instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mlx5_ib_modify_wq(struct ib_wq *wq, struct ib_wq_attr *wq_attr,
u32 wq_attr_mask, struct ib_udata *udata)
{
struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev = to_mdev(wq->device);
struct mlx5_ib_rwq *rwq = to_mrwq(wq);
struct mlx5_ib_modify_wq ucmd = {};
size_t required_cmd_sz;
int curr_wq_state;
int wq_state;
int inlen;
int err;
void *rqc;
void *in;
required_cmd_sz = offsetof(typeof(ucmd), reserved) + sizeof(ucmd.reserved);
if (udata->inlen < required_cmd_sz)
return -EINVAL;
if (udata->inlen > sizeof(ucmd) &&
!ib_is_udata_cleared(udata, sizeof(ucmd),
udata->inlen - sizeof(ucmd)))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (ib_copy_from_udata(&ucmd, udata, min(sizeof(ucmd), udata->inlen)))
return -EFAULT;
if (ucmd.comp_mask || ucmd.reserved)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
inlen = MLX5_ST_SZ_BYTES(modify_rq_in);
in = kvzalloc(inlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!in)
return -ENOMEM;
rqc = MLX5_ADDR_OF(modify_rq_in, in, ctx);
curr_wq_state = (wq_attr_mask & IB_WQ_CUR_STATE) ?
wq_attr->curr_wq_state : wq->state;
wq_state = (wq_attr_mask & IB_WQ_STATE) ?
wq_attr->wq_state : curr_wq_state;
if (curr_wq_state == IB_WQS_ERR)
curr_wq_state = MLX5_RQC_STATE_ERR;
if (wq_state == IB_WQS_ERR)
wq_state = MLX5_RQC_STATE_ERR;
MLX5_SET(modify_rq_in, in, rq_state, curr_wq_state);
MLX5_SET(rqc, rqc, state, wq_state);
if (wq_attr_mask & IB_WQ_FLAGS) {
if (wq_attr->flags_mask & IB_WQ_FLAGS_CVLAN_STRIPPING) {
if (!(MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, eth_net_offloads) &&
MLX5_CAP_ETH(dev->mdev, vlan_cap))) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "VLAN offloads are not "
"supported\n");
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
MLX5_SET64(modify_rq_in, in, modify_bitmask,
MLX5_MODIFY_RQ_IN_MODIFY_BITMASK_VSD);
MLX5_SET(rqc, rqc, vsd,
(wq_attr->flags & IB_WQ_FLAGS_CVLAN_STRIPPING) ? 0 : 1);
}
if (wq_attr->flags_mask & IB_WQ_FLAGS_PCI_WRITE_END_PADDING) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "Modifying scatter end padding is not supported\n");
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
}
if (curr_wq_state == IB_WQS_RESET && wq_state == IB_WQS_RDY) {
if (MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, modify_rq_counter_set_id)) {
MLX5_SET64(modify_rq_in, in, modify_bitmask,
MLX5_MODIFY_RQ_IN_MODIFY_BITMASK_RQ_COUNTER_SET_ID);
MLX5_SET(rqc, rqc, counter_set_id,
dev->port->cnts.set_id);
} else
pr_info_once("%s: Receive WQ counters are not supported on current FW\n",
dev->ib_dev.name);
}
err = mlx5_core_modify_rq(dev->mdev, rwq->core_qp.qpn, in, inlen);
if (!err)
rwq->ibwq.state = (wq_state == MLX5_RQC_STATE_ERR) ? IB_WQS_ERR : wq_state;
out:
kvfree(in);
return err;
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
/*
* Note that as a general rule, the high half of the MSRs (bits in
* the control fields which may be 1) should be initialized by the
* intersection of the underlying hardware's MSR (i.e., features which
* can be supported) and the list of features we want to expose -
* because they are known to be properly supported in our code.
* Also, usually, the low half of the MSRs (bits which must be 1) can
* be set to 0, meaning that L1 may turn off any of these bits. The
* reason is that if one of these bits is necessary, it will appear
* in vmcs01 and prepare_vmcs02, when it bitwise-or's the control
* fields of vmcs01 and vmcs02, will turn these bits off - and
* nested_vmx_exit_handled() will not pass related exits to L1.
* These rules have exceptions below.
*/
/* pin-based controls */
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_pinbased_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_pinbased_ctls_high);
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_pinbased_ctls_low |=
PIN_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_pinbased_ctls_high &=
PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK |
PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING |
PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_pinbased_ctls_high |=
PIN_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR |
PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu))
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_pinbased_ctls_high |=
PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
/* exit controls */
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_exit_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_exit_ctls_high);
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_exit_ctls_low =
VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_exit_ctls_high &=
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE |
#endif
VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT | VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_exit_ctls_high |=
VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR |
VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER | VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_EFER |
VM_EXIT_SAVE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER | VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT;
if (kvm_mpx_supported())
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_exit_ctls_high |= VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS;
/* We support free control of debug control saving. */
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_exit_ctls_low &= ~VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS;
/* entry controls */
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_entry_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_entry_ctls_high);
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_entry_ctls_low =
VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_entry_ctls_high &=
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE |
#endif
VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_entry_ctls_high |=
(VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR | VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER);
if (kvm_mpx_supported())
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_entry_ctls_high |= VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
/* We support free control of debug control loading. */
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_entry_ctls_low &= ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS;
/* cpu-based controls */
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_procbased_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_procbased_ctls_high);
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_procbased_ctls_low =
CPU_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_procbased_ctls_high &=
CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_INTR_PENDING |
CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING | CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETING |
CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING | CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING | CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING |
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING | CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING |
#endif
CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING | CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS | CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG |
CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING | CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING | CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW | CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS;
/*
* We can allow some features even when not supported by the
* hardware. For example, L1 can specify an MSR bitmap - and we
* can use it to avoid exits to L1 - even when L0 runs L2
* without MSR bitmaps.
*/
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_procbased_ctls_high |=
CPU_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR |
CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS;
/* We support free control of CR3 access interception. */
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_procbased_ctls_low &=
~(CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING | CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING);
/* secondary cpu-based controls */
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high);
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_low = 0;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high &=
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP |
SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC |
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID |
SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY |
SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING |
SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES;
if (enable_ept) {
/* nested EPT: emulate EPT also to L1 */
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high |=
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_ept_caps = VMX_EPT_PAGE_WALK_4_BIT |
VMX_EPTP_WB_BIT | VMX_EPT_2MB_PAGE_BIT |
VMX_EPT_INVEPT_BIT;
if (cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only())
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_ept_caps |=
VMX_EPT_EXECUTE_ONLY_BIT;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_ept_caps &= vmx_capability.ept;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_ept_caps |= VMX_EPT_EXTENT_GLOBAL_BIT |
VMX_EPT_EXTENT_CONTEXT_BIT;
} else
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_ept_caps = 0;
/*
* Old versions of KVM use the single-context version without
* checking for support, so declare that it is supported even
* though it is treated as global context. The alternative is
* not failing the single-context invvpid, and it is worse.
*/
if (enable_vpid)
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vpid_caps = VMX_VPID_INVVPID_BIT |
VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SUPPORTED_MASK;
else
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vpid_caps = 0;
if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high |=
SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
/* miscellaneous data */
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_misc_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_misc_high);
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_misc_low &= VMX_MISC_SAVE_EFER_LMA;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_misc_low |=
VMX_MISC_EMULATED_PREEMPTION_TIMER_RATE |
VMX_MISC_ACTIVITY_HLT;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_misc_high = 0;
/*
* This MSR reports some information about VMX support. We
* should return information about the VMX we emulate for the
* guest, and the VMCS structure we give it - not about the
* VMX support of the underlying hardware.
*/
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_basic =
VMCS12_REVISION |
VMX_BASIC_TRUE_CTLS |
((u64)VMCS12_SIZE << VMX_BASIC_VMCS_SIZE_SHIFT) |
(VMX_BASIC_MEM_TYPE_WB << VMX_BASIC_MEM_TYPE_SHIFT);
if (cpu_has_vmx_basic_inout())
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_basic |= VMX_BASIC_INOUT;
/*
* These MSRs specify bits which the guest must keep fixed on
* while L1 is in VMXON mode (in L1's root mode, or running an L2).
* We picked the standard core2 setting.
*/
#define VMXON_CR0_ALWAYSON (X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_NE)
#define VMXON_CR4_ALWAYSON X86_CR4_VMXE
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_cr0_fixed0 = VMXON_CR0_ALWAYSON;
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_cr4_fixed0 = VMXON_CR4_ALWAYSON;
/* These MSRs specify bits which the guest must keep fixed off. */
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1, vmx->nested.nested_vmx_cr0_fixed1);
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1, vmx->nested.nested_vmx_cr4_fixed1);
/* highest index: VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE */
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vmcs_enum = 0x2e;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 2,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int llc_exec_conn_trans_actions(struct sock *sk,
struct llc_conn_state_trans *trans,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int rc = 0;
const llc_conn_action_t *next_action;
for (next_action = trans->ev_actions;
next_action && *next_action; next_action++) {
int rc2 = (*next_action)(sk, skb);
if (rc2 == 2) {
rc = rc2;
break;
} else if (rc2)
rc = 1;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reflectTestInterfaceAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::reflectTestInterfaceAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::MarkAsTransferredNavigation(
const GlobalRequestID& id) {
GetLoader(id)->MarkAsTransferring();
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FileTransfer::AddDownloadFilenameRemaps(char const *remaps) {
if(!download_filename_remaps.IsEmpty()) {
download_filename_remaps += ";";
}
download_filename_remaps += remaps;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 9,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t NuPlayer::GenericSource::setBuffers(
bool audio, Vector<MediaBuffer *> &buffers) {
if (mIsWidevine && !audio && mVideoTrack.mSource != NULL) {
return mVideoTrack.mSource->setBuffers(buffers);
}
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
Commit Message: Resolve a merge issue between lmp and lmp-mr1+
Change-Id: I336cb003fb7f50fd7d95c30ca47e45530a7ad503
(cherry picked from commit 33f6da1092834f1e4be199cfa3b6310d66b521c0)
(cherry picked from commit bb3a0338b58fafb01ac5b34efc450b80747e71e4)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 24,694 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::setDataCapacity(size_t size)
{
if (size > mDataCapacity) return continueWrite(size);
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 14,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: channel_register_cleanup(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close)
{
Channel *c = channel_by_id(id);
if (c == NULL) {
logit("channel_register_cleanup: %d: bad id", id);
return;
}
c->detach_user = fn;
c->detach_close = do_close;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 11,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionsAPIClient::CreateContentRulesRegistry(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
RulesCacheDelegate* cache_delegate) const {
return scoped_refptr<ContentRulesRegistry>();
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 3,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::LoadingAnimationCallback() {
base::TimeTicks now = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (!last_animation_time_.is_null()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES(
"Tabs.LoadingAnimationTime",
now - last_animation_time_);
}
last_animation_time_ = now;
if (browser_->is_type_tabbed()) {
tabstrip_->UpdateLoadingAnimations();
} else if (ShouldShowWindowIcon()) {
WebContents* web_contents = chrome::GetActiveWebContents(browser_.get());
frame_->UpdateThrobber(web_contents && web_contents->IsLoading());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void drawLayers()
{
CCLayerTreeHostImpl::drawLayers();
m_testHooks->drawLayersOnCCThread(this);
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LayoutBlockFlow::mustSeparateMarginAfterForChild(const LayoutBox& child) const
{
ASSERT(!child.selfNeedsLayout());
const ComputedStyle& childStyle = child.styleRef();
if (!child.isWritingModeRoot())
return childStyle.marginAfterCollapse() == MSEPARATE;
if (child.isHorizontalWritingMode() == isHorizontalWritingMode())
return childStyle.marginBeforeCollapse() == MSEPARATE;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 17,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int crypto_aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
unsigned int key_len)
{
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
int ret;
ret = crypto_aes_expand_key(ctx, in_key, key_len);
if (!ret)
return 0;
*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vmxnet3_io_bar1_write(void *opaque,
hwaddr addr,
uint64_t val,
unsigned size)
{
VMXNET3State *s = opaque;
switch (addr) {
/* Vmxnet3 Revision Report Selection */
case VMXNET3_REG_VRRS:
VMW_CBPRN("Write BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_VRRS] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
val, size);
break;
/* UPT Version Report Selection */
case VMXNET3_REG_UVRS:
VMW_CBPRN("Write BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_UVRS] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
val, size);
break;
/* Driver Shared Address Low */
case VMXNET3_REG_DSAL:
VMW_CBPRN("Write BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_DSAL] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
val, size);
/*
* Guest driver will first write the low part of the shared
* memory address. We save it to temp variable and set the
* shared address only after we get the high part
*/
if (val == 0) {
vmxnet3_deactivate_device(s);
}
s->temp_shared_guest_driver_memory = val;
s->drv_shmem = 0;
break;
/* Driver Shared Address High */
case VMXNET3_REG_DSAH:
VMW_CBPRN("Write BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_DSAH] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
val, size);
/*
* Set the shared memory between guest driver and device.
* We already should have low address part.
*/
s->drv_shmem = s->temp_shared_guest_driver_memory | (val << 32);
break;
/* Command */
case VMXNET3_REG_CMD:
VMW_CBPRN("Write BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_CMD] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
val, size);
vmxnet3_handle_command(s, val);
break;
/* MAC Address Low */
case VMXNET3_REG_MACL:
VMW_CBPRN("Write BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_MACL] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
val, size);
s->temp_mac = val;
break;
/* MAC Address High */
case VMXNET3_REG_MACH:
VMW_CBPRN("Write BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_MACH] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
val, size);
vmxnet3_set_variable_mac(s, val, s->temp_mac);
break;
/* Interrupt Cause Register */
case VMXNET3_REG_ICR:
VMW_CBPRN("Write BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_ICR] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
val, size);
g_assert_not_reached();
break;
/* Event Cause Register */
case VMXNET3_REG_ECR:
VMW_CBPRN("Write BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_ECR] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
val, size);
vmxnet3_ack_events(s, val);
break;
default:
VMW_CBPRN("Unknown Write to BAR1 [%" PRIx64 "] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
addr, val, size);
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 27,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Plugin::NexeIsContentHandler() const {
return
!mime_type().empty() &&
mime_type() != kNaClMIMEType;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 15,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __dwc3_gadget_wakeup(struct dwc3 *dwc)
{
int retries;
int ret;
u32 reg;
u8 link_state;
u8 speed;
/*
* According to the Databook Remote wakeup request should
* be issued only when the device is in early suspend state.
*
* We can check that via USB Link State bits in DSTS register.
*/
reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_DSTS);
speed = reg & DWC3_DSTS_CONNECTSPD;
if ((speed == DWC3_DSTS_SUPERSPEED) ||
(speed == DWC3_DSTS_SUPERSPEED_PLUS))
return 0;
link_state = DWC3_DSTS_USBLNKST(reg);
switch (link_state) {
case DWC3_LINK_STATE_RX_DET: /* in HS, means Early Suspend */
case DWC3_LINK_STATE_U3: /* in HS, means SUSPEND */
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = dwc3_gadget_set_link_state(dwc, DWC3_LINK_STATE_RECOV);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_err(dwc->dev, "failed to put link in Recovery\n");
return ret;
}
/* Recent versions do this automatically */
if (dwc->revision < DWC3_REVISION_194A) {
/* write zeroes to Link Change Request */
reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_DCTL);
reg &= ~DWC3_DCTL_ULSTCHNGREQ_MASK;
dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_DCTL, reg);
}
/* poll until Link State changes to ON */
retries = 20000;
while (retries--) {
reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_DSTS);
/* in HS, means ON */
if (DWC3_DSTS_USBLNKST(reg) == DWC3_LINK_STATE_U0)
break;
}
if (DWC3_DSTS_USBLNKST(reg) != DWC3_LINK_STATE_U0) {
dev_err(dwc->dev, "failed to send remote wakeup\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::close(ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (ImportLoader()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Imported document doesn't support close().");
return;
}
if (!IsHTMLDocument()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Only HTML documents support close().");
return;
}
if (throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Custom Element constructor should not use close().");
return;
}
if (!AllowedToUseDynamicMarkUpInsertion("close", exception_state))
return;
close();
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 5,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: loop_get_status_old(struct loop_device *lo, struct loop_info __user *arg) {
struct loop_info info;
struct loop_info64 info64;
int err = 0;
if (!arg)
err = -EINVAL;
if (!err)
err = loop_get_status(lo, &info64);
if (!err)
err = loop_info64_to_old(&info64, &info);
if (!err && copy_to_user(arg, &info, sizeof(info)))
err = -EFAULT;
return err;
}
Commit Message: loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 21,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nullableDoubleAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
bool isNull = false;
double jsValue = imp->nullableDoubleAttribute(isNull);
if (isNull) {
v8SetReturnValueNull(info);
return;
}
v8SetReturnValue(info, jsValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 10,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static NavigationType DetermineNavigationType(FrameLoadType frame_load_type,
bool is_form_submission,
bool have_event) {
bool is_reload = IsReloadLoadType(frame_load_type);
bool is_back_forward = IsBackForwardLoadType(frame_load_type);
if (is_form_submission) {
return (is_reload || is_back_forward) ? kNavigationTypeFormResubmitted
: kNavigationTypeFormSubmitted;
}
if (have_event)
return kNavigationTypeLinkClicked;
if (is_reload)
return kNavigationTypeReload;
if (is_back_forward)
return kNavigationTypeBackForward;
return kNavigationTypeOther;
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 28,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BookmarkManagerView::FileSelectionCanceled(void* params) {
select_file_dialog_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Relands cl 16982 as it wasn't the cause of the build breakage. Here's
the description for that cl:
Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/115505 for bug
http://crbug.com/4030 for tyoshino.
BUG=http://crbug.com/4030
TEST=make sure control-w dismisses bookmark manager.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/113902
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@16987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct buffer_head *bh)
{
ext4_dx_csum_set(inode, (struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data);
return ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh);
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void print_netjoins(NETJOIN_SERVER_REC *server, const char *filter_channel)
{
TEMP_PRINT_REC *temp;
GHashTable *channels;
GSList *tmp, *tmp2, *next, *next2, *old;
g_return_if_fail(server != NULL);
printing_joins = TRUE;
/* save nicks to string, clear now_channels and remove the same
channels from old_channels list */
channels = g_hash_table_new((GHashFunc) g_istr_hash,
(GCompareFunc) g_istr_equal);
for (tmp = server->netjoins; tmp != NULL; tmp = next) {
NETJOIN_REC *rec = tmp->data;
next = g_slist_next(tmp);
for (tmp2 = rec->now_channels; tmp2 != NULL; tmp2 = next2) {
char *channel = tmp2->data;
char *realchannel = channel + 1;
next2 = g_slist_next(tmp2);
/* Filter the results by channel if asked to do so */
if (filter_channel != NULL &&
strcasecmp(realchannel, filter_channel) != 0)
continue;
temp = g_hash_table_lookup(channels, realchannel);
if (temp == NULL) {
temp = g_new0(TEMP_PRINT_REC, 1);
temp->nicks = g_string_new(NULL);
g_hash_table_insert(channels,
g_strdup(realchannel),
temp);
}
temp->count++;
if (temp->count <= netjoin_max_nicks) {
if (*channel != ' ')
g_string_append_c(temp->nicks,
*channel);
g_string_append_printf(temp->nicks, "%s, ",
rec->nick);
}
/* remove the channel from old_channels too */
old = gslist_find_icase_string(rec->old_channels,
realchannel);
if (old != NULL) {
void *data = old->data;
rec->old_channels =
g_slist_remove(rec->old_channels, data);
g_free(data);
}
/* drop tmp2 from the list */
rec->now_channels = g_slist_delete_link(rec->now_channels, tmp2);
g_free(channel);
}
if (rec->old_channels == NULL)
netjoin_remove(server, rec);
}
g_hash_table_foreach(channels, (GHFunc) print_channel_netjoins,
server);
g_hash_table_destroy(channels);
if (server->netjoins == NULL)
netjoin_server_remove(server);
printing_joins = FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'netjoin-timeout' into 'master'
fe-netjoin: remove irc servers on "server disconnected" signal
Closes #7
See merge request !10
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 20,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TextTrackCue::setStartTime(double value) {
if (start_time_ == value || value < 0)
return;
CueWillChange();
start_time_ = value;
CueDidChange(kCueMutationAffectsOrder);
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID: | 1 | 2,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b)
{
/* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */
s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b);
if (b < 0)
return res > a;
return res < a;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix incorrect tracking of register size truncation
Properly handle register truncation to a smaller size.
The old code first mirrors the clearing of the high 32 bits in the bitwise
tristate representation, which is correct. But then, it computes the new
arithmetic bounds as the intersection between the old arithmetic bounds and
the bounds resulting from the bitwise tristate representation. Therefore,
when coerce_reg_to_32() is called on a number with bounds
[0xffff'fff8, 0x1'0000'0007], the verifier computes
[0xffff'fff8, 0xffff'ffff] as bounds of the truncated number.
This is incorrect: The truncated number could also be in the range [0, 7],
and no meaningful arithmetic bounds can be computed in that case apart from
the obvious [0, 0xffff'ffff].
Starting with v4.14, this is exploitable by unprivileged users as long as
the unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl isn't set.
Debian assigned CVE-2017-16996 for this issue.
v2:
- flip the mask during arithmetic bounds calculation (Ben Hutchings)
v3:
- add CVE number (Ben Hutchings)
Fixes: b03c9f9fdc37 ("bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: c_pdf14trans_write_ctm(byte **ppbuf, const gs_pdf14trans_params_t *pparams)
{
/* Note: We can't skip writing CTM if it is equal to pgs->ctm,
because clist writer may skip this command for some bands.
For a better result we need individual CTM for each band.
*/
byte *pbuf = *ppbuf;
int len, code;
len = cmd_write_ctm_return_length_nodevice(&pparams->ctm);
pbuf--; /* For cmd_write_ctm. */
code = cmd_write_ctm(&pparams->ctm, pbuf, len);
if (code < 0)
return code;
pbuf += len + 1;
*ppbuf = pbuf;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 27,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CStarter::GetJobEnv( ClassAd *jobad, Env *job_env, MyString *env_errors )
{
char *env_str = param( "STARTER_JOB_ENVIRONMENT" );
ASSERT( jobad );
ASSERT( job_env );
if( !job_env->MergeFromV1RawOrV2Quoted(env_str,env_errors) ) {
if( env_errors ) {
env_errors->sprintf_cat(
" The full value for STARTER_JOB_ENVIRONMENT: %s\n",env_str);
}
free(env_str);
return false;
}
free(env_str);
if(!job_env->MergeFrom(jobad,env_errors)) {
if( env_errors ) {
env_errors->sprintf_cat(
" (This error was from the environment string in the job "
"ClassAd.)");
}
return false;
}
PublishToEnv( job_env );
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 13,461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::IsWebSafeScheme(
const std::string& scheme) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
return base::ContainsKey(schemes_okay_to_request_in_any_process_, scheme);
}
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long aio_read_events_ring(struct kioctx *ctx,
struct io_event __user *event, long nr)
{
struct aio_ring *ring;
unsigned head, tail, pos;
long ret = 0;
int copy_ret;
/*
* The mutex can block and wake us up and that will cause
* wait_event_interruptible_hrtimeout() to schedule without sleeping
* and repeat. This should be rare enough that it doesn't cause
* peformance issues. See the comment in read_events() for more detail.
*/
sched_annotate_sleep();
mutex_lock(&ctx->ring_lock);
/* Access to ->ring_pages here is protected by ctx->ring_lock. */
ring = kmap_atomic(ctx->ring_pages[0]);
head = ring->head;
tail = ring->tail;
kunmap_atomic(ring);
/*
* Ensure that once we've read the current tail pointer, that
* we also see the events that were stored up to the tail.
*/
smp_rmb();
pr_debug("h%u t%u m%u\n", head, tail, ctx->nr_events);
if (head == tail)
goto out;
head %= ctx->nr_events;
tail %= ctx->nr_events;
while (ret < nr) {
long avail;
struct io_event *ev;
struct page *page;
avail = (head <= tail ? tail : ctx->nr_events) - head;
if (head == tail)
break;
avail = min(avail, nr - ret);
avail = min_t(long, avail, AIO_EVENTS_PER_PAGE -
((head + AIO_EVENTS_OFFSET) % AIO_EVENTS_PER_PAGE));
pos = head + AIO_EVENTS_OFFSET;
page = ctx->ring_pages[pos / AIO_EVENTS_PER_PAGE];
pos %= AIO_EVENTS_PER_PAGE;
ev = kmap(page);
copy_ret = copy_to_user(event + ret, ev + pos,
sizeof(*ev) * avail);
kunmap(page);
if (unlikely(copy_ret)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
ret += avail;
head += avail;
head %= ctx->nr_events;
}
ring = kmap_atomic(ctx->ring_pages[0]);
ring->head = head;
kunmap_atomic(ring);
flush_dcache_page(ctx->ring_pages[0]);
pr_debug("%li h%u t%u\n", ret, head, tail);
out:
mutex_unlock(&ctx->ring_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: aio: mark AIO pseudo-fs noexec
This ensures that do_mmap() won't implicitly make AIO memory mappings
executable if the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag is set. Such
behavior is problematic because the security_mmap_file LSM hook doesn't
catch this case, potentially permitting an attacker to bypass a W^X
policy enforced by SELinux.
I have tested the patch on my machine.
To test the behavior, compile and run this:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <linux/aio_abi.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
int main(void) {
personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC);
aio_context_t ctx = 0;
if (syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx))
err(1, "io_setup");
char cmd[1000];
sprintf(cmd, "cat /proc/%d/maps | grep -F '/[aio]'",
(int)getpid());
system(cmd);
return 0;
}
In the output, "rw-s" is good, "rwxs" is bad.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 29,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoundChannel::setRate(float rate)
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(&mLock);
if (mAudioTrack != NULL && mSample != 0) {
uint32_t sampleRate = uint32_t(float(mSample->sampleRate()) * rate + 0.5);
mAudioTrack->setSampleRate(sampleRate);
mRate = rate;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int udpv6_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
if (level == SOL_UDP || level == SOL_UDPLITE)
return udp_lib_getsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
return ipv6_getsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: udp: fix the wrong headroom check
At this point, skb->data points to skb_transport_header.
So, headroom check is wrong.
For some case:bridge(UFO is on) + eth device(UFO is off),
there is no enough headroom for IPv6 frag head.
But headroom check is always false.
This will bring about data be moved to there prior to skb->head,
when adding IPv6 frag header to skb.
Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 7,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint32 RenderViewTest::GetNavigationIPCType() {
return FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad::ID;
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 5,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u8 l2cap_get_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
{
u8 id;
/* Get next available identificator.
* 1 - 128 are used by kernel.
* 129 - 199 are reserved.
* 200 - 254 are used by utilities like l2ping, etc.
*/
spin_lock_bh(&conn->lock);
if (++conn->tx_ident > 128)
conn->tx_ident = 1;
id = conn->tx_ident;
spin_unlock_bh(&conn->lock);
return id;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <gustavo@las.ic.unicamp.br>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void usb_set_lpm_parameters(struct usb_device *udev)
{
struct usb_hub *hub;
unsigned int port_to_port_delay;
unsigned int udev_u1_del;
unsigned int udev_u2_del;
unsigned int hub_u1_del;
unsigned int hub_u2_del;
if (!udev->lpm_capable || udev->speed != USB_SPEED_SUPER)
return;
hub = usb_hub_to_struct_hub(udev->parent);
/* It doesn't take time to transition the roothub into U0, since it
* doesn't have an upstream link.
*/
if (!hub)
return;
udev_u1_del = udev->bos->ss_cap->bU1devExitLat;
udev_u2_del = le16_to_cpu(udev->bos->ss_cap->bU2DevExitLat);
hub_u1_del = udev->parent->bos->ss_cap->bU1devExitLat;
hub_u2_del = le16_to_cpu(udev->parent->bos->ss_cap->bU2DevExitLat);
usb_set_lpm_mel(udev, &udev->u1_params, udev_u1_del,
hub, &udev->parent->u1_params, hub_u1_del);
usb_set_lpm_mel(udev, &udev->u2_params, udev_u2_del,
hub, &udev->parent->u2_params, hub_u2_del);
/*
* Appendix C, section C.2.2.2, says that there is a slight delay from
* when the parent hub notices the downstream port is trying to
* transition to U0 to when the hub initiates a U0 transition on its
* upstream port. The section says the delays are tPort2PortU1EL and
* tPort2PortU2EL, but it doesn't define what they are.
*
* The hub chapter, sections 10.4.2.4 and 10.4.2.5 seem to be talking
* about the same delays. Use the maximum delay calculations from those
* sections. For U1, it's tHubPort2PortExitLat, which is 1us max. For
* U2, it's tHubPort2PortExitLat + U2DevExitLat - U1DevExitLat. I
* assume the device exit latencies they are talking about are the hub
* exit latencies.
*
* What do we do if the U2 exit latency is less than the U1 exit
* latency? It's possible, although not likely...
*/
port_to_port_delay = 1;
usb_set_lpm_pel(udev, &udev->u1_params, udev_u1_del,
hub, &udev->parent->u1_params, hub_u1_del,
port_to_port_delay);
if (hub_u2_del > hub_u1_del)
port_to_port_delay = 1 + hub_u2_del - hub_u1_del;
else
port_to_port_delay = 1 + hub_u1_del;
usb_set_lpm_pel(udev, &udev->u2_params, udev_u2_del,
hub, &udev->parent->u2_params, hub_u2_del,
port_to_port_delay);
/* Now that we've got PEL, calculate SEL. */
usb_set_lpm_sel(udev, &udev->u1_params);
usb_set_lpm_sel(udev, &udev->u2_params);
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmw_surface_init(struct vmw_private *dev_priv,
struct vmw_surface *srf,
void (*res_free) (struct vmw_resource *res))
{
int ret;
struct vmw_resource *res = &srf->res;
BUG_ON(!res_free);
if (!dev_priv->has_mob)
vmw_fifo_resource_inc(dev_priv);
ret = vmw_resource_init(dev_priv, res, true, res_free,
(dev_priv->has_mob) ? &vmw_gb_surface_func :
&vmw_legacy_surface_func);
if (unlikely(ret != 0)) {
if (!dev_priv->has_mob)
vmw_fifo_resource_dec(dev_priv);
res_free(res);
return ret;
}
/*
* The surface won't be visible to hardware until a
* surface validate.
*/
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&srf->view_list);
vmw_resource_activate(res, vmw_hw_surface_destroy);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: drm/vmwgfx: Make sure backup_handle is always valid
When vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is called with an existing buffer,
we end up returning an uninitialized variable in the backup_handle.
The fix is to first initialize backup_handle to 0 just to be sure, and
second, when a user-provided buffer is found, we will use the
req->buffer_handle as the backup_handle.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Murray McAllister <murray.mcallister@insomniasec.com>
Signed-off-by: Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat <drawat@vmware.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 21,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: createCroppedImage(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
unsigned char **read_buff_ptr, unsigned char **crop_buff_ptr)
{
tsize_t cropsize;
unsigned char *read_buff = NULL;
unsigned char *crop_buff = NULL;
unsigned char *new_buff = NULL;
static tsize_t prev_cropsize = 0;
read_buff = *read_buff_ptr;
/* process full image, no crop buffer needed */
crop_buff = read_buff;
*crop_buff_ptr = read_buff;
crop->combined_width = image->width;
crop->combined_length = image->length;
cropsize = crop->bufftotal;
crop_buff = *crop_buff_ptr;
if (!crop_buff)
{
crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize);
*crop_buff_ptr = crop_buff;
_TIFFmemset(crop_buff, 0, cropsize);
prev_cropsize = cropsize;
}
else
{
if (prev_cropsize < cropsize)
{
new_buff = _TIFFrealloc(crop_buff, cropsize);
if (!new_buff)
{
free (crop_buff);
crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize);
}
else
crop_buff = new_buff;
_TIFFmemset(crop_buff, 0, cropsize);
}
}
if (!crop_buff)
{
TIFFError("createCroppedImage", "Unable to allocate/reallocate crop buffer");
return (-1);
}
*crop_buff_ptr = crop_buff;
if (crop->crop_mode & CROP_INVERT)
{
switch (crop->photometric)
{
/* Just change the interpretation */
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
image->photometric = crop->photometric;
break;
case INVERT_DATA_ONLY:
case INVERT_DATA_AND_TAG:
if (invertImage(image->photometric, image->spp, image->bps,
crop->combined_width, crop->combined_length, crop_buff))
{
TIFFError("createCroppedImage",
"Failed to invert colorspace for image or cropped selection");
return (-1);
}
if (crop->photometric == INVERT_DATA_AND_TAG)
{
switch (image->photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
image->photometric = PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK;
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
image->photometric = PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
break;
default: break;
}
}
if (crop->crop_mode & CROP_MIRROR)
{
if (mirrorImage(image->spp, image->bps, crop->mirror,
crop->combined_width, crop->combined_length, crop_buff))
{
TIFFError("createCroppedImage", "Failed to mirror image or cropped selection %s",
(crop->rotation == MIRROR_HORIZ) ? "horizontally" : "vertically");
return (-1);
}
}
if (crop->crop_mode & CROP_ROTATE) /* rotate should be last as it can reallocate the buffer */
{
if (rotateImage(crop->rotation, image, &crop->combined_width,
&crop->combined_length, crop_buff_ptr))
{
TIFFError("createCroppedImage",
"Failed to rotate image or cropped selection by %d degrees", crop->rotation);
return (-1);
}
}
if (crop_buff == read_buff) /* we used the read buffer for the crop buffer */
*read_buff_ptr = NULL; /* so we don't try to free it later */
return (0);
} /* end createCroppedImage */
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 19,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags,
struct key_restriction *restrict_link)
{
struct key_user *user = NULL;
struct key *key;
size_t desclen, quotalen;
int ret;
key = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (!desc || !*desc)
goto error;
if (type->vet_description) {
ret = type->vet_description(desc);
if (ret < 0) {
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
}
desclen = strlen(desc);
quotalen = desclen + 1 + type->def_datalen;
/* get hold of the key tracking for this user */
user = key_user_lookup(uid);
if (!user)
goto no_memory_1;
/* check that the user's quota permits allocation of another key and
* its description */
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
spin_lock(&user->lock);
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN)) {
if (user->qnkeys + 1 >= maxkeys ||
user->qnbytes + quotalen >= maxbytes ||
user->qnbytes + quotalen < user->qnbytes)
goto no_quota;
}
user->qnkeys++;
user->qnbytes += quotalen;
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
}
/* allocate and initialise the key and its description */
key = kmem_cache_zalloc(key_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key)
goto no_memory_2;
key->index_key.desc_len = desclen;
key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key->index_key.description)
goto no_memory_3;
refcount_set(&key->usage, 1);
init_rwsem(&key->sem);
lockdep_set_class(&key->sem, &type->lock_class);
key->index_key.type = type;
key->user = user;
key->quotalen = quotalen;
key->datalen = type->def_datalen;
key->uid = uid;
key->gid = gid;
key->perm = perm;
key->restrict_link = restrict_link;
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA))
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN)
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN;
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC;
#endif
/* let the security module know about the key */
ret = security_key_alloc(key, cred, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto security_error;
/* publish the key by giving it a serial number */
atomic_inc(&user->nkeys);
key_alloc_serial(key);
error:
return key;
security_error:
kfree(key->description);
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
spin_lock(&user->lock);
user->qnkeys--;
user->qnbytes -= quotalen;
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
}
key_user_put(user);
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
no_memory_3:
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
no_memory_2:
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
spin_lock(&user->lock);
user->qnkeys--;
user->qnbytes -= quotalen;
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
}
key_user_put(user);
no_memory_1:
key = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
goto error;
no_quota:
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
key_user_put(user);
key = ERR_PTR(-EDQUOT);
goto error;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user. For example:
sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
sleep 15' &
sleep 1
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us
This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions. In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:
-4: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid.4000
-5: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000
Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING. Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.
Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 1 | 29,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::OpenAboutChromeDialog() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("AboutChrome"), profile_);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
ShowSingletonTab(GURL(chrome::kChromeUIAboutURL));
#else
window_->ShowAboutChromeDialog();
#endif
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_get_time_scale(uint32_t scaled_khz, uint32_t base_khz,
s8 *pshift, u32 *pmultiplier)
{
uint64_t scaled64;
int32_t shift = 0;
uint64_t tps64;
uint32_t tps32;
tps64 = base_khz * 1000LL;
scaled64 = scaled_khz * 1000LL;
while (tps64 > scaled64*2 || tps64 & 0xffffffff00000000ULL) {
tps64 >>= 1;
shift--;
}
tps32 = (uint32_t)tps64;
while (tps32 <= scaled64 || scaled64 & 0xffffffff00000000ULL) {
if (scaled64 & 0xffffffff00000000ULL || tps32 & 0x80000000)
scaled64 >>= 1;
else
tps32 <<= 1;
shift++;
}
*pshift = shift;
*pmultiplier = div_frac(scaled64, tps32);
pr_debug("%s: base_khz %u => %u, shift %d, mul %u\n",
__func__, base_khz, scaled_khz, shift, *pmultiplier);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void unlink_queued_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
int status = urb->status;
struct queued_ctx *ctx = urb->context;
if (ctx->status)
goto done;
if (urb == ctx->urbs[ctx->num - 4] || urb == ctx->urbs[ctx->num - 2]) {
if (status == -ECONNRESET)
goto done;
/* What error should we report if the URB completed normally? */
}
if (status != 0)
ctx->status = status;
done:
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ctx->pending))
complete(&ctx->complete);
}
Commit Message: usb: usbtest: fix NULL pointer dereference
If the usbtest driver encounters a device with an IN bulk endpoint but
no OUT bulk endpoint, it will try to dereference a NULL pointer
(out->desc.bEndpointAddress). The problem can be solved by adding a
missing test.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 44 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static pgoff_t ext4_num_dirty_pages(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t idx,
unsigned int max_pages)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
pgoff_t index;
struct pagevec pvec;
pgoff_t num = 0;
int i, nr_pages, done = 0;
if (max_pages == 0)
return 0;
pagevec_init(&pvec, 0);
while (!done) {
index = idx;
nr_pages = pagevec_lookup_tag(&pvec, mapping, &index,
PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY,
(pgoff_t)PAGEVEC_SIZE);
if (nr_pages == 0)
break;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
struct buffer_head *bh, *head;
lock_page(page);
if (unlikely(page->mapping != mapping) ||
!PageDirty(page) ||
PageWriteback(page) ||
page->index != idx) {
done = 1;
unlock_page(page);
break;
}
if (page_has_buffers(page)) {
bh = head = page_buffers(page);
do {
if (!buffer_delay(bh) &&
!buffer_unwritten(bh))
done = 1;
bh = bh->b_this_page;
} while (!done && (bh != head));
}
unlock_page(page);
if (done)
break;
idx++;
num++;
if (num >= max_pages)
break;
}
pagevec_release(&pvec);
}
return num;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 8,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dut_mode_recv(uint16_t UNUSED opcode, uint8_t UNUSED *buf, uint8_t UNUSED len)
{
bdt_log("DUT MODE RECV : NOT IMPLEMENTED");
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Extension::LoadAppFeatures(string16* error) {
if (!LoadExtent(keys::kWebURLs, &extent_,
errors::kInvalidWebURLs, errors::kInvalidWebURL, error) ||
!LoadLaunchURL(error) ||
!LoadLaunchContainer(error)) {
return false;
}
if (manifest_->HasKey(keys::kDisplayInLauncher) &&
!manifest_->GetBoolean(keys::kDisplayInLauncher, &display_in_launcher_)) {
*error = ASCIIToUTF16(errors::kInvalidDisplayInLauncher);
return false;
}
if (manifest_->HasKey(keys::kDisplayInNewTabPage)) {
if (!manifest_->GetBoolean(keys::kDisplayInNewTabPage,
&display_in_new_tab_page_)) {
*error = ASCIIToUTF16(errors::kInvalidDisplayInNewTabPage);
return false;
}
} else {
display_in_new_tab_page_ = display_in_launcher_;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cxusb_aver_streaming_ctrl(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap, int onoff)
{
if (onoff)
cxusb_ctrl_msg(adap->dev, CMD_AVER_STREAM_ON, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
else
cxusb_ctrl_msg(adap->dev, CMD_AVER_STREAM_OFF,
NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DataReductionProxySettings::ClearDataSavingStatistics(
DataReductionProxySavingsClearedReason reason) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats());
data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats()->ClearDataSavingStatistics(
reason);
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didCommitProvisionalLoad(
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebHistoryItem& item,
blink::WebHistoryCommitType commit_type) {
TRACE_EVENT2("navigation", "RenderFrameImpl::didCommitProvisionalLoad",
"id", routing_id_,
"url", GetLoadingUrl().possibly_invalid_spec());
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->dataSource());
NavigationStateImpl* navigation_state =
static_cast<NavigationStateImpl*>(document_state->navigation_state());
if (proxy_routing_id_ != MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
RenderFrameProxy* proxy =
RenderFrameProxy::FromRoutingID(proxy_routing_id_);
CHECK(proxy);
proxy->web_frame()->swap(frame_);
proxy_routing_id_ = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
if (!is_subframe_) {
CHECK(!render_view_->main_render_frame_);
render_view_->main_render_frame_ = this;
if (render_view_->is_swapped_out())
render_view_->SetSwappedOut(false);
}
}
render_view_->SendUpdateState();
render_view_->history_controller()->UpdateForCommit(
this, item, commit_type, navigation_state->WasWithinSamePage());
InternalDocumentStateData* internal_data =
InternalDocumentStateData::FromDocumentState(document_state);
if (document_state->commit_load_time().is_null())
document_state->set_commit_load_time(Time::Now());
if (internal_data->must_reset_scroll_and_scale_state()) {
render_view_->webview()->resetScrollAndScaleState();
internal_data->set_must_reset_scroll_and_scale_state(false);
}
bool is_new_navigation = commit_type == blink::WebStandardCommit;
if (is_new_navigation) {
render_view_->page_id_ = render_view_->next_page_id_++;
DCHECK_IMPLIES(
navigation_state->common_params().should_replace_current_entry,
render_view_->history_list_length_ > 0);
if (GetLoadingUrl() != GURL(kSwappedOutURL) &&
!navigation_state->common_params().should_replace_current_entry) {
render_view_->history_list_offset_++;
if (render_view_->history_list_offset_ >= kMaxSessionHistoryEntries)
render_view_->history_list_offset_ = kMaxSessionHistoryEntries - 1;
render_view_->history_list_length_ =
render_view_->history_list_offset_ + 1;
}
} else {
const RequestNavigationParams& request_params =
navigation_state->request_params();
if (request_params.nav_entry_id != 0 &&
!request_params.intended_as_new_entry) {
render_view_->page_id_ = request_params.page_id;
render_view_->history_list_offset_ =
request_params.pending_history_list_offset;
}
}
bool sent = Send(
new FrameHostMsg_DidAssignPageId(routing_id_, render_view_->page_id_));
CHECK(sent); // http://crbug.com/407376
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, render_view_->observers_,
DidCommitProvisionalLoad(frame, is_new_navigation));
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderFrameObserver, observers_,
DidCommitProvisionalLoad(is_new_navigation,
navigation_state->WasWithinSamePage()));
if (!frame->parent()) { // Only for top frames.
RenderThreadImpl* render_thread_impl = RenderThreadImpl::current();
if (render_thread_impl) { // Can be NULL in tests.
render_thread_impl->histogram_customizer()->
RenderViewNavigatedToHost(GURL(GetLoadingUrl()).host(),
RenderView::GetRenderViewCount());
}
}
navigation_state->set_request_committed(true);
SendDidCommitProvisionalLoad(frame, commit_type, item);
UpdateEncoding(frame, frame->view()->pageEncoding().utf8());
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoRenderbufferStorage(
GLenum target, GLenum internalformat, GLsizei width, GLsizei height) {
Renderbuffer* renderbuffer =
GetRenderbufferInfoForTarget(GL_RENDERBUFFER);
if (!renderbuffer) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glRenderbufferStorage", "no renderbuffer bound");
return;
}
if (width > renderbuffer_manager()->max_renderbuffer_size() ||
height > renderbuffer_manager()->max_renderbuffer_size()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glRenderbufferStorage", "dimensions too large");
return;
}
uint32 estimated_size = 0;
if (!renderbuffer_manager()->ComputeEstimatedRenderbufferSize(
width, height, 1, internalformat, &estimated_size)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "glRenderbufferStorage", "dimensions too large");
return;
}
if (!EnsureGPUMemoryAvailable(estimated_size)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "glRenderbufferStorage", "out of memory");
return;
}
LOCAL_COPY_REAL_GL_ERRORS_TO_WRAPPER("glRenderbufferStorage");
glRenderbufferStorageEXT(
target,
renderbuffer_manager()->InternalRenderbufferFormatToImplFormat(
internalformat),
width,
height);
GLenum error = LOCAL_PEEK_GL_ERROR("glRenderbufferStorage");
if (error == GL_NO_ERROR) {
framebuffer_manager()->IncFramebufferStateChangeCount();
renderbuffer_manager()->SetInfo(
renderbuffer, 1, internalformat, width, height);
}
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err stbl_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_SampleTableBox *ptr = (GF_SampleTableBox *)s;
e = gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, stbl_AddBox);
if (e) return e;
if (!ptr->SyncSample)
ptr->no_sync_found = 1;
ptr->nb_sgpd_in_stbl = gf_list_count(ptr->sampleGroupsDescription);
ptr->nb_other_boxes_in_stbl = gf_list_count(ptr->other_boxes);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 14,412 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val)
{
if (val == NULL)
return;
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code),
val == NULL ? "none" : val);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_write_tIME(png_structp png_ptr, png_timep mod_time)
{
#ifdef PNG_USE_LOCAL_ARRAYS
PNG_tIME;
#endif
png_byte buf[7];
png_debug(1, "in png_write_tIME");
if (mod_time->month > 12 || mod_time->month < 1 ||
mod_time->day > 31 || mod_time->day < 1 ||
mod_time->hour > 23 || mod_time->second > 60)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Invalid time specified for tIME chunk");
return;
}
png_save_uint_16(buf, mod_time->year);
buf[2] = mod_time->month;
buf[3] = mod_time->day;
buf[4] = mod_time->hour;
buf[5] = mod_time->minute;
buf[6] = mod_time->second;
png_write_chunk(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_tIME, buf, (png_size_t)7);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::empty_this_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret1 = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned int nBufferIndex ;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETB: buffer = %p, buffer->pBuffer[%p]", buffer, buffer->pBuffer);
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Empty this buffer in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (buffer == NULL || (buffer->nSize != sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE))) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::etb--> buffer is null or buffer size is invalid");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (buffer->nVersion.nVersion != OMX_SPEC_VERSION) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::etb--> OMX Version Invalid");
return OMX_ErrorVersionMismatch;
}
if (buffer->nInputPortIndex != (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_IN) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Bad port index to call empty_this_buffer");
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (!m_sInPortDef.bEnabled) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Cannot call empty_this_buffer while I/P port is disabled");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
nBufferIndex = buffer - ((!meta_mode_enable)?m_inp_mem_ptr:meta_buffer_hdr);
if (nBufferIndex > m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual ) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: ETB: Invalid buffer index[%d]", nBufferIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
m_etb_count++;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("DBG: i/p nTimestamp = %u", (unsigned)buffer->nTimeStamp);
post_event ((unsigned long)hComp,(unsigned long)buffer,m_input_msg_id);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add safety checks for freeing buffers
Allow only up to 64 buffers on input/output port (since the
allocation bitmap is only 64-wide).
Add safety checks to free only as many buffers were allocated.
Fixes: Heap Overflow and Possible Local Privilege Escalation in
MediaServer (libOmxVenc problem)
Bug: 27532497
Change-Id: I31e576ef9dc542df73aa6b0ea113d72724b50fc6
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_ForwardToServer_f( void ) {
if ( clc.state != CA_ACTIVE || clc.demoplaying ) {
Com_Printf( "Not connected to a server.\n" );
return;
}
if ( Cmd_Argc() > 1 ) {
CL_AddReliableCommand(Cmd_Args(), qfalse);
}
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 6,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_sig_data_segment(const struct ib_sig_handover_wr *wr,
struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp, void **seg, int *size)
{
struct ib_sig_attrs *sig_attrs = wr->sig_attrs;
struct ib_mr *sig_mr = wr->sig_mr;
struct mlx5_bsf *bsf;
u32 data_len = wr->wr.sg_list->length;
u32 data_key = wr->wr.sg_list->lkey;
u64 data_va = wr->wr.sg_list->addr;
int ret;
int wqe_size;
if (!wr->prot ||
(data_key == wr->prot->lkey &&
data_va == wr->prot->addr &&
data_len == wr->prot->length)) {
/**
* Source domain doesn't contain signature information
* or data and protection are interleaved in memory.
* So need construct:
* ------------------
* | data_klm |
* ------------------
* | BSF |
* ------------------
**/
struct mlx5_klm *data_klm = *seg;
data_klm->bcount = cpu_to_be32(data_len);
data_klm->key = cpu_to_be32(data_key);
data_klm->va = cpu_to_be64(data_va);
wqe_size = ALIGN(sizeof(*data_klm), 64);
} else {
/**
* Source domain contains signature information
* So need construct a strided block format:
* ---------------------------
* | stride_block_ctrl |
* ---------------------------
* | data_klm |
* ---------------------------
* | prot_klm |
* ---------------------------
* | BSF |
* ---------------------------
**/
struct mlx5_stride_block_ctrl_seg *sblock_ctrl;
struct mlx5_stride_block_entry *data_sentry;
struct mlx5_stride_block_entry *prot_sentry;
u32 prot_key = wr->prot->lkey;
u64 prot_va = wr->prot->addr;
u16 block_size = sig_attrs->mem.sig.dif.pi_interval;
int prot_size;
sblock_ctrl = *seg;
data_sentry = (void *)sblock_ctrl + sizeof(*sblock_ctrl);
prot_sentry = (void *)data_sentry + sizeof(*data_sentry);
prot_size = prot_field_size(sig_attrs->mem.sig_type);
if (!prot_size) {
pr_err("Bad block size given: %u\n", block_size);
return -EINVAL;
}
sblock_ctrl->bcount_per_cycle = cpu_to_be32(block_size +
prot_size);
sblock_ctrl->op = cpu_to_be32(MLX5_STRIDE_BLOCK_OP);
sblock_ctrl->repeat_count = cpu_to_be32(data_len / block_size);
sblock_ctrl->num_entries = cpu_to_be16(2);
data_sentry->bcount = cpu_to_be16(block_size);
data_sentry->key = cpu_to_be32(data_key);
data_sentry->va = cpu_to_be64(data_va);
data_sentry->stride = cpu_to_be16(block_size);
prot_sentry->bcount = cpu_to_be16(prot_size);
prot_sentry->key = cpu_to_be32(prot_key);
prot_sentry->va = cpu_to_be64(prot_va);
prot_sentry->stride = cpu_to_be16(prot_size);
wqe_size = ALIGN(sizeof(*sblock_ctrl) + sizeof(*data_sentry) +
sizeof(*prot_sentry), 64);
}
*seg += wqe_size;
*size += wqe_size / 16;
if (unlikely((*seg == qp->sq.qend)))
*seg = mlx5_get_send_wqe(qp, 0);
bsf = *seg;
ret = mlx5_set_bsf(sig_mr, sig_attrs, bsf, data_len);
if (ret)
return -EINVAL;
*seg += sizeof(*bsf);
*size += sizeof(*bsf) / 16;
if (unlikely((*seg == qp->sq.qend)))
*seg = mlx5_get_send_wqe(qp, 0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __dn_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,int optname, char __user *optval,int __user *optlen, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct dn_scp *scp = DN_SK(sk);
struct linkinfo_dn link;
unsigned int r_len;
void *r_data = NULL;
unsigned int val;
if(get_user(r_len , optlen))
return -EFAULT;
switch (optname) {
case DSO_CONDATA:
if (r_len > sizeof(struct optdata_dn))
r_len = sizeof(struct optdata_dn);
r_data = &scp->conndata_in;
break;
case DSO_DISDATA:
if (r_len > sizeof(struct optdata_dn))
r_len = sizeof(struct optdata_dn);
r_data = &scp->discdata_in;
break;
case DSO_CONACCESS:
if (r_len > sizeof(struct accessdata_dn))
r_len = sizeof(struct accessdata_dn);
r_data = &scp->accessdata;
break;
case DSO_ACCEPTMODE:
if (r_len > sizeof(unsigned char))
r_len = sizeof(unsigned char);
r_data = &scp->accept_mode;
break;
case DSO_LINKINFO:
if (r_len > sizeof(struct linkinfo_dn))
r_len = sizeof(struct linkinfo_dn);
memset(&link, 0, sizeof(link));
switch (sock->state) {
case SS_CONNECTING:
link.idn_linkstate = LL_CONNECTING;
break;
case SS_DISCONNECTING:
link.idn_linkstate = LL_DISCONNECTING;
break;
case SS_CONNECTED:
link.idn_linkstate = LL_RUNNING;
break;
default:
link.idn_linkstate = LL_INACTIVE;
}
link.idn_segsize = scp->segsize_rem;
r_data = &link;
break;
default:
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
{
int ret, len;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
ret = nf_getsockopt(sk, PF_DECnet, optname, optval, &len);
if (ret >= 0)
ret = put_user(len, optlen);
return ret;
}
#endif
case DSO_STREAM:
case DSO_SEQPACKET:
case DSO_CONACCEPT:
case DSO_CONREJECT:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
case DSO_MAXWINDOW:
if (r_len > sizeof(unsigned long))
r_len = sizeof(unsigned long);
r_data = &scp->max_window;
break;
case DSO_NODELAY:
if (r_len > sizeof(int))
r_len = sizeof(int);
val = (scp->nonagle == 1);
r_data = &val;
break;
case DSO_CORK:
if (r_len > sizeof(int))
r_len = sizeof(int);
val = (scp->nonagle == 2);
r_data = &val;
break;
case DSO_SERVICES:
if (r_len > sizeof(unsigned char))
r_len = sizeof(unsigned char);
r_data = &scp->services_rem;
break;
case DSO_INFO:
if (r_len > sizeof(unsigned char))
r_len = sizeof(unsigned char);
r_data = &scp->info_rem;
break;
}
if (r_data) {
if (copy_to_user(optval, r_data, r_len))
return -EFAULT;
if (put_user(r_len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gst_asf_demux_pull_indices (GstASFDemux * demux)
{
GstBuffer *buf = NULL;
guint64 offset;
guint num_read = 0;
GstFlowReturn ret = GST_FLOW_OK;
offset = demux->index_offset;
if (G_UNLIKELY (offset == 0)) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "can't read indices, don't know index offset");
/* non-fatal */
return GST_FLOW_OK;
}
while (gst_asf_demux_pull_data (demux, offset, 16 + 8, &buf, NULL)) {
AsfObject obj;
GstMapInfo map;
guint8 *bufdata;
guint64 obj_size;
gst_buffer_map (buf, &map, GST_MAP_READ);
g_assert (map.size >= 16 + 8);
if (!asf_demux_peek_object (demux, map.data, 16 + 8, &obj, TRUE)) {
gst_buffer_unmap (buf, &map);
gst_buffer_replace (&buf, NULL);
ret = GST_FLOW_ERROR;
break;
}
gst_buffer_unmap (buf, &map);
gst_buffer_replace (&buf, NULL);
/* check for sanity */
if (G_UNLIKELY (obj.size > (5 * 1024 * 1024))) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "implausible index object size, bailing out");
break;
}
if (G_UNLIKELY (!gst_asf_demux_pull_data (demux, offset, obj.size, &buf,
NULL)))
break;
GST_LOG_OBJECT (demux, "index object at offset 0x%" G_GINT64_MODIFIER "X"
", size %u", offset, (guint) obj.size);
offset += obj.size; /* increase before _process_object changes it */
gst_buffer_map (buf, &map, GST_MAP_READ);
g_assert (map.size >= obj.size);
bufdata = (guint8 *) map.data;
obj_size = obj.size;
ret = gst_asf_demux_process_object (demux, &bufdata, &obj_size);
gst_buffer_unmap (buf, &map);
gst_buffer_replace (&buf, NULL);
if (G_UNLIKELY (ret != GST_FLOW_OK))
break;
++num_read;
}
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "read %u index objects", num_read);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 25,329 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::requestPointerUnlock()
{
return m_webView->requestPointerUnlock();
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __always_inline unsigned long vmcs_readl(unsigned long field)
{
vmcs_checkl(field);
if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
return evmcs_read64(field);
return __vmcs_readl(field);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,412 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lseg_length(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
LSEG *lseg = PG_GETARG_LSEG_P(0);
PG_RETURN_FLOAT8(point_dt(&lseg->p[0], &lseg->p[1]));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 6,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void pin_insert_group(struct fs_pin *pin, struct vfsmount *m, struct hlist_head *p)
{
spin_lock(&pin_lock);
if (p)
hlist_add_head(&pin->s_list, p);
hlist_add_head(&pin->m_list, &real_mount(m)->mnt_pins);
spin_unlock(&pin_lock);
}
Commit Message: fs_pin: Allow for the possibility that m_list or s_list go unused.
This is needed to support lazily umounting locked mounts. Because the
entire unmounted subtree needs to stay together until there are no
users with references to any part of the subtree.
To support this guarantee that the fs_pin m_list and s_list nodes
are initialized by initializing them in init_fs_pin allowing
for the possibility that pin_insert_group does not touch them.
Further use hlist_del_init in pin_remove so that there is
a hlist_unhashed test before the list we attempt to update
the previous list item.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameHostManager::DetermineSiteInstanceForURL(
const GURL& dest_url,
SiteInstance* source_instance,
SiteInstance* current_instance,
SiteInstance* dest_instance,
ui::PageTransition transition,
bool dest_is_restore,
bool dest_is_view_source_mode,
bool force_browsing_instance_swap,
bool was_server_redirect) {
SiteInstanceImpl* current_instance_impl =
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(current_instance);
NavigationControllerImpl& controller =
delegate_->GetControllerForRenderManager();
BrowserContext* browser_context = controller.GetBrowserContext();
if (dest_instance) {
if (force_browsing_instance_swap) {
CHECK(!dest_instance->IsRelatedSiteInstance(
render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance()));
}
return SiteInstanceDescriptor(dest_instance);
}
if (force_browsing_instance_swap)
return SiteInstanceDescriptor(browser_context, dest_url,
SiteInstanceRelation::UNRELATED);
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kProcessPerSite) &&
ui::PageTransitionCoreTypeIs(transition, ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_GENERATED)) {
return SiteInstanceDescriptor(current_instance_impl);
}
if (SiteIsolationPolicy::AreCrossProcessFramesPossible() &&
!frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
SiteInstance* parent_site_instance =
frame_tree_node_->parent()->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
if (parent_site_instance->GetSiteURL().SchemeIs(kChromeUIScheme) &&
dest_url.SchemeIs(kChromeUIScheme)) {
return SiteInstanceDescriptor(parent_site_instance);
}
}
if (!current_instance_impl->HasSite()) {
bool use_process_per_site =
RenderProcessHost::ShouldUseProcessPerSite(browser_context, dest_url) &&
RenderProcessHostImpl::GetProcessHostForSite(browser_context, dest_url);
if (current_instance_impl->HasRelatedSiteInstance(dest_url) ||
use_process_per_site) {
return SiteInstanceDescriptor(browser_context, dest_url,
SiteInstanceRelation::RELATED);
}
if (current_instance_impl->HasWrongProcessForURL(dest_url))
return SiteInstanceDescriptor(browser_context, dest_url,
SiteInstanceRelation::RELATED);
if (dest_is_view_source_mode)
return SiteInstanceDescriptor(browser_context, dest_url,
SiteInstanceRelation::UNRELATED);
if (WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->UseWebUIForURL(
browser_context, dest_url)) {
return SiteInstanceDescriptor(browser_context, dest_url,
SiteInstanceRelation::UNRELATED);
}
if (dest_is_restore &&
GetContentClient()->browser()->ShouldAssignSiteForURL(dest_url)) {
current_instance_impl->SetSite(dest_url);
}
return SiteInstanceDescriptor(current_instance_impl);
}
NavigationEntry* current_entry = controller.GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (interstitial_page_) {
current_entry = controller.GetEntryAtOffset(-1);
}
if (current_entry &&
current_entry->IsViewSourceMode() != dest_is_view_source_mode &&
!IsRendererDebugURL(dest_url)) {
return SiteInstanceDescriptor(browser_context, dest_url,
SiteInstanceRelation::UNRELATED);
}
GURL about_blank(url::kAboutBlankURL);
GURL about_srcdoc(content::kAboutSrcDocURL);
bool dest_is_data_or_about = dest_url == about_srcdoc ||
dest_url == about_blank ||
dest_url.scheme() == url::kDataScheme;
if (source_instance && dest_is_data_or_about && !was_server_redirect)
return SiteInstanceDescriptor(source_instance);
if (IsCurrentlySameSite(render_frame_host_.get(), dest_url))
return SiteInstanceDescriptor(render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance());
if (SiteIsolationPolicy::IsTopDocumentIsolationEnabled()) {
if (!frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* main_frame =
frame_tree_node_->frame_tree()->root()->current_frame_host();
if (IsCurrentlySameSite(main_frame, dest_url))
return SiteInstanceDescriptor(main_frame->GetSiteInstance());
}
if (frame_tree_node_->opener()) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* opener_frame =
frame_tree_node_->opener()->current_frame_host();
if (IsCurrentlySameSite(opener_frame, dest_url))
return SiteInstanceDescriptor(opener_frame->GetSiteInstance());
}
}
if (!frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame() &&
SiteIsolationPolicy::IsTopDocumentIsolationEnabled() &&
!SiteInstanceImpl::DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess(browser_context,
dest_url)) {
if (GetContentClient()
->browser()
->ShouldFrameShareParentSiteInstanceDespiteTopDocumentIsolation(
dest_url, current_instance)) {
return SiteInstanceDescriptor(render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance());
}
return SiteInstanceDescriptor(
browser_context, dest_url,
SiteInstanceRelation::RELATED_DEFAULT_SUBFRAME);
}
if (!frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* parent =
frame_tree_node_->parent()->current_frame_host();
bool dest_url_requires_dedicated_process =
SiteInstanceImpl::DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess(browser_context,
dest_url);
if (!parent->GetSiteInstance()->RequiresDedicatedProcess() &&
!dest_url_requires_dedicated_process) {
return SiteInstanceDescriptor(parent->GetSiteInstance());
}
}
return SiteInstanceDescriptor(browser_context, dest_url,
SiteInstanceRelation::RELATED);
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 27,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::HttpResponse> HandleTestRequest(
const net::test_server::HttpRequest& request) {
if (request.relative_url == "/") {
std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::BasicHttpResponse> http_response(
new net::test_server::BasicHttpResponse);
http_response->set_code(net::HTTP_OK);
http_response->set_content("Success");
return std::move(http_response);
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652}
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PaymentHandlerWebFlowViewController::DidAttachInterstitialPage() {
log_.Error("Aborting payment handler window \"" + target_.spec() +
"\" because of navigation to a page with invalid certificate "
"state or malicious content.");
AbortPayment();
}
Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 27,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::OnPreferenceChanged(PrefServiceBase* service,
const std::string& pref_name) {
if (pref_name == prefs::kUseCustomChromeFrame) {
UpdateCustomFrame();
ui::SetHideTitlebarWhenMaximizedProperty(
ui::GetX11WindowFromGtkWidget(GTK_WIDGET(window_)),
UseCustomFrame() ?
ui::HIDE_TITLEBAR_WHEN_MAXIMIZED :
ui::SHOW_TITLEBAR_WHEN_MAXIMIZED);
} else {
NOTREACHED() << "Got pref change notification we didn't register for!";
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GetGeometry(ClientPtr client, xGetGeometryReply * rep)
{
DrawablePtr pDraw;
int rc;
REQUEST(xResourceReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xResourceReq);
rc = dixLookupDrawable(&pDraw, stuff->id, client, M_ANY, DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
rep->type = X_Reply;
rep->length = 0;
rep->sequenceNumber = client->sequence;
rep->root = pDraw->pScreen->root->drawable.id;
rep->depth = pDraw->depth;
rep->width = pDraw->width;
rep->height = pDraw->height;
if (WindowDrawable(pDraw->type)) {
WindowPtr pWin = (WindowPtr) pDraw;
rep->x = pWin->origin.x - wBorderWidth(pWin);
rep->y = pWin->origin.y - wBorderWidth(pWin);
rep->borderWidth = pWin->borderWidth;
}
else { /* DRAWABLE_PIXMAP */
rep->x = rep->y = rep->borderWidth = 0;
}
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 25,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayerTreeHost::GetSurfaceSequenceGenerator() {
return &surface_sequence_generator_;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 12,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::clearBufferuiv(
GLenum buffer,
GLint drawbuffer,
MaybeShared<DOMUint32Array> value,
GLuint src_offset) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateClearBuffer("clearBufferuiv", buffer, value.View()->length(),
src_offset))
return;
ContextGL()->ClearBufferuiv(buffer, drawbuffer,
value.View()->DataMaybeShared() + src_offset);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Plugin::HistogramStartupTimeMedium(const std::string& name, float dt) {
if (nexe_size_ > 0) {
float size_in_MB = static_cast<float>(nexe_size_) / (1024.f * 1024.f);
HistogramTimeMedium(name, static_cast<int64_t>(dt));
HistogramTimeMedium(name + "PerMB", static_cast<int64_t>(dt / size_in_MB));
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::ShowPageInfo(content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& url,
const NavigationEntry::SSLStatus& ssl,
bool show_history) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context);
window()->ShowPageInfo(profile, url, ssl, show_history);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long hugetlb_change_protection(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, unsigned long end, pgprot_t newprot)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
unsigned long start = address;
pte_t *ptep;
pte_t pte;
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma);
unsigned long pages = 0;
bool shared_pmd = false;
struct mmu_notifier_range range;
/*
* In the case of shared PMDs, the area to flush could be beyond
* start/end. Set range.start/range.end to cover the maximum possible
* range if PMD sharing is possible.
*/
mmu_notifier_range_init(&range, mm, start, end);
adjust_range_if_pmd_sharing_possible(vma, &range.start, &range.end);
BUG_ON(address >= end);
flush_cache_range(vma, range.start, range.end);
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(&range);
i_mmap_lock_write(vma->vm_file->f_mapping);
for (; address < end; address += huge_page_size(h)) {
spinlock_t *ptl;
ptep = huge_pte_offset(mm, address, huge_page_size(h));
if (!ptep)
continue;
ptl = huge_pte_lock(h, mm, ptep);
if (huge_pmd_unshare(mm, &address, ptep)) {
pages++;
spin_unlock(ptl);
shared_pmd = true;
continue;
}
pte = huge_ptep_get(ptep);
if (unlikely(is_hugetlb_entry_hwpoisoned(pte))) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
continue;
}
if (unlikely(is_hugetlb_entry_migration(pte))) {
swp_entry_t entry = pte_to_swp_entry(pte);
if (is_write_migration_entry(entry)) {
pte_t newpte;
make_migration_entry_read(&entry);
newpte = swp_entry_to_pte(entry);
set_huge_swap_pte_at(mm, address, ptep,
newpte, huge_page_size(h));
pages++;
}
spin_unlock(ptl);
continue;
}
if (!huge_pte_none(pte)) {
pte = huge_ptep_get_and_clear(mm, address, ptep);
pte = pte_mkhuge(huge_pte_modify(pte, newprot));
pte = arch_make_huge_pte(pte, vma, NULL, 0);
set_huge_pte_at(mm, address, ptep, pte);
pages++;
}
spin_unlock(ptl);
}
/*
* Must flush TLB before releasing i_mmap_rwsem: x86's huge_pmd_unshare
* may have cleared our pud entry and done put_page on the page table:
* once we release i_mmap_rwsem, another task can do the final put_page
* and that page table be reused and filled with junk. If we actually
* did unshare a page of pmds, flush the range corresponding to the pud.
*/
if (shared_pmd)
flush_hugetlb_tlb_range(vma, range.start, range.end);
else
flush_hugetlb_tlb_range(vma, start, end);
/*
* No need to call mmu_notifier_invalidate_range() we are downgrading
* page table protection not changing it to point to a new page.
*
* See Documentation/vm/mmu_notifier.rst
*/
i_mmap_unlock_write(vma->vm_file->f_mapping);
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(&range);
return pages << h->order;
}
Commit Message: mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
If the page refcount wraps around past zero, it will be freed while
there are still four billion references to it. One of the possible
avenues for an attacker to try to make this happen is by doing direct IO
on a page multiple times. This patch makes get_user_pages() refuse to
take a new page reference if there are already more than two billion
references to the page.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 25,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WinScreenKeyboardObserver(RenderWidgetHostImpl* host,
const gfx::Point& location_in_screen,
float scale_factor,
aura::Window* window)
: host_(host),
location_in_screen_(location_in_screen),
device_scale_factor_(scale_factor),
window_(window) {
host_->GetView()->SetInsets(gfx::Insets());
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 11,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int check_target(struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_target *t = arpt_get_target(e);
int ret;
struct xt_tgchk_param par = {
.table = name,
.entryinfo = e,
.target = t->u.kernel.target,
.targinfo = t->data,
.hook_mask = e->comefrom,
.family = NFPROTO_ARP,
};
ret = xt_check_target(&par, t->u.target_size - sizeof(*t), 0, false);
if (ret < 0) {
duprintf("arp_tables: check failed for `%s'.\n",
t->u.kernel.target->name);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::Time GetFixedTime(base::Time time) {
return time;
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,311 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int can_open_cached(struct nfs4_state *state, fmode_t mode, int open_mode)
{
int ret = 0;
if (open_mode & O_EXCL)
goto out;
switch (mode & (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE)) {
case FMODE_READ:
ret |= test_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags) != 0
&& state->n_rdonly != 0;
break;
case FMODE_WRITE:
ret |= test_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags) != 0
&& state->n_wronly != 0;
break;
case FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE:
ret |= test_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags) != 0
&& state->n_rdwr != 0;
}
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 udp_ehashfn(const struct net *net, const __be32 laddr,
const __u16 lport, const __be32 faddr,
const __be16 fport)
{
static u32 udp_ehash_secret __read_mostly;
net_get_random_once(&udp_ehash_secret, sizeof(udp_ehash_secret));
return __inet_ehashfn(laddr, lport, faddr, fport,
udp_ehash_secret + net_hash_mix(net));
}
Commit Message: udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums
We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :
1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()
2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.
This patch is an attempt to make things better.
We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 23,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static blkcnt_t ext4_inode_blocks(struct ext4_inode *raw_inode,
struct ext4_inode_info *ei)
{
blkcnt_t i_blocks ;
struct inode *inode = &(ei->vfs_inode);
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
if (ext4_has_feature_huge_file(sb)) {
/* we are using combined 48 bit field */
i_blocks = ((u64)le16_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_blocks_high)) << 32 |
le32_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_blocks_lo);
if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_HUGE_FILE)) {
/* i_blocks represent file system block size */
return i_blocks << (inode->i_blkbits - 9);
} else {
return i_blocks;
}
} else {
return le32_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_blocks_lo);
}
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 5,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poppler_mapping_free (PopplerLinkMapping *mapping)
{
poppler_action_free (mapping->action);
g_free (mapping);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 14,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hci_uart_close(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
BT_DBG("hdev %p", hdev);
hci_uart_flush(hdev);
hdev->flush = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Postpone HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit set in hci_uart_set_proto()
task A: task B:
hci_uart_set_proto flush_to_ldisc
- p->open(hu) -> h5_open //alloc h5 - receive_buf
- set_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY - tty_port_default_receive_buf
- hci_uart_register_dev - tty_ldisc_receive_buf
- hci_uart_tty_receive
- test_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY
- h5_recv
- clear_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY while() {
- p->open(hu) -> h5_close //free h5
- h5_rx_3wire_hdr
- h5_reset() //use-after-free
}
It could use ioctl to set hci uart proto, but there is
a use-after-free issue when hci_uart_register_dev() fail in
hci_uart_set_proto(), see stack above, fix this by setting
HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit only when hci_uart_register_dev()
return success.
Reported-by: syzbot+899a33dc0fa0dbaf06a6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 25,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs4_layoutget_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_layoutget *lgp = calldata;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(lgp->args.inode);
struct nfs4_session *session = nfs4_get_session(server);
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
/* Note the is a race here, where a CB_LAYOUTRECALL can come in
* right now covering the LAYOUTGET we are about to send.
* However, that is not so catastrophic, and there seems
* to be no way to prevent it completely.
*/
if (nfs41_setup_sequence(session, &lgp->args.seq_args,
&lgp->res.seq_res, task))
return;
if (pnfs_choose_layoutget_stateid(&lgp->args.stateid,
NFS_I(lgp->args.inode)->layout,
&lgp->args.range,
lgp->args.ctx->state)) {
rpc_exit(task, NFS4_OK);
}
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PrimitiveInfo *TraceStrokePolygon(const DrawInfo *draw_info,
const PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info)
{
typedef struct _LineSegment
{
double
p,
q;
} LineSegment;
double
delta_theta,
dot_product,
mid,
miterlimit;
LineSegment
dx,
dy,
inverse_slope,
slope,
theta;
MagickBooleanType
closed_path;
PointInfo
box_p[5],
box_q[5],
center,
offset,
*path_p,
*path_q;
PrimitiveInfo
*polygon_primitive,
*stroke_polygon;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
arc_segments,
max_strokes,
number_vertices;
ssize_t
j,
n,
p,
q;
/*
Allocate paths.
*/
number_vertices=primitive_info->coordinates;
max_strokes=2*number_vertices+6*BezierQuantum+360;
path_p=(PointInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_p));
path_q=(PointInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_q));
polygon_primitive=(PrimitiveInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
number_vertices+2UL,sizeof(*polygon_primitive));
if ((path_p == (PointInfo *) NULL) || (path_q == (PointInfo *) NULL) ||
(polygon_primitive == (PrimitiveInfo *) NULL))
return((PrimitiveInfo *) NULL);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(polygon_primitive,primitive_info,(size_t)
number_vertices*sizeof(*polygon_primitive));
closed_path=
(fabs(primitive_info[number_vertices-1].point.x-primitive_info[0].point.x) < DrawEpsilon) &&
(fabs(primitive_info[number_vertices-1].point.y-primitive_info[0].point.y) < DrawEpsilon) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((draw_info->linejoin == RoundJoin) ||
((draw_info->linejoin == MiterJoin) && (closed_path != MagickFalse)))
{
polygon_primitive[number_vertices]=primitive_info[1];
number_vertices++;
}
polygon_primitive[number_vertices].primitive=UndefinedPrimitive;
/*
Compute the slope for the first line segment, p.
*/
dx.p=0.0;
dy.p=0.0;
for (n=1; n < (ssize_t) number_vertices; n++)
{
dx.p=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-polygon_primitive[0].point.x;
dy.p=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-polygon_primitive[0].point.y;
if ((fabs(dx.p) >= DrawEpsilon) || (fabs(dy.p) >= DrawEpsilon))
break;
}
if (n == (ssize_t) number_vertices)
n=(ssize_t) number_vertices-1L;
slope.p=0.0;
inverse_slope.p=0.0;
if (fabs(dx.p) < DrawEpsilon)
{
if (dx.p >= 0.0)
slope.p=dy.p < 0.0 ? -1.0/DrawEpsilon : 1.0/DrawEpsilon;
else
slope.p=dy.p < 0.0 ? 1.0/DrawEpsilon : -1.0/DrawEpsilon;
}
else
if (fabs(dy.p) < DrawEpsilon)
{
if (dy.p >= 0.0)
inverse_slope.p=dx.p < 0.0 ? -1.0/DrawEpsilon : 1.0/DrawEpsilon;
else
inverse_slope.p=dx.p < 0.0 ? 1.0/DrawEpsilon : -1.0/DrawEpsilon;
}
else
{
slope.p=dy.p/dx.p;
inverse_slope.p=(-1.0/slope.p);
}
mid=ExpandAffine(&draw_info->affine)*draw_info->stroke_width/2.0;
miterlimit=(double) (draw_info->miterlimit*draw_info->miterlimit*mid*mid);
if ((draw_info->linecap == SquareCap) && (closed_path == MagickFalse))
TraceSquareLinecap(polygon_primitive,number_vertices,mid);
offset.x=sqrt((double) (mid*mid/(inverse_slope.p*inverse_slope.p+1.0)));
offset.y=(double) (offset.x*inverse_slope.p);
if ((dy.p*offset.x-dx.p*offset.y) > 0.0)
{
box_p[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y-offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
box_p[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
box_q[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y+offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
box_q[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
}
else
{
box_p[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y+offset.y;
box_p[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.y;
box_q[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y-offset.y;
box_q[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.y;
}
/*
Create strokes for the line join attribute: bevel, miter, round.
*/
p=0;
q=0;
path_q[p++]=box_q[0];
path_p[q++]=box_p[0];
for (i=(ssize_t) n+1; i < (ssize_t) number_vertices; i++)
{
/*
Compute the slope for this line segment, q.
*/
dx.q=polygon_primitive[i].point.x-polygon_primitive[n].point.x;
dy.q=polygon_primitive[i].point.y-polygon_primitive[n].point.y;
dot_product=dx.q*dx.q+dy.q*dy.q;
if (dot_product < 0.25)
continue;
slope.q=0.0;
inverse_slope.q=0.0;
if (fabs(dx.q) < DrawEpsilon)
{
if (dx.q >= 0.0)
slope.q=dy.q < 0.0 ? -1.0/DrawEpsilon : 1.0/DrawEpsilon;
else
slope.q=dy.q < 0.0 ? 1.0/DrawEpsilon : -1.0/DrawEpsilon;
}
else
if (fabs(dy.q) < DrawEpsilon)
{
if (dy.q >= 0.0)
inverse_slope.q=dx.q < 0.0 ? -1.0/DrawEpsilon : 1.0/DrawEpsilon;
else
inverse_slope.q=dx.q < 0.0 ? 1.0/DrawEpsilon : -1.0/DrawEpsilon;
}
else
{
slope.q=dy.q/dx.q;
inverse_slope.q=(-1.0/slope.q);
}
offset.x=sqrt((double) (mid*mid/(inverse_slope.q*inverse_slope.q+1.0)));
offset.y=(double) (offset.x*inverse_slope.q);
dot_product=dy.q*offset.x-dx.q*offset.y;
if (dot_product > 0.0)
{
box_p[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.y;
box_p[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y-offset.y;
box_q[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.y;
box_q[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y+offset.y;
}
else
{
box_p[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.y;
box_p[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y+offset.y;
box_q[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.y;
box_q[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y-offset.y;
}
if (fabs((double) (slope.p-slope.q)) < DrawEpsilon)
{
box_p[4]=box_p[1];
box_q[4]=box_q[1];
}
else
{
box_p[4].x=(double) ((slope.p*box_p[0].x-box_p[0].y-slope.q*box_p[3].x+
box_p[3].y)/(slope.p-slope.q));
box_p[4].y=(double) (slope.p*(box_p[4].x-box_p[0].x)+box_p[0].y);
box_q[4].x=(double) ((slope.p*box_q[0].x-box_q[0].y-slope.q*box_q[3].x+
box_q[3].y)/(slope.p-slope.q));
box_q[4].y=(double) (slope.p*(box_q[4].x-box_q[0].x)+box_q[0].y);
}
if (q >= (ssize_t) (max_strokes-6*BezierQuantum-360))
{
if (~max_strokes < (6*BezierQuantum+360))
{
path_p=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_p);
path_q=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_q);
}
else
{
max_strokes+=6*BezierQuantum+360;
path_p=(PointInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(path_p,max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_p));
path_q=(PointInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(path_q,max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_q));
}
if ((path_p == (PointInfo *) NULL) || (path_q == (PointInfo *) NULL))
{
if (path_p != (PointInfo *) NULL)
path_p=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_p);
if (path_q != (PointInfo *) NULL)
path_q=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_q);
polygon_primitive=(PrimitiveInfo *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(polygon_primitive);
return((PrimitiveInfo *) NULL);
}
}
dot_product=dx.q*dy.p-dx.p*dy.q;
if (dot_product <= 0.0)
switch (draw_info->linejoin)
{
case BevelJoin:
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
else
{
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
break;
}
case MiterJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
}
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
break;
}
case RoundJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
else
{
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
center=polygon_primitive[n].point;
theta.p=atan2(box_q[1].y-center.y,box_q[1].x-center.x);
theta.q=atan2(box_q[2].y-center.y,box_q[2].x-center.x);
if (theta.q < theta.p)
theta.q+=2.0*MagickPI;
arc_segments=(size_t) ceil((double) ((theta.q-theta.p)/
(2.0*sqrt((double) (1.0/mid)))));
path_q[q].x=box_q[1].x;
path_q[q].y=box_q[1].y;
q++;
for (j=1; j < (ssize_t) arc_segments; j++)
{
delta_theta=(double) (j*(theta.q-theta.p)/arc_segments);
path_q[q].x=(double) (center.x+mid*cos(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
path_q[q].y=(double) (center.y+mid*sin(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
q++;
}
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
break;
}
default:
break;
}
else
switch (draw_info->linejoin)
{
case BevelJoin:
{
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
}
break;
}
case MiterJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
}
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
break;
}
case RoundJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
}
center=polygon_primitive[n].point;
theta.p=atan2(box_p[1].y-center.y,box_p[1].x-center.x);
theta.q=atan2(box_p[2].y-center.y,box_p[2].x-center.x);
if (theta.p < theta.q)
theta.p+=2.0*MagickPI;
arc_segments=(size_t) ceil((double) ((theta.p-theta.q)/
(2.0*sqrt((double) (1.0/mid)))));
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
for (j=1; j < (ssize_t) arc_segments; j++)
{
delta_theta=(double) (j*(theta.q-theta.p)/arc_segments);
path_p[p].x=(double) (center.x+mid*cos(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
path_p[p].y=(double) (center.y+mid*sin(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
p++;
}
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
break;
}
default:
break;
}
slope.p=slope.q;
inverse_slope.p=inverse_slope.q;
box_p[0]=box_p[2];
box_p[1]=box_p[3];
box_q[0]=box_q[2];
box_q[1]=box_q[3];
dx.p=dx.q;
dy.p=dy.q;
n=i;
}
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
/*
Trace stroked polygon.
*/
stroke_polygon=(PrimitiveInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
(p+q+2UL*closed_path+2UL),sizeof(*stroke_polygon));
if (stroke_polygon != (PrimitiveInfo *) NULL)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) p; i++)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=path_p[i];
}
if (closed_path != MagickFalse)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=stroke_polygon[0].point;
i++;
}
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) (p+q+closed_path); i++)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=path_q[p+q+closed_path-(i+1)];
}
if (closed_path != MagickFalse)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=stroke_polygon[p+closed_path].point;
i++;
}
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=stroke_polygon[0].point;
i++;
stroke_polygon[i].primitive=UndefinedPrimitive;
stroke_polygon[0].coordinates=(size_t) (p+q+2*closed_path+1);
}
path_p=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_p);
path_q=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_q);
polygon_primitive=(PrimitiveInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(polygon_primitive);
return(stroke_polygon);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Max Thrane)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ImeAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueInt(info, impl->imeAttribute());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_flags(unsigned int flags)
{
if (flags & ~(FS_IMMUTABLE_FL | FS_APPEND_FL | \
FS_NOATIME_FL | FS_NODUMP_FL | \
FS_SYNC_FL | FS_DIRSYNC_FL | \
FS_NOCOMP_FL | FS_COMPR_FL |
FS_NOCOW_FL))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if ((flags & FS_NOCOMP_FL) && (flags & FS_COMPR_FL))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 4,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cma_save_net_info(struct rdma_cm_id *id, struct rdma_cm_id *listen_id,
struct ib_cm_event *ib_event)
{
struct cma_hdr *hdr;
if ((listen_id->route.addr.src_addr.ss_family == AF_IB) &&
(ib_event->event == IB_CM_REQ_RECEIVED)) {
cma_save_ib_info(id, listen_id, ib_event->param.req_rcvd.primary_path);
return 0;
}
hdr = ib_event->private_data;
if (hdr->cma_version != CMA_VERSION)
return -EINVAL;
switch (cma_get_ip_ver(hdr)) {
case 4:
cma_save_ip4_info(id, listen_id, hdr);
break;
case 6:
cma_save_ip6_info(id, listen_id, hdr);
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int trace_array_printk(struct trace_array *tr,
unsigned long ip, const char *fmt, ...)
{
int ret;
va_list ap;
if (!(global_trace.trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_PRINTK))
return 0;
va_start(ap, fmt);
ret = trace_array_vprintk(tr, ip, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 22,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err mhac_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_MHAConfigBox *ptr = (GF_MHAConfigBox *) s;
s->size += 5;
if (ptr->mha_config_size && ptr->mha_config) s->size += ptr->mha_config_size;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: prevent dref memleak on invalid input (#1183)
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 12,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vmalloc_sync_all(void)
{
unsigned long address;
if (SHARED_KERNEL_PMD)
return;
for (address = VMALLOC_START & PMD_MASK;
address >= TASK_SIZE && address < FIXADDR_TOP;
address += PMD_SIZE) {
struct page *page;
spin_lock(&pgd_lock);
list_for_each_entry(page, &pgd_list, lru) {
spinlock_t *pgt_lock;
pmd_t *ret;
/* the pgt_lock only for Xen */
pgt_lock = &pgd_page_get_mm(page)->page_table_lock;
spin_lock(pgt_lock);
ret = vmalloc_sync_one(page_address(page), address);
spin_unlock(pgt_lock);
if (!ret)
break;
}
spin_unlock(&pgd_lock);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void virtio_net_set_multiqueue(VirtIONet *n, int multiqueue)
{
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
int i, max = multiqueue ? n->max_queues : 1;
n->multiqueue = multiqueue;
for (i = 2; i <= n->max_queues * 2 + 1; i++) {
virtio_del_queue(vdev, i);
}
for (i = 1; i < max; i++) {
n->vqs[i].rx_vq = virtio_add_queue(vdev, 256, virtio_net_handle_rx);
if (n->vqs[i].tx_timer) {
n->vqs[i].tx_vq =
virtio_add_queue(vdev, 256, virtio_net_handle_tx_timer);
n->vqs[i].tx_timer = timer_new_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL,
virtio_net_tx_timer,
&n->vqs[i]);
} else {
n->vqs[i].tx_vq =
virtio_add_queue(vdev, 256, virtio_net_handle_tx_bh);
n->vqs[i].tx_bh = qemu_bh_new(virtio_net_tx_bh, &n->vqs[i]);
}
n->vqs[i].tx_waiting = 0;
n->vqs[i].n = n;
}
/* Note: Minux Guests (version 3.2.1) use ctrl vq but don't ack
* VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_VQ. Create ctrl vq unconditionally to avoid
* breaking them.
*/
n->ctrl_vq = virtio_add_queue(vdev, 64, virtio_net_handle_ctrl);
virtio_net_set_queues(n);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
int r;
r = vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt(vcpu, vector);
if (!r)
return;
if (pi_test_and_set_pir(vector, &vmx->pi_desc))
return;
/* If a previous notification has sent the IPI, nothing to do. */
if (pi_test_and_set_on(&vmx->pi_desc))
return;
if (!kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, false))
kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebKit::WebMediaStreamCenter* RenderThreadImpl::CreateMediaStreamCenter(
WebKit::WebMediaStreamCenterClient* client) {
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
if (!CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableMediaStream)) {
return NULL;
}
if (!media_stream_center_)
media_stream_center_ = new content::MediaStreamCenter(client);
#endif
return media_stream_center_;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dns_packet_append_type_window(DnsPacket *p, uint8_t window, uint8_t length, const uint8_t *types, size_t *start) {
size_t saved_size;
int r;
assert(p);
assert(types);
assert(length > 0);
saved_size = p->size;
r = dns_packet_append_uint8(p, window, NULL);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = dns_packet_append_uint8(p, length, NULL);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = dns_packet_append_blob(p, types, length, NULL);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
if (start)
*start = saved_size;
return 0;
fail:
dns_packet_truncate(p, saved_size);
return r;
}
Commit Message: resolved: bugfix of null pointer p->question dereferencing (#6020)
See https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/systemd/+bug/1621396
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ContentBrowserClient::GetSpeechRecognitionManagerDelegate() {
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 13,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void core_dump_config(apr_pool_t *p, server_rec *s)
{
core_server_config *sconf = ap_get_core_module_config(s->module_config);
apr_file_t *out = NULL;
const char *tmp;
const char **defines;
int i;
if (!ap_exists_config_define("DUMP_RUN_CFG"))
return;
apr_file_open_stdout(&out, p);
apr_file_printf(out, "ServerRoot: \"%s\"\n", ap_server_root);
tmp = ap_server_root_relative(p, sconf->ap_document_root);
apr_file_printf(out, "Main DocumentRoot: \"%s\"\n", tmp);
if (s->error_fname[0] != '|' && s->errorlog_provider == NULL)
tmp = ap_server_root_relative(p, s->error_fname);
else
tmp = s->error_fname;
apr_file_printf(out, "Main ErrorLog: \"%s\"\n", tmp);
if (ap_scoreboard_fname) {
tmp = ap_runtime_dir_relative(p, ap_scoreboard_fname);
apr_file_printf(out, "ScoreBoardFile: \"%s\"\n", tmp);
}
ap_dump_mutexes(p, s, out);
ap_mpm_dump_pidfile(p, out);
defines = (const char **)ap_server_config_defines->elts;
for (i = 0; i < ap_server_config_defines->nelts; i++) {
const char *name = defines[i];
const char *val = NULL;
if (server_config_defined_vars)
val = apr_table_get(server_config_defined_vars, name);
if (val)
apr_file_printf(out, "Define: %s=%s\n", name, val);
else
apr_file_printf(out, "Define: %s\n", name);
}
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 2,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_siz_dumpparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, FILE *out)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
unsigned int i;
fprintf(out, "caps = 0x%02"PRIxFAST16";\n", siz->caps);
fprintf(out, "width = %"PRIuFAST32"; height = %"PRIuFAST32"; xoff = %"PRIuFAST32"; yoff = %" PRIuFAST32 ";\n",
siz->width, siz->height, siz->xoff, siz->yoff);
fprintf(out, "tilewidth = %"PRIuFAST32"; tileheight = %"PRIuFAST32"; "
"tilexoff = %"PRIuFAST32"; tileyoff = %" PRIuFAST32 ";\n",
siz->tilewidth, siz->tileheight, siz->tilexoff, siz->tileyoff);
fprintf(out, "numcomps = %"PRIuFAST16";\n", siz->numcomps);
for (i = 0; i < siz->numcomps; ++i) {
fprintf(out, "prec[%d] = %d; sgnd[%d] = %d; hsamp[%d] = %d; "
"vsamp[%d] = %d\n", i, siz->comps[i].prec, i,
siz->comps[i].sgnd, i, siz->comps[i].hsamp, i,
siz->comps[i].vsamp);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 1,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDrawArrays(uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile cmds::DrawArrays& c =
*static_cast<const volatile cmds::DrawArrays*>(cmd_data);
GLint first = static_cast<GLint>(c.first);
GLsizei count = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.count);
return DoMultiDrawArrays("glDrawArrays", false, static_cast<GLenum>(c.mode),
&first, &count, nullptr, 1);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 23,074 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_setfilesize_trans_alloc(
struct xfs_ioend *ioend)
{
struct xfs_mount *mp = XFS_I(ioend->io_inode)->i_mount;
struct xfs_trans *tp;
int error;
error = xfs_trans_alloc(mp, &M_RES(mp)->tr_fsyncts, 0, 0, 0, &tp);
if (error)
return error;
ioend->io_append_trans = tp;
/*
* We may pass freeze protection with a transaction. So tell lockdep
* we released it.
*/
__sb_writers_release(ioend->io_inode->i_sb, SB_FREEZE_FS);
/*
* We hand off the transaction to the completion thread now, so
* clear the flag here.
*/
current_restore_flags_nested(&tp->t_pflags, PF_FSTRANS);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfs: don't BUG() on mixed direct and mapped I/O
We've had reports of generic/095 causing XFS to BUG() in
__xfs_get_blocks() due to the existence of delalloc blocks on a
direct I/O read. generic/095 issues a mix of various types of I/O,
including direct and memory mapped I/O to a single file. This is
clearly not supported behavior and is known to lead to such
problems. E.g., the lack of exclusion between the direct I/O and
write fault paths means that a write fault can allocate delalloc
blocks in a region of a file that was previously a hole after the
direct read has attempted to flush/inval the file range, but before
it actually reads the block mapping. In turn, the direct read
discovers a delalloc extent and cannot proceed.
While the appropriate solution here is to not mix direct and memory
mapped I/O to the same regions of the same file, the current
BUG_ON() behavior is probably overkill as it can crash the entire
system. Instead, localize the failure to the I/O in question by
returning an error for a direct I/O that cannot be handled safely
due to delalloc blocks. Be careful to allow the case of a direct
write to post-eof delalloc blocks. This can occur due to speculative
preallocation and is safe as post-eof blocks are not accompanied by
dirty pages in pagecache (conversely, preallocation within eof must
have been zeroed, and thus dirtied, before the inode size could have
been increased beyond said blocks).
Finally, provide an additional warning if a direct I/O write occurs
while the file is memory mapped. This may not catch all problematic
scenarios, but provides a hint that some known-to-be-problematic I/O
methods are in use.
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 26,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: map_engine_get_player(player_id_t player_id)
{
return s_players[player_id].person;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 27,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int keylen)
{
if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_KEY_LENGTH)
return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c, EVP_CTRL_SET_KEY_LENGTH, keylen, NULL);
if (c->key_len == keylen)
return 1;
if ((keylen > 0) && (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH)) {
c->key_len = keylen;
return 1;
}
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_server_key(BIGNUM *A, BIGNUM *v, BIGNUM *u, BIGNUM *b, BIGNUM *N)
{
BIGNUM *tmp = NULL, *S = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
if (u == NULL || A == NULL || v == NULL || b == NULL || N == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL ||
(tmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(S = BN_new()) == NULL )
goto err;
/* S = (A*v**u) ** b */
if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp,v,u,N,bn_ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp,A,tmp,N,bn_ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_exp(S,tmp,b,N,bn_ctx))
goto err;
err:
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
BN_clear_free(tmp);
return S;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NuPlayer::GenericSource::pause() {
setDrmPlaybackStatusIfNeeded(Playback::PAUSE, 0);
mStarted = false;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_recv_NPStream(rpc_message_t *message, void *p_value)
{
int error;
uint32_t stream_id;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &stream_id)) < 0)
return error;
NPW_StreamInstance *stream = id_lookup(stream_id);
*((NPStream **)p_value) = stream ? stream->stream : NULL;
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 14,760 |
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