instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseEndTag(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlParseEndTag1(ctxt, 0);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 59,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void basic_globals_dtor(php_basic_globals *basic_globals_p TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (BG(url_adapt_state_ex).tags) {
zend_hash_destroy(BG(url_adapt_state_ex).tags);
free(BG(url_adapt_state_ex).tags);
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mcopy(struct magic_set *ms, union VALUETYPE *p, int type, int indir,
const unsigned char *s, uint32_t offset, size_t nbytes, struct magic *m)
{
/*
* Note: FILE_SEARCH and FILE_REGEX do not actually copy
* anything, but setup pointers into the source
*/
if (indir == 0) {
switch (type) {
case FILE_SEARCH:
ms->search.s = RCAST(const char *, s) + offset;
ms->search.s_len = nbytes - offset;
ms->search.offset = offset;
return 0;
case FILE_REGEX: {
const char *b;
const char *c;
const char *last; /* end of search region */
const char *buf; /* start of search region */
const char *end;
size_t lines, linecnt, bytecnt;
if (s == NULL) {
ms->search.s_len = 0;
ms->search.s = NULL;
return 0;
}
if (m->str_flags & REGEX_LINE_COUNT) {
linecnt = m->str_range;
bytecnt = linecnt * 80;
} else {
linecnt = 0;
bytecnt = m->str_range;
}
if (bytecnt == 0)
bytecnt = 8192;
if (bytecnt > nbytes)
bytecnt = nbytes;
buf = RCAST(const char *, s) + offset;
end = last = RCAST(const char *, s) + bytecnt;
/* mget() guarantees buf <= last */
for (lines = linecnt, b = buf; lines && b < end &&
((b = CAST(const char *,
memchr(c = b, '\n', CAST(size_t, (end - b)))))
|| (b = CAST(const char *,
memchr(c, '\r', CAST(size_t, (end - c))))));
lines--, b++) {
last = b;
if (b[0] == '\r' && b[1] == '\n')
b++;
}
if (lines)
last = RCAST(const char *, s) + bytecnt;
ms->search.s = buf;
ms->search.s_len = last - buf;
ms->search.offset = offset;
ms->search.rm_len = 0;
return 0;
}
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16: {
const unsigned char *src = s + offset;
const unsigned char *esrc = s + nbytes;
char *dst = p->s;
char *edst = &p->s[sizeof(p->s) - 1];
if (type == FILE_BESTRING16)
src++;
/* check that offset is within range */
if (offset >= nbytes)
break;
for (/*EMPTY*/; src < esrc; src += 2, dst++) {
if (dst < edst)
*dst = *src;
else
break;
if (*dst == '\0') {
if (type == FILE_BESTRING16 ?
*(src - 1) != '\0' :
*(src + 1) != '\0')
*dst = ' ';
}
}
*edst = '\0';
return 0;
}
case FILE_STRING: /* XXX - these two should not need */
case FILE_PSTRING: /* to copy anything, but do anyway. */
default:
break;
}
}
if (offset >= nbytes) {
(void)memset(p, '\0', sizeof(*p));
return 0;
}
if (nbytes - offset < sizeof(*p))
nbytes = nbytes - offset;
else
nbytes = sizeof(*p);
(void)memcpy(p, s + offset, nbytes);
/*
* the usefulness of padding with zeroes eludes me, it
* might even cause problems
*/
if (nbytes < sizeof(*p))
(void)memset(((char *)(void *)p) + nbytes, '\0',
sizeof(*p) - nbytes);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: - reduce recursion level from 20 to 10 and make a symbolic constant for it.
- pull out the guts of saving and restoring the output buffer into functions
and take care not to overwrite the error message if an error happened.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaRecorderHandler::~MediaRecorderHandler() {
DCHECK(main_render_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (client_)
client_->WriteData(
nullptr, 0u, true,
(TimeTicks::Now() - TimeTicks::UnixEpoch()).InMillisecondsF());
}
Commit Message: Check context is attached before creating MediaRecorder
Bug: 896736
Change-Id: I3ccfd2188fb15704af14c8af050e0a5667855d34
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324231
Commit-Queue: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606242}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 172,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t GetWorkerRefCount(const GURL& origin) {
content::ServiceWorkerContext* sw_context =
content::BrowserContext::GetDefaultStoragePartition(
browser()->profile())
->GetServiceWorkerContext();
base::RunLoop run_loop;
size_t ref_count = 0;
auto set_ref_count = [](size_t* ref_count, base::RunLoop* run_loop,
size_t external_request_count) {
*ref_count = external_request_count;
run_loop->Quit();
};
sw_context->CountExternalRequestsForTest(
origin, base::BindOnce(set_ref_count, &ref_count, &run_loop));
run_loop.Run();
return ref_count;
}
Commit Message: Skip Service workers in requests for mime handler plugins
BUG=808838
TEST=./browser_tests --gtest_filter=*/ServiceWorkerTest.MimeHandlerView*
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I82e75c200091babbab648a04232db47e2938d914
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914150
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Istiaque Ahmed <lazyboy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#537386}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t hash_sendpage(struct socket *sock, struct page *page,
int offset, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct hash_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
int err;
lock_sock(sk);
sg_init_table(ctx->sgl.sg, 1);
sg_set_page(ctx->sgl.sg, page, size, offset);
ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, ctx->sgl.sg, ctx->result, size);
if (!(flags & MSG_MORE)) {
if (ctx->more)
err = crypto_ahash_finup(&ctx->req);
else
err = crypto_ahash_digest(&ctx->req);
} else {
if (!ctx->more) {
err = crypto_ahash_init(&ctx->req);
if (err)
goto unlock;
}
err = crypto_ahash_update(&ctx->req);
}
err = af_alg_wait_for_completion(err, &ctx->completion);
if (err)
goto unlock;
ctx->more = flags & MSG_MORE;
unlock:
release_sock(sk);
return err ?: size;
}
Commit Message: crypto: algif - suppress sending source address information in recvmsg
The current code does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local sockaddr_storage variable to userland
-- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix that.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.38
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PluginServiceImpl::AddExtraPluginDir(const FilePath& path) {
plugin_list_->AddExtraPluginDir(path);
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 116,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void js_initvar(js_State *J, const char *name, int idx)
{
jsR_defproperty(J, J->E->variables, name, JS_DONTENUM | JS_DONTCONF, stackidx(J, idx), NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,437 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void userns_fixup_signal_uid(struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t)
{
return;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: assert_buf_ok(buf_t *buf)
{
tor_assert(buf);
tor_assert(buf->magic == BUFFER_MAGIC);
if (! buf->head) {
tor_assert(!buf->tail);
tor_assert(buf->datalen == 0);
} else {
chunk_t *ch;
size_t total = 0;
tor_assert(buf->tail);
for (ch = buf->head; ch; ch = ch->next) {
total += ch->datalen;
tor_assert(ch->datalen <= ch->memlen);
tor_assert(ch->data >= &ch->mem[0]);
tor_assert(ch->data <= &ch->mem[0]+ch->memlen);
if (ch->data == &ch->mem[0]+ch->memlen) {
static int warned = 0;
if (! warned) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Invariant violation in buf.c related to #15083");
warned = 1;
}
}
tor_assert(ch->data+ch->datalen <= &ch->mem[0] + ch->memlen);
if (!ch->next)
tor_assert(ch == buf->tail);
}
tor_assert(buf->datalen == total);
}
}
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 73,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *jas_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
{
void *result;
jas_mb_t *mb;
jas_mb_t *old_mb;
size_t old_size;
size_t ext_size;
size_t mem;
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("jas_realloc(%x, %zu)\n", ptr, size));
if (!ptr) {
return jas_malloc(size);
}
if (ptr && !size) {
jas_free(ptr);
}
if (!jas_safe_size_add(size, JAS_MB_SIZE, &ext_size)) {
jas_eprintf("requested memory size is too large\n");
return 0;
}
old_mb = jas_get_mb(ptr);
old_size = old_mb->size;
JAS_DBGLOG(101, ("jas_realloc: old_mb=%x; old_size=%zu\n", old_mb,
old_size));
if (size > old_size) {
if (!jas_safe_size_add(jas_mem, ext_size, &mem) || mem > jas_max_mem) {
jas_eprintf("maximum memory limit would be exceeded\n");
return 0;
}
} else {
if (!jas_safe_size_sub(jas_mem, old_size - size, &jas_mem)) {
jas_eprintf("heap corruption detected\n");
abort();
}
}
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("jas_realloc: realloc(%p, %zu)\n", old_mb, ext_size));
if (!(mb = realloc(old_mb, ext_size))) {
result = 0;
} else {
result = jas_mb_get_data(mb);
mb->size = size;
jas_mem = mem;
}
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("jas_realloc(%p, %zu) -> %p (%p)\n", ptr, size, result,
mb));
JAS_DBGLOG(102, ("max_mem=%zu; mem=%zu\n", jas_max_mem, jas_mem));
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 70,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool bin_raw_strings(RCore *r, int mode, int va) {
RBinFile *bf = r_bin_cur (r->bin);
bool new_bf = false;
if (bf && strstr (bf->file, "malloc://")) {
ut8 *tmp = R_NEWS (ut8, bf->size);
if (!tmp) {
return false;
}
r_io_read_at (r->io, 0, tmp, bf->size);
r_buf_write_at (bf->buf, 0, tmp, bf->size);
}
if (!r->file) {
eprintf ("Core file not open\n");
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_print ("[]");
}
return false;
}
if (!bf) {
bf = R_NEW0 (RBinFile);
if (!bf) {
return false;
}
RIODesc *desc = r_io_desc_get (r->io, r->file->fd);
if (!desc) {
free (bf);
return false;
}
bf->file = strdup (desc->name);
bf->size = r_io_desc_size (desc);
if (bf->size == UT64_MAX) {
free (bf);
return false;
}
bf->buf = r_buf_new_with_io (&r->bin->iob, r->file->fd);
bf->o = NULL;
bf->rbin = r->bin;
new_bf = true;
va = false;
}
RList *l = r_bin_raw_strings (bf, 0);
_print_strings (r, l, mode, va);
r_list_free (l);
if (new_bf) {
r_buf_free (bf->buf);
bf->buf = NULL;
bf->id = -1;
r_bin_file_free (bf);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: More fixes for the CVE-2019-14745
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 96,608 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __inline VOID CalculateIpChecksum(IPv4Header *pIpHeader)
{
pIpHeader->ip_xsum = 0;
pIpHeader->ip_xsum = CheckSumCalculatorFlat(pIpHeader, IP_HEADER_LENGTH(pIpHeader));
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int in_configure_effect_channels(effect_handle_t effect,
channel_config_t *channel_config)
{
int status = 0;
int fct_status;
int32_t cmd_status;
uint32_t reply_size;
effect_config_t config;
uint32_t cmd[(sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(channel_config_t) - 1) / sizeof(uint32_t) + 1];
ALOGV("in_configure_effect_channels(): configure effect with channels: [%04x][%04x]",
channel_config->main_channels,
channel_config->aux_channels);
config.inputCfg.mask = EFFECT_CONFIG_CHANNELS;
config.outputCfg.mask = EFFECT_CONFIG_CHANNELS;
reply_size = sizeof(effect_config_t);
fct_status = (*effect)->command(effect,
EFFECT_CMD_GET_CONFIG,
0,
NULL,
&reply_size,
&config);
if (fct_status != 0) {
ALOGE("in_configure_effect_channels(): EFFECT_CMD_GET_CONFIG failed");
return fct_status;
}
config.inputCfg.channels = channel_config->aux_channels;
config.outputCfg.channels = config.inputCfg.channels;
reply_size = sizeof(uint32_t);
fct_status = (*effect)->command(effect,
EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG,
sizeof(effect_config_t),
&config,
&reply_size,
&cmd_status);
status = get_command_status(status, fct_status, cmd_status);
if (status != 0) {
ALOGE("in_configure_effect_channels(): EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG failed");
return status;
}
/* some implementations need to be re-enabled after a config change */
reply_size = sizeof(uint32_t);
fct_status = (*effect)->command(effect,
EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE,
0,
NULL,
&reply_size,
&cmd_status);
status = get_command_status(status, fct_status, cmd_status);
if (status != 0) {
ALOGE("in_configure_effect_channels(): EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE failed");
return status;
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLenum WebGL2RenderingContextBase::clientWaitSync(WebGLSync* sync,
GLbitfield flags,
GLuint64 timeout) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateWebGLObject("clientWaitSync", sync))
return GL_WAIT_FAILED;
if (timeout > kMaxClientWaitTimeout) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "clientWaitSync",
"timeout > MAX_CLIENT_WAIT_TIMEOUT_WEBGL");
return GL_WAIT_FAILED;
}
return ContextGL()->ClientWaitSync(SyncObjectOrZero(sync), flags, timeout);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataFileSystem::FindEntryByPathAsyncOnUIThread(
const FilePath& search_file_path,
const FindEntryCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (directory_service_->origin() == INITIALIZING) {
AddObserver(new InitialLoadObserver(
this,
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::FindEntryByPathSyncOnUIThread,
ui_weak_ptr_,
search_file_path,
callback)));
return;
} else if (directory_service_->origin() == UNINITIALIZED) {
directory_service_->set_origin(INITIALIZING);
feed_loader_->LoadFromCache(
true, // should_load_from_server
search_file_path,
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::RunAndNotifyInitialLoadFinished,
ui_weak_ptr_,
callback));
return;
}
base::MessageLoopProxy::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::FindEntryByPathSyncOnUIThread,
ui_weak_ptr_,
search_file_path,
callback));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 116,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void limitedToOnlyOneAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
imp->setAttribute(HTMLNames::limitedtoonlyoneattributeAttr, cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: test_bson_append_timestamp (void)
{
bson_t *b;
bson_t *b2;
b = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_timestamp (b, "timestamp", -1, 1234, 9876));
b2 = get_bson ("test35.bson");
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL (b, b2);
bson_destroy (b);
bson_destroy (b2);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 77,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t ProCamera2Client::exclusiveUnlock() {
ATRACE_CALL();
ALOGV("%s", __FUNCTION__);
Mutex::Autolock icl(mBinderSerializationLock);
SharedCameraCallbacks::Lock l(mSharedCameraCallbacks);
if (!mExclusiveLock) {
ALOGW("%s: cannot unlock, no lock was held in the first place",
__FUNCTION__);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
mExclusiveLock = false;
if (mRemoteCallback != NULL ) {
mRemoteCallback->onLockStatusChanged(
IProCameraCallbacks::LOCK_RELEASED);
}
ALOGV("%s: exclusive lock released", __FUNCTION__);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ft_stub_set_char_sizes( FT_Size size,
FT_F26Dot6 width,
FT_F26Dot6 height,
FT_UInt horz_res,
FT_UInt vert_res )
{
FT_Size_RequestRec req;
FT_Driver driver = size->face->driver;
if ( driver->clazz->request_size )
{
req.type = FT_SIZE_REQUEST_TYPE_NOMINAL;
req.width = width;
req.height = height;
if ( horz_res == 0 )
horz_res = vert_res;
if ( vert_res == 0 )
vert_res = horz_res;
if ( horz_res == 0 )
horz_res = vert_res = 72;
req.horiResolution = horz_res;
req.vertResolution = vert_res;
return driver->clazz->request_size( size, &req );
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (guint8 ** p_data, guint64 * p_size)
{
guint32 ret;
g_assert (*p_size >= 4);
ret = GST_READ_UINT32_LE (*p_data);
*p_data += sizeof (guint32);
*p_size -= sizeof (guint32);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cmd_starttls(char *tag, int imaps)
{
int result;
int *layerp;
char *auth_id;
sasl_ssf_t ssf;
/* SASL and openssl have different ideas about whether ssf is signed */
layerp = (int *) &ssf;
if (imapd_starttls_done == 1)
{
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO TLS already active\r\n", tag);
return;
}
result=tls_init_serverengine("imap",
5, /* depth to verify */
!imaps, /* can client auth? */
NULL);
if (result == -1) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "error initializing TLS");
if (imaps == 0) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO Error initializing TLS\r\n", tag);
} else {
shut_down(0);
}
return;
}
if (imaps == 0)
{
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK Begin TLS negotiation now\r\n", tag);
/* must flush our buffers before starting tls */
prot_flush(imapd_out);
}
result=tls_start_servertls(0, /* read */
1, /* write */
imaps ? 180 : imapd_timeout,
layerp,
&auth_id,
&tls_conn);
/* if error */
if (result==-1) {
if (imaps == 0) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO Starttls negotiation failed\r\n", tag);
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "STARTTLS negotiation failed: %s", imapd_clienthost);
return;
} else {
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "imaps TLS negotiation failed: %s", imapd_clienthost);
shut_down(0);
}
}
/* tell SASL about the negotiated layer */
result = sasl_setprop(imapd_saslconn, SASL_SSF_EXTERNAL, &ssf);
if (result == SASL_OK) {
saslprops.ssf = ssf;
result = sasl_setprop(imapd_saslconn, SASL_AUTH_EXTERNAL, auth_id);
}
if (result != SASL_OK) {
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "sasl_setprop() failed: cmd_starttls()");
if (imaps == 0) {
fatal("sasl_setprop() failed: cmd_starttls()", EC_TEMPFAIL);
} else {
shut_down(0);
}
}
if(saslprops.authid) {
free(saslprops.authid);
saslprops.authid = NULL;
}
if(auth_id)
saslprops.authid = xstrdup(auth_id);
/* tell the prot layer about our new layers */
prot_settls(imapd_in, tls_conn);
prot_settls(imapd_out, tls_conn);
imapd_starttls_done = 1;
imapd_tls_required = 0;
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL)
imapd_tls_comp = (void *) SSL_get_current_compression(tls_conn);
#endif
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ut64 binobj_a2b(RBinObject *o, ut64 addr) {
return addr + (o? o->baddr_shift: 0);
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 60,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PDFiumEngine::OnMouseDown(const pp::MouseInputEvent& event) {
if (event.GetButton() == PP_INPUTEVENT_MOUSEBUTTON_RIGHT) {
if (selection_.empty())
return false;
std::vector<pp::Rect> selection_rect_vector;
GetAllScreenRectsUnion(&selection_, GetVisibleRect().point(),
&selection_rect_vector);
pp::Point point = event.GetPosition();
for (const auto& rect : selection_rect_vector) {
if (rect.Contains(point.x(), point.y()))
return false;
}
SelectionChangeInvalidator selection_invalidator(this);
selection_.clear();
return true;
}
if (event.GetButton() != PP_INPUTEVENT_MOUSEBUTTON_LEFT &&
event.GetButton() != PP_INPUTEVENT_MOUSEBUTTON_MIDDLE) {
return false;
}
SelectionChangeInvalidator selection_invalidator(this);
selection_.clear();
int page_index = -1;
int char_index = -1;
int form_type = FPDF_FORMFIELD_UNKNOWN;
PDFiumPage::LinkTarget target;
PDFiumPage::Area area =
GetCharIndex(event, &page_index, &char_index, &form_type, &target);
mouse_down_state_.Set(area, target);
if (area == PDFiumPage::WEBLINK_AREA)
return true;
if (event.GetButton() == PP_INPUTEVENT_MOUSEBUTTON_MIDDLE)
return false;
if (area == PDFiumPage::DOCLINK_AREA) {
client_->ScrollToPage(target.page);
client_->FormTextFieldFocusChange(false);
return true;
}
if (page_index != -1) {
last_page_mouse_down_ = page_index;
double page_x, page_y;
pp::Point point = event.GetPosition();
DeviceToPage(page_index, point.x(), point.y(), &page_x, &page_y);
FORM_OnLButtonDown(form_, pages_[page_index]->GetPage(), 0, page_x, page_y);
if (form_type > FPDF_FORMFIELD_UNKNOWN) { // returns -1 sometimes...
mouse_down_state_.Set(PDFiumPage::NONSELECTABLE_AREA, target);
bool is_valid_control = (form_type == FPDF_FORMFIELD_TEXTFIELD ||
form_type == FPDF_FORMFIELD_COMBOBOX);
#if defined(PDF_ENABLE_XFA)
is_valid_control |= (form_type == FPDF_FORMFIELD_XFA);
#endif
client_->FormTextFieldFocusChange(is_valid_control);
return true; // Return now before we get into the selection code.
}
}
client_->FormTextFieldFocusChange(false);
if (area != PDFiumPage::TEXT_AREA)
return true; // Return true so WebKit doesn't do its own highlighting.
if (event.GetClickCount() == 1) {
OnSingleClick(page_index, char_index);
} else if (event.GetClickCount() == 2 ||
event.GetClickCount() == 3) {
OnMultipleClick(event.GetClickCount(), page_index, char_index);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnDidPreviewPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage_Params& params) {
DCHECK(params.page_number >= printing::FIRST_PAGE_INDEX);
print_preview_pages_remaining_--;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 170,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static CURLcode smtp_state_data_resp(struct connectdata *conn, int smtpcode,
smtpstate instate)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
(void)instate; /* no use for this yet */
if(smtpcode != 354) {
failf(data, "DATA failed: %d", smtpcode);
result = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
}
else {
/* Set the progress upload size */
Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, data->state.infilesize);
/* SMTP upload */
Curl_setup_transfer(conn, -1, -1, FALSE, NULL, FIRSTSOCKET, NULL);
/* End of DO phase */
state(conn, SMTP_STOP);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc
... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause
a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500
Reported-by: Peter Wu
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlock::addOverflowFromInlineChildren()
{
LayoutUnit endPadding = hasOverflowClip() ? paddingEnd() : LayoutUnit();
if (hasOverflowClip() && !endPadding && node() && node()->isRootEditableElement() && style()->isLeftToRightDirection())
endPadding = 1;
for (RootInlineBox* curr = firstRootBox(); curr; curr = curr->nextRootBox()) {
addLayoutOverflow(curr->paddedLayoutOverflowRect(endPadding));
LayoutRect visualOverflow = curr->visualOverflowRect(curr->lineTop(), curr->lineBottom());
addContentsVisualOverflow(visualOverflow);
}
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init nf_defrag_init(void)
{
int ret = 0;
ret = nf_ct_frag6_init();
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("nf_defrag_ipv6: can't initialize frag6.\n");
return ret;
}
ret = nf_register_hooks(ipv6_defrag_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(ipv6_defrag_ops));
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("nf_defrag_ipv6: can't register hooks\n");
goto cleanup_frag6;
}
return ret;
cleanup_frag6:
nf_ct_frag6_cleanup();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: drop mangled skb on ream error
Dmitry Vyukov reported GPF in network stack that Andrey traced down to
negative nh offset in nf_ct_frag6_queue().
Problem is that all network headers before fragment header are pulled.
Normal ipv6 reassembly will drop the skb when errors occur further down
the line.
netfilter doesn't do this, and instead passed the original fragment
along. That was also fine back when netfilter ipv6 defrag worked with
cloned fragments, as the original, pristine fragment was passed on.
So we either have to undo the pull op, or discard such fragments.
Since they're malformed after all (e.g. overlapping fragment) it seems
preferrable to just drop them.
Same for temporary errors -- it doesn't make sense to accept (and
perhaps forward!) only some fragments of same datagram.
Fixes: 029f7f3b8701cc7ac ("netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: avoid/free clone operations")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Debugged-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Diagnosed-by: Eric Dumazet <Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,000 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::push_input_sc_codec(OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp)
{
OMX_U32 partial_frame = 1;
OMX_BOOL generate_ebd = OMX_TRUE;
unsigned long address = 0, p2 = 0, id = 0;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Start Parsing the bit stream address %p TimeStamp %lld",
psource_frame,psource_frame->nTimeStamp);
if (m_frame_parser.parse_sc_frame(psource_frame,
pdest_frame,&partial_frame) == -1) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error In Parsing Return Error");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (partial_frame == 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Frame size %u source %p frame count %d",
(unsigned int)pdest_frame->nFilledLen,psource_frame,frame_count);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("TimeStamp updated %lld", pdest_frame->nTimeStamp);
/*First Parsed buffer will have only header Hence skip*/
if (frame_count == 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("H263/MPEG4 Codec First Frame ");
if (codec_type_parse == CODEC_TYPE_MPEG4 ||
codec_type_parse == CODEC_TYPE_DIVX) {
mp4StreamType psBits;
psBits.data = pdest_frame->pBuffer + pdest_frame->nOffset;
psBits.numBytes = pdest_frame->nFilledLen;
mp4_headerparser.parseHeader(&psBits);
}
frame_count++;
} else {
pdest_frame->nFlags &= ~OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
if (pdest_frame->nFilledLen) {
/*Push the frame to the Decoder*/
if (empty_this_buffer_proxy(hComp,pdest_frame) != OMX_ErrorNone) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
frame_count++;
pdest_frame = NULL;
if (m_input_free_q.m_size) {
m_input_free_q.pop_entry(&address,&p2,&id);
pdest_frame = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *) address;
pdest_frame->nFilledLen = 0;
}
} else if (!(psource_frame->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Zero len buffer return back to POOL");
m_input_free_q.insert_entry((unsigned long) pdest_frame, (unsigned)NULL,
(unsigned)NULL);
pdest_frame = NULL;
}
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Not a Complete Frame %u", (unsigned int)pdest_frame->nFilledLen);
/*Check if Destination Buffer is full*/
if (pdest_frame->nAllocLen ==
pdest_frame->nFilledLen + pdest_frame->nOffset) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:Frame Not found though Destination Filled");
return OMX_ErrorStreamCorrupt;
}
}
if (psource_frame->nFilledLen == 0) {
if (psource_frame->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
if (pdest_frame) {
pdest_frame->nFlags |= psource_frame->nFlags;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Frame Found start Decoding Size =%u TimeStamp = %lld",
(unsigned int)pdest_frame->nFilledLen,pdest_frame->nTimeStamp);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Found a frame size = %u number = %d",
(unsigned int)pdest_frame->nFilledLen,frame_count++);
/*Push the frame to the Decoder*/
if (empty_this_buffer_proxy(hComp,pdest_frame) != OMX_ErrorNone) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
frame_count++;
pdest_frame = NULL;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Last frame in else dest addr") ;
generate_ebd = OMX_FALSE;
}
}
if (generate_ebd) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Buffer Consumed return back to client %p",psource_frame);
m_cb.EmptyBufferDone (hComp,m_app_data,psource_frame);
psource_frame = NULL;
if (m_input_pending_q.m_size) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Pull Next source Buffer %p",psource_frame);
m_input_pending_q.pop_entry(&address,&p2,&id);
psource_frame = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *) address;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Next source Buffer %p time stamp %lld",psource_frame,
psource_frame->nTimeStamp);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Next source Buffer flag %u length %u",
(unsigned int)psource_frame->nFlags, (unsigned int)psource_frame->nFilledLen);
}
}
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RunSingleClientMigrationTest(const MigrationList& migration_list,
TriggerMethod trigger_method) {
if (!ShouldRunMigrationTest()) {
return;
}
ASSERT_TRUE(SetupSync());
RunMigrationTest(migration_list, trigger_method);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u64 sys_reg_to_index(const struct sys_reg_desc *reg)
{
return (KVM_REG_ARM64 | KVM_REG_SIZE_U64 |
KVM_REG_ARM64_SYSREG |
(reg->Op0 << KVM_REG_ARM64_SYSREG_OP0_SHIFT) |
(reg->Op1 << KVM_REG_ARM64_SYSREG_OP1_SHIFT) |
(reg->CRn << KVM_REG_ARM64_SYSREG_CRN_SHIFT) |
(reg->CRm << KVM_REG_ARM64_SYSREG_CRM_SHIFT) |
(reg->Op2 << KVM_REG_ARM64_SYSREG_OP2_SHIFT));
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 62,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int read_int32_info (WavpackStream *wps, WavpackMetadata *wpmd)
{
int bytecnt = wpmd->byte_length;
char *byteptr = wpmd->data;
if (bytecnt != 4)
return FALSE;
wps->int32_sent_bits = *byteptr++;
wps->int32_zeros = *byteptr++;
wps->int32_ones = *byteptr++;
wps->int32_dups = *byteptr;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: fixes for 4 fuzz failures posted to SourceForge mailing list
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::UpdateLoadInfoOnUIThread(
scoped_ptr<LoadInfoMap> info_map) {
tracked_objects::ScopedTracker tracking_profile(
FROM_HERE_WITH_EXPLICIT_FUNCTION(
"466285 ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::UpdateLoadInfoOnUIThread"));
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
for (const auto& load_info : *info_map) {
RenderViewHostImpl* view = RenderViewHostImpl::FromID(
load_info.first.child_id, load_info.first.route_id);
if (view) {
view->LoadStateChanged(load_info.second.url, load_info.second.load_state,
load_info.second.upload_position,
load_info.second.upload_size);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 132,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tt_cmap10_char_next( TT_CMap cmap,
FT_UInt32 *pchar_code )
{
FT_Byte* table = cmap->data;
FT_UInt32 char_code = *pchar_code + 1;
FT_UInt gindex = 0;
FT_Byte* p = table + 12;
FT_UInt32 start = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
FT_UInt32 count = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
FT_UInt32 idx;
if ( char_code < start )
char_code = start;
idx = (FT_UInt32)( char_code - start );
p += 2 * idx;
for ( ; idx < count; idx++ )
{
gindex = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( gindex != 0 )
break;
char_code++;
}
*pchar_code = char_code;
return gindex;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 4,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseComment(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
size_t size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
size_t len = 0;
xmlParserInputState state;
const xmlChar *in;
size_t nbchar = 0;
int ccol;
int inputid;
/*
* Check that there is a comment right here.
*/
if ((RAW != '<') || (NXT(1) != '!') ||
(NXT(2) != '-') || (NXT(3) != '-')) return;
state = ctxt->instate;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_COMMENT;
inputid = ctxt->input->id;
SKIP(4);
SHRINK;
GROW;
/*
* Accelerated common case where input don't need to be
* modified before passing it to the handler.
*/
in = ctxt->input->cur;
do {
if (*in == 0xA) {
do {
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
in++;
} while (*in == 0xA);
}
get_more:
ccol = ctxt->input->col;
while (((*in > '-') && (*in <= 0x7F)) ||
((*in >= 0x20) && (*in < '-')) ||
(*in == 0x09)) {
in++;
ccol++;
}
ctxt->input->col = ccol;
if (*in == 0xA) {
do {
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
in++;
} while (*in == 0xA);
goto get_more;
}
nbchar = in - ctxt->input->cur;
/*
* save current set of data
*/
if (nbchar > 0) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->comment != NULL)) {
if (buf == NULL) {
if ((*in == '-') && (in[1] == '-'))
size = nbchar + 1;
else
size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE + nbchar;
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
len = 0;
} else if (len + nbchar + 1 >= size) {
xmlChar *new_buf;
size += len + nbchar + XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
new_buf = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf,
size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (new_buf == NULL) {
xmlFree (buf);
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
buf = new_buf;
}
memcpy(&buf[len], ctxt->input->cur, nbchar);
len += nbchar;
buf[len] = 0;
}
}
if ((len > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_COMMENT_NOT_FINISHED,
"Comment too big found", NULL);
xmlFree (buf);
return;
}
ctxt->input->cur = in;
if (*in == 0xA) {
in++;
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
}
if (*in == 0xD) {
in++;
if (*in == 0xA) {
ctxt->input->cur = in;
in++;
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
continue; /* while */
}
in--;
}
SHRINK;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
xmlFree(buf);
return;
}
in = ctxt->input->cur;
if (*in == '-') {
if (in[1] == '-') {
if (in[2] == '>') {
if (ctxt->input->id != inputid) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"comment doesn't start and stop in the"
" same entity\n");
}
SKIP(3);
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->comment != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (buf != NULL)
ctxt->sax->comment(ctxt->userData, buf);
else
ctxt->sax->comment(ctxt->userData, BAD_CAST "");
}
if (buf != NULL)
xmlFree(buf);
if (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
if (buf != NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_HYPHEN_IN_COMMENT,
"Double hyphen within comment: "
"<!--%.50s\n",
buf);
} else
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_HYPHEN_IN_COMMENT,
"Double hyphen within comment\n", NULL);
in++;
ctxt->input->col++;
}
in++;
ctxt->input->col++;
goto get_more;
}
} while (((*in >= 0x20) && (*in <= 0x7F)) || (*in == 0x09));
xmlParseCommentComplex(ctxt, buf, len, size);
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 59,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline void LineWidth::shrinkAvailableWidthForNewFloatIfNeeded(FloatingObject* newFloat)
{
LayoutUnit height = m_block->logicalHeight();
if (height < newFloat->logicalTop(m_block->isHorizontalWritingMode()) || height >= newFloat->logicalBottom(m_block->isHorizontalWritingMode()))
return;
ShapeOutsideInfo* previousShapeOutsideInfo = 0;
const FloatingObjectSet& floatingObjectSet = m_block->m_floatingObjects->set();
FloatingObjectSetIterator it = floatingObjectSet.end();
FloatingObjectSetIterator begin = floatingObjectSet.begin();
while (it != begin) {
--it;
FloatingObject* previousFloat = *it;
if (previousFloat != newFloat && previousFloat->type() == newFloat->type()) {
previousShapeOutsideInfo = previousFloat->renderer()->shapeOutsideInfo();
if (previousShapeOutsideInfo) {
previousShapeOutsideInfo->computeSegmentsForContainingBlockLine(m_block->logicalHeight(), previousFloat->logicalTop(m_block->isHorizontalWritingMode()), logicalHeightForLine(m_block, m_isFirstLine));
}
break;
}
}
ShapeOutsideInfo* shapeOutsideInfo = newFloat->renderer()->shapeOutsideInfo();
if (shapeOutsideInfo)
shapeOutsideInfo->computeSegmentsForContainingBlockLine(m_block->logicalHeight(), newFloat->logicalTop(m_block->isHorizontalWritingMode()), logicalHeightForLine(m_block, m_isFirstLine));
if (newFloat->type() == FloatingObject::FloatLeft) {
float newLeft = newFloat->logicalRight(m_block->isHorizontalWritingMode());
if (previousShapeOutsideInfo)
newLeft -= previousShapeOutsideInfo->rightSegmentMarginBoxDelta();
if (shapeOutsideInfo)
newLeft += shapeOutsideInfo->rightSegmentMarginBoxDelta();
if (shouldIndentText() && m_block->style()->isLeftToRightDirection())
newLeft += floorToInt(m_block->textIndentOffset());
m_left = max<float>(m_left, newLeft);
} else {
float newRight = newFloat->logicalLeft(m_block->isHorizontalWritingMode());
if (previousShapeOutsideInfo)
newRight -= previousShapeOutsideInfo->leftSegmentMarginBoxDelta();
if (shapeOutsideInfo)
newRight += shapeOutsideInfo->leftSegmentMarginBoxDelta();
if (shouldIndentText() && !m_block->style()->isLeftToRightDirection())
newRight -= floorToInt(m_block->textIndentOffset());
m_right = min<float>(m_right, newRight);
}
computeAvailableWidthFromLeftAndRight();
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cipso_v4_map_cat_rng_valid(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
const unsigned char *rngcat,
u32 rngcat_len)
{
u16 cat_high;
u16 cat_low;
u32 cat_prev = CIPSO_V4_MAX_REM_CATS + 1;
u32 iter;
if (doi_def->type != CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS || rngcat_len & 0x01)
return -EFAULT;
for (iter = 0; iter < rngcat_len; iter += 4) {
cat_high = get_unaligned_be16(&rngcat[iter]);
if ((iter + 4) <= rngcat_len)
cat_low = get_unaligned_be16(&rngcat[iter + 2]);
else
cat_low = 0;
if (cat_high > cat_prev)
return -EFAULT;
cat_prev = cat_low;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_seq_ioctl_delete_queue(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void __user *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_queue_info info;
if (copy_from_user(&info, arg, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
return snd_seq_queue_delete(client->number, info.queue);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_recv_NPWindowData(rpc_message_t *message, void *p_value)
{
NPWindow *window = (NPWindow *)p_value;
NPSetWindowCallbackStruct *ws_info;
uint32_t window_id;
int32_t window_type;
int error;
if (window == NULL)
return RPC_ERROR_MESSAGE_ARGUMENT_INVALID;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &window_id)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &window->x)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &window->y)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &window->width)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &window->height)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = do_recv_NPRect(message, &window->clipRect)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &window_type)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = do_recv_NPSetWindowCallbackStruct(message, &ws_info)) < 0)
return error;
window->type = window_type;
window->window = (void *)(Window)window_id;
window->ws_info = ws_info;
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::ShowBrokenPageTab(TabContents* contents) {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("ReportBug"));
string16 page_title = contents->GetTitle();
NavigationEntry* entry = contents->controller().GetActiveEntry();
if (!entry)
return;
std::string page_url = entry->url().spec();
std::vector<std::string> subst;
subst.push_back(UTF16ToASCII(page_title));
subst.push_back(page_url);
std::string report_page_url =
ReplaceStringPlaceholders(kBrokenPageUrl, subst, NULL);
ShowSingletonTab(GURL(report_page_url));
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ThreadHeap::VerifyMarking() {
for (int i = 0; i < BlinkGC::kNumberOfArenas; ++i) {
arenas_[i]->VerifyMarking();
}
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 153,682 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void reds_stream_free(RedsStream *s)
{
if (!s) {
return;
}
reds_stream_push_channel_event(s, SPICE_CHANNEL_EVENT_DISCONNECTED);
#if HAVE_SASL
if (s->sasl.conn) {
s->sasl.runSSF = s->sasl.wantSSF = 0;
s->sasl.len = 0;
s->sasl.encodedLength = s->sasl.encodedOffset = 0;
s->sasl.encoded = NULL;
free(s->sasl.mechlist);
free(s->sasl.mechname);
s->sasl.mechlist = NULL;
sasl_dispose(&s->sasl.conn);
s->sasl.conn = NULL;
}
#endif
if (s->ssl) {
SSL_free(s->ssl);
}
reds_stream_remove_watch(s);
spice_info("close socket fd %d", s->socket);
close(s->socket);
free(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::InitDecoder() {
HMODULE decoder_dll = ::GetModuleHandle(L"msmpeg2vdec.dll");
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(decoder_dll,
"msmpeg2vdec.dll required for decoding is not loaded",
false);
typedef HRESULT (WINAPI* GetClassObject)(const CLSID& clsid,
const IID& iid,
void** object);
GetClassObject get_class_object = reinterpret_cast<GetClassObject>(
GetProcAddress(decoder_dll, "DllGetClassObject"));
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(get_class_object,
"Failed to get DllGetClassObject pointer", false);
base::win::ScopedComPtr<IClassFactory> factory;
HRESULT hr = get_class_object(__uuidof(CMSH264DecoderMFT),
__uuidof(IClassFactory),
reinterpret_cast<void**>(factory.Receive()));
RETURN_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "DllGetClassObject for decoder failed", false);
hr = factory->CreateInstance(NULL, __uuidof(IMFTransform),
reinterpret_cast<void**>(decoder_.Receive()));
RETURN_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to create decoder instance", false);
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(CheckDecoderDxvaSupport(),
"Failed to check decoder DXVA support", false);
hr = decoder_->ProcessMessage(
MFT_MESSAGE_SET_D3D_MANAGER,
reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(device_manager_));
RETURN_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to pass D3D manager to decoder", false);
EGLint config_attribs[] = {
EGL_BUFFER_SIZE, 32,
EGL_RED_SIZE, 8,
EGL_GREEN_SIZE, 8,
EGL_BLUE_SIZE, 8,
EGL_SURFACE_TYPE, EGL_PBUFFER_BIT,
EGL_ALPHA_SIZE, 0,
EGL_NONE
};
EGLint num_configs;
if (!eglChooseConfig(
static_cast<EGLDisplay*>(eglGetDisplay(EGL_DEFAULT_DISPLAY)),
config_attribs,
&egl_config_,
1,
&num_configs)) {
return false;
}
return SetDecoderMediaTypes();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int remove_calls() const { return remove_calls_; }
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 154,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext3_acquire_dquot(struct dquot *dquot)
{
int ret, err;
handle_t *handle;
handle = ext3_journal_start(dquot_to_inode(dquot),
EXT3_QUOTA_INIT_BLOCKS(dquot->dq_sb));
if (IS_ERR(handle))
return PTR_ERR(handle);
ret = dquot_acquire(dquot);
err = ext3_journal_stop(handle);
if (!ret)
ret = err;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 32,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
int error = 0;
if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry))
return 0;
profile = aa_current_profile();
if (!unconfined(profile)) {
struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid,
d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
};
error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0,
MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE |
AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE,
&cond);
if (!error)
error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path,
0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE |
AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.
SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.
Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.
Fixes: bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vrrp_group_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_sgroup_t *vgroup = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp_sync_group);
if (vgroup->iname) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Group list already specified for sync group %s", vgroup->gname);
skip_block(true);
return;
}
vgroup->iname = read_value_block(strvec);
if (!vgroup->iname)
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Warning - sync group %s has empty group block", vgroup->gname);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sctp_chunk_destroy(struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&chunk->list));
list_del_init(&chunk->transmitted_list);
consume_skb(chunk->skb);
consume_skb(chunk->auth_chunk);
SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_DEC(chunk);
kmem_cache_free(sctp_chunk_cachep, chunk);
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeMetricsServiceClient::RegisterForProfileEvents(Profile* profile) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (chromeos::ProfileHelper::IsSigninProfile(profile) ||
chromeos::ProfileHelper::IsLockScreenAppProfile(profile)) {
return true;
}
#endif
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_MACOSX) || \
(defined(OS_LINUX) && !defined(OS_CHROMEOS))
metrics::DesktopProfileSessionDurationsServiceFactory::GetForBrowserContext(
profile);
#endif
history::HistoryService* history_service =
HistoryServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile,
ServiceAccessType::IMPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (!history_service) {
return false;
}
ObserveServiceForDeletions(history_service);
syncer::SyncService* sync =
ProfileSyncServiceFactory::GetSyncServiceForBrowserContext(profile);
if (!sync) {
return false;
}
ObserveServiceForSyncDisables(sync, profile->GetPrefs());
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(tee, int, fdin, int, fdout, size_t, len, unsigned int, flags)
{
struct fd in;
int error;
if (unlikely(flags & ~SPLICE_F_ALL))
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(!len))
return 0;
error = -EBADF;
in = fdget(fdin);
if (in.file) {
if (in.file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
struct fd out = fdget(fdout);
if (out.file) {
if (out.file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
error = do_tee(in.file, out.file,
len, flags);
fdput(out);
}
}
fdput(in);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ffs_epfile_write_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *from)
{
struct ffs_io_data io_data, *p = &io_data;
ssize_t res;
ENTER();
if (!is_sync_kiocb(kiocb)) {
p = kmalloc(sizeof(io_data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!p))
return -ENOMEM;
p->aio = true;
} else {
p->aio = false;
}
p->read = false;
p->kiocb = kiocb;
p->data = *from;
p->mm = current->mm;
kiocb->private = p;
if (p->aio)
kiocb_set_cancel_fn(kiocb, ffs_aio_cancel);
res = ffs_epfile_io(kiocb->ki_filp, p);
if (res == -EIOCBQUEUED)
return res;
if (p->aio)
kfree(p);
else
*from = p->data;
return res;
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ReadAndVerifyTransaction(net::HttpTransaction* trans,
const MockTransaction& trans_info) {
std::string content;
int rv = ReadTransaction(trans, &content);
EXPECT_EQ(net::OK, rv);
std::string expected(trans_info.data);
EXPECT_EQ(expected, content);
}
Commit Message: Http cache: Test deleting an entry with a pending_entry when
adding the truncated flag.
BUG=125159
TEST=net_unittests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10356113
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139331 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _nfs4_proc_lookup(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name,
struct nfs_fh *fhandle, struct nfs_fattr *fattr)
{
int status;
dprintk("NFS call lookup %s\n", name->name);
status = _nfs4_proc_lookupfh(NFS_SERVER(dir), NFS_FH(dir), name, fhandle, fattr);
if (status == -NFS4ERR_MOVED)
status = nfs4_get_referral(dir, name, fattr, fhandle);
dprintk("NFS reply lookup: %d\n", status);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cifs_reconnect(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
{
int rc = 0;
struct list_head *tmp, *tmp2;
struct cifsSesInfo *ses;
struct cifsTconInfo *tcon;
struct mid_q_entry *mid_entry;
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
if (server->tcpStatus == CifsExiting) {
/* the demux thread will exit normally
next time through the loop */
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
return rc;
} else
server->tcpStatus = CifsNeedReconnect;
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
server->maxBuf = 0;
cFYI(1, "Reconnecting tcp session");
/* before reconnecting the tcp session, mark the smb session (uid)
and the tid bad so they are not used until reconnected */
cFYI(1, "%s: marking sessions and tcons for reconnect", __func__);
spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
list_for_each(tmp, &server->smb_ses_list) {
ses = list_entry(tmp, struct cifsSesInfo, smb_ses_list);
ses->need_reconnect = true;
ses->ipc_tid = 0;
list_for_each(tmp2, &ses->tcon_list) {
tcon = list_entry(tmp2, struct cifsTconInfo, tcon_list);
tcon->need_reconnect = true;
}
}
spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
/* do not want to be sending data on a socket we are freeing */
cFYI(1, "%s: tearing down socket", __func__);
mutex_lock(&server->srv_mutex);
if (server->ssocket) {
cFYI(1, "State: 0x%x Flags: 0x%lx", server->ssocket->state,
server->ssocket->flags);
kernel_sock_shutdown(server->ssocket, SHUT_WR);
cFYI(1, "Post shutdown state: 0x%x Flags: 0x%lx",
server->ssocket->state,
server->ssocket->flags);
sock_release(server->ssocket);
server->ssocket = NULL;
}
server->sequence_number = 0;
server->session_estab = false;
kfree(server->session_key.response);
server->session_key.response = NULL;
server->session_key.len = 0;
server->lstrp = jiffies;
mutex_unlock(&server->srv_mutex);
/* mark submitted MIDs for retry and issue callback */
cFYI(1, "%s: issuing mid callbacks", __func__);
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
list_for_each_safe(tmp, tmp2, &server->pending_mid_q) {
mid_entry = list_entry(tmp, struct mid_q_entry, qhead);
if (mid_entry->midState == MID_REQUEST_SUBMITTED)
mid_entry->midState = MID_RETRY_NEEDED;
list_del_init(&mid_entry->qhead);
mid_entry->callback(mid_entry);
}
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
while ((server->tcpStatus != CifsExiting) &&
(server->tcpStatus != CifsGood)) {
try_to_freeze();
/* we should try only the port we connected to before */
rc = generic_ip_connect(server);
if (rc) {
cFYI(1, "reconnect error %d", rc);
msleep(3000);
} else {
atomic_inc(&tcpSesReconnectCount);
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
if (server->tcpStatus != CifsExiting)
server->tcpStatus = CifsGood;
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
}
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount
Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.
This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <ysharma@cymer.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Bignum ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
{
char *p;
int length;
Bignum b;
ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &p, &length);
if (!p)
return NULL;
if (p[0] & 0x80)
return NULL;
b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);
return b;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void limitedWithInvalidAndMissingDefaultAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
String resultValue = imp->fastGetAttribute(HTMLNames::limitedwithinvalidandmissingdefaultattributeAttr);
if (resultValue.isEmpty()) {
resultValue = "left";
} else if (equalIgnoringCase(resultValue, "left")) {
resultValue = "left";
} else if (equalIgnoringCase(resultValue, "right")) {
resultValue = "right";
} else {
resultValue = "left";
}
v8SetReturnValueString(info, resultValue, info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kadm5_chpass_principal_3(void *server_handle,
krb5_principal principal, krb5_boolean keepold,
int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple,
char *password)
{
krb5_int32 now;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec pol;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
int ret, ret2, last_pwd, hist_added;
krb5_boolean have_pol = FALSE;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
osa_pw_hist_ent hist;
krb5_keyblock *act_mkey, *hist_keyblocks = NULL;
krb5_kvno act_kvno, hist_kvno;
int new_n_ks_tuple = 0;
krb5_key_salt_tuple *new_ks_tuple = NULL;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
hist_added = 0;
memset(&hist, 0, sizeof(hist));
if (principal == NULL || password == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if ((krb5_principal_compare(handle->context,
principal, hist_princ)) == TRUE)
return KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL;
if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, principal, &kdb, &adb)))
return(ret);
ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, adb.policy, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple,
&new_n_ks_tuple, &new_ks_tuple);
if (ret)
goto done;
if ((adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, adb.policy, &pol, &have_pol);
if (ret)
goto done;
}
if (have_pol) {
/* Create a password history entry before we change kdb's key_data. */
ret = kdb_get_hist_key(handle, &hist_keyblocks, &hist_kvno);
if (ret)
goto done;
ret = create_history_entry(handle->context, &hist_keyblocks[0],
kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data, &hist);
if (ret)
goto done;
}
if ((ret = passwd_check(handle, password, have_pol ? &pol : NULL,
principal)))
goto done;
ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, &act_kvno, &act_mkey);
if (ret)
goto done;
ret = krb5_dbe_cpw(handle->context, act_mkey, new_ks_tuple, new_n_ks_tuple,
password, 0 /* increment kvno */,
keepold, kdb);
if (ret)
goto done;
ret = krb5_dbe_update_mkvno(handle->context, kdb, act_kvno);
if (ret)
goto done;
kdb->attributes &= ~KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE;
ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now);
if (ret)
goto done;
if ((adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) {
/* the policy was loaded before */
ret = krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, &last_pwd);
if (ret)
goto done;
#if 0
/*
* The spec says this check is overridden if the caller has
* modify privilege. The admin server therefore makes this
* check itself (in chpass_principal_wrapper, misc.c). A
* local caller implicitly has all authorization bits.
*/
if ((now - last_pwd) < pol.pw_min_life &&
!(kdb->attributes & KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE)) {
ret = KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON;
goto done;
}
#endif
ret = check_pw_reuse(handle->context, hist_keyblocks,
kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data,
1, &hist);
if (ret)
goto done;
if (pol.pw_history_num > 1) {
/* If hist_kvno has changed since the last password change, we
* can't check the history. */
if (adb.admin_history_kvno == hist_kvno) {
ret = check_pw_reuse(handle->context, hist_keyblocks,
kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data,
adb.old_key_len, adb.old_keys);
if (ret)
goto done;
}
ret = add_to_history(handle->context, hist_kvno, &adb, &pol,
&hist);
if (ret)
goto done;
hist_added = 1;
}
if (pol.pw_max_life)
kdb->pw_expiration = now + pol.pw_max_life;
else
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
} else {
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
#ifdef USE_PASSWORD_SERVER
if (kadm5_use_password_server () &&
(krb5_princ_size (handle->context, principal) == 1)) {
krb5_data *princ = krb5_princ_component (handle->context, principal, 0);
const char *path = "/usr/sbin/mkpassdb";
char *argv[] = { "mkpassdb", "-setpassword", NULL, NULL };
char *pstring = NULL;
if (!ret) {
pstring = malloc ((princ->length + 1) * sizeof (char));
if (pstring == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; }
}
if (!ret) {
memcpy (pstring, princ->data, princ->length);
pstring [princ->length] = '\0';
argv[2] = pstring;
ret = kadm5_launch_task (handle->context, path, argv, password);
}
if (pstring != NULL)
free (pstring);
if (ret)
goto done;
}
#endif
ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now);
if (ret)
goto done;
/* unlock principal on this KDC */
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
/* key data and attributes changed, let the database provider know */
kdb->mask = KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_ATTRIBUTES |
KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT;
/* | KADM5_CPW_FUNCTION */
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_chpass(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, principal, keepold,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
if (ret)
goto done;
if ((ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb)))
goto done;
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_chpass(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, principal,
keepold, new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
ret = KADM5_OK;
done:
free(new_ks_tuple);
if (!hist_added && hist.key_data)
free_history_entry(handle->context, &hist);
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
kdb_free_keyblocks(handle, hist_keyblocks);
if (have_pol && (ret2 = kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &pol))
&& !ret)
ret = ret2;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Return only new keys in randkey [CVE-2014-5351]
In kadmind's randkey operation, if a client specifies the keepold
flag, do not include the preserved old keys in the response.
CVE-2014-5351:
An authenticated remote attacker can retrieve the current keys for a
service principal when generating a new set of keys for that
principal. The attacker needs to be authenticated as a user who has
the elevated privilege for randomizing the keys of other principals.
Normally, when a Kerberos administrator randomizes the keys of a
service principal, kadmind returns only the new keys. This prevents
an administrator who lacks legitimate privileged access to a service
from forging tickets to authenticate to that service. If the
"keepold" flag to the kadmin randkey RPC operation is true, kadmind
retains the old keys in the KDC database as intended, but also
unexpectedly returns the old keys to the client, which exposes the
service to ticket forgery attacks from the administrator.
A mitigating factor is that legitimate clients of the affected service
will start failing to authenticate to the service once they begin to
receive service tickets encrypted in the new keys. The affected
service will be unable to decrypt the newly issued tickets, possibly
alerting the legitimate administrator of the affected service.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[tlyu@mit.edu: CVE description and CVSS score]
ticket: 8018 (new)
target_version: 1.13
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-255 | 0 | 36,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint::RestoreSize() {
if (frame()) {
blink::WebView* web_view = frame_.GetFrame()->view();
web_view->resize(prev_view_size_);
if (blink::WebFrame* web_frame = web_view->mainFrame())
web_frame->setScrollOffset(prev_scroll_offset_);
}
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_tp(const struct atm_trafprm *tp)
{
/* @@@ Should be merged with adjust_tp */
if (!tp->traffic_class || tp->traffic_class == ATM_ANYCLASS)
return 0;
if (tp->traffic_class != ATM_UBR && !tp->min_pcr && !tp->pcr &&
!tp->max_pcr)
return -EINVAL;
if (tp->min_pcr == ATM_MAX_PCR)
return -EINVAL;
if (tp->min_pcr && tp->max_pcr && tp->max_pcr != ATM_MAX_PCR &&
tp->min_pcr > tp->max_pcr)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* We allow pcr to be outside [min_pcr,max_pcr], because later
* adjustment may still push it in the valid range.
*/
return 0;
}
Commit Message: atm: update msg_namelen in vcc_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about vcc_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContinueDrag(views::View* view, const ui::LocatedEvent& event) {
if (drag_controller_.get() &&
drag_controller_->event_source() == EventSourceFromEvent(event)) {
gfx::Point screen_location(event.location());
views::View::ConvertPointToScreen(view, &screen_location);
drag_controller_->Drag(screen_location);
}
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,682 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *ipmr_mfc_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
{
struct ipmr_mfc_iter *it = seq->private;
struct net *net = seq_file_net(seq);
struct mr6_table *mrt;
mrt = ip6mr_get_table(net, RT6_TABLE_DFLT);
if (!mrt)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
it->mrt = mrt;
return *pos ? ipmr_mfc_seq_idx(net, seq->private, *pos - 1)
: SEQ_START_TOKEN;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 93,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: authentic_pin_reset(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_pin_cmd_data *data, int *tries_left)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct authentic_private_data *prv_data = (struct authentic_private_data *) card->drv_data;
struct sc_pin_cmd_data pin_cmd, puk_cmd;
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned reference;
int rv, ii;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
sc_log(ctx, "reset PIN (ref:%i,lengths %i/%i)", data->pin_reference, data->pin1.len, data->pin2.len);
memset(prv_data->pins_sha1[data->pin_reference], 0, sizeof(prv_data->pins_sha1[0]));
memset(&pin_cmd, 0, sizeof(pin_cmd));
pin_cmd.pin_reference = data->pin_reference;
pin_cmd.pin_type = data->pin_type;
pin_cmd.pin1.tries_left = -1;
rv = authentic_pin_get_policy(card, &pin_cmd);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Get 'PIN policy' error");
if (pin_cmd.pin1.acls[AUTHENTIC_ACL_NUM_PIN_RESET].method == SC_AC_CHV) {
for (ii=0;ii<8;ii++) {
unsigned char mask = 0x01 << ii;
if (pin_cmd.pin1.acls[AUTHENTIC_ACL_NUM_PIN_RESET].key_ref & mask) {
memset(&puk_cmd, 0, sizeof(puk_cmd));
puk_cmd.pin_reference = ii + 1;
rv = authentic_pin_get_policy(card, &puk_cmd);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Get 'PIN policy' error");
if (puk_cmd.pin_type == SC_AC_CHV)
break;
}
}
if (ii < 8) {
puk_cmd.pin1.data = data->pin1.data;
puk_cmd.pin1.len = data->pin1.len;
rv = authentic_pin_verify(card, &puk_cmd);
if (tries_left && rv == SC_ERROR_PIN_CODE_INCORRECT)
*tries_left = puk_cmd.pin1.tries_left;
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Cannot verify PUK");
}
}
reference = data->pin_reference;
if (data->pin2.len) {
unsigned char pin_data[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE];
memset(pin_data, pin_cmd.pin1.pad_char, sizeof(pin_data));
memcpy(pin_data, data->pin2.data, data->pin2.len);
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x2C, 0x02, reference);
apdu.data = pin_data;
apdu.datalen = pin_cmd.pin1.pad_length;
apdu.lc = pin_cmd.pin1.pad_length;
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "PIN cmd failed");
}
else if (data->pin2.data) {
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_1, 0x2C, 3, reference);
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "PIN cmd failed");
}
else {
rv = authentic_chv_set_pinpad(card, reference);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Failed to set PIN with pin-pad");
}
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __detach_extent_node(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
struct extent_tree *et, struct extent_node *en)
{
rb_erase(&en->rb_node, &et->root);
atomic_dec(&et->node_cnt);
atomic_dec(&sbi->total_ext_node);
if (et->cached_en == en)
et->cached_en = NULL;
kmem_cache_free(extent_node_slab, en);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a bug caused by NULL extent tree
Thread A: Thread B:
-f2fs_remount
-sbi->mount_opt.opt = 0;
<--- -f2fs_iget
-do_read_inode
-f2fs_init_extent_tree
-F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree is NULL
-default_options && parse_options
-remount return
<--- -f2fs_map_blocks
-f2fs_lookup_extent_tree
-f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !et);
The same problem with f2fs_new_inode.
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,070 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jsvCompareString(JsVar *va, JsVar *vb, size_t starta, size_t startb, bool equalAtEndOfString) {
JsvStringIterator ita, itb;
jsvStringIteratorNew(&ita, va, starta);
jsvStringIteratorNew(&itb, vb, startb);
while (true) {
int ca = jsvStringIteratorGetCharOrMinusOne(&ita);
int cb = jsvStringIteratorGetCharOrMinusOne(&itb);
if (ca != cb) {
jsvStringIteratorFree(&ita);
jsvStringIteratorFree(&itb);
if ((ca<0 || cb<0) && equalAtEndOfString) return 0;
return ca - cb;
}
if (ca < 0) { // both equal, but end of string
jsvStringIteratorFree(&ita);
jsvStringIteratorFree(&itb);
return 0;
}
jsvStringIteratorNext(&ita);
jsvStringIteratorNext(&itb);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int shmem_replace_page(struct page **pagep, gfp_t gfp,
struct shmem_inode_info *info, pgoff_t index)
{
struct page *oldpage, *newpage;
struct address_space *swap_mapping;
pgoff_t swap_index;
int error;
oldpage = *pagep;
swap_index = page_private(oldpage);
swap_mapping = page_mapping(oldpage);
/*
* We have arrived here because our zones are constrained, so don't
* limit chance of success by further cpuset and node constraints.
*/
gfp &= ~GFP_CONSTRAINT_MASK;
newpage = shmem_alloc_page(gfp, info, index);
if (!newpage)
return -ENOMEM;
page_cache_get(newpage);
copy_highpage(newpage, oldpage);
flush_dcache_page(newpage);
__set_page_locked(newpage);
SetPageUptodate(newpage);
SetPageSwapBacked(newpage);
set_page_private(newpage, swap_index);
SetPageSwapCache(newpage);
/*
* Our caller will very soon move newpage out of swapcache, but it's
* a nice clean interface for us to replace oldpage by newpage there.
*/
spin_lock_irq(&swap_mapping->tree_lock);
error = shmem_radix_tree_replace(swap_mapping, swap_index, oldpage,
newpage);
if (!error) {
__inc_zone_page_state(newpage, NR_FILE_PAGES);
__dec_zone_page_state(oldpage, NR_FILE_PAGES);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&swap_mapping->tree_lock);
if (unlikely(error)) {
/*
* Is this possible? I think not, now that our callers check
* both PageSwapCache and page_private after getting page lock;
* but be defensive. Reverse old to newpage for clear and free.
*/
oldpage = newpage;
} else {
mem_cgroup_replace_page_cache(oldpage, newpage);
lru_cache_add_anon(newpage);
*pagep = newpage;
}
ClearPageSwapCache(oldpage);
set_page_private(oldpage, 0);
unlock_page(oldpage);
page_cache_release(oldpage);
page_cache_release(oldpage);
return error;
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MaybeRunCallback() {
if (wait_for_copy_result || !display_did_finish_frame)
return false;
callback.Run(has_damage, main_frame_content_updated, std::move(bitmap));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_set_progressive_read_fn(png_structp png_ptr, png_voidp progressive_ptr,
png_progressive_info_ptr info_fn, png_progressive_row_ptr row_fn,
png_progressive_end_ptr end_fn)
{
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
png_ptr->info_fn = info_fn;
png_ptr->row_fn = row_fn;
png_ptr->end_fn = end_fn;
png_set_read_fn(png_ptr, progressive_ptr, png_push_fill_buffer);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void shrink_dcache_parent(struct dentry *parent)
{
for (;;) {
struct select_data data;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&data.dispose);
data.start = parent;
data.found = 0;
d_walk(parent, &data, select_collect, NULL);
if (!data.found)
break;
shrink_dentry_list(&data.dispose);
cond_resched();
}
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int red_channel_client_urgent_marshaller_is_active(RedChannelClient *rcc)
{
return (rcc->send_data.marshaller == rcc->send_data.urgent.marshaller);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void cirrus_bitblt_bgcol(CirrusVGAState *s)
{
unsigned int color;
switch (s->cirrus_blt_pixelwidth) {
case 1:
s->cirrus_blt_bgcol = s->cirrus_shadow_gr0;
break;
case 2:
color = s->cirrus_shadow_gr0 | (s->vga.gr[0x10] << 8);
s->cirrus_blt_bgcol = le16_to_cpu(color);
break;
case 3:
s->cirrus_blt_bgcol = s->cirrus_shadow_gr0 |
(s->vga.gr[0x10] << 8) | (s->vga.gr[0x12] << 16);
break;
default:
case 4:
color = s->cirrus_shadow_gr0 | (s->vga.gr[0x10] << 8) |
(s->vga.gr[0x12] << 16) | (s->vga.gr[0x14] << 24);
s->cirrus_blt_bgcol = le32_to_cpu(color);
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,561 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void intel_ds_init(void)
{
/*
* No support for 32bit formats
*/
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DTES64))
return;
x86_pmu.bts = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BTS);
x86_pmu.pebs = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PEBS);
if (x86_pmu.pebs) {
char pebs_type = x86_pmu.intel_cap.pebs_trap ? '+' : '-';
int format = x86_pmu.intel_cap.pebs_format;
switch (format) {
case 0:
printk(KERN_CONT "PEBS fmt0%c, ", pebs_type);
x86_pmu.pebs_record_size = sizeof(struct pebs_record_core);
x86_pmu.drain_pebs = intel_pmu_drain_pebs_core;
break;
case 1:
printk(KERN_CONT "PEBS fmt1%c, ", pebs_type);
x86_pmu.pebs_record_size = sizeof(struct pebs_record_nhm);
x86_pmu.drain_pebs = intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm;
break;
default:
printk(KERN_CONT "no PEBS fmt%d%c, ", format, pebs_type);
x86_pmu.pebs = 0;
}
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void buffer_advance(Buffer *buf, size_t len)
{
memmove(buf->buffer, buf->buffer + len,
(buf->offset - len));
buf->offset -= len;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,951 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ManifestChangeNotifier::DidChangeManifest() {
if (weak_factory_.HasWeakPtrs())
return;
if (!render_frame()->GetWebFrame()->IsLoading()) {
render_frame()
->GetTaskRunner(blink::TaskType::kUnspecedLoading)
->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&ManifestChangeNotifier::ReportManifestChange,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
return;
}
ReportManifestChange();
}
Commit Message: Fail the web app manifest fetch if the document is sandboxed.
This ensures that sandboxed pages are regarded as non-PWAs, and that
other features in the browser process which trust the web manifest do
not receive the manifest at all if the document itself cannot access the
manifest.
BUG=771709
Change-Id: Ifd4d00c2fccff8cc0e5e8d2457bd55b992b0a8f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/866529
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531121}
CWE ID: | 1 | 172,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormControlElement::setFormMethod(const AtomicString& value) {
setAttribute(kFormmethodAttr, value);
}
Commit Message: autofocus: Fix a crash with an autofocus element in a document without browsing context.
ShouldAutofocus() should check existence of the browsing context.
Otherwise, doc.TopFrameOrigin() returns null.
Before crrev.com/695830, ShouldAutofocus() was called only for
rendered elements. That is to say, the document always had
browsing context.
Bug: 1003228
Change-Id: I2a941c34e9707d44869a6d7585dc7fb9f06e3bf4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1800902
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keishi Hattori <keishi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#696291}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 136,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __must_check __sta_info_destroy_part1(struct sta_info *sta)
{
struct ieee80211_local *local;
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
int ret;
might_sleep();
if (!sta)
return -ENOENT;
local = sta->local;
sdata = sta->sdata;
lockdep_assert_held(&local->sta_mtx);
/*
* Before removing the station from the driver and
* rate control, it might still start new aggregation
* sessions -- block that to make sure the tear-down
* will be sufficient.
*/
set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA);
ieee80211_sta_tear_down_BA_sessions(sta, AGG_STOP_DESTROY_STA);
ret = sta_info_hash_del(local, sta);
if (WARN_ON(ret))
return ret;
list_del_rcu(&sta->list);
drv_sta_pre_rcu_remove(local, sta->sdata, sta);
if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN &&
rcu_access_pointer(sdata->u.vlan.sta) == sta)
RCU_INIT_POINTER(sdata->u.vlan.sta, NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix AP powersave TX vs. wakeup race
There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while
a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes
up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX
path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be
processed while a packet is being transmitted.
This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list
is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on
the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in
the TX path.
As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime
soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the
station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time.
Additionally, it can lead to the crash below.
Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock.
Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations.
In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to
reduce locking overhead.
BUG: unable to handle kernel
NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0
IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1
EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000
ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000)
iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9
Stack:
e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0
ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210
ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002
Call Trace:
[<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211]
[<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211]
[<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211]
[<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211]
[<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211]
[<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950
[<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250
[<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150
[<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <yaara.rozenblum@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
[reword commit log, use a separate lock]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 38,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: microcode_pointer(struct microcode_intel **mc_saved,
unsigned long *mc_saved_in_initrd,
unsigned long initrd_start, int mc_saved_count)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < mc_saved_count; i++)
mc_saved[i] = (struct microcode_intel *)
(mc_saved_in_initrd[i] + initrd_start);
}
Commit Message: x86/microcode/intel: Guard against stack overflow in the loader
mc_saved_tmp is a static array allocated on the stack, we need to make
sure mc_saved_count stays within its bounds, otherwise we're overflowing
the stack in _save_mc(). A specially crafted microcode header could lead
to a kernel crash or potentially kernel execution.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422964824-22056-1-git-send-email-quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void rps_lock(struct softnet_data *sd)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
spin_lock(&sd->input_pkt_queue.lock);
#endif
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,299 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DragController::DoSystemDrag(DragImage* image,
const IntPoint& drag_location,
const IntPoint& event_pos,
DataTransfer* data_transfer,
LocalFrame* frame,
bool for_link) {
did_initiate_drag_ = true;
drag_initiator_ = frame->GetDocument();
IntPoint adjusted_drag_location =
frame->View()->ContentsToViewport(drag_location);
IntPoint adjusted_event_pos = frame->View()->ContentsToViewport(event_pos);
IntSize offset_size(adjusted_event_pos - adjusted_drag_location);
WebPoint offset_point(offset_size.Width(), offset_size.Height());
WebDragData drag_data = data_transfer->GetDataObject()->ToWebDragData();
WebDragOperationsMask drag_operation_mask =
static_cast<WebDragOperationsMask>(data_transfer->SourceOperation());
WebImage drag_image;
if (image) {
float resolution_scale = image->ResolutionScale();
float device_scale_factor =
page_->GetChromeClient().GetScreenInfo().device_scale_factor;
if (device_scale_factor != resolution_scale) {
DCHECK_GT(resolution_scale, 0);
float scale = device_scale_factor / resolution_scale;
image->Scale(scale, scale);
}
drag_image = image->Bitmap();
}
page_->GetChromeClient().StartDragging(frame, drag_data, drag_operation_mask,
drag_image, offset_point);
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::SetIdleNotificationDelayInMs(
int64_t idle_notification_delay_in_ms) {
idle_notification_delay_in_ms_ = idle_notification_delay_in_ms;
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldEraseMarkersAfterChangeSelection(TextCheckingType) const
{
return true;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t version_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct uio_device *idev = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", idev->info->version);
}
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,324 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void request_gathered_write(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn)
{
assert(conn->state < H2O_HTTP2_CONN_STATE_IS_CLOSING);
if (conn->_write.buf_in_flight == NULL) {
if (!h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry))
h2o_timeout_link(conn->super.ctx->loop, &conn->super.ctx->zero_timeout, &conn->_write.timeout_entry);
}
}
Commit Message: h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham.
CWE ID: | 0 | 52,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void SetupHistoryPageTest(Browser* browser,
const std::string page_url,
const std::string page_title) {
HistoryService* history_service =
browser->profile()->GetHistoryService(Profile::IMPLICIT_ACCESS);
const GURL history_url = GURL(page_url);
history_service->AddPage(history_url, history::SOURCE_BROWSED);
history_service->SetPageTitle(history_url, UTF8ToUTF16(page_title));
}
Commit Message: Disable WebUIBidiCheckerBrowserTestRTL.TestSettingsFramePasswords for being flaky on all platforms.
TBR=jeremy@chromium.org.
BUG=95425
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10447119
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139814 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 103,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: callout_name_table_hash(st_callout_name_key* x)
{
UChar *p;
int val = 0;
p = x->s;
while (p < x->end) {
val = val * 997 + (int )*p++;
}
/* use intptr_t for escape warning in Windows */
return val + (val >> 5) + ((intptr_t )x->enc & 0xffff) + x->type;
}
Commit Message: fix #147: Stack Exhaustion Problem caused by some parsing functions in regcomp.c making recursive calls to themselves.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 87,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AP_DECLARE(void) ap_hook_check_authz(ap_HOOK_auth_checker_t *pf,
const char * const *aszPre,
const char * const *aszSucc,
int nOrder, int type)
{
if ((type & AP_AUTH_INTERNAL_MASK) == AP_AUTH_INTERNAL_PER_CONF) {
++auth_internal_per_conf_hooks;
}
ap_hook_auth_checker(pf, aszPre, aszSucc, nOrder);
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2015-3183 (cve.mitre.org)
Replacement of ap_some_auth_required (unusable in Apache httpd 2.4)
with new ap_some_authn_required and ap_force_authn hook.
Submitted by: breser
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684524 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 43,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vfio_pci_intx_mask(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = vdev->pdev;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&vdev->irqlock, flags);
/*
* Masking can come from interrupt, ioctl, or config space
* via INTx disable. The latter means this can get called
* even when not using intx delivery. In this case, just
* try to have the physical bit follow the virtual bit.
*/
if (unlikely(!is_intx(vdev))) {
if (vdev->pci_2_3)
pci_intx(pdev, 0);
} else if (!vdev->ctx[0].masked) {
/*
* Can't use check_and_mask here because we always want to
* mask, not just when something is pending.
*/
if (vdev->pci_2_3)
pci_intx(pdev, 0);
else
disable_irq_nosync(pdev->irq);
vdev->ctx[0].masked = true;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vdev->irqlock, flags);
}
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 48,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: make_data_reader(Gif_Reader *grr, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t length)
{
grr->v = data;
grr->pos = 0;
grr->length = length;
grr->is_record = 1;
grr->byte_getter = record_byte_getter;
grr->block_getter = record_block_getter;
grr->eofer = record_eofer;
}
Commit Message: gif_read: Set last_name = NULL unconditionally.
With a non-malicious GIF, last_name is set to NULL when a name
extension is followed by an image. Reported in #117, via
Debian, via a KAIST fuzzing program.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 86,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int is_pcm(enum AVCodecID codec_id)
{
/* we only care about "normal" PCM codecs until we get samples */
return codec_id >= AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S16LE && codec_id < AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S24DAUD;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool observed_before_proxy_headers_sent() const {
return observed_before_proxy_headers_sent_;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SubpelVarianceTest<SubpelVarianceFunctionType>::RefTest() {
for (int x = 0; x < 16; ++x) {
for (int y = 0; y < 16; ++y) {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
src_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_ + width_ + height_ + 1; j++) {
ref_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
unsigned int sse1, sse2;
unsigned int var1;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var1 = subpel_variance_(ref_, width_ + 1, x, y,
src_, width_, &sse1));
const unsigned int var2 = subpel_variance_ref(ref_, src_, log2width_,
log2height_, x, y, &sse2);
EXPECT_EQ(sse1, sse2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
EXPECT_EQ(var1, var2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AutolaunchInfoBarDelegate::Accept() {
action_taken_ = true;
auto_launch_trial::UpdateInfobarResponseMetric(
auto_launch_trial::INFOBAR_OK);
return true;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_vm_define_module(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value outer, mrb_sym id)
{
check_if_class_or_module(mrb, outer);
if (mrb_const_defined_at(mrb, outer, id)) {
mrb_value old = mrb_const_get(mrb, outer, id);
if (mrb_type(old) != MRB_TT_MODULE) {
mrb_raisef(mrb, E_TYPE_ERROR, "%S is not a module", mrb_inspect(mrb, old));
}
return mrb_class_ptr(old);
}
return define_module(mrb, id, mrb_class_ptr(outer));
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 82,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IDNSpoofChecker::SetAllowedUnicodeSet(UErrorCode* status) {
if (U_FAILURE(*status))
return;
const icu::UnicodeSet* recommended_set =
uspoof_getRecommendedUnicodeSet(status);
icu::UnicodeSet allowed_set;
allowed_set.addAll(*recommended_set);
const icu::UnicodeSet* inclusion_set = uspoof_getInclusionUnicodeSet(status);
allowed_set.addAll(*inclusion_set);
allowed_set.remove(0x338u);
allowed_set.remove(0x58au); // Armenian Hyphen
allowed_set.remove(0x2010u);
allowed_set.remove(0x2019u); // Right Single Quotation Mark
allowed_set.remove(0x2027u);
allowed_set.remove(0x30a0u); // Katakana-Hiragana Double Hyphen
allowed_set.remove(0x2bbu); // Modifier Letter Turned Comma
allowed_set.remove(0x2bcu); // Modifier Letter Apostrophe
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
allowed_set.remove(0x0620u);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Cu);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Du);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Eu);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Fu);
#endif
allowed_set.remove(0x01CDu, 0x01DCu); // Latin Ext B; Pinyin
allowed_set.remove(0x1C80u, 0x1C8Fu); // Cyrillic Extended-C
allowed_set.remove(0x1E00u, 0x1E9Bu); // Latin Extended Additional
allowed_set.remove(0x1F00u, 0x1FFFu); // Greek Extended
allowed_set.remove(0xA640u, 0xA69Fu); // Cyrillic Extended-B
allowed_set.remove(0xA720u, 0xA7FFu); // Latin Extended-D
uspoof_setAllowedUnicodeSet(checker_, &allowed_set, status);
}
Commit Message: Map U+10DE to 3 when checking for confusables
Georgian letter U+10DE (პ) looks similar to the number 3. This cl adds
U+10DE to the mapping to 3 when determining whether to fall back to
punycode when displaying URLs.
Bug: 895207
Change-Id: I49713d7772428f8d364f371850a42913669acc4b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1284396
Commit-Queue: Livvie Lin <livvielin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600193}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void clear_system_oom(void)
{
struct zone *zone;
spin_lock(&zone_scan_lock);
for_each_populated_zone(zone)
zone_clear_flag(zone, ZONE_OOM_LOCKED);
spin_unlock(&zone_scan_lock);
}
Commit Message: oom: fix integer overflow of points in oom_badness
commit ff05b6f7ae762b6eb464183eec994b28ea09f6dd upstream.
An integer overflow will happen on 64bit archs if task's sum of rss,
swapents and nr_ptes exceeds (2^31)/1000 value. This was introduced by
commit
f755a04 oom: use pte pages in OOM score
where the oom score computation was divided into several steps and it's no
longer computed as one expression in unsigned long(rss, swapents, nr_pte
are unsigned long), where the result value assigned to points(int) is in
range(1..1000). So there could be an int overflow while computing
176 points *= 1000;
and points may have negative value. Meaning the oom score for a mem hog task
will be one.
196 if (points <= 0)
197 return 1;
For example:
[ 3366] 0 3366 35390480 24303939 5 0 0 oom01
Out of memory: Kill process 3366 (oom01) score 1 or sacrifice child
Here the oom1 process consumes more than 24303939(rss)*4096~=92GB physical
memory, but it's oom score is one.
In this situation the mem hog task is skipped and oom killer kills another and
most probably innocent task with oom score greater than one.
The points variable should be of type long instead of int to prevent the
int overflow.
Signed-off-by: Frantisek Hrbata <fhrbata@redhat.com>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aodv_v6_draft_01_rreq(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
u_int i;
const struct aodv_rreq6_draft_01 *ap = (const struct aodv_rreq6_draft_01 *)dat;
ND_TCHECK(*ap);
if (length < sizeof(*ap))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rreq %u %s%s%s%s%shops %u id 0x%08lx\n"
"\tdst %s seq %lu src %s seq %lu", length,
ap->rreq_type & RREQ_JOIN ? "[J]" : "",
ap->rreq_type & RREQ_REPAIR ? "[R]" : "",
ap->rreq_type & RREQ_GRAT ? "[G]" : "",
ap->rreq_type & RREQ_DEST ? "[D]" : "",
ap->rreq_type & RREQ_UNKNOWN ? "[U] " : " ",
ap->rreq_hops,
(unsigned long)EXTRACT_32BITS(&ap->rreq_id),
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ap->rreq_da),
(unsigned long)EXTRACT_32BITS(&ap->rreq_ds),
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ap->rreq_oa),
(unsigned long)EXTRACT_32BITS(&ap->rreq_os)));
i = length - sizeof(*ap);
if (i >= sizeof(struct aodv_ext))
aodv_extension(ndo, (const struct aodv_ext *)(dat + sizeof(*ap)), i);
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|rreq"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13002/AODV: Add some missing bounds checks.
In aodv_extension() do a bounds check on the extension header before we
look at it.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, add the RFC number, and check the validity of the
length for the Hello extension.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,476 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static FloatPoint PerspectiveOrigin(const LayoutBox& box) {
const ComputedStyle& style = box.StyleRef();
DCHECK(style.HasPerspective());
FloatSize border_box_size(box.Size());
return FloatPointForLengthPoint(style.PerspectiveOrigin(), border_box_size);
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cm_enter_timewait(struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv)
{
int wait_time;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&cm.lock, flags);
cm_cleanup_timewait(cm_id_priv->timewait_info);
list_add_tail(&cm_id_priv->timewait_info->list, &cm.timewait_list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cm.lock, flags);
/*
* The cm_id could be destroyed by the user before we exit timewait.
* To protect against this, we search for the cm_id after exiting
* timewait before notifying the user that we've exited timewait.
*/
cm_id_priv->id.state = IB_CM_TIMEWAIT;
wait_time = cm_convert_to_ms(cm_id_priv->av.timeout);
queue_delayed_work(cm.wq, &cm_id_priv->timewait_info->work.work,
msecs_to_jiffies(wait_time));
cm_id_priv->timewait_info = NULL;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PeopleHandler::HandleSignout(const base::ListValue* args) {
bool delete_profile = false;
args->GetBoolean(0, &delete_profile);
if (!signin_util::IsUserSignoutAllowedForProfile(profile_)) {
DCHECK(delete_profile);
} else {
SigninManager* signin_manager =
SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
if (signin_manager->IsAuthenticated()) {
if (GetSyncService())
ProfileSyncService::SyncEvent(ProfileSyncService::STOP_FROM_OPTIONS);
signin_metrics::SignoutDelete delete_metric =
delete_profile ? signin_metrics::SignoutDelete::DELETED
: signin_metrics::SignoutDelete::KEEPING;
signin_manager->SignOutAndRemoveAllAccounts(
signin_metrics::USER_CLICKED_SIGNOUT_SETTINGS, delete_metric);
} else {
DCHECK(!delete_profile)
<< "Deleting the profile should only be offered the user is syncing.";
ProfileOAuth2TokenServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)
->RevokeAllCredentials();
}
}
if (delete_profile) {
webui::DeleteProfileAtPath(profile_->GetPath(),
ProfileMetrics::DELETE_PROFILE_SETTINGS);
}
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: local uLong crc32_combine_(crc1, crc2, len2)
uLong crc1;
uLong crc2;
z_off64_t len2;
{
int n;
unsigned long row;
unsigned long even[GF2_DIM]; /* even-power-of-two zeros operator */
unsigned long odd[GF2_DIM]; /* odd-power-of-two zeros operator */
/* degenerate case (also disallow negative lengths) */
if (len2 <= 0)
return crc1;
/* put operator for one zero bit in odd */
odd[0] = 0xedb88320UL; /* CRC-32 polynomial */
row = 1;
for (n = 1; n < GF2_DIM; n++) {
odd[n] = row;
row <<= 1;
}
/* put operator for two zero bits in even */
gf2_matrix_square(even, odd);
/* put operator for four zero bits in odd */
gf2_matrix_square(odd, even);
/* apply len2 zeros to crc1 (first square will put the operator for one
zero byte, eight zero bits, in even) */
do {
/* apply zeros operator for this bit of len2 */
gf2_matrix_square(even, odd);
if (len2 & 1)
crc1 = gf2_matrix_times(even, crc1);
len2 >>= 1;
/* if no more bits set, then done */
if (len2 == 0)
break;
/* another iteration of the loop with odd and even swapped */
gf2_matrix_square(odd, even);
if (len2 & 1)
crc1 = gf2_matrix_times(odd, crc1);
len2 >>= 1;
/* if no more bits set, then done */
} while (len2 != 0);
/* return combined crc */
crc1 ^= crc2;
return crc1;
}
Commit Message: Avoid pre-decrement of pointer in big-endian CRC calculation.
There was a small optimization for PowerPCs to pre-increment a
pointer when accessing a word, instead of post-incrementing. This
required prefacing the loop with a decrement of the pointer,
possibly pointing before the object passed. This is not compliant
with the C standard, for which decrementing a pointer before its
allocated memory is undefined. When tested on a modern PowerPC
with a modern compiler, the optimization no longer has any effect.
Due to all that, and per the recommendation of a security audit of
the zlib code by Trail of Bits and TrustInSoft, in support of the
Mozilla Foundation, this "optimization" was removed, in order to
avoid the possibility of undefined behavior.
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 72,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PlatformSensorProviderWin::StopSensorThread() {
if (sensor_thread_ && sensor_thread_->IsRunning())
sensor_thread_->Stop();
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 149,011 |
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