instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init rmd160_mod_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_shash(&alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void testCrash_MakeOwner_Bug20080207() {
UriParserStateA state;
UriUriA sourceUri;
state.uri = &sourceUri;
const char * const sourceUriString = "http://user:pass@somehost.com:80/";
if (uriParseUriA(&state, sourceUriString) != 0) {
TEST_ASSERT(false);
}
if (uriNormalizeSyntaxA(&sourceUri) != 0) {
TEST_ASSERT(false);
}
uriFreeUriMembersA(&sourceUri);
TEST_ASSERT(true);
}
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 8,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Function::Function() {
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sctp_assoc_del_nonprimary_peers(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_transport *primary)
{
struct sctp_transport *temp;
struct sctp_transport *t;
list_for_each_entry_safe(t, temp, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
transports) {
/* if the current transport is not the primary one, delete it */
if (t != primary)
sctp_assoc_rm_peer(asoc, t);
}
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions
Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
SCTP authentication enabled:
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013
sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924
r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000
r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254
r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660
Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015
Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
[...]
Backtrace:
[<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
[<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
[<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
[<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
[<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
[<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
[<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
[<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache
auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
kind.
Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
needed can be found in RFC4895:
SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
lifetime of an SCTP association.
Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
the original peer that started the association and not by a
malicious attacker.
To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
number and the peer's random number *after* the association
has been established. The local and peer's random number along
with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
<--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
-------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
...
Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
has been established.
In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
running and send a COOKIE ACK.
In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
Action B of section 5.2.4.
Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
association to update the existing one.
Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
<------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
and dereferences it in ...
crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
*updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
throw away each time.
The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init sit_init(void)
{
int err;
printk(KERN_INFO "IPv6 over IPv4 tunneling driver\n");
err = register_pernet_device(&sit_net_ops);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = xfrm4_tunnel_register(&sit_handler, AF_INET6);
if (err < 0) {
unregister_pernet_device(&sit_net_ops);
printk(KERN_INFO "sit init: Can't add protocol\n");
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoDisable(GLenum cap) {
if (SetCapabilityState(cap, false)) {
if (cap == GL_PRIMITIVE_RESTART_FIXED_INDEX &&
feature_info_->feature_flags().emulate_primitive_restart_fixed_index) {
return;
}
if (cap == GL_FRAMEBUFFER_SRGB) {
return;
}
api()->glDisableFn(cap);
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void net_ns_get_ownership(const struct net *net, kuid_t *uid, kgid_t *gid)
{
if (net) {
kuid_t ns_root_uid = make_kuid(net->user_ns, 0);
kgid_t ns_root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0);
if (uid_valid(ns_root_uid))
*uid = ns_root_uid;
if (gid_valid(ns_root_gid))
*gid = ns_root_gid;
} else {
*uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
*gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
}
}
Commit Message: netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 26,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xml_apply_patchset(xmlNode *xml, xmlNode *patchset, bool check_version)
{
int format = 1;
int rc = pcmk_ok;
xmlNode *old = NULL;
const char *digest = crm_element_value(patchset, XML_ATTR_DIGEST);
if(patchset == NULL) {
return rc;
}
xml_log_patchset(LOG_TRACE, __FUNCTION__, patchset);
crm_element_value_int(patchset, "format", &format);
if(check_version) {
rc = xml_patch_version_check(xml, patchset, format);
if(rc != pcmk_ok) {
return rc;
}
}
if(digest) {
/* Make it available for logging if the result doesn't have the expected digest */
old = copy_xml(xml);
}
if(rc == pcmk_ok) {
switch(format) {
case 1:
rc = xml_apply_patchset_v1(xml, patchset, check_version);
break;
case 2:
rc = xml_apply_patchset_v2(xml, patchset, check_version);
break;
default:
crm_err("Unknown patch format: %d", format);
rc = -EINVAL;
}
}
if(rc == pcmk_ok && digest) {
static struct qb_log_callsite *digest_cs = NULL;
char *new_digest = NULL;
char *version = crm_element_value_copy(xml, XML_ATTR_CRM_VERSION);
if (digest_cs == NULL) {
digest_cs =
qb_log_callsite_get(__func__, __FILE__, "diff-digest", LOG_TRACE, __LINE__,
crm_trace_nonlog);
}
new_digest = calculate_xml_versioned_digest(xml, FALSE, TRUE, version);
if (safe_str_neq(new_digest, digest)) {
crm_info("v%d digest mis-match: expected %s, calculated %s", format, digest, new_digest);
rc = -pcmk_err_diff_failed;
if (digest_cs && digest_cs->targets) {
save_xml_to_file(old, "PatchDigest:input", NULL);
save_xml_to_file(xml, "PatchDigest:result", NULL);
save_xml_to_file(patchset,"PatchDigest:diff", NULL);
} else {
crm_trace("%p %0.6x", digest_cs, digest_cs ? digest_cs->targets : 0);
}
} else {
crm_trace("v%d digest matched: expected %s, calculated %s", format, digest, new_digest);
}
free(new_digest);
free(version);
}
free_xml(old);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GfxPath::append(GfxPath *path) {
int i;
if (n + path->n > size) {
size = n + path->n;
subpaths = (GfxSubpath **)
greallocn(subpaths, size, sizeof(GfxSubpath *));
}
for (i = 0; i < path->n; ++i) {
subpaths[n++] = path->subpaths[i]->copy();
}
justMoved = gFalse;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int8_t GASpecificConfig(bitfile *ld, mp4AudioSpecificConfig *mp4ASC,
program_config *pce_out)
{
program_config pce;
/* 1024 or 960 */
mp4ASC->frameLengthFlag = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,138,"GASpecificConfig(): FrameLengthFlag"));
#ifndef ALLOW_SMALL_FRAMELENGTH
if (mp4ASC->frameLengthFlag == 1)
return -3;
#endif
mp4ASC->dependsOnCoreCoder = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,139,"GASpecificConfig(): DependsOnCoreCoder"));
if (mp4ASC->dependsOnCoreCoder == 1)
{
mp4ASC->coreCoderDelay = (uint16_t)faad_getbits(ld, 14
DEBUGVAR(1,140,"GASpecificConfig(): CoreCoderDelay"));
}
mp4ASC->extensionFlag = faad_get1bit(ld DEBUGVAR(1,141,"GASpecificConfig(): ExtensionFlag"));
if (mp4ASC->channelsConfiguration == 0)
{
if (program_config_element(&pce, ld))
return -3;
if (pce_out != NULL)
memcpy(pce_out, &pce, sizeof(program_config));
/*
if (pce.num_valid_cc_elements)
return -3;
*/
}
#ifdef ERROR_RESILIENCE
if (mp4ASC->extensionFlag == 1)
{
/* Error resilience not supported yet */
if (mp4ASC->objectTypeIndex >= ER_OBJECT_START)
{
mp4ASC->aacSectionDataResilienceFlag = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,144,"GASpecificConfig(): aacSectionDataResilienceFlag"));
mp4ASC->aacScalefactorDataResilienceFlag = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,145,"GASpecificConfig(): aacScalefactorDataResilienceFlag"));
mp4ASC->aacSpectralDataResilienceFlag = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,146,"GASpecificConfig(): aacSpectralDataResilienceFlag"));
}
/* 1 bit: extensionFlag3 */
faad_getbits(ld, 1);
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a couple buffer overflows
https://hackerone.com/reports/502816
https://hackerone.com/reports/507858
https://github.com/videolan/vlc/blob/master/contrib/src/faad2/faad2-fix-overflows.patch
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sctp_wait_for_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
{
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
do {
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (list_empty(&sctp_sk(sk)->ep->asocs))
break;
sctp_release_sock(sk);
timeout = schedule_timeout(timeout);
sctp_lock_sock(sk);
} while (!signal_pending(current) && timeout);
finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ui::MenuModel* ExtensionAppItem::GetContextMenuModel() {
context_menu_.reset(new app_list::AppContextMenu(
this, profile_, extension_id_, GetController()));
context_menu_->set_is_platform_app(is_platform_app_);
if (IsInFolder())
context_menu_->set_is_in_folder(true);
return context_menu_->GetMenuModel();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *create_index(void)
{
const char *tmpfile;
struct pack_idx_entry **idx, **c, **last;
struct object_entry *e;
struct object_entry_pool *o;
/* Build the table of object IDs. */
idx = xmalloc(object_count * sizeof(*idx));
c = idx;
for (o = blocks; o; o = o->next_pool)
for (e = o->next_free; e-- != o->entries;)
if (pack_id == e->pack_id)
*c++ = &e->idx;
last = idx + object_count;
if (c != last)
die("internal consistency error creating the index");
tmpfile = write_idx_file(NULL, idx, object_count, &pack_idx_opts, pack_data->sha1);
free(idx);
return tmpfile;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CommandBufferProxyImpl::OnSwapBuffersCompleted(
const SwapBuffersCompleteParams& params) {
if (!swap_buffers_completion_callback_.is_null())
swap_buffers_completion_callback_.Run(params);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 13,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Isolate* isolate() { return m_scriptState->isolate(); }
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 9,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Browser::GetDragActions() const {
return TabStripModelDelegate::TAB_TEAROFF_ACTION | (tab_count() > 1 ?
TabStripModelDelegate::TAB_MOVE_ACTION : 0);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fpm_stdio_child_use_pipes(struct fpm_child_s *child) /* {{{ */
{
if (child->wp->config->catch_workers_output) {
dup2(fd_stdout[1], STDOUT_FILENO);
dup2(fd_stderr[1], STDERR_FILENO);
close(fd_stdout[0]); close(fd_stdout[1]);
close(fd_stderr[0]); close(fd_stderr[1]);
} else {
/* stdout of parent is always /dev/null */
dup2(STDOUT_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO);
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fixed bug #73342
Directly listen on socket, instead of duping it to STDIN and
listening on that.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 7,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u8 pmcraid_task_attributes(struct scsi_cmnd *scsi_cmd)
{
char tag[2];
u8 rc = 0;
if (scsi_populate_tag_msg(scsi_cmd, tag)) {
switch (tag[0]) {
case MSG_SIMPLE_TAG:
rc = TASK_TAG_SIMPLE;
break;
case MSG_HEAD_TAG:
rc = TASK_TAG_QUEUE_HEAD;
break;
case MSG_ORDERED_TAG:
rc = TASK_TAG_ORDERED;
break;
};
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 2,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: crm_trigger_prepare(GSource * source, gint * timeout)
{
crm_trigger_t *trig = (crm_trigger_t *) source;
/* cluster-glue's FD and IPC related sources make use of
* g_source_add_poll() but do not set a timeout in their prepare
* functions
*
* This means mainloop's poll() will block until an event for one
* of these sources occurs - any /other/ type of source, such as
* this one or g_idle_*, that doesn't use g_source_add_poll() is
* S-O-L and wont be processed until there is something fd-based
* happens.
*
* Luckily the timeout we can set here affects all sources and
* puts an upper limit on how long poll() can take.
*
* So unconditionally set a small-ish timeout, not too small that
* we're in constant motion, which will act as an upper bound on
* how long the signal handling might be delayed for.
*/
*timeout = 500; /* Timeout in ms */
return trig->trigger;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FrameConsole* LocalDOMWindow::GetFrameConsole() const {
if (!IsCurrentlyDisplayedInFrame())
return nullptr;
return &GetFrame()->Console();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void red_channel_client_ref(RedChannelClient *rcc)
{
rcc->refs++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Browser::IsTabPinned(int index) const {
return tabstrip_model()->IsTabPinned(index);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint8_t* data() { return data_; }
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 29,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_common_crc(LHAFileHeader *header)
{
uint16_t crc;
crc = 0;
lha_crc16_buf(&crc, header->raw_data, header->raw_data_len);
return crc == header->common_crc;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer underflow vulnerability in L3 decode.
Marcin 'Icewall' Noga of Cisco TALOS discovered that the level 3 header
decoding routines were vulnerable to an integer underflow, if the 32-bit
header length was less than the base level 3 header length. This could
lead to an exploitable heap corruption condition.
Thanks go to Marcin Noga and Regina Wilson of Cisco TALOS for reporting
this vulnerability.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 3,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Stream *Gfx::buildImageStream() {
Object dict;
Object obj;
char *key;
Stream *str;
dict.initDict(xref);
parser->getObj(&obj);
while (!obj.isCmd("ID") && !obj.isEOF()) {
if (!obj.isName()) {
error(getPos(), "Inline image dictionary key must be a name object");
obj.free();
} else {
key = copyString(obj.getName());
obj.free();
parser->getObj(&obj);
if (obj.isEOF() || obj.isError()) {
gfree(key);
break;
}
dict.dictAdd(key, &obj);
}
parser->getObj(&obj);
}
if (obj.isEOF()) {
error(getPos(), "End of file in inline image");
obj.free();
dict.free();
return NULL;
}
obj.free();
if (parser->getStream()) {
str = new EmbedStream(parser->getStream(), &dict, gFalse, 0);
str = str->addFilters(&dict);
} else {
str = NULL;
dict.free();
}
return str;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OVS_REQUIRES(ofproto_mutex)
{
struct rule *rule;
RULE_COLLECTION_FOR_EACH (rule, rules) {
struct oftable *table = &ofproto->tables[rule->table_id];
/* Add rule back to ofproto data structures. */
ofproto_rule_insert__(ofproto, rule);
/* Restore table's rule count. */
table->n_flows++;
/* Restore the original visibility of the rule. */
cls_rule_restore_visibility(&rule->cr);
}
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 11,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int _yr_re_emit(
RE_EMIT_CONTEXT* emit_context,
RE_NODE* re_node,
int flags,
uint8_t** code_addr,
size_t* code_size)
{
size_t branch_size;
size_t split_size;
size_t inst_size;
size_t jmp_size;
int emit_split;
int emit_repeat;
int emit_prolog;
int emit_epilog;
RE_REPEAT_ARGS repeat_args;
RE_REPEAT_ARGS* repeat_start_args_addr;
RE_REPEAT_ANY_ARGS repeat_any_args;
RE_NODE* left;
RE_NODE* right;
int16_t* split_offset_addr = NULL;
int16_t* jmp_offset_addr = NULL;
uint8_t* instruction_addr = NULL;
*code_size = 0;
switch(re_node->type)
{
case RE_NODE_LITERAL:
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst_arg_uint8(
emit_context,
RE_OPCODE_LITERAL,
re_node->value,
&instruction_addr,
NULL,
code_size));
break;
case RE_NODE_MASKED_LITERAL:
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst_arg_uint16(
emit_context,
RE_OPCODE_MASKED_LITERAL,
re_node->mask << 8 | re_node->value,
&instruction_addr,
NULL,
code_size));
break;
case RE_NODE_WORD_CHAR:
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst(
emit_context,
RE_OPCODE_WORD_CHAR,
&instruction_addr,
code_size));
break;
case RE_NODE_NON_WORD_CHAR:
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst(
emit_context,
RE_OPCODE_NON_WORD_CHAR,
&instruction_addr,
code_size));
break;
case RE_NODE_WORD_BOUNDARY:
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst(
emit_context,
RE_OPCODE_WORD_BOUNDARY,
&instruction_addr,
code_size));
break;
case RE_NODE_NON_WORD_BOUNDARY:
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst(
emit_context,
RE_OPCODE_NON_WORD_BOUNDARY,
&instruction_addr,
code_size));
break;
case RE_NODE_SPACE:
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst(
emit_context,
RE_OPCODE_SPACE,
&instruction_addr,
code_size));
break;
case RE_NODE_NON_SPACE:
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst(
emit_context,
RE_OPCODE_NON_SPACE,
&instruction_addr,
code_size));
break;
case RE_NODE_DIGIT:
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst(
emit_context,
RE_OPCODE_DIGIT,
&instruction_addr,
code_size));
break;
case RE_NODE_NON_DIGIT:
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst(
emit_context,
RE_OPCODE_NON_DIGIT,
&instruction_addr,
code_size));
break;
case RE_NODE_ANY:
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst(
emit_context,
RE_OPCODE_ANY,
&instruction_addr,
code_size));
break;
case RE_NODE_CLASS:
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst(
emit_context,
RE_OPCODE_CLASS,
&instruction_addr,
code_size));
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
re_node->class_vector,
32,
NULL));
*code_size += 32;
break;
case RE_NODE_ANCHOR_START:
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst(
emit_context,
RE_OPCODE_MATCH_AT_START,
&instruction_addr,
code_size));
break;
case RE_NODE_ANCHOR_END:
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst(
emit_context,
RE_OPCODE_MATCH_AT_END,
&instruction_addr,
code_size));
break;
case RE_NODE_CONCAT:
if (flags & EMIT_BACKWARDS)
{
left = re_node->right;
right = re_node->left;
}
else
{
left = re_node->left;
right = re_node->right;
}
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_re_emit(
emit_context,
left,
flags,
&instruction_addr,
&branch_size));
*code_size += branch_size;
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_re_emit(
emit_context,
right,
flags,
NULL,
&branch_size));
*code_size += branch_size;
break;
case RE_NODE_PLUS:
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_re_emit(
emit_context,
re_node->left,
flags,
&instruction_addr,
&branch_size));
*code_size += branch_size;
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_split(
emit_context,
re_node->greedy ? RE_OPCODE_SPLIT_B : RE_OPCODE_SPLIT_A,
-((int16_t) branch_size),
NULL,
&split_offset_addr,
&split_size));
*code_size += split_size;
break;
case RE_NODE_STAR:
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_split(
emit_context,
re_node->greedy ? RE_OPCODE_SPLIT_A : RE_OPCODE_SPLIT_B,
0,
&instruction_addr,
&split_offset_addr,
&split_size));
*code_size += split_size;
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_re_emit(
emit_context,
re_node->left,
flags,
NULL,
&branch_size));
*code_size += branch_size;
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst_arg_int16(
emit_context,
RE_OPCODE_JUMP,
-((uint16_t)(branch_size + split_size)),
NULL,
&jmp_offset_addr,
&jmp_size));
*code_size += jmp_size;
assert(split_size + branch_size + jmp_size < INT16_MAX);
*split_offset_addr = (int16_t) (split_size + branch_size + jmp_size);
break;
case RE_NODE_ALT:
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_split(
emit_context,
RE_OPCODE_SPLIT_A,
0,
&instruction_addr,
&split_offset_addr,
&split_size));
*code_size += split_size;
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_re_emit(
emit_context,
re_node->left,
flags,
NULL,
&branch_size));
*code_size += branch_size;
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst_arg_int16(
emit_context,
RE_OPCODE_JUMP,
0,
NULL,
&jmp_offset_addr,
&jmp_size));
*code_size += jmp_size;
assert(split_size + branch_size + jmp_size < INT16_MAX);
*split_offset_addr = (int16_t) (split_size + branch_size + jmp_size);
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_re_emit(
emit_context,
re_node->right,
flags,
NULL,
&branch_size));
*code_size += branch_size;
assert(branch_size + jmp_size < INT16_MAX);
*jmp_offset_addr = (int16_t) (branch_size + jmp_size);
break;
case RE_NODE_RANGE_ANY:
repeat_any_args.min = re_node->start;
repeat_any_args.max = re_node->end;
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst_arg_struct(
emit_context,
re_node->greedy ?
RE_OPCODE_REPEAT_ANY_GREEDY :
RE_OPCODE_REPEAT_ANY_UNGREEDY,
&repeat_any_args,
sizeof(repeat_any_args),
&instruction_addr,
NULL,
&inst_size));
*code_size += inst_size;
break;
case RE_NODE_RANGE:
emit_prolog = re_node->start > 0;
emit_repeat = re_node->end > re_node->start + 1 || re_node->end > 2;
emit_split = re_node->end > re_node->start;
emit_epilog = re_node->end > re_node->start || re_node->end > 1;
if (emit_prolog)
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_re_emit(
emit_context,
re_node->left,
flags,
&instruction_addr,
&branch_size));
*code_size += branch_size;
}
if (emit_repeat)
{
repeat_args.min = re_node->start;
repeat_args.max = re_node->end;
if (emit_prolog)
{
repeat_args.max--;
repeat_args.min--;
}
if (emit_split)
repeat_args.max--;
else
repeat_args.min--;
repeat_args.offset = 0;
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst_arg_struct(
emit_context,
re_node->greedy ?
RE_OPCODE_REPEAT_START_GREEDY :
RE_OPCODE_REPEAT_START_UNGREEDY,
&repeat_args,
sizeof(repeat_args),
emit_prolog ? NULL : &instruction_addr,
(void**) &repeat_start_args_addr,
&inst_size));
*code_size += inst_size;
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_re_emit(
emit_context,
re_node->left,
flags | EMIT_DONT_SET_FORWARDS_CODE | EMIT_DONT_SET_BACKWARDS_CODE,
NULL,
&branch_size));
*code_size += branch_size;
repeat_start_args_addr->offset = (int32_t)(2 * inst_size + branch_size);
repeat_args.offset = -((int32_t) branch_size);
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_inst_arg_struct(
emit_context,
re_node->greedy ?
RE_OPCODE_REPEAT_END_GREEDY :
RE_OPCODE_REPEAT_END_UNGREEDY,
&repeat_args,
sizeof(repeat_args),
NULL,
NULL,
&inst_size));
*code_size += inst_size;
}
if (emit_split)
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_emit_split(
emit_context,
re_node->greedy ?
RE_OPCODE_SPLIT_A :
RE_OPCODE_SPLIT_B,
0,
NULL,
&split_offset_addr,
&split_size));
*code_size += split_size;
}
if (emit_epilog)
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_re_emit(
emit_context,
re_node->left,
emit_prolog ? flags | EMIT_DONT_SET_FORWARDS_CODE : flags,
emit_prolog || emit_repeat ? NULL : &instruction_addr,
&branch_size));
*code_size += branch_size;
}
if (emit_split)
{
assert(split_size + branch_size < INT16_MAX);
*split_offset_addr = (int16_t) (split_size + branch_size);
}
break;
}
if (flags & EMIT_BACKWARDS)
{
if (!(flags & EMIT_DONT_SET_BACKWARDS_CODE))
re_node->backward_code = instruction_addr + *code_size;
}
else
{
if (!(flags & EMIT_DONT_SET_FORWARDS_CODE))
re_node->forward_code = instruction_addr;
}
if (code_addr != NULL)
*code_addr = instruction_addr;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer overrun (issue #678). Add assert for detecting this kind of issues earlier.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 11,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int git_index_entry_is_conflict(const git_index_entry *entry)
{
return (GIT_IDXENTRY_STAGE(entry) > 0);
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 11,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::RemoveFileSystem(const std::string& file_system_path) {
CHECK(web_contents_->GetURL().SchemeIs(content::kChromeDevToolsScheme));
file_helper_->RemoveFileSystem(file_system_path);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool req_is_in_chain(struct smb_request *req)
{
if (req->vwv != (uint16_t *)(req->inbuf+smb_vwv)) {
/*
* We're right now handling a subsequent request, so we must
* be in a chain
*/
return true;
}
if (!is_andx_req(req->cmd)) {
return false;
}
if (req->wct < 2) {
/*
* Okay, an illegal request, but definitely not chained :-)
*/
return false;
}
return (CVAL(req->vwv+0, 0) != 0xFF);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::FilePath ContentBrowserClient::GetHyphenDictionaryDirectory() {
return base::FilePath();
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 25,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DBusHelperProxy::hasToStopAction()
{
QEventLoop loop;
loop.processEvents(QEventLoop::AllEvents);
return m_stopRequest;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-290 | 0 | 4,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static VirtIONetQueue *virtio_net_get_subqueue(NetClientState *nc)
{
VirtIONet *n = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
return &n->vqs[nc->queue_index];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::GetUniformiv(GLuint program,
GLint location,
GLint* params) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glGetUniformiv(" << program << ", "
<< location << ", " << static_cast<const void*>(params)
<< ")");
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2::GetUniformiv");
typedef cmds::GetUniformiv::Result Result;
auto result = GetResultAs<Result>();
if (!result) {
return;
}
result->SetNumResults(0);
helper_->GetUniformiv(program, location, GetResultShmId(), result.offset());
WaitForCmd();
result->CopyResult(params);
GPU_CLIENT_LOG_CODE_BLOCK({
for (int32_t i = 0; i < result->GetNumResults(); ++i) {
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(" " << i << ": " << result->GetData()[i]);
}
});
CheckGLError();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 7,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int alloc_addbyter(int output, FILE *data)
{
struct asprintf *infop=(struct asprintf *)data;
unsigned char outc = (unsigned char)output;
if(!infop->buffer) {
infop->buffer = malloc(32);
if(!infop->buffer) {
infop->fail = 1;
return -1; /* fail */
}
infop->alloc = 32;
infop->len =0;
}
else if(infop->len+1 >= infop->alloc) {
char *newptr = NULL;
size_t newsize = infop->alloc*2;
/* detect wrap-around or other overflow problems */
if(newsize > infop->alloc)
newptr = realloc(infop->buffer, newsize);
if(!newptr) {
infop->fail = 1;
return -1; /* fail */
}
infop->buffer = newptr;
infop->alloc = newsize;
}
infop->buffer[ infop->len ] = outc;
infop->len++;
return outc; /* fputc() returns like this on success */
}
Commit Message: printf: fix floating point buffer overflow issues
... and add a bunch of floating point printf tests
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DOMWindow* V8Proxy::retrieveWindowForCallingContext()
{
v8::Handle<v8::Context> context = v8::Context::GetCalling();
if (context.IsEmpty())
return 0;
return retrieveWindow(context);
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebPage::keyEvent(const Platform::KeyboardEvent& keyboardEvent)
{
if (!d->m_mainFrame->view())
return false;
if (d->m_page->defersLoading())
return false;
ASSERT(d->m_page->focusController());
bool handled = d->m_inputHandler->handleKeyboardInput(keyboardEvent);
if (!handled && keyboardEvent.type() == Platform::KeyboardEvent::KeyDown && !d->m_inputHandler->isInputMode()) {
IntPoint previousPos = d->scrollPosition();
handleScrolling(keyboardEvent.character(), d);
handled = previousPos != d->scrollPosition();
}
return handled;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct f_midi *func_to_midi(struct usb_function *f)
{
return container_of(f, struct f_midi, func);
}
Commit Message: USB: gadget: f_midi: fixing a possible double-free in f_midi
It looks like there is a possibility of a double-free vulnerability on an
error path of the f_midi_set_alt function in the f_midi driver. If the
path is feasible then free_ep_req gets called twice:
req->complete = f_midi_complete;
err = usb_ep_queue(midi->out_ep, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=> ...
usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_midi_complete (CALLBACK)
(inside f_midi_complete, for various cases of status)
free_ep_req(ep, req); // first kfree
if (err) {
ERROR(midi, "%s: couldn't enqueue request: %d\n",
midi->out_ep->name, err);
free_ep_req(midi->out_ep, req); // second kfree
return err;
}
The double-free possibility was introduced with commit ad0d1a058eac
("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests").
Found by MOXCAFE tool.
Signed-off-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Fixes: ad0d1a058eac ("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests")
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 19,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_vld_inv_quant_mpeg1(
void *pv_dec, /* Decoder State */
WORD16 *pi2_out_addr, /*!< Address where decoded symbols will be stored */
const UWORD8 *pu1_scan, /*!< Scan table to be used */
UWORD16 u2_intra_flag, /*!< Intra Macroblock or not */
UWORD16 u2_colr_comp, /*!< 0 - Luma,1 - U comp, 2 - V comp */
UWORD16 u2_d_picture /*!< D Picture or not */
)
{
UWORD8 *pu1_weighting_matrix;
dec_state_t *ps_dec = (dec_state_t *) pv_dec;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
WORD16 pi2_coeffs[NUM_COEFFS];
UWORD8 pu1_pos[NUM_COEFFS];
WORD32 i4_num_coeffs;
/* Perform VLD on the stream to get the coefficients and their positions */
e_error = impeg2d_vld_decode(ps_dec, pi2_coeffs, pu1_scan, pu1_pos, u2_intra_flag,
u2_colr_comp, u2_d_picture, ps_dec->u2_intra_vlc_format,
ps_dec->u2_is_mpeg2, &i4_num_coeffs);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
return e_error;
}
/* For YUV420 format,Select the weighting matrix according to Table 7.5 */
pu1_weighting_matrix = (u2_intra_flag == 1) ? ps_dec->au1_intra_quant_matrix:
ps_dec->au1_inter_quant_matrix;
IMPEG2D_IQNT_INP_STATISTICS(pi2_out_addr, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
/* Inverse Quantize the Output of VLD */
PROFILE_DISABLE_INVQUANT_IF0
{
/* Clear output matrix */
PROFILE_DISABLE_MEMSET_RESBUF_IF0
if (1 != (ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols | ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows))
{
ps_dec->pf_memset_16bit_8x8_linear_block (pi2_out_addr);
}
impeg2d_inv_quant_mpeg1(pi2_out_addr, pu1_weighting_matrix,
ps_dec->u1_quant_scale, u2_intra_flag,
i4_num_coeffs, pi2_coeffs, pu1_pos,
pu1_scan, &ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[u2_colr_comp],
ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision);
if (0 != pi2_out_addr[0])
{
/* The first coeff might've become non-zero due to intra_dc_decision
* value. So, check here after inverse quantization.
*/
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols |= 0x1;
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows |= 0x1;
}
}
return e_error;
}
Commit Message: Fixed stack buffer overflow
Bugfix: 25812590
Moved check for numCoeffs > 64 inside the coeff decode loop
Change-Id: I444b77ef2a3da9233ec14bb72ac70b7e2fa56bd1
(cherry picked from commit ff3496c45c571da7eb93d6f9f05758813468fc72)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int collationMatch(const char *zColl, Index *pIndex){
int i;
assert( zColl!=0 );
for(i=0; i<pIndex->nColumn; i++){
const char *z = pIndex->azColl[i];
assert( z!=0 || pIndex->aiColumn[i]<0 );
if( pIndex->aiColumn[i]>=0 && 0==sqlite3StrICmp(z, zColl) ){
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 17,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::Reload() {
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void patch_instruction(VAPICROMState *s, X86CPU *cpu, target_ulong ip)
{
CPUState *cs = CPU(cpu);
CPUX86State *env = &cpu->env;
VAPICHandlers *handlers;
uint8_t opcode[2];
uint32_t imm32;
target_ulong current_pc = 0;
target_ulong current_cs_base = 0;
uint32_t current_flags = 0;
if (smp_cpus == 1) {
handlers = &s->rom_state.up;
} else {
handlers = &s->rom_state.mp;
}
if (!kvm_enabled()) {
cpu_get_tb_cpu_state(env, ¤t_pc, ¤t_cs_base,
¤t_flags);
}
pause_all_vcpus();
cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, ip, opcode, sizeof(opcode), 0);
switch (opcode[0]) {
case 0x89: /* mov r32 to r/m32 */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x50 + modrm_reg(opcode[1])); /* push reg */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 1, handlers->set_tpr);
break;
case 0x8b: /* mov r/m32 to r32 */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x90);
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 1, handlers->get_tpr[modrm_reg(opcode[1])]);
break;
case 0xa1: /* mov abs to eax */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip, handlers->get_tpr[0]);
break;
case 0xa3: /* mov eax to abs */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip, handlers->set_tpr_eax);
break;
case 0xc7: /* mov imm32, r/m32 (c7/0) */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x68); /* push imm32 */
cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, ip + 6, (void *)&imm32, sizeof(imm32), 0);
cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, ip + 1, (void *)&imm32, sizeof(imm32), 1);
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 5, handlers->set_tpr);
break;
case 0xff: /* push r/m32 */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x50); /* push eax */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 1, handlers->get_tpr_stack);
break;
default:
abort();
}
resume_all_vcpus();
if (!kvm_enabled()) {
tb_gen_code(cs, current_pc, current_cs_base, current_flags, 1);
cpu_resume_from_signal(cs, NULL);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 29,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_image_filter_gaussian_blur(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS)
{
PHP_GD_SINGLE_RES
if (gdImageGaussianBlur(im_src) == 1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 17,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::IsFullscreenForCurrentTab() const {
return delegate_ ? delegate_->IsFullscreenForTabOrPending(this) : false;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcp_undo_cwnd_reduction(struct sock *sk, bool unmark_loss)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
if (unmark_loss) {
struct sk_buff *skb;
tcp_for_write_queue(skb, sk) {
if (skb == tcp_send_head(sk))
break;
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked &= ~TCPCB_LOST;
}
tp->lost_out = 0;
tcp_clear_all_retrans_hints(tp);
}
if (tp->prior_ssthresh) {
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
if (icsk->icsk_ca_ops->undo_cwnd)
tp->snd_cwnd = icsk->icsk_ca_ops->undo_cwnd(sk);
else
tp->snd_cwnd = max(tp->snd_cwnd, tp->snd_ssthresh << 1);
if (tp->prior_ssthresh > tp->snd_ssthresh) {
tp->snd_ssthresh = tp->prior_ssthresh;
tcp_ecn_withdraw_cwr(tp);
}
} else {
tp->snd_cwnd = max(tp->snd_cwnd, tp->snd_ssthresh);
}
tp->snd_cwnd_stamp = tcp_time_stamp;
tp->undo_marker = 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction
Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().
To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:
1) The proportional reduction mode
inflight > ssthresh > 0
2) The reduction bound mode
a) inflight == ssthresh > 0
b) inflight < ssthresh
sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh
Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.
In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events. For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.
Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int uvesafb_set_par(struct fb_info *info)
{
struct uvesafb_par *par = info->par;
struct uvesafb_ktask *task = NULL;
struct vbe_crtc_ib *crtc = NULL;
struct vbe_mode_ib *mode = NULL;
int i, err = 0, depth = info->var.bits_per_pixel;
if (depth > 8 && depth != 32)
depth = info->var.red.length + info->var.green.length +
info->var.blue.length;
i = uvesafb_vbe_find_mode(par, info->var.xres, info->var.yres, depth,
UVESAFB_EXACT_RES | UVESAFB_EXACT_DEPTH);
if (i >= 0)
mode = &par->vbe_modes[i];
else
return -EINVAL;
task = uvesafb_prep();
if (!task)
return -ENOMEM;
setmode:
task->t.regs.eax = 0x4f02;
task->t.regs.ebx = mode->mode_id | 0x4000; /* use LFB */
if (par->vbe_ib.vbe_version >= 0x0300 && !par->nocrtc &&
info->var.pixclock != 0) {
task->t.regs.ebx |= 0x0800; /* use CRTC data */
task->t.flags = TF_BUF_ESDI;
crtc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct vbe_crtc_ib), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!crtc) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
crtc->horiz_start = info->var.xres + info->var.right_margin;
crtc->horiz_end = crtc->horiz_start + info->var.hsync_len;
crtc->horiz_total = crtc->horiz_end + info->var.left_margin;
crtc->vert_start = info->var.yres + info->var.lower_margin;
crtc->vert_end = crtc->vert_start + info->var.vsync_len;
crtc->vert_total = crtc->vert_end + info->var.upper_margin;
crtc->pixel_clock = PICOS2KHZ(info->var.pixclock) * 1000;
crtc->refresh_rate = (u16)(100 * (crtc->pixel_clock /
(crtc->vert_total * crtc->horiz_total)));
if (info->var.vmode & FB_VMODE_DOUBLE)
crtc->flags |= 0x1;
if (info->var.vmode & FB_VMODE_INTERLACED)
crtc->flags |= 0x2;
if (!(info->var.sync & FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT))
crtc->flags |= 0x4;
if (!(info->var.sync & FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT))
crtc->flags |= 0x8;
memcpy(&par->crtc, crtc, sizeof(*crtc));
} else {
memset(&par->crtc, 0, sizeof(*crtc));
}
task->t.buf_len = sizeof(struct vbe_crtc_ib);
task->buf = &par->crtc;
err = uvesafb_exec(task);
if (err || (task->t.regs.eax & 0xffff) != 0x004f) {
/*
* The mode switch might have failed because we tried to
* use our own timings. Try again with the default timings.
*/
if (crtc != NULL) {
pr_warn("mode switch failed (eax=0x%x, err=%d) - trying again with default timings\n",
task->t.regs.eax, err);
uvesafb_reset(task);
kfree(crtc);
crtc = NULL;
info->var.pixclock = 0;
goto setmode;
} else {
pr_err("mode switch failed (eax=0x%x, err=%d)\n",
task->t.regs.eax, err);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
par->mode_idx = i;
/* For 8bpp modes, always try to set the DAC to 8 bits. */
if (par->vbe_ib.capabilities & VBE_CAP_CAN_SWITCH_DAC &&
mode->bits_per_pixel <= 8) {
uvesafb_reset(task);
task->t.regs.eax = 0x4f08;
task->t.regs.ebx = 0x0800;
err = uvesafb_exec(task);
if (err || (task->t.regs.eax & 0xffff) != 0x004f ||
((task->t.regs.ebx & 0xff00) >> 8) != 8) {
dac_width = 6;
} else {
dac_width = 8;
}
}
info->fix.visual = (info->var.bits_per_pixel == 8) ?
FB_VISUAL_PSEUDOCOLOR : FB_VISUAL_TRUECOLOR;
info->fix.line_length = mode->bytes_per_scan_line;
out:
kfree(crtc);
uvesafb_free(task);
return err;
}
Commit Message: video: uvesafb: Fix integer overflow in allocation
cmap->len can get close to INT_MAX/2, allowing for an integer overflow in
allocation. This uses kmalloc_array() instead to catch the condition.
Reported-by: Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Fixes: 8bdb3a2d7df48 ("uvesafb: the driver core")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 20,114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DOMHandler::Wire(UberDispatcher* dispatcher) {
DOM::Dispatcher::wire(dispatcher, this);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Guard DOM.setFileInputFiles under MayAffectLocalFiles
Bug: 805557
Change-Id: Ib6f37ec6e1d091ee54621cc0c5c44f1a6beab10f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1334847
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607902}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int coroutine_fn v9fs_xattr_fid_clunk(V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp)
{
int retval = 0;
if (fidp->fs.xattr.xattrwalk_fid) {
/* getxattr/listxattr fid */
goto free_value;
}
/*
* if this is fid for setxattr. clunk should
* result in setxattr localcall
*/
if (fidp->fs.xattr.len != fidp->fs.xattr.copied_len) {
/* clunk after partial write */
retval = -EINVAL;
goto free_out;
}
if (fidp->fs.xattr.len) {
retval = v9fs_co_lsetxattr(pdu, &fidp->path, &fidp->fs.xattr.name,
fidp->fs.xattr.value,
fidp->fs.xattr.len,
fidp->fs.xattr.flags);
} else {
retval = v9fs_co_lremovexattr(pdu, &fidp->path, &fidp->fs.xattr.name);
}
free_out:
v9fs_string_free(&fidp->fs.xattr.name);
free_value:
g_free(fidp->fs.xattr.value);
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 16,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
{
rend_service_t *service;
char buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
crypt_path_t *hop;
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
char hexcookie[9];
int reason;
const char *rend_cookie, *rend_pk_digest;
tor_assert(circuit->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND);
tor_assert(circuit->cpath);
tor_assert(circuit->build_state);
assert_circ_anonymity_ok(circuit, get_options());
tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
/* XXX: This is version 2 specific (only one supported). */
rend_pk_digest = (char *) rend_data_get_pk_digest(circuit->rend_data,
NULL);
rend_cookie = circuit->rend_data->rend_cookie;
/* Declare the circuit dirty to avoid reuse, and for path-bias */
if (!circuit->base_.timestamp_dirty)
circuit->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
/* This may be redundant */
pathbias_count_use_attempt(circuit);
hop = circuit->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref->cpath;
base16_encode(hexcookie,9, rend_cookie,4);
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
log_info(LD_REND,
"Done building circuit %u to rendezvous with "
"cookie %s for service %s",
(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id, hexcookie, serviceid);
circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO, LD_REND, circuit);
/* Clear the 'in-progress HS circ has timed out' flag for
* consistency with what happens on the client side; this line has
* no effect on Tor's behaviour. */
circuit->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 0;
/* If hop is NULL, another rend circ has already connected to this
* rend point. Close this circ. */
if (hop == NULL) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Another rend circ has already reached this rend point; "
"closing this rend circ.");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_NONE;
goto err;
}
/* Remove our final cpath element from the reference, so that no
* other circuit will try to use it. Store it in
* pending_final_cpath for now to ensure that it will be freed if
* our rendezvous attempt fails. */
circuit->build_state->pending_final_cpath = hop;
circuit->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref->cpath = NULL;
service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(rend_pk_digest);
if (!service) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Internal error: unrecognized service ID on "
"rendezvous circuit.");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
/* All we need to do is send a RELAY_RENDEZVOUS1 cell... */
memcpy(buf, rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
if (crypto_dh_get_public(hop->rend_dh_handshake_state,
buf+REND_COOKIE_LEN, DH_KEY_LEN)<0) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Couldn't get DH public key.");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
memcpy(buf+REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN, hop->rend_circ_nonce,
DIGEST_LEN);
/* Send the cell */
if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circuit),
RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS1,
buf, REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN,
circuit->cpath->prev)<0) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't send RENDEZVOUS1 cell.");
goto done;
}
crypto_dh_free(hop->rend_dh_handshake_state);
hop->rend_dh_handshake_state = NULL;
/* Append the cpath entry. */
hop->state = CPATH_STATE_OPEN;
/* set the windows to default. these are the windows
* that the service thinks the client has.
*/
hop->package_window = circuit_initial_package_window();
hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
onion_append_to_cpath(&circuit->cpath, hop);
circuit->build_state->pending_final_cpath = NULL; /* prevent double-free */
/* Change the circuit purpose. */
circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED);
goto done;
err:
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), reason);
done:
memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
memwipe(serviceid, 0, sizeof(serviceid));
memwipe(hexcookie, 0, sizeof(hexcookie));
return;
}
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
CWE ID: CWE-532 | 0 | 14,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DefragInsertFrag(ThreadVars *tv, DecodeThreadVars *dtv, DefragTracker *tracker, Packet *p, PacketQueue *pq)
{
Packet *r = NULL;
int ltrim = 0;
uint8_t more_frags;
uint16_t frag_offset;
/* IPv4 header length - IPv4 only. */
uint16_t hlen = 0;
/* This is the offset of the start of the data in the packet that
* falls after the IP header. */
uint16_t data_offset;
/* The length of the (fragmented) data. This is the length of the
* data that falls after the IP header. */
uint16_t data_len;
/* Where the fragment ends. */
uint16_t frag_end;
/* Offset in the packet to the IPv6 header. */
uint16_t ip_hdr_offset;
/* Offset in the packet to the IPv6 frag header. IPv6 only. */
uint16_t frag_hdr_offset = 0;
/* Address family */
int af = tracker->af;
/* settings for updating a payload when an ip6 fragment with
* unfragmentable exthdrs are encountered. */
int ip6_nh_set_offset = 0;
uint8_t ip6_nh_set_value = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
uint64_t pcap_cnt = p->pcap_cnt;
#endif
if (tracker->af == AF_INET) {
more_frags = IPV4_GET_MF(p);
frag_offset = IPV4_GET_IPOFFSET(p) << 3;
hlen = IPV4_GET_HLEN(p);
data_offset = (uint8_t *)p->ip4h + hlen - GET_PKT_DATA(p);
data_len = IPV4_GET_IPLEN(p) - hlen;
frag_end = frag_offset + data_len;
ip_hdr_offset = (uint8_t *)p->ip4h - GET_PKT_DATA(p);
/* Ignore fragment if the end of packet extends past the
* maximum size of a packet. */
if (IPV4_HEADER_LEN + frag_offset + data_len > IPV4_MAXPACKET_LEN) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV4_FRAG_PKT_TOO_LARGE);
return NULL;
}
}
else if (tracker->af == AF_INET6) {
more_frags = IPV6_EXTHDR_GET_FH_FLAG(p);
frag_offset = IPV6_EXTHDR_GET_FH_OFFSET(p);
data_offset = p->ip6eh.fh_data_offset;
data_len = p->ip6eh.fh_data_len;
frag_end = frag_offset + data_len;
ip_hdr_offset = (uint8_t *)p->ip6h - GET_PKT_DATA(p);
frag_hdr_offset = p->ip6eh.fh_header_offset;
SCLogDebug("mf %s frag_offset %u data_offset %u, data_len %u, "
"frag_end %u, ip_hdr_offset %u, frag_hdr_offset %u",
more_frags ? "true" : "false", frag_offset, data_offset,
data_len, frag_end, ip_hdr_offset, frag_hdr_offset);
/* handle unfragmentable exthdrs */
if (ip_hdr_offset + IPV6_HEADER_LEN < frag_hdr_offset) {
SCLogDebug("we have exthdrs before fraghdr %u bytes",
(uint32_t)(frag_hdr_offset - (ip_hdr_offset + IPV6_HEADER_LEN)));
/* get the offset of the 'next' field in exthdr before the FH,
* relative to the buffer start */
/* store offset and FH 'next' value for updating frag buffer below */
ip6_nh_set_offset = p->ip6eh.fh_prev_hdr_offset;
ip6_nh_set_value = IPV6_EXTHDR_GET_FH_NH(p);
SCLogDebug("offset %d, value %u", ip6_nh_set_offset, ip6_nh_set_value);
}
/* Ignore fragment if the end of packet extends past the
* maximum size of a packet. */
if (frag_offset + data_len > IPV6_MAXPACKET) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_FRAG_PKT_TOO_LARGE);
return NULL;
}
}
else {
/* Abort - should not happen. */
SCLogWarning(SC_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, "Invalid address family, aborting.");
return NULL;
}
/* Update timeout. */
tracker->timeout.tv_sec = p->ts.tv_sec + tracker->host_timeout;
tracker->timeout.tv_usec = p->ts.tv_usec;
Frag *prev = NULL, *next;
int overlap = 0;
if (!TAILQ_EMPTY(&tracker->frags)) {
TAILQ_FOREACH(prev, &tracker->frags, next) {
ltrim = 0;
next = TAILQ_NEXT(prev, next);
switch (tracker->policy) {
case DEFRAG_POLICY_BSD:
if (frag_offset < prev->offset + prev->data_len) {
if (frag_offset >= prev->offset) {
ltrim = prev->offset + prev->data_len - frag_offset;
overlap++;
}
if ((next != NULL) && (frag_end > next->offset)) {
next->ltrim = frag_end - next->offset;
overlap++;
}
if ((frag_offset < prev->offset) &&
(frag_end >= prev->offset + prev->data_len)) {
prev->skip = 1;
overlap++;
}
goto insert;
}
break;
case DEFRAG_POLICY_LINUX:
if (frag_offset < prev->offset + prev->data_len) {
if (frag_offset > prev->offset) {
ltrim = prev->offset + prev->data_len - frag_offset;
overlap++;
}
if ((next != NULL) && (frag_end > next->offset)) {
next->ltrim = frag_end - next->offset;
overlap++;
}
if ((frag_offset < prev->offset) &&
(frag_end >= prev->offset + prev->data_len)) {
prev->skip = 1;
overlap++;
}
goto insert;
}
break;
case DEFRAG_POLICY_WINDOWS:
if (frag_offset < prev->offset + prev->data_len) {
if (frag_offset >= prev->offset) {
ltrim = prev->offset + prev->data_len - frag_offset;
overlap++;
}
if ((frag_offset < prev->offset) &&
(frag_end > prev->offset + prev->data_len)) {
prev->skip = 1;
overlap++;
}
goto insert;
}
break;
case DEFRAG_POLICY_SOLARIS:
if (frag_offset < prev->offset + prev->data_len) {
if (frag_offset >= prev->offset) {
ltrim = prev->offset + prev->data_len - frag_offset;
overlap++;
}
if ((frag_offset < prev->offset) &&
(frag_end >= prev->offset + prev->data_len)) {
prev->skip = 1;
overlap++;
}
goto insert;
}
break;
case DEFRAG_POLICY_FIRST:
if ((frag_offset >= prev->offset) &&
(frag_end <= prev->offset + prev->data_len)) {
overlap++;
goto done;
}
if (frag_offset < prev->offset) {
goto insert;
}
if (frag_offset < prev->offset + prev->data_len) {
ltrim = prev->offset + prev->data_len - frag_offset;
overlap++;
goto insert;
}
break;
case DEFRAG_POLICY_LAST:
if (frag_offset <= prev->offset) {
if (frag_end > prev->offset) {
prev->ltrim = frag_end - prev->offset;
overlap++;
}
goto insert;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
insert:
if (data_len - ltrim <= 0) {
/* Full packet has been trimmed due to the overlap policy. Overlap
* already set. */
goto done;
}
/* Allocate fragment and insert. */
SCMutexLock(&defrag_context->frag_pool_lock);
Frag *new = PoolGet(defrag_context->frag_pool);
SCMutexUnlock(&defrag_context->frag_pool_lock);
if (new == NULL) {
if (af == AF_INET) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV4_FRAG_IGNORED);
} else {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_FRAG_IGNORED);
}
goto done;
}
new->pkt = SCMalloc(GET_PKT_LEN(p));
if (new->pkt == NULL) {
SCMutexLock(&defrag_context->frag_pool_lock);
PoolReturn(defrag_context->frag_pool, new);
SCMutexUnlock(&defrag_context->frag_pool_lock);
if (af == AF_INET) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV4_FRAG_IGNORED);
} else {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_FRAG_IGNORED);
}
goto done;
}
memcpy(new->pkt, GET_PKT_DATA(p) + ltrim, GET_PKT_LEN(p) - ltrim);
new->len = GET_PKT_LEN(p) - ltrim;
/* in case of unfragmentable exthdrs, update the 'next hdr' field
* in the raw buffer so the reassembled packet will point to the
* correct next header after stripping the frag header */
if (ip6_nh_set_offset > 0 && frag_offset == 0 && ltrim == 0) {
if (new->len > ip6_nh_set_offset) {
SCLogDebug("updating frag to have 'correct' nh value: %u -> %u",
new->pkt[ip6_nh_set_offset], ip6_nh_set_value);
new->pkt[ip6_nh_set_offset] = ip6_nh_set_value;
}
}
new->hlen = hlen;
new->offset = frag_offset + ltrim;
new->data_offset = data_offset;
new->data_len = data_len - ltrim;
new->ip_hdr_offset = ip_hdr_offset;
new->frag_hdr_offset = frag_hdr_offset;
new->more_frags = more_frags;
#ifdef DEBUG
new->pcap_cnt = pcap_cnt;
#endif
Frag *frag;
TAILQ_FOREACH(frag, &tracker->frags, next) {
if (new->offset < frag->offset)
break;
}
if (frag == NULL) {
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tracker->frags, new, next);
}
else {
TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(frag, new, next);
}
if (!more_frags) {
tracker->seen_last = 1;
}
if (tracker->seen_last) {
if (tracker->af == AF_INET) {
r = Defrag4Reassemble(tv, tracker, p);
if (r != NULL && tv != NULL && dtv != NULL) {
StatsIncr(tv, dtv->counter_defrag_ipv4_reassembled);
if (pq && DecodeIPV4(tv, dtv, r, (void *)r->ip4h,
IPV4_GET_IPLEN(r), pq) != TM_ECODE_OK) {
UNSET_TUNNEL_PKT(r);
r->root = NULL;
TmqhOutputPacketpool(tv, r);
r = NULL;
} else {
PacketDefragPktSetupParent(p);
}
}
}
else if (tracker->af == AF_INET6) {
r = Defrag6Reassemble(tv, tracker, p);
if (r != NULL && tv != NULL && dtv != NULL) {
StatsIncr(tv, dtv->counter_defrag_ipv6_reassembled);
if (pq && DecodeIPV6(tv, dtv, r, (uint8_t *)r->ip6h,
IPV6_GET_PLEN(r) + IPV6_HEADER_LEN,
pq) != TM_ECODE_OK) {
UNSET_TUNNEL_PKT(r);
r->root = NULL;
TmqhOutputPacketpool(tv, r);
r = NULL;
} else {
PacketDefragPktSetupParent(p);
}
}
}
}
done:
if (overlap) {
if (af == AF_INET) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV4_FRAG_OVERLAP);
}
else {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_FRAG_OVERLAP);
}
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | 0 | 6,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::UpdateFrameArrivalMap(QuicStreamOffset offset) {
auto next_frame = frame_arrival_time_map_.upper_bound(offset);
DCHECK(next_frame != frame_arrival_time_map_.begin());
auto iter = frame_arrival_time_map_.begin();
while (iter != next_frame) {
auto erased = *iter;
iter = frame_arrival_time_map_.erase(iter);
QUIC_DVLOG(1) << "Removed FrameInfo with offset: " << erased.first
<< " and length: " << erased.second.length;
if (erased.first + erased.second.length > offset) {
auto updated = std::make_pair(
offset, FrameInfo(erased.first + erased.second.length - offset,
erased.second.timestamp));
QUIC_DVLOG(1) << "Inserted FrameInfo with offset: " << updated.first
<< " and length: " << updated.second.length;
frame_arrival_time_map_.insert(updated);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB Write in QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::OnStreamData
BUG=778505
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I1dfd1d26a2c7ee8fe047f7fe6e4ac2e9b97efa52
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/748282
Commit-Queue: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513144}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 2,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandler::AddTransceiverWithTrackOnSignalingThread(
rtc::scoped_refptr<webrtc::MediaStreamTrackInterface> webrtc_track,
webrtc::RtpTransceiverInit init,
TransceiverStateSurfacer* transceiver_state_surfacer,
webrtc::RTCErrorOr<rtc::scoped_refptr<webrtc::RtpTransceiverInterface>>*
error_or_transceiver) {
*error_or_transceiver =
native_peer_connection_->AddTransceiver(webrtc_track, init);
std::vector<rtc::scoped_refptr<webrtc::RtpTransceiverInterface>> transceivers;
if (error_or_transceiver->ok())
transceivers.push_back(error_or_transceiver->value());
transceiver_state_surfacer->Initialize(track_adapter_map_, transceivers);
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 27,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AnyBitsSet(GLbitfield bits, GLbitfield ref) {
DCHECK_NE(0u, ref);
return ((bits & ref) != 0);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 27,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static IW_INLINE iw_tmpsample linear_to_srgb_sample(iw_tmpsample v_linear)
{
if(v_linear <= 0.0031308) {
return 12.92*v_linear;
}
return 1.055*pow(v_linear,1.0/2.4) - 0.055;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 28,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::keepEventInNode(Event* event) {
return isUserInteractionEventForSlider(event, layoutObject());
}
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RuntimeCustomBindings::RuntimeCustomBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetManifest",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::GetManifest, base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("OpenChannelToExtension",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::OpenChannelToExtension,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("OpenChannelToNativeApp",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::OpenChannelToNativeApp,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("GetExtensionViews",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::GetExtensionViews,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 5,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
int n, int *al)
{
unsigned short length;
unsigned short type;
unsigned short size;
unsigned char *data = *p;
int tlsext_servername = 0;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
# endif
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
# endif
if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
goto ri_check;
n2s(data, length);
if ((d + n) - data != length) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
if ((d + n) - data < size)
goto ri_check;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
tlsext_servername = 1;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
ecpointformatlist_length;
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
ecpointformatlist_length);
}
# if 0
fprintf(stderr,
"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
# endif
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
|| (size > 0)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
}
# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
unsigned char *sdata = data;
if (size < 2) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
/* shouldn't really happen */
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
}
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
/* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
} else {
s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
}
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
# endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
/*
* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
* request message.
*/
if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
unsigned char *selected;
unsigned char selected_len;
/* We must have requested it. */
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
/* The data must be valid */
if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->
ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
size,
s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
}
# endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
switch (data[0]) {
case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
break;
case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
break;
default:
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
}
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
return 0;
}
# endif
data += size;
}
if (data != d + n) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
} else {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
}
*p = data;
ri_check:
/*
* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
* an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
* because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
* However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
* doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
* initial connect only.
*/
if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 7,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, setDefaultStub)
{
char *index = NULL, *webindex = NULL, *error = NULL;
zend_string *stub = NULL;
size_t index_len = 0, webindex_len = 0;
int created_stub = 0;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (phar_obj->archive->is_data) {
if (phar_obj->archive->is_tar) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"A Phar stub cannot be set in a plain tar archive");
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"A Phar stub cannot be set in a plain zip archive");
}
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "|s!s", &index, &index_len, &webindex, &webindex_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() > 0 && (phar_obj->archive->is_tar || phar_obj->archive->is_zip)) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "method accepts no arguments for a tar- or zip-based phar stub, %d given", ZEND_NUM_ARGS());
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (PHAR_G(readonly)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"Cannot change stub: phar.readonly=1");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!phar_obj->archive->is_tar && !phar_obj->archive->is_zip) {
stub = phar_create_default_stub(index, webindex, &error);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
if (stub) {
zend_string_free(stub);
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
created_stub = 1;
}
if (phar_obj->archive->is_persistent && FAILURE == phar_copy_on_write(&(phar_obj->archive))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "phar \"%s\" is persistent, unable to copy on write", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
phar_flush(phar_obj->archive, stub ? ZSTR_VAL(stub) : 0, stub ? ZSTR_LEN(stub) : 0, 1, &error);
if (created_stub) {
zend_string_free(stub);
}
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ExecuteDeleteToBeginningOfParagraph(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
frame.GetEditor().DeleteWithDirection(DeleteDirection::kBackward,
TextGranularity::kParagraphBoundary,
true, false);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void virtio_notify_vector(VirtIODevice *vdev, uint16_t vector)
{
BusState *qbus = qdev_get_parent_bus(DEVICE(vdev));
VirtioBusClass *k = VIRTIO_BUS_GET_CLASS(qbus);
if (k->notify) {
k->notify(qbus->parent, vector);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FormControlState BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::saveFormControlState() const
{
if (!m_dateTimeEditElement)
return FormControlState();
return m_dateTimeEditElement->valueAsDateTimeFieldsState().saveFormControlState();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> ModuleSystem::RequireForJsInner(
v8::Local<v8::String> module_name) {
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Context> v8_context = context()->v8_context();
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(v8_context);
v8::Local<v8::Object> global(context()->v8_context()->Global());
v8::Local<v8::Value> modules_value;
if (!GetPrivate(global, kModulesField, &modules_value) ||
modules_value->IsUndefined()) {
Warn(GetIsolate(), "Extension view no longer exists");
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::Object> modules(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(modules_value));
v8::Local<v8::Value> exports;
if (!GetProperty(v8_context, modules, module_name, &exports) ||
!exports->IsUndefined())
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
exports = LoadModule(*v8::String::Utf8Value(module_name));
SetProperty(v8_context, modules, module_name, exports);
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Harden against bindings interception
There's more we can do but this is a start.
BUG=590275
BUG=590118
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1748943002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378621}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 15,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLButtonElement::isURLAttribute(const Attribute& attribute) const
{
return attribute.name() == formactionAttr || HTMLFormControlElement::isURLAttribute(attribute);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOL gdi_Bitmap_Decompress(rdpContext* context, rdpBitmap* bitmap,
const BYTE* pSrcData, UINT32 DstWidth, UINT32 DstHeight,
UINT32 bpp, UINT32 length, BOOL compressed,
UINT32 codecId)
{
UINT32 SrcSize = length;
rdpGdi* gdi = context->gdi;
bitmap->compressed = FALSE;
bitmap->format = gdi->dstFormat;
bitmap->length = DstWidth * DstHeight * GetBytesPerPixel(bitmap->format);
bitmap->data = (BYTE*) _aligned_malloc(bitmap->length, 16);
if (!bitmap->data)
return FALSE;
if (compressed)
{
if (bpp < 32)
{
if (!interleaved_decompress(context->codecs->interleaved,
pSrcData, SrcSize,
DstWidth, DstHeight,
bpp,
bitmap->data, bitmap->format,
0, 0, 0, DstWidth, DstHeight,
&gdi->palette))
return FALSE;
}
else
{
if (!planar_decompress(context->codecs->planar, pSrcData, SrcSize,
DstWidth, DstHeight,
bitmap->data, bitmap->format, 0, 0, 0,
DstWidth, DstHeight, TRUE))
return FALSE;
}
}
else
{
const UINT32 SrcFormat = gdi_get_pixel_format(bpp);
const size_t sbpp = GetBytesPerPixel(SrcFormat);
const size_t dbpp = GetBytesPerPixel(bitmap->format);
if ((sbpp == 0) || (dbpp == 0))
return FALSE;
else
{
const size_t dstSize = SrcSize * dbpp / sbpp;
if (dstSize < bitmap->length)
return FALSE;
}
if (!freerdp_image_copy(bitmap->data, bitmap->format, 0, 0, 0,
DstWidth, DstHeight, pSrcData, SrcFormat,
0, 0, 0, &gdi->palette, FREERDP_FLIP_VERTICAL))
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8787
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 15,567 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfsd_startup_generic(int nrservs)
{
int ret;
if (nfsd_users++)
return 0;
/*
* Readahead param cache - will no-op if it already exists.
* (Note therefore results will be suboptimal if number of
* threads is modified after nfsd start.)
*/
ret = nfsd_racache_init(2*nrservs);
if (ret)
goto dec_users;
ret = nfs4_state_start();
if (ret)
goto out_racache;
return 0;
out_racache:
nfsd_racache_shutdown();
dec_users:
nfsd_users--;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: nfsd: check for oversized NFSv2/v3 arguments
A client can append random data to the end of an NFSv2 or NFSv3 RPC call
without our complaining; we'll just stop parsing at the end of the
expected data and ignore the rest.
Encoded arguments and replies are stored together in an array of pages,
and if a call is too large it could leave inadequate space for the
reply. This is normally OK because NFS RPC's typically have either
short arguments and long replies (like READ) or long arguments and short
replies (like WRITE). But a client that sends an incorrectly long reply
can violate those assumptions. This was observed to cause crashes.
Also, several operations increment rq_next_page in the decode routine
before checking the argument size, which can leave rq_next_page pointing
well past the end of the page array, causing trouble later in
svc_free_pages.
So, following a suggestion from Neil Brown, add a central check to
enforce our expectation that no NFSv2/v3 call has both a large call and
a large reply.
As followup we may also want to rewrite the encoding routines to check
more carefully that they aren't running off the end of the page array.
We may also consider rejecting calls that have any extra garbage
appended. That would be safer, and within our rights by spec, but given
the age of our server and the NFS protocol, and the fact that we've
never enforced this before, we may need to balance that against the
possibility of breaking some oddball client.
Reported-by: Tuomas Haanpää <thaan@synopsys.com>
Reported-by: Ari Kauppi <ari@synopsys.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderLayerCompositor::updateViewportConstraintStatus(RenderLayer* layer)
{
if (isViewportConstrainedFixedOrStickyLayer(layer))
addViewportConstrainedLayer(layer);
else
removeViewportConstrainedLayer(layer);
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void LocationWithPerWorldBindingsAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "locationWithPerWorldBindings");
v8::Local<v8::Value> target;
if (!holder->Get(isolate->GetCurrentContext(), V8AtomicString(isolate, "locationWithPerWorldBindings"))
.ToLocal(&target)) {
return;
}
if (!target->IsObject()) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("The attribute value is not an object");
return;
}
bool result;
if (!target.As<v8::Object>()->Set(
isolate->GetCurrentContext(),
V8AtomicString(isolate, "href"),
v8_value).To(&result)) {
return;
}
if (!result)
return;
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 9,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OMXCodec::onCmdComplete(OMX_COMMANDTYPE cmd, OMX_U32 data) {
switch (cmd) {
case OMX_CommandStateSet:
{
onStateChange((OMX_STATETYPE)data);
break;
}
case OMX_CommandPortDisable:
{
OMX_U32 portIndex = data;
CODEC_LOGV("PORT_DISABLED(%u)", portIndex);
CHECK(mState == EXECUTING || mState == RECONFIGURING);
CHECK_EQ((int)mPortStatus[portIndex], (int)DISABLING);
CHECK_EQ(mPortBuffers[portIndex].size(), 0u);
mPortStatus[portIndex] = DISABLED;
if (mState == RECONFIGURING) {
CHECK_EQ(portIndex, (OMX_U32)kPortIndexOutput);
sp<MetaData> oldOutputFormat = mOutputFormat;
initOutputFormat(mSource->getFormat());
bool formatChanged = formatHasNotablyChanged(oldOutputFormat, mOutputFormat);
if (!mOutputPortSettingsHaveChanged) {
mOutputPortSettingsHaveChanged = formatChanged;
}
status_t err = enablePortAsync(portIndex);
if (err != OK) {
CODEC_LOGE("enablePortAsync(%u) failed (err = %d)", portIndex, err);
setState(ERROR);
} else {
err = allocateBuffersOnPort(portIndex);
if (err != OK) {
CODEC_LOGE("allocateBuffersOnPort (%s) failed "
"(err = %d)",
portIndex == kPortIndexInput
? "input" : "output",
err);
setState(ERROR);
}
}
}
break;
}
case OMX_CommandPortEnable:
{
OMX_U32 portIndex = data;
CODEC_LOGV("PORT_ENABLED(%u)", portIndex);
CHECK(mState == EXECUTING || mState == RECONFIGURING);
CHECK_EQ((int)mPortStatus[portIndex], (int)ENABLING);
mPortStatus[portIndex] = ENABLED;
if (mState == RECONFIGURING) {
CHECK_EQ(portIndex, (OMX_U32)kPortIndexOutput);
setState(EXECUTING);
fillOutputBuffers();
}
break;
}
case OMX_CommandFlush:
{
OMX_U32 portIndex = data;
CODEC_LOGV("FLUSH_DONE(%u)", portIndex);
CHECK_EQ((int)mPortStatus[portIndex], (int)SHUTTING_DOWN);
mPortStatus[portIndex] = ENABLED;
CHECK_EQ(countBuffersWeOwn(mPortBuffers[portIndex]),
mPortBuffers[portIndex].size());
if (mSkipCutBuffer != NULL && mPortStatus[kPortIndexOutput] == ENABLED) {
mSkipCutBuffer->clear();
}
if (mState == RECONFIGURING) {
CHECK_EQ(portIndex, (OMX_U32)kPortIndexOutput);
disablePortAsync(portIndex);
} else if (mState == EXECUTING_TO_IDLE) {
if (mPortStatus[kPortIndexInput] == ENABLED
&& mPortStatus[kPortIndexOutput] == ENABLED) {
CODEC_LOGV("Finished flushing both ports, now completing "
"transition from EXECUTING to IDLE.");
mPortStatus[kPortIndexInput] = SHUTTING_DOWN;
mPortStatus[kPortIndexOutput] = SHUTTING_DOWN;
status_t err =
mOMX->sendCommand(mNode, OMX_CommandStateSet, OMX_StateIdle);
CHECK_EQ(err, (status_t)OK);
}
} else {
if (mPortStatus[kPortIndexInput] == ENABLED
&& mPortStatus[kPortIndexOutput] == ENABLED) {
CODEC_LOGV("Finished flushing both ports, now continuing from"
" seek-time.");
mPaused = false;
drainInputBuffers();
fillOutputBuffers();
}
if (mOutputPortSettingsChangedPending) {
CODEC_LOGV(
"Honoring deferred output port settings change.");
mOutputPortSettingsChangedPending = false;
onPortSettingsChanged(kPortIndexOutput);
}
}
break;
}
default:
{
CODEC_LOGV("CMD_COMPLETE(%d, %u)", cmd, data);
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 13,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: auth_select_aid(struct sc_card *card)
{
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned char apdu_resp[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE];
struct auth_private_data *data = (struct auth_private_data *) card->drv_data;
int rv, ii;
struct sc_path tmp_path;
/* Select Card Manager (to deselect previously selected application) */
rv = gp_select_card_manager(card);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
/* Get smart card serial number */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xCA, 0x9F, 0x7F);
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.le = 0x2D;
apdu.resplen = 0x30;
apdu.resp = apdu_resp;
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
card->serialnr.len = 4;
memcpy(card->serialnr.value, apdu.resp+15, 4);
for (ii=0, data->sn = 0; ii < 4; ii++)
data->sn += (long int)(*(apdu.resp + 15 + ii)) << (3-ii)*8;
sc_log(card->ctx, "serial number %li/0x%lX", data->sn, data->sn);
memset(&tmp_path, 0, sizeof(struct sc_path));
tmp_path.type = SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME;
memcpy(tmp_path.value, aidAuthentIC_V5, lenAidAuthentIC_V5);
tmp_path.len = lenAidAuthentIC_V5;
rv = iso_ops->select_file(card, &tmp_path, NULL);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "select parent failed");
sc_format_path("3F00", &tmp_path);
rv = iso_ops->select_file(card, &tmp_path, &auth_current_df);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "select parent failed");
sc_format_path("3F00", &card->cache.current_path);
sc_file_dup(&auth_current_ef, auth_current_df);
memcpy(data->aid, aidAuthentIC_V5, lenAidAuthentIC_V5);
data->aid_len = lenAidAuthentIC_V5;
card->name = nameAidAuthentIC_V5;
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, rv);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 13,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u64 perf_swevent_set_period(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
u64 period = hwc->last_period;
u64 nr, offset;
s64 old, val;
hwc->last_period = hwc->sample_period;
again:
old = val = local64_read(&hwc->period_left);
if (val < 0)
return 0;
nr = div64_u64(period + val, period);
offset = nr * period;
val -= offset;
if (local64_cmpxchg(&hwc->period_left, old, val) != old)
goto again;
return nr;
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 12,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void init_once(void *foo)
{
struct f2fs_inode_info *fi = (struct f2fs_inode_info *) foo;
inode_init_once(&fi->vfs_inode);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: sanity check checkpoint segno and blkoff
Make sure segno and blkoff read from raw image are valid.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
[Jaegeuk Kim: adjust minor coding style]
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-129 | 0 | 11,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void vti_set_rr6(unsigned long rr6)
{
ia64_set_rr(RR6, rr6);
ia64_srlz_i();
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rtadv_prefix_get (struct list *rplist, struct prefix_ipv6 *p)
{
struct rtadv_prefix *rprefix;
rprefix = rtadv_prefix_lookup (rplist, p);
if (rprefix)
return rprefix;
rprefix = rtadv_prefix_new ();
memcpy (&rprefix->prefix, p, sizeof (struct prefix_ipv6));
listnode_add (rplist, rprefix);
return rprefix;
}
Commit Message: zebra: stack overrun in IPv6 RA receive code (CVE-2016-1245)
The IPv6 RA code also receives ICMPv6 RS and RA messages.
Unfortunately, by bad coding practice, the buffer size specified on
receiving such messages mixed up 2 constants that in fact have
different values.
The code itself has:
#define RTADV_MSG_SIZE 4096
While BUFSIZ is system-dependent, in my case (x86_64 glibc):
/usr/include/_G_config.h:#define _G_BUFSIZ 8192
/usr/include/libio.h:#define _IO_BUFSIZ _G_BUFSIZ
/usr/include/stdio.h:# define BUFSIZ _IO_BUFSIZ
FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD and Illumos are not affected, since all of them
have BUFSIZ == 1024.
As the latter is passed to the kernel on recvmsg(), it's possible to
overwrite 4kB of stack -- with ICMPv6 packets that can be globally sent
to any of the system's addresses (using fragmentation to get to 8k).
(The socket has filters installed limiting this to RS and RA packets,
but does not have a filter for source address or TTL.)
Issue discovered by trying to test other stuff, which randomly caused
the stack to be smaller than 8kB in that code location, which then
causes the kernel to report EFAULT (Bad address).
Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <equinox@opensourcerouting.org>
Reviewed-by: Donald Sharp <sharpd@cumulusnetworks.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_decode_table_status(const struct ofp_header *oh,
struct ofputil_table_status *ts)
{
const struct ofp14_table_status *ots;
struct ofpbuf b;
enum ofperr error;
enum ofpraw raw;
ofpbuf_use_const(&b, oh, ntohs(oh->length));
raw = ofpraw_pull_assert(&b);
ots = ofpbuf_pull(&b, sizeof *ots);
if (raw == OFPRAW_OFPT14_TABLE_STATUS) {
if (ots->reason != OFPTR_VACANCY_DOWN
&& ots->reason != OFPTR_VACANCY_UP) {
return OFPERR_OFPBPC_BAD_VALUE;
}
ts->reason = ots->reason;
error = ofputil_decode_table_desc(&b, &ts->desc, oh->version);
return error;
} else {
return OFPERR_OFPBRC_BAD_VERSION;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 28,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int conv_a8_blend(int blend_factor)
{
if (blend_factor == PIPE_BLENDFACTOR_DST_ALPHA)
return PIPE_BLENDFACTOR_DST_COLOR;
if (blend_factor == PIPE_BLENDFACTOR_INV_DST_ALPHA)
return PIPE_BLENDFACTOR_INV_DST_COLOR;
return blend_factor;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 28,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gchar* webkit_web_view_real_choose_file(WebKitWebView*, WebKitWebFrame*, const gchar* old_name)
{
notImplemented();
return g_strdup(old_name);
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 17,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nl_msg_parse(struct nl_msg *msg, void (*cb)(struct nl_object *, void *),
void *arg)
{
struct nl_cache_ops *ops;
struct nl_parser_param p = {
.pp_cb = parse_cb
};
struct dp_xdata x = {
.cb = cb,
.arg = arg,
};
int err;
ops = nl_cache_ops_associate_safe(nlmsg_get_proto(msg),
nlmsg_hdr(msg)->nlmsg_type);
if (ops == NULL)
return -NLE_MSGTYPE_NOSUPPORT;
p.pp_arg = &x;
err = nl_cache_parse(ops, NULL, nlmsg_hdr(msg), &p);
nl_cache_ops_put(ops);
return err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 1,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jas_iccgetuint64(jas_stream_t *in, jas_iccuint64_t *val)
{
ulonglong tmp;
if (jas_iccgetuint(in, 8, &tmp))
return -1;
*val = tmp;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 3,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: file_eofer(Gif_Reader *grr)
{
int c = getc(grr->f);
if (c == EOF)
return 1;
else {
ungetc(c, grr->f);
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: gif_read: Set last_name = NULL unconditionally.
With a non-malicious GIF, last_name is set to NULL when a name
extension is followed by an image. Reported in #117, via
Debian, via a KAIST fuzzing program.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 24,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int get_mmio_spte_generation(u64 spte)
{
unsigned int gen;
spte &= ~shadow_mmio_mask;
gen = (spte >> MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_SHIFT) & MMIO_GEN_LOW_MASK;
gen |= (spte >> MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_SHIFT) << MMIO_GEN_LOW_SHIFT;
return gen;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::BindRenderbufferStub(GLenum target,
GLuint renderbuffer) {
helper_->BindRenderbuffer(target, renderbuffer);
if (share_group_->bind_generates_resource())
helper_->CommandBufferHelper::OrderingBarrier();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 5,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u8 *nfc_llcp_build_tlv(u8 type, u8 *value, u8 value_length, u8 *tlv_length)
{
u8 *tlv, length;
pr_debug("type %d\n", type);
if (type >= LLCP_TLV_MAX)
return NULL;
length = llcp_tlv_length[type];
if (length == 0 && value_length == 0)
return NULL;
else if (length == 0)
length = value_length;
*tlv_length = 2 + length;
tlv = kzalloc(2 + length, GFP_KERNEL);
if (tlv == NULL)
return tlv;
tlv[0] = type;
tlv[1] = length;
memcpy(tlv + 2, value, length);
return tlv;
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 19,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _nfs4_get_security_label(struct inode *inode, void *buf,
size_t buflen)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
struct nfs_fattr fattr;
struct nfs4_label label = {0, 0, buflen, buf};
u32 bitmask[3] = { 0, 0, FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL };
struct nfs4_getattr_arg arg = {
.fh = NFS_FH(inode),
.bitmask = bitmask,
};
struct nfs4_getattr_res res = {
.fattr = &fattr,
.label = &label,
.server = server,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_GETATTR],
.rpc_argp = &arg,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
int ret;
nfs_fattr_init(&fattr);
ret = nfs4_call_sync(server->client, server, &msg, &arg.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!(fattr.valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4_SECURITY_LABEL))
return -ENOENT;
if (buflen < label.len)
return -ERANGE;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint8_t read_u8(uint8_t *data, size_t offset)
{
return data[offset];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource,
struct rlimit *new_rlim, struct rlimit *old_rlim)
{
struct rlimit *rlim;
int retval = 0;
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
return -EINVAL;
if (new_rlim) {
if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max)
return -EINVAL;
if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE &&
new_rlim->rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open)
return -EPERM;
}
/* protect tsk->signal and tsk->sighand from disappearing */
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
if (!tsk->sighand) {
retval = -ESRCH;
goto out;
}
rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource;
task_lock(tsk->group_leader);
if (new_rlim) {
/* Keep the capable check against init_user_ns until
cgroups can contain all limits */
if (new_rlim->rlim_max > rlim->rlim_max &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
retval = -EPERM;
if (!retval)
retval = security_task_setrlimit(tsk->group_leader,
resource, new_rlim);
if (resource == RLIMIT_CPU && new_rlim->rlim_cur == 0) {
/*
* The caller is asking for an immediate RLIMIT_CPU
* expiry. But we use the zero value to mean "it was
* never set". So let's cheat and make it one second
* instead
*/
new_rlim->rlim_cur = 1;
}
}
if (!retval) {
if (old_rlim)
*old_rlim = *rlim;
if (new_rlim)
*rlim = *new_rlim;
}
task_unlock(tsk->group_leader);
/*
* RLIMIT_CPU handling. Note that the kernel fails to return an error
* code if it rejected the user's attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU. This is a
* very long-standing error, and fixing it now risks breakage of
* applications, so we live with it
*/
if (!retval && new_rlim && resource == RLIMIT_CPU &&
new_rlim->rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY)
update_rlimit_cpu(tsk, new_rlim->rlim_cur);
out:
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <jld@mozilla.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 10,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UrlData::set_range_supported() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
range_supported_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 23,801 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *checkstring(js_State *J, int idx)
{
if (!js_iscoercible(J, idx))
js_typeerror(J, "string function called on null or undefined");
return js_tostring(J, idx);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void init_config_defines(apr_pool_t *pconf)
{
saved_server_config_defines = ap_server_config_defines;
/* Use apr_array_copy instead of apr_array_copy_hdr because it does not
* protect from the way unset_define removes entries.
*/
ap_server_config_defines = apr_array_copy(pconf, ap_server_config_defines);
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 18,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Parcel::allowFds() const
{
return mAllowFds;
}
Commit Message: Correctly handle dup() failure in Parcel::readNativeHandle
bail out if dup() fails, instead of creating an invalid native_handle_t
Bug: 28395952
Change-Id: Ia1a6198c0f45165b9c6a55a803e5f64d8afa0572
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void clr_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int bit)
{
struct vmcb *vmcb = get_host_vmcb(svm);
vmcb->control.intercept &= ~(1ULL << bit);
recalc_intercepts(svm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void qeth_qdio_start_poll(struct ccw_device *ccwdev, int queue,
unsigned long card_ptr)
{
struct qeth_card *card = (struct qeth_card *)card_ptr;
if (card->dev && (card->dev->flags & IFF_UP))
napi_schedule(&card->napi);
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void asyncCloseClientOnOutputBufferLimitReached(client *c) {
serverAssert(c->reply_bytes < SIZE_MAX-(1024*64));
if (c->reply_bytes == 0 || c->flags & CLIENT_CLOSE_ASAP) return;
if (checkClientOutputBufferLimits(c)) {
sds client = catClientInfoString(sdsempty(),c);
freeClientAsync(c);
serverLog(LL_WARNING,"Client %s scheduled to be closed ASAP for overcoming of output buffer limits.", client);
sdsfree(client);
}
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 25,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int md_alloc(dev_t dev, char *name)
{
static DEFINE_MUTEX(disks_mutex);
struct mddev *mddev = mddev_find(dev);
struct gendisk *disk;
int partitioned;
int shift;
int unit;
int error;
if (!mddev)
return -ENODEV;
partitioned = (MAJOR(mddev->unit) != MD_MAJOR);
shift = partitioned ? MdpMinorShift : 0;
unit = MINOR(mddev->unit) >> shift;
/* wait for any previous instance of this device to be
* completely removed (mddev_delayed_delete).
*/
flush_workqueue(md_misc_wq);
mutex_lock(&disks_mutex);
error = -EEXIST;
if (mddev->gendisk)
goto abort;
if (name) {
/* Need to ensure that 'name' is not a duplicate.
*/
struct mddev *mddev2;
spin_lock(&all_mddevs_lock);
list_for_each_entry(mddev2, &all_mddevs, all_mddevs)
if (mddev2->gendisk &&
strcmp(mddev2->gendisk->disk_name, name) == 0) {
spin_unlock(&all_mddevs_lock);
goto abort;
}
spin_unlock(&all_mddevs_lock);
}
error = -ENOMEM;
mddev->queue = blk_alloc_queue(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mddev->queue)
goto abort;
mddev->queue->queuedata = mddev;
blk_queue_make_request(mddev->queue, md_make_request);
blk_set_stacking_limits(&mddev->queue->limits);
disk = alloc_disk(1 << shift);
if (!disk) {
blk_cleanup_queue(mddev->queue);
mddev->queue = NULL;
goto abort;
}
disk->major = MAJOR(mddev->unit);
disk->first_minor = unit << shift;
if (name)
strcpy(disk->disk_name, name);
else if (partitioned)
sprintf(disk->disk_name, "md_d%d", unit);
else
sprintf(disk->disk_name, "md%d", unit);
disk->fops = &md_fops;
disk->private_data = mddev;
disk->queue = mddev->queue;
blk_queue_flush(mddev->queue, REQ_FLUSH | REQ_FUA);
/* Allow extended partitions. This makes the
* 'mdp' device redundant, but we can't really
* remove it now.
*/
disk->flags |= GENHD_FL_EXT_DEVT;
mddev->gendisk = disk;
/* As soon as we call add_disk(), another thread could get
* through to md_open, so make sure it doesn't get too far
*/
mutex_lock(&mddev->open_mutex);
add_disk(disk);
error = kobject_init_and_add(&mddev->kobj, &md_ktype,
&disk_to_dev(disk)->kobj, "%s", "md");
if (error) {
/* This isn't possible, but as kobject_init_and_add is marked
* __must_check, we must do something with the result
*/
printk(KERN_WARNING "md: cannot register %s/md - name in use\n",
disk->disk_name);
error = 0;
}
if (mddev->kobj.sd &&
sysfs_create_group(&mddev->kobj, &md_bitmap_group))
printk(KERN_DEBUG "pointless warning\n");
mutex_unlock(&mddev->open_mutex);
abort:
mutex_unlock(&disks_mutex);
if (!error && mddev->kobj.sd) {
kobject_uevent(&mddev->kobj, KOBJ_ADD);
mddev->sysfs_state = sysfs_get_dirent_safe(mddev->kobj.sd, "array_state");
}
mddev_put(mddev);
return error;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 26,561 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool isSeparator(UChar32 character)
{
static const bool latin1SeparatorTable[256] = {
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, // space ! " # $ % & ' ( ) * + , - . /
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, // : ; < = > ?
1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // @
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, // [ \ ] ^ _
1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // `
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, // { | } ~
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
if (character < 256)
return latin1SeparatorTable[character];
return isNonLatin1Separator(character);
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestMoreDrawing() {
FakeDisplayItemClient first("first");
GraphicsContext context(GetPaintController());
InitRootChunk();
DrawRect(context, first, kBackgroundType, FloatRect(100, 100, 300, 300));
GetPaintController().CommitNewDisplayItems();
InitRootChunk();
DrawRect(context, first, kBackgroundType, FloatRect(100, 100, 300, 300));
DrawRect(context, first, kForegroundType, FloatRect(100, 100, 300, 300));
GetPaintController().CommitNewDisplayItems();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen)
return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-327 | 0 | 26,422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String urlToMarkup(const KURL& url, const String& title)
{
StringBuilder markup;
markup.append("<a href=\"");
markup.append(url.string());
markup.append("\">");
appendCharactersReplacingEntities(markup, title.characters(), title.length(), EntityMaskInPCDATA);
markup.append("</a>");
return markup.toString();
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Curl_getoff_all_pipelines(struct Curl_easy *data,
struct connectdata *conn)
{
if(!conn->bundle)
return;
if(conn->bundle->multiuse == BUNDLE_PIPELINING) {
bool recv_head = (conn->readchannel_inuse &&
Curl_recvpipe_head(data, conn));
bool send_head = (conn->writechannel_inuse &&
Curl_sendpipe_head(data, conn));
if(Curl_removeHandleFromPipeline(data, &conn->recv_pipe) && recv_head)
Curl_pipeline_leave_read(conn);
if(Curl_removeHandleFromPipeline(data, &conn->send_pipe) && send_head)
Curl_pipeline_leave_write(conn);
}
else {
(void)Curl_removeHandleFromPipeline(data, &conn->recv_pipe);
(void)Curl_removeHandleFromPipeline(data, &conn->send_pipe);
}
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 5,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smb2_select_sectype(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, enum securityEnum requested)
{
switch (requested) {
case Kerberos:
case RawNTLMSSP:
return requested;
case NTLMv2:
return RawNTLMSSP;
case Unspecified:
if (server->sec_ntlmssp &&
(global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP))
return RawNTLMSSP;
if ((server->sec_kerberos || server->sec_mskerberos) &&
(global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5))
return Kerberos;
/* Fallthrough */
default:
return Unspecified;
}
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 508 |
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