instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CheckAccessControlHeaders(const char* header_name, bool exposed) {
std::string id("http://www.other.com/CheckAccessControlExposeHeaders_");
id.append(header_name);
if (exposed)
id.append("-Exposed");
id.append(".html");
KURL url = ToKURL(id);
WebURLRequest request(url);
request.SetFetchRequestMode(network::mojom::FetchRequestMode::kCORS);
request.SetFetchCredentialsMode(
network::mojom::FetchCredentialsMode::kOmit);
WebString header_name_string(WebString::FromUTF8(header_name));
expected_response_ = WebURLResponse();
expected_response_.SetMIMEType("text/html");
expected_response_.SetHTTPStatusCode(200);
expected_response_.AddHTTPHeaderField("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*");
if (exposed) {
expected_response_.AddHTTPHeaderField("access-control-expose-headers",
header_name_string);
}
expected_response_.AddHTTPHeaderField(header_name_string, "foo");
Platform::Current()->GetURLLoaderMockFactory()->RegisterURL(
url, expected_response_, frame_file_path_);
WebAssociatedURLLoaderOptions options;
expected_loader_ = CreateAssociatedURLLoader(options);
EXPECT_TRUE(expected_loader_);
expected_loader_->LoadAsynchronously(request, this);
ServeRequests();
EXPECT_TRUE(did_receive_response_);
EXPECT_TRUE(did_receive_data_);
EXPECT_TRUE(did_finish_loading_);
return !actual_response_.HttpHeaderField(header_name_string).IsEmpty();
}
Commit Message: Verify that header values set from Blink don't contain '\n'.
Because that would be silly.
Bug: 845961
Change-Id: I69de2cb093a3629de63c48652c9499f7387b8334
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1109757
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#570206}
CWE ID: CWE-93 | 0 | 28,546 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spnego_gss_set_sec_context_option(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
const gss_buffer_t value)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_set_sec_context_option(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
value);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 23,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mp_chars_in_buffer(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct sb_uart_state *state = tty->driver_data;
return uart_circ_chars_pending(&state->info->xmit);
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 15,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestChangeDrawingInSubsequence() {
FakeDisplayItemClient first("first");
GraphicsContext context(GetPaintController());
InitRootChunk();
{
SubsequenceRecorder r(context, first);
first.SetVisualRect(LayoutRect(100, 100, 300, 300));
DrawRect(context, first, kBackgroundType, FloatRect(100, 100, 300, 300));
DrawRect(context, first, kForegroundType, FloatRect(100, 100, 300, 300));
}
GetPaintController().CommitNewDisplayItems();
InitRootChunk();
{
EXPECT_FALSE(
SubsequenceRecorder::UseCachedSubsequenceIfPossible(context, first));
SubsequenceRecorder r(context, first);
first.SetVisualRect(LayoutRect(200, 200, 300, 300));
DrawRect(context, first, kBackgroundType, FloatRect(200, 200, 300, 300));
DrawRect(context, first, kForegroundType, FloatRect(100, 100, 300, 300));
}
GetPaintController().CommitNewDisplayItems();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool CheckAac(const uint8* buffer, int buffer_size) {
RCHECK(buffer_size > 6);
int offset = 0;
while (offset + 6 < buffer_size) {
BitReader reader(buffer + offset, 6);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 12) == 0xfff);
reader.SkipBits(1);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 2) == 0);
reader.SkipBits(1 + 2);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 4) != 15); // Forbidden.
reader.SkipBits(1 + 3 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1);
int size = ReadBits(&reader, 13);
RCHECK(size > 0);
offset += size;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add extra checks to avoid integer overflow.
BUG=425980
TEST=no crash with ASAN
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/659743004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#301249}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnSwapOutACK(bool timed_out) {
decrement_in_flight_event_count();
StopHangMonitorTimeout();
is_waiting_for_unload_ack_ = false;
has_timed_out_on_unload_ = timed_out;
delegate_->SwappedOut(this);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int task_switch_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
u16 tss_selector;
int reason;
int int_type = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info &
SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_MASK;
int int_vec = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info & SVM_EVTINJ_VEC_MASK;
uint32_t type =
svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info & SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_MASK;
uint32_t idt_v =
svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID;
bool has_error_code = false;
u32 error_code = 0;
tss_selector = (u16)svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 &
(1ULL << SVM_EXITINFOSHIFT_TS_REASON_IRET))
reason = TASK_SWITCH_IRET;
else if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 &
(1ULL << SVM_EXITINFOSHIFT_TS_REASON_JMP))
reason = TASK_SWITCH_JMP;
else if (idt_v)
reason = TASK_SWITCH_GATE;
else
reason = TASK_SWITCH_CALL;
if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_GATE) {
switch (type) {
case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_NMI:
svm->vcpu.arch.nmi_injected = false;
break;
case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_EXEPT:
if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 &
(1ULL << SVM_EXITINFOSHIFT_TS_HAS_ERROR_CODE)) {
has_error_code = true;
error_code =
(u32)svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
}
kvm_clear_exception_queue(&svm->vcpu);
break;
case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_INTR:
kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(&svm->vcpu);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (reason != TASK_SWITCH_GATE ||
int_type == SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_SOFT ||
(int_type == SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_EXEPT &&
(int_vec == OF_VECTOR || int_vec == BP_VECTOR)))
skip_emulated_instruction(&svm->vcpu);
if (int_type != SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_SOFT)
int_vec = -1;
if (kvm_task_switch(&svm->vcpu, tss_selector, int_vec, reason,
has_error_code, error_code) == EMULATE_FAIL) {
svm->vcpu.run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
svm->vcpu.run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
svm->vcpu.run->internal.ndata = 0;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Size AutofillDialogViews::SuggestionView::GetPreferredSize() const {
return gfx::Size();
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void GetNonpeakPixelList(PixelList *pixel_list,MagickPixelPacket *pixel)
{
register SkipList
*list;
register ssize_t
channel;
size_t
color,
next,
previous;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned short
channels[5];
/*
Finds the non peak value for each of the colors.
*/
for (channel=0; channel < 5; channel++)
{
list=pixel_list->lists+channel;
color=65536L;
next=list->nodes[color].next[0];
count=0;
do
{
previous=color;
color=next;
next=list->nodes[color].next[0];
count+=list->nodes[color].count;
} while (count <= (ssize_t) (pixel_list->length >> 1));
if ((previous == 65536UL) && (next != 65536UL))
color=next;
else
if ((previous != 65536UL) && (next == 65536UL))
color=previous;
channels[channel]=(unsigned short) color;
}
pixel->red=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[0]);
pixel->green=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[1]);
pixel->blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[2]);
pixel->opacity=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[3]);
pixel->index=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[4]);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::RequestDesktopNotificationPermission(
const GURL& source_origin,
int callback_context,
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id) {
#if defined(ENABLE_NOTIFICATIONS)
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
WebContents* contents =
tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(render_process_id, render_view_id);
if (!contents) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(contents->GetBrowserContext());
ExtensionService* service =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->extension_service();
const Extension* extension = !service ? NULL :
service->extensions()->GetExtensionOrAppByURL(ExtensionURLInfo(
source_origin));
RenderViewHost* rvh =
RenderViewHost::FromID(render_process_id, render_view_id);
if (IsExtensionWithPermissionOrSuggestInConsole(
APIPermission::kNotification, extension, rvh)) {
if (rvh)
rvh->DesktopNotificationPermissionRequestDone(callback_context);
return;
}
DesktopNotificationService* notifications =
DesktopNotificationServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
notifications->RequestPermission(source_origin, render_process_id,
render_view_id, callback_context, contents);
#else
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> postMessageCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestActiveDOMObject.postMessage");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestActiveDOMObject* imp = V8TestActiveDOMObject::toNative(args.Holder());
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, message, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
imp->postMessage(message);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 1 | 2,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeMetricsServiceClient::RegisterForNotifications() {
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_OPENED,
content::NotificationService::AllBrowserContextsAndSources());
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_CLOSED,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_TAB_PARENTED,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_TAB_CLOSING,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
registrar_.Add(this, content::NOTIFICATION_LOAD_START,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
registrar_.Add(this, content::NOTIFICATION_LOAD_STOP,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
registrar_.Add(this, content::NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_PROCESS_CLOSED,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
registrar_.Add(this, content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_HOST_HANG,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
omnibox_url_opened_subscription_ =
OmniboxEventGlobalTracker::GetInstance()->RegisterCallback(
base::Bind(&ChromeMetricsServiceClient::OnURLOpenedFromOmnibox,
base::Unretained(this)));
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_PROFILE_ADDED,
content::NotificationService::AllBrowserContextsAndSources());
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_PROFILE_DESTROYED,
content::NotificationService::AllBrowserContextsAndSources());
bool all_profiles_succeeded = true;
for (Profile* profile :
g_browser_process->profile_manager()->GetLoadedProfiles()) {
if (!RegisterForProfileEvents(profile)) {
all_profiles_succeeded = false;
}
}
return all_profiles_succeeded;
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 15,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void testInterfaceEmptyArrayMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::testInterfaceEmptyArrayMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_event_ctx_unlock(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
put_ctx(ctx);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 24,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GraphicsContext::translate(float w, float h)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
platformContext()->canvas()->translate(WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(w),
WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(h));
}
Commit Message: [skia] not all convex paths are convex, so recompute convexity for the problematic ones
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75960
Reviewed by Stephen White.
No new tests.
See related chrome issue
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=108605
* platform/graphics/skia/GraphicsContextSkia.cpp:
(WebCore::setPathFromConvexPoints):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104609 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 2,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebContentsImpl::WebContentsImpl(
BrowserContext* browser_context,
WebContentsImpl* opener)
: delegate_(NULL),
controller_(this, browser_context),
render_view_host_delegate_view_(NULL),
opener_(opener),
#if defined(OS_WIN) && defined(USE_AURA)
accessible_parent_(NULL),
#endif
render_manager_(this, this, this),
is_loading_(false),
crashed_status_(base::TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING),
crashed_error_code_(0),
waiting_for_response_(false),
load_state_(net::LOAD_STATE_IDLE, string16()),
upload_size_(0),
upload_position_(0),
displayed_insecure_content_(false),
capturer_count_(0),
should_normally_be_visible_(true),
is_being_destroyed_(false),
notify_disconnection_(false),
dialog_manager_(NULL),
is_showing_before_unload_dialog_(false),
closed_by_user_gesture_(false),
minimum_zoom_percent_(static_cast<int>(kMinimumZoomFactor * 100)),
maximum_zoom_percent_(static_cast<int>(kMaximumZoomFactor * 100)),
temporary_zoom_settings_(false),
color_chooser_identifier_(0),
message_source_(NULL),
fullscreen_widget_routing_id_(MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < g_created_callbacks.Get().size(); i++)
g_created_callbacks.Get().at(i).Run(this);
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InitializeSDK() {
SetUpV8();
FPDF_LIBRARY_CONFIG config;
config.version = 2;
config.m_pUserFontPaths = nullptr;
config.m_pIsolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
config.m_v8EmbedderSlot = gin::kEmbedderPDFium;
FPDF_InitLibraryWithConfig(&config);
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
FPDF_SetSystemFontInfo(&g_font_info);
#else
g_font_info =
new FPDF_SYSFONTINFO_WITHMETRICS(FPDF_GetDefaultSystemFontInfo());
g_font_info->Release = Release;
g_font_info->EnumFonts = EnumFonts;
g_font_info->MapFont = MapFontWithMetrics;
g_font_info->GetFont = GetFont;
g_font_info->GetFaceName = GetFaceName;
g_font_info->GetFontCharset = GetFontCharset;
g_font_info->GetFontData = GetFontData;
g_font_info->DeleteFont = DeleteFont;
FPDF_SetSystemFontInfo(g_font_info);
#endif
FSDK_SetUnSpObjProcessHandler(&g_unsupported_info);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 19,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void hwsim_set_chanctx_magic(struct ieee80211_chanctx_conf *c)
{
struct hwsim_chanctx_priv *cp = (void *)c->drv_priv;
cp->magic = HWSIM_CHANCTX_MAGIC;
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 24,682 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static loff_t get_loop_size(struct loop_device *lo, struct file *file)
{
return get_size(lo->lo_offset, lo->lo_sizelimit, file);
}
Commit Message: loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 1,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TIFFReadRawTile1(TIFF* tif, uint32 tile, void* buf, tmsize_t size, const char* module)
{
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
if (!_TIFFFillStriles( tif ))
return ((tmsize_t)(-1));
assert((tif->tif_flags&TIFF_NOREADRAW)==0);
if (!isMapped(tif)) {
tmsize_t cc;
if (!SeekOK(tif, td->td_stripoffset[tile])) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Seek error at row %lu, col %lu, tile %lu",
(unsigned long) tif->tif_row,
(unsigned long) tif->tif_col,
(unsigned long) tile);
return ((tmsize_t)(-1));
}
cc = TIFFReadFile(tif, buf, size);
if (cc != size) {
#if defined(__WIN32__) && (defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__MINGW32__))
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Read error at row %lu, col %lu; got %I64u bytes, expected %I64u",
(unsigned long) tif->tif_row,
(unsigned long) tif->tif_col,
(unsigned __int64) cc,
(unsigned __int64) size);
#else
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Read error at row %lu, col %lu; got %llu bytes, expected %llu",
(unsigned long) tif->tif_row,
(unsigned long) tif->tif_col,
(unsigned long long) cc,
(unsigned long long) size);
#endif
return ((tmsize_t)(-1));
}
} else {
tmsize_t ma,mb;
tmsize_t n;
ma=(tmsize_t)td->td_stripoffset[tile];
mb=ma+size;
if ((td->td_stripoffset[tile] > (uint64)TIFF_TMSIZE_T_MAX)||(ma>tif->tif_size))
n=0;
else if ((mb<ma)||(mb<size)||(mb>tif->tif_size))
n=tif->tif_size-ma;
else
n=size;
if (n!=size) {
#if defined(__WIN32__) && (defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__MINGW32__))
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Read error at row %lu, col %lu, tile %lu; got %I64u bytes, expected %I64u",
(unsigned long) tif->tif_row,
(unsigned long) tif->tif_col,
(unsigned long) tile,
(unsigned __int64) n,
(unsigned __int64) size);
#else
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Read error at row %lu, col %lu, tile %lu; got %llu bytes, expected %llu",
(unsigned long) tif->tif_row,
(unsigned long) tif->tif_col,
(unsigned long) tile,
(unsigned long long) n,
(unsigned long long) size);
#endif
return ((tmsize_t)(-1));
}
_TIFFmemcpy(buf, tif->tif_base + ma, size);
}
return (size);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_read.c, libtiff/tiffiop.h: fix uint32 overflow in
TIFFReadEncodedStrip() that caused an integer division by zero.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2596
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::CreateProxiesForChildFrame(FrameTreeNode* child) {
RenderFrameProxyHost* outer_delegate_proxy =
ForInnerDelegate() ? GetProxyToOuterDelegate() : nullptr;
for (const auto& pair : proxy_hosts_) {
if (pair.second.get() == outer_delegate_proxy)
continue;
child->render_manager()->CreateRenderFrameProxy(
pair.second->GetSiteInstance());
}
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long do_mincore(unsigned long addr, unsigned long pages, unsigned char *vec)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned long end;
vma = find_vma(current->mm, addr);
if (!vma || addr < vma->vm_start)
return -ENOMEM;
end = min(vma->vm_end, addr + (pages << PAGE_SHIFT));
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) {
mincore_hugetlb_page_range(vma, addr, end, vec);
return (end - addr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
}
end = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
mincore_hugetlb_page_range(vma, addr, end, vec);
else
mincore_page_range(vma, addr, end, vec);
return (end - addr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 14,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int h2c_handle_window_update(struct h2c *h2c, struct h2s *h2s)
{
int32_t inc;
int error;
if (h2c->dfl != 4) {
error = H2_ERR_FRAME_SIZE_ERROR;
goto conn_err;
}
/* process full frame only */
if (h2c->dbuf->i < h2c->dfl)
return 0;
inc = h2_get_n32(h2c->dbuf, 0);
if (h2c->dsi != 0) {
/* stream window update */
/* it's not an error to receive WU on a closed stream */
if (h2s->st == H2_SS_CLOSED)
return 1;
if (!inc) {
error = H2_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
goto strm_err;
}
if (h2s->mws >= 0 && h2s->mws + inc < 0) {
error = H2_ERR_FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR;
goto strm_err;
}
h2s->mws += inc;
if (h2s->mws > 0 && (h2s->flags & H2_SF_BLK_SFCTL)) {
h2s->flags &= ~H2_SF_BLK_SFCTL;
if (h2s->cs && LIST_ISEMPTY(&h2s->list) &&
(h2s->cs->flags & CS_FL_DATA_WR_ENA)) {
/* This stream wanted to send but could not due to its
* own flow control. We can put it back into the send
* list now, it will be handled upon next send() call.
*/
LIST_ADDQ(&h2c->send_list, &h2s->list);
}
}
}
else {
/* connection window update */
if (!inc) {
error = H2_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
goto conn_err;
}
if (h2c->mws >= 0 && h2c->mws + inc < 0) {
error = H2_ERR_FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR;
goto conn_err;
}
h2c->mws += inc;
}
return 1;
conn_err:
h2c_error(h2c, error);
return 0;
strm_err:
if (h2s) {
h2s_error(h2s, error);
h2c->st0 = H2_CS_FRAME_E;
}
else
h2c_error(h2c, error);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err drep_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
s->size += 8;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 4,078 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int page_mapped_in_vma(struct page *page, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
unsigned long address;
pte_t *pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
address = __vma_address(page, vma);
if (unlikely(address < vma->vm_start || address >= vma->vm_end))
return 0;
pte = page_check_address(page, vma->vm_mm, address, &ptl, 1);
if (!pte) /* the page is not in this mm */
return 0;
pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void activityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::activityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 7,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileSelectionCanceled() {
proxy_ = nullptr;
if (!render_frame_host_)
return;
std::move(callback_).Run(nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 12,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iasecc_init_amos_or_sagem(struct sc_card *card)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
unsigned int flags;
int rv = 0;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
flags = IASECC_CARD_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
_sc_card_add_rsa_alg(card, 1024, flags, 0x10001);
_sc_card_add_rsa_alg(card, 2048, flags, 0x10001);
card->caps = SC_CARD_CAP_RNG;
card->caps |= SC_CARD_CAP_APDU_EXT;
card->caps |= SC_CARD_CAP_USE_FCI_AC;
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_MI) {
rv = iasecc_mi_match(card);
if (rv)
card->type = SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_MI2;
else
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
rv = iasecc_parse_ef_atr(card);
if (rv == SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND) {
rv = iasecc_select_mf(card, NULL);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "MF selection error");
rv = iasecc_parse_ef_atr(card);
}
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "IASECC: ATR parse failed");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 11,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> AsObjectOrEmpty(v8::Local<v8::Value> value) {
return value->IsObject() ? value.As<v8::Object>() : v8::Local<v8::Object>();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 13,184 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2Util::ComputeImagePaddedRowSize(int width,
int format,
int type,
int alignment,
uint32_t* padded_row_size) {
uint32_t bytes_per_group = ComputeImageGroupSize(format, type);
return ComputeImageRowSizeHelper(
width, bytes_per_group, alignment, nullptr, padded_row_size, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Validate glClearBuffer*v function |buffer| param on the client side
Otherwise we could read out-of-bounds even if an invalid |buffer| is passed
in and in theory we should not read the buffer at all.
BUG=908749
TEST=gl_tests in ASAN build
R=piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I94b69b56ce3358ff9bfc0e21f0618aec4371d1ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1354571
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#612023}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 8,971 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PopupContainer::handleMouseMoveEvent(const PlatformMouseEvent& event)
{
UserGestureIndicator gestureIndicator(DefinitelyProcessingUserGesture);
return m_listBox->handleMouseMoveEvent(
constructRelativeMouseEvent(event, this, m_listBox.get()));
}
Commit Message: [REGRESSION] Refreshed autofill popup renders garbage
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=83255
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=118374
The code used to update only the PopupContainer coordinates as if they were the coordinates relative
to the root view. Instead, a WebWidget positioned relative to the screen origin holds the PopupContainer,
so it is the WebWidget that should be positioned in PopupContainer::refresh(), and the PopupContainer's
location should be (0, 0) (and their sizes should always be equal).
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
No new tests, as the popup appearance is not testable in WebKit.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.cpp:
(WebCore::PopupContainer::layoutAndCalculateWidgetRect): Variable renamed.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showPopup): Use m_originalFrameRect rather than frameRect()
for passing into chromeClient.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showInRect): Set up the correct frameRect() for the container.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::refresh): Resize the container and position the WebWidget correctly.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.h:
(PopupContainer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@113418 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cmd_syncget(const char *tag, struct dlist *kin)
{
struct sync_state sync_state = {
imapd_userid,
imapd_userisadmin || imapd_userisproxyadmin,
imapd_authstate,
&imapd_namespace,
imapd_out,
0 /* local_only */
};
/* administrators only please */
if (!imapd_userisadmin) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "SYNCERROR: invalid user %s trying to sync", imapd_userid);
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO only admininstrators may use sync commands\r\n", tag);
return;
}
const char *resp = sync_get(kin, &sync_state);
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s %s\r\n", tag, resp);
/* Reset inactivity timer in case we spent a long time processing data */
prot_resettimeout(imapd_in);
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool emulator_io_port_access_allowed(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 port, u16 len)
{
struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
struct desc_struct tr_seg;
u32 base3;
int r;
u16 tr, io_bitmap_ptr, perm, bit_idx = port & 0x7;
unsigned mask = (1 << len) - 1;
unsigned long base;
ops->get_segment(ctxt, &tr, &tr_seg, &base3, VCPU_SREG_TR);
if (!tr_seg.p)
return false;
if (desc_limit_scaled(&tr_seg) < 103)
return false;
base = get_desc_base(&tr_seg);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
base |= ((u64)base3) << 32;
#endif
r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + 102, &io_bitmap_ptr, 2, NULL);
if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return false;
if (io_bitmap_ptr + port/8 > desc_limit_scaled(&tr_seg))
return false;
r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + io_bitmap_ptr + port/8, &perm, 2, NULL);
if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return false;
if ((perm >> bit_idx) & mask)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnDidChangeScrollOffsetPinningForMainFrame(
bool is_pinned_to_left, bool is_pinned_to_right) {
if (view_)
view_->SetScrollOffsetPinning(is_pinned_to_left, is_pinned_to_right);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool cmd_read_multiple(IDEState *s, uint8_t cmd)
{
bool lba48 = (cmd == WIN_MULTREAD_EXT);
if (!s->blk || !s->mult_sectors) {
ide_abort_command(s);
return true;
}
ide_cmd_lba48_transform(s, lba48);
s->req_nb_sectors = s->mult_sectors;
ide_sector_read(s);
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wb_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const void *hdr, register u_int len)
{
register const struct pkt_hdr *ph;
ph = (const struct pkt_hdr *)hdr;
if (len < sizeof(*ph) || !ND_TTEST(*ph)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
len -= sizeof(*ph);
if (ph->ph_flags)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "*"));
switch (ph->ph_type) {
case PT_KILL:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-kill"));
return;
case PT_ID:
if (wb_id(ndo, (struct pkt_id *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
break;
case PT_RREQ:
if (wb_rreq(ndo, (struct pkt_rreq *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
break;
case PT_RREP:
if (wb_rrep(ndo, (struct pkt_rrep *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
break;
case PT_DRAWOP:
if (wb_drawop(ndo, (struct pkt_dop *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
break;
case PT_PREQ:
if (wb_preq(ndo, (struct pkt_preq *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
break;
case PT_PREP:
if (wb_prep(ndo, (struct pkt_prep *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-%d!", ph->ph_type));
return;
}
}
Commit Message: whiteboard: fixup a few reversed tests (GH #446)
This is a follow-up to commit 3a3ec26.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: on_user_property_notify (User *user)
{
if (user->changed_timeout_id != 0)
return;
user->changed_timeout_id = g_timeout_add (250, (GSourceFunc) on_user_changed_timeout, user);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 20,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int IncrementEventListenerCount(ScriptContext* script_context,
const std::string& event_name) {
return ++g_listener_counts
.Get()[GetKeyForScriptContext(script_context)][event_name];
}
Commit Message: Ignore filtered event if an event matcher cannot be added.
BUG=625404
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236133002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411472}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 717 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit exit_o2nm(void)
{
/* XXX sync with hb callbacks and shut down hb? */
o2net_unregister_hb_callbacks();
configfs_unregister_subsystem(&o2nm_cluster_group.cs_subsys);
o2cb_sys_shutdown();
o2net_exit();
o2hb_exit();
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EEAA69.9080703@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59E9B36A.10700@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 13,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pdf_run_gs_OP(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, int b)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pdf_gstate *gstate = pdf_flush_text(ctx, pr);
gstate->stroke.color_params.op = b;
gstate->fill.color_params.op = b;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 1,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void clear_system_oom(void)
{
struct zone *zone;
spin_lock(&zone_scan_lock);
for_each_populated_zone(zone)
zone_clear_flag(zone, ZONE_OOM_LOCKED);
spin_unlock(&zone_scan_lock);
}
Commit Message: oom: fix integer overflow of points in oom_badness
commit ff05b6f7ae762b6eb464183eec994b28ea09f6dd upstream.
An integer overflow will happen on 64bit archs if task's sum of rss,
swapents and nr_ptes exceeds (2^31)/1000 value. This was introduced by
commit
f755a04 oom: use pte pages in OOM score
where the oom score computation was divided into several steps and it's no
longer computed as one expression in unsigned long(rss, swapents, nr_pte
are unsigned long), where the result value assigned to points(int) is in
range(1..1000). So there could be an int overflow while computing
176 points *= 1000;
and points may have negative value. Meaning the oom score for a mem hog task
will be one.
196 if (points <= 0)
197 return 1;
For example:
[ 3366] 0 3366 35390480 24303939 5 0 0 oom01
Out of memory: Kill process 3366 (oom01) score 1 or sacrifice child
Here the oom1 process consumes more than 24303939(rss)*4096~=92GB physical
memory, but it's oom score is one.
In this situation the mem hog task is skipped and oom killer kills another and
most probably innocent task with oom score greater than one.
The points variable should be of type long instead of int to prevent the
int overflow.
Signed-off-by: Frantisek Hrbata <fhrbata@redhat.com>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ASessionDescription::~ASessionDescription() {
}
Commit Message: Fix corruption via buffer overflow in mediaserver
change unbound sprintf() to snprintf() so network-provided values
can't overflow the buffers.
Applicable to all K/L/M/N branches.
Bug: 25747670
Change-Id: Id6a5120c2d08a6fbbd47deffb680ecf82015f4f6
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 29,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mapped_hostid(unsigned id, struct lxc_conf *conf, enum idtype idtype)
{
struct lxc_list *it;
struct id_map *map;
lxc_list_for_each(it, &conf->id_map) {
map = it->elem;
if (map->idtype != idtype)
continue;
if (id >= map->hostid && id < map->hostid + map->range)
return (id - map->hostid) + map->nsid;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 1,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_file_permissions(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, const char *fname, int len,
const char *permitgroup)
{
char fname_reduced[gp_file_name_sizeof];
uint rlen = sizeof(fname_reduced);
if (gp_file_name_reduce(fname, len, fname_reduced, &rlen) != gp_combine_success)
return gs_error_invalidaccess; /* fail if we couldn't reduce */
return check_file_permissions_reduced(i_ctx_p, fname_reduced, rlen, permitgroup);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ClientGpuFence GpuFence::AsClientGpuFence() {
return reinterpret_cast<ClientGpuFence>(this);
}
Commit Message: gfx: Add GpuFence::Wait() method
Provide a GpuFence::Wait() method to hide the implementation details of
waiting for a GpuFence object.
Bug: 828393
Change-Id: I2153ebcb4b8cca6bb43c827fb0a9740f6a6cc221
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1021513
Reviewed-by: David Reveman <reveman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniele Castagna <dcastagna@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559292}
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static netdev_tx_t hwsim_mon_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *dev)
{
/* TODO: allow packet injection */
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 8,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: doshn(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off, int num,
size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags, int mach, int strtab)
{
Elf32_Shdr sh32;
Elf64_Shdr sh64;
int stripped = 1;
void *nbuf;
off_t noff, coff, name_off;
uint64_t cap_hw1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x hardware capabilites */
uint64_t cap_sf1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x software capabilites */
char name[50];
if (size != xsh_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted section header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/* Read offset of name section to be able to read section names later */
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, off + size * strtab) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name_off = xsh_offset;
for ( ; num; num--) {
/* Read the name of this section. */
if (pread(fd, name, sizeof(name), name_off + xsh_name) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0';
if (strcmp(name, ".debug_info") == 0)
stripped = 0;
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, off) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
/* Things we can determine before we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_SYMTAB:
#if 0
case SHT_DYNSYM:
#endif
stripped = 0;
break;
default:
if (xsh_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
break;
}
/* Things we can determine when we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_NOTE:
if ((nbuf = malloc(xsh_size)) == NULL) {
file_error(ms, errno, "Cannot allocate memory"
" for note");
return -1;
}
if (pread(fd, nbuf, xsh_size, xsh_offset) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
free(nbuf);
return -1;
}
noff = 0;
for (;;) {
if (noff >= (off_t)xsh_size)
break;
noff = donote(ms, nbuf, (size_t)noff,
xsh_size, clazz, swap, 4, flags);
if (noff == 0)
break;
}
free(nbuf);
break;
case SHT_SUNW_cap:
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARCV9:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_386:
case EM_AMD64:
break;
default:
goto skip;
}
if (lseek(fd, xsh_offset, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
file_badseek(ms);
return -1;
}
coff = 0;
for (;;) {
Elf32_Cap cap32;
Elf64_Cap cap64;
char cbuf[/*CONSTCOND*/
MAX(sizeof cap32, sizeof cap64)];
if ((coff += xcap_sizeof) > (off_t)xsh_size)
break;
if (read(fd, cbuf, (size_t)xcap_sizeof) !=
(ssize_t)xcap_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
if (cbuf[0] == 'A') {
#ifdef notyet
char *p = cbuf + 1;
uint32_t len, tag;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (memcmp("gnu", p, 3) != 0) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", unknown capability %.3s", p)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
p += strlen(p) + 1;
tag = *p++;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (tag != 1) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", unknown gnu"
" capability tag %d", tag)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
#endif
break;
}
(void)memcpy(xcap_addr, cbuf, xcap_sizeof);
switch (xcap_tag) {
case CA_SUNW_NULL:
break;
case CA_SUNW_HW_1:
cap_hw1 |= xcap_val;
break;
case CA_SUNW_SF_1:
cap_sf1 |= xcap_val;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown capability "
"0x%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x = 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)xcap_tag,
(unsigned long long)xcap_val) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
}
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
skip:
default:
break;
}
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", %sstripped", stripped ? "" : "not ") == -1)
return -1;
if (cap_hw1) {
const cap_desc_t *cdp;
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARC32PLUS:
case EM_SPARCV9:
cdp = cap_desc_sparc;
break;
case EM_386:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_AMD64:
cdp = cap_desc_386;
break;
default:
cdp = NULL;
break;
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", uses") == -1)
return -1;
if (cdp) {
while (cdp->cd_name) {
if (cap_hw1 & cdp->cd_mask) {
if (file_printf(ms,
" %s", cdp->cd_name) == -1)
return -1;
cap_hw1 &= ~cdp->cd_mask;
}
++cdp;
}
if (cap_hw1)
if (file_printf(ms,
" unknown hardware capability 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_hw1) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
if (file_printf(ms,
" hardware capability 0x%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_hw1) == -1)
return -1;
}
}
if (cap_sf1) {
if (cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPUSED) {
if (file_printf(ms,
(cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPKNWN)
? ", uses frame pointer"
: ", not known to use frame pointer") == -1)
return -1;
}
cap_sf1 &= ~SF1_SUNW_MASK;
if (cap_sf1)
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown software capability 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_sf1) == -1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Stop reporting bad capabilities after the first few.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 29,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cirrus_vga_register_types(void)
{
type_register_static(&isa_cirrus_vga_info);
type_register_static(&cirrus_vga_info);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
if( len != 1 || buf[0] >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code = buf[0];
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Prevent bounds check bypass through overflow in PSK identity parsing
The check `if( *p + n > end )` in `ssl_parse_client_psk_identity` is
unsafe because `*p + n` might overflow, thus bypassing the check. As
`n` is a user-specified value up to 65K, this is relevant if the
library happens to be located in the last 65K of virtual memory.
This commit replaces the check by a safe version.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 20,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u32 nfsd4_layoutcommit_rsize(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_op *op)
{
return (op_encode_hdr_size +
1 /* locr_newsize */ +
2 /* ns_size */) * sizeof(__be32);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 6,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AreURLsInPageNavigation(const GURL& existing_url,
const GURL& new_url,
bool renderer_says_in_page,
NavigationType navigation_type) {
if (existing_url == new_url)
return renderer_says_in_page;
if (!new_url.has_ref()) {
return navigation_type == NAVIGATION_TYPE_IN_PAGE;
}
url_canon::Replacements<char> replacements;
replacements.ClearRef();
return existing_url.ReplaceComponents(replacements) ==
new_url.ReplaceComponents(replacements);
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RendererSchedulerImpl::EndIdlePeriodForTesting(
const base::Closure& callback,
base::TimeTicks time_remaining) {
main_thread_only().in_idle_period_for_testing = false;
EndIdlePeriod();
callback.Run();
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UnloadController::ProcessPendingTabs() {
if (!is_attempting_to_close_browser_) {
return;
}
if (HasCompletedUnloadProcessing()) {
browser_->OnWindowClosing();
return;
}
if (!tabs_needing_before_unload_fired_.empty()) {
content::WebContents* web_contents =
*(tabs_needing_before_unload_fired_.begin());
if (web_contents->GetRenderViewHost()) {
web_contents->GetRenderViewHost()->FirePageBeforeUnload(false);
} else {
ClearUnloadState(web_contents, true);
}
} else if (!tabs_needing_unload_fired_.empty()) {
content::WebContents* web_contents = *(tabs_needing_unload_fired_.begin());
if (web_contents->GetRenderViewHost()) {
web_contents->GetRenderViewHost()->ClosePage();
} else {
ClearUnloadState(web_contents, true);
}
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScopedRenderBufferBinder::ScopedRenderBufferBinder(ContextState* state,
ErrorState* error_state,
GLuint id)
: state_(state), error_state_(error_state) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor("ScopedRenderBufferBinder::ctor",
error_state_);
state->api()->glBindRenderbufferEXTFn(GL_RENDERBUFFER, id);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 7,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Add(const std::string& event) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
log_ += event + "\n";
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 8,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vmacache_update(unsigned long addr, struct vm_area_struct *newvma)
{
if (vmacache_valid_mm(newvma->vm_mm))
current->vmacache.vmas[VMACACHE_HASH(addr)] = newvma;
}
Commit Message: mm: get rid of vmacache_flush_all() entirely
Jann Horn points out that the vmacache_flush_all() function is not only
potentially expensive, it's buggy too. It also happens to be entirely
unnecessary, because the sequence number overflow case can be avoided by
simply making the sequence number be 64-bit. That doesn't even grow the
data structures in question, because the other adjacent fields are
already 64-bit.
So simplify the whole thing by just making the sequence number overflow
case go away entirely, which gets rid of all the complications and makes
the code faster too. Win-win.
[ Oleg Nesterov points out that the VMACACHE_FULL_FLUSHES statistics
also just goes away entirely with this ]
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool did_replace_entry() {
EXPECT_EQ(1U, did_replace_entries_.size());
return did_replace_entries_[0];
}
Commit Message: Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ndp_sock_recv(struct ndp *ndp)
{
struct ndp_msg *msg;
enum ndp_msg_type msg_type;
size_t len;
int err;
msg = ndp_msg_alloc();
if (!msg)
return -ENOMEM;
len = ndp_msg_payload_maxlen(msg);
err = myrecvfrom6(ndp->sock, msg->buf, &len, 0,
&msg->addrto, &msg->ifindex);
if (err) {
err(ndp, "Failed to receive message");
goto free_msg;
}
dbg(ndp, "rcvd from: %s, ifindex: %u",
str_in6_addr(&msg->addrto), msg->ifindex);
if (len < sizeof(*msg->icmp6_hdr)) {
warn(ndp, "rcvd icmp6 packet too short (%luB)", len);
err = 0;
goto free_msg;
}
err = ndp_msg_type_by_raw_type(&msg_type, msg->icmp6_hdr->icmp6_type);
if (err) {
err = 0;
goto free_msg;
}
ndp_msg_init(msg, msg_type);
ndp_msg_payload_len_set(msg, len);
if (!ndp_msg_check_valid(msg)) {
warn(ndp, "rcvd invalid ND message");
err = 0;
goto free_msg;
}
dbg(ndp, "rcvd %s, len: %zuB",
ndp_msg_type_info(msg_type)->strabbr, len);
if (!ndp_msg_check_opts(msg)) {
err = 0;
goto free_msg;
}
err = ndp_call_handlers(ndp, msg);;
free_msg:
ndp_msg_destroy(msg);
return err;
}
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <julien.bernard@viagenie.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 10,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType JPEGWarningHandler(j_common_ptr jpeg_info,int level)
{
#define JPEGExcessiveWarnings 1000
char
message[JMSG_LENGTH_MAX];
ErrorManager
*error_manager;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
Image
*image;
*message='\0';
error_manager=(ErrorManager *) jpeg_info->client_data;
exception=error_manager->exception;
image=error_manager->image;
if (level < 0)
{
/*
Process warning message.
*/
(jpeg_info->err->format_message)(jpeg_info,message);
if (jpeg_info->err->num_warnings++ < JPEGExcessiveWarnings)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageWarning,(char *) message,
image->filename);
}
else
if ((image->debug != MagickFalse) &&
(level >= jpeg_info->err->trace_level))
{
/*
Process trace message.
*/
(jpeg_info->err->format_message)(jpeg_info,message);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"[%s] JPEG Trace: \"%s\"",image->filename,message);
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1641
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CairoImageOutputDev::drawSoftMaskedImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
Stream *maskStr,
int maskWidth, int maskHeight,
GfxImageColorMap *maskColorMap)
{
cairo_t *cr;
cairo_surface_t *surface;
double x1, y1, x2, y2;
double *ctm;
double mat[6];
CairoImage *image;
ctm = state->getCTM();
mat[0] = ctm[0];
mat[1] = ctm[1];
mat[2] = -ctm[2];
mat[3] = -ctm[3];
mat[4] = ctm[2] + ctm[4];
mat[5] = ctm[3] + ctm[5];
x1 = mat[4];
y1 = mat[5];
x2 = x1 + width;
y2 = y1 + height;
image = new CairoImage (x1, y1, x2, y2);
saveImage (image);
if (imgDrawCbk && imgDrawCbk (numImages - 1, imgDrawCbkData)) {
surface = cairo_image_surface_create (CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32, width, height);
cr = cairo_create (surface);
setCairo (cr);
cairo_translate (cr, 0, height);
cairo_scale (cr, width, -height);
CairoOutputDev::drawSoftMaskedImage(state, ref, str, width, height, colorMap,
maskStr, maskWidth, maskHeight, maskColorMap);
image->setImage (surface);
setCairo (NULL);
cairo_surface_destroy (surface);
cairo_destroy (cr);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 8,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterPCDImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("PCD","PCD","Photo CD");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPCDImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePCDImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPCD;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderDecoderSeekableStreamFlag;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("PCD","PCDS","Photo CD");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPCDImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePCDImage;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderDecoderSeekableStreamFlag;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1450
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 18,018 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_dupcook_c(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands,
struct sctp_association *new_asoc)
{
/* The cookie should be silently discarded.
* The endpoint SHOULD NOT change states and should leave
* any timers running.
*/
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned paravirt_patch_default(u8 type, u16 clobbers, void *insnbuf,
unsigned long addr, unsigned len)
{
void *opfunc = get_call_destination(type);
unsigned ret;
if (opfunc == NULL)
/* If there's no function, patch it with a ud2a (BUG) */
ret = paravirt_patch_insns(insnbuf, len, ud2a, ud2a+sizeof(ud2a));
else if (opfunc == _paravirt_nop)
ret = 0;
/* identity functions just return their single argument */
else if (opfunc == _paravirt_ident_32)
ret = paravirt_patch_ident_32(insnbuf, len);
else if (opfunc == _paravirt_ident_64)
ret = paravirt_patch_ident_64(insnbuf, len);
else if (type == PARAVIRT_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops.iret) ||
type == PARAVIRT_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops.usergs_sysret64))
/* If operation requires a jmp, then jmp */
ret = paravirt_patch_jmp(insnbuf, opfunc, addr, len);
else
/* Otherwise call the function; assume target could
clobber any caller-save reg */
ret = paravirt_patch_call(insnbuf, opfunc, CLBR_ANY,
addr, clobbers, len);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests
Nadav reported that on guests we're failing to rewrite the indirect
calls to CALLEE_SAVE paravirt functions. In particular the
pv_queued_spin_unlock() call is left unpatched and that is all over the
place. This obviously wrecks Spectre-v2 mitigation (for paravirt
guests) which relies on not actually having indirect calls around.
The reason is an incorrect clobber test in paravirt_patch_call(); this
function rewrites an indirect call with a direct call to the _SAME_
function, there is no possible way the clobbers can be different
because of this.
Therefore remove this clobber check. Also put WARNs on the other patch
failure case (not enough room for the instruction) which I've not seen
trigger in my (limited) testing.
Three live kernel image disassemblies for lock_sock_nested (as a small
function that illustrates the problem nicely). PRE is the current
situation for guests, POST is with this patch applied and NATIVE is with
or without the patch for !guests.
PRE:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq *0xffffffff822299e8
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
POST:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq 0xffffffff810a0c20 <__raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock>
0xffffffff817be9a5 <+53>: xchg %ax,%ax
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063aa0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
NATIVE:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: movb $0x0,(%rdi)
0xffffffff817be9a3 <+51>: nopl 0x0(%rax)
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
Fixes: 63f70270ccd9 ("[PATCH] i386: PARAVIRT: add common patching machinery")
Fixes: 3010a0663fd9 ("x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls")
Reported-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 3,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Size PageInfoBubbleView::CalculatePreferredSize() const {
if (header_ == nullptr && site_settings_view_ == nullptr) {
return views::View::CalculatePreferredSize();
}
int height = views::View::CalculatePreferredSize().height();
int width = kMinBubbleWidth;
if (site_settings_view_) {
width = std::max(width, permissions_view_->GetPreferredSize().width());
}
width = std::min(width, kMaxBubbleWidth);
return gfx::Size(width, height);
}
Commit Message: Desktop Page Info/Harmony: Show close button for internal pages.
The Harmony version of Page Info for internal Chrome pages (chrome://,
chrome-extension:// and view-source:// pages) show a close button. Update the
code to match this.
This patch also adds TestBrowserDialog tests for the latter two cases described
above (internal extension and view source pages).
See screenshot -
https://drive.google.com/file/d/18RZnMiHCu-rCX9N6DLUpu4mkFWguh1xm/view?usp=sharing
Bug: 535074
Change-Id: I55e5f1aa682fd4ec85f7b65ac88f5a4f5906fe53
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/759624
Commit-Queue: Patti <patricialor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Trent Apted <tapted@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516624}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 11,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jsvAppendPrintf(JsVar *var, const char *fmt, ...) {
JsvStringIterator it;
jsvStringIteratorNew(&it, var, 0);
jsvStringIteratorGotoEnd(&it);
va_list argp;
va_start(argp, fmt);
vcbprintf((vcbprintf_callback)jsvStringIteratorPrintfCallback,&it, fmt, argp);
va_end(argp);
jsvStringIteratorFree(&it);
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostQt::removeTile(WebLayerID layerID, int tileID)
{
m_webPage->send(Messages::LayerTreeHostProxy::RemoveTileForLayer(layerID, tileID));
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DictionaryValue* TabNavigationToValue(
const sync_pb::TabNavigation& proto) {
DictionaryValue* value = new DictionaryValue();
SET_STR(virtual_url);
SET_STR(referrer);
SET_STR(title);
SET_STR(state);
SET_ENUM(page_transition, GetPageTransitionString);
SET_ENUM(navigation_qualifier, GetPageTransitionQualifierString);
SET_INT32(unique_id);
SET_INT64(timestamp);
return value;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 9,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cdrom_read_subchannel(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi,
struct cdrom_subchnl *subchnl, int mcn)
{
const struct cdrom_device_ops *cdo = cdi->ops;
struct packet_command cgc;
char buffer[32];
int ret;
init_cdrom_command(&cgc, buffer, 16, CGC_DATA_READ);
cgc.cmd[0] = GPCMD_READ_SUBCHANNEL;
cgc.cmd[1] = subchnl->cdsc_format;/* MSF or LBA addressing */
cgc.cmd[2] = 0x40; /* request subQ data */
cgc.cmd[3] = mcn ? 2 : 1;
cgc.cmd[8] = 16;
if ((ret = cdo->generic_packet(cdi, &cgc)))
return ret;
subchnl->cdsc_audiostatus = cgc.buffer[1];
subchnl->cdsc_ctrl = cgc.buffer[5] & 0xf;
subchnl->cdsc_trk = cgc.buffer[6];
subchnl->cdsc_ind = cgc.buffer[7];
if (subchnl->cdsc_format == CDROM_LBA) {
subchnl->cdsc_absaddr.lba = ((cgc.buffer[8] << 24) |
(cgc.buffer[9] << 16) |
(cgc.buffer[10] << 8) |
(cgc.buffer[11]));
subchnl->cdsc_reladdr.lba = ((cgc.buffer[12] << 24) |
(cgc.buffer[13] << 16) |
(cgc.buffer[14] << 8) |
(cgc.buffer[15]));
} else {
subchnl->cdsc_reladdr.msf.minute = cgc.buffer[13];
subchnl->cdsc_reladdr.msf.second = cgc.buffer[14];
subchnl->cdsc_reladdr.msf.frame = cgc.buffer[15];
subchnl->cdsc_absaddr.msf.minute = cgc.buffer[9];
subchnl->cdsc_absaddr.msf.second = cgc.buffer[10];
subchnl->cdsc_absaddr.msf.frame = cgc.buffer[11];
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 19,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport void UnregisterFITSImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("FITS");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("FTS");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sctp_chunkhdr *sctp_inq_peek(struct sctp_inq *queue)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch = NULL;
chunk = queue->in_progress;
/* If there is no more chunks in this packet, say so */
if (chunk->singleton ||
chunk->end_of_packet ||
chunk->pdiscard)
return NULL;
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *)chunk->chunk_end;
return ch;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
{
s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
/* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2)
{
s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL);
}
if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT)
{
/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Free up s->d1->buffered_app_data.q properly.
PR#3286
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sco_conn *sco_conn_add(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 status)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
struct sco_conn *conn = hcon->sco_data;
if (conn || status)
return conn;
conn = kzalloc(sizeof(struct sco_conn), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!conn)
return NULL;
spin_lock_init(&conn->lock);
hcon->sco_data = conn;
conn->hcon = hcon;
conn->src = &hdev->bdaddr;
conn->dst = &hcon->dst;
if (hdev->sco_mtu > 0)
conn->mtu = hdev->sco_mtu;
else
conn->mtu = 60;
BT_DBG("hcon %p conn %p", hcon, conn);
return conn;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: sco: fix information leak to userspace
struct sco_conninfo has one padding byte in the end. Local variable
cinfo of type sco_conninfo is copied to userspace with this uninizialized
one byte, leading to old stack contents leak.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 29,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit FileURLLoaderFactory(int child_id) : child_id_(child_id) {}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,323 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BackendImpl::OpenFollowingEntryFromList(
Rankings::List list,
CacheRankingsBlock** from_entry,
scoped_refptr<EntryImpl>* next_entry) {
if (disabled_)
return false;
if (!new_eviction_ && Rankings::NO_USE != list)
return false;
Rankings::ScopedRankingsBlock rankings(&rankings_, *from_entry);
CacheRankingsBlock* next_block = rankings_.GetNext(rankings.get(), list);
Rankings::ScopedRankingsBlock next(&rankings_, next_block);
*from_entry = NULL;
*next_entry = GetEnumeratedEntry(next.get(), list);
if (!*next_entry)
return false;
*from_entry = next.release();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,246 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Com_Frame( void ) {
int msec, minMsec;
int timeVal, timeValSV;
static int lastTime = 0, bias = 0;
int timeBeforeFirstEvents;
int timeBeforeServer;
int timeBeforeEvents;
int timeBeforeClient;
int timeAfter;
if ( setjmp (abortframe) ) {
return; // an ERR_DROP was thrown
}
timeBeforeFirstEvents =0;
timeBeforeServer =0;
timeBeforeEvents =0;
timeBeforeClient = 0;
timeAfter = 0;
Com_WriteConfiguration();
if ( com_speeds->integer ) {
timeBeforeFirstEvents = Sys_Milliseconds ();
}
if(!com_timedemo->integer)
{
if(com_dedicated->integer)
minMsec = SV_FrameMsec();
else
{
if(com_minimized->integer && com_maxfpsMinimized->integer > 0)
minMsec = 1000 / com_maxfpsMinimized->integer;
else if(com_unfocused->integer && com_maxfpsUnfocused->integer > 0)
minMsec = 1000 / com_maxfpsUnfocused->integer;
else if(com_maxfps->integer > 0)
minMsec = 1000 / com_maxfps->integer;
else
minMsec = 1;
timeVal = com_frameTime - lastTime;
bias += timeVal - minMsec;
if(bias > minMsec)
bias = minMsec;
minMsec -= bias;
}
}
else
minMsec = 1;
do
{
if(com_sv_running->integer)
{
timeValSV = SV_SendQueuedPackets();
timeVal = Com_TimeVal(minMsec);
if(timeValSV < timeVal)
timeVal = timeValSV;
}
else
timeVal = Com_TimeVal(minMsec);
if(com_busyWait->integer || timeVal < 1)
NET_Sleep(0);
else
NET_Sleep(timeVal - 1);
} while(Com_TimeVal(minMsec));
lastTime = com_frameTime;
com_frameTime = Com_EventLoop();
msec = com_frameTime - lastTime;
Cbuf_Execute ();
if (com_altivec->modified)
{
Com_DetectAltivec();
com_altivec->modified = qfalse;
}
msec = Com_ModifyMsec(msec);
if ( com_speeds->integer ) {
timeBeforeServer = Sys_Milliseconds ();
}
SV_Frame( msec );
if ( com_dedicated->modified ) {
Cvar_Get( "dedicated", "0", 0 );
com_dedicated->modified = qfalse;
if ( !com_dedicated->integer ) {
SV_Shutdown( "dedicated set to 0" );
CL_FlushMemory();
}
}
#ifndef DEDICATED
if ( com_speeds->integer ) {
timeBeforeEvents = Sys_Milliseconds ();
}
Com_EventLoop();
Cbuf_Execute ();
if ( com_speeds->integer ) {
timeBeforeClient = Sys_Milliseconds ();
}
CL_Frame( msec );
if ( com_speeds->integer ) {
timeAfter = Sys_Milliseconds ();
}
#else
if ( com_speeds->integer ) {
timeAfter = Sys_Milliseconds ();
timeBeforeEvents = timeAfter;
timeBeforeClient = timeAfter;
}
#endif
NET_FlushPacketQueue();
if ( com_speeds->integer ) {
int all, sv, ev, cl;
all = timeAfter - timeBeforeServer;
sv = timeBeforeEvents - timeBeforeServer;
ev = timeBeforeServer - timeBeforeFirstEvents + timeBeforeClient - timeBeforeEvents;
cl = timeAfter - timeBeforeClient;
sv -= time_game;
cl -= time_frontend + time_backend;
Com_Printf ("frame:%i all:%3i sv:%3i ev:%3i cl:%3i gm:%3i rf:%3i bk:%3i\n",
com_frameNumber, all, sv, ev, cl, time_game, time_frontend, time_backend );
}
if ( com_showtrace->integer ) {
extern int c_traces, c_brush_traces, c_patch_traces;
extern int c_pointcontents;
Com_Printf ("%4i traces (%ib %ip) %4i points\n", c_traces,
c_brush_traces, c_patch_traces, c_pointcontents);
c_traces = 0;
c_brush_traces = 0;
c_patch_traces = 0;
c_pointcontents = 0;
}
Com_ReadFromPipe( );
com_frameNumber++;
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 9,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool hasErrorInfo(ExecState* exec, JSObject* error)
{
return error->hasProperty(exec, Identifier(exec, linePropertyName))
|| error->hasProperty(exec, Identifier(exec, sourceURLPropertyName));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FileTransfer::SaveTransferInfo(bool success,bool try_again,int hold_code,int hold_subcode,char const *hold_reason)
{
Info.success = success;
Info.try_again = try_again;
Info.hold_code = hold_code;
Info.hold_subcode = hold_subcode;
if( hold_reason ) {
Info.error_desc = hold_reason;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 27,694 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __bio_clone_fast(struct bio *bio, struct bio *bio_src)
{
BUG_ON(bio->bi_pool && BVEC_POOL_IDX(bio));
/*
* most users will be overriding ->bi_disk with a new target,
* so we don't set nor calculate new physical/hw segment counts here
*/
bio->bi_disk = bio_src->bi_disk;
bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_CLONED);
bio->bi_opf = bio_src->bi_opf;
bio->bi_write_hint = bio_src->bi_write_hint;
bio->bi_iter = bio_src->bi_iter;
bio->bi_io_vec = bio_src->bi_io_vec;
bio_clone_blkcg_association(bio, bio_src);
}
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 8,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parserInit(XML_Parser parser, const XML_Char *encodingName) {
parser->m_processor = prologInitProcessor;
XmlPrologStateInit(&parser->m_prologState);
if (encodingName != NULL) {
parser->m_protocolEncodingName = copyString(encodingName, &(parser->m_mem));
}
parser->m_curBase = NULL;
XmlInitEncoding(&parser->m_initEncoding, &parser->m_encoding, 0);
parser->m_userData = NULL;
parser->m_handlerArg = NULL;
parser->m_startElementHandler = NULL;
parser->m_endElementHandler = NULL;
parser->m_characterDataHandler = NULL;
parser->m_processingInstructionHandler = NULL;
parser->m_commentHandler = NULL;
parser->m_startCdataSectionHandler = NULL;
parser->m_endCdataSectionHandler = NULL;
parser->m_defaultHandler = NULL;
parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_endDoctypeDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_unparsedEntityDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_notationDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_startNamespaceDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_endNamespaceDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_notStandaloneHandler = NULL;
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler = NULL;
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandlerArg = parser;
parser->m_skippedEntityHandler = NULL;
parser->m_elementDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_attlistDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_entityDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_xmlDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_bufferPtr = parser->m_buffer;
parser->m_bufferEnd = parser->m_buffer;
parser->m_parseEndByteIndex = 0;
parser->m_parseEndPtr = NULL;
parser->m_declElementType = NULL;
parser->m_declAttributeId = NULL;
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
parser->m_doctypeName = NULL;
parser->m_doctypeSysid = NULL;
parser->m_doctypePubid = NULL;
parser->m_declAttributeType = NULL;
parser->m_declNotationName = NULL;
parser->m_declNotationPublicId = NULL;
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_declAttributeIsId = XML_FALSE;
memset(&parser->m_position, 0, sizeof(POSITION));
parser->m_errorCode = XML_ERROR_NONE;
parser->m_eventPtr = NULL;
parser->m_eventEndPtr = NULL;
parser->m_positionPtr = NULL;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = NULL;
parser->m_defaultExpandInternalEntities = XML_TRUE;
parser->m_tagLevel = 0;
parser->m_tagStack = NULL;
parser->m_inheritedBindings = NULL;
parser->m_nSpecifiedAtts = 0;
parser->m_unknownEncodingMem = NULL;
parser->m_unknownEncodingRelease = NULL;
parser->m_unknownEncodingData = NULL;
parser->m_parentParser = NULL;
parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing = XML_INITIALIZED;
#ifdef XML_DTD
parser->m_isParamEntity = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_useForeignDTD = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_paramEntityParsing = XML_PARAM_ENTITY_PARSING_NEVER;
#endif
parser->m_hash_secret_salt = 0;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 28,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHPAPI zend_bool append_user_shutdown_function(php_shutdown_function_entry shutdown_function_entry TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (!BG(user_shutdown_function_names)) {
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(BG(user_shutdown_function_names));
zend_hash_init(BG(user_shutdown_function_names), 0, NULL, (void (*)(void *)) user_shutdown_function_dtor, 0);
}
return zend_hash_next_index_insert(BG(user_shutdown_function_names), &shutdown_function_entry, sizeof(php_shutdown_function_entry), NULL) != FAILURE;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GraphicsContext3DPrivate::createGraphicsSurfaces(const IntSize& size)
{
#if USE(GRAPHICS_SURFACE)
if (size.isEmpty())
m_graphicsSurface.clear();
else
m_graphicsSurface = GraphicsSurface::create(size, m_surfaceFlags, m_platformContext);
#endif
}
Commit Message: [Qt] Remove an unnecessary masking from swapBgrToRgb()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=103630
Reviewed by Zoltan Herczeg.
Get rid of a masking command in swapBgrToRgb() to speed up a little bit.
* platform/graphics/qt/GraphicsContext3DQt.cpp:
(WebCore::swapBgrToRgb):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@136375 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 19,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfc_genl_dump_ses(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct class_dev_iter *iter = (struct class_dev_iter *) cb->args[0];
struct nfc_dev *dev = (struct nfc_dev *) cb->args[1];
bool first_call = false;
if (!iter) {
first_call = true;
iter = kmalloc(sizeof(struct class_dev_iter), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iter)
return -ENOMEM;
cb->args[0] = (long) iter;
}
mutex_lock(&nfc_devlist_mutex);
cb->seq = nfc_devlist_generation;
if (first_call) {
nfc_device_iter_init(iter);
dev = nfc_device_iter_next(iter);
}
while (dev) {
int rc;
rc = nfc_genl_send_se(skb, dev, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, cb, NLM_F_MULTI);
if (rc < 0)
break;
dev = nfc_device_iter_next(iter);
}
mutex_unlock(&nfc_devlist_mutex);
cb->args[1] = (long) dev;
return skb->len;
}
Commit Message: nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the deactivate_target handler
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attributes (in addition to
NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to
accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference
exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs,
if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 2,588 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(next_);
visitor->Trace(obj_);
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 20,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int addrconf_ifid_gre(u8 *eui, struct net_device *dev)
{
return __ipv6_isatap_ifid(eui, *(__be32 *)dev->dev_addr);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Context(base::Time begin_time, BrowserContext* browser_context)
: event_(new base::WaitableEvent(true, false)),
begin_time_(begin_time),
is_removing_(false),
browser_context_path_(browser_context->GetPath()),
resource_context_(browser_context->GetResourceContext()) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
}
Commit Message: Do not attempt to open a channel to a plugin in Plugin Data Remover if there are no plugins available.
BUG=485886
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1144353003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#331168}
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_decode_hello(const struct ofp_header *oh, uint32_t *allowed_versions)
{
struct ofpbuf msg = ofpbuf_const_initializer(oh, ntohs(oh->length));
ofpbuf_pull(&msg, sizeof *oh);
*allowed_versions = version_bitmap_from_version(oh->version);
bool ok = true;
while (msg.size) {
const struct ofp_hello_elem_header *oheh;
unsigned int len;
if (msg.size < sizeof *oheh) {
return false;
}
oheh = msg.data;
len = ntohs(oheh->length);
if (len < sizeof *oheh || !ofpbuf_try_pull(&msg, ROUND_UP(len, 8))) {
return false;
}
if (oheh->type != htons(OFPHET_VERSIONBITMAP)
|| !ofputil_decode_hello_bitmap(oheh, allowed_versions)) {
ok = false;
}
}
return ok;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 26,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ActiveTabDelegateTest() {
auto delegate = std::make_unique<ActiveTabPermissionGranterTestDelegate>();
test_delegate_ = delegate.get();
ActiveTabPermissionGranter::SetPlatformDelegate(std::move(delegate));
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void omninet_process_read_urb(struct urb *urb)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = urb->context;
const struct omninet_header *hdr = urb->transfer_buffer;
const unsigned char *data;
size_t data_len;
if (urb->actual_length <= OMNINET_HEADERLEN || !hdr->oh_len)
return;
data = (char *)urb->transfer_buffer + OMNINET_HEADERLEN;
data_len = min_t(size_t, urb->actual_length - OMNINET_HEADERLEN,
hdr->oh_len);
tty_insert_flip_string(&port->port, data, data_len);
tty_flip_buffer_push(&port->port);
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: omninet: fix reference leaks at open
This driver needlessly took another reference to the tty on open, a
reference which was then never released on close. This lead to not just
a leak of the tty, but also a driver reference leak that prevented the
driver from being unloaded after a port had once been opened.
Fixes: 4a90f09b20f4 ("tty: usb-serial krefs")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.28
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 12,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nci_clear_target_list(struct nci_dev *ndev)
{
memset(ndev->targets, 0,
(sizeof(struct nfc_target)*NCI_MAX_DISCOVERED_TARGETS));
ndev->n_targets = 0;
}
Commit Message: NFC: Prevent multiple buffer overflows in NCI
Fix multiple remotely-exploitable stack-based buffer overflows due to
the NCI code pulling length fields directly from incoming frames and
copying too much data into statically-sized arrays.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Ilan Elias <ilane@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RTCPeerConnectionHandler::CreateNativeSessionDescription(
const std::string& sdp, const std::string& type,
webrtc::SdpParseError* error) {
webrtc::SessionDescriptionInterface* native_desc =
dependency_factory_->CreateSessionDescription(type, sdp, error);
LOG_IF(ERROR, !native_desc) << "Failed to create native session description."
<< " Type: " << type << " SDP: " << sdp;
return native_desc;
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct shmid_kernel *shm_obtain_object(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int id)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp = ipc_obtain_object_idr(&shm_ids(ns), id);
if (IS_ERR(ipcp))
return ERR_CAST(ipcp);
return container_of(ipcp, struct shmid_kernel, shm_perm);
}
Commit Message: Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 11,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoCopyBufferSubData(GLenum readtarget,
GLenum writetarget,
GLintptr readoffset,
GLintptr writeoffset,
GLsizeiptr size) {
buffer_manager()->ValidateAndDoCopyBufferSubData(
&state_, readtarget, writetarget, readoffset, writeoffset, size);
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnSaveImageAt(int x, int y) {
blink::WebFloatRect viewport_position(x, y, 0, 0);
GetLocalRootRenderWidget()->ConvertWindowToViewport(&viewport_position);
frame_->SaveImageAt(WebPoint(viewport_position.x, viewport_position.y));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 12,327 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuChannel::DestroySoon() {
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&GpuChannel::OnDestroy, this));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gd_error(const char *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, format);
gd_error_ex(GD_WARNING, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: fix #215 gdImageFillToBorder stack-overflow when invalid color is used
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,789 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlPushInput(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserInputPtr input) {
int ret;
if (input == NULL) return(-1);
if (xmlParserDebugEntities) {
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) && (ctxt->input->filename))
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"%s(%d): ", ctxt->input->filename,
ctxt->input->line);
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"Pushing input %d : %.30s\n", ctxt->inputNr+1, input->cur);
}
ret = inputPush(ctxt, input);
GROW;
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 17,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GetSchema(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
args.GetReturnValue().Set(
registry_->GetSchema(*v8::String::Utf8Value(args[0])));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Finish freezing schema
BUG=604901
BUG=603725
BUG=591164
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1906593002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#388945}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 19,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned long php_curl_ssl_id(void)
{
return (unsigned long) tsrm_thread_id();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnUpdateViewportIntersectionOnUI(const gfx::Rect& viewport_intersection,
const gfx::Rect& compositing_rect,
bool occluded_or_obscured) {
viewport_intersection_ = viewport_intersection;
compositing_rect_ = compositing_rect;
occluded_or_obscured_ = occluded_or_obscured;
msg_received_ = true;
if (run_loop_)
run_loop_->Quit();
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 8,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_attr_mounted_on_fileid(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap, uint64_t *fileid)
{
__be32 *p;
*fileid = 0;
if (unlikely(bitmap[1] & (FATTR4_WORD1_MOUNTED_ON_FILEID - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_MOUNTED_ON_FILEID)) {
READ_BUF(8);
READ64(*fileid);
bitmap[1] &= ~FATTR4_WORD1_MOUNTED_ON_FILEID;
}
dprintk("%s: fileid=%Lu\n", __func__, (unsigned long long)*fileid);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,342 |
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