instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<DocumentParser> Document::createParser()
{
if (isHTMLDocument()) {
bool reportErrors = InspectorInstrumentation::collectingHTMLParseErrors(this->page());
return HTMLDocumentParser::create(toHTMLDocument(this), reportErrors);
}
return XMLDocumentParser::create(this, view());
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mipspmu_start(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
{
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
if (!mipspmu)
return;
if (flags & PERF_EF_RELOAD)
WARN_ON_ONCE(!(hwc->state & PERF_HES_UPTODATE));
hwc->state = 0;
/* Set the period for the event. */
mipspmu_event_set_period(event, hwc, hwc->idx);
/* Enable the event. */
mipspmu->enable_event(hwc, hwc->idx);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,379
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vcpu_stat_get(void *_offset, u64 *val)
{
unsigned offset = (long)_offset;
struct kvm *kvm;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
int i;
*val = 0;
spin_lock(&kvm_lock);
list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list)
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
*val += *(u32 *)((void *)vcpu + offset);
spin_unlock(&kvm_lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,363
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void mm_init_owner(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
{
mm->owner = p;
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 22,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tg3_init_hw(struct tg3 *tp, int reset_phy)
{
tg3_switch_clocks(tp);
tw32(TG3PCI_MEM_WIN_BASE_ADDR, 0);
return tg3_reset_hw(tp, reset_phy);
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,592
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: double AffineTransform::yScale() const
{
return sqrt(m_transform[2] * m_transform[2] + m_transform[3] * m_transform[3]);
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,670
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void blkcg_print_blkgs(struct seq_file *sf, struct blkcg *blkcg,
u64 (*prfill)(struct seq_file *,
struct blkg_policy_data *, int),
const struct blkcg_policy *pol, int data,
bool show_total)
{
struct blkcg_gq *blkg;
u64 total = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(blkg, &blkcg->blkg_list, blkcg_node) {
spin_lock_irq(blkg->q->queue_lock);
if (blkcg_policy_enabled(blkg->q, pol))
total += prfill(sf, blkg->pd[pol->plid], data);
spin_unlock_irq(blkg->q->queue_lock);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (show_total)
seq_printf(sf, "Total %llu\n", (unsigned long long)total);
}
Commit Message: blkcg: fix double free of new_blkg in blkcg_init_queue
If blkg_create fails, new_blkg passed as an argument will
be freed by blkg_create, so there is no need to free it again.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 84,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::Rect RenderViewTest::GetElementBounds(const std::string& element_id) {
std::vector<std::string> params;
params.push_back(element_id);
std::string script =
base::ReplaceStringPlaceholders(kGetCoordinatesScript, params, NULL);
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> value = GetMainFrame()->executeScriptAndReturnValue(
WebScriptSource(WebString::fromUTF8(script)));
if (value.IsEmpty() || !value->IsArray())
return gfx::Rect();
v8::Local<v8::Array> array = value.As<v8::Array>();
if (array->Length() != 4)
return gfx::Rect();
std::vector<int> coords;
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
v8::Local<v8::Number> index = v8::Number::New(isolate, i);
v8::Local<v8::Value> value = array->Get(index);
if (value.IsEmpty() || !value->IsInt32())
return gfx::Rect();
coords.push_back(value->Int32Value());
}
return gfx::Rect(coords[0], coords[1], coords[2], coords[3]);
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init dccp_v4_init(void)
{
int err = proto_register(&dccp_v4_prot, 1);
if (err != 0)
goto out;
err = inet_add_protocol(&dccp_v4_protocol, IPPROTO_DCCP);
if (err != 0)
goto out_proto_unregister;
inet_register_protosw(&dccp_v4_protosw);
err = register_pernet_subsys(&dccp_v4_ops);
if (err)
goto out_destroy_ctl_sock;
out:
return err;
out_destroy_ctl_sock:
inet_unregister_protosw(&dccp_v4_protosw);
inet_del_protocol(&dccp_v4_protocol, IPPROTO_DCCP);
out_proto_unregister:
proto_unregister(&dccp_v4_prot);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,748
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: exsltDateSecondsFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs)
{
xmlChar *str = NULL;
double ret;
if (nargs > 1) {
xmlXPathSetArityError(ctxt);
return;
}
if (nargs == 1) {
str = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
if (xmlXPathCheckError(ctxt)) {
xmlXPathSetTypeError(ctxt);
return;
}
}
ret = exsltDateSeconds(str);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree(str);
xmlXPathReturnNumber(ctxt, ret);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,628
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
{
bn_check_top(a);
if (bn_expand(a,(int)sizeof(BN_ULONG)*8) == NULL) return(0);
a->neg = 0;
a->d[0] = w;
a->top = (w ? 1 : 0);
bn_check_top(a);
return(1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 14,558
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CommandBufferProxyImpl::SetChannelErrorCallback(
const base::Closure& callback) {
channel_error_callback_ = callback;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,736
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderView::didReceiveResponse(
WebFrame* frame, unsigned identifier, const WebURLResponse& response) {
SiteIsolationMetrics::LogMimeTypeForCrossOriginRequest(frame,
identifier,
response);
if (!frame->provisionalDataSource() || frame->parent())
return;
if (frame->isViewSourceModeEnabled())
return;
NavigationState* navigation_state =
NavigationState::FromDataSource(frame->provisionalDataSource());
CHECK(navigation_state);
int http_status_code = response.httpStatusCode();
navigation_state->set_was_fetched_via_spdy(response.wasFetchedViaSPDY());
navigation_state->set_was_npn_negotiated(response.wasNpnNegotiated());
navigation_state->set_was_alternate_protocol_available(
response.wasAlternateProtocolAvailable());
navigation_state->set_was_fetched_via_proxy(response.wasFetchedViaProxy());
navigation_state->set_http_status_code(http_status_code);
navigation_state->set_use_error_page(true);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PaymentHandlerWebFlowViewController::LoadProgressChanged(
content::WebContents* source,
double progress) {
DCHECK(source == web_contents());
progress_bar_->SetValue(progress);
if (progress == 1.0 && show_progress_bar_) {
show_progress_bar_ = false;
UpdateHeaderContentSeparatorView();
return;
}
if (progress < 1.0 && !show_progress_bar_) {
show_progress_bar_ = true;
UpdateHeaderContentSeparatorView();
return;
}
}
Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 151,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string ExtensionWebContentsObserver::GetExtensionIdFromFrame(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) const {
content::SiteInstance* site_instance = render_frame_host->GetSiteInstance();
GURL url = render_frame_host->GetLastCommittedURL();
if (!url.is_empty()) {
if (site_instance->GetSiteURL().GetOrigin() != url.GetOrigin())
return std::string();
} else {
url = site_instance->GetSiteURL();
}
return url.SchemeIs(kExtensionScheme) ? url.host() : std::string();
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 125,187
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ext4_orphan_add(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct ext4_iloc iloc;
int err = 0, rc;
if (!EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal)
return 0;
mutex_lock(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_orphan_lock);
if (!list_empty(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_orphan))
goto out_unlock;
/*
* Orphan handling is only valid for files with data blocks
* being truncated, or files being unlinked. Note that we either
* hold i_mutex, or the inode can not be referenced from outside,
* so i_nlink should not be bumped due to race
*/
J_ASSERT((S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) ||
S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) || inode->i_nlink == 0);
BUFFER_TRACE(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh, "get_write_access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &iloc);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
/*
* Due to previous errors inode may be already a part of on-disk
* orphan list. If so skip on-disk list modification.
*/
if (NEXT_ORPHAN(inode) && NEXT_ORPHAN(inode) <=
(le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_inodes_count)))
goto mem_insert;
/* Insert this inode at the head of the on-disk orphan list... */
NEXT_ORPHAN(inode) = le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_last_orphan);
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_last_orphan = cpu_to_le32(inode->i_ino);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, sb);
rc = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &iloc);
if (!err)
err = rc;
/* Only add to the head of the in-memory list if all the
* previous operations succeeded. If the orphan_add is going to
* fail (possibly taking the journal offline), we can't risk
* leaving the inode on the orphan list: stray orphan-list
* entries can cause panics at unmount time.
*
* This is safe: on error we're going to ignore the orphan list
* anyway on the next recovery. */
mem_insert:
if (!err)
list_add(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_orphan, &EXT4_SB(sb)->s_orphan);
jbd_debug(4, "superblock will point to %lu\n", inode->i_ino);
jbd_debug(4, "orphan inode %lu will point to %d\n",
inode->i_ino, NEXT_ORPHAN(inode));
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_orphan_lock);
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, err);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost* FindAgentHost(FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node) {
if (!g_agent_host_instances.IsCreated())
return nullptr;
auto it = g_agent_host_instances.Get().find(frame_tree_node);
return it == g_agent_host_instances.Get().end() ? nullptr : it->second;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,651
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string caption() { return caption_; }
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,235
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void iov_iter_init(struct iov_iter *i, int direction,
const struct iovec *iov, unsigned long nr_segs,
size_t count)
{
/* It will get better. Eventually... */
if (segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)) {
direction |= ITER_KVEC;
i->type = direction;
i->kvec = (struct kvec *)iov;
} else {
i->type = direction;
i->iov = iov;
}
i->nr_segs = nr_segs;
i->iov_offset = 0;
i->count = count;
}
Commit Message: fix a fencepost error in pipe_advance()
The logics in pipe_advance() used to release all buffers past the new
position failed in cases when the number of buffers to release was equal
to pipe->buffers. If that happened, none of them had been released,
leaving pipe full. Worse, it was trivial to trigger and we end up with
pipe full of uninitialized pages. IOW, it's an infoleak.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Tested-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 68,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_cmdtest_ioctl(struct comedi_device *dev,
struct comedi_cmd __user *arg, void *file)
{
struct comedi_cmd user_cmd;
struct comedi_subdevice *s;
int ret = 0;
unsigned int *chanlist = NULL;
unsigned int __user *chanlist_saver = NULL;
if (copy_from_user(&user_cmd, arg, sizeof(struct comedi_cmd))) {
DPRINTK("bad cmd address\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
/* save user's chanlist pointer so it can be restored later */
chanlist_saver = user_cmd.chanlist;
if (user_cmd.subdev >= dev->n_subdevices) {
DPRINTK("%d no such subdevice\n", user_cmd.subdev);
return -ENODEV;
}
s = dev->subdevices + user_cmd.subdev;
if (s->type == COMEDI_SUBD_UNUSED) {
DPRINTK("%d not valid subdevice\n", user_cmd.subdev);
return -EIO;
}
if (!s->do_cmd || !s->do_cmdtest) {
DPRINTK("subdevice %i does not support commands\n",
user_cmd.subdev);
return -EIO;
}
/* make sure channel/gain list isn't too long */
if (user_cmd.chanlist_len > s->len_chanlist) {
DPRINTK("channel/gain list too long %d > %d\n",
user_cmd.chanlist_len, s->len_chanlist);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
/* load channel/gain list */
if (user_cmd.chanlist) {
chanlist =
kmalloc(user_cmd.chanlist_len * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!chanlist) {
DPRINTK("allocation failed\n");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if (copy_from_user(chanlist, user_cmd.chanlist,
user_cmd.chanlist_len * sizeof(int))) {
DPRINTK("fault reading chanlist\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
/* make sure each element in channel/gain list is valid */
ret = comedi_check_chanlist(s, user_cmd.chanlist_len, chanlist);
if (ret < 0) {
DPRINTK("bad chanlist\n");
goto cleanup;
}
user_cmd.chanlist = chanlist;
}
ret = s->do_cmdtest(dev, s, &user_cmd);
/* restore chanlist pointer before copying back */
user_cmd.chanlist = chanlist_saver;
if (copy_to_user(arg, &user_cmd, sizeof(struct comedi_cmd))) {
DPRINTK("bad cmd address\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
kfree(chanlist);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: staging: comedi: fix infoleak to userspace
driver_name and board_name are pointers to strings, not buffers of size
COMEDI_NAMELEN. Copying COMEDI_NAMELEN bytes of a string containing
less than COMEDI_NAMELEN-1 bytes would leak some unrelated bytes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 41,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_excludes(struct perf_event **ctrs, unsigned int cflags[],
int n_prev, int n_new)
{
int eu = 0, ek = 0, eh = 0;
int i, n, first;
struct perf_event *event;
n = n_prev + n_new;
if (n <= 1)
return 0;
first = 1;
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
if (cflags[i] & PPMU_LIMITED_PMC_OK) {
cflags[i] &= ~PPMU_LIMITED_PMC_REQD;
continue;
}
event = ctrs[i];
if (first) {
eu = event->attr.exclude_user;
ek = event->attr.exclude_kernel;
eh = event->attr.exclude_hv;
first = 0;
} else if (event->attr.exclude_user != eu ||
event->attr.exclude_kernel != ek ||
event->attr.exclude_hv != eh) {
return -EAGAIN;
}
}
if (eu || ek || eh)
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
if (cflags[i] & PPMU_LIMITED_PMC_OK)
cflags[i] |= PPMU_LIMITED_PMC_REQD;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf, powerpc: Handle events that raise an exception without overflowing
Events on POWER7 can roll back if a speculative event doesn't
eventually complete. Unfortunately in some rare cases they will
raise a performance monitor exception. We need to catch this to
ensure we reset the PMC. In all cases the PMC will be 256 or less
cycles from overflow.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # as far back as it applies cleanly
LKML-Reference: <20110309143842.6c22845e@kryten>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 22,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t iov_iter_get_pages(struct iov_iter *i,
struct page **pages, size_t maxsize, unsigned maxpages,
size_t *start)
{
if (maxsize > i->count)
maxsize = i->count;
if (unlikely(i->type & ITER_PIPE))
return pipe_get_pages(i, pages, maxsize, maxpages, start);
iterate_all_kinds(i, maxsize, v, ({
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)v.iov_base;
size_t len = v.iov_len + (*start = addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
int n;
int res;
if (len > maxpages * PAGE_SIZE)
len = maxpages * PAGE_SIZE;
addr &= ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);
n = DIV_ROUND_UP(len, PAGE_SIZE);
res = get_user_pages_fast(addr, n, (i->type & WRITE) != WRITE, pages);
if (unlikely(res < 0))
return res;
return (res == n ? len : res * PAGE_SIZE) - *start;
0;}),({
/* can't be more than PAGE_SIZE */
*start = v.bv_offset;
get_page(*pages = v.bv_page);
return v.bv_len;
}),({
return -EFAULT;
})
)
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix a fencepost error in pipe_advance()
The logics in pipe_advance() used to release all buffers past the new
position failed in cases when the number of buffers to release was equal
to pipe->buffers. If that happened, none of them had been released,
leaving pipe full. Worse, it was trivial to trigger and we end up with
pipe full of uninitialized pages. IOW, it's an infoleak.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Tested-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 68,740
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _tiffSeekProc(thandle_t fd, toff_t off, int whence)
{
return ((toff_t) lseek((int) fd, (off_t) off, whence));
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 86,792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void npidentifier_cache_add_int(NPIdentifier ident, int32_t value)
{
if (G_UNLIKELY(g_npidentifier_cache == NULL))
return;
NPIdentifierInfo *npi = npidentifier_info_new();
if (G_UNLIKELY(npi == NULL))
return;
npi->string_len = 0;
npi->u.value = value;
g_hash_table_insert(g_npidentifier_cache, ident, npi);
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,151
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Element* HTMLFormElement::ElementFromPastNamesMap(
const AtomicString& past_name) {
if (past_name.IsEmpty() || !past_names_map_)
return nullptr;
Element* element = past_names_map_->at(past_name);
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
if (!element)
return nullptr;
SECURITY_DCHECK(ToHTMLElement(element)->formOwner() == this);
if (IsHTMLImageElement(*element)) {
SECURITY_DCHECK(ImageElements().Find(element) != kNotFound);
} else if (IsHTMLObjectElement(*element)) {
SECURITY_DCHECK(ListedElements().Find(ToHTMLObjectElement(element)) !=
kNotFound);
} else {
SECURITY_DCHECK(ListedElements().Find(ToHTMLFormControlElement(element)) !=
kNotFound);
}
#endif
return element;
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 152,216
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserRenderProcessHost::SetBackgrounded(bool backgrounded) {
backgrounded_ = backgrounded;
if (!child_process_launcher_.get() || child_process_launcher_->IsStarting())
return;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (GetModuleHandle(L"cbstext.dll"))
return;
#endif // OS_WIN
child_process_launcher_->SetProcessBackgrounded(backgrounded);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(SoapClient, __getTypes)
{
sdlPtr sdl;
HashPosition pos;
FETCH_THIS_SDL(sdl);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (sdl) {
sdlTypePtr *type;
smart_str buf = {0};
array_init(return_value);
if (sdl->types) {
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(sdl->types, &pos);
while (zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(sdl->types, (void **)&type, &pos) != FAILURE) {
type_to_string((*type), &buf, 0);
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, buf.c, buf.len, 1);
smart_str_free(&buf);
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(sdl->types, &pos);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,873
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContext::init(
const QWeakPointer<WebContextProxyClient::IOClient>& io_client) {
delegate_->Init(io_client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 16,990
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: release_bmc_device(struct device *dev)
{
kfree(to_bmc_device(dev));
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::TabDetachedAtImpl(content::WebContents* contents,
bool was_active,
DetachType type) {
if (type == DETACH_TYPE_DETACH) {
if (was_active) {
LocationBar* location_bar = window()->GetLocationBar();
if (location_bar)
location_bar->SaveStateToContents(contents);
}
if (!tab_strip_model_->closing_all())
SyncHistoryWithTabs(0);
}
SetAsDelegate(contents, false);
RemoveScheduledUpdatesFor(contents);
if (HasFindBarController() && was_active)
find_bar_controller_->ChangeWebContents(NULL);
for (size_t i = 0; i < interstitial_observers_.size(); i++) {
if (interstitial_observers_[i]->web_contents() != contents)
continue;
delete interstitial_observers_[i];
interstitial_observers_.erase(interstitial_observers_.begin() + i);
return;
}
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,056
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum bp_state update_schedule(enum bp_state state)
{
if (state == BP_WAIT)
return BP_WAIT;
if (state == BP_ECANCELED)
return BP_ECANCELED;
if (state == BP_DONE) {
balloon_stats.schedule_delay = 1;
balloon_stats.retry_count = 1;
return BP_DONE;
}
++balloon_stats.retry_count;
if (balloon_stats.max_retry_count != RETRY_UNLIMITED &&
balloon_stats.retry_count > balloon_stats.max_retry_count) {
balloon_stats.schedule_delay = 1;
balloon_stats.retry_count = 1;
return BP_ECANCELED;
}
balloon_stats.schedule_delay <<= 1;
if (balloon_stats.schedule_delay > balloon_stats.max_schedule_delay)
balloon_stats.schedule_delay = balloon_stats.max_schedule_delay;
return BP_EAGAIN;
}
Commit Message: xen: let alloc_xenballooned_pages() fail if not enough memory free
commit a1078e821b605813b63bf6bca414a85f804d5c66 upstream.
Instead of trying to allocate pages with GFP_USER in
add_ballooned_pages() check the available free memory via
si_mem_available(). GFP_USER is far less limiting memory exhaustion
than the test via si_mem_available().
This will avoid dom0 running out of memory due to excessive foreign
page mappings especially on ARM and on x86 in PVH mode, as those don't
have a pre-ballooned area which can be used for foreign mappings.
As the normal ballooning suffers from the same problem don't balloon
down more than si_mem_available() pages in one iteration. At the same
time limit the default maximum number of retries.
This is part of XSA-300.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 87,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_sregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_sregs *sregs)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
bool masked;
if (!enable_vnmi)
return vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked;
if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
return false;
masked = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI;
vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
return masked;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 81,039
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err sgpd_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 entry_count;
GF_SampleGroupDescriptionBox *p = (GF_SampleGroupDescriptionBox *)s;
p->grouping_type = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(p, 4);
if (p->version>=1) {
p->default_length = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(p, 4);
}
if (p->version>=2) {
p->default_description_index = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(p, 4);
}
entry_count = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(p, 4);
if (entry_count>p->size)
return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
while (entry_count) {
void *ptr;
u32 parsed_bytes=0;
u32 size = p->default_length;
if ((p->version>=1) && !size) {
size = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(p, 4);
}
ptr = sgpd_parse_entry(p->grouping_type, bs, size, &parsed_bytes);
if (!ptr) return GF_OK;
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(p, parsed_bytes);
gf_list_add(p->group_descriptions, ptr);
entry_count--;
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,401
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool StartInputMethodDaemon() {
should_launch_ime_ = true;
return MaybeLaunchInputMethodDaemon();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppListControllerDelegate::ShowOptionsPage(
Profile* profile,
const std::string& app_id) {
const extensions::Extension* extension = GetExtension(profile, app_id);
if (!extension)
return;
OpenURL(profile,
extensions::OptionsPageInfo::GetOptionsPage(extension),
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
CURRENT_TAB);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AtomicString DateTimeFieldElement::localeIdentifier() const
{
return m_fieldOwner ? m_fieldOwner->localeIdentifier() : nullAtom;
}
Commit Message: INPUT_MULTIPLE_FIELDS_UI: Inconsistent value of aria-valuetext attribute
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107897
Reviewed by Kentaro Hara.
Source/WebCore:
aria-valuetext and aria-valuenow attributes had inconsistent values in
a case of initial empty state and a case that a user clears a field.
- aria-valuetext attribute should have "blank" message in the initial
empty state.
- aria-valuenow attribute should be removed in the cleared empty state.
Also, we have a bug that aira-valuenow had a symbolic value such as "AM"
"January". It should always have a numeric value according to the
specification.
http://www.w3.org/TR/wai-aria/states_and_properties#aria-valuenow
No new tests. Updates fast/forms/*-multiple-fields/*-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::DateTimeFieldElement):
Set "blank" message to aria-valuetext attribute.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::updateVisibleValue):
aria-valuenow attribute should be a numeric value. Apply String::number
to the return value of valueForARIAValueNow.
Remove aria-valuenow attribute if nothing is selected.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added. Returns 1 + internal selection index.
For example, the function returns 1 for January.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
LayoutTests:
Fix existing tests to show aria-valuenow attribute values.
* fast/forms/resources/multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js: Added.
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
Add tests for initial empty-value state.
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@140803 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 103,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void VoidMethodPromiseArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
V8ThrowException::ThrowTypeError(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("voidMethodPromiseArg", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())));
return;
}
ScriptPromise promise_arg;
promise_arg = ScriptPromise::Cast(ScriptState::Current(info.GetIsolate()), info[0]);
if (!promise_arg.IsUndefinedOrNull() && !promise_arg.IsObject()) {
V8ThrowException::ThrowTypeError(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("voidMethodPromiseArg", "TestObject", "parameter 1 ('promiseArg') is not an object."));
return;
}
impl->voidMethodPromiseArg(promise_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,461
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: invoke_NPN_SetValue(PluginInstance *plugin, NPPVariable variable, void *value)
{
switch (rpc_type_of_NPPVariable(variable)) {
case RPC_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
break;
default:
D(bug("WARNING: unhandled variable %d in NPN_SetValue()\n", variable));
return NPERR_INVALID_PARAM;
}
npw_return_val_if_fail(rpc_method_invoke_possible(g_rpc_connection),
NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR);
int error = rpc_method_invoke(g_rpc_connection,
RPC_METHOD_NPN_SET_VALUE,
RPC_TYPE_NPW_PLUGIN_INSTANCE, plugin,
RPC_TYPE_UINT32, variable,
RPC_TYPE_BOOLEAN, (uint32_t)(uintptr_t)value,
RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPN_SetValue() invoke", error);
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
int32_t ret;
error = rpc_method_wait_for_reply(g_rpc_connection, RPC_TYPE_INT32, &ret, RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPN_SetValue() wait for reply", error);
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gss_pseudo_random (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int prf_key,
const gss_buffer_t prf_in,
ssize_t desired_output_len,
gss_buffer_t prf_out)
{
OM_uint32 status;
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx;
gss_mechanism mech;
if (minor_status == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
if (context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ | GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
if (prf_in == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ | GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
if (prf_out == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE | GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
prf_out->length = 0;
prf_out->value = NULL;
/*
* select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech != NULL) {
if (mech->gss_pseudo_random != NULL) {
status = mech->gss_pseudo_random(minor_status,
ctx->internal_ctx_id,
prf_key,
prf_in,
desired_output_len,
prf_out);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
map_error(minor_status, mech);
} else
status = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
return status;
}
return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
}
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 1
| 168,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: crm_diff_update(const char *event, xmlNode * msg)
{
int rc = -1;
long now = time(NULL);
const char *op = NULL;
print_dot();
if (current_cib != NULL) {
xmlNode *cib_last = current_cib;
current_cib = NULL;
rc = cib_apply_patch_event(msg, cib_last, ¤t_cib, LOG_DEBUG);
free_xml(cib_last);
switch(rc) {
case pcmk_err_diff_resync:
case pcmk_err_diff_failed:
crm_warn("[%s] %s Patch aborted: %s (%d)", event, op, pcmk_strerror(rc), rc);
case pcmk_ok:
break;
default:
crm_warn("[%s] %s ABORTED: %s (%d)", event, op, pcmk_strerror(rc), rc);
return;
}
}
if (current_cib == NULL) {
current_cib = get_cib_copy(cib);
}
if (crm_mail_to || snmp_target || external_agent) {
/* Process operation updates */
xmlXPathObject *xpathObj =
xpath_search(msg,
"//" F_CIB_UPDATE_RESULT "//" XML_TAG_DIFF_ADDED "//" XML_LRM_TAG_RSC_OP);
if (xpathObj && xpathObj->nodesetval->nodeNr > 0) {
int lpc = 0, max = xpathObj->nodesetval->nodeNr;
for (lpc = 0; lpc < max; lpc++) {
xmlNode *rsc_op = getXpathResult(xpathObj, lpc);
handle_rsc_op(rsc_op);
}
}
if (xpathObj) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(xpathObj);
}
}
if ((now - last_refresh) > (reconnect_msec / 1000)) {
/* Force a refresh */
mon_refresh_display(NULL);
} else {
mainloop_set_trigger(refresh_trigger);
}
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,935
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void P2PQuicStreamImpl::Reset() {
if (rst_sent()) {
return;
}
quic::QuicStream::Reset(quic::QuicRstStreamErrorCode::QUIC_STREAM_CANCELLED);
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,712
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Cluster::Cluster(
Segment* pSegment,
long idx,
long long element_start
/* long long element_size */ ) :
m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_index(idx),
m_pos(element_start),
m_element_size(-1 /* element_size */ ),
m_timecode(-1),
m_entries(NULL),
m_entries_size(0),
m_entries_count(-1) //means "has not been parsed yet"
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,249
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AllSamplesPassedQuery::AllSamplesPassedQuery(
QueryManager* manager, GLenum target, int32 shm_id, uint32 shm_offset,
GLuint service_id)
: Query(manager, target, shm_id, shm_offset),
service_id_(service_id) {
}
Commit Message: Add bounds validation to AsyncPixelTransfersCompletedQuery::End
BUG=351852
R=jbauman@chromium.org, jorgelo@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/198253002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256723 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 121,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gio_poll_dispatch_add(enum qb_loop_priority p, int32_t fd, int32_t evts,
void *data, qb_ipcs_dispatch_fn_t fn)
{
struct gio_to_qb_poll *adaptor;
GIOChannel *channel;
int32_t res = 0;
res = qb_array_index(gio_map, fd, (void**)&adaptor);
if (res < 0) {
crm_err("Array lookup failed for fd=%d: %d", fd, res);
return res;
}
crm_trace("Adding fd=%d to mainloop as adapater %p", fd, adaptor);
if (adaptor->is_used) {
crm_err("Adapter for descriptor %d is still in-use", fd);
return -EEXIST;
}
/* channel is created with ref_count = 1 */
channel = g_io_channel_unix_new(fd);
if (!channel) {
crm_err("No memory left to add fd=%d", fd);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Because unlike the poll() API, glib doesn't tell us about HUPs by default */
evts |= (G_IO_HUP|G_IO_NVAL|G_IO_ERR);
adaptor->channel = channel;
adaptor->fn = fn;
adaptor->events = evts;
adaptor->data = data;
adaptor->p = p;
adaptor->is_used = QB_TRUE;
adaptor->source = g_io_add_watch_full(channel, G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT, evts, gio_read_socket, adaptor, gio_poll_destroy);
/* Now that mainloop now holds a reference to adaptor->channel,
* thanks to g_io_add_watch_full(), drop ours from g_io_channel_unix_new().
*
* This means that adaptor->channel will be free'd by:
* g_main_context_dispatch()
* -> g_source_destroy_internal()
* -> g_source_callback_unref()
* shortly after gio_poll_destroy() completes
*/
g_io_channel_unref(adaptor->channel);
crm_trace("Added to mainloop with gsource id=%d, ref=%d", adaptor->source, gio_adapter_refcount(adaptor));
if(adaptor->source > 0) {
return 0;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type, void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack = arg;
struct sctp_chunk *last_asconf = asoc->addip_last_asconf;
struct sctp_chunk *abort;
struct sctp_paramhdr *err_param = NULL;
sctp_addiphdr_t *addip_hdr;
__u32 sent_serial, rcvd_serial;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(asconf_ack, asoc)) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_BAD_TAG,
SCTP_NULL());
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
/* ADD-IP, Section 4.1.2:
* This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using
* the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk
* is received unauthenticated it MUST be silently discarded as
* described in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth].
*/
if (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !asconf_ack->auth)
return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(asconf_ack, sizeof(sctp_addip_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
addip_hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)asconf_ack->skb->data;
rcvd_serial = ntohl(addip_hdr->serial);
/* Verify the ASCONF-ACK chunk before processing it. */
if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc,
(sctp_paramhdr_t *)addip_hdr->params,
(void *)asconf_ack->chunk_end,
&err_param))
return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
(void *)err_param, commands);
if (last_asconf) {
addip_hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)last_asconf->subh.addip_hdr;
sent_serial = ntohl(addip_hdr->serial);
} else {
sent_serial = asoc->addip_serial - 1;
}
/* D0) If an endpoint receives an ASCONF-ACK that is greater than or
* equal to the next serial number to be used but no ASCONF chunk is
* outstanding the endpoint MUST ABORT the association. Note that a
* sequence number is greater than if it is no more than 2^^31-1
* larger than the current sequence number (using serial arithmetic).
*/
if (ADDIP_SERIAL_gte(rcvd_serial, sent_serial + 1) &&
!(asoc->addip_last_asconf)) {
abort = sctp_make_abort(asoc, asconf_ack,
sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t));
if (abort) {
sctp_init_cause(abort, SCTP_ERROR_ASCONF_ACK, 0);
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY,
SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
}
/* We are going to ABORT, so we might as well stop
* processing the rest of the chunks in the packet.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T4_RTO));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_DISCARD_PACKET,SCTP_NULL());
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
SCTP_ERROR(ECONNABORTED));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_FAILED,
SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_ASCONF_ACK));
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_ABORTEDS);
SCTP_DEC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_ABORT;
}
if ((rcvd_serial == sent_serial) && asoc->addip_last_asconf) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T4_RTO));
if (!sctp_process_asconf_ack((struct sctp_association *)asoc,
asconf_ack)) {
/* Successfully processed ASCONF_ACK. We can
* release the next asconf if we have one.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SEND_NEXT_ASCONF,
SCTP_NULL());
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
abort = sctp_make_abort(asoc, asconf_ack,
sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t));
if (abort) {
sctp_init_cause(abort, SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW, 0);
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY,
SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
}
/* We are going to ABORT, so we might as well stop
* processing the rest of the chunks in the packet.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_DISCARD_PACKET,SCTP_NULL());
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
SCTP_ERROR(ECONNABORTED));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_FAILED,
SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_ASCONF_ACK));
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_ABORTEDS);
SCTP_DEC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_ABORT;
}
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 31,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tg3_get_settings(struct net_device *dev, struct ethtool_cmd *cmd)
{
struct tg3 *tp = netdev_priv(dev);
if (tg3_flag(tp, USE_PHYLIB)) {
struct phy_device *phydev;
if (!(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_IS_CONNECTED))
return -EAGAIN;
phydev = tp->mdio_bus->phy_map[TG3_PHY_MII_ADDR];
return phy_ethtool_gset(phydev, cmd);
}
cmd->supported = (SUPPORTED_Autoneg);
if (!(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_10_100_ONLY))
cmd->supported |= (SUPPORTED_1000baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_1000baseT_Full);
if (!(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_ANY_SERDES)) {
cmd->supported |= (SUPPORTED_100baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_100baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_10baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_10baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_TP);
cmd->port = PORT_TP;
} else {
cmd->supported |= SUPPORTED_FIBRE;
cmd->port = PORT_FIBRE;
}
cmd->advertising = tp->link_config.advertising;
if (tg3_flag(tp, PAUSE_AUTONEG)) {
if (tp->link_config.flowctrl & FLOW_CTRL_RX) {
if (tp->link_config.flowctrl & FLOW_CTRL_TX) {
cmd->advertising |= ADVERTISED_Pause;
} else {
cmd->advertising |= ADVERTISED_Pause |
ADVERTISED_Asym_Pause;
}
} else if (tp->link_config.flowctrl & FLOW_CTRL_TX) {
cmd->advertising |= ADVERTISED_Asym_Pause;
}
}
if (netif_running(dev) && tp->link_up) {
ethtool_cmd_speed_set(cmd, tp->link_config.active_speed);
cmd->duplex = tp->link_config.active_duplex;
cmd->lp_advertising = tp->link_config.rmt_adv;
if (!(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_ANY_SERDES)) {
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_MDIX_STATE)
cmd->eth_tp_mdix = ETH_TP_MDI_X;
else
cmd->eth_tp_mdix = ETH_TP_MDI;
}
} else {
ethtool_cmd_speed_set(cmd, SPEED_UNKNOWN);
cmd->duplex = DUPLEX_UNKNOWN;
cmd->eth_tp_mdix = ETH_TP_MDI_INVALID;
}
cmd->phy_address = tp->phy_addr;
cmd->transceiver = XCVR_INTERNAL;
cmd->autoneg = tp->link_config.autoneg;
cmd->maxtxpkt = 0;
cmd->maxrxpkt = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sock_edemux(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
#ifdef CONFIG_INET
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT)
inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
else
#endif
sock_put(sk);
}
Commit Message: net: guard tcp_set_keepalive() to tcp sockets
Its possible to use RAW sockets to get a crash in
tcp_set_keepalive() / sk_reset_timer()
Fix is to make sure socket is a SOCK_STREAM one.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 41,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al)
{
const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
unsigned char selected_len = 0;
if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
s->cert->alpn_proposed,
s->cert->alpn_proposed_len,
s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
*ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
# endif
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 12,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: setup_sam(void)
{
return krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, &psr_key);
}
Commit Message: Multi-realm KDC null deref [CVE-2013-1418]
If a KDC serves multiple realms, certain requests can cause
setup_server_realm() to dereference a null pointer, crashing the KDC.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
A related but more minor vulnerability requires authentication to
exploit, and is only present if a third-party KDC database module can
dereference a null pointer under certain conditions.
(back ported from commit 5d2d9a1abe46a2c1a8614d4672d08d9d30a5f8bf)
ticket: 7757 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.7
status: resolved
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Response PageHandler::GetNavigationHistory(
int* current_index,
std::unique_ptr<NavigationEntries>* entries) {
WebContentsImpl* web_contents = GetWebContents();
if (!web_contents)
return Response::InternalError();
NavigationController& controller = web_contents->GetController();
*current_index = controller.GetCurrentEntryIndex();
*entries = NavigationEntries::create();
for (int i = 0; i != controller.GetEntryCount(); ++i) {
auto* entry = controller.GetEntryAtIndex(i);
(*entries)->addItem(
Page::NavigationEntry::Create()
.SetId(entry->GetUniqueID())
.SetUrl(entry->GetURL().spec())
.SetUserTypedURL(entry->GetUserTypedURL().spec())
.SetTitle(base::UTF16ToUTF8(entry->GetTitle()))
.SetTransitionType(TransitionTypeName(entry->GetTransitionType()))
.Build());
}
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::deleteFramebuffer(
WebGLFramebuffer* framebuffer) {
if (!DeleteObject(framebuffer))
return;
GLenum target = 0;
if (framebuffer == framebuffer_binding_) {
if (framebuffer == read_framebuffer_binding_) {
target = GL_FRAMEBUFFER;
framebuffer_binding_ = nullptr;
read_framebuffer_binding_ = nullptr;
} else {
target = GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER;
framebuffer_binding_ = nullptr;
}
} else if (framebuffer == read_framebuffer_binding_) {
target = GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER;
read_framebuffer_binding_ = nullptr;
}
if (target) {
GetDrawingBuffer()->Bind(target);
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int bprm_change_interp(char *interp, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
/* If a binfmt changed the interp, free it first. */
if (bprm->interp != bprm->filename)
kfree(bprm->interp);
bprm->interp = kstrdup(interp, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bprm->interp)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 30,886
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jpc_cod_dumpparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, FILE *out)
{
jpc_cod_t *cod = &ms->parms.cod;
int i;
fprintf(out, "csty = 0x%02x;\n", cod->compparms.csty);
fprintf(out, "numdlvls = %d; qmfbid = %d; mctrans = %d\n",
cod->compparms.numdlvls, cod->compparms.qmfbid, cod->mctrans);
fprintf(out, "prg = %d; numlyrs = %"PRIuFAST16";\n",
cod->prg, cod->numlyrs);
fprintf(out, "cblkwidthval = %d; cblkheightval = %d; "
"cblksty = 0x%02x;\n", cod->compparms.cblkwidthval, cod->compparms.cblkheightval,
cod->compparms.cblksty);
if (cod->csty & JPC_COX_PRT) {
for (i = 0; i < cod->compparms.numrlvls; ++i) {
jas_eprintf("prcwidth[%d] = %d, prcheight[%d] = %d\n",
i, cod->compparms.rlvls[i].parwidthval,
i, cod->compparms.rlvls[i].parheightval);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,836
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void gdImageAABlend (gdImagePtr im)
{
float p_alpha, old_alpha;
int color = im->AA_color, color_red, color_green, color_blue;
int old_color, old_red, old_green, old_blue;
int p_color, p_red, p_green, p_blue;
int px, py;
color_red = gdImageRed(im, color);
color_green = gdImageGreen(im, color);
color_blue = gdImageBlue(im, color);
/* Impose the anti-aliased drawing on the image. */
for (py = 0; py < im->sy; py++) {
for (px = 0; px < im->sx; px++) {
if (im->AA_opacity[py][px] != 0) {
old_color = gdImageGetPixel(im, px, py);
if ((old_color != color) && ((old_color != im->AA_dont_blend) || (im->AA_opacity[py][px] == 255))) {
/* Only blend with different colors that aren't the dont_blend color. */
p_alpha = (float) (im->AA_opacity[py][px]) / 255.0;
old_alpha = 1.0 - p_alpha;
if (p_alpha >= 1.0) {
p_color = color;
} else {
old_red = gdImageRed(im, old_color);
old_green = gdImageGreen(im, old_color);
old_blue = gdImageBlue(im, old_color);
p_red = (int) (((float) color_red * p_alpha) + ((float) old_red * old_alpha));
p_green = (int) (((float) color_green * p_alpha) + ((float) old_green * old_alpha));
p_blue = (int) (((float) color_blue * p_alpha) + ((float) old_blue * old_alpha));
p_color = gdImageColorResolve(im, p_red, p_green, p_blue);
}
gdImageSetPixel(im, px, py, p_color);
}
}
}
/* Clear the AA_opacity array behind us. */
memset(im->AA_opacity[py], 0, im->sx);
}
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 51,412
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *auth_server(int f_in, int f_out, int module, const char *host,
const char *addr, const char *leader)
{
char *users = lp_auth_users(module);
char challenge[MAX_DIGEST_LEN*2];
char line[BIGPATHBUFLEN];
char **auth_uid_groups = NULL;
int auth_uid_groups_cnt = -1;
const char *err = NULL;
int group_match = -1;
char *tok, *pass;
char opt_ch = '\0';
/* if no auth list then allow anyone in! */
if (!users || !*users)
if (!users || !*users)
return "";
gen_challenge(addr, challenge);
io_printf(f_out, "%s%s\n", leader, challenge);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-354
| 1
| 164,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> WebContentsAndroid::GetVisibleURL(
JNIEnv* env, jobject obj) const {
return base::android::ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(
env, web_contents_->GetVisibleURL().spec());
}
Commit Message: Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
TBR=tedchoc@chromium.org,jbudorick@chromium.org,sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 109,884
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: test_bson_append_general (void)
{
uint8_t bytes[12] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x01, 0x23, 0x45};
bson_oid_t oid;
bson_t *bson;
bson_t *array;
bson_t *subdoc;
bson = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_int32 (bson, "int", -1, 1));
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL_FILE (bson, "test1.bson");
bson_destroy (bson);
bson = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_int64 (bson, "int64", -1, 1));
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL_FILE (bson, "test2.bson");
bson_destroy (bson);
bson = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_double (bson, "double", -1, 1.123));
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL_FILE (bson, "test3.bson");
bson_destroy (bson);
bson = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_utf8 (bson, "string", -1, "some string", -1));
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL_FILE (bson, "test5.bson");
bson_destroy (bson);
bson = bson_new ();
array = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_int32 (array, "0", -1, 1));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_int32 (array, "1", -1, 2));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_int32 (array, "2", -1, 3));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_int32 (array, "3", -1, 4));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_int32 (array, "4", -1, 5));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_int32 (array, "5", -1, 6));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_array (bson, "array[int]", -1, array));
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL_FILE (bson, "test6.bson");
bson_destroy (array);
bson_destroy (bson);
bson = bson_new ();
array = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_double (array, "0", -1, 1.123));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_double (array, "1", -1, 2.123));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_array (bson, "array[double]", -1, array));
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL_FILE (bson, "test7.bson");
bson_destroy (array);
bson_destroy (bson);
bson = bson_new ();
subdoc = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_int32 (subdoc, "int", -1, 1));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_document (bson, "document", -1, subdoc));
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL_FILE (bson, "test8.bson");
bson_destroy (subdoc);
bson_destroy (bson);
bson = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_null (bson, "null", -1));
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL_FILE (bson, "test9.bson");
bson_destroy (bson);
bson = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_regex (bson, "regex", -1, "1234", "i"));
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL_FILE (bson, "test10.bson");
bson_destroy (bson);
bson = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_utf8 (bson, "hello", -1, "world", -1));
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL_FILE (bson, "test11.bson");
bson_destroy (bson);
bson = bson_new ();
array = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_utf8 (array, "0", -1, "awesome", -1));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_double (array, "1", -1, 5.05));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_int32 (array, "2", -1, 1986));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_array (bson, "BSON", -1, array));
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL_FILE (bson, "test12.bson");
bson_destroy (bson);
bson_destroy (array);
bson = bson_new ();
memcpy (&oid, bytes, sizeof oid);
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_oid (bson, "_id", -1, &oid));
subdoc = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_oid (subdoc, "_id", -1, &oid));
array = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_utf8 (array, "0", -1, "1", -1));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_utf8 (array, "1", -1, "2", -1));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_utf8 (array, "2", -1, "3", -1));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_utf8 (array, "3", -1, "4", -1));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_array (subdoc, "tags", -1, array));
bson_destroy (array);
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_utf8 (subdoc, "text", -1, "asdfanother", -1));
array = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_utf8 (array, "name", -1, "blah", -1));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_document (subdoc, "source", -1, array));
bson_destroy (array);
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_document (bson, "document", -1, subdoc));
bson_destroy (subdoc);
array = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_utf8 (array, "0", -1, "source", -1));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_array (bson, "type", -1, array));
bson_destroy (array);
array = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_utf8 (array, "0", -1, "server_created_at", -1));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_array (bson, "missing", -1, array));
bson_destroy (array);
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL_FILE (bson, "test17.bson");
bson_destroy (bson);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 77,882
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const struct rule *next_rule(void)
{
struct rule *rule;
/* Open conf file if we didn't do it yet */
if (!G.parser && G.filename) {
dbg("config_open('%s')", G.filename);
G.parser = config_open2(G.filename, fopen_for_read);
G.filename = NULL;
}
if (G.rule_vec) {
/* mdev -s */
/* Do we have rule parsed already? */
if (G.rule_vec[G.rule_idx]) {
dbg("< G.rule_vec[G.rule_idx:%d]=%p", G.rule_idx, G.rule_vec[G.rule_idx]);
return G.rule_vec[G.rule_idx++];
}
make_default_cur_rule();
} else {
/* not mdev -s */
clean_up_cur_rule();
}
/* Parse one more rule if file isn't fully read */
rule = &G.cur_rule;
if (G.parser) {
parse_next_rule();
if (G.rule_vec) { /* mdev -s */
rule = memcpy(xmalloc(sizeof(G.cur_rule)), &G.cur_rule, sizeof(G.cur_rule));
G.rule_vec = xrealloc_vector(G.rule_vec, 4, G.rule_idx);
G.rule_vec[G.rule_idx++] = rule;
dbg("> G.rule_vec[G.rule_idx:%d]=%p", G.rule_idx, G.rule_vec[G.rule_idx]);
}
}
return rule;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 3,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: util_fatal(const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
fprintf(stderr, "error: ");
vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
fprintf(stderr, "\nAborting.\n");
va_end(ap);
sc_notify_close();
exit(1);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebViewPrivate::setContentPos(const QPointF& pos)
{
Q_Q(QQuickWebView);
q->setContentX(pos.x());
q->setContentY(pos.y());
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,043
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int validatecieaspace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref **r)
{
int code;
float value[9];
ref CIEdict, *CIEspace = *r, *tempref;
if (!r_is_array(CIEspace))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
/* Validate parameters, check we have enough operands */
if (r_size(CIEspace) != 2)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
code = array_get(imemory, CIEspace, 1, &CIEdict);
if (code < 0)
return code;
check_read_type(CIEdict, t_dictionary);
/* Check white point exists, and is an array of three numbers */
code = checkWhitePoint(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict);
if (code != 0)
return code;
/* Remaining parameters are optional, but we must validate
* them if they are present
*/
code = dict_find_string(&CIEdict, "RangeA", &tempref);
if (code > 0 && !r_has_type(tempref, t_null)) {
/* Array of two numbers A0 < A1 */
if (!r_is_array(tempref))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
if (r_size(tempref) != 2)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
code = get_cie_param_array(imemory, tempref, 2, value);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (value[1] < value[0])
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
}
code = dict_find_string(&CIEdict, "DecodeA", &tempref);
if (code > 0 && !r_has_type(tempref, t_null)) {
check_proc(*tempref);
}
code = dict_find_string(&CIEdict, "MatrixA", &tempref);
if (code > 0 && !r_has_type(tempref, t_null)) {
if (!r_is_array(tempref))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
if (r_size(tempref) != 3)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
code = get_cie_param_array(imemory, tempref, 3, value);
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
code = checkRangeLMN(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict);
if (code != 0)
return code;
code = checkDecodeLMN(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict);
if (code != 0)
return code;
code = checkMatrixLMN(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict);
if (code != 0)
return code;
code = checkBlackPoint(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict);
if (code != 0)
return code;
*r = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 3,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: apprentice_load(struct magic_set *ms, const char *fn, int action)
{
int errs = 0;
uint32_t i, j;
size_t files = 0, maxfiles = 0;
char **filearr = NULL, *mfn;
struct stat st;
struct magic_map *map;
struct magic_entry_set mset[MAGIC_SETS];
DIR *dir;
struct dirent *d;
memset(mset, 0, sizeof(mset));
ms->flags |= MAGIC_CHECK; /* Enable checks for parsed files */
if ((map = CAST(struct magic_map *, calloc(1, sizeof(*map)))) == NULL)
{
file_oomem(ms, sizeof(*map));
return NULL;
}
/* print silly verbose header for USG compat. */
if (action == FILE_CHECK)
(void)fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", usg_hdr);
/* load directory or file */
if (stat(fn, &st) == 0 && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
dir = opendir(fn);
if (!dir) {
errs++;
goto out;
}
while ((d = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
if (asprintf(&mfn, "%s/%s", fn, d->d_name) < 0) {
file_oomem(ms,
strlen(fn) + strlen(d->d_name) + 2);
errs++;
closedir(dir);
goto out;
}
if (stat(mfn, &st) == -1 || !S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
free(mfn);
continue;
}
if (files >= maxfiles) {
size_t mlen;
maxfiles = (maxfiles + 1) * 2;
mlen = maxfiles * sizeof(*filearr);
if ((filearr = CAST(char **,
realloc(filearr, mlen))) == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, mlen);
free(mfn);
closedir(dir);
errs++;
goto out;
}
}
filearr[files++] = mfn;
}
closedir(dir);
qsort(filearr, files, sizeof(*filearr), cmpstrp);
for (i = 0; i < files; i++) {
load_1(ms, action, filearr[i], &errs, mset);
free(filearr[i]);
}
free(filearr);
} else
load_1(ms, action, fn, &errs, mset);
if (errs)
goto out;
for (j = 0; j < MAGIC_SETS; j++) {
/* Set types of tests */
for (i = 0; i < mset[j].count; ) {
if (mset[j].me[i].mp->cont_level != 0) {
i++;
continue;
}
i = set_text_binary(ms, mset[j].me, mset[j].count, i);
}
qsort(mset[j].me, mset[j].count, sizeof(*mset[j].me),
apprentice_sort);
/*
* Make sure that any level 0 "default" line is last
* (if one exists).
*/
set_last_default(ms, mset[j].me, mset[j].count);
/* coalesce per file arrays into a single one */
if (coalesce_entries(ms, mset[j].me, mset[j].count,
&map->magic[j], &map->nmagic[j]) == -1) {
errs++;
goto out;
}
}
out:
for (j = 0; j < MAGIC_SETS; j++)
magic_entry_free(mset[j].me, mset[j].count);
if (errs) {
apprentice_unmap(map);
return NULL;
}
return map;
}
Commit Message: * Enforce limit of 8K on regex searches that have no limits
* Allow the l modifier for regex to mean line count. Default
to byte count. If line count is specified, assume a max
of 80 characters per line to limit the byte count.
* Don't allow conversions to be used for dates, allowing
the mask field to be used as an offset.
* Bump the version of the magic format so that regex changes
are visible.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,956
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BookmarksExportFunction::FileSelected(const base::FilePath& path,
int index,
void* params) {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
bookmark_html_writer::WriteBookmarks(profile(), path, NULL);
#endif
Release(); // Balanced in BookmarksIOFunction::SelectFile()
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free in BookmarksIOFunction::ShowSelectFileDialog.
BUG=177410
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12326086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 115,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Textfield::ExtendSelectionAndDelete(size_t before, size_t after) {
gfx::Range range = GetRenderText()->selection();
DCHECK_GE(range.start(), before);
range.set_start(range.start() - before);
range.set_end(range.end() + after);
gfx::Range text_range;
if (GetTextRange(&text_range) && text_range.Contains(range))
DeleteRange(range);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,309
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API void* ZEND_FASTCALL _safe_realloc(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size, size_t offset)
{
return perealloc(ptr, safe_address(nmemb, size, offset), 1);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72742 - memory allocator fails to realloc small block to large one
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 50,160
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::LoadInfo::~LoadInfo() {}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 152,055
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool rb_per_cpu_empty(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
{
struct buffer_page *reader = cpu_buffer->reader_page;
struct buffer_page *head = rb_set_head_page(cpu_buffer);
struct buffer_page *commit = cpu_buffer->commit_page;
/* In case of error, head will be NULL */
if (unlikely(!head))
return true;
return reader->read == rb_page_commit(reader) &&
(commit == reader ||
(commit == head &&
head->read == rb_page_commit(commit)));
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,568
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uriPathTest(const char *filename ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const char *result ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const char *err ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
int options ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) {
int parsed;
int failures = 0;
/*
* register the new I/O handlers
*/
if (xmlRegisterInputCallbacks(uripMatch, uripOpen, uripRead, uripClose) < 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "failed to register HTTP handler\n");
return(-1);
}
for (urip_current = 0;urip_testURLs[urip_current] != NULL;urip_current++) {
urip_success = 1;
parsed = urip_checkURL(urip_testURLs[urip_current]);
if (urip_success != 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed the URL passing test for %s",
urip_testURLs[urip_current]);
failures++;
} else if (parsed != 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed the parsing test for %s",
urip_testURLs[urip_current]);
failures++;
}
nb_tests++;
}
xmlPopInputCallbacks();
return(failures);
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 59,643
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeClientImpl::UnregisterPopupOpeningObserver(
PopupOpeningObserver* observer) {
size_t index = popup_opening_observers_.Find(observer);
DCHECK_NE(index, kNotFound);
popup_opening_observers_.erase(index);
}
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 150,933
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnTextTrackSettingsChanged(
const FrameMsg_TextTrackSettings_Params& params) {
DCHECK(!frame_->parent());
if (!render_view_->webview())
return;
if (params.text_tracks_enabled) {
render_view_->webview()->settings()->setTextTrackKindUserPreference(
WebSettings::TextTrackKindUserPreference::Captions);
} else {
render_view_->webview()->settings()->setTextTrackKindUserPreference(
WebSettings::TextTrackKindUserPreference::Default);
}
render_view_->webview()->settings()->setTextTrackBackgroundColor(
WebString::fromUTF8(params.text_track_background_color));
render_view_->webview()->settings()->setTextTrackFontFamily(
WebString::fromUTF8(params.text_track_font_family));
render_view_->webview()->settings()->setTextTrackFontStyle(
WebString::fromUTF8(params.text_track_font_style));
render_view_->webview()->settings()->setTextTrackFontVariant(
WebString::fromUTF8(params.text_track_font_variant));
render_view_->webview()->settings()->setTextTrackTextColor(
WebString::fromUTF8(params.text_track_text_color));
render_view_->webview()->settings()->setTextTrackTextShadow(
WebString::fromUTF8(params.text_track_text_shadow));
render_view_->webview()->settings()->setTextTrackTextSize(
WebString::fromUTF8(params.text_track_text_size));
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,178
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::shouldSendCSPHeader(Resource::Type type) const {
for (const auto& policy : m_policies) {
if (policy->shouldSendCSPHeader(type))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 136,806
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dispatchSimAuthentication(Parcel &p, RequestInfo *pRI)
{
RIL_SimAuthentication pf;
int32_t t;
status_t status;
memset(&pf, 0, sizeof(pf));
status = p.readInt32(&t);
pf.authContext = (int) t;
pf.authData = strdupReadString(p);
pf.aid = strdupReadString(p);
startRequest;
appendPrintBuf("authContext=%s, authData=%s, aid=%s", pf.authContext, pf.authData, pf.aid);
closeRequest;
printRequest(pRI->token, pRI->pCI->requestNumber);
if (status != NO_ERROR) {
goto invalid;
}
CALL_ONREQUEST(pRI->pCI->requestNumber, &pf, sizeof(pf), pRI, pRI->socket_id);
#ifdef MEMSET_FREED
memsetString(pf.authData);
memsetString(pf.aid);
#endif
free(pf.authData);
free(pf.aid);
#ifdef MEMSET_FREED
memset(&pf, 0, sizeof(pf));
#endif
return;
invalid:
invalidCommandBlock(pRI);
return;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE
Fix security vulnerability in pre-O rild code.
Remove wrong code for setup_data_call.
Add check for max address for RIL_DIAL.
Bug: 37896655
Test: Manual.
Change-Id: I05c027140ae828a2653794fcdd94e1b1a130941b
(cherry picked from commit dda24c6557911aa1f4708abbd6b2f20f0e205b9e)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 162,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sp<AMessage> NuPlayer::GenericSource::getTrackInfo(size_t trackIndex) const {
size_t trackCount = mSources.size();
if (trackIndex >= trackCount) {
return NULL;
}
sp<AMessage> format = new AMessage();
sp<MetaData> meta = mSources.itemAt(trackIndex)->getFormat();
const char *mime;
CHECK(meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
format->setString("mime", mime);
int32_t trackType;
if (!strncasecmp(mime, "video/", 6)) {
trackType = MEDIA_TRACK_TYPE_VIDEO;
} else if (!strncasecmp(mime, "audio/", 6)) {
trackType = MEDIA_TRACK_TYPE_AUDIO;
} else if (!strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP)) {
trackType = MEDIA_TRACK_TYPE_TIMEDTEXT;
} else {
trackType = MEDIA_TRACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
format->setInt32("type", trackType);
const char *lang;
if (!meta->findCString(kKeyMediaLanguage, &lang)) {
lang = "und";
}
format->setString("language", lang);
if (trackType == MEDIA_TRACK_TYPE_SUBTITLE) {
int32_t isAutoselect = 1, isDefault = 0, isForced = 0;
meta->findInt32(kKeyTrackIsAutoselect, &isAutoselect);
meta->findInt32(kKeyTrackIsDefault, &isDefault);
meta->findInt32(kKeyTrackIsForced, &isForced);
format->setInt32("auto", !!isAutoselect);
format->setInt32("default", !!isDefault);
format->setInt32("forced", !!isForced);
}
return format;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 160,412
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ff_mpv_report_decode_progress(MpegEncContext *s)
{
if (s->pict_type != AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B && !s->partitioned_frame && !s->er.error_occurred)
ff_thread_report_progress(&s->current_picture_ptr->tf, s->mb_y, 0);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 81,741
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int xfrm_add_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct xfrm_usersa_info *p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
struct xfrm_state *x;
int err;
struct km_event c;
uid_t loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
u32 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
u32 sid;
err = verify_newsa_info(p, attrs);
if (err)
return err;
x = xfrm_state_construct(net, p, attrs, &err);
if (!x)
return err;
xfrm_state_hold(x);
if (nlh->nlmsg_type == XFRM_MSG_NEWSA)
err = xfrm_state_add(x);
else
err = xfrm_state_update(x);
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
xfrm_audit_state_add(x, err ? 0 : 1, loginuid, sessionid, sid);
if (err < 0) {
x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_DEAD;
__xfrm_state_put(x);
goto out;
}
c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
c.pid = nlh->nlmsg_pid;
c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type;
km_state_notify(x, &c);
out:
xfrm_state_put(x);
return err;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,133
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __kvm_set_xcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 xcr)
{
u64 xcr0 = xcr;
u64 old_xcr0 = vcpu->arch.xcr0;
u64 valid_bits;
/* Only support XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK(xcr0) now */
if (index != XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK)
return 1;
if (!(xcr0 & XSTATE_FP))
return 1;
if ((xcr0 & XSTATE_YMM) && !(xcr0 & XSTATE_SSE))
return 1;
/*
* Do not allow the guest to set bits that we do not support
* saving. However, xcr0 bit 0 is always set, even if the
* emulated CPU does not support XSAVE (see fx_init).
*/
valid_bits = vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 | XSTATE_FP;
if (xcr0 & ~valid_bits)
return 1;
if ((!(xcr0 & XSTATE_BNDREGS)) != (!(xcr0 & XSTATE_BNDCSR)))
return 1;
kvm_put_guest_xcr0(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.xcr0 = xcr0;
if ((xcr0 ^ old_xcr0) & XSTATE_EXTEND_MASK)
kvm_update_cpuid(vcpu);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 35,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLInputElement::IsOutOfRange() const {
return willValidate() && input_type_->IsOutOfRange(value());
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,050
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int __ctrblk_init(u8 *ctrptr, unsigned int nbytes)
{
unsigned int i, n;
/* align to block size, max. PAGE_SIZE */
n = (nbytes > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : nbytes & ~(DES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
for (i = DES_BLOCK_SIZE; i < n; i += DES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
memcpy(ctrptr + i, ctrptr + i - DES_BLOCK_SIZE, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
crypto_inc(ctrptr + i, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void jslSeekToP(JslCharPos *seekToChar) {
if (lex->it.var) jsvLockAgain(lex->it.var); // see jslGetNextCh
jsvStringIteratorFree(&lex->it);
lex->it = jsvStringIteratorClone(&seekToChar->it);
jsvUnLock(lex->it.var); // see jslGetNextCh
lex->currCh = seekToChar->currCh;
lex->tokenStart.it.var = 0;
lex->tokenStart.currCh = 0;
jslGetNextToken();
}
Commit Message: Fix strncat/cpy bounding issues (fix #1425)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 82,543
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationRequest::OnFailureChecksComplete(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
NavigationThrottle::ThrottleCheckResult result) {
DCHECK(result.action() != NavigationThrottle::DEFER);
net_error_ = result.net_error_code();
navigation_handle_->set_net_error_code(static_cast<net::Error>(net_error_));
if (net::ERR_ABORTED == net_error_) {
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(false, true);
return;
}
CommitErrorPage(render_frame_host, result.error_page_content());
}
Commit Message: Check ancestors when setting an <iframe> navigation's "site for cookies".
Currently, we're setting the "site for cookies" only by looking at the
top-level document. We ought to be verifying that the ancestor frames
are same-site before doing so. We do this correctly in Blink (see
`Document::SiteForCookies`), but didn't do so when navigating in the
browser.
This patch addresses the majority of the problem by walking the ancestor
chain when processing a NavigationRequest. If all the ancestors are
same-site, we set the "site for cookies" to the top-level document's URL.
If they aren't all same-site, we set it to an empty URL to ensure that
we don't send SameSite cookies.
Bug: 833847
Change-Id: Icd77f31fa618fa9f8b59fc3b15e1bed6ee05aabd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1025772
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553942}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 144,122
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CustomButton::OnMouseDragged(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
if (state_ != STATE_DISABLED) {
if (HitTestPoint(event.location()))
SetState(ShouldEnterPushedState(event) ? STATE_PRESSED : STATE_HOVERED);
else
SetState(STATE_NORMAL);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Custom buttons should only handle accelerators when focused.
BUG=541415
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1437523005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360130}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 132,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gss_wrap_aead (minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
input_assoc_buffer,
input_payload_buffer,
conf_state,
output_message_buffer)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
gss_buffer_t input_assoc_buffer;
gss_buffer_t input_payload_buffer;
int * conf_state;
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer;
{
OM_uint32 status;
gss_mechanism mech;
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx;
status = val_wrap_aead_args(minor_status, context_handle,
conf_req_flag, qop_req,
input_assoc_buffer, input_payload_buffer,
conf_state, output_message_buffer);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
/*
* select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (!mech)
return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
return gssint_wrap_aead(mech, minor_status, ctx,
conf_req_flag, qop_req,
input_assoc_buffer, input_payload_buffer,
conf_state, output_message_buffer);
}
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 1
| 168,028
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool InputDispatcherThread::threadLoop() {
mDispatcher->dispatchOnce();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 163,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcXF86DRIOpenConnection(register ClientPtr client)
{
xXF86DRIOpenConnectionReply rep;
drm_handle_t hSAREA;
char *busIdString;
CARD32 busIdStringLength = 0;
REQUEST(xXF86DRIOpenConnectionReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXF86DRIOpenConnectionReq);
if (stuff->screen >= screenInfo.numScreens) {
client->errorValue = stuff->screen;
return BadValue;
}
if (!DRIOpenConnection(screenInfo.screens[stuff->screen],
&hSAREA, &busIdString)) {
return BadValue;
}
if (busIdString)
busIdStringLength = strlen(busIdString);
rep = (xXF86DRIOpenConnectionReply) {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = bytes_to_int32(SIZEOF(xXF86DRIOpenConnectionReply) -
SIZEOF(xGenericReply) +
pad_to_int32(busIdStringLength)),
.busIdStringLength = busIdStringLength,
.hSAREALow = (CARD32) (hSAREA & 0xffffffff),
#if defined(LONG64) && !defined(__linux__)
.hSAREAHigh = (CARD32) (hSAREA >> 32),
#else
.hSAREAHigh = 0
#endif
};
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(xXF86DRIOpenConnectionReply), &rep);
if (busIdStringLength)
WriteToClient(client, busIdStringLength, busIdString);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,741
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Ins_ISECT( INS_ARG )
{
Long point, /* are these Ints or Longs? */
a0, a1,
b0, b1;
TT_F26Dot6 discriminant;
TT_F26Dot6 dx, dy,
dax, day,
dbx, dby;
TT_F26Dot6 val;
TT_Vector R;
point = args[0];
a0 = args[1];
a1 = args[2];
b0 = args[3];
b1 = args[4];
if ( BOUNDS( b0, CUR.zp0.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( b1, CUR.zp0.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( a0, CUR.zp1.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( a1, CUR.zp1.n_points ) )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
dbx = CUR.zp0.cur_x[b1] - CUR.zp0.cur_x[b0];
dby = CUR.zp0.cur_y[b1] - CUR.zp0.cur_y[b0];
dax = CUR.zp1.cur_x[a1] - CUR.zp1.cur_x[a0];
day = CUR.zp1.cur_y[a1] - CUR.zp1.cur_y[a0];
dx = CUR.zp0.cur_x[b0] - CUR.zp1.cur_x[a0];
dy = CUR.zp0.cur_y[b0] - CUR.zp1.cur_y[a0];
CUR.zp2.touch[point] |= TT_Flag_Touched_Both;
discriminant = MulDiv_Round( dax, -dby, 0x40L ) +
MulDiv_Round( day, dbx, 0x40L );
if ( ABS( discriminant ) >= 0x40 )
{
val = MulDiv_Round( dx, -dby, 0x40L ) + MulDiv_Round( dy, dbx, 0x40L );
R.x = MulDiv_Round( val, dax, discriminant );
R.y = MulDiv_Round( val, day, discriminant );
CUR.zp2.cur_x[point] = CUR.zp1.cur_x[a0] + R.x;
CUR.zp2.cur_y[point] = CUR.zp1.cur_y[a0] + R.y;
}
else
{
/* else, take the middle of the middles of A and B */
CUR.zp2.cur_x[point] = ( CUR.zp1.cur_x[a0] +
CUR.zp1.cur_x[a1] +
CUR.zp0.cur_x[b0] +
CUR.zp1.cur_x[b1] ) / 4;
CUR.zp2.cur_y[point] = ( CUR.zp1.cur_y[a0] +
CUR.zp1.cur_y[a1] +
CUR.zp0.cur_y[b0] +
CUR.zp1.cur_y[b1] ) / 4;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,398
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
size_t callout_len, struct key *dest_keyring)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka, *irka;
const struct cred *cred = current->cred;
struct key *authkey = NULL;
char desc[20];
int ret = -ENOMEM;
kenter("%d,", target->serial);
/* allocate a auth record */
rka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rka)
goto error;
rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rka->callout_info)
goto error_free_rka;
rka->callout_len = callout_len;
/* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of
* another process */
if (cred->request_key_auth) {
/* it is - use that instantiation context here too */
down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
/* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're
* servicing is already instantiated */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
&cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {
up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
goto error_free_rka;
}
irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];
rka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred);
rka->pid = irka->pid;
up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
}
else {
/* it isn't - use this process as the context */
rka->cred = get_cred(cred);
rka->pid = current->pid;
}
rka->target_key = key_get(target);
rka->dest_keyring = key_get(dest_keyring);
/* allocate the auth key */
sprintf(desc, "%x", target->serial);
authkey = key_alloc(&key_type_request_key_auth, desc,
cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH |
KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(authkey);
goto error_free_rka;
}
/* construct the auth key */
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(authkey, rka, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_put_authkey;
kleave(" = {%d,%d}", authkey->serial, refcount_read(&authkey->usage));
return authkey;
error_put_authkey:
key_put(authkey);
error_free_rka:
free_request_key_auth(rka);
error:
kleave("= %d", ret);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 60,287
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptedAnimationController& Document::ensureScriptedAnimationController()
{
if (!m_scriptedAnimationController) {
m_scriptedAnimationController = ScriptedAnimationController::create(this);
if (!page())
m_scriptedAnimationController->suspend();
}
return *m_scriptedAnimationController;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int unicast_flush_resp(struct sock *sk, const struct sadb_msg *ihdr)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
skb = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct sadb_msg) + 16, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return -ENOBUFS;
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
memcpy(hdr, ihdr, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
hdr->sadb_msg_errno = (uint8_t) 0;
hdr->sadb_msg_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) / sizeof(uint64_t));
return pfkey_broadcast(skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ONE, sk, sock_net(sk));
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,484
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BlinkTestRunner::EvaluateInWebInspector(long call_id,
const std::string& script) {
WebDevToolsAgent* agent =
render_view()->GetMainRenderFrame()->GetWebFrame()->devToolsAgent();
if (agent)
agent->evaluateInWebInspector(call_id, WebString::fromUTF8(script));
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,563
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_map *map, int func_id)
{
if (!map)
return 0;
/* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */
switch (map->map_type) {
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage)
goto error;
break;
/* devmap returns a pointer to a live net_device ifindex that we cannot
* allow to be modified from bpf side. So do not allow lookup elements
* for now.
*/
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map)
goto error;
break;
/* Restrict bpf side of cpumap and xskmap, open when use-cases
* appear.
*/
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP:
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS:
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport)
goto error;
break;
default:
break;
}
/* ... and second from the function itself. */
switch (func_id) {
case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY)
goto error;
if (env->subprog_cnt > 1) {
verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
break;
case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read:
case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output:
case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup:
case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP &&
map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP &&
map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map:
case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map:
case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash:
case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash:
case BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY)
goto error;
break;
default:
break;
}
return 0;
error:
verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n",
map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 76,376
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UserInitiatedInfo CreateUserInitiatedInfo(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle,
PageLoadTracker* committed_load) {
if (!navigation_handle->IsRendererInitiated())
return UserInitiatedInfo::BrowserInitiated();
return UserInitiatedInfo::RenderInitiated(
navigation_handle->HasUserGesture());
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 1
| 172,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool netlink_net_capable(const struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
{
return netlink_ns_capable(skb, sock_net(skb->sk)->user_ns, cap);
}
Commit Message: netlink: Fix dump skb leak/double free
When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the
lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time
being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours.
This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free
the right memory.
Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 47,756
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sk_buff *tcp_get_timestamping_opt_stats(const struct sock *sk)
{
const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *stats;
struct tcp_info info;
stats = alloc_skb(3 * nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(u64)), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!stats)
return NULL;
tcp_get_info_chrono_stats(tp, &info);
nla_put_u64_64bit(stats, TCP_NLA_BUSY,
info.tcpi_busy_time, TCP_NLA_PAD);
nla_put_u64_64bit(stats, TCP_NLA_RWND_LIMITED,
info.tcpi_rwnd_limited, TCP_NLA_PAD);
nla_put_u64_64bit(stats, TCP_NLA_SNDBUF_LIMITED,
info.tcpi_sndbuf_limited, TCP_NLA_PAD);
return stats;
}
Commit Message: tcp: avoid infinite loop in tcp_splice_read()
Splicing from TCP socket is vulnerable when a packet with URG flag is
received and stored into receive queue.
__tcp_splice_read() returns 0, and sk_wait_data() immediately
returns since there is the problematic skb in queue.
This is a nice way to burn cpu (aka infinite loop) and trigger
soft lockups.
Again, this gem was found by syzkaller tool.
Fixes: 9c55e01c0cc8 ("[TCP]: Splice receive support.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 68,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int PC4500_writerid(struct airo_info *ai, u16 rid,
const void *pBuf, int len, int lock)
{
u16 status;
int rc = SUCCESS;
*(__le16*)pBuf = cpu_to_le16((u16)len);
if (lock) {
if (down_interruptible(&ai->sem))
return ERROR;
}
if (test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags)) {
Cmd cmd;
Resp rsp;
if (test_bit(FLAG_ENABLED, &ai->flags) && (RID_WEP_TEMP != rid))
airo_print_err(ai->dev->name,
"%s: MAC should be disabled (rid=%04x)",
__func__, rid);
memset(&cmd, 0, sizeof(cmd));
memset(&rsp, 0, sizeof(rsp));
ai->config_desc.rid_desc.valid = 1;
ai->config_desc.rid_desc.len = *((u16 *)pBuf);
ai->config_desc.rid_desc.rid = 0;
cmd.cmd = CMD_WRITERID;
cmd.parm0 = rid;
memcpy_toio(ai->config_desc.card_ram_off,
&ai->config_desc.rid_desc, sizeof(Rid));
if (len < 4 || len > 2047) {
airo_print_err(ai->dev->name, "%s: len=%d", __func__, len);
rc = -1;
} else {
memcpy((char *)ai->config_desc.virtual_host_addr,
pBuf, len);
rc = issuecommand(ai, &cmd, &rsp);
if ((rc & 0xff00) != 0) {
airo_print_err(ai->dev->name, "%s: Write rid Error %d",
__func__, rc);
airo_print_err(ai->dev->name, "%s: Cmd=%04x",
__func__, cmd.cmd);
}
if ((rsp.status & 0x7f00))
rc = rsp.rsp0;
}
} else {
if ( (status = PC4500_accessrid(ai, rid, CMD_ACCESS)) != 0) {
rc = status;
goto done;
}
if (bap_setup(ai, rid, 0, BAP1) != SUCCESS) {
rc = ERROR;
goto done;
}
bap_write(ai, pBuf, len, BAP1);
rc = PC4500_accessrid(ai, rid, 0x100|CMD_ACCESS);
}
done:
if (lock)
up(&ai->sem);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long vhost_set_vring(struct vhost_dev *d, int ioctl, void __user *argp)
{
struct file *eventfp, *filep = NULL;
bool pollstart = false, pollstop = false;
struct eventfd_ctx *ctx = NULL;
u32 __user *idxp = argp;
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
struct vhost_vring_state s;
struct vhost_vring_file f;
struct vhost_vring_addr a;
u32 idx;
long r;
r = get_user(idx, idxp);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (idx >= d->nvqs)
return -ENOBUFS;
vq = d->vqs + idx;
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
switch (ioctl) {
case VHOST_SET_VRING_NUM:
/* Resizing ring with an active backend?
* You don't want to do that. */
if (vq->private_data) {
r = -EBUSY;
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&s, argp, sizeof s)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (!s.num || s.num > 0xffff || (s.num & (s.num - 1))) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
vq->num = s.num;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_BASE:
/* Moving base with an active backend?
* You don't want to do that. */
if (vq->private_data) {
r = -EBUSY;
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&s, argp, sizeof s)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (s.num > 0xffff) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
vq->last_avail_idx = s.num;
/* Forget the cached index value. */
vq->avail_idx = vq->last_avail_idx;
break;
case VHOST_GET_VRING_BASE:
s.index = idx;
s.num = vq->last_avail_idx;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &s, sizeof s))
r = -EFAULT;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_ADDR:
if (copy_from_user(&a, argp, sizeof a)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (a.flags & ~(0x1 << VHOST_VRING_F_LOG)) {
r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
}
/* For 32bit, verify that the top 32bits of the user
data are set to zero. */
if ((u64)(unsigned long)a.desc_user_addr != a.desc_user_addr ||
(u64)(unsigned long)a.used_user_addr != a.used_user_addr ||
(u64)(unsigned long)a.avail_user_addr != a.avail_user_addr) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if ((a.avail_user_addr & (sizeof *vq->avail->ring - 1)) ||
(a.used_user_addr & (sizeof *vq->used->ring - 1)) ||
(a.log_guest_addr & (sizeof *vq->used->ring - 1))) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* We only verify access here if backend is configured.
* If it is not, we don't as size might not have been setup.
* We will verify when backend is configured. */
if (vq->private_data) {
if (!vq_access_ok(d, vq->num,
(void __user *)(unsigned long)a.desc_user_addr,
(void __user *)(unsigned long)a.avail_user_addr,
(void __user *)(unsigned long)a.used_user_addr)) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* Also validate log access for used ring if enabled. */
if ((a.flags & (0x1 << VHOST_VRING_F_LOG)) &&
!log_access_ok(vq->log_base, a.log_guest_addr,
sizeof *vq->used +
vq->num * sizeof *vq->used->ring)) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
vq->log_used = !!(a.flags & (0x1 << VHOST_VRING_F_LOG));
vq->desc = (void __user *)(unsigned long)a.desc_user_addr;
vq->avail = (void __user *)(unsigned long)a.avail_user_addr;
vq->log_addr = a.log_guest_addr;
vq->used = (void __user *)(unsigned long)a.used_user_addr;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_KICK:
if (copy_from_user(&f, argp, sizeof f)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
eventfp = f.fd == -1 ? NULL : eventfd_fget(f.fd);
if (IS_ERR(eventfp)) {
r = PTR_ERR(eventfp);
break;
}
if (eventfp != vq->kick) {
pollstop = (filep = vq->kick) != NULL;
pollstart = (vq->kick = eventfp) != NULL;
} else
filep = eventfp;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_CALL:
if (copy_from_user(&f, argp, sizeof f)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
eventfp = f.fd == -1 ? NULL : eventfd_fget(f.fd);
if (IS_ERR(eventfp)) {
r = PTR_ERR(eventfp);
break;
}
if (eventfp != vq->call) {
filep = vq->call;
ctx = vq->call_ctx;
vq->call = eventfp;
vq->call_ctx = eventfp ?
eventfd_ctx_fileget(eventfp) : NULL;
} else
filep = eventfp;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_ERR:
if (copy_from_user(&f, argp, sizeof f)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
eventfp = f.fd == -1 ? NULL : eventfd_fget(f.fd);
if (IS_ERR(eventfp)) {
r = PTR_ERR(eventfp);
break;
}
if (eventfp != vq->error) {
filep = vq->error;
vq->error = eventfp;
ctx = vq->error_ctx;
vq->error_ctx = eventfp ?
eventfd_ctx_fileget(eventfp) : NULL;
} else
filep = eventfp;
break;
default:
r = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
if (pollstop && vq->handle_kick)
vhost_poll_stop(&vq->poll);
if (ctx)
eventfd_ctx_put(ctx);
if (filep)
fput(filep);
if (pollstart && vq->handle_kick)
vhost_poll_start(&vq->poll, vq->kick);
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
if (pollstop && vq->handle_kick)
vhost_poll_flush(&vq->poll);
return r;
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix length for cross region descriptor
If a single descriptor crosses a region, the
second chunk length should be decremented
by size translated so far, instead it includes
the full descriptor length.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int CLASS ljpeg_diff (ushort *huff)
{
int len, diff;
len = gethuff(huff);
if (len == 16 && (!dng_version || dng_version >= 0x1010000))
return -32768;
diff = getbits(len);
if ((diff & (1 << (len-1))) == 0)
diff -= (1 << len) - 1;
return diff;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int test_gf2m_mod_mul(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *a,*b[2],*c,*d,*e,*f,*g,*h;
int i, j, ret = 0;
int p0[] = {163,7,6,3,0,-1};
int p1[] = {193,15,0,-1};
a=BN_new();
b[0]=BN_new();
b[1]=BN_new();
c=BN_new();
d=BN_new();
e=BN_new();
f=BN_new();
g=BN_new();
h=BN_new();
BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
for (i=0; i<num0; i++)
{
BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0);
BN_bntest_rand(c, 1024, 0, 0);
BN_bntest_rand(d, 1024, 0, 0);
for (j=0; j < 2; j++)
{
BN_GF2m_mod_mul(e, a, c, b[j], ctx);
#if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
if (bp != NULL)
{
if (!results)
{
BN_print(bp,a);
BIO_puts(bp," * ");
BN_print(bp,c);
BIO_puts(bp," % ");
BN_print(bp,b[j]);
BIO_puts(bp," - ");
BN_print(bp,e);
BIO_puts(bp,"\n");
}
}
#endif
BN_GF2m_add(f, a, d);
BN_GF2m_mod_mul(g, f, c, b[j], ctx);
BN_GF2m_mod_mul(h, d, c, b[j], ctx);
BN_GF2m_add(f, e, g);
BN_GF2m_add(f, f, h);
/* Test that (a+d)*c = a*c + d*c. */
if(!BN_is_zero(f))
{
fprintf(stderr,"GF(2^m) modular multiplication test failed!\n");
goto err;
}
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b[0]);
BN_free(b[1]);
BN_free(c);
BN_free(d);
BN_free(e);
BN_free(f);
BN_free(g);
BN_free(h);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2014-3570 (with minor bn_asm.c revamp).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 46,506
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Extension::ManifestData* Extension::GetManifestData(const std::string& key)
const {
DCHECK(finished_parsing_manifest_ || thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
ManifestDataMap::const_iterator iter = manifest_data_.find(key);
if (iter != manifest_data_.end())
return iter->second.get();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 114,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_gglobal_tracking_handler(__attribute__((unused)) vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_sgroup_t *vgroup = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp_sync_group);
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "(%s) global_tracking is deprecated. Use track_interface/script/file on the sync group", vgroup->gname);
vgroup->sgroup_tracking_weight = true;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 75,999
|
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