instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptValue WebGLRenderingContextBase::getShaderParameter(
ScriptState* script_state,
WebGLShader* shader,
GLenum pname) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateWebGLObject("getShaderParameter", shader))
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
GLint value = 0;
switch (pname) {
case GL_DELETE_STATUS:
return WebGLAny(script_state, shader->IsDeleted());
case GL_COMPILE_STATUS:
ContextGL()->GetShaderiv(ObjectOrZero(shader), pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<bool>(value));
case GL_SHADER_TYPE:
ContextGL()->GetShaderiv(ObjectOrZero(shader), pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<unsigned>(value));
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getShaderParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,834
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::UpdateSubresourceLoaderFactories(
std::unique_ptr<URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo> subresource_loaders) {
DCHECK(loader_factories_);
static_cast<URLLoaderFactoryBundle*>(loader_factories_.get())
->Update(std::move(subresource_loaders));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,932
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tty_tiocgicount(struct tty_struct *tty, void __user *arg)
{
int retval = -EINVAL;
struct serial_icounter_struct icount;
memset(&icount, 0, sizeof(icount));
if (tty->ops->get_icount)
retval = tty->ops->get_icount(tty, &icount);
if (retval != 0)
return retval;
if (copy_to_user(arg, &icount, sizeof(icount)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 55,947
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GeometryMapper::PointVisibleInAncestorSpace(
const PropertyTreeState& local_state,
const PropertyTreeState& ancestor_state,
const FloatPoint& local_point) {
for (const auto* clip = local_state.Clip();
clip && clip != ancestor_state.Clip(); clip = clip->Parent()) {
FloatPoint mapped_point =
SourceToDestinationProjection(local_state.Transform(),
clip->LocalTransformSpace())
.MapPoint(local_point);
if (!clip->ClipRect().IntersectsQuad(
FloatRect(mapped_point, FloatSize(1, 1))))
return false;
if (clip->ClipPath() && !clip->ClipPath()->Contains(mapped_point))
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WallpaperManagerBase::RemoveObserver(
WallpaperManagerBase::Observer* observer) {
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 128,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::~ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate() {
DCHECK(!download_manager_);
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExternalProtocolHandler::LaunchUrlWithDelegate(
const GURL& url,
int render_process_host_id,
int render_view_routing_id,
ui::PageTransition page_transition,
bool has_user_gesture,
Delegate* delegate) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
std::string escaped_url_string = net::EscapeExternalHandlerValue(url.spec());
GURL escaped_url(escaped_url_string);
content::WebContents* web_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(
render_process_host_id, render_view_routing_id);
Profile* profile = nullptr;
if (web_contents) // Maybe NULL during testing.
profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
BlockState block_state =
GetBlockStateWithDelegate(escaped_url.scheme(), delegate, profile);
if (block_state == BLOCK) {
if (delegate)
delegate->BlockRequest();
return;
}
g_accept_requests = false;
shell_integration::DefaultWebClientWorkerCallback callback = base::Bind(
&OnDefaultProtocolClientWorkerFinished, url, render_process_host_id,
render_view_routing_id, block_state == UNKNOWN, page_transition,
has_user_gesture, delegate);
CreateShellWorker(callback, escaped_url.scheme(), delegate)
->StartCheckIsDefault();
}
Commit Message: Reland "Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL."
This is a reland of 2401e58572884b3561e4348d64f11ac74667ef02
Original change's description:
> Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL.
>
> Fixes bug introduced in r102449.
>
> Bug: 785809
> Change-Id: I9e6dd1031dd7e7b8d378b138ab151daefdc0c6dc
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/778747
> Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518848}
Bug: 785809
Change-Id: Ib8954584004ff5681654398db76d48cdf4437df7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/788551
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519203}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 172,687
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InputDispatcher::traceOutboundQueueLengthLocked(const sp<Connection>& connection) {
if (ATRACE_ENABLED()) {
char counterName[40];
snprintf(counterName, sizeof(counterName), "oq:%s", connection->getWindowName());
ATRACE_INT(counterName, connection->outboundQueue.count());
}
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 163,848
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::MessageLoop* RenderThreadImpl::GetMainLoop() {
return message_loop();
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 111,137
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::StackAbove(aura::Window* window) {
if (window && window->GetRootWindow()) {
::Window window_below = window->GetHost()->GetAcceleratedWidget();
std::vector<::Window> window_below_parents =
GetParentsList(xdisplay_, window_below);
std::vector<::Window> window_above_parents =
GetParentsList(xdisplay_, xwindow_);
auto it_below_window = window_below_parents.rbegin();
auto it_above_window = window_above_parents.rbegin();
for (; it_below_window != window_below_parents.rend() &&
it_above_window != window_above_parents.rend() &&
*it_below_window == *it_above_window;
++it_below_window, ++it_above_window) {
}
if (it_below_window != window_below_parents.rend() &&
it_above_window != window_above_parents.rend()) {
::Window windows[] = {*it_below_window, *it_above_window};
if (XRestackWindows(xdisplay_, windows, 2) == 0) {
std::swap(windows[0], windows[1]);
XRestackWindows(xdisplay_, windows, 2);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 140,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static vm_fault_t hugetlb_no_page(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t idx,
unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep, unsigned int flags)
{
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma);
vm_fault_t ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
int anon_rmap = 0;
unsigned long size;
struct page *page;
pte_t new_pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
unsigned long haddr = address & huge_page_mask(h);
bool new_page = false;
/*
* Currently, we are forced to kill the process in the event the
* original mapper has unmapped pages from the child due to a failed
* COW. Warn that such a situation has occurred as it may not be obvious
*/
if (is_vma_resv_set(vma, HPAGE_RESV_UNMAPPED)) {
pr_warn_ratelimited("PID %d killed due to inadequate hugepage pool\n",
current->pid);
return ret;
}
/*
* Use page lock to guard against racing truncation
* before we get page_table_lock.
*/
retry:
page = find_lock_page(mapping, idx);
if (!page) {
size = i_size_read(mapping->host) >> huge_page_shift(h);
if (idx >= size)
goto out;
/*
* Check for page in userfault range
*/
if (userfaultfd_missing(vma)) {
u32 hash;
struct vm_fault vmf = {
.vma = vma,
.address = haddr,
.flags = flags,
/*
* Hard to debug if it ends up being
* used by a callee that assumes
* something about the other
* uninitialized fields... same as in
* memory.c
*/
};
/*
* hugetlb_fault_mutex must be dropped before
* handling userfault. Reacquire after handling
* fault to make calling code simpler.
*/
hash = hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(h, mm, vma, mapping,
idx, haddr);
mutex_unlock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]);
ret = handle_userfault(&vmf, VM_UFFD_MISSING);
mutex_lock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]);
goto out;
}
page = alloc_huge_page(vma, haddr, 0);
if (IS_ERR(page)) {
ret = vmf_error(PTR_ERR(page));
goto out;
}
clear_huge_page(page, address, pages_per_huge_page(h));
__SetPageUptodate(page);
new_page = true;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE) {
int err = huge_add_to_page_cache(page, mapping, idx);
if (err) {
put_page(page);
if (err == -EEXIST)
goto retry;
goto out;
}
} else {
lock_page(page);
if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma))) {
ret = VM_FAULT_OOM;
goto backout_unlocked;
}
anon_rmap = 1;
}
} else {
/*
* If memory error occurs between mmap() and fault, some process
* don't have hwpoisoned swap entry for errored virtual address.
* So we need to block hugepage fault by PG_hwpoison bit check.
*/
if (unlikely(PageHWPoison(page))) {
ret = VM_FAULT_HWPOISON |
VM_FAULT_SET_HINDEX(hstate_index(h));
goto backout_unlocked;
}
}
/*
* If we are going to COW a private mapping later, we examine the
* pending reservations for this page now. This will ensure that
* any allocations necessary to record that reservation occur outside
* the spinlock.
*/
if ((flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
if (vma_needs_reservation(h, vma, haddr) < 0) {
ret = VM_FAULT_OOM;
goto backout_unlocked;
}
/* Just decrements count, does not deallocate */
vma_end_reservation(h, vma, haddr);
}
ptl = huge_pte_lock(h, mm, ptep);
size = i_size_read(mapping->host) >> huge_page_shift(h);
if (idx >= size)
goto backout;
ret = 0;
if (!huge_pte_none(huge_ptep_get(ptep)))
goto backout;
if (anon_rmap) {
ClearPagePrivate(page);
hugepage_add_new_anon_rmap(page, vma, haddr);
} else
page_dup_rmap(page, true);
new_pte = make_huge_pte(vma, page, ((vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
&& (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)));
set_huge_pte_at(mm, haddr, ptep, new_pte);
hugetlb_count_add(pages_per_huge_page(h), mm);
if ((flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
/* Optimization, do the COW without a second fault */
ret = hugetlb_cow(mm, vma, address, ptep, page, ptl);
}
spin_unlock(ptl);
/*
* Only make newly allocated pages active. Existing pages found
* in the pagecache could be !page_huge_active() if they have been
* isolated for migration.
*/
if (new_page)
set_page_huge_active(page);
unlock_page(page);
out:
return ret;
backout:
spin_unlock(ptl);
backout_unlocked:
unlock_page(page);
restore_reserve_on_error(h, vma, haddr, page);
put_page(page);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 97,002
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Com_WriteConfigToFile( const char *filename ) {
fileHandle_t f;
f = FS_FOpenFileWrite( filename );
if ( !f ) {
Com_Printf( "Couldn't write %s.\n", filename );
return;
}
FS_Printf( f, "// generated by RTCW, do not modify\n" );
Key_WriteBindings( f );
Cvar_WriteVariables( f );
FS_FCloseFile( f );
}
Commit Message: All: Merge some file writing extension checks
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PrintingFrameHasPageSizeStyle(blink::WebFrame* frame,
int total_page_count) {
if (!frame)
return false;
bool frame_has_custom_page_size_style = false;
for (int i = 0; i < total_page_count; ++i) {
if (frame->hasCustomPageSizeStyle(i)) {
frame_has_custom_page_size_style = true;
break;
}
}
return frame_has_custom_page_size_style;
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,664
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *segr_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(FDSessionGroupBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SEGR);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaPlayerService::removeClient(wp<Client> client)
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
mClients.remove(client);
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I3518416e89ed901021970958fb6005fd69129f7c
(cherry picked from commit 1d3f4278b2666d1a145af2f54782c993aa07d1d9)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,639
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nr_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) {
memset(&nr_sk(sk)->user_addr, 0, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog;
sk->sk_state = TCP_LISTEN;
release_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
release_sock(sk);
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
Commit Message: netrom: fix info leak via msg_name in nr_recvmsg()
In case msg_name is set the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of
struct sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Also
the sax25_ndigis member does not get assigned, leaking four more
bytes.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_init_sands(list l)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp;
element e;
LIST_FOREACH(l, vrrp, e) {
vrrp->sands.tv_sec = TIMER_DISABLED;
rb_insert_sort_cached(&vrrp->sockets->rb_sands, vrrp, rb_sands, vrrp_timer_cmp);
vrrp_init_instance_sands(vrrp);
vrrp->reload_master = false;
}
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 76,080
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *csv_escape_str(AVBPrint *dst, const char *src, const char sep, void *log_ctx)
{
char meta_chars[] = { sep, '"', '\n', '\r', '\0' };
int needs_quoting = !!src[strcspn(src, meta_chars)];
if (needs_quoting)
av_bprint_chars(dst, '"', 1);
for (; *src; src++) {
if (*src == '"')
av_bprint_chars(dst, '"', 1);
av_bprint_chars(dst, *src, 1);
}
if (needs_quoting)
av_bprint_chars(dst, '"', 1);
return dst->str;
}
Commit Message: ffprobe: Fix null pointer dereference with color primaries
Found-by: AD-lab of venustech
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 61,323
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pmcraid_chr_fasync(int fd, struct file *filep, int mode)
{
struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance;
int rc;
pinstance = filep->private_data;
mutex_lock(&pinstance->aen_queue_lock);
rc = fasync_helper(fd, filep, mode, &pinstance->aen_queue);
mutex_unlock(&pinstance->aen_queue_lock);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 26,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String InputType::TypeMismatchText() const {
return GetLocale().QueryString(WebLocalizedString::kValidationTypeMismatch);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,261
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int check_pmd_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pud_t *pud,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
const nodemask_t *nodes, unsigned long flags,
void *private)
{
pmd_t *pmd;
unsigned long next;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
do {
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
continue;
if (check_pte_range(vma, pmd, addr, next, nodes,
flags, private))
return -EIO;
} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 165,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_emulate_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 function, index;
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
function = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
index = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX, 0);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RBX, 0);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RCX, 0);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RDX, 0);
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, function, index);
if (best) {
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX, best->eax);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RBX, best->ebx);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RCX, best->ecx);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RDX, best->edx);
}
kvm_x86_ops->skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
trace_kvm_cpuid(function,
kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX),
kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RBX),
kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RCX),
kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RDX));
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 41,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pch_c_function (void)
{
return p_c_function;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 2,692
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: raptor_option_get_value_type_label(const raptor_option_value_type type)
{
if(type > RAPTOR_OPTION_VALUE_TYPE_LAST)
return NULL;
return raptor_option_value_type_labels[type];
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 21,992
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Plugin::DispatchProgressEvent(int32_t result) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::DispatchProgressEvent (result=%"
NACL_PRId32")\n", result));
if (result < 0) {
return;
}
if (progress_events_.empty()) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::DispatchProgressEvent: no pending events\n"));
return;
}
nacl::scoped_ptr<ProgressEvent> event(progress_events_.front());
progress_events_.pop();
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::DispatchProgressEvent ("
"event_type='%s', url='%s', length_computable=%d, "
"loaded=%"NACL_PRIu64", total=%"NACL_PRIu64")\n",
event->event_type(),
event->url(),
static_cast<int>(event->length_computable()),
event->loaded_bytes(),
event->total_bytes()));
static const char* kEventClosureJS =
"(function(target, type, url,"
" lengthComputable, loadedBytes, totalBytes) {"
" var progress_event = new ProgressEvent(type, {"
" bubbles: false,"
" cancelable: true,"
" lengthComputable: lengthComputable,"
" loaded: loadedBytes,"
" total: totalBytes"
" });"
" progress_event.url = url;"
" target.dispatchEvent(progress_event);"
"})";
pp::VarPrivate exception;
pp::VarPrivate function_object = ExecuteScript(kEventClosureJS, &exception);
if (!exception.is_undefined() || !function_object.is_object()) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::DispatchProgressEvent:"
" Function object creation failed.\n"));
return;
}
pp::Var owner_element_object = GetOwnerElementObject();
if (!owner_element_object.is_object()) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::DispatchProgressEvent:"
" Couldn't get owner element object.\n"));
NACL_NOTREACHED();
return;
}
pp::Var argv[6];
static const uint32_t argc = NACL_ARRAY_SIZE(argv);
argv[0] = owner_element_object;
argv[1] = pp::Var(event->event_type());
argv[2] = pp::Var(event->url());
argv[3] = pp::Var(event->length_computable() == LENGTH_IS_COMPUTABLE);
argv[4] = pp::Var(static_cast<double>(event->loaded_bytes()));
argv[5] = pp::Var(static_cast<double>(event->total_bytes()));
const pp::Var default_method;
function_object.Call(default_method, argc, argv, &exception);
if (!exception.is_undefined()) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::DispatchProgressEvent:"
" event dispatch failed.\n"));
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,337
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned xen_netbk_tx_build_gops(struct xen_netbk *netbk)
{
struct gnttab_copy *gop = netbk->tx_copy_ops, *request_gop;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int ret;
while (((nr_pending_reqs(netbk) + MAX_SKB_FRAGS) < MAX_PENDING_REQS) &&
!list_empty(&netbk->net_schedule_list)) {
struct xenvif *vif;
struct xen_netif_tx_request txreq;
struct xen_netif_tx_request txfrags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
struct page *page;
struct xen_netif_extra_info extras[XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_TYPE_MAX-1];
u16 pending_idx;
RING_IDX idx;
int work_to_do;
unsigned int data_len;
pending_ring_idx_t index;
/* Get a netif from the list with work to do. */
vif = poll_net_schedule_list(netbk);
/* This can sometimes happen because the test of
* list_empty(net_schedule_list) at the top of the
* loop is unlocked. Just go back and have another
* look.
*/
if (!vif)
continue;
if (vif->tx.sring->req_prod - vif->tx.req_cons >
XEN_NETIF_TX_RING_SIZE) {
netdev_err(vif->dev,
"Impossible number of requests. "
"req_prod %d, req_cons %d, size %ld\n",
vif->tx.sring->req_prod, vif->tx.req_cons,
XEN_NETIF_TX_RING_SIZE);
netbk_fatal_tx_err(vif);
continue;
}
RING_FINAL_CHECK_FOR_REQUESTS(&vif->tx, work_to_do);
if (!work_to_do) {
xenvif_put(vif);
continue;
}
idx = vif->tx.req_cons;
rmb(); /* Ensure that we see the request before we copy it. */
memcpy(&txreq, RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->tx, idx), sizeof(txreq));
/* Credit-based scheduling. */
if (txreq.size > vif->remaining_credit &&
tx_credit_exceeded(vif, txreq.size)) {
xenvif_put(vif);
continue;
}
vif->remaining_credit -= txreq.size;
work_to_do--;
vif->tx.req_cons = ++idx;
memset(extras, 0, sizeof(extras));
if (txreq.flags & XEN_NETTXF_extra_info) {
work_to_do = xen_netbk_get_extras(vif, extras,
work_to_do);
idx = vif->tx.req_cons;
if (unlikely(work_to_do < 0))
continue;
}
ret = netbk_count_requests(vif, &txreq, txfrags, work_to_do);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
continue;
idx += ret;
if (unlikely(txreq.size < ETH_HLEN)) {
netdev_dbg(vif->dev,
"Bad packet size: %d\n", txreq.size);
netbk_tx_err(vif, &txreq, idx);
continue;
}
/* No crossing a page as the payload mustn't fragment. */
if (unlikely((txreq.offset + txreq.size) > PAGE_SIZE)) {
netdev_err(vif->dev,
"txreq.offset: %x, size: %u, end: %lu\n",
txreq.offset, txreq.size,
(txreq.offset&~PAGE_MASK) + txreq.size);
netbk_fatal_tx_err(vif);
continue;
}
index = pending_index(netbk->pending_cons);
pending_idx = netbk->pending_ring[index];
data_len = (txreq.size > PKT_PROT_LEN &&
ret < MAX_SKB_FRAGS) ?
PKT_PROT_LEN : txreq.size;
skb = alloc_skb(data_len + NET_SKB_PAD + NET_IP_ALIGN,
GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (unlikely(skb == NULL)) {
netdev_dbg(vif->dev,
"Can't allocate a skb in start_xmit.\n");
netbk_tx_err(vif, &txreq, idx);
break;
}
/* Packets passed to netif_rx() must have some headroom. */
skb_reserve(skb, NET_SKB_PAD + NET_IP_ALIGN);
if (extras[XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_TYPE_GSO - 1].type) {
struct xen_netif_extra_info *gso;
gso = &extras[XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_TYPE_GSO - 1];
if (netbk_set_skb_gso(vif, skb, gso)) {
/* Failure in netbk_set_skb_gso is fatal. */
kfree_skb(skb);
continue;
}
}
/* XXX could copy straight to head */
page = xen_netbk_alloc_page(netbk, skb, pending_idx);
if (!page) {
kfree_skb(skb);
netbk_tx_err(vif, &txreq, idx);
continue;
}
gop->source.u.ref = txreq.gref;
gop->source.domid = vif->domid;
gop->source.offset = txreq.offset;
gop->dest.u.gmfn = virt_to_mfn(page_address(page));
gop->dest.domid = DOMID_SELF;
gop->dest.offset = txreq.offset;
gop->len = txreq.size;
gop->flags = GNTCOPY_source_gref;
gop++;
memcpy(&netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req,
&txreq, sizeof(txreq));
netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].vif = vif;
*((u16 *)skb->data) = pending_idx;
__skb_put(skb, data_len);
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = ret;
if (data_len < txreq.size) {
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags++;
frag_set_pending_idx(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0],
pending_idx);
} else {
frag_set_pending_idx(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0],
INVALID_PENDING_IDX);
}
netbk->pending_cons++;
request_gop = xen_netbk_get_requests(netbk, vif,
skb, txfrags, gop);
if (request_gop == NULL) {
kfree_skb(skb);
netbk_tx_err(vif, &txreq, idx);
continue;
}
gop = request_gop;
__skb_queue_tail(&netbk->tx_queue, skb);
vif->tx.req_cons = idx;
xen_netbk_check_rx_xenvif(vif);
if ((gop-netbk->tx_copy_ops) >= ARRAY_SIZE(netbk->tx_copy_ops))
break;
}
return gop - netbk->tx_copy_ops;
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 34,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gpu::SyncToken SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::SubmitPaint(
base::OnceClosure on_finished) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(current_paint_);
DCHECK(!deferred_framebuffer_draw_closure_);
bool painting_render_pass = current_paint_->render_pass_id() != 0;
gpu::SyncToken sync_token(
gpu::CommandBufferNamespace::VIZ_SKIA_OUTPUT_SURFACE,
impl_on_gpu_->command_buffer_id(), ++sync_fence_release_);
sync_token.SetVerifyFlush();
auto ddl = current_paint_->recorder()->detach();
DCHECK(ddl);
std::unique_ptr<SkDeferredDisplayList> overdraw_ddl;
if (renderer_settings_.show_overdraw_feedback && !painting_render_pass) {
overdraw_ddl = overdraw_surface_recorder_->detach();
DCHECK(overdraw_ddl);
overdraw_canvas_.reset();
nway_canvas_.reset();
overdraw_surface_recorder_.reset();
}
if (painting_render_pass) {
auto it = render_pass_image_cache_.find(current_paint_->render_pass_id());
if (it != render_pass_image_cache_.end()) {
it->second->clear_image();
}
DCHECK(!on_finished);
auto closure = base::BindOnce(
&SkiaOutputSurfaceImplOnGpu::FinishPaintRenderPass,
base::Unretained(impl_on_gpu_.get()), current_paint_->render_pass_id(),
std::move(ddl), std::move(images_in_current_paint_),
resource_sync_tokens_, sync_fence_release_);
ScheduleGpuTask(std::move(closure), std::move(resource_sync_tokens_));
} else {
deferred_framebuffer_draw_closure_ = base::BindOnce(
&SkiaOutputSurfaceImplOnGpu::FinishPaintCurrentFrame,
base::Unretained(impl_on_gpu_.get()), std::move(ddl),
std::move(overdraw_ddl), std::move(images_in_current_paint_),
resource_sync_tokens_, sync_fence_release_, std::move(on_finished),
draw_rectangle_);
draw_rectangle_.reset();
}
images_in_current_paint_.clear();
current_paint_.reset();
return sync_token;
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 135,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rc_free_srcgtag_profile(gs_memory_t * mem, void *ptr_in, client_name_t cname)
{
cmm_srcgtag_profile_t *srcgtag_profile = (cmm_srcgtag_profile_t *)ptr_in;
int k;
gs_memory_t *mem_nongc = srcgtag_profile->memory;
if (srcgtag_profile->rc.ref_count <= 1 ) {
/* Decrement any profiles. */
for (k = 0; k < NUM_SOURCE_PROFILES; k++) {
if (srcgtag_profile->gray_profiles[k] != NULL) {
rc_decrement(srcgtag_profile->gray_profiles[k],
"rc_free_srcgtag_profile(gray)");
}
if (srcgtag_profile->rgb_profiles[k] != NULL) {
rc_decrement(srcgtag_profile->rgb_profiles[k],
"rc_free_srcgtag_profile(rgb)");
}
if (srcgtag_profile->cmyk_profiles[k] != NULL) {
rc_decrement(srcgtag_profile->cmyk_profiles[k],
"rc_free_srcgtag_profile(cmyk)");
}
if (srcgtag_profile->color_warp_profile != NULL) {
rc_decrement(srcgtag_profile->color_warp_profile,
"rc_free_srcgtag_profile(warp)");
}
}
gs_free_object(mem_nongc, srcgtag_profile->name, "rc_free_srcgtag_profile");
gs_free_object(mem_nongc, srcgtag_profile, "rc_free_srcgtag_profile");
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,006
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: raptor_rss_emit_item(raptor_parser* rdf_parser, raptor_rss_item *item)
{
raptor_rss_parser* rss_parser = (raptor_rss_parser*)rdf_parser->context;
int f;
raptor_rss_block *block;
raptor_uri *type_uri;
if(!item->fields_count)
return 0;
/* HACK - FIXME - set correct atom output class type */
if(item->node_typei == RAPTOR_ATOM_AUTHOR)
type_uri = rdf_parser->world->rss_fields_info_uris[RAPTOR_RSS_RDF_ATOM_AUTHOR_CLASS];
else
type_uri = rdf_parser->world->rss_types_info_uris[item->node_typei];
if(raptor_rss_emit_type_triple(rdf_parser, item->term, type_uri))
return 1;
for(f = 0; f< RAPTOR_RSS_FIELDS_SIZE; f++) {
raptor_rss_field* field;
raptor_uri* predicate_uri = NULL;
raptor_term* predicate_term = NULL;
/* This is only made by a connection */
if(f == RAPTOR_RSS_FIELD_ITEMS)
continue;
/* skip predicates with no URI (no namespace e.g. RSS 2) */
predicate_uri = rdf_parser->world->rss_fields_info_uris[f];
if(!predicate_uri)
continue;
predicate_term = raptor_new_term_from_uri(rdf_parser->world,
predicate_uri);
if(!predicate_term)
continue;
rss_parser->statement.predicate = predicate_term;
for(field = item->fields[f]; field; field = field->next) {
raptor_term* object_term;
if(field->value) {
/* FIXME - should store and emit languages */
object_term = raptor_new_term_from_literal(rdf_parser->world,
field->value,
NULL, NULL);
} else {
object_term = raptor_new_term_from_uri(rdf_parser->world,
field->uri);
}
rss_parser->statement.object = object_term;
/* Generate the statement */
(*rdf_parser->statement_handler)(rdf_parser->user_data,
&rss_parser->statement);
raptor_free_term(object_term);
}
raptor_free_term(predicate_term);
}
for(block = item->blocks; block; block = block->next) {
raptor_rss_emit_block(rdf_parser, item->term, block);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 22,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct mm_struct * old_mm, *active_mm;
/* Notify parent that we're no longer interested in the old VM */
tsk = current;
old_mm = current->mm;
mm_release(tsk, old_mm);
if (old_mm) {
sync_mm_rss(old_mm);
/*
* Make sure that if there is a core dump in progress
* for the old mm, we get out and die instead of going
* through with the exec. We must hold mmap_sem around
* checking core_state and changing tsk->mm.
*/
down_read(&old_mm->mmap_sem);
if (unlikely(old_mm->core_state)) {
up_read(&old_mm->mmap_sem);
return -EINTR;
}
}
task_lock(tsk);
active_mm = tsk->active_mm;
tsk->mm = mm;
tsk->active_mm = mm;
activate_mm(active_mm, mm);
task_unlock(tsk);
arch_pick_mmap_layout(mm);
if (old_mm) {
up_read(&old_mm->mmap_sem);
BUG_ON(active_mm != old_mm);
setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&tsk->signal->maxrss, old_mm);
mm_update_next_owner(old_mm);
mmput(old_mm);
return 0;
}
mmdrop(active_mm);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 30,898
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, setFlags)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &intern->flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int SplFileObject::getFlags()
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 51,334
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int InputHandler::selectionStart() const
{
return selectionPosition(true);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidFailProvisionalLoad(
const WebURLError& error,
blink::WebHistoryCommitType commit_type) {
TRACE_EVENT1("navigation,benchmark,rail",
"RenderFrameImpl::didFailProvisionalLoad", "id", routing_id_);
NotifyObserversOfFailedProvisionalLoad(error);
WebDocumentLoader* document_loader = frame_->GetProvisionalDocumentLoader();
if (!document_loader)
return;
SendFailedProvisionalLoad(document_loader->HttpMethod().Ascii(), error,
frame_);
if (!ShouldDisplayErrorPageForFailedLoad(error.reason(), error.url()))
return;
bool replace_current_item = commit_type != blink::kWebStandardCommit;
bool inherit_document_state =
!NavigationState::FromDocumentLoader(document_loader)
->IsContentInitiated();
LoadNavigationErrorPage(document_loader, error, base::nullopt,
replace_current_item, inherit_document_state);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,596
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void _mkp_exit()
{
}
Commit Message: Mandril: check decoded URI (fix #92)
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Silva <eduardo@monkey.io>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 41,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeClientImpl::chromeDestroyed()
{
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintRenderFrameHelper::OnFramePreparedForPreviewDocument() {
if (reset_prep_frame_view_) {
PrepareFrameForPreviewDocument();
return;
}
DidFinishPrinting(CreatePreviewDocument() ? OK : FAIL_PREVIEW);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: skia::PlatformCanvas* TransportDIB::GetPlatformCanvas(int w, int h) {
if (address_ == kInvalidAddress && !Map())
return NULL;
scoped_ptr<skia::PlatformCanvas> canvas(new skia::PlatformCanvas);
if (!canvas->initialize(w, h, true, reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(memory())))
return NULL;
return canvas.release();
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 119,242
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ACodec::onSignalEndOfInputStream() {
sp<AMessage> notify = mNotify->dup();
notify->setInt32("what", CodecBase::kWhatSignaledInputEOS);
status_t err = mOMX->signalEndOfInputStream(mNode);
if (err != OK) {
notify->setInt32("err", err);
}
notify->post();
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,115
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline static unsigned short xml_encode_iso_8859_1(unsigned char c)
{
return (unsigned short)c;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __init platform_bus_init(void)
{
int error;
early_platform_cleanup();
error = device_register(&platform_bus);
if (error)
return error;
error = bus_register(&platform_bus_type);
if (error)
device_unregister(&platform_bus);
of_platform_register_reconfig_notifier();
return error;
}
Commit Message: driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override
The driver_override implementation is susceptible to race condition when
different threads are reading vs storing a different driver override.
Add locking to avoid race condition.
Fixes: 3d713e0e382e ("driver core: platform: add device binding path 'driver_override'")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <salidoa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 63,085
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t WritePSDChannels(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
MagickOffsetType size_offset,const MagickBooleanType separate)
{
Image
*mask;
MagickOffsetType
rows_offset;
size_t
channels,
count,
length,
offset_length;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
count=0;
offset_length=0;
rows_offset=0;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
compact_pixels=AcquireCompactPixels(image);
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return(0);
}
channels=1;
if (separate == MagickFalse)
{
if (next_image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
if (IsGrayImage(next_image,&next_image->exception) == MagickFalse)
channels=next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace ? 4 : 3;
if (next_image->matte != MagickFalse)
channels++;
}
rows_offset=TellBlob(image)+2;
count+=WriteCompressionStart(psd_info,image,next_image,channels);
offset_length=(next_image->rows*(psd_info->version == 1 ? 2 : 4));
}
size_offset+=2;
if (next_image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
IndexQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
}
else
{
if (IsGrayImage(next_image,&next_image->exception) != MagickFalse)
{
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
GrayQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
}
else
{
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateImage(next_image,MagickFalse);
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
RedQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
GreenQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
BlueQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
BlackQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
}
}
if (next_image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
AlphaQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
}
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateImage(next_image,MagickFalse);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
{
const char
*property;
property=GetImageArtifact(next_image,"psd:opacity-mask");
if (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
mask=(Image *) GetImageRegistry(ImageRegistryType,property,
&image->exception);
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
{
if (mask->compression == RLECompression)
{
compact_pixels=AcquireCompactPixels(mask);
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return(0);
}
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,mask,
RedQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,MagickTrue);
(void) WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset);
count+=length;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
compact_pixels);
}
}
}
return(count);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/350
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 170,103
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DevHasCursor(DeviceIntPtr pDev)
{
return pDev->spriteInfo->spriteOwner;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,823
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderViewImpl::HasAddedInputHandler() const {
return has_added_input_handler_;
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rdp_out_ts_sound_capabilityset(STREAM s)
{
uint16 soundflags = SOUND_BEEPS_FLAG;
out_uint16_le(s, RDP_CAPSET_SOUND);
out_uint16_le(s, RDP_CAPLEN_SOUND);
out_uint16_le(s, soundflags); /* soundFlags */
out_uint16_le(s, 0); /* pad2OctetsA */
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 93,024
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FormatStringForOS(base::string16* text) {
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
static const base::char16 kCr[] = {L'\r', L'\0'};
static const base::char16 kBlank[] = {L'\0'};
base::ReplaceChars(*text, kCr, kBlank, text);
#elif defined(OS_WIN)
#else
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
#endif
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,316
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::ContinueHandleManifestFetchCompleted(bool changed) {
DCHECK(internal_state_ == FETCH_MANIFEST);
if (!changed) {
DCHECK(update_type_ == UPGRADE_ATTEMPT);
internal_state_ = NO_UPDATE;
FetchMasterEntries();
MaybeCompleteUpdate(); // if not done, run async 6.9.4 step 7 substeps
return;
}
AppCacheManifest manifest;
if (!ParseManifest(manifest_url_, manifest_data_.data(),
manifest_data_.length(),
manifest_has_valid_mime_type_ ?
PARSE_MANIFEST_ALLOWING_INTERCEPTS :
PARSE_MANIFEST_PER_STANDARD,
manifest)) {
const char* kFormatString = "Failed to parse manifest %s";
const std::string message = base::StringPrintf(kFormatString,
manifest_url_.spec().c_str());
HandleCacheFailure(
AppCacheErrorDetails(
message, APPCACHE_SIGNATURE_ERROR, GURL(), 0,
false /*is_cross_origin*/),
MANIFEST_ERROR,
GURL());
VLOG(1) << message;
return;
}
internal_state_ = DOWNLOADING;
inprogress_cache_ = new AppCache(storage_, storage_->NewCacheId());
BuildUrlFileList(manifest);
inprogress_cache_->InitializeWithManifest(&manifest);
for (PendingMasters::iterator it = pending_master_entries_.begin();
it != pending_master_entries_.end(); ++it) {
PendingHosts& hosts = it->second;
for (PendingHosts::iterator host_it = hosts.begin();
host_it != hosts.end(); ++host_it) {
(*host_it)
->AssociateIncompleteCache(inprogress_cache_.get(), manifest_url_);
}
}
if (manifest.did_ignore_intercept_namespaces) {
std::string message(
"Ignoring the INTERCEPT section of the application cache manifest "
"because the content type is not text/cache-manifest");
LogConsoleMessageToAll(message);
}
group_->SetUpdateAppCacheStatus(AppCacheGroup::DOWNLOADING);
NotifyAllAssociatedHosts(APPCACHE_DOWNLOADING_EVENT);
FetchUrls();
FetchMasterEntries();
MaybeCompleteUpdate(); // if not done, continues when async fetches complete
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int calc_stack(const char *str, int *parens, int *preds, int *err)
{
bool is_pred = false;
int nr_preds = 0;
int open = 1; /* Count the expression as "(E)" */
int last_quote = 0;
int max_open = 1;
int quote = 0;
int i;
*err = 0;
for (i = 0; str[i]; i++) {
if (isspace(str[i]))
continue;
if (quote) {
if (str[i] == quote)
quote = 0;
continue;
}
switch (str[i]) {
case '\'':
case '"':
quote = str[i];
last_quote = i;
break;
case '|':
case '&':
if (str[i+1] != str[i])
break;
is_pred = false;
continue;
case '(':
is_pred = false;
open++;
if (open > max_open)
max_open = open;
continue;
case ')':
is_pred = false;
if (open == 1) {
*err = i;
return TOO_MANY_CLOSE;
}
open--;
continue;
}
if (!is_pred) {
nr_preds++;
is_pred = true;
}
}
if (quote) {
*err = last_quote;
return MISSING_QUOTE;
}
if (open != 1) {
int level = open;
/* find the bad open */
for (i--; i; i--) {
if (quote) {
if (str[i] == quote)
quote = 0;
continue;
}
switch (str[i]) {
case '(':
if (level == open) {
*err = i;
return TOO_MANY_OPEN;
}
level--;
break;
case ')':
level++;
break;
case '\'':
case '"':
quote = str[i];
break;
}
}
/* First character is the '(' with missing ')' */
*err = 0;
return TOO_MANY_OPEN;
}
/* Set the size of the required stacks */
*parens = max_open;
*preds = nr_preds;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __pure struct page *pgvec_to_page(const void *addr)
{
if (is_vmalloc_addr(addr))
return vmalloc_to_page(addr);
else
return virt_to_page(addr);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static off_t flush_command(char* buf, size_t bufsz, uint8_t cmd, uint32_t exptime, bool use_extra) {
protocol_binary_request_flush *request = (void*)buf;
assert(bufsz > sizeof(*request));
memset(request, 0, sizeof(*request));
request->message.header.request.magic = PROTOCOL_BINARY_REQ;
request->message.header.request.opcode = cmd;
off_t size = sizeof(protocol_binary_request_no_extras);
if (use_extra) {
request->message.header.request.extlen = 4;
request->message.body.expiration = htonl(exptime);
request->message.header.request.bodylen = htonl(4);
size += 4;
}
request->message.header.request.opaque = 0xdeadbeef;
return size;
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 94,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int gpr_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
unsigned long reg;
int ret;
if (target->thread.regs == NULL)
return -EIO;
CHECK_FULL_REGS(target->thread.regs);
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
target->thread.regs,
0, PT_MSR * sizeof(reg));
if (!ret && count > 0) {
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, ®,
PT_MSR * sizeof(reg),
(PT_MSR + 1) * sizeof(reg));
if (!ret)
ret = set_user_msr(target, reg);
}
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct pt_regs, orig_gpr3) !=
offsetof(struct pt_regs, msr) + sizeof(long));
if (!ret)
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.regs->orig_gpr3,
PT_ORIG_R3 * sizeof(reg),
(PT_MAX_PUT_REG + 1) * sizeof(reg));
if (PT_MAX_PUT_REG + 1 < PT_TRAP && !ret)
ret = user_regset_copyin_ignore(
&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
(PT_MAX_PUT_REG + 1) * sizeof(reg),
PT_TRAP * sizeof(reg));
if (!ret && count > 0) {
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, ®,
PT_TRAP * sizeof(reg),
(PT_TRAP + 1) * sizeof(reg));
if (!ret)
ret = set_user_trap(target, reg);
}
if (!ret)
ret = user_regset_copyin_ignore(
&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
(PT_TRAP + 1) * sizeof(reg), -1);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,484
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::IsIOThread() {
return BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBox::addVisualOverflow(const LayoutRect& rect)
{
LayoutRect borderBox = borderBoxRect();
if (borderBox.contains(rect) || rect.isEmpty())
return;
if (!m_overflow)
m_overflow = adoptPtr(new RenderOverflow(clientBoxRect(), borderBox));
m_overflow->addVisualOverflow(rect);
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,531
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CWebServer::DisplayLanguageCombo(std::string & content_part)
{
std::map<std::string, std::string> _ltypes;
char szTmp[200];
int ii = 0;
while (guiLanguage[ii].szShort != NULL)
{
_ltypes[guiLanguage[ii].szLong] = guiLanguage[ii].szShort;
ii++;
}
for (const auto & itt : _ltypes)
{
sprintf(szTmp, "<option value=\"%s\">%s</option>\n", itt.second.c_str(), itt.first.c_str());
content_part += szTmp;
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89
| 0
| 91,028
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnWebLayerUpdated() {}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bgp_route_refresh_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, int len)
{
const struct bgp_route_refresh *bgp_route_refresh_header;
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], BGP_ROUTE_REFRESH_SIZE);
/* some little sanity checking */
if (len<BGP_ROUTE_REFRESH_SIZE)
return;
bgp_route_refresh_header = (const struct bgp_route_refresh *)pptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI %s (%u), SAFI %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values,"Unknown",
/* this stinks but the compiler pads the structure
* weird */
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bgp_route_refresh_header->afi)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bgp_route_refresh_header->afi),
tok2str(bgp_safi_values,"Unknown",
bgp_route_refresh_header->safi),
bgp_route_refresh_header->safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, len);
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16300/BGP: prevent stack exhaustion
Enforce a limit on how many times bgp_attr_print() can recurse.
This fixes a stack exhaustion discovered by Include Security working
under the Mozilla SOS program in 2018 by means of code audit.
CWE ID: CWE-674
| 0
| 93,158
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline __kprobes int notify_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int ret = 0;
/* kprobe_running() needs smp_processor_id() */
if (kprobes_built_in() && !user_mode(regs)) {
preempt_disable();
if (kprobe_running() && kprobe_fault_handler(regs, 0))
ret = 1;
preempt_enable();
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,744
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int query_formats(AVFilterContext *ctx)
{
static const enum AVPixelFormat pix_fmts[] = {
AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P, AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P, AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P,
AV_PIX_FMT_YUV411P, AV_PIX_FMT_YUV410P,
AV_PIX_FMT_NONE
};
ff_set_common_formats(ctx, ff_make_format_list(pix_fmts));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nodeAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Node*, cppValue, V8Node::toNativeWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), jsValue));
imp->setNodeAttribute(WTF::getPtr(cppValue));
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,412
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::readAligned(T *pArg) const {
COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT_FUNCTION_SCOPE(PAD_SIZE_UNSAFE(sizeof(T)) == sizeof(T));
if ((mDataPos+sizeof(T)) <= mDataSize) {
const void* data = mData+mDataPos;
mDataPos += sizeof(T);
*pArg = *reinterpret_cast<const T*>(data);
return NO_ERROR;
} else {
return NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
}
}
Commit Message: Correctly handle dup() failure in Parcel::readNativeHandle
bail out if dup() fails, instead of creating an invalid native_handle_t
Bug: 28395952
Change-Id: Ia1a6198c0f45165b9c6a55a803e5f64d8afa0572
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 160,191
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int compat_do_ebt_set_ctl(struct sock *sk,
int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
{
int ret;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
case EBT_SO_SET_ENTRIES:
ret = compat_do_replace(net, user, len);
break;
case EBT_SO_SET_COUNTERS:
ret = compat_update_counters(net, user, len);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets
We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.
The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.
Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.
Reported-by: <syzbot+845a53d13171abf8bf29@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 84,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NTPResourceCache::CreateNewTabCSS() {
ui::ThemeProvider* tp = ThemeServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
DCHECK(tp);
SkColor color_background =
tp->GetColor(ThemeService::COLOR_NTP_BACKGROUND);
SkColor color_text = tp->GetColor(ThemeService::COLOR_NTP_TEXT);
SkColor color_link = tp->GetColor(ThemeService::COLOR_NTP_LINK);
SkColor color_link_underline =
tp->GetColor(ThemeService::COLOR_NTP_LINK_UNDERLINE);
SkColor color_section =
tp->GetColor(ThemeService::COLOR_NTP_SECTION);
SkColor color_section_text =
tp->GetColor(ThemeService::COLOR_NTP_SECTION_TEXT);
SkColor color_section_link =
tp->GetColor(ThemeService::COLOR_NTP_SECTION_LINK);
SkColor color_section_link_underline =
tp->GetColor(ThemeService::COLOR_NTP_SECTION_LINK_UNDERLINE);
SkColor color_section_header_text =
tp->GetColor(ThemeService::COLOR_NTP_SECTION_HEADER_TEXT);
SkColor color_section_header_text_hover =
tp->GetColor(ThemeService::COLOR_NTP_SECTION_HEADER_TEXT_HOVER);
SkColor color_section_header_rule =
tp->GetColor(ThemeService::COLOR_NTP_SECTION_HEADER_RULE);
SkColor color_section_header_rule_light =
tp->GetColor(ThemeService::COLOR_NTP_SECTION_HEADER_RULE_LIGHT);
SkColor color_text_light =
tp->GetColor(ThemeService::COLOR_NTP_TEXT_LIGHT);
SkColor color_header =
tp->GetColor(ThemeService::COLOR_NTP_HEADER);
color_utils::HSL header_lighter;
color_utils::SkColorToHSL(color_header, &header_lighter);
header_lighter.l += (1 - header_lighter.l) * 0.33;
SkColor color_header_gradient_light =
color_utils::HSLToSkColor(header_lighter, SkColorGetA(color_header));
SkColor color_section_border =
SkColorSetARGB(80,
SkColorGetR(color_header),
SkColorGetG(color_header),
SkColorGetB(color_header));
std::vector<std::string> subst;
subst.push_back(
profile_->GetPrefs()->GetString(prefs::kCurrentThemeID)); // $1
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBAString(color_background)); // $2
subst.push_back(GetNewTabBackgroundCSS(tp, false)); // $3
subst.push_back(GetNewTabBackgroundCSS(tp, true)); // $4
subst.push_back(GetNewTabBackgroundTilingCSS(tp)); // $5
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBAString(color_header)); // $6
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBAString(color_header_gradient_light)); // $7
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBAString(color_text)); // $8
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBAString(color_link)); // $9
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBAString(color_section)); // $10
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBAString(color_section_border)); // $11
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBAString(color_section_text)); // $12
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBAString(color_section_link)); // $13
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBAString(color_link_underline)); // $14
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBAString(color_section_link_underline)); // $15
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBAString(color_section_header_text)); // $16
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBAString(
color_section_header_text_hover)); // $17
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBAString(color_section_header_rule)); // $18
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBAString(
color_section_header_rule_light)); // $19
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBAString(
SkColorSetA(color_section_header_rule, 0))); // $20
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBAString(color_text_light)); // $21
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBComponents(color_section_border)); // $22
subst.push_back(SkColorToRGBComponents(color_text)); // $23
static const base::StringPiece new_tab_theme_css(
ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetRawDataResource(
IDR_NEW_TAB_4_THEME_CSS));
std::string css_string;
css_string = ReplaceStringPlaceholders(new_tab_theme_css, subst, NULL);
new_tab_css_ = base::RefCountedString::TakeString(&css_string);
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 107,784
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void acpi_os_wait_events_complete(void)
{
/*
* Make sure the GPE handler or the fixed event handler is not used
* on another CPU after removal.
*/
if (acpi_sci_irq_valid())
synchronize_hardirq(acpi_sci_irq);
flush_workqueue(kacpid_wq);
flush_workqueue(kacpi_notify_wq);
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 53,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static GF_ESD *FFD_GetESDescriptor(FFDemux *ffd, Bool for_audio)
{
GF_BitStream *bs;
Bool dont_use_sl;
GF_ESD *esd = (GF_ESD *) gf_odf_desc_esd_new(0);
esd->ESID = 1 + (for_audio ? ffd->audio_st : ffd->video_st);
esd->decoderConfig->streamType = for_audio ? GF_STREAM_AUDIO : GF_STREAM_VISUAL;
esd->decoderConfig->avgBitrate = esd->decoderConfig->maxBitrate = 0;
/*remap std object types - depending on input formats, FFMPEG may not have separate DSI from initial frame.
In this case we have no choice but using FFMPEG decoders*/
if (for_audio) {
AVCodecContext *dec = ffd->ctx->streams[ffd->audio_st]->codec;
esd->slConfig->timestampResolution = ffd->audio_tscale.den;
switch (dec->codec_id) {
case CODEC_ID_MP2:
esd->decoderConfig->objectTypeIndication = GPAC_OTI_AUDIO_MPEG1;
break;
case CODEC_ID_MP3:
esd->decoderConfig->objectTypeIndication = GPAC_OTI_AUDIO_MPEG2_PART3;
break;
case CODEC_ID_AAC:
if (!dec->extradata_size) goto opaque_audio;
esd->decoderConfig->objectTypeIndication = GPAC_OTI_AUDIO_AAC_MPEG4;
esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo->dataLength = dec->extradata_size;
esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo->data = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char)*dec->extradata_size);
memcpy(esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo->data,
dec->extradata,
sizeof(char)*dec->extradata_size);
break;
default:
opaque_audio:
esd->decoderConfig->objectTypeIndication = GPAC_OTI_MEDIA_FFMPEG;
bs = gf_bs_new(NULL, 0, GF_BITSTREAM_WRITE);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, dec->codec_id);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, dec->sample_rate);
gf_bs_write_u16(bs, dec->channels);
gf_bs_write_u16(bs, dec->frame_size);
gf_bs_write_u8(bs, 16);
gf_bs_write_u8(bs, 0);
/*ffmpeg specific*/
gf_bs_write_u16(bs, dec->block_align);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, dec->bit_rate);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, dec->codec_tag);
if (dec->extradata_size) {
gf_bs_write_data(bs, (char *) dec->extradata, dec->extradata_size);
}
gf_bs_get_content(bs, (char **) &esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo->data, &esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo->dataLength);
gf_bs_del(bs);
break;
}
dont_use_sl = ffd->unreliable_audio_timing;
} else {
AVCodecContext *dec = ffd->ctx->streams[ffd->video_st]->codec;
esd->slConfig->timestampResolution = ffd->video_tscale.den;
switch (dec->codec_id) {
case CODEC_ID_MPEG4:
/*there is a bug in fragmentation of raw H264 in ffmpeg, the NALU startcode (0x00000001) is split across
two frames - we therefore force internal ffmpeg codec ID to avoid NALU size recompute
at the decoder level*/
/*if dsi not detected force use ffmpeg*/
if (!dec->extradata_size) goto opaque_video;
/*otherwise use any MPEG-4 Visual*/
esd->decoderConfig->objectTypeIndication = (dec->codec_id==CODEC_ID_H264) ? GPAC_OTI_VIDEO_AVC : GPAC_OTI_VIDEO_MPEG4_PART2;
esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo->dataLength = dec->extradata_size;
esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo->data = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char)*dec->extradata_size);
memcpy(esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo->data,
dec->extradata,
sizeof(char)*dec->extradata_size);
break;
case CODEC_ID_MPEG1VIDEO:
esd->decoderConfig->objectTypeIndication = GPAC_OTI_VIDEO_MPEG1;
break;
case CODEC_ID_MPEG2VIDEO:
esd->decoderConfig->objectTypeIndication = GPAC_OTI_VIDEO_MPEG2_MAIN;
break;
case CODEC_ID_H263:
esd->decoderConfig->objectTypeIndication = GPAC_OTI_MEDIA_GENERIC;
bs = gf_bs_new(NULL, 0, GF_BITSTREAM_WRITE);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, GF_4CC('s', '2', '6', '3') );
gf_bs_write_u16(bs, dec->width);
gf_bs_write_u16(bs, dec->height);
gf_bs_get_content(bs, (char **) &esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo->data, &esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo->dataLength);
gf_bs_del(bs);
break;
default:
opaque_video:
esd->decoderConfig->objectTypeIndication = GPAC_OTI_MEDIA_FFMPEG;
bs = gf_bs_new(NULL, 0, GF_BITSTREAM_WRITE);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, dec->codec_id);
gf_bs_write_u16(bs, dec->width);
gf_bs_write_u16(bs, dec->height);
/*ffmpeg specific*/
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, dec->bit_rate);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, dec->codec_tag);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, dec->pix_fmt);
if (dec->extradata_size) {
gf_bs_write_data(bs, (char *) dec->extradata, dec->extradata_size);
}
gf_bs_get_content(bs, (char **) &esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo->data, &esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo->dataLength);
gf_bs_del(bs);
break;
}
dont_use_sl = GF_FALSE;
}
if (dont_use_sl) {
esd->slConfig->predefined = SLPredef_SkipSL;
} else {
/*only send full AUs*/
esd->slConfig->useAccessUnitStartFlag = esd->slConfig->useAccessUnitEndFlag = 0;
if (for_audio) {
esd->slConfig->hasRandomAccessUnitsOnlyFlag = 1;
} else {
esd->slConfig->useRandomAccessPointFlag = 1;
}
esd->slConfig->useTimestampsFlag = 1;
}
return esd;
}
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,857
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void gdImageStringUp (gdImagePtr im, gdFontPtr f, int x, int y, unsigned char *s, int color)
{
int i;
int l;
l = strlen ((char *) s);
for (i = 0; (i < l); i++) {
gdImageCharUp(im, f, x, y, s[i], color);
y -= f->w;
}
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 51,457
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void php_snmp_write_property(zval *object, zval *member, zval *value, const zend_literal *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval tmp_member;
php_snmp_object *obj;
php_snmp_prop_handler *hnd;
int ret;
if (Z_TYPE_P(member) != IS_STRING) {
tmp_member = *member;
zval_copy_ctor(&tmp_member);
convert_to_string(&tmp_member);
member = &tmp_member;
}
ret = FAILURE;
obj = (php_snmp_object *)zend_objects_get_address(object TSRMLS_CC);
ret = zend_hash_find(&php_snmp_properties, Z_STRVAL_P(member), Z_STRLEN_P(member) + 1, (void **) &hnd);
if (ret == SUCCESS && hnd->write_func) {
hnd->write_func(obj, value TSRMLS_CC);
if (! PZVAL_IS_REF(value) && Z_REFCOUNT_P(value) == 0) {
Z_ADDREF_P(value);
zval_ptr_dtor(&value);
}
} else {
zend_object_handlers * std_hnd = zend_get_std_object_handlers();
std_hnd->write_property(object, member, value, key TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (member == &tmp_member) {
zval_dtor(member);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InputType::DisableSecureTextInput() {}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,189
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WORD32 ihevcd_get_pic_mv_bank_size(WORD32 num_luma_samples)
{
WORD32 size;
WORD32 pic_size;
WORD32 mv_bank_size;
WORD32 num_pu;
WORD32 num_ctb;
pic_size = num_luma_samples;
num_pu = pic_size / (MIN_PU_SIZE * MIN_PU_SIZE);
num_ctb = pic_size / (MIN_CTB_SIZE * MIN_CTB_SIZE);
mv_bank_size = 0;
/* Size for storing pu_t start index each CTB */
/* One extra entry is needed to compute number of PUs in the last CTB */
mv_bank_size += (num_ctb + 1) * sizeof(WORD32);
/* Size for pu_map */
mv_bank_size += num_pu;
/* Size for storing pu_t for each PU */
mv_bank_size += num_pu * sizeof(pu_t);
/* Size for storing slice_idx for each CTB */
mv_bank_size += ALIGN4(num_ctb * sizeof(UWORD16));
size = mv_bank_size;
return size;
}
Commit Message: Check only allocated mv bufs for releasing from reference
When checking mv bufs for releasing from reference, unallocated
mv bufs were also checked. This issue was fixed by restricting
the loop count to allocated number of mv bufs.
Bug: 34896906
Bug: 34819017
Change-Id: If832f590b301f414d4cd5206414efc61a70c17cb
(cherry picked from commit 23bfe3e06d53ea749073a5d7ceda84239742b2c2)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 162,370
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int auto_connect(struct socket *sock, struct tipc_msg *msg)
{
struct tipc_sock *tsock = tipc_sk(sock->sk);
struct tipc_port *p_ptr;
tsock->peer_name.ref = msg_origport(msg);
tsock->peer_name.node = msg_orignode(msg);
p_ptr = tipc_port_deref(tsock->p->ref);
if (!p_ptr)
return -EINVAL;
__tipc_connect(tsock->p->ref, p_ptr, &tsock->peer_name);
if (msg_importance(msg) > TIPC_CRITICAL_IMPORTANCE)
return -EINVAL;
msg_set_importance(&p_ptr->phdr, (u32)msg_importance(msg));
sock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tipc: fix info leaks via msg_name in recv_msg/recv_stream
The code in set_orig_addr() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_tipc when filling the sockaddr info -- namely the union
is only partly filled. This will make recv_msg() and recv_stream() --
the only users of this function -- leak kernel stack memory as the
msg_name member is a local variable in net/socket.c.
Additionally to that both recv_msg() and recv_stream() fail to update
the msg_namelen member to 0 while otherwise returning with 0, i.e.
"success". This is the case for, e.g., non-blocking sockets. This will
lead to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory of the union with
memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early as it
will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Cc: Allan Stephens <allan.stephens@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IDNToUnicodeOneComponent(const base::char16* comp,
size_t comp_len,
base::string16* out) {
DCHECK(out);
if (comp_len == 0)
return false;
static const base::char16 kIdnPrefix[] = {'x', 'n', '-', '-'};
if ((comp_len > arraysize(kIdnPrefix)) &&
!memcmp(comp, kIdnPrefix, sizeof(kIdnPrefix))) {
UIDNA* uidna = g_uidna.Get().value;
DCHECK(uidna != NULL);
size_t original_length = out->length();
int32_t output_length = 64;
UIDNAInfo info = UIDNA_INFO_INITIALIZER;
UErrorCode status;
do {
out->resize(original_length + output_length);
status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
output_length = uidna_labelToUnicode(
uidna, comp, static_cast<int32_t>(comp_len), &(*out)[original_length],
output_length, &info, &status);
} while ((status == U_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR && info.errors == 0));
if (U_SUCCESS(status) && info.errors == 0) {
out->resize(original_length + output_length);
if (IsIDNComponentSafe(
base::StringPiece16(out->data() + original_length,
base::checked_cast<size_t>(output_length))))
return true;
}
out->resize(original_length);
}
out->append(comp, comp_len);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Block domain labels made of Cyrillic letters that look alike Latin
Block a label made entirely of Latin-look-alike Cyrillic letters when the TLD is not an IDN (i.e. this check is ON only for TLDs like 'com', 'net', 'uk', but not applied for IDN TLDs like рф.
BUG=683314
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=U*IDN*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2683793010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#459226}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 172,390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_table_width(struct table *t, short *orgwidth, short *cellwidth, int flag)
{
#ifdef __GNUC__
short newwidth[t->maxcol + 1];
#else /* not __GNUC__ */
short newwidth[MAXCOL];
#endif /* not __GNUC__ */
int i;
int swidth;
struct table_cell *cell = &t->cell;
int rulewidth = table_rule_width(t);
for (i = 0; i <= t->maxcol; i++)
newwidth[i] = max(orgwidth[i], 0);
if (flag & CHECK_FIXED) {
#ifdef __GNUC__
short ccellwidth[cell->maxcell + 1];
#else /* not __GNUC__ */
short ccellwidth[MAXCELL];
#endif /* not __GNUC__ */
for (i = 0; i <= t->maxcol; i++) {
if (newwidth[i] < t->fixed_width[i])
newwidth[i] = t->fixed_width[i];
}
for (i = 0; i <= cell->maxcell; i++) {
ccellwidth[i] = cellwidth[i];
if (ccellwidth[i] < cell->fixed_width[i])
ccellwidth[i] = cell->fixed_width[i];
}
check_cell_width(newwidth, ccellwidth, cell->col, cell->colspan,
cell->maxcell, cell->index, t->cellspacing, 0);
}
else {
check_cell_width(newwidth, cellwidth, cell->col, cell->colspan,
cell->maxcell, cell->index, t->cellspacing, 0);
}
if (flag & CHECK_MINIMUM)
check_minimum_width(t, newwidth);
swidth = 0;
for (i = 0; i <= t->maxcol; i++) {
swidth += ceil_at_intervals(newwidth[i], rulewidth);
}
swidth += table_border_width(t);
return swidth;
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 84,629
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::commit() {
int width = GetDrawingBuffer()->Size().Width();
int height = GetDrawingBuffer()->Size().Height();
if (PaintRenderingResultsToCanvas(kBackBuffer)) {
if (Host()->GetOrCreateCanvasResourceProvider(kPreferAcceleration)) {
Host()->Commit(Host()->ResourceProvider()->ProduceCanvasResource(),
SkIRect::MakeWH(width, height));
}
}
MarkLayerComposited();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cdf_count_chain(const cdf_sat_t *sat, cdf_secid_t sid, size_t size)
{
size_t i, j;
cdf_secid_t maxsector = (cdf_secid_t)(sat->sat_len * size);
DPRINTF(("Chain:"));
for (j = i = 0; sid >= 0; i++, j++) {
DPRINTF((" %d", sid));
if (j >= CDF_LOOP_LIMIT) {
DPRINTF(("Counting chain loop limit"));
errno = EFTYPE;
return (size_t)-1;
}
if (sid > maxsector) {
DPRINTF(("Sector %d > %d\n", sid, maxsector));
errno = EFTYPE;
return (size_t)-1;
}
sid = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)sat->sat_tab[sid]);
}
if (i == 0) {
DPRINTF((" none, sid: %d\n", sid));
return (size_t)-1;
}
DPRINTF(("\n"));
return i;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2014-0207: Prevent 0 element vectors and vectors longer than the number
of properties from accessing random memory.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 39,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: single_step_cont(struct pt_regs *regs, struct die_args *args)
{
/*
* Single step exception from kernel space to user space so
* eat the exception and continue the process:
*/
printk(KERN_ERR "KGDB: trap/step from kernel to user space, "
"resuming...\n");
kgdb_arch_handle_exception(args->trapnr, args->signr,
args->err, "c", "", regs);
/*
* Reset the BS bit in dr6 (pointed by args->err) to
* denote completion of processing
*/
(*(unsigned long *)ERR_PTR(args->err)) &= ~DR_STEP;
return NOTIFY_STOP;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,885
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ReadableStream::error(DOMException* exception)
{
if (m_state != ReadableStream::Readable)
return;
m_exception = exception;
clearQueue();
rejectAllPendingReads(m_exception);
m_state = Errored;
if (m_reader)
m_reader->error();
}
Commit Message: Remove blink::ReadableStream
This CL removes two stable runtime enabled flags
- ResponseConstructedWithReadableStream
- ResponseBodyWithV8ExtraStream
and related code including blink::ReadableStream.
BUG=613435
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2227403002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411014}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,341
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ContentBrowserClient* RenderViewTest::CreateContentBrowserClient() {
return new ContentBrowserClient;
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,062
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fuse_notify_inval_inode(struct fuse_conn *fc, unsigned int size,
struct fuse_copy_state *cs)
{
struct fuse_notify_inval_inode_out outarg;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (size != sizeof(outarg))
goto err;
err = fuse_copy_one(cs, &outarg, sizeof(outarg));
if (err)
goto err;
fuse_copy_finish(cs);
down_read(&fc->killsb);
err = -ENOENT;
if (fc->sb) {
err = fuse_reverse_inval_inode(fc->sb, outarg.ino,
outarg.off, outarg.len);
}
up_read(&fc->killsb);
return err;
err:
fuse_copy_finish(cs);
return err;
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,615
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ap_flush_queue(struct ap_device *ap_dev)
{
spin_lock_bh(&ap_dev->lock);
__ap_flush_queue(ap_dev);
spin_unlock_bh(&ap_dev->lock);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,594
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sched_get_priority_max, int, policy)
{
int ret = -EINVAL;
switch (policy) {
case SCHED_FIFO:
case SCHED_RR:
ret = MAX_USER_RT_PRIO-1;
break;
case SCHED_NORMAL:
case SCHED_BATCH:
case SCHED_IDLE:
ret = 0;
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,286
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BlobData::appendData(PassRefPtr<RawData> data, long long offset, long long length)
{
m_items.append(BlobDataItem(data, offset, length));
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 102,505
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dns_validate_dns_response(unsigned char *resp, unsigned char *bufend,
struct dns_resolution *resolution, int max_answer_records)
{
unsigned char *reader;
char *previous_dname, tmpname[DNS_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
int len, flags, offset;
int dns_query_record_id;
int nb_saved_records;
struct dns_query_item *dns_query;
struct dns_answer_item *dns_answer_record, *tmp_record;
struct dns_response_packet *dns_p;
int i, found = 0;
reader = resp;
len = 0;
previous_dname = NULL;
dns_query = NULL;
/* Initialization of response buffer and structure */
dns_p = &resolution->response;
/* query id */
if (reader + 2 >= bufend)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
dns_p->header.id = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
reader += 2;
/* Flags and rcode are stored over 2 bytes
* First byte contains:
* - response flag (1 bit)
* - opcode (4 bits)
* - authoritative (1 bit)
* - truncated (1 bit)
* - recursion desired (1 bit)
*/
if (reader + 2 >= bufend)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
flags = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
if ((flags & DNS_FLAG_REPLYCODE) != DNS_RCODE_NO_ERROR) {
if ((flags & DNS_FLAG_REPLYCODE) == DNS_RCODE_NX_DOMAIN)
return DNS_RESP_NX_DOMAIN;
else if ((flags & DNS_FLAG_REPLYCODE) == DNS_RCODE_REFUSED)
return DNS_RESP_REFUSED;
return DNS_RESP_ERROR;
}
/* Move forward 2 bytes for flags */
reader += 2;
/* 2 bytes for question count */
if (reader + 2 >= bufend)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
dns_p->header.qdcount = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
/* (for now) we send one query only, so we expect only one in the
* response too */
if (dns_p->header.qdcount != 1)
return DNS_RESP_QUERY_COUNT_ERROR;
if (dns_p->header.qdcount > DNS_MAX_QUERY_RECORDS)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
reader += 2;
/* 2 bytes for answer count */
if (reader + 2 >= bufend)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
dns_p->header.ancount = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
if (dns_p->header.ancount == 0)
return DNS_RESP_ANCOUNT_ZERO;
/* Check if too many records are announced */
if (dns_p->header.ancount > max_answer_records)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
reader += 2;
/* 2 bytes authority count */
if (reader + 2 >= bufend)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
dns_p->header.nscount = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
reader += 2;
/* 2 bytes additional count */
if (reader + 2 >= bufend)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
dns_p->header.arcount = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
reader += 2;
/* Parsing dns queries */
LIST_INIT(&dns_p->query_list);
for (dns_query_record_id = 0; dns_query_record_id < dns_p->header.qdcount; dns_query_record_id++) {
/* Use next pre-allocated dns_query_item after ensuring there is
* still one available.
* It's then added to our packet query list. */
if (dns_query_record_id > DNS_MAX_QUERY_RECORDS)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
dns_query = &resolution->response_query_records[dns_query_record_id];
LIST_ADDQ(&dns_p->query_list, &dns_query->list);
/* Name is a NULL terminated string in our case, since we have
* one query per response and the first one can't be compressed
* (using the 0x0c format) */
offset = 0;
len = dns_read_name(resp, bufend, reader, dns_query->name, DNS_MAX_NAME_SIZE, &offset, 0);
if (len == 0)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
reader += offset;
previous_dname = dns_query->name;
/* move forward 2 bytes for question type */
if (reader + 2 >= bufend)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
dns_query->type = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
reader += 2;
/* move forward 2 bytes for question class */
if (reader + 2 >= bufend)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
dns_query->class = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
reader += 2;
}
/* TRUNCATED flag must be checked after we could read the query type
* because a TRUNCATED SRV query type response can still be exploited */
if (dns_query->type != DNS_RTYPE_SRV && flags & DNS_FLAG_TRUNCATED)
return DNS_RESP_TRUNCATED;
/* now parsing response records */
nb_saved_records = 0;
for (i = 0; i < dns_p->header.ancount; i++) {
if (reader >= bufend)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
dns_answer_record = pool_alloc(dns_answer_item_pool);
if (dns_answer_record == NULL)
return (DNS_RESP_INVALID);
offset = 0;
len = dns_read_name(resp, bufend, reader, tmpname, DNS_MAX_NAME_SIZE, &offset, 0);
if (len == 0) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
/* Check if the current record dname is valid. previous_dname
* points either to queried dname or last CNAME target */
if (dns_query->type != DNS_RTYPE_SRV && memcmp(previous_dname, tmpname, len) != 0) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
if (i == 0) {
/* First record, means a mismatch issue between
* queried dname and dname found in the first
* record */
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
else {
/* If not the first record, this means we have a
* CNAME resolution error */
return DNS_RESP_CNAME_ERROR;
}
}
memcpy(dns_answer_record->name, tmpname, len);
dns_answer_record->name[len] = 0;
reader += offset;
if (reader >= bufend) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
/* 2 bytes for record type (A, AAAA, CNAME, etc...) */
if (reader + 2 > bufend) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
dns_answer_record->type = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
reader += 2;
/* 2 bytes for class (2) */
if (reader + 2 > bufend) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
dns_answer_record->class = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
reader += 2;
/* 4 bytes for ttl (4) */
if (reader + 4 > bufend) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
dns_answer_record->ttl = reader[0] * 16777216 + reader[1] * 65536
+ reader[2] * 256 + reader[3];
reader += 4;
/* Now reading data len */
if (reader + 2 > bufend) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
dns_answer_record->data_len = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
/* Move forward 2 bytes for data len */
reader += 2;
/* Analyzing record content */
switch (dns_answer_record->type) {
case DNS_RTYPE_A:
dns_answer_record->address.sa_family = AF_INET;
memcpy(&(((struct sockaddr_in *)&dns_answer_record->address)->sin_addr),
reader, dns_answer_record->data_len);
break;
case DNS_RTYPE_CNAME:
/* Check if this is the last record and update the caller about the status:
* no IP could be found and last record was a CNAME. Could be triggered
* by a wrong query type
*
* + 1 because dns_answer_record_id starts at 0
* while number of answers is an integer and
* starts at 1.
*/
if (i + 1 == dns_p->header.ancount) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_CNAME_ERROR;
}
offset = 0;
len = dns_read_name(resp, bufend, reader, tmpname, DNS_MAX_NAME_SIZE, &offset, 0);
if (len == 0) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
memcpy(dns_answer_record->target, tmpname, len);
dns_answer_record->target[len] = 0;
previous_dname = dns_answer_record->target;
break;
case DNS_RTYPE_SRV:
/* Answer must contain :
* - 2 bytes for the priority
* - 2 bytes for the weight
* - 2 bytes for the port
* - the target hostname
*/
if (dns_answer_record->data_len <= 6) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
dns_answer_record->priority = read_n16(reader);
reader += sizeof(uint16_t);
dns_answer_record->weight = read_n16(reader);
reader += sizeof(uint16_t);
dns_answer_record->port = read_n16(reader);
reader += sizeof(uint16_t);
offset = 0;
len = dns_read_name(resp, bufend, reader, tmpname, DNS_MAX_NAME_SIZE, &offset, 0);
if (len == 0) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
dns_answer_record->data_len = len;
memcpy(dns_answer_record->target, tmpname, len);
dns_answer_record->target[len] = 0;
break;
case DNS_RTYPE_AAAA:
/* ipv6 is stored on 16 bytes */
if (dns_answer_record->data_len != 16) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
dns_answer_record->address.sa_family = AF_INET6;
memcpy(&(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&dns_answer_record->address)->sin6_addr),
reader, dns_answer_record->data_len);
break;
} /* switch (record type) */
/* Increment the counter for number of records saved into our
* local response */
nb_saved_records++;
/* Move forward dns_answer_record->data_len for analyzing next
* record in the response */
reader += ((dns_answer_record->type == DNS_RTYPE_SRV)
? offset
: dns_answer_record->data_len);
/* Lookup to see if we already had this entry */
found = 0;
list_for_each_entry(tmp_record, &dns_p->answer_list, list) {
if (tmp_record->type != dns_answer_record->type)
continue;
switch(tmp_record->type) {
case DNS_RTYPE_A:
if (!memcmp(&((struct sockaddr_in *)&dns_answer_record->address)->sin_addr,
&((struct sockaddr_in *)&tmp_record->address)->sin_addr,
sizeof(in_addr_t)))
found = 1;
break;
case DNS_RTYPE_AAAA:
if (!memcmp(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&dns_answer_record->address)->sin6_addr,
&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&tmp_record->address)->sin6_addr,
sizeof(struct in6_addr)))
found = 1;
break;
case DNS_RTYPE_SRV:
if (dns_answer_record->data_len == tmp_record->data_len &&
!memcmp(dns_answer_record->target, tmp_record->target, dns_answer_record->data_len) &&
dns_answer_record->port == tmp_record->port) {
tmp_record->weight = dns_answer_record->weight;
found = 1;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
if (found == 1)
break;
}
if (found == 1) {
tmp_record->last_seen = now.tv_sec;
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
}
else {
dns_answer_record->last_seen = now.tv_sec;
LIST_ADDQ(&dns_p->answer_list, &dns_answer_record->list);
}
} /* for i 0 to ancount */
/* Save the number of records we really own */
dns_p->header.ancount = nb_saved_records;
dns_check_dns_response(resolution);
return DNS_RESP_VALID;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 164,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cmd_xstats(char *tag, int c)
{
int metric;
if (backend_current) {
/* remote mailbox */
const char *cmd = "Xstats";
prot_printf(backend_current->out, "%s %s ", tag, cmd);
if (!pipe_command(backend_current, 65536)) {
pipe_including_tag(backend_current, tag, 0);
}
return;
}
if (c == EOF) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s BAD Syntax error in Xstats arguments\r\n", tag);
goto error;
}
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Unexpected extra arguments to Xstats\r\n", tag);
goto error;
}
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* XSTATS");
for (metric = 0 ; metric < XSTATS_NUM_METRICS ; metric++)
prot_printf(imapd_out, " %s %u", xstats_names[metric], xstats[metric]);
prot_printf(imapd_out, "\r\n");
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED));
return;
error:
eatline(imapd_in, (c == EOF ? ' ' : c));
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 95,191
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init dccp_v6_init(void)
{
int err = proto_register(&dccp_v6_prot, 1);
if (err != 0)
goto out;
err = inet6_add_protocol(&dccp_v6_protocol, IPPROTO_DCCP);
if (err != 0)
goto out_unregister_proto;
inet6_register_protosw(&dccp_v6_protosw);
err = register_pernet_subsys(&dccp_v6_ops);
if (err != 0)
goto out_destroy_ctl_sock;
out:
return err;
out_destroy_ctl_sock:
inet6_del_protocol(&dccp_v6_protocol, IPPROTO_DCCP);
inet6_unregister_protosw(&dccp_v6_protosw);
out_unregister_proto:
proto_unregister(&dccp_v6_prot);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,766
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext_index_add_object(struct object *object, const char *name)
{
struct eindex *eindex = &bitmap_git.ext_index;
khiter_t hash_pos;
int hash_ret;
int bitmap_pos;
hash_pos = kh_put_sha1_pos(eindex->positions, object->oid.hash, &hash_ret);
if (hash_ret > 0) {
if (eindex->count >= eindex->alloc) {
eindex->alloc = (eindex->alloc + 16) * 3 / 2;
REALLOC_ARRAY(eindex->objects, eindex->alloc);
REALLOC_ARRAY(eindex->hashes, eindex->alloc);
}
bitmap_pos = eindex->count;
eindex->objects[eindex->count] = object;
eindex->hashes[eindex->count] = pack_name_hash(name);
kh_value(eindex->positions, hash_pos) = bitmap_pos;
eindex->count++;
} else {
bitmap_pos = kh_value(eindex->positions, hash_pos);
}
return bitmap_pos + bitmap_git.pack->num_objects;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 54,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void php_xmlwriter_end(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, xmlwriter_read_int_t internal_function)
{
zval *pind;
xmlwriter_object *intern;
xmlTextWriterPtr ptr;
int retval;
#ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval *this = getThis();
if (this) {
XMLWRITER_FROM_OBJECT(intern, this);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
} else
#endif
{
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &pind) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(intern,xmlwriter_object *, &pind, -1, "XMLWriter", le_xmlwriter);
}
ptr = intern->ptr;
if (ptr) {
retval = internal_function(ptr);
if (retval != -1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
unsigned long frag_len)
{
struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 14,349
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebViewExperimental::setAlertDialog(QQmlComponent* alertDialog)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
if (d->alertDialog == alertDialog)
return;
d->alertDialog = alertDialog;
emit alertDialogChanged();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebURLRequest::RequestContext ResourceFetcher::DetermineRequestContext(
Resource::Type type,
IsImageSet is_image_set,
bool is_main_frame) {
DCHECK((is_image_set == kImageNotImageSet) ||
(type == Resource::kImage && is_image_set == kImageIsImageSet));
switch (type) {
case Resource::kMainResource:
if (!is_main_frame)
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextIframe;
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextHyperlink;
case Resource::kXSLStyleSheet:
DCHECK(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::XSLTEnabled());
case Resource::kCSSStyleSheet:
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextStyle;
case Resource::kScript:
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextScript;
case Resource::kFont:
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextFont;
case Resource::kImage:
if (is_image_set == kImageIsImageSet)
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextImageSet;
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextImage;
case Resource::kRaw:
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextSubresource;
case Resource::kImportResource:
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextImport;
case Resource::kLinkPrefetch:
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextPrefetch;
case Resource::kTextTrack:
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextTrack;
case Resource::kSVGDocument:
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextImage;
case Resource::kMedia: // TODO: Split this.
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextVideo;
case Resource::kManifest:
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextManifest;
case Resource::kMock:
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextSubresource;
}
NOTREACHED();
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextSubresource;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Function> createCaptor(String* value)
{
return StringCapturingFunction::createFunction(getScriptState(), value);
}
Commit Message: Remove blink::ReadableStream
This CL removes two stable runtime enabled flags
- ResponseConstructedWithReadableStream
- ResponseBodyWithV8ExtraStream
and related code including blink::ReadableStream.
BUG=613435
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2227403002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411014}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MetricsWebContentsObserver* MetricsWebContentsObserver::CreateForWebContents(
content::WebContents* web_contents,
std::unique_ptr<PageLoadMetricsEmbedderInterface> embedder_interface) {
DCHECK(web_contents);
MetricsWebContentsObserver* metrics = FromWebContents(web_contents);
if (!metrics) {
metrics = new MetricsWebContentsObserver(web_contents,
std::move(embedder_interface));
web_contents->SetUserData(UserDataKey(), base::WrapUnique(metrics));
}
return metrics;
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 140,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void brcmf_cfg80211_detach(struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg)
{
if (!cfg)
return;
brcmf_btcoex_detach(cfg);
wiphy_unregister(cfg->wiphy);
kfree(cfg->ops);
wl_deinit_priv(cfg);
brcmf_free_wiphy(cfg->wiphy);
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext3_quota_on_mount(struct super_block *sb, int type)
{
return dquot_quota_on_mount(sb, EXT3_SB(sb)->s_qf_names[type],
EXT3_SB(sb)->s_jquota_fmt, type);
}
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 32,942
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void RemoveObserver(Observer* observer) {}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,840
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u32 tun_get_msglevel(struct net_device *dev)
{
#ifdef TUN_DEBUG
struct tun_struct *tun = netdev_priv(dev);
return tun->debug;
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,858
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::SetEffectiveConnectionTypeForTesting(
blink::WebEffectiveConnectionType type) {
effective_connection_type_ = type;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutofillDialogViews::UpdateSection(DialogSection section) {
UpdateSectionImpl(section, true);
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 110,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cff_builder_init( CFF_Builder* builder,
TT_Face face,
CFF_Size size,
CFF_GlyphSlot glyph,
FT_Bool hinting )
{
builder->path_begun = 0;
builder->load_points = 1;
builder->face = face;
builder->glyph = glyph;
builder->memory = face->root.memory;
if ( glyph )
{
FT_GlyphLoader loader = glyph->root.internal->loader;
builder->loader = loader;
builder->base = &loader->base.outline;
builder->current = &loader->current.outline;
FT_GlyphLoader_Rewind( loader );
builder->hints_globals = 0;
builder->hints_funcs = 0;
if ( hinting && size )
{
CFF_Internal internal = (CFF_Internal)size->root.internal;
builder->hints_globals = (void *)internal->topfont;
builder->hints_funcs = glyph->root.internal->glyph_hints;
}
}
builder->pos_x = 0;
builder->pos_y = 0;
builder->left_bearing.x = 0;
builder->left_bearing.y = 0;
builder->advance.x = 0;
builder->advance.y = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 10,353
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: net::RequestPriority ConvertWebKitPriorityToNetPriority(
const WebURLRequest::Priority& priority) {
switch (priority) {
case WebURLRequest::PriorityVeryHigh:
return net::HIGHEST;
case WebURLRequest::PriorityHigh:
return net::MEDIUM;
case WebURLRequest::PriorityMedium:
return net::LOW;
case WebURLRequest::PriorityLow:
return net::LOWEST;
case WebURLRequest::PriorityVeryLow:
return net::IDLE;
case WebURLRequest::PriorityUnresolved:
default:
NOTREACHED();
return net::LOW;
}
}
Commit Message: Protect WebURLLoaderImpl::Context while receiving responses.
A client's didReceiveResponse can cancel a request; by protecting the
Context we avoid a use after free in this case.
Interestingly, we really had very good warning about this problem, see
https://codereview.chromium.org/11900002/ back in January.
R=darin
BUG=241139
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15738007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,055
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BlobRegistryProxy::registerBlobURL(const KURL& url, const KURL& srcURL)
{
if (m_webBlobRegistry)
m_webBlobRegistry->registerBlobURL(url, srcURL);
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 102,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned long cpu_util(int cpu)
{
struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq;
unsigned int util;
cfs_rq = &cpu_rq(cpu)->cfs;
util = READ_ONCE(cfs_rq->avg.util_avg);
if (sched_feat(UTIL_EST))
util = max(util, READ_ONCE(cfs_rq->avg.util_est.enqueued));
return min_t(unsigned long, util, capacity_orig_of(cpu));
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,517
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int reds_get_mouse_mode(void)
{
return reds->mouse_mode;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,866
|
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