instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackInterfaceArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackInterfaceArg", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 2)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(2, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, nonCallback, toInt32(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
if (info.Length() <= 1 || !info[1]->IsFunction()) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError("The callback provided as parameter 2 is not a function.");
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
OwnPtr<TestCallbackInterface> callbackInterface = V8TestCallbackInterface::create(v8::Handle<v8::Function>::Cast(info[1]), currentExecutionContext(info.GetIsolate()));
imp->methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackInterfaceArg(nonCallback, callbackInterface.release());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 18,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetShelfAutoHideBehaviorPref(int64_t display_id,
ShelfAutoHideBehavior behavior) {
PrefService* prefs =
Shell::Get()->session_controller()->GetLastActiveUserPrefService();
if (!prefs)
return;
SetShelfAutoHideBehaviorPref(prefs, display_id, behavior);
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned hub_is_wusb(struct usb_hub *hub)
{
struct usb_hcd *hcd;
if (hub->hdev->parent != NULL) /* not a root hub? */
return 0;
hcd = container_of(hub->hdev->bus, struct usb_hcd, self);
return hcd->wireless;
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(umount, char __user *, name, int, flags)
{
struct path path;
struct mount *mnt;
int retval;
int lookup_flags = 0;
if (flags & ~(MNT_FORCE | MNT_DETACH | MNT_EXPIRE | UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW))
return -EINVAL;
if (!may_mount())
return -EPERM;
if (!(flags & UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW))
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
retval = user_path_mountpoint_at(AT_FDCWD, name, lookup_flags, &path);
if (retval)
goto out;
mnt = real_mount(path.mnt);
retval = -EINVAL;
if (path.dentry != path.mnt->mnt_root)
goto dput_and_out;
if (!check_mnt(mnt))
goto dput_and_out;
if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
goto dput_and_out;
retval = -EPERM;
if (flags & MNT_FORCE && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
goto dput_and_out;
retval = do_umount(mnt, flags);
dput_and_out:
/* we mustn't call path_put() as that would clear mnt_expiry_mark */
dput(path.dentry);
mntput_no_expire(mnt);
out:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 27,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ShellWindowGeometryCache* TestExtensionSystem::shell_window_geometry_cache() {
return shell_window_geometry_cache_.get();
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 13,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void usage() {
fputs("Usage: -b [<tid>]\n"
" -b dump backtrace to console, otherwise dump full tombstone file\n"
"\n"
"If tid specified, sends a request to debuggerd to dump that task.\n"
"Otherwise, starts the debuggerd server.\n", stderr);
}
Commit Message: debuggerd: verify that traced threads belong to the right process.
Fix two races in debuggerd's PTRACE_ATTACH logic:
1. The target thread in a crash dump request could exit between the
/proc/<pid>/task/<tid> check and the PTRACE_ATTACH.
2. Sibling threads could exit between listing /proc/<pid>/task and the
PTRACE_ATTACH.
Bug: http://b/29555636
Change-Id: I4dfe1ea30e2c211d2389321bd66e3684dd757591
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 10,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smp_fetch_url_port(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
struct http_txn *txn;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST();
txn = smp->strm->txn;
url2sa(txn->req.chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u, txn->req.sl.rq.u_l, &addr, NULL);
if (((struct sockaddr_in *)&addr)->sin_family != AF_INET)
return 0;
smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT;
smp->data.u.sint = ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)&addr)->sin_port);
smp->flags = 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 24,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UINT CSoundFile::GetSaveFormats() const
{
UINT n = 0;
if ((!m_nSamples) || (!m_nChannels) || (m_nType == MOD_TYPE_NONE)) return 0;
switch(m_nType)
{
case MOD_TYPE_MOD: n = MOD_TYPE_MOD;
case MOD_TYPE_S3M: n = MOD_TYPE_S3M;
}
n |= MOD_TYPE_XM | MOD_TYPE_IT;
if (!m_nInstruments)
{
if (m_nSamples < 32) n |= MOD_TYPE_MOD;
n |= MOD_TYPE_S3M;
}
return n;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ExecuteScrollPageForward(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
return frame.GetEventHandler().BubblingScroll(kScrollBlockDirectionForward,
kScrollByPage);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,694 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gx_ttfReader__Tell(ttfReader *self)
{
gx_ttfReader *r = (gx_ttfReader *)self;
return r->pos;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 10,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_port)
{
php_pgsql_get_link_info(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU,PHP_PG_PORT);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IW_IMPL(double) iw_convert_sample_to_linear(double v, const struct iw_csdescr *csdescr)
{
return (double)x_to_linear_sample(v,csdescr);
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 3,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void qeth_init_tokens(struct qeth_card *card)
{
card->token.issuer_rm_w = 0x00010103UL;
card->token.cm_filter_w = 0x00010108UL;
card->token.cm_connection_w = 0x0001010aUL;
card->token.ulp_filter_w = 0x0001010bUL;
card->token.ulp_connection_w = 0x0001010dUL;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const viz::FrameSinkId& RenderWidgetHostImpl::GetFrameSinkId() const {
return frame_sink_id_;
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int netlink_realloc_groups(struct sock *sk)
{
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
unsigned int groups;
unsigned long *new_groups;
int err = 0;
netlink_table_grab();
groups = nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].groups;
if (!nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].registered) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_unlock;
}
if (nlk->ngroups >= groups)
goto out_unlock;
new_groups = krealloc(nlk->groups, NLGRPSZ(groups), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (new_groups == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_unlock;
}
memset((char *)new_groups + NLGRPSZ(nlk->ngroups), 0,
NLGRPSZ(groups) - NLGRPSZ(nlk->ngroups));
nlk->groups = new_groups;
nlk->ngroups = groups;
out_unlock:
netlink_table_ungrab();
return err;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 13,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::CreateShaderHelper(GLenum type, GLuint client_id) {
if (GetShaderInfo(client_id)) {
return false;
}
GLuint service_id = glCreateShader(type);
if (service_id != 0) {
CreateShaderInfo(client_id, service_id, type);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: server_httperror_cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const struct http_error *ea = a;
const struct http_error *eb = b;
return (ea->error_code - eb->error_code);
}
Commit Message: Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@
CWE ID: CWE-770 | 0 | 1,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: device_job_cancel (Device *device,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context)
{
uid_t uid;
const gchar *action_id;
if (!device->priv->job_in_progress)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "There is no job to cancel");
goto out;
}
if (!device->priv->job_is_cancellable)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Job cannot be cancelled");
goto out;
}
daemon_local_get_uid (device->priv->daemon, &uid, context);
action_id = NULL;
if (device->priv->job_initiated_by_uid != uid)
{
action_id = "org.freedesktop.udisks.cancel-job-others";
}
daemon_local_check_auth (device->priv->daemon,
device,
action_id,
"JobCancel",
TRUE,
device_job_cancel_authorized_cb,
context,
0);
out:
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 24,581 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderLayerScrollableArea::userInputScrollable(ScrollbarOrientation orientation) const
{
if (box().isIntristicallyScrollable(orientation))
return true;
EOverflow overflowStyle = (orientation == HorizontalScrollbar) ?
box().style()->overflowX() : box().style()->overflowY();
return (overflowStyle == OSCROLL || overflowStyle == OAUTO || overflowStyle == OOVERLAY);
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 24,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint64_t Histogram::name_hash() const {
return samples_->id();
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 29,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface::getOwnPropertyDescriptor(JSObject* object, ExecState* exec, const Identifier& propertyName, PropertyDescriptor& descriptor)
{
JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface* thisObject = jsCast<JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface*>(object);
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(thisObject, &s_info);
return getStaticValueDescriptor<JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface, Base>(exec, &JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceTable, thisObject, propertyName, descriptor);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataImpl::OnInitCallback(
base::Optional<SiteCharacteristicsProto> db_site_characteristics) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
if (db_site_characteristics) {
auto this_features = GetAllFeaturesFromProto(&site_characteristics_);
auto db_features =
GetAllFeaturesFromProto(&db_site_characteristics.value());
auto this_features_iter = this_features.begin();
auto db_features_iter = db_features.begin();
for (; this_features_iter != this_features.end() &&
db_features_iter != db_features.end();
++this_features_iter, ++db_features_iter) {
if (!(*this_features_iter)->has_use_timestamp()) {
if ((*db_features_iter)->has_use_timestamp()) {
(*this_features_iter)
->set_use_timestamp((*db_features_iter)->use_timestamp());
(*this_features_iter)
->set_observation_duration(
LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataImpl::
TimeDeltaToInternalRepresentation(base::TimeDelta()));
} else {
if (!(*this_features_iter)->has_observation_duration()) {
(*this_features_iter)
->set_observation_duration(
LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataImpl::
TimeDeltaToInternalRepresentation(base::TimeDelta()));
}
IncrementFeatureObservationDuration(
(*this_features_iter),
InternalRepresentationToTimeDelta(
(*db_features_iter)->observation_duration()));
}
}
}
if (!site_characteristics_.has_last_loaded()) {
site_characteristics_.set_last_loaded(
db_site_characteristics->last_loaded());
}
} else {
InitWithDefaultValues(true /* only_init_uninitialized_fields */);
}
safe_to_write_to_db_ = true;
DCHECK(site_characteristics_.IsInitialized());
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::SetFocusedFrame(FrameTreeNode* node,
SiteInstance* source) {
SetAsFocusedWebContentsIfNecessary();
frame_tree_.SetFocusedFrame(node, source);
WebContentsImpl* inner_contents = node_.GetInnerWebContentsInFrame(node);
WebContentsImpl* contents_to_focus = inner_contents ? inner_contents : this;
contents_to_focus->SetAsFocusedWebContentsIfNecessary();
}
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int icmpv6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
struct inet6_dev *idev = __in6_dev_get(dev);
const struct in6_addr *saddr, *daddr;
struct icmp6hdr *hdr;
u8 type;
bool success = false;
if (!xfrm6_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) {
struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
int nh;
if (!(sp && sp->xvec[sp->len - 1]->props.flags &
XFRM_STATE_ICMP))
goto drop_no_count;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*hdr) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)))
goto drop_no_count;
nh = skb_network_offset(skb);
skb_set_network_header(skb, sizeof(*hdr));
if (!xfrm6_policy_check_reverse(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
goto drop_no_count;
skb_set_network_header(skb, nh);
}
__ICMP6_INC_STATS(dev_net(dev), idev, ICMP6_MIB_INMSGS);
saddr = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
daddr = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;
if (skb_checksum_validate(skb, IPPROTO_ICMPV6, ip6_compute_pseudo)) {
net_dbg_ratelimited("ICMPv6 checksum failed [%pI6c > %pI6c]\n",
saddr, daddr);
goto csum_error;
}
if (!pskb_pull(skb, sizeof(*hdr)))
goto discard_it;
hdr = icmp6_hdr(skb);
type = hdr->icmp6_type;
ICMP6MSGIN_INC_STATS(dev_net(dev), idev, type);
switch (type) {
case ICMPV6_ECHO_REQUEST:
icmpv6_echo_reply(skb);
break;
case ICMPV6_ECHO_REPLY:
success = ping_rcv(skb);
break;
case ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG:
/* BUGGG_FUTURE: if packet contains rthdr, we cannot update
standard destination cache. Seems, only "advanced"
destination cache will allow to solve this problem
--ANK (980726)
*/
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)))
goto discard_it;
hdr = icmp6_hdr(skb);
/*
* Drop through to notify
*/
case ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH:
case ICMPV6_TIME_EXCEED:
case ICMPV6_PARAMPROB:
icmpv6_notify(skb, type, hdr->icmp6_code, hdr->icmp6_mtu);
break;
case NDISC_ROUTER_SOLICITATION:
case NDISC_ROUTER_ADVERTISEMENT:
case NDISC_NEIGHBOUR_SOLICITATION:
case NDISC_NEIGHBOUR_ADVERTISEMENT:
case NDISC_REDIRECT:
ndisc_rcv(skb);
break;
case ICMPV6_MGM_QUERY:
igmp6_event_query(skb);
break;
case ICMPV6_MGM_REPORT:
igmp6_event_report(skb);
break;
case ICMPV6_MGM_REDUCTION:
case ICMPV6_NI_QUERY:
case ICMPV6_NI_REPLY:
case ICMPV6_MLD2_REPORT:
case ICMPV6_DHAAD_REQUEST:
case ICMPV6_DHAAD_REPLY:
case ICMPV6_MOBILE_PREFIX_SOL:
case ICMPV6_MOBILE_PREFIX_ADV:
break;
default:
/* informational */
if (type & ICMPV6_INFOMSG_MASK)
break;
net_dbg_ratelimited("icmpv6: msg of unknown type [%pI6c > %pI6c]\n",
saddr, daddr);
/*
* error of unknown type.
* must pass to upper level
*/
icmpv6_notify(skb, type, hdr->icmp6_code, hdr->icmp6_mtu);
}
/* until the v6 path can be better sorted assume failure and
* preserve the status quo behaviour for the rest of the paths to here
*/
if (success)
consume_skb(skb);
else
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
csum_error:
__ICMP6_INC_STATS(dev_net(dev), idev, ICMP6_MIB_CSUMERRORS);
discard_it:
__ICMP6_INC_STATS(dev_net(dev), idev, ICMP6_MIB_INERRORS);
drop_no_count:
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: handle no dst on skb in icmp6_send
Andrey reported the following while fuzzing the kernel with syzkaller:
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3859 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6+ #429
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff8800666d4200 task.stack: ffff880067348000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff833617ec>] [<ffffffff833617ec>]
icmp6_send+0x5fc/0x1e30 net/ipv6/icmp.c:451
RSP: 0018:ffff88006734f2c0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: ffff8800666d4200 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 0000000000000018
RBP: ffff88006734f630 R08: ffff880064138418 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffff84e7e200 R14: ffff880064138484 R15: ffff8800641383c0
FS: 00007fb3887a07c0(0000) GS:ffff88006cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 000000006b040000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Stack:
ffff8800666d4200 ffff8800666d49f8 ffff8800666d4200 ffffffff84c02460
ffff8800666d4a1a 1ffff1000ccdaa2f ffff88006734f498 0000000000000046
ffff88006734f440 ffffffff832f4269 ffff880064ba7456 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff83364ddc>] icmpv6_param_prob+0x2c/0x40 net/ipv6/icmp.c:557
[< inline >] ip6_tlvopt_unknown net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:88
[<ffffffff83394405>] ip6_parse_tlv+0x555/0x670 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:157
[<ffffffff8339a759>] ipv6_parse_hopopts+0x199/0x460 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:663
[<ffffffff832ee773>] ipv6_rcv+0xfa3/0x1dc0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:191
...
icmp6_send / icmpv6_send is invoked for both rx and tx paths. In both
cases the dst->dev should be preferred for determining the L3 domain
if the dst has been set on the skb. Fallback to the skb->dev if it has
not. This covers the case reported here where icmp6_send is invoked on
Rx before the route lookup.
Fixes: 5d41ce29e ("net: icmp6_send should use dst dev to determine L3 domain")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxViewViews::SetEmphasis(bool emphasize, const gfx::Range& range) {
SkColor color = location_bar_view_->GetColor(
emphasize ? OmniboxPart::LOCATION_BAR_TEXT_DEFAULT
: OmniboxPart::LOCATION_BAR_TEXT_DIMMED);
if (range.IsValid())
ApplyColor(color, range);
else
SetColor(color);
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 16,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tipc_nl_sk_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
int err;
struct tipc_sock *tsk;
const struct bucket_table *tbl;
struct rhash_head *pos;
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct tipc_net *tn = net_generic(net, tipc_net_id);
u32 tbl_id = cb->args[0];
u32 prev_portid = cb->args[1];
rcu_read_lock();
tbl = rht_dereference_rcu((&tn->sk_rht)->tbl, &tn->sk_rht);
for (; tbl_id < tbl->size; tbl_id++) {
rht_for_each_entry_rcu(tsk, pos, tbl, tbl_id, node) {
spin_lock_bh(&tsk->sk.sk_lock.slock);
if (prev_portid && prev_portid != tsk->portid) {
spin_unlock_bh(&tsk->sk.sk_lock.slock);
continue;
}
err = __tipc_nl_add_sk(skb, cb, tsk);
if (err) {
prev_portid = tsk->portid;
spin_unlock_bh(&tsk->sk.sk_lock.slock);
goto out;
}
prev_portid = 0;
spin_unlock_bh(&tsk->sk.sk_lock.slock);
}
}
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
cb->args[0] = tbl_id;
cb->args[1] = prev_portid;
return skb->len;
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HIDDetectionView* OobeUI::GetHIDDetectionView() {
return hid_detection_view_;
}
Commit Message: One polymer_config.js to rule them all.
R=michaelpg@chromium.org,fukino@chromium.org,mfoltz@chromium.org
BUG=425626
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1224783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#337882}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void manage_client_side_cookies(struct session *s, struct channel *req)
{
struct http_txn *txn = &s->txn;
int preserve_hdr;
int cur_idx, old_idx;
char *hdr_beg, *hdr_end, *hdr_next, *del_from;
char *prev, *att_beg, *att_end, *equal, *val_beg, *val_end, *next;
/* Iterate through the headers, we start with the start line. */
old_idx = 0;
hdr_next = req->buf->p + hdr_idx_first_pos(&txn->hdr_idx);
while ((cur_idx = txn->hdr_idx.v[old_idx].next)) {
struct hdr_idx_elem *cur_hdr;
int val;
cur_hdr = &txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx];
hdr_beg = hdr_next;
hdr_end = hdr_beg + cur_hdr->len;
hdr_next = hdr_end + cur_hdr->cr + 1;
/* We have one full header between hdr_beg and hdr_end, and the
* next header starts at hdr_next. We're only interested in
* "Cookie:" headers.
*/
val = http_header_match2(hdr_beg, hdr_end, "Cookie", 6);
if (!val) {
old_idx = cur_idx;
continue;
}
del_from = NULL; /* nothing to be deleted */
preserve_hdr = 0; /* assume we may kill the whole header */
/* Now look for cookies. Conforming to RFC2109, we have to support
* attributes whose name begin with a '$', and associate them with
* the right cookie, if we want to delete this cookie.
* So there are 3 cases for each cookie read :
* 1) it's a special attribute, beginning with a '$' : ignore it.
* 2) it's a server id cookie that we *MAY* want to delete : save
* some pointers on it (last semi-colon, beginning of cookie...)
* 3) it's an application cookie : we *MAY* have to delete a previous
* "special" cookie.
* At the end of loop, if a "special" cookie remains, we may have to
* remove it. If no application cookie persists in the header, we
* *MUST* delete it.
*
* Note: RFC2965 is unclear about the processing of spaces around
* the equal sign in the ATTR=VALUE form. A careful inspection of
* the RFC explicitly allows spaces before it, and not within the
* tokens (attrs or values). An inspection of RFC2109 allows that
* too but section 10.1.3 lets one think that spaces may be allowed
* after the equal sign too, resulting in some (rare) buggy
* implementations trying to do that. So let's do what servers do.
* Latest ietf draft forbids spaces all around. Also, earlier RFCs
* allowed quoted strings in values, with any possible character
* after a backslash, including control chars and delimitors, which
* causes parsing to become ambiguous. Browsers also allow spaces
* within values even without quotes.
*
* We have to keep multiple pointers in order to support cookie
* removal at the beginning, middle or end of header without
* corrupting the header. All of these headers are valid :
*
* Cookie:NAME1=VALUE1;NAME2=VALUE2;NAME3=VALUE3\r\n
* Cookie:NAME1=VALUE1;NAME2_ONLY ;NAME3=VALUE3\r\n
* Cookie: NAME1 = VALUE 1 ; NAME2 = VALUE2 ; NAME3 = VALUE3\r\n
* | | | | | | | | |
* | | | | | | | | hdr_end <--+
* | | | | | | | +--> next
* | | | | | | +----> val_end
* | | | | | +-----------> val_beg
* | | | | +--------------> equal
* | | | +----------------> att_end
* | | +---------------------> att_beg
* | +--------------------------> prev
* +--------------------------------> hdr_beg
*/
for (prev = hdr_beg + 6; prev < hdr_end; prev = next) {
/* Iterate through all cookies on this line */
/* find att_beg */
att_beg = prev + 1;
while (att_beg < hdr_end && http_is_spht[(unsigned char)*att_beg])
att_beg++;
/* find att_end : this is the first character after the last non
* space before the equal. It may be equal to hdr_end.
*/
equal = att_end = att_beg;
while (equal < hdr_end) {
if (*equal == '=' || *equal == ',' || *equal == ';')
break;
if (http_is_spht[(unsigned char)*equal++])
continue;
att_end = equal;
}
/* here, <equal> points to '=', a delimitor or the end. <att_end>
* is between <att_beg> and <equal>, both may be identical.
*/
/* look for end of cookie if there is an equal sign */
if (equal < hdr_end && *equal == '=') {
/* look for the beginning of the value */
val_beg = equal + 1;
while (val_beg < hdr_end && http_is_spht[(unsigned char)*val_beg])
val_beg++;
/* find the end of the value, respecting quotes */
next = find_cookie_value_end(val_beg, hdr_end);
/* make val_end point to the first white space or delimitor after the value */
val_end = next;
while (val_end > val_beg && http_is_spht[(unsigned char)*(val_end - 1)])
val_end--;
} else {
val_beg = val_end = next = equal;
}
/* We have nothing to do with attributes beginning with '$'. However,
* they will automatically be removed if a header before them is removed,
* since they're supposed to be linked together.
*/
if (*att_beg == '$')
continue;
/* Ignore cookies with no equal sign */
if (equal == next) {
/* This is not our cookie, so we must preserve it. But if we already
* scheduled another cookie for removal, we cannot remove the
* complete header, but we can remove the previous block itself.
*/
preserve_hdr = 1;
if (del_from != NULL) {
int delta = del_hdr_value(req->buf, &del_from, prev);
val_end += delta;
next += delta;
hdr_end += delta;
hdr_next += delta;
cur_hdr->len += delta;
http_msg_move_end(&txn->req, delta);
prev = del_from;
del_from = NULL;
}
continue;
}
/* if there are spaces around the equal sign, we need to
* strip them otherwise we'll get trouble for cookie captures,
* or even for rewrites. Since this happens extremely rarely,
* it does not hurt performance.
*/
if (unlikely(att_end != equal || val_beg > equal + 1)) {
int stripped_before = 0;
int stripped_after = 0;
if (att_end != equal) {
stripped_before = buffer_replace2(req->buf, att_end, equal, NULL, 0);
equal += stripped_before;
val_beg += stripped_before;
}
if (val_beg > equal + 1) {
stripped_after = buffer_replace2(req->buf, equal + 1, val_beg, NULL, 0);
val_beg += stripped_after;
stripped_before += stripped_after;
}
val_end += stripped_before;
next += stripped_before;
hdr_end += stripped_before;
hdr_next += stripped_before;
cur_hdr->len += stripped_before;
http_msg_move_end(&txn->req, stripped_before);
}
/* now everything is as on the diagram above */
/* First, let's see if we want to capture this cookie. We check
* that we don't already have a client side cookie, because we
* can only capture one. Also as an optimisation, we ignore
* cookies shorter than the declared name.
*/
if (s->fe->capture_name != NULL && txn->cli_cookie == NULL &&
(val_end - att_beg >= s->fe->capture_namelen) &&
memcmp(att_beg, s->fe->capture_name, s->fe->capture_namelen) == 0) {
int log_len = val_end - att_beg;
if ((txn->cli_cookie = pool_alloc2(pool2_capture)) == NULL) {
Alert("HTTP logging : out of memory.\n");
} else {
if (log_len > s->fe->capture_len)
log_len = s->fe->capture_len;
memcpy(txn->cli_cookie, att_beg, log_len);
txn->cli_cookie[log_len] = 0;
}
}
/* Persistence cookies in passive, rewrite or insert mode have the
* following form :
*
* Cookie: NAME=SRV[|<lastseen>[|<firstseen>]]
*
* For cookies in prefix mode, the form is :
*
* Cookie: NAME=SRV~VALUE
*/
if ((att_end - att_beg == s->be->cookie_len) && (s->be->cookie_name != NULL) &&
(memcmp(att_beg, s->be->cookie_name, att_end - att_beg) == 0)) {
struct server *srv = s->be->srv;
char *delim;
/* if we're in cookie prefix mode, we'll search the delimitor so that we
* have the server ID between val_beg and delim, and the original cookie between
* delim+1 and val_end. Otherwise, delim==val_end :
*
* Cookie: NAME=SRV; # in all but prefix modes
* Cookie: NAME=SRV~OPAQUE ; # in prefix mode
* | || || | |+-> next
* | || || | +--> val_end
* | || || +---------> delim
* | || |+------------> val_beg
* | || +-------------> att_end = equal
* | |+-----------------> att_beg
* | +------------------> prev
* +-------------------------> hdr_beg
*/
if (s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_PFX) {
for (delim = val_beg; delim < val_end; delim++)
if (*delim == COOKIE_DELIM)
break;
} else {
char *vbar1;
delim = val_end;
/* Now check if the cookie contains a date field, which would
* appear after a vertical bar ('|') just after the server name
* and before the delimiter.
*/
vbar1 = memchr(val_beg, COOKIE_DELIM_DATE, val_end - val_beg);
if (vbar1) {
/* OK, so left of the bar is the server's cookie and
* right is the last seen date. It is a base64 encoded
* 30-bit value representing the UNIX date since the
* epoch in 4-second quantities.
*/
int val;
delim = vbar1++;
if (val_end - vbar1 >= 5) {
val = b64tos30(vbar1);
if (val > 0)
txn->cookie_last_date = val << 2;
}
/* look for a second vertical bar */
vbar1 = memchr(vbar1, COOKIE_DELIM_DATE, val_end - vbar1);
if (vbar1 && (val_end - vbar1 > 5)) {
val = b64tos30(vbar1 + 1);
if (val > 0)
txn->cookie_first_date = val << 2;
}
}
}
/* if the cookie has an expiration date and the proxy wants to check
* it, then we do that now. We first check if the cookie is too old,
* then only if it has expired. We detect strict overflow because the
* time resolution here is not great (4 seconds). Cookies with dates
* in the future are ignored if their offset is beyond one day. This
* allows an admin to fix timezone issues without expiring everyone
* and at the same time avoids keeping unwanted side effects for too
* long.
*/
if (txn->cookie_first_date && s->be->cookie_maxlife &&
(((signed)(date.tv_sec - txn->cookie_first_date) > (signed)s->be->cookie_maxlife) ||
((signed)(txn->cookie_first_date - date.tv_sec) > 86400))) {
txn->flags &= ~TX_CK_MASK;
txn->flags |= TX_CK_OLD;
delim = val_beg; // let's pretend we have not found the cookie
txn->cookie_first_date = 0;
txn->cookie_last_date = 0;
}
else if (txn->cookie_last_date && s->be->cookie_maxidle &&
(((signed)(date.tv_sec - txn->cookie_last_date) > (signed)s->be->cookie_maxidle) ||
((signed)(txn->cookie_last_date - date.tv_sec) > 86400))) {
txn->flags &= ~TX_CK_MASK;
txn->flags |= TX_CK_EXPIRED;
delim = val_beg; // let's pretend we have not found the cookie
txn->cookie_first_date = 0;
txn->cookie_last_date = 0;
}
/* Here, we'll look for the first running server which supports the cookie.
* This allows to share a same cookie between several servers, for example
* to dedicate backup servers to specific servers only.
* However, to prevent clients from sticking to cookie-less backup server
* when they have incidentely learned an empty cookie, we simply ignore
* empty cookies and mark them as invalid.
* The same behaviour is applied when persistence must be ignored.
*/
if ((delim == val_beg) || (s->flags & (SN_IGNORE_PRST | SN_ASSIGNED)))
srv = NULL;
while (srv) {
if (srv->cookie && (srv->cklen == delim - val_beg) &&
!memcmp(val_beg, srv->cookie, delim - val_beg)) {
if ((srv->state != SRV_ST_STOPPED) ||
(s->be->options & PR_O_PERSIST) ||
(s->flags & SN_FORCE_PRST)) {
/* we found the server and we can use it */
txn->flags &= ~TX_CK_MASK;
txn->flags |= (srv->state != SRV_ST_STOPPED) ? TX_CK_VALID : TX_CK_DOWN;
s->flags |= SN_DIRECT | SN_ASSIGNED;
s->target = &srv->obj_type;
break;
} else {
/* we found a server, but it's down,
* mark it as such and go on in case
* another one is available.
*/
txn->flags &= ~TX_CK_MASK;
txn->flags |= TX_CK_DOWN;
}
}
srv = srv->next;
}
if (!srv && !(txn->flags & (TX_CK_DOWN|TX_CK_EXPIRED|TX_CK_OLD))) {
/* no server matched this cookie or we deliberately skipped it */
txn->flags &= ~TX_CK_MASK;
if ((s->flags & (SN_IGNORE_PRST | SN_ASSIGNED)))
txn->flags |= TX_CK_UNUSED;
else
txn->flags |= TX_CK_INVALID;
}
/* depending on the cookie mode, we may have to either :
* - delete the complete cookie if we're in insert+indirect mode, so that
* the server never sees it ;
* - remove the server id from the cookie value, and tag the cookie as an
* application cookie so that it does not get accidentely removed later,
* if we're in cookie prefix mode
*/
if ((s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_PFX) && (delim != val_end)) {
int delta; /* negative */
delta = buffer_replace2(req->buf, val_beg, delim + 1, NULL, 0);
val_end += delta;
next += delta;
hdr_end += delta;
hdr_next += delta;
cur_hdr->len += delta;
http_msg_move_end(&txn->req, delta);
del_from = NULL;
preserve_hdr = 1; /* we want to keep this cookie */
}
else if (del_from == NULL &&
(s->be->ck_opts & (PR_CK_INS | PR_CK_IND)) == (PR_CK_INS | PR_CK_IND)) {
del_from = prev;
}
} else {
/* This is not our cookie, so we must preserve it. But if we already
* scheduled another cookie for removal, we cannot remove the
* complete header, but we can remove the previous block itself.
*/
preserve_hdr = 1;
if (del_from != NULL) {
int delta = del_hdr_value(req->buf, &del_from, prev);
if (att_beg >= del_from)
att_beg += delta;
if (att_end >= del_from)
att_end += delta;
val_beg += delta;
val_end += delta;
next += delta;
hdr_end += delta;
hdr_next += delta;
cur_hdr->len += delta;
http_msg_move_end(&txn->req, delta);
prev = del_from;
del_from = NULL;
}
}
/* Look for the appsession cookie unless persistence must be ignored */
if (!(s->flags & SN_IGNORE_PRST) && (s->be->appsession_name != NULL)) {
int cmp_len, value_len;
char *value_begin;
if (s->be->options2 & PR_O2_AS_PFX) {
cmp_len = MIN(val_end - att_beg, s->be->appsession_name_len);
value_begin = att_beg + s->be->appsession_name_len;
value_len = val_end - att_beg - s->be->appsession_name_len;
} else {
cmp_len = att_end - att_beg;
value_begin = val_beg;
value_len = val_end - val_beg;
}
/* let's see if the cookie is our appcookie */
if (cmp_len == s->be->appsession_name_len &&
memcmp(att_beg, s->be->appsession_name, cmp_len) == 0) {
manage_client_side_appsession(s, value_begin, value_len);
}
}
/* continue with next cookie on this header line */
att_beg = next;
} /* for each cookie */
/* There are no more cookies on this line.
* We may still have one (or several) marked for deletion at the
* end of the line. We must do this now in two ways :
* - if some cookies must be preserved, we only delete from the
* mark to the end of line ;
* - if nothing needs to be preserved, simply delete the whole header
*/
if (del_from) {
int delta;
if (preserve_hdr) {
delta = del_hdr_value(req->buf, &del_from, hdr_end);
hdr_end = del_from;
cur_hdr->len += delta;
} else {
delta = buffer_replace2(req->buf, hdr_beg, hdr_next, NULL, 0);
/* FIXME: this should be a separate function */
txn->hdr_idx.v[old_idx].next = cur_hdr->next;
txn->hdr_idx.used--;
cur_hdr->len = 0;
cur_idx = old_idx;
}
hdr_next += delta;
http_msg_move_end(&txn->req, delta);
}
/* check next header */
old_idx = cur_idx;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int setcieabcspace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *r, int *stage, int *cont, int CIESubst)
{
int code = 0;
ref CIEDict, *nocie;
ulong dictkey;
gs_md5_state_t md5;
byte key[16];
if (i_ctx_p->language_level < 2)
return_error(gs_error_undefined);
code = dict_find_string(systemdict, "NOCIE", &nocie);
if (code > 0) {
if (!r_has_type(nocie, t_boolean))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
if (nocie->value.boolval)
return setrgbspace(i_ctx_p, r, stage, cont, 1);
}
*cont = 0;
code = array_get(imemory, r, 1, &CIEDict);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if ((*stage) > 0) {
gs_client_color cc;
int i;
cc.pattern = 0x00;
for (i=0;i<3;i++)
cc.paint.values[i] = 0;
code = gs_setcolor(igs, &cc);
*stage = 0;
return code;
}
gs_md5_init(&md5);
/* If the hash (dictkey) is 0, we don't check for an existing
* ICC profile dor this space. So if we get an error hashing
* the space, we construct a new profile.
*/
dictkey = 0;
if (hashcieabcspace(i_ctx_p, r, &md5)) {
/* Ideally we would use the whole md5 hash, but the ICC code only
* expects a long. I'm 'slightly' concerned about collisions here
* but I think its unlikely really. If it ever becomes a problem
* we could add the hash bytes up, or modify the ICC cache to store
* the full 16 byte hashs.
*/
gs_md5_finish(&md5, key);
dictkey = *(ulong *)&key[sizeof(key) - sizeof(ulong)];
} else {
gs_md5_finish(&md5, key);
}
code = cieabcspace(i_ctx_p, &CIEDict,dictkey);
*cont = 1;
(*stage)++;
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 8,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mux_exit_message(Channel *c, int exitval)
{
Buffer m;
Channel *mux_chan;
debug3("%s: channel %d: exit message, exitval %d", __func__, c->self,
exitval);
if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d",
__func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan);
/* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE);
buffer_put_int(&m, c->self);
buffer_put_int(&m, exitval);
buffer_put_string(&mux_chan->output, buffer_ptr(&m), buffer_len(&m));
buffer_free(&m);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 914 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vlan_dev_get_realdev_name(const struct net_device *dev, char *result)
{
strncpy(result, vlan_dev_info(dev)->real_dev->name, 23);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int smaps_rollup_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
int ret;
struct proc_maps_private *priv;
priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!priv)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = single_open(file, show_smaps_rollup, priv);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
priv->inode = inode;
priv->mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
if (IS_ERR(priv->mm)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(priv->mm);
single_release(inode, file);
goto out_free;
}
return 0;
out_free:
kfree(priv);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 4,026 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::setTitle(const String& title)
{
if (!isHTMLDocument() && !isXHTMLDocument()) {
m_titleElement = nullptr;
} else if (!m_titleElement) {
HTMLElement* headElement = head();
if (!headElement)
return;
m_titleElement = HTMLTitleElement::create(*this);
headElement->appendChild(m_titleElement.get());
}
if (isHTMLTitleElement(m_titleElement))
toHTMLTitleElement(m_titleElement)->setText(title);
else
updateTitle(title);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 16,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void update_meta_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, void *src, block_t blk_addr)
{
struct page *page = grab_meta_page(sbi, blk_addr);
void *dst = page_address(page);
if (src)
memcpy(dst, src, PAGE_SIZE);
else
memset(dst, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
set_page_dirty(page);
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 22,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MessageLoop::AddDestructionObserver(
DestructionObserver* destruction_observer) {
DCHECK_EQ(this, current());
destruction_observers_.AddObserver(destruction_observer);
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Downmix_foldGeneric(
uint32_t mask, int16_t *pSrc, int16_t*pDst, size_t numFrames, bool accumulate) {
if (!Downmix_validChannelMask(mask)) {
return false;
}
const bool hasSides = (mask & kSides) != 0;
const bool hasBacks = (mask & kBacks) != 0;
const int numChan = audio_channel_count_from_out_mask(mask);
const bool hasFC = ((mask & AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_FRONT_CENTER) == AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_FRONT_CENTER);
const bool hasLFE =
((mask & AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_LOW_FREQUENCY) == AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_LOW_FREQUENCY);
const bool hasBC = ((mask & AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_BACK_CENTER) == AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_BACK_CENTER);
const int indexFC = hasFC ? 2 : 1; // front center
const int indexLFE = hasLFE ? indexFC + 1 : indexFC; // low frequency
const int indexBL = hasBacks ? indexLFE + 1 : indexLFE; // back left
const int indexBR = hasBacks ? indexBL + 1 : indexBL; // back right
const int indexBC = hasBC ? indexBR + 1 : indexBR; // back center
const int indexSL = hasSides ? indexBC + 1 : indexBC; // side left
const int indexSR = hasSides ? indexSL + 1 : indexSL; // side right
int32_t lt, rt, centersLfeContrib; // samples in Q19.12 format
if (accumulate) {
while (numFrames) {
centersLfeContrib = 0;
if (hasFC) { centersLfeContrib += pSrc[indexFC]; }
if (hasLFE) { centersLfeContrib += pSrc[indexLFE]; }
if (hasBC) { centersLfeContrib += pSrc[indexBC]; }
centersLfeContrib *= MINUS_3_DB_IN_Q19_12;
lt = (pSrc[0] << 12);
rt = (pSrc[1] << 12);
if (hasSides) {
lt += pSrc[indexSL] << 12;
rt += pSrc[indexSR] << 12;
}
if (hasBacks) {
lt += pSrc[indexBL] << 12;
rt += pSrc[indexBR] << 12;
}
lt += centersLfeContrib;
rt += centersLfeContrib;
pDst[0] = clamp16(pDst[0] + (lt >> 13));
pDst[1] = clamp16(pDst[1] + (rt >> 13));
pSrc += numChan;
pDst += 2;
numFrames--;
}
} else {
while (numFrames) {
centersLfeContrib = 0;
if (hasFC) { centersLfeContrib += pSrc[indexFC]; }
if (hasLFE) { centersLfeContrib += pSrc[indexLFE]; }
if (hasBC) { centersLfeContrib += pSrc[indexBC]; }
centersLfeContrib *= MINUS_3_DB_IN_Q19_12;
lt = (pSrc[0] << 12);
rt = (pSrc[1] << 12);
if (hasSides) {
lt += pSrc[indexSL] << 12;
rt += pSrc[indexSR] << 12;
}
if (hasBacks) {
lt += pSrc[indexBL] << 12;
rt += pSrc[indexBR] << 12;
}
lt += centersLfeContrib;
rt += centersLfeContrib;
pDst[0] = clamp16(lt >> 13); // differs from when accumulate is true above
pDst[1] = clamp16(rt >> 13); // differs from when accumulate is true above
pSrc += numChan;
pDst += 2;
numFrames--;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking to Downmix and Reverb
Bug: 63662938
Bug: 63526567
Test: Added CTS tests
Change-Id: I8ed398cd62a9f461b0590e37f593daa3d8e4dbc4
(cherry picked from commit 804632afcdda6e80945bf27c384757bda50560cb)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void stringAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setStringAttribute(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8(
"ӏ > l; [кĸκ] > k; п > n; [ƅь] > b; в > b; м > m; н > h; "
"т > t; [шщ] > w; ട > s;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Add more confusable character map entries
When comparing domain names with top 10k domain names for confusability,
characters with diacritics are decomposed into base + diacritic marks
(Unicode Normalization Form D) and diacritics are dropped before
calculating the confusability skeleton because two characters with and
without a diacritics is NOT regarded as confusable.
However, there are a dozen of characters (most of them are Cyrillic)
with a diacritic-like mark attached but they are not decomposed into
base + diacritics by NFD (e.g. U+049B, қ; Cyrillic Small Letter Ka
with Descender). This CL treats them the same way as their "base"
characters. For instance, қ (U+049B) is treated as confusable with
Latin k because к (U+043A; Cyrillic Small Letter Ka) is.
They're curated from the following sets:
[:IdentifierStatus=Allowed:] & [:Ll:] &
[[:sc=Cyrillic:] -
[[\u01cd-\u01dc][\u1c80-\u1c8f][\u1e00-\u1e9b][\u1f00-\u1fff]
[\ua640-\ua69f][\ua720-\ua7ff]]] &
[:NFD_Inert=Yes:]
[:IdentifierStatus=Allowed:] & [:Ll:] &
[[:sc=Latin:] - [[\u01cd-\u01dc][\u1e00-\u1e9b][\ua720-\ua7ff]]] &
[:NFD_Inert=Yes:]
[:IdentifierStatus=Allowed:] & [:Ll:] & [[:sc=Greek:]] &
[:NFD_Inert=Yes:]
Bug: 793628,798892
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I20c6af13defa295f6952f33d75987e87ce1853d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/860567
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529129}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static WORD32 ihevcd_parse_vui_parameters(bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm,
vui_t *ps_vui,
WORD32 sps_max_sub_layers_minus1)
{
WORD32 ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
BITS_PARSE("aspect_ratio_info_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_aspect_ratio_info_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u1_aspect_ratio_idc = SAR_UNUSED;
ps_vui->u2_sar_width = 0;
ps_vui->u2_sar_height = 0;
if(ps_vui->u1_aspect_ratio_info_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("aspect_ratio_idc", ps_vui->u1_aspect_ratio_idc, ps_bitstrm, 8);
if(ps_vui->u1_aspect_ratio_idc == EXTENDED_SAR)
{
BITS_PARSE("sar_width", ps_vui->u2_sar_width, ps_bitstrm, 16);
BITS_PARSE("sar_height", ps_vui->u2_sar_height, ps_bitstrm, 16);
}
}
BITS_PARSE("overscan_info_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_overscan_info_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u1_overscan_appropriate_flag = 0;
if(ps_vui->u1_overscan_info_present_flag)
BITS_PARSE("overscan_appropriate_flag", ps_vui->u1_overscan_appropriate_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("video_signal_type_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_video_signal_type_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u1_video_format = VID_FMT_UNSPECIFIED;
ps_vui->u1_video_full_range_flag = 0;
ps_vui->u1_colour_description_present_flag = 0;
ps_vui->u1_colour_primaries = 2;
ps_vui->u1_transfer_characteristics = 2;
ps_vui->u1_matrix_coefficients = 2;
if(ps_vui->u1_video_signal_type_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("video_format", ps_vui->u1_video_format, ps_bitstrm, 3);
BITS_PARSE("video_full_range_flag", ps_vui->u1_video_full_range_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("colour_description_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_colour_description_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
if(ps_vui->u1_colour_description_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("colour_primaries", ps_vui->u1_colour_primaries, ps_bitstrm, 8);
BITS_PARSE("transfer_characteristics", ps_vui->u1_transfer_characteristics, ps_bitstrm, 8);
BITS_PARSE("matrix_coeffs", ps_vui->u1_matrix_coefficients, ps_bitstrm, 8);
}
}
BITS_PARSE("chroma_loc_info_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_chroma_loc_info_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u1_chroma_sample_loc_type_top_field = 0;
ps_vui->u1_chroma_sample_loc_type_bottom_field = 0;
if(ps_vui->u1_chroma_loc_info_present_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("chroma_sample_loc_type_top_field", ps_vui->u1_chroma_sample_loc_type_top_field, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("chroma_sample_loc_type_bottom_field", ps_vui->u1_chroma_sample_loc_type_bottom_field, ps_bitstrm);
}
BITS_PARSE("neutral_chroma_indication_flag", ps_vui->u1_neutral_chroma_indication_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("field_seq_flag", ps_vui->u1_field_seq_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("frame_field_info_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_frame_field_info_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("default_display_window_flag", ps_vui->u1_default_display_window_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_left_offset = 0;
ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_right_offset = 0;
ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_top_offset = 0;
ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_bottom_offset = 0;
if(ps_vui->u1_default_display_window_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("def_disp_win_left_offset", ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_left_offset, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("def_disp_win_right_offset", ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_right_offset, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("def_disp_win_top_offset", ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_top_offset, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("def_disp_win_bottom_offset", ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_bottom_offset, ps_bitstrm);
}
BITS_PARSE("vui_timing_info_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_vui_timing_info_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
if(ps_vui->u1_vui_timing_info_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("vui_num_units_in_tick", ps_vui->u4_vui_num_units_in_tick, ps_bitstrm, 32);
BITS_PARSE("vui_time_scale", ps_vui->u4_vui_time_scale, ps_bitstrm, 32);
BITS_PARSE("vui_poc_proportional_to_timing_flag", ps_vui->u1_poc_proportional_to_timing_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
if(ps_vui->u1_poc_proportional_to_timing_flag)
UEV_PARSE("vui_num_ticks_poc_diff_one_minus1", ps_vui->u1_num_ticks_poc_diff_one_minus1, ps_bitstrm);
BITS_PARSE("vui_hrd_parameters_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_vui_hrd_parameters_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
if(ps_vui->u1_vui_hrd_parameters_present_flag)
ihevcd_parse_hrd_parameters(ps_bitstrm, &ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters, 1, sps_max_sub_layers_minus1);
}
BITS_PARSE("bitstream_restriction_flag", ps_vui->u1_bitstream_restriction_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u1_tiles_fixed_structure_flag = 0;
ps_vui->u1_motion_vectors_over_pic_boundaries_flag = 1;
ps_vui->u1_restricted_ref_pic_lists_flag = 0;
ps_vui->u4_min_spatial_segmentation_idc = 0;
ps_vui->u1_max_bytes_per_pic_denom = 2;
ps_vui->u1_max_bits_per_mincu_denom = 1;
ps_vui->u1_log2_max_mv_length_horizontal = 15;
ps_vui->u1_log2_max_mv_length_vertical = 15;
if(ps_vui->u1_bitstream_restriction_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("tiles_fixed_structure_flag", ps_vui->u1_tiles_fixed_structure_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("motion_vectors_over_pic_boundaries_flag", ps_vui->u1_motion_vectors_over_pic_boundaries_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("restricted_ref_pic_lists_flag", ps_vui->u1_restricted_ref_pic_lists_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
UEV_PARSE("min_spatial_segmentation_idc", ps_vui->u4_min_spatial_segmentation_idc, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("max_bytes_per_pic_denom", ps_vui->u1_max_bytes_per_pic_denom, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("max_bits_per_min_cu_denom", ps_vui->u1_max_bits_per_mincu_denom, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("log2_max_mv_length_horizontal", ps_vui->u1_log2_max_mv_length_horizontal, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("log2_max_mv_length_vertical", ps_vui->u1_log2_max_mv_length_vertical, ps_bitstrm);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Correct Tiles rows and cols check
Bug: 36231493
Bug: 34064500
Change-Id: Ib17b2c68360685c5a2c019e1497612a130f9f76a
(cherry picked from commit 07ef4e7138e0e13d61039530358343a19308b188)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsURLHandledByDefaultLoader(const GURL& url) {
return IsURLHandledByNetworkService(url) || url.SchemeIs(url::kDataScheme);
}
Commit Message: Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,246 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void debugfs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
clear_inode(inode);
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
kfree(inode->i_link);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ConnectionFilterImpl(
const service_manager::Identity& child_identity,
std::unique_ptr<service_manager::BinderRegistry> registry)
: child_identity_(child_identity),
registry_(std::move(registry)),
controller_(new ConnectionFilterController(this)),
weak_factory_(this) {
thread_checker_.DetachFromThread();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 8,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dumpV8Message(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Message> message)
{
if (message.IsEmpty())
return;
message->GetScriptOrigin();
v8::Maybe<int> unused = message->GetLineNumber(context);
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(unused);
v8::Local<v8::Value> resourceName = message->GetScriptOrigin().ResourceName();
String fileName = "Unknown JavaScript file";
if (!resourceName.IsEmpty() && resourceName->IsString())
fileName = toCoreString(v8::Local<v8::String>::Cast(resourceName));
int lineNumber = 0;
v8Call(message->GetLineNumber(context), lineNumber);
v8::Local<v8::String> errorMessage = message->Get();
fprintf(stderr, "%s (line %d): %s\n", fileName.utf8().data(), lineNumber, toCoreString(errorMessage).utf8().data());
}
Commit Message: Blink-in-JS should not run micro tasks
If Blink-in-JS runs micro tasks, there's a risk of causing a UXSS bug
(see 645211 for concrete steps).
This CL makes Blink-in-JS use callInternalFunction (instead of callFunction)
to avoid running micro tasks after Blink-in-JS' callbacks.
BUG=645211
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2330843002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#417874}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 13,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlFatalErrMsgInt(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserErrors error,
const char *msg, int val)
{
if ((ctxt != NULL) && (ctxt->disableSAX != 0) &&
(ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF))
return;
if (ctxt != NULL)
ctxt->errNo = error;
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
ctxt, NULL, XML_FROM_PARSER, error, XML_ERR_FATAL,
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, val, 0, msg, val);
if (ctxt != NULL) {
ctxt->wellFormed = 0;
if (ctxt->recovery == 0)
ctxt->disableSAX = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 9,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableVideoFullscreenDetection(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetVideoFullscreenDetectionEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 20,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static EVP_PKEY * php_openssl_evp_from_zval(zval ** val, int public_key, char * passphrase, int makeresource, long * resourceval TSRMLS_DC)
{
EVP_PKEY * key = NULL;
X509 * cert = NULL;
int free_cert = 0;
long cert_res = -1;
char * filename = NULL;
zval tmp;
Z_TYPE(tmp) = IS_NULL;
#define TMP_CLEAN \
if (Z_TYPE(tmp) == IS_STRING) {\
zval_dtor(&tmp); \
} \
return NULL;
if (resourceval) {
*resourceval = -1;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(val) == IS_ARRAY) {
zval ** zphrase;
/* get passphrase */
if (zend_hash_index_find(HASH_OF(*val), 1, (void **)&zphrase) == FAILURE) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "key array must be of the form array(0 => key, 1 => phrase)");
return NULL;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(zphrase) == IS_STRING) {
passphrase = Z_STRVAL_PP(zphrase);
} else {
tmp = **zphrase;
zval_copy_ctor(&tmp);
convert_to_string(&tmp);
passphrase = Z_STRVAL(tmp);
}
/* now set val to be the key param and continue */
if (zend_hash_index_find(HASH_OF(*val), 0, (void **)&val) == FAILURE) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "key array must be of the form array(0 => key, 1 => phrase)");
TMP_CLEAN;
}
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(val) == IS_RESOURCE) {
void * what;
int type;
what = zend_fetch_resource(val TSRMLS_CC, -1, "OpenSSL X.509/key", &type, 2, le_x509, le_key);
if (!what) {
TMP_CLEAN;
}
if (resourceval) {
*resourceval = Z_LVAL_PP(val);
}
if (type == le_x509) {
/* extract key from cert, depending on public_key param */
cert = (X509*)what;
free_cert = 0;
} else if (type == le_key) {
int is_priv;
is_priv = php_openssl_is_private_key((EVP_PKEY*)what TSRMLS_CC);
/* check whether it is actually a private key if requested */
if (!public_key && !is_priv) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "supplied key param is a public key");
TMP_CLEAN;
}
if (public_key && is_priv) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Don't know how to get public key from this private key");
TMP_CLEAN;
} else {
if (Z_TYPE(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
zval_dtor(&tmp);
}
/* got the key - return it */
return (EVP_PKEY*)what;
}
} else {
/* other types could be used here - eg: file pointers and read in the data from them */
TMP_CLEAN;
}
} else {
/* force it to be a string and check if it refers to a file */
/* passing non string values leaks, object uses toString, it returns NULL
* See bug38255.phpt
*/
if (!(Z_TYPE_PP(val) == IS_STRING || Z_TYPE_PP(val) == IS_OBJECT)) {
TMP_CLEAN;
}
convert_to_string_ex(val);
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(val) > 7 && memcmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(val), "file://", sizeof("file://") - 1) == 0) {
filename = Z_STRVAL_PP(val) + (sizeof("file://") - 1);
}
/* it's an X509 file/cert of some kind, and we need to extract the data from that */
if (public_key) {
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(val, 0, &cert_res TSRMLS_CC);
free_cert = (cert_res == -1);
/* actual extraction done later */
if (!cert) {
/* not a X509 certificate, try to retrieve public key */
BIO* in;
if (filename) {
in = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
} else {
in = BIO_new_mem_buf(Z_STRVAL_PP(val), Z_STRLEN_PP(val));
}
if (in == NULL) {
TMP_CLEAN;
}
key = PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(in, NULL,NULL, NULL);
BIO_free(in);
}
} else {
/* we want the private key */
BIO *in;
if (filename) {
if (php_openssl_safe_mode_chk(filename TSRMLS_CC)) {
TMP_CLEAN;
}
in = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
} else {
in = BIO_new_mem_buf(Z_STRVAL_PP(val), Z_STRLEN_PP(val));
}
if (in == NULL) {
TMP_CLEAN;
}
key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL,NULL, passphrase);
BIO_free(in);
}
}
if (public_key && cert && key == NULL) {
/* extract public key from X509 cert */
key = (EVP_PKEY *) X509_get_pubkey(cert);
}
if (free_cert && cert) {
X509_free(cert);
}
if (key && makeresource && resourceval) {
*resourceval = ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(NULL, key, le_key);
}
if (Z_TYPE(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
zval_dtor(&tmp);
}
return key;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerStreamURL(const KURL& url, const String& type)
{
if (isMainThread()) {
blobRegistry().registerStreamURL(url, type);
} else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url, type));
callOnMainThread(®isterStreamURLTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 1 | 18,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Part::Part(QWidget *parentWidget, QObject *parent, const QVariantList& args)
: KParts::ReadWritePart(parent),
m_splitter(Q_NULLPTR),
m_busy(false),
m_jobTracker(Q_NULLPTR)
{
Q_UNUSED(args)
KAboutData aboutData(QStringLiteral("ark"),
i18n("ArkPart"),
QStringLiteral("3.0"));
setComponentData(aboutData, false);
new DndExtractAdaptor(this);
const QString pathName = QStringLiteral("/DndExtract/%1").arg(s_instanceCounter++);
if (!QDBusConnection::sessionBus().registerObject(pathName, this)) {
qCCritical(ARK) << "Could not register a D-Bus object for drag'n'drop";
}
QWidget *mainWidget = new QWidget;
m_vlayout = new QVBoxLayout;
m_model = new ArchiveModel(pathName, this);
m_splitter = new QSplitter(Qt::Horizontal, parentWidget);
m_view = new ArchiveView;
m_infoPanel = new InfoPanel(m_model);
m_commentView = new QPlainTextEdit();
m_commentView->setReadOnly(true);
m_commentView->setFont(QFontDatabase::systemFont(QFontDatabase::FixedFont));
m_commentBox = new QGroupBox(i18n("Comment"));
m_commentBox->hide();
QVBoxLayout *vbox = new QVBoxLayout;
vbox->addWidget(m_commentView);
m_commentBox->setLayout(vbox);
m_messageWidget = new KMessageWidget(parentWidget);
m_messageWidget->setWordWrap(true);
m_messageWidget->hide();
m_commentMsgWidget = new KMessageWidget();
m_commentMsgWidget->setText(i18n("Comment has been modified."));
m_commentMsgWidget->setMessageType(KMessageWidget::Information);
m_commentMsgWidget->setCloseButtonVisible(false);
m_commentMsgWidget->hide();
QAction *saveAction = new QAction(i18n("Save"), m_commentMsgWidget);
m_commentMsgWidget->addAction(saveAction);
connect(saveAction, &QAction::triggered, this, &Part::slotAddComment);
m_commentBox->layout()->addWidget(m_commentMsgWidget);
connect(m_commentView, &QPlainTextEdit::textChanged, this, &Part::slotCommentChanged);
setWidget(mainWidget);
mainWidget->setLayout(m_vlayout);
m_vlayout->setContentsMargins(0,0,0,0);
m_vlayout->addWidget(m_messageWidget);
m_vlayout->addWidget(m_splitter);
m_commentSplitter = new QSplitter(Qt::Vertical, parentWidget);
m_commentSplitter->setOpaqueResize(false);
m_commentSplitter->addWidget(m_view);
m_commentSplitter->addWidget(m_commentBox);
m_commentSplitter->setCollapsible(0, false);
m_splitter->addWidget(m_commentSplitter);
m_splitter->addWidget(m_infoPanel);
if (!ArkSettings::showInfoPanel()) {
m_infoPanel->hide();
} else {
m_splitter->setSizes(ArkSettings::splitterSizes());
}
setupView();
setupActions();
connect(m_view, &ArchiveView::entryChanged,
this, &Part::slotRenameFile);
connect(m_model, &ArchiveModel::loadingStarted,
this, &Part::slotLoadingStarted);
connect(m_model, &ArchiveModel::loadingFinished,
this, &Part::slotLoadingFinished);
connect(m_model, &ArchiveModel::droppedFiles,
this, static_cast<void (Part::*)(const QStringList&, const Archive::Entry*, const QString&)>(&Part::slotAddFiles));
connect(m_model, &ArchiveModel::error,
this, &Part::slotError);
connect(m_model, &ArchiveModel::messageWidget,
this, &Part::displayMsgWidget);
connect(this, &Part::busy,
this, &Part::setBusyGui);
connect(this, &Part::ready,
this, &Part::setReadyGui);
connect(this, static_cast<void (KParts::ReadOnlyPart::*)()>(&KParts::ReadOnlyPart::completed),
this, &Part::setFileNameFromArchive);
m_statusBarExtension = new KParts::StatusBarExtension(this);
setXMLFile(QStringLiteral("ark_part.rc"));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 26,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string GetInputValue(RenderFrameHostImpl* frame) {
std::string result;
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecuteScriptAndExtractString(
frame, "window.domAutomationController.send(input.value);", &result));
return result;
}
Commit Message: Avoid sharing process for blob URLs with null origin.
Previously, when a frame with a unique origin, such as from a data
URL, created a blob URL, the blob URL looked like blob:null/guid and
resulted in a site URL of "blob:" when navigated to. This incorrectly
allowed all such blob URLs to share a process, even if they were
created by different sites.
This CL changes the site URL assigned in such cases to be the full
blob URL, which includes the GUID. This avoids process sharing for
all blob URLs with unique origins.
This fix is conservative in the sense that it would also isolate
different blob URLs created by the same unique origin from each other.
This case isn't expected to be common, so it's unlikely to affect
process count. There's ongoing work to maintain a GUID for unique
origins, so longer-term, we could try using that to track down the
creator and potentially use that GUID in the site URL instead of the
blob URL's GUID, to avoid unnecessary process isolation in scenarios
like this.
Note that as part of this, we discovered a bug where data URLs aren't
able to script blob URLs that they create: https://crbug.com/865254.
This scripting bug should be fixed independently of this CL, and as
far as we can tell, this CL doesn't regress scripting cases like this
further.
Bug: 863623
Change-Id: Ib50407adbba3d5ee0cf6d72d3df7f8d8f24684ee
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142389
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576318}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 23,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t ImageProcessorClient::GetErrorCount() const {
base::AutoLock auto_lock_(output_lock_);
return image_processor_error_count_;
}
Commit Message: media/gpu/test: ImageProcessorClient: Use bytes for width and height in libyuv::CopyPlane()
|width| is in bytes in libyuv::CopyPlane(). We formerly pass width in pixels.
This should matter when a pixel format is used whose pixel is composed of
more than one bytes.
Bug: None
Test: image_processor_test
Change-Id: I98e90be70c8d0128319172d4d19f3a8017b65d78
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1553129
Commit-Queue: Hirokazu Honda <hiroh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#648117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,971 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ext4_falloc_update_inode(struct inode *inode,
int mode, loff_t new_size, int update_ctime)
{
struct timespec now;
if (update_ctime) {
now = current_fs_time(inode->i_sb);
if (!timespec_equal(&inode->i_ctime, &now))
inode->i_ctime = now;
}
/*
* Update only when preallocation was requested beyond
* the file size.
*/
if (!(mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE)) {
if (new_size > i_size_read(inode))
i_size_write(inode, new_size);
if (new_size > EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize)
ext4_update_i_disksize(inode, new_size);
} else {
/*
* Mark that we allocate beyond EOF so the subsequent truncate
* can proceed even if the new size is the same as i_size.
*/
if (new_size > i_size_read(inode))
ext4_set_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EOFBLOCKS);
}
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int in_set_format(struct audio_stream *stream, audio_format_t format)
{
(void)stream;
(void)format;
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 20,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline FDrive *drv0(FDCtrl *fdctrl)
{
return &fdctrl->drives[(fdctrl->tdr & FD_TDR_BOOTSEL) >> 2];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *csv_escape_str(AVBPrint *dst, const char *src, const char sep, void *log_ctx)
{
char meta_chars[] = { sep, '"', '\n', '\r', '\0' };
int needs_quoting = !!src[strcspn(src, meta_chars)];
if (needs_quoting)
av_bprint_chars(dst, '"', 1);
for (; *src; src++) {
if (*src == '"')
av_bprint_chars(dst, '"', 1);
av_bprint_chars(dst, *src, 1);
}
if (needs_quoting)
av_bprint_chars(dst, '"', 1);
return dst->str;
}
Commit Message: ffprobe: Fix null pointer dereference with color primaries
Found-by: AD-lab of venustech
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 3,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err tfdt_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_TFBaseMediaDecodeTimeBox *ptr = (GF_TFBaseMediaDecodeTimeBox*) a;
if (!a) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "TrackFragmentBaseMediaDecodeTimeBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "baseMediaDecodeTime=\""LLD"\">\n", ptr->baseMediaDecodeTime);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("TrackFragmentBaseMediaDecodeTimeBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 10,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void voidMethodDoubleArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("voidMethodDoubleArg", "TestObjectPython", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(double, doubleArg, static_cast<double>(info[0]->NumberValue()));
imp->voidMethodDoubleArg(doubleArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PDFiumEngine::OnChar(const pp::KeyboardInputEvent& event) {
if (last_page_mouse_down_ == -1)
return false;
base::string16 str = base::UTF8ToUTF16(event.GetCharacterText().AsString());
return !!FORM_OnChar(
form_, pages_[last_page_mouse_down_]->GetPage(),
str[0],
event.GetModifiers());
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 8,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
int ret = -1;
int new_state, state, skip = 0;
RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
/* init things to blank */
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
SSL_clear(s);
if (s->cert == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
return (-1);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/*
* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
* don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
* handshakes anyway.
*/
if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
}
#endif
for (;;) {
state = s->state;
switch (s->state) {
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->renegotiate = 1;
/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
s->server = 1;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf = buf;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
s->init_num = 0;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/*
* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
*/
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
/*
* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
* output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
*/
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
} else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
!(s->options &
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
/*
* Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
* support secure renegotiation.
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
} else {
/*
* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
* HelloRequest
*/
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
s->shutdown = 0;
ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num = 0;
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
s->shutdown = 0;
ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
{
int al;
if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
/*
* callback indicates firther work to be done
*/
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
goto end;
}
if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
/*
* This is not really an error but the only means to for
* a client to detect whether srp is supported.
*/
if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
}
#endif
s->renegotiate = 2;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->hit) {
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
}
#else
if (s->hit)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
#endif
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
/* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
if (!
(s->s3->tmp.
new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
SSL_aSRP))
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
} else {
skip = 1;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
#else
} else
skip = 1;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
#endif
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/*
* clear this, it may get reset by
* send_server_key_exchange
*/
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
/*
* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
* sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
* ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
* the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
* the server certificate contains the server's public key for
* key exchange.
*/
if (0
/*
* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
* provided
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
|| (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
#endif
|| (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
|| (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
)
)
)
) {
ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
} else
skip = 1;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
/*
* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
* during re-negotiation:
*/
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
/*
* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
* section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
* RFC 2246):
*/
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
/*
* ... except when the application insists on
* verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
* this for SSL 3)
*/
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
/*
* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
*/
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
/*
* With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
* are omitted
*/
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
/* no cert request */
skip = 1;
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
}
} else {
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
#else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
#endif
s->init_num = 0;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
/*
* This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
* using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
* documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
* resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
* BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
* unconditionally.
*/
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
}
s->init_num = 0;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 2) {
/*
* For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
* pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
* not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
* its key from the certificate for key exchange.
*/
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
s->init_num = 0;
} else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num = 0;
if (!s->session->peer)
break;
/*
* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
* digest cached records.
*/
if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
} else {
int offset = 0;
int dgst_num;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num = 0;
/*
* We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
* it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
* CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
* step
*/
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
}
for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
int dgst_size;
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
EVP_MD_CTX_type
(s->
s3->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num]),
&(s->s3->
tmp.cert_verify_md
[offset]));
dgst_size =
EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
if (dgst_size < 0) {
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
offset += dgst_size;
}
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
s->init_num = 0;
break;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
/*
* Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
* first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
* cautious.
* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
* processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
* the client's Finished message is read.
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->init_num = 0;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
/*
* Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
* already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
* processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
* the client's Finished message is read.
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
#endif
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num = 0;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
{
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
s->method->
ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
s->method->
ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit) {
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
} else
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
} else
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf = NULL;
/* remove buffering on output */
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num = 0;
if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
* HelloRequest */
s->renegotiate = 0;
s->new_session = 0;
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
/* s->server=1; */
s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
}
ret = 1;
goto end;
/* break; */
case SSL_ST_ERR:
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret = -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
if (s->debug) {
if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
new_state = s->state;
s->state = state;
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
s->state = new_state;
}
}
skip = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 13,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void udp_v4_early_demux(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
const struct iphdr *iph;
const struct udphdr *uh;
struct sock *sk;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int dif = skb->dev->ifindex;
/* validate the packet */
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb) + sizeof(struct udphdr)))
return;
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
uh = udp_hdr(skb);
if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_BROADCAST ||
skb->pkt_type == PACKET_MULTICAST)
sk = __udp4_lib_mcast_demux_lookup(net, uh->dest, iph->daddr,
uh->source, iph->saddr, dif);
else if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_HOST)
sk = __udp4_lib_demux_lookup(net, uh->dest, iph->daddr,
uh->source, iph->saddr, dif);
else
return;
if (!sk)
return;
skb->sk = sk;
skb->destructor = sock_efree;
dst = sk->sk_rx_dst;
if (dst)
dst = dst_check(dst, 0);
if (dst)
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, dst);
}
Commit Message: udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums
We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :
1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()
2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.
This patch is an attempt to make things better.
We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void addrconf_cleanup(void)
{
struct net_device *dev;
int i;
unregister_netdevice_notifier(&ipv6_dev_notf);
unregister_pernet_subsys(&addrconf_ops);
ipv6_addr_label_cleanup();
rtnl_lock();
__rtnl_af_unregister(&inet6_ops);
/* clean dev list */
for_each_netdev(&init_net, dev) {
if (__in6_dev_get(dev) == NULL)
continue;
addrconf_ifdown(dev, 1);
}
addrconf_ifdown(init_net.loopback_dev, 2);
/*
* Check hash table.
*/
spin_lock_bh(&addrconf_hash_lock);
for (i = 0; i < IN6_ADDR_HSIZE; i++)
WARN_ON(!hlist_empty(&inet6_addr_lst[i]));
spin_unlock_bh(&addrconf_hash_lock);
cancel_delayed_work(&addr_chk_work);
rtnl_unlock();
destroy_workqueue(addrconf_wq);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ApiTestBase::SetUp() {
ModuleSystemTest::SetUp();
test_env_.reset(new ApiTestEnvironment(env()));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_wddx_pop_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name)
{
st_entry *ent1, *ent2;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
HashTable *target_hash;
zend_class_entry **pce;
zval *obj;
zval *tmp;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
if (stack->top == 0) {
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRING) || !strcmp(name, EL_NUMBER) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_BOOLEAN) || !strcmp(name, EL_NULL) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_ARRAY) || !strcmp(name, EL_STRUCT) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_RECORDSET) || !strcmp(name, EL_BINARY) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_DATETIME)) {
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent1);
if (!ent1->data) {
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
efree(ent1);
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_BINARY)) {
int new_len=0;
unsigned char *new_str;
new_str = php_base64_decode(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data), &new_len);
STR_FREE(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data));
if (new_str) {
Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data) = new_str;
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) = new_len;
} else {
ZVAL_EMPTY_STRING(ent1->data);
}
}
/* Call __wakeup() method on the object. */
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zval *fname, *retval = NULL;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(fname);
ZVAL_STRING(fname, "__wakeup", 1);
call_user_function_ex(NULL, &ent1->data, fname, &retval, 0, 0, 0, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(fname);
FREE_ZVAL(fname);
if (retval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent2);
/* if non-existent field */
if (ent2->data == NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY || Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
target_hash = HASH_OF(ent2->data);
if (ent1->varname) {
if (!strcmp(ent1->varname, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR) &&
Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) &&
ent2->type == ST_STRUCT && Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_bool incomplete_class = 0;
zend_str_tolower(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
if (zend_hash_find(EG(class_table), Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data),
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data)+1, (void **) &pce)==FAILURE) {
incomplete_class = 1;
pce = &PHP_IC_ENTRY;
}
if (pce != &PHP_IC_ENTRY && ((*pce)->serialize || (*pce)->unserialize)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent2->data);
ent2->data = NULL;
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Class %s can not be unserialized", Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data));
} else {
/* Initialize target object */
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(obj);
object_init_ex(obj, *pce);
/* Merge current hashtable with object's default properties */
zend_hash_merge(Z_OBJPROP_P(obj),
Z_ARRVAL_P(ent2->data),
(void (*)(void *)) zval_add_ref,
(void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *), 0);
if (incomplete_class) {
php_store_class_name(obj, Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
}
/* Clean up old array entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent2->data);
/* Set stack entry to point to the newly created object */
ent2->data = obj;
}
/* Clean up class name var entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_class_entry *old_scope = EG(scope);
EG(scope) = Z_OBJCE_P(ent2->data);
Z_DELREF_P(ent1->data);
add_property_zval(ent2->data, ent1->varname, ent1->data);
EG(scope) = old_scope;
} else {
zend_symtable_update(target_hash, ent1->varname, strlen(ent1->varname)+1, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
efree(ent1->varname);
} else {
zend_hash_next_index_insert(target_hash, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
}
efree(ent1);
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_VAR) && stack->varname) {
efree(stack->varname);
stack->varname = NULL;
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_FIELD)) {
st_entry *ent;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void **)&ent);
efree(ent);
stack->top--;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73631 - Invalid read when wddx decodes empty boolean element
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 14,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::PropagateBrowserCommandLineToRenderer(
const base::CommandLine& browser_cmd,
base::CommandLine* renderer_cmd) {
static const char* const kSwitchNames[] = {
service_manager::switches::kDisableInProcessStackTraces,
service_manager::switches::kDisableSeccompFilterSandbox,
switches::kAgcStartupMinVolume,
switches::kAecRefinedAdaptiveFilter,
switches::kAllowLoopbackInPeerConnection,
switches::kAndroidFontsPath,
switches::kAudioBufferSize,
switches::kAutoplayPolicy,
switches::kBlinkSettings,
switches::kDefaultTileWidth,
switches::kDefaultTileHeight,
switches::kDisable2dCanvasImageChromium,
switches::kDisableAcceleratedJpegDecoding,
switches::kDisableAcceleratedVideoDecode,
switches::kDisableBackgroundTimerThrottling,
switches::kDisableBreakpad,
switches::kDisableCompositorUkmForTests,
switches::kDisablePreferCompositingToLCDText,
switches::kDisableDatabases,
switches::kDisableDistanceFieldText,
switches::kDisableFileSystem,
switches::kDisableGpuMemoryBufferVideoFrames,
switches::kDisableGpuVsync,
switches::kDisableLowResTiling,
switches::kDisableHistogramCustomizer,
switches::kDisableLCDText,
switches::kDisableLogging,
switches::kDisableMediaSuspend,
switches::kDisableNotifications,
switches::kDisableOriginTrialControlledBlinkFeatures,
switches::kDisablePepper3DImageChromium,
switches::kDisablePermissionsAPI,
switches::kDisablePresentationAPI,
switches::kDisableRGBA4444Textures,
switches::kDisableRTCSmoothnessAlgorithm,
switches::kDisableSharedWorkers,
switches::kDisableSkiaRuntimeOpts,
switches::kDisableSpeechAPI,
switches::kDisableThreadedCompositing,
switches::kDisableThreadedScrolling,
switches::kDisableTouchAdjustment,
switches::kDisableTouchDragDrop,
switches::kDisableV8IdleTasks,
switches::kDisableWebGLImageChromium,
switches::kDomAutomationController,
switches::kEnableAutomation,
switches::kEnableDistanceFieldText,
switches::kEnableExperimentalCanvasFeatures,
switches::kEnableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures,
switches::kEnableHeapProfiling,
switches::kEnableGPUClientLogging,
switches::kEnableGpuClientTracing,
switches::kEnableGpuMemoryBufferVideoFrames,
switches::kEnableGPUServiceLogging,
switches::kEnableLowResTiling,
switches::kEnableMediaSuspend,
switches::kEnableInbandTextTracks,
switches::kEnableLCDText,
switches::kEnableLogging,
switches::kEnableNetworkInformationDownlinkMax,
switches::kEnableOOPRasterization,
switches::kEnablePluginPlaceholderTesting,
switches::kEnablePreciseMemoryInfo,
switches::kEnablePrintBrowser,
switches::kEnablePreferCompositingToLCDText,
switches::kEnableRGBA4444Textures,
switches::kEnableSkiaBenchmarking,
switches::kEnableSlimmingPaintV175,
switches::kEnableSlimmingPaintV2,
switches::kEnableThreadedCompositing,
switches::kEnableTouchDragDrop,
switches::kEnableUseZoomForDSF,
switches::kEnableViewport,
switches::kEnableVtune,
switches::kEnableWebGLDraftExtensions,
switches::kEnableWebGLImageChromium,
switches::kEnableWebVR,
switches::kExplicitlyAllowedPorts,
switches::kForceColorProfile,
switches::kForceDeviceScaleFactor,
switches::kForceGpuMemAvailableMb,
switches::kForceGpuRasterization,
switches::kForceOverlayFullscreenVideo,
switches::kForceVideoOverlays,
switches::kFullMemoryCrashReport,
switches::kIPCConnectionTimeout,
switches::kJavaScriptFlags,
switches::kLoggingLevel,
switches::kMaxUntiledLayerWidth,
switches::kMaxUntiledLayerHeight,
switches::kDisableMojoLocalStorage,
switches::kMSEAudioBufferSizeLimit,
switches::kMSEVideoBufferSizeLimit,
switches::kNoReferrers,
switches::kNoSandbox,
switches::kNoZygote,
switches::kOverridePluginPowerSaverForTesting,
switches::kPassiveListenersDefault,
switches::kPpapiInProcess,
switches::kReducedReferrerGranularity,
switches::kRegisterPepperPlugins,
switches::kRendererStartupDialog,
switches::kRootLayerScrolls,
switches::kShowPaintRects,
switches::kStatsCollectionController,
switches::kTestType,
switches::kTouchEventFeatureDetection,
switches::kTouchTextSelectionStrategy,
switches::kTraceConfigFile,
switches::kTraceToConsole,
switches::kUseFakeUIForMediaStream,
switches::kUseGL,
switches::kUseGpuInTests,
switches::kUseMobileUserAgent,
switches::kV,
switches::kVideoThreads,
switches::kVideoUnderflowThresholdMs,
switches::kVModule,
cc::switches::kDisableCompositedAntialiasing,
cc::switches::kDisableThreadedAnimation,
cc::switches::kEnableGpuBenchmarking,
cc::switches::kEnableLayerLists,
cc::switches::kEnableTileCompression,
cc::switches::kShowCompositedLayerBorders,
cc::switches::kShowFPSCounter,
cc::switches::kShowLayerAnimationBounds,
cc::switches::kShowPropertyChangedRects,
cc::switches::kShowScreenSpaceRects,
cc::switches::kShowSurfaceDamageRects,
cc::switches::kSlowDownRasterScaleFactor,
cc::switches::kBrowserControlsHideThreshold,
cc::switches::kBrowserControlsShowThreshold,
cc::switches::kRunAllCompositorStagesBeforeDraw,
switches::kDisableSurfaceReferences,
switches::kEnableSurfaceSynchronization,
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
switches::kEnablePepperTesting,
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_RUNTIME_MEDIA_RENDERER_SELECTION)
switches::kDisableMojoRenderer,
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
switches::kDisableWebRtcHWDecoding,
switches::kDisableWebRtcHWEncoding,
switches::kEnableWebRtcSrtpAesGcm,
switches::kEnableWebRtcSrtpEncryptedHeaders,
switches::kEnableWebRtcStunOrigin,
switches::kEnforceWebRtcIPPermissionCheck,
switches::kWebRtcMaxCaptureFramerate,
#endif
switches::kEnableLowEndDeviceMode,
switches::kDisableLowEndDeviceMode,
switches::kDisallowNonExactResourceReuse,
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
switches::kDisableMediaSessionAPI,
switches::kMadviseRandomExecutableCode,
switches::kRendererWaitForJavaDebugger,
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
switches::kEnableSandboxLogging,
#endif
#if defined(OS_WIN)
service_manager::switches::kDisableWin32kLockDown,
switches::kEnableWin7WebRtcHWH264Decoding,
switches::kTrySupportedChannelLayouts,
switches::kTraceExportEventsToETW,
#endif
#if defined(USE_OZONE)
switches::kOzonePlatform,
#endif
#if defined(ENABLE_IPC_FUZZER)
switches::kIpcDumpDirectory,
switches::kIpcFuzzerTestcase,
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MUS)
switches::kMus,
switches::kMusHostingViz,
#endif
};
renderer_cmd->CopySwitchesFrom(browser_cmd, kSwitchNames,
arraysize(kSwitchNames));
BrowserChildProcessHostImpl::CopyFeatureAndFieldTrialFlags(renderer_cmd);
if (browser_cmd.HasSwitch(switches::kTraceStartup) &&
BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()->is_tracing_startup_for_duration()) {
renderer_cmd->AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kTraceStartup,
browser_cmd.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kTraceStartup));
}
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
if (!has_done_stun_trials &&
browser_cmd.HasSwitch(switches::kWebRtcStunProbeTrialParameter)) {
has_done_stun_trials = true;
renderer_cmd->AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kWebRtcStunProbeTrialParameter,
browser_cmd.GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kWebRtcStunProbeTrialParameter));
}
#endif
if (GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord() &&
!browser_cmd.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableDatabases)) {
renderer_cmd->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableDatabases);
}
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID) && !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
#if !BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MUS)
if (ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance()->IsGpuCompositingDisabled())
renderer_cmd->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuCompositing);
#else
#endif
#endif
if (browser_cmd.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) {
std::string value =
browser_cmd.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren);
if (value.empty() || value == switches::kRendererProcess) {
renderer_cmd->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger);
}
}
DCHECK(child_connection_);
renderer_cmd->AppendSwitchASCII(service_manager::switches::kServicePipeToken,
child_connection_->service_token());
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(OFFICIAL_BUILD)
if (renderer_cmd->HasSwitch(switches::kRendererStartupDialog) &&
!renderer_cmd->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
renderer_cmd->AppendSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox);
}
#endif
CopyFeatureSwitch(browser_cmd, renderer_cmd, switches::kEnableBlinkFeatures);
CopyFeatureSwitch(browser_cmd, renderer_cmd, switches::kDisableBlinkFeatures);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 7,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PostScript_MetaHandler::ExtractContainsXMPHint(IOBuffer &ioBuf,XMP_Int64 containsXMPStartpos)
{
XMP_IO* fileRef = this->parent->ioRef;
int xmpHint = kPSHint_NoMain; // ! From here on, a failure means "no main", not "no marker".
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 1 ) ) return false;
if ( ! IsSpaceOrTab ( *ioBuf.ptr ) ) return false;
if ( ! PostScript_Support::SkipTabsAndSpaces(fileRef,ioBuf) ) return false;
if ( IsNewline ( *ioBuf.ptr ) ) return false; // Reached the end of the ContainsXMP comment.
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 6 ) ) return false ;
if ( CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("NoMain"), 6 ) )
{
ioBuf.ptr += 6;
if ( ! PostScript_Support::SkipTabsAndSpaces(fileRef,ioBuf) ) return false;
if ( ! IsNewline( *ioBuf.ptr) ) return false;
this->psHint = kPSHint_NoMain;
setTokenInfo(kPS_ADOContainsXMP,containsXMPStartpos,ioBuf.filePos+ioBuf.ptr-ioBuf.data-containsXMPStartpos);
}
else if ( CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("MainFi"), 6 ) )
{
ioBuf.ptr += 6;
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 3 ) ) return false;
if ( CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("rst"), 3 ) )
{
ioBuf.ptr += 3;
if ( ! PostScript_Support::SkipTabsAndSpaces(fileRef,ioBuf) ) return false;
if ( ! IsNewline( *ioBuf.ptr) ) return false;
this->psHint = kPSHint_MainFirst;
setTokenInfo(kPS_ADOContainsXMP,containsXMPStartpos,ioBuf.filePos+ioBuf.ptr-ioBuf.data-containsXMPStartpos);
containsXMPHint=true;
}
}
else if ( CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("MainLa"), 6 ) )
{
ioBuf.ptr += 6;
if ( ! CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, &ioBuf, 2 ) ) return false;
if ( CheckBytes ( ioBuf.ptr, Uns8Ptr("st"), 2 ) ) {
ioBuf.ptr += 2;
if ( ! PostScript_Support::SkipTabsAndSpaces(fileRef,ioBuf) ) return false;
if ( ! IsNewline( *ioBuf.ptr) ) return false;
this->psHint = kPSHint_MainLast;
setTokenInfo(kPS_ADOContainsXMP,containsXMPStartpos,ioBuf.filePos+ioBuf.ptr-ioBuf.data-containsXMPStartpos);
containsXMPHint=true;
}
}
else
{
if ( ! PostScript_Support::SkipUntilNewline(fileRef,ioBuf) ) return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 13,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void PrintTime(u64 time)
{
u32 ms, h, m, s;
h = (u32) (time / 1000 / 3600);
m = (u32) (time / 1000 / 60 - h*60);
s = (u32) (time / 1000 - h*3600 - m*60);
ms = (u32) (time - (h*3600 + m*60 + s) * 1000);
fprintf(stderr, "%02d:%02d:%02d.%03d", h, m, s, ms);
}
Commit Message: add some boundary checks on gf_text_get_utf8_line (#1188)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 24,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int load_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 selector, int seg)
{
struct desc_struct seg_desc;
u8 dpl, rpl, cpl;
unsigned err_vec = GP_VECTOR;
u32 err_code = 0;
bool null_selector = !(selector & ~0x3); /* 0000-0003 are null */
int ret;
memset(&seg_desc, 0, sizeof seg_desc);
if ((seg <= VCPU_SREG_GS && ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_VM86)
|| ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL) {
/* set real mode segment descriptor */
set_desc_base(&seg_desc, selector << 4);
set_desc_limit(&seg_desc, 0xffff);
seg_desc.type = 3;
seg_desc.p = 1;
seg_desc.s = 1;
goto load;
}
/* NULL selector is not valid for TR, CS and SS */
if ((seg == VCPU_SREG_CS || seg == VCPU_SREG_SS || seg == VCPU_SREG_TR)
&& null_selector)
goto exception;
/* TR should be in GDT only */
if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR && (selector & (1 << 2)))
goto exception;
if (null_selector) /* for NULL selector skip all following checks */
goto load;
ret = read_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector, &seg_desc);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
err_code = selector & 0xfffc;
err_vec = GP_VECTOR;
/* can't load system descriptor into segment selecor */
if (seg <= VCPU_SREG_GS && !seg_desc.s)
goto exception;
if (!seg_desc.p) {
err_vec = (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS) ? SS_VECTOR : NP_VECTOR;
goto exception;
}
rpl = selector & 3;
dpl = seg_desc.dpl;
cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
switch (seg) {
case VCPU_SREG_SS:
/*
* segment is not a writable data segment or segment
* selector's RPL != CPL or segment selector's RPL != CPL
*/
if (rpl != cpl || (seg_desc.type & 0xa) != 0x2 || dpl != cpl)
goto exception;
break;
case VCPU_SREG_CS:
if (!(seg_desc.type & 8))
goto exception;
if (seg_desc.type & 4) {
/* conforming */
if (dpl > cpl)
goto exception;
} else {
/* nonconforming */
if (rpl > cpl || dpl != cpl)
goto exception;
}
/* CS(RPL) <- CPL */
selector = (selector & 0xfffc) | cpl;
break;
case VCPU_SREG_TR:
if (seg_desc.s || (seg_desc.type != 1 && seg_desc.type != 9))
goto exception;
break;
case VCPU_SREG_LDTR:
if (seg_desc.s || seg_desc.type != 2)
goto exception;
break;
default: /* DS, ES, FS, or GS */
/*
* segment is not a data or readable code segment or
* ((segment is a data or nonconforming code segment)
* and (both RPL and CPL > DPL))
*/
if ((seg_desc.type & 0xa) == 0x8 ||
(((seg_desc.type & 0xc) != 0xc) &&
(rpl > dpl && cpl > dpl)))
goto exception;
break;
}
if (seg_desc.s) {
/* mark segment as accessed */
seg_desc.type |= 1;
ret = write_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector, &seg_desc);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
}
load:
ctxt->ops->set_segment(ctxt, selector, &seg_desc, 0, seg);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
exception:
emulate_exception(ctxt, err_vec, err_code, true);
return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sas_get_phy_change_count(struct domain_device *dev,
int phy_id, int *pcc)
{
int res;
struct smp_resp *disc_resp;
disc_resp = alloc_smp_resp(DISCOVER_RESP_SIZE);
if (!disc_resp)
return -ENOMEM;
res = sas_get_phy_discover(dev, phy_id, disc_resp);
if (!res)
*pcc = disc_resp->disc.change_count;
kfree(disc_resp);
return res;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: fix memory leak in sas_smp_get_phy_events()
We've got a memory leak with the following producer:
while true;
do cat /sys/class/sas_phy/phy-1:0:12/invalid_dword_count >/dev/null;
done
The buffer req is allocated and not freed after we return. Fix it.
Fixes: 2908d778ab3e ("[SCSI] aic94xx: new driver")
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: chenqilin <chenqilin2@huawei.com>
CC: chenxiang <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 9,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int big_key_gen_enckey(u8 *key)
{
return crypto_rng_get_bytes(big_key_rng, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisation
big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the
key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to
register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because
there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type.
However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not,
big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code
neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type.
Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is
theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the
crypto is set up, leading to the same effect.
Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling
the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we
shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the
encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the
crypto initialisation.
The fix also includes message printing on failure.
If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing:
dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s
ought to cause an oops.
Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted')
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Peter Hlavaty <zer0mem@yahoo.com>
cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
cc: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 7,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nfc_llcp_unregister_device(struct nfc_dev *dev)
{
struct nfc_llcp_local *local = nfc_llcp_find_local(dev);
if (local == NULL) {
pr_debug("No such device\n");
return;
}
local_cleanup(local);
nfc_llcp_local_put(local);
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 13,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputDispatcher::doNotifyANRLockedInterruptible(
CommandEntry* commandEntry) {
mLock.unlock();
nsecs_t newTimeout = mPolicy->notifyANR(
commandEntry->inputApplicationHandle, commandEntry->inputWindowHandle,
commandEntry->reason);
mLock.lock();
resumeAfterTargetsNotReadyTimeoutLocked(newTimeout,
commandEntry->inputWindowHandle != NULL
? commandEntry->inputWindowHandle->getInputChannel() : NULL);
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplDoublyLinkedList, push)
{
zval *value;
spl_dllist_object *intern;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "z", &value) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern = Z_SPLDLLIST_P(getThis());
spl_ptr_llist_push(intern->llist, value);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #71735: Double-free in SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 13,683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void brcmf_link_down(struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif *vif, u16 reason)
{
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = wiphy_to_cfg(vif->wdev.wiphy);
s32 err = 0;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Enter\n");
if (test_and_clear_bit(BRCMF_VIF_STATUS_CONNECTED, &vif->sme_state)) {
brcmf_dbg(INFO, "Call WLC_DISASSOC to stop excess roaming\n ");
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_data_set(vif->ifp,
BRCMF_C_DISASSOC, NULL, 0);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("WLC_DISASSOC failed (%d)\n", err);
}
if ((vif->wdev.iftype == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION) ||
(vif->wdev.iftype == NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_CLIENT))
cfg80211_disconnected(vif->wdev.netdev, reason, NULL, 0,
true, GFP_KERNEL);
}
clear_bit(BRCMF_VIF_STATUS_CONNECTING, &vif->sme_state);
clear_bit(BRCMF_SCAN_STATUS_SUPPRESS, &cfg->scan_status);
brcmf_btcoex_set_mode(vif, BRCMF_BTCOEX_ENABLED, 0);
if (vif->profile.use_fwsup != BRCMF_PROFILE_FWSUP_NONE) {
brcmf_set_pmk(vif->ifp, NULL, 0);
vif->profile.use_fwsup = BRCMF_PROFILE_FWSUP_NONE;
}
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Exit\n");
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: fix possible buffer overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx()
The lower level nl80211 code in cfg80211 ensures that "len" is between
25 and NL80211_ATTR_FRAME (2304). We subtract DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN (24) from
"len" so thats's max of 2280. However, the action_frame->data[] buffer is
only BRCMF_FIL_ACTION_FRAME_SIZE (1800) bytes long so this memcpy() can
overflow.
memcpy(action_frame->data, &buf[DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN],
le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len));
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9.x
Fixes: 18e2f61db3b70 ("brcmfmac: P2P action frame tx.")
Reported-by: "freenerguo(郭大兴)" <freenerguo@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_get_notify)
{
zval *pgsql_link;
int id = -1;
long result_type = PGSQL_ASSOC;
PGconn *pgsql;
PGnotify *pgsql_notify;
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r|l",
&pgsql_link, &result_type) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
if (!(result_type & PGSQL_BOTH)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid result type");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PQconsumeInput(pgsql);
pgsql_notify = PQnotifies(pgsql);
if (!pgsql_notify) {
/* no notify message */
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
if (result_type & PGSQL_NUM) {
add_index_string(return_value, 0, pgsql_notify->relname, 1);
add_index_long(return_value, 1, pgsql_notify->be_pid);
#if HAVE_PQPROTOCOLVERSION && HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
if (PQprotocolVersion(pgsql) >= 3 && atof(PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "server_version")) >= 9.0) {
#else
if (atof(PG_VERSION) >= 9.0) {
#endif
#if HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
add_index_string(return_value, 2, pgsql_notify->extra, 1);
#endif
}
}
if (result_type & PGSQL_ASSOC) {
add_assoc_string(return_value, "message", pgsql_notify->relname, 1);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "pid", pgsql_notify->be_pid);
#if HAVE_PQPROTOCOLVERSION && HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
if (PQprotocolVersion(pgsql) >= 3 && atof(PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "server_version")) >= 9.0) {
#else
if (atof(PG_VERSION) >= 9.0) {
#endif
#if HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
add_assoc_string(return_value, "payload", pgsql_notify->extra, 1);
#endif
}
}
PQfreemem(pgsql_notify);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int pg_get_pid([resource connection)
Get backend(server) pid */
PHP_FUNCTION(pg_get_pid)
{
zval *pgsql_link;
int id = -1;
PGconn *pgsql;
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r",
&pgsql_link) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
RETURN_LONG(PQbackendPID(pgsql));
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ php_pgsql_meta_data
* TODO: Add meta_data cache for better performance
*/
PHP_PGSQL_API int php_pgsql_meta_data(PGconn *pg_link, const char *table_name, zval *meta TSRMLS_DC)
{
PGresult *pg_result;
char *src, *tmp_name, *tmp_name2 = NULL;
char *escaped;
smart_str querystr = {0};
size_t new_len;
int i, num_rows;
zval *elem;
if (!*table_name) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The table name must be specified");
return FAILURE;
}
src = estrdup(table_name);
tmp_name = php_strtok_r(src, ".", &tmp_name2);
if (!tmp_name2 || !*tmp_name2) {
/* Default schema */
tmp_name2 = tmp_name;
"SELECT a.attname, a.attnum, t.typname, a.attlen, a.attnotnull, a.atthasdef, a.attndims, t.typtype = 'e' "
"FROM pg_class as c, pg_attribute a, pg_type t, pg_namespace n "
"WHERE a.attnum > 0 AND a.attrelid = c.oid AND c.relname = '");
escaped = (char *)safe_emalloc(strlen(tmp_name2), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, escaped, tmp_name2, strlen(tmp_name2), NULL);
if (new_len) {
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, escaped, new_len);
}
efree(escaped);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "' AND c.relnamespace = n.oid AND n.nspname = '");
escaped = (char *)safe_emalloc(strlen(tmp_name), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, escaped, tmp_name, strlen(tmp_name), NULL);
if (new_len) {
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, escaped, new_len);
}
efree(escaped);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "' AND a.atttypid = t.oid ORDER BY a.attnum;");
smart_str_0(&querystr);
efree(src);
pg_result = PQexec(pg_link, querystr.c);
if (PQresultStatus(pg_result) != PGRES_TUPLES_OK || (num_rows = PQntuples(pg_result)) == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Table '%s' doesn't exists", table_name);
smart_str_free(&querystr);
PQclear(pg_result);
return FAILURE;
}
smart_str_free(&querystr);
for (i = 0; i < num_rows; i++) {
char *name;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(elem);
array_init(elem);
add_assoc_long(elem, "num", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,1)));
add_assoc_string(elem, "type", PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,2), 1);
add_assoc_long(elem, "len", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,3)));
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,4), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "not null", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "not null", 0);
}
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,5), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "has default", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "has default", 0);
}
add_assoc_long(elem, "array dims", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,6)));
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,7), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "is enum", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "is enum", 0);
}
name = PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,0);
add_assoc_zval(meta, name, elem);
}
PQclear(pg_result);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 1 | 4,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MyOggExtractor::init() {
mMeta = new MetaData;
mMeta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, mMimeType);
status_t err;
MediaBuffer *packet;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mNumHeaders; ++i) {
if ((err = _readNextPacket(&packet, /* calcVorbisTimestamp = */ false)) != OK) {
return err;
}
ALOGV("read packet of size %zu\n", packet->range_length());
err = verifyHeader(packet, /* type = */ i * 2 + 1);
packet->release();
packet = NULL;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
mFirstDataOffset = mOffset + mCurrentPageSize;
off64_t size;
uint64_t lastGranulePosition;
if (!(mSource->flags() & DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)
&& mSource->getSize(&size) == OK
&& findPrevGranulePosition(size, &lastGranulePosition) == OK) {
int64_t durationUs = getTimeUsOfGranule(lastGranulePosition);
mMeta->setInt64(kKeyDuration, durationUs);
buildTableOfContents();
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix memory leak in OggExtractor
Test: added a temporal log and run poc
Bug: 63581671
Change-Id: I436a08e54d5e831f9fbdb33c26d15397ce1fbeba
(cherry picked from commit 63079e7c8e12cda4eb124fbe565213d30b9ea34c)
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 20,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::prepareForDestruction()
{
disconnectDescendantFrames();
if (!confusingAndOftenMisusedAttached())
return;
if (DOMWindow* window = this->domWindow())
window->willDetachDocumentFromFrame();
detach();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring)
{
struct key *keyring;
int bucket;
if (!name)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
bucket = keyring_hash(name);
read_lock(&keyring_name_lock);
if (keyring_name_hash[bucket].next) {
/* search this hash bucket for a keyring with a matching name
* that's readable and that hasn't been revoked */
list_for_each_entry(keyring,
&keyring_name_hash[bucket],
name_link
) {
if (!kuid_has_mapping(current_user_ns(), keyring->user->uid))
continue;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
continue;
if (strcmp(keyring->description, name) != 0)
continue;
if (uid_keyring) {
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING,
&keyring->flags))
continue;
} else {
if (key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
continue;
}
/* we've got a match but we might end up racing with
* key_cleanup() if the keyring is currently 'dead'
* (ie. it has a zero usage count) */
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&keyring->usage))
continue;
keyring->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
goto out;
}
}
keyring = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
out:
read_unlock(&keyring_name_lock);
return keyring;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proc_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
const struct seq_operations *ops, int psize)
{
struct proc_maps_private *priv = __seq_open_private(file, ops, psize);
if (!priv)
return -ENOMEM;
priv->inode = inode;
priv->mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
if (IS_ERR(priv->mm)) {
int err = PTR_ERR(priv->mm);
seq_release_private(inode, file);
return err;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.
This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.
[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
this is the simple model. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 19,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void radeon_restore_bios_scratch_regs(struct radeon_device *rdev)
{
uint32_t scratch_reg;
int i;
if (rdev->family >= CHIP_R600)
scratch_reg = R600_BIOS_0_SCRATCH;
else
scratch_reg = RADEON_BIOS_0_SCRATCH;
for (i = 0; i < RADEON_BIOS_NUM_SCRATCH; i++)
WREG32(scratch_reg + (i * 4), rdev->bios_scratch[i]);
}
Commit Message: drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_atombios.c: range check issues
This change makes the array larger, "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2" is 3
and the original size "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING" is 2.
Also there were checks that were off by one.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexdeucher@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: send_smtp_trap(const char *node, const char *rsc, const char *task, int target_rc, int rc,
int status, const char *desc)
{
#if ENABLE_ESMTP
smtp_session_t session;
smtp_message_t message;
auth_context_t authctx;
struct sigaction sa;
int len = 20;
int noauth = 1;
int smtp_debug = LOG_DEBUG;
char crm_mail_body[BODY_MAX];
char *crm_mail_subject = NULL;
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(struct sigaction));
if (node == NULL) {
node = "-";
}
if (rsc == NULL) {
rsc = "-";
}
if (desc == NULL) {
desc = "-";
}
if (crm_mail_to == NULL) {
return 1;
}
if (crm_mail_host == NULL) {
crm_mail_host = "localhost:25";
}
if (crm_mail_prefix == NULL) {
crm_mail_prefix = "Cluster notification";
}
crm_debug("Sending '%s' mail to %s via %s", crm_mail_prefix, crm_mail_to, crm_mail_host);
len += strlen(crm_mail_prefix);
len += strlen(task);
len += strlen(rsc);
len += strlen(node);
len += strlen(desc);
len++;
crm_mail_subject = calloc(1, len);
snprintf(crm_mail_subject, len, "%s - %s event for %s on %s: %s\r\n", crm_mail_prefix, task,
rsc, node, desc);
len = 0;
len += snprintf(crm_mail_body + len, BODY_MAX - len, "\r\n%s\r\n", crm_mail_prefix);
len += snprintf(crm_mail_body + len, BODY_MAX - len, "====\r\n\r\n");
if (rc == target_rc) {
len += snprintf(crm_mail_body + len, BODY_MAX - len,
"Completed operation %s for resource %s on %s\r\n", task, rsc, node);
} else {
len += snprintf(crm_mail_body + len, BODY_MAX - len,
"Operation %s for resource %s on %s failed: %s\r\n", task, rsc, node, desc);
}
len += snprintf(crm_mail_body + len, BODY_MAX - len, "\r\nDetails:\r\n");
len += snprintf(crm_mail_body + len, BODY_MAX - len,
"\toperation status: (%d) %s\r\n", status, services_lrm_status_str(status));
if (status == PCMK_LRM_OP_DONE) {
len += snprintf(crm_mail_body + len, BODY_MAX - len,
"\tscript returned: (%d) %s\r\n", rc, lrmd_event_rc2str(rc));
len += snprintf(crm_mail_body + len, BODY_MAX - len,
"\texpected return value: (%d) %s\r\n", target_rc,
lrmd_event_rc2str(target_rc));
}
auth_client_init();
session = smtp_create_session();
message = smtp_add_message(session);
smtp_starttls_enable(session, Starttls_ENABLED);
sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
sa.sa_flags = 0;
sigaction(SIGPIPE, &sa, NULL);
smtp_set_server(session, crm_mail_host);
authctx = auth_create_context();
auth_set_mechanism_flags(authctx, AUTH_PLUGIN_PLAIN, 0);
smtp_set_eventcb(session, event_cb, NULL);
/* Now tell libESMTP it can use the SMTP AUTH extension.
*/
if (!noauth) {
crm_debug("Adding authentication context");
smtp_auth_set_context(session, authctx);
}
if (crm_mail_from == NULL) {
struct utsname us;
char auto_from[BODY_MAX];
CRM_ASSERT(uname(&us) == 0);
snprintf(auto_from, BODY_MAX, "crm_mon@%s", us.nodename);
smtp_set_reverse_path(message, auto_from);
} else {
/* NULL is ok */
smtp_set_reverse_path(message, crm_mail_from);
}
smtp_set_header(message, "To", NULL /*phrase */ , NULL /*addr */ ); /* "Phrase" <addr> */
smtp_add_recipient(message, crm_mail_to);
/* Set the Subject: header and override any subject line in the message headers. */
smtp_set_header(message, "Subject", crm_mail_subject);
smtp_set_header_option(message, "Subject", Hdr_OVERRIDE, 1);
smtp_set_message_str(message, crm_mail_body);
smtp_set_monitorcb(session, crm_smtp_debug, &smtp_debug, 1);
if (smtp_start_session(session)) {
char buf[128];
int rc = smtp_errno();
crm_err("SMTP server problem: %s (%d)", smtp_strerror(rc, buf, sizeof buf), rc);
} else {
char buf[128];
int rc = smtp_errno();
const smtp_status_t *smtp_status = smtp_message_transfer_status(message);
if (rc != 0) {
crm_err("SMTP server problem: %s (%d)", smtp_strerror(rc, buf, sizeof buf), rc);
}
crm_info("Send status: %d %s", smtp_status->code, crm_str(smtp_status->text));
smtp_enumerate_recipients(message, print_recipient_status, NULL);
}
smtp_destroy_session(session);
auth_destroy_context(authctx);
auth_client_exit();
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pfn_t gfn_to_pfn_memslot_atomic(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
{
return __gfn_to_pfn_memslot(slot, gfn, true, NULL, true, NULL);
}
Commit Message: KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 10,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::TabDetachedAtImpl(content::WebContents* contents,
int index,
DetachType type) {
if (type == DETACH_TYPE_DETACH) {
if (contents == tab_strip_model_->GetActiveWebContents()) {
LocationBar* location_bar = window()->GetLocationBar();
if (location_bar)
location_bar->SaveStateToContents(contents);
}
if (!tab_strip_model_->closing_all())
SyncHistoryWithTabs(0);
}
SetAsDelegate(contents, false);
RemoveScheduledUpdatesFor(contents);
if (find_bar_controller_.get() && index == tab_strip_model_->active_index()) {
find_bar_controller_->ChangeWebContents(NULL);
}
search_delegate_->OnTabDetached(contents);
for (size_t i = 0; i < interstitial_observers_.size(); i++) {
if (interstitial_observers_[i]->web_contents() != contents)
continue;
delete interstitial_observers_[i];
interstitial_observers_.erase(interstitial_observers_.begin() + i);
return;
}
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int skcipher_walk_aead(struct skcipher_walk *walk, struct aead_request *req,
bool atomic)
{
walk->total = req->cryptlen;
return skcipher_walk_aead_common(walk, req, atomic);
}
Commit Message: crypto: skcipher - Add missing API setkey checks
The API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the
skcipher conversion. This patch restores them.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4e6c3df4d729 ("crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...")
Reported-by: Baozeng <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 12,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(stream_get_wrappers)
{
HashTable *url_stream_wrappers_hash;
char *stream_protocol;
int key_flags;
uint stream_protocol_len = 0;
ulong num_key;
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((url_stream_wrappers_hash = php_stream_get_url_stream_wrappers_hash())) {
HashPosition pos;
array_init(return_value);
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(url_stream_wrappers_hash, &pos);
(key_flags = zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(url_stream_wrappers_hash, &stream_protocol, &stream_protocol_len, &num_key, 0, &pos)) != HASH_KEY_NON_EXISTANT;
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(url_stream_wrappers_hash, &pos)) {
if (key_flags == HASH_KEY_IS_STRING) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, stream_protocol, stream_protocol_len - 1, 1);
}
}
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 16,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init postgresql_init(void)
{
dissect_add("postgresql", APP_LAYER_TCP, 5432, dissector_postgresql);
}
Commit Message: Fixed heap overflow caused by length
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ServiceWorkerContainer::dispatchMessageEvent(WebPassOwnPtr<WebServiceWorker::Handle> handle, const WebString& message, const WebMessagePortChannelArray& webChannels)
{
if (!getExecutionContext() || !getExecutionContext()->executingWindow())
return;
MessagePortArray* ports = MessagePort::toMessagePortArray(getExecutionContext(), webChannels);
RefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> value = SerializedScriptValueFactory::instance().createFromWire(message);
ServiceWorker* source = ServiceWorker::from(getExecutionContext(), handle.release());
dispatchEvent(ServiceWorkerMessageEvent::create(ports, value, source, getExecutionContext()->getSecurityOrigin()->toString()));
}
Commit Message: Check CSP before registering ServiceWorkers
Service Worker registrations should be subject to the same CSP checks as
other workers. The spec doesn't say this explicitly
(https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#directive-child-src-workers says "Worker or
SharedWorker constructors"), but it seems to be in the spirit of things,
and it matches Firefox's behavior.
BUG=579801
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1861253004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385775}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 26,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: trash_files (CommonJob *job,
GList *files,
int *files_skipped)
{
GList *l;
GFile *file;
GList *to_delete;
SourceInfo source_info;
TransferInfo transfer_info;
gboolean skipped_file;
if (job_aborted (job))
{
return;
}
scan_sources (files,
&source_info,
job,
OP_KIND_TRASH);
if (job_aborted (job))
{
return;
}
g_timer_start (job->time);
memset (&transfer_info, 0, sizeof (transfer_info));
report_trash_progress (job, &source_info, &transfer_info);
to_delete = NULL;
for (l = files;
l != NULL && !job_aborted (job);
l = l->next)
{
file = l->data;
skipped_file = FALSE;
trash_file (job, file,
&skipped_file,
&source_info, &transfer_info,
TRUE, &to_delete);
if (skipped_file)
{
(*files_skipped)++;
transfer_add_file_to_count (file, job, &transfer_info);
report_trash_progress (job, &source_info, &transfer_info);
}
}
if (to_delete)
{
to_delete = g_list_reverse (to_delete);
delete_files (job, to_delete, files_skipped);
g_list_free (to_delete);
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int stb_vorbis_get_samples_float(stb_vorbis *f, int channels, float **buffer, int num_samples)
{
float **outputs;
int n=0;
int z = f->channels;
if (z > channels) z = channels;
while (n < num_samples) {
int i;
int k = f->channel_buffer_end - f->channel_buffer_start;
if (n+k >= num_samples) k = num_samples - n;
if (k) {
for (i=0; i < z; ++i)
memcpy(buffer[i]+n, f->channel_buffers[i]+f->channel_buffer_start, sizeof(float)*k);
for ( ; i < channels; ++i)
memset(buffer[i]+n, 0, sizeof(float) * k);
}
n += k;
f->channel_buffer_start += k;
if (n == num_samples)
break;
if (!stb_vorbis_get_frame_float(f, NULL, &outputs))
break;
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Rect BrowserWindowGtk::GetBounds() const {
return bounds_;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::RemoveBindingSet(const std::string& interface_name) {
auto it = binding_sets_.find(interface_name);
if (it != binding_sets_.end())
binding_sets_.erase(it);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,078 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int hns_rcb_common_init_hw(struct rcb_common_cb *rcb_common)
{
u32 reg_val;
int i;
int port_num = hns_rcb_common_get_port_num(rcb_common);
hns_rcb_comm_exc_irq_en(rcb_common, 0);
reg_val = dsaf_read_dev(rcb_common, RCB_COM_CFG_INIT_FLAG_REG);
if (0x1 != (reg_val & 0x1)) {
dev_err(rcb_common->dsaf_dev->dev,
"RCB_COM_CFG_INIT_FLAG_REG reg = 0x%x\n", reg_val);
return -EBUSY;
}
for (i = 0; i < port_num; i++) {
hns_rcb_set_port_desc_cnt(rcb_common, i, rcb_common->desc_num);
hns_rcb_set_rx_coalesced_frames(
rcb_common, i, HNS_RCB_DEF_RX_COALESCED_FRAMES);
if (!AE_IS_VER1(rcb_common->dsaf_dev->dsaf_ver) &&
!HNS_DSAF_IS_DEBUG(rcb_common->dsaf_dev))
hns_rcb_set_tx_coalesced_frames(
rcb_common, i, HNS_RCB_DEF_TX_COALESCED_FRAMES);
hns_rcb_set_port_timeout(
rcb_common, i, HNS_RCB_DEF_COALESCED_USECS);
}
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common, RCB_COM_CFG_ENDIAN_REG,
HNS_RCB_COMMON_ENDIAN);
if (AE_IS_VER1(rcb_common->dsaf_dev->dsaf_ver)) {
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common, RCB_COM_CFG_FNA_REG, 0x0);
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common, RCB_COM_CFG_FA_REG, 0x1);
} else {
dsaf_set_dev_bit(rcb_common, RCBV2_COM_CFG_USER_REG,
RCB_COM_CFG_FNA_B, false);
dsaf_set_dev_bit(rcb_common, RCBV2_COM_CFG_USER_REG,
RCB_COM_CFG_FA_B, true);
dsaf_set_dev_bit(rcb_common, RCBV2_COM_CFG_TSO_MODE_REG,
RCB_COM_TSO_MODE_B, HNS_TSO_MODE_8BD_32K);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: irc_server_msgq_add_buffer (struct t_irc_server *server, const char *buffer)
{
char *pos_cr, *pos_lf;
while (buffer[0])
{
pos_cr = strchr (buffer, '\r');
pos_lf = strchr (buffer, '\n');
if (!pos_cr && !pos_lf)
{
/* no CR/LF found => add to unterminated and return */
irc_server_msgq_add_unterminated (server, buffer);
return;
}
if (pos_cr && ((!pos_lf) || (pos_lf > pos_cr)))
{
/* found '\r' first => ignore this char */
pos_cr[0] = '\0';
irc_server_msgq_add_unterminated (server, buffer);
buffer = pos_cr + 1;
}
else
{
/* found: '\n' first => terminate message */
pos_lf[0] = '\0';
irc_server_msgq_add_msg (server, buffer);
buffer = pos_lf + 1;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: epass2003_hook_file(struct sc_file *file, int inc)
{
int fidl = file->id & 0xff;
int fidh = file->id & 0xff00;
if (epass2003_hook_path(&file->path, inc)) {
if (inc)
file->id = fidh + fidl * FID_STEP;
else
file->id = fidh + fidl / FID_STEP;
}
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 19,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::JSOutOfMemory(TabContents* tab) {
JSOutOfMemoryHelper(tab);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
atomic_set(&vcpu->arch.nmi_queued, 0);
vcpu->arch.nmi_pending = 0;
vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
memset(vcpu->arch.db, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.db));
vcpu->arch.dr6 = DR6_FIXED_1;
vcpu->arch.dr7 = DR7_FIXED_1;
kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
vcpu->arch.apf.msr_val = 0;
vcpu->arch.st.msr_val = 0;
kvmclock_reset(vcpu);
kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue(vcpu);
kvm_async_pf_hash_reset(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.apf.halted = false;
kvm_pmu_reset(vcpu);
memset(vcpu->arch.regs, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.regs));
vcpu->arch.regs_avail = ~0;
vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = ~0;
kvm_x86_ops->vcpu_reset(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct page *new_page_node(struct page *p, unsigned long private,
int **result)
{
struct page_to_node *pm = (struct page_to_node *)private;
while (pm->node != MAX_NUMNODES && pm->page != p)
pm++;
if (pm->node == MAX_NUMNODES)
return NULL;
*result = &pm->status;
if (PageHuge(p))
return alloc_huge_page_node(page_hstate(compound_head(p)),
pm->node);
else
return __alloc_pages_node(pm->node,
GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE | __GFP_THISNODE, 0);
}
Commit Message: mm: migrate dirty page without clear_page_dirty_for_io etc
clear_page_dirty_for_io() has accumulated writeback and memcg subtleties
since v2.6.16 first introduced page migration; and the set_page_dirty()
which completed its migration of PageDirty, later had to be moderated to
__set_page_dirty_nobuffers(); then PageSwapBacked had to skip that too.
No actual problems seen with this procedure recently, but if you look into
what the clear_page_dirty_for_io(page)+set_page_dirty(newpage) is actually
achieving, it turns out to be nothing more than moving the PageDirty flag,
and its NR_FILE_DIRTY stat from one zone to another.
It would be good to avoid a pile of irrelevant decrementations and
incrementations, and improper event counting, and unnecessary descent of
the radix_tree under tree_lock (to set the PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY which
radix_tree_replace_slot() left in place anyway).
Do the NR_FILE_DIRTY movement, like the other stats movements, while
interrupts still disabled in migrate_page_move_mapping(); and don't even
bother if the zone is the same. Do the PageDirty movement there under
tree_lock too, where old page is frozen and newpage not yet visible:
bearing in mind that as soon as newpage becomes visible in radix_tree, an
un-page-locked set_page_dirty() might interfere (or perhaps that's just
not possible: anything doing so should already hold an additional
reference to the old page, preventing its migration; but play safe).
But we do still need to transfer PageDirty in migrate_page_copy(), for
those who don't go the mapping route through migrate_page_move_mapping().
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 1,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PluginObserver::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(PluginObserver, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_MissingPluginStatus, OnMissingPluginStatus)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_CrashedPlugin, OnCrashedPlugin)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_BlockedOutdatedPlugin,
OnBlockedOutdatedPlugin)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(return false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return true;
}
Commit Message: Infobar Windows Media Player plug-in by default.
BUG=51464
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7080048
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87500 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,070 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iakerb_make_token(iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx,
krb5_data *realm,
krb5_data *cookie,
krb5_data *request,
int initialContextToken,
gss_buffer_t token)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_iakerb_header iah;
krb5_data *data = NULL;
char *p;
unsigned int tokenSize;
unsigned char *q;
token->value = NULL;
token->length = 0;
/*
* Assemble the IAKERB-HEADER from the realm and cookie
*/
memset(&iah, 0, sizeof(iah));
iah.target_realm = *realm;
iah.cookie = cookie;
code = encode_krb5_iakerb_header(&iah, &data);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
/*
* Concatenate Kerberos request.
*/
p = realloc(data->data, data->length + request->length);
if (p == NULL) {
code = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
data->data = p;
if (request->length > 0)
memcpy(data->data + data->length, request->data, request->length);
data->length += request->length;
if (initialContextToken)
tokenSize = g_token_size(gss_mech_iakerb, data->length);
else
tokenSize = 2 + data->length;
token->value = q = gssalloc_malloc(tokenSize);
if (q == NULL) {
code = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
token->length = tokenSize;
if (initialContextToken) {
g_make_token_header(gss_mech_iakerb, data->length, &q,
IAKERB_TOK_PROXY);
} else {
store_16_be(IAKERB_TOK_PROXY, q);
q += 2;
}
memcpy(q, data->data, data->length);
q += data->length;
assert(q == (unsigned char *)token->value + token->length);
cleanup:
krb5_free_data(ctx->k5c, data);
return code;
}
Commit Message: Fix IAKERB context export/import [CVE-2015-2698]
The patches for CVE-2015-2696 contained a regression in the newly
added IAKERB iakerb_gss_export_sec_context() function, which could
cause it to corrupt memory. Fix the regression by properly
dereferencing the context_handle pointer before casting it.
Also, the patches did not implement an IAKERB gss_import_sec_context()
function, under the erroneous belief that an exported IAKERB context
would be tagged as a krb5 context. Implement it now to allow IAKERB
contexts to be successfully exported and imported after establishment.
CVE-2015-2698:
In any MIT krb5 release with the patches for CVE-2015-2696 applied, an
application which calls gss_export_sec_context() may experience memory
corruption if the context was established using the IAKERB mechanism.
Historically, some vulnerabilities of this nature can be translated
into remote code execution, though the necessary exploits must be
tailored to the individual application and are usually quite
complicated.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8273 (new)
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pdf_run_gs_SMask(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, pdf_xobject *smask, pdf_obj *page_resources, float *bc, int luminosity)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pdf_gstate *gstate = pdf_flush_text(ctx, pr);
int i;
if (gstate->softmask)
{
pdf_drop_xobject(ctx, gstate->softmask);
gstate->softmask = NULL;
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, gstate->softmask_resources);
gstate->softmask_resources = NULL;
}
if (smask)
{
fz_colorspace *cs = pdf_xobject_colorspace(ctx, smask);
int cs_n = 1;
if (cs)
cs_n = fz_colorspace_n(ctx, cs);
gstate->softmask_ctm = gstate->ctm;
gstate->softmask = pdf_keep_xobject(ctx, smask);
gstate->softmask_resources = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, page_resources);
for (i = 0; i < cs_n; ++i)
gstate->softmask_bc[i] = bc[i];
gstate->luminosity = luminosity;
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, cs);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 14,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String HTMLFormControlElement::NameForAutofill() const {
String full_name = GetName();
String trimmed_name = full_name.StripWhiteSpace();
if (!trimmed_name.IsEmpty())
return trimmed_name;
full_name = GetIdAttribute();
trimmed_name = full_name.StripWhiteSpace();
return trimmed_name;
}
Commit Message: autofocus: Fix a crash with an autofocus element in a document without browsing context.
ShouldAutofocus() should check existence of the browsing context.
Otherwise, doc.TopFrameOrigin() returns null.
Before crrev.com/695830, ShouldAutofocus() was called only for
rendered elements. That is to say, the document always had
browsing context.
Bug: 1003228
Change-Id: I2a941c34e9707d44869a6d7585dc7fb9f06e3bf4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1800902
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keishi Hattori <keishi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#696291}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 13,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::setDesignMode(InheritedBool value)
{
m_designMode = value;
for (Frame* frame = m_frame; frame && frame->document(); frame = frame->tree()->traverseNext(m_frame))
frame->document()->setNeedsStyleRecalc();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,140 |
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