instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nlmclnt_locks_release_private(struct file_lock *fl)
{
spin_lock(&fl->fl_u.nfs_fl.owner->host->h_lock);
list_del(&fl->fl_u.nfs_fl.list);
spin_unlock(&fl->fl_u.nfs_fl.owner->host->h_lock);
nlm_put_lockowner(fl->fl_u.nfs_fl.owner);
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hash_init(struct ahash_request *req)
{
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
struct hash_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
struct hash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
if (!ctx->key)
ctx->keylen = 0;
memset(&req_ctx->state, 0, sizeof(struct hash_state));
req_ctx->updated = 0;
if (hash_mode == HASH_MODE_DMA) {
if (req->nbytes < HASH_DMA_ALIGN_SIZE) {
req_ctx->dma_mode = false; /* Don't use DMA */
pr_debug("%s: DMA mode, but direct to CPU mode for data size < %d\n",
__func__, HASH_DMA_ALIGN_SIZE);
} else {
if (req->nbytes >= HASH_DMA_PERFORMANCE_MIN_SIZE &&
hash_dma_valid_data(req->src, req->nbytes)) {
req_ctx->dma_mode = true;
} else {
req_ctx->dma_mode = false;
pr_debug("%s: DMA mode, but use CPU mode for datalength < %d or non-aligned data, except in last nent\n",
__func__,
HASH_DMA_PERFORMANCE_MIN_SIZE);
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool __ieee80211_tx(struct ieee80211_local *local,
struct sk_buff_head *skbs, int led_len,
struct sta_info *sta, bool txpending)
{
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
struct ieee80211_vif *vif;
struct ieee80211_sta *pubsta;
struct sk_buff *skb;
bool result = true;
__le16 fc;
if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_empty(skbs)))
return true;
skb = skb_peek(skbs);
fc = ((struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data)->frame_control;
info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
sdata = vif_to_sdata(info->control.vif);
if (sta && !sta->uploaded)
sta = NULL;
if (sta)
pubsta = &sta->sta;
else
pubsta = NULL;
switch (sdata->vif.type) {
case NL80211_IFTYPE_MONITOR:
if (sdata->u.mntr_flags & MONITOR_FLAG_ACTIVE) {
vif = &sdata->vif;
break;
}
sdata = rcu_dereference(local->monitor_sdata);
if (sdata) {
vif = &sdata->vif;
info->hw_queue =
vif->hw_queue[skb_get_queue_mapping(skb)];
} else if (local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_QUEUE_CONTROL) {
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
return true;
} else
vif = NULL;
break;
case NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN:
sdata = container_of(sdata->bss,
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data, u.ap);
/* fall through */
default:
vif = &sdata->vif;
break;
}
result = ieee80211_tx_frags(local, vif, pubsta, skbs,
txpending);
ieee80211_tpt_led_trig_tx(local, fc, led_len);
WARN_ON_ONCE(!skb_queue_empty(skbs));
return result;
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix fragmentation code, particularly for encryption
The "new" fragmentation code (since my rewrite almost 5 years ago)
erroneously sets skb->len rather than using skb_trim() to adjust
the length of the first fragment after copying out all the others.
This leaves the skb tail pointer pointing to after where the data
originally ended, and thus causes the encryption MIC to be written
at that point, rather than where it belongs: immediately after the
data.
The impact of this is that if software encryption is done, then
a) encryption doesn't work for the first fragment, the connection
becomes unusable as the first fragment will never be properly
verified at the receiver, the MIC is practically guaranteed to
be wrong
b) we leak up to 8 bytes of plaintext (!) of the packet out into
the air
This is only mitigated by the fact that many devices are capable
of doing encryption in hardware, in which case this can't happen
as the tail pointer is irrelevant in that case. Additionally,
fragmentation is not used very frequently and would normally have
to be configured manually.
Fix this by using skb_trim() properly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2de8e0d999b8 ("mac80211: rewrite fragmentation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ttusbdecfe_dvbt_set_frontend(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
{
struct dtv_frontend_properties *p = &fe->dtv_property_cache;
struct ttusbdecfe_state* state = (struct ttusbdecfe_state*) fe->demodulator_priv;
u8 b[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff };
__be32 freq = htonl(p->frequency / 1000);
memcpy(&b[4], &freq, sizeof (u32));
state->config->send_command(fe, 0x71, sizeof(b), b, NULL, NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] ttusb-dec: buffer overflow in ioctl
We need to add a limit check here so we don't overflow the buffer.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_vmptrst(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
u32 vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
gva_t vmcs_gva;
struct x86_exception e;
if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
return 1;
if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, exit_qualification,
vmx_instruction_info, true, &vmcs_gva))
return 1;
/* ok to use *_system, as nested_vmx_check_permission verified cpl=0 */
if (kvm_write_guest_virt_system(&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt, vmcs_gva,
(void *)&to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.current_vmptr,
sizeof(u64), &e)) {
kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &e);
return 1;
}
nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 8,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_t1_cookie_timer_expire(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *repl = NULL;
int attempts = asoc->init_err_counter + 1;
pr_debug("%s: timer T1 expired (COOKIE-ECHO)\n", __func__);
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_T1_COOKIE_EXPIREDS);
if (attempts <= asoc->max_init_attempts) {
repl = sctp_make_cookie_echo(asoc, NULL);
if (!repl)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_CHOOSE_TRANSPORT,
SCTP_CHUNK(repl));
/* Issue a sideeffect to do the needed accounting. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_COOKIEECHO_RESTART,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T1_COOKIE));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(repl));
} else {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
SCTP_ERROR(ETIMEDOUT));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_FAILED,
SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DELETE_TCB;
}
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 5,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: qboolean CL_UpdateVisiblePings_f(int source) {
int slots, i;
char buff[MAX_STRING_CHARS];
int pingTime;
int max;
qboolean status = qfalse;
if (source < 0 || source > AS_FAVORITES) {
return qfalse;
}
cls.pingUpdateSource = source;
slots = CL_GetPingQueueCount();
if (slots < MAX_PINGREQUESTS) {
serverInfo_t *server = NULL;
switch (source) {
case AS_LOCAL :
server = &cls.localServers[0];
max = cls.numlocalservers;
break;
case AS_GLOBAL :
server = &cls.globalServers[0];
max = cls.numglobalservers;
break;
case AS_FAVORITES :
server = &cls.favoriteServers[0];
max = cls.numfavoriteservers;
break;
default:
return qfalse;
}
for (i = 0; i < max; i++) {
if (server[i].visible) {
if (server[i].ping == -1) {
int j;
if (slots >= MAX_PINGREQUESTS) {
break;
}
for (j = 0; j < MAX_PINGREQUESTS; j++) {
if (!cl_pinglist[j].adr.port) {
continue;
}
if (NET_CompareAdr( cl_pinglist[j].adr, server[i].adr)) {
break;
}
}
if (j >= MAX_PINGREQUESTS) {
status = qtrue;
for (j = 0; j < MAX_PINGREQUESTS; j++) {
if (!cl_pinglist[j].adr.port) {
break;
}
}
memcpy(&cl_pinglist[j].adr, &server[i].adr, sizeof(netadr_t));
cl_pinglist[j].start = Sys_Milliseconds();
cl_pinglist[j].time = 0;
NET_OutOfBandPrint( NS_CLIENT, cl_pinglist[j].adr, "getinfo xxx" );
slots++;
}
}
else if (server[i].ping == 0) {
if (source == AS_GLOBAL) {
if ( cls.numGlobalServerAddresses > 0 ) {
cls.numGlobalServerAddresses--;
CL_InitServerInfo(&server[i], &cls.globalServerAddresses[cls.numGlobalServerAddresses]);
}
}
}
}
}
}
if (slots) {
status = qtrue;
}
for (i = 0; i < MAX_PINGREQUESTS; i++) {
if (!cl_pinglist[i].adr.port) {
continue;
}
CL_GetPing( i, buff, MAX_STRING_CHARS, &pingTime );
if (pingTime != 0) {
CL_ClearPing(i);
status = qtrue;
}
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 13,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::OnFirstSurfaceActivation(
const viz::SurfaceInfo& surface_info) {
}
Commit Message: mac: Make RWHVMac::ClearCompositorFrame clear locks
Ensure that the BrowserCompositorMac not hold on to a compositor lock
when requested to clear its compositor frame. This lock may be held
indefinitely (if the renderer hangs) and so the frame will never be
cleared.
Bug: 739621
Change-Id: I15d0e82bdf632f3379a48e959f198afb8a4ac218
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/608239
Commit-Queue: ccameron chromium <ccameron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#493563}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,226 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: raptor_init_parser_rdfxml(raptor_world* world)
{
return !raptor_world_register_parser_factory(world,
&raptor_rdfxml_parser_register_factory);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 9,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::resourceTimingReportTimerFired(Timer<ResourceFetcher>* timer)
{
ASSERT_UNUSED(timer, timer == &m_resourceTimingReportTimer);
HashMap<RefPtr<ResourceTimingInfo>, bool> timingReports;
timingReports.swap(m_scheduledResourceTimingReports);
HashMap<RefPtr<ResourceTimingInfo>, bool>::iterator end = timingReports.end();
for (HashMap<RefPtr<ResourceTimingInfo>, bool>::iterator it = timingReports.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
RefPtr<ResourceTimingInfo> info = it->key;
bool isMainResource = it->value;
reportResourceTiming(info.get(), document(), isMainResource);
}
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nullableBooleanAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
bool isNull = false;
bool jsValue = imp->nullableBooleanAttribute(isNull);
if (isNull) {
v8SetReturnValueNull(info);
return;
}
v8SetReturnValueBool(info, jsValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LogClientServiceForInfo(
T* info, GLuint client_id, const char* function_name) {
if (info) {
LogClientServiceMapping(function_name, client_id, info->service_id());
}
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dbpageBestIndex(sqlite3_vtab *tab, sqlite3_index_info *pIdxInfo){
int i;
int iPlan = 0;
/* If there is a schema= constraint, it must be honored. Report a
** ridiculously large estimated cost if the schema= constraint is
** unavailable
*/
for(i=0; i<pIdxInfo->nConstraint; i++){
struct sqlite3_index_constraint *p = &pIdxInfo->aConstraint[i];
if( p->iColumn!=DBPAGE_COLUMN_SCHEMA ) continue;
if( p->op!=SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_EQ ) continue;
if( !p->usable ){
/* No solution. */
return SQLITE_CONSTRAINT;
}
iPlan = 2;
pIdxInfo->aConstraintUsage[i].argvIndex = 1;
pIdxInfo->aConstraintUsage[i].omit = 1;
break;
}
/* If we reach this point, it means that either there is no schema=
** constraint (in which case we use the "main" schema) or else the
** schema constraint was accepted. Lower the estimated cost accordingly
*/
pIdxInfo->estimatedCost = 1.0e6;
/* Check for constraints against pgno */
for(i=0; i<pIdxInfo->nConstraint; i++){
struct sqlite3_index_constraint *p = &pIdxInfo->aConstraint[i];
if( p->usable && p->iColumn<=0 && p->op==SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_EQ ){
pIdxInfo->estimatedRows = 1;
pIdxInfo->idxFlags = SQLITE_INDEX_SCAN_UNIQUE;
pIdxInfo->estimatedCost = 1.0;
pIdxInfo->aConstraintUsage[i].argvIndex = iPlan ? 2 : 1;
pIdxInfo->aConstraintUsage[i].omit = 1;
iPlan |= 1;
break;
}
}
pIdxInfo->idxNum = iPlan;
if( pIdxInfo->nOrderBy>=1
&& pIdxInfo->aOrderBy[0].iColumn<=0
&& pIdxInfo->aOrderBy[0].desc==0
){
pIdxInfo->orderByConsumed = 1;
}
return SQLITE_OK;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 19,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHost> DevToolsAgentHost::CreateForDiscovery() {
CreateServerSocketCallback null_callback;
return new BrowserDevToolsAgentHost(nullptr, null_callback, true);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_minor(int minor)
{
spin_lock(&_minor_lock);
idr_remove(&_minor_idr, minor);
spin_unlock(&_minor_lock);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 14,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: stringprep_utf8_to_unichar (const char *p)
{
return g_utf8_get_char (p);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int64_t yr_object_get_integer(
YR_OBJECT* object,
const char* field,
...)
{
YR_OBJECT* integer_obj;
va_list args;
va_start(args, field);
if (field != NULL)
integer_obj = _yr_object_lookup(object, 0, field, args);
else
integer_obj = object;
va_end(args);
if (integer_obj == NULL)
return UNDEFINED;
assertf(integer_obj->type == OBJECT_TYPE_INTEGER,
"type of \"%s\" is not integer\n", field);
return ((YR_OBJECT_INTEGER*) integer_obj)->value;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #658
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 17,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *new_sock, int flags)
{
struct sock *new_sk, *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *buf;
struct tipc_sock *new_tsock;
struct tipc_port *new_tport;
struct tipc_msg *msg;
u32 new_ref;
int res;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sock->state != SS_LISTENING) {
res = -EINVAL;
goto exit;
}
while (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
if (flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
res = -EWOULDBLOCK;
goto exit;
}
release_sock(sk);
res = wait_event_interruptible(*sk_sleep(sk),
(!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)));
lock_sock(sk);
if (res)
goto exit;
}
buf = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
res = tipc_create(sock_net(sock->sk), new_sock, 0, 0);
if (res)
goto exit;
new_sk = new_sock->sk;
new_tsock = tipc_sk(new_sk);
new_tport = new_tsock->p;
new_ref = new_tport->ref;
msg = buf_msg(buf);
/* we lock on new_sk; but lockdep sees the lock on sk */
lock_sock_nested(new_sk, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
/*
* Reject any stray messages received by new socket
* before the socket lock was taken (very, very unlikely)
*/
reject_rx_queue(new_sk);
/* Connect new socket to it's peer */
new_tsock->peer_name.ref = msg_origport(msg);
new_tsock->peer_name.node = msg_orignode(msg);
tipc_connect(new_ref, &new_tsock->peer_name);
new_sock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
tipc_set_portimportance(new_ref, msg_importance(msg));
if (msg_named(msg)) {
new_tport->conn_type = msg_nametype(msg);
new_tport->conn_instance = msg_nameinst(msg);
}
/*
* Respond to 'SYN-' by discarding it & returning 'ACK'-.
* Respond to 'SYN+' by queuing it on new socket.
*/
if (!msg_data_sz(msg)) {
struct msghdr m = {NULL,};
advance_rx_queue(sk);
send_packet(NULL, new_sock, &m, 0);
} else {
__skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
__skb_queue_head(&new_sk->sk_receive_queue, buf);
skb_set_owner_r(buf, new_sk);
}
release_sock(new_sk);
exit:
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
Commit Message: tipc: fix info leaks via msg_name in recv_msg/recv_stream
The code in set_orig_addr() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_tipc when filling the sockaddr info -- namely the union
is only partly filled. This will make recv_msg() and recv_stream() --
the only users of this function -- leak kernel stack memory as the
msg_name member is a local variable in net/socket.c.
Additionally to that both recv_msg() and recv_stream() fail to update
the msg_namelen member to 0 while otherwise returning with 0, i.e.
"success". This is the case for, e.g., non-blocking sockets. This will
lead to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory of the union with
memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early as it
will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Cc: Allan Stephens <allan.stephens@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 16,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct dentry *d_make_root(struct inode *root_inode)
{
struct dentry *res = NULL;
if (root_inode) {
static const struct qstr name = QSTR_INIT("/", 1);
res = __d_alloc(root_inode->i_sb, &name);
if (res)
d_instantiate(res, root_inode);
else
iput(root_inode);
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: dcache: Handle escaped paths in prepend_path
A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent
will never reach it's mnt_root. For lack of a better term
I call this an escaped path.
prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path,
d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd.
__d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes
in. So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error.
d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to
some root. Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so
d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater
than 1. So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily
unmounted mounts.
getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs
prepend_path to return an error.
d_path is the interesting hold out. d_path just wants to print
something, and does not care about the weird cases. Which raises
the question what should be printed?
Given that <escaped_path>/<anything> should result in -ENOENT I
believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty
paths. As there are not really any meaninful path components when
considered from the perspective of a mount tree.
So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error
code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 23,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int parse_time_interval_uint(const char *time, guint *msecs)
{
const char *desc;
guint number;
int len, ret, digits;
*msecs = 0;
/* max. return value is around 24 days */
number = 0; ret = TRUE; digits = FALSE;
while (i_isspace(*time))
time++;
for (;;) {
if (i_isdigit(*time)) {
char *endptr;
if (!parse_uint(time, &endptr, 10, &number)) {
return FALSE;
}
time = endptr;
digits = TRUE;
continue;
}
if (!digits)
return FALSE;
/* skip punctuation */
while (*time != '\0' && i_ispunct(*time) && *time != '-')
time++;
/* get description */
for (len = 0, desc = time; i_isalpha(*time); time++)
len++;
while (i_isspace(*time))
time++;
if (len == 0) {
if (*time != '\0')
return FALSE;
*msecs += number * 1000; /* assume seconds */
return TRUE;
}
if (g_ascii_strncasecmp(desc, "days", len) == 0) {
if (number > 24) {
/* would overflow */
return FALSE;
}
*msecs += number * 1000*3600*24;
} else if (g_ascii_strncasecmp(desc, "hours", len) == 0)
*msecs += number * 1000*3600;
else if (g_ascii_strncasecmp(desc, "minutes", len) == 0 ||
g_ascii_strncasecmp(desc, "mins", len) == 0)
*msecs += number * 1000*60;
else if (g_ascii_strncasecmp(desc, "seconds", len) == 0 ||
g_ascii_strncasecmp(desc, "secs", len) == 0)
*msecs += number * 1000;
else if (g_ascii_strncasecmp(desc, "milliseconds", len) == 0 ||
g_ascii_strncasecmp(desc, "millisecs", len) == 0 ||
g_ascii_strncasecmp(desc, "mseconds", len) == 0 ||
g_ascii_strncasecmp(desc, "msecs", len) == 0)
*msecs += number;
else {
ret = FALSE;
}
/* skip punctuation */
while (*time != '\0' && i_ispunct(*time) && *time != '-')
time++;
if (*time == '\0')
break;
number = 0;
digits = FALSE;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 5,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_write_stts_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVTrack *track)
{
MOVStts *stts_entries = NULL;
uint32_t entries = -1;
uint32_t atom_size;
int i;
if (track->par->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO && !track->audio_vbr) {
stts_entries = av_malloc(sizeof(*stts_entries)); /* one entry */
if (!stts_entries)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
stts_entries[0].count = track->sample_count;
stts_entries[0].duration = 1;
entries = 1;
} else {
if (track->entry) {
stts_entries = av_malloc_array(track->entry, sizeof(*stts_entries)); /* worst case */
if (!stts_entries)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
for (i = 0; i < track->entry; i++) {
int duration = get_cluster_duration(track, i);
if (i && duration == stts_entries[entries].duration) {
stts_entries[entries].count++; /* compress */
} else {
entries++;
stts_entries[entries].duration = duration;
stts_entries[entries].count = 1;
}
}
entries++; /* last one */
}
atom_size = 16 + (entries * 8);
avio_wb32(pb, atom_size); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "stts");
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* version & flags */
avio_wb32(pb, entries); /* entry count */
for (i = 0; i < entries; i++) {
avio_wb32(pb, stts_entries[i].count);
avio_wb32(pb, stts_entries[i].duration);
}
av_free(stts_entries);
return atom_size;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 25,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t ProCamera2Client::createDefaultRequest(int templateId,
/*out*/
camera_metadata** request)
{
ATRACE_CALL();
ALOGV("%s (templateId = 0x%x)", __FUNCTION__, templateId);
if (request) {
*request = NULL;
}
status_t res;
if ( (res = checkPid(__FUNCTION__) ) != OK) return res;
Mutex::Autolock icl(mBinderSerializationLock);
if (!mDevice.get()) return DEAD_OBJECT;
CameraMetadata metadata;
if ( (res = mDevice->createDefaultRequest(templateId, &metadata) ) == OK) {
*request = metadata.release();
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 10,857 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AsyncFileSystemChromium::readDirectory(const KURL& path, PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks)
{
m_webFileSystem->readDirectory(path, new WebKit::WebFileSystemCallbacksImpl(callbacks));
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 9,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::BlockRequests() {
frame_request_blocker_->Block();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ipip6_tunnel_update_6rd(struct ip_tunnel *t,
struct ip_tunnel_6rd *ip6rd)
{
struct in6_addr prefix;
__be32 relay_prefix;
if (ip6rd->relay_prefixlen > 32 ||
ip6rd->prefixlen + (32 - ip6rd->relay_prefixlen) > 64)
return -EINVAL;
ipv6_addr_prefix(&prefix, &ip6rd->prefix, ip6rd->prefixlen);
if (!ipv6_addr_equal(&prefix, &ip6rd->prefix))
return -EINVAL;
if (ip6rd->relay_prefixlen)
relay_prefix = ip6rd->relay_prefix &
htonl(0xffffffffUL <<
(32 - ip6rd->relay_prefixlen));
else
relay_prefix = 0;
if (relay_prefix != ip6rd->relay_prefix)
return -EINVAL;
t->ip6rd.prefix = prefix;
t->ip6rd.relay_prefix = relay_prefix;
t->ip6rd.prefixlen = ip6rd->prefixlen;
t->ip6rd.relay_prefixlen = ip6rd->relay_prefixlen;
dst_cache_reset(&t->dst_cache);
netdev_state_change(t->dev);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: sit: fix memory leak in sit_init_net()
If register_netdev() is failed to register sitn->fb_tunnel_dev,
it will go to err_reg_dev and forget to free netdev(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev).
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888378daad00 (size 512):
comm "syz-executor.1", pid 4006, jiffies 4295121142 (age 16.115s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 e6 ed c0 83 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:577 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:585 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] netif_alloc_netdev_queues net/core/dev.c:8380 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x600/0xcc0 net/core/dev.c:8970
[<00000000867e172f>] sit_init_net+0x295/0xa40 net/ipv6/sit.c:1848
[<00000000871019fa>] ops_init+0xad/0x3e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:129
[<00000000319507f6>] setup_net+0x2ba/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:314
[<0000000087db4f96>] copy_net_ns+0x1dc/0x330 net/core/net_namespace.c:437
[<0000000057efc651>] create_new_namespaces+0x382/0x730 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
[<00000000676f83de>] copy_namespaces+0x2ed/0x3d0 kernel/nsproxy.c:165
[<0000000030b74bac>] copy_process.part.27+0x231e/0x6db0 kernel/fork.c:1919
[<00000000fff78746>] copy_process kernel/fork.c:1713 [inline]
[<00000000fff78746>] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xe90 kernel/fork.c:2224
[<000000001c2e0d1c>] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000ec48bd44>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<0000000039acff8a>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 8,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderFlexibleBox::mainAxisBorderAndPaddingExtentForChild(RenderBox* child) const
{
return isHorizontalFlow() ? child->borderAndPaddingWidth() : child->borderAndPaddingHeight();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IsMacResource( FT_Library library,
FT_Stream stream,
FT_Long resource_offset,
FT_Long face_index,
FT_Face *aface )
{
FT_Memory memory = library->memory;
FT_Error error;
FT_Long map_offset, rdara_pos;
FT_Long *data_offsets;
FT_Long count;
error = FT_Raccess_Get_HeaderInfo( library, stream, resource_offset,
&map_offset, &rdara_pos );
if ( error )
return error;
error = FT_Raccess_Get_DataOffsets( library, stream,
map_offset, rdara_pos,
TTAG_POST,
&data_offsets, &count );
if ( !error )
{
error = Mac_Read_POST_Resource( library, stream, data_offsets, count,
face_index, aface );
FT_FREE( data_offsets );
/* POST exists in an LWFN providing a single face */
if ( !error )
(*aface)->num_faces = 1;
return error;
}
error = FT_Raccess_Get_DataOffsets( library, stream,
map_offset, rdara_pos,
TTAG_sfnt,
&data_offsets, &count );
if ( !error )
{
FT_Long face_index_internal = face_index % count;
error = Mac_Read_sfnt_Resource( library, stream, data_offsets, count,
face_index_internal, aface );
FT_FREE( data_offsets );
if ( !error )
(*aface)->num_faces = count;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void snd_usbmidi_novation_input(struct snd_usb_midi_in_endpoint *ep,
uint8_t *buffer, int buffer_length)
{
if (buffer_length < 2 || !buffer[0] || buffer_length < buffer[0] + 1)
return;
snd_usbmidi_input_data(ep, 0, &buffer[2], buffer[0] - 1);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AVCodecParser* av_parser_next(AVCodecParser *p){
if(p) return p->next;
else return av_first_parser;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/parser: reset indexes on realloc failure
Fixes Ticket2982
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long fuse_file_ioctl_common(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg, unsigned int flags)
{
struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
if (!fuse_allow_task(fc, current))
return -EACCES;
if (is_bad_inode(inode))
return -EIO;
return fuse_do_ioctl(file, cmd, arg, flags);
}
Commit Message: fuse: verify ioctl retries
Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
CC: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.31+]
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static std::unique_ptr<KeyedService> CreateOneGoogleBarService(
content::BrowserContext* context) {
GaiaCookieManagerService* cookie_service =
GaiaCookieManagerServiceFactory::GetForProfile(
Profile::FromBrowserContext(context));
return base::MakeUnique<OneGoogleBarService>(
cookie_service, base::MakeUnique<FakeOneGoogleBarFetcher>());
}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void user_flush_data(png_structp png_ptr)
{
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in rwpng.h (CVE-2016-5735)
Reported by Choi Jaeseung
Found with Sparrow (http://ropas.snu.ac.kr/sparrow)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 14,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabStrip* tab_strip() { return tab_strip_; }
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: INST_HANDLER (cpse) { // CPSE Rd, Rr
int r = (buf[0] & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0x2) << 3);
int d = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4);
RAnalOp next_op = {0};
avr_op_analyze (anal,
&next_op,
op->addr + op->size, buf + op->size, len - op->size,
cpu);
r_strbuf_fini (&next_op.esil);
op->jump = op->addr + next_op.size + 2;
op->cycles = 1; // XXX: This is a bug, because depends on eval state,
ESIL_A ("r%d,r%d,^,!,", r, d); // Rr == Rd
ESIL_A ("?{,%"PFMT64d",pc,=,},", op->jump); // ?true => jmp
}
Commit Message: Fix #10091 - crash in AVR analysis
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 23,888 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameLoader::frameDetached()
{
RefPtr<Frame> protect(m_frame);
stopAllLoaders();
m_frame->document()->stopActiveDOMObjects();
detachFromParent();
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
url_util::AddStandardScheme("tabcontentstest");
old_browser_client_ = content::GetContentClient()->browser();
content::GetContentClient()->set_browser(&browser_client_);
RenderViewHostTestHarness::SetUp();
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 15,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dwc3_suspend_gadget(struct dwc3 *dwc)
{
if (dwc->gadget_driver && dwc->gadget_driver->suspend) {
spin_unlock(&dwc->lock);
dwc->gadget_driver->suspend(&dwc->gadget);
spin_lock(&dwc->lock);
}
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 22,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_combine_row(png_structp png_ptr, png_bytep row, int mask)
{
png_debug(1, "in png_combine_row");
if (mask == 0xff)
{
png_memcpy(row, png_ptr->row_buf + 1,
PNG_ROWBYTES(png_ptr->row_info.pixel_depth, png_ptr->width));
}
else
{
switch (png_ptr->row_info.pixel_depth)
{
case 1:
{
png_bytep sp = png_ptr->row_buf + 1;
png_bytep dp = row;
int s_inc, s_start, s_end;
int m = 0x80;
int shift;
png_uint_32 i;
png_uint_32 row_width = png_ptr->width;
#ifdef PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_PACKSWAP)
{
s_start = 0;
s_end = 7;
s_inc = 1;
}
else
#endif
{
s_start = 7;
s_end = 0;
s_inc = -1;
}
shift = s_start;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
if (m & mask)
{
int value;
value = (*sp >> shift) & 0x01;
*dp &= (png_byte)((0x7f7f >> (7 - shift)) & 0xff);
*dp |= (png_byte)(value << shift);
}
if (shift == s_end)
{
shift = s_start;
sp++;
dp++;
}
else
shift += s_inc;
if (m == 1)
m = 0x80;
else
m >>= 1;
}
break;
}
case 2:
{
png_bytep sp = png_ptr->row_buf + 1;
png_bytep dp = row;
int s_start, s_end, s_inc;
int m = 0x80;
int shift;
png_uint_32 i;
png_uint_32 row_width = png_ptr->width;
int value;
#ifdef PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_PACKSWAP)
{
s_start = 0;
s_end = 6;
s_inc = 2;
}
else
#endif
{
s_start = 6;
s_end = 0;
s_inc = -2;
}
shift = s_start;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
if (m & mask)
{
value = (*sp >> shift) & 0x03;
*dp &= (png_byte)((0x3f3f >> (6 - shift)) & 0xff);
*dp |= (png_byte)(value << shift);
}
if (shift == s_end)
{
shift = s_start;
sp++;
dp++;
}
else
shift += s_inc;
if (m == 1)
m = 0x80;
else
m >>= 1;
}
break;
}
case 4:
{
png_bytep sp = png_ptr->row_buf + 1;
png_bytep dp = row;
int s_start, s_end, s_inc;
int m = 0x80;
int shift;
png_uint_32 i;
png_uint_32 row_width = png_ptr->width;
int value;
#ifdef PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_PACKSWAP)
{
s_start = 0;
s_end = 4;
s_inc = 4;
}
else
#endif
{
s_start = 4;
s_end = 0;
s_inc = -4;
}
shift = s_start;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
if (m & mask)
{
value = (*sp >> shift) & 0xf;
*dp &= (png_byte)((0xf0f >> (4 - shift)) & 0xff);
*dp |= (png_byte)(value << shift);
}
if (shift == s_end)
{
shift = s_start;
sp++;
dp++;
}
else
shift += s_inc;
if (m == 1)
m = 0x80;
else
m >>= 1;
}
break;
}
default:
{
png_bytep sp = png_ptr->row_buf + 1;
png_bytep dp = row;
png_size_t pixel_bytes = (png_ptr->row_info.pixel_depth >> 3);
png_uint_32 i;
png_uint_32 row_width = png_ptr->width;
png_byte m = 0x80;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
if (m & mask)
{
png_memcpy(dp, sp, pixel_bytes);
}
sp += pixel_bytes;
dp += pixel_bytes;
if (m == 1)
m = 0x80;
else
m >>= 1;
}
break;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Pull follow-up tweak from upstream.
BUG=116162
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9546033
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125311 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 21,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::OnJobNotification(DWORD message,
DWORD pid) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
switch (message) {
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_ACTIVE_PROCESS_ZERO:
CHECK(SetEvent(process_exit_event_));
break;
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_NEW_PROCESS:
worker_process_.Set(OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid));
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 11,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void spl_filesystem_dir_it_rewind(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object((spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter);
object->u.dir.index = 0;
if (object->u.dir.dirp) {
php_stream_rewinddir(object->u.dir.dirp);
}
spl_filesystem_dir_read(object TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 26,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_pushf(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
ctxt->src.val = (unsigned long)ctxt->eflags & ~X86_EFLAGS_VM;
return em_push(ctxt);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *X86_reg_name(csh handle, unsigned int reg)
{
#ifndef CAPSTONE_DIET
cs_struct *ud = (cs_struct *)handle;
if (reg >= X86_REG_ENDING)
return NULL;
if (reg == X86_REG_EFLAGS) {
if (ud->mode & CS_MODE_32)
return "eflags";
if (ud->mode & CS_MODE_64)
return "rflags";
}
return reg_name_maps[reg].name;
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
Commit Message: x86: fast path checking for X86_insn_reg_intel()
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 27,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 AutofillDialogViews::GetCvc() {
return GroupForSection(GetCreditCardSection())->suggested_info->
textfield()->GetText();
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv); // Removes gtest-specific args.
CommandLine::Init(argc, argv);
CommandLine* cmd_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
DCHECK(cmd_line);
CommandLine::SwitchMap switches = cmd_line->GetSwitches();
for (CommandLine::SwitchMap::const_iterator it = switches.begin();
it != switches.end(); ++it) {
if (it->first == "test_video_data") {
test_video_data = it->second.c_str();
continue;
}
LOG(FATAL) << "Unexpected switch: " << it->first << ":" << it->second;
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
base::ShadowingAtExitManager at_exit_manager;
gfx::InitializeGLBindings(gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2);
gfx::GLSurface::InitializeOneOff();
{
scoped_refptr<gfx::GLSurface> surface(
gfx::GLSurface::CreateOffscreenGLSurface(false, gfx::Size(1, 1)));
scoped_refptr<gfx::GLContext> context(
gfx::GLContext::CreateGLContext(NULL, surface.get(),
gfx::PreferIntegratedGpu));
context->MakeCurrent(surface.get());
}
DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::PreSandboxInitialization();
#endif // OS_WIN
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: buf_finalize(StringInfo buf)
{
TxidSnapshot *snap = (TxidSnapshot *) buf->data;
SET_VARSIZE(snap, buf->len);
/* buf is not needed anymore */
buf->data = NULL;
pfree(buf);
return snap;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 17,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int http_transform_header_str(struct stream* s, struct http_msg *msg,
const char* name, unsigned int name_len,
const char *str, struct my_regex *re,
int action)
{
struct hdr_ctx ctx;
char *buf = msg->chn->buf->p;
struct hdr_idx *idx = &s->txn->hdr_idx;
int (*http_find_hdr_func)(const char *name, int len, char *sol,
struct hdr_idx *idx, struct hdr_ctx *ctx);
struct chunk *output = get_trash_chunk();
ctx.idx = 0;
/* Choose the header browsing function. */
switch (action) {
case ACT_HTTP_REPLACE_VAL:
http_find_hdr_func = http_find_header2;
break;
case ACT_HTTP_REPLACE_HDR:
http_find_hdr_func = http_find_full_header2;
break;
default: /* impossible */
return -1;
}
while (http_find_hdr_func(name, name_len, buf, idx, &ctx)) {
struct hdr_idx_elem *hdr = idx->v + ctx.idx;
int delta;
char *val = ctx.line + ctx.val;
char* val_end = val + ctx.vlen;
if (!regex_exec_match2(re, val, val_end-val, MAX_MATCH, pmatch, 0))
continue;
output->len = exp_replace(output->str, output->size, val, str, pmatch);
if (output->len == -1)
return -1;
delta = buffer_replace2(msg->chn->buf, val, val_end, output->str, output->len);
hdr->len += delta;
http_msg_move_end(msg, delta);
/* Adjust the length of the current value of the index. */
ctx.vlen += delta;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_fxsave(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct fxregs_state fx_state;
size_t size;
int rc;
rc = check_fxsr(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt);
rc = asm_safe("fxsave %[fx]", , [fx] "+m"(fx_state));
ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
if (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_OSFXSR)
size = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, xmm_space[8 * 16/4]);
else
size = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, xmm_space[0]);
return segmented_write(ctxt, ctxt->memop.addr.mem, &fx_state, size);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std
Introduces segemented_write_std.
Switches from emulated reads/writes to standard read/writes in fxsave,
fxrstor, sgdt, and sidt. This fixes CVE-2017-2584, a longstanding
kernel memory leak.
Since commit 283c95d0e389 ("KVM: x86: emulate FXSAVE and FXRSTOR",
2016-11-09), which is luckily not yet in any final release, this would
also be an exploitable kernel memory *write*!
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 96051572c819194c37a8367624b285be10297eca
Fixes: 283c95d0e3891b64087706b344a4b545d04a6e62
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 3,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::ReceiveDroppedFiles(const DragData* drag_data) {
return input_type_->ReceiveDroppedFiles(drag_data);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_register_bracket(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
struct parsed_bracket *brackets)
{
const char *cur;
uint uindex;
memset(brackets, 0, sizeof(struct parsed_bracket));
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
cur = ctx->cur;
if (parse_file( &cur, &brackets->ind_file )) {
if (!parse_register_1d( ctx, &brackets->ind_file,
&brackets->ind_index ))
return FALSE;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (*ctx->cur == '.') {
ctx->cur++;
eat_opt_white(&ctx->cur);
switch (uprcase(*ctx->cur)) {
case 'X':
brackets->ind_comp = TGSI_SWIZZLE_X;
break;
case 'Y':
brackets->ind_comp = TGSI_SWIZZLE_Y;
break;
case 'Z':
brackets->ind_comp = TGSI_SWIZZLE_Z;
break;
case 'W':
brackets->ind_comp = TGSI_SWIZZLE_W;
break;
default:
report_error(ctx, "Expected indirect register swizzle component `x', `y', `z' or `w'");
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
eat_opt_white(&ctx->cur);
}
if (*ctx->cur == '+' || *ctx->cur == '-')
parse_int( &ctx->cur, &brackets->index );
else
brackets->index = 0;
}
else {
if (!parse_uint( &ctx->cur, &uindex )) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected literal unsigned integer" );
return FALSE;
}
brackets->index = (int) uindex;
brackets->ind_file = TGSI_FILE_NULL;
brackets->ind_index = 0;
}
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (*ctx->cur != ']') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `]'" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
if (*ctx->cur == '(') {
ctx->cur++;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (!parse_uint( &ctx->cur, &brackets->ind_array )) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected literal unsigned integer" );
return FALSE;
}
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (*ctx->cur != ')') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `)'" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const Extension* ExtensionService::GetWebStoreApp() {
return GetExtensionById(extension_misc::kWebStoreAppId, false);
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 19,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ParamTraits<MSG>::Read(const Message* m, PickleIterator* iter,
param_type* r) {
const char *data;
int data_size = 0;
bool result = m->ReadData(iter, &data, &data_size);
if (result && data_size == sizeof(MSG)) {
memcpy(r, data, sizeof(MSG));
} else {
result = false;
NOTREACHED();
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cmd_xconvmultisort(char *tag)
{
int c;
struct sortcrit *sortcrit = NULL;
struct searchargs *searchargs = NULL;
struct windowargs *windowargs = NULL;
struct conversations_state *cstate = NULL;
clock_t start = clock();
char mytime[100];
int r;
if (backend_current) {
/* remote mailbox */
const char *cmd = "Xconvmultisort";
prot_printf(backend_current->out, "%s %s ", tag, cmd);
if (!pipe_command(backend_current, 65536)) {
pipe_including_tag(backend_current, tag, 0);
}
return;
}
assert(imapd_index);
if (!config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_CONVERSATIONS)) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s BAD Unrecognized command\r\n", tag);
eatline(imapd_in, ' ');
return;
}
c = getsortcriteria(tag, &sortcrit);
if (c == EOF) goto error;
if (c != ' ') {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s BAD Missing window args in XConvMultiSort\r\n",
tag);
goto error;
}
c = parse_windowargs(tag, &windowargs, /*updates*/0);
if (c != ' ')
goto error;
/* open the conversations state first - we don't care if it fails,
* because that probably just means it's already open */
conversations_open_mbox(index_mboxname(imapd_index), &cstate);
/* need index loaded to even parse searchargs! */
searchargs = new_searchargs(tag, GETSEARCH_CHARSET_FIRST,
&imapd_namespace, imapd_userid, imapd_authstate,
imapd_userisadmin || imapd_userisproxyadmin);
c = get_search_program(imapd_in, imapd_out, searchargs);
if (c == EOF) goto error;
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Unexpected extra arguments to XconvMultiSort\r\n", tag);
goto error;
}
r = index_convmultisort(imapd_index, sortcrit, searchargs, windowargs);
if (r < 0) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(r));
goto error;
}
snprintf(mytime, sizeof(mytime), "%2.3f",
(clock() - start) / (double) CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
if (CONFIG_TIMING_VERBOSE) {
char *s = sortcrit_as_string(sortcrit);
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "XCONVMULTISORT (%s) processing time %s sec",
s, mytime);
free(s);
}
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK %s (in %s secs)\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED), mytime);
out:
if (cstate) conversations_commit(&cstate);
freesortcrit(sortcrit);
freesearchargs(searchargs);
free_windowargs(windowargs);
return;
error:
if (cstate) conversations_commit(&cstate);
eatline(imapd_in, (c == EOF ? ' ' : c));
goto out;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,467 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __perf_event_enable(void *info)
{
struct perf_event *event = info;
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct perf_event *leader = event->group_leader;
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx = __get_cpu_context(ctx);
int err;
/*
* There's a time window between 'ctx->is_active' check
* in perf_event_enable function and this place having:
* - IRQs on
* - ctx->lock unlocked
*
* where the task could be killed and 'ctx' deactivated
* by perf_event_exit_task.
*/
if (!ctx->is_active)
return -EINVAL;
raw_spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
update_context_time(ctx);
if (event->state >= PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE)
goto unlock;
/*
* set current task's cgroup time reference point
*/
perf_cgroup_set_timestamp(current, ctx);
__perf_event_mark_enabled(event);
if (!event_filter_match(event)) {
if (is_cgroup_event(event))
perf_cgroup_defer_enabled(event);
goto unlock;
}
/*
* If the event is in a group and isn't the group leader,
* then don't put it on unless the group is on.
*/
if (leader != event && leader->state != PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE)
goto unlock;
if (!group_can_go_on(event, cpuctx, 1)) {
err = -EEXIST;
} else {
if (event == leader)
err = group_sched_in(event, cpuctx, ctx);
else
err = event_sched_in(event, cpuctx, ctx);
}
if (err) {
/*
* If this event can't go on and it's part of a
* group, then the whole group has to come off.
*/
if (leader != event) {
group_sched_out(leader, cpuctx, ctx);
perf_mux_hrtimer_restart(cpuctx);
}
if (leader->attr.pinned) {
update_group_times(leader);
leader->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_ERROR;
}
}
unlock:
raw_spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 1,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int csnmp_config_add_data_instance_prefix(data_definition_t *dd,
oconfig_item_t *ci) {
int status;
if (!dd->is_table) {
WARNING("snmp plugin: data %s: InstancePrefix is ignored when `Table' "
"is set to `false'.",
dd->name);
return (-1);
}
status = cf_util_get_string(ci, &dd->instance_prefix);
return status;
} /* int csnmp_config_add_data_instance_prefix */
Commit Message: snmp plugin: Fix double free of request PDU
snmp_sess_synch_response() always frees request PDU, in both case of request
error and success. If error condition occurs inside of `while (status == 0)`
loop, double free of `req` happens.
Issue: #2291
Signed-off-by: Florian Forster <octo@collectd.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 9,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_open_confirm_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_opendata *data = calldata;
data->rpc_status = task->tk_status;
if (data->rpc_status == 0) {
nfs4_stateid_copy(&data->o_res.stateid, &data->c_res.stateid);
nfs_confirm_seqid(&data->owner->so_seqid, 0);
renew_lease(data->o_res.server, data->timestamp);
data->rpc_done = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 13,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Browser* Browser::CreateForApp(const std::string& app_name,
const gfx::Size& window_size,
Profile* profile,
bool is_panel) {
Browser::Type type = TYPE_APP;
if (is_panel) {
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kEnablePanels)) {
type = TYPE_APP_PANEL;
} else {
type = TYPE_APP_POPUP;
}
}
Browser* browser = new Browser(type, profile);
browser->app_name_ = app_name;
if (!window_size.IsEmpty()) {
gfx::Rect initial_pos(window_size);
browser->set_override_bounds(initial_pos);
}
browser->InitBrowserWindow();
return browser;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: raptor_turtle_writer_qname(raptor_turtle_writer* turtle_writer,
raptor_qname* qname)
{
raptor_iostream* iostr = turtle_writer->iostr;
if(qname->nspace && qname->nspace->prefix_length > 0)
raptor_iostream_counted_string_write(qname->nspace->prefix,
qname->nspace->prefix_length,
iostr);
raptor_iostream_write_byte(':', iostr);
raptor_iostream_counted_string_write(qname->local_name,
qname->local_name_length,
iostr);
return;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 14,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void testUriHostIpSix1() {
UriParserStateA stateA;
UriUriA uriA;
stateA.uri = &uriA;
const char * const input = "http" "://" "[::1]" ":" "80";
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, input));
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.hostText.first == input + 4 + 3 + 1);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.hostText.afterLast == input + 4 + 3 + 4);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.hostData.ip4 == NULL);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.hostData.ip6 != NULL);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.hostData.ipFuture.first == NULL);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.hostData.ipFuture.afterLast == NULL);
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
}
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 11,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int X509_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md,
unsigned int *len)
{
return(ASN1_item_digest(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509),type,(char *)data,md,len));
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 28,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vfio_msi_set_vector_signal(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev,
int vector, int fd, bool msix)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = vdev->pdev;
struct eventfd_ctx *trigger;
int irq, ret;
if (vector < 0 || vector >= vdev->num_ctx)
return -EINVAL;
irq = pci_irq_vector(pdev, vector);
if (vdev->ctx[vector].trigger) {
free_irq(irq, vdev->ctx[vector].trigger);
irq_bypass_unregister_producer(&vdev->ctx[vector].producer);
kfree(vdev->ctx[vector].name);
eventfd_ctx_put(vdev->ctx[vector].trigger);
vdev->ctx[vector].trigger = NULL;
}
if (fd < 0)
return 0;
vdev->ctx[vector].name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "vfio-msi%s[%d](%s)",
msix ? "x" : "", vector,
pci_name(pdev));
if (!vdev->ctx[vector].name)
return -ENOMEM;
trigger = eventfd_ctx_fdget(fd);
if (IS_ERR(trigger)) {
kfree(vdev->ctx[vector].name);
return PTR_ERR(trigger);
}
/*
* The MSIx vector table resides in device memory which may be cleared
* via backdoor resets. We don't allow direct access to the vector
* table so even if a userspace driver attempts to save/restore around
* such a reset it would be unsuccessful. To avoid this, restore the
* cached value of the message prior to enabling.
*/
if (msix) {
struct msi_msg msg;
get_cached_msi_msg(irq, &msg);
pci_write_msi_msg(irq, &msg);
}
ret = request_irq(irq, vfio_msihandler, 0,
vdev->ctx[vector].name, trigger);
if (ret) {
kfree(vdev->ctx[vector].name);
eventfd_ctx_put(trigger);
return ret;
}
vdev->ctx[vector].producer.token = trigger;
vdev->ctx[vector].producer.irq = irq;
ret = irq_bypass_register_producer(&vdev->ctx[vector].producer);
if (unlikely(ret))
dev_info(&pdev->dev,
"irq bypass producer (token %p) registration fails: %d\n",
vdev->ctx[vector].producer.token, ret);
vdev->ctx[vector].trigger = trigger;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 6,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 countLookasideSlots(LookasideSlot *p){
u32 cnt = 0;
while( p ){
p = p->pNext;
cnt++;
}
return cnt;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int blk_rq_map_kern(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq, void *kbuf,
unsigned int len, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
int reading = rq_data_dir(rq) == READ;
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long) kbuf;
int do_copy = 0;
struct bio *bio;
int ret;
if (len > (queue_max_hw_sectors(q) << 9))
return -EINVAL;
if (!len || !kbuf)
return -EINVAL;
do_copy = !blk_rq_aligned(q, addr, len) || object_is_on_stack(kbuf);
if (do_copy)
bio = bio_copy_kern(q, kbuf, len, gfp_mask, reading);
else
bio = bio_map_kern(q, kbuf, len, gfp_mask);
if (IS_ERR(bio))
return PTR_ERR(bio);
if (!reading)
bio_set_op_attrs(bio, REQ_OP_WRITE, 0);
if (do_copy)
rq->cmd_flags |= REQ_COPY_USER;
ret = blk_rq_append_bio(rq, bio);
if (unlikely(ret)) {
/* request is too big */
bio_put(bio);
return ret;
}
blk_queue_bounce(q, &rq->bio);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Don't feed anything but regular iovec's to blk_rq_map_user_iov
In theory we could map other things, but there's a reason that function
is called "user_iov". Using anything else (like splice can do) just
confuses it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 29,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const ResourceRequest& DocumentLoader::originalRequestCopy() const
{
return m_originalRequestCopy;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 10,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_refptr<Extension> LoadExtension(DictionaryValue* value,
std::string* error) {
return LoadExtensionWithLocation(value, Extension::INTERNAL, false, error);
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,375 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bond_miimon_commit(struct bonding *bond)
{
struct slave *slave;
int i;
bond_for_each_slave(bond, slave, i) {
switch (slave->new_link) {
case BOND_LINK_NOCHANGE:
continue;
case BOND_LINK_UP:
slave->link = BOND_LINK_UP;
slave->jiffies = jiffies;
if (bond->params.mode == BOND_MODE_8023AD) {
/* prevent it from being the active one */
bond_set_backup_slave(slave);
} else if (bond->params.mode != BOND_MODE_ACTIVEBACKUP) {
/* make it immediately active */
bond_set_active_slave(slave);
} else if (slave != bond->primary_slave) {
/* prevent it from being the active one */
bond_set_backup_slave(slave);
}
bond_update_speed_duplex(slave);
pr_info("%s: link status definitely up for interface %s, %u Mbps %s duplex.\n",
bond->dev->name, slave->dev->name,
slave->speed, slave->duplex ? "full" : "half");
/* notify ad that the link status has changed */
if (bond->params.mode == BOND_MODE_8023AD)
bond_3ad_handle_link_change(slave, BOND_LINK_UP);
if (bond_is_lb(bond))
bond_alb_handle_link_change(bond, slave,
BOND_LINK_UP);
if (!bond->curr_active_slave ||
(slave == bond->primary_slave))
goto do_failover;
continue;
case BOND_LINK_DOWN:
if (slave->link_failure_count < UINT_MAX)
slave->link_failure_count++;
slave->link = BOND_LINK_DOWN;
if (bond->params.mode == BOND_MODE_ACTIVEBACKUP ||
bond->params.mode == BOND_MODE_8023AD)
bond_set_slave_inactive_flags(slave);
pr_info("%s: link status definitely down for interface %s, disabling it\n",
bond->dev->name, slave->dev->name);
if (bond->params.mode == BOND_MODE_8023AD)
bond_3ad_handle_link_change(slave,
BOND_LINK_DOWN);
if (bond_is_lb(bond))
bond_alb_handle_link_change(bond, slave,
BOND_LINK_DOWN);
if (slave == bond->curr_active_slave)
goto do_failover;
continue;
default:
pr_err("%s: invalid new link %d on slave %s\n",
bond->dev->name, slave->new_link,
slave->dev->name);
slave->new_link = BOND_LINK_NOCHANGE;
continue;
}
do_failover:
ASSERT_RTNL();
block_netpoll_tx();
write_lock_bh(&bond->curr_slave_lock);
bond_select_active_slave(bond);
write_unlock_bh(&bond->curr_slave_lock);
unblock_netpoll_tx();
}
bond_set_carrier(bond);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 29,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanRedirectToURL(const GURL& url) {
if (!url.is_valid())
return false; // Can't redirect to invalid URLs.
const std::string& scheme = url.scheme();
if (scheme == kChromeErrorScheme)
return false;
if (IsPseudoScheme(scheme)) {
return url.IsAboutBlank();
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vips_foreign_load_dispose( GObject *gobject )
{
VipsForeignLoad *load = VIPS_FOREIGN_LOAD( gobject );
VIPS_UNREF( load->real );
G_OBJECT_CLASS( vips_foreign_load_parent_class )->dispose( gobject );
}
Commit Message: fix a crash with delayed load
If a delayed load failed, it could leave the pipeline only half-set up.
Sebsequent threads could then segv.
Set a load-has-failed flag and test before generate.
See https://github.com/jcupitt/libvips/issues/893
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBindFragDataLocationIndexed(
GLuint program_id,
GLuint colorName,
GLuint index,
const std::string& name) {
const char kFunctionName[] = "glBindFragDataLocationIndexEXT";
if (!StringIsValidForGLES(name)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, kFunctionName, "invalid character");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (ProgramManager::HasBuiltInPrefix(name)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, kFunctionName, "reserved prefix");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (index != 0 && index != 1) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, kFunctionName, "index out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
if ((index == 0 && colorName >= group_->max_draw_buffers()) ||
(index == 1 && colorName >= group_->max_dual_source_draw_buffers())) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, kFunctionName,
"colorName out of range for the color index");
return error::kNoError;
}
Program* program = GetProgramInfoNotShader(program_id, kFunctionName);
if (!program) {
return error::kNoError;
}
program->SetProgramOutputLocationIndexedBinding(name, colorName, index);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 3,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_path_all(FunctionCallInfo fcinfo, bool as_text)
{
text *json = PG_GETARG_TEXT_P(0);
ArrayType *path = PG_GETARG_ARRAYTYPE_P(1);
text *result;
Datum *pathtext;
bool *pathnulls;
int npath;
char **tpath;
int *ipath;
int i;
/*
* If the array contains any null elements, return NULL, on the grounds
* that you'd have gotten NULL if any RHS value were NULL in a nested
* series of applications of the -> operator. (Note: because we also
* return NULL for error cases such as no-such-field, this is true
* regardless of the contents of the rest of the array.)
*/
if (array_contains_nulls(path))
PG_RETURN_NULL();
deconstruct_array(path, TEXTOID, -1, false, 'i',
&pathtext, &pathnulls, &npath);
tpath = palloc(npath * sizeof(char *));
ipath = palloc(npath * sizeof(int));
for (i = 0; i < npath; i++)
{
Assert(!pathnulls[i]);
tpath[i] = TextDatumGetCString(pathtext[i]);
/*
* we have no idea at this stage what structure the document is so
* just convert anything in the path that we can to an integer and set
* all the other integers to INT_MIN which will never match.
*/
if (*tpath[i] != '\0')
{
long ind;
char *endptr;
errno = 0;
ind = strtol(tpath[i], &endptr, 10);
if (*endptr == '\0' && errno == 0 && ind <= INT_MAX && ind >= INT_MIN)
ipath[i] = (int) ind;
else
ipath[i] = INT_MIN;
}
else
ipath[i] = INT_MIN;
}
result = get_worker(json, tpath, ipath, npath, as_text);
if (result != NULL)
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(result);
else
PG_RETURN_NULL();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_event_comm_event(struct perf_comm_event *comm_event)
{
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx;
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
unsigned int size;
struct pmu *pmu;
int ctxn;
memset(comm, 0, sizeof(comm));
strlcpy(comm, comm_event->task->comm, sizeof(comm));
size = ALIGN(strlen(comm)+1, sizeof(u64));
comm_event->comm = comm;
comm_event->comm_size = size;
comm_event->event_id.header.size = sizeof(comm_event->event_id) + size;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(pmu, &pmus, entry) {
cpuctx = get_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context);
if (cpuctx->unique_pmu != pmu)
goto next;
perf_event_comm_ctx(&cpuctx->ctx, comm_event);
ctxn = pmu->task_ctx_nr;
if (ctxn < 0)
goto next;
ctx = rcu_dereference(current->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn]);
if (ctx)
perf_event_comm_ctx(ctx, comm_event);
next:
put_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 2,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::DrawRangeElements(GLenum mode,
GLuint start,
GLuint end,
GLsizei count,
GLenum type,
const void* indices) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glDrawRangeElements("
<< GLES2Util::GetStringDrawMode(mode) << ", " << start
<< ", " << end << ", " << count << ", "
<< GLES2Util::GetStringIndexType(type) << ", "
<< static_cast<const void*>(indices) << ")");
if (end < start) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawRangeElements", "end < start");
return;
}
DrawElementsImpl(mode, count, type, indices, "glDrawRangeElements");
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 21,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int32_t out_blocks;
/* XXX client can't cope with rekeying pre-auth */
if (!state->after_authentication)
return 0;
/* Haven't keyed yet or KEX in progress. */
if (ssh->kex == NULL || ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
return 0;
/* Peer can't rekey */
if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
return 0;
/*
* Permit one packet in or out per rekey - this allows us to
* make progress when rekey limits are very small.
*/
if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0)
return 0;
/* Time-based rekeying */
if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
return 1;
/* Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction */
if (state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS ||
state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS)
return 1;
/* Rekey after (cipher-specific) maxiumum blocks */
out_blocks = ROUNDUP(outbound_packet_len,
state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc.block_size);
return (state->max_blocks_out &&
(state->p_send.blocks + out_blocks > state->max_blocks_out)) ||
(state->max_blocks_in &&
(state->p_read.blocks > state->max_blocks_in));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 22,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int bad_cluster(DOS_FS * fs, uint32_t cluster)
{
FAT_ENTRY curEntry;
get_fat(&curEntry, fs->fat, cluster, fs);
return FAT_IS_BAD(fs, curEntry.value);
}
Commit Message: set_fat(): Fix off-by-2 error leading to corruption in FAT12
In FAT12 two 12 bit entries are combined to a 24 bit value (three
bytes). Therefore, when an even numbered FAT entry is set in FAT12, it
must be be combined with the following entry. To prevent accessing
beyond the end of the FAT array, it must be checked that the cluster is
not the last one.
Previously, the check tested that the requested cluster was equal to
fs->clusters - 1. However, fs->clusters is the number of data clusters
not including the two reserved FAT entries at the start so the test
triggered two clusters early.
If the third to last entry was written on a FAT12 filesystem with an
odd number of clusters, the second to last entry would be corrupted.
This corruption may also lead to invalid memory accesses when the
corrupted entry becomes out of bounds and is used later.
Change the test to fs->clusters + 1 to fix.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Bombe <aeb@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::TextInputStateChanged(
const ViewHostMsg_TextInputState_Params& params) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool vm_need_tpr_shadow(struct kvm *kvm)
{
return (cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow()) && (irqchip_in_kernel(kvm));
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 24,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ocfs2_dir_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
ocfs2_free_file_private(inode, file);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()
we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
process 1 process 2 process 3
truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
ocfs2_setattr
ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
ocfs2_inode_lock_full
inode_dio_wait
__inode_dio_wait
-->waiting for all dio
requests finish
dlm_proxy_ast_handler
dlm_do_local_bast
ocfs2_blocking_ast
ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
dio_end_io
dio_bio_end_aio
dio_complete
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_inode_lock
__ocfs2_cluster_lock
ocfs2_wait_for_mask
-->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
flag to be cleared, that is waiting
for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
inode_dio_end
-->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
be called, so a deadlock happened.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59F81636.70508@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void webkit_web_view_get_property(GObject* object, guint prop_id, GValue* value, GParamSpec* pspec)
{
WebKitWebView* webView = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(object);
switch(prop_id) {
case PROP_TITLE:
g_value_set_string(value, webkit_web_view_get_title(webView));
break;
case PROP_URI:
g_value_set_string(value, webkit_web_view_get_uri(webView));
break;
case PROP_COPY_TARGET_LIST:
g_value_set_boxed(value, webkit_web_view_get_copy_target_list(webView));
break;
case PROP_PASTE_TARGET_LIST:
g_value_set_boxed(value, webkit_web_view_get_paste_target_list(webView));
break;
case PROP_EDITABLE:
g_value_set_boolean(value, webkit_web_view_get_editable(webView));
break;
case PROP_SETTINGS:
g_value_set_object(value, webkit_web_view_get_settings(webView));
break;
case PROP_WEB_INSPECTOR:
g_value_set_object(value, webkit_web_view_get_inspector(webView));
break;
case PROP_VIEWPORT_ATTRIBUTES:
g_value_set_object(value, webkit_web_view_get_viewport_attributes(webView));
break;
case PROP_WINDOW_FEATURES:
g_value_set_object(value, webkit_web_view_get_window_features(webView));
break;
case PROP_TRANSPARENT:
g_value_set_boolean(value, webkit_web_view_get_transparent(webView));
break;
case PROP_ZOOM_LEVEL:
g_value_set_float(value, webkit_web_view_get_zoom_level(webView));
break;
case PROP_FULL_CONTENT_ZOOM:
g_value_set_boolean(value, webkit_web_view_get_full_content_zoom(webView));
break;
case PROP_ENCODING:
g_value_set_string(value, webkit_web_view_get_encoding(webView));
break;
case PROP_CUSTOM_ENCODING:
g_value_set_string(value, webkit_web_view_get_custom_encoding(webView));
break;
case PROP_LOAD_STATUS:
g_value_set_enum(value, webkit_web_view_get_load_status(webView));
break;
case PROP_PROGRESS:
g_value_set_double(value, webkit_web_view_get_progress(webView));
break;
case PROP_ICON_URI:
g_value_set_string(value, webkit_web_view_get_icon_uri(webView));
break;
case PROP_IM_CONTEXT:
g_value_set_object(value, webkit_web_view_get_im_context(webView));
break;
case PROP_VIEW_MODE:
g_value_set_enum(value, webkit_web_view_get_view_mode(webView));
break;
#ifndef GTK_API_VERSION_2
case PROP_HADJUSTMENT:
g_value_set_object(value, getHorizontalAdjustment(webView));
break;
case PROP_VADJUSTMENT:
g_value_set_object(value, getVerticalAdjustment(webView));
break;
case PROP_HSCROLL_POLICY:
g_value_set_enum(value, getHorizontalScrollPolicy(webView));
break;
case PROP_VSCROLL_POLICY:
g_value_set_enum(value, getVerticalScrollPolicy(webView));
break;
#endif
default:
G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID(object, prop_id, pspec);
}
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct ring_buffer *ring_buffer_get(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct ring_buffer *rb;
rcu_read_lock();
rb = rcu_dereference(event->rb);
if (rb) {
if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&rb->refcount))
rb = NULL;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return rb;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 21,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderBlock::positionNewFloatOnLine(FloatingObject* newFloat, FloatingObject* lastFloatFromPreviousLine, LineInfo& lineInfo, LineWidth& width)
{
if (!positionNewFloats())
return false;
width.shrinkAvailableWidthForNewFloatIfNeeded(newFloat);
if (!newFloat->paginationStrut() || !lineInfo.previousLineBrokeCleanly() || !lineInfo.isEmpty())
return true;
const FloatingObjectSet& floatingObjectSet = m_floatingObjects->set();
ASSERT(floatingObjectSet.last() == newFloat);
LayoutUnit floatLogicalTop = newFloat->logicalTop(isHorizontalWritingMode());
int paginationStrut = newFloat->paginationStrut();
if (floatLogicalTop - paginationStrut != logicalHeight() + lineInfo.floatPaginationStrut())
return true;
FloatingObjectSetIterator it = floatingObjectSet.end();
--it; // Last float is newFloat, skip that one.
FloatingObjectSetIterator begin = floatingObjectSet.begin();
while (it != begin) {
--it;
FloatingObject* f = *it;
if (f == lastFloatFromPreviousLine)
break;
if (f->logicalTop(isHorizontalWritingMode()) == logicalHeight() + lineInfo.floatPaginationStrut()) {
f->setPaginationStrut(paginationStrut + f->paginationStrut());
RenderBox* o = f->renderer();
setLogicalTopForChild(o, logicalTopForChild(o) + marginBeforeForChild(o) + paginationStrut);
if (o->isRenderBlock())
o->forceChildLayout();
else
o->layoutIfNeeded();
LayoutUnit oldLogicalTop = f->logicalTop(isHorizontalWritingMode());
m_floatingObjects->removePlacedObject(f);
f->setLogicalTop(oldLogicalTop + paginationStrut, isHorizontalWritingMode());
m_floatingObjects->addPlacedObject(f);
}
}
lineInfo.setFloatPaginationStrut(lineInfo.floatPaginationStrut() + paginationStrut);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int airspy_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct airspy *s;
int ret;
u8 u8tmp, buf[BUF_SIZE];
s = kzalloc(sizeof(struct airspy), GFP_KERNEL);
if (s == NULL) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Could not allocate memory for state\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
mutex_init(&s->v4l2_lock);
mutex_init(&s->vb_queue_lock);
spin_lock_init(&s->queued_bufs_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->queued_bufs);
s->dev = &intf->dev;
s->udev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
s->f_adc = bands[0].rangelow;
s->f_rf = bands_rf[0].rangelow;
s->pixelformat = formats[0].pixelformat;
s->buffersize = formats[0].buffersize;
/* Detect device */
ret = airspy_ctrl_msg(s, CMD_BOARD_ID_READ, 0, 0, &u8tmp, 1);
if (ret == 0)
ret = airspy_ctrl_msg(s, CMD_VERSION_STRING_READ, 0, 0,
buf, BUF_SIZE);
if (ret) {
dev_err(s->dev, "Could not detect board\n");
goto err_free_mem;
}
buf[BUF_SIZE - 1] = '\0';
dev_info(s->dev, "Board ID: %02x\n", u8tmp);
dev_info(s->dev, "Firmware version: %s\n", buf);
/* Init videobuf2 queue structure */
s->vb_queue.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_SDR_CAPTURE;
s->vb_queue.io_modes = VB2_MMAP | VB2_USERPTR | VB2_READ;
s->vb_queue.drv_priv = s;
s->vb_queue.buf_struct_size = sizeof(struct airspy_frame_buf);
s->vb_queue.ops = &airspy_vb2_ops;
s->vb_queue.mem_ops = &vb2_vmalloc_memops;
s->vb_queue.timestamp_flags = V4L2_BUF_FLAG_TIMESTAMP_MONOTONIC;
ret = vb2_queue_init(&s->vb_queue);
if (ret) {
dev_err(s->dev, "Could not initialize vb2 queue\n");
goto err_free_mem;
}
/* Init video_device structure */
s->vdev = airspy_template;
s->vdev.queue = &s->vb_queue;
s->vdev.queue->lock = &s->vb_queue_lock;
video_set_drvdata(&s->vdev, s);
/* Register the v4l2_device structure */
s->v4l2_dev.release = airspy_video_release;
ret = v4l2_device_register(&intf->dev, &s->v4l2_dev);
if (ret) {
dev_err(s->dev, "Failed to register v4l2-device (%d)\n", ret);
goto err_free_mem;
}
/* Register controls */
v4l2_ctrl_handler_init(&s->hdl, 5);
s->lna_gain_auto = v4l2_ctrl_new_std(&s->hdl, &airspy_ctrl_ops,
V4L2_CID_RF_TUNER_LNA_GAIN_AUTO, 0, 1, 1, 0);
s->lna_gain = v4l2_ctrl_new_std(&s->hdl, &airspy_ctrl_ops,
V4L2_CID_RF_TUNER_LNA_GAIN, 0, 14, 1, 8);
v4l2_ctrl_auto_cluster(2, &s->lna_gain_auto, 0, false);
s->mixer_gain_auto = v4l2_ctrl_new_std(&s->hdl, &airspy_ctrl_ops,
V4L2_CID_RF_TUNER_MIXER_GAIN_AUTO, 0, 1, 1, 0);
s->mixer_gain = v4l2_ctrl_new_std(&s->hdl, &airspy_ctrl_ops,
V4L2_CID_RF_TUNER_MIXER_GAIN, 0, 15, 1, 8);
v4l2_ctrl_auto_cluster(2, &s->mixer_gain_auto, 0, false);
s->if_gain = v4l2_ctrl_new_std(&s->hdl, &airspy_ctrl_ops,
V4L2_CID_RF_TUNER_IF_GAIN, 0, 15, 1, 0);
if (s->hdl.error) {
ret = s->hdl.error;
dev_err(s->dev, "Could not initialize controls\n");
goto err_free_controls;
}
v4l2_ctrl_handler_setup(&s->hdl);
s->v4l2_dev.ctrl_handler = &s->hdl;
s->vdev.v4l2_dev = &s->v4l2_dev;
s->vdev.lock = &s->v4l2_lock;
ret = video_register_device(&s->vdev, VFL_TYPE_SDR, -1);
if (ret) {
dev_err(s->dev, "Failed to register as video device (%d)\n",
ret);
goto err_unregister_v4l2_dev;
}
dev_info(s->dev, "Registered as %s\n",
video_device_node_name(&s->vdev));
dev_notice(s->dev, "SDR API is still slightly experimental and functionality changes may follow\n");
return 0;
err_free_controls:
v4l2_ctrl_handler_free(&s->hdl);
err_unregister_v4l2_dev:
v4l2_device_unregister(&s->v4l2_dev);
err_free_mem:
kfree(s);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: media: fix airspy usb probe error path
Fix a memory leak on probe error of the airspy usb device driver.
The problem is triggered when more than 64 usb devices register with
v4l2 of type VFL_TYPE_SDR or VFL_TYPE_SUBDEV.
The memory leak is caused by the probe function of the airspy driver
mishandeling errors and not freeing the corresponding control structures
when an error occours registering the device to v4l2 core.
A badusb device can emulate 64 of these devices, and then through
continual emulated connect/disconnect of the 65th device, cause the
kernel to run out of RAM and crash the kernel, thus causing a local DOS
vulnerability.
Fixes CVE-2016-5400
Signed-off-by: James Patrick-Evans <james@jmp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 28,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoOverlayPromotionHintCHROMIUM(
GLuint texture,
GLboolean promotion_hint,
GLint display_x,
GLint display_y,
GLint display_width,
GLint display_height) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 22,459 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int wc_ecc_export_point_der(const int curve_idx, ecc_point* point, byte* out,
word32* outLen)
{
int ret = MP_OKAY;
word32 numlen;
#ifndef WOLFSSL_ATECC508A
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
byte* buf;
#else
byte buf[ECC_BUFSIZE];
#endif
#endif /* !WOLFSSL_ATECC508A */
if ((curve_idx < 0) || (wc_ecc_is_valid_idx(curve_idx) == 0))
return ECC_BAD_ARG_E;
/* return length needed only */
if (point != NULL && out == NULL && outLen != NULL) {
numlen = ecc_sets[curve_idx].size;
*outLen = 1 + 2*numlen;
return LENGTH_ONLY_E;
}
if (point == NULL || out == NULL || outLen == NULL)
return ECC_BAD_ARG_E;
numlen = ecc_sets[curve_idx].size;
if (*outLen < (1 + 2*numlen)) {
*outLen = 1 + 2*numlen;
return BUFFER_E;
}
#ifdef WOLFSSL_ATECC508A
/* TODO: Implement equiv call to ATECC508A */
ret = BAD_COND_E;
#else
/* store byte point type */
out[0] = ECC_POINT_UNCOMP;
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
buf = (byte*)XMALLOC(ECC_BUFSIZE, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_ECC_BUFFER);
if (buf == NULL)
return MEMORY_E;
#endif
/* pad and store x */
XMEMSET(buf, 0, ECC_BUFSIZE);
ret = mp_to_unsigned_bin(point->x, buf +
(numlen - mp_unsigned_bin_size(point->x)));
if (ret != MP_OKAY)
goto done;
XMEMCPY(out+1, buf, numlen);
/* pad and store y */
XMEMSET(buf, 0, ECC_BUFSIZE);
ret = mp_to_unsigned_bin(point->y, buf +
(numlen - mp_unsigned_bin_size(point->y)));
if (ret != MP_OKAY)
goto done;
XMEMCPY(out+1+numlen, buf, numlen);
*outLen = 1 + 2*numlen;
done:
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
XFREE(buf, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_ECC_BUFFER);
#endif
#endif /* WOLFSSL_ATECC508A */
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InitializeAura() {
view_->InitAsChild(nullptr);
view_->Show();
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int crypto_init_shash_ops_async(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct crypto_alg *calg = tfm->__crt_alg;
struct shash_alg *alg = __crypto_shash_alg(calg);
struct crypto_ahash *crt = __crypto_ahash_cast(tfm);
struct crypto_shash **ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct crypto_shash *shash;
if (!crypto_mod_get(calg))
return -EAGAIN;
shash = crypto_create_tfm(calg, &crypto_shash_type);
if (IS_ERR(shash)) {
crypto_mod_put(calg);
return PTR_ERR(shash);
}
*ctx = shash;
tfm->exit = crypto_exit_shash_ops_async;
crt->init = shash_async_init;
crt->update = shash_async_update;
crt->final = shash_async_final;
crt->finup = shash_async_finup;
crt->digest = shash_async_digest;
if (alg->setkey)
crt->setkey = shash_async_setkey;
if (alg->export)
crt->export = shash_async_export;
if (alg->import)
crt->import = shash_async_import;
crt->reqsize = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(shash);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 11,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::updateBaseURL()
{
KURL oldBaseURL = m_baseURL;
if (!m_baseElementURL.isEmpty())
m_baseURL = m_baseElementURL;
else if (!m_baseURLOverride.isEmpty())
m_baseURL = m_baseURLOverride;
else {
m_baseURL = KURL(ParsedURLString, documentURI());
}
selectorQueryCache()->invalidate();
if (!m_baseURL.isValid())
m_baseURL = KURL();
if (m_elemSheet) {
ASSERT(!m_elemSheet->contents()->ruleCount());
bool usesRemUnits = m_elemSheet->contents()->usesRemUnits();
m_elemSheet = CSSStyleSheet::createInline(this, m_baseURL);
m_elemSheet->contents()->parserSetUsesRemUnits(usesRemUnits);
}
if (!equalIgnoringFragmentIdentifier(oldBaseURL, m_baseURL)) {
for (Element* element = ElementTraversal::firstWithin(this); element; element = ElementTraversal::next(element)) {
if (isHTMLAnchorElement(element))
toHTMLAnchorElement(element)->invalidateCachedVisitedLinkHash();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PermissionPromptImpl::~PermissionPromptImpl() {
if (bubble_delegate_)
bubble_delegate_->CloseBubble();
}
Commit Message: Elide the permission bubble title from the head of the string.
Long URLs can be used to spoof other origins in the permission bubble
title. This CL customises the title to be elided from the head, which
ensures that the maximal amount of the URL host is displayed in the case
where the URL is too long and causes the string to overflow.
Implementing the ellision means that the title cannot be multiline
(where elision is not well supported). Note that in English, the
window title is a string "$ORIGIN wants to", so the non-origin
component will not be elided. In other languages, the non-origin
component may appear fully or partly before the origin (e.g. in
Filipino, "Gusto ng $ORIGIN na"), so it may be elided there if the
URL is sufficiently long. This is not optimal, but the URLs that are
sufficiently long to trigger the elision are probably malicious, and
displaying the most relevant component of the URL is most important
for security purposes.
BUG=774438
Change-Id: I75c2364b10bf69bf337c7f4970481bf1809f6aae
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768312
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lucas Garron <lgarron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516921}
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cpu_cgroup_exit(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css,
struct cgroup_subsys_state *old_css,
struct task_struct *task)
{
/*
* cgroup_exit() is called in the copy_process() failure path.
* Ignore this case since the task hasn't ran yet, this avoids
* trying to poke a half freed task state from generic code.
*/
if (!(task->flags & PF_EXITING))
return;
sched_move_task(task);
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalDOMWindow::RemovedEventListener(
const AtomicString& event_type,
const RegisteredEventListener& registered_listener) {
DOMWindow::RemovedEventListener(event_type, registered_listener);
if (GetFrame() && GetFrame()->GetPage())
GetFrame()->GetPage()->GetEventHandlerRegistry().DidRemoveEventHandler(
*this, event_type, registered_listener.Options());
for (auto& it : event_listener_observers_) {
it->DidRemoveEventListener(this, event_type);
}
if (event_type == EventTypeNames::unload) {
UntrackUnloadEventListener(this);
} else if (event_type == EventTypeNames::beforeunload) {
UntrackBeforeUnloadEventListener(this);
}
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_attr_set(
xfs_inode_t *dp,
const unsigned char *name,
unsigned char *value,
int valuelen,
int flags)
{
int error;
struct xfs_name xname;
XFS_STATS_INC(xs_attr_set);
if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(dp->i_mount))
return (EIO);
error = xfs_attr_name_to_xname(&xname, name);
if (error)
return error;
return xfs_attr_set_int(dp, &xname, value, valuelen, flags);
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 14,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: istr_set_new (void)
{
return g_hash_table_new_full (istr_hash, istr_equal, g_free, NULL);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int insert_extent(struct uid_gid_map *map, struct uid_gid_extent *extent)
{
struct uid_gid_extent *dest;
if (map->nr_extents == UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) {
struct uid_gid_extent *forward;
/* Allocate memory for 340 mappings. */
forward = kmalloc_array(UID_GID_MAP_MAX_EXTENTS,
sizeof(struct uid_gid_extent),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!forward)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Copy over memory. Only set up memory for the forward pointer.
* Defer the memory setup for the reverse pointer.
*/
memcpy(forward, map->extent,
map->nr_extents * sizeof(map->extent[0]));
map->forward = forward;
map->reverse = NULL;
}
if (map->nr_extents < UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS)
dest = &map->extent[map->nr_extents];
else
dest = &map->forward[map->nr_extents];
*dest = *extent;
map->nr_extents++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: userns: also map extents in the reverse map to kernel IDs
The current logic first clones the extent array and sorts both copies, then
maps the lower IDs of the forward mapping into the lower namespace, but
doesn't map the lower IDs of the reverse mapping.
This means that code in a nested user namespace with >5 extents will see
incorrect IDs. It also breaks some access checks, like
inode_owner_or_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(), so a process
can incorrectly appear to be capable relative to an inode.
To fix it, we have to make sure that the "lower_first" members of extents
in both arrays are translated; and we have to make sure that the reverse
map is sorted *after* the translation (since otherwise the translation can
break the sorting).
This is CVE-2018-18955.
Fixes: 6397fac4915a ("userns: bump idmap limits to 340")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Tested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(zif_zip_read)
{
zval *zip_dp;
zip_read_rsrc *zr_rsrc;
int ret;
zip_rsrc *rsrc_int;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "r", &zip_dp) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((rsrc_int = (zip_rsrc *)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(zip_dp), le_zip_dir_name, le_zip_dir)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (rsrc_int && rsrc_int->za) {
if (rsrc_int->index_current >= rsrc_int->num_files) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
zr_rsrc = emalloc(sizeof(zip_read_rsrc));
ret = zip_stat_index(rsrc_int->za, rsrc_int->index_current, 0, &zr_rsrc->sb);
if (ret != 0) {
efree(zr_rsrc);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
zr_rsrc->zf = zip_fopen_index(rsrc_int->za, rsrc_int->index_current, 0);
if (zr_rsrc->zf) {
rsrc_int->index_current++;
RETURN_RES(zend_register_resource(zr_rsrc, le_zip_entry));
} else {
efree(zr_rsrc);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 22,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int close_display(
Display *dpy,
XExtCodes *codes) /* not used */
{
XExtDisplayInfo *info = find_display (dpy);
LockDisplay(dpy);
if (info && info->data) {
struct mem_cache_str *cache = (struct mem_cache_str *)info->data;
struct intercept_queue *iq, *iq_next;
struct reply_buffer *rbp, **rbp_next_p;
for (iq=cache->inter_data; iq; iq=iq_next) {
iq_next = iq->next;
XFree(iq);
cache->inter_data_count--;
}
/* this is a little trickier, because some of these
might still be in use */
for (rbp_next_p = &cache->reply_buffers; *rbp_next_p; ) {
rbp = *rbp_next_p;
if (rbp->ref_count == 0) {
*rbp_next_p = rbp->next;
XFree(rbp->buf);
XFree(rbp);
} else {
rbp_next_p = &rbp->next;
}
}
if (cache->reply_buffers == NULL && cache->inter_data_count == 0) {
/* every thing has been freed, can free ourselves, too */
XFree(cache);
} else {
cache->display_closed = True;
cache->inter_data = NULL; /* neatness only; won't be used */
}
}
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
return XextRemoveDisplay(xrecord_info, dpy);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::MessageLoop* RenderThreadImpl::GetMainLoop() {
return message_loop();
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 2,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
unsigned int len)
{
int i;
SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
/* XXXX */
if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
|| ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
|| (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
return (-1);
}
for (;;) {
clear_sys_error();
if (s->wbio != NULL) {
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
(char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
(unsigned int)wb->left);
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
i = -1;
}
if (i == wb->left) {
wb->left = 0;
wb->offset += i;
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
} else if (i <= 0) {
if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
/*
* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
* using a datagram service
*/
wb->left = 0;
}
return (i);
}
wb->offset += i;
wb->left -= i;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 4,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mipspmu_event_set_period(struct perf_event *event,
struct hw_perf_event *hwc,
int idx)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
s64 left = local64_read(&hwc->period_left);
s64 period = hwc->sample_period;
int ret = 0;
u64 uleft;
unsigned long flags;
if (unlikely(left <= -period)) {
left = period;
local64_set(&hwc->period_left, left);
hwc->last_period = period;
ret = 1;
}
if (unlikely(left <= 0)) {
left += period;
local64_set(&hwc->period_left, left);
hwc->last_period = period;
ret = 1;
}
if (left > (s64)MAX_PERIOD)
left = MAX_PERIOD;
local64_set(&hwc->prev_count, (u64)-left);
local_irq_save(flags);
uleft = (u64)(-left) & MAX_PERIOD;
uleft > VALID_COUNT ?
set_bit(idx, cpuc->msbs) : clear_bit(idx, cpuc->msbs);
mipspmu->write_counter(idx, (u64)(-left) & VALID_COUNT);
local_irq_restore(flags);
perf_event_update_userpage(event);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int crypto_is_test_larval(struct crypto_larval *larval)
{
return larval->alg.cra_driver_name[0];
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sys_swapcontext(struct ucontext __user *old_ctx,
struct ucontext __user *new_ctx,
long ctx_size, long r6, long r7, long r8, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned char tmp;
sigset_t set;
unsigned long new_msr = 0;
int ctx_has_vsx_region = 0;
if (new_ctx &&
get_user(new_msr, &new_ctx->uc_mcontext.gp_regs[PT_MSR]))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Check that the context is not smaller than the original
* size (with VMX but without VSX)
*/
if (ctx_size < UCONTEXTSIZEWITHOUTVSX)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* If the new context state sets the MSR VSX bits but
* it doesn't provide VSX state.
*/
if ((ctx_size < sizeof(struct ucontext)) &&
(new_msr & MSR_VSX))
return -EINVAL;
/* Does the context have enough room to store VSX data? */
if (ctx_size >= sizeof(struct ucontext))
ctx_has_vsx_region = 1;
if (old_ctx != NULL) {
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, old_ctx, ctx_size)
|| setup_sigcontext(&old_ctx->uc_mcontext, regs, 0, NULL, 0,
ctx_has_vsx_region)
|| __copy_to_user(&old_ctx->uc_sigmask,
¤t->blocked, sizeof(sigset_t)))
return -EFAULT;
}
if (new_ctx == NULL)
return 0;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, new_ctx, ctx_size)
|| __get_user(tmp, (u8 __user *) new_ctx)
|| __get_user(tmp, (u8 __user *) new_ctx + ctx_size - 1))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* If we get a fault copying the context into the kernel's
* image of the user's registers, we can't just return -EFAULT
* because the user's registers will be corrupted. For instance
* the NIP value may have been updated but not some of the
* other registers. Given that we have done the access_ok
* and successfully read the first and last bytes of the region
* above, this should only happen in an out-of-memory situation
* or if another thread unmaps the region containing the context.
* We kill the task with a SIGSEGV in this situation.
*/
if (__copy_from_user(&set, &new_ctx->uc_sigmask, sizeof(set)))
do_exit(SIGSEGV);
set_current_blocked(&set);
if (restore_sigcontext(regs, NULL, 0, &new_ctx->uc_mcontext))
do_exit(SIGSEGV);
/* This returns like rt_sigreturn */
set_thread_flag(TIF_RESTOREALL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Block signal return setting invalid MSR state
Currently we allow both the MSR T and S bits to be set by userspace on
a signal return. Unfortunately this is a reserved configuration and
will cause a TM Bad Thing exception if attempted (via rfid).
This patch checks for this case in both the 32 and 64 bit signals
code. If both T and S are set, we mark the context as invalid.
Found using a syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
unsigned int j;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ipt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct ipt_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
j = 0;
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name, &e->ip, &off);
if (ret != 0)
goto release_matches;
++j;
}
t = compat_ipt_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_IPV4, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto release_matches;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(AF_INET, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
out:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
release_matches:
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
if (j-- == 0)
break;
module_put(ematch->u.kernel.match->me);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 8,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CanOpenProfileOnStartup(Profile* profile) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
return true;
#else
ProfileAttributesEntry* entry = nullptr;
if (g_browser_process->profile_manager()
->GetProfileAttributesStorage()
.GetProfileAttributesWithPath(profile->GetPath(), &entry) &&
entry->IsSigninRequired()) {
return false;
}
return (!profile->IsGuestSession() && !profile->IsSystemProfile()) ||
(chrome::GetBrowserCount(profile->GetOffTheRecordProfile()) > 0);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Prevent regular mode session startup pref type turning to default.
When user loses past session tabs of regular mode after
invoking a new window from the incognito mode.
This was happening because the SessionStartUpPref type was being set
to default, from last, for regular user mode. This was happening in
the RestoreIfNecessary method where the restoration was taking place
for users whose SessionStartUpPref type was set to last.
The fix was to make the protocol of changing the pref type to
default more explicit to incognito users and not regular users
of pref type last.
Bug: 481373
Change-Id: I96efb4cf196949312181c83c6dcd45986ddded13
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1774441
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rohit Agarwal <roagarwal@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691726}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 12,848 |
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