instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init sock_init(void)
{
int err;
/*
* Initialize sock SLAB cache.
*/
sk_init();
/*
* Initialize skbuff SLAB cache
*/
skb_init();
/*
* Initialize the protocols module.
*/
init_inodecache();
err = register_filesystem(&sock_fs_type);
if (err)
goto out_fs;
sock_mnt = kern_mount(&sock_fs_type);
if (IS_ERR(sock_mnt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(sock_mnt);
goto out_mount;
}
/* The real protocol initialization is performed in later initcalls.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
netfilter_init();
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_PHY_TIMESTAMPING
skb_timestamping_init();
#endif
out:
return err;
out_mount:
unregister_filesystem(&sock_fs_type);
out_fs:
goto out;
}
Commit Message: sendmmsg/sendmsg: fix unsafe user pointer access
Dereferencing a user pointer directly from kernel-space without going
through the copy_from_user family of functions is a bad idea. Two of
such usages can be found in the sendmsg code path called from sendmmsg,
added by
commit c71d8ebe7a4496fb7231151cb70a6baa0cb56f9a upstream.
commit 5b47b8038f183b44d2d8ff1c7d11a5c1be706b34 in the 3.0-stable tree.
Usages are performed through memcmp() and memcpy() directly. Fix those
by using the already copied msg_sys structure instead of the __user *msg
structure. Note that msg_sys can be set to NULL by verify_compat_iovec()
or verify_iovec(), which requires additional NULL pointer checks.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
CC: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
CC: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,733
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gre_print_0(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
u_int len = length;
uint16_t flags, prot;
/* 16 bits ND_TCHECKed in gre_print() */
flags = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(gre_flag_values,"none",flags)));
len -= 2;
bp += 2;
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
prot = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
len -= 2;
bp += 2;
if ((flags & GRE_CP) | (flags & GRE_RP)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", sum 0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)));
bp += 2;
len -= 2;
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", off 0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)));
bp += 2;
len -= 2;
}
if (flags & GRE_KP) {
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", key=0x%x", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
bp += 4;
len -= 4;
}
if (flags & GRE_SP) {
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", seq %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
bp += 4;
len -= 4;
}
if (flags & GRE_RP) {
for (;;) {
uint16_t af;
uint8_t sreoff;
uint8_t srelen;
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
sreoff = *(bp + 2);
srelen = *(bp + 3);
bp += 4;
len -= 4;
if (af == 0 && srelen == 0)
break;
if (!gre_sre_print(ndo, af, sreoff, srelen, bp, len))
goto trunc;
if (len < srelen)
goto trunc;
bp += srelen;
len -= srelen;
}
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", proto %s (0x%04x)",
tok2str(ethertype_values,"unknown",prot),
prot));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u",length));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": ")); /* put in a colon as protocol demarc */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t")); /* if verbose go multiline */
switch (prot) {
case ETHERTYPE_IP:
ip_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS:
mpls_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IPX:
ipx_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_ATALK:
atalk_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_GRE_ISO:
isoclns_print(ndo, bp, len, ndo->ndo_snapend - bp);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_TEB:
ether_print(ndo, bp, len, ndo->ndo_snapend - bp, NULL, NULL);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "gre-proto-0x%x", prot));
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 167,946
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int udf_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *options)
{
struct udf_options uopt;
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(sb);
int error = 0;
uopt.flags = sbi->s_flags;
uopt.uid = sbi->s_uid;
uopt.gid = sbi->s_gid;
uopt.umask = sbi->s_umask;
uopt.fmode = sbi->s_fmode;
uopt.dmode = sbi->s_dmode;
if (!udf_parse_options(options, &uopt, true))
return -EINVAL;
write_lock(&sbi->s_cred_lock);
sbi->s_flags = uopt.flags;
sbi->s_uid = uopt.uid;
sbi->s_gid = uopt.gid;
sbi->s_umask = uopt.umask;
sbi->s_fmode = uopt.fmode;
sbi->s_dmode = uopt.dmode;
write_unlock(&sbi->s_cred_lock);
if (sbi->s_lvid_bh) {
int write_rev = le16_to_cpu(udf_sb_lvidiu(sbi)->minUDFWriteRev);
if (write_rev > UDF_MAX_WRITE_VERSION)
*flags |= MS_RDONLY;
}
if ((*flags & MS_RDONLY) == (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
goto out_unlock;
if (*flags & MS_RDONLY)
udf_close_lvid(sb);
else
udf_open_lvid(sb);
out_unlock:
return error;
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table length is corrupted
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __orderly_poweroff(void)
{
int argc;
char **argv;
static char *envp[] = {
"HOME=/",
"PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin",
NULL
};
int ret;
argv = argv_split(GFP_ATOMIC, poweroff_cmd, &argc);
if (argv == NULL) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s failed to allocate memory for \"%s\"\n",
__func__, poweroff_cmd);
return -ENOMEM;
}
ret = call_usermodehelper_fns(argv[0], argv, envp, UMH_WAIT_EXEC,
NULL, argv_cleanup, NULL);
if (ret == -ENOMEM)
argv_free(argv);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-16
| 0
| 21,540
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebViewPrivate::_q_onUrlChanged()
{
Q_Q(QQuickWebView);
context->iconDatabase()->requestIconForPageURL(q->url());
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 101,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void netlink_overrun(struct sock *sk)
{
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
if (!(nlk->flags & NETLINK_F_RECV_NO_ENOBUFS)) {
if (!test_and_set_bit(NETLINK_S_CONGESTED,
&nlk_sk(sk)->state)) {
sk->sk_err = ENOBUFS;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
}
}
atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
}
Commit Message: netlink: Fix dump skb leak/double free
When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the
lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time
being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours.
This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free
the right memory.
Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 47,758
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GoogleChromeDistribution::DoPostUninstallOperations(
const base::Version& version,
const base::FilePath& local_data_path,
const base::string16& distribution_data) {
const base::string16 kVersionParam = L"crversion";
const base::string16 kOSParam = L"os";
const base::win::OSInfo* os_info = base::win::OSInfo::GetInstance();
base::win::OSInfo::VersionNumber version_number = os_info->version_number();
base::string16 os_version =
base::StringPrintf(L"%d.%d.%d", version_number.major,
version_number.minor, version_number.build);
base::string16 url = GetUninstallSurveyUrl() + L"&" + kVersionParam + L"=" +
base::ASCIIToUTF16(version.GetString()) + L"&" +
kOSParam + L"=" + os_version;
base::string16 uninstall_metrics;
if (installer::ExtractUninstallMetricsFromFile(local_data_path,
&uninstall_metrics)) {
url += uninstall_metrics;
if (!distribution_data.empty()) {
url += L"&";
url += distribution_data;
}
}
if (os_info->version() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN10 &&
NavigateToUrlWithEdge(url)) {
return;
}
NavigateToUrlWithIExplore(url);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of SEE_MASK_FLAG_NO_UI from Chrome Windows installer.
This flag was originally added to ui::base::win to suppress a specific
error message when attempting to open a file via the shell using the
"open" verb. The flag has additional side-effects and shouldn't be used
when invoking ShellExecute().
R=grt@chromium.org
Bug: 819809
Change-Id: I7db2344982dd206c85a73928e906c21e06a47a9e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/966964
Commit-Queue: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544012}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _rpc_stat_jobacct(slurm_msg_t *msg)
{
job_step_id_msg_t *req = (job_step_id_msg_t *)msg->data;
slurm_msg_t resp_msg;
job_step_stat_t *resp = NULL;
int fd;
uid_t req_uid, uid;
uint16_t protocol_version;
debug3("Entering _rpc_stat_jobacct");
/* step completion messages are only allowed from other slurmstepd,
so only root or SlurmUser is allowed here */
req_uid = g_slurm_auth_get_uid(msg->auth_cred, conf->auth_info);
fd = stepd_connect(conf->spooldir, conf->node_name,
req->job_id, req->step_id, &protocol_version);
if (fd == -1) {
error("stepd_connect to %u.%u failed: %m",
req->job_id, req->step_id);
slurm_send_rc_msg(msg, ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID);
return ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID;
}
if ((int)(uid = stepd_get_uid(fd, protocol_version)) < 0) {
debug("stat_jobacct couldn't read from the step %u.%u: %m",
req->job_id, req->step_id);
close(fd);
if (msg->conn_fd >= 0)
slurm_send_rc_msg(msg, ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID);
return ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID;
}
/*
* check that requesting user ID is the SLURM UID or root
*/
if ((req_uid != uid) && (!_slurm_authorized_user(req_uid))) {
error("stat_jobacct from uid %ld for job %u "
"owned by uid %ld",
(long) req_uid, req->job_id, (long) uid);
if (msg->conn_fd >= 0) {
slurm_send_rc_msg(msg, ESLURM_USER_ID_MISSING);
close(fd);
return ESLURM_USER_ID_MISSING;/* or bad in this case */
}
}
resp = xmalloc(sizeof(job_step_stat_t));
resp->step_pids = xmalloc(sizeof(job_step_pids_t));
resp->step_pids->node_name = xstrdup(conf->node_name);
slurm_msg_t_copy(&resp_msg, msg);
resp->return_code = SLURM_SUCCESS;
if (stepd_stat_jobacct(fd, protocol_version, req, resp)
== SLURM_ERROR) {
debug("accounting for nonexistent job %u.%u requested",
req->job_id, req->step_id);
}
/* FIX ME: This should probably happen in the
stepd_stat_jobacct to get more information about the pids.
*/
if (stepd_list_pids(fd, protocol_version, &resp->step_pids->pid,
&resp->step_pids->pid_cnt) == SLURM_ERROR) {
debug("No pids for nonexistent job %u.%u requested",
req->job_id, req->step_id);
}
close(fd);
resp_msg.msg_type = RESPONSE_JOB_STEP_STAT;
resp_msg.data = resp;
slurm_send_node_msg(msg->conn_fd, &resp_msg);
slurm_free_job_step_stat(resp);
return SLURM_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 72,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionDevToolsInfoBarDelegate::InfoBarDismissed() {
DCHECK(!dismissed_callback_.is_null());
base::ResetAndReturn(&dismissed_callback_).Run();
}
Commit Message: Allow to specify elide behavior for confrim infobar message
Used in "<extension name> is debugging this browser" infobar.
Bug: 823194
Change-Id: Iff6627097c020cccca8f7cc3e21a803a41fd8f2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1048064
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557245}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 154,192
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BOOL rdp_send_pdu(rdpRdp* rdp, STREAM* s, UINT16 type, UINT16 channel_id)
{
UINT16 length;
UINT32 sec_bytes;
BYTE* sec_hold;
length = stream_get_length(s);
stream_set_pos(s, 0);
rdp_write_header(rdp, s, length, MCS_GLOBAL_CHANNEL_ID);
sec_bytes = rdp_get_sec_bytes(rdp);
sec_hold = s->p;
stream_seek(s, sec_bytes);
rdp_write_share_control_header(s, length - sec_bytes, type, channel_id);
s->p = sec_hold;
length += rdp_security_stream_out(rdp, s, length);
stream_set_pos(s, length);
if (transport_write(rdp->transport, s) < 0)
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: security: add a NULL pointer check to fix a server crash.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 58,645
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ssl_set_rng( ssl_context *ssl,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
ssl->f_rng = f_rng;
ssl->p_rng = p_rng;
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_xdr_enc_rename(struct rpc_rqst *req, __be32 *p, const struct nfs4_rename_arg *args)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.nops = 7,
};
int status;
xdr_init_encode(&xdr, &req->rq_snd_buf, p);
encode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
if ((status = encode_putfh(&xdr, args->old_dir)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = encode_savefh(&xdr)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = encode_putfh(&xdr, args->new_dir)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = encode_rename(&xdr, args->old_name, args->new_name)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = encode_getfattr(&xdr, args->bitmask)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = encode_restorefh(&xdr)) != 0)
goto out;
status = encode_getfattr(&xdr, args->bitmask);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,152
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HarfBuzzShaper::HarfBuzzRun::addAdvance(unsigned index, float advance)
{
ASSERT(index < m_numGlyphs);
m_advances[index] += advance;
}
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
R=leviw@chromium.org
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,397
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vmxnet3_dec_rx_completion_counter(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx)
{
vmxnet3_ring_dec(&s->rxq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 8,983
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sspi_SecBufferAlloc(PSecBuffer SecBuffer, size_t size)
{
SecBuffer->cbBuffer = size;
SecBuffer->pvBuffer = malloc(size);
ZeroMemory(SecBuffer->pvBuffer, SecBuffer->cbBuffer);
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 58,615
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void EditorClientBlackBerry::willSetInputMethodState()
{
notImplemented();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,788
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: string16 OmniboxViewWin::GetLabelForCommandId(int command_id) const {
DCHECK_EQ(IDS_PASTE_AND_GO, command_id);
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(model_->is_paste_and_search() ?
IDS_PASTE_AND_SEARCH : IDS_PASTE_AND_GO);
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,444
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::string16 PrepareForDisplay(const base::string16& message,
bool bullet_point) {
return bullet_point ? l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_EXTENSION_PERMISSION_LINE,
message) : message;
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 131,749
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void free_init_pages(char *what, unsigned long begin, unsigned long end)
{
unsigned long begin_aligned, end_aligned;
/* Make sure boundaries are page aligned */
begin_aligned = PAGE_ALIGN(begin);
end_aligned = end & PAGE_MASK;
if (WARN_ON(begin_aligned != begin || end_aligned != end)) {
begin = begin_aligned;
end = end_aligned;
}
if (begin >= end)
return;
/*
* If debugging page accesses then do not free this memory but
* mark them not present - any buggy init-section access will
* create a kernel page fault:
*/
if (debug_pagealloc_enabled()) {
pr_info("debug: unmapping init [mem %#010lx-%#010lx]\n",
begin, end - 1);
set_memory_np(begin, (end - begin) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
} else {
/*
* We just marked the kernel text read only above, now that
* we are going to free part of that, we need to make that
* writeable and non-executable first.
*/
set_memory_nx(begin, (end - begin) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
set_memory_rw(begin, (end - begin) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
free_reserved_area((void *)begin, (void *)end,
POISON_FREE_INITMEM, what);
}
}
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 66,857
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::SetResourceDispatcherDelegate(
content::ResourceDispatcherDelegate* delegate) {
resource_dispatcher()->set_delegate(delegate);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SendKeyEvent(ui::KeyboardCode key_code,
bool shift,
bool control_or_command) {
SendKeyEvent(key_code, false, shift, control_or_command, false);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void check_spinlock_acquired_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, int node)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
check_irq_off();
assert_spin_locked(&get_node(cachep, node)->list_lock);
#endif
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 68,858
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tcp_sendmsg_fastopen(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
int *copied, size_t size)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int err, flags;
if (!(sysctl_tcp_fastopen & TFO_CLIENT_ENABLE))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (tp->fastopen_req)
return -EALREADY; /* Another Fast Open is in progress */
tp->fastopen_req = kzalloc(sizeof(struct tcp_fastopen_request),
sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(!tp->fastopen_req))
return -ENOBUFS;
tp->fastopen_req->data = msg;
tp->fastopen_req->size = size;
flags = (msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) ? O_NONBLOCK : 0;
err = __inet_stream_connect(sk->sk_socket, msg->msg_name,
msg->msg_namelen, flags);
*copied = tp->fastopen_req->copied;
tcp_free_fastopen_req(tp);
return err;
}
Commit Message: tcp: avoid infinite loop in tcp_splice_read()
Splicing from TCP socket is vulnerable when a packet with URG flag is
received and stored into receive queue.
__tcp_splice_read() returns 0, and sk_wait_data() immediately
returns since there is the problematic skb in queue.
This is a nice way to burn cpu (aka infinite loop) and trigger
soft lockups.
Again, this gem was found by syzkaller tool.
Fixes: 9c55e01c0cc8 ("[TCP]: Splice receive support.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 68,260
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_table_width(struct table *t, short *newwidth, int maxwidth)
{
int i, j, k, bcol, ecol;
struct table_cell *cell = &t->cell;
char *fixed;
int swidth, fwidth, width, nvar;
double s;
double *dwidth;
int try_again;
fixed = NewAtom_N(char, t->maxcol + 1);
bzero(fixed, t->maxcol + 1);
dwidth = NewAtom_N(double, t->maxcol + 1);
for (i = 0; i <= t->maxcol; i++) {
dwidth[i] = 0.0;
if (t->fixed_width[i] < 0) {
t->fixed_width[i] = -t->fixed_width[i] * maxwidth / 100;
}
if (t->fixed_width[i] > 0) {
newwidth[i] = t->fixed_width[i];
fixed[i] = 1;
}
else
newwidth[i] = 0;
if (newwidth[i] < t->minimum_width[i])
newwidth[i] = t->minimum_width[i];
}
for (k = 0; k <= cell->maxcell; k++) {
j = cell->indexarray[k];
bcol = cell->col[j];
ecol = bcol + cell->colspan[j];
if (cell->fixed_width[j] < 0)
cell->fixed_width[j] = -cell->fixed_width[j] * maxwidth / 100;
swidth = 0;
fwidth = 0;
nvar = 0;
for (i = bcol; i < ecol; i++) {
if (fixed[i]) {
fwidth += newwidth[i];
}
else {
swidth += newwidth[i];
nvar++;
}
}
width = max(cell->fixed_width[j], cell->minimum_width[j])
- (cell->colspan[j] - 1) * t->cellspacing;
if (nvar > 0 && width > fwidth + swidth) {
s = 0.;
for (i = bcol; i < ecol; i++) {
if (!fixed[i])
s += weight3(t->tabwidth[i]);
}
for (i = bcol; i < ecol; i++) {
if (!fixed[i])
dwidth[i] = (width - fwidth) * weight3(t->tabwidth[i]) / s;
else
dwidth[i] = (double)newwidth[i];
}
dv2sv(dwidth, newwidth, cell->colspan[j]);
if (cell->fixed_width[j] > 0) {
for (i = bcol; i < ecol; i++)
fixed[i] = 1;
}
}
}
do {
nvar = 0;
swidth = 0;
fwidth = 0;
for (i = 0; i <= t->maxcol; i++) {
if (fixed[i]) {
fwidth += newwidth[i];
}
else {
swidth += newwidth[i];
nvar++;
}
}
width = maxwidth - t->maxcol * t->cellspacing;
if (nvar == 0 || width <= fwidth + swidth)
break;
s = 0.;
for (i = 0; i <= t->maxcol; i++) {
if (!fixed[i])
s += weight3(t->tabwidth[i]);
}
for (i = 0; i <= t->maxcol; i++) {
if (!fixed[i])
dwidth[i] = (width - fwidth) * weight3(t->tabwidth[i]) / s;
else
dwidth[i] = (double)newwidth[i];
}
dv2sv(dwidth, newwidth, t->maxcol + 1);
try_again = 0;
for (i = 0; i <= t->maxcol; i++) {
if (!fixed[i]) {
if (newwidth[i] > t->tabwidth[i]) {
newwidth[i] = t->tabwidth[i];
fixed[i] = 1;
try_again = 1;
}
else if (newwidth[i] < t->minimum_width[i]) {
newwidth[i] = t->minimum_width[i];
fixed[i] = 1;
try_again = 1;
}
}
}
} while (try_again);
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 84,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(curl_version)
{
curl_version_info_data *d;
zend_long uversion = CURLVERSION_NOW;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "|l", &uversion) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
d = curl_version_info(uversion);
if (d == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
CAAL("version_number", d->version_num);
CAAL("age", d->age);
CAAL("features", d->features);
CAAL("ssl_version_number", d->ssl_version_num);
CAAS("version", d->version);
CAAS("host", d->host);
CAAS("ssl_version", d->ssl_version);
CAAS("libz_version", d->libz_version);
/* Add an array of protocols */
{
char **p = (char **) d->protocols;
zval protocol_list;
array_init(&protocol_list);
while (*p != NULL) {
add_next_index_string(&protocol_list, *p);
p++;
}
CAAZ("protocols", &protocol_list);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API int zend_declare_class_constant_string(zend_class_entry *ce, const char *name, size_t name_length, const char *value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
return zend_declare_class_constant_stringl(ce, name, name_length, value, strlen(value) TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,778
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::dispatchLoad() {
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DispatchLoad(routing_id_));
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bgp_packet_attribute (struct bgp *bgp, struct peer *peer,
struct stream *s, struct attr *attr, struct prefix *p,
afi_t afi, safi_t safi, struct peer *from,
struct prefix_rd *prd, u_char *tag)
{
size_t cp;
size_t aspath_sizep;
struct aspath *aspath;
int send_as4_path = 0;
int send_as4_aggregator = 0;
int use32bit = (CHECK_FLAG (peer->cap, PEER_CAP_AS4_RCV)) ? 1 : 0;
if (! bgp)
bgp = bgp_get_default ();
/* Remember current pointer. */
cp = stream_get_endp (s);
/* Origin attribute. */
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_ORIGIN);
stream_putc (s, 1);
stream_putc (s, attr->origin);
/* AS path attribute. */
/* If remote-peer is EBGP */
if (peer_sort (peer) == BGP_PEER_EBGP
&& (! CHECK_FLAG (peer->af_flags[afi][safi], PEER_FLAG_AS_PATH_UNCHANGED)
|| attr->aspath->segments == NULL)
&& (! CHECK_FLAG (peer->af_flags[afi][safi], PEER_FLAG_RSERVER_CLIENT)))
{
aspath = aspath_dup (attr->aspath);
if (CHECK_FLAG(bgp->config, BGP_CONFIG_CONFEDERATION))
{
/* Strip the confed info, and then stuff our path CONFED_ID
on the front */
aspath = aspath_delete_confed_seq (aspath);
aspath = aspath_add_seq (aspath, bgp->confed_id);
}
else
{
aspath = aspath_add_seq (aspath, peer->local_as);
if (peer->change_local_as)
aspath = aspath_add_seq (aspath, peer->change_local_as);
}
}
else if (peer_sort (peer) == BGP_PEER_CONFED)
{
/* A confed member, so we need to do the AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE thing */
aspath = aspath_dup (attr->aspath);
aspath = aspath_add_confed_seq (aspath, peer->local_as);
}
else
aspath = attr->aspath;
/* If peer is not AS4 capable, then:
* - send the created AS_PATH out as AS4_PATH (optional, transitive),
* but ensure that no AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE and AS_CONFED_SET path segment
* types are in it (i.e. exclude them if they are there)
* AND do this only if there is at least one asnum > 65535 in the path!
* - send an AS_PATH out, but put 16Bit ASnums in it, not 32bit, and change
* all ASnums > 65535 to BGP_AS_TRANS
*/
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS|BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_AS_PATH);
aspath_sizep = stream_get_endp (s);
stream_putw (s, 0);
stream_putw_at (s, aspath_sizep, aspath_put (s, aspath, use32bit));
/* OLD session may need NEW_AS_PATH sent, if there are 4-byte ASNs
* in the path
*/
if (!use32bit && aspath_has_as4 (aspath))
send_as4_path = 1; /* we'll do this later, at the correct place */
/* Nexthop attribute. */
if (attr->flag & ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_NEXT_HOP) && afi == AFI_IP)
{
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_NEXT_HOP);
stream_putc (s, 4);
if (safi == SAFI_MPLS_VPN)
{
if (attr->nexthop.s_addr == 0)
stream_put_ipv4 (s, peer->nexthop.v4.s_addr);
else
stream_put_ipv4 (s, attr->nexthop.s_addr);
}
else
stream_put_ipv4 (s, attr->nexthop.s_addr);
}
/* MED attribute. */
if (attr->flag & ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_MULTI_EXIT_DISC))
{
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_MULTI_EXIT_DISC);
stream_putc (s, 4);
stream_putl (s, attr->med);
}
/* Local preference. */
if (peer_sort (peer) == BGP_PEER_IBGP ||
peer_sort (peer) == BGP_PEER_CONFED)
{
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_LOCAL_PREF);
stream_putc (s, 4);
stream_putl (s, attr->local_pref);
}
/* Atomic aggregate. */
if (attr->flag & ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE))
{
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE);
stream_putc (s, 0);
}
/* Aggregator. */
if (attr->flag & ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_AGGREGATOR))
{
assert (attr->extra);
/* Common to BGP_ATTR_AGGREGATOR, regardless of ASN size */
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL|BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_AGGREGATOR);
if (use32bit)
{
/* AS4 capable peer */
stream_putc (s, 8);
stream_putl (s, attr->extra->aggregator_as);
}
else
{
/* 2-byte AS peer */
stream_putc (s, 6);
/* Is ASN representable in 2-bytes? Or must AS_TRANS be used? */
if ( attr->extra->aggregator_as > 65535 )
{
stream_putw (s, BGP_AS_TRANS);
/* we have to send AS4_AGGREGATOR, too.
* we'll do that later in order to send attributes in ascending
* order.
*/
send_as4_aggregator = 1;
}
else
stream_putw (s, (u_int16_t) attr->extra->aggregator_as);
}
stream_put_ipv4 (s, attr->extra->aggregator_addr.s_addr);
}
/* Community attribute. */
if (CHECK_FLAG (peer->af_flags[afi][safi], PEER_FLAG_SEND_COMMUNITY)
&& (attr->flag & ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_COMMUNITIES)))
{
if (attr->community->size * 4 > 255)
{
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL|BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS|BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_COMMUNITIES);
stream_putw (s, attr->community->size * 4);
}
else
{
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL|BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_COMMUNITIES);
stream_putc (s, attr->community->size * 4);
}
stream_put (s, attr->community->val, attr->community->size * 4);
}
/* Route Reflector. */
if (peer_sort (peer) == BGP_PEER_IBGP
&& from
&& peer_sort (from) == BGP_PEER_IBGP)
{
/* Originator ID. */
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_ORIGINATOR_ID);
stream_putc (s, 4);
if (attr->flag & ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_ORIGINATOR_ID))
stream_put_in_addr (s, &attr->extra->originator_id);
else
stream_put_in_addr (s, &from->remote_id);
/* Cluster list. */
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_CLUSTER_LIST);
if (attr->extra && attr->extra->cluster)
{
stream_putc (s, attr->extra->cluster->length + 4);
/* If this peer configuration's parent BGP has cluster_id. */
if (bgp->config & BGP_CONFIG_CLUSTER_ID)
stream_put_in_addr (s, &bgp->cluster_id);
else
stream_put_in_addr (s, &bgp->router_id);
stream_put (s, attr->extra->cluster->list,
attr->extra->cluster->length);
}
else
{
stream_putc (s, 4);
/* If this peer configuration's parent BGP has cluster_id. */
if (bgp->config & BGP_CONFIG_CLUSTER_ID)
stream_put_in_addr (s, &bgp->cluster_id);
else
stream_put_in_addr (s, &bgp->router_id);
}
}
#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
/* If p is IPv6 address put it into attribute. */
if (p->family == AF_INET6)
{
unsigned long sizep;
struct attr_extra *attre = attr->extra;
assert (attr->extra);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_MP_REACH_NLRI);
sizep = stream_get_endp (s);
stream_putc (s, 0); /* Marker: Attribute length. */
stream_putw (s, AFI_IP6); /* AFI */
stream_putc (s, safi); /* SAFI */
stream_putc (s, attre->mp_nexthop_len);
if (attre->mp_nexthop_len == 16)
stream_put (s, &attre->mp_nexthop_global, 16);
else if (attre->mp_nexthop_len == 32)
{
stream_put (s, &attre->mp_nexthop_global, 16);
stream_put (s, &attre->mp_nexthop_local, 16);
}
/* SNPA */
stream_putc (s, 0);
/* Prefix write. */
stream_put_prefix (s, p);
/* Set MP attribute length. */
stream_putc_at (s, sizep, (stream_get_endp (s) - sizep) - 1);
}
#endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
if (p->family == AF_INET && safi == SAFI_MULTICAST)
{
unsigned long sizep;
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_MP_REACH_NLRI);
sizep = stream_get_endp (s);
stream_putc (s, 0); /* Marker: Attribute Length. */
stream_putw (s, AFI_IP); /* AFI */
stream_putc (s, SAFI_MULTICAST); /* SAFI */
stream_putc (s, 4);
stream_put_ipv4 (s, attr->nexthop.s_addr);
/* SNPA */
stream_putc (s, 0);
/* Prefix write. */
stream_put_prefix (s, p);
/* Set MP attribute length. */
stream_putc_at (s, sizep, (stream_get_endp (s) - sizep) - 1);
}
if (p->family == AF_INET && safi == SAFI_MPLS_VPN)
{
unsigned long sizep;
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_MP_REACH_NLRI);
sizep = stream_get_endp (s);
stream_putc (s, 0); /* Length of this attribute. */
stream_putw (s, AFI_IP); /* AFI */
stream_putc (s, SAFI_MPLS_LABELED_VPN); /* SAFI */
stream_putc (s, 12);
stream_putl (s, 0);
stream_putl (s, 0);
stream_put (s, &attr->extra->mp_nexthop_global_in, 4);
/* SNPA */
stream_putc (s, 0);
/* Tag, RD, Prefix write. */
stream_putc (s, p->prefixlen + 88);
stream_put (s, tag, 3);
stream_put (s, prd->val, 8);
stream_put (s, &p->u.prefix, PSIZE (p->prefixlen));
/* Set MP attribute length. */
stream_putc_at (s, sizep, (stream_get_endp (s) - sizep) - 1);
}
/* Extended Communities attribute. */
if (CHECK_FLAG (peer->af_flags[afi][safi], PEER_FLAG_SEND_EXT_COMMUNITY)
&& (attr->flag & ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_EXT_COMMUNITIES)))
{
struct attr_extra *attre = attr->extra;
assert (attre);
if (peer_sort (peer) == BGP_PEER_IBGP
|| peer_sort (peer) == BGP_PEER_CONFED)
{
if (attre->ecommunity->size * 8 > 255)
{
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL|BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS|BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_EXT_COMMUNITIES);
stream_putw (s, attre->ecommunity->size * 8);
}
else
{
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL|BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_EXT_COMMUNITIES);
stream_putc (s, attre->ecommunity->size * 8);
}
stream_put (s, attre->ecommunity->val, attre->ecommunity->size * 8);
}
else
{
u_int8_t *pnt;
int tbit;
int ecom_tr_size = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < attre->ecommunity->size; i++)
{
pnt = attre->ecommunity->val + (i * 8);
tbit = *pnt;
if (CHECK_FLAG (tbit, ECOMMUNITY_FLAG_NON_TRANSITIVE))
continue;
ecom_tr_size++;
}
if (ecom_tr_size)
{
if (ecom_tr_size * 8 > 255)
{
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL|BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS|BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_EXT_COMMUNITIES);
stream_putw (s, ecom_tr_size * 8);
}
else
{
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL|BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_EXT_COMMUNITIES);
stream_putc (s, ecom_tr_size * 8);
}
for (i = 0; i < attre->ecommunity->size; i++)
{
pnt = attre->ecommunity->val + (i * 8);
tbit = *pnt;
if (CHECK_FLAG (tbit, ECOMMUNITY_FLAG_NON_TRANSITIVE))
continue;
stream_put (s, pnt, 8);
}
}
}
}
if ( send_as4_path )
{
/* If the peer is NOT As4 capable, AND */
/* there are ASnums > 65535 in path THEN
* give out AS4_PATH */
/* Get rid of all AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE and AS_CONFED_SET
* path segments!
* Hm, I wonder... confederation things *should* only be at
* the beginning of an aspath, right? Then we should use
* aspath_delete_confed_seq for this, because it is already
* there! (JK)
* Folks, talk to me: what is reasonable here!?
*/
aspath = aspath_delete_confed_seq (aspath);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS|BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL|BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_AS4_PATH);
aspath_sizep = stream_get_endp (s);
stream_putw (s, 0);
stream_putw_at (s, aspath_sizep, aspath_put (s, aspath, 1));
}
if (aspath != attr->aspath)
aspath_free (aspath);
if ( send_as4_aggregator )
{
assert (attr->extra);
/* send AS4_AGGREGATOR, at this place */
/* this section of code moved here in order to ensure the correct
* *ascending* order of attributes
*/
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL|BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS);
stream_putc (s, BGP_ATTR_AS4_AGGREGATOR);
stream_putc (s, 8);
stream_putl (s, attr->extra->aggregator_as);
stream_put_ipv4 (s, attr->extra->aggregator_addr.s_addr);
}
/* Unknown transit attribute. */
if (attr->extra && attr->extra->transit)
stream_put (s, attr->extra->transit->val, attr->extra->transit->length);
/* Return total size of attribute. */
return stream_get_endp (s) - cp;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 271
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderFrameImpl::CreateWorkerFetchContext() {
blink::WebServiceWorkerNetworkProvider* web_provider =
frame_->GetDocumentLoader()->GetServiceWorkerNetworkProvider();
DCHECK(web_provider);
ServiceWorkerNetworkProvider* provider =
ServiceWorkerNetworkProvider::FromWebServiceWorkerNetworkProvider(
web_provider);
mojom::ServiceWorkerWorkerClientRequest service_worker_client_request;
mojom::ServiceWorkerContainerHostPtrInfo container_host_ptr_info;
ServiceWorkerProviderContext* provider_context = provider->context();
if (provider_context) {
service_worker_client_request =
provider_context->CreateWorkerClientRequest();
if (ServiceWorkerUtils::IsServicificationEnabled())
container_host_ptr_info = provider_context->CloneContainerHostPtrInfo();
}
std::unique_ptr<WorkerFetchContextImpl> worker_fetch_context =
std::make_unique<WorkerFetchContextImpl>(
std::move(service_worker_client_request),
std::move(container_host_ptr_info), GetLoaderFactoryBundle()->Clone(),
GetContentClient()->renderer()->CreateURLLoaderThrottleProvider(
URLLoaderThrottleProviderType::kWorker));
worker_fetch_context->set_parent_frame_id(routing_id_);
worker_fetch_context->set_site_for_cookies(
frame_->GetDocument().SiteForCookies());
worker_fetch_context->set_is_secure_context(
frame_->GetDocument().IsSecureContext());
worker_fetch_context->set_service_worker_provider_id(provider->provider_id());
worker_fetch_context->set_is_controlled_by_service_worker(
provider->IsControlledByServiceWorker());
worker_fetch_context->set_origin_url(
GURL(frame_->GetDocument().Url()).GetOrigin());
{
SCOPED_UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMER(
"RenderFrameObservers.WillCreateWorkerFetchContext");
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.WillCreateWorkerFetchContext(worker_fetch_context.get());
}
return std::move(worker_fetch_context);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,758
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: certauth_pkinit_san_initvt(krb5_context context, int maj_ver, int min_ver,
krb5_plugin_vtable vtable)
{
krb5_certauth_vtable vt;
if (maj_ver != 1)
return KRB5_PLUGIN_VER_NOTSUPP;
vt = (krb5_certauth_vtable)vtable;
vt->name = "pkinit_san";
vt->authorize = pkinit_san_authorize;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix certauth built-in module returns
The PKINIT certauth eku module should never authoritatively authorize
a certificate, because an extended key usage does not establish a
relationship between the certificate and any specific user; it only
establishes that the certificate was created for PKINIT client
authentication. Therefore, pkinit_eku_authorize() should return
KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE on success, not 0.
The certauth san module should pass if it does not find any SANs of
the types it can match against; the presence of other types of SANs
should not cause it to explicitly deny a certificate. Check for an
empty result from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() in verify_client_san(),
instead of returning ENOENT from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() when
there are no SANs at all.
ticket: 8561
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 96,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy(SecurityOrigin* origin, String* errorMessage)
{
if (errorMessage)
return origin->isPotentiallyTrustworthy(*errorMessage);
return origin->isPotentiallyTrustworthy();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,419
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nlmsvc_lookup_block(struct nlm_file *file, struct nlm_lock *lock)
{
struct nlm_block *block;
struct file_lock *fl;
dprintk("lockd: nlmsvc_lookup_block f=%p pd=%d %Ld-%Ld ty=%d\n",
file, lock->fl.fl_pid,
(long long)lock->fl.fl_start,
(long long)lock->fl.fl_end, lock->fl.fl_type);
list_for_each_entry(block, &nlm_blocked, b_list) {
fl = &block->b_call->a_args.lock.fl;
dprintk("lockd: check f=%p pd=%d %Ld-%Ld ty=%d cookie=%s\n",
block->b_file, fl->fl_pid,
(long long)fl->fl_start,
(long long)fl->fl_end, fl->fl_type,
nlmdbg_cookie2a(&block->b_call->a_args.cookie));
if (block->b_file == file && nlm_compare_locks(fl, &lock->fl)) {
kref_get(&block->b_count);
return block;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,226
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleTexSubImage3D(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
if (!feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context())
return error::kUnknownCommand;
const char* func_name = "glTexSubImage3D";
const volatile gles2::cmds::TexSubImage3D& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::TexSubImage3D*>(cmd_data);
TRACE_EVENT2("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleTexSubImage3D",
"widthXheight", c.width * c.height, "depth", c.depth);
GLboolean internal = static_cast<GLboolean>(c.internal);
if (internal == GL_TRUE && texture_state_.tex_image_failed)
return error::kNoError;
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLint level = static_cast<GLint>(c.level);
GLint xoffset = static_cast<GLint>(c.xoffset);
GLint yoffset = static_cast<GLint>(c.yoffset);
GLint zoffset = static_cast<GLint>(c.zoffset);
GLsizei width = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.width);
GLsizei height = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.height);
GLsizei depth = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.depth);
GLenum format = static_cast<GLenum>(c.format);
GLenum type = static_cast<GLenum>(c.type);
uint32_t pixels_shm_id = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.pixels_shm_id);
uint32_t pixels_shm_offset = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.pixels_shm_offset);
if (width < 0 || height < 0 || depth < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "dimensions < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
PixelStoreParams params;
Buffer* buffer = state_.bound_pixel_unpack_buffer.get();
if (buffer) {
if (pixels_shm_id)
return error::kInvalidArguments;
if (buffer->GetMappedRange()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name,
"pixel unpack buffer should not be mapped to client memory");
return error::kNoError;
}
params = state_.GetUnpackParams(ContextState::k3D);
} else {
if (!pixels_shm_id && pixels_shm_offset)
return error::kInvalidArguments;
params.alignment = state_.unpack_alignment;
}
uint32_t pixels_size;
uint32_t skip_size;
uint32_t padding;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizesES3(width, height, depth,
format, type,
params,
&pixels_size,
nullptr,
nullptr,
&skip_size,
&padding)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
DCHECK_EQ(0u, skip_size);
const void* pixels;
if (pixels_shm_id) {
pixels = GetSharedMemoryAs<const void*>(
pixels_shm_id, pixels_shm_offset, pixels_size);
if (!pixels)
return error::kOutOfBounds;
} else {
DCHECK(buffer || !pixels_shm_offset);
pixels = reinterpret_cast<const void*>(pixels_shm_offset);
}
TextureManager::DoTexSubImageArguments args = {
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset, width, height, depth,
format, type, pixels, pixels_size, padding,
TextureManager::DoTexSubImageArguments::kTexSubImage3D};
texture_manager()->ValidateAndDoTexSubImage(this, &texture_state_, &state_,
&framebuffer_state_,
func_name, args);
ExitCommandProcessingEarly();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 145,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WaitForStored() {
if (seen_stored_)
return;
waiting_ = true;
content::RunMessageLoop();
waiting_ = false;
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 151,952
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct f_fs_opts *ffs_do_functionfs_bind(struct usb_function *f,
struct usb_configuration *c)
{
struct ffs_function *func = ffs_func_from_usb(f);
struct f_fs_opts *ffs_opts =
container_of(f->fi, struct f_fs_opts, func_inst);
int ret;
ENTER();
/*
* Legacy gadget triggers binding in functionfs_ready_callback,
* which already uses locking; taking the same lock here would
* cause a deadlock.
*
* Configfs-enabled gadgets however do need ffs_dev_lock.
*/
if (!ffs_opts->no_configfs)
ffs_dev_lock();
ret = ffs_opts->dev->desc_ready ? 0 : -ENODEV;
func->ffs = ffs_opts->dev->ffs_data;
if (!ffs_opts->no_configfs)
ffs_dev_unlock();
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
func->conf = c;
func->gadget = c->cdev->gadget;
/*
* in drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:configfs_composite_bind()
* configurations are bound in sequence with list_for_each_entry,
* in each configuration its functions are bound in sequence
* with list_for_each_entry, so we assume no race condition
* with regard to ffs_opts->bound access
*/
if (!ffs_opts->refcnt) {
ret = functionfs_bind(func->ffs, c->cdev);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
ffs_opts->refcnt++;
func->function.strings = func->ffs->stringtabs;
return ffs_opts;
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 49,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestSynchronousCompositor::SetHardwareFrame(
scoped_ptr<cc::CompositorFrame> frame) {
hardware_frame_ = frame.Pass();
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int param_set_scroll(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
ypan = 0;
if (!strcmp(val, "redraw"))
ypan = 0;
else if (!strcmp(val, "ypan"))
ypan = 1;
else if (!strcmp(val, "ywrap"))
ypan = 2;
else
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: video: uvesafb: Fix integer overflow in allocation
cmap->len can get close to INT_MAX/2, allowing for an integer overflow in
allocation. This uses kmalloc_array() instead to catch the condition.
Reported-by: Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Fixes: 8bdb3a2d7df48 ("uvesafb: the driver core")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 79,768
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PeopleHandler::SyncStartupCompleted() {
ProfileSyncService* service = GetSyncService();
DCHECK(service->IsEngineInitialized());
engine_start_timer_.reset();
sync_startup_tracker_.reset();
PushSyncPrefs();
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IndexedDBDispatcher::OnSuccessCursorContinue(
const IndexedDBMsg_CallbacksSuccessCursorContinue_Params& p) {
DCHECK_EQ(p.thread_id, CurrentWorkerId());
int32 response_id = p.response_id;
int32 cursor_id = p.cursor_id;
const IndexedDBKey& key = p.key;
const IndexedDBKey& primary_key = p.primary_key;
const content::SerializedScriptValue& value = p.serialized_value;
RendererWebIDBCursorImpl* cursor = cursors_[cursor_id];
DCHECK(cursor);
cursor->SetKeyAndValue(key, primary_key, value);
WebIDBCallbacks* callbacks = pending_callbacks_.Lookup(response_id);
if (!callbacks)
return;
callbacks->onSuccessWithContinuation();
pending_callbacks_.Remove(response_id);
}
Commit Message: Add DCHECK to ensure IndexedDBDispatcher doesn't get re-created.
This could happen if there are IDB objects that survive the call to
didStopWorkerRunLoop.
BUG=121734
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9999035
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131679 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 108,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(radius_send_request)
{
radius_descriptor *raddesc;
zval *z_radh;
int res;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &z_radh)
== FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(raddesc, radius_descriptor *, &z_radh, -1, "rad_handle", le_radius);
res = rad_send_request(raddesc->radh);
if (res == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
RETURN_LONG(res);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,507
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xprt_rdma_bc_put(struct rpc_xprt *xprt)
{
dprintk("svcrdma: %s: xprt %p\n", __func__, xprt);
xprt_free(xprt);
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,964
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str)
{
if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
evm_fixmode = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().
Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <ware@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 55,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int rand_neg(void)
{
static unsigned int neg=0;
static int sign[8]={0,0,0,1,1,0,1,1};
return(sign[(neg++)%8]);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2014-3570 (with minor bn_asm.c revamp).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 46,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void TIFFGetProperties(TIFF *tiff,Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
message[MagickPathExtent],
*text;
uint32
count,
type;
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ARTIST,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:artist",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COPYRIGHT,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:copyright",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_DATETIME,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:timestamp",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_DOCUMENTNAME,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:document",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_HOSTCOMPUTER,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:hostcomputer",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEDESCRIPTION,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_MAKE,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:make",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_MODEL,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:model",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_OPIIMAGEID,&count,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:image-id",message,exception);
}
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENAME,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"label",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SOFTWARE,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:software",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,33423,&count,&text) == 1) && (text != (char *) NULL))
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:kodak-33423",message,exception);
}
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,36867,&count,&text) == 1) && (text != (char *) NULL))
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:kodak-36867",message,exception);
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE,&type) == 1)
switch (type)
{
case 0x01:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","REDUCEDIMAGE",
exception);
break;
}
case 0x02:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","PAGE",exception);
break;
}
case 0x04:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","MASK",exception);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1602
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 89,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CreateContextProviderAfterGpuChannelEstablished(
gpu::SurfaceHandle handle,
gpu::ContextCreationAttribs attributes,
gpu::SharedMemoryLimits shared_memory_limits,
Compositor::ContextProviderCallback callback,
scoped_refptr<gpu::GpuChannelHost> gpu_channel_host) {
if (!gpu_channel_host)
callback.Run(nullptr);
gpu::GpuChannelEstablishFactory* factory =
BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()->gpu_channel_establish_factory();
int32_t stream_id = kGpuStreamIdDefault;
gpu::SchedulingPriority stream_priority = kGpuStreamPriorityUI;
constexpr bool automatic_flushes = false;
constexpr bool support_locking = false;
constexpr bool support_grcontext = false;
auto context_provider =
base::MakeRefCounted<ws::ContextProviderCommandBuffer>(
std::move(gpu_channel_host), factory->GetGpuMemoryBufferManager(),
stream_id, stream_priority, handle,
GURL(std::string("chrome://gpu/Compositor::CreateContextProvider")),
automatic_flushes, support_locking, support_grcontext,
shared_memory_limits, attributes,
ws::command_buffer_metrics::ContextType::UNKNOWN);
callback.Run(std::move(context_provider));
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 130,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_user_context(struct file *fp, struct hfi1_user_info *uinfo,
int devno, unsigned alg)
{
struct hfi1_devdata *dd = NULL;
int ret = 0, devmax, npresent, nup, dev;
devmax = hfi1_count_units(&npresent, &nup);
if (!npresent) {
ret = -ENXIO;
goto done;
}
if (!nup) {
ret = -ENETDOWN;
goto done;
}
if (devno >= 0) {
dd = hfi1_lookup(devno);
if (!dd)
ret = -ENODEV;
else if (!dd->freectxts)
ret = -EBUSY;
} else {
struct hfi1_devdata *pdd;
if (alg == HFI1_ALG_ACROSS) {
unsigned free = 0U;
for (dev = 0; dev < devmax; dev++) {
pdd = hfi1_lookup(dev);
if (!pdd)
continue;
if (!usable_device(pdd))
continue;
if (pdd->freectxts &&
pdd->freectxts > free) {
dd = pdd;
free = pdd->freectxts;
}
}
} else {
for (dev = 0; dev < devmax; dev++) {
pdd = hfi1_lookup(dev);
if (!pdd)
continue;
if (!usable_device(pdd))
continue;
if (pdd->freectxts) {
dd = pdd;
break;
}
}
}
if (!dd)
ret = -EBUSY;
}
done:
return ret ? ret : allocate_ctxt(fp, dd, uinfo);
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::Init() {
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("RenderThreadImpl::Init", 0, "");
base::debug::TraceLog::GetInstance()->SetThreadSortIndex(
base::PlatformThread::CurrentId(),
kTraceEventRendererMainThreadSortIndex);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(OS_ANDROID)
blink::WebView::setUseExternalPopupMenus(true);
#endif
lazy_tls.Pointer()->Set(this);
ChildProcess::current()->set_main_thread(this);
suspend_webkit_shared_timer_ = true;
notify_webkit_of_modal_loop_ = true;
webkit_shared_timer_suspended_ = false;
widget_count_ = 0;
hidden_widget_count_ = 0;
idle_notification_delay_in_ms_ = kInitialIdleHandlerDelayMs;
idle_notifications_to_skip_ = 0;
layout_test_mode_ = false;
appcache_dispatcher_.reset(
new AppCacheDispatcher(Get(), new AppCacheFrontendImpl()));
dom_storage_dispatcher_.reset(new DomStorageDispatcher());
main_thread_indexed_db_dispatcher_.reset(new IndexedDBDispatcher(
thread_safe_sender()));
embedded_worker_dispatcher_.reset(new EmbeddedWorkerDispatcher());
media_stream_center_ = NULL;
db_message_filter_ = new DBMessageFilter();
AddFilter(db_message_filter_.get());
vc_manager_.reset(new VideoCaptureImplManager());
AddFilter(vc_manager_->video_capture_message_filter());
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
peer_connection_tracker_.reset(new PeerConnectionTracker());
AddObserver(peer_connection_tracker_.get());
p2p_socket_dispatcher_ =
new P2PSocketDispatcher(GetIOMessageLoopProxy().get());
AddFilter(p2p_socket_dispatcher_.get());
webrtc_identity_service_.reset(new WebRTCIdentityService());
aec_dump_message_filter_ =
new AecDumpMessageFilter(GetIOMessageLoopProxy(),
message_loop()->message_loop_proxy());
AddFilter(aec_dump_message_filter_.get());
peer_connection_factory_.reset(new PeerConnectionDependencyFactory(
p2p_socket_dispatcher_.get()));
#endif // defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
audio_input_message_filter_ =
new AudioInputMessageFilter(GetIOMessageLoopProxy());
AddFilter(audio_input_message_filter_.get());
audio_message_filter_ = new AudioMessageFilter(GetIOMessageLoopProxy());
AddFilter(audio_message_filter_.get());
midi_message_filter_ = new MidiMessageFilter(GetIOMessageLoopProxy());
AddFilter(midi_message_filter_.get());
AddFilter((new IndexedDBMessageFilter(thread_safe_sender()))->GetFilter());
AddFilter((new EmbeddedWorkerContextMessageFilter())->GetFilter());
GetContentClient()->renderer()->RenderThreadStarted();
InitSkiaEventTracer();
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(cc::switches::kEnableGpuBenchmarking))
RegisterExtension(GpuBenchmarkingExtension::Get());
is_impl_side_painting_enabled_ =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableImplSidePainting);
cc_blink::WebLayerImpl::SetImplSidePaintingEnabled(
is_impl_side_painting_enabled_);
is_zero_copy_enabled_ = command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableZeroCopy) &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableZeroCopy);
is_one_copy_enabled_ = command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableOneCopy);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableLCDText)) {
is_lcd_text_enabled_ = false;
} else if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLCDText)) {
is_lcd_text_enabled_ = true;
} else {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
is_lcd_text_enabled_ = false;
#else
is_lcd_text_enabled_ = true;
#endif
}
is_gpu_rasterization_enabled_ =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableGpuRasterization);
is_gpu_rasterization_forced_ =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kForceGpuRasterization);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableDistanceFieldText)) {
is_distance_field_text_enabled_ = false;
} else if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableDistanceFieldText)) {
is_distance_field_text_enabled_ = true;
} else {
is_distance_field_text_enabled_ = false;
}
base::FilePath media_path;
PathService::Get(DIR_MEDIA_LIBS, &media_path);
if (!media_path.empty())
media::InitializeMediaLibrary(media_path);
memory_pressure_listener_.reset(new base::MemoryPressureListener(
base::Bind(&RenderThreadImpl::OnMemoryPressure, base::Unretained(this))));
std::vector<base::DiscardableMemoryType> supported_types;
base::DiscardableMemory::GetSupportedTypes(&supported_types);
DCHECK(!supported_types.empty());
base::DiscardableMemoryType type = supported_types[0];
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kUseDiscardableMemory)) {
std::string requested_type_name = command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kUseDiscardableMemory);
base::DiscardableMemoryType requested_type =
base::DiscardableMemory::GetNamedType(requested_type_name);
if (std::find(supported_types.begin(),
supported_types.end(),
requested_type) != supported_types.end()) {
type = requested_type;
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Requested discardable memory type is not supported.";
}
}
base::DiscardableMemory::SetPreferredType(type);
allocate_gpu_memory_buffer_thread_checker_.DetachFromThread();
if (is_impl_side_painting_enabled_) {
int num_raster_threads = 0;
std::string string_value =
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kNumRasterThreads);
bool parsed_num_raster_threads =
base::StringToInt(string_value, &num_raster_threads);
DCHECK(parsed_num_raster_threads) << string_value;
DCHECK_GT(num_raster_threads, 0);
cc::RasterWorkerPool::SetNumRasterThreads(num_raster_threads);
}
service_registry()->AddService<RenderFrameSetup>(
base::Bind(CreateRenderFrameSetup));
TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("RenderThreadImpl::Init", 0, "");
}
Commit Message: Disable forwarding tasks to the Blink scheduler
Disable forwarding tasks to the Blink scheduler to avoid some
regressions which it has introduced.
BUG=391005,415758,415478,412714,416362,416827,417608
TBR=jamesr@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/609483002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#296916}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,745
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t mptsas_config_ioc_2(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address)
{
return MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK(2, MPI_CONFIG_PAGETYPE_IOC, 0x04,
"*l*b*b*b*b");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,643
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsVoidMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_activityLoggingForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsVoidMethod");
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(info);
V8PerContextData* context_data = script_state->PerContextData();
if (context_data && context_data->ActivityLogger()) {
context_data->ActivityLogger()->LogMethod("TestObject.activityLoggingForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsVoidMethod", info);
}
test_object_v8_internal::ActivityLoggingForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsVoidMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,491
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct dentry *__d_lookup_rcu(const struct dentry *parent,
const struct qstr *name,
unsigned *seqp)
{
u64 hashlen = name->hash_len;
const unsigned char *str = name->name;
struct hlist_bl_head *b = d_hash(parent, hashlen_hash(hashlen));
struct hlist_bl_node *node;
struct dentry *dentry;
/*
* Note: There is significant duplication with __d_lookup_rcu which is
* required to prevent single threaded performance regressions
* especially on architectures where smp_rmb (in seqcounts) are costly.
* Keep the two functions in sync.
*/
/*
* The hash list is protected using RCU.
*
* Carefully use d_seq when comparing a candidate dentry, to avoid
* races with d_move().
*
* It is possible that concurrent renames can mess up our list
* walk here and result in missing our dentry, resulting in the
* false-negative result. d_lookup() protects against concurrent
* renames using rename_lock seqlock.
*
* See Documentation/filesystems/path-lookup.txt for more details.
*/
hlist_bl_for_each_entry_rcu(dentry, node, b, d_hash) {
unsigned seq;
seqretry:
/*
* The dentry sequence count protects us from concurrent
* renames, and thus protects parent and name fields.
*
* The caller must perform a seqcount check in order
* to do anything useful with the returned dentry.
*
* NOTE! We do a "raw" seqcount_begin here. That means that
* we don't wait for the sequence count to stabilize if it
* is in the middle of a sequence change. If we do the slow
* dentry compare, we will do seqretries until it is stable,
* and if we end up with a successful lookup, we actually
* want to exit RCU lookup anyway.
*/
seq = raw_seqcount_begin(&dentry->d_seq);
if (dentry->d_parent != parent)
continue;
if (d_unhashed(dentry))
continue;
if (unlikely(parent->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_COMPARE)) {
if (dentry->d_name.hash != hashlen_hash(hashlen))
continue;
*seqp = seq;
switch (slow_dentry_cmp(parent, dentry, seq, name)) {
case D_COMP_OK:
return dentry;
case D_COMP_NOMATCH:
continue;
default:
goto seqretry;
}
}
if (dentry->d_name.hash_len != hashlen)
continue;
*seqp = seq;
if (!dentry_cmp(dentry, str, hashlen_len(hashlen)))
return dentry;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: dcache: Handle escaped paths in prepend_path
A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent
will never reach it's mnt_root. For lack of a better term
I call this an escaped path.
prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path,
d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd.
__d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes
in. So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error.
d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to
some root. Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so
d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater
than 1. So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily
unmounted mounts.
getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs
prepend_path to return an error.
d_path is the interesting hold out. d_path just wants to print
something, and does not care about the weird cases. Which raises
the question what should be printed?
Given that <escaped_path>/<anything> should result in -ENOENT I
believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty
paths. As there are not really any meaninful path components when
considered from the perspective of a mount tree.
So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error
code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 94,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLInputElement::matchesReadWritePseudoClass() const
{
return m_inputType->supportsReadOnly() && !isReadOnly();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 112,954
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static BT_HDR* avrc_copy_packet(BT_HDR* p_pkt, int rsp_pkt_len) {
const int offset = MAX(AVCT_MSG_OFFSET, p_pkt->offset);
const int pkt_len = MAX(rsp_pkt_len, p_pkt->len);
BT_HDR* p_pkt_copy = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(BT_HDR_SIZE + offset + pkt_len);
/* Copy the packet header, set the new offset, and copy the payload */
memcpy(p_pkt_copy, p_pkt, BT_HDR_SIZE);
p_pkt_copy->offset = offset;
uint8_t* p_data = avrc_get_data_ptr(p_pkt);
uint8_t* p_data_copy = avrc_get_data_ptr(p_pkt_copy);
memcpy(p_data_copy, p_data, p_pkt->len);
return p_pkt_copy;
}
Commit Message: Add missing AVRCP message length checks inside avrc_msg_cback
Explicitly check the length of the received message before
accessing the data.
Bug: 111803925
Bug: 79883824
Test: POC scripts
Change-Id: I00b1c6bd6dd7e18ac2c469ef2032c7ff10dcaecb
Merged-In: I00b1c6bd6dd7e18ac2c469ef2032c7ff10dcaecb
(cherry picked from commit 282deb3e27407aaa88b8ddbdbd7bb7d56ddc635f)
(cherry picked from commit 007868d05f4b761842c7345161aeda6fd40dd245)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 162,877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionInstallDialogView::~ExtensionInstallDialogView() {
if (!handled_result_ && !done_callback_.is_null()) {
base::ResetAndReturn(&done_callback_)
.Run(ExtensionInstallPrompt::Result::USER_CANCELED);
}
}
Commit Message: [Extensions UI] Initially disabled OK button for extension install prompts and enable them after a 500 ms time period.
BUG=394518
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2716353003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461933}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 154,033
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct rds_connection *__rds_conn_create(struct net *net,
__be32 laddr, __be32 faddr,
struct rds_transport *trans, gfp_t gfp,
int is_outgoing)
{
struct rds_connection *conn, *parent = NULL;
struct hlist_head *head = rds_conn_bucket(laddr, faddr);
struct rds_transport *loop_trans;
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
rcu_read_lock();
conn = rds_conn_lookup(net, head, laddr, faddr, trans);
if (conn && conn->c_loopback && conn->c_trans != &rds_loop_transport &&
laddr == faddr && !is_outgoing) {
/* This is a looped back IB connection, and we're
* called by the code handling the incoming connect.
* We need a second connection object into which we
* can stick the other QP. */
parent = conn;
conn = parent->c_passive;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (conn)
goto out;
conn = kmem_cache_zalloc(rds_conn_slab, gfp);
if (!conn) {
conn = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
goto out;
}
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&conn->c_hash_node);
conn->c_laddr = laddr;
conn->c_faddr = faddr;
spin_lock_init(&conn->c_lock);
conn->c_next_tx_seq = 1;
rds_conn_net_set(conn, net);
init_waitqueue_head(&conn->c_waitq);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&conn->c_send_queue);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&conn->c_retrans);
ret = rds_cong_get_maps(conn);
if (ret) {
kmem_cache_free(rds_conn_slab, conn);
conn = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto out;
}
/*
* This is where a connection becomes loopback. If *any* RDS sockets
* can bind to the destination address then we'd rather the messages
* flow through loopback rather than either transport.
*/
loop_trans = rds_trans_get_preferred(net, faddr);
if (loop_trans) {
rds_trans_put(loop_trans);
conn->c_loopback = 1;
if (is_outgoing && trans->t_prefer_loopback) {
/* "outgoing" connection - and the transport
* says it wants the connection handled by the
* loopback transport. This is what TCP does.
*/
trans = &rds_loop_transport;
}
}
if (trans == NULL) {
kmem_cache_free(rds_conn_slab, conn);
conn = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
goto out;
}
conn->c_trans = trans;
ret = trans->conn_alloc(conn, gfp);
if (ret) {
kmem_cache_free(rds_conn_slab, conn);
conn = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto out;
}
atomic_set(&conn->c_state, RDS_CONN_DOWN);
conn->c_send_gen = 0;
conn->c_outgoing = (is_outgoing ? 1 : 0);
conn->c_reconnect_jiffies = 0;
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&conn->c_send_w, rds_send_worker);
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&conn->c_recv_w, rds_recv_worker);
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&conn->c_conn_w, rds_connect_worker);
INIT_WORK(&conn->c_down_w, rds_shutdown_worker);
mutex_init(&conn->c_cm_lock);
conn->c_flags = 0;
rdsdebug("allocated conn %p for %pI4 -> %pI4 over %s %s\n",
conn, &laddr, &faddr,
trans->t_name ? trans->t_name : "[unknown]",
is_outgoing ? "(outgoing)" : "");
/*
* Since we ran without holding the conn lock, someone could
* have created the same conn (either normal or passive) in the
* interim. We check while holding the lock. If we won, we complete
* init and return our conn. If we lost, we rollback and return the
* other one.
*/
spin_lock_irqsave(&rds_conn_lock, flags);
if (parent) {
/* Creating passive conn */
if (parent->c_passive) {
trans->conn_free(conn->c_transport_data);
kmem_cache_free(rds_conn_slab, conn);
conn = parent->c_passive;
} else {
parent->c_passive = conn;
rds_cong_add_conn(conn);
rds_conn_count++;
}
} else {
/* Creating normal conn */
struct rds_connection *found;
found = rds_conn_lookup(net, head, laddr, faddr, trans);
if (found) {
trans->conn_free(conn->c_transport_data);
kmem_cache_free(rds_conn_slab, conn);
conn = found;
} else {
hlist_add_head_rcu(&conn->c_hash_node, head);
rds_cong_add_conn(conn);
rds_conn_count++;
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rds_conn_lock, flags);
out:
return conn;
}
Commit Message: RDS: fix race condition when sending a message on unbound socket
Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when
sending a message to an apparently unbound socket. The problem is caused
by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks
the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket. This opens a
race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not
in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to
dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create().
Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if
you're interested.
I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer
with this patch, whereas I could without.
Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937:
74e98eb08588 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection")
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 166,572
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: views::ImageButton* CreateBackButton(views::ButtonListener* listener) {
views::ImageButton* back_button = new views::ImageButton(listener);
back_button->SetImageAlignment(views::ImageButton::ALIGN_LEFT,
views::ImageButton::ALIGN_MIDDLE);
ui::ResourceBundle* rb = &ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
back_button->SetImage(views::ImageButton::STATE_NORMAL,
rb->GetImageSkiaNamed(IDR_BACK));
back_button->SetImage(views::ImageButton::STATE_HOVERED,
rb->GetImageSkiaNamed(IDR_BACK_H));
back_button->SetImage(views::ImageButton::STATE_PRESSED,
rb->GetImageSkiaNamed(IDR_BACK_P));
back_button->SetImage(views::ImageButton::STATE_DISABLED,
rb->GetImageSkiaNamed(IDR_BACK_D));
back_button->SetFocusForPlatform();
return back_button;
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,138
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_pending_event(struct irq_work *entry)
{
struct perf_event *event = container_of(entry,
struct perf_event, pending);
if (event->pending_disable) {
event->pending_disable = 0;
__perf_event_disable(event);
}
if (event->pending_wakeup) {
event->pending_wakeup = 0;
perf_event_wakeup(event);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,139
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int em_jmp_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc;
unsigned short sel;
memcpy(&sel, ctxt->src.valptr + ctxt->op_bytes, 2);
rc = load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, sel, VCPU_SREG_CS);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
ctxt->_eip = 0;
memcpy(&ctxt->_eip, ctxt->src.valptr, ctxt->op_bytes);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps
Far jmp/call/ret may fault while loading a new RIP. Currently KVM does not
handle this case, and may result in failed vm-entry once the assignment is
done. The tricky part of doing so is that loading the new CS affects the
VMCS/VMCB state, so if we fail during loading the new RIP, we are left in
unconsistent state. Therefore, this patch saves on 64-bit the old CS
descriptor and restores it if loading RIP failed.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 166,339
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state,
struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 id,
bool is_null)
{
if (reg_type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id) {
/* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should
* have been known-zero, because we don't allow pointer
* arithmetic on pointers that might be NULL.
*/
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value ||
!tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0) ||
reg->off)) {
__mark_reg_known_zero(reg);
reg->off = 0;
}
if (is_null) {
reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
if (reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta) {
reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
reg->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta;
} else {
reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
}
} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL) {
reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET;
}
if (is_null || !reg_is_refcounted(reg)) {
/* We don't need id from this point onwards anymore,
* thus we should better reset it, so that state
* pruning has chances to take effect.
*/
reg->id = 0;
}
}
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 91,451
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DragOperation DragController::GetDragOperation(DragData* drag_data) {
DCHECK(drag_data);
return drag_data->ContainsURL() && !did_initiate_drag_ ? kDragOperationCopy
: kDragOperationNone;
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 152,276
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long long BlinkTestRunner::GetCurrentTimeInMillisecond() {
return base::TimeDelta(base::Time::Now() -
base::Time::UnixEpoch()).ToInternalValue() /
base::Time::kMicrosecondsPerMillisecond;
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,565
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long perf_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
switch (_IOC_NR(cmd)) {
case _IOC_NR(PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_FILTER):
case _IOC_NR(PERF_EVENT_IOC_ID):
/* Fix up pointer size (usually 4 -> 8 in 32-on-64-bit case */
if (_IOC_SIZE(cmd) == sizeof(compat_uptr_t)) {
cmd &= ~IOCSIZE_MASK;
cmd |= sizeof(void *) << IOCSIZE_SHIFT;
}
break;
}
return perf_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 56,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _zip_cdir_new(zip_uint64_t nentry, zip_error_t *error)
{
zip_cdir_t *cd;
if ((cd=(zip_cdir_t *)malloc(sizeof(*cd))) == NULL) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_MEMORY, 0);
return NULL;
}
cd->entry = NULL;
cd->nentry = cd->nentry_alloc = 0;
cd->size = cd->offset = 0;
cd->comment = NULL;
cd->is_zip64 = false;
if (!_zip_cdir_grow(cd, nentry, error)) {
_zip_cdir_free(cd);
return NULL;
}
return cd;
}
Commit Message: Fix double free().
Found by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter using AFL.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 62,645
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String HTMLFormControlElement::formEnctype() const {
const AtomicString& formEnctypeAttr = fastGetAttribute(formenctypeAttr);
if (formEnctypeAttr.isNull())
return emptyString();
return FormSubmission::Attributes::parseEncodingType(formEnctypeAttr);
}
Commit Message: Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476}
CWE ID: CWE-1021
| 0
| 139,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SessionStore::AreValidSpecifics(const SessionSpecifics& specifics) {
if (specifics.session_tag().empty()) {
return false;
}
if (specifics.has_tab()) {
return specifics.tab_node_id() >= 0 && specifics.tab().tab_id() > 0;
}
if (specifics.has_header()) {
std::set<int> session_tab_ids;
for (const sync_pb::SessionWindow& window : specifics.header().window()) {
for (int tab_id : window.tab()) {
bool success = session_tab_ids.insert(tab_id).second;
if (!success) {
return false;
}
}
}
return !specifics.has_tab() &&
specifics.tab_node_id() == TabNodePool::kInvalidTabNodeID;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add trace event to sync_sessions::OnReadAllMetadata()
It is likely a cause of janks on UI thread on Android.
Add a trace event to get metrics about the duration.
BUG=902203
Change-Id: I4c4e9c2a20790264b982007ea7ee88ddfa7b972c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1319369
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <mastiz@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: ssid <ssid@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606104}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::FindGroup(int64_t group_id, GroupRecord* record) {
DCHECK(record);
if (!LazyOpen(kDontCreate))
return false;
static const char kSql[] =
"SELECT group_id, origin, manifest_url,"
" creation_time, last_access_time,"
" last_full_update_check_time,"
" first_evictable_error_time"
" FROM Groups WHERE group_id = ?";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt64(0, group_id);
if (!statement.Step())
return false;
ReadGroupRecord(statement, record);
DCHECK(record->group_id == group_id);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,276
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: eXosip_set_cbsip_message (struct eXosip_t *excontext, CbSipCallback cbsipCallback)
{
excontext->cbsipCallback = cbsipCallback;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 17,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mem_cgroup_force_empty(struct mem_cgroup *memcg, bool free_all)
{
int ret;
int node, zid, shrink;
int nr_retries = MEM_CGROUP_RECLAIM_RETRIES;
struct cgroup *cgrp = memcg->css.cgroup;
css_get(&memcg->css);
shrink = 0;
/* should free all ? */
if (free_all)
goto try_to_free;
move_account:
do {
ret = -EBUSY;
if (cgroup_task_count(cgrp) || !list_empty(&cgrp->children))
goto out;
ret = -EINTR;
if (signal_pending(current))
goto out;
/* This is for making all *used* pages to be on LRU. */
lru_add_drain_all();
drain_all_stock_sync(memcg);
ret = 0;
mem_cgroup_start_move(memcg);
for_each_node_state(node, N_HIGH_MEMORY) {
for (zid = 0; !ret && zid < MAX_NR_ZONES; zid++) {
enum lru_list l;
for_each_lru(l) {
ret = mem_cgroup_force_empty_list(memcg,
node, zid, l);
if (ret)
break;
}
}
if (ret)
break;
}
mem_cgroup_end_move(memcg);
memcg_oom_recover(memcg);
/* it seems parent cgroup doesn't have enough mem */
if (ret == -ENOMEM)
goto try_to_free;
cond_resched();
/* "ret" should also be checked to ensure all lists are empty. */
} while (memcg->res.usage > 0 || ret);
out:
css_put(&memcg->css);
return ret;
try_to_free:
/* returns EBUSY if there is a task or if we come here twice. */
if (cgroup_task_count(cgrp) || !list_empty(&cgrp->children) || shrink) {
ret = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
/* we call try-to-free pages for make this cgroup empty */
lru_add_drain_all();
/* try to free all pages in this cgroup */
shrink = 1;
while (nr_retries && memcg->res.usage > 0) {
int progress;
if (signal_pending(current)) {
ret = -EINTR;
goto out;
}
progress = try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages(memcg, GFP_KERNEL,
false);
if (!progress) {
nr_retries--;
/* maybe some writeback is necessary */
congestion_wait(BLK_RW_ASYNC, HZ/10);
}
}
lru_add_drain();
/* try move_account...there may be some *locked* pages. */
goto move_account;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,058
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_release_dquot(struct dquot *dquot)
{
int ret, err;
handle_t *handle;
handle = ext4_journal_start(dquot_to_inode(dquot), EXT4_HT_QUOTA,
EXT4_QUOTA_DEL_BLOCKS(dquot->dq_sb));
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
/* Release dquot anyway to avoid endless cycle in dqput() */
dquot_release(dquot);
return PTR_ERR(handle);
}
ret = dquot_release(dquot);
err = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (!ret)
ret = err;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 56,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void list_add_connection(struct mt_connection *conn) {
DL_APPEND(connections_head, conn);
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 50,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SplashCoord Splash::getMiterLimit() {
return state->miterLimit;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,264
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderMessageCompletionCallback(RenderMessageFilter* filter,
IPC::Message* reply_msg)
: filter_(filter),
reply_msg_(reply_msg) {
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 116,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: METHODDEF(JDIMENSION)
get_gray_cmyk_row(j_compress_ptr cinfo, cjpeg_source_ptr sinfo)
/* This version is for reading raw-byte-format PGM files with any maxval
and converting to CMYK */
{
ppm_source_ptr source = (ppm_source_ptr)sinfo;
register JSAMPROW ptr;
register U_CHAR *bufferptr;
register JSAMPLE *rescale = source->rescale;
JDIMENSION col;
unsigned int maxval = source->maxval;
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, source->iobuffer, source->buffer_width))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
ptr = source->pub.buffer[0];
bufferptr = source->iobuffer;
if (maxval == MAXJSAMPLE) {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
JSAMPLE gray = *bufferptr++;
rgb_to_cmyk(gray, gray, gray, ptr, ptr + 1, ptr + 2, ptr + 3);
ptr += 4;
}
} else {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
JSAMPLE gray = rescale[UCH(*bufferptr++)];
rgb_to_cmyk(gray, gray, gray, ptr, ptr + 1, ptr + 2, ptr + 3);
ptr += 4;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: cjpeg: Fix OOB read caused by malformed 8-bit BMP
... in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the
number of palette entries.
Fix partly borrowed from jpeg-9c. This commit also adopts Guido's
JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE enum value in lieu of our project-specific
JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE enum value.
Fixes #258
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 93,215
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptLoader::~ScriptLoader()
{
stopLoadRequest();
}
Commit Message: Apply 'x-content-type-options' check to dynamically inserted script.
BUG=348581
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/185593011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@168570 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 115,370
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int fanout_demux_rollover(struct packet_fanout *f,
struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int idx, bool try_self,
unsigned int num)
{
struct packet_sock *po, *po_next, *po_skip = NULL;
unsigned int i, j, room = ROOM_NONE;
po = pkt_sk(f->arr[idx]);
if (try_self) {
room = packet_rcv_has_room(po, skb);
if (room == ROOM_NORMAL ||
(room == ROOM_LOW && !fanout_flow_is_huge(po, skb)))
return idx;
po_skip = po;
}
i = j = min_t(int, po->rollover->sock, num - 1);
do {
po_next = pkt_sk(f->arr[i]);
if (po_next != po_skip && !po_next->pressure &&
packet_rcv_has_room(po_next, skb) == ROOM_NORMAL) {
if (i != j)
po->rollover->sock = i;
atomic_long_inc(&po->rollover->num);
if (room == ROOM_LOW)
atomic_long_inc(&po->rollover->num_huge);
return i;
}
if (++i == num)
i = 0;
} while (i != j);
atomic_long_inc(&po->rollover->num_failed);
return idx;
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 49,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void usbhid_mark_busy(struct usbhid_device *usbhid)
{
struct usb_interface *intf = usbhid->intf;
usb_mark_last_busy(interface_to_usbdev(intf));
}
Commit Message: HID: usbhid: fix out-of-bounds bug
The hid descriptor identifies the length and type of subordinate
descriptors for a device. If the received hid descriptor is smaller than
the size of the struct hid_descriptor, it is possible to cause
out-of-bounds.
In addition, if bNumDescriptors of the hid descriptor have an incorrect
value, this can also cause out-of-bounds while approaching hdesc->desc[n].
So check the size of hid descriptor and bNumDescriptors.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006c5f8edf by task kworker/1:2/1261
CPU: 1 PID: 1261 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted
4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #169
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1004
hid_add_device+0x16b/0xb30 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2944
usbhid_probe+0xc28/0x1100 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1369
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaejoong Kim <climbbb.kim@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 59,826
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabStripModel::SelectRelativeTab(bool next) {
if (contents_data_.empty())
return;
int index = active_index();
int delta = next ? 1 : -1;
index = (index + count() + delta) % count();
ActivateTabAt(index, true);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void cJSON_DeleteItemFromArray( cJSON *array, int which )
{
cJSON_Delete( cJSON_DetachItemFromArray( array, which ) );
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 167,282
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ALWAYS_INLINE JsVar *jsvLockAgain(JsVar *var) {
assert(var);
assert(jsvGetLocks(var) < JSV_LOCK_MAX);
var->flags += JSV_LOCK_ONE;
return var;
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 82,500
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Dispatcher::OnUpdatePermissions(
const ExtensionMsg_UpdatePermissions_Params& params) {
const Extension* extension =
RendererExtensionRegistry::Get()->GetByID(params.extension_id);
if (!extension)
return;
scoped_ptr<const PermissionSet> active =
params.active_permissions.ToPermissionSet();
scoped_ptr<const PermissionSet> withheld =
params.withheld_permissions.ToPermissionSet();
UpdateOriginPermissions(
extension->url(),
extension->permissions_data()->GetEffectiveHostPermissions(),
active->effective_hosts());
extension->permissions_data()->SetPermissions(std::move(active),
std::move(withheld));
UpdateBindings(extension->id());
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,569
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HistoryController::UpdateForCommit(RenderFrameImpl* frame,
const WebHistoryItem& item,
WebHistoryCommitType commit_type,
bool navigation_within_page) {
switch (commit_type) {
case blink::WebBackForwardCommit:
if (!provisional_entry_)
return;
current_entry_.reset(provisional_entry_.release());
if (HistoryEntry::HistoryNode* node =
current_entry_->GetHistoryNodeForFrame(frame)) {
node->set_item(item);
}
break;
case blink::WebStandardCommit:
CreateNewBackForwardItem(frame, item, navigation_within_page);
break;
case blink::WebInitialCommitInChildFrame:
UpdateForInitialLoadInChildFrame(frame, item);
break;
case blink::WebHistoryInertCommit:
if (current_entry_) {
if (HistoryEntry::HistoryNode* node =
current_entry_->GetHistoryNodeForFrame(frame)) {
if (!navigation_within_page)
node->RemoveChildren();
node->set_item(item);
}
}
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Invalid commit type: " << commit_type;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix HistoryEntry corruption when commit isn't for provisional entry.
BUG=597322
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1848103004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#384659}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 1
| 172,565
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DecodeIPV6FragHeader(Packet *p, uint8_t *pkt,
uint16_t hdrextlen, uint16_t plen,
uint16_t prev_hdrextlen)
{
uint16_t frag_offset = (*(pkt + 2) << 8 | *(pkt + 3)) & 0xFFF8;
int frag_morefrags = (*(pkt + 2) << 8 | *(pkt + 3)) & 0x0001;
p->ip6eh.fh_offset = frag_offset;
p->ip6eh.fh_more_frags_set = frag_morefrags ? TRUE : FALSE;
p->ip6eh.fh_nh = *pkt;
uint32_t fh_id;
memcpy(&fh_id, pkt+4, 4);
p->ip6eh.fh_id = SCNtohl(fh_id);
SCLogDebug("IPV6 FH: offset %u, mf %s, nh %u, id %u/%x",
p->ip6eh.fh_offset,
p->ip6eh.fh_more_frags_set ? "true" : "false",
p->ip6eh.fh_nh,
p->ip6eh.fh_id, p->ip6eh.fh_id);
uint16_t frag_hdr_offset = (uint16_t)(pkt - GET_PKT_DATA(p));
uint16_t data_offset = (uint16_t)(frag_hdr_offset + hdrextlen);
uint16_t data_len = plen - hdrextlen;
p->ip6eh.fh_header_offset = frag_hdr_offset;
p->ip6eh.fh_data_offset = data_offset;
p->ip6eh.fh_data_len = data_len;
/* if we have a prev hdr, store the type and offset of it */
if (prev_hdrextlen) {
p->ip6eh.fh_prev_hdr_offset = frag_hdr_offset - prev_hdrextlen;
}
SCLogDebug("IPV6 FH: frag_hdr_offset %u, data_offset %u, data_len %u",
p->ip6eh.fh_header_offset, p->ip6eh.fh_data_offset,
p->ip6eh.fh_data_len);
}
Commit Message: teredo: be stricter on what to consider valid teredo
Invalid Teredo can lead to valid DNS traffic (or other UDP traffic)
being misdetected as Teredo. This leads to false negatives in the
UDP payload inspection.
Make the teredo code only consider a packet teredo if the encapsulated
data was decoded without any 'invalid' events being set.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 87,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: my_object_many_args (MyObject *obj, guint32 x, const char *str, double trouble, double *d_ret, char **str_ret, GError **error)
{
*d_ret = trouble + (x * 2);
*str_ret = g_ascii_strup (str, -1);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 165,110
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err lsrc_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_LASERConfigurationBox *p = (GF_LASERConfigurationBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "LASeRConfigurationBox", trace);
dump_data_attribute(trace, "LASeRHeader", p->hdr, p->hdr_size);
fprintf(trace, ">");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("LASeRConfigurationBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,784
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::VoidMethodOptionalLongArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodOptionalLongArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodOptionalLongArgMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,454
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u32 veth_get_rx_csum(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct veth_priv *priv;
priv = netdev_priv(dev);
return priv->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,043
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MediaStreamManager::FindRequest(const std::string& label) const {
for (const LabeledDeviceRequest& labeled_request : requests_) {
if (labeled_request.first == label)
return labeled_request.second;
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: urip_checkURL(const char *URL) {
xmlDocPtr doc;
doc = xmlReadFile(URL, NULL, 0);
if (doc == NULL)
return(-1);
xmlFreeDoc(doc);
return(1);
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 59,648
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Layer::SetNonFastScrollableRegion(const Region& region) {
DCHECK(IsPropertyChangeAllowed());
if (non_fast_scrollable_region_ == region)
return;
non_fast_scrollable_region_ = region;
SetNeedsCommit();
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,923
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void insert_mark(uintmax_t idnum, struct object_entry *oe)
{
struct mark_set *s = marks;
while ((idnum >> s->shift) >= 1024) {
s = pool_calloc(1, sizeof(struct mark_set));
s->shift = marks->shift + 10;
s->data.sets[0] = marks;
marks = s;
}
while (s->shift) {
uintmax_t i = idnum >> s->shift;
idnum -= i << s->shift;
if (!s->data.sets[i]) {
s->data.sets[i] = pool_calloc(1, sizeof(struct mark_set));
s->data.sets[i]->shift = s->shift - 10;
}
s = s->data.sets[i];
}
if (!s->data.marked[idnum])
marks_set_count++;
s->data.marked[idnum] = oe;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::GetBlockCapacity(size_t block_index) const {
if ((block_index + 1) == blocks_count_) {
size_t result = max_buffer_capacity_bytes_ % kBlockSizeBytes;
if (result == 0) { // whole block
result = kBlockSizeBytes;
}
return result;
} else {
return kBlockSizeBytes;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB Write in QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::OnStreamData
BUG=778505
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I1dfd1d26a2c7ee8fe047f7fe6e4ac2e9b97efa52
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/748282
Commit-Queue: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513144}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 150,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ip6_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi6 *fl6,
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt, int tclass)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *first_hop = &fl6->daddr;
struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
struct ipv6hdr *hdr;
u8 proto = fl6->flowi6_proto;
int seg_len = skb->len;
int hlimit = -1;
u32 mtu;
if (opt) {
unsigned int head_room;
/* First: exthdrs may take lots of space (~8K for now)
MAX_HEADER is not enough.
*/
head_room = opt->opt_nflen + opt->opt_flen;
seg_len += head_room;
head_room += sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dst->dev);
if (skb_headroom(skb) < head_room) {
struct sk_buff *skb2 = skb_realloc_headroom(skb, head_room);
if (skb2 == NULL) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -ENOBUFS;
}
consume_skb(skb);
skb = skb2;
skb_set_owner_w(skb, sk);
}
if (opt->opt_flen)
ipv6_push_frag_opts(skb, opt, &proto);
if (opt->opt_nflen)
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts(skb, opt, &proto, &first_hop);
}
skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
/*
* Fill in the IPv6 header
*/
if (np)
hlimit = np->hop_limit;
if (hlimit < 0)
hlimit = ip6_dst_hoplimit(dst);
ip6_flow_hdr(hdr, tclass, fl6->flowlabel);
hdr->payload_len = htons(seg_len);
hdr->nexthdr = proto;
hdr->hop_limit = hlimit;
hdr->saddr = fl6->saddr;
hdr->daddr = *first_hop;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
skb->priority = sk->sk_priority;
skb->mark = sk->sk_mark;
mtu = dst_mtu(dst);
if ((skb->len <= mtu) || skb->local_df || skb_is_gso(skb)) {
IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_OUT, skb->len);
return NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, skb, NULL,
dst->dev, dst_output);
}
skb->dev = dst->dev;
ipv6_local_error(sk, EMSGSIZE, fl6, mtu);
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)), IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: udp packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO
In the following scenario the socket is corked:
If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the
write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller
than the mtu would be appended to the already queued up gso-skb via
plain ip6_append_data. This causes random memory corruptions.
In ip6_ufo_append_data we also have to be careful to not queue up the
same skb multiple times. So setup the gso frame only when no first skb
is available.
This also fixes a shortcoming where we add the current packet's length to
cork->length but return early because of a packet > mtu with dontfrag set
(instead of sutracting it again).
Found with trinity.
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,619
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int unregister_console(struct console *console)
{
struct console *a, *b;
int res = 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_A11Y_BRAILLE_CONSOLE
if (console->flags & CON_BRL)
return braille_unregister_console(console);
#endif
console_lock();
if (console_drivers == console) {
console_drivers=console->next;
res = 0;
} else if (console_drivers) {
for (a=console_drivers->next, b=console_drivers ;
a; b=a, a=b->next) {
if (a == console) {
b->next = a->next;
res = 0;
break;
}
}
}
/*
* If this isn't the last console and it has CON_CONSDEV set, we
* need to set it on the next preferred console.
*/
if (console_drivers != NULL && console->flags & CON_CONSDEV)
console_drivers->flags |= CON_CONSDEV;
console_unlock();
console_sysfs_notify();
return res;
}
Commit Message: printk: fix buffer overflow when calling log_prefix function from call_console_drivers
This patch corrects a buffer overflow in kernels from 3.0 to 3.4 when calling
log_prefix() function from call_console_drivers().
This bug existed in previous releases but has been revealed with commit
162a7e7500f9664636e649ba59defe541b7c2c60 (2.6.39 => 3.0) that made changes
about how to allocate memory for early printk buffer (use of memblock_alloc).
It disappears with commit 7ff9554bb578ba02166071d2d487b7fc7d860d62 (3.4 => 3.5)
that does a refactoring of printk buffer management.
In log_prefix(), the access to "p[0]", "p[1]", "p[2]" or
"simple_strtoul(&p[1], &endp, 10)" may cause a buffer overflow as this
function is called from call_console_drivers by passing "&LOG_BUF(cur_index)"
where the index must be masked to do not exceed the buffer's boundary.
The trick is to prepare in call_console_drivers() a buffer with the necessary
data (PRI field of syslog message) to be safely evaluated in log_prefix().
This patch can be applied to stable kernel branches 3.0.y, 3.2.y and 3.4.y.
Without this patch, one can freeze a server running this loop from shell :
$ export DUMMY=`cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc '12345AZERTYUIOPQSDFGHJKLMWXCVBNazertyuiopqsdfghjklmwxcvbn' | head -c255`
$ while true do ; echo $DUMMY > /dev/kmsg ; done
The "server freeze" depends on where memblock_alloc does allocate printk buffer :
if the buffer overflow is inside another kernel allocation the problem may not
be revealed, else the server may hangs up.
Signed-off-by: Alexandre SIMON <Alexandre.Simon@univ-lorraine.fr>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 33,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ar6000_rx_refill(void *Context, HTC_ENDPOINT_ID Endpoint)
{
struct ar6_softc *ar = (struct ar6_softc *)Context;
void *osBuf;
int RxBuffers;
int buffersToRefill;
struct htc_packet *pPacket;
struct htc_packet_queue queue;
buffersToRefill = (int)AR6000_MAX_RX_BUFFERS -
HTCGetNumRecvBuffers(ar->arHtcTarget, Endpoint);
if (buffersToRefill <= 0) {
/* fast return, nothing to fill */
return;
}
INIT_HTC_PACKET_QUEUE(&queue);
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_WLAN_RX,("ar6000_rx_refill: providing htc with %d buffers at eid=%d\n",
buffersToRefill, Endpoint));
for (RxBuffers = 0; RxBuffers < buffersToRefill; RxBuffers++) {
osBuf = A_NETBUF_ALLOC(AR6000_BUFFER_SIZE);
if (NULL == osBuf) {
break;
}
/* the HTC packet wrapper is at the head of the reserved area
* in the skb */
pPacket = (struct htc_packet *)(A_NETBUF_HEAD(osBuf));
/* set re-fill info */
SET_HTC_PACKET_INFO_RX_REFILL(pPacket,osBuf,A_NETBUF_DATA(osBuf),AR6000_BUFFER_SIZE,Endpoint);
/* add to queue */
HTC_PACKET_ENQUEUE(&queue,pPacket);
}
if (!HTC_QUEUE_EMPTY(&queue)) {
/* add packets */
HTCAddReceivePktMultiple(ar->arHtcTarget, &queue);
}
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static VOID MiniportEnableInterruptEx(IN PVOID MiniportInterruptContext)
{
DEBUG_ENTRY(0);
PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext = (PARANDIS_ADAPTER *)MiniportInterruptContext;
for (UINT i = 0; i < pContext->nPathBundles; i++)
{
pContext->pPathBundles[i].txPath.EnableInterrupts();
pContext->pPathBundles[i].rxPath.EnableInterrupts();
}
if (pContext->bCXPathCreated)
{
pContext->CXPath.EnableInterrupts();
}
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 96,349
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileSystemOperation::DoCopy(const StatusCallback& callback) {
FileSystemFileUtilProxy::Copy(
&operation_context_,
src_util_, dest_util_,
src_path_, dest_path_,
base::Bind(&FileSystemOperation::DidFinishFileOperation,
base::Owned(this), callback));
}
Commit Message: Crash fix in fileapi::FileSystemOperation::DidGetUsageAndQuotaAndRunTask
https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10008047 introduced delete-with-inflight-tasks in Write sequence but I failed to convert this callback to use WeakPtr().
BUG=128178
TEST=manual test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10408006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137635 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int piv_get_pin_preference(sc_card_t *card, int *ptr)
{
piv_private_data_t * priv = PIV_DATA(card);
*ptr = priv->pin_preference;
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit michael_mic_exit(void)
{
crypto_unregister_shash(&alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Smb4KGlobal::removeHost( Smb4KHost *host )
{
Q_ASSERT( host );
bool removed = false;
mutex.lock();
int index = p->hostsList.indexOf( host );
if ( index != -1 )
{
delete p->hostsList.takeAt( index );
removed = true;
}
else
{
Smb4KHost *h = findHost( host->hostName(), host->workgroupName() );
if ( h )
{
index = p->hostsList.indexOf( h );
if ( index != -1 )
{
delete p->hostsList.takeAt( index );
removed = true;
}
else
{
}
}
else
{
}
delete host;
}
mutex.unlock();
return removed;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: getAttributeId(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *start,
const char *end) {
DTD *const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
ATTRIBUTE_ID *id;
const XML_Char *name;
if (! poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, XML_T('\0')))
return NULL;
name = poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, start, end);
if (! name)
return NULL;
/* skip quotation mark - its storage will be re-used (like in name[-1]) */
++name;
id = (ATTRIBUTE_ID *)lookup(parser, &dtd->attributeIds, name,
sizeof(ATTRIBUTE_ID));
if (! id)
return NULL;
if (id->name != name)
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
else {
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
if (! parser->m_ns)
;
else if (name[0] == XML_T(ASCII_x) && name[1] == XML_T(ASCII_m)
&& name[2] == XML_T(ASCII_l) && name[3] == XML_T(ASCII_n)
&& name[4] == XML_T(ASCII_s)
&& (name[5] == XML_T('\0') || name[5] == XML_T(ASCII_COLON))) {
if (name[5] == XML_T('\0'))
id->prefix = &dtd->defaultPrefix;
else
id->prefix = (PREFIX *)lookup(parser, &dtd->prefixes, name + 6,
sizeof(PREFIX));
id->xmlns = XML_TRUE;
} else {
int i;
for (i = 0; name[i]; i++) {
/* attributes without prefix are *not* in the default namespace */
if (name[i] == XML_T(ASCII_COLON)) {
int j;
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
if (! poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, name[j]))
return NULL;
}
if (! poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, XML_T('\0')))
return NULL;
id->prefix = (PREFIX *)lookup(parser, &dtd->prefixes,
poolStart(&dtd->pool), sizeof(PREFIX));
if (! id->prefix)
return NULL;
if (id->prefix->name == poolStart(&dtd->pool))
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
else
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
break;
}
}
}
}
return id;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 88,271
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableOnDeviceChange(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetOnDeviceChangeEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 154,648
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.