instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_async_page_ready(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_async_pf *work)
{
int r;
if ((vcpu->arch.mmu.direct_map != work->arch.direct_map) ||
is_error_page(work->page))
return;
r = kvm_mmu_reload(vcpu);
if (unlikely(r))
return;
if (!vcpu->arch.mmu.direct_map &&
work->arch.cr3 != vcpu->arch.mmu.get_cr3(vcpu))
return;
vcpu->arch.mmu.page_fault(vcpu, work->gva, 0, true);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,712
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void _gd_error_ex(int priority, const char *format, va_list args)
{
if (gd_error_method) {
gd_error_method(priority, format, args);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 73,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::PixelStorei(GLenum pname, GLint param) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glPixelStorei("
<< GLES2Util::GetStringPixelStore(pname) << ", " << param
<< ")");
switch (pname) {
case GL_PACK_ALIGNMENT:
case GL_UNPACK_ALIGNMENT:
if (param != 1 && param != 2 && param != 4 && param != 8) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glPixelStorei", "invalid param");
return;
}
break;
case GL_PACK_ROW_LENGTH:
case GL_PACK_SKIP_PIXELS:
case GL_PACK_SKIP_ROWS:
case GL_UNPACK_IMAGE_HEIGHT:
case GL_UNPACK_SKIP_IMAGES:
if (capabilities_.major_version < 3) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glPixelStorei", "invalid pname");
return;
}
if (param < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glPixelStorei", "invalid param");
return;
}
break;
case GL_UNPACK_ROW_LENGTH:
case GL_UNPACK_SKIP_ROWS:
case GL_UNPACK_SKIP_PIXELS:
if (param < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glPixelStorei", "invalid param");
return;
}
break;
default:
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glPixelStorei", "invalid pname");
return;
}
switch (pname) {
case GL_PACK_ALIGNMENT:
pack_alignment_ = param;
break;
case GL_PACK_ROW_LENGTH:
pack_row_length_ = param;
break;
case GL_PACK_SKIP_PIXELS:
pack_skip_pixels_ = param;
return;
case GL_PACK_SKIP_ROWS:
pack_skip_rows_ = param;
return;
case GL_UNPACK_ALIGNMENT:
unpack_alignment_ = param;
break;
case GL_UNPACK_ROW_LENGTH:
unpack_row_length_ = param;
if (capabilities_.major_version < 3) {
return;
}
break;
case GL_UNPACK_IMAGE_HEIGHT:
unpack_image_height_ = param;
break;
case GL_UNPACK_SKIP_ROWS:
unpack_skip_rows_ = param;
return;
case GL_UNPACK_SKIP_PIXELS:
unpack_skip_pixels_ = param;
return;
case GL_UNPACK_SKIP_IMAGES:
unpack_skip_images_ = param;
return;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
helper_->PixelStorei(pname, param);
CheckGLError();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,096
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ext4_acl_to_disk(const struct posix_acl *acl, size_t *size)
{
ext4_acl_header *ext_acl;
char *e;
size_t n;
*size = ext4_acl_size(acl->a_count);
ext_acl = kmalloc(sizeof(ext4_acl_header) + acl->a_count *
sizeof(ext4_acl_entry), GFP_NOFS);
if (!ext_acl)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
ext_acl->a_version = cpu_to_le32(EXT4_ACL_VERSION);
e = (char *)ext_acl + sizeof(ext4_acl_header);
for (n = 0; n < acl->a_count; n++) {
const struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e = &acl->a_entries[n];
ext4_acl_entry *entry = (ext4_acl_entry *)e;
entry->e_tag = cpu_to_le16(acl_e->e_tag);
entry->e_perm = cpu_to_le16(acl_e->e_perm);
switch (acl_e->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, acl_e->e_uid));
e += sizeof(ext4_acl_entry);
break;
case ACL_GROUP:
entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, acl_e->e_gid));
e += sizeof(ext4_acl_entry);
break;
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
e += sizeof(ext4_acl_entry_short);
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
return (char *)ext_acl;
fail:
kfree(ext_acl);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 50,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
bprm->p = PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 30,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ui::AcceleratedWidgetMac* TestRenderWidgetHostView::GetAcceleratedWidgetMac()
const {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,925
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gx_dc_pattern_read(
gx_device_color * pdevc,
const gs_gstate * pgs,
const gx_device_color * prior_devc,
const gx_device * dev,
int64_t offset,
const byte * data,
uint size,
gs_memory_t * mem )
{
gx_dc_serialized_tile_t buf;
int size_b, size_c = -1;
const byte *dp = data;
int left = size;
int64_t offset1 = offset;
gx_color_tile *ptile;
int code, l;
tile_trans_clist_info_t trans_info = { { { 0 } } };
int cache_space_needed;
if (offset == 0) {
pdevc->mask.id = gx_no_bitmap_id;
pdevc->mask.m_tile = NULL;
if (size == 0) {
/* Null pattern. */
pdevc->type = &gx_dc_pattern;
pdevc->colors.pattern.p_tile = NULL;
pdevc->mask.id = gs_no_id;
return 0;
}
if (size == sizeof(gs_id)) {
/* A special case for restoring a known (cached) pattern :
read the tile id only. */
gs_id id; /* Ensure data size == sizeof(gs_id). */
memcpy(&id, dp, sizeof(id));
pdevc->type = &gx_dc_pattern;
pdevc->mask.id = id; /* See gx_dc_pattern_load, gx_pattern_cache_lookup. */
return size;
}
if (sizeof(buf) > size) {
/* For a while we require the client to provide enough buffer size. */
return_error(gs_error_unregistered); /* Must not happen. */
}
memcpy(&buf, dp, sizeof(buf));
dp += sizeof(buf);
left -= sizeof(buf);
offset1 += sizeof(buf);
if ((buf.flags & TILE_USES_TRANSP) && !(buf.flags & TILE_IS_CLIST)){
if (sizeof(buf) + sizeof(tile_trans_clist_info_t) > size) {
return_error(gs_error_unregistered); /* Must not happen. */
}
memcpy(&trans_info, dp, sizeof(trans_info));
dp += sizeof(trans_info);
left -= sizeof(trans_info);
offset1 += sizeof(trans_info);
/* limit our upper bound to avoid int overflow */
cache_space_needed = trans_info.planestride > (0x7fffffff / 6) ? 0x7fff0000 :
trans_info.planestride * trans_info.n_chan;
} else {
/* the following works for raster or clist patterns */
cache_space_needed = buf.size_b + buf.size_c;
}
gx_pattern_cache_ensure_space((gs_gstate *)pgs, cache_space_needed);
code = gx_pattern_cache_get_entry((gs_gstate *)pgs, /* Break 'const'. */
buf.id, &ptile);
if (code < 0)
return code;
gx_pattern_cache_update_used((gs_gstate *)pgs, cache_space_needed);
ptile->bits_used = cache_space_needed;
pdevc->type = &gx_dc_pattern;
pdevc->colors.pattern.p_tile = ptile;
ptile->id = buf.id;
pdevc->mask.id = buf.id;
ptile->step_matrix = buf.step_matrix;
ptile->bbox = buf.bbox;
ptile->depth = buf.flags & TILE_DEPTH_MASK;
ptile->tiling_type = (buf.flags & TILE_TYPE_MASK)>>TILE_TYPE_SHIFT;
ptile->is_simple = !!(buf.flags & TILE_IS_SIMPLE);
ptile->has_overlap = !!(buf.flags & TILE_HAS_OVERLAP);
ptile->blending_mode = buf.blending_mode;
ptile->is_dummy = 0;
if (!(buf.flags & TILE_IS_CLIST)) {
if (buf.flags & TILE_USES_TRANSP){
/* Make a new ttrans object */
ptile->ttrans = new_pattern_trans_buff(mem);
/* trans_info was loaded above */
ptile->ttrans->height = trans_info.height;
ptile->ttrans->n_chan = trans_info.n_chan;
ptile->ttrans->has_tags = trans_info.has_tags;
ptile->ttrans->pdev14 = NULL;
ptile->ttrans->planestride = trans_info.planestride;
ptile->ttrans->rect.p.x = trans_info.rect.p.x;
ptile->ttrans->rect.p.y = trans_info.rect.p.y;
ptile->ttrans->rect.q.x = trans_info.rect.q.x;
ptile->ttrans->rect.q.y = trans_info.rect.q.y;
ptile->ttrans->rowstride = trans_info.rowstride;
ptile->ttrans->width = trans_info.width;
pdevc->type = &gx_dc_pattern_trans;
if_debug2m('v', pgs->memory,
"[v*] Reading trans tile from clist into cache, uid = %ld id = %ld \n",
ptile->uid.id, ptile->id);
code = gx_dc_pattern_read_trans_buff(ptile, offset1, dp, left, mem);
if (code < 0)
return code;
return code + sizeof(buf)+sizeof(trans_info);
} else {
code = gx_dc_pattern_read_raster(ptile, &buf, offset1, dp, left, mem);
if (code < 0)
return code;
return code + sizeof(buf);
}
}
/* Here is where we read back from the clist */
size_b = buf.size_b;
size_c = buf.size_c;
ptile->tbits.size.x = size_b; /* HACK: Use unrelated field for saving size_b between calls. */
ptile->tbits.size.y = size_c; /* HACK: Use unrelated field for saving size_c between calls. */
{
gs_gstate state;
gs_pattern1_instance_t inst;
memset(&state, 0, sizeof(state));
memset(&inst, 0, sizeof(inst));
/* NB: Currently PaintType 2 can't pass here. */
state.device = (gx_device *)dev; /* Break 'const'. */
inst.templat.PaintType = 1;
inst.size.x = buf.size.x;
inst.size.y = buf.size.y;
inst.saved = &state;
inst.is_clist = !!(buf.flags & TILE_IS_CLIST); /* tell gx_pattern_accum_alloc to use clist */
ptile->cdev = (gx_device_clist *)gx_pattern_accum_alloc(mem, mem,
&inst, "gx_dc_pattern_read");
if (ptile->cdev == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
ptile->cdev->common.page_uses_transparency = !!(buf.flags & TILE_USES_TRANSP);
code = dev_proc(&ptile->cdev->writer, open_device)((gx_device *)&ptile->cdev->writer);
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
} else {
ptile = pdevc->colors.pattern.p_tile;
if (ptile->ttrans != NULL)
return gx_dc_pattern_read_trans_buff(ptile, offset1, dp, left, mem);
if (ptile->cdev == NULL)
return gx_dc_pattern_read_raster(ptile, NULL, offset1, dp, left, mem);
size_b = ptile->tbits.size.x;
}
if (offset1 <= sizeof(buf) + size_b) {
l = min(left, size_b - (offset1 - sizeof(buf)));
code = clist_put_data(ptile->cdev, 0, offset1 - sizeof(buf), dp, l);
if (code < 0)
return code;
l = code;
left -= l;
offset1 += l;
dp += l;
ptile->cdev->common.page_bfile_end_pos = offset1 - sizeof(buf);
}
if (left > 0) {
l = left;
code = clist_put_data(ptile->cdev, 1, offset1 - sizeof(buf) - size_b, dp, l);
if (code < 0)
return code;
l = code;
left -= l;
}
return size - left;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 1,679
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reds_handle_auth_startlen(void *opaque)
{
RedLinkInfo *link = (RedLinkInfo *)opaque;
AsyncRead *obj = &link->async_read;
RedsSASL *sasl = &link->stream->sasl;
spice_info("Got client start len %d", sasl->len);
if (sasl->len > SASL_DATA_MAX_LEN) {
spice_warning("Too much SASL data %d", sasl->len);
reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA);
reds_link_free(link);
return;
}
if (sasl->len == 0) {
reds_handle_auth_sasl_start(opaque);
return;
}
sasl->data = spice_realloc(sasl->data, sasl->len);
obj->now = (uint8_t *)sasl->data;
obj->end = obj->now + sasl->len;
obj->done = reds_handle_auth_sasl_start;
async_read_handler(0, 0, &link->async_read);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const effect_descriptor_t *PreProc_GetDescriptor(const effect_uuid_t *uuid)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < PREPROC_NUM_EFFECTS; i++) {
if (memcmp(&sDescriptors[i]->uuid, uuid, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) == 0) {
return sDescriptors[i];
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,477
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandler::StopEventLog() {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
native_peer_connection_->StopRtcEventLog();
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 153,009
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
return 0;
return (s->s3->rrec.type ==
SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) ? s->s3->rrec.length : 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 13,697
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void free_tga(oTga * tga)
{
if (tga) {
if (tga->ident)
gdFree(tga->ident);
if (tga->bitmap)
gdFree(tga->bitmap);
gdFree(tga);
}
}
Commit Message: Proper fix for #248
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 50,411
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t ucma_migrate_id(struct ucma_file *new_file,
const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_migrate_id cmd;
struct rdma_ucm_migrate_resp resp;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
struct fd f;
struct ucma_file *cur_file;
int ret = 0;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
/* Get current fd to protect against it being closed */
f = fdget(cmd.fd);
if (!f.file)
return -ENOENT;
/* Validate current fd and prevent destruction of id. */
ctx = ucma_get_ctx(f.file->private_data, cmd.id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(ctx);
goto file_put;
}
cur_file = ctx->file;
if (cur_file == new_file) {
resp.events_reported = ctx->events_reported;
goto response;
}
/*
* Migrate events between fd's, maintaining order, and avoiding new
* events being added before existing events.
*/
ucma_lock_files(cur_file, new_file);
mutex_lock(&mut);
list_move_tail(&ctx->list, &new_file->ctx_list);
ucma_move_events(ctx, new_file);
ctx->file = new_file;
resp.events_reported = ctx->events_reported;
mutex_unlock(&mut);
ucma_unlock_files(cur_file, new_file);
response:
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(unsigned long)cmd.response,
&resp, sizeof(resp)))
ret = -EFAULT;
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
file_put:
fdput(f);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,856
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool isHTMLBlockElement(const Node* node)
{
return node->hasTagName(tdTag)
|| node->hasTagName(thTag)
|| isNonTableCellHTMLBlockElement(node);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 100,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void JPEGErrorHandler(j_common_ptr jpeg_info)
{
char
message[JMSG_LENGTH_MAX];
ErrorManager
*error_manager;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
Image
*image;
*message='\0';
error_manager=(ErrorManager *) jpeg_info->client_data;
image=error_manager->image;
exception=error_manager->exception;
(jpeg_info->err->format_message)(jpeg_info,message);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"[%s] JPEG Trace: \"%s\"",image->filename,message);
if (error_manager->finished != MagickFalse)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageWarning,
(char *) message,"`%s'",image->filename);
else
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageError,
(char *) message,"`%s'",image->filename);
longjmp(error_manager->error_recovery,1);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1641
CWE ID:
| 0
| 87,306
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoShaderSource(GLuint shader,
GLsizei count,
const char** string,
const GLint* length) {
api()->glShaderSourceFn(GetShaderServiceID(shader, resources_), count, string,
length);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,106
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: param_get_pool_mode(char *buf, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
int *ip = (int *)kp->arg;
switch (*ip)
{
case SVC_POOL_AUTO:
return strlcpy(buf, "auto", 20);
case SVC_POOL_GLOBAL:
return strlcpy(buf, "global", 20);
case SVC_POOL_PERCPU:
return strlcpy(buf, "percpu", 20);
case SVC_POOL_PERNODE:
return strlcpy(buf, "pernode", 20);
default:
return sprintf(buf, "%d", *ip);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> JNI_SendTabToSelfAndroidBridge_AddEntry(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& j_profile,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& j_url,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& j_title,
jlong j_navigation_time,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& j_target_device_sync_cache_guid) {
const std::string url = ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, j_url);
const std::string title = ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, j_title);
const std::string target_device_sync_cache_guid =
ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, j_target_device_sync_cache_guid);
base::Time navigation_time = base::Time::FromJavaTime(j_navigation_time);
SendTabToSelfModel* model = GetModel(j_profile);
if (!model->IsReady()) {
return nullptr;
}
const SendTabToSelfEntry* persisted_entry = model->AddEntry(
GURL(url), title, navigation_time, target_device_sync_cache_guid);
if (persisted_entry == nullptr) {
return nullptr;
}
return CreateJavaSendTabToSelfEntry(env, persisted_entry);
}
Commit Message: [SendTabToSelf] Added logic to display an infobar for the feature.
This CL is one of many to come. It covers:
* Creation of the infobar from the SendTabToSelfInfoBarController
* Plumbed the call to create the infobar to the native code.
* Open the link when user taps on the link
In follow-up CLs, the following will be done:
* Instantiate the InfobarController in the ChromeActivity
* Listen for Model changes in the Controller
Bug: 949233,963193
Change-Id: I5df1359debb5f0f35c32c2df3b691bf9129cdeb8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1604406
Reviewed-by: Tommy Nyquist <nyquist@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <mastiz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: sebsg <sebsg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Cohen <jeffreycohen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Jones <mdjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Tanya Gupta <tgupta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660854}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 142,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __init taskstats_init_early(void)
{
unsigned int i;
taskstats_cache = KMEM_CACHE(taskstats, SLAB_PANIC);
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(per_cpu(listener_array, i).list));
init_rwsem(&(per_cpu(listener_array, i).sem));
}
}
Commit Message: Make TASKSTATS require root access
Ok, this isn't optimal, since it means that 'iotop' needs admin
capabilities, and we may have to work on this some more. But at the
same time it is very much not acceptable to let anybody just read
anybody elses IO statistics quite at this level.
Use of the GENL_ADMIN_PERM suggested by Johannes Berg as an alternative
to checking the capabilities by hand.
Reported-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 26,929
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int64 temporary_global_quota() const {
DCHECK_EQ(type(), kStorageTypeTemporary);
DCHECK(manager());
DCHECK_GE(global_usage(), global_unlimited_usage());
if (manager()->temporary_quota_override_ > 0) {
return manager()->temporary_quota_override_;
}
int64 limited_usage = global_usage() - global_unlimited_usage();
int64 avail_space = available_space();
if (avail_space < kint64max - limited_usage) {
avail_space += limited_usage;
}
return avail_space * kTemporaryQuotaRatioToAvail;
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt )
{
/* Must use affine coordinates */
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 1 ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY );
#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY)
if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY )
return( ecp_check_pubkey_mx( grp, pt ) );
#endif
#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS)
if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS )
return( ecp_check_pubkey_sw( grp, pt ) );
#endif
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 96,564
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool cmd_data_set_management(IDEState *s, uint8_t cmd)
{
switch (s->feature) {
case DSM_TRIM:
if (s->blk) {
ide_sector_start_dma(s, IDE_DMA_TRIM);
return false;
}
break;
}
ide_abort_command(s);
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 6,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hevc_decode_extradata(HEVCContext *s, uint8_t *buf, int length, int first)
{
int ret, i;
ret = ff_hevc_decode_extradata(buf, length, &s->ps, &s->sei, &s->is_nalff,
&s->nal_length_size, s->avctx->err_recognition,
s->apply_defdispwin, s->avctx);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/* export stream parameters from the first SPS */
for (i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(s->ps.sps_list); i++) {
if (first && s->ps.sps_list[i]) {
const HEVCSPS *sps = (const HEVCSPS*)s->ps.sps_list[i]->data;
export_stream_params(s->avctx, &s->ps, sps);
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/hevcdec: Avoid only partly skiping duplicate first slices
Fixes: NULL pointer dereference and out of array access
Fixes: 13871/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5746167087890432
Fixes: 13845/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5650370728034304
This also fixes the return code for explode mode
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 90,758
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tcos_card_ctl(sc_card_t *card, unsigned long cmd, void *ptr)
{
switch (cmd) {
case SC_CARDCTL_TCOS_SETPERM:
return tcos_setperm(card, !!ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_GET_SERIALNR:
return tcos_get_serialnr(card, (sc_serial_number_t *)ptr);
}
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,778
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct dentry *proc_task_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry * dentry, unsigned int flags)
{
int result = -ENOENT;
struct task_struct *task;
struct task_struct *leader = get_proc_task(dir);
unsigned tid;
struct pid_namespace *ns;
if (!leader)
goto out_no_task;
tid = name_to_int(&dentry->d_name);
if (tid == ~0U)
goto out;
ns = dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info;
rcu_read_lock();
task = find_task_by_pid_ns(tid, ns);
if (task)
get_task_struct(task);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!task)
goto out;
if (!same_thread_group(leader, task))
goto out_drop_task;
result = proc_task_instantiate(dir, dentry, task, NULL);
out_drop_task:
put_task_struct(task);
out:
put_task_struct(leader);
out_no_task:
return ERR_PTR(result);
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 49,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ssl_set_verify( ssl_context *ssl,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, x509_cert *, int, int *),
void *p_vrfy )
{
ssl->f_vrfy = f_vrfy;
ssl->p_vrfy = p_vrfy;
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long weighted_cpuload(struct rq *rq)
{
return cfs_rq_runnable_load_avg(&rq->cfs);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,797
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::cancelMainResourceLoad(const ResourceError& resourceError)
{
RefPtr<DocumentLoader> protect(this);
ResourceError error = resourceError.isNull() ? frameLoader()->cancelledError(m_request) : resourceError;
m_dataLoadTimer.stop();
if (m_waitingForContentPolicy) {
frameLoader()->policyChecker()->cancelCheck();
ASSERT(m_waitingForContentPolicy);
m_waitingForContentPolicy = false;
}
if (mainResourceLoader())
mainResourceLoader()->cancel(error);
mainReceivedError(error);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,692
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintRenderFrameHelper::FinishFramePrinting() {
prep_frame_view_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,088
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ConvertBigEndian(HFSPlusCatalogFile* file) {
ConvertBigEndian(&file->recordType);
ConvertBigEndian(&file->flags);
ConvertBigEndian(&file->reserved1);
ConvertBigEndian(&file->fileID);
ConvertBigEndian(&file->createDate);
ConvertBigEndian(&file->contentModDate);
ConvertBigEndian(&file->attributeModDate);
ConvertBigEndian(&file->accessDate);
ConvertBigEndian(&file->backupDate);
ConvertBigEndian(&file->bsdInfo.ownerID);
ConvertBigEndian(&file->bsdInfo.groupID);
ConvertBigEndian(&file->bsdInfo.fileMode);
ConvertBigEndian(&file->userInfo.fdType);
ConvertBigEndian(&file->userInfo.fdCreator);
ConvertBigEndian(&file->userInfo.fdFlags);
ConvertBigEndian(&file->textEncoding);
ConvertBigEndian(&file->reserved2);
ConvertBigEndian(&file->dataFork);
ConvertBigEndian(&file->resourceFork);
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,788
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int MDC2_Update(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
size_t i, j;
i = c->num;
if (i != 0) {
if (i + len < MDC2_BLOCK) {
/* partial block */
memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, len);
c->num += (int)len;
return 1;
} else {
/* filled one */
j = MDC2_BLOCK - i;
memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, j);
len -= j;
in += j;
c->num = 0;
mdc2_body(c, &(c->data[0]), MDC2_BLOCK);
}
}
i = len & ~((size_t)MDC2_BLOCK - 1);
if (i > 0)
mdc2_body(c, in, i);
j = len - i;
if (j > 0) {
memcpy(&(c->data[0]), &(in[i]), j);
c->num = (int)j;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 164,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tcp_valid_rtt_meas(struct sock *sk, u32 seq_rtt)
{
tcp_rtt_estimator(sk, seq_rtt);
tcp_set_rto(sk);
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_backoff = 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 41,236
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virDomainMigrateFinish(virConnectPtr dconn,
const char *dname,
const char *cookie,
int cookielen,
const char *uri,
unsigned long flags)
{
VIR_DEBUG("dconn=%p, dname=%s, cookie=%p, cookielen=%d, uri=%s, "
"flags=%lx", dconn, NULLSTR(dname), cookie, cookielen,
NULLSTR(uri), flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckConnectReturn(dconn, NULL);
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(dconn->flags, error);
if (dconn->driver->domainMigrateFinish) {
virDomainPtr ret;
ret = dconn->driver->domainMigrateFinish(dconn, dname,
cookie, cookielen,
uri, flags);
if (!ret)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(dconn);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 93,856
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int btrfs_check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode)
{
kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
if (!(dir->i_mode & S_ISVTX))
return 0;
if (uid_eq(inode->i_uid, fsuid))
return 0;
if (uid_eq(dir->i_uid, fsuid))
return 0;
return !capable(CAP_FOWNER);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 34,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: aspath_delimiter_char (u_char type, u_char which)
{
int i;
struct
{
int type;
char start;
char end;
} aspath_delim_char [] =
{
{ AS_SET, '{', '}' },
{ AS_CONFED_SET, '[', ']' },
{ AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE, '(', ')' },
{ 0 }
};
for (i = 0; aspath_delim_char[i].type != 0; i++)
{
if (aspath_delim_char[i].type == type)
{
if (which == AS_SEG_START)
return aspath_delim_char[i].start;
else if (which == AS_SEG_END)
return aspath_delim_char[i].end;
}
}
return ' ';
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: network_prefix(int ae, int plen, unsigned int omitted,
const unsigned char *p, const unsigned char *dp,
unsigned int len, unsigned char *p_r)
{
unsigned pb;
unsigned char prefix[16];
int consumed = 0;
if(plen >= 0)
pb = (plen + 7) / 8;
else if(ae == 1)
pb = 4;
else
pb = 16;
if(pb > 16)
return -1;
memset(prefix, 0, 16);
switch(ae) {
case 0: break;
case 1:
if(omitted > 4 || pb > 4 || (pb > omitted && len < pb - omitted))
return -1;
memcpy(prefix, v4prefix, 12);
if(omitted) {
if (dp == NULL) return -1;
memcpy(prefix, dp, 12 + omitted);
}
if(pb > omitted) {
memcpy(prefix + 12 + omitted, p, pb - omitted);
consumed = pb - omitted;
}
break;
case 2:
if(omitted > 16 || (pb > omitted && len < pb - omitted))
return -1;
if(omitted) {
if (dp == NULL) return -1;
memcpy(prefix, dp, omitted);
}
if(pb > omitted) {
memcpy(prefix + omitted, p, pb - omitted);
consumed = pb - omitted;
}
break;
case 3:
if(pb > 8 && len < pb - 8) return -1;
prefix[0] = 0xfe;
prefix[1] = 0x80;
if(pb > 8) {
memcpy(prefix + 8, p, pb - 8);
consumed = pb - 8;
}
break;
default:
return -1;
}
memcpy(p_r, prefix, 16);
return consumed;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14470/Babel: fix an existing length check
In babel_print_v2() the non-verbose branch for an Update TLV compared
the TLV Length against 1 instead of 10 (probably a typo), put it right.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Henri Salo from Nixu
Corporation.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 93,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoGetProgramResourceiv(
GLuint program,
GLenum program_interface,
GLuint index,
GLsizei prop_count,
const GLenum* props,
GLsizei bufsize,
GLsizei* length,
GLint* params) {
api()->glGetProgramResourceivFn(GetProgramServiceID(program, resources_),
program_interface, index, prop_count, props,
bufsize, length, params);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,007
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: print_vendor_attr(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *data, u_int length, u_short attr_code _U_)
{
u_int idx;
u_int vendor_id;
u_int vendor_type;
u_int vendor_length;
if (length < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK2(*data, 4);
vendor_id = EXTRACT_32BITS(data);
data+=4;
length-=4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Vendor: %s (%u)",
tok2str(smi_values,"Unknown",vendor_id),
vendor_id));
while (length >= 2) {
ND_TCHECK2(*data, 2);
vendor_type = *(data);
vendor_length = *(data+1);
if (vendor_length < 2)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Vendor Attribute: %u, Length: %u (bogus, must be >= 2)",
vendor_type,
vendor_length));
return;
}
if (vendor_length > length)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Vendor Attribute: %u, Length: %u (bogus, goes past end of vendor-specific attribute)",
vendor_type,
vendor_length));
return;
}
data+=2;
vendor_length-=2;
length-=2;
ND_TCHECK2(*data, vendor_length);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Vendor Attribute: %u, Length: %u, Value: ",
vendor_type,
vendor_length));
for (idx = 0; idx < vendor_length ; idx++, data++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c", (*data < 32 || *data > 126) ? '.' : *data));
length-=vendor_length;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13032/RADIUS: Check whether a byte exists before testing its value.
Reverse the test in a for loop to test the length before testing whether
we have a null byte.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Clean up other length tests while we're at it.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,353
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void huge_pte_to_pagemap_entry(pagemap_entry_t *pme, struct pagemapread *pm,
pte_t pte, int offset, int flags2)
{
if (pte_present(pte))
*pme = make_pme(PM_PFRAME(pte_pfn(pte) + offset) |
PM_STATUS2(pm->v2, flags2) |
PM_PRESENT);
else
*pme = make_pme(PM_NOT_PRESENT(pm->v2) |
PM_STATUS2(pm->v2, flags2));
}
Commit Message: pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.
This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.
[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
this is the simple model. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 55,797
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct ndp_msgra *ndp_msgra(struct ndp_msg *msg)
{
if (ndp_msg_type(msg) != NDP_MSG_RA)
return NULL;
return &msg->nd_msg.ra;
}
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <julien.bernard@viagenie.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 53,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pipe_to_user(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf,
struct splice_desc *sd)
{
int n = copy_page_to_iter(buf->page, buf->offset, sd->len, sd->u.data);
return n == sd->len ? n : -EFAULT;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,385
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nbd_disconnect(int fd)
{
ioctl(fd, NBD_CLEAR_QUE);
ioctl(fd, NBD_DISCONNECT);
ioctl(fd, NBD_CLEAR_SOCK);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,808
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestExtensionSystem::CreateExtensionProcessManager() {
extension_process_manager_.reset(ExtensionProcessManager::Create(profile_));
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,968
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pn_ioctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int answ;
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCINQ:
lock_sock(sk);
skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
answ = skb ? skb->len : 0;
release_sock(sk);
return put_user(answ, (int __user *)arg);
case SIOCPNADDRESOURCE:
case SIOCPNDELRESOURCE: {
u32 res;
if (get_user(res, (u32 __user *)arg))
return -EFAULT;
if (res >= 256)
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd == SIOCPNADDRESOURCE)
return pn_sock_bind_res(sk, res);
else
return pn_sock_unbind_res(sk, res);
}
}
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 40,241
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool tun_not_capable(struct tun_struct *tun)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct net *net = dev_net(tun->dev);
return ((uid_valid(tun->owner) && !uid_eq(cred->euid, tun->owner)) ||
(gid_valid(tun->group) && !in_egroup_p(tun->group))) &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,312
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::FinishImeCompositionSession() {
if (!has_composition_text_)
return;
if (host_)
host_->ImeConfirmComposition();
ImeCancelComposition();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DevToolsUIBindings* DevToolsUIBindings::ForWebContents(
content::WebContents* web_contents) {
if (!g_instances.IsCreated())
return NULL;
DevToolsUIBindingsList* instances = g_instances.Pointer();
for (DevToolsUIBindingsList::iterator it(instances->begin());
it != instances->end(); ++it) {
if ((*it)->web_contents() == web_contents)
return *it;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Improve sanitization of remoteFrontendUrl in DevTools
This change ensures that the decoded remoteFrontendUrl parameter cannot
contain any single quote in its value. As of this commit, none of the
permitted query params in SanitizeFrontendQueryParam can contain single
quotes.
Note that the existing SanitizeEndpoint function does not explicitly
check for single quotes. This is fine since single quotes in the query
string are already URL-encoded and the values validated by
SanitizeEndpoint are not url-decoded elsewhere.
BUG=798163
TEST=Manually, see https://crbug.com/798163#c1
TEST=./unit_tests --gtest_filter=DevToolsUIBindingsTest.SanitizeFrontendURL
Change-Id: I5a08e8ce6f1abc2c8d2a0983fef63e1e194cd242
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/846979
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#527250}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __rpc_add_timer(struct rpc_wait_queue *queue, struct rpc_task *task)
{
if (!task->tk_timeout)
return;
dprintk("RPC: %5u setting alarm for %lu ms\n",
task->tk_pid, task->tk_timeout * 1000 / HZ);
task->u.tk_wait.expires = jiffies + task->tk_timeout;
if (list_empty(&queue->timer_list.list) || time_before(task->u.tk_wait.expires, queue->timer_list.expires))
rpc_set_queue_timer(queue, task->u.tk_wait.expires);
list_add(&task->u.tk_wait.timer_list, &queue->timer_list.list);
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 34,934
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mm_answer_pam_start(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
start_pam(authctxt);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: set sshpam_ctxt to NULL after free
Avoids use-after-free in monitor when privsep child is compromised.
Reported by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 42,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void balloon_process(struct work_struct *work)
{
enum bp_state state = BP_DONE;
long credit;
do {
mutex_lock(&balloon_mutex);
credit = current_credit();
if (credit > 0) {
if (balloon_is_inflated())
state = increase_reservation(credit);
else
state = reserve_additional_memory();
}
if (credit < 0)
state = decrease_reservation(-credit, GFP_BALLOON);
state = update_schedule(state);
mutex_unlock(&balloon_mutex);
cond_resched();
} while (credit && state == BP_DONE);
/* Schedule more work if there is some still to be done. */
if (state == BP_EAGAIN)
schedule_delayed_work(&balloon_worker, balloon_stats.schedule_delay * HZ);
}
Commit Message: xen: let alloc_xenballooned_pages() fail if not enough memory free
commit a1078e821b605813b63bf6bca414a85f804d5c66 upstream.
Instead of trying to allocate pages with GFP_USER in
add_ballooned_pages() check the available free memory via
si_mem_available(). GFP_USER is far less limiting memory exhaustion
than the test via si_mem_available().
This will avoid dom0 running out of memory due to excessive foreign
page mappings especially on ARM and on x86 in PVH mode, as those don't
have a pre-ballooned area which can be used for foreign mappings.
As the normal ballooning suffers from the same problem don't balloon
down more than si_mem_available() pages in one iteration. At the same
time limit the default maximum number of retries.
This is part of XSA-300.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 1
| 169,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _nfs4_server_capabilities(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle)
{
struct nfs4_server_caps_arg args = {
.fhandle = fhandle,
};
struct nfs4_server_caps_res res = {};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_SERVER_CAPS],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
int status;
status = nfs4_call_sync(server->client, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
if (status == 0) {
memcpy(server->attr_bitmask, res.attr_bitmask, sizeof(server->attr_bitmask));
server->caps &= ~(NFS_CAP_ACLS|NFS_CAP_HARDLINKS|
NFS_CAP_SYMLINKS|NFS_CAP_FILEID|
NFS_CAP_MODE|NFS_CAP_NLINK|NFS_CAP_OWNER|
NFS_CAP_OWNER_GROUP|NFS_CAP_ATIME|
NFS_CAP_CTIME|NFS_CAP_MTIME);
if (res.attr_bitmask[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_ACL)
server->caps |= NFS_CAP_ACLS;
if (res.has_links != 0)
server->caps |= NFS_CAP_HARDLINKS;
if (res.has_symlinks != 0)
server->caps |= NFS_CAP_SYMLINKS;
if (res.attr_bitmask[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_FILEID)
server->caps |= NFS_CAP_FILEID;
if (res.attr_bitmask[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_MODE)
server->caps |= NFS_CAP_MODE;
if (res.attr_bitmask[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_NUMLINKS)
server->caps |= NFS_CAP_NLINK;
if (res.attr_bitmask[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER)
server->caps |= NFS_CAP_OWNER;
if (res.attr_bitmask[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER_GROUP)
server->caps |= NFS_CAP_OWNER_GROUP;
if (res.attr_bitmask[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_ACCESS)
server->caps |= NFS_CAP_ATIME;
if (res.attr_bitmask[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_METADATA)
server->caps |= NFS_CAP_CTIME;
if (res.attr_bitmask[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_MODIFY)
server->caps |= NFS_CAP_MTIME;
memcpy(server->cache_consistency_bitmask, res.attr_bitmask, sizeof(server->cache_consistency_bitmask));
server->cache_consistency_bitmask[0] &= FATTR4_WORD0_CHANGE|FATTR4_WORD0_SIZE;
server->cache_consistency_bitmask[1] &= FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_METADATA|FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_MODIFY;
server->acl_bitmask = res.acl_bitmask;
server->fh_expire_type = res.fh_expire_type;
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,840
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfsd_buffered_filldir(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name,
int namlen, loff_t offset, u64 ino,
unsigned int d_type)
{
struct readdir_data *buf =
container_of(ctx, struct readdir_data, ctx);
struct buffered_dirent *de = (void *)(buf->dirent + buf->used);
unsigned int reclen;
reclen = ALIGN(sizeof(struct buffered_dirent) + namlen, sizeof(u64));
if (buf->used + reclen > PAGE_SIZE) {
buf->full = 1;
return -EINVAL;
}
de->namlen = namlen;
de->offset = offset;
de->ino = ino;
de->d_type = d_type;
memcpy(de->name, name, namlen);
buf->used += reclen;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DOMArrayBuffer* FileReaderLoader::ArrayBufferResult() {
DCHECK_EQ(read_type_, kReadAsArrayBuffer);
if (array_buffer_result_)
return array_buffer_result_;
if (!raw_data_ || error_code_ != FileErrorCode::kOK)
return nullptr;
DOMArrayBuffer* result = DOMArrayBuffer::Create(raw_data_->ToArrayBuffer());
if (finished_loading_) {
array_buffer_result_ = result;
AdjustReportedMemoryUsageToV8(
-1 * static_cast<int64_t>(raw_data_->ByteLength()));
raw_data_.reset();
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: FileReader: Make a copy of the ArrayBuffer when returning partial results.
This is to avoid accidentally ending up with multiple references to the
same underlying ArrayBuffer. The extra performance overhead of this is
minimal as usage of partial results is very rare anyway (as can be seen
on https://www.chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/2158).
Bug: 936448
Change-Id: Icd1081adc1c889829fe7fa4af9cf4440097e8854
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1492873
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Klein <adamk@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#636251}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 173,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderFrameHostImpl::TakeNavigationHandleForCommit(
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params) {
bool is_browser_initiated = (params.nav_entry_id != 0);
NavigationHandleImpl* navigation_handle = GetNavigationHandle();
if (params.was_within_same_document) {
if (is_browser_initiated && navigation_handle &&
navigation_handle->IsSameDocument() &&
navigation_handle->GetURL() == params.url) {
std::unique_ptr<NavigationHandleImpl> result_navigation_handle =
navigation_request()->TakeNavigationHandle();
navigation_request_.reset();
return result_navigation_handle;
}
bool is_renderer_initiated = true;
int pending_nav_entry_id = 0;
NavigationEntryImpl* pending_entry =
NavigationEntryImpl::FromNavigationEntry(
frame_tree_node()->navigator()->GetController()->GetPendingEntry());
if (pending_entry && pending_entry->GetUniqueID() == params.nav_entry_id) {
pending_nav_entry_id = params.nav_entry_id;
is_renderer_initiated = pending_entry->is_renderer_initiated();
}
return NavigationHandleImpl::Create(
params.url, params.redirects, frame_tree_node_, is_renderer_initiated,
params.was_within_same_document, base::TimeTicks::Now(),
pending_nav_entry_id,
false, // started_from_context_menu
CSPDisposition::CHECK, // should_check_main_world_csp
false, // is_form_submission
base::nullopt); // suggested_filename
}
if (navigation_handle && navigation_handle->GetURL() == params.url) {
std::unique_ptr<NavigationHandleImpl> result_navigation_handle =
navigation_request()->TakeNavigationHandle();
navigation_request_.reset();
return result_navigation_handle;
}
int entry_id_for_data_nav = 0;
bool is_renderer_initiated = true;
if (navigation_handle) {
NavigationEntryImpl* pending_entry =
NavigationEntryImpl::FromNavigationEntry(
frame_tree_node()->navigator()->GetController()->GetPendingEntry());
bool pending_entry_matches_handle =
pending_entry && pending_entry->GetUniqueID() ==
navigation_handle->pending_nav_entry_id();
if (navigation_handle->GetURL() == params.base_url &&
pending_entry_matches_handle &&
!pending_entry->GetBaseURLForDataURL().is_empty()) {
entry_id_for_data_nav = navigation_handle->pending_nav_entry_id();
is_renderer_initiated = pending_entry->is_renderer_initiated();
}
}
return NavigationHandleImpl::Create(
params.url, params.redirects, frame_tree_node_, is_renderer_initiated,
params.was_within_same_document, base::TimeTicks::Now(),
entry_id_for_data_nav,
false, // started_from_context_menu
CSPDisposition::CHECK, // should_check_main_world_csp
false, // is_form_submission
base::nullopt); // suggested_filename
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,680
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string MediaStreamManager::GetHMACForMediaDeviceID(
const std::string& salt,
const url::Origin& security_origin,
const std::string& raw_unique_id) {
DCHECK(!raw_unique_id.empty());
if (raw_unique_id == media::AudioDeviceDescription::kDefaultDeviceId ||
raw_unique_id == media::AudioDeviceDescription::kCommunicationsDeviceId) {
return raw_unique_id;
}
crypto::HMAC hmac(crypto::HMAC::SHA256);
const size_t digest_length = hmac.DigestLength();
std::vector<uint8_t> digest(digest_length);
bool result = hmac.Init(security_origin.Serialize()) &&
hmac.Sign(raw_unique_id + salt, &digest[0], digest.size());
DCHECK(result);
return base::ToLowerASCII(base::HexEncode(&digest[0], digest.size()));
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,319
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long long Block::GetDiscardPadding() const { return m_discard_padding; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 160,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void prplcb_xfer_progress(PurpleXfer *xfer, double percent)
{
struct prpl_xfer_data *px = xfer->ui_data;
if (px == NULL) {
return;
}
if (purple_xfer_get_type(xfer) == PURPLE_XFER_SEND) {
if (*px->fn) {
char *slash;
unlink(px->fn);
if ((slash = strrchr(px->fn, '/'))) {
*slash = '\0';
rmdir(px->fn);
}
*px->fn = '\0';
}
return;
}
if (px->fd == -1 && percent > 0) {
/* Weeeeeeeee, we're getting data! That means the file exists
by now so open it and start sending to the UI. */
px->fd = open(px->fn, O_RDONLY);
/* Unlink it now, because we don't need it after this. */
unlink(px->fn);
}
if (percent < 1) {
try_write_to_ui(px->ft, 0, 0);
} else {
/* Another nice problem: If we have the whole file, it only
gets closed when we return. Problem: There may still be
stuff buffered and not written, we'll only see it after
the caller close()s the file. So poll the file after that. */
b_timeout_add(0, try_write_to_ui, px->ft);
}
}
Commit Message: purple: Fix crash on ft requests from unknown contacts
Followup to 701ab81 (included in 3.5) which was a partial fix which only
improved things for non-libpurple file transfers (that is, just jabber)
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 68,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void get_page_bootmem(unsigned long info, struct page *page,
unsigned long type)
{
page->lru.next = (struct list_head *) type;
SetPagePrivate(page);
set_page_private(page, info);
atomic_inc(&page->_count);
}
Commit Message: mm/hotplug: correctly add new zone to all other nodes' zone lists
When online_pages() is called to add new memory to an empty zone, it
rebuilds all zone lists by calling build_all_zonelists(). But there's a
bug which prevents the new zone to be added to other nodes' zone lists.
online_pages() {
build_all_zonelists()
.....
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY)
}
Here the node of the zone is put into N_HIGH_MEMORY state after calling
build_all_zonelists(), but build_all_zonelists() only adds zones from
nodes in N_HIGH_MEMORY state to the fallback zone lists.
build_all_zonelists()
->__build_all_zonelists()
->build_zonelists()
->find_next_best_node()
->for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
So memory in the new zone will never be used by other nodes, and it may
cause strange behavor when system is under memory pressure. So put node
into N_HIGH_MEMORY state before calling build_all_zonelists().
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Keping Chen <chenkeping@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DriveFsHost::~DriveFsHost() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
chromeos::disks::DiskMountManager::GetInstance()->RemoveObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,097
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHost> DevToolsAgentHost::GetForId(
const std::string& id) {
if (!g_devtools_instances.IsCreated())
return nullptr;
DevToolsMap::iterator it = g_devtools_instances.Get().find(id);
if (it == g_devtools_instances.Get().end())
return nullptr;
return it->second;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,748
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void idt_invalidate(void *addr)
{
struct desc_ptr idt = { .address = (unsigned long) addr, .size = 0 };
load_idt(&idt);
}
Commit Message: x86/entry/64: Don't use IST entry for #BP stack
There's nothing IST-worthy about #BP/int3. We don't allow kprobes
in the small handful of places in the kernel that run at CPL0 with
an invalid stack, and 32-bit kernels have used normal interrupt
gates for #BP forever.
Furthermore, we don't allow kprobes in places that have usergs while
in kernel mode, so "paranoid" is also unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 83,472
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void debugfs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
clear_inode(inode);
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
kfree(inode->i_link);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 67,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Gfx::opBeginImage(Object args[], int numArgs) {
Stream *str;
int c1, c2;
str = buildImageStream();
if (str) {
doImage(NULL, str, gTrue);
c1 = str->getUndecodedStream()->getChar();
c2 = str->getUndecodedStream()->getChar();
while (!(c1 == 'E' && c2 == 'I') && c2 != EOF) {
c1 = c2;
c2 = str->getUndecodedStream()->getChar();
}
delete str;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,107
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetCallback(LayerTreeHostImpl* host_impl, bool enable) {
host_impl->SetTreeActivationCallback(
enable
? base::Bind(
&LayerTreeHostTestTreeActivationCallback::ActivationCallback,
base::Unretained(this))
: base::Closure());
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,464
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tg3_rss_write_indir_tbl(struct tg3 *tp)
{
int i = 0;
u32 reg = MAC_RSS_INDIR_TBL_0;
while (i < TG3_RSS_INDIR_TBL_SIZE) {
u32 val = tp->rss_ind_tbl[i];
i++;
for (; i % 8; i++) {
val <<= 4;
val |= tp->rss_ind_tbl[i];
}
tw32(reg, val);
reg += 4;
}
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,728
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ShellSurface::~ShellSurface() {
DCHECK(!scoped_configure_);
ash::Shell::GetInstance()->activation_client()->RemoveObserver(this);
if (surface_) {
if (scale_ != 1.0)
surface_->window()->SetTransform(gfx::Transform());
surface_->SetSurfaceDelegate(nullptr);
surface_->RemoveSurfaceObserver(this);
}
if (parent_)
parent_->RemoveObserver(this);
if (resizer_)
EndDrag(false /* revert */);
if (widget_) {
ash::wm::GetWindowState(widget_->GetNativeWindow())->RemoveObserver(this);
widget_->GetNativeWindow()->RemoveObserver(this);
if (widget_->IsVisible())
widget_->Hide();
widget_->CloseNow();
}
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 120,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptValue ScriptController::callFunctionEvenIfScriptDisabled(v8::Handle<v8::Function> function, v8::Handle<v8::Object> receiver, int argc, v8::Handle<v8::Value> argv[])
{
return ScriptValue(m_proxy->callFunction(function, receiver, argc, argv));
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ext4_feat_release(struct kobject *kobj)
{
complete(&ext4_feat->f_kobj_unregister);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 20,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int padlock_sha_export_nano(struct shash_desc *desc,
void *out)
{
int statesize = crypto_shash_statesize(desc->tfm);
void *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
memcpy(out, sctx, statesize);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,461
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int unix_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
if (protocol && protocol != PF_UNIX)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
switch (sock->type) {
case SOCK_STREAM:
sock->ops = &unix_stream_ops;
break;
/*
* Believe it or not BSD has AF_UNIX, SOCK_RAW though
* nothing uses it.
*/
case SOCK_RAW:
sock->type = SOCK_DGRAM;
case SOCK_DGRAM:
sock->ops = &unix_dgram_ops;
break;
case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
sock->ops = &unix_seqpacket_ops;
break;
default:
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
}
return unix_create1(net, sock, kern) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 46,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FreeAttrs(ScreenSaverAttrPtr pAttr)
{
PixmapPtr pPixmap;
CursorPtr pCursor;
if ((pPixmap = pAttr->pBackgroundPixmap) != 0)
(*pPixmap->drawable.pScreen->DestroyPixmap) (pPixmap);
if ((pPixmap = pAttr->pBorderPixmap) != 0)
(*pPixmap->drawable.pScreen->DestroyPixmap) (pPixmap);
if ((pCursor = pAttr->pCursor) != 0)
FreeCursor(pCursor, (Cursor) 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
{
ctx->error = err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 5,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int user_page_pipe_buf_steal(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct pipe_buffer *buf)
{
if (!(buf->flags & PIPE_BUF_FLAG_GIFT))
return 1;
buf->flags |= PIPE_BUF_FLAG_LRU;
return generic_pipe_buf_steal(pipe, buf);
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,397
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnMediaPlayerActionAt(
const gfx::PointF& location,
const blink::WebMediaPlayerAction& action) {
blink::WebFloatRect viewport_position(location.x(), location.y(), 0, 0);
GetLocalRootRenderWidget()->ConvertWindowToViewport(&viewport_position);
frame_->PerformMediaPlayerAction(
WebPoint(viewport_position.x, viewport_position.y), action);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void qeth_free_buffer_pool(struct qeth_card *card)
{
struct qeth_buffer_pool_entry *pool_entry, *tmp;
int i = 0;
list_for_each_entry_safe(pool_entry, tmp,
&card->qdio.init_pool.entry_list, init_list){
for (i = 0; i < QETH_MAX_BUFFER_ELEMENTS(card); ++i)
free_page((unsigned long)pool_entry->elements[i]);
list_del(&pool_entry->init_list);
kfree(pool_entry);
}
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_set_pte_rmapp(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long *rmapp,
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, unsigned long data)
{
u64 *sptep;
struct rmap_iterator iter;
int need_flush = 0;
u64 new_spte;
pte_t *ptep = (pte_t *)data;
pfn_t new_pfn;
WARN_ON(pte_huge(*ptep));
new_pfn = pte_pfn(*ptep);
for (sptep = rmap_get_first(*rmapp, &iter); sptep;) {
BUG_ON(!is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep));
rmap_printk("kvm_set_pte_rmapp: spte %p %llx\n", sptep, *sptep);
need_flush = 1;
if (pte_write(*ptep)) {
drop_spte(kvm, sptep);
sptep = rmap_get_first(*rmapp, &iter);
} else {
new_spte = *sptep & ~PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK;
new_spte |= (u64)new_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
new_spte &= ~PT_WRITABLE_MASK;
new_spte &= ~SPTE_HOST_WRITEABLE;
new_spte &= ~shadow_accessed_mask;
mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(sptep);
mmu_spte_set(sptep, new_spte);
sptep = rmap_get_next(&iter);
}
}
if (need_flush)
kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionAppModelBuilderTest() {}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,964
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfs3svc_decode_writeargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_writeargs *args)
{
unsigned int len, v, hdr, dlen;
u32 max_blocksize = svc_max_payload(rqstp);
struct kvec *head = rqstp->rq_arg.head;
struct kvec *tail = rqstp->rq_arg.tail;
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &args->offset);
args->count = ntohl(*p++);
args->stable = ntohl(*p++);
len = args->len = ntohl(*p++);
if ((void *)p > head->iov_base + head->iov_len)
return 0;
/*
* The count must equal the amount of data passed.
*/
if (args->count != args->len)
return 0;
/*
* Check to make sure that we got the right number of
* bytes.
*/
hdr = (void*)p - head->iov_base;
dlen = head->iov_len + rqstp->rq_arg.page_len + tail->iov_len - hdr;
/*
* Round the length of the data which was specified up to
* the next multiple of XDR units and then compare that
* against the length which was actually received.
* Note that when RPCSEC/GSS (for example) is used, the
* data buffer can be padded so dlen might be larger
* than required. It must never be smaller.
*/
if (dlen < XDR_QUADLEN(len)*4)
return 0;
if (args->count > max_blocksize) {
args->count = max_blocksize;
len = args->len = max_blocksize;
}
rqstp->rq_vec[0].iov_base = (void*)p;
rqstp->rq_vec[0].iov_len = head->iov_len - hdr;
v = 0;
while (len > rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len) {
len -= rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len;
v++;
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_base = page_address(rqstp->rq_pages[v]);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = PAGE_SIZE;
}
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = len;
args->vlen = v + 1;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,277
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __rds_conn_error(struct rds_connection *conn, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
vprintk(fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
rds_conn_drop(conn);
}
Commit Message: RDS: fix race condition when sending a message on unbound socket
Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when
sending a message to an apparently unbound socket. The problem is caused
by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks
the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket. This opens a
race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not
in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to
dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create().
Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if
you're interested.
I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer
with this patch, whereas I could without.
Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937:
74e98eb08588 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection")
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 41,925
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfc_llcp_recv_agf(struct nfc_llcp_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u8 ptype;
u16 pdu_len;
struct sk_buff *new_skb;
if (skb->len <= LLCP_HEADER_SIZE) {
pr_err("Malformed AGF PDU\n");
return;
}
skb_pull(skb, LLCP_HEADER_SIZE);
while (skb->len > LLCP_AGF_PDU_HEADER_SIZE) {
pdu_len = skb->data[0] << 8 | skb->data[1];
skb_pull(skb, LLCP_AGF_PDU_HEADER_SIZE);
if (pdu_len < LLCP_HEADER_SIZE || pdu_len > skb->len) {
pr_err("Malformed AGF PDU\n");
return;
}
ptype = nfc_llcp_ptype(skb);
if (ptype == LLCP_PDU_SYMM || ptype == LLCP_PDU_AGF)
goto next;
new_skb = nfc_alloc_recv_skb(pdu_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (new_skb == NULL) {
pr_err("Could not allocate PDU\n");
return;
}
skb_put_data(new_skb, skb->data, pdu_len);
nfc_llcp_rx_skb(local, new_skb);
kfree_skb(new_skb);
next:
skb_pull(skb, pdu_len);
}
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,706
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppLauncherHandler::HandleCreateAppShortcut(const base::ListValue* args) {
std::string extension_id;
CHECK(args->GetString(0, &extension_id));
const Extension* extension =
extension_service_->GetExtensionById(extension_id, true);
if (!extension)
return;
Browser* browser = chrome::FindBrowserWithWebContents(
web_ui()->GetWebContents());
chrome::ShowCreateChromeAppShortcutsDialog(
browser->window()->GetNativeWindow(), browser->profile(), extension,
base::Callback<void(bool)>());
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PixelPacket *GetAuthenticPixelsCache(Image *image,const ssize_t x,
const ssize_t y,const size_t columns,const size_t rows,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*restrict cache_info;
const int
id = GetOpenMPThreadId();
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
if (cache_info == (Cache) NULL)
return((PixelPacket *) NULL);
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(id < (int) cache_info->number_threads);
return(GetAuthenticPixelCacheNexus(image,x,y,columns,rows,
cache_info->nexus_info[id],exception));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 73,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void cJSON_AddItemToObjectCS(cJSON *object,const char *string,cJSON *item) {if (!item) return; if (!(item->type&cJSON_StringIsConst) && item->string) cJSON_free(item->string);item->string=(char*)string;item->type|=cJSON_StringIsConst;cJSON_AddItemToArray(object,item);}
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 93,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static UINT drdynvc_process_close_request(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, int Sp,
int cbChId, wStream* s)
{
int value;
UINT error;
UINT32 ChannelId;
wStream* data_out;
ChannelId = drdynvc_read_variable_uint(s, cbChId);
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_DEBUG, "process_close_request: Sp=%d cbChId=%d, ChannelId=%"PRIu32"",
Sp,
cbChId, ChannelId);
if ((error = dvcman_close_channel(drdynvc->channel_mgr, ChannelId)))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "dvcman_close_channel failed with error %"PRIu32"!", error);
return error;
}
data_out = Stream_New(NULL, 4);
if (!data_out)
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "Stream_New failed!");
return CHANNEL_RC_NO_MEMORY;
}
value = (CLOSE_REQUEST_PDU << 4) | (cbChId & 0x03);
Stream_Write_UINT8(data_out, value);
drdynvc_write_variable_uint(data_out, ChannelId);
error = drdynvc_send(drdynvc, data_out);
if (error)
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "VirtualChannelWriteEx failed with %s [%08"PRIX32"]",
WTSErrorToString(error), error);
return error;
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID:
| 1
| 168,935
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline const char *qeth_get_cardname(struct qeth_card *card)
{
if (card->info.guestlan) {
switch (card->info.type) {
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSD:
return " Virtual NIC QDIO";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_IQD:
return " Virtual NIC Hiper";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSM:
return " Virtual NIC QDIO - OSM";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSX:
return " Virtual NIC QDIO - OSX";
default:
return " unknown";
}
} else {
switch (card->info.type) {
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSD:
return " OSD Express";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_IQD:
return " HiperSockets";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSN:
return " OSN QDIO";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSM:
return " OSM QDIO";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSX:
return " OSX QDIO";
default:
return " unknown";
}
}
return " n/a";
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Chunk::changesAndSize( RIFF_MetaHandler* handler )
{
hasChange = false; // unknown chunk ==> no change, naturally
this->newSize = this->oldSize;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,071
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int open_check_o_direct(struct file *f)
{
/* NB: we're sure to have correct a_ops only after f_op->open */
if (f->f_flags & O_DIRECT) {
if (!f->f_mapping->a_ops ||
((!f->f_mapping->a_ops->direct_IO) &&
(!f->f_mapping->a_ops->get_xip_mem))) {
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 46,172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline gint pixelsFromSize(WebKitWebView* webView, gint size)
{
gdouble DPI = webViewGetDPI(webView);
return size / 72.0 * DPI;
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,505
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_inet_cmp_addr(const union sctp_addr *addr1,
const union sctp_addr *addr2,
struct sctp_sock *opt)
{
/* PF_INET only supports AF_INET addresses. */
if (addr1->sa.sa_family != addr2->sa.sa_family)
return 0;
if (htonl(INADDR_ANY) == addr1->v4.sin_addr.s_addr ||
htonl(INADDR_ANY) == addr2->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)
return 1;
if (addr1->v4.sin_addr.s_addr == addr2->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 42,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jpeg_read_raw_data_encap(OJPEGState* sp, jpeg_decompress_struct* cinfo, void* data, uint32 max_lines)
{
if( SETJMP(sp->exit_jmpbuf) )
return 0;
else {
jpeg_read_raw_data(cinfo,data,max_lines);
return 1;
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure in
OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other issues.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 70,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ptrace_do_notify(int signr, int exit_code, int why)
{
siginfo_t info;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof info);
info.si_signo = signr;
info.si_code = exit_code;
info.si_pid = task_pid_vnr(current);
info.si_uid = from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid());
/* Let the debugger run. */
ptrace_stop(exit_code, why, 1, &info);
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 31,780
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::HandleSwapOutACK(
const ViewMsg_SwapOut_Params& params, bool timed_out) {
ResourceLoader* loader = GetLoader(params.new_render_process_host_id,
params.new_request_id);
if (loader) {
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = loader->GetRequestInfo();
if (info->cross_site_handler())
info->cross_site_handler()->ResumeResponse();
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&OnSwapOutACKHelper,
params.closing_process_id,
params.closing_route_id,
timed_out));
}
Commit Message: Revert cross-origin auth prompt blocking.
BUG=174129
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12183030
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181113 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mpeg4_decode_studio_mb(MpegEncContext *s, int16_t block_[12][64])
{
int i;
s->dpcm_direction = 0;
/* StudioMacroblock */
/* Assumes I-VOP */
s->mb_intra = 1;
if (get_bits1(&s->gb)) { /* compression_mode */
/* DCT */
/* macroblock_type, 1 or 2-bit VLC */
if (!get_bits1(&s->gb)) {
skip_bits1(&s->gb);
s->qscale = mpeg_get_qscale(s);
}
for (i = 0; i < mpeg4_block_count[s->chroma_format]; i++) {
if (mpeg4_decode_studio_block(s, (*s->block32)[i], i) < 0)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
} else {
/* DPCM */
check_marker(s->avctx, &s->gb, "DPCM block start");
s->dpcm_direction = get_bits1(&s->gb) ? -1 : 1;
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
if (mpeg4_decode_dpcm_macroblock(s, (*s->dpcm_macroblock)[i], i) < 0)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
if (get_bits_left(&s->gb) >= 24 && show_bits(&s->gb, 23) == 0) {
next_start_code_studio(&s->gb);
return SLICE_END;
}
if (get_bits_left(&s->gb) == 0)
return SLICE_END;
if (get_bits_left(&s->gb) < 8U && show_bits(&s->gb, get_bits_left(&s->gb)) == 0)
return SLICE_END;
return SLICE_OK;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check idx in mpeg4_decode_studio_block()
Fixes: Out of array access
Fixes: 13500/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4_fuzzer-5769760178962432
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: Kieran Kunhya <kierank@obe.tv>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 90,750
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CollectBacklog(std::vector<std::string>* to_fetch,
std::vector<std::string>* to_upload,
const std::string& resource_id,
const GDataCache::CacheEntry& cache_entry) {
DCHECK(to_fetch);
DCHECK(to_upload);
if (cache_entry.IsPinned() && !cache_entry.IsPresent())
to_fetch->push_back(resource_id);
if (cache_entry.IsDirty())
to_upload->push_back(resource_id);
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 105,914
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nullstrcmp(const char *a, const char *b)
{
if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
return 0;
if (a == NULL)
return -1;
if (b == NULL)
return +1;
return strcmp(a, b);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vfs_remove_fsp_extension(vfs_handle_struct *handle, files_struct *fsp)
{
struct vfs_fsp_data *curr;
struct vfs_fsp_data *prev;
for (curr = fsp->vfs_extension, prev = NULL;
curr;
prev = curr, curr = curr->next) {
if (curr->owner == handle) {
if (prev) {
prev->next = curr->next;
} else {
fsp->vfs_extension = curr->next;
}
if (curr->destroy) {
curr->destroy(EXT_DATA_AREA(curr));
}
TALLOC_FREE(curr);
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,675
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct aead_request *crypto_rfc4309_crypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
struct crypto_rfc4309_req_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
struct aead_request *subreq = &rctx->subreq;
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_rfc4309_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
struct crypto_aead *child = ctx->child;
struct scatterlist *sg;
u8 *iv = PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)(subreq + 1) + crypto_aead_reqsize(child),
crypto_aead_alignmask(child) + 1);
/* L' */
iv[0] = 3;
memcpy(iv + 1, ctx->nonce, 3);
memcpy(iv + 4, req->iv, 8);
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(iv + 16, req->src, 0, req->assoclen - 8, 0);
sg_init_table(rctx->src, 3);
sg_set_buf(rctx->src, iv + 16, req->assoclen - 8);
sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->src + 1, req->src, req->assoclen);
if (sg != rctx->src + 1)
sg_chain(rctx->src, 2, sg);
if (req->src != req->dst) {
sg_init_table(rctx->dst, 3);
sg_set_buf(rctx->dst, iv + 16, req->assoclen - 8);
sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->dst + 1, req->dst, req->assoclen);
if (sg != rctx->dst + 1)
sg_chain(rctx->dst, 2, sg);
}
aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, child);
aead_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, req->base.complete,
req->base.data);
aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, rctx->src,
req->src == req->dst ? rctx->src : rctx->dst,
req->cryptlen, iv);
aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen - 8);
return subreq;
}
Commit Message: crypto: ccm - move cbcmac input off the stack
Commit f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
refactored the CCM driver to allow separate implementations of the
underlying MAC to be provided by a platform. However, in doing so, it
moved some data from the linear region to the stack, which violates the
SG constraints when the stack is virtually mapped.
So move idata/odata back to the request ctx struct, of which we can
reasonably expect that it has been allocated using kmalloc() et al.
Reported-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Fixes: f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 66,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void _WM_do_meta_keysignature(struct _mdi *mdi, struct _event_data *data) {
/* placeholder function so we can record tempo in the event stream
* for conversion function _WM_Event2Midi */
#ifdef DEBUG_MIDI
uint8_t ch = data->channel;
MIDI_EVENT_DEBUG(__FUNCTION__, ch, data->data.value);
#else
UNUSED(data);
#endif
UNUSED(mdi);
return;
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 63,245
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_lock_denied (struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct file_lock *fl)
{
uint64_t offset, length, clientid;
__be32 *p;
uint32_t namelen, type;
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 32); /* read 32 bytes */
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &offset); /* read 2 8-byte long words */
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &length);
type = be32_to_cpup(p++); /* 4 byte read */
if (fl != NULL) { /* manipulate file lock */
fl->fl_start = (loff_t)offset;
fl->fl_end = fl->fl_start + (loff_t)length - 1;
if (length == ~(uint64_t)0)
fl->fl_end = OFFSET_MAX;
fl->fl_type = F_WRLCK;
if (type & 1)
fl->fl_type = F_RDLCK;
fl->fl_pid = 0;
}
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &clientid); /* read 8 bytes */
namelen = be32_to_cpup(p); /* read 4 bytes */ /* have read all 32 bytes now */
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, namelen); /* variable size field */
if (likely(p))
return -NFS4ERR_DENIED;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_txt2obj(const char *s, int no_name)
{
int nid = NID_undef;
ASN1_OBJECT *op=NULL;
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p;
const unsigned char *cp;
int i, j;
if(!no_name) {
if( ((nid = OBJ_sn2nid(s)) != NID_undef) ||
((nid = OBJ_ln2nid(s)) != NID_undef) )
return OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
}
/* Work out size of content octets */
i=a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(NULL,0,s,-1);
if (i <= 0) {
/* Don't clear the error */
/*ERR_clear_error();*/
return NULL;
}
/* Work out total size */
j = ASN1_object_size(0,i,V_ASN1_OBJECT);
if((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(j)) == NULL) return NULL;
p = buf;
/* Write out tag+length */
ASN1_put_object(&p,0,i,V_ASN1_OBJECT,V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
/* Write out contents */
a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(p,i,s,-1);
cp=buf;
op=d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(NULL,&cp,j);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
return op;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 12,477
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.