instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptPromise ImageBitmapFactories::createImageBitmap(EventTarget& eventTarget, CanvasRenderingContext2D* context, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
return createImageBitmap(eventTarget, context->canvas(), exceptionState);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash when creating an ImageBitmap from an invalid canvas
BUG=354356
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/211313003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169973 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 115,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static boolean parse_int( const char **pcur, int *val )
{
const char *cur = *pcur;
int sign = (*cur == '-' ? -1 : 1);
if (*cur == '+' || *cur == '-')
cur++;
if (parse_uint(&cur, (uint *)val)) {
*val *= sign;
*pcur = cur;
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gstd_get_mech(gss_OID mech_oid)
{
#ifdef HAVE_GSS_OID_TO_STR
OM_uint32 maj;
OM_uint32 min;
#endif
gss_buffer_desc buf;
unsigned char *bufp;
unsigned char nibble;
char *ret;
size_t i, k;
if (mech_oid->length == sizeof(KNC_KRB5_MECH_OID) - 1 &&
memcmp(mech_oid->elements, KNC_KRB5_MECH_OID,
sizeof(KNC_KRB5_MECH_OID) - 1) == 0) {
if ((ret = strdup("krb5")) == NULL) {
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("unable to malloc"));
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
#ifdef HAVE_GSS_OID_TO_STR
maj = gss_oid_to_str(&min, mech_oid, &buf);
if (maj != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("unable to display mechanism OID"));
return NULL;
}
ret = strndup(buf.value, buf.length);
#else
ret = strdup("");
#endif
if (!ret)
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("unable to malloc"));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: knc: fix a couple of memory leaks.
One of these can be remotely triggered during the authentication
phase which leads to a remote DoS possibility.
Pointed out by: Imre Rad <radimre83@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 86,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::MaybeShowBookmarkBar(bool animate) {
TRACE_EVENT0("ui::gtk", "BrowserWindowGtk::MaybeShowBookmarkBar");
if (!IsBookmarkBarSupported())
return;
TabContents* tab = GetDisplayedTab();
if (tab)
bookmark_bar_->SetPageNavigator(browser_.get());
BookmarkBar::State state = browser_->bookmark_bar_state();
if (contents_container_->HasPreview() && state == BookmarkBar::DETACHED)
state = BookmarkBar::HIDDEN;
toolbar_->UpdateForBookmarkBarVisibility(state == BookmarkBar::DETACHED);
PlaceBookmarkBar(state == BookmarkBar::DETACHED);
bookmark_bar_->SetBookmarkBarState(
state,
animate ? BookmarkBar::ANIMATE_STATE_CHANGE :
BookmarkBar::DONT_ANIMATE_STATE_CHANGE);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UDPSocketLibevent::DidCompleteRead() {
int result =
InternalRecvFrom(read_buf_.get(), read_buf_len_, recv_from_address_);
if (result != ERR_IO_PENDING) {
read_buf_ = NULL;
read_buf_len_ = 0;
recv_from_address_ = NULL;
bool ok = read_socket_watcher_.StopWatchingFileDescriptor();
DCHECK(ok);
DoReadCallback(result);
}
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 113,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int aio_migratepage(struct address_space *mapping, struct page *new,
struct page *old, enum migrate_mode mode)
{
struct kioctx *ctx;
unsigned long flags;
int rc;
/* Writeback must be complete */
BUG_ON(PageWriteback(old));
put_page(old);
rc = migrate_page_move_mapping(mapping, new, old, NULL, mode);
if (rc != MIGRATEPAGE_SUCCESS) {
get_page(old);
return rc;
}
get_page(new);
/* We can potentially race against kioctx teardown here. Use the
* address_space's private data lock to protect the mapping's
* private_data.
*/
spin_lock(&mapping->private_lock);
ctx = mapping->private_data;
if (ctx) {
pgoff_t idx;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->completion_lock, flags);
migrate_page_copy(new, old);
idx = old->index;
if (idx < (pgoff_t)ctx->nr_pages)
ctx->ring_pages[idx] = new;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->completion_lock, flags);
} else
rc = -EBUSY;
spin_unlock(&mapping->private_lock);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: aio: prevent double free in ioctx_alloc
ioctx_alloc() calls aio_setup_ring() to allocate a ring. If aio_setup_ring()
fails to do so it would call aio_free_ring() before returning, but
ioctx_alloc() would call aio_free_ring() again causing a double free of
the ring.
This is easily reproducible from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 40,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
return (NULL);
return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 72,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evdns_request_data_build(const char *const name, const size_t name_len,
const u16 trans_id, const u16 type, const u16 class,
u8 *const buf, size_t buf_len) {
off_t j = 0; /* current offset into buf */
u16 t_; /* used by the macros */
APPEND16(trans_id);
APPEND16(0x0100); /* standard query, recusion needed */
APPEND16(1); /* one question */
APPEND16(0); /* no answers */
APPEND16(0); /* no authority */
APPEND16(0); /* no additional */
j = dnsname_to_labels(buf, buf_len, j, name, name_len, NULL);
if (j < 0) {
return (int)j;
}
APPEND16(type);
APPEND16(class);
return (int)j;
overflow:
return (-1);
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_read_fiel(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
unsigned mov_field_order;
enum AVFieldOrder decoded_field_order = AV_FIELD_UNKNOWN;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1) // will happen with jp2 files
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams-1];
if (atom.size < 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
mov_field_order = avio_rb16(pb);
if ((mov_field_order & 0xFF00) == 0x0100)
decoded_field_order = AV_FIELD_PROGRESSIVE;
else if ((mov_field_order & 0xFF00) == 0x0200) {
switch (mov_field_order & 0xFF) {
case 0x01: decoded_field_order = AV_FIELD_TT;
break;
case 0x06: decoded_field_order = AV_FIELD_BB;
break;
case 0x09: decoded_field_order = AV_FIELD_TB;
break;
case 0x0E: decoded_field_order = AV_FIELD_BT;
break;
}
}
if (decoded_field_order == AV_FIELD_UNKNOWN && mov_field_order) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unknown MOV field order 0x%04x\n", mov_field_order);
}
st->codecpar->field_order = decoded_field_order;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_flush_tlb_all(void)
{
unsigned long i, j, count0, count1, stride0, stride1, addr;
long flags;
addr = local_cpu_data->ptce_base;
count0 = local_cpu_data->ptce_count[0];
count1 = local_cpu_data->ptce_count[1];
stride0 = local_cpu_data->ptce_stride[0];
stride1 = local_cpu_data->ptce_stride[1];
local_irq_save(flags);
for (i = 0; i < count0; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < count1; ++j) {
ia64_ptce(addr);
addr += stride1;
}
addr += stride0;
}
local_irq_restore(flags);
ia64_srlz_i(); /* srlz.i implies srlz.d */
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cleanup_transaction(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root, int err)
{
struct btrfs_transaction *cur_trans = trans->transaction;
WARN_ON(trans->use_count > 1);
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, err);
spin_lock(&root->fs_info->trans_lock);
list_del_init(&cur_trans->list);
if (cur_trans == root->fs_info->running_transaction) {
root->fs_info->running_transaction = NULL;
root->fs_info->trans_no_join = 0;
}
spin_unlock(&root->fs_info->trans_lock);
btrfs_cleanup_one_transaction(trans->transaction, root);
put_transaction(cur_trans);
put_transaction(cur_trans);
trace_btrfs_transaction_commit(root);
btrfs_scrub_continue(root);
if (current->journal_info == trans)
current->journal_info = NULL;
kmem_cache_free(btrfs_trans_handle_cachep, trans);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cdrom_mrw_exit(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi)
{
disc_information di;
int ret;
ret = cdrom_get_disc_info(cdi, &di);
if (ret < 0 || ret < (int)offsetof(typeof(di),disc_type))
return 1;
ret = 0;
if (di.mrw_status == CDM_MRW_BGFORMAT_ACTIVE) {
pr_info("issuing MRW background format suspend\n");
ret = cdrom_mrw_bgformat_susp(cdi, 0);
}
if (!ret && cdi->media_written)
ret = cdrom_flush_cache(cdi);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 76,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _ipmi_destroy_user(struct ipmi_user *user)
{
struct ipmi_smi *intf = user->intf;
int i;
unsigned long flags;
struct cmd_rcvr *rcvr;
struct cmd_rcvr *rcvrs = NULL;
if (!acquire_ipmi_user(user, &i)) {
/*
* The user has already been cleaned up, just make sure
* nothing is using it and return.
*/
synchronize_srcu(&user->release_barrier);
return;
}
rcu_assign_pointer(user->self, NULL);
release_ipmi_user(user, i);
synchronize_srcu(&user->release_barrier);
if (user->handler->shutdown)
user->handler->shutdown(user->handler_data);
if (user->handler->ipmi_watchdog_pretimeout)
atomic_dec(&intf->event_waiters);
if (user->gets_events)
atomic_dec(&intf->event_waiters);
/* Remove the user from the interface's sequence table. */
spin_lock_irqsave(&intf->seq_lock, flags);
list_del_rcu(&user->link);
for (i = 0; i < IPMI_IPMB_NUM_SEQ; i++) {
if (intf->seq_table[i].inuse
&& (intf->seq_table[i].recv_msg->user == user)) {
intf->seq_table[i].inuse = 0;
ipmi_free_recv_msg(intf->seq_table[i].recv_msg);
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&intf->seq_lock, flags);
/*
* Remove the user from the command receiver's table. First
* we build a list of everything (not using the standard link,
* since other things may be using it till we do
* synchronize_srcu()) then free everything in that list.
*/
mutex_lock(&intf->cmd_rcvrs_mutex);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(rcvr, &intf->cmd_rcvrs, link) {
if (rcvr->user == user) {
list_del_rcu(&rcvr->link);
rcvr->next = rcvrs;
rcvrs = rcvr;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&intf->cmd_rcvrs_mutex);
synchronize_rcu();
while (rcvrs) {
rcvr = rcvrs;
rcvrs = rcvr->next;
kfree(rcvr);
}
kref_put(&intf->refcount, intf_free);
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,207 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _build_env(job_env_t *job_env)
{
char **env = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
bool user_name_set = 0;
env[0] = NULL;
if (!valid_spank_job_env(job_env->spank_job_env,
job_env->spank_job_env_size,
job_env->uid)) {
/* If SPANK job environment is bad, log it and do not use */
job_env->spank_job_env_size = 0;
job_env->spank_job_env = (char **) NULL;
}
if (job_env->spank_job_env_size) {
env_array_merge_spank(&env,
(const char **) job_env->spank_job_env);
}
slurm_mutex_lock(&conf->config_mutex);
setenvf(&env, "SLURMD_NODENAME", "%s", conf->node_name);
setenvf(&env, "SLURM_CONF", conf->conffile);
slurm_mutex_unlock(&conf->config_mutex);
setenvf(&env, "SLURM_CLUSTER_NAME", "%s", conf->cluster_name);
setenvf(&env, "SLURM_JOB_ID", "%u", job_env->jobid);
setenvf(&env, "SLURM_JOB_UID", "%u", job_env->uid);
#ifndef HAVE_NATIVE_CRAY
/* uid_to_string on a cray is a heavy call, so try to avoid it */
if (!job_env->user_name) {
job_env->user_name = uid_to_string(job_env->uid);
user_name_set = 1;
}
#endif
setenvf(&env, "SLURM_JOB_USER", "%s", job_env->user_name);
if (user_name_set)
xfree(job_env->user_name);
setenvf(&env, "SLURM_JOBID", "%u", job_env->jobid);
setenvf(&env, "SLURM_UID", "%u", job_env->uid);
if (job_env->node_list)
setenvf(&env, "SLURM_NODELIST", "%s", job_env->node_list);
if (job_env->partition)
setenvf(&env, "SLURM_JOB_PARTITION", "%s", job_env->partition);
if (job_env->resv_id) {
#if defined(HAVE_BG)
setenvf(&env, "MPIRUN_PARTITION", "%s", job_env->resv_id);
# ifdef HAVE_BGP
/* Needed for HTC jobs */
setenvf(&env, "SUBMIT_POOL", "%s", job_env->resv_id);
# endif
#elif defined(HAVE_ALPS_CRAY)
setenvf(&env, "BASIL_RESERVATION_ID", "%s", job_env->resv_id);
#endif
}
return env;
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 72,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String Document::queryCommandValue(const String& commandName, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
if (!isHTMLDocument() && !isXHTMLDocument()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(InvalidStateError, "queryCommandValue is only supported on HTML documents.");
return "";
}
return command(this, commandName).value();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorPageAgent::FrameClearedScheduledNavigation(LocalFrame* frame) {
GetFrontend()->frameClearedScheduledNavigation(
IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(frame));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void streamIteratorStop(streamIterator *si) {
raxStop(&si->ri);
}
Commit Message: Abort in XGROUP if the key is not a stream
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 81,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChildThread::Send(IPC::Message* msg) {
DCHECK(base::MessageLoop::current() == message_loop());
if (!channel_) {
delete msg;
return false;
}
return channel_->Send(msg);
}
Commit Message: [FileAPI] Clean up WebFileSystemImpl before Blink shutdown
WebFileSystemImpl should not outlive V8 instance, since it may have references to V8.
This CL ensures it deleted before Blink shutdown.
BUG=369525
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/270633009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269345 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 121,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nautilus_mime_file_opens_in_external_app (NautilusFile *file)
{
ActivationAction activation_action;
activation_action = get_activation_action (file);
return (activation_action == ACTIVATION_ACTION_OPEN_IN_APPLICATION);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppResult::OnShutdown(extensions::ExtensionRegistry* registry) {
DCHECK_EQ(extension_registry_, registry);
StopObservingExtensionRegistry();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GaiaCookieManagerService::CancelAll() {
VLOG(1) << "GaiaCookieManagerService::CancelAll";
gaia_auth_fetcher_.reset();
uber_token_fetcher_.reset();
requests_.clear();
fetcher_timer_.Stop();
}
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 128,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_PHAR_API int phar_resolve_alias(char *alias, int alias_len, char **filename, int *filename_len) /* {{{ */ {
phar_archive_data *fd_ptr;
if (PHAR_G(phar_alias_map.u.flags)
&& NULL != (fd_ptr = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_alias_map)), alias, alias_len))) {
*filename = fd_ptr->fname;
*filename_len = fd_ptr->fname_len;
return SUCCESS;
}
return FAILURE;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72928 - Out of bound when verify signature of zip phar in phar_parse_zipfile
(cherry picked from commit 19484ab77466f99c78fc0e677f7e03da0584d6a2)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(php_inet_ntop)
{
char *address;
int address_len, af = AF_INET;
char buffer[40];
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &address, &address_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
if (address_len == 16) {
af = AF_INET6;
} else
#endif
if (address_len != 4) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid in_addr value");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!inet_ntop(af, address, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "An unknown error occurred");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRING(buffer, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::StackAtTop() {
XRaiseWindow(xdisplay_, xwindow_);
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 140,610 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_ServerInfoPacket( netadr_t from, msg_t *msg ) {
int i, type;
char info[MAX_INFO_STRING];
char *infoString;
int prot;
char *gamename;
qboolean gameMismatch;
infoString = MSG_ReadString( msg );
gamename = Info_ValueForKey( infoString, "gamename" );
#ifdef LEGACY_PROTOCOL
if (com_legacyprotocol->integer && !*gamename)
gameMismatch = qfalse;
else
#endif
gameMismatch = !*gamename || strcmp(gamename, com_gamename->string) != 0;
if (gameMismatch)
{
Com_DPrintf( "Game mismatch in info packet: %s\n", infoString );
return;
}
prot = atoi( Info_ValueForKey( infoString, "protocol" ) );
if(prot != com_protocol->integer
#ifdef LEGACY_PROTOCOL
&& prot != com_legacyprotocol->integer
#endif
)
{
Com_DPrintf( "Different protocol info packet: %s\n", infoString );
return;
}
for ( i = 0; i < MAX_PINGREQUESTS; i++ )
{
if ( cl_pinglist[i].adr.port && !cl_pinglist[i].time && NET_CompareAdr( from, cl_pinglist[i].adr ) ) {
cl_pinglist[i].time = Sys_Milliseconds() - cl_pinglist[i].start;
Com_DPrintf( "ping time %dms from %s\n", cl_pinglist[i].time, NET_AdrToString( from ) );
Q_strncpyz( cl_pinglist[i].info, infoString, sizeof( cl_pinglist[i].info ) );
switch ( from.type )
{
case NA_BROADCAST:
case NA_IP:
type = 1;
break;
case NA_IP6:
type = 2;
break;
default:
type = 0;
break;
}
Info_SetValueForKey( cl_pinglist[i].info, "nettype", va( "%d", type ) );
CL_SetServerInfoByAddress( from, infoString, cl_pinglist[i].time );
return;
}
}
if ( cls.pingUpdateSource != AS_LOCAL ) {
return;
}
for ( i = 0 ; i < MAX_OTHER_SERVERS ; i++ ) {
if ( cls.localServers[i].adr.port == 0 ) {
break;
}
if ( NET_CompareAdr( from, cls.localServers[i].adr ) ) {
return;
}
}
if ( i == MAX_OTHER_SERVERS ) {
Com_DPrintf( "MAX_OTHER_SERVERS hit, dropping infoResponse\n" );
return;
}
cls.numlocalservers = i + 1;
CL_InitServerInfo( &cls.localServers[i], &from );
Q_strncpyz( info, MSG_ReadString( msg ), MAX_INFO_STRING );
if ( strlen( info ) ) {
if ( info[strlen( info ) - 1] != '\n' ) {
Q_strcat( info, sizeof(info), "\n" );
}
Com_Printf( "%s: %s", NET_AdrToStringwPort( from ), info );
}
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,717 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnWebContentsDestroyed(WebContentsImpl* web_contents) {
RemoveDestructionObserver(web_contents);
for (PendingContents::iterator iter = pending_contents_.begin();
iter != pending_contents_.end();
++iter) {
if (iter->second != web_contents)
continue;
pending_contents_.erase(iter);
return;
}
NOTREACHED();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int f2fs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi;
struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super;
struct inode *root;
int err;
bool retry = true, need_fsck = false;
char *options = NULL;
int recovery, i, valid_super_block;
struct curseg_info *seg_i;
try_onemore:
err = -EINVAL;
raw_super = NULL;
valid_super_block = -1;
recovery = 0;
/* allocate memory for f2fs-specific super block info */
sbi = kzalloc(sizeof(struct f2fs_sb_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi)
return -ENOMEM;
sbi->sb = sb;
/* Load the checksum driver */
sbi->s_chksum_driver = crypto_alloc_shash("crc32", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(sbi->s_chksum_driver)) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Cannot load crc32 driver.");
err = PTR_ERR(sbi->s_chksum_driver);
sbi->s_chksum_driver = NULL;
goto free_sbi;
}
/* set a block size */
if (unlikely(!sb_set_blocksize(sb, F2FS_BLKSIZE))) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to set blocksize");
goto free_sbi;
}
err = read_raw_super_block(sbi, &raw_super, &valid_super_block,
&recovery);
if (err)
goto free_sbi;
sb->s_fs_info = sbi;
sbi->raw_super = raw_super;
/*
* The BLKZONED feature indicates that the drive was formatted with
* zone alignment optimization. This is optional for host-aware
* devices, but mandatory for host-managed zoned block devices.
*/
#ifndef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_ZONED
if (f2fs_sb_mounted_blkzoned(sb)) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Zoned block device support is not enabled\n");
goto free_sb_buf;
}
#endif
default_options(sbi);
/* parse mount options */
options = kstrdup((const char *)data, GFP_KERNEL);
if (data && !options) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto free_sb_buf;
}
err = parse_options(sb, options);
if (err)
goto free_options;
sbi->max_file_blocks = max_file_blocks();
sb->s_maxbytes = sbi->max_file_blocks <<
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocksize);
sb->s_max_links = F2FS_LINK_MAX;
get_random_bytes(&sbi->s_next_generation, sizeof(u32));
sb->s_op = &f2fs_sops;
sb->s_cop = &f2fs_cryptops;
sb->s_xattr = f2fs_xattr_handlers;
sb->s_export_op = &f2fs_export_ops;
sb->s_magic = F2FS_SUPER_MAGIC;
sb->s_time_gran = 1;
sb->s_flags = (sb->s_flags & ~MS_POSIXACL) |
(test_opt(sbi, POSIX_ACL) ? MS_POSIXACL : 0);
memcpy(sb->s_uuid, raw_super->uuid, sizeof(raw_super->uuid));
/* init f2fs-specific super block info */
sbi->valid_super_block = valid_super_block;
mutex_init(&sbi->gc_mutex);
mutex_init(&sbi->cp_mutex);
init_rwsem(&sbi->node_write);
init_rwsem(&sbi->node_change);
/* disallow all the data/node/meta page writes */
set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_POR_DOING);
spin_lock_init(&sbi->stat_lock);
init_rwsem(&sbi->read_io.io_rwsem);
sbi->read_io.sbi = sbi;
sbi->read_io.bio = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < NR_PAGE_TYPE; i++) {
init_rwsem(&sbi->write_io[i].io_rwsem);
sbi->write_io[i].sbi = sbi;
sbi->write_io[i].bio = NULL;
}
init_rwsem(&sbi->cp_rwsem);
init_waitqueue_head(&sbi->cp_wait);
init_sb_info(sbi);
err = init_percpu_info(sbi);
if (err)
goto free_options;
if (F2FS_IO_SIZE(sbi) > 1) {
sbi->write_io_dummy =
mempool_create_page_pool(2 * (F2FS_IO_SIZE(sbi) - 1), 0);
if (!sbi->write_io_dummy)
goto free_options;
}
/* get an inode for meta space */
sbi->meta_inode = f2fs_iget(sb, F2FS_META_INO(sbi));
if (IS_ERR(sbi->meta_inode)) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to read F2FS meta data inode");
err = PTR_ERR(sbi->meta_inode);
goto free_io_dummy;
}
err = get_valid_checkpoint(sbi);
if (err) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to get valid F2FS checkpoint");
goto free_meta_inode;
}
/* Initialize device list */
err = f2fs_scan_devices(sbi);
if (err) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to find devices");
goto free_devices;
}
sbi->total_valid_node_count =
le32_to_cpu(sbi->ckpt->valid_node_count);
percpu_counter_set(&sbi->total_valid_inode_count,
le32_to_cpu(sbi->ckpt->valid_inode_count));
sbi->user_block_count = le64_to_cpu(sbi->ckpt->user_block_count);
sbi->total_valid_block_count =
le64_to_cpu(sbi->ckpt->valid_block_count);
sbi->last_valid_block_count = sbi->total_valid_block_count;
for (i = 0; i < NR_INODE_TYPE; i++) {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbi->inode_list[i]);
spin_lock_init(&sbi->inode_lock[i]);
}
init_extent_cache_info(sbi);
init_ino_entry_info(sbi);
/* setup f2fs internal modules */
err = build_segment_manager(sbi);
if (err) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Failed to initialize F2FS segment manager");
goto free_sm;
}
err = build_node_manager(sbi);
if (err) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Failed to initialize F2FS node manager");
goto free_nm;
}
/* For write statistics */
if (sb->s_bdev->bd_part)
sbi->sectors_written_start =
(u64)part_stat_read(sb->s_bdev->bd_part, sectors[1]);
/* Read accumulated write IO statistics if exists */
seg_i = CURSEG_I(sbi, CURSEG_HOT_NODE);
if (__exist_node_summaries(sbi))
sbi->kbytes_written =
le64_to_cpu(seg_i->journal->info.kbytes_written);
build_gc_manager(sbi);
/* get an inode for node space */
sbi->node_inode = f2fs_iget(sb, F2FS_NODE_INO(sbi));
if (IS_ERR(sbi->node_inode)) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to read node inode");
err = PTR_ERR(sbi->node_inode);
goto free_nm;
}
f2fs_join_shrinker(sbi);
err = f2fs_build_stats(sbi);
if (err)
goto free_nm;
/* if there are nt orphan nodes free them */
err = recover_orphan_inodes(sbi);
if (err)
goto free_node_inode;
/* read root inode and dentry */
root = f2fs_iget(sb, F2FS_ROOT_INO(sbi));
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to read root inode");
err = PTR_ERR(root);
goto free_node_inode;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(root->i_mode) || !root->i_blocks || !root->i_size) {
iput(root);
err = -EINVAL;
goto free_node_inode;
}
sb->s_root = d_make_root(root); /* allocate root dentry */
if (!sb->s_root) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto free_root_inode;
}
if (f2fs_proc_root)
sbi->s_proc = proc_mkdir(sb->s_id, f2fs_proc_root);
if (sbi->s_proc) {
proc_create_data("segment_info", S_IRUGO, sbi->s_proc,
&f2fs_seq_segment_info_fops, sb);
proc_create_data("segment_bits", S_IRUGO, sbi->s_proc,
&f2fs_seq_segment_bits_fops, sb);
}
sbi->s_kobj.kset = f2fs_kset;
init_completion(&sbi->s_kobj_unregister);
err = kobject_init_and_add(&sbi->s_kobj, &f2fs_ktype, NULL,
"%s", sb->s_id);
if (err)
goto free_proc;
/* recover fsynced data */
if (!test_opt(sbi, DISABLE_ROLL_FORWARD)) {
/*
* mount should be failed, when device has readonly mode, and
* previous checkpoint was not done by clean system shutdown.
*/
if (bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev) &&
!is_set_ckpt_flags(sbi, CP_UMOUNT_FLAG)) {
err = -EROFS;
goto free_kobj;
}
if (need_fsck)
set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
if (!retry)
goto skip_recovery;
err = recover_fsync_data(sbi, false);
if (err < 0) {
need_fsck = true;
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Cannot recover all fsync data errno=%d", err);
goto free_kobj;
}
} else {
err = recover_fsync_data(sbi, true);
if (!f2fs_readonly(sb) && err > 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Need to recover fsync data");
goto free_kobj;
}
}
skip_recovery:
/* recover_fsync_data() cleared this already */
clear_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_POR_DOING);
/*
* If filesystem is not mounted as read-only then
* do start the gc_thread.
*/
if (test_opt(sbi, BG_GC) && !f2fs_readonly(sb)) {
/* After POR, we can run background GC thread.*/
err = start_gc_thread(sbi);
if (err)
goto free_kobj;
}
kfree(options);
/* recover broken superblock */
if (recovery) {
err = f2fs_commit_super(sbi, true);
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Try to recover %dth superblock, ret: %d",
sbi->valid_super_block ? 1 : 2, err);
}
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_NOTICE, "Mounted with checkpoint version = %llx",
cur_cp_version(F2FS_CKPT(sbi)));
f2fs_update_time(sbi, CP_TIME);
f2fs_update_time(sbi, REQ_TIME);
return 0;
free_kobj:
f2fs_sync_inode_meta(sbi);
kobject_del(&sbi->s_kobj);
kobject_put(&sbi->s_kobj);
wait_for_completion(&sbi->s_kobj_unregister);
free_proc:
if (sbi->s_proc) {
remove_proc_entry("segment_info", sbi->s_proc);
remove_proc_entry("segment_bits", sbi->s_proc);
remove_proc_entry(sb->s_id, f2fs_proc_root);
}
free_root_inode:
dput(sb->s_root);
sb->s_root = NULL;
free_node_inode:
truncate_inode_pages_final(NODE_MAPPING(sbi));
mutex_lock(&sbi->umount_mutex);
release_ino_entry(sbi, true);
f2fs_leave_shrinker(sbi);
/*
* Some dirty meta pages can be produced by recover_orphan_inodes()
* failed by EIO. Then, iput(node_inode) can trigger balance_fs_bg()
* followed by write_checkpoint() through f2fs_write_node_pages(), which
* falls into an infinite loop in sync_meta_pages().
*/
truncate_inode_pages_final(META_MAPPING(sbi));
iput(sbi->node_inode);
mutex_unlock(&sbi->umount_mutex);
f2fs_destroy_stats(sbi);
free_nm:
destroy_node_manager(sbi);
free_sm:
destroy_segment_manager(sbi);
free_devices:
destroy_device_list(sbi);
kfree(sbi->ckpt);
free_meta_inode:
make_bad_inode(sbi->meta_inode);
iput(sbi->meta_inode);
free_io_dummy:
mempool_destroy(sbi->write_io_dummy);
free_options:
destroy_percpu_info(sbi);
kfree(options);
free_sb_buf:
kfree(raw_super);
free_sbi:
if (sbi->s_chksum_driver)
crypto_free_shash(sbi->s_chksum_driver);
kfree(sbi);
/* give only one another chance */
if (retry) {
retry = false;
shrink_dcache_sb(sb);
goto try_onemore;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: sanity check checkpoint segno and blkoff
Make sure segno and blkoff read from raw image are valid.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
[Jaegeuk Kim: adjust minor coding style]
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-129 | 0 | 63,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_Reconnect_f( void ) {
if ( !strlen( cl_reconnectArgs ) )
return;
Cvar_Set("ui_singlePlayerActive", "0");
Cbuf_AddText( va("connect %s\n", cl_reconnectArgs ) );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: find_url_param_pos(char* query_string, size_t query_string_l,
char* url_param_name, size_t url_param_name_l,
char delim)
{
char *pos, *last;
pos = query_string;
last = query_string + query_string_l - url_param_name_l - 1;
while (pos <= last) {
if (pos[url_param_name_l] == '=') {
if (memcmp(pos, url_param_name, url_param_name_l) == 0)
return pos;
pos += url_param_name_l + 1;
}
while (pos <= last && !is_param_delimiter(*pos, delim))
pos++;
pos++;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::NotFeasible(const Session& session,
FSMEvent event) {
NOTREACHED() << "Unfeasible event " << event
<< " in state " << GetSessionState(session.id)
<< " for session " << session.id;
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SendNoContentResponse(struct mg_connection* connection,
const struct mg_request_info* request_info,
void* user_data) {
std::string response = "HTTP/1.1 204 No Content\r\n"
"Content-Length:0\r\n"
"\r\n";
mg_write(connection, response.data(), response.length());
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void netif_nit_deliver(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct packet_type *ptype;
if (list_empty(&ptype_all))
return;
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
skb->mac_len = skb->network_header - skb->mac_header;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptype, &ptype_all, list) {
if (!ptype->dev || ptype->dev == skb->dev)
deliver_skb(skb, ptype, skb->dev);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,209 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MemBackendImpl::EvictIfNeeded() {
if (current_size_ <= max_size_)
return;
int target_size = std::max(0, max_size_ - kDefaultEvictionSize);
base::LinkNode<MemEntryImpl>* entry = lru_list_.head();
while (current_size_ > target_size && entry != lru_list_.end()) {
MemEntryImpl* to_doom = entry->value();
entry = entry->next();
if (!to_doom->InUse())
to_doom->Doom();
}
}
Commit Message: [MemCache] Fix bug while iterating LRU list in eviction
It was possible to reanalyze a previously doomed entry.
Bug: 827492
Change-Id: I5d34d2ae87c96e0d2099e926e6eb2c1b30b01d63
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/987919
Commit-Queue: Josh Karlin <jkarlin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547236}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 172,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cdf_read_short_stream(const cdf_info_t *info, const cdf_header_t *h,
const cdf_sat_t *sat, const cdf_dir_t *dir, cdf_stream_t *scn)
{
size_t i;
const cdf_directory_t *d;
for (i = 0; i < dir->dir_len; i++)
if (dir->dir_tab[i].d_type == CDF_DIR_TYPE_ROOT_STORAGE)
break;
/* If the it is not there, just fake it; some docs don't have it */
if (i == dir->dir_len)
goto out;
d = &dir->dir_tab[i];
/* If the it is not there, just fake it; some docs don't have it */
if (d->d_stream_first_sector < 0)
goto out;
return cdf_read_long_sector_chain(info, h, sat,
d->d_stream_first_sector, d->d_size, scn);
out:
scn->sst_tab = NULL;
scn->sst_len = 0;
scn->sst_dirlen = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix bounds checks again.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static aura::Window* OpenTestWindow(aura::Window* parent, bool modal) {
DCHECK(!modal || (modal && parent));
views::Widget* widget =
views::Widget::CreateWindowWithParent(new TestWindow(modal), parent);
widget->Show();
return widget->GetNativeView();
}
Commit Message: Removed requirement for ash::Window::transient_parent() presence for system modal dialogs.
BUG=130420
TEST=SystemModalContainerLayoutManagerTest.ModalTransientAndNonTransient
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10514012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@140647 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::OnDevToolsAvailabilityChanged() {
using DTPH = policy::DeveloperToolsPolicyHandler;
if (DTPH::GetDevToolsAvailability(profile_->GetPrefs()) !=
DTPH::Availability::kAllowed) {
content::DevToolsAgentHost::DetachAllClients();
}
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PageSnapshotTaker::PageSnapshotTaker(AutomationProvider* automation,
IPC::Message* reply_message,
TabContents* tab_contents,
const FilePath& path)
: automation_(automation->AsWeakPtr()),
reply_message_(reply_message),
tab_contents_(tab_contents),
image_path_(path) {
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_APP_MODAL_DIALOG_SHOWN,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __cast6_decrypt(struct cast6_ctx *c, u8 *outbuf, const u8 *inbuf)
{
const __be32 *src = (const __be32 *)inbuf;
__be32 *dst = (__be32 *)outbuf;
u32 block[4];
u32 *Km;
u8 *Kr;
block[0] = be32_to_cpu(src[0]);
block[1] = be32_to_cpu(src[1]);
block[2] = be32_to_cpu(src[2]);
block[3] = be32_to_cpu(src[3]);
Km = c->Km[11]; Kr = c->Kr[11]; Q(block, Kr, Km);
Km = c->Km[10]; Kr = c->Kr[10]; Q(block, Kr, Km);
Km = c->Km[9]; Kr = c->Kr[9]; Q(block, Kr, Km);
Km = c->Km[8]; Kr = c->Kr[8]; Q(block, Kr, Km);
Km = c->Km[7]; Kr = c->Kr[7]; Q(block, Kr, Km);
Km = c->Km[6]; Kr = c->Kr[6]; Q(block, Kr, Km);
Km = c->Km[5]; Kr = c->Kr[5]; QBAR(block, Kr, Km);
Km = c->Km[4]; Kr = c->Kr[4]; QBAR(block, Kr, Km);
Km = c->Km[3]; Kr = c->Kr[3]; QBAR(block, Kr, Km);
Km = c->Km[2]; Kr = c->Kr[2]; QBAR(block, Kr, Km);
Km = c->Km[1]; Kr = c->Kr[1]; QBAR(block, Kr, Km);
Km = c->Km[0]; Kr = c->Kr[0]; QBAR(block, Kr, Km);
dst[0] = cpu_to_be32(block[0]);
dst[1] = cpu_to_be32(block[1]);
dst[2] = cpu_to_be32(block[2]);
dst[3] = cpu_to_be32(block[3]);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Reset() {
state_ = NOT_BLOCKED;
callback_.Reset();
auth_callback_.Reset();
}
Commit Message: Tests were marked as Flaky.
BUG=151811,151810
TBR=droger@chromium.org,shalev@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10968052
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158204 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 102,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InitializeCommandLine(const std::string& argv0,
const base::FilePath& subprocess_path,
ProcessModel process_model,
gl::GLImplementation gl_impl,
base::Environment* env) {
const char* argv0_c = nullptr;
if (!argv0.empty()) {
argv0_c = argv0.c_str();
}
CHECK(base::CommandLine::Init(argv0_c ? 1 : 0,
argv0_c ? &argv0_c : nullptr)) <<
"CommandLine already exists. Did you call BrowserProcessMain::Start "
"in a child process?";
base::CommandLine* command_line = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kBrowserSubprocessPath,
subprocess_path.value().c_str());
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kInProcessGPU);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuShaderDiskCache);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuEarlyInit);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kUIPrioritizeInGpuProcess);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableSmoothScrolling);
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kProfilerTiming,
switches::kProfilerTimingDisabledValue);
if (gl_impl == gl::kGLImplementationNone ||
IsEnvironmentOptionEnabled("DISABLE_GPU", env)) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableGpu);
} else {
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kUseGL,
GetGLImplName(gl_impl));
}
if (IsEnvironmentOptionEnabled("DISABLE_GPU_COMPOSITING", env)) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuCompositing);
}
std::string renderer_cmd_prefix =
GetEnvironmentOption("RENDERER_CMD_PREFIX", env);
if (!renderer_cmd_prefix.empty()) {
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kRendererCmdPrefix,
renderer_cmd_prefix);
}
if (IsEnvironmentOptionEnabled("NO_SANDBOX", env)) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox);
} else {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableNamespaceSandbox);
if (IsEnvironmentOptionEnabled("DISABLE_SETUID_SANDBOX", env)) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSetuidSandbox);
}
if (IsEnvironmentOptionEnabled("DISABLE_SECCOMP_FILTER_SANDBOX",
env)) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSeccompFilterSandbox);
}
}
if (IsEnvironmentOptionEnabled("IGNORE_GPU_BLACKLIST", env)) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kIgnoreGpuBlacklist);
}
if (IsEnvironmentOptionEnabled("DISABLE_GPU_DRIVER_BUG_WORKAROUNDS",
env)) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuDriverBugWorkarounds);
}
if (IsEnvironmentOptionEnabled("ENABLE_GPU_SERVICE_LOGGING", env)) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableGPUServiceLogging);
}
if (IsEnvironmentOptionEnabled("ENABLE_GPU_DEBUGGING", env)) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableGPUDebugging);
}
if (process_model == PROCESS_MODEL_SINGLE_PROCESS) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kSingleProcess);
} else if (process_model == PROCESS_MODEL_PROCESS_PER_VIEW) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kProcessPerTab);
} else if (process_model == PROCESS_MODEL_PROCESS_PER_SITE) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kProcessPerSite);
} else if (process_model == PROCESS_MODEL_SITE_PER_PROCESS) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kSitePerProcess);
} else {
DCHECK(process_model == PROCESS_MODEL_PROCESS_PER_SITE_INSTANCE ||
process_model == PROCESS_MODEL_MULTI_PROCESS);
}
if (IsEnvironmentOptionEnabled("ALLOW_SANDBOX_DEBUGGING", env)) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowSandboxDebugging);
}
if (IsEnvironmentOptionEnabled("ENABLE_MEDIA_HUB_AUDIO", env)) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableMediaHubAudio);
}
std::string mediahub_fixed_session_domains =
GetEnvironmentOption("MEDIA_HUB_FIXED_SESSION_DOMAINS", env);
if (!mediahub_fixed_session_domains.empty()) {
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kMediaHubFixedSessionDomains,
mediahub_fixed_session_domains);
if (!IsEnvironmentOptionEnabled("ENABLE_MEDIA_HUB_AUDIO", env)) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableMediaHubAudio);
}
}
if (IsEnvironmentOptionEnabled("TESTING_MODE", env)) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kUseFakeDeviceForMediaStream);
}
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
command_line->AppendSwitchPath(switches::kSharedMemoryOverridePath,
GetSharedMemoryPath(env));
#endif
const std::string& verbose_log_level =
GetEnvironmentOption("VERBOSE_LOG_LEVEL", env);
if (!verbose_log_level.empty()) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableLogging);
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kV, verbose_log_level);
}
const std::string& extra_cmd_arg_list =
GetEnvironmentOption("EXTRA_CMD_ARGS", env);
if (!extra_cmd_arg_list.empty()) {
std::vector<std::string> args =
base::SplitString(extra_cmd_arg_list,
base::kWhitespaceASCII,
base::KEEP_WHITESPACE,
base::SPLIT_WANT_NONEMPTY);
base::CommandLine::StringVector new_args;
new_args.push_back(command_line->argv()[0]);
new_args.insert(new_args.end(), args.begin(), args.end());
base::CommandLine extra_cmd_line(new_args);
command_line->AppendArguments(extra_cmd_line, false);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::CreateViewAndSetSizeForRVH(RenderViewHost* rvh) {
RenderWidgetHostView* rwh_view = view_->CreateViewForWidget(rvh);
if (rwh_view)
rwh_view->SetSize(GetView()->GetContainerSize());
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: close_ls(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
LINE *line = PG_GETARG_LINE_P(0);
LSEG *lseg = PG_GETARG_LSEG_P(1);
Point *result;
float8 d1,
d2;
result = interpt_sl(lseg, line);
if (result)
PG_RETURN_POINT_P(result);
d1 = dist_pl_internal(&lseg->p[0], line);
d2 = dist_pl_internal(&lseg->p[1], line);
if (d1 < d2)
result = point_copy(&lseg->p[0]);
else
result = point_copy(&lseg->p[1]);
PG_RETURN_POINT_P(result);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wiki_show_changes_page(HttpResponse *res)
{
WikiPageList **pages = NULL;
int n_pages, i;
wiki_show_header(res, "Changes", FALSE);
pages = wiki_get_pages(&n_pages, NULL);
for (i=0; i<n_pages; i++)
{
struct tm *pTm;
char datebuf[64];
pTm = localtime(&pages[i]->mtime);
strftime(datebuf, sizeof(datebuf), "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M", pTm);
http_response_printf(res, "<a href='%s'>%s</a> %s<br />\n",
pages[i]->name,
pages[i]->name,
datebuf);
}
wiki_show_footer(res);
http_response_send(res);
exit(0);
}
Commit Message: page_name_is_good function
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 58,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OfflinePageModelTaskified::GetPagesByURL(
const GURL& url,
URLSearchMode url_search_mode,
const MultipleOfflinePageItemCallback& callback) {
auto task = GetPagesTask::CreateTaskMatchingUrl(store_.get(), callback, url);
task_queue_.AddTask(std::move(task));
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_signature (Buffer *buffer, guint32 *offset, guint32 end_offset)
{
guint8 len;
char *str;
if (*offset >= end_offset)
return FALSE;
len = buffer->data[*offset];
(*offset)++;
if ((*offset) + len + 1 > end_offset)
return FALSE;
if (buffer->data[(*offset) + len] != 0)
return FALSE;
str = (char *) &buffer->data[(*offset)];
*offset += len + 1;
return str;
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436 | 0 | 84,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ping_getfrag(void *from, char *to,
int offset, int fraglen, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct pingfakehdr *pfh = (struct pingfakehdr *)from;
if (offset == 0) {
fraglen -= sizeof(struct icmphdr);
if (fraglen < 0)
BUG();
if (!csum_and_copy_from_iter_full(to + sizeof(struct icmphdr),
fraglen, &pfh->wcheck,
&pfh->msg->msg_iter))
return -EFAULT;
} else if (offset < sizeof(struct icmphdr)) {
BUG();
} else {
if (!csum_and_copy_from_iter_full(to, fraglen, &pfh->wcheck,
&pfh->msg->msg_iter))
return -EFAULT;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
/* For IPv6, checksum each skb as we go along, as expected by
* icmpv6_push_pending_frames. For IPv4, accumulate the checksum in
* wcheck, it will be finalized in ping_v4_push_pending_frames.
*/
if (pfh->family == AF_INET6) {
skb->csum = pfh->wcheck;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
pfh->wcheck = 0;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ping: implement proper locking
We got a report of yet another bug in ping
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/03/24/6
->disconnect() is not called with socket lock held.
Fix this by acquiring ping rwlock earlier.
Thanks to Daniel, Alexander and Andrey for letting us know this problem.
Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Daniel Jiang <danieljiang0415@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 69,396 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void DetectRulePacketRules(
ThreadVars * const tv,
DetectEngineCtx * const de_ctx,
DetectEngineThreadCtx * const det_ctx,
Packet * const p,
Flow * const pflow,
const DetectRunScratchpad *scratch
)
{
const Signature *s = NULL;
const Signature *next_s = NULL;
/* inspect the sigs against the packet */
/* Prefetch the next signature. */
SigIntId match_cnt = det_ctx->match_array_cnt;
#ifdef PROFILING
if (tv) {
StatsAddUI64(tv, det_ctx->counter_match_list,
(uint64_t)match_cnt);
}
#endif
Signature **match_array = det_ctx->match_array;
SGH_PROFILING_RECORD(det_ctx, scratch->sgh);
#ifdef PROFILING
#ifdef HAVE_LIBJANSSON
if (match_cnt >= de_ctx->profile_match_logging_threshold)
RulesDumpMatchArray(det_ctx, scratch->sgh, p);
#endif
#endif
uint32_t sflags, next_sflags = 0;
if (match_cnt) {
next_s = *match_array++;
next_sflags = next_s->flags;
}
while (match_cnt--) {
RULE_PROFILING_START(p);
uint8_t alert_flags = 0;
bool state_alert = false;
#ifdef PROFILING
bool smatch = false; /* signature match */
#endif
s = next_s;
sflags = next_sflags;
if (match_cnt) {
next_s = *match_array++;
next_sflags = next_s->flags;
}
const uint8_t s_proto_flags = s->proto.flags;
SCLogDebug("inspecting signature id %"PRIu32"", s->id);
if (sflags & SIG_FLAG_STATE_MATCH) {
goto next; // TODO skip and handle in DetectRunTx
}
/* don't run mask check for stateful rules.
* There we depend on prefilter */
if ((s->mask & scratch->pkt_mask) != s->mask) {
SCLogDebug("mask mismatch %x & %x != %x", s->mask, scratch->pkt_mask, s->mask);
goto next;
}
if (unlikely(sflags & SIG_FLAG_DSIZE)) {
if (likely(p->payload_len < s->dsize_low || p->payload_len > s->dsize_high)) {
SCLogDebug("kicked out as p->payload_len %u, dsize low %u, hi %u",
p->payload_len, s->dsize_low, s->dsize_high);
goto next;
}
}
/* if the sig has alproto and the session as well they should match */
if (likely(sflags & SIG_FLAG_APPLAYER)) {
if (s->alproto != ALPROTO_UNKNOWN && s->alproto != scratch->alproto) {
if (s->alproto == ALPROTO_DCERPC) {
if (scratch->alproto != ALPROTO_SMB && scratch->alproto != ALPROTO_SMB2) {
SCLogDebug("DCERPC sig, alproto not SMB or SMB2");
goto next;
}
} else {
SCLogDebug("alproto mismatch");
goto next;
}
}
}
if (DetectRunInspectRuleHeader(p, pflow, s, sflags, s_proto_flags) == 0) {
goto next;
}
/* Check the payload keywords. If we are a MPM sig and we've made
* to here, we've had at least one of the patterns match */
if (!(sflags & SIG_FLAG_STATE_MATCH) && s->sm_arrays[DETECT_SM_LIST_PMATCH] != NULL) {
KEYWORD_PROFILING_SET_LIST(det_ctx, DETECT_SM_LIST_PMATCH);
/* if we have stream msgs, inspect against those first,
* but not for a "dsize" signature */
if (sflags & SIG_FLAG_REQUIRE_STREAM) {
int pmatch = 0;
if (p->flags & PKT_DETECT_HAS_STREAMDATA) {
pmatch = DetectEngineInspectStreamPayload(de_ctx, det_ctx, s, pflow, p);
if (pmatch) {
det_ctx->flags |= DETECT_ENGINE_THREAD_CTX_STREAM_CONTENT_MATCH;
/* Tell the engine that this reassembled stream can drop the
* rest of the pkts with no further inspection */
if (s->action & ACTION_DROP)
alert_flags |= PACKET_ALERT_FLAG_DROP_FLOW;
alert_flags |= PACKET_ALERT_FLAG_STREAM_MATCH;
}
}
/* no match? then inspect packet payload */
if (pmatch == 0) {
SCLogDebug("no match in stream, fall back to packet payload");
/* skip if we don't have to inspect the packet and segment was
* added to stream */
if (!(sflags & SIG_FLAG_REQUIRE_PACKET) && (p->flags & PKT_STREAM_ADD)) {
goto next;
}
if (DetectEngineInspectPacketPayload(de_ctx, det_ctx, s, pflow, p) != 1) {
goto next;
}
}
} else {
if (DetectEngineInspectPacketPayload(de_ctx, det_ctx, s, pflow, p) != 1) {
goto next;
}
}
}
if (DetectRunInspectRulePacketMatches(tv, det_ctx, p, pflow, s) == 0)
goto next;
#ifdef PROFILING
smatch = true;
#endif
DetectRunPostMatch(tv, det_ctx, p, s);
if (!(sflags & SIG_FLAG_NOALERT)) {
/* stateful sigs call PacketAlertAppend from DeStateDetectStartDetection */
if (!state_alert)
PacketAlertAppend(det_ctx, s, p, 0, alert_flags);
} else {
/* apply actions even if not alerting */
DetectSignatureApplyActions(p, s, alert_flags);
}
next:
DetectVarProcessList(det_ctx, pflow, p);
DetectReplaceFree(det_ctx);
RULE_PROFILING_END(det_ctx, s, smatch, p);
det_ctx->flags = 0;
continue;
}
}
Commit Message: stream: still inspect packets dropped by stream
The detect engine would bypass packets that are set as dropped. This
seems sane, as these packets are going to be dropped anyway.
However, it lead to the following corner case: stream events that
triggered the drop could not be matched on the rules. The packet
with the event wouldn't make it to the detect engine due to the bypass.
This patch changes the logic to not bypass DROP packets anymore.
Packets that are dropped by the stream engine will set the no payload
inspection flag, so avoid needless cost.
CWE ID: CWE-693 | 0 | 84,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void git_index_reuc_clear(git_index *index)
{
size_t i;
assert(index);
for (i = 0; i < index->reuc.length; ++i)
index_entry_reuc_free(git__swap(index->reuc.contents[i], NULL));
git_vector_clear(&index->reuc);
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,697 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerMS::OnIdleTimeout() {}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int add_to_pagemap(unsigned long addr, u64 pfn,
struct pagemapread *pm)
{
pm->buffer[pm->pos++] = pfn;
if (pm->pos >= pm->len)
return PM_END_OF_BUFFER;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CardUnmaskPromptView* CardUnmaskPromptView::CreateAndShow(
CardUnmaskPromptController* controller) {
CardUnmaskPromptViews* view = new CardUnmaskPromptViews(controller);
view->Show();
return view;
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 110,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int wdm_resume(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct wdm_device *desc = wdm_find_device(intf);
int rv;
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev, "wdm%d_resume\n", intf->minor);
clear_bit(WDM_SUSPENDING, &desc->flags);
rv = recover_from_urb_loss(desc);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseEntityValue(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar **orig) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int len = 0;
int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
int c, l;
xmlChar stop;
xmlChar *ret = NULL;
const xmlChar *cur = NULL;
xmlParserInputPtr input;
if (RAW == '"') stop = '"';
else if (RAW == '\'') stop = '\'';
else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* The content of the entity definition is copied in a buffer.
*/
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ENTITY_VALUE;
input = ctxt->input;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
NEXT;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
/*
* NOTE: 4.4.5 Included in Literal
* When a parameter entity reference appears in a literal entity
* value, ... a single or double quote character in the replacement
* text is always treated as a normal data character and will not
* terminate the literal.
* In practice it means we stop the loop only when back at parsing
* the initial entity and the quote is found
*/
while (((IS_CHAR(c)) && ((c != stop) || /* checked */
(ctxt->input != input))) && (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
if (len + 5 >= size) {
xmlChar *tmp;
size *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
buf = tmp;
}
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,c);
NEXTL(l);
/*
* Pop-up of finished entities.
*/
while ((RAW == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr > 1)) /* non input consuming */
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if (c == 0) {
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* Raise problem w.r.t. '&' and '%' being used in non-entities
* reference constructs. Note Charref will be handled in
* xmlStringDecodeEntities()
*/
cur = buf;
while (*cur != 0) { /* non input consuming */
if ((*cur == '%') || ((*cur == '&') && (cur[1] != '#'))) {
xmlChar *name;
xmlChar tmp = *cur;
cur++;
name = xmlParseStringName(ctxt, &cur);
if ((name == NULL) || (*cur != ';')) {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_CHAR_ERROR,
"EntityValue: '%c' forbidden except for entities references\n",
tmp);
}
if ((tmp == '%') && (ctxt->inSubset == 1) &&
(ctxt->inputNr == 1)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_PE_INTERNAL, NULL);
}
if (name != NULL)
xmlFree(name);
if (*cur == 0)
break;
}
cur++;
}
/*
* Then PEReference entities are substituted.
*/
if (c != stop) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
xmlFree(buf);
} else {
NEXT;
/*
* NOTE: 4.4.7 Bypassed
* When a general entity reference appears in the EntityValue in
* an entity declaration, it is bypassed and left as is.
* so XML_SUBSTITUTE_REF is not set here.
*/
++ctxt->depth;
ret = xmlStringDecodeEntities(ctxt, buf, XML_SUBSTITUTE_PEREF,
0, 0, 0);
--ctxt->depth;
if (orig != NULL)
*orig = buf;
else
xmlFree(buf);
}
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FT_Get_Next_Char( FT_Face face,
FT_ULong charcode,
FT_UInt *agindex )
{
FT_ULong result = 0;
FT_UInt gindex = 0;
if ( face && face->charmap && face->num_glyphs )
{
FT_UInt32 code = (FT_UInt32)charcode;
FT_CMap cmap = FT_CMAP( face->charmap );
do {
gindex = cmap->clazz->char_next( cmap, &code );
} while ( gindex >= (FT_UInt)face->num_glyphs );
result = ( gindex == 0 ) ? 0 : code;
}
if ( agindex )
*agindex = gindex;
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_decode_queue_stats_request(const struct ofp_header *request,
struct ofputil_queue_stats_request *oqsr)
{
switch ((enum ofp_version)request->version) {
case OFP16_VERSION:
case OFP15_VERSION:
case OFP14_VERSION:
case OFP13_VERSION:
case OFP12_VERSION:
case OFP11_VERSION: {
const struct ofp11_queue_stats_request *qsr11 = ofpmsg_body(request);
oqsr->queue_id = ntohl(qsr11->queue_id);
return ofputil_port_from_ofp11(qsr11->port_no, &oqsr->port_no);
}
case OFP10_VERSION: {
const struct ofp10_queue_stats_request *qsr10 = ofpmsg_body(request);
oqsr->queue_id = ntohl(qsr10->queue_id);
oqsr->port_no = u16_to_ofp(ntohs(qsr10->port_no));
/* OF 1.0 uses OFPP_ALL for OFPP_ANY */
if (oqsr->port_no == OFPP_ALL) {
oqsr->port_no = OFPP_ANY;
}
return 0;
}
default:
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,536 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType IsGrayImage(const Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if ((image->type == BilevelType) || (image->type == GrayscaleType) ||
(image->type == GrayscaleMatteType))
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/281
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 73,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *rfcomm_sock_alloc(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int proto, gfp_t prio)
{
struct rfcomm_dlc *d;
struct sock *sk;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_BLUETOOTH, prio, &rfcomm_proto);
if (!sk)
return NULL;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&bt_sk(sk)->accept_q);
d = rfcomm_dlc_alloc(prio);
if (!d) {
sk_free(sk);
return NULL;
}
d->data_ready = rfcomm_sk_data_ready;
d->state_change = rfcomm_sk_state_change;
rfcomm_pi(sk)->dlc = d;
d->owner = sk;
sk->sk_destruct = rfcomm_sock_destruct;
sk->sk_sndtimeo = RFCOMM_CONN_TIMEOUT;
sk->sk_sndbuf = RFCOMM_MAX_CREDITS * RFCOMM_DEFAULT_MTU * 10;
sk->sk_rcvbuf = RFCOMM_MAX_CREDITS * RFCOMM_DEFAULT_MTU * 10;
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
sk->sk_protocol = proto;
sk->sk_state = BT_OPEN;
bt_sock_link(&rfcomm_sk_list, sk);
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
return sk;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix missing msg_namelen update in rfcomm_sock_recvmsg()
If RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP is set in the flags, rfcomm_sock_recvmsg() returns
early with 0 without updating the possibly set msg_namelen member. This,
in turn, leads to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix this by updating msg_namelen in this case. For all other cases it
will be handled in bt_sock_stream_recvmsg().
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t GraphicBuffer::unlock()
{
status_t res = getBufferMapper().unlock(handle);
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix for corruption when numFds or numInts is too large.
Bug: 18076253
Change-Id: I4c5935440013fc755e1d123049290383f4659fb6
(cherry picked from commit dfd06b89a4b77fc75eb85a3c1c700da3621c0118)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,692 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: horAcc8(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
unsigned char* cp = (unsigned char*) cp0;
assert((cc%stride)==0);
if (cc > stride) {
/*
* Pipeline the most common cases.
*/
if (stride == 3) {
unsigned int cr = cp[0];
unsigned int cg = cp[1];
unsigned int cb = cp[2];
cc -= 3;
cp += 3;
while (cc>0) {
cp[0] = (unsigned char) ((cr += cp[0]) & 0xff);
cp[1] = (unsigned char) ((cg += cp[1]) & 0xff);
cp[2] = (unsigned char) ((cb += cp[2]) & 0xff);
cc -= 3;
cp += 3;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
unsigned int cr = cp[0];
unsigned int cg = cp[1];
unsigned int cb = cp[2];
unsigned int ca = cp[3];
cc -= 4;
cp += 4;
while (cc>0) {
cp[0] = (unsigned char) ((cr += cp[0]) & 0xff);
cp[1] = (unsigned char) ((cg += cp[1]) & 0xff);
cp[2] = (unsigned char) ((cb += cp[2]) & 0xff);
cp[3] = (unsigned char) ((ca += cp[3]) & 0xff);
cc -= 4;
cp += 4;
}
} else {
cc -= stride;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] =
(unsigned char) ((cp[stride] + *cp) & 0xff); cp++)
cc -= stride;
} while (cc>0);
}
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 166,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Stream *Stream::makeFilter(char *name, Stream *str, Object *params) {
int pred; // parameters
int colors;
int bits;
int early;
int encoding;
GBool endOfLine, byteAlign, endOfBlock, black;
int columns, rows;
int colorXform;
Object globals, obj;
if (!strcmp(name, "ASCIIHexDecode") || !strcmp(name, "AHx")) {
str = new ASCIIHexStream(str);
} else if (!strcmp(name, "ASCII85Decode") || !strcmp(name, "A85")) {
str = new ASCII85Stream(str);
} else if (!strcmp(name, "LZWDecode") || !strcmp(name, "LZW")) {
pred = 1;
columns = 1;
colors = 1;
bits = 8;
early = 1;
if (params->isDict()) {
params->dictLookup("Predictor", &obj);
if (obj.isInt())
pred = obj.getInt();
obj.free();
params->dictLookup("Columns", &obj);
if (obj.isInt())
columns = obj.getInt();
obj.free();
params->dictLookup("Colors", &obj);
if (obj.isInt())
colors = obj.getInt();
obj.free();
params->dictLookup("BitsPerComponent", &obj);
if (obj.isInt())
bits = obj.getInt();
obj.free();
params->dictLookup("EarlyChange", &obj);
if (obj.isInt())
early = obj.getInt();
obj.free();
}
str = new LZWStream(str, pred, columns, colors, bits, early);
} else if (!strcmp(name, "RunLengthDecode") || !strcmp(name, "RL")) {
str = new RunLengthStream(str);
} else if (!strcmp(name, "CCITTFaxDecode") || !strcmp(name, "CCF")) {
encoding = 0;
endOfLine = gFalse;
byteAlign = gFalse;
columns = 1728;
rows = 0;
endOfBlock = gTrue;
black = gFalse;
if (params->isDict()) {
params->dictLookup("K", &obj);
if (obj.isInt()) {
encoding = obj.getInt();
}
obj.free();
params->dictLookup("EndOfLine", &obj);
if (obj.isBool()) {
endOfLine = obj.getBool();
}
obj.free();
params->dictLookup("EncodedByteAlign", &obj);
if (obj.isBool()) {
byteAlign = obj.getBool();
}
obj.free();
params->dictLookup("Columns", &obj);
if (obj.isInt()) {
columns = obj.getInt();
}
obj.free();
params->dictLookup("Rows", &obj);
if (obj.isInt()) {
rows = obj.getInt();
}
obj.free();
params->dictLookup("EndOfBlock", &obj);
if (obj.isBool()) {
endOfBlock = obj.getBool();
}
obj.free();
params->dictLookup("BlackIs1", &obj);
if (obj.isBool()) {
black = obj.getBool();
}
obj.free();
}
str = new CCITTFaxStream(str, encoding, endOfLine, byteAlign,
columns, rows, endOfBlock, black);
} else if (!strcmp(name, "DCTDecode") || !strcmp(name, "DCT")) {
colorXform = -1;
if (params->isDict()) {
if (params->dictLookup("ColorTransform", &obj)->isInt()) {
colorXform = obj.getInt();
}
obj.free();
}
str = new DCTStream(str, colorXform);
} else if (!strcmp(name, "FlateDecode") || !strcmp(name, "Fl")) {
pred = 1;
columns = 1;
colors = 1;
bits = 8;
if (params->isDict()) {
params->dictLookup("Predictor", &obj);
if (obj.isInt())
pred = obj.getInt();
obj.free();
params->dictLookup("Columns", &obj);
if (obj.isInt())
columns = obj.getInt();
obj.free();
params->dictLookup("Colors", &obj);
if (obj.isInt())
colors = obj.getInt();
obj.free();
params->dictLookup("BitsPerComponent", &obj);
if (obj.isInt())
bits = obj.getInt();
obj.free();
}
str = new FlateStream(str, pred, columns, colors, bits);
} else if (!strcmp(name, "JBIG2Decode")) {
if (params->isDict()) {
params->dictLookup("JBIG2Globals", &globals);
}
str = new JBIG2Stream(str, &globals);
globals.free();
} else if (!strcmp(name, "JPXDecode")) {
str = new JPXStream(str);
} else {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(), "Unknown filter '{0:s}'", name);
str = new EOFStream(str);
}
return str;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(snmp, get)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_GET, (-1));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,536 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct megasas_instance *megasas_lookup_instance(u16 host_no)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < megasas_mgmt_info.max_index; i++) {
if ((megasas_mgmt_info.instance[i]) &&
(megasas_mgmt_info.instance[i]->host->host_no == host_no))
return megasas_mgmt_info.instance[i];
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool IsNonCanonicalCharacter(UChar c) {
return (c == '\\' || c == '0' || c == '\0' || c == '/' || c == '?' ||
c == '%' || c >= 127);
}
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
R=tsepez@chromium.org,mkwst@chromium.org
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 147,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::RemoveSpellingMarkers() {
GetFrame()->GetSpellChecker().RemoveSpellingMarkers();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcRenderTriangles (ClientPtr client)
{
register int n;
REQUEST(xRenderTrianglesReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderTrianglesReq);
swaps (&stuff->length, n);
swapl (&stuff->src, n);
swapl (&stuff->dst, n);
swapl (&stuff->maskFormat, n);
swaps (&stuff->xSrc, n);
swaps (&stuff->ySrc, n);
SwapRestL(stuff);
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cexit(JF, enum js_AstType T, js_Ast *node, js_Ast *target)
{
js_Ast *prev;
do {
prev = node, node = node->parent;
switch (node->type) {
default: /* impossible */ break;
case STM_WITH:
emit(J, F, OP_ENDWITH);
break;
case STM_FOR_IN:
case STM_FOR_IN_VAR:
/* pop the iterator if leaving the loop */
if (F->script) {
if (T == STM_RETURN || T == STM_BREAK || (T == STM_CONTINUE && target != node)) {
/* pop the iterator, save the return or exp value */
emit(J, F, OP_ROT2);
emit(J, F, OP_POP);
}
if (T == STM_CONTINUE)
emit(J, F, OP_ROT2); /* put the iterator back on top */
} else {
if (T == STM_RETURN) {
/* pop the iterator, save the return value */
emit(J, F, OP_ROT2);
emit(J, F, OP_POP);
}
if (T == STM_BREAK || (T == STM_CONTINUE && target != node))
emit(J, F, OP_POP); /* pop the iterator */
}
break;
case STM_TRY:
/* came from try block */
if (prev == node->a) {
emit(J, F, OP_ENDTRY);
if (node->d) cstm(J, F, node->d); /* finally */
}
/* came from catch block */
if (prev == node->c) {
/* ... with finally */
if (node->d) {
emit(J, F, OP_ENDCATCH);
emit(J, F, OP_ENDTRY);
cstm(J, F, node->d); /* finally */
} else {
emit(J, F, OP_ENDCATCH);
}
}
break;
}
} while (node != target);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 7,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> multiTransferListCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.multiTransferList");
TestSerializedScriptValueInterface* imp = V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::toNative(args.Holder());
if (args.Length() <= 0) {
imp->multiTransferList();
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
MessagePortArray messagePortArrayTx;
ArrayBufferArray arrayBufferArrayTx;
if (args.Length() > 1) {
if (!extractTransferables(args[1], messagePortArrayTx, arrayBufferArrayTx))
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("Could not extract transferables");
}
bool firstDidThrow = false;
RefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> first = SerializedScriptValue::create(args[0], &messagePortArrayTx, &arrayBufferArrayTx, firstDidThrow, args.GetIsolate());
if (firstDidThrow)
return v8::Undefined();
if (args.Length() <= 1) {
imp->multiTransferList(first);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
if (args.Length() <= 2) {
imp->multiTransferList(first, messagePortArrayTx);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
MessagePortArray messagePortArrayTxx;
ArrayBufferArray arrayBufferArrayTxx;
if (args.Length() > 3) {
if (!extractTransferables(args[3], messagePortArrayTxx, arrayBufferArrayTxx))
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("Could not extract transferables");
}
bool secondDidThrow = false;
RefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> second = SerializedScriptValue::create(args[2], &messagePortArrayTxx, &arrayBufferArrayTxx, secondDidThrow, args.GetIsolate());
if (secondDidThrow)
return v8::Undefined();
if (args.Length() <= 3) {
imp->multiTransferList(first, messagePortArrayTx, second);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
imp->multiTransferList(first, messagePortArrayTx, second, messagePortArrayTxx);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::SetFilesFromPaths(const Vector<String>& paths) {
return input_type_->SetFilesFromPaths(paths);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TopSitesCache::CountForcedURLs() {
num_forced_urls_ = 0;
while (num_forced_urls_ < top_sites_.size()) {
if (top_sites_[num_forced_urls_].last_forced_time.is_null())
break;
num_forced_urls_++;
}
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
for (size_t i = num_forced_urls_; i < top_sites_.size(); ++i) {
DCHECK(top_sites_[i].last_forced_time.is_null())
<< "All the forced URLs must appear before non-forced URLs.";
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 147,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DisplaySourceCustomBindings::OnSessionTerminated(int sink_id) {
CHECK(GetDisplaySession(sink_id));
session_map_.erase(sink_id);
DispatchSessionTerminated(sink_id);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int scsi_get_bus(struct request_queue *q, int __user *p)
{
return put_user(0, p);
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 94,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IW_IMPL(double) iw_get_value_dbl(struct iw_context *ctx, int code)
{
double ret = 0.0;
switch(code) {
case IW_VAL_TRANSLATE_X:
ret = ctx->resize_settings[IW_DIMENSION_H].translate;
break;
case IW_VAL_TRANSLATE_Y:
ret = ctx->resize_settings[IW_DIMENSION_V].translate;
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 64,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UrlData::UrlDataWithLoadingState::SetUrlData(
scoped_refptr<UrlData> url_data) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
if (url_data)
url_data->IncreaseLoadersInState(loading_state_);
if (url_data_)
url_data_->DecreaseLoadersInState(loading_state_);
url_data_ = std::move(url_data);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void JBIG2Stream::readProfilesSeg(Guint length) {
Guint i;
for (i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
if (curStr->getChar() == EOF) {
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,713 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CWebServer::Cmd_GetUserVariable(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
std::string idx = request::findValue(&req, "idx");
if (idx.empty())
return;
int iVarID = atoi(idx.c_str());
std::vector<std::vector<std::string> > result;
result = m_sql.safe_query("SELECT ID, Name, ValueType, Value, LastUpdate FROM UserVariables WHERE (ID==%d)", iVarID);
int ii = 0;
for (const auto & itt : result)
{
std::vector<std::string> sd = itt;
root["result"][ii]["idx"] = sd[0];
root["result"][ii]["Name"] = sd[1];
root["result"][ii]["Type"] = sd[2];
root["result"][ii]["Value"] = sd[3];
root["result"][ii]["LastUpdate"] = sd[4];
ii++;
}
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "GetUserVariable";
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 91,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MockRenderThread::SetResourceDispatcherDelegate(
content::ResourceDispatcherDelegate* delegate) {
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr)
{
struct list_head *next, *head = &curr->pi_state_list;
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return;
/*
* We are a ZOMBIE and nobody can enqueue itself on
* pi_state_list anymore, but we have to be careful
* versus waiters unqueueing themselves:
*/
raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
while (!list_empty(head)) {
next = head->next;
pi_state = list_entry(next, struct futex_pi_state, list);
key = pi_state->key;
hb = hash_futex(&key);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
/*
* We dropped the pi-lock, so re-check whether this
* task still owns the PI-state:
*/
if (head->next != next) {
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
continue;
}
WARN_ON(pi_state->owner != curr);
WARN_ON(list_empty(&pi_state->list));
list_del_init(&pi_state->list);
pi_state->owner = NULL;
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
rt_mutex_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
}
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
}
Commit Message: futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 38,194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool pinch_end() const { return pinch_end_; }
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tun_poll_controller(struct net_device *dev)
{
/*
* Tun only receives frames when:
* 1) the char device endpoint gets data from user space
* 2) the tun socket gets a sendmsg call from user space
* Since both of those are syncronous operations, we are guaranteed
* never to have pending data when we poll for it
* so theres nothing to do here but return.
* We need this though so netpoll recognizes us as an interface that
* supports polling, which enables bridge devices in virt setups to
* still use netconsole
*/
return;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::registerProtocolHandler(const WebString& scheme,
const WebString& base_url,
const WebString& url,
const WebString& title) {
GURL base(base_url);
GURL absolute_url = base.Resolve(UTF16ToUTF8(url));
if (base.GetOrigin() != absolute_url.GetOrigin()) {
return;
}
Send(new ViewHostMsg_RegisterProtocolHandler(routing_id_,
UTF16ToUTF8(scheme),
absolute_url,
title));
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string ProfileDependencyManager::DumpGraphvizDependency() {
std::string result("digraph {\n");
std::deque<ProfileKeyedBaseFactory*> components;
std::copy(all_components_.begin(),
all_components_.end(),
std::back_inserter(components));
std::deque<ProfileKeyedBaseFactory*>::iterator components_end =
components.end();
result.append(" /* Dependencies */\n");
for (EdgeMap::const_iterator it = edges_.begin(); it != edges_.end(); ++it) {
result.append(" ");
result.append(it->second->name());
result.append(" -> ");
result.append(it->first->name());
result.append(";\n");
components_end = std::remove(components.begin(), components_end,
it->second);
}
components.erase(components_end, components.end());
result.append("\n /* Toplevel attachments */\n");
for (std::deque<ProfileKeyedBaseFactory*>::const_iterator it =
components.begin(); it != components.end(); ++it) {
result.append(" ");
result.append((*it)->name());
result.append(" -> Profile;\n");
}
result.append("\n /* Toplevel profile */\n");
result.append(" Profile [shape=box];\n");
result.append("}\n");
return result;
}
Commit Message: DIAL (Discovery and Launch protocol) extension API skeleton.
This implements the skeleton for a new Chrome extension API for local device discovery. The API will first be restricted to whitelisted extensions only. The API will allow extensions to receive events from a DIAL service running within Chrome which notifies of devices being discovered on the local network.
Spec available here:
https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/14FI-VKWrsMG7pIy3trgM3ybnKS-o5TULkt8itiBNXlQ/edit
BUG=163288
TBR=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11444020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@172243 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CrostiniUpgrader::Shutdown() {
CrostiniManager::GetForProfile(profile_)
->RemoveUpgradeContainerProgressObserver(this);
upgrader_observers_.Clear();
}
Commit Message: Revert "Creates a WebUI-based Crostini Upgrader"
This reverts commit 29c8bb394dd8b8c03e006efb39ec77fc42f96900.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 717476 as the
culprit for failures in the build cycles as shown on:
https://analysis.chromium.org/waterfall/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyRAsSDVdmU3VzcGVjdGVkQ0wiMWNocm9taXVtLzI5YzhiYjM5NGRkOGI4YzAzZTAwNmVmYjM5ZWM3N2ZjNDJmOTY5MDAM
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/b/8896211200981346592
Sample Failed Step: compile
Original change's description:
> Creates a WebUI-based Crostini Upgrader
>
> The UI is behind the new crostini-webui-upgrader flag
> (currently disabled by default)
>
> The main areas for review are
>
> calamity@:
> html/js - chrome/browser/chromeos/crostini_upgrader/
> mojo and webui glue classes - chrome/browser/ui/webui/crostini_upgrader/
>
> davidmunro@
> crostini business logic - chrome/browser/chromeos/crostini/
>
> In this CL, the optional container backup stage is stubbed, and will be
> in a subsequent CL.
>
> A suite of unit/browser tests are also currently lacking. I intend them for
> follow-up CLs.
>
>
> Bug: 930901
> Change-Id: Ic52c5242e6c57232ffa6be5d6af65aaff5e8f4ff
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1900520
> Commit-Queue: Nicholas Verne <nverne@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: calamity <calamity@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#717476}
Change-Id: I704f549216a7d1dc21942fbf6cf4ab9a1d600380
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 930901
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1928159
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#717481}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int in_gate_area(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >= gate_vma.vm_start) && (addr < gate_vma.vm_end);
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 58,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_cox_getcompparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *in, int prtflag, jpc_coxcp_t *compparms)
{
uint_fast8_t tmp;
int i;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
ms = 0;
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &compparms->numdlvls) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &compparms->cblkwidthval) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &compparms->cblkheightval) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &compparms->cblksty) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &compparms->qmfbid)) {
return -1;
}
if (compparms->numdlvls > 32) {
goto error;
}
compparms->numrlvls = compparms->numdlvls + 1;
if (compparms->numrlvls > JPC_MAXRLVLS) {
goto error;
}
if (prtflag) {
for (i = 0; i < compparms->numrlvls; ++i) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp)) {
goto error;
}
compparms->rlvls[i].parwidthval = tmp & 0xf;
compparms->rlvls[i].parheightval = (tmp >> 4) & 0xf;
}
/* Sigh.
This bit should be in the same field in both COC and COD mrk segs. */
compparms->csty |= JPC_COX_PRT;
}
if (jas_stream_eof(in)) {
goto error;
}
return 0;
error:
if (compparms) {
jpc_cox_destroycompparms(compparms);
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spnego_gss_set_sec_context_option(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
const gss_buffer_t value)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_set_sec_context_option(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
value);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 36,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int StreamTcpPacketStateClosing(ThreadVars *tv, Packet *p,
StreamTcpThread *stt, TcpSession *ssn, PacketQueue *pq)
{
if (ssn == NULL)
return -1;
if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_RST) {
if (!StreamTcpValidateRst(ssn, p))
return -1;
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_CLOSED);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: Reset received state changed to TCP_CLOSED",
ssn);
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
if ((p->tcph->th_flags & TH_ACK) && StreamTcpValidateAck(ssn, &ssn->server, p) == 0)
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->server,
StreamTcpResetGetMaxAck(&ssn->server, TCP_GET_ACK(p)));
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->client,
StreamTcpResetGetMaxAck(&ssn->client, TCP_GET_SEQ(p)));
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->client, p, pq);
} else {
if ((p->tcph->th_flags & TH_ACK) && StreamTcpValidateAck(ssn, &ssn->client, p) == 0)
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->client,
StreamTcpResetGetMaxAck(&ssn->client, TCP_GET_ACK(p)));
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->server,
StreamTcpResetGetMaxAck(&ssn->server, TCP_GET_SEQ(p)));
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->server, p, pq);
}
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_SYN) {
SCLogDebug("ssn (%p): SYN pkt on Closing", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_SHUTDOWN_SYN_RESEND);
return -1;
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_ACK) {
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
if (!StreamTcpValidateTimestamp(ssn, p))
return -1;
}
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: pkt (%" PRIu32 ") is to server: SEQ "
"%" PRIu32 ", ACK %" PRIu32 "", ssn, p->payload_len,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), TCP_GET_ACK(p));
int retransmission = 0;
if (StreamTcpPacketIsRetransmission(&ssn->client, p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: packet is retransmission", ssn);
retransmission = 1;
}
if (TCP_GET_SEQ(p) != ssn->client.next_seq) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: -> SEQ mismatch, packet SEQ %" PRIu32 ""
" != %" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.next_seq);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_CLOSING_ACK_WRONG_SEQ);
return -1;
}
if (StreamTcpValidateAck(ssn, &ssn->server, p) == -1) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: rejecting because of invalid ack value", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_CLOSING_INVALID_ACK);
return -1;
}
if (!retransmission) {
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_TIME_WAIT);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: state changed to TCP_TIME_WAIT", ssn);
ssn->client.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p) << ssn->client.wscale;
}
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->server, TCP_GET_ACK(p));
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
/* Update the next_seq, in case if we have missed the client
packet and server has already received and acked it */
if (SEQ_LT(ssn->server.next_seq, TCP_GET_ACK(p)))
ssn->server.next_seq = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->client, p, pq);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =+ next SEQ %" PRIu32 ", last ACK "
"%" PRIu32 "", ssn, ssn->client.next_seq,
ssn->server.last_ack);
} else { /* implied to client */
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: pkt (%" PRIu32 ") is to client: SEQ "
"%" PRIu32 ", ACK %" PRIu32 "", ssn, p->payload_len,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), TCP_GET_ACK(p));
int retransmission = 0;
if (StreamTcpPacketIsRetransmission(&ssn->server, p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: packet is retransmission", ssn);
retransmission = 1;
}
if (TCP_GET_SEQ(p) != ssn->server.next_seq) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: -> SEQ mismatch, packet SEQ %" PRIu32 ""
" != %" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->server.next_seq);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_CLOSING_ACK_WRONG_SEQ);
return -1;
}
if (StreamTcpValidateAck(ssn, &ssn->client, p) == -1) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: rejecting because of invalid ack value", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_CLOSING_INVALID_ACK);
return -1;
}
if (!retransmission) {
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_TIME_WAIT);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: state changed to TCP_TIME_WAIT", ssn);
ssn->client.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p) << ssn->client.wscale;
}
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->client, TCP_GET_ACK(p));
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
/* Update the next_seq, in case if we have missed the client
packet and server has already received and acked it */
if (SEQ_LT(ssn->client.next_seq, TCP_GET_ACK(p)))
ssn->client.next_seq = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->server, p, pq);
SCLogDebug("StreamTcpPacketStateClosing (%p): =+ next SEQ "
"%" PRIu32 ", last ACK %" PRIu32 "", ssn,
ssn->server.next_seq, ssn->client.last_ack);
}
} else {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: default case", ssn);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID: | 0 | 79,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: on_unregister_handler(TCMUService1HandlerManager1 *interface,
GDBusMethodInvocation *invocation,
gchar *subtype,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct tcmur_handler *handler = find_handler_by_subtype(subtype);
struct dbus_info *info = handler->opaque;
if (!handler) {
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", FALSE,
"unknown subtype"));
return TRUE;
}
dbus_unexport_handler(handler);
tcmur_unregister_handler(handler);
g_bus_unwatch_name(info->watcher_id);
g_free(info);
g_free(handler);
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", TRUE, "succeeded"));
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: fixed local DoS when UnregisterHandler was called for a not existing handler
Any user with DBUS access could cause a SEGFAULT in tcmu-runner by
running something like this:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:123
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 167,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jpc_ft_synthesize(jpc_fix_t *a, int xstart, int ystart, int width, int height,
int stride)
{
int numrows = height;
int numcols = width;
int rowparity = ystart & 1;
int colparity = xstart & 1;
int maxcols;
jpc_fix_t *startptr;
int i;
startptr = &a[0];
for (i = 0; i < numrows; ++i) {
jpc_ft_invlift_row(startptr, numcols, colparity);
jpc_qmfb_join_row(startptr, numcols, colparity);
startptr += stride;
}
maxcols = (numcols / JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE) * JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE;
startptr = &a[0];
for (i = 0; i < maxcols; i += JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE) {
jpc_ft_invlift_colgrp(startptr, numrows, stride, rowparity);
jpc_qmfb_join_colgrp(startptr, numrows, stride, rowparity);
startptr += JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE;
}
if (maxcols < numcols) {
jpc_ft_invlift_colres(startptr, numrows, numcols - maxcols, stride,
rowparity);
jpc_qmfb_join_colres(startptr, numrows, numcols - maxcols, stride,
rowparity);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a buffer overrun problem in the QMFB code in the JPC codec
that was caused by a buffer being allocated with a size that was too small
in some cases.
Added a new regression test case.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,547 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mojom::CommitResult FrameLoader::CommitSameDocumentNavigation(
const KURL& url,
FrameLoadType frame_load_type,
HistoryItem* history_item,
ClientRedirectPolicy client_redirect_policy,
Document* origin_document,
Event* triggering_event) {
DCHECK(!IsReloadLoadType(frame_load_type));
DCHECK(frame_->GetDocument());
if (in_stop_all_loaders_)
return mojom::CommitResult::Aborted;
bool history_navigation = IsBackForwardLoadType(frame_load_type);
if (!frame_->IsNavigationAllowed() && history_navigation)
return mojom::CommitResult::Aborted;
if (!history_navigation) {
if (!url.HasFragmentIdentifier() ||
!EqualIgnoringFragmentIdentifier(frame_->GetDocument()->Url(), url) ||
frame_->GetDocument()->IsFrameSet()) {
return mojom::CommitResult::RestartCrossDocument;
}
}
DCHECK(history_item || !history_navigation);
scoped_refptr<SerializedScriptValue> state_object =
history_navigation ? history_item->StateObject() : nullptr;
if (!history_navigation) {
document_loader_->SetNavigationType(
DetermineNavigationType(frame_load_type, false, triggering_event));
if (ShouldTreatURLAsSameAsCurrent(url))
frame_load_type = kFrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem;
}
LoadInSameDocument(url, state_object, frame_load_type, history_item,
client_redirect_policy, origin_document);
return mojom::CommitResult::Ok;
}
Commit Message: Only allow downloading in response to real keyboard modifiers
BUG=848531
Change-Id: I97554c8d312243b55647f1376945aee32dbd95bf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1082216
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564051}
CWE ID: | 0 | 154,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int register_pernet_operations(struct list_head *list,
struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
int error;
if (ops->id) {
again:
error = ida_get_new_above(&net_generic_ids, MIN_PERNET_OPS_ID, ops->id);
if (error < 0) {
if (error == -EAGAIN) {
ida_pre_get(&net_generic_ids, GFP_KERNEL);
goto again;
}
return error;
}
max_gen_ptrs = max(max_gen_ptrs, *ops->id + 1);
}
error = __register_pernet_operations(list, ops);
if (error) {
rcu_barrier();
if (ops->id)
ida_remove(&net_generic_ids, *ops->id);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id()
(I can trivially verify that that idr_remove in cleanup_net happens
after the network namespace count has dropped to zero --EWB)
Function get_net_ns_by_id() does not check for net::count
after it has found a peer in netns_ids idr.
It may dereference a peer, after its count has already been
finaly decremented. This leads to double free and memory
corruption:
put_net(peer) rtnl_lock()
atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0] ...
__put_net(peer) get_net_ns_by_id(net, id)
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
queue_work() peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id)
| get_net(peer) [count=1]
| ...
| (use after final put)
v ...
cleanup_net() ...
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..) ...
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
... ...
... put_net(peer)
... atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0]
... spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
... spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... queue_work()
... rtnl_unlock()
rtnl_lock() ...
for_each_net(tmp) { ...
id = __peernet2id(tmp, peer) ...
spin_lock_irq(&tmp->nsid_lock) ...
idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id) ...
... ...
net_drop_ns() ...
net_free(peer) ...
} ...
|
v
cleanup_net()
...
(Second free of peer)
Also, put_net() on the right cpu may reorder with left's cpu
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..), and then cleanup_list
will be corrupted.
Since cleanup_net() is executed in worker thread, while
put_net(peer) can happen everywhere, there should be
enough time for concurrent get_net_ns_by_id() to pick
the peer up, and the race does not seem to be unlikely.
The patch fixes the problem in standard way.
(Also, there is possible problem in peernet2id_alloc(), which requires
check for net::count under nsid_lock and maybe_get_net(peer), but
in current stable kernel it's used under rtnl_lock() and it has to be
safe. Openswitch begun to use peernet2id_alloc(), and possibly it should
be fixed too. While this is not in stable kernel yet, so I'll send
a separate message to netdev@ later).
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Fixes: 0c7aecd4bde4 "netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids"
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 86,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void runSingleTask()
{
if (m_tasks.isEmpty())
return;
m_tasks.takeFirst()->run();
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 132,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int emulator_cmpxchg_emulated(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
unsigned long addr,
const void *old,
const void *new,
unsigned int bytes,
struct x86_exception *exception)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
gpa_t gpa;
struct page *page;
char *kaddr;
bool exchanged;
/* guests cmpxchg8b have to be emulated atomically */
if (bytes > 8 || (bytes & (bytes - 1)))
goto emul_write;
gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write(vcpu, addr, NULL);
if (gpa == UNMAPPED_GVA ||
(gpa & PAGE_MASK) == APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE)
goto emul_write;
if (((gpa + bytes - 1) & PAGE_MASK) != (gpa & PAGE_MASK))
goto emul_write;
page = gfn_to_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
if (is_error_page(page))
goto emul_write;
kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
kaddr += offset_in_page(gpa);
switch (bytes) {
case 1:
exchanged = CMPXCHG_TYPE(u8, kaddr, old, new);
break;
case 2:
exchanged = CMPXCHG_TYPE(u16, kaddr, old, new);
break;
case 4:
exchanged = CMPXCHG_TYPE(u32, kaddr, old, new);
break;
case 8:
exchanged = CMPXCHG64(kaddr, old, new);
break;
default:
BUG();
}
kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
kvm_release_page_dirty(page);
if (!exchanged)
return X86EMUL_CMPXCHG_FAILED;
mark_page_dirty(vcpu->kvm, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
kvm_mmu_pte_write(vcpu, gpa, new, bytes);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
emul_write:
printk_once(KERN_WARNING "kvm: emulating exchange as write\n");
return emulator_write_emulated(ctxt, addr, new, bytes, exception);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 35,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int php_tcp_sockop_connect(php_stream *stream, php_netstream_data_t *sock,
php_stream_xport_param *xparam)
{
char *host = NULL, *bindto = NULL;
int portno, bindport = 0;
int err = 0;
int ret;
zval *tmpzval = NULL;
long sockopts = STREAM_SOCKOP_NONE;
#ifdef AF_UNIX
if (stream->ops == &php_stream_unix_socket_ops || stream->ops == &php_stream_unixdg_socket_ops) {
struct sockaddr_un unix_addr;
sock->socket = socket(PF_UNIX, stream->ops == &php_stream_unix_socket_ops ? SOCK_STREAM : SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
if (sock->socket == SOCK_ERR) {
if (xparam->want_errortext) {
xparam->outputs.error_text = strpprintf(0, "Failed to create unix socket");
}
return -1;
}
parse_unix_address(xparam, &unix_addr);
ret = php_network_connect_socket(sock->socket,
(const struct sockaddr *)&unix_addr, (socklen_t) XtOffsetOf(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + xparam->inputs.namelen,
xparam->op == STREAM_XPORT_OP_CONNECT_ASYNC, xparam->inputs.timeout,
xparam->want_errortext ? &xparam->outputs.error_text : NULL,
&err);
xparam->outputs.error_code = err;
goto out;
}
#endif
host = parse_ip_address(xparam, &portno);
if (host == NULL) {
return -1;
}
if (PHP_STREAM_CONTEXT(stream) && (tmpzval = php_stream_context_get_option(PHP_STREAM_CONTEXT(stream), "socket", "bindto")) != NULL) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(tmpzval) != IS_STRING) {
if (xparam->want_errortext) {
xparam->outputs.error_text = strpprintf(0, "local_addr context option is not a string.");
}
efree(host);
return -1;
}
bindto = parse_ip_address_ex(Z_STRVAL_P(tmpzval), Z_STRLEN_P(tmpzval), &bindport, xparam->want_errortext, &xparam->outputs.error_text);
}
#ifdef SO_BROADCAST
if (stream->ops == &php_stream_udp_socket_ops /* SO_BROADCAST is only applicable for UDP */
&& PHP_STREAM_CONTEXT(stream)
&& (tmpzval = php_stream_context_get_option(PHP_STREAM_CONTEXT(stream), "socket", "so_broadcast")) != NULL
&& zend_is_true(tmpzval)
) {
sockopts |= STREAM_SOCKOP_SO_BROADCAST;
}
#endif
/* Note: the test here for php_stream_udp_socket_ops is important, because we
* want the default to be TCP sockets so that the openssl extension can
* re-use this code. */
sock->socket = php_network_connect_socket_to_host(host, portno,
stream->ops == &php_stream_udp_socket_ops ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM,
xparam->op == STREAM_XPORT_OP_CONNECT_ASYNC,
xparam->inputs.timeout,
xparam->want_errortext ? &xparam->outputs.error_text : NULL,
&err,
bindto,
bindport,
sockopts
);
ret = sock->socket == -1 ? -1 : 0;
xparam->outputs.error_code = err;
if (host) {
efree(host);
}
if (bindto) {
efree(bindto);
}
#ifdef AF_UNIX
out:
#endif
if (ret >= 0 && xparam->op == STREAM_XPORT_OP_CONNECT_ASYNC && err == EINPROGRESS) {
/* indicates pending connection */
return 1;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Detect invalid port in xp_socket parse ip address
For historical reasons, fsockopen() accepts the port and hostname
separately: fsockopen('127.0.0.1', 80)
However, with the introdcution of stream transports in PHP 4.3,
it became possible to include the port in the hostname specifier:
fsockopen('127.0.0.1:80')
Or more formally: fsockopen('tcp://127.0.0.1:80')
Confusing results when these two forms are combined, however.
fsockopen('127.0.0.1:80', 443) results in fsockopen() attempting
to connect to '127.0.0.1:80:443' which any reasonable stack would
consider invalid.
Unfortunately, PHP parses the address looking for the first colon
(with special handling for IPv6, don't worry) and calls atoi()
from there. atoi() in turn, simply stops parsing at the first
non-numeric character and returns the value so far.
The end result is that the explicitly supplied port is treated
as ignored garbage, rather than producing an error.
This diff replaces atoi() with strtol() and inspects the
stop character. If additional "garbage" of any kind is found,
it fails and returns an error.
CWE ID: CWE-918 | 0 | 67,780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32_t U24_AT(const uint8_t *ptr) {
return ptr[0] << 16 | ptr[1] << 8 | ptr[2];
}
Commit Message: Make VBRISeeker more robust
Bug: 32577290
Change-Id: I9bcc9422ae7dd3ae4a38df330c9dcd7ac4941ec8
(cherry picked from commit 7fdd36418e945cf6a500018632dfb0ed8cb1a343)
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void GetRootMeanSquarePixelList(PixelList *pixel_list,
Quantum *pixel)
{
double
sum;
register SkipList
*p;
size_t
color;
ssize_t
count;
/*
Find the root mean square value for each of the color.
*/
p=(&pixel_list->skip_list);
color=65536L;
count=0;
sum=0.0;
do
{
color=p->nodes[color].next[0];
sum+=(double) (p->nodes[color].count*color*color);
count+=p->nodes[color].count;
} while (count < (ssize_t) pixel_list->length);
sum/=pixel_list->length;
*pixel=ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) sqrt(sum));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 96,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: netdev_port_features_from_ofp11(ovs_be32 ofp11)
{
return ntohl(ofp11) & 0xffff;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TestBrowserWindow::IsMaximized() const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string FormatUrlErrorMessage(
const char* format, const GURL& url,
AppCacheUpdateJob::ResultType error,
int response_code) {
int code = response_code;
if (error != AppCacheUpdateJob::SERVER_ERROR)
code = static_cast<int>(error);
return base::StringPrintf(format, code, url.spec().c_str());
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void UpdatePreferredSize(const gfx::Size& pref_size) {}
Commit Message: Add unit test for AllowBindings check.
BUG=117418
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9701038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126929 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 109,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs41_init_sequence(struct nfs4_sequence_args *args,
struct nfs4_sequence_res *res, int cache_reply)
{
args->sa_session = NULL;
args->sa_cache_this = 0;
if (cache_reply)
args->sa_cache_this = 1;
res->sr_session = NULL;
res->sr_slot = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,852 |
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