instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err gitn_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i;
GroupIdToNameBox *ptr = (GroupIdToNameBox *) a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "GroupIdToNameBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
for (i=0; i<ptr->nb_entries; i++) {
fprintf(trace, "<GroupIdToNameBoxEntry groupID=\"%d\" name=\"%s\"/>\n", ptr->entries[i].group_id, ptr->entries[i].name);
}
if (!ptr->size) {
fprintf(trace, "<GroupIdToNameBoxEntryEntry groupID=\"\" name=\"\"/>\n");
}
gf_isom_box_dump_done("GroupIdToNameBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int SocketStream::DoBeforeConnect() {
next_state_ = STATE_BEFORE_CONNECT_COMPLETE;
if (!context_.get() || !context_->network_delegate()) {
return OK;
}
int result = context_->network_delegate()->NotifyBeforeSocketStreamConnect(
this, io_callback_);
if (result != OK && result != ERR_IO_PENDING)
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 171,253 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vmxnet3_indicate_packet(VMXNET3State *s)
{
struct Vmxnet3_RxDesc rxd;
bool is_head = true;
uint32_t rxd_idx;
uint32_t rx_ridx = 0;
struct Vmxnet3_RxCompDesc rxcd;
uint32_t new_rxcd_gen = VMXNET3_INIT_GEN;
hwaddr new_rxcd_pa = 0;
hwaddr ready_rxcd_pa = 0;
struct iovec *data = vmxnet_rx_pkt_get_iovec(s->rx_pkt);
size_t bytes_copied = 0;
size_t bytes_left = vmxnet_rx_pkt_get_total_len(s->rx_pkt);
uint16_t num_frags = 0;
size_t chunk_size;
vmxnet_rx_pkt_dump(s->rx_pkt);
while (bytes_left > 0) {
/* cannot add more frags to packet */
if (num_frags == s->max_rx_frags) {
break;
}
new_rxcd_pa = vmxnet3_pop_rxc_descr(s, RXQ_IDX, &new_rxcd_gen);
if (!new_rxcd_pa) {
break;
}
if (!vmxnet3_get_next_rx_descr(s, is_head, &rxd, &rxd_idx, &rx_ridx)) {
break;
}
chunk_size = MIN(bytes_left, rxd.len);
vmxnet3_physical_memory_writev(data, bytes_copied,
le64_to_cpu(rxd.addr), chunk_size);
bytes_copied += chunk_size;
bytes_left -= chunk_size;
vmxnet3_dump_rx_descr(&rxd);
if (0 != ready_rxcd_pa) {
cpu_physical_memory_write(ready_rxcd_pa, &rxcd, sizeof(rxcd));
}
memset(&rxcd, 0, sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_RxCompDesc));
rxcd.rxdIdx = rxd_idx;
rxcd.len = chunk_size;
rxcd.sop = is_head;
rxcd.gen = new_rxcd_gen;
rxcd.rqID = RXQ_IDX + rx_ridx * s->rxq_num;
if (0 == bytes_left) {
vmxnet3_rx_update_descr(s->rx_pkt, &rxcd);
}
VMW_RIPRN("RX Completion descriptor: rxRing: %lu rxIdx %lu len %lu "
"sop %d csum_correct %lu",
(unsigned long) rx_ridx,
(unsigned long) rxcd.rxdIdx,
(unsigned long) rxcd.len,
(int) rxcd.sop,
(unsigned long) rxcd.tuc);
is_head = false;
ready_rxcd_pa = new_rxcd_pa;
new_rxcd_pa = 0;
num_frags++;
}
if (0 != ready_rxcd_pa) {
rxcd.eop = 1;
rxcd.err = (0 != bytes_left);
cpu_physical_memory_write(ready_rxcd_pa, &rxcd, sizeof(rxcd));
/* Flush RX descriptor changes */
smp_wmb();
}
if (0 != new_rxcd_pa) {
vmxnet3_revert_rxc_descr(s, RXQ_IDX);
}
vmxnet3_trigger_interrupt(s, s->rxq_descr[RXQ_IDX].intr_idx);
if (bytes_left == 0) {
vmxnet3_on_rx_done_update_stats(s, RXQ_IDX, VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_OK);
return true;
} else if (num_frags == s->max_rx_frags) {
vmxnet3_on_rx_done_update_stats(s, RXQ_IDX, VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_ERROR);
return false;
} else {
vmxnet3_on_rx_done_update_stats(s, RXQ_IDX,
VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_OUT_OF_BUF);
return false;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void StringOrNullAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueStringOrNull(info, impl->stringOrNullAttribute(), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
{
struct key *keyring;
long err;
ctx->iterator = keyring_search_iterator;
ctx->possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref);
ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
key_check(keyring);
if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM)) {
err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
if (err < 0)
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
rcu_read_lock();
ctx->now = current_kernel_time();
if (search_nested_keyrings(keyring, ctx))
__key_get(key_ref_to_ptr(ctx->result));
rcu_read_unlock();
return ctx->result;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: ensure we free the assoc array edit if edit is valid
__key_link_end is not freeing the associated array edit structure
and this leads to a 512 byte memory leak each time an identical
existing key is added with add_key().
The reason the add_key() system call returns okay is that
key_create_or_update() calls __key_link_begin() before checking to see
whether it can update a key directly rather than adding/replacing - which
it turns out it can. Thus __key_link() is not called through
__key_instantiate_and_link() and __key_link_end() must cancel the edit.
CVE-2015-1333
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 44,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs4_init_uniform_client_string(struct nfs_client *clp)
{
int result;
size_t len;
char *str;
if (clp->cl_owner_id != NULL)
return 0;
if (nfs4_client_id_uniquifier[0] != '\0')
return nfs4_init_uniquifier_client_string(clp);
len = 10 + 10 + 1 + 10 + 1 +
strlen(clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_nodename) + 1;
if (len > NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT + 1)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Since this string is allocated at mount time, and held until the
* nfs_client is destroyed, we can use GFP_KERNEL here w/o worrying
* about a memory-reclaim deadlock.
*/
str = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!str)
return -ENOMEM;
result = scnprintf(str, len, "Linux NFSv%u.%u %s",
clp->rpc_ops->version, clp->cl_minorversion,
clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_nodename);
if (result >= len) {
kfree(str);
return -EINVAL;
}
clp->cl_owner_id = str;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_CheckTimeout( void ) {
if ( ( !CL_CheckPaused() || !sv_paused->integer )
&& clc.state >= CA_CONNECTED && clc.state != CA_CINEMATIC
&& cls.realtime - clc.lastPacketTime > cl_timeout->value*1000) {
if (++cl.timeoutcount > 5) { // timeoutcount saves debugger
Com_Printf ("\nServer connection timed out.\n");
CL_Disconnect( qtrue );
return;
}
} else {
cl.timeoutcount = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_METHOD(PDOStatement, errorCode)
{
PHP_STMT_GET_OBJ;
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (stmt->error_code[0] == '\0') {
RETURN_NULL();
}
RETURN_STRING(stmt->error_code, 1);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 72,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PageInfoBubbleView::ButtonPressed(views::Button* button,
const ui::Event& event) {
switch (button->id()) {
case PageInfoBubbleView::VIEW_ID_PAGE_INFO_BUTTON_CLOSE:
GetWidget()->Close();
break;
case PageInfoBubbleView::VIEW_ID_PAGE_INFO_BUTTON_CHANGE_PASSWORD:
presenter_->OnChangePasswordButtonPressed(web_contents());
break;
case PageInfoBubbleView::VIEW_ID_PAGE_INFO_BUTTON_WHITELIST_PASSWORD_REUSE:
GetWidget()->Close();
presenter_->OnWhitelistPasswordReuseButtonPressed(web_contents());
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Desktop Page Info/Harmony: Show close button for internal pages.
The Harmony version of Page Info for internal Chrome pages (chrome://,
chrome-extension:// and view-source:// pages) show a close button. Update the
code to match this.
This patch also adds TestBrowserDialog tests for the latter two cases described
above (internal extension and view source pages).
See screenshot -
https://drive.google.com/file/d/18RZnMiHCu-rCX9N6DLUpu4mkFWguh1xm/view?usp=sharing
Bug: 535074
Change-Id: I55e5f1aa682fd4ec85f7b65ac88f5a4f5906fe53
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/759624
Commit-Queue: Patti <patricialor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Trent Apted <tapted@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516624}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 133,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool NavigationControllerImpl::CanGoForward() const {
int index = GetCurrentEntryIndex();
return index >= 0 && index < (static_cast<int>(entries_.size()) - 1);
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static cJSON_bool parse_array(cJSON * const item, parse_buffer * const input_buffer)
{
cJSON *head = NULL; /* head of the linked list */
cJSON *current_item = NULL;
if (input_buffer->depth >= CJSON_NESTING_LIMIT)
{
return false; /* to deeply nested */
}
input_buffer->depth++;
if (buffer_at_offset(input_buffer)[0] != '[')
{
/* not an array */
goto fail;
}
input_buffer->offset++;
buffer_skip_whitespace(input_buffer);
if (can_access_at_index(input_buffer, 0) && (buffer_at_offset(input_buffer)[0] == ']'))
{
/* empty array */
goto success;
}
/* check if we skipped to the end of the buffer */
if (cannot_access_at_index(input_buffer, 0))
{
input_buffer->offset--;
goto fail;
}
/* step back to character in front of the first element */
input_buffer->offset--;
/* loop through the comma separated array elements */
do
{
/* allocate next item */
cJSON *new_item = cJSON_New_Item(&(input_buffer->hooks));
if (new_item == NULL)
{
goto fail; /* allocation failure */
}
/* attach next item to list */
if (head == NULL)
{
/* start the linked list */
current_item = head = new_item;
}
else
{
/* add to the end and advance */
current_item->next = new_item;
new_item->prev = current_item;
current_item = new_item;
}
/* parse next value */
input_buffer->offset++;
buffer_skip_whitespace(input_buffer);
if (!parse_value(current_item, input_buffer))
{
goto fail; /* failed to parse value */
}
buffer_skip_whitespace(input_buffer);
}
while (can_access_at_index(input_buffer, 0) && (buffer_at_offset(input_buffer)[0] == ','));
if (cannot_access_at_index(input_buffer, 0) || buffer_at_offset(input_buffer)[0] != ']')
{
goto fail; /* expected end of array */
}
success:
input_buffer->depth--;
item->type = cJSON_Array;
item->child = head;
input_buffer->offset++;
return true;
fail:
if (head != NULL)
{
cJSON_Delete(head);
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 87,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void acpi_os_execute_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct acpi_os_dpc *dpc = container_of(work, struct acpi_os_dpc, work);
dpc->function(dpc->context);
kfree(dpc);
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 53,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void xfrm6_tunnel_spi_fini(void)
{
kmem_cache_destroy(xfrm6_tunnel_spi_kmem);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 165,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pam_sm_open_session (pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags UNUSED,
int argc, const char **argv)
{
char *cookiefile = NULL, *xauthority = NULL,
*cookie = NULL, *display = NULL, *tmp = NULL,
*xauthlocalhostname = NULL;
const char *user, *xauth = NULL;
struct passwd *tpwd, *rpwd;
int fd, i, debug = 0;
int retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
uid_t systemuser = 499, targetuser = 0, fsuid;
/* Parse arguments. We don't understand many, so no sense in breaking
* this into a separate function. */
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
if (strcmp(argv[i], "debug") == 0) {
debug = 1;
continue;
}
if (strncmp(argv[i], "xauthpath=", 10) == 0) {
xauth = argv[i] + 10;
continue;
}
if (strncmp(argv[i], "targetuser=", 11) == 0) {
long l = strtol(argv[i] + 11, &tmp, 10);
if ((strlen(argv[i] + 11) > 0) && (*tmp == '\0')) {
targetuser = l;
} else {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING,
"invalid value for targetuser (`%s')",
argv[i] + 11);
}
continue;
}
if (strncmp(argv[i], "systemuser=", 11) == 0) {
long l = strtol(argv[i] + 11, &tmp, 10);
if ((strlen(argv[i] + 11) > 0) && (*tmp == '\0')) {
systemuser = l;
} else {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING,
"invalid value for systemuser (`%s')",
argv[i] + 11);
}
continue;
}
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING, "unrecognized option `%s'",
argv[i]);
}
if (xauth == NULL) {
size_t j;
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(xauthpaths)/sizeof(xauthpaths[0]); j++) {
if (access(xauthpaths[j], X_OK) == 0) {
xauth = xauthpaths[j];
break;
}
}
if (xauth == NULL) {
/* xauth executable not found - nothing to do */
return PAM_SUCCESS;
}
}
/* If DISPLAY isn't set, we don't really care, now do we? */
if ((display = getenv("DISPLAY")) == NULL) {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"user has no DISPLAY, doing nothing");
}
return PAM_SUCCESS;
}
/* Read the target user's name. */
if (pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"error determining target user's name");
retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
rpwd = pam_modutil_getpwuid(pamh, getuid());
if (rpwd == NULL) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"error determining invoking user's name");
retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Get the target user's UID and primary GID, which we'll need to set
* on the xauthority file we create later on. */
tpwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, user);
if (tpwd == NULL) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"error determining target user's UID");
retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"requesting user %lu/%lu, target user %lu/%lu",
(unsigned long) rpwd->pw_uid,
(unsigned long) rpwd->pw_gid,
(unsigned long) tpwd->pw_uid,
(unsigned long) tpwd->pw_gid);
}
/* If the UID is a system account (and not the superuser), forget
* about forwarding keys. */
if ((tpwd->pw_uid != 0) &&
(tpwd->pw_uid != targetuser) &&
(tpwd->pw_uid <= systemuser)) {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"not forwarding cookies to user ID %lu",
(unsigned long) tpwd->pw_uid);
}
retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Check that both users are amenable to this. By default, this
* boils down to this policy:
* export(ruser=root): only if <user> is listed in .xauth/export
* export(ruser=*) if <user> is listed in .xauth/export, or
* if .xauth/export does not exist
* import(user=*): if <ruser> is listed in .xauth/import, or
* if .xauth/import does not exist */
i = (getuid() != 0 || tpwd->pw_uid == 0) ? PAM_SUCCESS : PAM_PERM_DENIED;
i = check_acl(pamh, "export", rpwd->pw_name, user, i, debug);
if (i != PAM_SUCCESS) {
retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
i = PAM_SUCCESS;
i = check_acl(pamh, "import", user, rpwd->pw_name, i, debug);
if (i != PAM_SUCCESS) {
retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Figure out where the source user's .Xauthority file is. */
if (getenv(XAUTHENV) != NULL) {
cookiefile = strdup(getenv(XAUTHENV));
} else {
cookiefile = malloc(strlen(rpwd->pw_dir) + 1 +
strlen(XAUTHDEF) + 1);
if (cookiefile == NULL) {
retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
strcpy(cookiefile, rpwd->pw_dir);
strcat(cookiefile, "/");
strcat(cookiefile, XAUTHDEF);
}
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "reading keys from `%s'",
cookiefile);
}
/* Read the user's .Xauthority file. Because the current UID is
* the original user's UID, this will only fail if something has
* gone wrong, or we have no cookies. */
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"running \"%s %s %s %s %s\" as %lu/%lu",
xauth, "-f", cookiefile, "nlist", display,
(unsigned long) getuid(), (unsigned long) getgid());
}
if (run_coprocess(pamh, NULL, &cookie,
getuid(), getgid(),
xauth, "-f", cookiefile, "nlist", display,
NULL) == 0) {
int save_errno;
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
security_context_t context = NULL;
#endif
/* Check that we got a cookie. If not, we get creative. */
if (((cookie == NULL) || (strlen(cookie) == 0)) &&
((strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) ||
(strncmp(display, "localhost/unix:", 15) == 0))) {
char *t, *screen;
size_t tlen, slen;
/* Free the useless cookie string. */
if (cookie != NULL) {
free(cookie);
cookie = NULL;
}
/* Allocate enough space to hold an adjusted name. */
tlen = strlen(display) + LINE_MAX + 1;
t = malloc(tlen);
if (t != NULL) {
memset(t, 0, tlen);
if (gethostname(t, tlen - 1) != -1) {
/* Append the protocol and then the
* screen number. */
if (strlen(t) < tlen - 6) {
strcat(t, "/unix:");
}
screen = strchr(display, ':');
if (screen != NULL) {
screen++;
slen = strlen(screen);
if (strlen(t) + slen < tlen) {
strcat(t, screen);
}
}
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"no key for `%s', "
"trying `%s'",
display, t);
}
/* Read the cookie for this display. */
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"running "
"\"%s %s %s %s %s\" as "
"%lu/%lu",
xauth,
"-f",
cookiefile,
"nlist",
t,
(unsigned long) getuid(),
(unsigned long) getgid());
}
run_coprocess(pamh, NULL, &cookie,
getuid(), getgid(),
xauth, "-f", cookiefile,
"nlist", t, NULL);
}
free(t);
t = NULL;
}
}
/* Check that we got a cookie, this time for real. */
if ((cookie == NULL) || (strlen(cookie) == 0)) {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "no key");
}
retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Generate the environment variable
* "XAUTHORITY=<homedir>/filename". */
if (asprintf(&xauthority, "%s=%s/%s",
XAUTHENV, tpwd->pw_dir, XAUTHTMP) < 0) {
xauthority = NULL;
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "out of memory");
}
retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Generate a new file to hold the data. */
fsuid = setfsuid(tpwd->pw_uid);
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
if (is_selinux_enabled() > 0) {
struct selabel_handle *ctx = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, NULL, 0);
if (ctx != NULL) {
if (selabel_lookup(ctx, &context,
xauthority + sizeof(XAUTHENV), S_IFREG) != 0) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING,
"could not get SELinux label for '%s'",
xauthority + sizeof(XAUTHENV));
}
selabel_close(ctx);
if (setfscreatecon(context)) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING,
"setfscreatecon(%s) failed: %m", context);
}
}
}
fd = mkstemp(xauthority + sizeof(XAUTHENV));
save_errno = errno;
if (context != NULL) {
free(context);
setfscreatecon(NULL);
}
#else
fd = mkstemp(xauthority + sizeof(XAUTHENV));
save_errno = errno;
#endif
setfsuid(fsuid);
if (fd == -1) {
errno = save_errno;
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"error creating temporary file `%s': %m",
xauthority + sizeof(XAUTHENV));
retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Set permissions on the new file and dispose of the
* descriptor. */
setfsuid(tpwd->pw_uid);
if (fchown(fd, tpwd->pw_uid, tpwd->pw_gid) < 0)
pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_ERR, "fchown: %m");
setfsuid(fsuid);
close(fd);
/* Get a copy of the filename to save as a data item for
* removal at session-close time. */
free(cookiefile);
cookiefile = strdup(xauthority + sizeof(XAUTHENV));
/* Save the filename. */
if (pam_set_data(pamh, DATANAME, cookiefile, cleanup) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"error saving name of temporary file `%s'",
cookiefile);
unlink(cookiefile);
retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Set the new variable in the environment. */
if (pam_putenv (pamh, xauthority) != PAM_SUCCESS)
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"can't set environment variable '%s'",
xauthority);
putenv (xauthority); /* The environment owns this string now. */
xauthority = NULL; /* Don't free environment variables. */
/* set $DISPLAY in pam handle to make su - work */
{
char *d;
if (asprintf(&d, "DISPLAY=%s", display) < 0)
{
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "out of memory");
cookiefile = NULL;
retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if (pam_putenv (pamh, d) != PAM_SUCCESS)
pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_ERR,
"can't set environment variable '%s'", d);
free (d);
}
/* set XAUTHLOCALHOSTNAME to make sure that su - work under gnome */
if ((xauthlocalhostname = getenv("XAUTHLOCALHOSTNAME")) != NULL) {
char *d;
if (asprintf(&d, "XAUTHLOCALHOSTNAME=%s", xauthlocalhostname) < 0) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "out of memory");
retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if (pam_putenv (pamh, d) != PAM_SUCCESS)
pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_ERR,
"can't set environment variable '%s'", d);
free (d);
}
/* Merge the cookie we read before into the new file. */
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"writing key `%s' to temporary file `%s'",
cookie, cookiefile);
}
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"running \"%s %s %s %s %s\" as %lu/%lu",
xauth, "-f", cookiefile, "nmerge", "-",
(unsigned long) tpwd->pw_uid,
(unsigned long) tpwd->pw_gid);
}
run_coprocess(pamh, cookie, &tmp,
tpwd->pw_uid, tpwd->pw_gid,
xauth, "-f", cookiefile, "nmerge", "-", NULL);
/* We don't need to keep a copy of these around any more. */
cookiefile = NULL;
free(tmp);
}
cleanup:
/* Unset any old XAUTHORITY variable in the environment. */
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS && getenv (XAUTHENV))
unsetenv (XAUTHENV);
free(cookiefile);
free(cookie);
free(xauthority);
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 5,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PDFShouldDisableScaling(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebNode& node,
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& params) {
const bool kDefaultPDFShouldDisableScalingSetting = true;
blink::WebPrintPresetOptions preset_options;
if (!frame->getPrintPresetOptionsForPlugin(node, &preset_options))
return kDefaultPDFShouldDisableScalingSetting;
return PDFShouldDisableScalingBasedOnPreset(preset_options, params);
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void js_trap(js_State *J, int pc)
{
if (pc > 0) {
js_Function *F = STACK[BOT-1].u.object->u.f.function;
printf("trap at %d in function ", pc);
jsC_dumpfunction(J, F);
}
jsR_dumpstack(J);
jsR_dumpenvironment(J, J->E, 0);
js_stacktrace(J);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,503 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnUserGesture() {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_, DidGetUserGesture());
ResourceDispatcherHostImpl* rdh = ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get();
if (rdh) // NULL in unittests.
rdh->OnUserGesture(this);
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __releases(mrt_lock)
{
read_unlock(&mrt_lock);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 93,509 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int js_isprimitive(js_State *J, int idx) { return stackidx(J, idx)->type != JS_TOBJECT; }
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char * coolkey_get_manufacturer(coolkey_cuid_t *cuid)
{
unsigned short fabricator = bebytes2ushort(cuid->ic_fabricator);
int i;
char *buf;
const char *manufacturer_string = "%04x Unknown";
size_t len;
int r;
for (i=0; i < manufacturer_list_count; i++) {
if (manufacturer_list[i].id == fabricator) {
manufacturer_string = manufacturer_list[i].string;
break;
}
}
len = strlen(manufacturer_string)+1;
buf= malloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
r = snprintf(buf, len, manufacturer_string, fabricator);
if (r < 0) {
free(buf);
return NULL;
}
return buf;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
const char *format,
const char *master_desc,
const char *datalen)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
unsigned short datablob_len;
unsigned short decrypted_datalen;
unsigned short payload_datalen;
unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
unsigned int format_len;
long dlen;
int ret;
ret = kstrtol(datalen, 10, &dlen);
if (ret < 0 || dlen < MIN_DATA_SIZE || dlen > MAX_DATA_SIZE)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
format_len = (!format) ? strlen(key_format_default) : strlen(format);
decrypted_datalen = dlen;
payload_datalen = decrypted_datalen;
if (format && !strcmp(format, key_format_ecryptfs)) {
if (dlen != ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: keylen for the ecryptfs format "
"must be equal to %d bytes\n",
ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
decrypted_datalen = ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES;
payload_datalen = sizeof(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok);
}
encrypted_datalen = roundup(decrypted_datalen, blksize);
datablob_len = format_len + 1 + strlen(master_desc) + 1
+ strlen(datalen) + 1 + ivsize + 1 + encrypted_datalen;
ret = key_payload_reserve(key, payload_datalen + datablob_len
+ HASH_SIZE + 1);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
epayload = kzalloc(sizeof(*epayload) + payload_datalen +
datablob_len + HASH_SIZE + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!epayload)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
epayload->payload_datalen = payload_datalen;
epayload->decrypted_datalen = decrypted_datalen;
epayload->datablob_len = datablob_len;
return epayload;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 57,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
int ok, al;
unsigned long resplen, n;
const unsigned char *p;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (n < 4) {
/* need at least status type + length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
n2l3(p, resplen);
if (resplen + 4 != n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
int ret;
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
if (ret == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
goto f_err;
}
if (ret < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return (-1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 6,215 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabletModeWindowState::LeaveTabletMode(wm::WindowState* window_state) {
EnterAnimationType animation_type =
window_state->IsSnapped() || IsTopWindow(window_state->window())
? DEFAULT
: IMMEDIATE;
if (old_state_->GetType() == window_state->GetStateType() &&
!window_state->IsNormalStateType()) {
animation_type = IMMEDIATE;
}
old_state_->set_enter_animation_type(animation_type);
std::unique_ptr<wm::WindowState::State> our_reference =
window_state->SetStateObject(std::move(old_state_));
}
Commit Message: Fix the crash after clamshell -> tablet transition in overview mode.
This CL just reverted some changes that were made in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1658955. In
that CL, we changed the clamshell <-> tablet transition when clamshell
split view mode is enabled, however, we should keep the old behavior
unchanged if the feature is not enabled, i.e., overview should be ended
if it's active before the transition. Otherwise, it will cause a nullptr
dereference crash since |split_view_drag_indicators_| is not created in
clamshell overview and will be used in tablet overview.
Bug: 982507
Change-Id: I238fe9472648a446cff4ab992150658c228714dd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1705474
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima (Slow - on/off site) <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679306}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 172,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_write_extradata_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVTrack *track)
{
avio_write(pb, track->par->extradata, track->par->extradata_size);
return track->par->extradata_size;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t keyboard_controller_observer_count() const {
return keyboard_controller_.observer_count();
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int task_dumpable(struct task_struct *task)
{
int dumpable = 0;
struct mm_struct *mm;
task_lock(task);
mm = task->mm;
if (mm)
dumpable = get_dumpable(mm);
task_unlock(task);
if(dumpable == 1)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __xfs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, struct posix_acl *acl)
{
struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(inode);
unsigned char *ea_name;
int error;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
ea_name = SGI_ACL_FILE;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
ea_name = SGI_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
struct xfs_acl *xfs_acl;
int len = XFS_ACL_MAX_SIZE(ip->i_mount);
xfs_acl = kmem_zalloc_large(len, KM_SLEEP);
if (!xfs_acl)
return -ENOMEM;
xfs_acl_to_disk(xfs_acl, acl);
/* subtract away the unused acl entries */
len -= sizeof(struct xfs_acl_entry) *
(XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES(ip->i_mount) - acl->a_count);
error = xfs_attr_set(ip, ea_name, (unsigned char *)xfs_acl,
len, ATTR_ROOT);
kmem_free(xfs_acl);
} else {
/*
* A NULL ACL argument means we want to remove the ACL.
*/
error = xfs_attr_remove(ip, ea_name, ATTR_ROOT);
/*
* If the attribute didn't exist to start with that's fine.
*/
if (error == -ENOATTR)
error = 0;
}
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return error;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 50,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isdn_net_stat_callback(int idx, isdn_ctrl *c)
{
isdn_net_dev *p = dev->st_netdev[idx];
int cmd = c->command;
if (p) {
isdn_net_local *lp = p->local;
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_X25
struct concap_proto *cprot = lp->netdev->cprot;
struct concap_proto_ops *pops = cprot ? cprot->pops : NULL;
#endif
switch (cmd) {
case ISDN_STAT_BSENT:
/* A packet has successfully been sent out */
if ((lp->flags & ISDN_NET_CONNECTED) &&
(!lp->dialstate)) {
isdn_net_dec_frame_cnt(lp);
lp->stats.tx_packets++;
lp->stats.tx_bytes += c->parm.length;
}
return 1;
case ISDN_STAT_DCONN:
/* D-Channel is up */
switch (lp->dialstate) {
case 4:
case 7:
case 8:
lp->dialstate++;
return 1;
case 12:
lp->dialstate = 5;
return 1;
}
break;
case ISDN_STAT_DHUP:
/* Either D-Channel-hangup or error during dialout */
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_X25
/* If we are not connencted then dialing had
failed. If there are generic encap protocol
receiver routines signal the closure of
the link*/
if( !(lp->flags & ISDN_NET_CONNECTED)
&& pops && pops -> disconn_ind )
pops -> disconn_ind(cprot);
#endif /* CONFIG_ISDN_X25 */
if ((!lp->dialstate) && (lp->flags & ISDN_NET_CONNECTED)) {
if (lp->p_encap == ISDN_NET_ENCAP_CISCOHDLCK)
isdn_net_ciscohdlck_disconnected(lp);
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_PPP
if (lp->p_encap == ISDN_NET_ENCAP_SYNCPPP)
isdn_ppp_free(lp);
#endif
isdn_net_lp_disconnected(lp);
isdn_all_eaz(lp->isdn_device, lp->isdn_channel);
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: remote hangup\n", p->dev->name);
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Chargesum is %d\n", p->dev->name,
lp->charge);
isdn_net_unbind_channel(lp);
return 1;
}
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_X25
case ISDN_STAT_BHUP:
/* B-Channel-hangup */
/* try if there are generic encap protocol
receiver routines and signal the closure of
the link */
if( pops && pops -> disconn_ind ){
pops -> disconn_ind(cprot);
return 1;
}
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_ISDN_X25 */
case ISDN_STAT_BCONN:
/* B-Channel is up */
isdn_net_zero_frame_cnt(lp);
switch (lp->dialstate) {
case 5:
case 6:
case 7:
case 8:
case 9:
case 10:
case 12:
if (lp->dialstate <= 6) {
dev->usage[idx] |= ISDN_USAGE_OUTGOING;
isdn_info_update();
} else
dev->rx_netdev[idx] = p;
lp->dialstate = 0;
isdn_timer_ctrl(ISDN_TIMER_NETHANGUP, 1);
if (lp->p_encap == ISDN_NET_ENCAP_CISCOHDLCK)
isdn_net_ciscohdlck_connected(lp);
if (lp->p_encap != ISDN_NET_ENCAP_SYNCPPP) {
if (lp->master) { /* is lp a slave? */
isdn_net_dev *nd = ISDN_MASTER_PRIV(lp)->netdev;
isdn_net_add_to_bundle(nd, lp);
}
}
printk(KERN_INFO "isdn_net: %s connected\n", p->dev->name);
/* If first Chargeinfo comes before B-Channel connect,
* we correct the timestamp here.
*/
lp->chargetime = jiffies;
/* reset dial-timeout */
lp->dialstarted = 0;
lp->dialwait_timer = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_PPP
if (lp->p_encap == ISDN_NET_ENCAP_SYNCPPP)
isdn_ppp_wakeup_daemon(lp);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_X25
/* try if there are generic concap receiver routines */
if( pops )
if( pops->connect_ind)
pops->connect_ind(cprot);
#endif /* CONFIG_ISDN_X25 */
/* ppp needs to do negotiations first */
if (lp->p_encap != ISDN_NET_ENCAP_SYNCPPP)
isdn_net_device_wake_queue(lp);
return 1;
}
break;
case ISDN_STAT_NODCH:
/* No D-Channel avail. */
if (lp->dialstate == 4) {
lp->dialstate--;
return 1;
}
break;
case ISDN_STAT_CINF:
/* Charge-info from TelCo. Calculate interval between
* charge-infos and set timestamp for last info for
* usage by isdn_net_autohup()
*/
lp->charge++;
if (lp->hupflags & ISDN_HAVECHARGE) {
lp->hupflags &= ~ISDN_WAITCHARGE;
lp->chargeint = jiffies - lp->chargetime - (2 * HZ);
}
if (lp->hupflags & ISDN_WAITCHARGE)
lp->hupflags |= ISDN_HAVECHARGE;
lp->chargetime = jiffies;
printk(KERN_DEBUG "isdn_net: Got CINF chargetime of %s now %lu\n",
p->dev->name, lp->chargetime);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct btrfs_dir_item *btrfs_lookup_dir_item(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root,
struct btrfs_path *path, u64 dir,
const char *name, int name_len,
int mod)
{
int ret;
struct btrfs_key key;
int ins_len = mod < 0 ? -1 : 0;
int cow = mod != 0;
key.objectid = dir;
key.type = BTRFS_DIR_ITEM_KEY;
key.offset = btrfs_name_hash(name, name_len);
ret = btrfs_search_slot(trans, root, &key, path, ins_len, cow);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
if (ret > 0)
return NULL;
return btrfs_match_dir_item_name(root, path, name, name_len);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 45,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lrw_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct camellia_lrw_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
be128 buf[CAMELLIA_AESNI_AVX2_PARALLEL_BLOCKS];
struct crypt_priv crypt_ctx = {
.ctx = &ctx->camellia_ctx,
.fpu_enabled = false,
};
struct lrw_crypt_req req = {
.tbuf = buf,
.tbuflen = sizeof(buf),
.table_ctx = &ctx->lrw_table,
.crypt_ctx = &crypt_ctx,
.crypt_fn = encrypt_callback,
};
int ret;
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
ret = lrw_crypt(desc, dst, src, nbytes, &req);
camellia_fpu_end(crypt_ctx.fpu_enabled);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,857 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataFileSystem::OnGetCacheFilePathCompleteForCloseFile(
const FilePath& file_path,
const FileOperationCallback& callback,
GDataFileError error,
const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
const FilePath& local_cache_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(error);
return;
}
base::PlatformFileInfo* file_info = new base::PlatformFileInfo;
bool* get_file_info_result = new bool(false);
util::PostBlockingPoolSequencedTaskAndReply(
FROM_HERE,
blocking_task_runner_,
base::Bind(&GetFileInfoOnBlockingPool,
local_cache_path,
base::Unretained(file_info),
base::Unretained(get_file_info_result)),
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::OnGetModifiedFileInfoCompleteForCloseFile,
ui_weak_ptr_,
file_path,
base::Owned(file_info),
base::Owned(get_file_info_result),
callback));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 116,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void arcmsr_free_irq(struct pci_dev *pdev,
struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
int i;
if (acb->acb_flags & ACB_F_MSI_ENABLED) {
free_irq(pdev->irq, acb);
pci_disable_msi(pdev);
} else if (acb->acb_flags & ACB_F_MSIX_ENABLED) {
for (i = 0; i < acb->msix_vector_count; i++)
free_irq(acb->entries[i].vector, acb);
pci_disable_msix(pdev);
} else
free_irq(pdev->irq, acb);
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PersistentSampleMapRecords* PersistentSampleMapRecords::Acquire(
const void* user) {
DCHECK(!user_);
user_ = user;
seen_ = 0;
return this;
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcRenderComposite (ClientPtr client)
{
PicturePtr pSrc, pMask, pDst;
REQUEST(xRenderCompositeReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderCompositeReq);
if (!PictOpValid (stuff->op))
{
client->errorValue = stuff->op;
return BadValue;
}
VERIFY_PICTURE (pDst, stuff->dst, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (!pDst->pDrawable)
return BadDrawable;
VERIFY_PICTURE (pSrc, stuff->src, client, DixReadAccess);
VERIFY_ALPHA (pMask, stuff->mask, client, DixReadAccess);
if ((pSrc->pDrawable && pSrc->pDrawable->pScreen != pDst->pDrawable->pScreen) ||
(pMask && pMask->pDrawable && pDst->pDrawable->pScreen != pMask->pDrawable->pScreen))
return BadMatch;
CompositePicture (stuff->op,
pSrc,
pMask,
pDst,
stuff->xSrc,
stuff->ySrc,
stuff->xMask,
stuff->yMask,
stuff->xDst,
stuff->yDst,
stuff->width,
stuff->height);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BOOL update_recv(rdpUpdate* update, wStream* s)
{
BOOL rc = FALSE;
UINT16 updateType;
rdpContext* context = update->context;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 2)
{
WLog_ERR(TAG, "Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 2");
return FALSE;
}
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, updateType); /* updateType (2 bytes) */
WLog_Print(update->log, WLOG_TRACE, "%s Update Data PDU", UPDATE_TYPE_STRINGS[updateType]);
if (!IFCALLRESULT(TRUE, update->BeginPaint, context))
return FALSE;
switch (updateType)
{
case UPDATE_TYPE_ORDERS:
rc = update_recv_orders(update, s);
break;
case UPDATE_TYPE_BITMAP:
{
BITMAP_UPDATE* bitmap_update = update_read_bitmap_update(update, s);
if (!bitmap_update)
{
WLog_ERR(TAG, "UPDATE_TYPE_BITMAP - update_read_bitmap_update() failed");
return FALSE;
}
rc = IFCALLRESULT(FALSE, update->BitmapUpdate, context, bitmap_update);
free_bitmap_update(update->context, bitmap_update);
}
break;
case UPDATE_TYPE_PALETTE:
{
PALETTE_UPDATE* palette_update = update_read_palette(update, s);
if (!palette_update)
{
WLog_ERR(TAG, "UPDATE_TYPE_PALETTE - update_read_palette() failed");
return FALSE;
}
rc = IFCALLRESULT(FALSE, update->Palette, context, palette_update);
free_palette_update(context, palette_update);
}
break;
case UPDATE_TYPE_SYNCHRONIZE:
update_read_synchronize(update, s);
rc = IFCALLRESULT(TRUE, update->Synchronize, context);
break;
default:
break;
}
if (!rc)
{
WLog_ERR(TAG, "UPDATE_TYPE %s [%"PRIu16"] failed", update_type_to_string(updateType), updateType);
return FALSE;
}
if (!IFCALLRESULT(FALSE, update->EndPaint, context))
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void DrawGLFunction(long view_context,
AwDrawGLInfo* draw_info,
void* spare) {
reinterpret_cast<android_webview::SharedRendererState*>(view_context)
->DrawGL(draw_info);
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebKitWebResource* webkit_web_view_get_main_resource(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
return webView->priv->mainResource.get();
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,566 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int DecodeIPV6HopTest01 (void)
{
uint8_t raw_pkt1[] = {
0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00,0x01,0xfe,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x02,0x0f,0xfe,0xff,0xfe,0x98,0x3d,0x01,0xff,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x3a,0x00,0xff, /* 0xff is a nonsene opt */
0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x82,0x00,0x1c,0x6f,0x27,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
};
Packet *p1 = PacketGetFromAlloc();
FAIL_IF(unlikely(p1 == NULL));
ThreadVars tv;
DecodeThreadVars dtv;
PacketQueue pq;
FlowInitConfig(FLOW_QUIET);
memset(&pq, 0, sizeof(PacketQueue));
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof(ThreadVars));
memset(&dtv, 0, sizeof(DecodeThreadVars));
PacketCopyData(p1, raw_pkt1, sizeof(raw_pkt1));
DecodeIPV6(&tv, &dtv, p1, GET_PKT_DATA(p1), GET_PKT_LEN(p1), &pq);
FAIL_IF (!(ENGINE_ISSET_EVENT(p1, IPV6_HOPOPTS_UNKNOWN_OPT)));
PACKET_RECYCLE(p1);
SCFree(p1);
FlowShutdown();
PASS;
}
Commit Message: teredo: be stricter on what to consider valid teredo
Invalid Teredo can lead to valid DNS traffic (or other UDP traffic)
being misdetected as Teredo. This leads to false negatives in the
UDP payload inspection.
Make the teredo code only consider a packet teredo if the encapsulated
data was decoded without any 'invalid' events being set.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 87,018 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int __normal_prio(struct task_struct *p)
{
return p->static_prio;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int suspend_audio_datapath(struct a2dp_stream_common *common, bool standby)
{
INFO("state %d", common->state);
if (common->ctrl_fd == AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED)
return -1;
if (common->state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STOPPING)
return -1;
if (a2dp_command(common, A2DP_CTRL_CMD_SUSPEND) < 0)
return -1;
if (standby)
common->state = AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STANDBY;
else
common->state = AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_SUSPENDED;
/* disconnect audio path */
skt_disconnect(common->audio_fd);
common->audio_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,503 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void lsi_soft_reset(LSIState *s)
{
trace_lsi_reset();
s->carry = 0;
s->msg_action = LSI_MSG_ACTION_COMMAND;
s->msg_len = 0;
s->waiting = LSI_NOWAIT;
s->dsa = 0;
s->dnad = 0;
s->dbc = 0;
s->temp = 0;
memset(s->scratch, 0, sizeof(s->scratch));
s->istat0 = 0;
s->istat1 = 0;
s->dcmd = 0x40;
s->dstat = 0;
s->dien = 0;
s->sist0 = 0;
s->sist1 = 0;
s->sien0 = 0;
s->sien1 = 0;
s->mbox0 = 0;
s->mbox1 = 0;
s->dfifo = 0;
s->ctest2 = LSI_CTEST2_DACK;
s->ctest3 = 0;
s->ctest4 = 0;
s->ctest5 = 0;
s->ccntl0 = 0;
s->ccntl1 = 0;
s->dsp = 0;
s->dsps = 0;
s->dmode = 0;
s->dcntl = 0;
s->scntl0 = 0xc0;
s->scntl1 = 0;
s->scntl2 = 0;
s->scntl3 = 0;
s->sstat0 = 0;
s->sstat1 = 0;
s->scid = 7;
s->sxfer = 0;
s->socl = 0;
s->sdid = 0;
s->ssid = 0;
s->sbcl = 0;
s->stest1 = 0;
s->stest2 = 0;
s->stest3 = 0;
s->sidl = 0;
s->stime0 = 0;
s->respid0 = 0x80;
s->respid1 = 0;
s->mmrs = 0;
s->mmws = 0;
s->sfs = 0;
s->drs = 0;
s->sbms = 0;
s->dbms = 0;
s->dnad64 = 0;
s->pmjad1 = 0;
s->pmjad2 = 0;
s->rbc = 0;
s->ua = 0;
s->ia = 0;
s->sbc = 0;
s->csbc = 0;
s->sbr = 0;
assert(QTAILQ_EMPTY(&s->queue));
assert(!s->current);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 3,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OVS_REQUIRES(ofproto_mutex)
{
struct classifier *cls = &ofproto->tables[0].cls;
struct rule *rule;
/* First do a cheap check whether the rule we're looking for has already
* been deleted. If so, then we're done. */
rule = rule_from_cls_rule(classifier_find_match_exactly(
cls, target, priority, OVS_VERSION_MAX));
if (!rule) {
return;
}
struct rule_collection rules;
rule_collection_init(&rules);
rule_collection_add(&rules, rule);
delete_flows__(&rules, OFPRR_DELETE, NULL);
rule_collection_destroy(&rules);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int crypto_enqueue_request(struct crypto_queue *queue,
struct crypto_async_request *request)
{
int err = -EINPROGRESS;
if (unlikely(queue->qlen >= queue->max_qlen)) {
err = -EBUSY;
if (!(request->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG))
goto out;
if (queue->backlog == &queue->list)
queue->backlog = &request->list;
}
queue->qlen++;
list_add_tail(&request->list, &queue->list);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int WebSocketJob::OnStartOpenConnection(
SocketStream* socket, CompletionCallback* callback) {
DCHECK(!callback_);
state_ = CONNECTING;
addresses_ = socket->address_list();
WebSocketThrottle::GetInstance()->PutInQueue(this);
if (delegate_) {
int result = delegate_->OnStartOpenConnection(socket, callback);
DCHECK_EQ(OK, result);
}
if (waiting_) {
callback_ = callback;
AddRef(); // Balanced when callback_ becomes NULL.
return ERR_IO_PENDING;
}
return TrySpdyStream();
}
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 98,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_blck(GetByteContext *gb, uint8_t *frame, int width, int height)
{
memset(frame, 0, width * height);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dfa: Fix off by 1 error
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 1345/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6062963045695488
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 64,087 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: htmlParseComment(htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int len;
int size = HTML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
int q, ql;
int r, rl;
int cur, l;
xmlParserInputState state;
/*
* Check that there is a comment right here.
*/
if ((RAW != '<') || (NXT(1) != '!') ||
(NXT(2) != '-') || (NXT(3) != '-')) return;
state = ctxt->instate;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_COMMENT;
SHRINK;
SKIP(4);
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(ctxt, "buffer allocation failed\n");
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
len = 0;
buf[len] = 0;
q = CUR_CHAR(ql);
if (!IS_CHAR(q))
goto unfinished;
NEXTL(ql);
r = CUR_CHAR(rl);
if (!IS_CHAR(r))
goto unfinished;
NEXTL(rl);
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
while (IS_CHAR(cur) &&
((cur != '>') ||
(r != '-') || (q != '-'))) {
if (len + 5 >= size) {
xmlChar *tmp;
size *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlFree(buf);
htmlErrMemory(ctxt, "growing buffer failed\n");
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
buf = tmp;
}
COPY_BUF(ql,buf,len,q);
q = r;
ql = rl;
r = cur;
rl = l;
NEXTL(l);
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
if (cur == 0) {
SHRINK;
GROW;
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (IS_CHAR(cur)) {
NEXT;
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->comment != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->comment(ctxt->userData, buf);
xmlFree(buf);
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
unfinished:
htmlParseErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_COMMENT_NOT_FINISHED,
"Comment not terminated \n<!--%.50s\n", buf, NULL);
xmlFree(buf);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 150,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ImageInputType::ensurePrimaryContent()
{
if (!m_useFallbackContent)
return;
m_useFallbackContent = false;
reattachFallbackContent();
}
Commit Message: ImageInputType::ensurePrimaryContent should recreate UA shadow tree.
Once the fallback shadow tree was created, it was never recreated even if
ensurePrimaryContent was called. Such situation happens by updating |src|
attribute.
BUG=589838
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1732753004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#377804}
CWE ID: CWE-361 | 1 | 172,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NormalizeDisposition(NavigateParams* params) {
if (params->browser->tab_strip_model()->empty() &&
(params->disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_BACKGROUND_TAB ||
params->disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::CURRENT_TAB ||
params->disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::SINGLETON_TAB)) {
params->disposition = WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB;
}
if (params->browser->profile()->IsOffTheRecord() &&
params->disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::OFF_THE_RECORD) {
params->disposition = WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB;
}
if (!params->source_contents &&
params->disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::CURRENT_TAB)
params->disposition = WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB;
switch (params->disposition) {
case WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_BACKGROUND_TAB:
params->tabstrip_add_types &= ~TabStripModel::ADD_ACTIVE;
break;
case WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_WINDOW:
case WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_POPUP: {
if (params->window_action == NavigateParams::NO_ACTION)
params->window_action = NavigateParams::SHOW_WINDOW;
FALLTHROUGH;
}
case WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB:
case WindowOpenDisposition::SINGLETON_TAB:
params->tabstrip_add_types |= TabStripModel::ADD_ACTIVE;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
char *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
const EVP_MD *type;
unsigned char *p,*buf_in=NULL;
int ret= -1,i,inl;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
i=OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm);
type=EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i));
if (type == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
inl=i2d(data,NULL);
buf_in=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl);
if (buf_in == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p=buf_in;
i2d(data,&p);
if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,type, NULL))
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl);
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl);
OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,(unsigned char *)signature->data,
(unsigned int)signature->length,pkey) <= 0)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
/* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked
* public information */
/* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */
ret=1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 5,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameHostManager::CreateRenderFrameHost(
SiteInstance* site_instance,
int32_t view_routing_id,
int32_t frame_routing_id,
int32_t widget_routing_id,
bool hidden,
bool renderer_initiated_creation) {
if (frame_routing_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
frame_routing_id = site_instance->GetProcess()->GetNextRoutingID();
FrameTree* frame_tree = frame_tree_node_->frame_tree();
RenderViewHostImpl* render_view_host = nullptr;
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
render_view_host = frame_tree->CreateRenderViewHost(
site_instance, view_routing_id, frame_routing_id, false, hidden);
if (view_routing_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
widget_routing_id = render_view_host->GetRoutingID();
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(view_routing_id, render_view_host->GetRoutingID());
}
} else {
render_view_host = frame_tree->GetRenderViewHost(site_instance);
CHECK(render_view_host);
}
return RenderFrameHostFactory::Create(
site_instance, render_view_host, render_frame_delegate_,
render_widget_delegate_, frame_tree, frame_tree_node_, frame_routing_id,
widget_routing_id, hidden, renderer_initiated_creation);
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fusage(FILE * f, int err)
{
fversion(f);
/* FIXME: gettextize? */
fprintf(f, "usage: w3m [options] [URL or filename]\noptions:\n");
fprintf(f, " -t tab set tab width\n");
fprintf(f, " -r ignore backspace effect\n");
fprintf(f, " -l line # of preserved line (default 10000)\n");
#ifdef USE_M17N
fprintf(f, " -I charset document charset\n");
fprintf(f, " -O charset display/output charset\n");
#if 0 /* use -O{s|j|e} instead */
fprintf(f, " -e EUC-JP\n");
fprintf(f, " -s Shift_JIS\n");
fprintf(f, " -j JIS\n");
#endif
#endif
fprintf(f, " -B load bookmark\n");
fprintf(f, " -bookmark file specify bookmark file\n");
fprintf(f, " -T type specify content-type\n");
fprintf(f, " -m internet message mode\n");
fprintf(f, " -v visual startup mode\n");
#ifdef USE_COLOR
fprintf(f, " -M monochrome display\n");
#endif /* USE_COLOR */
fprintf(f,
" -N open URL of command line on each new tab\n");
fprintf(f, " -F automatically render frames\n");
fprintf(f,
" -cols width specify column width (used with -dump)\n");
fprintf(f,
" -ppc count specify the number of pixels per character (4.0...32.0)\n");
#ifdef USE_IMAGE
fprintf(f,
" -ppl count specify the number of pixels per line (4.0...64.0)\n");
#endif
fprintf(f, " -dump dump formatted page into stdout\n");
fprintf(f,
" -dump_head dump response of HEAD request into stdout\n");
fprintf(f, " -dump_source dump page source into stdout\n");
fprintf(f, " -dump_both dump HEAD and source into stdout\n");
fprintf(f,
" -dump_extra dump HEAD, source, and extra information into stdout\n");
fprintf(f, " -post file use POST method with file content\n");
fprintf(f, " -header string insert string as a header\n");
fprintf(f, " +<num> goto <num> line\n");
fprintf(f, " -num show line number\n");
fprintf(f, " -no-proxy don't use proxy\n");
#ifdef INET6
fprintf(f, " -4 IPv4 only (-o dns_order=4)\n");
fprintf(f, " -6 IPv6 only (-o dns_order=6)\n");
#endif
#ifdef USE_MOUSE
fprintf(f, " -no-mouse don't use mouse\n");
#endif /* USE_MOUSE */
#ifdef USE_COOKIE
fprintf(f,
" -cookie use cookie (-no-cookie: don't use cookie)\n");
#endif /* USE_COOKIE */
fprintf(f, " -graph use DEC special graphics for border of table and menu\n");
fprintf(f, " -no-graph use ASCII character for border of table and menu\n");
#if 1 /* pager requires -s */
fprintf(f, " -s squeeze multiple blank lines\n");
#else
fprintf(f, " -S squeeze multiple blank lines\n");
#endif
fprintf(f, " -W toggle search wrap mode\n");
fprintf(f, " -X don't use termcap init/deinit\n");
fprintf(f,
" -title[=TERM] set buffer name to terminal title string\n");
fprintf(f, " -o opt=value assign value to config option\n");
fprintf(f, " -show-option print all config options\n");
fprintf(f, " -config file specify config file\n");
fprintf(f, " -help print this usage message\n");
fprintf(f, " -version print w3m version\n");
fprintf(f, " -reqlog write request logfile\n");
fprintf(f, " -debug DO NOT USE\n");
if (show_params_p)
show_params(f);
exit(err);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 84,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vhost_scsi_register_configfs(void)
{
struct target_fabric_configfs *fabric;
int ret;
pr_debug("vhost-scsi fabric module %s on %s/%s"
" on "UTS_RELEASE"\n", VHOST_SCSI_VERSION, utsname()->sysname,
utsname()->machine);
/*
* Register the top level struct config_item_type with TCM core
*/
fabric = target_fabric_configfs_init(THIS_MODULE, "vhost");
if (IS_ERR(fabric)) {
pr_err("target_fabric_configfs_init() failed\n");
return PTR_ERR(fabric);
}
/*
* Setup fabric->tf_ops from our local vhost_scsi_ops
*/
fabric->tf_ops = vhost_scsi_ops;
/*
* Setup default attribute lists for various fabric->tf_cit_tmpl
*/
fabric->tf_cit_tmpl.tfc_wwn_cit.ct_attrs = vhost_scsi_wwn_attrs;
fabric->tf_cit_tmpl.tfc_tpg_base_cit.ct_attrs = vhost_scsi_tpg_attrs;
fabric->tf_cit_tmpl.tfc_tpg_attrib_cit.ct_attrs = NULL;
fabric->tf_cit_tmpl.tfc_tpg_param_cit.ct_attrs = NULL;
fabric->tf_cit_tmpl.tfc_tpg_np_base_cit.ct_attrs = NULL;
fabric->tf_cit_tmpl.tfc_tpg_nacl_base_cit.ct_attrs = NULL;
fabric->tf_cit_tmpl.tfc_tpg_nacl_attrib_cit.ct_attrs = NULL;
fabric->tf_cit_tmpl.tfc_tpg_nacl_auth_cit.ct_attrs = NULL;
fabric->tf_cit_tmpl.tfc_tpg_nacl_param_cit.ct_attrs = NULL;
/*
* Register the fabric for use within TCM
*/
ret = target_fabric_configfs_register(fabric);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("target_fabric_configfs_register() failed"
" for TCM_VHOST\n");
return ret;
}
/*
* Setup our local pointer to *fabric
*/
vhost_scsi_fabric_configfs = fabric;
pr_debug("TCM_VHOST[0] - Set fabric -> vhost_scsi_fabric_configfs\n");
return 0;
};
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mux_exit_message(Channel *c, int exitval)
{
Buffer m;
Channel *mux_chan;
debug3("%s: channel %d: exit message, exitval %d", __func__, c->self,
exitval);
if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d",
__func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan);
/* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE);
buffer_put_int(&m, c->self);
buffer_put_int(&m, exitval);
buffer_put_string(&mux_chan->output, buffer_ptr(&m), buffer_len(&m));
buffer_free(&m);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t show_tabletProgrammableDelay(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct aiptek *aiptek = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
aiptek->curSetting.programmableDelay);
}
Commit Message: Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebLocalFrameImpl::IsLocalRoot() const {
return frame_->IsLocalRoot();
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 145,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void FillIQMatrix(const JpegQuantizationTable* q_table,
VAIQMatrixBufferJPEGBaseline* iq_matrix) {
static_assert(kJpegMaxQuantizationTableNum ==
std::extent<decltype(iq_matrix->load_quantiser_table)>(),
"max number of quantization table mismatched");
static_assert(
sizeof(iq_matrix->quantiser_table[0]) == sizeof(q_table[0].value),
"number of quantization entries mismatched");
for (size_t i = 0; i < kJpegMaxQuantizationTableNum; i++) {
if (!q_table[i].valid)
continue;
iq_matrix->load_quantiser_table[i] = 1;
for (size_t j = 0; j < base::size(q_table[i].value); j++)
iq_matrix->quantiser_table[i][j] = q_table[i].value[j];
}
}
Commit Message: Move Initialize() to VaapiImageDecoder parent class.
This CL moves the implementation of Initialize() to VaapiImageDecoder,
since it is common to all implementing classes.
Bug: 877694
Test: jpeg_decode_accelerator_unittest
Change-Id: Ic99601953ae1c7a572ba8a0b0bf43675b2b0969d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1654249
Commit-Queue: Gil Dekel <gildekel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Andres Calderon Jaramillo <andrescj@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668645}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 149,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vnc_job_push(VncJob *job)
{
vnc_lock_queue(queue);
if (queue->exit || QLIST_EMPTY(&job->rectangles)) {
g_free(job);
} else {
QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&queue->jobs, job, next);
qemu_cond_broadcast(&queue->cond);
}
vnc_unlock_queue(queue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 17,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void skb_release_data(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
int i;
if (skb->cloned &&
atomic_sub_return(skb->nohdr ? (1 << SKB_DATAREF_SHIFT) + 1 : 1,
&shinfo->dataref))
return;
for (i = 0; i < shinfo->nr_frags; i++)
__skb_frag_unref(&shinfo->frags[i]);
/*
* If skb buf is from userspace, we need to notify the caller
* the lower device DMA has done;
*/
if (shinfo->tx_flags & SKBTX_DEV_ZEROCOPY) {
struct ubuf_info *uarg;
uarg = shinfo->destructor_arg;
if (uarg->callback)
uarg->callback(uarg, true);
}
if (shinfo->frag_list)
kfree_skb_list(shinfo->frag_list);
skb_free_head(skb);
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 67,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Bool FFD_CanHandleURLInService(GF_InputService *plug, const char *url)
{
char szURL[2048], *sep;
FFDemux *ffd;
const char *this_url;
if (!plug || !url)
return GF_FALSE;
ffd = (FFDemux *)plug->priv;
this_url = gf_service_get_url(ffd->service);
if (!this_url)
return GF_FALSE;
strcpy(szURL, this_url);
sep = strrchr(szURL, '#');
if (sep) sep[0] = 0;
if ((url[0] != '#') && strnicmp(szURL, url, sizeof(char)*strlen(szURL))) return GF_FALSE;
sep = strrchr(url, '#');
if (sep && !stricmp(sep, "#video") && (ffd->video_st>=0)) return GF_TRUE;
if (sep && !stricmp(sep, "#audio") && (ffd->audio_st>=0)) return GF_TRUE;
return GF_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::ScheduleNotifyPlaying() {
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::playing);
ScheduleResolvePlayPromises();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_persistent_gnt(struct xen_blkif *blkif,
struct persistent_gnt *persistent_gnt)
{
if(!test_bit(PERSISTENT_GNT_ACTIVE, persistent_gnt->flags))
pr_alert_ratelimited(DRV_PFX " freeing a grant already unused");
set_bit(PERSISTENT_GNT_WAS_ACTIVE, persistent_gnt->flags);
clear_bit(PERSISTENT_GNT_ACTIVE, persistent_gnt->flags);
atomic_dec(&blkif->persistent_gnt_in_use);
}
Commit Message: xen/blkback: Check device permissions before allowing OP_DISCARD
We need to make sure that the device is not RO or that
the request is not past the number of sectors we want to
issue the DISCARD operation for.
This fixes CVE-2013-2140.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
[v1: Made it pr_warn instead of pr_debug]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 31,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport const IndexPacket *GetVirtualIndexesFromNexus(const Cache cache,
NexusInfo *nexus_info)
{
CacheInfo
*restrict cache_info;
assert(cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (cache_info->storage_class == UndefinedClass)
return((IndexPacket *) NULL);
return(nexus_info->indexes);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 73,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WallpaperManagerBase::ClearDisposableWallpaperCache() {
weak_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
std::set<AccountId> logged_in_user_account_ids;
const user_manager::UserList& logged_users =
user_manager::UserManager::Get()->GetLoggedInUsers();
for (user_manager::UserList::const_iterator it = logged_users.begin();
it != logged_users.end(); ++it) {
logged_in_user_account_ids.insert((*it)->GetAccountId());
}
CustomWallpaperMap logged_in_users_cache;
for (CustomWallpaperMap::iterator it = wallpaper_cache_.begin();
it != wallpaper_cache_.end(); ++it) {
if (logged_in_user_account_ids.find(it->first) !=
logged_in_user_account_ids.end()) {
logged_in_users_cache.insert(*it);
}
}
wallpaper_cache_ = logged_in_users_cache;
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 128,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeClientImpl::toolbarsVisible()
{
return m_toolbarsVisible;
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLES2DecoderImpl::GLES2DecoderImpl(
DecoderClient* client,
CommandBufferServiceBase* command_buffer_service,
Outputter* outputter,
ContextGroup* group)
: GLES2Decoder(command_buffer_service, outputter),
client_(client),
group_(group),
logger_(&debug_marker_manager_, client_),
state_(group_->feature_info(), this, &logger_),
attrib_0_buffer_id_(0),
attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_(true),
attrib_0_size_(0),
fixed_attrib_buffer_id_(0),
fixed_attrib_buffer_size_(0),
offscreen_target_color_format_(0),
offscreen_target_depth_format_(0),
offscreen_target_stencil_format_(0),
offscreen_target_samples_(0),
offscreen_target_buffer_preserved_(true),
max_offscreen_framebuffer_size_(0),
offscreen_single_buffer_(false),
offscreen_saved_color_format_(0),
offscreen_buffer_should_have_alpha_(false),
back_buffer_color_format_(0),
back_buffer_has_depth_(false),
back_buffer_has_stencil_(false),
back_buffer_read_buffer_(GL_BACK),
back_buffer_draw_buffer_(GL_BACK),
surfaceless_(false),
backbuffer_needs_clear_bits_(0),
swaps_since_resize_(0),
current_decoder_error_(error::kNoError),
validators_(group_->feature_info()->validators()),
feature_info_(group_->feature_info()),
frame_number_(0),
has_robustness_extension_(false),
context_was_lost_(false),
reset_by_robustness_extension_(false),
supports_post_sub_buffer_(false),
supports_swap_buffers_with_bounds_(false),
supports_commit_overlay_planes_(false),
supports_async_swap_(false),
derivatives_explicitly_enabled_(false),
frag_depth_explicitly_enabled_(false),
draw_buffers_explicitly_enabled_(false),
shader_texture_lod_explicitly_enabled_(false),
compile_shader_always_succeeds_(false),
lose_context_when_out_of_memory_(false),
should_use_native_gmb_for_backbuffer_(false),
service_logging_(
group_->gpu_preferences().enable_gpu_service_logging_gpu),
viewport_max_width_(0),
viewport_max_height_(0),
num_stencil_bits_(0),
texture_state_(group_->feature_info()->workarounds()),
gpu_decoder_category_(TRACE_EVENT_API_GET_CATEGORY_GROUP_ENABLED(
TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("gpu_decoder"))),
gpu_trace_level_(2),
gpu_trace_commands_(false),
gpu_debug_commands_(false),
validation_fbo_multisample_(0),
validation_fbo_(0),
texture_manager_service_id_generation_(0),
force_shader_name_hashing_for_test(false),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(client);
DCHECK(group);
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 145,888 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: H264SwDecRet H264SwDecInit(H264SwDecInst *decInst, u32 noOutputReordering)
{
u32 rv = 0;
decContainer_t *pDecCont;
DEC_API_TRC("H264SwDecInit#");
/* check that right shift on negative numbers is performed signed */
/*lint -save -e* following check causes multiple lint messages */
if ( ((-1)>>1) != (-1) )
{
DEC_API_TRC("H264SwDecInit# ERROR: Right shift is not signed");
return(H264SWDEC_INITFAIL);
}
/*lint -restore */
if (decInst == NULL)
{
DEC_API_TRC("H264SwDecInit# ERROR: decInst == NULL");
return(H264SWDEC_PARAM_ERR);
}
pDecCont = (decContainer_t *)H264SwDecMalloc(sizeof(decContainer_t));
if (pDecCont == NULL)
{
DEC_API_TRC("H264SwDecInit# ERROR: Memory allocation failed");
return(H264SWDEC_MEMFAIL);
}
#ifdef H264DEC_TRACE
sprintf(pDecCont->str, "H264SwDecInit# decInst %p noOutputReordering %d",
(void*)decInst, noOutputReordering);
DEC_API_TRC(pDecCont->str);
#endif
rv = h264bsdInit(&pDecCont->storage, noOutputReordering);
if (rv != HANTRO_OK)
{
H264SwDecRelease(pDecCont);
return(H264SWDEC_MEMFAIL);
}
pDecCont->decStat = INITIALIZED;
pDecCont->picNumber = 0;
#ifdef H264DEC_TRACE
sprintf(pDecCont->str, "H264SwDecInit# OK: return %p", (void*)pDecCont);
DEC_API_TRC(pDecCont->str);
#endif
*decInst = (decContainer_t *)pDecCont;
return(H264SWDEC_OK);
}
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_free_pcre_cache(void *data) /* {{{ */
{
pcre_cache_entry *pce = (pcre_cache_entry *) data;
if (!pce) return;
pefree(pce->re, 1);
if (pce->extra) pefree(pce->extra, 1);
#if HAVE_SETLOCALE
if ((void*)pce->tables) pefree((void*)pce->tables, 1);
pefree(pce->locale, 1);
#endif
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 57 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MetricsWebContentsObserver::DidRedirectNavigation(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
if (!navigation_handle->IsInMainFrame())
return;
auto it = provisional_loads_.find(navigation_handle);
if (it == provisional_loads_.end())
return;
it->second->Redirect(navigation_handle);
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 140,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void jpc_undo_roi(jas_matrix_t *x, int roishift, int bgshift, int numbps)
{
int i;
int j;
int thresh;
jpc_fix_t val;
jpc_fix_t mag;
bool warn;
uint_fast32_t mask;
if (roishift < 0) {
/* We could instead return an error here. */
/* I do not think it matters much. */
jas_eprintf("warning: forcing negative ROI shift to zero "
"(bitstream is probably corrupt)\n");
roishift = 0;
}
if (roishift == 0 && bgshift == 0) {
return;
}
thresh = 1 << roishift;
warn = false;
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(x); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(x); ++j) {
val = jas_matrix_get(x, i, j);
mag = JAS_ABS(val);
if (mag >= thresh) {
/* We are dealing with ROI data. */
mag >>= roishift;
val = (val < 0) ? (-mag) : mag;
jas_matrix_set(x, i, j, val);
} else {
/* We are dealing with non-ROI (i.e., background) data. */
mag <<= bgshift;
mask = (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << numbps) - 1;
/* Perform a basic sanity check on the sample value. */
/* Some implementations write garbage in the unused
most-significant bit planes introduced by ROI shifting.
Here we ensure that any such bits are masked off. */
if (mag & (~mask)) {
if (!warn) {
jas_eprintf("warning: possibly corrupt code stream\n");
warn = true;
}
mag &= mask;
}
val = (val < 0) ? (-mag) : mag;
jas_matrix_set(x, i, j, val);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed an array overflow problem in the JPC decoder.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 72,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sc_card_driver * sc_get_asepcos_driver(void)
{
return sc_get_driver();
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: signed char* CSoundFile::AllocateSample(UINT nbytes)
{
signed char * p = (signed char *)GlobalAllocPtr(GHND, (nbytes+39) & ~7);
if (p) p += 16;
return p;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 8,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeCoordinator::setLayerAnimatedOpacity(WebLayerID id, float opacity)
{
m_shouldSyncFrame = true;
m_webPage->send(Messages::LayerTreeCoordinatorProxy::SetLayerAnimatedOpacity(id, opacity));
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 97,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ar6000_display_roam_time(WMI_TARGET_ROAM_TIME *p)
{
A_PRINTF("Disconnect Data : BSSID: ");
AR6000_PRINT_BSSID(p->disassoc_bssid);
A_PRINTF(" RSSI %d DISASSOC Time %d NO_TXRX_TIME %d\n",
p->disassoc_bss_rssi,p->disassoc_time,
p->no_txrx_time);
A_PRINTF("Connect Data: BSSID: ");
AR6000_PRINT_BSSID(p->assoc_bssid);
A_PRINTF(" RSSI %d ASSOC Time %d TXRX_TIME %d\n",
p->assoc_bss_rssi,p->assoc_time,
p->allow_txrx_time);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int on_data_chunk_recv_cb(nghttp2_session *ngh2, uint8_t flags,
int32_t stream_id,
const uint8_t *data, size_t len, void *userp)
{
h2_session *session = (h2_session *)userp;
apr_status_t status = APR_SUCCESS;
h2_stream * stream;
int rv;
(void)flags;
stream = get_stream(session, stream_id);
if (!stream) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, session->c, APLOGNO(03064)
"h2_stream(%ld-%d): on_data_chunk for unknown stream",
session->id, (int)stream_id);
rv = nghttp2_submit_rst_stream(ngh2, NGHTTP2_FLAG_NONE, stream_id,
NGHTTP2_INTERNAL_ERROR);
if (nghttp2_is_fatal(rv)) {
return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE;
}
return 0;
}
/* FIXME: enabling setting EOS this way seems to break input handling
* in mod_proxy_http2. why? */
status = h2_stream_write_data(stream, (const char *)data, len,
0 /*flags & NGHTTP2_FLAG_END_STREAM*/);
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, status, session->c,
"h2_stream(%ld-%d): data_chunk_recv, written %ld bytes",
session->id, stream_id, (long)len);
if (status != APR_SUCCESS) {
update_window(session, stream_id, len);
rv = nghttp2_submit_rst_stream(ngh2, NGHTTP2_FLAG_NONE, stream_id,
H2_STREAM_RST(stream, H2_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR));
if (nghttp2_is_fatal(rv)) {
return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <naveen.tiwari@asu.edu> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 48,670 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Verify_Reinitialized(ReinitTestCase test_case) {
EXPECT_TRUE(observer_->observed_old_storage_.get());
EXPECT_TRUE(observer_->observed_old_storage_->storage() != storage());
EXPECT_FALSE(PathExists(
temp_directory_.GetPath().AppendASCII("Cache").AppendASCII("index")));
EXPECT_FALSE(PathExists(temp_directory_.GetPath().AppendASCII("Index")));
if (test_case == CORRUPT_SQL_ON_INSTALL) {
AppCacheStorageImpl* storage = static_cast<AppCacheStorageImpl*>(
observer_->observed_old_storage_->storage());
EXPECT_TRUE(storage->database_->was_corruption_detected());
}
if (test_case == CORRUPT_CACHE_ON_INSTALL ||
test_case == CORRUPT_SQL_ON_INSTALL) {
EXPECT_TRUE(frontend_.error_event_was_raised_);
AppCacheHost* host1 = backend_->GetHost(1);
EXPECT_FALSE(host1->associated_cache());
EXPECT_FALSE(host1->group_being_updated_.get());
EXPECT_TRUE(host1->disabled_storage_reference_.get());
} else {
ASSERT_EQ(CORRUPT_CACHE_ON_LOAD_EXISTING, test_case);
AppCacheHost* host2 = backend_->GetHost(2);
EXPECT_TRUE(host2->disabled_storage_reference_.get());
}
service_->RemoveObserver(observer_.get());
handler_.reset();
backend_.reset();
observer_.reset();
TestFinished();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void prepare_pmd_huge_pte(pgtable_t pgtable,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
assert_spin_locked(&mm->page_table_lock);
/* FIFO */
if (!mm->pmd_huge_pte)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pgtable->lru);
else
list_add(&pgtable->lru, &mm->pmd_huge_pte->lru);
mm->pmd_huge_pte = pgtable;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <bugs@casparzhang.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void count_bitmap_commit_list(uint32_t *commits, uint32_t *trees,
uint32_t *blobs, uint32_t *tags)
{
assert(bitmap_git.result);
if (commits)
*commits = count_object_type(bitmap_git.result, OBJ_COMMIT);
if (trees)
*trees = count_object_type(bitmap_git.result, OBJ_TREE);
if (blobs)
*blobs = count_object_type(bitmap_git.result, OBJ_BLOB);
if (tags)
*tags = count_object_type(bitmap_git.result, OBJ_TAG);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY AcceptSecurityContext(PCredHandle phCredential, PCtxtHandle phContext,
PSecBufferDesc pInput, ULONG fContextReq, ULONG TargetDataRep, PCtxtHandle phNewContext,
PSecBufferDesc pOutput, PULONG pfContextAttr, PTimeStamp ptsTimeStamp)
{
char* Name;
SECURITY_STATUS status;
SecurityFunctionTableA* table;
Name = (char*) sspi_SecureHandleGetUpperPointer(phCredential);
if (!Name)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
table = sspi_GetSecurityFunctionTableAByNameA(Name);
if (!table)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
if (table->AcceptSecurityContext == NULL)
return SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION;
status = table->AcceptSecurityContext(phCredential, phContext, pInput, fContextReq,
TargetDataRep, phNewContext, pOutput, pfContextAttr, ptsTimeStamp);
return status;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 58,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int _cgsem_mswait(cgsem_t *cgsem, int ms, const char *file, const char *func, const int line)
{
struct timespec abs_timeout, ts_now;
struct timeval tv_now;
int ret;
cgtime(&tv_now);
timeval_to_spec(&ts_now, &tv_now);
ms_to_timespec(&abs_timeout, ms);
retry:
timeraddspec(&abs_timeout, &ts_now);
ret = sem_timedwait(cgsem, &abs_timeout);
if (ret) {
if (likely(sock_timeout()))
return ETIMEDOUT;
if (interrupted())
goto retry;
quitfrom(1, file, func, line, "Failed to sem_timedwait errno=%d cgsem=0x%p", errno, cgsem);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WindowMaximizedObserver::~WindowMaximizedObserver() {}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mark_tagged(const char *path, const struct object_id *oid, int flag,
void *cb_data)
{
unsigned char peeled[20];
struct object_entry *entry = packlist_find(&to_pack, oid->hash, NULL);
if (entry)
entry->tagged = 1;
if (!peel_ref(path, peeled)) {
entry = packlist_find(&to_pack, peeled, NULL);
if (entry)
entry->tagged = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChunkToLayerMapper::AdjustVisualRectBySubpixelOffset(
FloatRect& rect) const {
if (chunk_state_.Transform() == layer_state_.Transform())
rect.Move(visual_rect_subpixel_offset_);
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct file *hugetlb_file_setup(const char *name, size_t size,
vm_flags_t acctflag,
struct user_struct **user, int creat_flags)
{
int error = -ENOMEM;
struct file *file;
struct inode *inode;
struct path path;
struct dentry *root;
struct qstr quick_string;
*user = NULL;
if (!hugetlbfs_vfsmount)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
if (creat_flags == HUGETLB_SHMFS_INODE && !can_do_hugetlb_shm()) {
*user = current_user();
if (user_shm_lock(size, *user)) {
printk_once(KERN_WARNING "Using mlock ulimits for SHM_HUGETLB is deprecated\n");
} else {
*user = NULL;
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
}
}
root = hugetlbfs_vfsmount->mnt_root;
quick_string.name = name;
quick_string.len = strlen(quick_string.name);
quick_string.hash = 0;
path.dentry = d_alloc(root, &quick_string);
if (!path.dentry)
goto out_shm_unlock;
path.mnt = mntget(hugetlbfs_vfsmount);
error = -ENOSPC;
inode = hugetlbfs_get_inode(root->d_sb, NULL, S_IFREG | S_IRWXUGO, 0);
if (!inode)
goto out_dentry;
error = -ENOMEM;
if (hugetlb_reserve_pages(inode, 0,
size >> huge_page_shift(hstate_inode(inode)), NULL,
acctflag))
goto out_inode;
d_instantiate(path.dentry, inode);
inode->i_size = size;
clear_nlink(inode);
error = -ENFILE;
file = alloc_file(&path, FMODE_WRITE | FMODE_READ,
&hugetlbfs_file_operations);
if (!file)
goto out_dentry; /* inode is already attached */
return file;
out_inode:
iput(inode);
out_dentry:
path_put(&path);
out_shm_unlock:
if (*user) {
user_shm_unlock(size, *user);
*user = NULL;
}
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int __ctr_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
{
struct bf_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
unsigned int bsize = BF_BLOCK_SIZE;
unsigned int nbytes = walk->nbytes;
u64 *src = (u64 *)walk->src.virt.addr;
u64 *dst = (u64 *)walk->dst.virt.addr;
u64 ctrblk = be64_to_cpu(*(__be64 *)walk->iv);
__be64 ctrblocks[4];
/* Process four block batch */
if (nbytes >= bsize * 4) {
do {
if (dst != src) {
dst[0] = src[0];
dst[1] = src[1];
dst[2] = src[2];
dst[3] = src[3];
}
/* create ctrblks for parallel encrypt */
ctrblocks[0] = cpu_to_be64(ctrblk++);
ctrblocks[1] = cpu_to_be64(ctrblk++);
ctrblocks[2] = cpu_to_be64(ctrblk++);
ctrblocks[3] = cpu_to_be64(ctrblk++);
blowfish_enc_blk_xor_4way(ctx, (u8 *)dst,
(u8 *)ctrblocks);
src += 4;
dst += 4;
} while ((nbytes -= bsize * 4) >= bsize * 4);
if (nbytes < bsize)
goto done;
}
/* Handle leftovers */
do {
if (dst != src)
*dst = *src;
ctrblocks[0] = cpu_to_be64(ctrblk++);
blowfish_enc_blk_xor(ctx, (u8 *)dst, (u8 *)ctrblocks);
src += 1;
dst += 1;
} while ((nbytes -= bsize) >= bsize);
done:
*(__be64 *)walk->iv = cpu_to_be64(ctrblk);
return nbytes;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void blitter_set_dst_dim(struct vrend_blitter_ctx *blit_ctx,
unsigned width, unsigned height)
{
blit_ctx->dst_width = width;
blit_ctx->dst_height = height;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 9,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
int val, valbool;
int retv = -ENOPROTOOPT;
bool needs_rtnl = setsockopt_needs_rtnl(optname);
if (!optval)
val = 0;
else {
if (optlen >= sizeof(int)) {
if (get_user(val, (int __user *) optval))
return -EFAULT;
} else
val = 0;
}
valbool = (val != 0);
if (ip6_mroute_opt(optname))
return ip6_mroute_setsockopt(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
if (needs_rtnl)
rtnl_lock();
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_ADDRFORM:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val == PF_INET) {
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct sk_buff *pktopt;
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_RAW)
break;
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP ||
sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDPLITE) {
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
if (up->pending == AF_INET6) {
retv = -EBUSY;
break;
}
} else if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
break;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
retv = -ENOTCONN;
break;
}
if (ipv6_only_sock(sk) ||
!ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr)) {
retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
break;
}
fl6_free_socklist(sk);
ipv6_sock_mc_close(sk);
/*
* Sock is moving from IPv6 to IPv4 (sk_prot), so
* remove it from the refcnt debug socks count in the
* original family...
*/
sk_refcnt_debug_dec(sk);
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP) {
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
local_bh_disable();
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, sk->sk_prot, -1);
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, &tcp_prot, 1);
local_bh_enable();
sk->sk_prot = &tcp_prot;
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &ipv4_specific;
sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_stream_ops;
sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
tcp_sync_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
} else {
struct proto *prot = &udp_prot;
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDPLITE)
prot = &udplite_prot;
local_bh_disable();
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, sk->sk_prot, -1);
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, prot, 1);
local_bh_enable();
sk->sk_prot = prot;
sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
}
opt = xchg(&np->opt, NULL);
if (opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
pktopt = xchg(&np->pktoptions, NULL);
kfree_skb(pktopt);
sk->sk_destruct = inet_sock_destruct;
/*
* ... and add it to the refcnt debug socks count
* in the new family. -acme
*/
sk_refcnt_debug_inc(sk);
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
retv = 0;
break;
}
goto e_inval;
case IPV6_V6ONLY:
if (optlen < sizeof(int) ||
inet_sk(sk)->inet_num)
goto e_inval;
sk->sk_ipv6only = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVPKTINFO:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxinfo = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292PKTINFO:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxoinfo = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVHOPLIMIT:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxhlim = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292HOPLIMIT:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxohlim = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVRTHDR:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.srcrt = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292RTHDR:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.osrcrt = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVHOPOPTS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.hopopts = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292HOPOPTS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.ohopopts = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVDSTOPTS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.dstopts = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292DSTOPTS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.odstopts = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_TCLASS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val < -1 || val > 0xff)
goto e_inval;
/* RFC 3542, 6.5: default traffic class of 0x0 */
if (val == -1)
val = 0;
np->tclass = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVTCLASS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxtclass = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWINFO:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxflow = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVPATHMTU:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxpmtu = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_TRANSPARENT:
if (valbool && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)) {
retv = -EPERM;
break;
}
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
/* we don't have a separate transparent bit for IPV6 we use the one in the IPv4 socket */
inet_sk(sk)->transparent = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVORIGDSTADDR:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxorigdstaddr = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_HOPOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDR:
case IPV6_DSTOPTS:
{
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
/* remove any sticky options header with a zero option
* length, per RFC3542.
*/
if (optlen == 0)
optval = NULL;
else if (!optval)
goto e_inval;
else if (optlen < sizeof(struct ipv6_opt_hdr) ||
optlen & 0x7 || optlen > 8 * 255)
goto e_inval;
/* hop-by-hop / destination options are privileged option */
retv = -EPERM;
if (optname != IPV6_RTHDR && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
break;
opt = ipv6_renew_options(sk, np->opt, optname,
(struct ipv6_opt_hdr __user *)optval,
optlen);
if (IS_ERR(opt)) {
retv = PTR_ERR(opt);
break;
}
/* routing header option needs extra check */
retv = -EINVAL;
if (optname == IPV6_RTHDR && opt && opt->srcrt) {
struct ipv6_rt_hdr *rthdr = opt->srcrt;
switch (rthdr->type) {
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6_MIP6)
case IPV6_SRCRT_TYPE_2:
if (rthdr->hdrlen != 2 ||
rthdr->segments_left != 1)
goto sticky_done;
break;
#endif
default:
goto sticky_done;
}
}
retv = 0;
opt = ipv6_update_options(sk, opt);
sticky_done:
if (opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
break;
}
case IPV6_PKTINFO:
{
struct in6_pktinfo pkt;
if (optlen == 0)
goto e_inval;
else if (optlen < sizeof(struct in6_pktinfo) || !optval)
goto e_inval;
if (copy_from_user(&pkt, optval, sizeof(struct in6_pktinfo))) {
retv = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && pkt.ipi6_ifindex != sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
goto e_inval;
np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex = pkt.ipi6_ifindex;
np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_addr = pkt.ipi6_addr;
retv = 0;
break;
}
case IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS:
{
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct msghdr msg;
struct flowi6 fl6;
int junk;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (optlen == 0)
goto update;
/* 1K is probably excessive
* 1K is surely not enough, 2K per standard header is 16K.
*/
retv = -EINVAL;
if (optlen > 64*1024)
break;
opt = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*opt) + optlen, GFP_KERNEL);
retv = -ENOBUFS;
if (!opt)
break;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(*opt) + optlen;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(opt+1, optval, optlen))
goto done;
msg.msg_controllen = optlen;
msg.msg_control = (void *)(opt+1);
retv = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(net, sk, &msg, &fl6, opt, &junk,
&junk, &junk);
if (retv)
goto done;
update:
retv = 0;
opt = ipv6_update_options(sk, opt);
done:
if (opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
break;
}
case IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val > 255 || val < -1)
goto e_inval;
np->hop_limit = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS:
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
break;
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val > 255 || val < -1)
goto e_inval;
np->mcast_hops = (val == -1 ? IPV6_DEFAULT_MCASTHOPS : val);
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_MULTICAST_LOOP:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val != valbool)
goto e_inval;
np->mc_loop = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_UNICAST_IF:
{
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
int ifindex;
if (optlen != sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
ifindex = (__force int)ntohl((__force __be32)val);
if (ifindex == 0) {
np->ucast_oif = 0;
retv = 0;
break;
}
dev = dev_get_by_index(net, ifindex);
retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (!dev)
break;
dev_put(dev);
retv = -EINVAL;
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
break;
np->ucast_oif = ifindex;
retv = 0;
break;
}
case IPV6_MULTICAST_IF:
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
break;
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val) {
struct net_device *dev;
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && sk->sk_bound_dev_if != val)
goto e_inval;
dev = dev_get_by_index(net, val);
if (!dev) {
retv = -ENODEV;
break;
}
dev_put(dev);
}
np->mcast_oif = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP:
case IPV6_DROP_MEMBERSHIP:
{
struct ipv6_mreq mreq;
if (optlen < sizeof(struct ipv6_mreq))
goto e_inval;
retv = -EPROTO;
if (inet_sk(sk)->is_icsk)
break;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&mreq, optval, sizeof(struct ipv6_mreq)))
break;
if (optname == IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP)
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_join(sk, mreq.ipv6mr_ifindex, &mreq.ipv6mr_multiaddr);
else
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_drop(sk, mreq.ipv6mr_ifindex, &mreq.ipv6mr_multiaddr);
break;
}
case IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST:
case IPV6_LEAVE_ANYCAST:
{
struct ipv6_mreq mreq;
if (optlen < sizeof(struct ipv6_mreq))
goto e_inval;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&mreq, optval, sizeof(struct ipv6_mreq)))
break;
if (optname == IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST)
retv = ipv6_sock_ac_join(sk, mreq.ipv6mr_ifindex, &mreq.ipv6mr_acaddr);
else
retv = ipv6_sock_ac_drop(sk, mreq.ipv6mr_ifindex, &mreq.ipv6mr_acaddr);
break;
}
case MCAST_JOIN_GROUP:
case MCAST_LEAVE_GROUP:
{
struct group_req greq;
struct sockaddr_in6 *psin6;
if (optlen < sizeof(struct group_req))
goto e_inval;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&greq, optval, sizeof(struct group_req)))
break;
if (greq.gr_group.ss_family != AF_INET6) {
retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
break;
}
psin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&greq.gr_group;
if (optname == MCAST_JOIN_GROUP)
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_join(sk, greq.gr_interface,
&psin6->sin6_addr);
else
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_drop(sk, greq.gr_interface,
&psin6->sin6_addr);
break;
}
case MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP:
case MCAST_LEAVE_SOURCE_GROUP:
case MCAST_BLOCK_SOURCE:
case MCAST_UNBLOCK_SOURCE:
{
struct group_source_req greqs;
int omode, add;
if (optlen < sizeof(struct group_source_req))
goto e_inval;
if (copy_from_user(&greqs, optval, sizeof(greqs))) {
retv = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (greqs.gsr_group.ss_family != AF_INET6 ||
greqs.gsr_source.ss_family != AF_INET6) {
retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
break;
}
if (optname == MCAST_BLOCK_SOURCE) {
omode = MCAST_EXCLUDE;
add = 1;
} else if (optname == MCAST_UNBLOCK_SOURCE) {
omode = MCAST_EXCLUDE;
add = 0;
} else if (optname == MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP) {
struct sockaddr_in6 *psin6;
psin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&greqs.gsr_group;
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_join(sk, greqs.gsr_interface,
&psin6->sin6_addr);
/* prior join w/ different source is ok */
if (retv && retv != -EADDRINUSE)
break;
omode = MCAST_INCLUDE;
add = 1;
} else /* MCAST_LEAVE_SOURCE_GROUP */ {
omode = MCAST_INCLUDE;
add = 0;
}
retv = ip6_mc_source(add, omode, sk, &greqs);
break;
}
case MCAST_MSFILTER:
{
struct group_filter *gsf;
if (optlen < GROUP_FILTER_SIZE(0))
goto e_inval;
if (optlen > sysctl_optmem_max) {
retv = -ENOBUFS;
break;
}
gsf = kmalloc(optlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!gsf) {
retv = -ENOBUFS;
break;
}
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(gsf, optval, optlen)) {
kfree(gsf);
break;
}
/* numsrc >= (4G-140)/128 overflow in 32 bits */
if (gsf->gf_numsrc >= 0x1ffffffU ||
gsf->gf_numsrc > sysctl_mld_max_msf) {
kfree(gsf);
retv = -ENOBUFS;
break;
}
if (GROUP_FILTER_SIZE(gsf->gf_numsrc) > optlen) {
kfree(gsf);
retv = -EINVAL;
break;
}
retv = ip6_mc_msfilter(sk, gsf);
kfree(gsf);
break;
}
case IPV6_ROUTER_ALERT:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
retv = ip6_ra_control(sk, val);
break;
case IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val < IPV6_PMTUDISC_DONT || val > IPV6_PMTUDISC_OMIT)
goto e_inval;
np->pmtudisc = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_MTU:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val && val < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
goto e_inval;
np->frag_size = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVERR:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->recverr = valbool;
if (!val)
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_error_queue);
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWINFO_SEND:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->sndflow = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR:
retv = ipv6_flowlabel_opt(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY:
case IPV6_XFRM_POLICY:
retv = -EPERM;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
retv = xfrm_user_policy(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
break;
case IPV6_ADDR_PREFERENCES:
{
unsigned int pref = 0;
unsigned int prefmask = ~0;
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
retv = -EINVAL;
/* check PUBLIC/TMP/PUBTMP_DEFAULT conflicts */
switch (val & (IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC|
IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP|
IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBTMP_DEFAULT)) {
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC:
pref |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC;
break;
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP:
pref |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP;
break;
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBTMP_DEFAULT:
break;
case 0:
goto pref_skip_pubtmp;
default:
goto e_inval;
}
prefmask &= ~(IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC|
IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP);
pref_skip_pubtmp:
/* check HOME/COA conflicts */
switch (val & (IPV6_PREFER_SRC_HOME|IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA)) {
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_HOME:
break;
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA:
pref |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA;
case 0:
goto pref_skip_coa;
default:
goto e_inval;
}
prefmask &= ~IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA;
pref_skip_coa:
/* check CGA/NONCGA conflicts */
switch (val & (IPV6_PREFER_SRC_CGA|IPV6_PREFER_SRC_NONCGA)) {
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_CGA:
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_NONCGA:
case 0:
break;
default:
goto e_inval;
}
np->srcprefs = (np->srcprefs & prefmask) | pref;
retv = 0;
break;
}
case IPV6_MINHOPCOUNT:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val < 0 || val > 255)
goto e_inval;
np->min_hopcount = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_DONTFRAG:
np->dontfrag = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL:
np->autoflowlabel = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
if (needs_rtnl)
rtnl_unlock();
return retv;
e_inval:
release_sock(sk);
if (needs_rtnl)
rtnl_unlock();
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 167,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool access_pmu_evtyper(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct sys_reg_params *p,
const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
{
u64 idx, reg;
if (!kvm_arm_pmu_v3_ready(vcpu))
return trap_raz_wi(vcpu, p, r);
if (pmu_access_el0_disabled(vcpu))
return false;
if (r->CRn == 9 && r->CRm == 13 && r->Op2 == 1) {
/* PMXEVTYPER_EL0 */
idx = vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, PMSELR_EL0) & ARMV8_PMU_COUNTER_MASK;
reg = PMEVTYPER0_EL0 + idx;
} else if (r->CRn == 14 && (r->CRm & 12) == 12) {
idx = ((r->CRm & 3) << 3) | (r->Op2 & 7);
if (idx == ARMV8_PMU_CYCLE_IDX)
reg = PMCCFILTR_EL0;
else
/* PMEVTYPERn_EL0 */
reg = PMEVTYPER0_EL0 + idx;
} else {
BUG();
}
if (!pmu_counter_idx_valid(vcpu, idx))
return false;
if (p->is_write) {
kvm_pmu_set_counter_event_type(vcpu, p->regval, idx);
vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, reg) = p->regval & ARMV8_PMU_EVTYPE_MASK;
} else {
p->regval = vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, reg) & ARMV8_PMU_EVTYPE_MASK;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 62,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static U32 ZSTD_cycleLog(U32 hashLog, ZSTD_strategy strat)
{
U32 const btScale = ((U32)strat >= (U32)ZSTD_btlazy2);
return hashLog - btScale;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string ChromeContentClient::GetUserAgent(bool* overriding) const {
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kUserAgent)) {
*overriding = true;
return CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kUserAgent);
} else {
*overriding = false;
chrome::VersionInfo version_info;
std::string product("Chrome/");
product += version_info.is_valid() ? version_info.Version() : "0.0.0.0";
return webkit_glue::BuildUserAgentFromProduct(product);
}
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Condor_Auth_SSL :: server_exchange_messages( int server_status, char *buf, BIO *conn_in, BIO *conn_out )
{
ouch("Server exchange messages.\n");
if(server_send_message( server_status, buf, conn_in, conn_out )
== AUTH_SSL_ERROR ) {
return AUTH_SSL_ERROR;
}
return server_receive_message( server_status, buf, conn_in, conn_out );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void unix_sock_destructor(struct sock *sk)
{
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc));
WARN_ON(!sk_unhashed(sk));
WARN_ON(sk->sk_socket);
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) {
pr_info("Attempt to release alive unix socket: %p\n", sk);
return;
}
if (u->addr)
unix_release_addr(u->addr);
atomic_long_dec(&unix_nr_socks);
local_bh_disable();
sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, -1);
local_bh_enable();
#ifdef UNIX_REFCNT_DEBUG
pr_debug("UNIX %p is destroyed, %ld are still alive.\n", sk,
atomic_long_read(&unix_nr_socks));
#endif
}
Commit Message: unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 46,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cryptd_hash_update_enqueue(struct ahash_request *req)
{
return cryptd_hash_enqueue(req, cryptd_hash_update);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ucma_init_qp_attr(struct ucma_file *file,
const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_init_qp_attr cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_qp_attr resp;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
struct ib_qp_attr qp_attr;
int ret;
if (out_len < sizeof(resp))
return -ENOSPC;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
resp.qp_attr_mask = 0;
memset(&qp_attr, 0, sizeof qp_attr);
qp_attr.qp_state = cmd.qp_state;
ret = rdma_init_qp_attr(ctx->cm_id, &qp_attr, &resp.qp_attr_mask);
if (ret)
goto out;
ib_copy_qp_attr_to_user(&resp, &qp_attr);
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(unsigned long)cmd.response,
&resp, sizeof(resp)))
ret = -EFAULT;
out:
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::AttachWebFrameWidget(blink::WebFrameWidget* frame_widget) {
DCHECK(!frame_widget_);
frame_widget_ = frame_widget;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBlockFlow::logicalLeftFloatOffsetForLine(LayoutUnit logicalTop, LayoutUnit fixedOffset, LayoutUnit logicalHeight) const
{
if (m_floatingObjects && m_floatingObjects->hasLeftObjects())
return m_floatingObjects->logicalLeftOffset(fixedOffset, logicalTop, logicalHeight);
return fixedOffset;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MockAutofillManager(AutofillDriver* driver, MockAutofillClient* client)
: AutofillManager(driver,
client,
client->GetPersonalDataManager(),
client->GetAutocompleteHistoryManager()) {}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GesturePoint::Reset() {
first_touch_time_ = last_touch_time_ = 0.0;
velocity_calculator_.ClearHistory();
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 108,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void srpt_get_class_port_info(struct ib_dm_mad *mad)
{
struct ib_class_port_info *cif;
cif = (struct ib_class_port_info *)mad->data;
memset(cif, 0, sizeof *cif);
cif->base_version = 1;
cif->class_version = 1;
cif->resp_time_value = 20;
mad->mad_hdr.status = 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 50,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void show_commit(struct commit *commit, void *data)
{
add_object_entry(commit->object.oid.hash, OBJ_COMMIT, NULL, 0);
commit->object.flags |= OBJECT_ADDED;
if (write_bitmap_index)
index_commit_for_bitmap(commit);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void ap_schedule_poll_timer(void)
{
if (ap_using_interrupts())
return;
__ap_schedule_poll_timer();
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,634 |
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