_session *session,
unsigned char hdr, unsigned char *data, int size)
{
int err;
err = __hidp_send_ctrl_message(session, hdr, data, size);
hidp_schedule(session);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Fix incorrect strncpy() in hidp_setup_hid()
The length parameter should be sizeof(req->name) - 1 because there is no
guarantee that string provided by userspace will contain the trailing
'\0'.
Can be easily reproduced by manually setting req->name to 128 non-zero
bytes prior to ioctl(HIDPCONNADD) and checking the device name setup on
input subsystem:
$ cat /sys/devices/pnp0/00\:04/tty/ttyS0/hci0/hci0\:1/input8/name
AAAAAA[...]AAAAAAAAf0:af:f0:af:f0:af
("f0:af:f0:af:f0:af" is the device bluetooth address, taken from "phys"
field in struct hid_device due to overflow.)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <anderson.lizardo@openbossa.org>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 33,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~BacktraceOutputHandler() {}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 110,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *parse_number( cJSON *item, const char *num )
{
int64_t i = 0;
double f = 0;
int isint = 1;
int sign = 1, scale = 0, subscale = 0, signsubscale = 1;
/* Could use sscanf for this? */
if ( *num == '-' ) {
/* Has sign. */
sign = -1;
++num;
}
if ( *num == '0' )
/* Is zero. */
++num;
if ( *num >= '1' && *num<='9' ) {
/* Number. */
do {
i = ( i * 10 ) + ( *num - '0' );
f = ( f * 10.0 ) + ( *num - '0' );
++num;
} while ( *num >= '0' && *num <= '9' );
}
if ( *num == '.' && num[1] >= '0' && num[1] <= '9' ) {
/* Fractional part. */
isint = 0;
++num;
do {
f = ( f * 10.0 ) + ( *num++ - '0' );
scale--;
} while ( *num >= '0' && *num <= '9' );
}
if ( *num == 'e' || *num == 'E' ) {
/* Exponent. */
isint = 0;
++num;
if ( *num == '+' )
++num;
else if ( *num == '-' ) {
/* With sign. */
signsubscale = -1;
++num;
}
while ( *num >= '0' && *num <= '9' )
subscale = ( subscale * 10 ) + ( *num++ - '0' );
}
/* Put it together. */
if ( isint ) {
/* Int: number = +/- number */
i = sign * i;
item->valueint = i;
item->valuefloat = i;
} else {
/* Float: number = +/- number.fraction * 10^+/- exponent */
f = sign * f * ipow( 10.0, scale + subscale * signsubscale );
item->valueint = f;
item->valuefloat = f;
}
item->type = cJSON_Number;
return num;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 167,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Cues::~Cues()
{
const long n = m_count + m_preload_count;
CuePoint** p = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** const q = p + n;
while (p != q)
{
CuePoint* const pCP = *p++;
assert(pCP);
delete pCP;
}
delete[] m_cue_points;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cm_rep_handler(struct cm_work *work)
{
struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv;
struct cm_rep_msg *rep_msg;
int ret;
rep_msg = (struct cm_rep_msg *)work->mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.mad;
cm_id_priv = cm_acquire_id(rep_msg->remote_comm_id, 0);
if (!cm_id_priv) {
cm_dup_rep_handler(work);
return -EINVAL;
}
cm_format_rep_event(work, cm_id_priv->qp_type);
spin_lock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
switch (cm_id_priv->id.state) {
case IB_CM_REQ_SENT:
case IB_CM_MRA_REQ_RCVD:
break;
default:
spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto error;
}
cm_id_priv->timewait_info->work.remote_id = rep_msg->local_comm_id;
cm_id_priv->timewait_info->remote_ca_guid = rep_msg->local_ca_guid;
cm_id_priv->timewait_info->remote_qpn = cm_rep_get_qpn(rep_msg, cm_id_priv->qp_type);
spin_lock(&cm.lock);
/* Check for duplicate REP. */
if (cm_insert_remote_id(cm_id_priv->timewait_info)) {
spin_unlock(&cm.lock);
spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto error;
}
/* Check for a stale connection. */
if (cm_insert_remote_qpn(cm_id_priv->timewait_info)) {
rb_erase(&cm_id_priv->timewait_info->remote_id_node,
&cm.remote_id_table);
cm_id_priv->timewait_info->inserted_remote_id = 0;
spin_unlock(&cm.lock);
spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
cm_issue_rej(work->port, work->mad_recv_wc,
IB_CM_REJ_STALE_CONN, CM_MSG_RESPONSE_REP,
NULL, 0);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto error;
}
spin_unlock(&cm.lock);
cm_id_priv->id.state = IB_CM_REP_RCVD;
cm_id_priv->id.remote_id = rep_msg->local_comm_id;
cm_id_priv->remote_qpn = cm_rep_get_qpn(rep_msg, cm_id_priv->qp_type);
cm_id_priv->initiator_depth = rep_msg->resp_resources;
cm_id_priv->responder_resources = rep_msg->initiator_depth;
cm_id_priv->sq_psn = cm_rep_get_starting_psn(rep_msg);
cm_id_priv->rnr_retry_count = cm_rep_get_rnr_retry_count(rep_msg);
cm_id_priv->target_ack_delay = cm_rep_get_target_ack_delay(rep_msg);
cm_id_priv->av.timeout =
cm_ack_timeout(cm_id_priv->target_ack_delay,
cm_id_priv->av.timeout - 1);
cm_id_priv->alt_av.timeout =
cm_ack_timeout(cm_id_priv->target_ack_delay,
cm_id_priv->alt_av.timeout - 1);
/* todo: handle peer_to_peer */
ib_cancel_mad(cm_id_priv->av.port->mad_agent, cm_id_priv->msg);
ret = atomic_inc_and_test(&cm_id_priv->work_count);
if (!ret)
list_add_tail(&work->list, &cm_id_priv->work_list);
spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
if (ret)
cm_process_work(cm_id_priv, work);
else
cm_deref_id(cm_id_priv);
return 0;
error:
cm_deref_id(cm_id_priv);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::OnStopSyncingPermanently() {
if (!sync_loop_)
return;
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), sync_loop_);
host_.Call(
FROM_HERE,
&SyncBackendHost::HandleStopSyncingPermanentlyOnFrontendLoop);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void TestObjectPythonReplaceableAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String> name, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::TestObjectPythonReplaceableAttributeSetter(name, jsValue, info);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NTSTATUS cli_cm_force_encryption(struct cli_state *c,
const char *username,
const char *password,
const char *domain,
const char *sharename)
{
NTSTATUS status;
if (smbXcli_conn_protocol(c->conn) >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
status = smb2cli_session_encryption_on(c->smb2.session);
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED)) {
d_printf("Encryption required and "
"server doesn't support "
"SMB3 encryption - failing connect\n");
} else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
d_printf("Encryption required and "
"setup failed with error %s.\n",
nt_errstr(status));
}
return status;
}
status = cli_force_encryption(c,
username,
password,
domain);
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED)) {
d_printf("Encryption required and "
"server that doesn't support "
"UNIX extensions - failing connect\n");
} else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,NT_STATUS_UNKNOWN_REVISION)) {
d_printf("Encryption required and "
"can't get UNIX CIFS extensions "
"version from server.\n");
} else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,NT_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION)) {
d_printf("Encryption required and "
"share %s doesn't support "
"encryption.\n", sharename);
} else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
d_printf("Encryption required and "
"setup failed with error %s.\n",
nt_errstr(status));
}
return status;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void StyleResolver::processScopedRules(const RuleSet& authorRules, const KURL& sheetBaseURL, ContainerNode* scope)
{
const Vector<StyleRuleKeyframes*> keyframesRules = authorRules.keyframesRules();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < keyframesRules.size(); ++i)
ensureScopedStyleResolver(scope)->addKeyframeStyle(keyframesRules[i]);
const Vector<StyleRuleHost*> hostRules = authorRules.hostRules();
if (hostRules.size() && scope && scope->isInShadowTree()) {
bool enabled = buildScopedStyleTreeInDocumentOrder();
setBuildScopedStyleTreeInDocumentOrder(false);
bool hasDocumentSecurityOrigin = document().securityOrigin()->canRequest(sheetBaseURL);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < hostRules.size(); ++i)
ensureScopedStyleResolver(scope->shadowHost())->addHostRule(hostRules[i], hasDocumentSecurityOrigin, scope);
setBuildScopedStyleTreeInDocumentOrder(enabled);
}
addTreeBoundaryCrossingRules(authorRules.treeBoundaryCrossingRules(), scope);
if (!scope || scope->isDocumentNode()) {
const Vector<StyleRuleFontFace*> fontFaceRules = authorRules.fontFaceRules();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < fontFaceRules.size(); ++i)
fontSelector()->addFontFaceRule(fontFaceRules[i]);
if (fontFaceRules.size())
invalidateMatchedPropertiesCache();
} else {
addTreeBoundaryCrossingRules(authorRules.shadowDistributedRules(), scope);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init sched_domain_debug_setup(char *str)
{
sched_domain_debug_enabled = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void dm_internal_resume_fast(struct mapped_device *md)
{
if (dm_suspended_md(md) || dm_suspended_internally_md(md))
goto done;
dm_queue_flush(md);
done:
mutex_unlock(&md->suspend_lock);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fd_read_hunk (int fd, hunk_terminator_t terminator, long sizehint, long maxsize)
{
long bufsize = sizehint;
char *hunk = xmalloc (bufsize);
int tail = 0; /* tail position in HUNK */
assert (!maxsize || maxsize >= bufsize);
while (1)
{
const char *end;
int pklen, rdlen, remain;
/* First, peek at the available data. */
pklen = fd_peek (fd, hunk + tail, bufsize - 1 - tail, -1);
if (pklen < 0)
{
xfree (hunk);
return NULL;
}
end = terminator (hunk, hunk + tail, pklen);
if (end)
{
/* The data contains the terminator: we'll drain the data up
to the end of the terminator. */
remain = end - (hunk + tail);
assert (remain >= 0);
if (remain == 0)
{
/* No more data needs to be read. */
hunk[tail] = '\0';
return hunk;
}
if (bufsize - 1 < tail + remain)
{
bufsize = tail + remain + 1;
hunk = xrealloc (hunk, bufsize);
}
}
else
/* No terminator: simply read the data we know is (or should
be) available. */
remain = pklen;
/* Now, read the data. Note that we make no assumptions about
how much data we'll get. (Some TCP stacks are notorious for
read returning less data than the previous MSG_PEEK.) */
rdlen = fd_read (fd, hunk + tail, remain, 0);
if (rdlen < 0)
{
xfree (hunk);
return NULL;
}
tail += rdlen;
hunk[tail] = '\0';
if (rdlen == 0)
{
if (tail == 0)
{
/* EOF without anything having been read */
xfree (hunk);
errno = 0;
return NULL;
}
else
/* EOF seen: return the data we've read. */
return hunk;
}
if (end && rdlen == remain)
/* The terminator was seen and the remaining data drained --
we got what we came for. */
return hunk;
/* Keep looping until all the data arrives. */
if (tail == bufsize - 1)
{
/* Double the buffer size, but refuse to allocate more than
MAXSIZE bytes. */
if (maxsize && bufsize >= maxsize)
{
xfree (hunk);
errno = ENOMEM;
return NULL;
}
bufsize <<= 1;
if (maxsize && bufsize > maxsize)
bufsize = maxsize;
hunk = xrealloc (hunk, bufsize);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mmtimer_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
unsigned long mmtimer_addr;
if (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start != PAGE_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
return -EPERM;
if (PAGE_SIZE > (1 << 16))
return -ENOSYS;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
mmtimer_addr = __pa(RTC_COUNTER_ADDR);
mmtimer_addr &= ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);
mmtimer_addr &= 0xfffffffffffffffUL;
if (remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start, mmtimer_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT,
PAGE_SIZE, vma->vm_page_prot)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "remap_pfn_range failed in mmtimer.c\n");
return -EAGAIN;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(Array, seek)
{
long opos, position;
zval *object = getThis();
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
HashTable *aht = spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
int result;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &position) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!aht) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Array was modified outside object and is no longer an array");
return;
}
opos = position;
if (position >= 0) { /* negative values are not supported */
spl_array_rewind(intern TSRMLS_CC);
result = SUCCESS;
while (position-- > 0 && (result = spl_array_next(intern TSRMLS_CC)) == SUCCESS);
if (result == SUCCESS && zend_hash_has_more_elements_ex(aht, &intern->pos) == SUCCESS) {
return; /* ok */
}
}
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_OutOfBoundsException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Seek position %ld is out of range", opos);
} /* }}} */
int static spl_array_object_count_elements_helper(spl_array_object *intern, long *count TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
Commit Message: Fix bug #73029 - Missing type check when unserializing SplArray
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 49,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderLayerScrollableArea::setScrollOffset(const IntPoint& newScrollOffset)
{
if (!box().isMarquee()) {
if (m_scrollDimensionsDirty)
computeScrollDimensions();
}
if (scrollOffset() == toIntSize(newScrollOffset))
return;
setScrollOffset(toIntSize(newScrollOffset));
LocalFrame* frame = box().frame();
ASSERT(frame);
RefPtr<FrameView> frameView = box().frameView();
TRACE_EVENT1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("devtools.timeline"), "ScrollLayer", "data", InspectorScrollLayerEvent::data(&box()));
InspectorInstrumentation::willScrollLayer(&box());
const RenderLayerModelObject* paintInvalidationContainer = box().containerForPaintInvalidation();
if (!frameView->isInPerformLayout()) {
layer()->clipper().clearClipRectsIncludingDescendants();
box().setPreviousPaintInvalidationRect(box().boundsRectForPaintInvalidation(paintInvalidationContainer));
frameView->updateAnnotatedRegions();
frameView->updateWidgetPositions();
RELEASE_ASSERT(frameView->renderView());
updateCompositingLayersAfterScroll();
}
frame->selection().setCaretRectNeedsUpdate();
FloatQuad quadForFakeMouseMoveEvent = FloatQuad(layer()->renderer()->previousPaintInvalidationRect());
quadForFakeMouseMoveEvent = paintInvalidationContainer->localToAbsoluteQuad(quadForFakeMouseMoveEvent);
frame->eventHandler().dispatchFakeMouseMoveEventSoonInQuad(quadForFakeMouseMoveEvent);
bool requiresPaintInvalidation = true;
if (!box().isMarquee() && box().view()->compositor()->inCompositingMode()) {
DisableCompositingQueryAsserts disabler;
bool onlyScrolledCompositedLayers = scrollsOverflow()
&& !layer()->hasVisibleNonLayerContent()
&& !layer()->hasNonCompositedChild()
&& !layer()->hasBlockSelectionGapBounds()
&& box().style()->backgroundLayers().attachment() != LocalBackgroundAttachment;
if (usesCompositedScrolling() || onlyScrolledCompositedLayers)
requiresPaintInvalidation = false;
}
if (requiresPaintInvalidation) {
if (box().frameView()->isInPerformLayout())
box().setShouldDoFullPaintInvalidation(true);
else
box().invalidatePaintUsingContainer(paintInvalidationContainer, layer()->renderer()->previousPaintInvalidationRect(), InvalidationScroll);
}
if (box().node())
box().node()->document().enqueueScrollEventForNode(box().node());
if (AXObjectCache* cache = box().document().existingAXObjectCache())
cache->handleScrollPositionChanged(&box());
InspectorInstrumentation::didScrollLayer(&box());
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 171,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MediaStreamManager::PickDeviceId(
const MediaDeviceSaltAndOrigin& salt_and_origin,
const TrackControls& controls,
const MediaDeviceInfoArray& devices,
std::string* device_id) const {
if (controls.device_id.empty())
return true;
if (!GetDeviceIDFromHMAC(salt_and_origin.device_id_salt,
salt_and_origin.origin, controls.device_id, devices,
device_id)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Invalid device ID = " << controls.device_id;
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FFmpegVideoDecoder::Decode(const scoped_refptr<DecoderBuffer>& buffer,
const DecodeCB& decode_cb) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK(!decode_cb.is_null());
CHECK_NE(state_, kUninitialized);
CHECK(decode_cb_.is_null()) << "Overlapping decodes are not supported.";
decode_cb_ = BindToCurrentLoop(decode_cb);
if (state_ == kError) {
base::ResetAndReturn(&decode_cb_).Run(kDecodeError, NULL);
return;
}
if (state_ == kDecodeFinished) {
base::ResetAndReturn(&decode_cb_).Run(kOk, VideoFrame::CreateEOSFrame());
return;
}
DecodeBuffer(buffer);
}
Commit Message: Replicate FFmpeg's video frame allocation strategy.
This should avoid accidental overreads and overwrites due to our
VideoFrame's not being as large as FFmpeg expects.
BUG=368980
TEST=new regression test
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/270193002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268831 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evdns_err_to_string(int err)
{
switch (err) {
case DNS_ERR_NONE: return "no error";
case DNS_ERR_FORMAT: return "misformatted query";
case DNS_ERR_SERVERFAILED: return "server failed";
case DNS_ERR_NOTEXIST: return "name does not exist";
case DNS_ERR_NOTIMPL: return "query not implemented";
case DNS_ERR_REFUSED: return "refused";
case DNS_ERR_TRUNCATED: return "reply truncated or ill-formed";
case DNS_ERR_UNKNOWN: return "unknown";
case DNS_ERR_TIMEOUT: return "request timed out";
case DNS_ERR_SHUTDOWN: return "dns subsystem shut down";
case DNS_ERR_CANCEL: return "dns request canceled";
case DNS_ERR_NODATA: return "no records in the reply";
default: return "[Unknown error code]";
}
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
return sshbuf_get_string(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct crypto_instance *skcipher_geniv_alloc(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
struct rtattr **tb, u32 type,
u32 mask)
{
struct {
int (*setkey)(struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen);
int (*encrypt)(struct ablkcipher_request *req);
int (*decrypt)(struct ablkcipher_request *req);
unsigned int min_keysize;
unsigned int max_keysize;
unsigned int ivsize;
const char *geniv;
} balg;
const char *name;
struct crypto_skcipher_spawn *spawn;
struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
struct crypto_instance *inst;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
int err;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
if (IS_ERR(algt))
return ERR_CAST(algt);
if ((algt->type ^ (CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_GIVCIPHER | CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV)) &
algt->mask)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
if (IS_ERR(name))
return ERR_CAST(name);
inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*spawn), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!inst)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
spawn = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
/* Ignore async algorithms if necessary. */
mask |= crypto_requires_sync(algt->type, algt->mask);
crypto_set_skcipher_spawn(spawn, inst);
err = crypto_grab_nivcipher(spawn, name, type, mask);
if (err)
goto err_free_inst;
alg = crypto_skcipher_spawn_alg(spawn);
if ((alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) ==
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER) {
balg.ivsize = alg->cra_blkcipher.ivsize;
balg.min_keysize = alg->cra_blkcipher.min_keysize;
balg.max_keysize = alg->cra_blkcipher.max_keysize;
balg.setkey = async_setkey;
balg.encrypt = async_encrypt;
balg.decrypt = async_decrypt;
balg.geniv = alg->cra_blkcipher.geniv;
} else {
balg.ivsize = alg->cra_ablkcipher.ivsize;
balg.min_keysize = alg->cra_ablkcipher.min_keysize;
balg.max_keysize = alg->cra_ablkcipher.max_keysize;
balg.setkey = alg->cra_ablkcipher.setkey;
balg.encrypt = alg->cra_ablkcipher.encrypt;
balg.decrypt = alg->cra_ablkcipher.decrypt;
balg.geniv = alg->cra_ablkcipher.geniv;
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (!balg.ivsize)
goto err_drop_alg;
/*
* This is only true if we're constructing an algorithm with its
* default IV generator. For the default generator we elide the
* template name and double-check the IV generator.
*/
if (algt->mask & CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV) {
if (!balg.geniv)
balg.geniv = crypto_default_geniv(alg);
err = -EAGAIN;
if (strcmp(tmpl->name, balg.geniv))
goto err_drop_alg;
memcpy(inst->alg.cra_name, alg->cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
memcpy(inst->alg.cra_driver_name, alg->cra_driver_name,
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
} else {
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"%s(%s)", tmpl->name, alg->cra_name) >=
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto err_drop_alg;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"%s(%s)", tmpl->name, alg->cra_driver_name) >=
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto err_drop_alg;
}
inst->alg.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_GIVCIPHER | CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV;
inst->alg.cra_flags |= alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
inst->alg.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority;
inst->alg.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
inst->alg.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
inst->alg.cra_type = &crypto_givcipher_type;
inst->alg.cra_ablkcipher.ivsize = balg.ivsize;
inst->alg.cra_ablkcipher.min_keysize = balg.min_keysize;
inst->alg.cra_ablkcipher.max_keysize = balg.max_keysize;
inst->alg.cra_ablkcipher.geniv = balg.geniv;
inst->alg.cra_ablkcipher.setkey = balg.setkey;
inst->alg.cra_ablkcipher.encrypt = balg.encrypt;
inst->alg.cra_ablkcipher.decrypt = balg.decrypt;
out:
return inst;
err_drop_alg:
crypto_drop_skcipher(spawn);
err_free_inst:
kfree(inst);
inst = ERR_PTR(err);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,295 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::TimeDelta WallpaperManagerBase::GetWallpaperLoadDelay() const {
base::TimeDelta delay;
if (last_load_times_.size() == 0) {
delay = base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kLoadDefaultDelayMs);
} else {
delay = std::accumulate(last_load_times_.begin(), last_load_times_.end(),
base::TimeDelta(), std::plus<base::TimeDelta>()) /
last_load_times_.size();
}
if (delay < base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kLoadMinDelayMs))
delay = base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kLoadMinDelayMs);
else if (delay > base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kLoadMaxDelayMs))
delay = base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kLoadMaxDelayMs);
if (!last_load_finished_at_.is_null()) {
const base::TimeDelta interval = base::Time::Now() - last_load_finished_at_;
if (interval > delay)
delay = base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(0);
else if (interval > base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(0))
delay -= interval;
}
return delay;
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 128,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableCacheInlineScriptCode(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetCacheInlineScriptCodeEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool sched_can_stop_tick(struct rq *rq)
{
int fifo_nr_running;
/* Deadline tasks, even if single, need the tick */
if (rq->dl.dl_nr_running)
return false;
/*
* If there are more than one RR tasks, we need the tick to effect the
* actual RR behaviour.
*/
if (rq->rt.rr_nr_running) {
if (rq->rt.rr_nr_running == 1)
return true;
else
return false;
}
/*
* If there's no RR tasks, but FIFO tasks, we can skip the tick, no
* forced preemption between FIFO tasks.
*/
fifo_nr_running = rq->rt.rt_nr_running - rq->rt.rr_nr_running;
if (fifo_nr_running)
return true;
/*
* If there are no DL,RR/FIFO tasks, there must only be CFS tasks left;
* if there's more than one we need the tick for involuntary
* preemption.
*/
if (rq->nr_running > 1)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadMSLImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=(Image *) NULL;
(void) ProcessMSLScript(image_info,&image,exception);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: Prevent fault in MSL interpreter
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 71,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rc_pdf14_maskbuf_free(gs_memory_t * mem, void *ptr_in, client_name_t cname)
{
/* Ending the mask buffer. */
pdf14_rcmask_t *rcmask = (pdf14_rcmask_t * ) ptr_in;
/* free the pdf14 buffer. */
if ( rcmask->mask_buf != NULL ){
pdf14_buf_free(rcmask->mask_buf, mem);
}
gs_free_object(mem, rcmask, "rc_pdf14_maskbuf_free");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 13,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int log_debug_info(int level, int verbosity, const char *fmt, ...) {
va_list ap;
char *tmppath = NULL;
struct timeval current_time;
if(!(debug_level == DEBUGL_ALL || (level & debug_level)))
return OK;
if(verbosity > debug_verbosity)
return OK;
if(debug_file_fp == NULL)
return ERROR;
/* write the timestamp */
gettimeofday(¤t_time, NULL);
fprintf(debug_file_fp, "[%lu.%06lu] [%03d.%d] [pid=%lu] ", current_time.tv_sec, current_time.tv_usec, level, verbosity, (unsigned long)getpid());
/* write the data */
va_start(ap, fmt);
vfprintf(debug_file_fp, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
/* flush, so we don't have problems tailing or when fork()ing */
fflush(debug_file_fp);
/* if file has grown beyond max, rotate it */
if((unsigned long)ftell(debug_file_fp) > max_debug_file_size && max_debug_file_size > 0L) {
/* close the file */
close_debug_log();
/* rotate the log file */
asprintf(&tmppath, "%s.old", debug_file);
if(tmppath) {
/* unlink the old debug file */
unlink(tmppath);
/* rotate the debug file */
my_rename(debug_file, tmppath);
/* free memory */
my_free(tmppath);
}
/* open a new file */
open_debug_log();
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'maint'
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 48,162 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: encode_putfh(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct nfs_fh *fh)
{
int len = fh->size;
__be32 *p;
RESERVE_SPACE(8 + len);
WRITE32(OP_PUTFH);
WRITE32(len);
WRITEMEM(fh->data, len);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Rect ExtensionInstalledBubble::GetAnchorRect() {
if (type_ == OMNIBOX_KEYWORD) {
LocationBarView* location_bar_view =
BrowserView::GetBrowserViewForBrowser(browser_)->GetLocationBarView();
return gfx::Rect(location_bar_view->GetLocationEntryOrigin(),
gfx::Size(0, location_bar_view->location_entry_view()->height()));
}
return views::BubbleDelegateView::GetAnchorRect();
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit CCThreadProxySchedulerClient(CCThreadProxy* proxy)
{
m_proxy = proxy;
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void dev_close_many(struct list_head *head, bool unlink)
{
struct net_device *dev, *tmp;
/* Remove the devices that don't need to be closed */
list_for_each_entry_safe(dev, tmp, head, close_list)
if (!(dev->flags & IFF_UP))
list_del_init(&dev->close_list);
__dev_close_many(head);
list_for_each_entry_safe(dev, tmp, head, close_list) {
rtmsg_ifinfo(RTM_NEWLINK, dev, IFF_UP|IFF_RUNNING, GFP_KERNEL);
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_DOWN, dev);
if (unlink)
list_del_init(&dev->close_list);
}
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 93,371 |
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