instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline Evas_Smart* _ewk_frame_smart_class_new(void)
{
static Evas_Smart_Class smartClass = EVAS_SMART_CLASS_INIT_NAME_VERSION(EWK_FRAME_TYPE_STR);
static Evas_Smart* smart = 0;
if (EINA_UNLIKELY(!smart)) {
evas_object_smart_clipped_smart_set(&_parent_sc);
_ewk_frame_smart_set(&smartClass);
smart = evas_smart_class_new(&smartClass);
}
return smart;
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API zend_bool ZEND_FASTCALL zend_hash_index_exists(const HashTable *ht, zend_ulong h)
{
Bucket *p;
IS_CONSISTENT(ht);
if (ht->u.flags & HASH_FLAG_PACKED) {
if (h < ht->nNumUsed) {
if (Z_TYPE(ht->arData[h].val) != IS_UNDEF) {
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
p = zend_hash_index_find_bucket(ht, h);
return p ? 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 5,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rpng2_win_load_bg_image()
{
uch *src, *dest;
uch r1, r2, g1, g2, b1, b2;
uch r1_inv, r2_inv, g1_inv, g2_inv, b1_inv, b2_inv;
int k, hmax, max;
int xidx, yidx, yidx_max = (bgscale-1);
int even_odd_vert, even_odd_horiz, even_odd;
int invert_gradient2 = (bg[pat].type & 0x08);
int invert_column;
ulg i, row;
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Allocate buffer for fake background image to be used with transparent
images; if this fails, revert to plain background color.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
bg_rowbytes = 3 * rpng2_info.width;
bg_data = (uch *)malloc(bg_rowbytes * rpng2_info.height);
if (!bg_data) {
fprintf(stderr, PROGNAME
": unable to allocate memory for background image\n");
bg_image = 0;
return 1;
}
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vertical gradients (ramps) in NxN squares, alternating direction and
colors (N == bgscale).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if ((bg[pat].type & 0x07) == 0) {
uch r1_min = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_min].r;
uch g1_min = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_min].g;
uch b1_min = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_min].b;
uch r2_min = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_min].r;
uch g2_min = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_min].g;
uch b2_min = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_min].b;
int r1_diff = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_max].r - r1_min;
int g1_diff = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_max].g - g1_min;
int b1_diff = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_max].b - b1_min;
int r2_diff = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_max].r - r2_min;
int g2_diff = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_max].g - g2_min;
int b2_diff = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_max].b - b2_min;
for (row = 0; row < rpng2_info.height; ++row) {
yidx = row % bgscale;
even_odd_vert = (row / bgscale) & 1;
r1 = r1_min + (r1_diff * yidx) / yidx_max;
g1 = g1_min + (g1_diff * yidx) / yidx_max;
b1 = b1_min + (b1_diff * yidx) / yidx_max;
r1_inv = r1_min + (r1_diff * (yidx_max-yidx)) / yidx_max;
g1_inv = g1_min + (g1_diff * (yidx_max-yidx)) / yidx_max;
b1_inv = b1_min + (b1_diff * (yidx_max-yidx)) / yidx_max;
r2 = r2_min + (r2_diff * yidx) / yidx_max;
g2 = g2_min + (g2_diff * yidx) / yidx_max;
b2 = b2_min + (b2_diff * yidx) / yidx_max;
r2_inv = r2_min + (r2_diff * (yidx_max-yidx)) / yidx_max;
g2_inv = g2_min + (g2_diff * (yidx_max-yidx)) / yidx_max;
b2_inv = b2_min + (b2_diff * (yidx_max-yidx)) / yidx_max;
dest = bg_data + row*bg_rowbytes;
for (i = 0; i < rpng2_info.width; ++i) {
even_odd_horiz = (i / bgscale) & 1;
even_odd = even_odd_vert ^ even_odd_horiz;
invert_column =
(even_odd_horiz && (bg[pat].type & 0x10));
if (even_odd == 0) { /* gradient #1 */
if (invert_column) {
*dest++ = r1_inv;
*dest++ = g1_inv;
*dest++ = b1_inv;
} else {
*dest++ = r1;
*dest++ = g1;
*dest++ = b1;
}
} else { /* gradient #2 */
if ((invert_column && invert_gradient2) ||
(!invert_column && !invert_gradient2))
{
*dest++ = r2; /* not inverted or */
*dest++ = g2; /* doubly inverted */
*dest++ = b2;
} else {
*dest++ = r2_inv;
*dest++ = g2_inv; /* singly inverted */
*dest++ = b2_inv;
}
}
}
}
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Soft gradient-diamonds with scale = bgscale. Code contributed by Adam
M. Costello.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
} else if ((bg[pat].type & 0x07) == 1) {
hmax = (bgscale-1)/2; /* half the max weight of a color */
max = 2*hmax; /* the max weight of a color */
r1 = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_max].r;
g1 = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_max].g;
b1 = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_max].b;
r2 = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_max].r;
g2 = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_max].g;
b2 = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_max].b;
for (row = 0; row < rpng2_info.height; ++row) {
yidx = row % bgscale;
if (yidx > hmax)
yidx = bgscale-1 - yidx;
dest = bg_data + row*bg_rowbytes;
for (i = 0; i < rpng2_info.width; ++i) {
xidx = i % bgscale;
if (xidx > hmax)
xidx = bgscale-1 - xidx;
k = xidx + yidx;
*dest++ = (k*r1 + (max-k)*r2) / max;
*dest++ = (k*g1 + (max-k)*g2) / max;
*dest++ = (k*b1 + (max-k)*b2) / max;
}
}
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radial "starburst" with azimuthal sinusoids; [eventually number of sinu-
soids will equal bgscale?]. This one is slow but very cool. Code con-
tributed by Pieter S. van der Meulen (originally in Smalltalk).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
} else if ((bg[pat].type & 0x07) == 2) {
uch ch;
int ii, x, y, hw, hh, grayspot;
double freq, rotate, saturate, gray, intensity;
double angle=0.0, aoffset=0.0, maxDist, dist;
double red=0.0, green=0.0, blue=0.0, hue, s, v, f, p, q, t;
fprintf(stderr, "%s: computing radial background...",
PROGNAME);
fflush(stderr);
hh = rpng2_info.height / 2;
hw = rpng2_info.width / 2;
/* variables for radial waves:
* aoffset: number of degrees to rotate hue [CURRENTLY NOT USED]
* freq: number of color beams originating from the center
* grayspot: size of the graying center area (anti-alias)
* rotate: rotation of the beams as a function of radius
* saturate: saturation of beams' shape azimuthally
*/
angle = CLIP(angle, 0.0, 360.0);
grayspot = CLIP(bg[pat].bg_gray, 1, (hh + hw));
freq = MAX((double)bg[pat].bg_freq, 0.0);
saturate = (double)bg[pat].bg_bsat * 0.1;
rotate = (double)bg[pat].bg_brot * 0.1;
gray = 0.0;
intensity = 0.0;
maxDist = (double)((hw*hw) + (hh*hh));
for (row = 0; row < rpng2_info.height; ++row) {
y = row - hh;
dest = bg_data + row*bg_rowbytes;
for (i = 0; i < rpng2_info.width; ++i) {
x = i - hw;
angle = (x == 0)? PI_2 : atan((double)y / (double)x);
gray = (double)MAX(ABS(y), ABS(x)) / grayspot;
gray = MIN(1.0, gray);
dist = (double)((x*x) + (y*y)) / maxDist;
intensity = cos((angle+(rotate*dist*PI)) * freq) *
gray * saturate;
intensity = (MAX(MIN(intensity,1.0),-1.0) + 1.0) * 0.5;
hue = (angle + PI) * INV_PI_360 + aoffset;
s = gray * ((double)(ABS(x)+ABS(y)) / (double)(hw + hh));
s = MIN(MAX(s,0.0), 1.0);
v = MIN(MAX(intensity,0.0), 1.0);
if (s == 0.0) {
ch = (uch)(v * 255.0);
*dest++ = ch;
*dest++ = ch;
*dest++ = ch;
} else {
if ((hue < 0.0) || (hue >= 360.0))
hue -= (((int)(hue / 360.0)) * 360.0);
hue /= 60.0;
ii = (int)hue;
f = hue - (double)ii;
p = (1.0 - s) * v;
q = (1.0 - (s * f)) * v;
t = (1.0 - (s * (1.0 - f))) * v;
if (ii == 0) { red = v; green = t; blue = p; }
else if (ii == 1) { red = q; green = v; blue = p; }
else if (ii == 2) { red = p; green = v; blue = t; }
else if (ii == 3) { red = p; green = q; blue = v; }
else if (ii == 4) { red = t; green = p; blue = v; }
else if (ii == 5) { red = v; green = p; blue = q; }
*dest++ = (uch)(red * 255.0);
*dest++ = (uch)(green * 255.0);
*dest++ = (uch)(blue * 255.0);
}
}
}
fprintf(stderr, "done.\n");
fflush(stderr);
}
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Blast background image to display buffer before beginning PNG decode;
calling function will handle invalidation and UpdateWindow() call.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
for (row = 0; row < rpng2_info.height; ++row) {
src = bg_data + row*bg_rowbytes;
dest = wimage_data + row*wimage_rowbytes;
for (i = rpng2_info.width; i > 0; --i) {
r1 = *src++;
g1 = *src++;
b1 = *src++;
*dest++ = b1;
*dest++ = g1; /* note reverse order */
*dest++ = r1;
}
}
return 0;
} /* end function rpng2_win_load_bg_image() */
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
{
struct rlimit new_rlim;
if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim)))
return -EFAULT;
return do_prlimit(current, resource, &new_rlim, NULL);
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <jld@mozilla.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 6,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::DiscoveringChanged(
bool discovering) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(BluetoothAdapter::Observer, observers_,
AdapterDiscoveringChanged(this, discovering));
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageloadfont)
{
char *file;
int file_name, hdr_size = sizeof(gdFont) - sizeof(char *);
int ind, body_size, n = 0, b, i, body_size_check;
gdFontPtr font;
php_stream *stream;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p", &file, &file_name) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper(file, "rb", IGNORE_PATH | IGNORE_URL_WIN | REPORT_ERRORS, NULL);
if (stream == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Only supports a architecture-dependent binary dump format
* at the moment.
* The file format is like this on machines with 32-byte integers:
*
* byte 0-3: (int) number of characters in the font
* byte 4-7: (int) value of first character in the font (often 32, space)
* byte 8-11: (int) pixel width of each character
* byte 12-15: (int) pixel height of each character
* bytes 16-: (char) array with character data, one byte per pixel
* in each character, for a total of
* (nchars*width*height) bytes.
*/
font = (gdFontPtr) emalloc(sizeof(gdFont));
b = 0;
while (b < hdr_size && (n = php_stream_read(stream, (char*)&font[b], hdr_size - b))) {
b += n;
}
if (!n) {
efree(font);
if (php_stream_eof(stream)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "End of file while reading header");
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error while reading header");
}
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
i = php_stream_tell(stream);
php_stream_seek(stream, 0, SEEK_END);
body_size_check = php_stream_tell(stream) - hdr_size;
php_stream_seek(stream, i, SEEK_SET);
body_size = font->w * font->h * font->nchars;
if (body_size != body_size_check) {
font->w = FLIPWORD(font->w);
font->h = FLIPWORD(font->h);
font->nchars = FLIPWORD(font->nchars);
body_size = font->w * font->h * font->nchars;
}
if (overflow2(font->nchars, font->h) || overflow2(font->nchars * font->h, font->w )) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error reading font, invalid font header");
efree(font);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (body_size != body_size_check) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error reading font");
efree(font);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
font->data = emalloc(body_size);
b = 0;
while (b < body_size && (n = php_stream_read(stream, &font->data[b], body_size - b))) {
b += n;
}
if (!n) {
efree(font->data);
efree(font);
if (php_stream_eof(stream)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "End of file while reading body");
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error while reading body");
}
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_stream_close(stream);
/* Adding 5 to the font index so we will never have font indices
* that overlap with the old fonts (with indices 1-5). The first
* list index given out is always 1.
*/
ind = 5 + zend_list_insert(font, le_gd_font TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_LONG(ind);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72730 - imagegammacorrect allows arbitrary write access
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_mount_opt(struct super_block *sb, char *opt, int token,
substring_t *args, unsigned long *journal_devnum,
unsigned int *journal_ioprio, int is_remount)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
const struct mount_opts *m;
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
int arg = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
if (token == Opt_usrjquota)
return set_qf_name(sb, USRQUOTA, &args[0]);
else if (token == Opt_grpjquota)
return set_qf_name(sb, GRPQUOTA, &args[0]);
else if (token == Opt_offusrjquota)
return clear_qf_name(sb, USRQUOTA);
else if (token == Opt_offgrpjquota)
return clear_qf_name(sb, GRPQUOTA);
#endif
switch (token) {
case Opt_noacl:
case Opt_nouser_xattr:
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, deprecated_msg, opt, "3.5");
break;
case Opt_sb:
return 1; /* handled by get_sb_block() */
case Opt_removed:
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Ignoring removed %s option", opt);
return 1;
case Opt_abort:
sbi->s_mount_flags |= EXT4_MF_FS_ABORTED;
return 1;
case Opt_i_version:
sb->s_flags |= MS_I_VERSION;
return 1;
case Opt_lazytime:
sb->s_flags |= MS_LAZYTIME;
return 1;
case Opt_nolazytime:
sb->s_flags &= ~MS_LAZYTIME;
return 1;
}
for (m = ext4_mount_opts; m->token != Opt_err; m++)
if (token == m->token)
break;
if (m->token == Opt_err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Unrecognized mount option \"%s\" "
"or missing value", opt);
return -1;
}
if ((m->flags & MOPT_NO_EXT2) && IS_EXT2_SB(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Mount option \"%s\" incompatible with ext2", opt);
return -1;
}
if ((m->flags & MOPT_NO_EXT3) && IS_EXT3_SB(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Mount option \"%s\" incompatible with ext3", opt);
return -1;
}
if (args->from && !(m->flags & MOPT_STRING) && match_int(args, &arg))
return -1;
if (args->from && (m->flags & MOPT_GTE0) && (arg < 0))
return -1;
if (m->flags & MOPT_EXPLICIT) {
if (m->mount_opt & EXT4_MOUNT_DELALLOC) {
set_opt2(sb, EXPLICIT_DELALLOC);
} else if (m->mount_opt & EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM) {
set_opt2(sb, EXPLICIT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM);
} else
return -1;
}
if (m->flags & MOPT_CLEAR_ERR)
clear_opt(sb, ERRORS_MASK);
if (token == Opt_noquota && sb_any_quota_loaded(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Cannot change quota "
"options when quota turned on");
return -1;
}
if (m->flags & MOPT_NOSUPPORT) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "%s option not supported", opt);
} else if (token == Opt_commit) {
if (arg == 0)
arg = JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE;
sbi->s_commit_interval = HZ * arg;
} else if (token == Opt_max_batch_time) {
sbi->s_max_batch_time = arg;
} else if (token == Opt_min_batch_time) {
sbi->s_min_batch_time = arg;
} else if (token == Opt_inode_readahead_blks) {
if (arg && (arg > (1 << 30) || !is_power_of_2(arg))) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"EXT4-fs: inode_readahead_blks must be "
"0 or a power of 2 smaller than 2^31");
return -1;
}
sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks = arg;
} else if (token == Opt_init_itable) {
set_opt(sb, INIT_INODE_TABLE);
if (!args->from)
arg = EXT4_DEF_LI_WAIT_MULT;
sbi->s_li_wait_mult = arg;
} else if (token == Opt_max_dir_size_kb) {
sbi->s_max_dir_size_kb = arg;
} else if (token == Opt_stripe) {
sbi->s_stripe = arg;
} else if (token == Opt_resuid) {
uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), arg);
if (!uid_valid(uid)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Invalid uid value %d", arg);
return -1;
}
sbi->s_resuid = uid;
} else if (token == Opt_resgid) {
gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), arg);
if (!gid_valid(gid)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Invalid gid value %d", arg);
return -1;
}
sbi->s_resgid = gid;
} else if (token == Opt_journal_dev) {
if (is_remount) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Cannot specify journal on remount");
return -1;
}
*journal_devnum = arg;
} else if (token == Opt_journal_path) {
char *journal_path;
struct inode *journal_inode;
struct path path;
int error;
if (is_remount) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Cannot specify journal on remount");
return -1;
}
journal_path = match_strdup(&args[0]);
if (!journal_path) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: could not dup "
"journal device string");
return -1;
}
error = kern_path(journal_path, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
if (error) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: could not find "
"journal device path: error %d", error);
kfree(journal_path);
return -1;
}
journal_inode = d_inode(path.dentry);
if (!S_ISBLK(journal_inode->i_mode)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: journal path %s "
"is not a block device", journal_path);
path_put(&path);
kfree(journal_path);
return -1;
}
*journal_devnum = new_encode_dev(journal_inode->i_rdev);
path_put(&path);
kfree(journal_path);
} else if (token == Opt_journal_ioprio) {
if (arg > 7) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Invalid journal IO priority"
" (must be 0-7)");
return -1;
}
*journal_ioprio =
IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE, arg);
} else if (token == Opt_test_dummy_encryption) {
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
sbi->s_mount_flags |= EXT4_MF_TEST_DUMMY_ENCRYPTION;
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"Test dummy encryption mode enabled");
#else
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"Test dummy encryption mount option ignored");
#endif
} else if (m->flags & MOPT_DATAJ) {
if (is_remount) {
if (!sbi->s_journal)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Remounting file system with no journal so ignoring journalled data option");
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) != m->mount_opt) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Cannot change data mode on remount");
return -1;
}
} else {
clear_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS);
sbi->s_mount_opt |= m->mount_opt;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
} else if (m->flags & MOPT_QFMT) {
if (sb_any_quota_loaded(sb) &&
sbi->s_jquota_fmt != m->mount_opt) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Cannot change journaled "
"quota options when quota turned on");
return -1;
}
if (ext4_has_feature_quota(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Quota format mount options ignored "
"when QUOTA feature is enabled");
return 1;
}
sbi->s_jquota_fmt = m->mount_opt;
#endif
} else if (token == Opt_dax) {
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"DAX enabled. Warning: EXPERIMENTAL, use at your own risk");
sbi->s_mount_opt |= m->mount_opt;
#else
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "dax option not supported");
return -1;
#endif
} else if (token == Opt_data_err_abort) {
sbi->s_mount_opt |= m->mount_opt;
} else if (token == Opt_data_err_ignore) {
sbi->s_mount_opt &= ~m->mount_opt;
} else {
if (!args->from)
arg = 1;
if (m->flags & MOPT_CLEAR)
arg = !arg;
else if (unlikely(!(m->flags & MOPT_SET))) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"buggy handling of option %s", opt);
WARN_ON(1);
return -1;
}
if (arg != 0)
sbi->s_mount_opt |= m->mount_opt;
else
sbi->s_mount_opt &= ~m->mount_opt;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time
Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.
ext4_calculate_overhead():
buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS); <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);
count_overhead():
for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf); <=== buffer overrun
count++;
}
This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:
#!/bin/bash
rm -f fs.img
mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
fallocate -l 16M fs.img
mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4
Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@os-t.de>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 2,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RunMethod(Method method) {
(this->*method)();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 16,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsUserAllowedForARC(const AccountId& account_id) {
return user_manager::UserManager::IsInitialized() &&
arc::IsArcAllowedForUser(
user_manager::UserManager::Get()->FindUser(account_id));
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int futex_unlock_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags)
{
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
struct futex_q *this, *next;
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
u32 uval, vpid = task_pid_vnr(current);
int ret;
retry:
if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* We release only a lock we actually own:
*/
if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != vpid)
return -EPERM;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key, VERIFY_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
hb = hash_futex(&key);
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
/*
* To avoid races, try to do the TID -> 0 atomic transition
* again. If it succeeds then we can return without waking
* anyone else up:
*/
if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) &&
cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr, vpid, 0))
goto pi_faulted;
/*
* Rare case: we managed to release the lock atomically,
* no need to wake anyone else up:
*/
if (unlikely(uval == vpid))
goto out_unlock;
/*
* Ok, other tasks may need to be woken up - check waiters
* and do the wakeup if necessary:
*/
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &hb->chain, list) {
if (!match_futex (&this->key, &key))
continue;
ret = wake_futex_pi(uaddr, uval, this);
/*
* The atomic access to the futex value
* generated a pagefault, so retry the
* user-access and the wakeup:
*/
if (ret == -EFAULT)
goto pi_faulted;
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* No waiters - kernel unlocks the futex:
*/
if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) {
ret = unlock_futex_pi(uaddr, uval);
if (ret == -EFAULT)
goto pi_faulted;
}
out_unlock:
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
put_futex_key(&key);
out:
return ret;
pi_faulted:
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
put_futex_key(&key);
ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr);
if (!ret)
goto retry;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 6,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kadm5_modify_principal(void *server_handle,
kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask)
{
int ret, ret2, i;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec pol;
krb5_boolean have_pol = FALSE;
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data_orig;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
if((mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) ||
(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) ||
(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) || (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) ||
(mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) ||
(mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & ~ALL_PRINC_MASK))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if(entry == (kadm5_principal_ent_t) NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
tl_data_orig = entry->tl_data;
while (tl_data_orig) {
if (tl_data_orig->tl_data_type < 256)
return KADM5_BAD_TL_TYPE;
tl_data_orig = tl_data_orig->tl_data_next;
}
}
ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, entry->principal, &kdb, &adb);
if (ret)
return(ret);
/*
* This is pretty much the same as create ...
*/
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, entry->policy, &pol, &have_pol);
if (ret)
goto done;
/* set us up to use the new policy */
adb.aux_attributes |= KADM5_POLICY;
if (adb.policy)
free(adb.policy);
adb.policy = strdup(entry->policy);
}
if (have_pol) {
/* set pw_max_life based on new policy */
if (pol.pw_max_life) {
ret = krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb,
&(kdb->pw_expiration));
if (ret)
goto done;
kdb->pw_expiration += pol.pw_max_life;
} else {
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
}
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR) && (adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) {
free(adb.policy);
adb.policy = NULL;
adb.aux_attributes &= ~KADM5_POLICY;
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
if ((mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES))
kdb->attributes = entry->attributes;
if ((mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE))
kdb->max_life = entry->max_life;
if ((mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME))
kdb->expiration = entry->princ_expire_time;
if (mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION)
kdb->pw_expiration = entry->pw_expiration;
if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE)
kdb->max_renewable_life = entry->max_renewable_life;
if((mask & KADM5_KVNO)) {
for (i = 0; i < kdb->n_key_data; i++)
kdb->key_data[i].key_data_kvno = entry->kvno;
}
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
krb5_tl_data *tl;
/* may have to change the version number of the API. Updates the list with the given tl_data rather than over-writting */
for (tl = entry->tl_data; tl;
tl = tl->tl_data_next)
{
ret = krb5_dbe_update_tl_data(handle->context, kdb, tl);
if( ret )
{
goto done;
}
}
}
/*
* Setting entry->fail_auth_count to 0 can be used to manually unlock
* an account. It is not possible to set fail_auth_count to any other
* value using kadmin.
*/
if (mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) {
if (entry->fail_auth_count != 0) {
ret = KADM5_BAD_SERVER_PARAMS;
goto done;
}
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
}
/* let the mask propagate to the database provider */
kdb->mask = mask;
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_modify(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, entry, mask);
if (ret)
goto done;
ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
if (ret) goto done;
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_modify(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, entry, mask);
ret = KADM5_OK;
done:
if (have_pol) {
ret2 = kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &pol);
ret = ret ? ret : ret2;
}
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Check for null kadm5 policy name [CVE-2015-8630]
In kadm5_create_principal_3() and kadm5_modify_principal(), check for
entry->policy being null when KADM5_POLICY is included in the mask.
CVE-2015-8630:
In MIT krb5 1.12 and later, an authenticated attacker with permission
to modify a principal entry can cause kadmind to dereference a null
pointer by supplying a null policy value but including KADM5_POLICY in
the mask.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8342 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | 1 | 4,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuChannel::OnCreateOffscreenCommandBuffer(
const gfx::Size& size,
const GPUCreateCommandBufferConfig& init_params,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
int32 route_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
content::GetContentClient()->SetActiveURL(init_params.active_url);
#if defined(ENABLE_GPU)
WillCreateCommandBuffer(init_params.gpu_preference);
GpuCommandBufferStub* share_group = stubs_.Lookup(init_params.share_group_id);
route_id = GenerateRouteID();
scoped_ptr<GpuCommandBufferStub> stub(new GpuCommandBufferStub(
this,
share_group,
gfx::GLSurfaceHandle(),
size,
disallowed_features_,
init_params.allowed_extensions,
init_params.attribs,
init_params.gpu_preference,
route_id,
0, watchdog_,
software_));
router_.AddRoute(route_id, stub.get());
stubs_.AddWithID(stub.release(), route_id);
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "GpuChannel::OnCreateOffscreenCommandBuffer",
"route_id", route_id);
#endif
GpuChannelMsg_CreateOffscreenCommandBuffer::WriteReplyParams(
reply_message,
route_id);
Send(reply_message);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_xmlwriter_end(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, xmlwriter_read_int_t internal_function)
{
zval *pind;
xmlwriter_object *intern;
xmlTextWriterPtr ptr;
int retval;
#ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval *this = getThis();
if (this) {
XMLWRITER_FROM_OBJECT(intern, this);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
} else
#endif
{
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &pind) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(intern,xmlwriter_object *, &pind, -1, "XMLWriter", le_xmlwriter);
}
ptr = intern->ptr;
if (ptr) {
retval = internal_function(ptr);
if (retval != -1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 20,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: opj_pi_iterator_t *opj_pi_create_decode(opj_image_t *p_image,
opj_cp_t *p_cp,
OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no)
{
OPJ_UINT32 numcomps = p_image->numcomps;
/* loop */
OPJ_UINT32 pino;
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
/* to store w, h, dx and dy fro all components and resolutions */
OPJ_UINT32 * l_tmp_data;
OPJ_UINT32 ** l_tmp_ptr;
/* encoding prameters to set */
OPJ_UINT32 l_max_res;
OPJ_UINT32 l_max_prec;
OPJ_INT32 l_tx0, l_tx1, l_ty0, l_ty1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_dx_min, l_dy_min;
OPJ_UINT32 l_bound;
OPJ_UINT32 l_step_p, l_step_c, l_step_r, l_step_l ;
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_stride;
/* pointers */
opj_pi_iterator_t *l_pi = 00;
opj_tcp_t *l_tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t *l_tccp = 00;
opj_pi_comp_t *l_current_comp = 00;
opj_image_comp_t * l_img_comp = 00;
opj_pi_iterator_t * l_current_pi = 00;
OPJ_UINT32 * l_encoding_value_ptr = 00;
/* preconditions in debug */
assert(p_cp != 00);
assert(p_image != 00);
assert(p_tile_no < p_cp->tw * p_cp->th);
/* initializations */
l_tcp = &p_cp->tcps[p_tile_no];
l_bound = l_tcp->numpocs + 1;
l_data_stride = 4 * OPJ_J2K_MAXRLVLS;
l_tmp_data = (OPJ_UINT32*)opj_malloc(
l_data_stride * numcomps * sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if
(! l_tmp_data) {
return 00;
}
l_tmp_ptr = (OPJ_UINT32**)opj_malloc(
numcomps * sizeof(OPJ_UINT32 *));
if
(! l_tmp_ptr) {
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
return 00;
}
/* memory allocation for pi */
l_pi = opj_pi_create(p_image, p_cp, p_tile_no);
if (!l_pi) {
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
return 00;
}
l_encoding_value_ptr = l_tmp_data;
/* update pointer array */
for
(compno = 0; compno < numcomps; ++compno) {
l_tmp_ptr[compno] = l_encoding_value_ptr;
l_encoding_value_ptr += l_data_stride;
}
/* get encoding parameters */
opj_get_all_encoding_parameters(p_image, p_cp, p_tile_no, &l_tx0, &l_tx1,
&l_ty0, &l_ty1, &l_dx_min, &l_dy_min, &l_max_prec, &l_max_res, l_tmp_ptr);
/* step calculations */
l_step_p = 1;
l_step_c = l_max_prec * l_step_p;
l_step_r = numcomps * l_step_c;
l_step_l = l_max_res * l_step_r;
/* set values for first packet iterator */
l_current_pi = l_pi;
/* memory allocation for include */
/* prevent an integer overflow issue */
/* 0 < l_tcp->numlayers < 65536 c.f. opj_j2k_read_cod in j2k.c */
l_current_pi->include = 00;
if (l_step_l <= (UINT_MAX / (l_tcp->numlayers + 1U))) {
l_current_pi->include_size = (l_tcp->numlayers + 1U) * l_step_l;
l_current_pi->include = (OPJ_INT16*) opj_calloc(
l_current_pi->include_size, sizeof(OPJ_INT16));
}
if (!l_current_pi->include) {
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
opj_pi_destroy(l_pi, l_bound);
return 00;
}
/* special treatment for the first packet iterator */
l_current_comp = l_current_pi->comps;
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
l_current_pi->tx0 = l_tx0;
l_current_pi->ty0 = l_ty0;
l_current_pi->tx1 = l_tx1;
l_current_pi->ty1 = l_ty1;
/*l_current_pi->dx = l_img_comp->dx;*/
/*l_current_pi->dy = l_img_comp->dy;*/
l_current_pi->step_p = l_step_p;
l_current_pi->step_c = l_step_c;
l_current_pi->step_r = l_step_r;
l_current_pi->step_l = l_step_l;
/* allocation for components and number of components has already been calculated by opj_pi_create */
for
(compno = 0; compno < numcomps; ++compno) {
opj_pi_resolution_t *l_res = l_current_comp->resolutions;
l_encoding_value_ptr = l_tmp_ptr[compno];
l_current_comp->dx = l_img_comp->dx;
l_current_comp->dy = l_img_comp->dy;
/* resolutions have already been initialized */
for
(resno = 0; resno < l_current_comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
l_res->pdx = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pdy = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pw = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->ph = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
++l_res;
}
++l_current_comp;
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
}
++l_current_pi;
for (pino = 1 ; pino < l_bound ; ++pino) {
l_current_comp = l_current_pi->comps;
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
l_current_pi->tx0 = l_tx0;
l_current_pi->ty0 = l_ty0;
l_current_pi->tx1 = l_tx1;
l_current_pi->ty1 = l_ty1;
/*l_current_pi->dx = l_dx_min;*/
/*l_current_pi->dy = l_dy_min;*/
l_current_pi->step_p = l_step_p;
l_current_pi->step_c = l_step_c;
l_current_pi->step_r = l_step_r;
l_current_pi->step_l = l_step_l;
/* allocation for components and number of components has already been calculated by opj_pi_create */
for
(compno = 0; compno < numcomps; ++compno) {
opj_pi_resolution_t *l_res = l_current_comp->resolutions;
l_encoding_value_ptr = l_tmp_ptr[compno];
l_current_comp->dx = l_img_comp->dx;
l_current_comp->dy = l_img_comp->dy;
/* resolutions have already been initialized */
for
(resno = 0; resno < l_current_comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
l_res->pdx = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pdy = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pw = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->ph = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
++l_res;
}
++l_current_comp;
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
}
/* special treatment*/
l_current_pi->include = (l_current_pi - 1)->include;
l_current_pi->include_size = (l_current_pi - 1)->include_size;
++l_current_pi;
}
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
l_tmp_data = 00;
opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
l_tmp_ptr = 00;
if
(l_tcp->POC) {
opj_pi_update_decode_poc(l_pi, l_tcp, l_max_prec, l_max_res);
} else {
opj_pi_update_decode_not_poc(l_pi, l_tcp, l_max_prec, l_max_res);
}
return l_pi;
}
Commit Message: [OPENJP2] change the way to compute *p_tx0, *p_tx1, *p_ty0, *p_ty1 in function
opj_get_encoding_parameters
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 7,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spnego_gss_import_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_buffer_t interprocess_token,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_import_sec_context(minor_status,
interprocess_token,
context_handle);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-18 | 1 | 12,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dst_entry *tcp_v6_route_req(const struct sock *sk,
struct flowi *fl,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
return inet6_csk_route_req(sk, &fl->u.ip6, req, IPPROTO_TCP);
}
Commit Message: ipv6/dccp: do not inherit ipv6_mc_list from parent
Like commit 657831ffc38e ("dccp/tcp: do not inherit mc_list from parent")
we should clear ipv6_mc_list etc. for IPv6 sockets too.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_write_track_metadata(AVIOContext *pb, AVStream *st,
const char *tag, const char *str)
{
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb);
AVDictionaryEntry *t = av_dict_get(st->metadata, str, NULL, 0);
if (!t || !utf8len(t->value))
return 0;
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, tag); /* type */
avio_write(pb, t->value, strlen(t->value)); /* UTF8 string value */
return update_size(pb, pos);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 18,832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint32_t virtio_config_readw(VirtIODevice *vdev, uint32_t addr)
{
VirtioDeviceClass *k = VIRTIO_DEVICE_GET_CLASS(vdev);
uint16_t val;
if (addr + sizeof(val) > vdev->config_len) {
return (uint32_t)-1;
}
k->get_config(vdev, vdev->config);
val = lduw_p(vdev->config + addr);
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcp_v4_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
tcp_init_sock(sk);
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &ipv4_specific;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
tcp_sk(sk)->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv4_specific;
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 10,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vrrp_gnotify_fault_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_sgroup_t *vgroup = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp_sync_group);
if (vgroup->script_fault) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "vrrp group %s: notify_fault script already specified - ignoring %s", vgroup->gname, FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec,1));
return;
}
vgroup->script_fault = set_vrrp_notify_script(strvec, 0);
vgroup->notify_exec = true;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 7,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PaintController::UseCachedDrawingIfPossible(
const DisplayItemClient& client,
DisplayItem::Type type) {
DCHECK(DisplayItem::IsDrawingType(type));
if (DisplayItemConstructionIsDisabled())
return false;
if (!ClientCacheIsValid(client))
return false;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::PaintUnderInvalidationCheckingEnabled() &&
IsCheckingUnderInvalidation()) {
return false;
}
size_t cached_item =
FindCachedItem(DisplayItem::Id(client, type, current_fragment_));
if (cached_item == kNotFound) {
return false;
}
++num_cached_new_items_;
EnsureNewDisplayItemListInitialCapacity();
current_paint_artifact_.GetDisplayItemList()[cached_item].UpdateVisualRect();
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::PaintUnderInvalidationCheckingEnabled())
ProcessNewItem(MoveItemFromCurrentListToNewList(cached_item));
next_item_to_match_ = cached_item + 1;
if (next_item_to_match_ > next_item_to_index_)
next_item_to_index_ = next_item_to_match_;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::PaintUnderInvalidationCheckingEnabled()) {
if (!IsCheckingUnderInvalidation()) {
under_invalidation_checking_begin_ = cached_item;
under_invalidation_checking_end_ = cached_item + 1;
under_invalidation_message_prefix_ = "";
}
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int iucv_sock_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
if (protocol && protocol != PF_IUCV)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
switch (sock->type) {
case SOCK_STREAM:
sock->ops = &iucv_sock_ops;
break;
case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
/* currently, proto ops can handle both sk types */
sock->ops = &iucv_sock_ops;
break;
default:
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
}
sk = iucv_sock_alloc(sock, protocol, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sk)
return -ENOMEM;
iucv_sock_init(sk, NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 19,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t tpm_show_pcrs(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
cap_t cap;
u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
ssize_t rc;
int i, j, num_pcrs;
char *str = buf;
struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR, &cap,
"attempting to determine the number of PCRS");
if (rc)
return 0;
num_pcrs = be32_to_cpu(cap.num_pcrs);
for (i = 0; i < num_pcrs; i++) {
rc = __tpm_pcr_read(chip, i, digest);
if (rc)
break;
str += sprintf(str, "PCR-%02d: ", i);
for (j = 0; j < TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; j++)
str += sprintf(str, "%02X ", digest[j]);
str += sprintf(str, "\n");
}
return str - buf;
}
Commit Message: char/tpm: Fix unitialized usage of data buffer
This patch fixes information leakage to the userspace by initializing
the data buffer to zero.
Reported-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Selhorst <m.selhorst@sirrix.com>
[ Also removed the silly "* sizeof(u8)". If that isn't 1, we have way
deeper problems than a simple multiplication can fix. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 7,094 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 apic_get_tmcct(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
{
ktime_t remaining;
s64 ns;
u32 tmcct;
ASSERT(apic != NULL);
/* if initial count is 0, current count should also be 0 */
if (kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_TMICT) == 0 ||
apic->lapic_timer.period == 0)
return 0;
remaining = hrtimer_get_remaining(&apic->lapic_timer.timer);
if (ktime_to_ns(remaining) < 0)
remaining = ktime_set(0, 0);
ns = mod_64(ktime_to_ns(remaining), apic->lapic_timer.period);
tmcct = div64_u64(ns,
(APIC_BUS_CYCLE_NS * apic->divide_count));
return tmcct;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poppler_page_get_duration (PopplerPage *page)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (POPPLER_IS_PAGE (page), -1);
return page->page->getDuration ();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 2,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RecordDownloadContentDisposition(
const std::string& content_disposition_string) {
if (content_disposition_string.empty())
return;
net::HttpContentDisposition content_disposition(content_disposition_string,
std::string());
int result = content_disposition.parse_result_flags();
bool is_valid = !content_disposition.filename().empty();
RecordContentDispositionCount(CONTENT_DISPOSITION_HEADER_PRESENT, true);
RecordContentDispositionCount(CONTENT_DISPOSITION_IS_VALID, is_valid);
if (!is_valid)
return;
RecordContentDispositionCountFlag(
CONTENT_DISPOSITION_HAS_DISPOSITION_TYPE, result,
net::HttpContentDisposition::HAS_DISPOSITION_TYPE);
RecordContentDispositionCountFlag(
CONTENT_DISPOSITION_HAS_UNKNOWN_TYPE, result,
net::HttpContentDisposition::HAS_UNKNOWN_DISPOSITION_TYPE);
RecordContentDispositionCountFlag(CONTENT_DISPOSITION_HAS_FILENAME, result,
net::HttpContentDisposition::HAS_FILENAME);
RecordContentDispositionCountFlag(
CONTENT_DISPOSITION_HAS_EXT_FILENAME, result,
net::HttpContentDisposition::HAS_EXT_FILENAME);
RecordContentDispositionCountFlag(
CONTENT_DISPOSITION_HAS_NON_ASCII_STRINGS, result,
net::HttpContentDisposition::HAS_NON_ASCII_STRINGS);
RecordContentDispositionCountFlag(
CONTENT_DISPOSITION_HAS_PERCENT_ENCODED_STRINGS, result,
net::HttpContentDisposition::HAS_PERCENT_ENCODED_STRINGS);
RecordContentDispositionCountFlag(
CONTENT_DISPOSITION_HAS_RFC2047_ENCODED_STRINGS, result,
net::HttpContentDisposition::HAS_RFC2047_ENCODED_STRINGS);
RecordContentDispositionCountFlag(
CONTENT_DISPOSITION_HAS_SINGLE_QUOTED_FILENAME, result,
net::HttpContentDisposition::HAS_SINGLE_QUOTED_FILENAME);
}
Commit Message: Add .desktop file to download_file_types.asciipb
.desktop files act as shortcuts on Linux, allowing arbitrary code
execution. We should send pings for these files.
Bug: 904182
Change-Id: Ibc26141fb180e843e1ffaf3f78717a9109d2fa9a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1344552
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#611272}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tgr128_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 * out)
{
u8 D[64];
tgr192_final(desc, D);
memcpy(out, D, TGR128_DIGEST_SIZE);
memzero_explicit(D, TGR192_DIGEST_SIZE);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutocompleteEditModel::SetUserText(const string16& text) {
SetInputInProgress(true);
InternalSetUserText(text);
paste_state_ = NONE;
has_temporary_text_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int del_dac(struct task_struct *child, int slot)
{
if (slot == 1) {
if ((dbcr_dac(child) & (DBCR_DAC1R | DBCR_DAC1W)) == 0)
return -ENOENT;
child->thread.debug.dac1 = 0;
dbcr_dac(child) &= ~(DBCR_DAC1R | DBCR_DAC1W);
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DAC_RANGE
if (child->thread.debug.dbcr2 & DBCR2_DAC12MODE) {
child->thread.debug.dac2 = 0;
child->thread.debug.dbcr2 &= ~DBCR2_DAC12MODE;
}
child->thread.debug.dbcr2 &= ~(DBCR2_DVC1M | DBCR2_DVC1BE);
#endif
#if CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DVCS > 0
child->thread.debug.dvc1 = 0;
#endif
} else if (slot == 2) {
if ((dbcr_dac(child) & (DBCR_DAC2R | DBCR_DAC2W)) == 0)
return -ENOENT;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DAC_RANGE
if (child->thread.debug.dbcr2 & DBCR2_DAC12MODE)
/* Part of a range */
return -EINVAL;
child->thread.debug.dbcr2 &= ~(DBCR2_DVC2M | DBCR2_DVC2BE);
#endif
#if CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DVCS > 0
child->thread.debug.dvc2 = 0;
#endif
child->thread.debug.dac2 = 0;
dbcr_dac(child) &= ~(DBCR_DAC2R | DBCR_DAC2W);
} else
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItems(
bool canceled,
const std::vector<int>& selected_indices) {
if (!external_popup_menu_)
return;
blink::WebScopedUserGesture gesture(frame_);
external_popup_menu_->DidSelectItems(canceled, selected_indices);
external_popup_menu_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 12,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CLASS kodak_rgb_load_raw()
{
short buf[768], *bp;
int row, col, len, c, i, rgb[3];
ushort *ip=image[0];
for (row=0; row < height; row++)
for (col=0; col < width; col+=256) {
len = MIN (256, width-col);
kodak_65000_decode (buf, len*3);
memset (rgb, 0, sizeof rgb);
for (bp=buf, i=0; i < len; i++, ip+=4)
FORC3 if ((ip[c] = rgb[c] += *bp++) >> 12) derror();
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 27,780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~BordersTest() {}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BindMediaStreamDeviceObserverRequest(
int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
blink::mojom::MediaStreamDeviceObserverRequest request) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host =
RenderFrameHost::FromID(render_process_id, render_frame_id);
if (render_frame_host)
render_frame_host->GetRemoteInterfaces()->GetInterface(std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: [MediaStream] Pass request ID parameters in the right order for OpenDevice()
Prior to this CL, requester_id and page_request_id parameters were
passed in incorrect order from MediaStreamDispatcherHost to
MediaStreamManager for the OpenDevice() operation, which could lead to
errors.
Bug: 948564
Change-Id: Iadcf3fe26adaac50564102138ce212269cf32d62
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1569113
Reviewed-by: Marina Ciocea <marinaciocea@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651255}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,490 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PageHandler::Reload(Maybe<bool> bypassCache,
Maybe<std::string> script_to_evaluate_on_load,
std::unique_ptr<ReloadCallback> callback) {
WebContentsImpl* web_contents = GetWebContents();
if (!web_contents) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
callback->fallThrough();
web_contents->GetController().Reload(bypassCache.fromMaybe(false)
? ReloadType::BYPASSING_CACHE
: ReloadType::NORMAL,
false);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,323 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cifs_reclassify_socket6(struct socket *sock)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
BUG_ON(sock_owned_by_user(sk));
sock_lock_init_class_and_name(sk, "slock-AF_INET6-CIFS",
&cifs_slock_key[1], "sk_lock-AF_INET6-CIFS", &cifs_key[1]);
}
Commit Message: cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount
Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.
This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <ysharma@cymer.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_find_codec_tag(AVFormatContext *s, MOVTrack *track)
{
int tag;
if (is_cover_image(track->st))
return ff_codec_get_tag(codec_cover_image_tags, track->par->codec_id);
if (track->mode == MODE_MP4 || track->mode == MODE_PSP)
tag = track->par->codec_tag;
else if (track->mode == MODE_ISM)
tag = track->par->codec_tag;
else if (track->mode == MODE_IPOD) {
if (!av_match_ext(s->url, "m4a") &&
!av_match_ext(s->url, "m4v") &&
!av_match_ext(s->url, "m4b"))
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Warning, extension is not .m4a nor .m4v "
"Quicktime/Ipod might not play the file\n");
tag = track->par->codec_tag;
} else if (track->mode & MODE_3GP)
tag = track->par->codec_tag;
else if (track->mode == MODE_F4V)
tag = track->par->codec_tag;
else
tag = mov_get_codec_tag(s, track);
return tag;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 29,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::isInRequiredRadioButtonGroup()
{
ASSERT(isRadioButton());
if (CheckedRadioButtons* buttons = checkedRadioButtons())
return buttons->isInRequiredGroup(this);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::SetHasHorizontalScrollbar(
bool has_horizontal_scrollbar) {
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(clock_getres, clockid_t, which_clock,
struct compat_timespec __user *, tp)
{
const struct k_clock *kc = clockid_to_kclock(which_clock);
struct timespec64 ts;
int err;
if (!kc)
return -EINVAL;
err = kc->clock_getres(which_clock, &ts);
if (!err && tp && compat_put_timespec64(&ts, tp))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 4,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::PerformIdleWork() {
gpu_tracer_->ProcessTraces();
ProcessPendingReadPixels(false);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 6,396 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bson_iter_array (const bson_iter_t *iter, /* IN */
uint32_t *array_len, /* OUT */
const uint8_t **array) /* OUT */
{
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
BSON_ASSERT (array_len);
BSON_ASSERT (array);
*array = NULL;
*array_len = 0;
if (ITER_TYPE (iter) == BSON_TYPE_ARRAY) {
memcpy (array_len, (iter->raw + iter->d1), sizeof (*array_len));
*array_len = BSON_UINT32_FROM_LE (*array_len);
*array = (iter->raw + iter->d1);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 29,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStrip::ButtonPressed(views::Button* sender, const ui::Event& event) {
if (sender == new_tab_button_) {
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("NewTab_Button"));
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Tab.NewTab", TabStripModel::NEW_TAB_BUTTON,
TabStripModel::NEW_TAB_ENUM_COUNT);
if (event.IsMouseEvent()) {
const ui::MouseEvent& mouse = static_cast<const ui::MouseEvent&>(event);
if (mouse.IsOnlyMiddleMouseButton()) {
if (ui::Clipboard::IsSupportedClipboardType(
ui::CLIPBOARD_TYPE_SELECTION)) {
ui::Clipboard* clipboard = ui::Clipboard::GetForCurrentThread();
CHECK(clipboard);
base::string16 clipboard_text;
clipboard->ReadText(ui::CLIPBOARD_TYPE_SELECTION, &clipboard_text);
if (!clipboard_text.empty())
controller_->CreateNewTabWithLocation(clipboard_text);
}
return;
}
}
controller_->CreateNewTab();
if (event.type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_TAP)
TouchUMA::RecordGestureAction(TouchUMA::kGestureNewTabTap);
}
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,547 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iperf_set_test_unit_format(struct iperf_test *ipt, char unit_format)
{
ipt->settings->unit_format = unit_format;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void unsignedLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueUnsigned(info, imp->unsignedLongAttribute());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Element::detachAttrNodeAtIndex(Attr* attr, size_t index)
{
ASSERT(attr);
ASSERT(elementData());
const Attribute* attribute = elementData()->attributeItem(index);
ASSERT(attribute);
ASSERT(attribute->name() == attr->qualifiedName());
detachAttrNodeFromElementWithValue(attr, attribute->value());
removeAttributeInternal(index, NotInSynchronizationOfLazyAttribute);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SessionStore::AreValidSpecifics(const SessionSpecifics& specifics) {
if (specifics.session_tag().empty()) {
return false;
}
if (specifics.has_tab()) {
return specifics.tab_node_id() >= 0 && specifics.tab().tab_id() > 0;
}
if (specifics.has_header()) {
std::set<int> session_tab_ids;
for (const sync_pb::SessionWindow& window : specifics.header().window()) {
for (int tab_id : window.tab()) {
bool success = session_tab_ids.insert(tab_id).second;
if (!success) {
return false;
}
}
}
return !specifics.has_tab() &&
specifics.tab_node_id() == TabNodePool::kInvalidTabNodeID;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add trace event to sync_sessions::OnReadAllMetadata()
It is likely a cause of janks on UI thread on Android.
Add a trace event to get metrics about the duration.
BUG=902203
Change-Id: I4c4e9c2a20790264b982007ea7ee88ddfa7b972c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1319369
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <mastiz@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: ssid <ssid@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606104}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlock(bool relayoutChildren)
{
ASSERT(needsLayout());
ASSERT(isInlineBlockOrInlineTable() || !isInline());
m_hasOnlySelfCollapsingChildren = false;
if (!relayoutChildren && simplifiedLayout())
return;
SubtreeLayoutScope layoutScope(*this);
bool done = false;
LayoutUnit pageLogicalHeight = 0;
LayoutRepainter repainter(*this, checkForRepaintDuringLayout());
while (!done)
done = layoutBlockFlow(relayoutChildren, pageLogicalHeight, layoutScope);
fitBorderToLinesIfNeeded();
RenderView* renderView = view();
if (renderView->layoutState()->pageLogicalHeight())
setPageLogicalOffset(renderView->layoutState()->pageLogicalOffset(*this, logicalTop()));
updateLayerTransform();
updateScrollInfoAfterLayout();
bool didFullRepaint = repainter.repaintAfterLayout();
if (!didFullRepaint && m_repaintLogicalTop != m_repaintLogicalBottom && (style()->visibility() == VISIBLE || enclosingLayer()->hasVisibleContent())) {
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::repaintAfterLayoutEnabled())
setShouldRepaintOverflow(true);
else
repaintOverflow();
}
clearNeedsLayout();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_sgdt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
return emulate_store_desc_ptr(ctxt, ctxt->ops->get_gdt);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std
Introduces segemented_write_std.
Switches from emulated reads/writes to standard read/writes in fxsave,
fxrstor, sgdt, and sidt. This fixes CVE-2017-2584, a longstanding
kernel memory leak.
Since commit 283c95d0e389 ("KVM: x86: emulate FXSAVE and FXRSTOR",
2016-11-09), which is luckily not yet in any final release, this would
also be an exploitable kernel memory *write*!
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 96051572c819194c37a8367624b285be10297eca
Fixes: 283c95d0e3891b64087706b344a4b545d04a6e62
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: new_device (u2fh_devs * devs)
{
struct u2fdevice *new = malloc (sizeof (struct u2fdevice));
if (new == NULL)
{
return NULL;
}
memset (new, 0, sizeof (struct u2fdevice));
new->id = devs->max_id++;
if (devs->first == NULL)
{
devs->first = new;
}
else
{
struct u2fdevice *dev;
for (dev = devs->first; dev != NULL; dev = dev->next)
{
if (dev->next == NULL)
{
break;
}
}
dev->next = new;
}
return new;
}
Commit Message: fix filling out of initresp
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SessionStore::WriteBatch::~WriteBatch() {
DCHECK(!batch_) << "Destructed without prior commit";
}
Commit Message: Add trace event to sync_sessions::OnReadAllMetadata()
It is likely a cause of janks on UI thread on Android.
Add a trace event to get metrics about the duration.
BUG=902203
Change-Id: I4c4e9c2a20790264b982007ea7ee88ddfa7b972c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1319369
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <mastiz@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: ssid <ssid@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606104}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UiSceneCreator::CreateUnderDevelopmentNotice() {
auto text = base::MakeUnique<Text>(kUnderDevelopmentNoticeFontHeightDMM);
BindColor(model_, text.get(), &ColorScheme::world_background_text,
&Text::SetColor);
text->SetText(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_VR_UNDER_DEVELOPMENT_NOTICE));
text->SetName(kUnderDevelopmentNotice);
text->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseForeground);
text->set_hit_testable(false);
text->SetSize(kUnderDevelopmentNoticeWidthDMM,
kUnderDevelopmentNoticeHeightDMM);
text->SetTranslate(0, -kUnderDevelopmentNoticeVerticalOffsetDMM, 0);
text->SetRotate(1, 0, 0, kUnderDevelopmentNoticeRotationRad);
text->set_y_anchoring(BOTTOM);
scene_->AddUiElement(kUrlBar, std::move(text));
}
Commit Message: Fix wrapping behavior of description text in omnibox suggestion
This regression is introduced by
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/827033
The description text should not wrap.
Bug: NONE
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Iaac5e6176e1730853406602835d61fe1e80ec0d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/839960
Reviewed-by: Christopher Grant <cjgrant@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525806}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 27,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormElement::PrepareForSubmission(
Event* event,
HTMLFormControlElement* submit_button) {
LocalFrame* frame = GetDocument().GetFrame();
if (!frame || is_submitting_ || in_user_js_submit_event_)
return;
if (!isConnected()) {
GetDocument().AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kJSMessageSource, kWarningMessageLevel,
"Form submission canceled because the form is not connected"));
return;
}
if (GetDocument().IsSandboxed(kSandboxForms)) {
GetDocument().AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kSecurityMessageSource, kErrorMessageLevel,
"Blocked form submission to '" + attributes_.Action() +
"' because the form's frame is sandboxed and the 'allow-forms' "
"permission is not set."));
return;
}
for (const auto& element : ListedElements()) {
if (element->IsFormControlElement() &&
ToHTMLFormControlElement(element)->BlocksFormSubmission()) {
UseCounter::Count(GetDocument(),
WebFeature::kFormSubmittedWithUnclosedFormControl);
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::UnclosedFormControlIsInvalidEnabled()) {
String tag_name = ToHTMLFormControlElement(element)->tagName();
GetDocument().AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kSecurityMessageSource, kErrorMessageLevel,
"Form submission failed, as the <" + tag_name +
"> element named "
"'" +
element->GetName() +
"' was implicitly closed by reaching "
"the end of the file. Please add an explicit end tag "
"('</" +
tag_name + ">')"));
DispatchEvent(Event::Create(EventTypeNames::error));
return;
}
}
}
bool skip_validation = !GetDocument().GetPage() || NoValidate();
DCHECK(event);
if (submit_button && submit_button->FormNoValidate())
skip_validation = true;
UseCounter::Count(GetDocument(), WebFeature::kFormSubmissionStarted);
if (!skip_validation && !ValidateInteractively())
return;
bool should_submit;
{
AutoReset<bool> submit_event_handler_scope(&in_user_js_submit_event_, true);
frame->Client()->DispatchWillSendSubmitEvent(this);
should_submit =
DispatchEvent(Event::CreateCancelableBubble(EventTypeNames::submit)) ==
DispatchEventResult::kNotCanceled;
}
if (should_submit) {
planned_navigation_ = nullptr;
Submit(event, submit_button);
}
if (!planned_navigation_)
return;
AutoReset<bool> submit_scope(&is_submitting_, true);
ScheduleFormSubmission(planned_navigation_);
planned_navigation_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 10,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char **pbuffer,
u16 *buflen,
struct cifs_ses *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int rc;
AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob;
__u32 flags;
unsigned char *tmp;
rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLMSSP authentication\n", rc);
*buflen = 0;
goto setup_ntlmv2_ret;
}
*pbuffer = kmalloc(size_of_ntlmssp_blob(ses), GFP_KERNEL);
sec_blob = (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *)*pbuffer;
memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmAuthenticate;
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 |
NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC;
if (ses->server->sign) {
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
if (!ses->server->session_estab ||
ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess)
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH;
}
tmp = *pbuffer + sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE);
sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32(sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE));
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
memcpy(tmp, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
tmp += ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length =
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
} else {
/*
* don't send an NT Response for anonymous access
*/
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
}
if (ses->domainName == NULL) {
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
} else {
int len;
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->domainName,
CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
tmp += len;
}
if (ses->user_name == NULL) {
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->UserName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
} else {
int len;
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->user_name,
CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->UserName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
tmp += len;
}
sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
if (((ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH) ||
(ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC))
&& !calc_seckey(ses)) {
memcpy(tmp, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
tmp += CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE;
} else {
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = 0;
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength = 0;
}
*buflen = tmp - *pbuffer;
setup_ntlmv2_ret:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 12,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int unqueue_me(struct futex_q *q)
{
spinlock_t *lock_ptr;
int ret = 0;
/* In the common case we don't take the spinlock, which is nice. */
retry:
lock_ptr = q->lock_ptr;
barrier();
if (lock_ptr != NULL) {
spin_lock(lock_ptr);
/*
* q->lock_ptr can change between reading it and
* spin_lock(), causing us to take the wrong lock. This
* corrects the race condition.
*
* Reasoning goes like this: if we have the wrong lock,
* q->lock_ptr must have changed (maybe several times)
* between reading it and the spin_lock(). It can
* change again after the spin_lock() but only if it was
* already changed before the spin_lock(). It cannot,
* however, change back to the original value. Therefore
* we can detect whether we acquired the correct lock.
*/
if (unlikely(lock_ptr != q->lock_ptr)) {
spin_unlock(lock_ptr);
goto retry;
}
WARN_ON(plist_node_empty(&q->list));
plist_del(&q->list, &q->list.plist);
BUG_ON(q->pi_state);
spin_unlock(lock_ptr);
ret = 1;
}
drop_futex_key_refs(&q->key);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<matthieu.fertre@kerlabs.com>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
LKML-Reference: <4CBB17A8.70401@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sig_handler(int signo) {
if (signo == SIGINT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Received SIGINT\n");
CALL_AND_WAIT(bt_interface->disable(), adapter_state_changed);
fprintf(stderr, "BT adapter is down\n");
exit(1);
}
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigatorImpl::RequestOpenURL(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const GURL& url,
bool uses_post,
const scoped_refptr<ResourceRequestBodyImpl>& body,
const std::string& extra_headers,
SiteInstance* source_site_instance,
const Referrer& referrer,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
bool should_replace_current_entry,
bool user_gesture) {
if (render_frame_host !=
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->current_frame_host()) {
return;
}
SiteInstance* current_site_instance = render_frame_host->GetSiteInstance();
std::vector<GURL> redirect_chain;
GURL dest_url(url);
if (!GetContentClient()->browser()->ShouldAllowOpenURL(
current_site_instance, url)) {
dest_url = GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL);
}
int frame_tree_node_id = -1;
if (SiteIsolationPolicy::UseSubframeNavigationEntries() &&
disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::CURRENT_TAB &&
render_frame_host->GetParent()) {
frame_tree_node_id =
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->frame_tree_node_id();
}
OpenURLParams params(dest_url, referrer, frame_tree_node_id, disposition,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
true /* is_renderer_initiated */);
params.uses_post = uses_post;
params.post_data = body;
params.extra_headers = extra_headers;
params.source_site_instance = source_site_instance;
if (redirect_chain.size() > 0)
params.redirect_chain = redirect_chain;
params.should_replace_current_entry = should_replace_current_entry;
params.user_gesture = user_gesture;
if (render_frame_host->web_ui()) {
if (ui::PageTransitionCoreTypeIs(
params.transition, ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK))
params.transition = render_frame_host->web_ui()->GetLinkTransitionType();
params.referrer = Referrer();
params.is_renderer_initiated = false;
}
GetContentClient()->browser()->OverrideOpenURLParams(current_site_instance,
¶ms);
if (delegate_)
delegate_->RequestOpenURL(render_frame_host, params);
}
Commit Message: Drop navigations to NavigationEntry with invalid virtual URLs.
BUG=657720
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2452443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#428056}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tls1_alert_code(int code)
{
switch (code) {
case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
return (-1);
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
case SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL:
return (TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
default:
return (-1);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dump_attrs(FILE *ofd, struct nlattr *attrs, int attrlen,
int prefix)
{
int rem;
struct nlattr *nla;
nla_for_each_attr(nla, attrs, attrlen, rem) {
int padlen, alen = nla_len(nla);
prefix_line(ofd, prefix);
if (nla->nla_type == 0)
fprintf(ofd, " [ATTR PADDING] %d octets\n", alen);
else
fprintf(ofd, " [ATTR %02d%s] %d octets\n", nla_type(nla),
nla_is_nested(nla) ? " NESTED" : "",
alen);
if (nla_is_nested(nla))
dump_attrs(ofd, nla_data(nla), alen, prefix+1);
else
dump_attr(ofd, nla, prefix);
padlen = nla_padlen(alen);
if (padlen > 0) {
prefix_line(ofd, prefix);
fprintf(ofd, " [PADDING] %d octets\n",
padlen);
dump_hex(ofd, nla_data(nla) + alen,
padlen, prefix);
}
}
if (rem) {
prefix_line(ofd, prefix);
fprintf(ofd, " [LEFTOVER] %d octets\n", rem);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 28,162 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool did_receive_event() { return did_receive_event_; }
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 12,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gamma_test(png_modifier *pmIn, PNG_CONST png_byte colour_typeIn,
PNG_CONST png_byte bit_depthIn, PNG_CONST int palette_numberIn,
PNG_CONST int interlace_typeIn,
PNG_CONST double file_gammaIn, PNG_CONST double screen_gammaIn,
PNG_CONST png_byte sbitIn, PNG_CONST int threshold_testIn,
PNG_CONST char *name,
PNG_CONST int use_input_precisionIn, PNG_CONST int scale16In,
PNG_CONST int expand16In, PNG_CONST int do_backgroundIn,
PNG_CONST png_color_16 *bkgd_colorIn, double bkgd_gammaIn)
{
gamma_display d;
context(&pmIn->this, fault);
gamma_display_init(&d, pmIn, FILEID(colour_typeIn, bit_depthIn,
palette_numberIn, interlace_typeIn, 0, 0, 0),
file_gammaIn, screen_gammaIn, sbitIn,
threshold_testIn, use_input_precisionIn, scale16In,
expand16In, do_backgroundIn, bkgd_colorIn, bkgd_gammaIn);
Try
{
png_structp pp;
png_infop pi;
gama_modification gama_mod;
srgb_modification srgb_mod;
sbit_modification sbit_mod;
/* For the moment don't use the png_modifier support here. */
d.pm->encoding_counter = 0;
modifier_set_encoding(d.pm); /* Just resets everything */
d.pm->current_gamma = d.file_gamma;
/* Make an appropriate modifier to set the PNG file gamma to the
* given gamma value and the sBIT chunk to the given precision.
*/
d.pm->modifications = NULL;
gama_modification_init(&gama_mod, d.pm, d.file_gamma);
srgb_modification_init(&srgb_mod, d.pm, 127 /*delete*/);
if (d.sbit > 0)
sbit_modification_init(&sbit_mod, d.pm, d.sbit);
modification_reset(d.pm->modifications);
/* Get a png_struct for writing the image. */
pp = set_modifier_for_read(d.pm, &pi, d.this.id, name);
standard_palette_init(&d.this);
/* Introduce the correct read function. */
if (d.pm->this.progressive)
{
/* Share the row function with the standard implementation. */
png_set_progressive_read_fn(pp, &d, gamma_info, progressive_row,
gamma_end);
/* Now feed data into the reader until we reach the end: */
modifier_progressive_read(d.pm, pp, pi);
}
else
{
/* modifier_read expects a png_modifier* */
png_set_read_fn(pp, d.pm, modifier_read);
/* Check the header values: */
png_read_info(pp, pi);
/* Process the 'info' requirements. Only one image is generated */
gamma_info_imp(&d, pp, pi);
sequential_row(&d.this, pp, pi, -1, 0);
if (!d.this.speed)
gamma_image_validate(&d, pp, pi);
else
d.this.ps->validated = 1;
}
modifier_reset(d.pm);
if (d.pm->log && !d.threshold_test && !d.this.speed)
fprintf(stderr, "%d bit %s %s: max error %f (%.2g, %2g%%)\n",
d.this.bit_depth, colour_types[d.this.colour_type], name,
d.maxerrout, d.maxerrabs, 100*d.maxerrpc);
/* Log the summary values too. */
if (d.this.colour_type == 0 || d.this.colour_type == 4)
{
switch (d.this.bit_depth)
{
case 1:
break;
case 2:
if (d.maxerrout > d.pm->error_gray_2)
d.pm->error_gray_2 = d.maxerrout;
break;
case 4:
if (d.maxerrout > d.pm->error_gray_4)
d.pm->error_gray_4 = d.maxerrout;
break;
case 8:
if (d.maxerrout > d.pm->error_gray_8)
d.pm->error_gray_8 = d.maxerrout;
break;
case 16:
if (d.maxerrout > d.pm->error_gray_16)
d.pm->error_gray_16 = d.maxerrout;
break;
default:
png_error(pp, "bad bit depth (internal: 1)");
}
}
else if (d.this.colour_type == 2 || d.this.colour_type == 6)
{
switch (d.this.bit_depth)
{
case 8:
if (d.maxerrout > d.pm->error_color_8)
d.pm->error_color_8 = d.maxerrout;
break;
case 16:
if (d.maxerrout > d.pm->error_color_16)
d.pm->error_color_16 = d.maxerrout;
break;
default:
png_error(pp, "bad bit depth (internal: 2)");
}
}
else if (d.this.colour_type == 3)
{
if (d.maxerrout > d.pm->error_indexed)
d.pm->error_indexed = d.maxerrout;
}
}
Catch(fault)
modifier_reset(voidcast(png_modifier*,(void*)fault));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 14,914 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::ReleaseIOSurfaceForTexture(GLuint texture_id) {
TextureToIOSurfaceMap::iterator it = texture_to_io_surface_map_.find(
texture_id);
if (it != texture_to_io_surface_map_.end()) {
CFTypeRef surface = it->second;
CFRelease(surface);
texture_to_io_surface_map_.erase(it);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 18,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: e1000e_set_pbaclr(E1000ECore *core, int index, uint32_t val)
{
int i;
core->mac[PBACLR] = val & E1000_PBACLR_VALID_MASK;
if (!msix_enabled(core->owner)) {
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < E1000E_MSIX_VEC_NUM; i++) {
if (core->mac[PBACLR] & BIT(i)) {
msix_clr_pending(core->owner, i);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 8,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FastTransactionServer() {
no_store = false;
}
Commit Message: Http cache: Test deleting an entry with a pending_entry when
adding the truncated flag.
BUG=125159
TEST=net_unittests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10356113
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139331 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 4,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SecurityExploitBrowserTest::TestFileChooserWithPath(
const base::FilePath& path) {
GURL foo("http://foo.com/simple_page.html");
NavigateToURL(shell(), foo);
EXPECT_EQ(base::ASCIIToUTF16("OK"), shell()->web_contents()->GetTitle());
RenderFrameHost* compromised_renderer =
shell()->web_contents()->GetMainFrame();
RenderProcessHostKillWaiter kill_waiter(compromised_renderer->GetProcess());
blink::mojom::FileChooserParams params;
params.default_file_name = path;
FrameHostMsg_RunFileChooser evil(compromised_renderer->GetRoutingID(),
params);
IpcSecurityTestUtil::PwnMessageReceived(
compromised_renderer->GetProcess()->GetChannel(), evil);
EXPECT_EQ(bad_message::RFH_FILE_CHOOSER_PATH, kill_waiter.Wait());
}
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BrowserContext* DownloadManagerImpl::GetBrowserContext() const {
return browser_context_;
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit snd_compress_exit(void)
{
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool isMainDisplay(int32_t displayId) {
return displayId == ADISPLAY_ID_DEFAULT || displayId == ADISPLAY_ID_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 6,034 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void br_multicast_del_pg(struct net_bridge *br,
struct net_bridge_port_group *pg)
{
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
struct net_bridge_port_group *p;
struct net_bridge_port_group __rcu **pp;
mdb = mlock_dereference(br->mdb, br);
mp = br_mdb_ip_get(mdb, &pg->addr);
if (WARN_ON(!mp))
return;
for (pp = &mp->ports;
(p = mlock_dereference(*pp, br)) != NULL;
pp = &p->next) {
if (p != pg)
continue;
rcu_assign_pointer(*pp, p->next);
hlist_del_init(&p->mglist);
del_timer(&p->timer);
call_rcu_bh(&p->rcu, br_multicast_free_pg);
if (!mp->ports && !mp->mglist &&
netif_running(br->dev))
mod_timer(&mp->timer, jiffies);
return;
}
WARN_ON(1);
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 16,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void longAttrAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::longAttrAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __pgd_error(const char *file, int line, pgd_t pgd)
{
printk("%s:%d: bad pgd %08llx.\n", file, line, (long long)pgd_val(pgd));
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::CloseFrameAfterDragSession() {
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_LINUX)
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, method_factory_.NewRunnableMethod(&Browser::CloseFrame));
#endif
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_qib_user_sdma_queue_create(struct file *fp)
{
struct qib_filedata *fd = fp->private_data;
struct qib_ctxtdata *rcd = fd->rcd;
struct qib_devdata *dd = rcd->dd;
if (dd->flags & QIB_HAS_SEND_DMA) {
fd->pq = qib_user_sdma_queue_create(&dd->pcidev->dev,
dd->unit,
rcd->ctxt,
fd->subctxt);
if (!fd->pq)
return -ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 3,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid::AddNewContents(
WebContents* source,
WebContents* new_contents,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
const gfx::Rect& initial_rect,
bool user_gesture,
bool* was_blocked) {
DCHECK_NE(disposition, SAVE_TO_DISK);
DCHECK_NE(disposition, CURRENT_TAB);
TabHelpers::AttachTabHelpers(new_contents);
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> obj = GetJavaDelegate(env);
AddWebContentsResult add_result =
ADD_WEB_CONTENTS_RESULT_STOP_LOAD_AND_DELETE;
if (!obj.is_null()) {
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> jsource;
if (source)
jsource = source->GetJavaWebContents();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> jnew_contents;
if (new_contents)
jnew_contents = new_contents->GetJavaWebContents();
add_result = static_cast<AddWebContentsResult>(
Java_ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid_addNewContents(
env,
obj.obj(),
jsource.obj(),
jnew_contents.obj(),
static_cast<jint>(disposition),
NULL,
user_gesture));
}
if (was_blocked)
*was_blocked = !(add_result == ADD_WEB_CONTENTS_RESULT_PROCEED);
if (add_result == ADD_WEB_CONTENTS_RESULT_STOP_LOAD_AND_DELETE)
delete new_contents;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
TBR=tedchoc@chromium.org,jbudorick@chromium.org,sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 21,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t aac_show_vendor(struct device *device,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct aac_dev *dev = (struct aac_dev*)class_to_shost(device)->hostdata;
int len;
if (dev->supplement_adapter_info.AdapterTypeText[0]) {
char * cp = dev->supplement_adapter_info.AdapterTypeText;
while (*cp && *cp != ' ')
++cp;
len = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%.*s\n",
(int)(cp - (char *)dev->supplement_adapter_info.AdapterTypeText),
dev->supplement_adapter_info.AdapterTypeText);
} else
len = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n",
aac_drivers[dev->cardtype].vname);
return len;
}
Commit Message: aacraid: missing capable() check in compat ioctl
In commit d496f94d22d1 ('[SCSI] aacraid: fix security weakness') we
added a check on CAP_SYS_RAWIO to the ioctl. The compat ioctls need the
check as well.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: device_filesystem_set_label (Device *device,
const char *new_label,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context)
{
const Filesystem *fs_details;
GError *error;
error = NULL;
if (device->priv->id_usage == NULL || strcmp (device->priv->id_usage, "filesystem") != 0)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Not a mountable file system");
goto out;
}
fs_details = daemon_local_get_fs_details (device->priv->daemon, device->priv->id_type);
if (fs_details == NULL)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_BUSY, "Unknown filesystem");
goto out;
}
if (!fs_details->supports_online_label_rename)
{
if (device_local_is_busy (device, FALSE, &error))
{
dbus_g_method_return_error (context, error);
g_error_free (error);
goto out;
}
}
daemon_local_check_auth (device->priv->daemon,
device,
device->priv->device_is_system_internal ? "org.freedesktop.udisks.change-system-internal"
: "org.freedesktop.udisks.change",
"FilesystemSetLabel",
TRUE,
device_filesystem_set_label_authorized_cb,
context,
1,
g_strdup (new_label),
g_free);
out:
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 7,811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ALuint S_AL_BufferGet(sfxHandle_t sfx)
{
return knownSfx[sfx].buffer;
}
Commit Message: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 13,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::editControlValueChanged()
{
RefPtr<HTMLInputElement> input(element());
String oldValue = input->value();
String newValue = sanitizeValue(m_dateTimeEditElement->value());
if ((oldValue.isEmpty() && newValue.isEmpty()) || oldValue == newValue)
input->setNeedsValidityCheck();
else {
input->setValueInternal(newValue, DispatchNoEvent);
input->setNeedsStyleRecalc();
input->dispatchFormControlInputEvent();
input->dispatchFormControlChangeEvent();
}
input->notifyFormStateChanged();
input->updateClearButtonVisibility();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,162 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int64_t streamTrimByLength(stream *s, size_t maxlen, int approx) {
if (s->length <= maxlen) return 0;
raxIterator ri;
raxStart(&ri,s->rax);
raxSeek(&ri,"^",NULL,0);
int64_t deleted = 0;
while(s->length > maxlen && raxNext(&ri)) {
unsigned char *lp = ri.data, *p = lpFirst(lp);
int64_t entries = lpGetInteger(p);
/* Check if we can remove the whole node, and still have at
* least maxlen elements. */
if (s->length - entries >= maxlen) {
lpFree(lp);
raxRemove(s->rax,ri.key,ri.key_len,NULL);
raxSeek(&ri,">=",ri.key,ri.key_len);
s->length -= entries;
deleted += entries;
continue;
}
/* If we cannot remove a whole element, and approx is true,
* stop here. */
if (approx) break;
/* Otherwise, we have to mark single entries inside the listpack
* as deleted. We start by updating the entries/deleted counters. */
int64_t to_delete = s->length - maxlen;
serverAssert(to_delete < entries);
lp = lpReplaceInteger(lp,&p,entries-to_delete);
p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Seek deleted field. */
int64_t marked_deleted = lpGetInteger(p);
lp = lpReplaceInteger(lp,&p,marked_deleted+to_delete);
p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Seek num-of-fields in the master entry. */
/* Skip all the master fields. */
int64_t master_fields_count = lpGetInteger(p);
p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Seek the first field. */
for (int64_t j = 0; j < master_fields_count; j++)
p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Skip all master fields. */
p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Skip the zero master entry terminator. */
/* 'p' is now pointing to the first entry inside the listpack.
* We have to run entry after entry, marking entries as deleted
* if they are already not deleted. */
while(p) {
int flags = lpGetInteger(p);
int to_skip;
/* Mark the entry as deleted. */
if (!(flags & STREAM_ITEM_FLAG_DELETED)) {
flags |= STREAM_ITEM_FLAG_DELETED;
lp = lpReplaceInteger(lp,&p,flags);
deleted++;
s->length--;
if (s->length <= maxlen) break; /* Enough entries deleted. */
}
p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Skip ID ms delta. */
p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Skip ID seq delta. */
p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Seek num-fields or values (if compressed). */
if (flags & STREAM_ITEM_FLAG_SAMEFIELDS) {
to_skip = master_fields_count;
} else {
to_skip = lpGetInteger(p);
to_skip = 1+(to_skip*2);
}
while(to_skip--) p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Skip the whole entry. */
p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Skip the final lp-count field. */
}
/* Here we should perform garbage collection in case at this point
* there are too many entries deleted inside the listpack. */
entries -= to_delete;
marked_deleted += to_delete;
if (entries + marked_deleted > 10 && marked_deleted > entries/2) {
/* TODO: perform a garbage collection. */
}
/* Update the listpack with the new pointer. */
raxInsert(s->rax,ri.key,ri.key_len,lp,NULL);
break; /* If we are here, there was enough to delete in the current
node, so no need to go to the next node. */
}
raxStop(&ri);
return deleted;
}
Commit Message: Abort in XGROUP if the key is not a stream
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 24,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Document& Document::AXObjectCacheOwner() const {
Document* doc = const_cast<Document*>(this);
if (doc->GetFrame() && doc->GetFrame()->PagePopupOwner()) {
DCHECK(!doc->ax_object_cache_);
return doc->GetFrame()
->PagePopupOwner()
->GetDocument()
.AXObjectCacheOwner();
}
return *doc;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 26,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NavigationPolicy FrameLoader::CheckLoadCanStart(
FrameLoadRequest& frame_load_request,
FrameLoadType type,
NavigationPolicy navigation_policy,
NavigationType navigation_type) {
if (frame_->GetDocument()->PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() !=
Document::kNoDismissal) {
return kNavigationPolicyIgnore;
}
ResourceRequest& resource_request = frame_load_request.GetResourceRequest();
RecordLatestRequiredCSP();
Settings* settings = frame_->GetSettings();
MaybeCheckCSP(
resource_request, navigation_type, frame_, navigation_policy,
frame_load_request.ShouldCheckMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy() ==
kCheckContentSecurityPolicy,
settings && settings->GetBrowserSideNavigationEnabled(),
ContentSecurityPolicy::CheckHeaderType::kCheckReportOnly);
ModifyRequestForCSP(resource_request, frame_load_request.OriginDocument());
WebTriggeringEventInfo triggering_event_info =
WebTriggeringEventInfo::kNotFromEvent;
if (frame_load_request.TriggeringEvent()) {
triggering_event_info = frame_load_request.TriggeringEvent()->isTrusted()
? WebTriggeringEventInfo::kFromTrustedEvent
: WebTriggeringEventInfo::kFromUntrustedEvent;
}
return ShouldContinueForNavigationPolicy(
resource_request, frame_load_request.OriginDocument(),
frame_load_request.GetSubstituteData(), nullptr,
frame_load_request.ShouldCheckMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy(),
navigation_type, navigation_policy, type,
frame_load_request.ClientRedirect() ==
ClientRedirectPolicy::kClientRedirect,
triggering_event_info, frame_load_request.Form());
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 11,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CorePageLoadMetricsObserver::OnFirstContentfulPaint(
const page_load_metrics::PageLoadTiming& timing,
const page_load_metrics::PageLoadExtraInfo& info) {
if (WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(
timing.first_contentful_paint, info)) {
PAGE_LOAD_HISTOGRAM(internal::kHistogramFirstContentfulPaintImmediate,
timing.first_contentful_paint.value());
PAGE_LOAD_HISTOGRAM(
internal::kHistogramParseStartToFirstContentfulPaintImmediate,
timing.first_contentful_paint.value() - timing.parse_start.value());
switch (GetPageLoadType(transition_)) {
case LOAD_TYPE_RELOAD:
PAGE_LOAD_HISTOGRAM(
internal::kHistogramLoadTypeFirstContentfulPaintReload,
timing.first_contentful_paint.value());
if (initiated_by_user_gesture_) {
PAGE_LOAD_HISTOGRAM(
internal::kHistogramLoadTypeFirstContentfulPaintReloadByGesture,
timing.first_contentful_paint.value());
}
break;
case LOAD_TYPE_FORWARD_BACK:
PAGE_LOAD_HISTOGRAM(
internal::kHistogramLoadTypeFirstContentfulPaintForwardBack,
timing.first_contentful_paint.value());
break;
case LOAD_TYPE_NEW_NAVIGATION:
PAGE_LOAD_HISTOGRAM(
internal::kHistogramLoadTypeFirstContentfulPaintNewNavigation,
timing.first_contentful_paint.value());
break;
case LOAD_TYPE_NONE:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
} else {
PAGE_LOAD_HISTOGRAM(
internal::kBackgroundHistogramFirstContentfulPaintImmediate,
timing.first_contentful_paint.value());
PAGE_LOAD_HISTOGRAM(
internal::kBackgroundHistogramParseStartToFirstContentfulPaintImmediate,
timing.first_contentful_paint.value() - timing.parse_start.value());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove clock resolution page load histograms.
These were temporary metrics intended to understand whether high/low
resolution clocks adversely impact page load metrics. After collecting a few
months of data it was determined that clock resolution doesn't adversely
impact our metrics, and it that these histograms were no longer needed.
BUG=394757
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2155143003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#406143}
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fp_set_per_packet_inf_from_conv(umts_fp_conversation_info_t *p_conv_data,
tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree _U_)
{
fp_info *fpi;
guint8 tfi, c_t;
int offset = 0, i=0, j=0, num_tbs, chan, tb_size, tb_bit_off;
gboolean is_control_frame;
umts_mac_info *macinf;
rlc_info *rlcinf;
guint8 fake_lchid=0;
gint *cur_val=NULL;
fpi = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), fp_info);
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_fp, 0, fpi);
fpi->iface_type = p_conv_data->iface_type;
fpi->division = p_conv_data->division;
fpi->release = 7; /* Set values greater then the checks performed */
fpi->release_year = 2006;
fpi->release_month = 12;
fpi->channel = p_conv_data->channel;
fpi->dch_crc_present = p_conv_data->dch_crc_present;
/*fpi->paging_indications;*/
fpi->link_type = FP_Link_Ethernet;
#if 0
/*Only do this the first run, signals that we need to reset the RLC fragtable*/
if (!pinfo->fd->flags.visited && p_conv_data->reset_frag ) {
fpi->reset_frag = p_conv_data->reset_frag;
p_conv_data->reset_frag = FALSE;
}
#endif
/* remember 'lower' UDP layer port information so we can later
* differentiate 'lower' UDP layer from 'user data' UDP layer */
fpi->srcport = pinfo->srcport;
fpi->destport = pinfo->destport;
fpi->com_context_id = p_conv_data->com_context_id;
if (pinfo->link_dir == P2P_DIR_UL) {
fpi->is_uplink = TRUE;
} else {
fpi->is_uplink = FALSE;
}
is_control_frame = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) & 0x01;
switch (fpi->channel) {
case CHANNEL_HSDSCH: /* HS-DSCH - High Speed Downlink Shared Channel */
fpi->hsdsch_entity = p_conv_data->hsdsch_entity;
macinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), umts_mac_info);
fpi->hsdsch_macflowd_id = p_conv_data->hsdsch_macdflow_id;
macinf->content[0] = hsdsch_macdflow_id_mac_content_map[p_conv_data->hsdsch_macdflow_id]; /*MAC_CONTENT_PS_DTCH;*/
macinf->lchid[0] = p_conv_data->hsdsch_macdflow_id;
/*macinf->content[0] = lchId_type_table[p_conv_data->edch_lchId[0]];*/
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_umts_mac, 0, macinf);
rlcinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), rlc_info);
/*Figure out RLC_MODE based on MACd-flow-ID, basically MACd-flow-ID = 0 then it's SRB0 == UM else AM*/
rlcinf->mode[0] = hsdsch_macdflow_id_rlc_map[p_conv_data->hsdsch_macdflow_id];
if (fpi->hsdsch_entity == hs /*&& !rlc_is_ciphered(pinfo)*/) {
for (i=0; i<MAX_NUM_HSDHSCH_MACDFLOW; i++) {
/*Figure out if this channel is multiplexed (signaled from RRC)*/
if ((cur_val=(gint *)g_tree_lookup(hsdsch_muxed_flows, GINT_TO_POINTER((gint)p_conv_data->hrnti))) != NULL) {
j = 1 << i;
fpi->hsdhsch_macfdlow_is_mux[i] = j & *cur_val;
} else {
fpi->hsdhsch_macfdlow_is_mux[i] = FALSE;
}
}
}
/* Make configurable ?(available in NBAP?) */
/* urnti[MAX_RLC_CHANS] */
/*
switch (p_conv_data->rlc_mode) {
case FP_RLC_TM:
rlcinf->mode[0] = RLC_TM;
break;
case FP_RLC_UM:
rlcinf->mode[0] = RLC_UM;
break;
case FP_RLC_AM:
rlcinf->mode[0] = RLC_AM;
break;
case FP_RLC_MODE_UNKNOWN:
default:
rlcinf->mode[0] = RLC_UNKNOWN_MODE;
break;
}*/
/* rbid[MAX_RLC_CHANS] */
/* For RLC re-assembly to work we urnti signaled from NBAP */
rlcinf->urnti[0] = fpi->com_context_id;
rlcinf->li_size[0] = RLC_LI_7BITS;
rlcinf->ciphered[0] = FALSE;
rlcinf->deciphered[0] = FALSE;
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_rlc, 0, rlcinf);
return fpi;
case CHANNEL_EDCH:
/*Most configuration is now done in the actual dissecting function*/
macinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), umts_mac_info);
rlcinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), rlc_info);
fpi->no_ddi_entries = p_conv_data->no_ddi_entries;
for (i=0; i<fpi->no_ddi_entries; i++) {
fpi->edch_ddi[i] = p_conv_data->edch_ddi[i]; /*Set the DDI value*/
fpi->edch_macd_pdu_size[i] = p_conv_data->edch_macd_pdu_size[i]; /*Set the size*/
fpi->edch_lchId[i] = p_conv_data->edch_lchId[i]; /*Set the channel id for this entry*/
/*macinf->content[i] = lchId_type_table[p_conv_data->edch_lchId[i]]; */ /*Set the proper Content type for the mac layer.*/
/* rlcinf->mode[i] = lchId_rlc_map[p_conv_data->edch_lchId[i]];*/ /* Set RLC mode by lchid to RLC_MODE map in nbap.h */
}
fpi->edch_type = p_conv_data->edch_type;
/* macinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), umts_mac_info);
macinf->content[0] = MAC_CONTENT_PS_DTCH;*/
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_umts_mac, 0, macinf);
/* For RLC re-assembly to work we need a urnti signaled from NBAP */
rlcinf->urnti[0] = fpi->com_context_id;
/* rlcinf->mode[0] = RLC_AM;*/
rlcinf->li_size[0] = RLC_LI_7BITS;
rlcinf->ciphered[0] = FALSE;
rlcinf->deciphered[0] = FALSE;
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_rlc, 0, rlcinf);
return fpi;
case CHANNEL_PCH:
fpi->paging_indications = p_conv_data->paging_indications;
fpi->num_chans = p_conv_data->num_dch_in_flow;
/* Set offset to point to first TFI
*/
if (is_control_frame) {
/* control frame, we're done */
return fpi;
}
/* Set offset to TFI */
offset = 3;
break;
case CHANNEL_DCH:
fpi->num_chans = p_conv_data->num_dch_in_flow;
if (is_control_frame) {
/* control frame, we're done */
return fpi;
}
rlcinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), rlc_info);
macinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), umts_mac_info);
offset = 2; /*To correctly read the tfi*/
fakes = 5; /* Reset fake counter. */
for (chan=0; chan < fpi->num_chans; chan++) { /*Iterate over the what channels*/
/*Iterate over the transport blocks*/
/*tfi = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);*/
/*TFI is 5 bits according to 3GPP TS 25.321, paragraph 6.2.4.4*/
tfi = tvb_get_bits8(tvb, 3+offset*8, 5);
/*Figure out the number of tbs and size*/
num_tbs = (fpi->is_uplink) ? p_conv_data->fp_dch_channel_info[chan].ul_chan_num_tbs[tfi] : p_conv_data->fp_dch_channel_info[chan].dl_chan_num_tbs[tfi];
tb_size= (fpi->is_uplink) ? p_conv_data->fp_dch_channel_info[i].ul_chan_tf_size[tfi] : p_conv_data->fp_dch_channel_info[i].dl_chan_tf_size[tfi];
/*TODO: This stuff has to be reworked!*/
/*Generates a fake logical channel id for non multiplexed channel*/
if ( p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan] != 31 && (p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan] == 24 &&
tb_size != 340) ) {
fake_lchid = make_fake_lchid(pinfo, p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan]);
}
tb_bit_off = (2+p_conv_data->num_dch_in_flow)*8; /*Point to the C/T of first TB*/
/*Set configuration for individual blocks*/
for (j=0; j < num_tbs && j+chan < MAX_MAC_FRAMES; j++) {
/*Set transport channel id (useful for debugging)*/
macinf->trchid[j+chan] = p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan];
/*Transport Channel m31 and 24 might be multiplexed!*/
if ( p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan] == 31 || p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan] == 24) {
/****** MUST FIGURE OUT IF THIS IS REALLY MULTIPLEXED OR NOT*******/
/*If Trchid == 31 and only on TB, we have no multiplexing*/
if (0/*p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan] == 31 && num_tbs == 1*/) {
macinf->ctmux[j+chan] = FALSE;/*Set TRUE if this channel is multiplexed (ie. C/T flag exists)*/
macinf->lchid[j+chan] = 1;
macinf->content[j+chan] = lchId_type_table[1]; /*Base MAC content on logical channel id (Table is in packet-nbap.h)*/
rlcinf->mode[j+chan] = lchId_rlc_map[1]; /*Based RLC mode on logical channel id*/
}
/*Indicate we don't have multiplexing.*/
else if (p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan] == 24 && tb_size != 340) {
macinf->ctmux[j+chan] = FALSE;/*Set TRUE if this channel is multiplexed (ie. C/T flag exists)*/
/*g_warning("settin this for %d", pinfo->num);*/
macinf->lchid[j+chan] = fake_lchid;
macinf->fake_chid[j+chan] = TRUE;
macinf->content[j+chan] = MAC_CONTENT_PS_DTCH; /*lchId_type_table[fake_lchid];*/ /*Base MAC content on logical channel id (Table is in packet-nbap.h)*/
rlcinf->mode[j+chan] = RLC_AM;/*lchId_rlc_map[fake_lchid];*/ /*Based RLC mode on logical channel id*/
}
/*We have multiplexing*/
else {
macinf->ctmux[j+chan] = TRUE;/*Set TRUE if this channel is multiplexed (ie. C/T flag exists)*/
/* Peek at C/T, different RLC params for different logical channels */
/*C/T is 4 bits according to 3GPP TS 25.321, paragraph 9.2.1, from MAC header (not FP)*/
c_t = tvb_get_bits8(tvb, tb_bit_off/*(2+p_conv_data->num_dch_in_flow)*8*/, 4); /* c_t = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);*/
macinf->lchid[j+chan] = c_t+1;
macinf->content[j+chan] = lchId_type_table[c_t+1]; /*Base MAC content on logical channel id (Table is in packet-nbap.h)*/
rlcinf->mode[j+chan] = lchId_rlc_map[c_t+1]; /*Based RLC mode on logical channel id*/
}
} else {
fake_lchid = make_fake_lchid(pinfo, p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan]);
macinf->ctmux[j+chan] = FALSE;/*Set TRUE if this channel is multiplexed (ie. C/T flag exists)*/
/*macinf->content[j+chan] = MAC_CONTENT_CS_DTCH;*/
macinf->content[j+chan] = lchId_type_table[fake_lchid];
rlcinf->mode[j+chan] = lchId_rlc_map[fake_lchid];
/*Generate virtual logical channel id*/
/************************/
/*TODO: Once proper lchid is always set, this has to be removed*/
macinf->fake_chid[j+chan] = TRUE;
macinf->lchid[j+chan] = fake_lchid; /*make_fake_lchid(pinfo, p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan]);*/
/************************/
}
/*** Set rlc info ***/
rlcinf->urnti[j+chan] = p_conv_data->com_context_id;
rlcinf->li_size[j+chan] = RLC_LI_7BITS;
#if 0
/*If this entry exists, SECRUITY_MODE is completed (signled by RRC)*/
if ( rrc_ciph_inf && g_tree_lookup(rrc_ciph_inf, GINT_TO_POINTER((gint)p_conv_data->com_context_id)) != NULL ) {
rlcinf->ciphered[j+chan] = TRUE;
} else {
rlcinf->ciphered[j+chan] = FALSE;
}
#endif
rlcinf->ciphered[j+chan] = FALSE;
rlcinf->deciphered[j+chan] = FALSE;
rlcinf->rbid[j+chan] = macinf->lchid[j+chan];
/*Step over this TB and it's C/T flag.*/
tb_bit_off += tb_size+4;
}
offset++;
}
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_umts_mac, 0, macinf);
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_rlc, 0, rlcinf);
/* Set offset to point to first TFI
* the Number of TFI's = number of DCH's in the flow
*/
offset = 2;
break;
case CHANNEL_FACH_FDD:
fpi->num_chans = p_conv_data->num_dch_in_flow;
if (is_control_frame) {
/* control frame, we're done */
return fpi;
}
/* Set offset to point to first TFI
* the Number of TFI's = number of DCH's in the flow
*/
offset = 2;
/* Set MAC data */
macinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), umts_mac_info);
macinf->ctmux[0] = 1;
macinf->content[0] = MAC_CONTENT_DCCH;
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_umts_mac, 0, macinf);
/* Set RLC data */
rlcinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), rlc_info);
/* Make configurable ?(avaliable in NBAP?) */
/* For RLC re-assembly to work we need to fake urnti */
rlcinf->urnti[0] = fpi->channel;
rlcinf->mode[0] = RLC_AM;
/* rbid[MAX_RLC_CHANS] */
rlcinf->li_size[0] = RLC_LI_7BITS;
rlcinf->ciphered[0] = FALSE;
rlcinf->deciphered[0] = FALSE;
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_rlc, 0, rlcinf);
break;
case CHANNEL_RACH_FDD:
fpi->num_chans = p_conv_data->num_dch_in_flow;
if (is_control_frame) {
/* control frame, we're done */
return fpi;
}
/* Set offset to point to first TFI
* the Number of TFI's = number of DCH's in the flow
*/
offset = 2;
/* set MAC data */
macinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), umts_mac_info);
rlcinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), rlc_info);
for ( chan = 0; chan < fpi->num_chans; chan++ ) {
macinf->ctmux[chan] = 1;
macinf->content[chan] = MAC_CONTENT_DCCH;
rlcinf->urnti[chan] = fpi->com_context_id; /*Note that MAC probably will change this*/
}
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_umts_mac, 0, macinf);
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_rlc, 0, rlcinf);
break;
case CHANNEL_HSDSCH_COMMON:
rlcinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), rlc_info);
macinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), umts_mac_info);
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_umts_mac, 0, macinf);
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_rlc, 0, rlcinf);
break;
default:
expert_add_info(pinfo, NULL, &ei_fp_transport_channel_type_unknown);
return NULL;
}
/* Peek at the packet as the per packet info seems not to take the tfi into account */
for (i=0; i<fpi->num_chans; i++) {
tfi = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
/*TFI is 5 bits according to 3GPP TS 25.321, paragraph 6.2.4.4*/
/*tfi = tvb_get_bits8(tvb, offset*8, 5);*/
if (pinfo->link_dir == P2P_DIR_UL) {
fpi->chan_tf_size[i] = p_conv_data->fp_dch_channel_info[i].ul_chan_tf_size[tfi];
fpi->chan_num_tbs[i] = p_conv_data->fp_dch_channel_info[i].ul_chan_num_tbs[tfi];
} else {
fpi->chan_tf_size[i] = p_conv_data->fp_dch_channel_info[i].dl_chan_tf_size[tfi];
fpi->chan_num_tbs[i] = p_conv_data->fp_dch_channel_info[i].dl_chan_num_tbs[tfi];
}
offset++;
}
return fpi;
}
Commit Message: UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 12,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xml_acl_filtered_copy(const char *user, xmlNode* acl_source, xmlNode *xml, xmlNode ** result)
{
GListPtr aIter = NULL;
xmlNode *target = NULL;
xml_private_t *p = NULL;
xml_private_t *doc = NULL;
*result = NULL;
if(xml == NULL || pcmk_acl_required(user) == FALSE) {
crm_trace("no acls needed for '%s'", user);
return FALSE;
}
crm_trace("filtering copy of %p for '%s'", xml, user);
target = copy_xml(xml);
if(target == NULL) {
return TRUE;
}
__xml_acl_unpack(acl_source, target, user);
set_doc_flag(target, xpf_acl_enabled);
__xml_acl_apply(target);
doc = target->doc->_private;
for(aIter = doc->acls; aIter != NULL && target; aIter = aIter->next) {
int max = 0;
xml_acl_t *acl = aIter->data;
if(acl->mode != xpf_acl_deny) {
/* Nothing to do */
} else if(acl->xpath) {
int lpc = 0;
xmlXPathObjectPtr xpathObj = xpath_search(target, acl->xpath);
max = numXpathResults(xpathObj);
for(lpc = 0; lpc < max; lpc++) {
xmlNode *match = getXpathResult(xpathObj, lpc);
crm_trace("Purging attributes from %s", acl->xpath);
if(__xml_purge_attributes(match) == FALSE && match == target) {
crm_trace("No access to the entire document for %s", user);
freeXpathObject(xpathObj);
return TRUE;
}
}
crm_trace("Enforced ACL %s (%d matches)", acl->xpath, max);
freeXpathObject(xpathObj);
}
}
p = target->_private;
if(is_set(p->flags, xpf_acl_deny) && __xml_purge_attributes(target) == FALSE) {
crm_trace("No access to the entire document for %s", user);
return TRUE;
}
if(doc->acls) {
g_list_free_full(doc->acls, __xml_acl_free);
doc->acls = NULL;
} else {
crm_trace("Ordinary user '%s' cannot access the CIB without any defined ACLs", doc->user);
free_xml(target);
target = NULL;
}
if(target) {
*result = target;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void LongMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8SetReturnValueInt(info, impl->longMethod());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,840 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: zipx_xz_init(struct archive_read *a, struct zip *zip)
{
lzma_ret r;
if(zip->zipx_lzma_valid) {
lzma_end(&zip->zipx_lzma_stream);
zip->zipx_lzma_valid = 0;
}
memset(&zip->zipx_lzma_stream, 0, sizeof(zip->zipx_lzma_stream));
r = lzma_stream_decoder(&zip->zipx_lzma_stream, UINT64_MAX, 0);
if (r != LZMA_OK) {
archive_set_error(&(a->archive), ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"xz initialization failed(%d)",
r);
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
zip->zipx_lzma_valid = 1;
free(zip->uncompressed_buffer);
zip->uncompressed_buffer_size = 256 * 1024;
zip->uncompressed_buffer =
(uint8_t*) malloc(zip->uncompressed_buffer_size);
if (zip->uncompressed_buffer == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"No memory for xz decompression");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
zip->decompress_init = 1;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Fix typo in preprocessor macro in archive_read_format_zip_cleanup()
Frees lzma_stream on cleanup()
Fixes #1165
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetTextFromRange(
const ui::Range& range,
string16* text) {
ui::Range selection_text_range(selection_text_offset_,
selection_text_offset_ + selection_text_.length());
if (!selection_text_range.Contains(range)) {
text->clear();
return false;
}
if (selection_text_range.EqualsIgnoringDirection(range)) {
*text = selection_text_;
} else {
*text = selection_text_.substr(
range.GetMin() - selection_text_offset_,
range.length());
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int copy_mm(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct * tsk)
{
struct mm_struct * mm, *oldmm;
int retval;
tsk->min_flt = tsk->maj_flt = 0;
tsk->nvcsw = tsk->nivcsw = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK
tsk->last_switch_count = tsk->nvcsw + tsk->nivcsw;
#endif
tsk->mm = NULL;
tsk->active_mm = NULL;
/*
* Are we cloning a kernel thread?
*
* We need to steal a active VM for that..
*/
oldmm = current->mm;
if (!oldmm)
return 0;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_VM) {
atomic_inc(&oldmm->mm_users);
mm = oldmm;
goto good_mm;
}
retval = -ENOMEM;
mm = dup_mm(tsk);
if (!mm)
goto fail_nomem;
good_mm:
/* Initializing for Swap token stuff */
mm->token_priority = 0;
mm->last_interval = 0;
tsk->mm = mm;
tsk->active_mm = mm;
return 0;
fail_nomem:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: block: Fix io_context leak after failure of clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, parent's io_context->nr_tasks is incremented, but never
decremented whenever copy_process() fails afterwards, which prevents
exit_io_context() from calling IO schedulers exit functions.
Give a task_struct to exit_io_context(), and call exit_io_context() instead of
put_io_context() in copy_process() cleanup path.
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CustomButton::SetState(ButtonState state) {
if (state == state_)
return;
if (animate_on_state_change_ &&
(!is_throbbing_ || !hover_animation_->is_animating())) {
is_throbbing_ = false;
if ((state_ == STATE_HOVERED) && (state == STATE_NORMAL)) {
hover_animation_->Hide();
} else if (state != STATE_HOVERED) {
hover_animation_->Reset();
} else if (state_ == STATE_NORMAL) {
hover_animation_->Show();
} else {
hover_animation_->Reset(1);
}
}
state_ = state;
StateChanged();
SchedulePaint();
}
Commit Message: Custom buttons should only handle accelerators when focused.
BUG=541415
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1437523005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360130}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 82 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
u32 low32, high32;
unsigned long tmpl;
struct desc_ptr dt;
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR0, read_cr0() & ~X86_CR0_TS); /* 22.2.3 */
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, read_cr4()); /* 22.2.3, 22.2.5 */
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, read_cr3()); /* 22.2.3 FIXME: shadow tables */
vmcs_write16(HOST_CS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_CS); /* 22.2.4 */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* Load null selectors, so we can avoid reloading them in
* __vmx_load_host_state(), in case userspace uses the null selectors
* too (the expected case).
*/
vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, 0);
vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, 0);
#else
vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
#endif
vmcs_write16(HOST_SS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_write16(HOST_TR_SELECTOR, GDT_ENTRY_TSS*8); /* 22.2.4 */
native_store_idt(&dt);
vmcs_writel(HOST_IDTR_BASE, dt.address); /* 22.2.4 */
vmx->host_idt_base = dt.address;
vmcs_writel(HOST_RIP, vmx_return); /* 22.2.5 */
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32, high32);
vmcs_write32(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32);
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl);
vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl); /* 22.2.3 */
if (vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, low32, high32);
vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_PAT, low32 | ((u64) high32 << 32));
}
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(PharFileInfo, isCRCChecked)
{
PHAR_ENTRY_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_BOOL(entry_obj->ent.entry->is_crc_checked);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NavigationState* RenderFrameImpl::CreateNavigationStateFromPending() {
if (IsBrowserInitiated(pending_navigation_params_.get())) {
return NavigationStateImpl::CreateBrowserInitiated(
pending_navigation_params_->common_params,
pending_navigation_params_->request_params);
}
return NavigationStateImpl::CreateContentInitiated();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int al, i, ok, ret = -1, exp_idx;
unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
X509 *x = NULL;
const unsigned char *q, *p;
unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
n2l3(p, llen);
if (llen + 3 != n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
n2l3(p, l);
if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
q = p;
x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
if (x == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (q != (p + l)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x = NULL;
nc += l + 3;
p = q;
}
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
if (i > 1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (sc == NULL)
goto err;
ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
s->session->sess_cert = sc;
sc->cert_chain = sk;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
* which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
*/
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
sk = NULL;
/*
* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
*/
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
if (i < 0) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
sc->peer_cert_type = i;
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
/*
* Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
* of lines ago.
*/
X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
X509_free(s->session->peer);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
s->session->peer = x;
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x = NULL;
ret = 1;
goto done;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
done:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix race condition in NewSessionTicket
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.
CVE-2015-1791
This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.
Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
https://github.com/akamai/openssl/commit/c0bf69a791239ceec64509f9f19fcafb2461b0d3
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 7,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BlinkTestRunner::SetPermission(const std::string& name,
const std::string& value,
const GURL& origin,
const GURL& embedding_origin) {
content::PermissionStatus status;
if (value == "granted")
status = PERMISSION_STATUS_GRANTED;
else if (value == "prompt")
status = PERMISSION_STATUS_ASK;
else if (value == "denied")
status = PERMISSION_STATUS_DENIED;
else {
NOTREACHED();
status = PERMISSION_STATUS_DENIED;
}
Send(new LayoutTestHostMsg_SetPermission(
routing_id(), name, status, origin, embedding_origin));
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,184 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderLayerCompositor::repaintCompositedLayers(const IntRect* absRect)
{
recursiveRepaintLayer(rootRenderLayer(), absRect);
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CSoundFile::SampleOffset(ModChannel &chn, SmpLength param) const
{
chn.proTrackerOffset += param;
if(param >= chn.nLoopEnd && GetType() == MOD_TYPE_MTM && chn.dwFlags[CHN_LOOP] && chn.nLoopEnd > 0)
{
param = (param - chn.nLoopStart) % (chn.nLoopEnd - chn.nLoopStart) + chn.nLoopStart;
}
if(GetType() == MOD_TYPE_MDL && chn.dwFlags[CHN_16BIT])
{
param /= 2u;
}
if(chn.rowCommand.IsNote())
{
if(chn.pModInstrument != nullptr)
{
SAMPLEINDEX smp = chn.pModInstrument->Keyboard[chn.rowCommand.note - NOTE_MIN];
if(smp == 0 || smp > GetNumSamples())
return;
}
if(m_SongFlags[SONG_PT_MODE])
{
chn.position.Set(chn.proTrackerOffset);
chn.proTrackerOffset += param;
} else
{
chn.position.Set(param);
}
if (chn.position.GetUInt() >= chn.nLength || (chn.dwFlags[CHN_LOOP] && chn.position.GetUInt() >= chn.nLoopEnd))
{
if (!(GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_XM | MOD_TYPE_MT2 | MOD_TYPE_MOD | MOD_TYPE_MTM)))
{
if(m_playBehaviour[kITOffset])
{
if(m_SongFlags[SONG_ITOLDEFFECTS])
chn.position.Set(chn.nLength); // Old FX: Clip to end of sample
else
chn.position.Set(0); // Reset to beginning of sample
} else
{
chn.position.Set(chn.nLoopStart);
if(m_SongFlags[SONG_ITOLDEFFECTS] && chn.nLength > 4)
{
chn.position.Set(chn.nLength - 2);
}
}
} else if(m_playBehaviour[kFT2OffsetOutOfRange] || GetType() == MOD_TYPE_MTM)
{
chn.dwFlags.set(CHN_FASTVOLRAMP);
chn.nPeriod = 0;
} else if(GetType() == MOD_TYPE_MOD && chn.dwFlags[CHN_LOOP])
{
chn.position.Set(chn.nLoopStart);
}
}
} else if ((param < chn.nLength) && (GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_MTM | MOD_TYPE_DMF | MOD_TYPE_MDL | MOD_TYPE_PLM)))
{
chn.position.Set(param);
}
}
Commit Message: [Fix] Possible out-of-bounds read when computing length of some IT files with pattern loops (OpenMPT: formats that are converted to IT, libopenmpt: IT/ITP/MO3), caught with afl-fuzz.
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@10027 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 24,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ImageCapture::OnMojoSetOptions(ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver,
PromiseResolverFunction resolve_function,
bool trigger_take_photo,
bool result) {
DCHECK(service_requests_.Contains(resolver));
if (!result) {
resolver->Reject(DOMException::Create(kUnknownError, "setOptions failed"));
service_requests_.erase(resolver);
return;
}
service_->GetPhotoState(
stream_track_->Component()->Source()->Id(),
ConvertToBaseCallback(WTF::Bind(
&ImageCapture::OnMojoGetPhotoState, WrapPersistent(this),
WrapPersistent(resolver), WTF::Passed(std::move(resolve_function)),
trigger_take_photo)));
}
Commit Message: Convert MediaTrackConstraints to a ScriptValue
IDLDictionaries such as MediaTrackConstraints should not be stored on
the heap which would happen when binding one as a parameter to a
callback. This change converts the object to a ScriptValue ahead of
time. This is fine because the value will be passed to a
ScriptPromiseResolver that will converted it to a V8 value if it
isn't already.
Bug: 759457
Change-Id: I3009a0f7711cc264aeaae07a36c18a6db8c915c8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/701358
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507177}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int migrate_misplaced_transhuge_page(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
pmd_t *pmd, pmd_t entry,
unsigned long address,
struct page *page, int node)
{
spinlock_t *ptl;
pg_data_t *pgdat = NODE_DATA(node);
int isolated = 0;
struct page *new_page = NULL;
int page_lru = page_is_file_cache(page);
unsigned long mmun_start = address & HPAGE_PMD_MASK;
unsigned long mmun_end = mmun_start + HPAGE_PMD_SIZE;
pmd_t orig_entry;
/*
* Rate-limit the amount of data that is being migrated to a node.
* Optimal placement is no good if the memory bus is saturated and
* all the time is being spent migrating!
*/
if (numamigrate_update_ratelimit(pgdat, HPAGE_PMD_NR))
goto out_dropref;
new_page = alloc_pages_node(node,
(GFP_TRANSHUGE | __GFP_THISNODE) & ~__GFP_WAIT,
HPAGE_PMD_ORDER);
if (!new_page)
goto out_fail;
isolated = numamigrate_isolate_page(pgdat, page);
if (!isolated) {
put_page(new_page);
goto out_fail;
}
if (mm_tlb_flush_pending(mm))
flush_tlb_range(vma, mmun_start, mmun_end);
/* Prepare a page as a migration target */
__set_page_locked(new_page);
SetPageSwapBacked(new_page);
/* anon mapping, we can simply copy page->mapping to the new page: */
new_page->mapping = page->mapping;
new_page->index = page->index;
migrate_page_copy(new_page, page);
WARN_ON(PageLRU(new_page));
/* Recheck the target PMD */
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(mm, mmun_start, mmun_end);
ptl = pmd_lock(mm, pmd);
if (unlikely(!pmd_same(*pmd, entry) || page_count(page) != 2)) {
fail_putback:
spin_unlock(ptl);
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(mm, mmun_start, mmun_end);
/* Reverse changes made by migrate_page_copy() */
if (TestClearPageActive(new_page))
SetPageActive(page);
if (TestClearPageUnevictable(new_page))
SetPageUnevictable(page);
unlock_page(new_page);
put_page(new_page); /* Free it */
/* Retake the callers reference and putback on LRU */
get_page(page);
putback_lru_page(page);
mod_zone_page_state(page_zone(page),
NR_ISOLATED_ANON + page_lru, -HPAGE_PMD_NR);
goto out_unlock;
}
orig_entry = *pmd;
entry = mk_pmd(new_page, vma->vm_page_prot);
entry = pmd_mkhuge(entry);
entry = maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_mkdirty(entry), vma);
/*
* Clear the old entry under pagetable lock and establish the new PTE.
* Any parallel GUP will either observe the old page blocking on the
* page lock, block on the page table lock or observe the new page.
* The SetPageUptodate on the new page and page_add_new_anon_rmap
* guarantee the copy is visible before the pagetable update.
*/
flush_cache_range(vma, mmun_start, mmun_end);
page_add_anon_rmap(new_page, vma, mmun_start);
pmdp_huge_clear_flush_notify(vma, mmun_start, pmd);
set_pmd_at(mm, mmun_start, pmd, entry);
flush_tlb_range(vma, mmun_start, mmun_end);
update_mmu_cache_pmd(vma, address, &entry);
if (page_count(page) != 2) {
set_pmd_at(mm, mmun_start, pmd, orig_entry);
flush_tlb_range(vma, mmun_start, mmun_end);
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range(mm, mmun_start, mmun_end);
update_mmu_cache_pmd(vma, address, &entry);
page_remove_rmap(new_page);
goto fail_putback;
}
mlock_migrate_page(new_page, page);
set_page_memcg(new_page, page_memcg(page));
set_page_memcg(page, NULL);
page_remove_rmap(page);
spin_unlock(ptl);
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(mm, mmun_start, mmun_end);
/* Take an "isolate" reference and put new page on the LRU. */
get_page(new_page);
putback_lru_page(new_page);
unlock_page(new_page);
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page); /* Drop the rmap reference */
put_page(page); /* Drop the LRU isolation reference */
count_vm_events(PGMIGRATE_SUCCESS, HPAGE_PMD_NR);
count_vm_numa_events(NUMA_PAGE_MIGRATE, HPAGE_PMD_NR);
mod_zone_page_state(page_zone(page),
NR_ISOLATED_ANON + page_lru,
-HPAGE_PMD_NR);
return isolated;
out_fail:
count_vm_events(PGMIGRATE_FAIL, HPAGE_PMD_NR);
out_dropref:
ptl = pmd_lock(mm, pmd);
if (pmd_same(*pmd, entry)) {
entry = pmd_modify(entry, vma->vm_page_prot);
set_pmd_at(mm, mmun_start, pmd, entry);
update_mmu_cache_pmd(vma, address, &entry);
}
spin_unlock(ptl);
out_unlock:
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: migrate dirty page without clear_page_dirty_for_io etc
clear_page_dirty_for_io() has accumulated writeback and memcg subtleties
since v2.6.16 first introduced page migration; and the set_page_dirty()
which completed its migration of PageDirty, later had to be moderated to
__set_page_dirty_nobuffers(); then PageSwapBacked had to skip that too.
No actual problems seen with this procedure recently, but if you look into
what the clear_page_dirty_for_io(page)+set_page_dirty(newpage) is actually
achieving, it turns out to be nothing more than moving the PageDirty flag,
and its NR_FILE_DIRTY stat from one zone to another.
It would be good to avoid a pile of irrelevant decrementations and
incrementations, and improper event counting, and unnecessary descent of
the radix_tree under tree_lock (to set the PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY which
radix_tree_replace_slot() left in place anyway).
Do the NR_FILE_DIRTY movement, like the other stats movements, while
interrupts still disabled in migrate_page_move_mapping(); and don't even
bother if the zone is the same. Do the PageDirty movement there under
tree_lock too, where old page is frozen and newpage not yet visible:
bearing in mind that as soon as newpage becomes visible in radix_tree, an
un-page-locked set_page_dirty() might interfere (or perhaps that's just
not possible: anything doing so should already hold an additional
reference to the old page, preventing its migration; but play safe).
But we do still need to transfer PageDirty in migrate_page_copy(), for
those who don't go the mapping route through migrate_page_move_mapping().
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 5,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::CopyFromCompositingSurface(
const gfx::Rect& src_subrect,
const gfx::Size& /* dst_size */,
const base::Callback<void(bool)>& callback,
skia::PlatformBitmap* output) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::Close() {
WebLocalFrame::Close();
client_ = nullptr;
if (dev_tools_agent_)
dev_tools_agent_.Clear();
self_keep_alive_.Clear();
if (print_context_)
PrintEnd();
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
is_in_printing_ = false;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 1,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: header_put_le_int (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 4)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
} ;
} /* header_put_le_int */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 28,148 |
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