instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int64 CreateUnsyncedDirectory(const string& entry_name,
const syncable::Id& id) {
WriteTransaction wtrans(FROM_HERE, UNITTEST, directory());
MutableEntry entry(&wtrans, syncable::CREATE, wtrans.root_id(),
entry_name);
EXPECT_TRUE(entry.good());
entry.Put(syncable::IS_UNSYNCED, true);
entry.Put(syncable::IS_DIR, true);
entry.Put(syncable::SPECIFICS, DefaultBookmarkSpecifics());
entry.Put(syncable::BASE_VERSION, id.ServerKnows() ? 1 : 0);
entry.Put(syncable::ID, id);
return entry.Get(META_HANDLE);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sf_read_short (SNDFILE *sndfile, short *ptr, sf_count_t len)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf ;
sf_count_t count, extra ;
VALIDATE_SNDFILE_AND_ASSIGN_PSF (sndfile, psf, 1) ;
if (psf->file.mode == SFM_WRITE)
{ psf->error = SFE_NOT_READMODE ;
return 0 ;
} ;
if (len % psf->sf.channels)
{ psf->error = SFE_BAD_READ_ALIGN ;
return 0 ;
} ;
if (len <= 0 || psf->read_current >= psf->sf.frames)
{ psf_memset (ptr, 0, len * sizeof (short)) ;
return 0 ; /* End of file. */
} ;
if (psf->read_short == NULL || psf->seek == NULL)
{ psf->error = SFE_UNIMPLEMENTED ;
return 0 ;
} ;
if (psf->last_op != SFM_READ)
if (psf->seek (psf, SFM_READ, psf->read_current) < 0)
return 0 ;
count = psf->read_short (psf, ptr, len) ;
if (psf->read_current + count / psf->sf.channels <= psf->sf.frames)
psf->read_current += count / psf->sf.channels ;
else
{ count = (psf->sf.frames - psf->read_current) * psf->sf.channels ;
extra = len - count ;
psf_memset (ptr + count, 0, extra * sizeof (short)) ;
psf->read_current = psf->sf.frames ;
} ;
psf->last_op = SFM_READ ;
return count ;
} /* sf_read_short */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 95,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool is_inert() const { return is_inert_; }
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 143,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageconvolution)
{
zval *SIM, *hash_matrix;
zval **var = NULL, **var2 = NULL;
gdImagePtr im_src = NULL;
double div, offset;
int nelem, i, j, res;
float matrix[3][3] = {{0,0,0}, {0,0,0}, {0,0,0}};
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "radd", &SIM, &hash_matrix, &div, &offset) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im_src, gdImagePtr, &SIM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
nelem = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(hash_matrix));
if (nelem != 3) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must have 3x3 array");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
for (i=0; i<3; i++) {
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(hash_matrix), (i), (void **) &var) == SUCCESS && Z_TYPE_PP(var) == IS_ARRAY) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(var) != IS_ARRAY || zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_PP(var)) != 3 ) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must have 3x3 array");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
for (j=0; j<3; j++) {
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(var), (j), (void **) &var2) == SUCCESS) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL(var2);
convert_to_double(*var2);
matrix[i][j] = Z_DVAL_PP(var2);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must have a 3x3 matrix");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
}
}
res = gdImageConvolution(im_src, matrix, div, offset);
if (res) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AppShortcutManager::~AppShortcutManager() {
if (g_browser_process && is_profile_info_cache_observer_) {
ProfileManager* profile_manager = g_browser_process->profile_manager();
if (profile_manager)
profile_manager->GetProfileInfoCache().RemoveObserver(this);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothOptionsHandler::ValidateDefaultAdapter(
chromeos::BluetoothAdapter* adapter) {
if ((adapter == NULL && !default_adapter_id_.empty()) ||
(adapter != NULL && default_adapter_id_ != adapter->Id())) {
VLOG(1) << "unexpected default adapter change from \""
<< default_adapter_id_ << "\" to \"" << adapter->Id() << "\"";
DefaultAdapterChanged(adapter);
}
}
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void xml_parser_dtor(zend_rsrc_list_entry *rsrc TSRMLS_DC)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)rsrc->ptr;
if (parser->parser) {
XML_ParserFree(parser->parser);
}
if (parser->ltags) {
int inx;
for (inx = 0; ((inx < parser->level) && (inx < XML_MAXLEVEL)); inx++)
efree(parser->ltags[ inx ]);
efree(parser->ltags);
}
if (parser->startElementHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->startElementHandler);
}
if (parser->endElementHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->endElementHandler);
}
if (parser->characterDataHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->characterDataHandler);
}
if (parser->processingInstructionHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->processingInstructionHandler);
}
if (parser->defaultHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->defaultHandler);
}
if (parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler);
}
if (parser->notationDeclHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->notationDeclHandler);
}
if (parser->externalEntityRefHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->externalEntityRefHandler);
}
if (parser->unknownEncodingHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->unknownEncodingHandler);
}
if (parser->startNamespaceDeclHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->startNamespaceDeclHandler);
}
if (parser->endNamespaceDeclHandler) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->endNamespaceDeclHandler);
}
if (parser->baseURI) {
efree(parser->baseURI);
}
if (parser->object) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->object);
}
efree(parser);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 165,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::SetCanHaveScrollbars(bool can_have_scrollbars) {
if (LocalFrameView* view = GetFrameView())
view->SetCanHaveScrollbars(can_have_scrollbars);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Persistent<v8::FunctionTemplate> V8TestInterface::GetTemplate()
{
V8BindingPerIsolateData* data = V8BindingPerIsolateData::current();
V8BindingPerIsolateData::TemplateMap::iterator result = data->templateMap().find(&info);
if (result != data->templateMap().end())
return result->second;
v8::HandleScope handleScope;
v8::Persistent<v8::FunctionTemplate> templ =
ConfigureV8TestInterfaceTemplate(GetRawTemplate());
data->templateMap().add(&info, templ);
return templ;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,490 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string16 ToLower(const string16& string) {
icu::UnicodeString unicode_string(string.c_str(), string.size());
unicode_string.toLower();
return string16(unicode_string.getBuffer(), unicode_string.length());
}
Commit Message: base/i18n: Remove unneeded includes in case_conversion.*
These includes are not needed anymore since r84855.
BUG=None
TEST=None
R=evan@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7032008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85559 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct usb_host_interface *usb_altnum_to_altsetting(
const struct usb_interface *intf,
unsigned int altnum)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < intf->num_altsetting; i++) {
if (intf->altsetting[i].desc.bAlternateSetting == altnum)
return &intf->altsetting[i];
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 75,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<Event> DeviceOrientationController::getLastEvent()
{
return DeviceOrientationEvent::create(EventTypeNames::deviceorientation,
DeviceOrientationDispatcher::instance().latestDeviceOrientationData());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NO_INLINE void jsExceptionHere_flash(JsExceptionType type, const char *ffmt, ...) {
size_t len = flash_strlen(ffmt);
char fmt[len+1];
flash_strncpy(fmt, ffmt, len+1);
if (jspHasError()) return;
jsiConsoleRemoveInputLine();
JsVar *var = jsvNewFromEmptyString();
if (!var) {
jspSetError(false);
return; // out of memory
}
JsvStringIterator it;
jsvStringIteratorNew(&it, var, 0);
jsvStringIteratorGotoEnd(&it);
vcbprintf_callback cb = (vcbprintf_callback)jsvStringIteratorPrintfCallback;
va_list argp;
va_start(argp, ffmt);
vcbprintf(cb,&it, fmt, argp);
va_end(argp);
jsvStringIteratorFree(&it);
if (type != JSET_STRING) {
JsVar *obj = 0;
if (type == JSET_ERROR) obj = jswrap_error_constructor(var);
else if (type == JSET_SYNTAXERROR) obj = jswrap_syntaxerror_constructor(var);
else if (type == JSET_TYPEERROR) obj = jswrap_typeerror_constructor(var);
else if (type == JSET_INTERNALERROR) obj = jswrap_internalerror_constructor(var);
else if (type == JSET_REFERENCEERROR) obj = jswrap_referenceerror_constructor(var);
jsvUnLock(var);
var = obj;
}
jspSetException(var);
jsvUnLock(var);
}
Commit Message: Fix stack size detection on Linux (fix #1427)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 82,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ndisc_error_report(struct neighbour *neigh, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
/*
* "The sender MUST return an ICMP
* destination unreachable"
*/
dst_link_failure(skb);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface
A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do.
RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing"
> 1. The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small
> number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to
> be dropped before they reach their destination.
> As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to
> ignore very small hop limits. The nodes could implement a
> configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below
> said limit.
Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark <ljungmark@modio.se>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 43,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebContentsViewDelegate* ContentBrowserClient::GetWebContentsViewDelegate(
WebContents* web_contents) {
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsHttpHandler::Send200(int connection_id,
const std::string& data,
const std::string& mime_type) {
if (!thread_)
return;
thread_->task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&ServerWrapper::Send200,
base::Unretained(server_wrapper_.get()),
connection_id, data, mime_type));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: check Host header for being IP or localhost when connecting over RDP.
Bug: 813540
Change-Id: I9338aa2475c15090b8a60729be25502eb866efb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/952522
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#541547}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,266 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionContextMenuModel::ExtensionContextMenuModel(
const Extension* extension,
Browser* browser,
PopupDelegate* delegate)
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(SimpleMenuModel(this)),
extension_id_(extension->id()),
browser_(browser),
profile_(browser->profile()),
delegate_(delegate) {
extension_action_ = extension->browser_action();
if (!extension_action_)
extension_action_ = extension->page_action();
InitCommonCommands();
if (profile_->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kExtensionsUIDeveloperMode) &&
delegate_) {
AddSeparator();
AddItemWithStringId(INSPECT_POPUP, IDS_EXTENSION_ACTION_INSPECT_POPUP);
}
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bond_arp_send(struct net_device *slave_dev, int arp_op, __be32 dest_ip, __be32 src_ip, unsigned short vlan_id)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
pr_debug("arp %d on slave %s: dst %x src %x vid %d\n", arp_op,
slave_dev->name, dest_ip, src_ip, vlan_id);
skb = arp_create(arp_op, ETH_P_ARP, dest_ip, slave_dev, src_ip,
NULL, slave_dev->dev_addr, NULL);
if (!skb) {
pr_err("ARP packet allocation failed\n");
return;
}
if (vlan_id) {
skb = vlan_put_tag(skb, vlan_id);
if (!skb) {
pr_err("failed to insert VLAN tag\n");
return;
}
}
arp_xmit(skb);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string TestURLLoader::TestBasicPOST() {
pp::URLRequestInfo request(instance_);
request.SetURL("/echo");
request.SetMethod("POST");
std::string postdata("postdata");
request.AppendDataToBody(postdata.data(),
static_cast<uint32_t>(postdata.length()));
return LoadAndCompareBody(request, postdata);
}
Commit Message: Fix one implicit 64-bit -> 32-bit implicit conversion in a PPAPI test.
../../ppapi/tests/test_url_loader.cc:877:11: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision: 'int64_t' (aka 'long long') to 'int32_t' (aka 'int') [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
total_bytes_to_be_received);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BUG=879657
Change-Id: I152f456368131fe7a2891ff0c97bf83f26ef0906
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1220173
Commit-Queue: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600182}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 156,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *create_server_config(apr_pool_t *p, server_rec *s)
{
ap_lua_server_cfg *cfg = apr_pcalloc(p, sizeof(ap_lua_server_cfg));
cfg->vm_reslists = apr_hash_make(p);
apr_thread_rwlock_create(&cfg->vm_reslists_lock, p);
cfg->root_path = NULL;
return cfg;
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void ne2000_mem_writel(NE2000State *s, uint32_t addr,
uint32_t val)
{
addr &= ~1; /* XXX: check exact behaviour if not even */
if (addr < 32
|| (addr >= NE2000_PMEM_START
&& addr + sizeof(uint32_t) <= NE2000_MEM_SIZE)) {
stl_le_p(s->mem + addr, val);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Range::intersectsNode(Node* refNode, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (!m_start.container()) {
ec = INVALID_STATE_ERR;
return false;
}
if (!refNode) {
ec = NOT_FOUND_ERR;
return false;
}
if (!refNode->attached() || refNode->document() != m_ownerDocument) {
return false;
}
ContainerNode* parentNode = refNode->parentNode();
int nodeIndex = refNode->nodeIndex();
if (!parentNode) {
ec = NOT_FOUND_ERR;
return false;
}
if (comparePoint(parentNode, nodeIndex, ec) < 0 && // starts before start
comparePoint(parentNode, nodeIndex + 1, ec) < 0) { // ends before start
return false;
} else if (comparePoint(parentNode, nodeIndex, ec) > 0 && // starts after end
comparePoint(parentNode, nodeIndex + 1, ec) > 0) { // ends after end
return false;
}
return true; // all other cases
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,253 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FoFiType1::writeEncoded(char **newEncoding,
FoFiOutputFunc outputFunc, void *outputStream) {
char buf[512];
char *line, *line2, *p;
int i;
for (line = (char *)file;
line && strncmp(line, "/Encoding", 9);
line = getNextLine(line)) ;
if (!line) {
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, (char *)file, len);
return;
}
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, (char *)file, line - (char *)file);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "/Encoding 256 array\n", 20);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream,
"0 1 255 {1 index exch /.notdef put} for\n", 40);
for (i = 0; i < 256; ++i) {
if (newEncoding[i]) {
sprintf(buf, "dup %d /%s put\n", i, newEncoding[i]);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, buf, strlen(buf));
}
}
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "readonly def\n", 13);
if (!strncmp(line, "/Encoding StandardEncoding def", 30)) {
line = getNextLine(line);
} else {
p = line + 10;
line = NULL;
for (; p < (char *)file + len; ++p) {
if ((*p == ' ' || *p == '\t' || *p == '\x0a' ||
*p == '\x0d' || *p == '\x0c' || *p == '\0') &&
p + 4 <= (char *)file + len &&
!strncmp(p + 1, "def", 3)) {
line = p + 4;
break;
}
}
}
if (line) {
for (line2 = line, i = 0;
i < 20 && line2 && strncmp(line2, "/Encoding", 9);
line2 = getNextLine(line2), ++i) ;
if (i < 20 && line2) {
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, line, line2 - line);
if (!strncmp(line2, "/Encoding StandardEncoding def", 30)) {
line = getNextLine(line2);
} else {
p = line2 + 10;
line = NULL;
for (; p < (char *)file + len; ++p) {
if ((*p == ' ' || *p == '\t' || *p == '\x0a' ||
*p == '\x0d' || *p == '\x0c' || *p == '\0') &&
p + 4 <= (char *)file + len &&
!strncmp(p + 1, "def", 3)) {
line = p + 4;
break;
}
}
}
}
if (line) {
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, line, ((char *)file + len) - line);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,064 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int bmp_gethdr(jas_stream_t *in, bmp_hdr_t *hdr)
{
if (bmp_getint16(in, &hdr->magic) || hdr->magic != BMP_MAGIC ||
bmp_getint32(in, &hdr->siz) || bmp_getint16(in, &hdr->reserved1) ||
bmp_getint16(in, &hdr->reserved2) || bmp_getint32(in, &hdr->off)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_ppt_putparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate, jas_stream_t *out)
{
jpc_ppt_t *ppt = &ms->parms.ppt;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variable. */
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_putuint8(out, ppt->ind)) {
return -1;
}
if (jas_stream_write(out, (char *) ppt->data, ppt->len) != JAS_CAST(int, ppt->len)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ResourceRequest& DocumentLoader::request()
{
return m_request;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jp2_colr_putdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *out)
{
jp2_colr_t *colr = &box->data.colr;
if (jp2_putuint8(out, colr->method) || jp2_putuint8(out, colr->pri) ||
jp2_putuint8(out, colr->approx)) {
return -1;
}
switch (colr->method) {
case JP2_COLR_ENUM:
if (jp2_putuint32(out, colr->csid)) {
return -1;
}
break;
case JP2_COLR_ICC:
if (jas_stream_write(out, colr->iccp,
JAS_CAST(int, colr->iccplen)) != JAS_CAST(int, colr->iccplen))
return -1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 67,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u8 byte(const u32 x, const unsigned n)
{
return x >> (n << 3);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sock_def_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
}
Commit Message: net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 47,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorResourceAgent::didReceiveResourceResponse(LocalFrame* frame, unsigned long identifier, DocumentLoader* loader, const ResourceResponse& response, ResourceLoader* resourceLoader)
{
if (!loader)
return;
String requestId = IdentifiersFactory::requestId(identifier);
RefPtr<TypeBuilder::Network::Response> resourceResponse = buildObjectForResourceResponse(response, loader);
bool isNotModified = response.httpStatusCode() == 304;
Resource* cachedResource = 0;
if (resourceLoader && !isNotModified)
cachedResource = resourceLoader->cachedResource();
if (!cachedResource || cachedResource->type() == Resource::MainResource)
cachedResource = InspectorPageAgent::cachedResource(loader->frame(), response.url());
if (cachedResource) {
if (resourceResponse && response.mimeType().isEmpty())
resourceResponse->setString(TypeBuilder::Network::Response::MimeType, cachedResource->response().mimeType());
m_resourcesData->addResource(requestId, cachedResource);
}
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType type = cachedResource ? InspectorPageAgent::cachedResourceType(*cachedResource) : InspectorPageAgent::OtherResource;
if (m_resourcesData->resourceType(requestId) == InspectorPageAgent::ScriptResource)
type = InspectorPageAgent::ScriptResource;
if (equalIgnoringFragmentIdentifier(response.url(), loader->url()) && !loader->isCommitted())
type = InspectorPageAgent::DocumentResource;
m_resourcesData->responseReceived(requestId, m_pageAgent->frameId(loader->frame()), response);
m_resourcesData->setResourceType(requestId, type);
if (!isResponseEmpty(resourceResponse))
m_frontend->responseReceived(requestId, m_pageAgent->frameId(loader->frame()), m_pageAgent->loaderId(loader), currentTime(), InspectorPageAgent::resourceTypeJson(type), resourceResponse);
if (isNotModified && cachedResource && cachedResource->encodedSize())
didReceiveData(frame, identifier, 0, cachedResource->encodedSize(), 0);
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AXObjectCacheImpl::textChanged(AXObject* obj) {
if (!obj)
return;
bool parentAlreadyExists = obj->parentObjectIfExists();
obj->textChanged();
postNotification(obj, AXObjectCacheImpl::AXTextChanged);
if (parentAlreadyExists)
obj->notifyIfIgnoredValueChanged();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: validGlxFBConfig(ClientPtr client, __GLXscreen *pGlxScreen, XID id,
__GLXconfig **config, int *err)
{
__GLXconfig *m;
for (m = pGlxScreen->fbconfigs; m != NULL; m = m->next)
if (m->fbconfigID == id) {
*config = m;
return TRUE;
}
client->errorValue = id;
*err = __glXError(GLXBadFBConfig);
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void set_datagram_seg(struct mlx5_wqe_datagram_seg *dseg,
const struct ib_send_wr *wr)
{
memcpy(&dseg->av, &to_mah(ud_wr(wr)->ah)->av, sizeof(struct mlx5_av));
dseg->av.dqp_dct = cpu_to_be32(ud_wr(wr)->remote_qpn | MLX5_EXTENDED_UD_AV);
dseg->av.key.qkey.qkey = cpu_to_be32(ud_wr(wr)->remote_qkey);
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AppCacheUpdateJob::~AppCacheUpdateJob() {
if (service_)
service_->RemoveObserver(this);
if (internal_state_ != COMPLETED)
Cancel();
DCHECK(!inprogress_cache_.get());
DCHECK(pending_master_entries_.empty());
CHECK(!manifest_fetcher_);
CHECK(pending_url_fetches_.empty());
CHECK(master_entry_fetches_.empty());
if (group_)
group_->SetUpdateAppCacheStatus(AppCacheGroup::IDLE);
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u32 rxrpc_kernel_get_abort_code(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
ASSERTCMP(skb->mark, ==, RXRPC_SKB_MARK_REMOTE_ABORT);
return sp->call->abort_code;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::OverloadedMethodLMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_overloadedMethodL");
test_object_v8_internal::OverloadedMethodLMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcRenderCreateConicalGradient(ClientPtr client)
{
int len;
REQUEST(xRenderCreateConicalGradientReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderCreateConicalGradientReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->pid);
swapl(&stuff->center.x);
swapl(&stuff->center.y);
swapl(&stuff->angle);
swapl(&stuff->nStops);
len = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof(xRenderCreateConicalGradientReq);
if (stuff->nStops > UINT32_MAX / (sizeof(xFixed) + sizeof(xRenderColor)))
return BadLength;
if (len != stuff->nStops * (sizeof(xFixed) + sizeof(xRenderColor)))
return BadLength;
swapStops(stuff + 1, stuff->nStops);
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_vfsmnt(struct mount *mnt)
{
kfree(mnt->mnt_devname);
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
free_percpu(mnt->mnt_pcp);
#endif
kmem_cache_free(mnt_cache, mnt);
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CustomInspectorTest()
: InspectorTest()
, m_inspectorWindow(0)
{
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: test_run_handler_arg_order (void) {
run_handler("sync_spawn echo uvw xyz", "abc def");
assert(uzbl.comm.sync_stdout);
/* the result should begin with the standard handler arguments */
gchar *rest = assert_sync_beginswith_stdarg();
/* the rest of the result should be the arguments passed to run_handler. */
/* the arguments in the second argument to run_handler should be placed before any
* included in the first argument to run handler. */
g_assert_cmpstr("abc def uvw xyz\n", ==, rest);
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __user *insn_get_addr_ref(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (!insn || !regs)
return (void __user *)-1L;
switch (insn->addr_bytes) {
case 2:
return get_addr_ref_16(insn, regs);
case 4:
return get_addr_ref_32(insn, regs);
case 8:
return get_addr_ref_64(insn, regs);
default:
return (void __user *)-1L;
}
}
Commit Message: x86/insn-eval: Fix use-after-free access to LDT entry
get_desc() computes a pointer into the LDT while holding a lock that
protects the LDT from being freed, but then drops the lock and returns the
(now potentially dangling) pointer to its caller.
Fix it by giving the caller a copy of the LDT entry instead.
Fixes: 670f928ba09b ("x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment descriptor")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 89,092 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _exsltDateParseTime (exsltDateValDatePtr dt, const xmlChar **str)
{
const xmlChar *cur = *str;
unsigned int hour = 0; /* use temp var in case str is not xs:time */
int ret = 0;
PARSE_2_DIGITS(hour, cur, VALID_HOUR, ret);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
if (*cur != ':')
return 1;
cur++;
/* the ':' insures this string is xs:time */
dt->hour = hour;
PARSE_2_DIGITS(dt->min, cur, VALID_MIN, ret);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
if (*cur != ':')
return 1;
cur++;
PARSE_FLOAT(dt->sec, cur, ret);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
if (!VALID_TIME(dt))
return 2;
*str = cur;
#ifdef DEBUG_EXSLT_DATE
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Parsed time %02i:%02i:%02.f\n",
dt->hour, dt->min, dt->sec);
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err gitn_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
u32 i;
GroupIdToNameBox *ptr = (GroupIdToNameBox *)s;
ptr->size += 2;
for (i=0; i<ptr->nb_entries; i++) {
ptr->size += 5;
if (ptr->entries[i].name) ptr->size += strlen(ptr->entries[i].name);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::TimeTicks RendererSchedulerImpl::IncrementVirtualTimePauseCount() {
main_thread_only().virtual_time_pause_count++;
ApplyVirtualTimePolicy();
if (virtual_time_domain_)
return virtual_time_domain_->Now();
return tick_clock()->NowTicks();
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageSetPixel (gdImagePtr im, int x, int y, int color)
{
int p;
switch (color) {
case gdStyled:
if (!im->style) {
/* Refuse to draw if no style is set. */
return;
} else {
p = im->style[im->stylePos++];
}
if (p != (gdTransparent)) {
gdImageSetPixel (im, x, y, p);
}
im->stylePos = im->stylePos % im->styleLength;
break;
case gdStyledBrushed:
if (!im->style) {
/* Refuse to draw if no style is set. */
return;
}
p = im->style[im->stylePos++];
if ((p != gdTransparent) && (p != 0)) {
gdImageSetPixel (im, x, y, gdBrushed);
}
im->stylePos = im->stylePos % im->styleLength;
break;
case gdBrushed:
gdImageBrushApply (im, x, y);
break;
case gdTiled:
gdImageTileApply (im, x, y);
break;
case gdAntiAliased:
/* This shouldn't happen (2.0.26) because we just call
gdImageAALine now, but do something sane. */
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y, im->AA_color);
break;
default:
if (gdImageBoundsSafeMacro (im, x, y)) {
if (im->trueColor) {
switch (im->alphaBlendingFlag) {
default:
case gdEffectReplace:
im->tpixels[y][x] = color;
break;
case gdEffectAlphaBlend:
case gdEffectNormal:
im->tpixels[y][x] = gdAlphaBlend(im->tpixels[y][x], color);
break;
case gdEffectOverlay :
im->tpixels[y][x] = gdLayerOverlay(im->tpixels[y][x], color);
break;
case gdEffectMultiply :
im->tpixels[y][x] = gdLayerMultiply(im->tpixels[y][x], color);
break;
}
} else {
im->pixels[y][x] = color;
}
}
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 73,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static noinline __kprobes int vmalloc_fault(unsigned long address)
{
pgd_t *pgd, *pgd_ref;
pud_t *pud, *pud_ref;
pmd_t *pmd, *pmd_ref;
pte_t *pte, *pte_ref;
/* Make sure we are in vmalloc area: */
if (!(address >= VMALLOC_START && address < VMALLOC_END))
return -1;
WARN_ON_ONCE(in_nmi());
/*
* Copy kernel mappings over when needed. This can also
* happen within a race in page table update. In the later
* case just flush:
*/
pgd = pgd_offset(current->active_mm, address);
pgd_ref = pgd_offset_k(address);
if (pgd_none(*pgd_ref))
return -1;
if (pgd_none(*pgd))
set_pgd(pgd, *pgd_ref);
else
BUG_ON(pgd_page_vaddr(*pgd) != pgd_page_vaddr(*pgd_ref));
/*
* Below here mismatches are bugs because these lower tables
* are shared:
*/
pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
pud_ref = pud_offset(pgd_ref, address);
if (pud_none(*pud_ref))
return -1;
if (pud_none(*pud) || pud_page_vaddr(*pud) != pud_page_vaddr(*pud_ref))
BUG();
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
pmd_ref = pmd_offset(pud_ref, address);
if (pmd_none(*pmd_ref))
return -1;
if (pmd_none(*pmd) || pmd_page(*pmd) != pmd_page(*pmd_ref))
BUG();
pte_ref = pte_offset_kernel(pmd_ref, address);
if (!pte_present(*pte_ref))
return -1;
pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);
/*
* Don't use pte_page here, because the mappings can point
* outside mem_map, and the NUMA hash lookup cannot handle
* that:
*/
if (!pte_present(*pte) || pte_pfn(*pte) != pte_pfn(*pte_ref))
BUG();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void activityLoggingForAllWorldsPerWorldBindingsVoidMethodMethodForMainWorld(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
imp->activityLoggingForAllWorldsPerWorldBindingsVoidMethod();
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *my_asctime(time_t t)
{
struct tm *tm;
char *str;
int len;
tm = localtime(&t);
str = g_strdup(asctime(tm));
len = strlen(str);
if (len > 0) str[len-1] = '\0';
return str;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 168,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mptsas_update_interrupt(MPTSASState *s)
{
PCIDevice *pci = (PCIDevice *) s;
uint32_t state = s->intr_status & ~(s->intr_mask | MPI_HIS_IOP_DOORBELL_STATUS);
if (msi_enabled(pci)) {
if (state) {
trace_mptsas_irq_msi(s);
msi_notify(pci, 0);
}
}
trace_mptsas_irq_intx(s, !!state);
pci_set_irq(pci, !!state);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 8,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_block_write_begin(struct page *page, loff_t pos, unsigned len,
get_block_t *get_block)
{
unsigned from = pos & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
unsigned to = from + len;
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
unsigned block_start, block_end;
sector_t block;
int err = 0;
unsigned blocksize = inode->i_sb->s_blocksize;
unsigned bbits;
struct buffer_head *bh, *head, *wait[2], **wait_bh = wait;
bool decrypt = false;
BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
BUG_ON(from > PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
BUG_ON(to > PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
BUG_ON(from > to);
if (!page_has_buffers(page))
create_empty_buffers(page, blocksize, 0);
head = page_buffers(page);
bbits = ilog2(blocksize);
block = (sector_t)page->index << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - bbits);
for (bh = head, block_start = 0; bh != head || !block_start;
block++, block_start = block_end, bh = bh->b_this_page) {
block_end = block_start + blocksize;
if (block_end <= from || block_start >= to) {
if (PageUptodate(page)) {
if (!buffer_uptodate(bh))
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
}
continue;
}
if (buffer_new(bh))
clear_buffer_new(bh);
if (!buffer_mapped(bh)) {
WARN_ON(bh->b_size != blocksize);
err = get_block(inode, block, bh, 1);
if (err)
break;
if (buffer_new(bh)) {
unmap_underlying_metadata(bh->b_bdev,
bh->b_blocknr);
if (PageUptodate(page)) {
clear_buffer_new(bh);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
mark_buffer_dirty(bh);
continue;
}
if (block_end > to || block_start < from)
zero_user_segments(page, to, block_end,
block_start, from);
continue;
}
}
if (PageUptodate(page)) {
if (!buffer_uptodate(bh))
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
continue;
}
if (!buffer_uptodate(bh) && !buffer_delay(bh) &&
!buffer_unwritten(bh) &&
(block_start < from || block_end > to)) {
ll_rw_block(READ, 1, &bh);
*wait_bh++ = bh;
decrypt = ext4_encrypted_inode(inode) &&
S_ISREG(inode->i_mode);
}
}
/*
* If we issued read requests, let them complete.
*/
while (wait_bh > wait) {
wait_on_buffer(*--wait_bh);
if (!buffer_uptodate(*wait_bh))
err = -EIO;
}
if (unlikely(err))
page_zero_new_buffers(page, from, to);
else if (decrypt)
err = ext4_decrypt(page);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long long Track::GetUid() const { return m_info.uid; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,819 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: device_linux_md_stop_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
Device *device,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
const gchar *action_id,
guint num_user_data,
gpointer *user_data_elements)
{
/* TODO: use options */
int n;
char *argv[10];
GError *error;
n = 0;
argv[n++] = "mdadm";
argv[n++] = "--stop";
argv[n++] = device->priv->device_file;
argv[n++] = NULL;
error = NULL;
if (!job_new (context, "LinuxMdStop", TRUE, device, argv, NULL, linux_md_stop_completed_cb, FALSE, NULL, NULL))
{
goto out;
}
out:
;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltRegisterExtPrefix(xsltStylesheetPtr style,
const xmlChar * prefix, const xmlChar * URI)
{
xsltExtDefPtr def, ret;
if ((style == NULL) || (URI == NULL))
return (-1);
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_EXTENSIONS
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Registering extension namespace '%s'.\n", URI);
#endif
def = (xsltExtDefPtr) style->nsDefs;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
/*
* The extension is associated with a namespace name.
*/
while (def != NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(URI, def->URI))
return (1);
def = def->next;
}
#else
while (def != NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(prefix, def->prefix))
return (-1);
def = def->next;
}
#endif
ret = xsltNewExtDef(prefix, URI);
if (ret == NULL)
return (-1);
ret->next = (xsltExtDefPtr) style->nsDefs;
style->nsDefs = ret;
/*
* check whether there is an extension module with a stylesheet
* initialization function.
*/
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
/*
* Don't initialize modules based on specified namespaces via
* the attribute "[xsl:]extension-element-prefixes".
*/
#else
if (xsltExtensionsHash != NULL) {
xsltExtModulePtr module;
xmlMutexLock(xsltExtMutex);
module = xmlHashLookup(xsltExtensionsHash, URI);
xmlMutexUnlock(xsltExtMutex);
if (NULL == module) {
if (!xsltExtModuleRegisterDynamic(URI)) {
xmlMutexLock(xsltExtMutex);
module = xmlHashLookup(xsltExtensionsHash, URI);
xmlMutexUnlock(xsltExtMutex);
}
}
if (module != NULL) {
xsltStyleGetExtData(style, URI);
}
}
#endif
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: prologInitProcessor(XML_Parser parser,
const char *s,
const char *end,
const char **nextPtr)
{
enum XML_Error result = initializeEncoding(parser);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
parser->m_processor = prologProcessor;
return prologProcessor(parser, s, end, nextPtr);
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 92,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool smb1cli_conn_activate_signing(struct smbXcli_conn *conn,
const DATA_BLOB user_session_key,
const DATA_BLOB response)
{
return smb_signing_activate(conn->smb1.signing,
user_session_key,
response);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UNCURL_EXPORT void uncurl_free_tls_ctx(struct uncurl_tls_ctx *uc_tls)
{
if (!uc_tls) return;
tlss_free(uc_tls->tlss);
free(uc_tls);
}
Commit Message: origin matching must come at str end
CWE ID: CWE-352 | 0 | 84,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t in_get_buffer_size(const struct audio_stream *stream)
{
struct stream_in *in = (struct stream_in *)stream;
return get_input_buffer_size(in->requested_rate,
in_get_format(stream),
audio_channel_count_from_in_mask(in->main_channels),
in->usecase_type,
in->devices);
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t GetNumberOfWatchedRenderViewHosts() const {
return watched_render_view_hosts_.size();
}
Commit Message: Fix issue with pending NavigationEntry being discarded incorrectly
This CL fixes an issue where we would attempt to discard a pending
NavigationEntry when a cross-process navigation to this NavigationEntry
is interrupted by another navigation to the same NavigationEntry.
BUG=760342,797656,796135
Change-Id: I204deff1efd4d572dd2e0b20e492592d48d787d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/850877
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528611}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Textfield::GetTextStyle() const {
return (read_only() || !enabled()) ? style::STYLE_DISABLED
: style::STYLE_PRIMARY;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: checked_xmalloc (size_t size)
{
alloc_limit_assert ("checked_xmalloc", size);
return xmalloc (size);
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflows and harden memory allocator.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 168,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsPipeline* DefaultICCintents(cmsContext ContextID,
cmsUInt32Number nProfiles,
cmsUInt32Number TheIntents[],
cmsHPROFILE hProfiles[],
cmsBool BPC[],
cmsFloat64Number AdaptationStates[],
cmsUInt32Number dwFlags)
{
cmsPipeline* Lut = NULL;
cmsPipeline* Result;
cmsHPROFILE hProfile;
cmsMAT3 m;
cmsVEC3 off;
cmsColorSpaceSignature ColorSpaceIn, ColorSpaceOut, CurrentColorSpace;
cmsProfileClassSignature ClassSig;
cmsUInt32Number i, Intent;
if (nProfiles == 0) return NULL;
Result = cmsPipelineAlloc(ContextID, 0, 0);
if (Result == NULL) return NULL;
CurrentColorSpace = cmsGetColorSpace(hProfiles[0]);
for (i=0; i < nProfiles; i++) {
cmsBool lIsDeviceLink, lIsInput;
hProfile = hProfiles[i];
ClassSig = cmsGetDeviceClass(hProfile);
lIsDeviceLink = (ClassSig == cmsSigLinkClass || ClassSig == cmsSigAbstractClass );
if ((i == 0) && !lIsDeviceLink) {
lIsInput = TRUE;
}
else {
lIsInput = (CurrentColorSpace != cmsSigXYZData) &&
(CurrentColorSpace != cmsSigLabData);
}
Intent = TheIntents[i];
if (lIsInput || lIsDeviceLink) {
ColorSpaceIn = cmsGetColorSpace(hProfile);
ColorSpaceOut = cmsGetPCS(hProfile);
}
else {
ColorSpaceIn = cmsGetPCS(hProfile);
ColorSpaceOut = cmsGetColorSpace(hProfile);
}
if (!ColorSpaceIsCompatible(ColorSpaceIn, CurrentColorSpace)) {
cmsSignalError(ContextID, cmsERROR_COLORSPACE_CHECK, "ColorSpace mismatch");
goto Error;
}
if (lIsDeviceLink || ((ClassSig == cmsSigNamedColorClass) && (nProfiles == 1))) {
Lut = _cmsReadDevicelinkLUT(hProfile, Intent);
if (Lut == NULL) goto Error;
if (ClassSig == cmsSigAbstractClass && i > 0) {
if (!ComputeConversion(i, hProfiles, Intent, BPC[i], AdaptationStates[i], &m, &off)) goto Error;
}
else {
_cmsMAT3identity(&m);
_cmsVEC3init(&off, 0, 0, 0);
}
if (!AddConversion(Result, CurrentColorSpace, ColorSpaceIn, &m, &off)) goto Error;
}
else {
if (lIsInput) {
Lut = _cmsReadInputLUT(hProfile, Intent);
if (Lut == NULL) goto Error;
}
else {
Lut = _cmsReadOutputLUT(hProfile, Intent);
if (Lut == NULL) goto Error;
if (!ComputeConversion(i, hProfiles, Intent, BPC[i], AdaptationStates[i], &m, &off)) goto Error;
if (!AddConversion(Result, CurrentColorSpace, ColorSpaceIn, &m, &off)) goto Error;
}
}
if (!cmsPipelineCat(Result, Lut))
goto Error;
cmsPipelineFree(Lut);
CurrentColorSpace = ColorSpaceOut;
}
return Result;
Error:
cmsPipelineFree(Lut);
if (Result != NULL) cmsPipelineFree(Result);
return NULL;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(dwFlags);
}
Commit Message: Fix a double free on error recovering
CWE ID: | 1 | 167,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nlmsvc_retry_blocked(void)
{
unsigned long timeout = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
struct nlm_block *block;
spin_lock(&nlm_blocked_lock);
while (!list_empty(&nlm_blocked) && !kthread_should_stop()) {
block = list_entry(nlm_blocked.next, struct nlm_block, b_list);
if (block->b_when == NLM_NEVER)
break;
if (time_after(block->b_when, jiffies)) {
timeout = block->b_when - jiffies;
break;
}
spin_unlock(&nlm_blocked_lock);
dprintk("nlmsvc_retry_blocked(%p, when=%ld)\n",
block, block->b_when);
if (block->b_flags & B_QUEUED) {
dprintk("nlmsvc_retry_blocked delete block (%p, granted=%d, flags=%d)\n",
block, block->b_granted, block->b_flags);
retry_deferred_block(block);
} else
nlmsvc_grant_blocked(block);
spin_lock(&nlm_blocked_lock);
}
spin_unlock(&nlm_blocked_lock);
return timeout;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DatabaseMessageFilter::OnMessageReceived(
const IPC::Message& message,
bool* message_was_ok) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_EX(DatabaseMessageFilter, message, *message_was_ok)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(DatabaseHostMsg_OpenFile,
OnDatabaseOpenFile)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(DatabaseHostMsg_DeleteFile,
OnDatabaseDeleteFile)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(DatabaseHostMsg_GetFileAttributes,
OnDatabaseGetFileAttributes)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(DatabaseHostMsg_GetFileSize,
OnDatabaseGetFileSize)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(DatabaseHostMsg_GetSpaceAvailable,
OnDatabaseGetSpaceAvailable)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DatabaseHostMsg_Opened, OnDatabaseOpened)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DatabaseHostMsg_Modified, OnDatabaseModified)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DatabaseHostMsg_Closed, OnDatabaseClosed)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DatabaseHostMsg_HandleSqliteError, OnHandleSqliteError)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP_EX()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: WebDatabase: check path traversal in origin_identifier
BUG=172264
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12212091
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@183141 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 116,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static SECStatus BadCertHandler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *sock)
{
struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata *)arg;
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError();
CERTCertificate *cert;
/* remember the cert verification result */
data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = err;
if(err == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN && !data->set.ssl.verifyhost)
/* we are asked not to verify the host name */
return SECSuccess;
/* print only info about the cert, the error is printed off the callback */
cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock);
if(cert) {
infof(data, "Server certificate:\n");
display_cert_info(data, cert);
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
}
return SECFailure;
}
Commit Message: nss: refuse previously loaded certificate from file
... when we are not asked to use a certificate from file
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 50,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MediaPlayer::setAudioStreamType(audio_stream_type_t type)
{
ALOGV("MediaPlayer::setAudioStreamType");
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
if (mStreamType == type) return NO_ERROR;
if (mCurrentState & ( MEDIA_PLAYER_PREPARED | MEDIA_PLAYER_STARTED |
MEDIA_PLAYER_PAUSED | MEDIA_PLAYER_PLAYBACK_COMPLETE ) ) {
ALOGE("setAudioStream called in state %d", mCurrentState);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
mStreamType = type;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 159,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_proc_lookup_common(struct rpc_clnt **clnt, struct inode *dir,
struct qstr *name, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
struct nfs_fattr *fattr)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
struct rpc_clnt *client = *clnt;
int err;
do {
err = _nfs4_proc_lookup(client, dir, name, fhandle, fattr);
switch (err) {
case -NFS4ERR_BADNAME:
err = -ENOENT;
goto out;
case -NFS4ERR_MOVED:
err = nfs4_get_referral(client, dir, name, fattr, fhandle);
goto out;
case -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC:
err = -EPERM;
if (client != *clnt)
goto out;
client = nfs4_create_sec_client(client, dir, name);
if (IS_ERR(client))
return PTR_ERR(client);
exception.retry = 1;
break;
default:
err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(dir), err, &exception);
}
} while (exception.retry);
out:
if (err == 0)
*clnt = client;
else if (client != *clnt)
rpc_shutdown_client(client);
return err;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DownloadManagerImpl::DownloadManagerImpl(BrowserContext* browser_context)
: item_factory_(new DownloadItemFactoryImpl()),
shutdown_needed_(true),
initialized_(false),
history_db_initialized_(false),
in_progress_cache_initialized_(false),
browser_context_(browser_context),
delegate_(nullptr),
in_progress_manager_(
browser_context_->RetriveInProgressDownloadManager()),
next_download_id_(download::DownloadItem::kInvalidId),
is_history_download_id_retrieved_(false),
should_persist_new_download_(false),
cancelled_download_cleared_from_history_(0),
interrupted_download_cleared_from_history_(0),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(browser_context);
download::SetIOTaskRunner(
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits({BrowserThread::IO}));
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService))
download::UrlDownloadHandlerFactory::Install(new UrlDownloaderFactory());
if (!in_progress_manager_) {
in_progress_manager_ =
std::make_unique<download::InProgressDownloadManager>(
this,
IsOffTheRecord() ? base::FilePath() : browser_context_->GetPath(),
base::BindRepeating(&IsOriginSecure),
base::BindRepeating(&DownloadRequestUtils::IsURLSafe));
} else {
in_progress_manager_->set_delegate(this);
in_progress_manager_->set_download_start_observer(nullptr);
in_progress_manager_->set_is_origin_secure_cb(
base::BindRepeating(&IsOriginSecure));
}
in_progress_manager_->NotifyWhenInitialized(base::BindOnce(
&DownloadManagerImpl::OnInProgressDownloadManagerInitialized,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 151,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::enable_extradata(OMX_U32 requested_extradata,
bool is_internal, bool enable)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret = OMX_ErrorNone;
struct v4l2_control control;
if (m_state != OMX_StateLoaded) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: enable extradata allowed in Loaded state only");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("NOTE: enable_extradata: actual[%u] requested[%u] enable[%d], is_internal: %d",
(unsigned int)client_extradata, (unsigned int)requested_extradata, enable, is_internal);
if (!is_internal) {
if (enable)
client_extradata |= requested_extradata;
else
client_extradata = client_extradata & ~requested_extradata;
}
if (enable) {
if (requested_extradata & OMX_INTERLACE_EXTRADATA) {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_EXTRADATA;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_EXTRADATA_INTERLACE_VIDEO;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Failed to set interlaced extradata."
" Quality of interlaced clips might be impacted.");
}
}
if (requested_extradata & OMX_FRAMEINFO_EXTRADATA) {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_EXTRADATA;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_EXTRADATA_FRAME_RATE;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Failed to set framerate extradata");
}
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_EXTRADATA;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_EXTRADATA_NUM_CONCEALED_MB;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Failed to set concealed MB extradata");
}
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_EXTRADATA;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_EXTRADATA_RECOVERY_POINT_SEI;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Failed to set recovery point SEI extradata");
}
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_EXTRADATA;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_EXTRADATA_PANSCAN_WINDOW;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Failed to set panscan extradata");
}
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_EXTRADATA;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_EXTRADATA_ASPECT_RATIO;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Failed to set panscan extradata");
}
}
if (requested_extradata & OMX_TIMEINFO_EXTRADATA) {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_EXTRADATA;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_EXTRADATA_TIMESTAMP;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Failed to set timeinfo extradata");
}
}
if (requested_extradata & OMX_FRAMEPACK_EXTRADATA) {
if (output_capability == V4L2_PIX_FMT_H264) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("enable OMX_FRAMEPACK_EXTRADATA");
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_EXTRADATA;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_EXTRADATA_S3D_FRAME_PACKING;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Failed to set S3D_FRAME_PACKING extradata");
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("OMX_FRAMEPACK_EXTRADATA supported for H264 only");
}
}
if (requested_extradata & OMX_QP_EXTRADATA) {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_EXTRADATA;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_EXTRADATA_FRAME_QP;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Failed to set QP extradata");
}
}
if (requested_extradata & OMX_BITSINFO_EXTRADATA) {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_EXTRADATA;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_EXTRADATA_FRAME_BITS_INFO;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Failed to set frame bits info extradata");
}
}
if (requested_extradata & OMX_EXTNUSER_EXTRADATA) {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_EXTRADATA;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_EXTRADATA_STREAM_USERDATA;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Failed to set stream userdata extradata");
}
}
if (requested_extradata & OMX_MPEG2SEQDISP_EXTRADATA) {
if (output_capability == V4L2_PIX_FMT_MPEG2) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Enable seq display extradata");
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_EXTRADATA;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_EXTRADATA_MPEG2_SEQDISP;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Failed to set seqdisp extradata");
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Seq display extradata is supported for MPEG2 only");
}
}
if (requested_extradata & OMX_VUI_DISPLAY_INFO_EXTRADATA) {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_EXTRADATA;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_EXTRADATA_VUI_DISPLAY;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Failed to set display VUI extradata");
}
}
}
ret = get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::OnRegisterAecDumpConsumer(int id) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&RenderProcessHostImpl::RegisterAecDumpConsumerOnUIThread,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), id));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void do_fault_siginfo(int code, int sig, struct pt_regs *regs,
unsigned int insn, int fault_code)
{
unsigned long addr;
siginfo_t info;
info.si_code = code;
info.si_signo = sig;
info.si_errno = 0;
if (fault_code & FAULT_CODE_ITLB)
addr = regs->tpc;
else
addr = compute_effective_address(regs, insn, 0);
info.si_addr = (void __user *) addr;
info.si_trapno = 0;
if (unlikely(show_unhandled_signals))
show_signal_msg(regs, sig, code, addr, current);
force_sig_info(sig, &info, current);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,740 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ScriptLoader::childrenChanged()
{
if (!m_parserInserted && m_element->inDocument())
prepareScript(); // FIXME: Provide a real starting line number here.
}
Commit Message: Apply 'x-content-type-options' check to dynamically inserted script.
BUG=348581
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/185593011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@168570 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 115,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void PromiseMethodWithoutExceptionStateMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "promiseMethodWithoutExceptionState");
ExceptionToRejectPromiseScope reject_promise_scope(info, exception_state);
if (!V8TestObject::HasInstance(info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate())) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("Illegal invocation");
return;
}
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
Dictionary arg_1;
if (!info[0]->IsNullOrUndefined() && !info[0]->IsObject()) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("parameter 1 ('arg1') is not an object.");
return;
}
arg_1 = NativeValueTraits<Dictionary>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
V8SetReturnValue(info, impl->promiseMethodWithoutExceptionState(arg_1).V8Value());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AP_DECLARE(int) ap_vrprintf(request_rec *r, const char *fmt, va_list va)
{
apr_size_t written;
struct ap_vrprintf_data vd;
char vrprintf_buf[AP_IOBUFSIZE];
vd.vbuff.curpos = vrprintf_buf;
vd.vbuff.endpos = vrprintf_buf + AP_IOBUFSIZE;
vd.r = r;
vd.buff = vrprintf_buf;
if (r->connection->aborted)
return -1;
written = apr_vformatter(r_flush, &vd.vbuff, fmt, va);
if (written != -1) {
int n = vd.vbuff.curpos - vrprintf_buf;
/* last call to buffer_output, to finish clearing the buffer */
if (buffer_output(r, vrprintf_buf,n) != APR_SUCCESS)
return -1;
written += n;
}
return written;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: | 0 | 45,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void TabClosingAt(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
TabContentsWrapper* contents,
int index) {
closing_count_++;
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabContents* TabStripModel::DetachTabContentsAt(int index) {
if (contents_data_.empty())
return NULL;
DCHECK(ContainsIndex(index));
TabContents* removed_contents = GetTabContentsAtImpl(index);
bool was_selected = IsTabSelected(index);
int next_selected_index = order_controller_->DetermineNewSelectedIndex(index);
delete contents_data_[index];
contents_data_.erase(contents_data_.begin() + index);
ForgetOpenersAndGroupsReferencing(removed_contents->web_contents());
if (empty())
closing_all_ = true;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabDetachedAt(removed_contents, index));
if (empty()) {
selection_model_.Clear();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_, TabStripEmpty());
} else {
int old_active = active_index();
selection_model_.DecrementFrom(index);
TabStripSelectionModel old_model;
old_model.Copy(selection_model_);
if (index == old_active) {
NotifyIfTabDeactivated(removed_contents);
if (!selection_model_.empty()) {
selection_model_.set_active(selection_model_.selected_indices()[0]);
selection_model_.set_anchor(selection_model_.active());
} else {
selection_model_.SetSelectedIndex(next_selected_index);
}
NotifyIfActiveTabChanged(removed_contents, NOTIFY_DEFAULT);
}
if (was_selected) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabSelectionChanged(this, old_model));
}
}
return removed_contents;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 171,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileInfo, getPathInfo)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zend_class_entry *ce = intern->info_class;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|C", &ce) == SUCCESS) {
int path_len;
char *path = spl_filesystem_object_get_pathname(intern, &path_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (path) {
char *dpath = estrndup(path, path_len);
path_len = php_dirname(dpath, path_len);
spl_filesystem_object_create_info(intern, dpath, path_len, 1, ce, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
efree(dpath);
}
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 167,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool venc_dev::venc_set_param(void *paramData,OMX_INDEXTYPE index )
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param:: venc-720p");
struct v4l2_format fmt;
struct v4l2_requestbuffers bufreq;
int ret;
switch ((int)index) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portDefn;
portDefn = (OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition");
if (portDefn->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_IN) {
if (!venc_set_encode_framerate(portDefn->format.video.xFramerate, 0)) {
return false;
}
if (!venc_set_color_format(portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat)) {
return false;
}
if (enable_mv_narrow_searchrange &&
(m_sVenc_cfg.input_width * m_sVenc_cfg.input_height) >=
(OMX_CORE_1080P_WIDTH * OMX_CORE_1080P_HEIGHT)) {
if (venc_set_searchrange() == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Failed to set search range");
}
}
if (m_sVenc_cfg.input_height != portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight ||
m_sVenc_cfg.input_width != portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Basic parameter has changed");
m_sVenc_cfg.input_height = portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight;
m_sVenc_cfg.input_width = portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth;
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = m_sVenc_cfg.input_height;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = m_sVenc_cfg.input_width;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = V4L2_PIX_FMT_NV12;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.colorspace = V4L2_COLORSPACE_BT878;
if (ioctl(m_nDriver_fd, VIDIOC_S_FMT, &fmt)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("VIDIOC_S_FMT OUTPUT_MPLANE Failed");
hw_overload = errno == EBUSY;
return false;
}
m_sInput_buff_property.datasize=fmt.fmt.pix_mp.plane_fmt[0].sizeimage;
bufreq.memory = V4L2_MEMORY_USERPTR;
bufreq.count = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
bufreq.type=V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
if (ioctl(m_nDriver_fd,VIDIOC_REQBUFS, &bufreq)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("VIDIOC_REQBUFS OUTPUT_MPLANE Failed");
return false;
}
if (bufreq.count == portDefn->nBufferCountActual)
m_sInput_buff_property.mincount = m_sInput_buff_property.actualcount = bufreq.count;
if (portDefn->nBufferCountActual >= m_sInput_buff_property.mincount)
m_sInput_buff_property.actualcount = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("input: actual: %u, min: %u, count_req: %u",
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual, (unsigned int)m_sInput_buff_property.mincount, bufreq.count);
if (m_sVenc_cfg.input_width * m_sVenc_cfg.input_height >= 3840 * 2160) {
if (venc_set_perf_mode(V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_PERF_POWER_SAVE) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Failed to set Power save mode");
}
}
} else if (portDefn->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
m_sVenc_cfg.dvs_height = portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight;
m_sVenc_cfg.dvs_width = portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth;
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = m_sVenc_cfg.dvs_height;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = m_sVenc_cfg.dvs_width;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = m_sVenc_cfg.codectype;
if (ioctl(m_nDriver_fd, VIDIOC_S_FMT, &fmt)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("VIDIOC_S_FMT CAPTURE_MPLANE Failed");
hw_overload = errno == EBUSY;
return false;
}
m_sOutput_buff_property.datasize = fmt.fmt.pix_mp.plane_fmt[0].sizeimage;
if (!venc_set_target_bitrate(portDefn->format.video.nBitrate, 0)) {
return false;
}
m_sOutput_buff_property.actualcount = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
bufreq.memory = V4L2_MEMORY_USERPTR;
bufreq.count = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
bufreq.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
if (ioctl(m_nDriver_fd,VIDIOC_REQBUFS, &bufreq)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting o/p buffer count failed: requested: %u, current: %u",
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual, (unsigned int)m_sOutput_buff_property.actualcount);
return false;
}
if (bufreq.count == portDefn->nBufferCountActual)
m_sOutput_buff_property.mincount = m_sOutput_buff_property.actualcount = bufreq.count;
if (portDefn->nBufferCountActual >= m_sOutput_buff_property.mincount)
m_sOutput_buff_property.actualcount = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
if (num_planes > 1)
extradata_info.count = m_sOutput_buff_property.actualcount;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Output: actual: %u, min: %u, count_req: %u",
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual, (unsigned int)m_sOutput_buff_property.mincount, bufreq.count);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index for OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition");
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *portFmt;
portFmt =(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat");
if (portFmt->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32) PORT_INDEX_IN) {
if (!venc_set_color_format(portFmt->eColorFormat)) {
return false;
}
} else if (portFmt->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32) PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!venc_set_encode_framerate(portFmt->xFramerate, 0)) {
return false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index for OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat");
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE* pParam;
pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param: OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32) PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!venc_set_target_bitrate(pParam->nTargetBitrate, 0)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Target Bit Rate setting failed");
return false;
}
if (!venc_set_ratectrl_cfg(pParam->eControlRate)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Rate Control setting failed");
return false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index for OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate");
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE* pParam;
OMX_U32 bFrames = 0;
pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param: OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32) PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!venc_set_voptiming_cfg(pParam->nTimeIncRes)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting vop_timing failed");
return false;
}
m_profile_set = false;
m_level_set = false;
if (!venc_set_profile_level (pParam->eProfile, pParam->eLevel)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsuccessful in updating Profile and level");
return false;
} else {
if (pParam->eProfile == OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileAdvancedSimple) {
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
bFrames = pParam->nBFrames;
}
} else {
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
bFrames = 0;
}
}
}
if (!venc_set_intra_period (pParam->nPFrames,bFrames)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting intra period failed");
return false;
}
if (!venc_set_multislice_cfg(OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4,pParam->nSliceHeaderSpacing)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsuccessful in updating slice_config");
return false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index for OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4");
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param: OMX_IndexParamVideoH263");
OMX_U32 bFrames = 0;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32) PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
m_profile_set = false;
m_level_set = false;
if (!venc_set_profile_level (pParam->eProfile, pParam->eLevel)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsuccessful in updating Profile and level");
return false;
}
if (pParam->nBFrames)
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("WARNING: B frame not supported for H.263");
if (venc_set_intra_period (pParam->nPFrames, bFrames) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting intra period failed");
return false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index for OMX_IndexParamVideoH263");
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param:OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE*)paramData;
OMX_U32 bFrames = 0;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32) PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("pParam->eProfile :%d ,pParam->eLevel %d",
pParam->eProfile,pParam->eLevel);
m_profile_set = false;
m_level_set = false;
if (!venc_set_profile_level (pParam->eProfile,pParam->eLevel)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsuccessful in updating Profile and level %d, %d",
pParam->eProfile, pParam->eLevel);
return false;
} else {
if ((pParam->eProfile != OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileBaseline) &&
(pParam->eProfile != (OMX_VIDEO_AVCPROFILETYPE) QOMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileConstrainedBaseline)) {
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
bFrames = pParam->nBFrames;
}
} else {
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
bFrames = 0;
}
}
}
if (!venc_set_intra_period (pParam->nPFrames, bFrames)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting intra period failed");
return false;
}
if (!venc_set_entropy_config (pParam->bEntropyCodingCABAC, pParam->nCabacInitIdc)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting Entropy failed");
return false;
}
if (!venc_set_inloop_filter (pParam->eLoopFilterMode)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting Inloop filter failed");
return false;
}
if (!venc_set_multislice_cfg(OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc, pParam->nSliceHeaderSpacing)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("WARNING: Unsuccessful in updating slice_config");
return false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index for OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc");
}
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param:OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE*)paramData;
if (!venc_set_profile_level (pParam->eProfile, pParam->eLevel)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsuccessful in updating Profile and level %d, %d",
pParam->eProfile, pParam->eLevel);
return false;
}
if(venc_set_vpx_error_resilience(pParam->bErrorResilientMode) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Failed to set vpx error resilience");
return false;
}
if(!venc_set_ltrmode(1, 1)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Failed to enable ltrmode");
return false;
}
if (m_codec == OMX_VIDEO_CodingVP8) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Disable Hier-P as LTR is being set");
if (!venc_set_hier_layers(QOMX_HIERARCHICALCODING_P, 0)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Disabling Hier P count failed");
}
}
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param:OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE*)paramData;
if (!venc_set_profile_level (pParam->eProfile, pParam->eLevel)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsuccessful in updating Profile and level %d, %d",
pParam->eProfile, pParam->eLevel);
return false;
}
if (!venc_set_inloop_filter(OMX_VIDEO_AVCLoopFilterEnable))
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("WARN: Request for setting Inloop filter failed for HEVC encoder");
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param:OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_INTRAREFRESHTYPE *intra_refresh =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_INTRAREFRESHTYPE *)paramData;
if (intra_refresh->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32) PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (venc_set_intra_refresh(intra_refresh->eRefreshMode, intra_refresh->nCirMBs) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting Intra refresh failed");
return false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index for OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh");
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param:OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ERRORCORRECTIONTYPE *error_resilience =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ERRORCORRECTIONTYPE *)paramData;
if (error_resilience->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32) PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (venc_set_error_resilience(error_resilience) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting Intra refresh failed");
return false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index for OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection");
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param:OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *profile_level =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *)paramData;
if (profile_level->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32) PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
m_profile_set = false;
m_level_set = false;
if (!venc_set_profile_level (profile_level->eProfile,
profile_level->eLevel)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("WARNING: Unsuccessful in updating Profile and level");
return false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index for OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent");
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param:OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_QUANTIZATIONTYPE *session_qp =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_QUANTIZATIONTYPE *)paramData;
if (session_qp->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32) PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (venc_set_session_qp (session_qp->nQpI,
session_qp->nQpP,
session_qp->nQpB) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting Session QP failed");
return false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index for OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization");
}
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoInitialQp:
{
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_VIDEO_INITIALQP * initqp =
(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_VIDEO_INITIALQP *)paramData;
if (initqp->bEnableInitQp) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Enable initial QP: %d", (int)initqp->bEnableInitQp);
if(venc_enable_initial_qp(initqp) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Failed to enable initial QP");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: setting QOMX_IndexParamVideoEnableInitialQp");
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param:OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange");
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_QPRANGETYPE *session_qp_range =
(OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_QPRANGETYPE *)paramData;
if(session_qp_range->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if(venc_set_session_qp_range (session_qp_range->minQP,
session_qp_range->maxQP) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting QP Range[%u %u] failed",
(unsigned int)session_qp_range->minQP, (unsigned int)session_qp_range->maxQP);
return false;
} else {
session_qp_values.minqp = session_qp_range->minQP;
session_qp_values.maxqp = session_qp_range->maxQP;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index for OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange");
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexEnableSliceDeliveryMode:
{
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE*)paramData;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (venc_set_slice_delivery_mode(pParam->bEnable) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setting slice delivery mode failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("OMX_QcomIndexEnableSliceDeliveryMode "
"called on wrong port(%u)", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderSliceInfo:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param: OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderSliceInfo");
OMX_BOOL extra_data = *(OMX_BOOL *)(paramData);
if (venc_set_extradata(OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderSliceInfo, extra_data) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderSliceInfo failed");
return false;
}
extradata = true;
break;
}
case OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderMBInfo:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param: OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderMBInfo");
OMX_BOOL extra_data = *(OMX_BOOL *)(paramData);
if (venc_set_extradata(OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderMBInfo, extra_data) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderMBInfo failed");
return false;
}
extradata = true;
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamSequenceHeaderWithIDR:
{
PrependSPSPPSToIDRFramesParams * pParam =
(PrependSPSPPSToIDRFramesParams *)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set inband sps/pps: %d", pParam->bEnable);
if(venc_set_inband_video_header(pParam->bEnable) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: set inband sps/pps failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamH264AUDelimiter:
{
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_H264_AUD * pParam =
(OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_H264_AUD *)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set AU delimiters: %d", pParam->bEnable);
if(venc_set_au_delimiter(pParam->bEnable) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: set H264 AU delimiter failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure:
{
QOMX_VIDEO_HIERARCHICALLAYERS* pParam =
(QOMX_VIDEO_HIERARCHICALLAYERS*)paramData;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!venc_set_hier_layers(pParam->eHierarchicalCodingType, pParam->nNumLayers)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setting Hier P count failed");
return false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure called on wrong port(%d)", (int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return false;
}
if (m_codec == OMX_VIDEO_CodingVP8) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Disable LTR as HIER-P is being set");
if(!venc_set_ltrmode(0, 1)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Failed to disable ltrmode");
}
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamPerfLevel:
{
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_PERF_LEVEL *pParam =
(OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_PERF_LEVEL *)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set perf level: %d", pParam->ePerfLevel);
if(!venc_set_perf_level(pParam->ePerfLevel)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Failed to set perf level to %d", pParam->ePerfLevel);
return false;
} else {
performance_level.perflevel = (unsigned int) pParam->ePerfLevel;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamH264VUITimingInfo:
{
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_VUI_TIMING_INFO *pParam =
(OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_VUI_TIMING_INFO *)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set VUI timing info: %d", pParam->bEnable);
if(venc_set_vui_timing_info(pParam->bEnable) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Failed to set vui timing info to %d", pParam->bEnable);
return false;
} else {
vui_timing_info.enabled = (unsigned int) pParam->bEnable;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamPeakBitrate:
{
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_PEAK_BITRATE *pParam =
(OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_PEAK_BITRATE *)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set peak bitrate: %u", (unsigned int)pParam->nPeakBitrate);
if(venc_set_peak_bitrate(pParam->nPeakBitrate) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Failed to set peak bitrate to %u", (unsigned int)pParam->nPeakBitrate);
return false;
} else {
peak_bitrate.peakbitrate = (unsigned int) pParam->nPeakBitrate;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamSetMVSearchrange:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_config: OMX_QcomIndexParamSetMVSearchrange");
is_searchrange_set = true;
if (!venc_set_searchrange()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Failed to set search range");
return false;
}
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoLTRCount:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_param: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoLTRCount");
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRCOUNT_TYPE* pParam =
(OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRCOUNT_TYPE*)paramData;
if (pParam->nCount > 0) {
if (venc_set_ltrmode(1, pParam->nCount) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Enable LTR mode failed");
return false;
}
} else {
if (venc_set_ltrmode(0, 0) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Disable LTR mode failed");
return false;
}
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoHybridHierpMode:
{
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_VIDEO_HYBRID_HP_MODE* pParam =
(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_VIDEO_HYBRID_HP_MODE*)paramData;
if (!venc_set_hybrid_hierp(pParam->nHpLayers)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setting hybrid Hier-P mode failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoSliceFMO:
default:
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsupported parameter in venc_set_param: %u",
index);
break;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void omx_vdec::perf_control::load_lib()
{
char perf_lib_path[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
if (m_perf_lib)
return;
if((property_get("ro.vendor.extension_library", perf_lib_path, NULL) <= 0)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("vendor library not set in ro.vendor.extension_library");
return;
}
if ((m_perf_lib = dlopen(perf_lib_path, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to open %s : %s",perf_lib_path, dlerror());
} else {
m_perf_lock_acquire = (perf_lock_acquire_t)dlsym(m_perf_lib, "perf_lock_acq");
if (m_perf_lock_acquire == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to load symbol: perf_lock_acq");
}
m_perf_lock_release = (perf_lock_release_t)dlsym(m_perf_lib, "perf_lock_rel");
if (m_perf_lock_release == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to load symbol: perf_lock_rel");
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,299 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TrimT(StringType* str) {
str->erase(str->find_last_not_of(GetWhiteSpacesForType<StringType>()) + 1);
str->erase(0, str->find_first_not_of(GetWhiteSpacesForType<StringType>()));
}
Commit Message: Ignore switches following "--" when parsing a command line.
BUG=933004
R=wfh@chromium.org
Change-Id: I911be4cbfc38a4d41dec85d85f7fe0f50ddca392
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481210
Auto-Submit: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634604}
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 152,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void process_slab(struct loc_track *t, struct kmem_cache *s,
struct page *page, enum track_item alloc)
{
void *addr = page_address(page);
DECLARE_BITMAP(map, page->objects);
void *p;
bitmap_zero(map, page->objects);
for_each_free_object(p, s, page->freelist)
set_bit(slab_index(p, s, addr), map);
for_each_object(p, s, addr, page->objects)
if (!test_bit(slab_index(p, s, addr), map))
add_location(t, s, get_track(s, p, alloc));
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool xmp_parse(XmpPtr xmp, const char *buffer, size_t len)
{
CHECK_PTR(xmp, false);
CHECK_PTR(buffer, false);
SXMPMeta *txmp = (SXMPMeta *)xmp;
try {
txmp->ParseFromBuffer(buffer, len, kXMP_RequireXMPMeta);
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 16,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetUniformLocation(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::GetUniformLocation& c) {
uint32 name_size = c.data_size;
const char* name = GetSharedMemoryAs<const char*>(
c.name_shm_id, c.name_shm_offset, name_size);
if (!name) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
String name_str(name, name_size);
return GetUniformLocationHelper(
c.program, c.location_shm_id, c.location_shm_offset, name_str);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t guid_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct bmc_device *bmc = to_bmc_device(dev);
bool guid_set;
guid_t guid;
int rv;
rv = bmc_get_device_id(NULL, bmc, NULL, &guid_set, &guid);
if (rv)
return rv;
if (!guid_set)
return -ENOENT;
return snprintf(buf, 38, "%pUl\n", guid.b);
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: header_read (SF_PRIVATE *psf, void *ptr, int bytes)
{ int count = 0 ;
if (psf->headindex >= SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header))
return psf_fread (ptr, 1, bytes, psf) ;
if (psf->headindex + bytes > SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header))
{ int most ;
most = SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - psf->headend ;
psf_fread (psf->header + psf->headend, 1, most, psf) ;
memcpy (ptr, psf->header + psf->headend, most) ;
psf->headend = psf->headindex += most ;
psf_fread ((char *) ptr + most, bytes - most, 1, psf) ;
return bytes ;
} ;
if (psf->headindex + bytes > psf->headend)
{ count = psf_fread (psf->header + psf->headend, 1, bytes - (psf->headend - psf->headindex), psf) ;
if (count != bytes - (int) (psf->headend - psf->headindex))
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "Error : psf_fread returned short count.\n") ;
return count ;
} ;
psf->headend += count ;
} ;
memcpy (ptr, psf->header + psf->headindex, bytes) ;
psf->headindex += bytes ;
return bytes ;
} /* header_read */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rio_ioctl (struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *rq, int cmd)
{
int phy_addr;
struct netdev_private *np = netdev_priv(dev);
struct mii_data *miidata = (struct mii_data *) &rq->ifr_ifru;
struct netdev_desc *desc;
int i;
phy_addr = np->phy_addr;
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE:
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 1:
miidata->out_value = mii_read (dev, phy_addr, miidata->reg_num);
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 2:
mii_write (dev, phy_addr, miidata->reg_num, miidata->in_value);
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 3:
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 4:
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 5:
netif_stop_queue (dev);
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 6:
netif_wake_queue (dev);
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 7:
printk
("tx_full=%x cur_tx=%lx old_tx=%lx cur_rx=%lx old_rx=%lx\n",
netif_queue_stopped(dev), np->cur_tx, np->old_tx, np->cur_rx,
np->old_rx);
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 8:
printk("TX ring:\n");
for (i = 0; i < TX_RING_SIZE; i++) {
desc = &np->tx_ring[i];
printk
("%02x:cur:%08x next:%08x status:%08x frag1:%08x frag0:%08x",
i,
(u32) (np->tx_ring_dma + i * sizeof (*desc)),
(u32)le64_to_cpu(desc->next_desc),
(u32)le64_to_cpu(desc->status),
(u32)(le64_to_cpu(desc->fraginfo) >> 32),
(u32)le64_to_cpu(desc->fraginfo));
printk ("\n");
}
printk ("\n");
break;
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dl2k: Clean up rio_ioctl
The dl2k driver's rio_ioctl call has a few issues:
- No permissions checking
- Implements SIOCGMIIREG and SIOCGMIIREG using the SIOCDEVPRIVATE numbers
- Has a few ioctls that may have been used for debugging at one point
but have no place in the kernel proper.
This patch removes all but the MII ioctls, renumbers them to use the
standard ones, and adds the proper permission check for SIOCSMIIREG.
We can also get rid of the dl2k-specific struct mii_data in favor of
the generic struct mii_ioctl_data.
Since we have the phyid on hand, we can add the SIOCGMIIPHY ioctl too.
Most of the MII code for the driver could probably be converted to use
the generic MII library but I don't have a device to test the results.
Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 165,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sched_read_attr(struct sched_attr __user *uattr,
struct sched_attr *attr,
unsigned int usize)
{
int ret;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uattr, usize))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* If we're handed a smaller struct than we know of,
* ensure all the unknown bits are 0 - i.e. old
* user-space does not get uncomplete information.
*/
if (usize < sizeof(*attr)) {
unsigned char *addr;
unsigned char *end;
addr = (void *)attr + usize;
end = (void *)attr + sizeof(*attr);
for (; addr < end; addr++) {
if (*addr)
goto err_size;
}
attr->size = usize;
}
ret = copy_to_user(uattr, attr, usize);
if (ret)
return -EFAULT;
out:
return ret;
err_size:
ret = -E2BIG;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 167,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int add_dirent_to_buf(handle_t *handle, struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de,
struct buffer_head *bh)
{
struct inode *dir = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
const char *name = dentry->d_name.name;
int namelen = dentry->d_name.len;
unsigned int offset = 0;
unsigned int blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize;
unsigned short reclen;
int nlen, rlen, err;
char *top;
int csum_size = 0;
if (EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(inode->i_sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM))
csum_size = sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail);
reclen = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(namelen);
if (!de) {
de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)bh->b_data;
top = bh->b_data + (blocksize - csum_size) - reclen;
while ((char *) de <= top) {
if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, bh, offset))
return -EIO;
if (ext4_match(namelen, name, de))
return -EEXIST;
nlen = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len);
rlen = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, blocksize);
if ((de->inode? rlen - nlen: rlen) >= reclen)
break;
de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)((char *)de + rlen);
offset += rlen;
}
if ((char *) de > top)
return -ENOSPC;
}
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "get_write_access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh);
if (err) {
ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, err);
return err;
}
/* By now the buffer is marked for journaling */
nlen = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len);
rlen = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, blocksize);
if (de->inode) {
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de1 = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)((char *)de + nlen);
de1->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(rlen - nlen, blocksize);
de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(nlen, blocksize);
de = de1;
}
de->file_type = EXT4_FT_UNKNOWN;
de->inode = cpu_to_le32(inode->i_ino);
ext4_set_de_type(dir->i_sb, de, inode->i_mode);
de->name_len = namelen;
memcpy(de->name, name, namelen);
/*
* XXX shouldn't update any times until successful
* completion of syscall, but too many callers depend
* on this.
*
* XXX similarly, too many callers depend on
* ext4_new_inode() setting the times, but error
* recovery deletes the inode, so the worst that can
* happen is that the times are slightly out of date
* and/or different from the directory change time.
*/
dir->i_mtime = dir->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(dir);
ext4_update_dx_flag(dir);
dir->i_version++;
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, dir);
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "call ext4_handle_dirty_metadata");
err = ext4_handle_dirty_dirent_node(handle, dir, bh);
if (err)
ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, err);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: make orphan functions be no-op in no-journal mode
Instead of checking whether the handle is valid, we check if journal
is enabled. This avoids taking the s_orphan_lock mutex in all cases
when there is no journal in use, including the error paths where
ext4_orphan_del() is called with a handle set to NULL.
Signed-off-by: Anatol Pomozov <anatol.pomozov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 42,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Textfield::MoveCaretTo(const gfx::Point& point) {
SelectRect(point, point);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OVS_REQUIRES(ofproto_mutex)
{
const struct rule_actions *actions = rule_get_actions(rule);
/* A rule may not be reinserted. */
ovs_assert(rule->state == RULE_INITIALIZED);
if (rule->hard_timeout || rule->idle_timeout) {
ovs_list_insert(&ofproto->expirable, &rule->expirable);
}
cookies_insert(ofproto, rule);
eviction_group_add_rule(rule);
if (actions->has_meter) {
meter_insert_rule(rule);
}
if (actions->has_groups) {
const struct ofpact_group *a;
OFPACT_FOR_EACH_TYPE_FLATTENED (a, GROUP, actions->ofpacts,
actions->ofpacts_len) {
struct ofgroup *group;
group = ofproto_group_lookup(ofproto, a->group_id, OVS_VERSION_MAX,
false);
ovs_assert(group != NULL);
group_add_rule(group, rule);
}
}
rule->state = RULE_INSERTED;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 1 | 169,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void magicmouse_emit_touch(struct magicmouse_sc *msc, int raw_id, u8 *tdata)
{
struct input_dev *input = msc->input;
int id, x, y, size, orientation, touch_major, touch_minor, state, down;
if (input->id.product == USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICMOUSE) {
id = (tdata[6] << 2 | tdata[5] >> 6) & 0xf;
x = (tdata[1] << 28 | tdata[0] << 20) >> 20;
y = -((tdata[2] << 24 | tdata[1] << 16) >> 20);
size = tdata[5] & 0x3f;
orientation = (tdata[6] >> 2) - 32;
touch_major = tdata[3];
touch_minor = tdata[4];
state = tdata[7] & TOUCH_STATE_MASK;
down = state != TOUCH_STATE_NONE;
} else { /* USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICTRACKPAD */
id = (tdata[7] << 2 | tdata[6] >> 6) & 0xf;
x = (tdata[1] << 27 | tdata[0] << 19) >> 19;
y = -((tdata[3] << 30 | tdata[2] << 22 | tdata[1] << 14) >> 19);
size = tdata[6] & 0x3f;
orientation = (tdata[7] >> 2) - 32;
touch_major = tdata[4];
touch_minor = tdata[5];
state = tdata[8] & TOUCH_STATE_MASK;
down = state != TOUCH_STATE_NONE;
}
/* Store tracking ID and other fields. */
msc->tracking_ids[raw_id] = id;
msc->touches[id].x = x;
msc->touches[id].y = y;
msc->touches[id].size = size;
/* If requested, emulate a scroll wheel by detecting small
* vertical touch motions.
*/
if (emulate_scroll_wheel) {
unsigned long now = jiffies;
int step_x = msc->touches[id].scroll_x - x;
int step_y = msc->touches[id].scroll_y - y;
/* Calculate and apply the scroll motion. */
switch (state) {
case TOUCH_STATE_START:
msc->touches[id].scroll_x = x;
msc->touches[id].scroll_y = y;
/* Reset acceleration after half a second. */
if (scroll_acceleration && time_before(now,
msc->scroll_jiffies + HZ / 2))
msc->scroll_accel = max_t(int,
msc->scroll_accel - 1, 1);
else
msc->scroll_accel = SCROLL_ACCEL_DEFAULT;
break;
case TOUCH_STATE_DRAG:
step_x /= (64 - (int)scroll_speed) * msc->scroll_accel;
if (step_x != 0) {
msc->touches[id].scroll_x -= step_x *
(64 - scroll_speed) * msc->scroll_accel;
msc->scroll_jiffies = now;
input_report_rel(input, REL_HWHEEL, -step_x);
}
step_y /= (64 - (int)scroll_speed) * msc->scroll_accel;
if (step_y != 0) {
msc->touches[id].scroll_y -= step_y *
(64 - scroll_speed) * msc->scroll_accel;
msc->scroll_jiffies = now;
input_report_rel(input, REL_WHEEL, step_y);
}
break;
}
}
if (down)
msc->ntouches++;
input_mt_slot(input, id);
input_mt_report_slot_state(input, MT_TOOL_FINGER, down);
/* Generate the input events for this touch. */
if (down) {
input_report_abs(input, ABS_MT_TOUCH_MAJOR, touch_major << 2);
input_report_abs(input, ABS_MT_TOUCH_MINOR, touch_minor << 2);
input_report_abs(input, ABS_MT_ORIENTATION, -orientation);
input_report_abs(input, ABS_MT_POSITION_X, x);
input_report_abs(input, ABS_MT_POSITION_Y, y);
if (report_undeciphered) {
if (input->id.product == USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICMOUSE)
input_event(input, EV_MSC, MSC_RAW, tdata[7]);
else /* USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICTRACKPAD */
input_event(input, EV_MSC, MSC_RAW, tdata[8]);
}
}
}
Commit Message: HID: magicmouse: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback
The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that
magicmouse_emit_touch() gets only valid values of raw_id.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Steven Vittitoe <scvitti@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 38,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SimpleExtensionLoadPrompt::InstallUIAbort(bool user_initiated) {
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 98,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OffscreenCanvas::DidDraw(const FloatRect& rect) {
if (rect.IsEmpty())
return;
if (HasPlaceholderCanvas()) {
needs_push_frame_ = true;
GetOrCreateResourceDispatcher()->SetNeedsBeginFrame(true);
}
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_set_read_status_fn(png_structp png_ptr, png_read_status_ptr read_row_fn)
{
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
png_ptr->read_row_fn = read_row_fn;
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mdia_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_MediaBox *ptr = (GF_MediaBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
if (ptr->mediaHeader) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->mediaHeader);
if (ptr->information) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->information);
if (ptr->handler) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->handler);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int i2c_type_bootmode(struct edgeport_serial *serial)
{
struct device *dev = &serial->serial->dev->dev;
int status;
u8 *data;
data = kmalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Try to read type 2 */
status = ti_vread_sync(serial->serial->dev, UMPC_MEMORY_READ,
DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_II, 0, data, 0x01);
if (status)
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - read 2 status error = %d\n", __func__, status);
else
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - read 2 data = 0x%x\n", __func__, *data);
if ((!status) && (*data == UMP5152 || *data == UMP3410)) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - ROM_TYPE_II\n", __func__);
serial->TI_I2C_Type = DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_II;
goto out;
}
/* Try to read type 3 */
status = ti_vread_sync(serial->serial->dev, UMPC_MEMORY_READ,
DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_III, 0, data, 0x01);
if (status)
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - read 3 status error = %d\n", __func__, status);
else
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - read 2 data = 0x%x\n", __func__, *data);
if ((!status) && (*data == UMP5152 || *data == UMP3410)) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - ROM_TYPE_III\n", __func__);
serial->TI_I2C_Type = DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_III;
goto out;
}
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Unknown\n", __func__);
serial->TI_I2C_Type = DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_II;
status = -ENODEV;
out:
kfree(data);
return status;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191 | 0 | 66,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RenderBox::baselinePosition(FontBaseline baselineType, bool /*firstLine*/, LineDirectionMode direction, LinePositionMode /*linePositionMode*/) const
{
if (isReplaced()) {
int result = direction == HorizontalLine ? m_marginTop + height() + m_marginBottom : m_marginRight + width() + m_marginLeft;
if (baselineType == AlphabeticBaseline)
return result;
return result - result / 2;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: auth_generate_key(struct sc_card *card, int use_sm,
struct sc_cardctl_oberthur_genkey_info *data)
{
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned char sbuf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE];
struct sc_path tmp_path;
int rv = 0;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
if (data->key_bits < 512 || data->key_bits > 2048 ||
(data->key_bits%0x20)!=0) {
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS, "Illegal key length");
}
sbuf[0] = (data->id_pub >> 8) & 0xFF;
sbuf[1] = data->id_pub & 0xFF;
sbuf[2] = (data->id_prv >> 8) & 0xFF;
sbuf[3] = data->id_prv & 0xFF;
if (data->exponent != 0x10001) {
rv = auth_encode_exponent(data->exponent, &sbuf[5],SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE-6);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "Cannot encode exponent");
sbuf[4] = rv;
rv++;
}
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_4_SHORT, 0x46, 0x00, 0x00);
apdu.resp = calloc(1, data->key_bits/8+8);
if (!apdu.resp)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
apdu.resplen = data->key_bits/8+8;
apdu.lc = rv + 4;
apdu.le = data->key_bits/8;
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.datalen = rv + 4;
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "Card returned error");
memset(&tmp_path, 0, sizeof(struct sc_path));
tmp_path.type = SC_PATH_TYPE_FILE_ID;
tmp_path.len = 2;
memcpy(tmp_path.value, sbuf, 2);
rv = auth_select_file(card, &tmp_path, NULL);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "cannot select public key");
rv = auth_read_component(card, SC_CARDCTL_OBERTHUR_KEY_RSA_PUBLIC,
1, apdu.resp, data->key_bits/8);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "auth_read_component() returned error");
apdu.resplen = rv;
if (data->pubkey) {
if (data->pubkey_len < apdu.resplen)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
memcpy(data->pubkey,apdu.resp,apdu.resplen);
}
data->pubkey_len = apdu.resplen;
free(apdu.resp);
sc_log(card->ctx, "resulted public key len %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
apdu.resplen);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool do_notify_parent(struct task_struct *tsk, int sig)
{
struct siginfo info;
unsigned long flags;
struct sighand_struct *psig;
bool autoreap = false;
BUG_ON(sig == -1);
/* do_notify_parent_cldstop should have been called instead. */
BUG_ON(task_is_stopped_or_traced(tsk));
BUG_ON(!tsk->ptrace &&
(tsk->group_leader != tsk || !thread_group_empty(tsk)));
if (sig != SIGCHLD) {
/*
* This is only possible if parent == real_parent.
* Check if it has changed security domain.
*/
if (tsk->parent_exec_id != tsk->parent->self_exec_id)
sig = SIGCHLD;
}
info.si_signo = sig;
info.si_errno = 0;
/*
* We are under tasklist_lock here so our parent is tied to
* us and cannot change.
*
* task_active_pid_ns will always return the same pid namespace
* until a task passes through release_task.
*
* write_lock() currently calls preempt_disable() which is the
* same as rcu_read_lock(), but according to Oleg, this is not
* correct to rely on this
*/
rcu_read_lock();
info.si_pid = task_pid_nr_ns(tsk, task_active_pid_ns(tsk->parent));
info.si_uid = from_kuid_munged(task_cred_xxx(tsk->parent, user_ns),
task_uid(tsk));
rcu_read_unlock();
info.si_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(tsk->utime + tsk->signal->utime);
info.si_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(tsk->stime + tsk->signal->stime);
info.si_status = tsk->exit_code & 0x7f;
if (tsk->exit_code & 0x80)
info.si_code = CLD_DUMPED;
else if (tsk->exit_code & 0x7f)
info.si_code = CLD_KILLED;
else {
info.si_code = CLD_EXITED;
info.si_status = tsk->exit_code >> 8;
}
psig = tsk->parent->sighand;
spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
if (!tsk->ptrace && sig == SIGCHLD &&
(psig->action[SIGCHLD-1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN ||
(psig->action[SIGCHLD-1].sa.sa_flags & SA_NOCLDWAIT))) {
/*
* We are exiting and our parent doesn't care. POSIX.1
* defines special semantics for setting SIGCHLD to SIG_IGN
* or setting the SA_NOCLDWAIT flag: we should be reaped
* automatically and not left for our parent's wait4 call.
* Rather than having the parent do it as a magic kind of
* signal handler, we just set this to tell do_exit that we
* can be cleaned up without becoming a zombie. Note that
* we still call __wake_up_parent in this case, because a
* blocked sys_wait4 might now return -ECHILD.
*
* Whether we send SIGCHLD or not for SA_NOCLDWAIT
* is implementation-defined: we do (if you don't want
* it, just use SIG_IGN instead).
*/
autoreap = true;
if (psig->action[SIGCHLD-1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN)
sig = 0;
}
if (valid_signal(sig) && sig)
__group_send_sig_info(sig, &info, tsk->parent);
__wake_up_parent(tsk, tsk->parent);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
return autoreap;
}
Commit Message: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 33,716 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::IsRequestIDInUse(
const GlobalRequestID& id) const {
if (pending_loaders_.find(id) != pending_loaders_.end())
return true;
for (const auto& blocked_loaders : blocked_loaders_map_) {
for (const auto& loader : *blocked_loaders.second.get()) {
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = loader->GetRequestInfo();
if (info->GetGlobalRequestID() == id)
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 152,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const PPB_NaCl_Private* PPB_NaCl_Private_Impl::GetInterface() {
return &nacl_interface;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,326 |
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