instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DownloadRequestLimiter::GetDownloadStatus(content::WebContents* web_contents) {
TabDownloadState* state = GetDownloadState(web_contents, nullptr, false);
return state ? state->download_status() : ALLOW_ONE_DOWNLOAD;
}
Commit Message: Don't reset TabDownloadState on history back/forward
Currently performing forward/backward on a tab will reset the TabDownloadState.
Which allows javascript code to do trigger multiple downloads.
This CL disables that behavior by not resetting the TabDownloadState on
forward/back.
It is still possible to reset the TabDownloadState through user gesture
or using browser initiated download.
BUG=848535
Change-Id: I7f9bf6e8fb759b4dcddf5ac0c214e8c6c9f48863
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1108959
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#574437}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 154,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __unmap_and_move(struct page *page, struct page *newpage,
int force, enum migrate_mode mode)
{
int rc = -EAGAIN;
int page_was_mapped = 0;
struct anon_vma *anon_vma = NULL;
bool is_lru = !__PageMovable(page);
if (!trylock_page(page)) {
if (!force || mode == MIGRATE_ASYNC)
goto out;
/*
* It's not safe for direct compaction to call lock_page.
* For example, during page readahead pages are added locked
* to the LRU. Later, when the IO completes the pages are
* marked uptodate and unlocked. However, the queueing
* could be merging multiple pages for one bio (e.g.
* mpage_readpages). If an allocation happens for the
* second or third page, the process can end up locking
* the same page twice and deadlocking. Rather than
* trying to be clever about what pages can be locked,
* avoid the use of lock_page for direct compaction
* altogether.
*/
if (current->flags & PF_MEMALLOC)
goto out;
lock_page(page);
}
if (PageWriteback(page)) {
/*
* Only in the case of a full synchronous migration is it
* necessary to wait for PageWriteback. In the async case,
* the retry loop is too short and in the sync-light case,
* the overhead of stalling is too much
*/
if (mode != MIGRATE_SYNC) {
rc = -EBUSY;
goto out_unlock;
}
if (!force)
goto out_unlock;
wait_on_page_writeback(page);
}
/*
* By try_to_unmap(), page->mapcount goes down to 0 here. In this case,
* we cannot notice that anon_vma is freed while we migrates a page.
* This get_anon_vma() delays freeing anon_vma pointer until the end
* of migration. File cache pages are no problem because of page_lock()
* File Caches may use write_page() or lock_page() in migration, then,
* just care Anon page here.
*
* Only page_get_anon_vma() understands the subtleties of
* getting a hold on an anon_vma from outside one of its mms.
* But if we cannot get anon_vma, then we won't need it anyway,
* because that implies that the anon page is no longer mapped
* (and cannot be remapped so long as we hold the page lock).
*/
if (PageAnon(page) && !PageKsm(page))
anon_vma = page_get_anon_vma(page);
/*
* Block others from accessing the new page when we get around to
* establishing additional references. We are usually the only one
* holding a reference to newpage at this point. We used to have a BUG
* here if trylock_page(newpage) fails, but would like to allow for
* cases where there might be a race with the previous use of newpage.
* This is much like races on refcount of oldpage: just don't BUG().
*/
if (unlikely(!trylock_page(newpage)))
goto out_unlock;
if (unlikely(!is_lru)) {
rc = move_to_new_page(newpage, page, mode);
goto out_unlock_both;
}
/*
* Corner case handling:
* 1. When a new swap-cache page is read into, it is added to the LRU
* and treated as swapcache but it has no rmap yet.
* Calling try_to_unmap() against a page->mapping==NULL page will
* trigger a BUG. So handle it here.
* 2. An orphaned page (see truncate_complete_page) might have
* fs-private metadata. The page can be picked up due to memory
* offlining. Everywhere else except page reclaim, the page is
* invisible to the vm, so the page can not be migrated. So try to
* free the metadata, so the page can be freed.
*/
if (!page->mapping) {
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageAnon(page), page);
if (page_has_private(page)) {
try_to_free_buffers(page);
goto out_unlock_both;
}
} else if (page_mapped(page)) {
/* Establish migration ptes */
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageAnon(page) && !PageKsm(page) && !anon_vma,
page);
try_to_unmap(page,
TTU_MIGRATION|TTU_IGNORE_MLOCK|TTU_IGNORE_ACCESS);
page_was_mapped = 1;
}
if (!page_mapped(page))
rc = move_to_new_page(newpage, page, mode);
if (page_was_mapped)
remove_migration_ptes(page,
rc == MIGRATEPAGE_SUCCESS ? newpage : page, false);
out_unlock_both:
unlock_page(newpage);
out_unlock:
/* Drop an anon_vma reference if we took one */
if (anon_vma)
put_anon_vma(anon_vma);
unlock_page(page);
out:
/*
* If migration is successful, decrease refcount of the newpage
* which will not free the page because new page owner increased
* refcounter. As well, if it is LRU page, add the page to LRU
* list in here.
*/
if (rc == MIGRATEPAGE_SUCCESS) {
if (unlikely(__PageMovable(newpage)))
put_page(newpage);
else
putback_lru_page(newpage);
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize 'move_pages()' permission checks
The 'move_paghes()' system call was introduced long long ago with the
same permission checks as for sending a signal (except using
CAP_SYS_NICE instead of CAP_SYS_KILL for the overriding capability).
That turns out to not be a great choice - while the system call really
only moves physical page allocations around (and you need other
capabilities to do a lot of it), you can check the return value to map
out some the virtual address choices and defeat ASLR of a binary that
still shares your uid.
So change the access checks to the more common 'ptrace_may_access()'
model instead.
This tightens the access checks for the uid, and also effectively
changes the CAP_SYS_NICE check to CAP_SYS_PTRACE, but it's unlikely that
anybody really _uses_ this legacy system call any more (we hav ebetter
NUMA placement models these days), so I expect nobody to notice.
Famous last words.
Reported-by: Otto Ebeling <otto.ebeling@iki.fi>
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 61,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::ShowDownloadInShell(DownloadItemImpl* download) {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->ShowDownloadInShell(download);
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool NavigationControllerImpl::IsURLInPageNavigation(
const GURL& url,
const url::Origin& origin,
bool renderer_says_in_page,
RenderFrameHost* rfh) const {
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfhi = static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(rfh);
GURL last_committed_url;
if (rfh->GetParent()) {
last_committed_url = rfhi->frame_tree_node()->current_url();
} else {
NavigationEntry* last_committed = GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (!last_committed)
return false;
last_committed_url = last_committed->GetURL();
}
WebPreferences prefs = rfh->GetRenderViewHost()->GetWebkitPreferences();
const url::Origin& committed_origin =
rfhi->frame_tree_node()->current_origin();
bool is_same_origin = last_committed_url.is_empty() ||
last_committed_url == url::kAboutBlankURL ||
last_committed_url.GetOrigin() == url.GetOrigin() ||
committed_origin == origin ||
!prefs.web_security_enabled ||
(prefs.allow_universal_access_from_file_urls &&
committed_origin.scheme() == url::kFileScheme);
if (!is_same_origin && renderer_says_in_page) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(rfh->GetProcess(),
bad_message::NC_IN_PAGE_NAVIGATION);
}
return is_same_origin && renderer_says_in_page;
}
Commit Message: Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,790
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: template<> const SVGEnumerationStringEntries& getStaticStringEntries<ColorMatrixType>()
{
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(SVGEnumerationStringEntries, entries, ());
if (entries.isEmpty()) {
entries.append(std::make_pair(FECOLORMATRIX_TYPE_MATRIX, "matrix"));
entries.append(std::make_pair(FECOLORMATRIX_TYPE_SATURATE, "saturate"));
entries.append(std::make_pair(FECOLORMATRIX_TYPE_HUEROTATE, "hueRotate"));
entries.append(std::make_pair(FECOLORMATRIX_TYPE_LUMINANCETOALPHA, "luminanceToAlpha"));
}
return entries;
}
Commit Message: Explicitly enforce values size in feColorMatrix.
R=senorblanco@chromium.org
BUG=468519
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1075413002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@193571 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _ksba_cert_cmp (ksba_cert_t a, ksba_cert_t b)
{
const unsigned char *img_a, *img_b;
size_t len_a, len_b;
img_a = ksba_cert_get_image (a, &len_a);
if (!img_a)
return 1;
img_b = ksba_cert_get_image (b, &len_b);
if (!img_b)
return 1;
return !(len_a == len_b && !memcmp (img_a, img_b, len_a));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void prep_new_huge_page(struct hstate *h, struct page *page, int nid)
{
set_compound_page_dtor(page, free_huge_page);
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
h->nr_huge_pages++;
h->nr_huge_pages_node[nid]++;
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
put_page(page); /* free it into the hugepage allocator */
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,249
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileSystemManagerImpl::ReadDirectorySync(
const GURL& path,
ReadDirectorySyncCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
FileSystemURL url(context_->CrackURL(path));
base::Optional<base::File::Error> opt_error = ValidateFileSystemURL(url);
if (opt_error) {
std::move(callback).Run(std::vector<filesystem::mojom::DirectoryEntryPtr>(),
opt_error.value());
return;
}
if (!security_policy_->CanReadFileSystemFile(process_id_, url)) {
std::move(callback).Run(std::vector<filesystem::mojom::DirectoryEntryPtr>(),
base::File::FILE_ERROR_SECURITY);
return;
}
operation_runner()->ReadDirectory(
url, base::BindRepeating(
&FileSystemManagerImpl::DidReadDirectorySync, GetWeakPtr(),
base::Owned(
new ReadDirectorySyncCallbackEntry(std::move(callback)))));
}
Commit Message: Disable FileSystemManager::CreateWriter if WritableFiles isn't enabled.
Bug: 922677
Change-Id: Ib16137cbabb2ec07f1ffc0484722f1d9cc533404
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1416570
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623552}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,053
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: irc_server_xfer_send_ready_cb (void *data, const char *signal,
const char *type_data, void *signal_data)
{
struct t_infolist *infolist;
struct t_irc_server *ptr_server;
const char *plugin_name, *plugin_id, *type, *filename;
int spaces_in_name;
/* make C compiler happy */
(void) data;
(void) signal;
(void) type_data;
infolist = (struct t_infolist *)signal_data;
if (weechat_infolist_next (infolist))
{
plugin_name = weechat_infolist_string (infolist, "plugin_name");
plugin_id = weechat_infolist_string (infolist, "plugin_id");
if (plugin_name && (strcmp (plugin_name, IRC_PLUGIN_NAME) == 0) && plugin_id)
{
ptr_server = irc_server_search (plugin_id);
if (ptr_server)
{
type = weechat_infolist_string (infolist, "type");
if (type)
{
if (strcmp (type, "file_send") == 0)
{
filename = weechat_infolist_string (infolist, "filename");
spaces_in_name = (strchr (filename, ' ') != NULL);
irc_server_sendf (ptr_server,
IRC_SERVER_SEND_OUTQ_PRIO_HIGH, NULL,
"PRIVMSG %s :\01DCC SEND %s%s%s "
"%s %d %s\01",
weechat_infolist_string (infolist, "remote_nick"),
(spaces_in_name) ? "\"" : "",
filename,
(spaces_in_name) ? "\"" : "",
weechat_infolist_string (infolist, "address"),
weechat_infolist_integer (infolist, "port"),
weechat_infolist_string (infolist, "size"));
}
else if (strcmp (type, "chat_send") == 0)
{
irc_server_sendf (ptr_server,
IRC_SERVER_SEND_OUTQ_PRIO_HIGH, NULL,
"PRIVMSG %s :\01DCC CHAT chat %s %d\01",
weechat_infolist_string (infolist, "remote_nick"),
weechat_infolist_string (infolist, "address"),
weechat_infolist_integer (infolist, "port"));
}
}
}
}
}
weechat_infolist_reset_item_cursor (infolist);
return WEECHAT_RC_OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,531
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: addBinding(XML_Parser parser, PREFIX *prefix, const ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId,
const XML_Char *uri, BINDING **bindingsPtr) {
static const XML_Char xmlNamespace[]
= {ASCII_h, ASCII_t, ASCII_t, ASCII_p, ASCII_COLON,
ASCII_SLASH, ASCII_SLASH, ASCII_w, ASCII_w, ASCII_w,
ASCII_PERIOD, ASCII_w, ASCII_3, ASCII_PERIOD, ASCII_o,
ASCII_r, ASCII_g, ASCII_SLASH, ASCII_X, ASCII_M,
ASCII_L, ASCII_SLASH, ASCII_1, ASCII_9, ASCII_9,
ASCII_8, ASCII_SLASH, ASCII_n, ASCII_a, ASCII_m,
ASCII_e, ASCII_s, ASCII_p, ASCII_a, ASCII_c,
ASCII_e, '\0'};
static const int xmlLen = (int)sizeof(xmlNamespace) / sizeof(XML_Char) - 1;
static const XML_Char xmlnsNamespace[]
= {ASCII_h, ASCII_t, ASCII_t, ASCII_p, ASCII_COLON, ASCII_SLASH,
ASCII_SLASH, ASCII_w, ASCII_w, ASCII_w, ASCII_PERIOD, ASCII_w,
ASCII_3, ASCII_PERIOD, ASCII_o, ASCII_r, ASCII_g, ASCII_SLASH,
ASCII_2, ASCII_0, ASCII_0, ASCII_0, ASCII_SLASH, ASCII_x,
ASCII_m, ASCII_l, ASCII_n, ASCII_s, ASCII_SLASH, '\0'};
static const int xmlnsLen
= (int)sizeof(xmlnsNamespace) / sizeof(XML_Char) - 1;
XML_Bool mustBeXML = XML_FALSE;
XML_Bool isXML = XML_TRUE;
XML_Bool isXMLNS = XML_TRUE;
BINDING *b;
int len;
/* empty URI is only valid for default namespace per XML NS 1.0 (not 1.1) */
if (*uri == XML_T('\0') && prefix->name)
return XML_ERROR_UNDECLARING_PREFIX;
if (prefix->name && prefix->name[0] == XML_T(ASCII_x)
&& prefix->name[1] == XML_T(ASCII_m)
&& prefix->name[2] == XML_T(ASCII_l)) {
/* Not allowed to bind xmlns */
if (prefix->name[3] == XML_T(ASCII_n) && prefix->name[4] == XML_T(ASCII_s)
&& prefix->name[5] == XML_T('\0'))
return XML_ERROR_RESERVED_PREFIX_XMLNS;
if (prefix->name[3] == XML_T('\0'))
mustBeXML = XML_TRUE;
}
for (len = 0; uri[len]; len++) {
if (isXML && (len > xmlLen || uri[len] != xmlNamespace[len]))
isXML = XML_FALSE;
if (! mustBeXML && isXMLNS
&& (len > xmlnsLen || uri[len] != xmlnsNamespace[len]))
isXMLNS = XML_FALSE;
}
isXML = isXML && len == xmlLen;
isXMLNS = isXMLNS && len == xmlnsLen;
if (mustBeXML != isXML)
return mustBeXML ? XML_ERROR_RESERVED_PREFIX_XML
: XML_ERROR_RESERVED_NAMESPACE_URI;
if (isXMLNS)
return XML_ERROR_RESERVED_NAMESPACE_URI;
if (parser->m_namespaceSeparator)
len++;
if (parser->m_freeBindingList) {
b = parser->m_freeBindingList;
if (len > b->uriAlloc) {
XML_Char *temp = (XML_Char *)REALLOC(
parser, b->uri, sizeof(XML_Char) * (len + EXPAND_SPARE));
if (temp == NULL)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
b->uri = temp;
b->uriAlloc = len + EXPAND_SPARE;
}
parser->m_freeBindingList = b->nextTagBinding;
} else {
b = (BINDING *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(BINDING));
if (! b)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
b->uri
= (XML_Char *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(XML_Char) * (len + EXPAND_SPARE));
if (! b->uri) {
FREE(parser, b);
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
b->uriAlloc = len + EXPAND_SPARE;
}
b->uriLen = len;
memcpy(b->uri, uri, len * sizeof(XML_Char));
if (parser->m_namespaceSeparator)
b->uri[len - 1] = parser->m_namespaceSeparator;
b->prefix = prefix;
b->attId = attId;
b->prevPrefixBinding = prefix->binding;
/* NULL binding when default namespace undeclared */
if (*uri == XML_T('\0') && prefix == &parser->m_dtd->defaultPrefix)
prefix->binding = NULL;
else
prefix->binding = b;
b->nextTagBinding = *bindingsPtr;
*bindingsPtr = b;
/* if attId == NULL then we are not starting a namespace scope */
if (attId && parser->m_startNamespaceDeclHandler)
parser->m_startNamespaceDeclHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, prefix->name,
prefix->binding ? uri : 0);
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 88,242
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebView::setUrl(const QUrl& url)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
if (url.isEmpty())
return;
d->webPageProxy->loadURL(url.toString());
emitUrlChangeIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,057
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Core::~Core() {
if (node_controller_ && node_controller_->io_task_runner()) {
scoped_refptr<base::TaskRunner> io_task_runner =
node_controller_->io_task_runner();
io_task_runner->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Core::PassNodeControllerToIOThread,
base::Passed(&node_controller_)));
}
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpManager::GetInstance()
->UnregisterAndDeleteDumpProviderSoon(std::move(handles_));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,622
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::MediaResized(
const gfx::Size& size,
const WebContentsObserver::MediaPlayerId& id) {
cached_video_sizes_[id] = size;
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.MediaResized(size, id);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,766
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoCompressedTexImage2D(
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLenum internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLint border,
GLsizei image_size,
GLsizei data_size,
const void* data) {
CheckErrorCallbackState();
api()->glCompressedTexImage2DRobustANGLEFn(target, level, internalformat,
width, height, border, image_size,
data_size, data);
if (CheckErrorCallbackState()) {
return error::kNoError;
}
UpdateTextureSizeFromTarget(target);
ExitCommandProcessingEarly();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,904
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pad_to_4byte (size_t length)
{
return (length+3) & ~3;
}
Commit Message: Use asserts on lengths to prevent invalid reads/writes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 68,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mailimf_greater_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx)
{
return mailimf_unstrict_char_parse(message, length, indx, '>');
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 66,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int fm10k_maybe_stop_tx(struct fm10k_ring *tx_ring, u16 size)
{
if (likely(fm10k_desc_unused(tx_ring) >= size))
return 0;
return __fm10k_maybe_stop_tx(tx_ring, size);
}
Commit Message: fm10k: Fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 4378 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x95b/0x3200 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 28 1e 00 00 48 81 c4 08 01 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 24 00 00 49 81 7d 00 e0 de 03 a6 41 bc 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e3c07a40 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000080
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8881e3c07d98 R11: ffff8881c7f21f80 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fce2252e700(0000) GS:ffff8881f2400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffc7eb0228 CR3: 00000001e5bea002 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xff/0x2c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xdf/0x1050 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1072
drain_workqueue+0x24/0x3f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2934
destroy_workqueue+0x23/0x630 kernel/workqueue.c:4319
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x30c/0x480 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fce2252dc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fce2252e6bc
R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff
If alloc_workqueue fails, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise may
trigger this NULL pointer dereference while unloading drivers.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 0a38c17a21a0 ("fm10k: Remove create_workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 87,933
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InspectorTraceEvents::Will(const probe::CallFunction& probe) {
if (probe.depth)
return;
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN1(
"devtools.timeline", "FunctionCall", "data",
InspectorFunctionCallEvent::Data(probe.context, probe.function));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,697
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int emulator_get_msr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u32 msr_index, u64 *pdata)
{
struct msr_data msr;
int r;
msr.index = msr_index;
msr.host_initiated = false;
r = kvm_get_msr(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), &msr);
if (r)
return r;
*pdata = msr.data;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _nfs4_proc_lookup(struct rpc_clnt *clnt, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *name, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
struct nfs_fattr *fattr)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
int status;
struct nfs4_lookup_arg args = {
.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask,
.dir_fh = NFS_FH(dir),
.name = name,
};
struct nfs4_lookup_res res = {
.server = server,
.fattr = fattr,
.fh = fhandle,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_LOOKUP],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
nfs_fattr_init(fattr);
dprintk("NFS call lookup %s\n", name->name);
status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
dprintk("NFS reply lookup: %d\n", status);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,825
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanCopyIntoFileSystem(
int child_id, const std::string& filesystem_id) {
return HasPermissionsForFileSystem(child_id, filesystem_id,
COPY_INTO_FILE_GRANT);
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 125,130
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Mat_Create4(const char* matname)
{
FILE *fp = NULL;
mat_t *mat = NULL;
#if defined(_WIN32) && defined(_MSC_VER)
wchar_t* wname = utf82u(matname);
if ( NULL != wname ) {
fp = _wfopen(wname, L"w+b");
free(wname);
}
#else
fp = fopen(matname, "w+b");
#endif
if ( !fp )
return NULL;
mat = (mat_t*)malloc(sizeof(*mat));
if ( NULL == mat ) {
fclose(fp);
Mat_Critical("Couldn't allocate memory for the MAT file");
return NULL;
}
mat->fp = fp;
mat->header = NULL;
mat->subsys_offset = NULL;
mat->filename = strdup_printf("%s",matname);
mat->version = MAT_FT_MAT4;
mat->byteswap = 0;
mat->mode = 0;
mat->bof = 0;
mat->next_index = 0;
mat->num_datasets = 0;
#if defined(MAT73) && MAT73
mat->refs_id = -1;
#endif
mat->dir = NULL;
Mat_Rewind(mat);
return mat;
}
Commit Message: Avoid uninitialized memory
As reported by https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=16856
CWE ID:
| 0
| 87,375
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewTest::SendWebMouseEvent(
const WebKit::WebMouseEvent& mouse_event) {
scoped_ptr<IPC::Message> input_message(new ViewMsg_HandleInputEvent(0));
input_message->WriteData(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&mouse_event),
sizeof(WebKit::WebMouseEvent));
RenderViewImpl* impl = static_cast<RenderViewImpl*>(view_);
impl->OnMessageReceived(*input_message);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,517
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string MediaStreamManager::MakeMediaAccessRequest(
int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
int page_request_id,
const StreamControls& controls,
const url::Origin& security_origin,
MediaAccessRequestCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DeviceRequest* request = new DeviceRequest(
render_process_id, render_frame_id, page_request_id, security_origin,
false, // user gesture
MEDIA_DEVICE_ACCESS, controls, std::string());
const std::string& label = AddRequest(request);
request->media_access_request_cb = std::move(callback);
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&MediaStreamManager::SetupRequest,
base::Unretained(this), label));
return label;
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,326
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ComputeWebKitPrintParamsInDesiredDpi(
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& print_params,
WebKit::WebPrintParams* webkit_print_params) {
int dpi = GetDPI(&print_params);
webkit_print_params->printerDPI = dpi;
webkit_print_params->printScalingOption = print_params.print_scaling_option;
using printing::ConvertUnit;
webkit_print_params->printContentArea.width =
ConvertUnit(print_params.content_size.width(), dpi,
print_params.desired_dpi);
webkit_print_params->printContentArea.height =
ConvertUnit(print_params.content_size.height(), dpi,
print_params.desired_dpi);
webkit_print_params->printableArea.x =
ConvertUnit(print_params.printable_area.x(), dpi,
print_params.desired_dpi);
webkit_print_params->printableArea.y =
ConvertUnit(print_params.printable_area.y(), dpi,
print_params.desired_dpi);
webkit_print_params->printableArea.width =
ConvertUnit(print_params.printable_area.width(), dpi,
print_params.desired_dpi);
webkit_print_params->printableArea.height =
ConvertUnit(print_params.printable_area.height(),
dpi, print_params.desired_dpi);
webkit_print_params->paperSize.width =
ConvertUnit(print_params.page_size.width(), dpi,
print_params.desired_dpi);
webkit_print_params->paperSize.height =
ConvertUnit(print_params.page_size.height(), dpi,
print_params.desired_dpi);
}
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,548
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int atl2_get_regs_len(struct net_device *netdev)
{
#define ATL2_REGS_LEN 42
return sizeof(u32) * ATL2_REGS_LEN;
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 55,301
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CCThreadProxy::stop()
{
TRACE_EVENT("CCThreadProxy::stop", this, 0);
ASSERT(isMainThread());
ASSERT(m_started);
CCCompletionEvent completion;
s_ccThread->postTask(createCCThreadTask(this, &CCThreadProxy::layerTreeHostClosedOnCCThread, AllowCrossThreadAccess(&completion)));
completion.wait();
ASSERT(!m_layerTreeHostImpl); // verify that the impl deleted.
m_layerTreeHost = 0;
m_started = false;
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 170,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API int _zend_ts_hash_init_ex(TsHashTable *ht, uint nSize, hash_func_t pHashFunction, dtor_func_t pDestructor, zend_bool persistent, zend_bool bApplyProtection ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC)
{
#ifdef ZTS
ht->mx_reader = tsrm_mutex_alloc();
ht->mx_writer = tsrm_mutex_alloc();
ht->reader = 0;
#endif
return _zend_hash_init_ex(TS_HASH(ht), nSize, pHashFunction, pDestructor, persistent, bApplyProtection ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,437
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String HTMLFormControlElement::resultForDialogSubmit()
{
return fastGetAttribute(valueAttr);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,935
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: exec_end_call_list(void)
{
EndCallListItemType* prev;
void (*func)(void);
while (EndCallTop != 0) {
func = EndCallTop->func;
(*func)();
prev = EndCallTop;
EndCallTop = EndCallTop->next;
xfree(prev);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,158
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lha_skip_sfx(struct archive_read *a)
{
const void *h;
const char *p, *q;
size_t next, skip;
ssize_t bytes, window;
window = 4096;
for (;;) {
h = __archive_read_ahead(a, window, &bytes);
if (h == NULL) {
/* Remaining bytes are less than window. */
window >>= 1;
if (window < (H_SIZE + 3))
goto fatal;
continue;
}
if (bytes < H_SIZE)
goto fatal;
p = h;
q = p + bytes;
/*
* Scan ahead until we find something that looks
* like the lha header.
*/
while (p + H_SIZE < q) {
if ((next = lha_check_header_format(p)) == 0) {
skip = p - (const char *)h;
__archive_read_consume(a, skip);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
p += next;
}
skip = p - (const char *)h;
__archive_read_consume(a, skip);
}
fatal:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Couldn't find out LHa header");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
Commit Message: Fail with negative lha->compsize in lha_read_file_header_1()
Fixes a heap buffer overflow reported in Secunia SA74169
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 68,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
{
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
memslot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gfn);
mark_page_dirty_in_slot(memslot, gfn);
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 71,258
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: remove_invalid_intro_points(rend_service_t *service,
smartlist_t *exclude_nodes,
smartlist_t *retry_nodes, time_t now)
{
tor_assert(service);
/* Remove any expired nodes that doesn't have a circuit. */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(service->expiring_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *,
intro) {
origin_circuit_t *intro_circ =
find_intro_circuit(intro, service->pk_digest);
if (intro_circ) {
continue;
}
/* No more circuit, cleanup the into point object. */
SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(service->expiring_nodes, intro);
rend_intro_point_free(intro);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(intro);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(service->intro_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *,
intro) {
/* Find the introduction point node object. */
const node_t *node =
node_get_by_id(intro->extend_info->identity_digest);
/* Find the intro circuit, this might be NULL. */
origin_circuit_t *intro_circ =
find_intro_circuit(intro, service->pk_digest);
/* Add the valid node to the exclusion list so we don't try to establish
* an introduction point to it again. */
if (node && exclude_nodes) {
smartlist_add(exclude_nodes, (void*) node);
}
/* First, make sure we still have a valid circuit for this intro point.
* If we dont, we'll give up on it and make a new one. */
if (intro_circ == NULL) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Attempting to retry on %s as intro point for %s"
" (circuit disappeared).",
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info)),
safe_str_client(service->service_id));
/* We've lost the circuit for this intro point, flag it so it can be
* accounted for when considiring uploading a descriptor. */
intro->circuit_established = 0;
/* Node is gone or we've reached our maximum circuit creationg retry
* count, clean up everything, we'll find a new one. */
if (node == NULL ||
intro->circuit_retries >= MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES) {
rend_intro_point_free(intro);
SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(service->intro_nodes, intro);
/* We've just killed the intro point, nothing left to do. */
continue;
}
/* The intro point is still alive so let's try to use it again because
* we have a published descriptor containing it. Keep the intro point
* in the intro_nodes list because it's still valid, we are rebuilding
* a circuit to it. */
if (retry_nodes) {
smartlist_add(retry_nodes, intro);
}
}
/* else, the circuit is valid so in both cases, node being alive or not,
* we leave the circuit and intro point object as is. Closing the
* circuit here would leak new consensus timing and freeing the intro
* point object would make the intro circuit unusable. */
/* Now, check if intro point should expire. If it does, queue it so
* it can be cleaned up once it has been replaced properly. */
if (intro_point_should_expire_now(intro, now)) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Expiring %s as intro point for %s.",
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info)),
safe_str_client(service->service_id));
smartlist_add(service->expiring_nodes, intro);
SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(service->intro_nodes, intro);
/* Intro point is expired, we need a new one thus don't consider it
* anymore has a valid established intro point. */
intro->circuit_established = 0;
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(intro);
}
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
CWE ID: CWE-532
| 0
| 69,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _pango_Is_Emoji_Emoji_Default (gunichar ch)
{
return _pango_Is_Emoji_Presentation (ch);
}
Commit Message: Prevent an assertion with invalid Unicode sequences
Invalid Unicode sequences, such as 0x2665 0xfe0e 0xfe0f,
can trick the Emoji iter code into returning an empty
segment, which then triggers an assertion in the itemizer.
Prevent this by ensuring that we make progress.
This issue was reported by Jeffrey M.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 79,117
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void performInternal(WebPagePrivate* webPagePrivate)
{
webPagePrivate->m_webPage->setDateTimeInput(webPagePrivate->m_cachedDateTimeInput);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err trep_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_TrackExtensionPropertiesBox *ptr = (GF_TrackExtensionPropertiesBox *)s;
ptr->trackID = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 4);
return gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, gf_isom_box_add_default);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,584
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: megasas_bios_param(struct scsi_device *sdev, struct block_device *bdev,
sector_t capacity, int geom[])
{
int heads;
int sectors;
sector_t cylinders;
unsigned long tmp;
/* Default heads (64) & sectors (32) */
heads = 64;
sectors = 32;
tmp = heads * sectors;
cylinders = capacity;
sector_div(cylinders, tmp);
/*
* Handle extended translation size for logical drives > 1Gb
*/
if (capacity >= 0x200000) {
heads = 255;
sectors = 63;
tmp = heads*sectors;
cylinders = capacity;
sector_div(cylinders, tmp);
}
geom[0] = heads;
geom[1] = sectors;
geom[2] = cylinders;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 90,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MakeFilename(char *buffer, char *orig_name, int cnt, int max_chars)
{
char *filename = malloc(PATH_MAX + 1);
if (filename == NULL)
error("Makefilename: malloc");
/* Process with strftime if Gflag is set. */
if (Gflag != 0) {
struct tm *local_tm;
/* Convert Gflag_time to a usable format */
if ((local_tm = localtime(&Gflag_time)) == NULL) {
error("MakeTimedFilename: localtime");
}
/* There's no good way to detect an error in strftime since a return
* value of 0 isn't necessarily failure.
*/
strftime(filename, PATH_MAX, orig_name, local_tm);
} else {
strncpy(filename, orig_name, PATH_MAX);
}
if (cnt == 0 && max_chars == 0)
strncpy(buffer, filename, PATH_MAX + 1);
else
if (snprintf(buffer, PATH_MAX + 1, "%s%0*d", filename, max_chars, cnt) > PATH_MAX)
/* Report an error if the filename is too large */
error("too many output files or filename is too long (> %d)", PATH_MAX);
free(filename);
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14879/fix -V to fail invalid input safely
get_next_file() did not check the return value of strlen() and
underflowed an array index if the line read by fgets() from the file
started with \0. This caused an out-of-bounds read and could cause a
write. Add the missing check.
This vulnerability was discovered by Brian Carpenter & Geeknik Labs.
CWE ID: CWE-120
| 0
| 93,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MojoAudioOutputIPC::StreamCreated(
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle shared_memory,
mojo::ScopedHandle socket) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(delegate_);
DCHECK(socket.is_valid());
DCHECK(shared_memory.is_valid());
base::PlatformFile socket_handle;
auto result = mojo::UnwrapPlatformFile(std::move(socket), &socket_handle);
DCHECK_EQ(result, MOJO_RESULT_OK);
base::SharedMemoryHandle memory_handle;
bool read_only = false;
size_t memory_length = 0;
result = mojo::UnwrapSharedMemoryHandle(
std::move(shared_memory), &memory_handle, &memory_length, &read_only);
DCHECK_EQ(result, MOJO_RESULT_OK);
DCHECK(!read_only);
delegate_->OnStreamCreated(memory_handle, socket_handle);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 172,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::completeConstruction() {
Q_Q(OxideQQuickWebView);
Q_ASSERT(construct_props_.data());
if (construct_props_->new_view_request) {
proxy_.reset(oxide::qt::WebViewProxy::create(
this, contents_view_.data(), q,
find_controller_.data(),
security_status_.data(),
construct_props_->new_view_request));
}
if (!proxy_) {
construct_props_->new_view_request = nullptr;
proxy_.reset(oxide::qt::WebViewProxy::create(
this, contents_view_.data(), q,
find_controller_.data(),
security_status_.data(),
construct_props_->context,
construct_props_->incognito,
construct_props_->restore_state,
construct_props_->restore_type));
}
proxy_->messageHandlers().swap(construct_props_->message_handlers);
proxy_->setLocationBarHeight(construct_props_->location_bar_height);
proxy_->setLocationBarMode(construct_props_->location_bar_mode);
proxy_->setLocationBarAnimated(construct_props_->location_bar_animated);
if (!construct_props_->new_view_request) {
if (construct_props_->load_html) {
proxy_->loadHtml(construct_props_->html, construct_props_->url);
} else if (!construct_props_->url.isEmpty()) {
proxy_->setUrl(construct_props_->url);
}
}
proxy_->setFullscreen(construct_props_->fullscreen);
if (construct_props_->preferences) {
proxy_->setPreferences(construct_props_->preferences);
}
emit q->rootFrameChanged();
if (construct_props_->incognito != proxy_->incognito()) {
emit q->incognitoChanged();
}
if (construct_props_->context != proxy_->context()) {
if (construct_props_->context) {
detachContextSignals(
OxideQQuickWebContextPrivate::get(construct_props_->context));
}
attachContextSignals(
OxideQQuickWebContextPrivate::get(
qobject_cast<OxideQQuickWebContext*>(proxy_->context())));
emit q->contextChanged();
}
emit q->editingCapabilitiesChanged();
construct_props_.reset();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void UnforgeableVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->unforgeableVoidMethod();
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,272
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebNotificationData createWebNotificationData(ExecutionContext* executionContext, const String& title, const NotificationOptions& options, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
if (options.hasVibrate() && options.silent()) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError("Silent notifications must not specify vibration patterns.");
return WebNotificationData();
}
WebNotificationData webData;
webData.title = title;
webData.direction = toDirectionEnumValue(options.dir());
webData.lang = options.lang();
webData.body = options.body();
webData.tag = options.tag();
KURL iconUrl;
iconUrl = executionContext->completeURL(options.icon());
if (!iconUrl.isValid())
iconUrl = KURL();
}
webData.icon = iconUrl;
webData.vibrate = NavigatorVibration::sanitizeVibrationPattern(options.vibrate());
webData.timestamp = options.hasTimestamp() ? static_cast<double>(options.timestamp()) : WTF::currentTimeMS();
webData.silent = options.silent();
webData.requireInteraction = options.requireInteraction();
if (options.hasData()) {
RefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> serializedScriptValue = SerializedScriptValueFactory::instance().create(options.data().isolate(), options.data(), nullptr, exceptionState);
if (exceptionState.hadException())
return WebNotificationData();
Vector<char> serializedData;
serializedScriptValue->toWireBytes(serializedData);
webData.data = serializedData;
}
Vector<WebNotificationAction> actions;
const size_t maxActions = Notification::maxActions();
for (const NotificationAction& action : options.actions()) {
if (actions.size() >= maxActions)
break;
WebNotificationAction webAction;
webAction.action = action.action();
webAction.title = action.title();
actions.append(webAction);
}
webData.actions = actions;
return webData;
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
{
int cmp;
unsigned int shift;
const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
if (cmp > 0)
{
shift = cmp;
if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
else
bitmap->map = 1UL;
memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8);
}
else {
shift = -cmp;
if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift;
}
}
Commit Message: A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 45,167
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetWallpaper(const gfx::ImageSkia& image, wallpaper::WallpaperInfo info) {
if (ash_util::IsRunningInMash()) {
service_manager::Connector* connector =
content::ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess()->GetConnector();
if (!connector)
return;
ash::mojom::WallpaperControllerPtr wallpaper_controller;
connector->BindInterface(ash::mojom::kServiceName, &wallpaper_controller);
wallpaper_controller->SetWallpaper(*image.bitmap(), info);
} else if (ash::Shell::HasInstance()) {
ash::Shell::Get()->wallpaper_controller()->SetWallpaperImage(image, info);
}
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 128,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: main (int argc, char **argv)
{
struct gengetopt_args_info cmdline;
struct sc_path path;
struct sc_context *ctx;
struct sc_reader *reader = NULL;
struct sc_card *card;
unsigned char *data = NULL;
size_t data_len = 0;
int r;
if (cmdline_parser(argc, argv, &cmdline) != 0)
exit(1);
r = initialize(cmdline.reader_arg, cmdline.verbose_given, &ctx, &reader);
if (r < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Can't initialize reader\n");
exit(1);
}
if (sc_connect_card(reader, &card) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not connect to card\n");
sc_release_context(ctx);
exit(1);
}
sc_path_set(&path, SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME, aid_hca, sizeof aid_hca, 0, 0);
if (SC_SUCCESS != sc_select_file(card, &path, NULL))
goto err;
if (cmdline.pd_flag
&& read_file(card, "D001", &data, &data_len)
&& data_len >= 2) {
size_t len_pd = (data[0] << 8) | data[1];
if (len_pd + 2 <= data_len) {
unsigned char uncompressed[1024];
size_t uncompressed_len = sizeof uncompressed;
if (uncompress_gzip(uncompressed, &uncompressed_len,
data + 2, len_pd) == SC_SUCCESS) {
dump_binary(uncompressed, uncompressed_len);
} else {
dump_binary(data + 2, len_pd);
}
}
}
if ((cmdline.vd_flag || cmdline.gvd_flag)
&& read_file(card, "D001", &data, &data_len)
&& data_len >= 8) {
size_t off_vd = (data[0] << 8) | data[1];
size_t end_vd = (data[2] << 8) | data[3];
size_t off_gvd = (data[4] << 8) | data[5];
size_t end_gvd = (data[6] << 8) | data[7];
size_t len_vd = end_vd - off_vd + 1;
size_t len_gvd = end_gvd - off_gvd + 1;
if (off_vd <= end_vd && end_vd < data_len
&& off_gvd <= end_gvd && end_gvd < data_len) {
unsigned char uncompressed[1024];
size_t uncompressed_len = sizeof uncompressed;
if (cmdline.vd_flag) {
if (uncompress_gzip(uncompressed, &uncompressed_len,
data + off_vd, len_vd) == SC_SUCCESS) {
dump_binary(uncompressed, uncompressed_len);
} else {
dump_binary(data + off_vd, len_vd);
}
}
if (cmdline.gvd_flag) {
if (uncompress_gzip(uncompressed, &uncompressed_len,
data + off_gvd, len_gvd) == SC_SUCCESS) {
dump_binary(uncompressed, uncompressed_len);
} else {
dump_binary(data + off_gvd, len_gvd);
}
}
}
}
if (cmdline.vsd_status_flag
&& read_file(card, "D00C", &data, &data_len)
&& data_len >= 25) {
char *status;
unsigned int major, minor, fix;
switch (data[0]) {
case '0':
status = "Transactions pending";
break;
case '1':
status = "No transactions pending";
break;
default:
status = "Unknown";
break;
}
decode_version(data+15, &major, &minor, &fix);
printf(
"Status %s\n"
"Timestamp %c%c.%c%c.%c%c%c%c at %c%c:%c%c:%c%c\n"
"Version %u.%u.%u\n",
status,
PRINT(data[7]), PRINT(data[8]),
PRINT(data[5]), PRINT(data[6]),
PRINT(data[1]), PRINT(data[2]), PRINT(data[3]), PRINT(data[4]),
PRINT(data[9]), PRINT(data[10]),
PRINT(data[11]), PRINT(data[12]),
PRINT(data[13]), PRINT(data[14]),
major, minor, fix);
}
err:
sc_disconnect_card(card);
sc_release_context(ctx);
cmdline_parser_free (&cmdline);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,889
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CSoundFile::~CSoundFile()
{
Destroy();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 8,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void hugepage_add_anon_rmap(struct page *page,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
{
struct anon_vma *anon_vma = vma->anon_vma;
int first;
BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
BUG_ON(!anon_vma);
/* address might be in next vma when migration races vma_adjust */
first = atomic_inc_and_test(&page->_mapcount);
if (first)
__hugepage_set_anon_rmap(page, vma, address, 0);
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 38,296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int r;
union {
struct kvm_lapic_state *lapic;
struct kvm_xsave *xsave;
struct kvm_xcrs *xcrs;
void *buffer;
} u;
u.buffer = NULL;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_GET_LAPIC: {
r = -EINVAL;
if (!vcpu->arch.apic)
goto out;
u.lapic = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_lapic_state), GFP_KERNEL);
r = -ENOMEM;
if (!u.lapic)
goto out;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_lapic(vcpu, u.lapic);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, u.lapic, sizeof(struct kvm_lapic_state)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_LAPIC: {
r = -EINVAL;
if (!vcpu->arch.apic)
goto out;
u.lapic = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*u.lapic));
if (IS_ERR(u.lapic))
return PTR_ERR(u.lapic);
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_lapic(vcpu, u.lapic);
break;
}
case KVM_INTERRUPT: {
struct kvm_interrupt irq;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&irq, argp, sizeof irq))
goto out;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_interrupt(vcpu, &irq);
break;
}
case KVM_NMI: {
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_nmi(vcpu);
break;
}
case KVM_SET_CPUID: {
struct kvm_cpuid __user *cpuid_arg = argp;
struct kvm_cpuid cpuid;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&cpuid, cpuid_arg, sizeof cpuid))
goto out;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid(vcpu, &cpuid, cpuid_arg->entries);
break;
}
case KVM_SET_CPUID2: {
struct kvm_cpuid2 __user *cpuid_arg = argp;
struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&cpuid, cpuid_arg, sizeof cpuid))
goto out;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid2(vcpu, &cpuid,
cpuid_arg->entries);
break;
}
case KVM_GET_CPUID2: {
struct kvm_cpuid2 __user *cpuid_arg = argp;
struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&cpuid, cpuid_arg, sizeof cpuid))
goto out;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_cpuid2(vcpu, &cpuid,
cpuid_arg->entries);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(cpuid_arg, &cpuid, sizeof cpuid))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_GET_MSRS:
r = msr_io(vcpu, argp, kvm_get_msr, 1);
break;
case KVM_SET_MSRS:
r = msr_io(vcpu, argp, do_set_msr, 0);
break;
case KVM_TPR_ACCESS_REPORTING: {
struct kvm_tpr_access_ctl tac;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&tac, argp, sizeof tac))
goto out;
r = vcpu_ioctl_tpr_access_reporting(vcpu, &tac);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &tac, sizeof tac))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
};
case KVM_SET_VAPIC_ADDR: {
struct kvm_vapic_addr va;
r = -EINVAL;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm))
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&va, argp, sizeof va))
goto out;
r = kvm_lapic_set_vapic_addr(vcpu, va.vapic_addr);
break;
}
case KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE: {
u64 mcg_cap;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&mcg_cap, argp, sizeof mcg_cap))
goto out;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_setup_mce(vcpu, mcg_cap);
break;
}
case KVM_X86_SET_MCE: {
struct kvm_x86_mce mce;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&mce, argp, sizeof mce))
goto out;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_mce(vcpu, &mce);
break;
}
case KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS: {
struct kvm_vcpu_events events;
kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(vcpu, &events);
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &events, sizeof(struct kvm_vcpu_events)))
break;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS: {
struct kvm_vcpu_events events;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&events, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_vcpu_events)))
break;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(vcpu, &events);
break;
}
case KVM_GET_DEBUGREGS: {
struct kvm_debugregs dbgregs;
kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs(vcpu, &dbgregs);
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &dbgregs,
sizeof(struct kvm_debugregs)))
break;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_DEBUGREGS: {
struct kvm_debugregs dbgregs;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&dbgregs, argp,
sizeof(struct kvm_debugregs)))
break;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(vcpu, &dbgregs);
break;
}
case KVM_GET_XSAVE: {
u.xsave = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_xsave), GFP_KERNEL);
r = -ENOMEM;
if (!u.xsave)
break;
kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave(vcpu, u.xsave);
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, u.xsave, sizeof(struct kvm_xsave)))
break;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_XSAVE: {
u.xsave = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*u.xsave));
if (IS_ERR(u.xsave))
return PTR_ERR(u.xsave);
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave(vcpu, u.xsave);
break;
}
case KVM_GET_XCRS: {
u.xcrs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_xcrs), GFP_KERNEL);
r = -ENOMEM;
if (!u.xcrs)
break;
kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xcrs(vcpu, u.xcrs);
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, u.xcrs,
sizeof(struct kvm_xcrs)))
break;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_XCRS: {
u.xcrs = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*u.xcrs));
if (IS_ERR(u.xcrs))
return PTR_ERR(u.xcrs);
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xcrs(vcpu, u.xcrs);
break;
}
case KVM_SET_TSC_KHZ: {
u32 user_tsc_khz;
r = -EINVAL;
user_tsc_khz = (u32)arg;
if (user_tsc_khz >= kvm_max_guest_tsc_khz)
goto out;
if (user_tsc_khz == 0)
user_tsc_khz = tsc_khz;
kvm_set_tsc_khz(vcpu, user_tsc_khz);
r = 0;
goto out;
}
case KVM_GET_TSC_KHZ: {
r = vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz;
goto out;
}
case KVM_KVMCLOCK_CTRL: {
r = kvm_set_guest_paused(vcpu);
goto out;
}
default:
r = -EINVAL;
}
out:
kfree(u.buffer);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 35,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserCommandController::TabRestoreServiceDestroyed(
sessions::TabRestoreService* service) {
service->RemoveObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <ellyjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 153,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __nfs4_proc_set_acl(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
struct page *pages[NFS4ACL_MAXPAGES];
struct nfs_setaclargs arg = {
.fh = NFS_FH(inode),
.acl_pages = pages,
.acl_len = buflen,
};
struct nfs_setaclres res;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_SETACL],
.rpc_argp = &arg,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
int ret, i;
if (!nfs4_server_supports_acls(server))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
i = buf_to_pages_noslab(buf, buflen, arg.acl_pages, &arg.acl_pgbase);
if (i < 0)
return i;
nfs_inode_return_delegation(inode);
ret = nfs4_call_sync(server->client, server, &msg, &arg.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 1);
/*
* Free each page after tx, so the only ref left is
* held by the network stack
*/
for (; i > 0; i--)
put_page(pages[i-1]);
/*
* Acl update can result in inode attribute update.
* so mark the attribute cache invalid.
*/
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
NFS_I(inode)->cache_validity |= NFS_INO_INVALID_ATTR;
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
nfs_access_zap_cache(inode);
nfs_zap_acl_cache(inode);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: QList<Smb4KShare*> Smb4KGlobal::findInaccessibleShares()
{
QList<Smb4KShare *> inaccessible_shares;
mutex.lock();
for ( int i = 0; i < p->mountedSharesList.size(); ++i )
{
if ( p->mountedSharesList.at( i )->isInaccessible() )
{
inaccessible_shares.append( p->mountedSharesList.at( i ) );
continue;
}
else
{
continue;
}
}
mutex.unlock();
return inaccessible_shares;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,562
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GtkIMContext* webkitWebViewBaseGetIMContext(WebKitWebViewBase* webkitWebViewBase)
{
return webkitWebViewBase->priv->imContext.get();
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 108,885
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kgdb_arch_init(void)
{
return register_die_notifier(&kgdb_notifier);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,873
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::reattach(const WebString& savedState)
{
if (m_attached)
return;
inspectorController()->reuseFrontend(this, savedState);
blink::Platform::current()->currentThread()->addTaskObserver(this);
m_attached = true;
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cib_pre_notify(int options, const char *op, xmlNode * existing, xmlNode * update)
{
xmlNode *update_msg = NULL;
const char *type = NULL;
const char *id = NULL;
gboolean needed = FALSE;
g_hash_table_foreach(client_list, need_pre_notify, &needed);
if (needed == FALSE) {
return;
}
/* TODO: consider pre-notification for removal */
update_msg = create_xml_node(NULL, "pre-notify");
if (update != NULL) {
id = crm_element_value(update, XML_ATTR_ID);
}
crm_xml_add(update_msg, F_TYPE, T_CIB_NOTIFY);
crm_xml_add(update_msg, F_SUBTYPE, T_CIB_PRE_NOTIFY);
crm_xml_add(update_msg, F_CIB_OPERATION, op);
if (id != NULL) {
crm_xml_add(update_msg, F_CIB_OBJID, id);
}
if (update != NULL) {
crm_xml_add(update_msg, F_CIB_OBJTYPE, crm_element_name(update));
} else if (existing != NULL) {
crm_xml_add(update_msg, F_CIB_OBJTYPE, crm_element_name(existing));
}
type = crm_element_value(update_msg, F_CIB_OBJTYPE);
attach_cib_generation(update_msg, "cib_generation", the_cib);
if (existing != NULL) {
add_message_xml(update_msg, F_CIB_EXISTING, existing);
}
if (update != NULL) {
add_message_xml(update_msg, F_CIB_UPDATE, update);
}
g_hash_table_foreach_remove(client_list, cib_notify_client, update_msg);
if (update == NULL) {
crm_trace("Performing operation %s (on section=%s)", op, type);
} else {
crm_trace("Performing %s on <%s%s%s>", op, type, id ? " id=" : "", id ? id : "");
}
free_xml(update_msg);
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
{
PACKET tmp_protocol;
while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
|| PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: header_put_le_8byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, sf_count_t x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 8)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 32) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 40) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 48) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 56) ;
} ;
} /* header_put_le_8byte */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 170,056
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseCharData(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int cdata) {
const xmlChar *in;
int nbchar = 0;
int line = ctxt->input->line;
int col = ctxt->input->col;
int ccol;
SHRINK;
GROW;
/*
* Accelerated common case where input don't need to be
* modified before passing it to the handler.
*/
if (!cdata) {
in = ctxt->input->cur;
do {
get_more_space:
while (*in == 0x20) { in++; ctxt->input->col++; }
if (*in == 0xA) {
do {
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
in++;
} while (*in == 0xA);
goto get_more_space;
}
if (*in == '<') {
nbchar = in - ctxt->input->cur;
if (nbchar > 0) {
const xmlChar *tmp = ctxt->input->cur;
ctxt->input->cur = in;
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace !=
ctxt->sax->characters)) {
if (areBlanks(ctxt, tmp, nbchar, 1)) {
if (ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace != NULL)
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace(ctxt->userData,
tmp, nbchar);
} else {
if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData,
tmp, nbchar);
if (*ctxt->space == -1)
*ctxt->space = -2;
}
} else if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)) {
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData,
tmp, nbchar);
}
}
return;
}
get_more:
ccol = ctxt->input->col;
while (test_char_data[*in]) {
in++;
ccol++;
}
ctxt->input->col = ccol;
if (*in == 0xA) {
do {
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
in++;
} while (*in == 0xA);
goto get_more;
}
if (*in == ']') {
if ((in[1] == ']') && (in[2] == '>')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_MISPLACED_CDATA_END, NULL);
ctxt->input->cur = in + 1;
return;
}
in++;
ctxt->input->col++;
goto get_more;
}
nbchar = in - ctxt->input->cur;
if (nbchar > 0) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace !=
ctxt->sax->characters) &&
(IS_BLANK_CH(*ctxt->input->cur))) {
const xmlChar *tmp = ctxt->input->cur;
ctxt->input->cur = in;
if (areBlanks(ctxt, tmp, nbchar, 0)) {
if (ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace != NULL)
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace(ctxt->userData,
tmp, nbchar);
} else {
if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData,
tmp, nbchar);
if (*ctxt->space == -1)
*ctxt->space = -2;
}
line = ctxt->input->line;
col = ctxt->input->col;
} else if (ctxt->sax != NULL) {
if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->input->cur, nbchar);
line = ctxt->input->line;
col = ctxt->input->col;
}
/* something really bad happened in the SAX callback */
if (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_CONTENT)
return;
}
ctxt->input->cur = in;
if (*in == 0xD) {
in++;
if (*in == 0xA) {
ctxt->input->cur = in;
in++;
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
continue; /* while */
}
in--;
}
if (*in == '<') {
return;
}
if (*in == '&') {
return;
}
SHRINK;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
in = ctxt->input->cur;
} while (((*in >= 0x20) && (*in <= 0x7F)) || (*in == 0x09));
nbchar = 0;
}
ctxt->input->line = line;
ctxt->input->col = col;
xmlParseCharDataComplex(ctxt, cdata);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 59,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TabsMoveFunction::RunImpl() {
Value* tab_value = NULL;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->Get(0, &tab_value));
std::vector<int> tab_ids;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(extensions::ReadOneOrMoreIntegers(
tab_value, &tab_ids));
DictionaryValue* update_props = NULL;
int new_index;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetDictionary(1, &update_props));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(update_props->GetInteger(keys::kIndexKey,
&new_index));
ListValue tab_values;
for (size_t i = 0; i < tab_ids.size(); ++i) {
Browser* source_browser = NULL;
TabStripModel* source_tab_strip = NULL;
WebContents* contents = NULL;
int tab_index = -1;
if (!GetTabById(tab_ids[i], profile(), include_incognito(),
&source_browser, &source_tab_strip, &contents,
&tab_index, &error_))
return false;
if (!source_browser->window()->IsTabStripEditable()) {
error_ = keys::kTabStripNotEditableError;
return false;
}
new_index += i;
if (update_props->HasKey(keys::kWindowIdKey)) {
Browser* target_browser = NULL;
int window_id = extension_misc::kUnknownWindowId;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(update_props->GetInteger(
keys::kWindowIdKey, &window_id));
if (!GetBrowserFromWindowID(this, window_id, &target_browser))
return false;
if (!target_browser->window()->IsTabStripEditable()) {
error_ = keys::kTabStripNotEditableError;
return false;
}
if (!target_browser->is_type_tabbed()) {
error_ = keys::kCanOnlyMoveTabsWithinNormalWindowsError;
return false;
}
if (target_browser->profile() != source_browser->profile()) {
error_ = keys::kCanOnlyMoveTabsWithinSameProfileError;
return false;
}
if (ExtensionTabUtil::GetWindowId(target_browser) !=
ExtensionTabUtil::GetWindowId(source_browser)) {
TabStripModel* target_tab_strip = target_browser->tab_strip_model();
WebContents* web_contents =
source_tab_strip->DetachWebContentsAt(tab_index);
if (!web_contents) {
error_ = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kTabNotFoundError, base::IntToString(tab_ids[i]));
return false;
}
if (new_index > target_tab_strip->count() || new_index < 0)
new_index = target_tab_strip->count();
target_tab_strip->InsertWebContentsAt(
new_index, web_contents, TabStripModel::ADD_NONE);
if (has_callback()) {
tab_values.Append(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
web_contents,
target_tab_strip,
new_index,
GetExtension()));
}
continue;
}
}
if (new_index >= source_tab_strip->count() || new_index < 0)
new_index = source_tab_strip->count() - 1;
if (new_index != tab_index)
source_tab_strip->MoveWebContentsAt(tab_index, new_index, false);
if (has_callback()) {
tab_values.Append(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
contents, source_tab_strip, new_index, GetExtension()));
}
}
if (!has_callback())
return true;
if (tab_ids.size() > 1) {
SetResult(tab_values.DeepCopy());
} else if (tab_ids.size() == 1) {
Value* value = NULL;
CHECK(tab_values.Get(0, &value));
SetResult(value->DeepCopy());
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Don't allow extensions to take screenshots of interstitial pages. Branched from
https://codereview.chromium.org/14885004/ which is trying to test it.
BUG=229504
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14954004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@198297 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 113,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs_commit_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs_commit_data *data = calldata;
dprintk("NFS: %5u nfs_commit_done (status %d)\n",
task->tk_pid, task->tk_status);
/* Call the NFS version-specific code */
NFS_PROTO(data->inode)->commit_done(task, data);
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,137
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __init printk_all_partitions(void)
{
struct class_dev_iter iter;
struct device *dev;
class_dev_iter_init(&iter, &block_class, NULL, &disk_type);
while ((dev = class_dev_iter_next(&iter))) {
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
struct disk_part_iter piter;
struct hd_struct *part;
char name_buf[BDEVNAME_SIZE];
char devt_buf[BDEVT_SIZE];
/*
* Don't show empty devices or things that have been
* suppressed
*/
if (get_capacity(disk) == 0 ||
(disk->flags & GENHD_FL_SUPPRESS_PARTITION_INFO))
continue;
/*
* Note, unlike /proc/partitions, I am showing the
* numbers in hex - the same format as the root=
* option takes.
*/
disk_part_iter_init(&piter, disk, DISK_PITER_INCL_PART0);
while ((part = disk_part_iter_next(&piter))) {
bool is_part0 = part == &disk->part0;
printk("%s%s %10llu %s %s", is_part0 ? "" : " ",
bdevt_str(part_devt(part), devt_buf),
(unsigned long long)part_nr_sects_read(part) >> 1
, disk_name(disk, part->partno, name_buf),
part->info ? part->info->uuid : "");
if (is_part0) {
if (dev->parent && dev->parent->driver)
printk(" driver: %s\n",
dev->parent->driver->name);
else
printk(" (driver?)\n");
} else
printk("\n");
}
disk_part_iter_exit(&piter);
}
class_dev_iter_exit(&iter);
}
Commit Message: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 49,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t wdm_write
(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
u8 *buf;
int rv = -EMSGSIZE, r, we;
struct wdm_device *desc = file->private_data;
struct usb_ctrlrequest *req;
if (count > desc->wMaxCommand)
count = desc->wMaxCommand;
spin_lock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
we = desc->werr;
desc->werr = 0;
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
if (we < 0)
return -EIO;
buf = kmalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf) {
rv = -ENOMEM;
goto outnl;
}
r = copy_from_user(buf, buffer, count);
if (r > 0) {
kfree(buf);
rv = -EFAULT;
goto outnl;
}
/* concurrent writes and disconnect */
r = mutex_lock_interruptible(&desc->wlock);
rv = -ERESTARTSYS;
if (r) {
kfree(buf);
goto outnl;
}
if (test_bit(WDM_DISCONNECTING, &desc->flags)) {
kfree(buf);
rv = -ENODEV;
goto outnp;
}
r = usb_autopm_get_interface(desc->intf);
if (r < 0) {
kfree(buf);
rv = usb_translate_errors(r);
goto outnp;
}
if (!(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK))
r = wait_event_interruptible(desc->wait, !test_bit(WDM_IN_USE,
&desc->flags));
else
if (test_bit(WDM_IN_USE, &desc->flags))
r = -EAGAIN;
if (test_bit(WDM_RESETTING, &desc->flags))
r = -EIO;
if (r < 0) {
kfree(buf);
rv = r;
goto out;
}
req = desc->orq;
usb_fill_control_urb(
desc->command,
interface_to_usbdev(desc->intf),
/* using common endpoint 0 */
usb_sndctrlpipe(interface_to_usbdev(desc->intf), 0),
(unsigned char *)req,
buf,
count,
wdm_out_callback,
desc
);
req->bRequestType = (USB_DIR_OUT | USB_TYPE_CLASS |
USB_RECIP_INTERFACE);
req->bRequest = USB_CDC_SEND_ENCAPSULATED_COMMAND;
req->wValue = 0;
req->wIndex = desc->inum;
req->wLength = cpu_to_le16(count);
set_bit(WDM_IN_USE, &desc->flags);
desc->outbuf = buf;
rv = usb_submit_urb(desc->command, GFP_KERNEL);
if (rv < 0) {
kfree(buf);
desc->outbuf = NULL;
clear_bit(WDM_IN_USE, &desc->flags);
dev_err(&desc->intf->dev, "Tx URB error: %d\n", rv);
rv = usb_translate_errors(rv);
} else {
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev, "Tx URB has been submitted index=%d",
req->wIndex);
}
out:
usb_autopm_put_interface(desc->intf);
outnp:
mutex_unlock(&desc->wlock);
outnl:
return rv < 0 ? rv : count;
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::initSecurityContext(const DocumentInit& initializer)
{
if (haveInitializedSecurityOrigin()) {
ASSERT(securityOrigin());
return;
}
if (initializer.isHostedInReservedIPRange())
setHostedInReservedIPRange();
if (!initializer.hasSecurityContext()) {
m_cookieURL = KURL(ParsedURLString, emptyString());
setSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::createUnique());
initContentSecurityPolicy();
return;
}
m_cookieURL = m_url;
enforceSandboxFlags(initializer.sandboxFlags());
if (initializer.shouldEnforceStrictMixedContentChecking())
enforceStrictMixedContentChecking();
setInsecureRequestsPolicy(initializer.insecureRequestsPolicy());
if (initializer.insecureNavigationsToUpgrade()) {
for (auto toUpgrade : *initializer.insecureNavigationsToUpgrade())
addInsecureNavigationUpgrade(toUpgrade);
}
setSecurityOrigin(isSandboxed(SandboxOrigin) ? SecurityOrigin::createUnique() : SecurityOrigin::create(m_url));
if (importsController()) {
setContentSecurityPolicy(importsController()->master()->contentSecurityPolicy());
} else {
initContentSecurityPolicy();
}
if (Settings* settings = initializer.settings()) {
if (!settings->webSecurityEnabled()) {
securityOrigin()->grantUniversalAccess();
} else if (securityOrigin()->isLocal()) {
if (settings->allowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs()) {
securityOrigin()->grantUniversalAccess();
} else if (!settings->allowFileAccessFromFileURLs()) {
securityOrigin()->enforceFilePathSeparation();
}
}
}
if (initializer.shouldTreatURLAsSrcdocDocument()) {
m_isSrcdocDocument = true;
setBaseURLOverride(initializer.parentBaseURL());
}
if (!shouldInheritSecurityOriginFromOwner(m_url))
return;
if (!initializer.owner()) {
didFailToInitializeSecurityOrigin();
return;
}
if (isSandboxed(SandboxOrigin)) {
if (initializer.owner()->securityOrigin()->canLoadLocalResources())
securityOrigin()->grantLoadLocalResources();
return;
}
m_cookieURL = initializer.owner()->cookieURL();
setSecurityOrigin(initializer.owner()->securityOrigin());
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutomationProviderImportSettingsObserver::ImportItemStarted(
importer::ImportItem item) {
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,538
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CWebServer::RType_GetTransfers(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "GetTransfers";
uint64_t idx = 0;
if (request::findValue(&req, "idx") != "")
{
idx = std::strtoull(request::findValue(&req, "idx").c_str(), nullptr, 10);
}
std::vector<std::vector<std::string> > result;
result = m_sql.safe_query("SELECT Type, SubType FROM DeviceStatus WHERE (ID==%" PRIu64 ")",
idx);
if (!result.empty())
{
int dType = atoi(result[0][0].c_str());
if (
(dType == pTypeTEMP) ||
(dType == pTypeTEMP_HUM)
)
{
result = m_sql.safe_query(
"SELECT ID, Name FROM DeviceStatus WHERE (Type=='%q') AND (ID!=%" PRIu64 ")",
result[0][0].c_str(), idx);
}
else
{
result = m_sql.safe_query(
"SELECT ID, Name FROM DeviceStatus WHERE (Type=='%q') AND (SubType=='%q') AND (ID!=%" PRIu64 ")",
result[0][0].c_str(), result[0][1].c_str(), idx);
}
int ii = 0;
for (const auto & itt : result)
{
std::vector<std::string> sd = itt;
root["result"][ii]["idx"] = sd[0];
root["result"][ii]["Name"] = sd[1];
ii++;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89
| 0
| 91,053
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void red_channel_client_pipe_add_empty_msg(RedChannelClient *rcc, int msg_type)
{
EmptyMsgPipeItem *item = spice_new(EmptyMsgPipeItem, 1);
red_channel_pipe_item_init(rcc->channel, &item->base, PIPE_ITEM_TYPE_EMPTY_MSG);
item->msg = msg_type;
red_channel_client_pipe_add(rcc, &item->base);
red_channel_client_push(rcc);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_priority_frame(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn, h2o_http2_frame_t *frame, const char **err_desc)
{
h2o_http2_priority_t payload;
h2o_http2_stream_t *stream;
int ret;
if ((ret = h2o_http2_decode_priority_payload(&payload, frame, err_desc)) != 0)
return ret;
if (frame->stream_id == payload.dependency) {
*err_desc = "stream cannot depend on itself";
return H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
}
if ((stream = h2o_http2_conn_get_stream(conn, frame->stream_id)) != NULL) {
/* ignore priority changes to pushed streams with weight=257, since that is where we are trying to be smarter than the web
* browsers
*/
if (h2o_http2_scheduler_get_weight(&stream->_refs.scheduler) != 257)
set_priority(conn, stream, &payload, 1);
} else {
if (conn->num_streams.priority.open >= conn->super.ctx->globalconf->http2.max_streams_for_priority) {
*err_desc = "too many streams in idle/closed state";
/* RFC 7540 10.5: An endpoint MAY treat activity that is suspicious as a connection error (Section 5.4.1) of type
* ENHANCE_YOUR_CALM.
*/
return H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_ENHANCE_YOUR_CALM;
}
stream = h2o_http2_stream_open(conn, frame->stream_id, NULL);
set_priority(conn, stream, &payload, 0);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 52,565
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit ProfilingClientBinder(content::RenderProcessHost* host)
: ProfilingClientBinder() {
DCHECK(content::BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(content::BrowserThread::UI));
content::BindInterface(host, std::move(request_));
}
Commit Message: [Reland #1] Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
The original CL added a javatest and its dependencies to the apk_under_test.
This causes the dependencies to be stripped from the instrumentation_apk, which
causes issue. This CL updates the build configuration so that the javatest and
its dependencies are only added to the instrumentation_apk.
This is a reland of e0b4355f0651adb1ebc2c513dc4410471af712f5
Original change's description:
> Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
>
> This CL has three components:
> 1) The bulk of the logic in OOP HP was refactored into ProfilingTestDriver.
> 2) Adds a java instrumentation test, along with a JNI shim that forwards into
> ProfilingTestDriver.
> 3) Creates a new apk: chrome_public_apk_for_test that contains the same
> content as chrome_public_apk, as well as native files needed for (2).
> chrome_public_apk_test now targets chrome_public_apk_for_test instead of
> chrome_public_apk.
>
> Other ideas, discarded:
> * Originally, I attempted to make the browser_tests target runnable on
> Android. The primary problem is that native test harness cannot fork
> or spawn processes. This is difficult to solve.
>
> More details on each of the components:
> (1) ProfilingTestDriver
> * The TracingController test was migrated to use ProfilingTestDriver, but the
> write-to-file test was left as-is. The latter behavior will likely be phased
> out, but I'll clean that up in a future CL.
> * gtest isn't supported for Android instrumentation tests. ProfilingTestDriver
> has a single function RunTest that returns a 'bool' indicating success. On
> failure, the class uses LOG(ERROR) to print the nature of the error. This will
> cause the error to be printed out on browser_test error. On instrumentation
> test failure, the error will be forwarded to logcat, which is available on all
> infra bot test runs.
> (2) Instrumentation test
> * For now, I only added a single test for the "browser" mode. Furthermore, I'm
> only testing the start with command-line path.
> (3) New apk
> * libchromefortest is a new shared library that contains all content from
> libchrome, but also contains native sources for the JNI shim.
> * chrome_public_apk_for_test is a new apk that contains all content from
> chrome_public_apk, but uses a single shared library libchromefortest rather
> than libchrome. This also contains java sources for the JNI shim.
> * There is no way to just add a second shared library to chrome_public_apk
> that just contains the native sources from the JNI shim without causing ODR
> issues.
> * chrome_public_test_apk now has apk_under_test = chrome_public_apk_for_test.
> * There is no way to add native JNI sources as a shared library to
> chrome_public_test_apk without causing ODR issues.
>
> Finally, this CL drastically increases the timeout to wait for native
> initialization. The previous timeout was 2 *
> CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL, which flakily failed for this test.
> This suggests that this step/timeout is generally flaky. I increased the timeout
> to 20 * CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL.
>
> Bug: 753218
> Change-Id: Ic224b7314fff57f1770a4048aa5753f54e040b55
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/770148
> Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Brett Wilson <brettw@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517541}
Bug: 753218
TBR: brettw@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ic6aafb34c2467253f75cc85da48200d19f3bc9af
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/777697
Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517850}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 150,218
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init mod_init(void)
{
register_hdlc_protocol(&proto);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct sock *sk_prot_alloc(struct proto *prot, gfp_t priority,
int family)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct kmem_cache *slab;
slab = prot->slab;
if (slab != NULL) {
sk = kmem_cache_alloc(slab, priority & ~__GFP_ZERO);
if (!sk)
return sk;
if (priority & __GFP_ZERO)
sk_prot_clear_nulls(sk, prot->obj_size);
} else
sk = kmalloc(prot->obj_size, priority);
if (sk != NULL) {
kmemcheck_annotate_bitfield(sk, flags);
if (security_sk_alloc(sk, family, priority))
goto out_free;
if (!try_module_get(prot->owner))
goto out_free_sec;
sk_tx_queue_clear(sk);
}
return sk;
out_free_sec:
security_sk_free(sk);
out_free:
if (slab != NULL)
kmem_cache_free(slab, sk);
else
kfree(sk);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 47,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t rtnl_link_get_size(const struct net_device *dev)
{
const struct rtnl_link_ops *ops = dev->rtnl_link_ops;
size_t size;
if (!ops)
return 0;
size = nla_total_size(sizeof(struct nlattr)) + /* IFLA_LINKINFO */
nla_total_size(strlen(ops->kind) + 1); /* IFLA_INFO_KIND */
if (ops->get_size)
/* IFLA_INFO_DATA + nested data */
size += nla_total_size(sizeof(struct nlattr)) +
ops->get_size(dev);
if (ops->get_xstats_size)
/* IFLA_INFO_XSTATS */
size += nla_total_size(ops->get_xstats_size(dev));
size += rtnl_link_get_slave_info_data_size(dev);
return size;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 53,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DiceTurnSyncOnHelper::~DiceTurnSyncOnHelper() {
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ndp_msg_addrto_adjust_all_routers(struct in6_addr *addr)
{
struct in6_addr any = IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT;
if (memcmp(addr, &any, sizeof(any)))
return;
addr->s6_addr32[0] = htonl(0xFF020000);
addr->s6_addr32[1] = 0;
addr->s6_addr32[2] = 0;
addr->s6_addr32[3] = htonl(0x2);
}
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <julien.bernard@viagenie.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 53,912
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void usbhid_set_leds(struct hid_device *hid)
{
struct hid_field *field;
int offset;
if ((offset = hid_find_field_early(hid, HID_UP_LED, 0x01, &field)) != -1) {
hid_set_field(field, offset, 0);
usbhid_submit_report(hid, field->report, USB_DIR_OUT);
}
}
Commit Message: HID: usbhid: fix out-of-bounds bug
The hid descriptor identifies the length and type of subordinate
descriptors for a device. If the received hid descriptor is smaller than
the size of the struct hid_descriptor, it is possible to cause
out-of-bounds.
In addition, if bNumDescriptors of the hid descriptor have an incorrect
value, this can also cause out-of-bounds while approaching hdesc->desc[n].
So check the size of hid descriptor and bNumDescriptors.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006c5f8edf by task kworker/1:2/1261
CPU: 1 PID: 1261 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted
4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #169
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1004
hid_add_device+0x16b/0xb30 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2944
usbhid_probe+0xc28/0x1100 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1369
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaejoong Kim <climbbb.kim@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 59,835
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_vm_exec(mrb_state *mrb, struct RProc *proc, mrb_code *pc)
{
/* mrb_assert(mrb_proc_cfunc_p(proc)) */
mrb_irep *irep = proc->body.irep;
mrb_value *pool = irep->pool;
mrb_sym *syms = irep->syms;
mrb_code i;
int ai = mrb_gc_arena_save(mrb);
struct mrb_jmpbuf *prev_jmp = mrb->jmp;
struct mrb_jmpbuf c_jmp;
#ifdef DIRECT_THREADED
static void *optable[] = {
&&L_OP_NOP, &&L_OP_MOVE,
&&L_OP_LOADL, &&L_OP_LOADI, &&L_OP_LOADSYM, &&L_OP_LOADNIL,
&&L_OP_LOADSELF, &&L_OP_LOADT, &&L_OP_LOADF,
&&L_OP_GETGLOBAL, &&L_OP_SETGLOBAL, &&L_OP_GETSPECIAL, &&L_OP_SETSPECIAL,
&&L_OP_GETIV, &&L_OP_SETIV, &&L_OP_GETCV, &&L_OP_SETCV,
&&L_OP_GETCONST, &&L_OP_SETCONST, &&L_OP_GETMCNST, &&L_OP_SETMCNST,
&&L_OP_GETUPVAR, &&L_OP_SETUPVAR,
&&L_OP_JMP, &&L_OP_JMPIF, &&L_OP_JMPNOT,
&&L_OP_ONERR, &&L_OP_RESCUE, &&L_OP_POPERR, &&L_OP_RAISE, &&L_OP_EPUSH, &&L_OP_EPOP,
&&L_OP_SEND, &&L_OP_SENDB, &&L_OP_FSEND,
&&L_OP_CALL, &&L_OP_SUPER, &&L_OP_ARGARY, &&L_OP_ENTER,
&&L_OP_KARG, &&L_OP_KDICT, &&L_OP_RETURN, &&L_OP_TAILCALL, &&L_OP_BLKPUSH,
&&L_OP_ADD, &&L_OP_ADDI, &&L_OP_SUB, &&L_OP_SUBI, &&L_OP_MUL, &&L_OP_DIV,
&&L_OP_EQ, &&L_OP_LT, &&L_OP_LE, &&L_OP_GT, &&L_OP_GE,
&&L_OP_ARRAY, &&L_OP_ARYCAT, &&L_OP_ARYPUSH, &&L_OP_AREF, &&L_OP_ASET, &&L_OP_APOST,
&&L_OP_STRING, &&L_OP_STRCAT, &&L_OP_HASH,
&&L_OP_LAMBDA, &&L_OP_RANGE, &&L_OP_OCLASS,
&&L_OP_CLASS, &&L_OP_MODULE, &&L_OP_EXEC,
&&L_OP_METHOD, &&L_OP_SCLASS, &&L_OP_TCLASS,
&&L_OP_DEBUG, &&L_OP_STOP, &&L_OP_ERR,
};
#endif
mrb_bool exc_catched = FALSE;
RETRY_TRY_BLOCK:
MRB_TRY(&c_jmp) {
if (exc_catched) {
exc_catched = FALSE;
if (mrb->exc && mrb->exc->tt == MRB_TT_BREAK)
goto L_BREAK;
goto L_RAISE;
}
mrb->jmp = &c_jmp;
mrb->c->ci->proc = proc;
mrb->c->ci->nregs = irep->nregs;
#define regs (mrb->c->stack)
INIT_DISPATCH {
CASE(OP_NOP) {
/* do nothing */
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_MOVE) {
/* A B R(A) := R(B) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int b = GETARG_B(i);
regs[a] = regs[b];
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_LOADL) {
/* A Bx R(A) := Pool(Bx) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
#ifdef MRB_WORD_BOXING
mrb_value val = pool[bx];
#ifndef MRB_WITHOUT_FLOAT
if (mrb_float_p(val)) {
val = mrb_float_value(mrb, mrb_float(val));
}
#endif
regs[a] = val;
#else
regs[a] = pool[bx];
#endif
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_LOADI) {
/* A sBx R(A) := sBx */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
mrb_int bx = GETARG_sBx(i);
SET_INT_VALUE(regs[a], bx);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_LOADSYM) {
/* A Bx R(A) := Syms(Bx) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
SET_SYM_VALUE(regs[a], syms[bx]);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_LOADSELF) {
/* A R(A) := self */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
regs[a] = regs[0];
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_LOADT) {
/* A R(A) := true */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
SET_TRUE_VALUE(regs[a]);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_LOADF) {
/* A R(A) := false */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
SET_FALSE_VALUE(regs[a]);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_GETGLOBAL) {
/* A Bx R(A) := getglobal(Syms(Bx)) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
mrb_value val = mrb_gv_get(mrb, syms[bx]);
regs[a] = val;
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_SETGLOBAL) {
/* A Bx setglobal(Syms(Bx), R(A)) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
mrb_gv_set(mrb, syms[bx], regs[a]);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_GETSPECIAL) {
/* A Bx R(A) := Special[Bx] */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
mrb_value val = mrb_vm_special_get(mrb, bx);
regs[a] = val;
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_SETSPECIAL) {
/* A Bx Special[Bx] := R(A) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
mrb_vm_special_set(mrb, bx, regs[a]);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_GETIV) {
/* A Bx R(A) := ivget(Bx) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
mrb_value val = mrb_vm_iv_get(mrb, syms[bx]);
regs[a] = val;
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_SETIV) {
/* A Bx ivset(Syms(Bx),R(A)) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
mrb_vm_iv_set(mrb, syms[bx], regs[a]);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_GETCV) {
/* A Bx R(A) := cvget(Syms(Bx)) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
mrb_value val;
ERR_PC_SET(mrb, pc);
val = mrb_vm_cv_get(mrb, syms[bx]);
ERR_PC_CLR(mrb);
regs[a] = val;
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_SETCV) {
/* A Bx cvset(Syms(Bx),R(A)) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
mrb_vm_cv_set(mrb, syms[bx], regs[a]);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_GETCONST) {
/* A Bx R(A) := constget(Syms(Bx)) */
mrb_value val;
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
mrb_sym sym = syms[bx];
ERR_PC_SET(mrb, pc);
val = mrb_vm_const_get(mrb, sym);
ERR_PC_CLR(mrb);
regs[a] = val;
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_SETCONST) {
/* A Bx constset(Syms(Bx),R(A)) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
mrb_vm_const_set(mrb, syms[bx], regs[a]);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_GETMCNST) {
/* A Bx R(A) := R(A)::Syms(Bx) */
mrb_value val;
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
ERR_PC_SET(mrb, pc);
val = mrb_const_get(mrb, regs[a], syms[bx]);
ERR_PC_CLR(mrb);
regs[a] = val;
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_SETMCNST) {
/* A Bx R(A+1)::Syms(Bx) := R(A) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
mrb_const_set(mrb, regs[a+1], syms[bx], regs[a]);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_GETUPVAR) {
/* A B C R(A) := uvget(B,C) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int b = GETARG_B(i);
int c = GETARG_C(i);
mrb_value *regs_a = regs + a;
struct REnv *e = uvenv(mrb, c);
if (!e) {
*regs_a = mrb_nil_value();
}
else {
*regs_a = e->stack[b];
}
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_SETUPVAR) {
/* A B C uvset(B,C,R(A)) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int b = GETARG_B(i);
int c = GETARG_C(i);
struct REnv *e = uvenv(mrb, c);
if (e) {
mrb_value *regs_a = regs + a;
if (b < MRB_ENV_STACK_LEN(e)) {
e->stack[b] = *regs_a;
mrb_write_barrier(mrb, (struct RBasic*)e);
}
}
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_JMP) {
/* sBx pc+=sBx */
int sbx = GETARG_sBx(i);
pc += sbx;
JUMP;
}
CASE(OP_JMPIF) {
/* A sBx if R(A) pc+=sBx */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int sbx = GETARG_sBx(i);
if (mrb_test(regs[a])) {
pc += sbx;
JUMP;
}
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_JMPNOT) {
/* A sBx if !R(A) pc+=sBx */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int sbx = GETARG_sBx(i);
if (!mrb_test(regs[a])) {
pc += sbx;
JUMP;
}
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_ONERR) {
/* sBx pc+=sBx on exception */
int sbx = GETARG_sBx(i);
if (mrb->c->rsize <= mrb->c->ci->ridx) {
if (mrb->c->rsize == 0) mrb->c->rsize = RESCUE_STACK_INIT_SIZE;
else mrb->c->rsize *= 2;
mrb->c->rescue = (mrb_code **)mrb_realloc(mrb, mrb->c->rescue, sizeof(mrb_code*) * mrb->c->rsize);
}
mrb->c->rescue[mrb->c->ci->ridx++] = pc + sbx;
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_RESCUE) {
/* A B R(A) := exc; clear(exc); R(B) := matched (bool) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int b = GETARG_B(i);
int c = GETARG_C(i);
mrb_value exc;
if (c == 0) {
exc = mrb_obj_value(mrb->exc);
mrb->exc = 0;
}
else { /* continued; exc taken from R(A) */
exc = regs[a];
}
if (b != 0) {
mrb_value e = regs[b];
struct RClass *ec;
switch (mrb_type(e)) {
case MRB_TT_CLASS:
case MRB_TT_MODULE:
break;
default:
{
mrb_value exc;
exc = mrb_exc_new_str_lit(mrb, E_TYPE_ERROR,
"class or module required for rescue clause");
mrb_exc_set(mrb, exc);
goto L_RAISE;
}
}
ec = mrb_class_ptr(e);
regs[b] = mrb_bool_value(mrb_obj_is_kind_of(mrb, exc, ec));
}
if (a != 0 && c == 0) {
regs[a] = exc;
}
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_POPERR) {
/* A A.times{rescue_pop()} */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
mrb->c->ci->ridx -= a;
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_RAISE) {
/* A raise(R(A)) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
mrb_exc_set(mrb, regs[a]);
goto L_RAISE;
}
CASE(OP_EPUSH) {
/* Bx ensure_push(SEQ[Bx]) */
int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
struct RProc *p;
p = mrb_closure_new(mrb, irep->reps[bx]);
/* push ensure_stack */
if (mrb->c->esize <= mrb->c->eidx+1) {
if (mrb->c->esize == 0) mrb->c->esize = ENSURE_STACK_INIT_SIZE;
else mrb->c->esize *= 2;
mrb->c->ensure = (struct RProc **)mrb_realloc(mrb, mrb->c->ensure, sizeof(struct RProc*) * mrb->c->esize);
}
mrb->c->ensure[mrb->c->eidx++] = p;
mrb->c->ensure[mrb->c->eidx] = NULL;
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_EPOP) {
/* A A.times{ensure_pop().call} */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
mrb_callinfo *ci = mrb->c->ci;
int n, epos = ci->epos;
mrb_value self = regs[0];
struct RClass *target_class = ci->target_class;
if (mrb->c->eidx <= epos) {
NEXT;
}
if (a > mrb->c->eidx - epos)
a = mrb->c->eidx - epos;
pc = pc + 1;
for (n=0; n<a; n++) {
proc = mrb->c->ensure[epos+n];
mrb->c->ensure[epos+n] = NULL;
if (proc == NULL) continue;
irep = proc->body.irep;
ci = cipush(mrb);
ci->mid = ci[-1].mid;
ci->argc = 0;
ci->proc = proc;
ci->stackent = mrb->c->stack;
ci->nregs = irep->nregs;
ci->target_class = target_class;
ci->pc = pc;
ci->acc = ci[-1].nregs;
mrb->c->stack += ci->acc;
stack_extend(mrb, ci->nregs);
regs[0] = self;
pc = irep->iseq;
}
pool = irep->pool;
syms = irep->syms;
mrb->c->eidx = epos;
JUMP;
}
CASE(OP_LOADNIL) {
/* A R(A) := nil */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
SET_NIL_VALUE(regs[a]);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_SENDB) {
/* A B C R(A) := call(R(A),Syms(B),R(A+1),...,R(A+C),&R(A+C+1))*/
/* fall through */
};
L_SEND:
CASE(OP_SEND) {
/* A B C R(A) := call(R(A),Syms(B),R(A+1),...,R(A+C)) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int n = GETARG_C(i);
int argc = (n == CALL_MAXARGS) ? -1 : n;
int bidx = (argc < 0) ? a+2 : a+n+1;
mrb_method_t m;
struct RClass *c;
mrb_callinfo *ci = mrb->c->ci;
mrb_value recv, blk;
mrb_sym mid = syms[GETARG_B(i)];
mrb_assert(bidx < ci->nregs);
recv = regs[a];
if (GET_OPCODE(i) != OP_SENDB) {
SET_NIL_VALUE(regs[bidx]);
blk = regs[bidx];
}
else {
blk = regs[bidx];
if (!mrb_nil_p(blk) && mrb_type(blk) != MRB_TT_PROC) {
blk = mrb_convert_type(mrb, blk, MRB_TT_PROC, "Proc", "to_proc");
/* The stack might have been reallocated during mrb_convert_type(),
see #3622 */
regs[bidx] = blk;
}
}
c = mrb_class(mrb, recv);
m = mrb_method_search_vm(mrb, &c, mid);
if (MRB_METHOD_UNDEF_P(m)) {
mrb_sym missing = mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "method_missing");
m = mrb_method_search_vm(mrb, &c, missing);
if (MRB_METHOD_UNDEF_P(m) || (missing == mrb->c->ci->mid && mrb_obj_eq(mrb, regs[0], recv))) {
mrb_value args = (argc < 0) ? regs[a+1] : mrb_ary_new_from_values(mrb, n, regs+a+1);
ERR_PC_SET(mrb, pc);
mrb_method_missing(mrb, mid, recv, args);
}
if (argc >= 0) {
if (a+2 >= irep->nregs) {
stack_extend(mrb, a+3);
}
regs[a+1] = mrb_ary_new_from_values(mrb, n, regs+a+1);
regs[a+2] = blk;
argc = -1;
}
mrb_ary_unshift(mrb, regs[a+1], mrb_symbol_value(mid));
mid = missing;
}
/* push callinfo */
ci = cipush(mrb);
ci->mid = mid;
ci->stackent = mrb->c->stack;
ci->target_class = c;
ci->argc = argc;
ci->pc = pc + 1;
ci->acc = a;
/* prepare stack */
mrb->c->stack += a;
if (MRB_METHOD_CFUNC_P(m)) {
ci->nregs = (argc < 0) ? 3 : n+2;
if (MRB_METHOD_PROC_P(m)) {
struct RProc *p = MRB_METHOD_PROC(m);
ci->proc = p;
recv = p->body.func(mrb, recv);
}
else {
recv = MRB_METHOD_FUNC(m)(mrb, recv);
}
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
mrb_gc_arena_shrink(mrb, ai);
if (mrb->exc) goto L_RAISE;
ci = mrb->c->ci;
if (GET_OPCODE(i) == OP_SENDB) {
if (mrb_type(blk) == MRB_TT_PROC) {
struct RProc *p = mrb_proc_ptr(blk);
if (p && !MRB_PROC_STRICT_P(p) && MRB_PROC_ENV(p) == ci[-1].env) {
p->flags |= MRB_PROC_ORPHAN;
}
}
}
if (!ci->target_class) { /* return from context modifying method (resume/yield) */
if (ci->acc == CI_ACC_RESUMED) {
mrb->jmp = prev_jmp;
return recv;
}
else {
mrb_assert(!MRB_PROC_CFUNC_P(ci[-1].proc));
proc = ci[-1].proc;
irep = proc->body.irep;
pool = irep->pool;
syms = irep->syms;
}
}
mrb->c->stack[0] = recv;
/* pop stackpos */
mrb->c->stack = ci->stackent;
pc = ci->pc;
cipop(mrb);
JUMP;
}
else {
/* setup environment for calling method */
proc = ci->proc = MRB_METHOD_PROC(m);
irep = proc->body.irep;
pool = irep->pool;
syms = irep->syms;
ci->nregs = irep->nregs;
stack_extend(mrb, (argc < 0 && ci->nregs < 3) ? 3 : ci->nregs);
pc = irep->iseq;
JUMP;
}
}
CASE(OP_FSEND) {
/* A B C R(A) := fcall(R(A),Syms(B),R(A+1),... ,R(A+C-1)) */
/* not implemented yet */
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_CALL) {
/* A R(A) := self.call(frame.argc, frame.argv) */
mrb_callinfo *ci;
mrb_value recv = mrb->c->stack[0];
struct RProc *m = mrb_proc_ptr(recv);
/* replace callinfo */
ci = mrb->c->ci;
ci->target_class = MRB_PROC_TARGET_CLASS(m);
ci->proc = m;
if (MRB_PROC_ENV_P(m)) {
mrb_sym mid;
struct REnv *e = MRB_PROC_ENV(m);
mid = e->mid;
if (mid) ci->mid = mid;
if (!e->stack) {
e->stack = mrb->c->stack;
}
}
/* prepare stack */
if (MRB_PROC_CFUNC_P(m)) {
recv = MRB_PROC_CFUNC(m)(mrb, recv);
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
mrb_gc_arena_shrink(mrb, ai);
if (mrb->exc) goto L_RAISE;
/* pop stackpos */
ci = mrb->c->ci;
mrb->c->stack = ci->stackent;
regs[ci->acc] = recv;
pc = ci->pc;
cipop(mrb);
irep = mrb->c->ci->proc->body.irep;
pool = irep->pool;
syms = irep->syms;
JUMP;
}
else {
/* setup environment for calling method */
proc = m;
irep = m->body.irep;
if (!irep) {
mrb->c->stack[0] = mrb_nil_value();
goto L_RETURN;
}
pool = irep->pool;
syms = irep->syms;
ci->nregs = irep->nregs;
stack_extend(mrb, ci->nregs);
if (ci->argc < 0) {
if (irep->nregs > 3) {
stack_clear(regs+3, irep->nregs-3);
}
}
else if (ci->argc+2 < irep->nregs) {
stack_clear(regs+ci->argc+2, irep->nregs-ci->argc-2);
}
if (MRB_PROC_ENV_P(m)) {
regs[0] = MRB_PROC_ENV(m)->stack[0];
}
pc = irep->iseq;
JUMP;
}
}
CASE(OP_SUPER) {
/* A C R(A) := super(R(A+1),... ,R(A+C+1)) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int n = GETARG_C(i);
int argc = (n == CALL_MAXARGS) ? -1 : n;
int bidx = (argc < 0) ? a+2 : a+n+1;
mrb_method_t m;
struct RClass *c;
mrb_callinfo *ci = mrb->c->ci;
mrb_value recv, blk;
mrb_sym mid = ci->mid;
struct RClass* target_class = MRB_PROC_TARGET_CLASS(ci->proc);
mrb_assert(bidx < ci->nregs);
if (mid == 0 || !target_class) {
mrb_value exc = mrb_exc_new_str_lit(mrb, E_NOMETHOD_ERROR, "super called outside of method");
mrb_exc_set(mrb, exc);
goto L_RAISE;
}
if (target_class->tt == MRB_TT_MODULE) {
target_class = ci->target_class;
if (target_class->tt != MRB_TT_ICLASS) {
mrb_value exc = mrb_exc_new_str_lit(mrb, E_RUNTIME_ERROR, "superclass info lost [mruby limitations]");
mrb_exc_set(mrb, exc);
goto L_RAISE;
}
}
recv = regs[0];
if (!mrb_obj_is_kind_of(mrb, recv, target_class)) {
mrb_value exc = mrb_exc_new_str_lit(mrb, E_TYPE_ERROR,
"self has wrong type to call super in this context");
mrb_exc_set(mrb, exc);
goto L_RAISE;
}
blk = regs[bidx];
if (!mrb_nil_p(blk) && mrb_type(blk) != MRB_TT_PROC) {
blk = mrb_convert_type(mrb, blk, MRB_TT_PROC, "Proc", "to_proc");
/* The stack or ci stack might have been reallocated during
mrb_convert_type(), see #3622 and #3784 */
regs[bidx] = blk;
ci = mrb->c->ci;
}
c = target_class->super;
m = mrb_method_search_vm(mrb, &c, mid);
if (MRB_METHOD_UNDEF_P(m)) {
mrb_sym missing = mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "method_missing");
if (mid != missing) {
c = mrb_class(mrb, recv);
}
m = mrb_method_search_vm(mrb, &c, missing);
if (MRB_METHOD_UNDEF_P(m)) {
mrb_value args = (argc < 0) ? regs[a+1] : mrb_ary_new_from_values(mrb, n, regs+a+1);
ERR_PC_SET(mrb, pc);
mrb_method_missing(mrb, mid, recv, args);
}
mid = missing;
if (argc >= 0) {
if (a+2 >= ci->nregs) {
stack_extend(mrb, a+3);
}
regs[a+1] = mrb_ary_new_from_values(mrb, n, regs+a+1);
regs[a+2] = blk;
argc = -1;
}
mrb_ary_unshift(mrb, regs[a+1], mrb_symbol_value(ci->mid));
}
/* push callinfo */
ci = cipush(mrb);
ci->mid = mid;
ci->stackent = mrb->c->stack;
ci->target_class = c;
ci->pc = pc + 1;
ci->argc = argc;
/* prepare stack */
mrb->c->stack += a;
mrb->c->stack[0] = recv;
if (MRB_METHOD_CFUNC_P(m)) {
mrb_value v;
ci->nregs = (argc < 0) ? 3 : n+2;
if (MRB_METHOD_PROC_P(m)) {
ci->proc = MRB_METHOD_PROC(m);
}
v = MRB_METHOD_CFUNC(m)(mrb, recv);
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
if (mrb->exc) goto L_RAISE;
ci = mrb->c->ci;
if (!ci->target_class) { /* return from context modifying method (resume/yield) */
if (ci->acc == CI_ACC_RESUMED) {
mrb->jmp = prev_jmp;
return v;
}
else {
mrb_assert(!MRB_PROC_CFUNC_P(ci[-1].proc));
proc = ci[-1].proc;
irep = proc->body.irep;
pool = irep->pool;
syms = irep->syms;
}
}
mrb->c->stack[0] = v;
/* pop stackpos */
mrb->c->stack = ci->stackent;
pc = ci->pc;
cipop(mrb);
JUMP;
}
else {
/* fill callinfo */
ci->acc = a;
/* setup environment for calling method */
proc = ci->proc = MRB_METHOD_PROC(m);
irep = proc->body.irep;
pool = irep->pool;
syms = irep->syms;
ci->nregs = irep->nregs;
stack_extend(mrb, (argc < 0 && ci->nregs < 3) ? 3 : ci->nregs);
pc = irep->iseq;
JUMP;
}
}
CASE(OP_ARGARY) {
/* A Bx R(A) := argument array (16=6:1:5:4) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
int m1 = (bx>>10)&0x3f;
int r = (bx>>9)&0x1;
int m2 = (bx>>4)&0x1f;
int lv = (bx>>0)&0xf;
mrb_value *stack;
if (mrb->c->ci->mid == 0 || mrb->c->ci->target_class == NULL) {
mrb_value exc;
L_NOSUPER:
exc = mrb_exc_new_str_lit(mrb, E_NOMETHOD_ERROR, "super called outside of method");
mrb_exc_set(mrb, exc);
goto L_RAISE;
}
if (lv == 0) stack = regs + 1;
else {
struct REnv *e = uvenv(mrb, lv-1);
if (!e) goto L_NOSUPER;
if (MRB_ENV_STACK_LEN(e) <= m1+r+m2+1)
goto L_NOSUPER;
stack = e->stack + 1;
}
if (r == 0) {
regs[a] = mrb_ary_new_from_values(mrb, m1+m2, stack);
}
else {
mrb_value *pp = NULL;
struct RArray *rest;
int len = 0;
if (mrb_array_p(stack[m1])) {
struct RArray *ary = mrb_ary_ptr(stack[m1]);
pp = ARY_PTR(ary);
len = (int)ARY_LEN(ary);
}
regs[a] = mrb_ary_new_capa(mrb, m1+len+m2);
rest = mrb_ary_ptr(regs[a]);
if (m1 > 0) {
stack_copy(ARY_PTR(rest), stack, m1);
}
if (len > 0) {
stack_copy(ARY_PTR(rest)+m1, pp, len);
}
if (m2 > 0) {
stack_copy(ARY_PTR(rest)+m1+len, stack+m1+1, m2);
}
ARY_SET_LEN(rest, m1+len+m2);
}
regs[a+1] = stack[m1+r+m2];
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_ENTER) {
/* Ax arg setup according to flags (23=5:5:1:5:5:1:1) */
/* number of optional arguments times OP_JMP should follow */
mrb_aspec ax = GETARG_Ax(i);
int m1 = MRB_ASPEC_REQ(ax);
int o = MRB_ASPEC_OPT(ax);
int r = MRB_ASPEC_REST(ax);
int m2 = MRB_ASPEC_POST(ax);
/* unused
int k = MRB_ASPEC_KEY(ax);
int kd = MRB_ASPEC_KDICT(ax);
int b = MRB_ASPEC_BLOCK(ax);
*/
int argc = mrb->c->ci->argc;
mrb_value *argv = regs+1;
mrb_value *argv0 = argv;
int len = m1 + o + r + m2;
mrb_value *blk = &argv[argc < 0 ? 1 : argc];
if (argc < 0) {
struct RArray *ary = mrb_ary_ptr(regs[1]);
argv = ARY_PTR(ary);
argc = (int)ARY_LEN(ary);
mrb_gc_protect(mrb, regs[1]);
}
if (mrb->c->ci->proc && MRB_PROC_STRICT_P(mrb->c->ci->proc)) {
if (argc >= 0) {
if (argc < m1 + m2 || (r == 0 && argc > len)) {
argnum_error(mrb, m1+m2);
goto L_RAISE;
}
}
}
else if (len > 1 && argc == 1 && mrb_array_p(argv[0])) {
mrb_gc_protect(mrb, argv[0]);
argc = (int)RARRAY_LEN(argv[0]);
argv = RARRAY_PTR(argv[0]);
}
if (argc < len) {
int mlen = m2;
if (argc < m1+m2) {
if (m1 < argc)
mlen = argc - m1;
else
mlen = 0;
}
regs[len+1] = *blk; /* move block */
SET_NIL_VALUE(regs[argc+1]);
if (argv0 != argv) {
value_move(®s[1], argv, argc-mlen); /* m1 + o */
}
if (argc < m1) {
stack_clear(®s[argc+1], m1-argc);
}
if (mlen) {
value_move(®s[len-m2+1], &argv[argc-mlen], mlen);
}
if (mlen < m2) {
stack_clear(®s[len-m2+mlen+1], m2-mlen);
}
if (r) {
regs[m1+o+1] = mrb_ary_new_capa(mrb, 0);
}
if (o == 0 || argc < m1+m2) pc++;
else
pc += argc - m1 - m2 + 1;
}
else {
int rnum = 0;
if (argv0 != argv) {
regs[len+1] = *blk; /* move block */
value_move(®s[1], argv, m1+o);
}
if (r) {
rnum = argc-m1-o-m2;
regs[m1+o+1] = mrb_ary_new_from_values(mrb, rnum, argv+m1+o);
}
if (m2) {
if (argc-m2 > m1) {
value_move(®s[m1+o+r+1], &argv[m1+o+rnum], m2);
}
}
if (argv0 == argv) {
regs[len+1] = *blk; /* move block */
}
pc += o + 1;
}
mrb->c->ci->argc = len;
/* clear local (but non-argument) variables */
if (irep->nlocals-len-2 > 0) {
stack_clear(®s[len+2], irep->nlocals-len-2);
}
JUMP;
}
CASE(OP_KARG) {
/* A B C R(A) := kdict[Syms(B)]; if C kdict.rm(Syms(B)) */
/* if C == 2; raise unless kdict.empty? */
/* OP_JMP should follow to skip init code */
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_KDICT) {
/* A C R(A) := kdict */
NEXT;
}
L_RETURN:
i = MKOP_AB(OP_RETURN, GETARG_A(i), OP_R_NORMAL);
/* fall through */
CASE(OP_RETURN) {
/* A B return R(A) (B=normal,in-block return/break) */
mrb_callinfo *ci;
#define ecall_adjust() do {\
ptrdiff_t cioff = ci - mrb->c->cibase;\
ecall(mrb);\
ci = mrb->c->cibase + cioff;\
} while (0)
ci = mrb->c->ci;
if (ci->mid) {
mrb_value blk;
if (ci->argc < 0) {
blk = regs[2];
}
else {
blk = regs[ci->argc+1];
}
if (mrb_type(blk) == MRB_TT_PROC) {
struct RProc *p = mrb_proc_ptr(blk);
if (!MRB_PROC_STRICT_P(p) &&
ci > mrb->c->cibase && MRB_PROC_ENV(p) == ci[-1].env) {
p->flags |= MRB_PROC_ORPHAN;
}
}
}
if (mrb->exc) {
mrb_callinfo *ci0;
L_RAISE:
ci0 = ci = mrb->c->ci;
if (ci == mrb->c->cibase) {
if (ci->ridx == 0) goto L_FTOP;
goto L_RESCUE;
}
while (ci[0].ridx == ci[-1].ridx) {
cipop(mrb);
mrb->c->stack = ci->stackent;
if (ci->acc == CI_ACC_SKIP && prev_jmp) {
mrb->jmp = prev_jmp;
MRB_THROW(prev_jmp);
}
ci = mrb->c->ci;
if (ci == mrb->c->cibase) {
if (ci->ridx == 0) {
L_FTOP: /* fiber top */
if (mrb->c == mrb->root_c) {
mrb->c->stack = mrb->c->stbase;
goto L_STOP;
}
else {
struct mrb_context *c = mrb->c;
while (c->eidx > ci->epos) {
ecall_adjust();
}
if (c->fib) {
mrb_write_barrier(mrb, (struct RBasic*)c->fib);
}
mrb->c->status = MRB_FIBER_TERMINATED;
mrb->c = c->prev;
c->prev = NULL;
goto L_RAISE;
}
}
break;
}
/* call ensure only when we skip this callinfo */
if (ci[0].ridx == ci[-1].ridx) {
while (mrb->c->eidx > ci->epos) {
ecall_adjust();
}
}
}
L_RESCUE:
if (ci->ridx == 0) goto L_STOP;
proc = ci->proc;
irep = proc->body.irep;
pool = irep->pool;
syms = irep->syms;
if (ci < ci0) {
mrb->c->stack = ci[1].stackent;
}
stack_extend(mrb, irep->nregs);
pc = mrb->c->rescue[--ci->ridx];
}
else {
int acc;
mrb_value v;
struct RProc *dst;
ci = mrb->c->ci;
v = regs[GETARG_A(i)];
mrb_gc_protect(mrb, v);
switch (GETARG_B(i)) {
case OP_R_RETURN:
/* Fall through to OP_R_NORMAL otherwise */
if (ci->acc >=0 && MRB_PROC_ENV_P(proc) && !MRB_PROC_STRICT_P(proc)) {
mrb_callinfo *cibase = mrb->c->cibase;
dst = top_proc(mrb, proc);
if (MRB_PROC_ENV_P(dst)) {
struct REnv *e = MRB_PROC_ENV(dst);
if (!MRB_ENV_STACK_SHARED_P(e) || e->cxt != mrb->c) {
localjump_error(mrb, LOCALJUMP_ERROR_RETURN);
goto L_RAISE;
}
}
while (cibase <= ci && ci->proc != dst) {
if (ci->acc < 0) {
localjump_error(mrb, LOCALJUMP_ERROR_RETURN);
goto L_RAISE;
}
ci--;
}
if (ci <= cibase) {
localjump_error(mrb, LOCALJUMP_ERROR_RETURN);
goto L_RAISE;
}
break;
}
case OP_R_NORMAL:
NORMAL_RETURN:
if (ci == mrb->c->cibase) {
struct mrb_context *c;
if (!mrb->c->prev) { /* toplevel return */
localjump_error(mrb, LOCALJUMP_ERROR_RETURN);
goto L_RAISE;
}
if (mrb->c->prev->ci == mrb->c->prev->cibase) {
mrb_value exc = mrb_exc_new_str_lit(mrb, E_FIBER_ERROR, "double resume");
mrb_exc_set(mrb, exc);
goto L_RAISE;
}
while (mrb->c->eidx > 0) {
ecall(mrb);
}
/* automatic yield at the end */
c = mrb->c;
c->status = MRB_FIBER_TERMINATED;
mrb->c = c->prev;
c->prev = NULL;
mrb->c->status = MRB_FIBER_RUNNING;
ci = mrb->c->ci;
}
break;
case OP_R_BREAK:
if (MRB_PROC_STRICT_P(proc)) goto NORMAL_RETURN;
if (MRB_PROC_ORPHAN_P(proc)) {
mrb_value exc;
L_BREAK_ERROR:
exc = mrb_exc_new_str_lit(mrb, E_LOCALJUMP_ERROR,
"break from proc-closure");
mrb_exc_set(mrb, exc);
goto L_RAISE;
}
if (!MRB_PROC_ENV_P(proc) || !MRB_ENV_STACK_SHARED_P(MRB_PROC_ENV(proc))) {
goto L_BREAK_ERROR;
}
else {
struct REnv *e = MRB_PROC_ENV(proc);
if (e == mrb->c->cibase->env && proc != mrb->c->cibase->proc) {
goto L_BREAK_ERROR;
}
if (e->cxt != mrb->c) {
goto L_BREAK_ERROR;
}
}
while (mrb->c->eidx > mrb->c->ci->epos) {
ecall_adjust();
}
/* break from fiber block */
if (ci == mrb->c->cibase && ci->pc) {
struct mrb_context *c = mrb->c;
mrb->c = c->prev;
c->prev = NULL;
ci = mrb->c->ci;
}
if (ci->acc < 0) {
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
mrb->c->vmexec = FALSE;
mrb->exc = (struct RObject*)break_new(mrb, proc, v);
mrb->jmp = prev_jmp;
MRB_THROW(prev_jmp);
}
if (FALSE) {
L_BREAK:
v = ((struct RBreak*)mrb->exc)->val;
proc = ((struct RBreak*)mrb->exc)->proc;
mrb->exc = NULL;
ci = mrb->c->ci;
}
mrb->c->stack = ci->stackent;
proc = proc->upper;
while (mrb->c->cibase < ci && ci[-1].proc != proc) {
if (ci[-1].acc == CI_ACC_SKIP) {
while (ci < mrb->c->ci) {
cipop(mrb);
}
goto L_BREAK_ERROR;
}
ci--;
}
if (ci == mrb->c->cibase) {
goto L_BREAK_ERROR;
}
break;
default:
/* cannot happen */
break;
}
while (ci < mrb->c->ci) {
cipop(mrb);
}
ci[0].ridx = ci[-1].ridx;
while (mrb->c->eidx > ci->epos) {
ecall_adjust();
}
if (mrb->c->vmexec && !ci->target_class) {
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
mrb->c->vmexec = FALSE;
mrb->jmp = prev_jmp;
return v;
}
acc = ci->acc;
mrb->c->stack = ci->stackent;
cipop(mrb);
if (acc == CI_ACC_SKIP || acc == CI_ACC_DIRECT) {
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
mrb->jmp = prev_jmp;
return v;
}
pc = ci->pc;
ci = mrb->c->ci;
DEBUG(fprintf(stderr, "from :%s\n", mrb_sym2name(mrb, ci->mid)));
proc = mrb->c->ci->proc;
irep = proc->body.irep;
pool = irep->pool;
syms = irep->syms;
regs[acc] = v;
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
}
JUMP;
}
CASE(OP_TAILCALL) {
/* A B C return call(R(A),Syms(B),R(A+1),... ,R(A+C+1)) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int b = GETARG_B(i);
int n = GETARG_C(i);
mrb_method_t m;
struct RClass *c;
mrb_callinfo *ci;
mrb_value recv;
mrb_sym mid = syms[b];
recv = regs[a];
c = mrb_class(mrb, recv);
m = mrb_method_search_vm(mrb, &c, mid);
if (MRB_METHOD_UNDEF_P(m)) {
mrb_value sym = mrb_symbol_value(mid);
mrb_sym missing = mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "method_missing");
m = mrb_method_search_vm(mrb, &c, missing);
if (MRB_METHOD_UNDEF_P(m)) {
mrb_value args;
if (n == CALL_MAXARGS) {
args = regs[a+1];
}
else {
args = mrb_ary_new_from_values(mrb, n, regs+a+1);
}
ERR_PC_SET(mrb, pc);
mrb_method_missing(mrb, mid, recv, args);
}
mid = missing;
if (n == CALL_MAXARGS) {
mrb_ary_unshift(mrb, regs[a+1], sym);
}
else {
value_move(regs+a+2, regs+a+1, ++n);
regs[a+1] = sym;
}
}
/* replace callinfo */
ci = mrb->c->ci;
ci->mid = mid;
ci->target_class = c;
if (n == CALL_MAXARGS) {
ci->argc = -1;
}
else {
ci->argc = n;
}
/* move stack */
value_move(mrb->c->stack, ®s[a], ci->argc+1);
if (MRB_METHOD_CFUNC_P(m)) {
mrb_value v = MRB_METHOD_CFUNC(m)(mrb, recv);
mrb->c->stack[0] = v;
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
goto L_RETURN;
}
else {
/* setup environment for calling method */
struct RProc *p = MRB_METHOD_PROC(m);
irep = p->body.irep;
pool = irep->pool;
syms = irep->syms;
if (ci->argc < 0) {
stack_extend(mrb, (irep->nregs < 3) ? 3 : irep->nregs);
}
else {
stack_extend(mrb, irep->nregs);
}
pc = irep->iseq;
}
JUMP;
}
CASE(OP_BLKPUSH) {
/* A Bx R(A) := block (16=6:1:5:4) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
int m1 = (bx>>10)&0x3f;
int r = (bx>>9)&0x1;
int m2 = (bx>>4)&0x1f;
int lv = (bx>>0)&0xf;
mrb_value *stack;
if (lv == 0) stack = regs + 1;
else {
struct REnv *e = uvenv(mrb, lv-1);
if (!e || (!MRB_ENV_STACK_SHARED_P(e) && e->mid == 0) ||
MRB_ENV_STACK_LEN(e) <= m1+r+m2+1) {
localjump_error(mrb, LOCALJUMP_ERROR_YIELD);
goto L_RAISE;
}
stack = e->stack + 1;
}
if (mrb_nil_p(stack[m1+r+m2])) {
localjump_error(mrb, LOCALJUMP_ERROR_YIELD);
goto L_RAISE;
}
regs[a] = stack[m1+r+m2];
NEXT;
}
#define TYPES2(a,b) ((((uint16_t)(a))<<8)|(((uint16_t)(b))&0xff))
#define OP_MATH_BODY(op,v1,v2) do {\
v1(regs[a]) = v1(regs[a]) op v2(regs[a+1]);\
} while(0)
CASE(OP_ADD) {
/* A B C R(A) := R(A)+R(A+1) (Syms[B]=:+,C=1)*/
int a = GETARG_A(i);
/* need to check if op is overridden */
switch (TYPES2(mrb_type(regs[a]),mrb_type(regs[a+1]))) {
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FIXNUM,MRB_TT_FIXNUM):
{
mrb_int x, y, z;
mrb_value *regs_a = regs + a;
x = mrb_fixnum(regs_a[0]);
y = mrb_fixnum(regs_a[1]);
if (mrb_int_add_overflow(x, y, &z)) {
#ifndef MRB_WITHOUT_FLOAT
SET_FLOAT_VALUE(mrb, regs_a[0], (mrb_float)x + (mrb_float)y);
break;
#endif
}
SET_INT_VALUE(regs[a], z);
}
break;
#ifndef MRB_WITHOUT_FLOAT
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FIXNUM,MRB_TT_FLOAT):
{
mrb_int x = mrb_fixnum(regs[a]);
mrb_float y = mrb_float(regs[a+1]);
SET_FLOAT_VALUE(mrb, regs[a], (mrb_float)x + y);
}
break;
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FLOAT,MRB_TT_FIXNUM):
#ifdef MRB_WORD_BOXING
{
mrb_float x = mrb_float(regs[a]);
mrb_int y = mrb_fixnum(regs[a+1]);
SET_FLOAT_VALUE(mrb, regs[a], x + y);
}
#else
OP_MATH_BODY(+,mrb_float,mrb_fixnum);
#endif
break;
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FLOAT,MRB_TT_FLOAT):
#ifdef MRB_WORD_BOXING
{
mrb_float x = mrb_float(regs[a]);
mrb_float y = mrb_float(regs[a+1]);
SET_FLOAT_VALUE(mrb, regs[a], x + y);
}
#else
OP_MATH_BODY(+,mrb_float,mrb_float);
#endif
break;
#endif
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_STRING,MRB_TT_STRING):
regs[a] = mrb_str_plus(mrb, regs[a], regs[a+1]);
break;
default:
goto L_SEND;
}
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_SUB) {
/* A B C R(A) := R(A)-R(A+1) (Syms[B]=:-,C=1)*/
int a = GETARG_A(i);
/* need to check if op is overridden */
switch (TYPES2(mrb_type(regs[a]),mrb_type(regs[a+1]))) {
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FIXNUM,MRB_TT_FIXNUM):
{
mrb_int x, y, z;
x = mrb_fixnum(regs[a]);
y = mrb_fixnum(regs[a+1]);
if (mrb_int_sub_overflow(x, y, &z)) {
#ifndef MRB_WITHOUT_FLOAT
SET_FLOAT_VALUE(mrb, regs[a], (mrb_float)x - (mrb_float)y);
break;
#endif
}
SET_INT_VALUE(regs[a], z);
}
break;
#ifndef MRB_WITHOUT_FLOAT
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FIXNUM,MRB_TT_FLOAT):
{
mrb_int x = mrb_fixnum(regs[a]);
mrb_float y = mrb_float(regs[a+1]);
SET_FLOAT_VALUE(mrb, regs[a], (mrb_float)x - y);
}
break;
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FLOAT,MRB_TT_FIXNUM):
#ifdef MRB_WORD_BOXING
{
mrb_float x = mrb_float(regs[a]);
mrb_int y = mrb_fixnum(regs[a+1]);
SET_FLOAT_VALUE(mrb, regs[a], x - y);
}
#else
OP_MATH_BODY(-,mrb_float,mrb_fixnum);
#endif
break;
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FLOAT,MRB_TT_FLOAT):
#ifdef MRB_WORD_BOXING
{
mrb_float x = mrb_float(regs[a]);
mrb_float y = mrb_float(regs[a+1]);
SET_FLOAT_VALUE(mrb, regs[a], x - y);
}
#else
OP_MATH_BODY(-,mrb_float,mrb_float);
#endif
break;
#endif
default:
goto L_SEND;
}
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_MUL) {
/* A B C R(A) := R(A)*R(A+1) (Syms[B]=:*,C=1)*/
int a = GETARG_A(i);
/* need to check if op is overridden */
switch (TYPES2(mrb_type(regs[a]),mrb_type(regs[a+1]))) {
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FIXNUM,MRB_TT_FIXNUM):
{
mrb_int x, y, z;
x = mrb_fixnum(regs[a]);
y = mrb_fixnum(regs[a+1]);
if (mrb_int_mul_overflow(x, y, &z)) {
#ifndef MRB_WITHOUT_FLOAT
SET_FLOAT_VALUE(mrb, regs[a], (mrb_float)x * (mrb_float)y);
break;
#endif
}
SET_INT_VALUE(regs[a], z);
}
break;
#ifndef MRB_WITHOUT_FLOAT
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FIXNUM,MRB_TT_FLOAT):
{
mrb_int x = mrb_fixnum(regs[a]);
mrb_float y = mrb_float(regs[a+1]);
SET_FLOAT_VALUE(mrb, regs[a], (mrb_float)x * y);
}
break;
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FLOAT,MRB_TT_FIXNUM):
#ifdef MRB_WORD_BOXING
{
mrb_float x = mrb_float(regs[a]);
mrb_int y = mrb_fixnum(regs[a+1]);
SET_FLOAT_VALUE(mrb, regs[a], x * y);
}
#else
OP_MATH_BODY(*,mrb_float,mrb_fixnum);
#endif
break;
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FLOAT,MRB_TT_FLOAT):
#ifdef MRB_WORD_BOXING
{
mrb_float x = mrb_float(regs[a]);
mrb_float y = mrb_float(regs[a+1]);
SET_FLOAT_VALUE(mrb, regs[a], x * y);
}
#else
OP_MATH_BODY(*,mrb_float,mrb_float);
#endif
break;
#endif
default:
goto L_SEND;
}
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_DIV) {
/* A B C R(A) := R(A)/R(A+1) (Syms[B]=:/,C=1)*/
int a = GETARG_A(i);
#ifndef MRB_WITHOUT_FLOAT
double x, y, f;
#endif
/* need to check if op is overridden */
switch (TYPES2(mrb_type(regs[a]),mrb_type(regs[a+1]))) {
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FIXNUM,MRB_TT_FIXNUM):
#ifdef MRB_WITHOUT_FLOAT
{
mrb_int x = mrb_fixnum(regs[a]);
mrb_int y = mrb_fixnum(regs[a+1]);
SET_INT_VALUE(regs[a], y ? x / y : 0);
}
break;
#else
x = (mrb_float)mrb_fixnum(regs[a]);
y = (mrb_float)mrb_fixnum(regs[a+1]);
break;
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FIXNUM,MRB_TT_FLOAT):
x = (mrb_float)mrb_fixnum(regs[a]);
y = mrb_float(regs[a+1]);
break;
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FLOAT,MRB_TT_FIXNUM):
x = mrb_float(regs[a]);
y = (mrb_float)mrb_fixnum(regs[a+1]);
break;
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FLOAT,MRB_TT_FLOAT):
x = mrb_float(regs[a]);
y = mrb_float(regs[a+1]);
break;
#endif
default:
goto L_SEND;
}
#ifndef MRB_WITHOUT_FLOAT
if (y == 0) {
if (x > 0) f = INFINITY;
else if (x < 0) f = -INFINITY;
else /* if (x == 0) */ f = NAN;
}
else {
f = x / y;
}
SET_FLOAT_VALUE(mrb, regs[a], f);
#endif
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_ADDI) {
/* A B C R(A) := R(A)+C (Syms[B]=:+)*/
int a = GETARG_A(i);
/* need to check if + is overridden */
switch (mrb_type(regs[a])) {
case MRB_TT_FIXNUM:
{
mrb_int x = mrb_fixnum(regs[a]);
mrb_int y = GETARG_C(i);
mrb_int z;
if (mrb_int_add_overflow(x, y, &z)) {
#ifndef MRB_WITHOUT_FLOAT
SET_FLOAT_VALUE(mrb, regs[a], (mrb_float)x + (mrb_float)y);
break;
#endif
}
SET_INT_VALUE(regs[a], z);
}
break;
#ifndef MRB_WITHOUT_FLOAT
case MRB_TT_FLOAT:
#ifdef MRB_WORD_BOXING
{
mrb_float x = mrb_float(regs[a]);
SET_FLOAT_VALUE(mrb, regs[a], x + GETARG_C(i));
}
#else
mrb_float(regs[a]) += GETARG_C(i);
#endif
break;
#endif
default:
SET_INT_VALUE(regs[a+1], GETARG_C(i));
i = MKOP_ABC(OP_SEND, a, GETARG_B(i), 1);
goto L_SEND;
}
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_SUBI) {
/* A B C R(A) := R(A)-C (Syms[B]=:-)*/
int a = GETARG_A(i);
mrb_value *regs_a = regs + a;
/* need to check if + is overridden */
switch (mrb_type(regs_a[0])) {
case MRB_TT_FIXNUM:
{
mrb_int x = mrb_fixnum(regs_a[0]);
mrb_int y = GETARG_C(i);
mrb_int z;
if (mrb_int_sub_overflow(x, y, &z)) {
#ifndef MRB_WITHOUT_FLOAT
SET_FLOAT_VALUE(mrb, regs_a[0], (mrb_float)x - (mrb_float)y);
break;
#endif
}
SET_INT_VALUE(regs_a[0], z);
}
break;
#ifndef MRB_WITHOUT_FLOAT
case MRB_TT_FLOAT:
#ifdef MRB_WORD_BOXING
{
mrb_float x = mrb_float(regs[a]);
SET_FLOAT_VALUE(mrb, regs[a], x - GETARG_C(i));
}
#else
mrb_float(regs_a[0]) -= GETARG_C(i);
#endif
break;
#endif
default:
SET_INT_VALUE(regs_a[1], GETARG_C(i));
i = MKOP_ABC(OP_SEND, a, GETARG_B(i), 1);
goto L_SEND;
}
NEXT;
}
#define OP_CMP_BODY(op,v1,v2) (v1(regs[a]) op v2(regs[a+1]))
#ifdef MRB_WITHOUT_FLOAT
#define OP_CMP(op) do {\
int result;\
/* need to check if - is overridden */\
switch (TYPES2(mrb_type(regs[a]),mrb_type(regs[a+1]))) {\
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FIXNUM,MRB_TT_FIXNUM):\
result = OP_CMP_BODY(op,mrb_fixnum,mrb_fixnum);\
break;\
default:\
goto L_SEND;\
}\
if (result) {\
SET_TRUE_VALUE(regs[a]);\
}\
else {\
SET_FALSE_VALUE(regs[a]);\
}\
} while(0)
#else
#define OP_CMP(op) do {\
int result;\
/* need to check if - is overridden */\
switch (TYPES2(mrb_type(regs[a]),mrb_type(regs[a+1]))) {\
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FIXNUM,MRB_TT_FIXNUM):\
result = OP_CMP_BODY(op,mrb_fixnum,mrb_fixnum);\
break;\
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FIXNUM,MRB_TT_FLOAT):\
result = OP_CMP_BODY(op,mrb_fixnum,mrb_float);\
break;\
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FLOAT,MRB_TT_FIXNUM):\
result = OP_CMP_BODY(op,mrb_float,mrb_fixnum);\
break;\
case TYPES2(MRB_TT_FLOAT,MRB_TT_FLOAT):\
result = OP_CMP_BODY(op,mrb_float,mrb_float);\
break;\
default:\
goto L_SEND;\
}\
if (result) {\
SET_TRUE_VALUE(regs[a]);\
}\
else {\
SET_FALSE_VALUE(regs[a]);\
}\
} while(0)
#endif
CASE(OP_EQ) {
/* A B C R(A) := R(A)==R(A+1) (Syms[B]=:==,C=1)*/
int a = GETARG_A(i);
if (mrb_obj_eq(mrb, regs[a], regs[a+1])) {
SET_TRUE_VALUE(regs[a]);
}
else {
OP_CMP(==);
}
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_LT) {
/* A B C R(A) := R(A)<R(A+1) (Syms[B]=:<,C=1)*/
int a = GETARG_A(i);
OP_CMP(<);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_LE) {
/* A B C R(A) := R(A)<=R(A+1) (Syms[B]=:<=,C=1)*/
int a = GETARG_A(i);
OP_CMP(<=);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_GT) {
/* A B C R(A) := R(A)>R(A+1) (Syms[B]=:>,C=1)*/
int a = GETARG_A(i);
OP_CMP(>);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_GE) {
/* A B C R(A) := R(A)>=R(A+1) (Syms[B]=:>=,C=1)*/
int a = GETARG_A(i);
OP_CMP(>=);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_ARRAY) {
/* A B C R(A) := ary_new(R(B),R(B+1)..R(B+C)) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int b = GETARG_B(i);
int c = GETARG_C(i);
mrb_value v = mrb_ary_new_from_values(mrb, c, ®s[b]);
regs[a] = v;
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_ARYCAT) {
/* A B mrb_ary_concat(R(A),R(B)) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int b = GETARG_B(i);
mrb_value splat = mrb_ary_splat(mrb, regs[b]);
mrb_ary_concat(mrb, regs[a], splat);
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_ARYPUSH) {
/* A B R(A).push(R(B)) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int b = GETARG_B(i);
mrb_ary_push(mrb, regs[a], regs[b]);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_AREF) {
/* A B C R(A) := R(B)[C] */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int b = GETARG_B(i);
int c = GETARG_C(i);
mrb_value v = regs[b];
if (!mrb_array_p(v)) {
if (c == 0) {
regs[a] = v;
}
else {
SET_NIL_VALUE(regs[a]);
}
}
else {
v = mrb_ary_ref(mrb, v, c);
regs[a] = v;
}
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_ASET) {
/* A B C R(B)[C] := R(A) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int b = GETARG_B(i);
int c = GETARG_C(i);
mrb_ary_set(mrb, regs[b], c, regs[a]);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_APOST) {
/* A B C *R(A),R(A+1)..R(A+C) := R(A) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
mrb_value v = regs[a];
int pre = GETARG_B(i);
int post = GETARG_C(i);
struct RArray *ary;
int len, idx;
if (!mrb_array_p(v)) {
v = mrb_ary_new_from_values(mrb, 1, ®s[a]);
}
ary = mrb_ary_ptr(v);
len = (int)ARY_LEN(ary);
if (len > pre + post) {
v = mrb_ary_new_from_values(mrb, len - pre - post, ARY_PTR(ary)+pre);
regs[a++] = v;
while (post--) {
regs[a++] = ARY_PTR(ary)[len-post-1];
}
}
else {
v = mrb_ary_new_capa(mrb, 0);
regs[a++] = v;
for (idx=0; idx+pre<len; idx++) {
regs[a+idx] = ARY_PTR(ary)[pre+idx];
}
while (idx < post) {
SET_NIL_VALUE(regs[a+idx]);
idx++;
}
}
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_STRING) {
/* A Bx R(A) := str_new(Lit(Bx)) */
mrb_int a = GETARG_A(i);
mrb_int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
mrb_value str = mrb_str_dup(mrb, pool[bx]);
regs[a] = str;
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_STRCAT) {
/* A B R(A).concat(R(B)) */
mrb_int a = GETARG_A(i);
mrb_int b = GETARG_B(i);
mrb_str_concat(mrb, regs[a], regs[b]);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_HASH) {
/* A B C R(A) := hash_new(R(B),R(B+1)..R(B+C)) */
int b = GETARG_B(i);
int c = GETARG_C(i);
int lim = b+c*2;
mrb_value hash = mrb_hash_new_capa(mrb, c);
while (b < lim) {
mrb_hash_set(mrb, hash, regs[b], regs[b+1]);
b+=2;
}
regs[GETARG_A(i)] = hash;
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_LAMBDA) {
/* A b c R(A) := lambda(SEQ[b],c) (b:c = 14:2) */
struct RProc *p;
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int b = GETARG_b(i);
int c = GETARG_c(i);
mrb_irep *nirep = irep->reps[b];
if (c & OP_L_CAPTURE) {
p = mrb_closure_new(mrb, nirep);
}
else {
p = mrb_proc_new(mrb, nirep);
p->flags |= MRB_PROC_SCOPE;
}
if (c & OP_L_STRICT) p->flags |= MRB_PROC_STRICT;
regs[a] = mrb_obj_value(p);
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_OCLASS) {
/* A R(A) := ::Object */
regs[GETARG_A(i)] = mrb_obj_value(mrb->object_class);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_CLASS) {
/* A B R(A) := newclass(R(A),Syms(B),R(A+1)) */
struct RClass *c = 0, *baseclass;
int a = GETARG_A(i);
mrb_value base, super;
mrb_sym id = syms[GETARG_B(i)];
base = regs[a];
super = regs[a+1];
if (mrb_nil_p(base)) {
baseclass = MRB_PROC_TARGET_CLASS(mrb->c->ci->proc);
base = mrb_obj_value(baseclass);
}
c = mrb_vm_define_class(mrb, base, super, id);
regs[a] = mrb_obj_value(c);
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_MODULE) {
/* A B R(A) := newmodule(R(A),Syms(B)) */
struct RClass *c = 0, *baseclass;
int a = GETARG_A(i);
mrb_value base;
mrb_sym id = syms[GETARG_B(i)];
base = regs[a];
if (mrb_nil_p(base)) {
baseclass = MRB_PROC_TARGET_CLASS(mrb->c->ci->proc);
base = mrb_obj_value(baseclass);
}
c = mrb_vm_define_module(mrb, base, id);
regs[a] = mrb_obj_value(c);
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_EXEC) {
/* A Bx R(A) := blockexec(R(A),SEQ[Bx]) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int bx = GETARG_Bx(i);
mrb_callinfo *ci;
mrb_value recv = regs[a];
struct RProc *p;
mrb_irep *nirep = irep->reps[bx];
/* prepare closure */
p = mrb_proc_new(mrb, nirep);
p->c = NULL;
mrb_field_write_barrier(mrb, (struct RBasic*)p, (struct RBasic*)proc);
MRB_PROC_SET_TARGET_CLASS(p, mrb_class_ptr(recv));
p->flags |= MRB_PROC_SCOPE;
/* prepare call stack */
ci = cipush(mrb);
ci->pc = pc + 1;
ci->acc = a;
ci->mid = 0;
ci->stackent = mrb->c->stack;
ci->argc = 0;
ci->target_class = mrb_class_ptr(recv);
/* prepare stack */
mrb->c->stack += a;
/* setup block to call */
ci->proc = p;
irep = p->body.irep;
pool = irep->pool;
syms = irep->syms;
ci->nregs = irep->nregs;
stack_extend(mrb, ci->nregs);
stack_clear(regs+1, ci->nregs-1);
pc = irep->iseq;
JUMP;
}
CASE(OP_METHOD) {
/* A B R(A).newmethod(Syms(B),R(A+1)) */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
struct RClass *c = mrb_class_ptr(regs[a]);
struct RProc *p = mrb_proc_ptr(regs[a+1]);
mrb_method_t m;
MRB_METHOD_FROM_PROC(m, p);
mrb_define_method_raw(mrb, c, syms[GETARG_B(i)], m);
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_SCLASS) {
/* A B R(A) := R(B).singleton_class */
int a = GETARG_A(i);
int b = GETARG_B(i);
regs[a] = mrb_singleton_class(mrb, regs[b]);
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_TCLASS) {
/* A R(A) := target_class */
if (!mrb->c->ci->target_class) {
mrb_value exc = mrb_exc_new_str_lit(mrb, E_TYPE_ERROR, "no target class or module");
mrb_exc_set(mrb, exc);
goto L_RAISE;
}
regs[GETARG_A(i)] = mrb_obj_value(mrb->c->ci->target_class);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_RANGE) {
/* A B C R(A) := range_new(R(B),R(B+1),C) */
int b = GETARG_B(i);
mrb_value val = mrb_range_new(mrb, regs[b], regs[b+1], GETARG_C(i));
regs[GETARG_A(i)] = val;
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_DEBUG) {
/* A B C debug print R(A),R(B),R(C) */
#ifdef MRB_ENABLE_DEBUG_HOOK
mrb->debug_op_hook(mrb, irep, pc, regs);
#else
#ifndef MRB_DISABLE_STDIO
printf("OP_DEBUG %d %d %d\n", GETARG_A(i), GETARG_B(i), GETARG_C(i));
#else
abort();
#endif
#endif
NEXT;
}
CASE(OP_STOP) {
/* stop VM */
L_STOP:
while (mrb->c->eidx > 0) {
ecall(mrb);
}
ERR_PC_CLR(mrb);
mrb->jmp = prev_jmp;
if (mrb->exc) {
return mrb_obj_value(mrb->exc);
}
return regs[irep->nlocals];
}
CASE(OP_ERR) {
/* Bx raise RuntimeError with message Lit(Bx) */
mrb_value msg = mrb_str_dup(mrb, pool[GETARG_Bx(i)]);
mrb_value exc;
if (GETARG_A(i) == 0) {
exc = mrb_exc_new_str(mrb, E_RUNTIME_ERROR, msg);
}
else {
exc = mrb_exc_new_str(mrb, E_LOCALJUMP_ERROR, msg);
}
ERR_PC_SET(mrb, pc);
mrb_exc_set(mrb, exc);
goto L_RAISE;
}
}
END_DISPATCH;
#undef regs
}
MRB_CATCH(&c_jmp) {
exc_catched = TRUE;
goto RETRY_TRY_BLOCK;
}
MRB_END_EXC(&c_jmp);
}
Commit Message: Check length of env stack before accessing upvar; fix #3995
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 169,256
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PushMessagingServiceImpl::SetMessageCallbackForTesting(
const base::Closure& callback) {
message_callback_for_testing_ = callback;
}
Commit Message: Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <awdf@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <peter@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 150,706
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void smbd_deferred_open_timer(struct event_context *ev,
struct timed_event *te,
struct timeval _tval,
void *private_data)
{
struct pending_message_list *msg = talloc_get_type(private_data,
struct pending_message_list);
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_tos();
uint16_t mid = SVAL(msg->buf.data,smb_mid);
uint8_t *inbuf;
inbuf = (uint8_t *)talloc_memdup(mem_ctx, msg->buf.data,
msg->buf.length);
if (inbuf == NULL) {
exit_server("smbd_deferred_open_timer: talloc failed\n");
return;
}
/* We leave this message on the queue so the open code can
know this is a retry. */
DEBUG(5,("smbd_deferred_open_timer: trigger mid %u.\n",
(unsigned int)mid ));
/* Mark the message as processed so this is not
* re-processed in error. */
msg->processed = true;
process_smb(smbd_server_conn, inbuf,
msg->buf.length, 0,
msg->seqnum, msg->encrypted, &msg->pcd);
/* If it's still there and was processed, remove it. */
msg = get_open_deferred_message(mid);
if (msg && msg->processed) {
remove_deferred_open_smb_message(mid);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CL_ShellExecute_URL_f( void ) {
qboolean doexit;
Com_DPrintf( "CL_ShellExecute_URL_f\n" );
if ( Q_stricmp( Cmd_Argv( 1 ),"open" ) ) {
Com_DPrintf( "invalid CL_ShellExecute_URL_f syntax (shellExecute \"open\" <url> <doExit>)\n" );
return;
}
if ( Cmd_Argc() < 4 ) {
doexit = qtrue;
} else {
doexit = (qboolean)( atoi( Cmd_Argv( 3 ) ) );
}
Sys_OpenURL( Cmd_Argv( 2 ),doexit );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: check_format_type(const char *ptr, int type)
{
int quad = 0, h;
if (*ptr == '\0') {
/* Missing format string; bad */
return -1;
}
switch (file_formats[type]) {
case FILE_FMT_QUAD:
quad = 1;
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case FILE_FMT_NUM:
if (quad == 0) {
switch (type) {
case FILE_BYTE:
h = 2;
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
case FILE_BESHORT:
case FILE_LESHORT:
h = 1;
break;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_MELONG:
case FILE_LEID3:
case FILE_BEID3:
case FILE_INDIRECT:
h = 0;
break;
default:
abort();
}
} else
h = 0;
if (*ptr == '-')
ptr++;
if (*ptr == '.')
ptr++;
while (isdigit((unsigned char)*ptr)) ptr++;
if (*ptr == '.')
ptr++;
while (isdigit((unsigned char)*ptr)) ptr++;
if (quad) {
if (*ptr++ != 'l')
return -1;
if (*ptr++ != 'l')
return -1;
}
switch (*ptr++) {
#ifdef STRICT_FORMAT /* "long" formats are int formats for us */
/* so don't accept the 'l' modifier */
case 'l':
switch (*ptr++) {
case 'i':
case 'd':
case 'u':
case 'o':
case 'x':
case 'X':
return h != 0 ? -1 : 0;
default:
return -1;
}
/*
* Don't accept h and hh modifiers. They make writing
* magic entries more complicated, for very little benefit
*/
case 'h':
if (h-- <= 0)
return -1;
switch (*ptr++) {
case 'h':
if (h-- <= 0)
return -1;
switch (*ptr++) {
case 'i':
case 'd':
case 'u':
case 'o':
case 'x':
case 'X':
return 0;
default:
return -1;
}
case 'i':
case 'd':
case 'u':
case 'o':
case 'x':
case 'X':
return h != 0 ? -1 : 0;
default:
return -1;
}
#endif
case 'c':
return h != 2 ? -1 : 0;
case 'i':
case 'd':
case 'u':
case 'o':
case 'x':
case 'X':
#ifdef STRICT_FORMAT
return h != 0 ? -1 : 0;
#else
return 0;
#endif
default:
return -1;
}
case FILE_FMT_FLOAT:
case FILE_FMT_DOUBLE:
if (*ptr == '-')
ptr++;
if (*ptr == '.')
ptr++;
while (isdigit((unsigned char)*ptr)) ptr++;
if (*ptr == '.')
ptr++;
while (isdigit((unsigned char)*ptr)) ptr++;
switch (*ptr++) {
case 'e':
case 'E':
case 'f':
case 'F':
case 'g':
case 'G':
return 0;
default:
return -1;
}
case FILE_FMT_STR:
if (*ptr == '-')
ptr++;
while (isdigit((unsigned char )*ptr))
ptr++;
if (*ptr == '.') {
ptr++;
while (isdigit((unsigned char )*ptr))
ptr++;
}
switch (*ptr++) {
case 's':
return 0;
default:
return -1;
}
default:
/* internal error */
abort();
}
/*NOTREACHED*/
return -1;
}
Commit Message: * Enforce limit of 8K on regex searches that have no limits
* Allow the l modifier for regex to mean line count. Default
to byte count. If line count is specified, assume a max
of 80 characters per line to limit the byte count.
* Don't allow conversions to be used for dates, allowing
the mask field to be used as an offset.
* Bump the version of the magic format so that regex changes
are visible.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ProfileChooserView::OnRefreshTokenAvailable(
const std::string& account_id) {
if (view_mode_ == profiles::BUBBLE_VIEW_MODE_ACCOUNT_MANAGEMENT ||
view_mode_ == profiles::BUBBLE_VIEW_MODE_GAIA_ADD_ACCOUNT ||
view_mode_ == profiles::BUBBLE_VIEW_MODE_GAIA_REAUTH) {
ShowViewFromMode(AccountConsistencyModeManager::IsMirrorEnabledForProfile(
browser_->profile())
? profiles::BUBBLE_VIEW_MODE_ACCOUNT_MANAGEMENT
: profiles::BUBBLE_VIEW_MODE_PROFILE_CHOOSER);
}
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::CheckLoadEventSoon() {
if (GetFrame() && !load_event_delay_timer_.IsActive())
load_event_delay_timer_.StartOneShot(0, BLINK_FROM_HERE);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,037
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
{
if (pkt->maxlen < length) {
unsigned char *body = pkt->body;
int offset = body ? body - pkt->data : 0;
pkt->maxlen = length + 256;
pkt->data = sresize(pkt->data, pkt->maxlen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
if (body) pkt->body = pkt->data + offset;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void br_multicast_add_router(struct net_bridge *br,
struct net_bridge_port *port)
{
struct net_bridge_port *p;
struct hlist_node *n, *slot = NULL;
hlist_for_each_entry(p, n, &br->router_list, rlist) {
if ((unsigned long) port >= (unsigned long) p)
break;
slot = n;
}
if (slot)
hlist_add_after_rcu(slot, &port->rlist);
else
hlist_add_head_rcu(&port->rlist, &br->router_list);
}
Commit Message: bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <ihands@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,808
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
{
struct ext4_super_block *es;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
ext4_fsblk_t n_blocks_count = 0;
unsigned long old_sb_flags;
struct ext4_mount_options old_opts;
int enable_quota = 0;
ext4_group_t g;
unsigned int journal_ioprio = DEFAULT_JOURNAL_IOPRIO;
int err = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
int i;
#endif
char *orig_data = kstrdup(data, GFP_KERNEL);
/* Store the original options */
lock_super(sb);
old_sb_flags = sb->s_flags;
old_opts.s_mount_opt = sbi->s_mount_opt;
old_opts.s_mount_opt2 = sbi->s_mount_opt2;
old_opts.s_resuid = sbi->s_resuid;
old_opts.s_resgid = sbi->s_resgid;
old_opts.s_commit_interval = sbi->s_commit_interval;
old_opts.s_min_batch_time = sbi->s_min_batch_time;
old_opts.s_max_batch_time = sbi->s_max_batch_time;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
old_opts.s_jquota_fmt = sbi->s_jquota_fmt;
for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++)
old_opts.s_qf_names[i] = sbi->s_qf_names[i];
#endif
if (sbi->s_journal && sbi->s_journal->j_task->io_context)
journal_ioprio = sbi->s_journal->j_task->io_context->ioprio;
/*
* Allow the "check" option to be passed as a remount option.
*/
if (!parse_options(data, sb, NULL, &journal_ioprio,
&n_blocks_count, 1)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto restore_opts;
}
if (sbi->s_mount_flags & EXT4_MF_FS_ABORTED)
ext4_abort(sb, "Abort forced by user");
sb->s_flags = (sb->s_flags & ~MS_POSIXACL) |
(test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) ? MS_POSIXACL : 0);
es = sbi->s_es;
if (sbi->s_journal) {
ext4_init_journal_params(sb, sbi->s_journal);
set_task_ioprio(sbi->s_journal->j_task, journal_ioprio);
}
if ((*flags & MS_RDONLY) != (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) ||
n_blocks_count > ext4_blocks_count(es)) {
if (sbi->s_mount_flags & EXT4_MF_FS_ABORTED) {
err = -EROFS;
goto restore_opts;
}
if (*flags & MS_RDONLY) {
err = dquot_suspend(sb, -1);
if (err < 0)
goto restore_opts;
/*
* First of all, the unconditional stuff we have to do
* to disable replay of the journal when we next remount
*/
sb->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
/*
* OK, test if we are remounting a valid rw partition
* readonly, and if so set the rdonly flag and then
* mark the partition as valid again.
*/
if (!(es->s_state & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_VALID_FS)) &&
(sbi->s_mount_state & EXT4_VALID_FS))
es->s_state = cpu_to_le16(sbi->s_mount_state);
if (sbi->s_journal)
ext4_mark_recovery_complete(sb, es);
} else {
/* Make sure we can mount this feature set readwrite */
if (!ext4_feature_set_ok(sb, 0)) {
err = -EROFS;
goto restore_opts;
}
/*
* Make sure the group descriptor checksums
* are sane. If they aren't, refuse to remount r/w.
*/
for (g = 0; g < sbi->s_groups_count; g++) {
struct ext4_group_desc *gdp =
ext4_get_group_desc(sb, g, NULL);
if (!ext4_group_desc_csum_verify(sbi, g, gdp)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"ext4_remount: Checksum for group %u failed (%u!=%u)",
g, le16_to_cpu(ext4_group_desc_csum(sbi, g, gdp)),
le16_to_cpu(gdp->bg_checksum));
err = -EINVAL;
goto restore_opts;
}
}
/*
* If we have an unprocessed orphan list hanging
* around from a previously readonly bdev mount,
* require a full umount/remount for now.
*/
if (es->s_last_orphan) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Couldn't "
"remount RDWR because of unprocessed "
"orphan inode list. Please "
"umount/remount instead");
err = -EINVAL;
goto restore_opts;
}
/*
* Mounting a RDONLY partition read-write, so reread
* and store the current valid flag. (It may have
* been changed by e2fsck since we originally mounted
* the partition.)
*/
if (sbi->s_journal)
ext4_clear_journal_err(sb, es);
sbi->s_mount_state = le16_to_cpu(es->s_state);
if ((err = ext4_group_extend(sb, es, n_blocks_count)))
goto restore_opts;
if (!ext4_setup_super(sb, es, 0))
sb->s_flags &= ~MS_RDONLY;
if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_MMP))
if (ext4_multi_mount_protect(sb,
le64_to_cpu(es->s_mmp_block))) {
err = -EROFS;
goto restore_opts;
}
enable_quota = 1;
}
}
/*
* Reinitialize lazy itable initialization thread based on
* current settings
*/
if ((sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) || !test_opt(sb, INIT_INODE_TABLE))
ext4_unregister_li_request(sb);
else {
ext4_group_t first_not_zeroed;
first_not_zeroed = ext4_has_uninit_itable(sb);
ext4_register_li_request(sb, first_not_zeroed);
}
ext4_setup_system_zone(sb);
if (sbi->s_journal == NULL)
ext4_commit_super(sb, 1);
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
/* Release old quota file names */
for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++)
if (old_opts.s_qf_names[i] &&
old_opts.s_qf_names[i] != sbi->s_qf_names[i])
kfree(old_opts.s_qf_names[i]);
#endif
unlock_super(sb);
if (enable_quota)
dquot_resume(sb, -1);
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "re-mounted. Opts: %s", orig_data);
kfree(orig_data);
return 0;
restore_opts:
sb->s_flags = old_sb_flags;
sbi->s_mount_opt = old_opts.s_mount_opt;
sbi->s_mount_opt2 = old_opts.s_mount_opt2;
sbi->s_resuid = old_opts.s_resuid;
sbi->s_resgid = old_opts.s_resgid;
sbi->s_commit_interval = old_opts.s_commit_interval;
sbi->s_min_batch_time = old_opts.s_min_batch_time;
sbi->s_max_batch_time = old_opts.s_max_batch_time;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
sbi->s_jquota_fmt = old_opts.s_jquota_fmt;
for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++) {
if (sbi->s_qf_names[i] &&
old_opts.s_qf_names[i] != sbi->s_qf_names[i])
kfree(sbi->s_qf_names[i]);
sbi->s_qf_names[i] = old_opts.s_qf_names[i];
}
#endif
unlock_super(sb);
kfree(orig_data);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 20,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void f2fs_update_data_blkaddr(struct dnode_of_data *dn, block_t blkaddr)
{
dn->data_blkaddr = blkaddr;
set_data_blkaddr(dn);
f2fs_update_extent_cache(dn);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a dead loop in f2fs_fiemap()
A dead loop can be triggered in f2fs_fiemap() using the test case
as below:
...
fd = open();
fallocate(fd, 0, 0, 4294967296);
ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fiemap_buf);
...
It's caused by an overflow in __get_data_block():
...
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
...
map.m_len is an unsigned int, and bh->b_size is a size_t which is 64 bits
on 64 bits archtecture, type conversion from an unsigned int to a size_t
will result in an overflow.
In the above-mentioned case, bh->b_size will be zero, and f2fs_fiemap()
will call get_data_block() at block 0 again an again.
Fix this by adding a force conversion before left shift.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 85,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mptsas_scsi_uninit(PCIDevice *dev)
{
MPTSASState *s = MPT_SAS(dev);
qemu_bh_delete(s->request_bh);
msi_uninit(dev);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 8,386
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *c_escape_str(AVBPrint *dst, const char *src, const char sep, void *log_ctx)
{
const char *p;
for (p = src; *p; p++) {
switch (*p) {
case '\b': av_bprintf(dst, "%s", "\\b"); break;
case '\f': av_bprintf(dst, "%s", "\\f"); break;
case '\n': av_bprintf(dst, "%s", "\\n"); break;
case '\r': av_bprintf(dst, "%s", "\\r"); break;
case '\\': av_bprintf(dst, "%s", "\\\\"); break;
default:
if (*p == sep)
av_bprint_chars(dst, '\\', 1);
av_bprint_chars(dst, *p, 1);
}
}
return dst->str;
}
Commit Message: ffprobe: Fix null pointer dereference with color primaries
Found-by: AD-lab of venustech
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 61,314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LoginHtmlDialog::OnDialogClosed(const std::string& json_retval) {
is_open_ = false;
notification_registrar_.RemoveAll();
if (delegate_)
delegate_->OnDialogClosed();
}
Commit Message: cros: The next 100 clang plugin errors.
BUG=none
TEST=none
TBR=dpolukhin
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7022008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85418 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 101,500
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gray_render_scanline( RAS_ARG_ TCoord ey,
TPos x1,
TCoord y1,
TPos x2,
TCoord y2 )
{
TCoord ex1, ex2, fx1, fx2, delta, mod, lift, rem;
long p, first, dx;
int incr;
dx = x2 - x1;
ex1 = TRUNC( x1 );
ex2 = TRUNC( x2 );
fx1 = (TCoord)( x1 - SUBPIXELS( ex1 ) );
fx2 = (TCoord)( x2 - SUBPIXELS( ex2 ) );
/* trivial case. Happens often */
if ( y1 == y2 )
{
gray_set_cell( RAS_VAR_ ex2, ey );
return;
}
/* everything is located in a single cell. That is easy! */
/* */
if ( ex1 == ex2 )
{
delta = y2 - y1;
ras.area += (TArea)(( fx1 + fx2 ) * delta);
ras.cover += delta;
return;
}
/* ok, we'll have to render a run of adjacent cells on the same */
/* scanline... */
/* */
p = ( ONE_PIXEL - fx1 ) * ( y2 - y1 );
first = ONE_PIXEL;
incr = 1;
if ( dx < 0 )
{
p = fx1 * ( y2 - y1 );
first = 0;
incr = -1;
dx = -dx;
}
delta = (TCoord)( p / dx );
mod = (TCoord)( p % dx );
if ( mod < 0 )
{
delta--;
mod += (TCoord)dx;
}
ras.area += (TArea)(( fx1 + first ) * delta);
ras.cover += delta;
ex1 += incr;
gray_set_cell( RAS_VAR_ ex1, ey );
y1 += delta;
if ( ex1 != ex2 )
{
p = ONE_PIXEL * ( y2 - y1 + delta );
lift = (TCoord)( p / dx );
rem = (TCoord)( p % dx );
if ( rem < 0 )
{
lift--;
rem += (TCoord)dx;
}
mod -= (int)dx;
while ( ex1 != ex2 )
{
delta = lift;
mod += rem;
if ( mod >= 0 )
{
mod -= (TCoord)dx;
delta++;
}
ras.area += (TArea)(ONE_PIXEL * delta);
ras.cover += delta;
y1 += delta;
ex1 += incr;
gray_set_cell( RAS_VAR_ ex1, ey );
}
}
delta = y2 - y1;
ras.area += (TArea)(( fx2 + ONE_PIXEL - first ) * delta);
ras.cover += delta;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 10,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf, *p;
int ret = -1;
unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
unsigned int size;
/* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
return -1;
}
/* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
return -1;
}
/* ...and no handshake in progress. */
if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return -1;
}
/*-
* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
* as payload to distinguish different messages and add
* some random stuff.
*/
size = HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding);
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
if (buf == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
p = buf;
/* Message Type */
*p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
/* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
s2n(payload, p);
/* Sequence number */
s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
/* 16 random bytes */
if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += 16;
/* Random padding */
if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, size);
if (ret >= 0) {
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
buf, size, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
dtls1_start_timer(s);
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
}
err:
OPENSSL_free(buf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 12,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void netif_reset_xps_queues(struct net_device *dev, u16 offset,
u16 count)
{
struct xps_dev_maps *dev_maps;
int cpu, i;
bool active = false;
mutex_lock(&xps_map_mutex);
dev_maps = xmap_dereference(dev->xps_maps);
if (!dev_maps)
goto out_no_maps;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
active |= remove_xps_queue_cpu(dev, dev_maps, cpu,
offset, count);
if (!active) {
RCU_INIT_POINTER(dev->xps_maps, NULL);
kfree_rcu(dev_maps, rcu);
}
for (i = offset + (count - 1); count--; i--)
netdev_queue_numa_node_write(netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, i),
NUMA_NO_NODE);
out_no_maps:
mutex_unlock(&xps_map_mutex);
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BOOLEAN BTM_SecRegisterLinkKeyNotificationCallback (tBTM_LINK_KEY_CALLBACK *p_callback)
{
btm_cb.api.p_link_key_callback = p_callback;
return(TRUE);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,391
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FrameFetchContext::AllowScriptFromSourceWithoutNotifying(
const KURL& url) const {
ContentSettingsClient* settings_client = GetContentSettingsClient();
Settings* settings = GetSettings();
if (settings_client && !settings_client->AllowScriptFromSource(
!settings || settings->GetScriptEnabled(), url)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 145,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int __gang_lookup_nat_set(struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i,
nid_t start, unsigned int nr, struct nat_entry_set **ep)
{
return radix_tree_gang_lookup(&nm_i->nat_set_root, (void **)ep,
start, nr);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,240
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cherokee_validator_ldap_configure (cherokee_config_node_t *conf, cherokee_server_t *srv, cherokee_module_props_t **_props)
{
ret_t ret;
cherokee_list_t *i;
cherokee_validator_ldap_props_t *props;
UNUSED(srv);
if (*_props == NULL) {
CHEROKEE_NEW_STRUCT (n, validator_ldap_props);
cherokee_validator_props_init_base (VALIDATOR_PROPS(n), MODULE_PROPS_FREE(props_free));
n->port = LDAP_DEFAULT_PORT;
n->tls = false;
cherokee_buffer_init (&n->server);
cherokee_buffer_init (&n->binddn);
cherokee_buffer_init (&n->bindpw);
cherokee_buffer_init (&n->basedn);
cherokee_buffer_init (&n->filter);
cherokee_buffer_init (&n->ca_file);
*_props = MODULE_PROPS(n);
}
props = PROP_LDAP(*_props);
cherokee_config_node_foreach (i, conf) {
cherokee_config_node_t *subconf = CONFIG_NODE(i);
if (equal_buf_str (&subconf->key, "server")) {
cherokee_buffer_add_buffer (&props->server, &subconf->val);
} else if (equal_buf_str (&subconf->key, "port")) {
ret = cherokee_atoi (subconf->val.buf, &props->port);
if (ret != ret_ok) return ret_error;
} else if (equal_buf_str (&subconf->key, "bind_dn")) {
cherokee_buffer_add_buffer (&props->binddn, &subconf->val);
} else if (equal_buf_str (&subconf->key, "bind_pw")) {
cherokee_buffer_add_buffer (&props->bindpw, &subconf->val);
} else if (equal_buf_str (&subconf->key, "base_dn")) {
cherokee_buffer_add_buffer (&props->basedn, &subconf->val);
} else if (equal_buf_str (&subconf->key, "filter")) {
cherokee_buffer_add_buffer (&props->filter, &subconf->val);
} else if (equal_buf_str (&subconf->key, "tls")) {
ret = cherokee_atob (subconf->val.buf, &props->tls);
if (ret != ret_ok) return ret_error;
} else if (equal_buf_str (&subconf->key, "ca_file")) {
cherokee_buffer_add_buffer (&props->ca_file, &subconf->val);
} else if (equal_buf_str (&subconf->key, "methods") ||
equal_buf_str (&subconf->key, "realm") ||
equal_buf_str (&subconf->key, "users")) {
/* Handled in validator.c
*/
} else {
LOG_WARNING (CHEROKEE_ERROR_VALIDATOR_LDAP_KEY, subconf->key.buf);
}
}
/* Checks
*/
if (cherokee_buffer_is_empty (&props->basedn)) {
LOG_ERROR (CHEROKEE_ERROR_VALIDATOR_LDAP_PROPERTY, "base_dn");
return ret_error;
}
if (cherokee_buffer_is_empty (&props->server)) {
LOG_ERROR (CHEROKEE_ERROR_VALIDATOR_LDAP_PROPERTY, "server");
return ret_error;
}
if ((cherokee_buffer_is_empty (&props->bindpw) &&
(! cherokee_buffer_is_empty (&props->basedn))))
{
LOG_ERROR_S (CHEROKEE_ERROR_VALIDATOR_LDAP_SECURITY);
return ret_error;
}
return ret_ok;
}
Commit Message: Prevent the LDAP validator from accepting an empty password.
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 36,435
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int msg_cache_commit(struct ImapData *idata, struct Header *h)
{
if (!idata || !h)
return -1;
idata->bcache = msg_cache_open(idata);
char id[64];
snprintf(id, sizeof(id), "%u-%u", idata->uid_validity, HEADER_DATA(h)->uid);
return mutt_bcache_commit(idata->bcache, id);
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow stack buffer in msg_parse_fetch
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 79,542
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: enqueue_job(job j, usec delay, char update_store)
{
int r;
j->reserver = NULL;
if (delay) {
j->deadline_at = now_usec() + delay;
r = pq_give(&j->tube->delay, j);
if (!r) return 0;
j->state = JOB_STATE_DELAYED;
set_main_delay_timeout();
} else {
r = pq_give(&j->tube->ready, j);
if (!r) return 0;
j->state = JOB_STATE_READY;
ready_ct++;
if (j->pri < URGENT_THRESHOLD) {
global_stat.urgent_ct++;
j->tube->stat.urgent_ct++;
}
}
if (update_store) {
r = binlog_write_job(j);
if (!r) return -1;
}
process_queue();
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,134
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(io_submit, aio_context_t, ctx_id, long, nr,
struct iocb __user * __user *, iocbpp)
{
return do_io_submit(ctx_id, nr, iocbpp, 0);
}
Commit Message: Unused iocbs in a batch should not be accounted as active.
commit 69e4747ee9727d660b88d7e1efe0f4afcb35db1b upstream.
Since commit 080d676de095 ("aio: allocate kiocbs in batches") iocbs are
allocated in a batch during processing of first iocbs. All iocbs in a
batch are automatically added to ctx->active_reqs list and accounted in
ctx->reqs_active.
If one (not the last one) of iocbs submitted by an user fails, further
iocbs are not processed, but they are still present in ctx->active_reqs
and accounted in ctx->reqs_active. This causes process to stuck in a D
state in wait_for_all_aios() on exit since ctx->reqs_active will never
go down to zero. Furthermore since kiocb_batch_free() frees iocb
without removing it from active_reqs list the list become corrupted
which may cause oops.
Fix this by removing iocb from ctx->active_reqs and updating
ctx->reqs_active in kiocb_batch_free().
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void print_bad_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
pte_t pte, struct page *page)
{
pgd_t *pgd = pgd_offset(vma->vm_mm, addr);
pud_t *pud = pud_offset(pgd, addr);
pmd_t *pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
struct address_space *mapping;
pgoff_t index;
static unsigned long resume;
static unsigned long nr_shown;
static unsigned long nr_unshown;
/*
* Allow a burst of 60 reports, then keep quiet for that minute;
* or allow a steady drip of one report per second.
*/
if (nr_shown == 60) {
if (time_before(jiffies, resume)) {
nr_unshown++;
return;
}
if (nr_unshown) {
printk(KERN_ALERT
"BUG: Bad page map: %lu messages suppressed\n",
nr_unshown);
nr_unshown = 0;
}
nr_shown = 0;
}
if (nr_shown++ == 0)
resume = jiffies + 60 * HZ;
mapping = vma->vm_file ? vma->vm_file->f_mapping : NULL;
index = linear_page_index(vma, addr);
printk(KERN_ALERT
"BUG: Bad page map in process %s pte:%08llx pmd:%08llx\n",
current->comm,
(long long)pte_val(pte), (long long)pmd_val(*pmd));
if (page)
dump_page(page);
printk(KERN_ALERT
"addr:%p vm_flags:%08lx anon_vma:%p mapping:%p index:%lx\n",
(void *)addr, vma->vm_flags, vma->anon_vma, mapping, index);
/*
* Choose text because data symbols depend on CONFIG_KALLSYMS_ALL=y
*/
if (vma->vm_ops)
print_symbol(KERN_ALERT "vma->vm_ops->fault: %s\n",
(unsigned long)vma->vm_ops->fault);
if (vma->vm_file && vma->vm_file->f_op)
print_symbol(KERN_ALERT "vma->vm_file->f_op->mmap: %s\n",
(unsigned long)vma->vm_file->f_op->mmap);
dump_stack();
add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
Commit Message: vm: add vm_iomap_memory() helper function
Various drivers end up replicating the code to mmap() their memory
buffers into user space, and our core memory remapping function may be
very flexible but it is unnecessarily complicated for the common cases
to use.
Our internal VM uses pfn's ("page frame numbers") which simplifies
things for the VM, and allows us to pass physical addresses around in a
denser and more efficient format than passing a "phys_addr_t" around,
and having to shift it up and down by the page size. But it just means
that drivers end up doing that shifting instead at the interface level.
It also means that drivers end up mucking around with internal VM things
like the vma details (vm_pgoff, vm_start/end) way more than they really
need to.
So this just exports a function to map a certain physical memory range
into user space (using a phys_addr_t based interface that is much more
natural for a driver) and hides all the complexity from the driver.
Some drivers will still end up tweaking the vm_page_prot details for
things like prefetching or cacheability etc, but that's actually
relevant to the driver, rather than caring about what the page offset of
the mapping is into the particular IO memory region.
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 94,454
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct socket *sock_alloc(void)
{
struct inode *inode;
struct socket *sock;
inode = new_inode_pseudo(sock_mnt->mnt_sb);
if (!inode)
return NULL;
sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
kmemcheck_annotate_bitfield(sock, type);
inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
inode->i_mode = S_IFSOCK | S_IRWXUGO;
inode->i_uid = current_fsuid();
inode->i_gid = current_fsgid();
inode->i_op = &sockfs_inode_ops;
this_cpu_add(sockets_in_use, 1);
return sock;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path
The syzkaller fuzzer hit the following use-after-free:
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8175ea0e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:295
[<ffffffff851cc31a>] __sys_recvmmsg+0x6fa/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2261
[< inline >] SYSC_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2281
[<ffffffff851cc57f>] SyS_recvmmsg+0x16f/0x180 net/socket.c:2270
[<ffffffff86332bb6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
And, as Dmitry rightly assessed, that is because we can drop the
reference and then touch it when the underlying recvmsg calls return
some packets and then hit an error, which will make recvmmsg to set
sock->sk->sk_err, oops, fix it.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Fixes: a2e2725541fa ("net: Introduce recvmmsg socket syscall")
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160122211644.GC2470@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 50,265
|
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