instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplDoublyLinkedList, offsetUnset)
{
zval *zindex;
zend_long index;
spl_dllist_object *intern;
spl_ptr_llist_element *element;
spl_ptr_llist *llist;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "z", &zindex) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern = Z_SPLDLLIST_P(getThis());
index = spl_offset_convert_to_long(zindex);
llist = intern->llist;
if (index < 0 || index >= intern->llist->count) {
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_OutOfRangeException, "Offset out of range", 0);
return;
}
element = spl_ptr_llist_offset(intern->llist, index, intern->flags & SPL_DLLIST_IT_LIFO);
if (element != NULL) {
/* connect the neightbors */
if (element->prev) {
element->prev->next = element->next;
}
if (element->next) {
element->next->prev = element->prev;
}
/* take care of head/tail */
if (element == llist->head) {
llist->head = element->next;
}
if (element == llist->tail) {
llist->tail = element->prev;
}
/* finally, delete the element */
llist->count--;
if(llist->dtor) {
llist->dtor(element);
}
if (intern->traverse_pointer == element) {
SPL_LLIST_DELREF(element);
intern->traverse_pointer = NULL;
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&element->data);
ZVAL_UNDEF(&element->data);
SPL_LLIST_DELREF(element);
} else {
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_OutOfRangeException, "Offset invalid", 0);
return;
}
} /* }}} */
static void spl_dllist_it_dtor(zend_object_iterator *iter) /* {{{ */
Commit Message: Fix bug #71735: Double-free in SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 54,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RunCommandAndWaitForResponse(FrameTreeNode* node,
const std::string& command,
const std::string& response) {
std::string msg_from_renderer;
ASSERT_TRUE(
ExecuteScriptAndExtractString(node, command, &msg_from_renderer));
ASSERT_EQ(response, msg_from_renderer);
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 143,886
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cpu_cgroup_attach(struct cgroup_subsys *ss, struct cgroup *cgrp,
struct cgroup *old_cont, struct task_struct *tsk,
bool threadgroup)
{
sched_move_task(tsk);
if (threadgroup) {
struct task_struct *c;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &tsk->thread_group, thread_group) {
sched_move_task(c);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,370
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AllViewsStoppedLoadingObserver::~AllViewsStoppedLoadingObserver() {
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fwnet_pd_delete(struct fwnet_partial_datagram *old)
{
struct fwnet_fragment_info *fi, *n;
list_for_each_entry_safe(fi, n, &old->fi_list, fi_link)
kfree(fi);
list_del(&old->pd_link);
dev_kfree_skb_any(old->skb);
kfree(old);
}
Commit Message: firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows
The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.
So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.
In addition, ensure that
- GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
- the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.
Reported-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,339
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void i8042_free_irqs(void)
{
if (i8042_aux_irq_registered)
free_irq(I8042_AUX_IRQ, i8042_platform_device);
if (i8042_kbd_irq_registered)
free_irq(I8042_KBD_IRQ, i8042_platform_device);
i8042_aux_irq_registered = i8042_kbd_irq_registered = false;
}
Commit Message: Input: i8042 - fix crash at boot time
The driver checks port->exists twice in i8042_interrupt(), first when
trying to assign temporary "serio" variable, and second time when deciding
whether it should call serio_interrupt(). The value of port->exists may
change between the 2 checks, and we may end up calling serio_interrupt()
with a NULL pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
IP: [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file:
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-358.el6.x86_64 #1 QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150feaf>] [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
RSP: 0018:ffff880028203cc0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000282 RSI: 0000000000000098 RDI: 0000000000000050
RBP: ffff880028203cc0 R08: ffff88013e79c000 R09: ffff880028203ee0
R10: 0000000000000298 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000098
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000001407f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo ffff88013e79c000, task ffff88013e79b500)
Stack:
ffff880028203d00 ffffffff813de186 ffffffffffffff02 0000000000000000
<d> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000098
<d> ffff880028203d70 ffffffff813e0162 ffff880028203d20 ffffffff8103b8ac
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813de186>] serio_interrupt+0x36/0xa0
[<ffffffff813e0162>] i8042_interrupt+0x132/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8103b8ac>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8103b8b9>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff810e1640>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170
[<ffffffff8103b154>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x44/0x50
[<ffffffff810e3d8e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180
[<ffffffff8100de89>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff81516c8c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0
[<ffffffff8100b9d3>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11
[<ffffffff81076f63>] ? __do_softirq+0x73/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8109b75b>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x14b/0x260
[<ffffffff8100c1cc>] ? call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[<ffffffff8100de05>] ? do_softirq+0x65/0xa0
[<ffffffff81076d95>] ? irq_exit+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff81516d80>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x9b
[<ffffffff8100bb93>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x13/0x20
To avoid the issue let's change the second check to test whether serio is
NULL or not.
Also, let's take i8042_lock in i8042_start() and i8042_stop() instead of
trying to be overly smart and using memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hong <chenhong3@huawei.com>
[dtor: take lock in i8042_start()/i8042_stop()]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 86,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DiskCacheBackendTest::BackendFixEnumerators() {
InitCache();
int seed = static_cast<int>(Time::Now().ToInternalValue());
srand(seed);
const int kNumEntries = 10;
for (int i = 0; i < kNumEntries; i++) {
std::string key = GenerateKey(true);
disk_cache::Entry* entry;
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry(key, &entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
}
EXPECT_EQ(kNumEntries, cache_->GetEntryCount());
disk_cache::Entry *entry1, *entry2;
std::unique_ptr<TestIterator> iter1 = CreateIterator(),
iter2 = CreateIterator();
ASSERT_THAT(iter1->OpenNextEntry(&entry1), IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != entry1);
entry1->Close();
entry1 = NULL;
for (int i = 0; i < kNumEntries / 2; i++) {
if (entry1)
entry1->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(iter1->OpenNextEntry(&entry1), IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != entry1);
ASSERT_THAT(iter2->OpenNextEntry(&entry2), IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != entry2);
entry2->Close();
}
entry1->Doom();
ASSERT_THAT(iter2->OpenNextEntry(&entry2), IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != entry2);
EXPECT_NE(entry2->GetKey(), entry1->GetKey());
entry1->Close();
entry2->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(iter2->OpenNextEntry(&entry2), IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != entry2);
entry2->Close();
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: spnego_gss_import_cred(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_buffer_t token,
gss_cred_id_t *cred_handle)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred;
gss_cred_id_t mcred;
ret = gss_import_cred(minor_status, token, &mcred);
if (GSS_ERROR(ret))
return (ret);
spcred = malloc(sizeof(*spcred));
if (spcred == NULL) {
gss_release_cred(minor_status, &mcred);
*minor_status = ENOMEM;
return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
spcred->mcred = mcred;
spcred->neg_mechs = GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET;
*cred_handle = (gss_cred_id_t)spcred;
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 36,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void unregisterBlobURLTask(void* context)
{
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> blobRegistryContext = adoptPtr(static_cast<BlobRegistryContext*>(context));
blobRegistry().unregisterBlobURL(blobRegistryContext->url);
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 1
| 170,691
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_write_dfla_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVTrack *track)
{
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb);
avio_wb32(pb, 0);
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "dfLa");
avio_w8(pb, 0); /* version */
avio_wb24(pb, 0); /* flags */
/* Expect the encoder to pass a METADATA_BLOCK_TYPE_STREAMINFO. */
if (track->par->extradata_size != FLAC_STREAMINFO_SIZE)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
/* TODO: Write other METADATA_BLOCK_TYPEs if the encoder makes them available. */
avio_w8(pb, 1 << 7 | FLAC_METADATA_TYPE_STREAMINFO); /* LastMetadataBlockFlag << 7 | BlockType */
avio_wb24(pb, track->par->extradata_size); /* Length */
avio_write(pb, track->par->extradata, track->par->extradata_size); /* BlockData[Length] */
return update_size(pb, pos);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 79,338
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
struct perf_event_attr __user *, attr_uptr,
pid_t, pid, int, cpu, int, group_fd, unsigned long, flags)
{
struct perf_event *group_leader = NULL, *output_event = NULL;
struct perf_event *event, *sibling;
struct perf_event_attr attr;
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
struct file *event_file = NULL;
struct file *group_file = NULL;
struct task_struct *task = NULL;
struct pmu *pmu;
int event_fd;
int move_group = 0;
int fput_needed = 0;
int err;
/* for future expandability... */
if (flags & ~PERF_FLAG_ALL)
return -EINVAL;
err = perf_copy_attr(attr_uptr, &attr);
if (err)
return err;
if (!attr.exclude_kernel) {
if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
}
if (attr.freq) {
if (attr.sample_freq > sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate)
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* In cgroup mode, the pid argument is used to pass the fd
* opened to the cgroup directory in cgroupfs. The cpu argument
* designates the cpu on which to monitor threads from that
* cgroup.
*/
if ((flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP) && (pid == -1 || cpu == -1))
return -EINVAL;
event_fd = get_unused_fd_flags(O_RDWR);
if (event_fd < 0)
return event_fd;
if (group_fd != -1) {
group_leader = perf_fget_light(group_fd, &fput_needed);
if (IS_ERR(group_leader)) {
err = PTR_ERR(group_leader);
goto err_fd;
}
group_file = group_leader->filp;
if (flags & PERF_FLAG_FD_OUTPUT)
output_event = group_leader;
if (flags & PERF_FLAG_FD_NO_GROUP)
group_leader = NULL;
}
if (pid != -1 && !(flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP)) {
task = find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (IS_ERR(task)) {
err = PTR_ERR(task);
goto err_group_fd;
}
}
event = perf_event_alloc(&attr, cpu, task, group_leader, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(event)) {
err = PTR_ERR(event);
goto err_task;
}
if (flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP) {
err = perf_cgroup_connect(pid, event, &attr, group_leader);
if (err)
goto err_alloc;
/*
* one more event:
* - that has cgroup constraint on event->cpu
* - that may need work on context switch
*/
atomic_inc(&per_cpu(perf_cgroup_events, event->cpu));
jump_label_inc(&perf_sched_events);
}
/*
* Special case software events and allow them to be part of
* any hardware group.
*/
pmu = event->pmu;
if (group_leader &&
(is_software_event(event) != is_software_event(group_leader))) {
if (is_software_event(event)) {
/*
* If event and group_leader are not both a software
* event, and event is, then group leader is not.
*
* Allow the addition of software events to !software
* groups, this is safe because software events never
* fail to schedule.
*/
pmu = group_leader->pmu;
} else if (is_software_event(group_leader) &&
(group_leader->group_flags & PERF_GROUP_SOFTWARE)) {
/*
* In case the group is a pure software group, and we
* try to add a hardware event, move the whole group to
* the hardware context.
*/
move_group = 1;
}
}
/*
* Get the target context (task or percpu):
*/
ctx = find_get_context(pmu, task, cpu);
if (IS_ERR(ctx)) {
err = PTR_ERR(ctx);
goto err_alloc;
}
if (task) {
put_task_struct(task);
task = NULL;
}
/*
* Look up the group leader (we will attach this event to it):
*/
if (group_leader) {
err = -EINVAL;
/*
* Do not allow a recursive hierarchy (this new sibling
* becoming part of another group-sibling):
*/
if (group_leader->group_leader != group_leader)
goto err_context;
/*
* Do not allow to attach to a group in a different
* task or CPU context:
*/
if (move_group) {
if (group_leader->ctx->type != ctx->type)
goto err_context;
} else {
if (group_leader->ctx != ctx)
goto err_context;
}
/*
* Only a group leader can be exclusive or pinned
*/
if (attr.exclusive || attr.pinned)
goto err_context;
}
if (output_event) {
err = perf_event_set_output(event, output_event);
if (err)
goto err_context;
}
event_file = anon_inode_getfile("[perf_event]", &perf_fops, event, O_RDWR);
if (IS_ERR(event_file)) {
err = PTR_ERR(event_file);
goto err_context;
}
if (move_group) {
struct perf_event_context *gctx = group_leader->ctx;
mutex_lock(&gctx->mutex);
perf_remove_from_context(group_leader);
list_for_each_entry(sibling, &group_leader->sibling_list,
group_entry) {
perf_remove_from_context(sibling);
put_ctx(gctx);
}
mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
put_ctx(gctx);
}
event->filp = event_file;
WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
if (move_group) {
perf_install_in_context(ctx, group_leader, cpu);
get_ctx(ctx);
list_for_each_entry(sibling, &group_leader->sibling_list,
group_entry) {
perf_install_in_context(ctx, sibling, cpu);
get_ctx(ctx);
}
}
perf_install_in_context(ctx, event, cpu);
++ctx->generation;
perf_unpin_context(ctx);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
event->owner = current;
mutex_lock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
list_add_tail(&event->owner_entry, ¤t->perf_event_list);
mutex_unlock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
/*
* Precalculate sample_data sizes
*/
perf_event__header_size(event);
perf_event__id_header_size(event);
/*
* Drop the reference on the group_event after placing the
* new event on the sibling_list. This ensures destruction
* of the group leader will find the pointer to itself in
* perf_group_detach().
*/
fput_light(group_file, fput_needed);
fd_install(event_fd, event_file);
return event_fd;
err_context:
perf_unpin_context(ctx);
put_ctx(ctx);
err_alloc:
free_event(event);
err_task:
if (task)
put_task_struct(task);
err_group_fd:
fput_light(group_file, fput_needed);
err_fd:
put_unused_fd(event_fd);
return err;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,956
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct ext_wait_queue *wq_get_first_waiter(
struct mqueue_inode_info *info, int sr)
{
struct list_head *ptr;
ptr = info->e_wait_q[sr].list.prev;
if (ptr == &info->e_wait_q[sr].list)
return NULL;
return list_entry(ptr, struct ext_wait_queue, list);
}
Commit Message: mqueue: fix a use-after-free in sys_mq_notify()
The retry logic for netlink_attachskb() inside sys_mq_notify()
is nasty and vulnerable:
1) The sock refcnt is already released when retry is needed
2) The fd is controllable by user-space because we already
release the file refcnt
so we when retry but the fd has been just closed by user-space
during this small window, we end up calling netlink_detachskb()
on the error path which releases the sock again, later when
the user-space closes this socket a use-after-free could be
triggered.
Setting 'sock' to NULL here should be sufficient to fix it.
Reported-by: GeneBlue <geneblue.mail@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 63,550
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ___perf_sw_event(u32 event_id, u64 nr, struct pt_regs *regs, u64 addr)
{
struct perf_sample_data data;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!regs))
return;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, addr, 0);
do_perf_sw_event(PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE, event_id, nr, &data, regs);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 50,413
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlCtxtGrowAttrs(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int nr) {
const xmlChar **atts;
int *attallocs;
int maxatts;
if (ctxt->atts == NULL) {
maxatts = 55; /* allow for 10 attrs by default */
atts = (const xmlChar **)
xmlMalloc(maxatts * sizeof(xmlChar *));
if (atts == NULL) goto mem_error;
ctxt->atts = atts;
attallocs = (int *) xmlMalloc((maxatts / 5) * sizeof(int));
if (attallocs == NULL) goto mem_error;
ctxt->attallocs = attallocs;
ctxt->maxatts = maxatts;
} else if (nr + 5 > ctxt->maxatts) {
maxatts = (nr + 5) * 2;
atts = (const xmlChar **) xmlRealloc((void *) ctxt->atts,
maxatts * sizeof(const xmlChar *));
if (atts == NULL) goto mem_error;
ctxt->atts = atts;
attallocs = (int *) xmlRealloc((void *) ctxt->attallocs,
(maxatts / 5) * sizeof(int));
if (attallocs == NULL) goto mem_error;
ctxt->attallocs = attallocs;
ctxt->maxatts = maxatts;
}
return(ctxt->maxatts);
mem_error:
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(-1);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 163,397
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf_set_pattern(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr, int what, pdf_pattern *pat, float *v)
{
pdf_gstate *gs;
pdf_material *mat;
gs = pdf_flush_text(ctx, pr);
mat = what == PDF_FILL ? &gs->fill : &gs->stroke;
pdf_drop_pattern(ctx, mat->pattern);
mat->pattern = NULL;
mat->kind = PDF_MAT_PATTERN;
if (pat)
mat->pattern = pdf_keep_pattern(ctx, pat);
if (v)
pdf_set_color(ctx, pr, what, v);
mat->gstate_num = pr->gparent;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ceph_x_reset(struct ceph_auth_client *ac)
{
struct ceph_x_info *xi = ac->private;
dout("reset\n");
xi->starting = true;
xi->server_challenge = 0;
}
Commit Message: libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len
We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes. This isn't
enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not
encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but
ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper). Since the
buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at
the point where we know how much is going to be needed.
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 36,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: read_exttime(const char *p, struct rar *rar, const char *endp)
{
unsigned rmode, flags, rem, j, count;
int ttime, i;
struct tm *tm;
time_t t;
long nsec;
if (p + 2 > endp)
return (-1);
flags = archive_le16dec(p);
p += 2;
for (i = 3; i >= 0; i--)
{
t = 0;
if (i == 3)
t = rar->mtime;
rmode = flags >> i * 4;
if (rmode & 8)
{
if (!t)
{
if (p + 4 > endp)
return (-1);
ttime = archive_le32dec(p);
t = get_time(ttime);
p += 4;
}
rem = 0;
count = rmode & 3;
if (p + count > endp)
return (-1);
for (j = 0; j < count; j++)
{
rem = (((unsigned)(unsigned char)*p) << 16) | (rem >> 8);
p++;
}
tm = localtime(&t);
nsec = tm->tm_sec + rem / NS_UNIT;
if (rmode & 4)
{
tm->tm_sec++;
t = mktime(tm);
}
if (i == 3)
{
rar->mtime = t;
rar->mnsec = nsec;
}
else if (i == 2)
{
rar->ctime = t;
rar->cnsec = nsec;
}
else if (i == 1)
{
rar->atime = t;
rar->ansec = nsec;
}
else
{
rar->arctime = t;
rar->arcnsec = nsec;
}
}
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Avoid a read off-by-one error for UTF16 names in RAR archives.
Reported-By: OSS-Fuzz issue 573
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 61,225
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HKEY GetHKEYFromString(const std::wstring &name) {
if (L"HKLM" == name)
return HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE;
else if (L"HKCR" == name)
return HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT;
else if (L"HKCC" == name)
return HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG;
else if (L"HKCU" == name)
return HKEY_CURRENT_USER;
else if (L"HKU" == name)
return HKEY_USERS;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed processes from opening each other
TBR=brettw
BUG=117627
BUG=119150
TEST=sbox_validation_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9716027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132477 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const net::LoadStateWithParam& WebContentsImpl::GetLoadState() const {
return load_state_;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,642
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void btrfs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_block_rsv *rsv, *global_rsv;
u64 min_size = btrfs_calc_trunc_metadata_size(root, 1);
int ret;
trace_btrfs_inode_evict(inode);
truncate_inode_pages(&inode->i_data, 0);
if (inode->i_nlink && (btrfs_root_refs(&root->root_item) != 0 ||
btrfs_is_free_space_inode(inode)))
goto no_delete;
if (is_bad_inode(inode)) {
btrfs_orphan_del(NULL, inode);
goto no_delete;
}
/* do we really want it for ->i_nlink > 0 and zero btrfs_root_refs? */
btrfs_wait_ordered_range(inode, 0, (u64)-1);
if (root->fs_info->log_root_recovering) {
BUG_ON(test_bit(BTRFS_INODE_HAS_ORPHAN_ITEM,
&BTRFS_I(inode)->runtime_flags));
goto no_delete;
}
if (inode->i_nlink > 0) {
BUG_ON(btrfs_root_refs(&root->root_item) != 0);
goto no_delete;
}
rsv = btrfs_alloc_block_rsv(root, BTRFS_BLOCK_RSV_TEMP);
if (!rsv) {
btrfs_orphan_del(NULL, inode);
goto no_delete;
}
rsv->size = min_size;
rsv->failfast = 1;
global_rsv = &root->fs_info->global_block_rsv;
btrfs_i_size_write(inode, 0);
/*
* This is a bit simpler than btrfs_truncate since we've already
* reserved our space for our orphan item in the unlink, so we just
* need to reserve some slack space in case we add bytes and update
* inode item when doing the truncate.
*/
while (1) {
ret = btrfs_block_rsv_refill(root, rsv, min_size,
BTRFS_RESERVE_FLUSH_LIMIT);
/*
* Try and steal from the global reserve since we will
* likely not use this space anyway, we want to try as
* hard as possible to get this to work.
*/
if (ret)
ret = btrfs_block_rsv_migrate(global_rsv, rsv, min_size);
if (ret) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "Could not get space for a "
"delete, will truncate on mount %d\n", ret);
btrfs_orphan_del(NULL, inode);
btrfs_free_block_rsv(root, rsv);
goto no_delete;
}
trans = btrfs_start_transaction_lflush(root, 1);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
btrfs_orphan_del(NULL, inode);
btrfs_free_block_rsv(root, rsv);
goto no_delete;
}
trans->block_rsv = rsv;
ret = btrfs_truncate_inode_items(trans, root, inode, 0, 0);
if (ret != -ENOSPC)
break;
trans->block_rsv = &root->fs_info->trans_block_rsv;
ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, inode);
BUG_ON(ret);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
trans = NULL;
btrfs_btree_balance_dirty(root);
}
btrfs_free_block_rsv(root, rsv);
if (ret == 0) {
trans->block_rsv = root->orphan_block_rsv;
ret = btrfs_orphan_del(trans, inode);
BUG_ON(ret);
}
trans->block_rsv = &root->fs_info->trans_block_rsv;
if (!(root == root->fs_info->tree_root ||
root->root_key.objectid == BTRFS_TREE_RELOC_OBJECTID))
btrfs_return_ino(root, btrfs_ino(inode));
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
btrfs_btree_balance_dirty(root);
no_delete:
clear_inode(inode);
return;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 34,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebContents* BrowserView::GetActiveWebContents() const {
return chrome::GetActiveWebContents(browser_.get());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,338
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AgcDisable(preproc_effect_t *effect)
{
ALOGV("AgcDisable");
webrtc::GainControl *agc = static_cast<webrtc::GainControl *>(effect->engine);
agc->Enable(false);
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,464
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
u32 *scontext_len, int force)
{
struct context *context;
int rc = 0;
if (scontext)
*scontext = NULL;
*scontext_len = 0;
if (!ss_initialized) {
if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
char *scontextp;
*scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
if (!scontext)
goto out;
scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!scontextp) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
strcpy(scontextp, initial_sid_to_string[sid]);
*scontext = scontextp;
goto out;
}
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: called before initial "
"load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
if (force)
context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid);
else
context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
if (!context) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, sid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
out:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
if (notification)
context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
else
context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
}
Commit Message: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 51,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hook_modifier (struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin, const char *modifier,
t_hook_callback_modifier *callback, void *callback_data)
{
struct t_hook *new_hook;
struct t_hook_modifier *new_hook_modifier;
int priority;
const char *ptr_modifier;
if (!modifier || !modifier[0] || !callback)
return NULL;
new_hook = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook));
if (!new_hook)
return NULL;
new_hook_modifier = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook_modifier));
if (!new_hook_modifier)
{
free (new_hook);
return NULL;
}
hook_get_priority_and_name (modifier, &priority, &ptr_modifier);
hook_init_data (new_hook, plugin, HOOK_TYPE_MODIFIER, priority,
callback_data);
new_hook->hook_data = new_hook_modifier;
new_hook_modifier->callback = callback;
new_hook_modifier->modifier = strdup ((ptr_modifier) ? ptr_modifier : modifier);
hook_add_to_list (new_hook);
return new_hook;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IntRect RenderBox::outlineBoundsForRepaint(RenderBoxModelObject* repaintContainer, IntPoint* cachedOffsetToRepaintContainer) const
{
IntRect box = borderBoundingBox();
adjustRectForOutlineAndShadow(box);
FloatQuad containerRelativeQuad = FloatRect(box);
if (cachedOffsetToRepaintContainer)
containerRelativeQuad.move(cachedOffsetToRepaintContainer->x(), cachedOffsetToRepaintContainer->y());
else
containerRelativeQuad = localToContainerQuad(containerRelativeQuad, repaintContainer);
box = containerRelativeQuad.enclosingBoundingBox();
box.move(view()->layoutDelta());
return box;
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,610
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pp::FloatRect PDFiumEngine::GetCharBounds(int page_index, int char_index) {
DCHECK(page_index >= 0 && page_index < static_cast<int>(pages_.size()));
return pages_[page_index]->GetCharBounds(char_index);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void xhci_xfer_unmap(XHCITransfer *xfer)
{
usb_packet_unmap(&xfer->packet, &xfer->sgl);
qemu_sglist_destroy(&xfer->sgl);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 5,766
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline double gamma_pow(const double value,const double gamma)
{
return(value < 0.0 ? value : pow(value,gamma));
}
Commit Message: Evaluate lazy pixel cache morphology to prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim M. El-Sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 50,570
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static vm_fault_t kvm_vcpu_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = vmf->vma->vm_file->private_data;
struct page *page;
if (vmf->pgoff == 0)
page = virt_to_page(vcpu->run);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
else if (vmf->pgoff == KVM_PIO_PAGE_OFFSET)
page = virt_to_page(vcpu->arch.pio_data);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MMIO
else if (vmf->pgoff == KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_PAGE_OFFSET)
page = virt_to_page(vcpu->kvm->coalesced_mmio_ring);
#endif
else
return kvm_arch_vcpu_fault(vcpu, vmf);
get_page(page);
vmf->page = page;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 91,589
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(timer_settime, timer_t, timer_id, int, flags,
const struct itimerspec __user *, new_setting,
struct itimerspec __user *, old_setting)
{
struct itimerspec64 new_spec, old_spec;
struct itimerspec64 *rtn = old_setting ? &old_spec : NULL;
int error = 0;
if (!new_setting)
return -EINVAL;
if (get_itimerspec64(&new_spec, new_setting))
return -EFAULT;
error = do_timer_settime(timer_id, flags, &new_spec, rtn);
if (!error && old_setting) {
if (put_itimerspec64(&old_spec, old_setting))
error = -EFAULT;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify
timer_create() specifies via sigevent->sigev_notify the signal delivery for
the new timer. The valid modes are SIGEV_NONE, SIGEV_SIGNAL, SIGEV_THREAD
and (SIGEV_SIGNAL | SIGEV_THREAD_ID).
The sanity check in good_sigevent() is only checking the valid combination
for the SIGEV_THREAD_ID bit, i.e. SIGEV_SIGNAL, but if SIGEV_THREAD_ID is
not set it accepts any random value.
This has no real effects on the posix timer and signal delivery code, but
it affects show_timer() which handles the output of /proc/$PID/timers. That
function uses a string array to pretty print sigev_notify. The access to
that array has no bound checks, so random sigev_notify cause access beyond
the array bounds.
Add proper checks for the valid notify modes and remove the SIGEV_THREAD_ID
masking from various code pathes as SIGEV_NONE can never be set in
combination with SIGEV_THREAD_ID.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 85,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API void r_bin_iobind(RBin *bin, RIO *io) {
r_io_bind (io, &bin->iob);
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 60,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::keepEventInNode(Event* event) {
return isUserInteractionEventForSlider(event, layoutObject());
}
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 126,969
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int i;
scm->fp = UNIXCB(skb).fp;
UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--)
unix_notinflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 19,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rw_interrupt(void)
{
int eoc;
int ssize;
int heads;
int nr_sectors;
if (R_HEAD >= 2) {
/* some Toshiba floppy controllers occasionnally seem to
* return bogus interrupts after read/write operations, which
* can be recognized by a bad head number (>= 2) */
return;
}
if (!DRS->first_read_date)
DRS->first_read_date = jiffies;
nr_sectors = 0;
ssize = DIV_ROUND_UP(1 << SIZECODE, 4);
if (ST1 & ST1_EOC)
eoc = 1;
else
eoc = 0;
if (COMMAND & 0x80)
heads = 2;
else
heads = 1;
nr_sectors = (((R_TRACK - TRACK) * heads +
R_HEAD - HEAD) * SECT_PER_TRACK +
R_SECTOR - SECTOR + eoc) << SIZECODE >> 2;
if (nr_sectors / ssize >
DIV_ROUND_UP(in_sector_offset + current_count_sectors, ssize)) {
DPRINT("long rw: %x instead of %lx\n",
nr_sectors, current_count_sectors);
pr_info("rs=%d s=%d\n", R_SECTOR, SECTOR);
pr_info("rh=%d h=%d\n", R_HEAD, HEAD);
pr_info("rt=%d t=%d\n", R_TRACK, TRACK);
pr_info("heads=%d eoc=%d\n", heads, eoc);
pr_info("spt=%d st=%d ss=%d\n",
SECT_PER_TRACK, fsector_t, ssize);
pr_info("in_sector_offset=%d\n", in_sector_offset);
}
nr_sectors -= in_sector_offset;
INFBOUND(nr_sectors, 0);
SUPBOUND(current_count_sectors, nr_sectors);
switch (interpret_errors()) {
case 2:
cont->redo();
return;
case 1:
if (!current_count_sectors) {
cont->error();
cont->redo();
return;
}
break;
case 0:
if (!current_count_sectors) {
cont->redo();
return;
}
current_type[current_drive] = _floppy;
floppy_sizes[TOMINOR(current_drive)] = _floppy->size;
break;
}
if (probing) {
if (DP->flags & FTD_MSG)
DPRINT("Auto-detected floppy type %s in fd%d\n",
_floppy->name, current_drive);
current_type[current_drive] = _floppy;
floppy_sizes[TOMINOR(current_drive)] = _floppy->size;
probing = 0;
}
if (CT(COMMAND) != FD_READ ||
raw_cmd->kernel_data == current_req->buffer) {
/* transfer directly from buffer */
cont->done(1);
} else if (CT(COMMAND) == FD_READ) {
buffer_track = raw_cmd->track;
buffer_drive = current_drive;
INFBOUND(buffer_max, nr_sectors + fsector_t);
}
cont->redo();
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 39,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: move_statusbar() {
if (!uzbl.gui.scrolled_win &&
!uzbl.gui.mainbar)
return;
g_object_ref(uzbl.gui.scrolled_win);
g_object_ref(uzbl.gui.mainbar);
gtk_container_remove(GTK_CONTAINER(uzbl.gui.vbox), uzbl.gui.scrolled_win);
gtk_container_remove(GTK_CONTAINER(uzbl.gui.vbox), uzbl.gui.mainbar);
if(uzbl.behave.status_top) {
gtk_box_pack_start (GTK_BOX (uzbl.gui.vbox), uzbl.gui.mainbar, FALSE, TRUE, 0);
gtk_box_pack_start (GTK_BOX (uzbl.gui.vbox), uzbl.gui.scrolled_win, TRUE, TRUE, 0);
}
else {
gtk_box_pack_start (GTK_BOX (uzbl.gui.vbox), uzbl.gui.scrolled_win, TRUE, TRUE, 0);
gtk_box_pack_start (GTK_BOX (uzbl.gui.vbox), uzbl.gui.mainbar, FALSE, TRUE, 0);
}
g_object_unref(uzbl.gui.scrolled_win);
g_object_unref(uzbl.gui.mainbar);
gtk_widget_grab_focus (GTK_WIDGET (uzbl.gui.web_view));
return;
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,379
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int SafeSock::connect(
char const *host,
int port,
bool
)
{
if (!host || port < 0) return FALSE;
_who.clear();
if (!Sock::guess_address_string(host, port, _who))
return FALSE;
if (host[0] == '<') {
set_connect_addr(host);
} else {
set_connect_addr(_who.to_sinful().Value());
}
addr_changed();
int retval=special_connect(host,port,true);
if( retval != CEDAR_ENOCCB ) {
return retval;
}
/* we bind here so that a sock may be */
/* assigned to the stream if needed */
/* TRUE means this is an outgoing connection */
if (_state == sock_virgin || _state == sock_assigned) {
bind(true);
}
if (_state != sock_bound) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,
"SafeSock::connect bind() failed: _state = %d\n",
_state);
return FALSE;
}
_state = sock_connect;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseVersionNum(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int len = 0;
int size = 10;
xmlChar cur;
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
cur = CUR;
if (!((cur >= '0') && (cur <= '9'))) {
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
buf[len++] = cur;
NEXT;
cur=CUR;
if (cur != '.') {
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
buf[len++] = cur;
NEXT;
cur=CUR;
while ((cur >= '0') && (cur <= '9')) {
if (len + 1 >= size) {
xmlChar *tmp;
size *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlFree(buf);
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
buf = tmp;
}
buf[len++] = cur;
NEXT;
cur=CUR;
}
buf[len] = 0;
return(buf);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 59,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: guint_slice_free (gpointer data)
{
g_slice_free (guint, data);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned int blk_plug_queued_count(struct request_queue *q)
{
struct blk_plug *plug;
struct request *rq;
struct list_head *plug_list;
unsigned int ret = 0;
plug = current->plug;
if (!plug)
goto out;
if (q->mq_ops)
plug_list = &plug->mq_list;
else
plug_list = &plug->list;
list_for_each_entry(rq, plug_list, queuelist) {
if (rq->q == q)
ret++;
}
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,995
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InputEventAckState SynchronousCompositorImpl::HandleInputEvent(
const blink::WebInputEvent& input_event) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
return g_factory.Get().synchronous_input_event_filter()->HandleInputEvent(
routing_id_, input_event);
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *pkt)
{
ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0);
pkt->savedpos = pkt->length;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static irqreturn_t _vop_virtio_intr_handler(int irq, void *data)
{
struct vop_vdev *vdev = data;
struct vop_device *vpdev = vdev->vpdev;
vpdev->hw_ops->ack_interrupt(vpdev, vdev->virtio_db);
schedule_work(&vdev->virtio_bh_work);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
Commit Message: misc: mic: Fix for double fetch security bug in VOP driver
The MIC VOP driver does two successive reads from user space to read a
variable length data structure. Kernel memory corruption can result if
the data structure changes between the two reads. This patch disallows
the chance of this happening.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116651
Reported by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Dutt <sudeep.dutt@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Dixit <ashutosh.dixit@intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 51,481
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ContentClient* RenderViewTest::CreateContentClient() {
return new TestContentClient;
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
{
struct shash_instance *inst;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
struct shash_alg *salg;
int err;
int ds;
int ss;
err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH);
if (err)
return err;
salg = shash_attr_alg(tb[1], 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(salg))
return PTR_ERR(salg);
err = -EINVAL;
ds = salg->digestsize;
ss = salg->statesize;
alg = &salg->base;
if (ds > alg->cra_blocksize ||
ss < alg->cra_blocksize)
goto out_put_alg;
inst = shash_alloc_instance("hmac", alg);
err = PTR_ERR(inst);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
goto out_put_alg;
err = crypto_init_shash_spawn(shash_instance_ctx(inst), salg,
shash_crypto_instance(inst));
if (err)
goto out_free_inst;
inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority;
inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
ss = ALIGN(ss, alg->cra_alignmask + 1);
inst->alg.digestsize = ds;
inst->alg.statesize = ss;
inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct hmac_ctx) +
ALIGN(ss * 2, crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
inst->alg.base.cra_init = hmac_init_tfm;
inst->alg.base.cra_exit = hmac_exit_tfm;
inst->alg.init = hmac_init;
inst->alg.update = hmac_update;
inst->alg.final = hmac_final;
inst->alg.finup = hmac_finup;
inst->alg.export = hmac_export;
inst->alg.import = hmac_import;
inst->alg.setkey = hmac_setkey;
err = shash_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
if (err) {
out_free_inst:
shash_free_instance(shash_crypto_instance(inst));
}
out_put_alg:
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,786
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest(void)
{
/* Expected data. */
u_char expected[] = {
"AAAAAAAA"
"AAAAAAAA"
"AAAAAAAA"
"JJJJJJJJ"
"BBBBBBBB"
"BBBBBBBB"
"CCCCCCCC"
"CCCCCCCC"
"CCCCCCCC"
"LLLLLLLL"
"DDDDDDDD"
"LLLLLLLL"
"MMMMMMMM"
"EEEEEEEE"
"EEEEEEEE"
"FFFFFFFF"
"FFFFFFFF"
"FFFFFFFF"
"GGGGGGGG"
"GGGGGGGG"
"HHHHHHHH"
"HHHHHHHH"
"IIIIIIII"
"QQQQQQQQ"
};
return DefragDoSturgesNovakTest(DEFRAG_POLICY_FIRST, expected, sizeof(expected));
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358
| 0
| 67,848
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri;
AES_KEY actx;
unsigned char *wkey = NULL;
int wkeylen;
int r = 0;
ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
kekri = ri->d.kekri;
if (!kekri->key) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NO_KEY);
return 0;
}
if (AES_set_encrypt_key(kekri->key, kekri->keylen << 3, &actx)) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT,
CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_KEY);
goto err;
}
wkey = OPENSSL_malloc(ec->keylen + 8);
if (wkey == NULL) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
wkeylen = AES_wrap_key(&actx, NULL, wkey, ec->key, ec->keylen);
if (wkeylen <= 0) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_WRAP_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ASN1_STRING_set0(kekri->encryptedKey, wkey, wkeylen);
r = 1;
err:
if (!r)
OPENSSL_free(wkey);
OPENSSL_cleanse(&actx, sizeof(actx));
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 11,920
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int FUZ_mallocTests(unsigned seed, double compressibility, unsigned part)
{
(void)seed; (void)compressibility; (void)part;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,135
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int getttyname_harder(int fd, char **ret) {
_cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL;
int r;
r = getttyname_malloc(fd, &s);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (streq(s, "tty"))
return get_ctty(0, NULL, ret);
*ret = TAKE_PTR(s);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255
| 0
| 92,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderLayerScrollableArea::userInputScrollable(ScrollbarOrientation orientation) const
{
if (box().isIntristicallyScrollable(orientation))
return true;
EOverflow overflowStyle = (orientation == HorizontalScrollbar) ?
box().style()->overflowX() : box().style()->overflowY();
return (overflowStyle == OSCROLL || overflowStyle == OAUTO || overflowStyle == OOVERLAY);
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 120,045
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int jsvGarbageCollect() {
if (isMemoryBusy) return false;
isMemoryBusy = MEMBUSY_GC;
JsVarRef i;
for (i=1;i<=jsVarsSize;i++) {
JsVar *var = jsvGetAddressOf(i);
if ((var->flags&JSV_VARTYPEMASK) != JSV_UNUSED) { // if it is not unused
var->flags |= (JsVarFlags)JSV_GARBAGE_COLLECT;
if (jsvIsFlatString(var))
i = (JsVarRef)(i+jsvGetFlatStringBlocks(var));
}
}
/* recursively remove anything that is referenced from a var that is locked. */
for (i=1;i<=jsVarsSize;i++) {
JsVar *var = jsvGetAddressOf(i);
if ((var->flags & JSV_GARBAGE_COLLECT) && // not already GC'd
jsvGetLocks(var)>0) // or it is locked
jsvGarbageCollectMarkUsed(var);
if (jsvIsFlatString(var))
i = (JsVarRef)(i+jsvGetFlatStringBlocks(var));
}
/* now sweep for things that we can GC!
* Also update the free list - this means that every new variable that
* gets allocated gets allocated towards the start of memory, which
* hopefully helps compact everything towards the start. */
unsigned int freedCount = 0;
jsVarFirstEmpty = 0;
JsVar *lastEmpty = 0;
for (i=1;i<=jsVarsSize;i++) {
JsVar *var = jsvGetAddressOf(i);
if (var->flags & JSV_GARBAGE_COLLECT) {
if (jsvIsFlatString(var)) {
unsigned int count = (unsigned int)jsvGetFlatStringBlocks(var);
freedCount+=count;
var->flags = JSV_UNUSED;
if (lastEmpty) jsvSetNextSibling(lastEmpty, i);
else jsVarFirstEmpty = i;
lastEmpty = var;
while (count-- > 0) {
i++;
var = jsvGetAddressOf((JsVarRef)(i));
var->flags = JSV_UNUSED;
if (lastEmpty) jsvSetNextSibling(lastEmpty, i);
else jsVarFirstEmpty = i;
lastEmpty = var;
}
} else {
if (jsvHasSingleChild(var)) {
/* If this had a child that wasn't listed for GC then we need to
* unref it. Everything else is fine because it'll disappear anyway.
* We don't have to check if we should free this other variable
* here because we know the GC picked up it was referenced from
* somewhere else. */
JsVarRef ch = jsvGetFirstChild(var);
if (ch) {
JsVar *child = jsvGetAddressOf(ch); // not locked
if (child->flags!=JSV_UNUSED && // not already GC'd!
!(child->flags&JSV_GARBAGE_COLLECT)) // not marked for GC
jsvUnRef(child);
}
}
/* Sanity checks here. We're making sure that any variables that are
* linked from this one have either already been garbage collected or
* are marked for GC */
assert(!jsvHasChildren(var) || !jsvGetFirstChild(var) ||
jsvGetAddressOf(jsvGetFirstChild(var))->flags==JSV_UNUSED ||
(jsvGetAddressOf(jsvGetFirstChild(var))->flags&JSV_GARBAGE_COLLECT));
assert(!jsvHasChildren(var) || !jsvGetLastChild(var) ||
jsvGetAddressOf(jsvGetLastChild(var))->flags==JSV_UNUSED ||
(jsvGetAddressOf(jsvGetLastChild(var))->flags&JSV_GARBAGE_COLLECT));
assert(!jsvIsName(var) || !jsvGetPrevSibling(var) ||
jsvGetAddressOf(jsvGetPrevSibling(var))->flags==JSV_UNUSED ||
(jsvGetAddressOf(jsvGetPrevSibling(var))->flags&JSV_GARBAGE_COLLECT));
assert(!jsvIsName(var) || !jsvGetNextSibling(var) ||
jsvGetAddressOf(jsvGetNextSibling(var))->flags==JSV_UNUSED ||
(jsvGetAddressOf(jsvGetNextSibling(var))->flags&JSV_GARBAGE_COLLECT));
var->flags = JSV_UNUSED;
if (lastEmpty) jsvSetNextSibling(lastEmpty, i);
else jsVarFirstEmpty = i;
lastEmpty = var;
freedCount++;
}
} else if (jsvIsFlatString(var)) {
i = (JsVarRef)(i+jsvGetFlatStringBlocks(var));
} else if (var->flags == JSV_UNUSED) {
if (lastEmpty) jsvSetNextSibling(lastEmpty, i);
else jsVarFirstEmpty = i;
lastEmpty = var;
}
}
if (lastEmpty) jsvSetNextSibling(lastEmpty, 0);
isMemoryBusy = MEM_NOT_BUSY;
return (int)freedCount;
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 82,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reds_handle_ticket(void *opaque)
{
RedLinkInfo *link = (RedLinkInfo *)opaque;
char password[SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH];
time_t ltime;
time(<ime);
RSA_private_decrypt(link->tiTicketing.rsa_size,
link->tiTicketing.encrypted_ticket.encrypted_data,
(unsigned char *)password, link->tiTicketing.rsa, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
if (ticketing_enabled && !link->skip_auth) {
int expired = taTicket.expiration_time < ltime;
if (strlen(taTicket.password) == 0) {
reds_send_link_result(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_PERMISSION_DENIED);
spice_warning("Ticketing is enabled, but no password is set. "
"please set a ticket first");
reds_link_free(link);
return;
}
if (expired || strncmp(password, taTicket.password, SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH) != 0) {
if (expired) {
spice_warning("Ticket has expired");
} else {
spice_warning("Invalid password");
}
reds_send_link_result(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_PERMISSION_DENIED);
reds_link_free(link);
return;
}
}
reds_handle_link(link);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 164,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvp_file_init(void)
{
int fd;
FILE *filep;
size_t records_read;
char *fname;
struct kvp_record *record;
struct kvp_record *readp;
int num_blocks;
int i;
int alloc_unit = sizeof(struct kvp_record) * ENTRIES_PER_BLOCK;
if (access("/var/opt/hyperv", F_OK)) {
if (mkdir("/var/opt/hyperv", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IROTH)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, " Failed to create /var/opt/hyperv");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < KVP_POOL_COUNT; i++) {
fname = kvp_file_info[i].fname;
records_read = 0;
num_blocks = 1;
sprintf(fname, "/var/opt/hyperv/.kvp_pool_%d", i);
fd = open(fname, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IROTH);
if (fd == -1)
return 1;
filep = fopen(fname, "r");
if (!filep)
return 1;
record = malloc(alloc_unit * num_blocks);
if (record == NULL) {
fclose(filep);
return 1;
}
for (;;) {
readp = &record[records_read];
records_read += fread(readp, sizeof(struct kvp_record),
ENTRIES_PER_BLOCK,
filep);
if (ferror(filep)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to read file, pool: %d",
i);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (!feof(filep)) {
/*
* We have more data to read.
*/
num_blocks++;
record = realloc(record, alloc_unit *
num_blocks);
if (record == NULL) {
fclose(filep);
return 1;
}
continue;
}
break;
}
kvp_file_info[i].fd = fd;
kvp_file_info[i].num_blocks = num_blocks;
kvp_file_info[i].records = record;
kvp_file_info[i].num_records = records_read;
fclose(filep);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tools: hv: Netlink source address validation allows DoS
The source code without this patch caused hypervkvpd to exit when it processed
a spoofed Netlink packet which has been sent from an untrusted local user.
Now Netlink messages with a non-zero nl_pid source address are ignored
and a warning is printed into the syslog.
Signed-off-by: Tomas Hozza <thozza@redhat.com>
Acked-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::CreateTarget(
content::DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host,
int session_id,
int command_id,
const base::DictionaryValue* params) {
std::string url;
if (const base::Value* url_value = params->FindKey("url")) {
url = url_value->GetString();
} else {
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "url");
}
std::string browser_context_id;
if (const base::Value* browser_context_id_value =
params->FindKey("browserContextId")) {
browser_context_id = browser_context_id_value->GetString();
}
int width = browser_->options()->window_size.width();
if (const base::Value* width_value = params->FindKey("width"))
width = width_value->GetInt();
int height = browser_->options()->window_size.height();
if (const base::Value* height_value = params->FindKey("height"))
height = height_value->GetInt();
bool enable_begin_frame_control = false;
if (const base::Value* enable_begin_frame_control_value =
params->FindKey("enableBeginFrameControl")) {
enable_begin_frame_control = enable_begin_frame_control_value->GetBool();
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (enable_begin_frame_control) {
return CreateErrorResponse(
command_id, kErrorServerError,
"BeginFrameControl is not supported on MacOS yet");
}
#endif
HeadlessBrowserContext* context =
browser_->GetBrowserContextForId(browser_context_id);
if (!browser_context_id.empty()) {
context = browser_->GetBrowserContextForId(browser_context_id);
if (!context)
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "browserContextId");
} else {
context = browser_->GetDefaultBrowserContext();
if (!context) {
return CreateErrorResponse(command_id, kErrorServerError,
"You specified no |browserContextId|, but "
"there is no default browser context set on "
"HeadlessBrowser");
}
}
HeadlessWebContentsImpl* web_contents_impl = HeadlessWebContentsImpl::From(
context->CreateWebContentsBuilder()
.SetInitialURL(GURL(url))
.SetWindowSize(gfx::Size(width, height))
.SetEnableBeginFrameControl(enable_begin_frame_control)
.Build());
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> result(
target::CreateTargetResult::Builder()
.SetTargetId(web_contents_impl->GetDevToolsAgentHostId())
.Build()
->Serialize());
return CreateSuccessResponse(command_id, std::move(result));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <jzfeng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 149,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ClonePixelCacheOnDisk(
CacheInfo *magick_restrict cache_info,CacheInfo *magick_restrict clone_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickSizeType
extent;
size_t
quantum;
ssize_t
count;
struct stat
file_stats;
unsigned char
*buffer;
/*
Clone pixel cache on disk with identical morphology.
*/
if ((OpenPixelCacheOnDisk(cache_info,ReadMode) == MagickFalse) ||
(OpenPixelCacheOnDisk(clone_info,IOMode) == MagickFalse))
return(MagickFalse);
quantum=(size_t) MagickMaxBufferExtent;
if ((fstat(cache_info->file,&file_stats) == 0) && (file_stats.st_size > 0))
quantum=(size_t) MagickMin(file_stats.st_size,MagickMaxBufferExtent);
buffer=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(quantum,sizeof(*buffer));
if (buffer == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
extent=0;
while ((count=read(cache_info->file,buffer,quantum)) > 0)
{
ssize_t
number_bytes;
number_bytes=write(clone_info->file,buffer,(size_t) count);
if (number_bytes != count)
break;
extent+=number_bytes;
}
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
if (extent != cache_info->length)
return(MagickFalse);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 73,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SavePackage::GetAllSavableResourceLinksForCurrentPage() {
if (wait_state_ != START_PROCESS)
return;
wait_state_ = RESOURCES_LIST;
Send(new ViewMsg_GetAllSavableResourceLinksForCurrentPage(routing_id(),
page_url_));
}
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_mmu_notifier_change_pte(struct mmu_notifier *mn,
struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long address,
pte_t pte)
{
struct kvm *kvm = mmu_notifier_to_kvm(mn);
int idx;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
spin_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
kvm->mmu_notifier_seq++;
kvm_set_spte_hva(kvm, address, pte);
spin_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,368
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __init tcp_init(void)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
unsigned long nr_pages, limit;
int order, i, max_share;
unsigned long jiffy = jiffies;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tcp_skb_cb) > sizeof(skb->cb));
percpu_counter_init(&tcp_sockets_allocated, 0);
percpu_counter_init(&tcp_orphan_count, 0);
tcp_hashinfo.bind_bucket_cachep =
kmem_cache_create("tcp_bind_bucket",
sizeof(struct inet_bind_bucket), 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
/* Size and allocate the main established and bind bucket
* hash tables.
*
* The methodology is similar to that of the buffer cache.
*/
tcp_hashinfo.ehash =
alloc_large_system_hash("TCP established",
sizeof(struct inet_ehash_bucket),
thash_entries,
(totalram_pages >= 128 * 1024) ?
13 : 15,
0,
NULL,
&tcp_hashinfo.ehash_mask,
thash_entries ? 0 : 512 * 1024);
for (i = 0; i <= tcp_hashinfo.ehash_mask; i++) {
INIT_HLIST_NULLS_HEAD(&tcp_hashinfo.ehash[i].chain, i);
INIT_HLIST_NULLS_HEAD(&tcp_hashinfo.ehash[i].twchain, i);
}
if (inet_ehash_locks_alloc(&tcp_hashinfo))
panic("TCP: failed to alloc ehash_locks");
tcp_hashinfo.bhash =
alloc_large_system_hash("TCP bind",
sizeof(struct inet_bind_hashbucket),
tcp_hashinfo.ehash_mask + 1,
(totalram_pages >= 128 * 1024) ?
13 : 15,
0,
&tcp_hashinfo.bhash_size,
NULL,
64 * 1024);
tcp_hashinfo.bhash_size = 1 << tcp_hashinfo.bhash_size;
for (i = 0; i < tcp_hashinfo.bhash_size; i++) {
spin_lock_init(&tcp_hashinfo.bhash[i].lock);
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&tcp_hashinfo.bhash[i].chain);
}
/* Try to be a bit smarter and adjust defaults depending
* on available memory.
*/
for (order = 0; ((1 << order) << PAGE_SHIFT) <
(tcp_hashinfo.bhash_size * sizeof(struct inet_bind_hashbucket));
order++)
;
if (order >= 4) {
tcp_death_row.sysctl_max_tw_buckets = 180000;
sysctl_tcp_max_orphans = 4096 << (order - 4);
sysctl_max_syn_backlog = 1024;
} else if (order < 3) {
tcp_death_row.sysctl_max_tw_buckets >>= (3 - order);
sysctl_tcp_max_orphans >>= (3 - order);
sysctl_max_syn_backlog = 128;
}
/* Set the pressure threshold to be a fraction of global memory that
* is up to 1/2 at 256 MB, decreasing toward zero with the amount of
* memory, with a floor of 128 pages.
*/
nr_pages = totalram_pages - totalhigh_pages;
limit = min(nr_pages, 1UL<<(28-PAGE_SHIFT)) >> (20-PAGE_SHIFT);
limit = (limit * (nr_pages >> (20-PAGE_SHIFT))) >> (PAGE_SHIFT-11);
limit = max(limit, 128UL);
sysctl_tcp_mem[0] = limit / 4 * 3;
sysctl_tcp_mem[1] = limit;
sysctl_tcp_mem[2] = sysctl_tcp_mem[0] * 2;
/* Set per-socket limits to no more than 1/128 the pressure threshold */
limit = ((unsigned long)sysctl_tcp_mem[1]) << (PAGE_SHIFT - 7);
max_share = min(4UL*1024*1024, limit);
sysctl_tcp_wmem[0] = SK_MEM_QUANTUM;
sysctl_tcp_wmem[1] = 16*1024;
sysctl_tcp_wmem[2] = max(64*1024, max_share);
sysctl_tcp_rmem[0] = SK_MEM_QUANTUM;
sysctl_tcp_rmem[1] = 87380;
sysctl_tcp_rmem[2] = max(87380, max_share);
printk(KERN_INFO "TCP: Hash tables configured "
"(established %u bind %u)\n",
tcp_hashinfo.ehash_mask + 1, tcp_hashinfo.bhash_size);
tcp_register_congestion_control(&tcp_reno);
memset(&tcp_secret_one.secrets[0], 0, sizeof(tcp_secret_one.secrets));
memset(&tcp_secret_two.secrets[0], 0, sizeof(tcp_secret_two.secrets));
tcp_secret_one.expires = jiffy; /* past due */
tcp_secret_two.expires = jiffy; /* past due */
tcp_secret_generating = &tcp_secret_one;
tcp_secret_primary = &tcp_secret_one;
tcp_secret_retiring = &tcp_secret_two;
tcp_secret_secondary = &tcp_secret_two;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix oops from tcp_collapse() when using splice()
tcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.
This can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result
of the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.
A userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another
socket or to a file can trigger this bug.
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <steve@digidescorp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmsBool GrowNamedColorList(cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* v)
{
cmsUInt32Number size;
_cmsNAMEDCOLOR * NewPtr;
if (v == NULL) return FALSE;
if (v ->Allocated == 0)
size = 64; // Initial guess
else
size = v ->Allocated * 2;
if (size > 1024*100) return FALSE;
NewPtr = (_cmsNAMEDCOLOR*) _cmsRealloc(v ->ContextID, v ->List, size * sizeof(_cmsNAMEDCOLOR));
if (NewPtr == NULL)
return FALSE;
v ->List = NewPtr;
v ->Allocated = size;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID:
| 0
| 40,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_inflate(png_structp png_ptr, const png_byte *data, png_size_t size,
png_bytep output, png_size_t output_size)
{
png_size_t count = 0;
png_ptr->zstream.next_in = (png_bytep)data; /* const_cast: VALID */
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = size;
while (1)
{
int ret, avail;
/* Reset the output buffer each time round - we empty it
* after every inflate call.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->zbuf;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = png_ptr->zbuf_size;
ret = inflate(&png_ptr->zstream, Z_NO_FLUSH);
avail = png_ptr->zbuf_size - png_ptr->zstream.avail_out;
/* First copy/count any new output - but only if we didn't
* get an error code.
*/
if ((ret == Z_OK || ret == Z_STREAM_END) && avail > 0)
{
if (output != 0 && output_size > count)
{
png_size_t copy = output_size - count;
if ((png_size_t) avail < copy) copy = (png_size_t) avail;
png_memcpy(output + count, png_ptr->zbuf, copy);
}
count += avail;
}
if (ret == Z_OK)
continue;
/* Termination conditions - always reset the zstream, it
* must be left in inflateInit state.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = 0;
inflateReset(&png_ptr->zstream);
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
return count; /* NOTE: may be zero. */
/* Now handle the error codes - the API always returns 0
* and the error message is dumped into the uncompressed
* buffer if available.
*/
{
PNG_CONST char *msg;
if (png_ptr->zstream.msg != 0)
msg = png_ptr->zstream.msg;
else
{
#if defined(PNG_STDIO_SUPPORTED) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
char umsg[52];
switch (ret)
{
case Z_BUF_ERROR:
msg = "Buffer error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
case Z_DATA_ERROR:
msg = "Data error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
default:
msg = "Incomplete compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
}
png_snprintf(umsg, sizeof umsg, msg, png_ptr->chunk_name);
msg = umsg;
#else
msg = "Damaged compressed datastream in chunk other than IDAT";
#endif
}
png_warning(png_ptr, msg);
}
/* 0 means an error - notice that this code simple ignores
* zero length compressed chunks as a result.
*/
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 172,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetInternalformativ(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
if (!feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context())
return error::kUnknownCommand;
const volatile gles2::cmds::GetInternalformativ& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::GetInternalformativ*>(cmd_data);
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLenum format = static_cast<GLenum>(c.format);
GLenum pname = static_cast<GLenum>(c.pname);
if (!validators_->render_buffer_target.IsValid(target)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR_INVALID_ENUM("glGetInternalformativ", target, "target");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->render_buffer_format.IsValid(format)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR_INVALID_ENUM("glGetInternalformativ", format,
"internalformat");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->internal_format_parameter.IsValid(pname)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR_INVALID_ENUM("glGetInternalformativ", pname, "pname");
return error::kNoError;
}
typedef cmds::GetInternalformativ::Result Result;
GLsizei num_sample_counts = 0;
std::vector<GLint> sample_counts;
GLsizei num_values = 0;
GLint* values = nullptr;
switch (pname) {
case GL_NUM_SAMPLE_COUNTS:
num_sample_counts =
InternalFormatSampleCountsHelper(target, format, nullptr);
num_values = 1;
values = &num_sample_counts;
break;
case GL_SAMPLES:
num_sample_counts =
InternalFormatSampleCountsHelper(target, format, &sample_counts);
num_values = num_sample_counts;
values = sample_counts.data();
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
uint32_t checked_size = 0;
if (!Result::ComputeSize(num_values).AssignIfValid(&checked_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
Result* result = GetSharedMemoryAs<Result*>(
c.params_shm_id, c.params_shm_offset, checked_size);
GLint* params = result ? result->GetData() : nullptr;
if (params == nullptr) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (result->size != 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
std::copy(values, &values[num_values], params);
result->SetNumResults(num_values);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,540
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LiveSyncTest::~LiveSyncTest() {}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,204
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::vector<RenderFrameHost*> WebContentsImpl::GetAllFrames() {
std::vector<RenderFrameHost*> frame_hosts;
for (FrameTreeNode* node : frame_tree_.Nodes())
frame_hosts.push_back(node->current_frame_host());
return frame_hosts;
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,834
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pseudo_register_machine_info(char *uiddomain, char *fsdomain,
char * starterAddr, char *full_hostname )
{
thisRemoteResource->setUidDomain( uiddomain );
thisRemoteResource->setFilesystemDomain( fsdomain );
thisRemoteResource->setStarterAddress( starterAddr );
thisRemoteResource->setMachineName( full_hostname );
/* For backwards compatibility, if we get this old pseudo call
from the starter, we assume we're not going to get the
happy new pseudo_begin_execution call. So, pretend we got
it now so we still log execute events and so on, even if
it's not as acurate as we'd like.
*/
thisRemoteResource->beginExecution();
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vrend_renderer_get_cap_set(uint32_t cap_set, uint32_t *max_ver,
uint32_t *max_size)
{
if (cap_set != VREND_CAP_SET) {
*max_ver = 0;
*max_size = 0;
return;
}
*max_ver = 1;
*max_size = sizeof(union virgl_caps);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 8,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltFreeCompMatch(xsltCompMatchPtr comp) {
xsltStepOpPtr op;
int i;
if (comp == NULL)
return;
if (comp->pattern != NULL)
xmlFree((xmlChar *)comp->pattern);
if (comp->nsList != NULL)
xmlFree(comp->nsList);
for (i = 0;i < comp->nbStep;i++) {
op = &comp->steps[i];
if (op->value != NULL)
xmlFree(op->value);
if (op->value2 != NULL)
xmlFree(op->value2);
if (op->value3 != NULL)
xmlFree(op->value3);
if (op->comp != NULL)
xmlXPathFreeCompExpr(op->comp);
}
xmlFree(comp->steps);
memset(comp, -1, sizeof(xsltCompMatch));
xmlFree(comp);
}
Commit Message: Handle a bad XSLT expression better.
BUG=138672
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10830177
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@150123 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 106,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VirtQueue *virtio_vector_next_queue(VirtQueue *vq)
{
return QLIST_NEXT(vq, node);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,251
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const AppCacheHost* AppCacheHost::GetSpawningHost() const {
AppCacheBackendImpl* backend = service_->GetBackend(spawning_process_id_);
return backend ? backend->GetHost(spawning_host_id_) : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SVGStyleElement* SVGStyleElement::Create(Document& document,
const CreateElementFlags flags) {
return new SVGStyleElement(document, flags);
}
Commit Message: Do not crash while reentrantly appending to style element.
When a node is inserted into a container, it is notified via
::InsertedInto. However, a node may request a second notification via
DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, which occurs after all the children
have been notified as well. *StyleElement is currently using this
second notification.
This causes a problem, because *ScriptElement is using the same mechanism,
which in turn means that scripts can execute before the state of
*StyleElements are properly updated.
This patch avoids ::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, and instead
processes the stylesheet in ::InsertedInto. The original reason for using
::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument in the first place appears to be
invalid now, as the test case is still passing.
R=futhark@chromium.org, hayato@chromium.org
Bug: 853709, 847570
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel
Change-Id: Ic0b5fa611044c78c5745cf26870a747f88920a14
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1104347
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <andruud@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568368}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 154,359
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int udp_lib_lport_inuse2(struct net *net, __u16 num,
struct udp_hslot *hslot2,
struct sock *sk,
int (*saddr_comp)(const struct sock *sk1,
const struct sock *sk2))
{
struct sock *sk2;
struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
kuid_t uid = sock_i_uid(sk);
int res = 0;
spin_lock(&hslot2->lock);
udp_portaddr_for_each_entry(sk2, node, &hslot2->head)
if (net_eq(sock_net(sk2), net) &&
sk2 != sk &&
(udp_sk(sk2)->udp_port_hash == num) &&
(!sk2->sk_reuse || !sk->sk_reuse) &&
(!sk2->sk_bound_dev_if || !sk->sk_bound_dev_if ||
sk2->sk_bound_dev_if == sk->sk_bound_dev_if) &&
(!sk2->sk_reuseport || !sk->sk_reuseport ||
!uid_eq(uid, sock_i_uid(sk2))) &&
(*saddr_comp)(sk, sk2)) {
res = 1;
break;
}
spin_unlock(&hslot2->lock);
return res;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: call udp_push_pending_frames when uncorking a socket with AF_INET pending data
We accidentally call down to ip6_push_pending_frames when uncorking
pending AF_INET data on a ipv6 socket. This results in the following
splat (from Dave Jones):
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff816765f6 len:48 put:40 head:ffff88013deb6df0 data:ffff88013deb6dec tail:0x2c end:0xc0 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:126!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: dccp_ipv4 dccp 8021q garp bridge stp dlci mpoa snd_seq_dummy sctp fuse hidp tun bnep nfnetlink scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm can_raw can_bcm af_802154 appletalk caif_socket can caif ipt_ULOG x25 rose af_key pppoe pppox ipx phonet irda llc2 ppp_generic slhc p8023 psnap p8022 llc crc_ccitt atm bluetooth
+netrom ax25 nfc rfkill rds af_rxrpc coretemp hwmon kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek ghash_clmulni_intel microcode pcspkr snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep usb_debug snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm e1000e snd_page_alloc snd_timer ptp snd pps_core soundcore xfs libcrc32c
CPU: 2 PID: 8095 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7+ #37
task: ffff8801f52c2520 ti: ffff8801e6430000 task.ti: ffff8801e6430000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816e759c>] [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP: 0018:ffff8801e6431de8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff8802353d3cc0 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000003b90 RSI: ffff8801f52c2ca0 RDI: ffff8801f52c2520
RBP: ffff8801e6431e08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88022ea0c800
R13: ffff88022ea0cdf8 R14: ffff8802353ecb40 R15: ffffffff81cc7800
FS: 00007f5720a10740(0000) GS:ffff880244c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000005862000 CR3: 000000022843c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
ffff88013deb6dec 000000000000002c 00000000000000c0 ffffffff81a3f6e4
ffff8801e6431e18 ffffffff8159a9aa ffff8801e6431e90 ffffffff816765f6
ffffffff810b756b 0000000700000002 ffff8801e6431e40 0000fea9292aa8c0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8159a9aa>] skb_push+0x3a/0x40
[<ffffffff816765f6>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f6/0x4d0
[<ffffffff810b756b>] ? mark_held_locks+0xbb/0x140
[<ffffffff81694919>] udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x2b9/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81694660>] ? udplite_getfrag+0x20/0x20
[<ffffffff8162092a>] udp_lib_setsockopt+0x1aa/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811cc5e7>] ? fget_light+0x387/0x4f0
[<ffffffff816958a4>] udpv6_setsockopt+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815949f4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff81593c31>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
[<ffffffff816f5d54>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 e8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 c0 04 aa 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 e1 7e ff ff <0f> 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55
RIP [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP <ffff8801e6431de8>
This patch adds a check if the pending data is of address family AF_INET
and directly calls udp_push_ending_frames from udp_v6_push_pending_frames
if that is the case.
This bug was found by Dave Jones with trinity.
(Also move the initialization of fl6 below the AF_INET check, even if
not strictly necessary.)
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,945
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PropertyDetails GetDetailsImpl(JSObject* holder, uint32_t entry) {
return PropertyDetails(kData, NONE, 0, PropertyCellType::kNoCell);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 163,093
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jas_stream_t *jas_stream_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode)
{
jas_stream_t *stream;
jas_stream_fileobj_t *obj;
int openflags;
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("jas_stream_fopen(\"%s\", \"%s\")\n", filename, mode));
/* Allocate a stream object. */
if (!(stream = jas_stream_create())) {
return 0;
}
/* Parse the mode string. */
stream->openmode_ = jas_strtoopenmode(mode);
/* Determine the correct flags to use for opening the file. */
if ((stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_READ) &&
(stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_WRITE)) {
openflags = O_RDWR;
} else if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_READ) {
openflags = O_RDONLY;
} else if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_WRITE) {
openflags = O_WRONLY;
} else {
openflags = 0;
}
if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_APPEND) {
openflags |= O_APPEND;
}
if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_BINARY) {
openflags |= O_BINARY;
}
if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_CREATE) {
openflags |= O_CREAT | O_TRUNC;
}
/* Allocate space for the underlying file stream object. */
if (!(obj = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_stream_fileobj_t)))) {
jas_stream_destroy(stream);
return 0;
}
obj->fd = -1;
obj->flags = 0;
obj->pathname[0] = '\0';
stream->obj_ = (void *) obj;
/* Select the operations for a file stream object. */
stream->ops_ = &jas_stream_fileops;
/* Open the underlying file. */
if ((obj->fd = open(filename, openflags, JAS_STREAM_PERMS)) < 0) {
jas_free(obj);
jas_stream_destroy(stream);
return 0;
}
/* By default, use full buffering for this type of stream. */
jas_stream_initbuf(stream, JAS_STREAM_FULLBUF, 0, 0);
return stream;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 67,914
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::LoseContext(LostContextMode mode) {
ForceLostContext(mode, kManual);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,648
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void agent_cancel_query(agent_pending_query *q)
{
assert(0 && "Windows agent queries are never asynchronous!");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __net_exit diag_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
netlink_kernel_release(net->diag_nlsk);
net->diag_nlsk = NULL;
}
Commit Message: sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]
Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
doors for a privilege escalation.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 33,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnMsgSetCursor(const WebCursor& cursor) {
if (!view_) {
return;
}
view_->UpdateCursor(cursor);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,665
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool venc_dev::venc_set_idr_period(OMX_U32 nPFrames, OMX_U32 nIDRPeriod)
{
int rc = 0;
struct v4l2_control control;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_idr_period: nPFrames = %u, nIDRPeriod: %u",
(unsigned int)nPFrames, (unsigned int)nIDRPeriod);
if (m_sVenc_cfg.codectype != V4L2_PIX_FMT_H264) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: IDR period valid for H264 only!!");
return false;
}
if (venc_set_intra_period (nPFrames, intra_period.num_bframes) == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting intra period failed");
return false;
}
if (!intra_period.num_bframes)
intra_period.num_pframes = nPFrames;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_IDR_PERIOD;
control.value = nIDRPeriod;
rc = ioctl(m_nDriver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set control");
return false;
}
idrperiod.idrperiod = nIDRPeriod;
return true;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataDirectoryService::SaveToDB() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (!blocking_task_runner_ || !directory_service_db_.get()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
size_t serialized_size = 0;
SerializedMap serialized_resources;
for (ResourceMap::const_iterator iter = resource_map_.begin();
iter != resource_map_.end(); ++iter) {
GDataEntryProto proto;
iter->second->ToProtoFull(&proto);
std::string serialized_string;
const bool ok = proto.SerializeToString(&serialized_string);
DCHECK(ok);
if (ok) {
serialized_resources.insert(
std::make_pair(std::string(kDBKeyResourceIdPrefix) + iter->first,
serialized_string));
serialized_size += serialized_string.size();
}
}
serialized_resources.insert(std::make_pair(kDBKeyVersion,
base::IntToString(kProtoVersion)));
serialized_resources.insert(std::make_pair(kDBKeyLargestChangestamp,
base::IntToString(largest_changestamp_)));
set_last_serialized(base::Time::Now());
set_serialized_size(serialized_size);
blocking_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ResourceMetadataDB::Save,
base::Unretained(directory_service_db_.get()),
serialized_resources));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 117,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> convert1Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.convert1");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(a*, , V8a::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8a::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
imp->convert1();
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,077
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static IntRect cornerRect(const RenderStyle* style, const Scrollbar* horizontalScrollbar, const Scrollbar* verticalScrollbar, const IntRect& bounds)
{
int horizontalThickness;
int verticalThickness;
if (!verticalScrollbar && !horizontalScrollbar) {
horizontalThickness = ScrollbarTheme::theme()->scrollbarThickness();
verticalThickness = horizontalThickness;
} else if (verticalScrollbar && !horizontalScrollbar) {
horizontalThickness = verticalScrollbar->width();
verticalThickness = horizontalThickness;
} else if (horizontalScrollbar && !verticalScrollbar) {
verticalThickness = horizontalScrollbar->height();
horizontalThickness = verticalThickness;
} else {
horizontalThickness = verticalScrollbar->width();
verticalThickness = horizontalScrollbar->height();
}
return IntRect(cornerStart(style, bounds.x(), bounds.maxX(), horizontalThickness),
bounds.maxY() - verticalThickness - style->borderBottomWidth(),
horizontalThickness, verticalThickness);
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 119,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ftrace_function_check_pred(struct filter_pred *pred)
{
struct ftrace_event_field *field = pred->field;
/*
* Check the predicate for function trace, verify:
* - only '==' and '!=' is used
* - the 'ip' field is used
*/
if ((pred->op != OP_EQ) && (pred->op != OP_NE))
return -EINVAL;
if (strcmp(field->name, "ip"))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,582
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void macvtap_exit(void)
{
rtnl_link_unregister(&macvtap_link_ops);
unregister_netdevice_notifier(&macvtap_notifier_block);
class_unregister(macvtap_class);
cdev_del(&macvtap_cdev);
unregister_chrdev_region(macvtap_major, MACVTAP_NUM_DEVS);
}
Commit Message: macvtap: zerocopy: validate vectors before building skb
There're several reasons that the vectors need to be validated:
- Return error when caller provides vectors whose num is greater than UIO_MAXIOV.
- Linearize part of skb when userspace provides vectors grater than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
- Return error when userspace provides vectors whose total length may exceed
- MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 34,562
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: eval_acl(uschar ** sub, int nsub, uschar ** user_msgp)
{
int i;
uschar *tmp;
int sav_narg = acl_narg;
int ret;
extern int acl_where;
if(--nsub > sizeof(acl_arg)/sizeof(*acl_arg)) nsub = sizeof(acl_arg)/sizeof(*acl_arg);
for (i = 0; i < nsub && sub[i+1]; i++)
{
tmp = acl_arg[i];
acl_arg[i] = sub[i+1]; /* place callers args in the globals */
sub[i+1] = tmp; /* stash the old args using our caller's storage */
}
acl_narg = i;
while (i < nsub)
{
sub[i+1] = acl_arg[i];
acl_arg[i++] = NULL;
}
DEBUG(D_expand)
debug_printf("expanding: acl: %s arg: %s%s\n",
sub[0],
acl_narg>0 ? acl_arg[0] : US"<none>",
acl_narg>1 ? " +more" : "");
ret = acl_eval(acl_where, sub[0], user_msgp, &tmp);
for (i = 0; i < nsub; i++)
acl_arg[i] = sub[i+1]; /* restore old args */
acl_narg = sav_narg;
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,645
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Editor::SelectionStartHasStyle(CSSPropertyID property_id,
const String& value) const {
EditingStyle* style_to_check = EditingStyle::Create(property_id, value);
EditingStyle* style_at_start =
EditingStyleUtilities::CreateStyleAtSelectionStart(
GetFrame().Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated(),
property_id == CSSPropertyBackgroundColor, style_to_check->Style());
return style_to_check->TriStateOfStyle(style_at_start);
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 124,731
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pppoe_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock)
{
struct sock *sk;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_PPPOX, GFP_KERNEL, &pppoe_sk_proto);
if (!sk)
return -ENOMEM;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
sock->ops = &pppoe_ops;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = pppoe_rcv_core;
sk->sk_state = PPPOX_NONE;
sk->sk_type = SOCK_STREAM;
sk->sk_family = PF_PPPOX;
sk->sk_protocol = PX_PROTO_OE;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,277
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gst_asf_demux_pull_data (GstASFDemux * demux, guint64 offset, guint size,
GstBuffer ** p_buf, GstFlowReturn * p_flow)
{
gsize buffer_size;
GstFlowReturn flow;
GST_LOG_OBJECT (demux, "pulling buffer at %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT "+%u",
offset, size);
flow = gst_pad_pull_range (demux->sinkpad, offset, size, p_buf);
if (G_LIKELY (p_flow))
*p_flow = flow;
if (G_UNLIKELY (flow != GST_FLOW_OK)) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "flow %s pulling buffer at %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT
"+%u", gst_flow_get_name (flow), offset, size);
*p_buf = NULL;
return FALSE;
}
g_assert (*p_buf != NULL);
buffer_size = gst_buffer_get_size (*p_buf);
if (G_UNLIKELY (buffer_size < size)) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "short read pulling buffer at %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT
"+%u (got only %" G_GSIZE_FORMAT " bytes)", offset, size, buffer_size);
gst_buffer_unref (*p_buf);
if (G_LIKELY (p_flow))
*p_flow = GST_FLOW_EOS;
*p_buf = NULL;
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 68,575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gst_qtdemux_handle_sink_event (GstPad * sinkpad, GstEvent * event)
{
GstQTDemux *demux = GST_QTDEMUX (GST_PAD_PARENT (sinkpad));
gboolean res;
switch (GST_EVENT_TYPE (event)) {
case GST_EVENT_NEWSEGMENT:
/* We need to convert it to a GST_FORMAT_TIME new segment */
gst_event_unref (event);
res = TRUE;
break;
case GST_EVENT_EOS:
/* If we are in push mode, and get an EOS before we've seen any streams,
* then error out - we have nowhere to send the EOS */
if (!demux->pullbased && demux->n_streams == 0) {
GST_ELEMENT_ERROR (demux, STREAM, DECODE,
(_("This file contains no playable streams.")),
("no known streams found"));
}
/* Fall through */
default:
res = gst_pad_event_default (demux->sinkpad, event);
break;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,945
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLvoid StubGLGenFramebuffers(GLsizei n, GLuint* framebuffers) {
glGenFramebuffersEXT(n, framebuffers);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 99,570
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t ZSTD_compress_usingCDict(ZSTD_CCtx* cctx,
void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
const void* src, size_t srcSize,
const ZSTD_CDict* cdict)
{
ZSTD_frameParameters const fParams = { 1 /*content*/, 0 /*checksum*/, 0 /*noDictID*/ };
return ZSTD_compress_usingCDict_advanced(cctx, dst, dstCapacity, src, srcSize, cdict, fParams);
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,033
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int find_next_best_node(int node, nodemask_t *used_nodes)
{
int i, n, val, min_val, best_node = -1;
min_val = INT_MAX;
for (i = 0; i < nr_node_ids; i++) {
/* Start at @node */
n = (node + i) % nr_node_ids;
if (!nr_cpus_node(n))
continue;
/* Skip already used nodes */
if (node_isset(n, *used_nodes))
continue;
/* Simple min distance search */
val = node_distance(node, n);
if (val < min_val) {
min_val = val;
best_node = n;
}
}
if (best_node != -1)
node_set(best_node, *used_nodes);
return best_node;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,281
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dn_user_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct optdata_dn *opt)
{
unsigned char *ptr = skb->data;
u16 len = *ptr++; /* yes, it's 8bit on the wire */
BUG_ON(len > 16); /* we've checked the contents earlier */
opt->opt_optl = cpu_to_le16(len);
opt->opt_status = 0;
memcpy(opt->opt_data, ptr, len);
skb_pull(skb, len + 1);
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,516
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: invoke_NPN_PushPopupsEnabledState(PluginInstance *plugin, NPBool enabled)
{
npw_return_if_fail(rpc_method_invoke_possible(g_rpc_connection));
int error = rpc_method_invoke(g_rpc_connection,
RPC_METHOD_NPN_PUSH_POPUPS_ENABLED_STATE,
RPC_TYPE_NPW_PLUGIN_INSTANCE, plugin,
RPC_TYPE_UINT32, (uint32_t)enabled,
RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPN_PushPopupsEnabledState() invoke", error);
return;
}
error = rpc_method_wait_for_reply(g_rpc_connection, RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR)
npw_perror("NPN_PushPopupsEnabledState() wait for reply", error);
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,135
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ClipboardMessageFilter::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message,
bool* message_was_ok) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_EX(ClipboardMessageFilter, message, *message_was_ok)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_WriteObjectsAsync, OnWriteObjectsAsync)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_WriteObjectsSync, OnWriteObjectsSync)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_GetSequenceNumber, OnGetSequenceNumber)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_IsFormatAvailable, OnIsFormatAvailable)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_Clear, OnClear)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_ReadAvailableTypes,
OnReadAvailableTypes)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_ReadText, OnReadText)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_ReadAsciiText, OnReadAsciiText)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_ReadHTML, OnReadHTML)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_ReadRTF, OnReadRTF)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ClipboardHostMsg_ReadImage, OnReadImage)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_ReadCustomData, OnReadCustomData)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_ReadData, OnReadData)
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ClipboardHostMsg_FindPboardWriteStringAsync,
OnFindPboardWriteString)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Refactor ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap sanitization in ClipboardMsgFilter.
BUG=352395
R=tony@chromium.org
TBR=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/200523004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@257164 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 122,937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void validate_coredump_safety(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP
if (suid_dumpable == SUID_DUMP_ROOT &&
core_pattern[0] != '/' && core_pattern[0] != '|') {
printk(KERN_WARNING "Unsafe core_pattern used with "\
"suid_dumpable=2. Pipe handler or fully qualified "\
"core dump path required.\n");
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 51,002
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hfs_write_resource_fork_header(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
unsigned char *buff;
uint32_t rsrc_bytes;
uint32_t rsrc_header_bytes;
/*
* Write resource fork header + block info.
*/
buff = a->resource_fork;
rsrc_bytes = a->compressed_rsrc_position - RSRC_F_SIZE;
rsrc_header_bytes =
RSRC_H_SIZE + /* Header base size. */
4 + /* Block count. */
(a->decmpfs_block_count * 8);/* Block info */
archive_be32enc(buff, 0x100);
archive_be32enc(buff + 4, rsrc_bytes);
archive_be32enc(buff + 8, rsrc_bytes - 256);
archive_be32enc(buff + 12, 0x32);
memset(buff + 16, 0, 240);
archive_be32enc(buff + 256, rsrc_bytes - 260);
return hfs_write_resource_fork(a, buff, rsrc_header_bytes, 0);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 43,923
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: smp_fetch_http_auth(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
if (!args || args->type != ARGT_USR)
return 0;
CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST();
if (!get_http_auth(l4))
return 0;
smp->type = SMP_T_BOOL;
smp->data.uint = check_user(args->data.usr, l4->txn.auth.user, l4->txn.auth.pass);
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 9,853
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::FocusedNodeChanged(
bool editable,
const gfx::Rect& node_bounds_in_screen) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (!editable && virtual_keyboard_requested_) {
virtual_keyboard_requested_ = false;
RenderViewHost* rvh = RenderViewHost::From(host_);
if (rvh && rvh->GetDelegate())
rvh->GetDelegate()->SetIsVirtualKeyboardRequested(false);
DCHECK(ui::OnScreenKeyboardDisplayManager::GetInstance());
ui::OnScreenKeyboardDisplayManager::GetInstance()->DismissVirtualKeyboard();
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 132,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::Value* CreateChoiceData(
const Experiment& experiment,
const std::set<std::string>& enabled_experiments) {
DCHECK(experiment.type == Experiment::MULTI_VALUE ||
experiment.type == Experiment::ENABLE_DISABLE_VALUE);
base::ListValue* result = new base::ListValue;
for (int i = 0; i < experiment.num_choices; ++i) {
base::DictionaryValue* value = new base::DictionaryValue;
const std::string name = experiment.NameForChoice(i);
value->SetString("internal_name", name);
value->SetString("description", experiment.DescriptionForChoice(i));
value->SetBoolean("selected", enabled_experiments.count(name) > 0);
result->Append(value);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,300
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InitializeExtraHeaders(browser::NavigateParams* params,
Profile* profile,
std::string* extra_headers) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
#if defined(GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD)
if (!profile)
profile = params->profile;
if (profile &&
(params->transition & content::PAGE_TRANSITION_HOME_PAGE) != 0) {
PrefService* pref_service = profile->GetPrefs();
if (pref_service) {
if (!pref_service->GetBoolean(prefs::kHomePageChanged)) {
std::string homepage = pref_service->GetString(prefs::kHomePage);
if (homepage == GoogleURLTracker::kDefaultGoogleHomepage) {
std::wstring rlz_string;
RLZTracker::GetAccessPointRlz(rlz_lib::CHROME_HOME_PAGE, &rlz_string);
if (!rlz_string.empty()) {
net::HttpUtil::AppendHeaderIfMissing("X-Rlz-String",
WideToUTF8(rlz_string),
extra_headers);
}
}
}
}
}
#endif
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fix memory error in previous CL.
BUG=100315
BUG=99016
TEST=Memory bots go green
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8302001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@105577 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 97,106
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Editor::CanSmartReplaceWithPasteboard(Pasteboard* pasteboard) {
return SmartInsertDeleteEnabled() && pasteboard->CanSmartReplace();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 124,664
|
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