instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_device (u2fh_devs * devs, unsigned id)
{
struct u2fdevice *dev;
for (dev = devs->first; dev != NULL; dev = dev->next)
{
if (dev->id == id)
{
return dev;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: fix filling out of initresp
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int packet_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
int len;
int val, lv = sizeof(val);
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
void *data = &val;
union tpacket_stats_u st;
struct tpacket_rollover_stats rstats;
if (level != SOL_PACKET)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (len < 0)
return -EINVAL;
switch (optname) {
case PACKET_STATISTICS:
spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
memcpy(&st, &po->stats, sizeof(st));
memset(&po->stats, 0, sizeof(po->stats));
spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
if (po->tp_version == TPACKET_V3) {
lv = sizeof(struct tpacket_stats_v3);
st.stats3.tp_packets += st.stats3.tp_drops;
data = &st.stats3;
} else {
lv = sizeof(struct tpacket_stats);
st.stats1.tp_packets += st.stats1.tp_drops;
data = &st.stats1;
}
break;
case PACKET_AUXDATA:
val = po->auxdata;
break;
case PACKET_ORIGDEV:
val = po->origdev;
break;
case PACKET_VNET_HDR:
val = po->has_vnet_hdr;
break;
case PACKET_VERSION:
val = po->tp_version;
break;
case PACKET_HDRLEN:
if (len > sizeof(int))
len = sizeof(int);
if (len < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, len))
return -EFAULT;
switch (val) {
case TPACKET_V1:
val = sizeof(struct tpacket_hdr);
break;
case TPACKET_V2:
val = sizeof(struct tpacket2_hdr);
break;
case TPACKET_V3:
val = sizeof(struct tpacket3_hdr);
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
break;
case PACKET_RESERVE:
val = po->tp_reserve;
break;
case PACKET_LOSS:
val = po->tp_loss;
break;
case PACKET_TIMESTAMP:
val = po->tp_tstamp;
break;
case PACKET_FANOUT:
val = (po->fanout ?
((u32)po->fanout->id |
((u32)po->fanout->type << 16) |
((u32)po->fanout->flags << 24)) :
0);
break;
case PACKET_ROLLOVER_STATS:
if (!po->rollover)
return -EINVAL;
rstats.tp_all = atomic_long_read(&po->rollover->num);
rstats.tp_huge = atomic_long_read(&po->rollover->num_huge);
rstats.tp_failed = atomic_long_read(&po->rollover->num_failed);
data = &rstats;
lv = sizeof(rstats);
break;
case PACKET_TX_HAS_OFF:
val = po->tp_tx_has_off;
break;
case PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS:
val = packet_use_direct_xmit(po);
break;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
if (len > lv)
len = lv;
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, data, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: packet: in packet_do_bind, test fanout with bind_lock held
Once a socket has po->fanout set, it remains a member of the group
until it is destroyed. The prot_hook must be constant and identical
across sockets in the group.
If fanout_add races with packet_do_bind between the test of po->fanout
and taking the lock, the bind call may make type or dev inconsistent
with that of the fanout group.
Hold po->bind_lock when testing po->fanout to avoid this race.
I had to introduce artificial delay (local_bh_enable) to actually
observe the race.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 13,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int jpc_putdata(jas_stream_t *out, jas_stream_t *in, long len)
{
return jas_stream_copy(out, in, len);
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 2,021
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int netif_alloc_netdev_queues(struct net_device *dev)
{
unsigned int count = dev->num_tx_queues;
struct netdev_queue *tx;
size_t sz = count * sizeof(*tx);
if (count < 1 || count > 0xffff)
return -EINVAL;
tx = kzalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_REPEAT);
if (!tx) {
tx = vzalloc(sz);
if (!tx)
return -ENOMEM;
}
dev->_tx = tx;
netdev_for_each_tx_queue(dev, netdev_init_one_queue, NULL);
spin_lock_init(&dev->tx_global_lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 21,304
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Image *ReadTXTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
colorspace[MagickPathExtent],
text[MagickPathExtent];
Image
*image;
long
x_offset,
y_offset;
PixelInfo
pixel;
MagickBooleanType
status;
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register Quantum
*q;
ssize_t
count,
type,
y;
unsigned long
depth,
height,
max_value,
width;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(text,0,sizeof(text));
(void) ReadBlobString(image,text);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
width=0;
height=0;
max_value=0;
*colorspace='\0';
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text+32,"%lu,%lu,%lu,%s",&width,&height,&max_value,
colorspace);
if ((count != 4) || (width == 0) || (height == 0) || (max_value == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->columns=width;
image->rows=height;
for (depth=1; (GetQuantumRange(depth)+1) < max_value; depth++) ;
image->depth=depth;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
LocaleLower(colorspace);
i=(ssize_t) strlen(colorspace)-1;
image->alpha_trait=UndefinedPixelTrait;
if ((i > 0) && (colorspace[i] == 'a'))
{
colorspace[i]='\0';
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
}
type=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,colorspace);
if (type < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,(ColorspaceType) type,exception);
GetPixelInfo(image,&pixel);
range=GetQuantumRange(image->depth);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
double
alpha,
black,
blue,
green,
red;
red=0.0;
green=0.0;
blue=0.0;
black=0.0;
alpha=0.0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (ReadBlobString(image,text) == (char *) NULL)
break;
switch (image->colorspace)
{
case GRAYColorspace:
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&alpha);
green=red;
blue=red;
break;
}
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,
&y_offset,&red);
green=red;
blue=red;
break;
}
case CMYKColorspace:
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&black,&alpha);
break;
}
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,
&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&black);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&alpha);
break;
}
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,
&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue);
break;
}
}
if (strchr(text,'%') != (char *) NULL)
{
red*=0.01*range;
green*=0.01*range;
blue*=0.01*range;
black*=0.01*range;
alpha*=0.01*range;
}
if (image->colorspace == LabColorspace)
{
green+=(range+1)/2.0;
blue+=(range+1)/2.0;
}
pixel.red=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (red+0.5),
range);
pixel.green=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (green+0.5),
range);
pixel.blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (blue+0.5),
range);
pixel.black=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (black+0.5),
range);
pixel.alpha=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (alpha+0.5),
range);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,(ssize_t) x_offset,(ssize_t) y_offset,1,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
continue;
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,&pixel,q);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) ReadBlobString(image,text);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) == 0)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) == 0);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/298
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 3,555
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: recursive_call_check_trav(Node* node, ScanEnv* env, int state)
{
int r = 0;
switch (NODE_TYPE(node)) {
case NODE_LIST:
case NODE_ALT:
{
int ret;
do {
ret = recursive_call_check_trav(NODE_CAR(node), env, state);
if (ret == FOUND_CALLED_NODE) r = FOUND_CALLED_NODE;
else if (ret < 0) return ret;
} while (IS_NOT_NULL(node = NODE_CDR(node)));
}
break;
case NODE_QUANT:
r = recursive_call_check_trav(NODE_BODY(node), env, state);
if (QUANT_(node)->upper == 0) {
if (r == FOUND_CALLED_NODE)
QUANT_(node)->is_refered = 1;
}
break;
case NODE_ANCHOR:
{
AnchorNode* an = ANCHOR_(node);
if (ANCHOR_HAS_BODY(an))
r = recursive_call_check_trav(NODE_ANCHOR_BODY(an), env, state);
}
break;
case NODE_BAG:
{
int ret;
int state1;
BagNode* en = BAG_(node);
if (en->type == BAG_MEMORY) {
if (NODE_IS_CALLED(node) || (state & IN_RECURSION) != 0) {
if (! NODE_IS_RECURSION(node)) {
NODE_STATUS_ADD(node, MARK1);
r = recursive_call_check(NODE_BODY(node));
if (r != 0)
NODE_STATUS_ADD(node, RECURSION);
NODE_STATUS_REMOVE(node, MARK1);
}
if (NODE_IS_CALLED(node))
r = FOUND_CALLED_NODE;
}
}
state1 = state;
if (NODE_IS_RECURSION(node))
state1 |= IN_RECURSION;
ret = recursive_call_check_trav(NODE_BODY(node), env, state1);
if (ret == FOUND_CALLED_NODE)
r = FOUND_CALLED_NODE;
if (en->type == BAG_IF_ELSE) {
if (IS_NOT_NULL(en->te.Then)) {
ret = recursive_call_check_trav(en->te.Then, env, state1);
if (ret == FOUND_CALLED_NODE)
r = FOUND_CALLED_NODE;
}
if (IS_NOT_NULL(en->te.Else)) {
ret = recursive_call_check_trav(en->te.Else, env, state1);
if (ret == FOUND_CALLED_NODE)
r = FOUND_CALLED_NODE;
}
}
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 20,363
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsreq_print_noaddr(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, u_int length,
register const u_char *bp2)
{
register const struct sunrpc_msg *rp;
register const uint32_t *dp;
nfs_type type;
int v3;
uint32_t proc;
uint32_t access_flags;
struct nfsv3_sattr sa3;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%d", length));
nfserr = 0; /* assume no error */
rp = (const struct sunrpc_msg *)bp;
if (!xid_map_enter(ndo, rp, bp2)) /* record proc number for later on */
goto trunc;
v3 = (EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_vers) == NFS_VER3);
proc = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_proc);
if (!v3 && proc < NFS_NPROCS)
proc = nfsv3_procid[proc];
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", tok2str(nfsproc_str, "proc-%u", proc)));
switch (proc) {
case NFSPROC_GETATTR:
case NFSPROC_SETATTR:
case NFSPROC_READLINK:
case NFSPROC_FSSTAT:
case NFSPROC_FSINFO:
case NFSPROC_PATHCONF:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
parsefh(ndo, dp, v3) != NULL)
return;
break;
case NFSPROC_LOOKUP:
case NFSPROC_CREATE:
case NFSPROC_MKDIR:
case NFSPROC_REMOVE:
case NFSPROC_RMDIR:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
parsefhn(ndo, dp, v3) != NULL)
return;
break;
case NFSPROC_ACCESS:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
access_flags = EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[0]);
if (access_flags & ~NFSV3ACCESS_FULL) {
/* NFSV3ACCESS definitions aren't up to date */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %04x", access_flags));
} else if ((access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_FULL) == NFSV3ACCESS_FULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NFS_ACCESS_FULL"));
} else {
char separator = ' ';
if (access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_READ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NFS_ACCESS_READ"));
separator = '|';
}
if (access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_LOOKUP) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%cNFS_ACCESS_LOOKUP", separator));
separator = '|';
}
if (access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_MODIFY) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%cNFS_ACCESS_MODIFY", separator));
separator = '|';
}
if (access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_EXTEND) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%cNFS_ACCESS_EXTEND", separator));
separator = '|';
}
if (access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_DELETE) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%cNFS_ACCESS_DELETE", separator));
separator = '|';
}
if (access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_EXECUTE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%cNFS_ACCESS_EXECUTE", separator));
}
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_READ:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
if (v3) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes @ %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[2]),
EXTRACT_64BITS(&dp[0])));
} else {
ND_TCHECK(dp[1]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes @ %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[1]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[0])));
}
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_WRITE:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
if (v3) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u (%u) bytes @ %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[4]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[2]),
EXTRACT_64BITS(&dp[0])));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <%s>",
tok2str(nfsv3_writemodes,
NULL, EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[3]))));
}
} else {
ND_TCHECK(dp[3]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u (%u) bytes @ %u (%u)",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[3]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[2]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[1]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[0])));
}
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_SYMLINK:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefhn(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ->"));
if (v3 && (dp = parse_sattr3(ndo, dp, &sa3)) == NULL)
break;
if (parsefn(ndo, dp) == NULL)
break;
if (v3 && ndo->ndo_vflag)
print_sattr3(ndo, &sa3, ndo->ndo_vflag);
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_MKNOD:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefhn(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_TCHECK(*dp);
type = (nfs_type)EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
dp++;
if ((dp = parse_sattr3(ndo, dp, &sa3)) == NULL)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", tok2str(type2str, "unk-ft %d", type)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag && (type == NFCHR || type == NFBLK)) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[1]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u/%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[0]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[1])));
dp += 2;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
print_sattr3(ndo, &sa3, ndo->ndo_vflag);
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_RENAME:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefhn(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ->"));
if (parsefhn(ndo, dp, v3) != NULL)
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_LINK:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ->"));
if (parsefhn(ndo, dp, v3) != NULL)
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_READDIR:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
if (v3) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[4]);
/*
* We shouldn't really try to interpret the
* offset cookie here.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes @ %" PRId64,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[4]),
EXTRACT_64BITS(&dp[0])));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " verf %08x%08x", dp[2], dp[3]));
} else {
ND_TCHECK(dp[1]);
/*
* Print the offset as signed, since -1 is
* common, but offsets > 2^31 aren't.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes @ %d",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[1]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[0])));
}
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_READDIRPLUS:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[4]);
/*
* We don't try to interpret the offset
* cookie here.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes @ %" PRId64,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[4]),
EXTRACT_64BITS(&dp[0])));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[5]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " max %u verf %08x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[5]), dp[2], dp[3]));
}
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_COMMIT:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes @ %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[2]),
EXTRACT_64BITS(&dp[0])));
return;
}
break;
default:
return;
}
trunc:
if (!nfserr)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13005/NFS: Add two bounds checks before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 15,346
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::TexImageHelperHTMLVideoElement(
const SecurityOrigin* security_origin,
TexImageFunctionID function_id,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
HTMLVideoElement* video,
const IntRect& source_image_rect,
GLsizei depth,
GLint unpack_image_height,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
const char* func_name = GetTexImageFunctionName(function_id);
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (!ValidateHTMLVideoElement(security_origin, func_name, video,
exception_state))
return;
WebGLTexture* texture =
ValidateTexImageBinding(func_name, function_id, target);
if (!texture)
return;
TexImageFunctionType function_type;
if (function_id == kTexImage2D || function_id == kTexImage3D)
function_type = kTexImage;
else
function_type = kTexSubImage;
if (!ValidateTexFunc(func_name, function_type, kSourceHTMLVideoElement,
target, level, internalformat, video->videoWidth(),
video->videoHeight(), 1, 0, format, type, xoffset,
yoffset, zoffset))
return;
GLint adjusted_internalformat =
ConvertTexInternalFormat(internalformat, type);
WebMediaPlayer::VideoFrameUploadMetadata frame_metadata = {};
int already_uploaded_id = -1;
WebMediaPlayer::VideoFrameUploadMetadata* frame_metadata_ptr = nullptr;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::ExtraWebGLVideoTextureMetadataEnabled()) {
already_uploaded_id = texture->GetLastUploadedVideoFrameId();
frame_metadata_ptr = &frame_metadata;
}
if (!source_image_rect.IsValid()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name,
"source sub-rectangle specified via pixel unpack "
"parameters is invalid");
return;
}
bool source_image_rect_is_default =
source_image_rect == SentinelEmptyRect() ||
source_image_rect ==
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight());
const bool use_copyTextureCHROMIUM = function_id == kTexImage2D &&
source_image_rect_is_default &&
depth == 1 && GL_TEXTURE_2D == target &&
CanUseTexImageViaGPU(format, type);
if (use_copyTextureCHROMIUM) {
DCHECK(Extensions3DUtil::CanUseCopyTextureCHROMIUM(target));
DCHECK_EQ(xoffset, 0);
DCHECK_EQ(yoffset, 0);
DCHECK_EQ(zoffset, 0);
if (video->CopyVideoTextureToPlatformTexture(
ContextGL(), target, texture->Object(), adjusted_internalformat,
format, type, level, unpack_premultiply_alpha_, unpack_flip_y_,
already_uploaded_id, frame_metadata_ptr)) {
texture->UpdateLastUploadedFrame(frame_metadata);
return;
}
if (video->CopyVideoYUVDataToPlatformTexture(
ContextGL(), target, texture->Object(), adjusted_internalformat,
format, type, level, unpack_premultiply_alpha_, unpack_flip_y_,
already_uploaded_id, frame_metadata_ptr)) {
texture->UpdateLastUploadedFrame(frame_metadata);
return;
}
}
if (source_image_rect_is_default) {
ScopedUnpackParametersResetRestore(
this, unpack_flip_y_ || unpack_premultiply_alpha_);
if (video->TexImageImpl(
static_cast<WebMediaPlayer::TexImageFunctionID>(function_id),
target, ContextGL(), texture->Object(), level,
adjusted_internalformat, format, type, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset,
unpack_flip_y_,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_ &&
unpack_colorspace_conversion_ == GL_NONE)) {
texture->ClearLastUploadedFrame();
return;
}
}
scoped_refptr<Image> image =
VideoFrameToImage(video, already_uploaded_id, frame_metadata_ptr);
if (!image)
return;
TexImageImpl(function_id, target, level, adjusted_internalformat, xoffset,
yoffset, zoffset, format, type, image.get(),
WebGLImageConversion::kHtmlDomVideo, unpack_flip_y_,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_, source_image_rect, depth,
unpack_image_height);
texture->UpdateLastUploadedFrame(frame_metadata);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 14,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContainerNode::setHovered(bool over)
{
if (over == hovered()) return;
Node::setHovered(over);
if (renderer()) {
if (renderer()->style()->affectedByHoverRules())
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
if (renderer() && renderer()->style()->hasAppearance())
renderer()->theme()->stateChanged(renderer(), HoverState);
}
}
Commit Message: https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93587
Node::replaceChild() can create bad DOM topology with MutationEvent, Part 2
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
Source/WebCore:
This is a followup of r124156. replaceChild() has yet another hidden
MutationEvent trigger. This change added a guard for it.
Test: fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html
* dom/ContainerNode.cpp:
(WebCore::ContainerNode::replaceChild):
LayoutTests:
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125237 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 23,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int Downmix_Process(effect_handle_t self,
audio_buffer_t *inBuffer, audio_buffer_t *outBuffer) {
downmix_object_t *pDownmixer;
int16_t *pSrc, *pDst;
downmix_module_t *pDwmModule = (downmix_module_t *)self;
if (pDwmModule == NULL) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (inBuffer == NULL || inBuffer->raw == NULL ||
outBuffer == NULL || outBuffer->raw == NULL ||
inBuffer->frameCount != outBuffer->frameCount) {
return -EINVAL;
}
pDownmixer = (downmix_object_t*) &pDwmModule->context;
if (pDownmixer->state == DOWNMIX_STATE_UNINITIALIZED) {
ALOGE("Downmix_Process error: trying to use an uninitialized downmixer");
return -EINVAL;
} else if (pDownmixer->state == DOWNMIX_STATE_INITIALIZED) {
ALOGE("Downmix_Process error: trying to use a non-configured downmixer");
return -ENODATA;
}
pSrc = inBuffer->s16;
pDst = outBuffer->s16;
size_t numFrames = outBuffer->frameCount;
const bool accumulate =
(pDwmModule->config.outputCfg.accessMode == EFFECT_BUFFER_ACCESS_ACCUMULATE);
const uint32_t downmixInputChannelMask = pDwmModule->config.inputCfg.channels;
switch(pDownmixer->type) {
case DOWNMIX_TYPE_STRIP:
if (accumulate) {
while (numFrames) {
pDst[0] = clamp16(pDst[0] + pSrc[0]);
pDst[1] = clamp16(pDst[1] + pSrc[1]);
pSrc += pDownmixer->input_channel_count;
pDst += 2;
numFrames--;
}
} else {
while (numFrames) {
pDst[0] = pSrc[0];
pDst[1] = pSrc[1];
pSrc += pDownmixer->input_channel_count;
pDst += 2;
numFrames--;
}
}
break;
case DOWNMIX_TYPE_FOLD:
#ifdef DOWNMIX_ALWAYS_USE_GENERIC_DOWNMIXER
if (!Downmix_foldGeneric(
downmixInputChannelMask, pSrc, pDst, numFrames, accumulate)) {
ALOGE("Multichannel configuration 0x%" PRIx32 " is not supported", downmixInputChannelMask);
return -EINVAL;
}
break;
#endif
switch((downmix_input_channel_mask_t)downmixInputChannelMask) {
case CHANNEL_MASK_QUAD_BACK:
case CHANNEL_MASK_QUAD_SIDE:
Downmix_foldFromQuad(pSrc, pDst, numFrames, accumulate);
break;
case CHANNEL_MASK_5POINT1_BACK:
case CHANNEL_MASK_5POINT1_SIDE:
Downmix_foldFrom5Point1(pSrc, pDst, numFrames, accumulate);
break;
case CHANNEL_MASK_7POINT1:
Downmix_foldFrom7Point1(pSrc, pDst, numFrames, accumulate);
break;
default:
if (!Downmix_foldGeneric(
downmixInputChannelMask, pSrc, pDst, numFrames, accumulate)) {
ALOGE("Multichannel configuration 0x%" PRIx32 " is not supported", downmixInputChannelMask);
return -EINVAL;
}
break;
}
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,524
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *FLTGetExpressionForValuesRanges(layerObj *lp, const char *item, const char *value, int forcecharcter)
{
int bIscharacter, bSqlLayer=MS_FALSE;
char *pszExpression = NULL, *pszEscapedStr=NULL, *pszTmpExpression=NULL;
char **paszElements = NULL, **papszRangeElements=NULL;
int numelements,i,nrangeelements;
/* TODO: remove the bSqlLayer checks since we want to write MapServer expressions only. */
/* double minval, maxval; */
if (lp && item && value) {
if (strstr(value, "/") == NULL) {
/*value(s)*/
paszElements = msStringSplit (value, ',', &numelements);
if (paszElements && numelements > 0) {
if (forcecharcter)
bIscharacter = MS_TRUE;
bIscharacter= !FLTIsNumeric(paszElements[0]);
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, "(");
for (i=0; i<numelements; i++) {
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, "(");
if (bSqlLayer)
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, item);
else {
if (bIscharacter)
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, "\"");
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, "[");
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, item);
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, "]");
if (bIscharacter)
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, "\"");
}
if (bIscharacter) {
if (bSqlLayer)
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, " = '");
else
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, " = \"");
} else
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, " = ");
pszEscapedStr = msLayerEscapeSQLParam(lp, paszElements[i]);
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, pszEscapedStr);
if (bIscharacter) {
if (bSqlLayer)
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, "'");
else
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, "\"");
}
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, ")");
msFree(pszEscapedStr);
pszEscapedStr=NULL;
if (pszExpression != NULL)
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, " OR ");
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, pszTmpExpression);
msFree(pszTmpExpression);
pszTmpExpression = NULL;
}
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, ")");
}
msFreeCharArray(paszElements, numelements);
} else {
/*range(s)*/
paszElements = msStringSplit (value, ',', &numelements);
if (paszElements && numelements > 0) {
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, "(");
for (i=0; i<numelements; i++) {
papszRangeElements = msStringSplit (paszElements[i], '/', &nrangeelements);
if (papszRangeElements && nrangeelements > 0) {
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, "(");
if (nrangeelements == 2 || nrangeelements == 3) {
/*
minval = atof(papszRangeElements[0]);
maxval = atof(papszRangeElements[1]);
*/
if (bSqlLayer)
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, item);
else {
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, "[");
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, item);
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, "]");
}
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, " >= ");
pszEscapedStr = msLayerEscapeSQLParam(lp, papszRangeElements[0]);
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, pszEscapedStr);
msFree(pszEscapedStr);
pszEscapedStr=NULL;
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, " AND ");
if (bSqlLayer)
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, item);
else {
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, "[");
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, item);
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, "]");
}
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, " <= ");
pszEscapedStr = msLayerEscapeSQLParam(lp, papszRangeElements[1]);
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, pszEscapedStr);
msFree(pszEscapedStr);
pszEscapedStr=NULL;
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, ")");
} else if (nrangeelements == 1) {
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, "(");
if (bSqlLayer)
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, item);
else {
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, "[");
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, item);
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, "]");
}
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, " = ");
pszEscapedStr = msLayerEscapeSQLParam(lp, papszRangeElements[0]);
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, pszEscapedStr);
msFree(pszEscapedStr);
pszEscapedStr=NULL;
pszTmpExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszTmpExpression, ")");
}
if (pszExpression != NULL)
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, " OR ");
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, pszTmpExpression);
msFree(pszTmpExpression);
pszTmpExpression = NULL;
}
msFreeCharArray(papszRangeElements, nrangeelements);
}
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, ")");
}
msFreeCharArray(paszElements, numelements);
}
}
msFree(pszTmpExpression);
return pszExpression;
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: httpd_method_str( int method )
{
switch ( method )
{
case METHOD_GET: return "GET";
case METHOD_HEAD: return "HEAD";
case METHOD_POST: return "POST";
default: return "UNKNOWN";
}
}
Commit Message: Fix heap buffer overflow in de_dotdot
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,604
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf14_begin_transparency_mask(gx_device *dev,
const gx_transparency_mask_params_t *ptmp,
const gs_rect *pbbox,
gs_gstate *pgs, gs_memory_t *mem)
{
pdf14_device *pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
byte bg_alpha = 0; /* By default the background alpha (area outside mask) is zero */
byte *transfer_fn;
gs_int_rect rect;
int code;
int group_color_numcomps;
gs_transparency_color_t group_color;
if (ptmp->subtype == TRANSPARENCY_MASK_None) {
pdf14_ctx *ctx = pdev->ctx;
/* free up any maskbuf on the current tos */
if (ctx->mask_stack) {
if (ctx->mask_stack->rc_mask->mask_buf != NULL ) {
pdf14_buf_free(ctx->mask_stack->rc_mask->mask_buf, ctx->mask_stack->memory);
ctx->mask_stack->rc_mask->mask_buf = NULL;
}
}
return 0;
}
transfer_fn = (byte *)gs_alloc_bytes(pdev->ctx->memory, 256,
"pdf14_begin_transparency_mask");
if (transfer_fn == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
code = compute_group_device_int_rect(pdev, &rect, pbbox, pgs);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* If we have background components the background alpha may be nonzero */
if (ptmp->Background_components)
bg_alpha = (int)(255 * ptmp->GrayBackground + 0.5);
if_debug1m('v', dev->memory,
"pdf14_begin_transparency_mask, bg_alpha = %d\n", bg_alpha);
memcpy(transfer_fn, ptmp->transfer_fn, size_of(ptmp->transfer_fn));
/* If the group color is unknown, then we must use the previous group color
space or the device process color space */
if (ptmp->group_color == UNKNOWN){
if (pdev->ctx->stack){
/* Use previous group color space */
group_color_numcomps = pdev->ctx->stack->n_chan-1; /* Remove alpha */
} else {
/* Use process color space */
group_color_numcomps = pdev->color_info.num_components;
}
switch (group_color_numcomps) {
case 1:
group_color = GRAY_SCALE;
break;
case 3:
group_color = DEVICE_RGB;
break;
case 4:
group_color = DEVICE_CMYK;
break;
default:
/* We can end up here if we are in a deviceN color space and
we have a sep output device */
group_color = DEVICEN;
break;
}
} else {
group_color = ptmp->group_color;
group_color_numcomps = ptmp->group_color_numcomps;
}
/* Always update the color mapping procs. Otherwise we end up
fowarding to the target device. */
code = pdf14_update_device_color_procs(dev, group_color, ptmp->icc_hashcode,
pgs, ptmp->iccprofile, true);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* Note that the soft mask always follows the group color requirements even
when we have a separable device */
return pdf14_push_transparency_mask(pdev->ctx, &rect, bg_alpha,
transfer_fn, ptmp->idle, ptmp->replacing,
ptmp->mask_id, ptmp->subtype,
group_color_numcomps,
ptmp->Background_components,
ptmp->Background,
ptmp->Matte_components,
ptmp->Matte,
ptmp->GrayBackground);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 13,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Sample::Sample(int sampleID, int fd, int64_t offset, int64_t length)
{
init();
mSampleID = sampleID;
mFd = dup(fd);
mOffset = offset;
mLength = length;
ALOGV("create sampleID=%d, fd=%d, offset=%" PRId64 " length=%" PRId64,
mSampleID, mFd, mLength, mOffset);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 11,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: point_set (mpi_point_t d, mpi_point_t s)
{
mpi_set (d->x, s->x);
mpi_set (d->y, s->y);
mpi_set (d->z, s->z);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 10,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GIFImageReader::addFrameIfNecessary()
{
if (m_frames.isEmpty() || m_frames.last()->isComplete())
m_frames.append(adoptPtr(new GIFFrameContext(m_frames.size())));
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of broken GIFs with weird frame sizes
Code didn't handle well if a GIF frame has dimension greater than the
"screen" dimension. This will break deferred image decoding.
This change reports the size as final only when the first frame is
encountered.
Added a test to verify this behavior. Frame size reported by the decoder
should be constant.
BUG=437651
R=pkasting@chromium.org, senorblanco@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/813943003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@188423 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,773
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoWaitSync(GLuint sync,
GLbitfield flags,
GLuint64 timeout) {
api()->glWaitSyncFn(GetSyncServiceID(sync, resources_), flags, timeout);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 18,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void put_mspel8_mc02_c(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src, ptrdiff_t stride)
{
wmv2_mspel8_v_lowpass(dst, src, stride, stride, 8);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 9,162
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
{
X509_NAME *nm;
int i;
nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,037
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PrerenderBrowserTest()
: prerender_contents_factory_(NULL),
use_https_src_server_(false),
call_javascript_(true) {
EnableDOMAutomation();
}
Commit Message: Update PrerenderBrowserTests to work with new
PrerenderContents.
Also update PrerenderContents to pass plugin
and HTML5 prerender tests.
BUG=81229
TEST=PrerenderBrowserTests (Once the new code is enabled)
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6905169
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83841 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 10,473
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int populate_page(struct ubifs_info *c, struct page *page,
struct bu_info *bu, int *n)
{
int i = 0, nn = *n, offs = bu->zbranch[0].offs, hole = 0, read = 0;
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
loff_t i_size = i_size_read(inode);
unsigned int page_block;
void *addr, *zaddr;
pgoff_t end_index;
dbg_gen("ino %lu, pg %lu, i_size %lld, flags %#lx",
inode->i_ino, page->index, i_size, page->flags);
addr = zaddr = kmap(page);
end_index = (i_size - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
if (!i_size || page->index > end_index) {
hole = 1;
memset(addr, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
goto out_hole;
}
page_block = page->index << UBIFS_BLOCKS_PER_PAGE_SHIFT;
while (1) {
int err, len, out_len, dlen;
if (nn >= bu->cnt) {
hole = 1;
memset(addr, 0, UBIFS_BLOCK_SIZE);
} else if (key_block(c, &bu->zbranch[nn].key) == page_block) {
struct ubifs_data_node *dn;
dn = bu->buf + (bu->zbranch[nn].offs - offs);
ubifs_assert(le64_to_cpu(dn->ch.sqnum) >
ubifs_inode(inode)->creat_sqnum);
len = le32_to_cpu(dn->size);
if (len <= 0 || len > UBIFS_BLOCK_SIZE)
goto out_err;
dlen = le32_to_cpu(dn->ch.len) - UBIFS_DATA_NODE_SZ;
out_len = UBIFS_BLOCK_SIZE;
err = ubifs_decompress(&dn->data, dlen, addr, &out_len,
le16_to_cpu(dn->compr_type));
if (err || len != out_len)
goto out_err;
if (len < UBIFS_BLOCK_SIZE)
memset(addr + len, 0, UBIFS_BLOCK_SIZE - len);
nn += 1;
read = (i << UBIFS_BLOCK_SHIFT) + len;
} else if (key_block(c, &bu->zbranch[nn].key) < page_block) {
nn += 1;
continue;
} else {
hole = 1;
memset(addr, 0, UBIFS_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
if (++i >= UBIFS_BLOCKS_PER_PAGE)
break;
addr += UBIFS_BLOCK_SIZE;
page_block += 1;
}
if (end_index == page->index) {
int len = i_size & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
if (len && len < read)
memset(zaddr + len, 0, read - len);
}
out_hole:
if (hole) {
SetPageChecked(page);
dbg_gen("hole");
}
SetPageUptodate(page);
ClearPageError(page);
flush_dcache_page(page);
kunmap(page);
*n = nn;
return 0;
out_err:
ClearPageUptodate(page);
SetPageError(page);
flush_dcache_page(page);
kunmap(page);
ubifs_err("bad data node (block %u, inode %lu)",
page_block, inode->i_ino);
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,065
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_recv_XButtonEvent(rpc_message_t *message, XEvent *xevent)
{
int32_t x, y, x_root, y_root, same_screen;
uint32_t root, subwindow, time, state, button;
int error;
if ((error = do_recv_XAnyEvent(message, xevent)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &root)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &subwindow)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &time)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &x)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &y)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &x_root)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &y_root)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &state)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &button)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &same_screen)) < 0)
return error;
xevent->xbutton.root = root;
xevent->xbutton.subwindow = subwindow;
xevent->xbutton.time = time;
xevent->xbutton.x = x;
xevent->xbutton.y = y;
xevent->xbutton.x_root = x_root;
xevent->xbutton.y_root = y_root;
xevent->xbutton.state = state;
xevent->xbutton.button = button;
xevent->xbutton.same_screen = same_screen;
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 12,726
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct se_portal_group *srpt_make_tpg(struct se_wwn *wwn,
struct config_group *group,
const char *name)
{
struct srpt_port *sport = container_of(wwn, struct srpt_port, port_wwn);
int res;
/* Initialize sport->port_wwn and sport->port_tpg_1 */
res = core_tpg_register(&sport->port_wwn, &sport->port_tpg_1, SCSI_PROTOCOL_SRP);
if (res)
return ERR_PTR(res);
return &sport->port_tpg_1;
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 4,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hub_set_initial_usb2_lpm_policy(struct usb_device *udev)
{
struct usb_hub *hub = usb_hub_to_struct_hub(udev->parent);
int connect_type = USB_PORT_CONNECT_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
if (!udev->usb2_hw_lpm_capable || !udev->bos)
return;
if (hub)
connect_type = hub->ports[udev->portnum - 1]->connect_type;
if ((udev->bos->ext_cap->bmAttributes & cpu_to_le32(USB_BESL_SUPPORT)) ||
connect_type == USB_PORT_CONNECT_TYPE_HARD_WIRED) {
udev->usb2_hw_lpm_allowed = 1;
usb_set_usb2_hardware_lpm(udev, 1);
}
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 20,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::SetNetworkState(WebMediaPlayer::NetworkState state) {
DVLOG(1) << __func__ << "(" << state << ")";
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
network_state_ = state;
client_->NetworkStateChanged();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 7,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static jint Bitmap_config(JNIEnv* env, jobject, jlong bitmapHandle) {
SkBitmap* bitmap = reinterpret_cast<SkBitmap*>(bitmapHandle);
return GraphicsJNI::colorTypeToLegacyBitmapConfig(bitmap->colorType());
}
Commit Message: Make Bitmap_createFromParcel check the color count. DO NOT MERGE
When reading from the parcel, if the number of colors is invalid, early
exit.
Add two more checks: setInfo must return true, and Parcel::readInplace
must return non-NULL. The former ensures that the previously read values
(width, height, etc) were valid, and the latter checks that the Parcel
had enough data even if the number of colors was reasonable.
Also use an auto-deleter to handle deletion of the SkBitmap.
Cherry pick from change-Id: Icbd562d6d1f131a723724883fd31822d337cf5a6
BUG=19666945
Change-Id: Iab0d218c41ae0c39606e333e44cda078eef32291
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 5,734
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(PharFileInfo, hasMetadata)
{
PHAR_ENTRY_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_BOOL(Z_TYPE(entry_obj->entry->metadata) != IS_UNDEF);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: zend_object_value pdo_row_new(zend_class_entry *ce TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object_value retval;
retval.handle = zend_objects_store_put(NULL, (zend_objects_store_dtor_t)zend_objects_destroy_object, (zend_objects_free_object_storage_t)pdo_row_free_storage, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
retval.handlers = &pdo_row_object_handlers;
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 5,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: INST_HANDLER (swap) { // SWAP Rd
int d = ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4) | ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf);
ESIL_A ("4,r%d,>>,0x0f,&,", d); // (Rd >> 4) & 0xf
ESIL_A ("4,r%d,<<,0xf0,&,", d); // (Rd >> 4) & 0xf
ESIL_A ("|,", d); // S[0] | S[1]
ESIL_A ("r%d,=,", d); // Rd = result
}
Commit Message: Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 15,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sig_winch(int sig) {
unsigned short width,height;
struct mt_packet data;
int plen;
/* terminal height/width has changed, inform server */
if (get_terminal_size(&width, &height) != -1) {
init_packet(&data, MT_PTYPE_DATA, srcmac, dstmac, sessionkey, outcounter);
width = htole16(width);
height = htole16(height);
plen = add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_WIDTH, &width, 2);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_HEIGHT, &height, 2);
outcounter += plen;
send_udp(&data, 1);
}
/* reinstate signal handler */
signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,671
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ntp_exit(int retval)
{
msyslog(LOG_ERR, "EXITING with return code %d", retval);
exit(retval);
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,828
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AutofillDialogViews::ValidateGroup(const DetailsGroup& group,
ValidationType validation_type) {
DCHECK(group.container->visible());
FieldValueMap detail_outputs;
if (group.manual_input->visible()) {
for (TextfieldMap::const_iterator iter = group.textfields.begin();
iter != group.textfields.end(); ++iter) {
if (!iter->second->editable())
continue;
detail_outputs[iter->first] = iter->second->GetText();
}
for (ComboboxMap::const_iterator iter = group.comboboxes.begin();
iter != group.comboboxes.end(); ++iter) {
if (!iter->second->enabled())
continue;
views::Combobox* combobox = iter->second;
base::string16 item =
combobox->model()->GetItemAt(combobox->selected_index());
detail_outputs[iter->first] = item;
}
} else if (group.section == GetCreditCardSection()) {
ExpandingTextfield* cvc = group.suggested_info->textfield();
if (cvc->visible())
detail_outputs[CREDIT_CARD_VERIFICATION_CODE] = cvc->GetText();
}
ValidityMessages validity = delegate_->InputsAreValid(group.section,
detail_outputs);
MarkInputsInvalid(group.section, validity, validation_type == VALIDATE_FINAL);
return !validity.HasErrors();
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,626
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void setSerifFontFamilyWrapper(WebSettings* settings,
const string16& font,
UScriptCode script) {
settings->setSerifFontFamily(font, script);
}
Commit Message: Copy-paste preserves <embed> tags containing active content.
BUG=112325
Enable webkit preference for Chromium to disallow unsafe plugin pasting.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176856 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DEFINE_TRACE(ContainerNode)
{
visitor->trace(m_firstChild);
visitor->trace(m_lastChild);
Node::trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Fix an optimisation in ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal
R=tkent@chromium.org
BUG=544020
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1420653003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355240}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 8,952
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry *entry, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (perf_guest_cbs && perf_guest_cbs->is_in_guest()) {
/* TODO: We don't support guest os callchain now */
return;
}
perf_callchain_store(entry, regs->ip);
dump_trace(NULL, regs, NULL, 0, &backtrace_ops, entry);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,732
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void overloadedMethodBMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::overloadedMethodBMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: eXosip_get_version (void)
{
return EXOSIP_VERSION;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 17,031
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hashTableIterInit(HASH_TABLE_ITER *iter, const HASH_TABLE *table) {
iter->p = table->v;
iter->end = iter->p + table->size;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 17,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void assertCellInfo(BtCursor *pCur){
CellInfo info;
int iPage = pCur->iPage;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
btreeParseCell(pCur->apPage[iPage], pCur->aiIdx[iPage], &info);
assert( CORRUPT_DB || memcmp(&info, &pCur->info, sizeof(info))==0 );
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,797
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::LostCapture() {
if (auto* touch_emulator = GetExistingTouchEmulator())
touch_emulator->CancelTouch();
GetWidgetInputHandler()->MouseCaptureLost();
if (delegate_)
delegate_->LostCapture(this);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::writeUtf8AsUtf16(const std::unique_ptr<std::string>& str) {
if (!str) {
return writeInt32(-1);
}
return writeUtf8AsUtf16(*str);
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,794
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void decrypt_callback(void *priv, u8 *srcdst, unsigned int nbytes)
{
const unsigned int bsize = SERPENT_BLOCK_SIZE;
struct crypt_priv *ctx = priv;
int i;
ctx->fpu_enabled = serpent_fpu_begin(ctx->fpu_enabled, nbytes);
if (nbytes == bsize * SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS) {
serpent_dec_blk_xway(ctx->ctx, srcdst, srcdst);
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < nbytes / bsize; i++, srcdst += bsize)
__serpent_decrypt(ctx->ctx, srcdst, srcdst);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 11,626
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const std::vector<GURL>& finished_navigation_urls() const {
return finished_navigation_urls_;
}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,320
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_dev_ioctl_create_vm(unsigned long type)
{
int r;
struct kvm *kvm;
struct file *file;
kvm = kvm_create_vm(type);
if (IS_ERR(kvm))
return PTR_ERR(kvm);
#ifdef KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_PAGE_OFFSET
r = kvm_coalesced_mmio_init(kvm);
if (r < 0) {
kvm_put_kvm(kvm);
return r;
}
#endif
r = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC);
if (r < 0) {
kvm_put_kvm(kvm);
return r;
}
file = anon_inode_getfile("kvm-vm", &kvm_vm_fops, kvm, O_RDWR);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
put_unused_fd(r);
kvm_put_kvm(kvm);
return PTR_ERR(file);
}
if (kvm_create_vm_debugfs(kvm, r) < 0) {
put_unused_fd(r);
fput(file);
return -ENOMEM;
}
fd_install(r, file);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AutofillDownloadManager::StartRequest(
const std::string& form_xml,
const FormRequestData& request_data) {
net::URLRequestContextGetter* request_context =
Profile::GetDefaultRequestContext();
if (!request_context)
return false;
std::string request_url;
if (request_data.request_type == AutofillDownloadManager::REQUEST_QUERY)
request_url = AUTO_FILL_QUERY_SERVER_REQUEST_URL;
else
request_url = AUTO_FILL_UPLOAD_SERVER_REQUEST_URL;
URLFetcher *fetcher = URLFetcher::Create(fetcher_id_for_unittest_++,
GURL(request_url),
URLFetcher::POST,
this);
url_fetchers_[fetcher] = request_data;
fetcher->set_automatically_retry_on_5xx(false);
fetcher->set_request_context(request_context);
fetcher->set_upload_data("text/plain", form_xml);
fetcher->Start();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add support for the "uploadrequired" attribute for Autofill query responses
BUG=84693
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutofillDownloadTest.QueryAndUploadTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6969090
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87729 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,417
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::SendTouchEvent(
const WebKit::WebTouchEvent& event) {
if (host_)
host_->ForwardTouchEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: QList<Smb4KShare *> Smb4KGlobal::findShareByUNC( const QString &unc )
{
QList<Smb4KShare *> list;
mutex.lock();
if ( !unc.isEmpty() && !p->mountedSharesList.isEmpty() )
{
for ( int i = 0; i < p->mountedSharesList.size(); ++i )
{
if ( QString::compare( unc, p->mountedSharesList.at( i )->unc(), Qt::CaseInsensitive ) == 0 ||
QString::compare( QString( unc ).replace( ' ', '_' ), p->mountedSharesList.at( i )->unc(), Qt::CaseInsensitive ) == 0 )
{
list.append( p->mountedSharesList.at( i ) );
continue;
}
else
{
continue;
}
}
}
else
{
}
mutex.unlock();
return list;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,213
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageCopyRotated (gdImagePtr dst,
gdImagePtr src,
double dstX, double dstY,
int srcX, int srcY,
int srcWidth, int srcHeight, int angle)
{
double dx, dy;
double radius = sqrt (srcWidth * srcWidth + srcHeight * srcHeight);
double aCos = cos (angle * .0174532925);
double aSin = sin (angle * .0174532925);
double scX = srcX + ((double) srcWidth) / 2;
double scY = srcY + ((double) srcHeight) / 2;
int cmap[gdMaxColors];
int i;
/*
2.0.34: transparency preservation. The transparentness of
the transparent color is more important than its hue.
*/
if (src->transparent != -1) {
if (dst->transparent == -1) {
dst->transparent = src->transparent;
}
}
for (i = 0; (i < gdMaxColors); i++) {
cmap[i] = (-1);
}
for (dy = dstY - radius; (dy <= dstY + radius); dy++) {
for (dx = dstX - radius; (dx <= dstX + radius); dx++) {
double sxd = (dx - dstX) * aCos - (dy - dstY) * aSin;
double syd = (dy - dstY) * aCos + (dx - dstX) * aSin;
int sx = sxd + scX;
int sy = syd + scY;
if ((sx >= srcX) && (sx < srcX + srcWidth) &&
(sy >= srcY) && (sy < srcY + srcHeight)) {
int c = gdImageGetPixel (src, sx, sy);
/* 2.0.34: transparency wins */
if (c == src->transparent) {
gdImageSetPixel (dst, dx, dy, dst->transparent);
} else if (!src->trueColor) {
/* Use a table to avoid an expensive
lookup on every single pixel */
if (cmap[c] == -1) {
cmap[c] = gdImageColorResolveAlpha (dst,
gdImageRed (src, c),
gdImageGreen (src,
c),
gdImageBlue (src,
c),
gdImageAlpha (src,
c));
}
gdImageSetPixel (dst, dx, dy, cmap[c]);
} else {
gdImageSetPixel (dst,
dx, dy,
gdImageColorResolveAlpha (dst,
gdImageRed (src,
c),
gdImageGreen
(src, c),
gdImageBlue (src,
c),
gdImageAlpha
(src, c)));
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,794
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Response EmulationHandler::ClearGeolocationOverride() {
if (!GetWebContents())
return Response::InternalError();
auto* geolocation_context = GetWebContents()->GetGeolocationContext();
geolocation_context->ClearOverride();
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void msg_rmid(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct msg_queue *s)
{
ipc_rmid(&msg_ids(ns), &s->q_perm);
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 27,955
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParsePITarget(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if ((name != NULL) &&
((name[0] == 'x') || (name[0] == 'X')) &&
((name[1] == 'm') || (name[1] == 'M')) &&
((name[2] == 'l') || (name[2] == 'L'))) {
int i;
if ((name[0] == 'x') && (name[1] == 'm') &&
(name[2] == 'l') && (name[3] == 0)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_RESERVED_XML_NAME,
"XML declaration allowed only at the start of the document\n");
return(name);
} else if (name[3] == 0) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_RESERVED_XML_NAME, NULL);
return(name);
}
for (i = 0;;i++) {
if (xmlW3CPIs[i] == NULL) break;
if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)xmlW3CPIs[i]))
return(name);
}
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_RESERVED_XML_NAME,
"xmlParsePITarget: invalid name prefix 'xml'\n",
NULL, NULL);
}
if ((name != NULL) && (xmlStrchr(name, ':') != NULL)) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_COLON,
"colons are forbidden from PI names '%s'\n", name, NULL, NULL);
}
return(name);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 7,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pdf_barcode_128a_ch(struct pdf_doc *pdf, struct pdf_object *page,
int x, int y, int width, int height,
uint32_t colour, int index, int code_len)
{
uint32_t code = code_128a_encoding[index].code;
int i;
int line_width = width / 11;
for (i = 0; i < code_len; i++) {
uint8_t shift = (code_len - 1 - i) * 4;
uint8_t mask = (code >> shift) & 0xf;
if (!(i % 2)) {
int j;
for (j = 0; j < mask; j++) {
pdf_add_line(pdf, page, x, y, x, y + height, line_width, colour);
x += line_width;
}
} else
x += line_width * mask;
}
return x;
}
Commit Message: jpeg: Fix another possible buffer overrun
Found via the clang libfuzzer
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 10,558
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct segmented_address addr,
unsigned *max_size, unsigned size,
bool write, bool fetch,
enum x86emul_mode mode, ulong *linear)
{
struct desc_struct desc;
bool usable;
ulong la;
u32 lim;
u16 sel;
la = seg_base(ctxt, addr.seg) + addr.ea;
*max_size = 0;
switch (mode) {
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
*linear = la;
if (is_noncanonical_address(la))
goto bad;
*max_size = min_t(u64, ~0u, (1ull << 48) - la);
if (size > *max_size)
goto bad;
break;
default:
*linear = la = (u32)la;
usable = ctxt->ops->get_segment(ctxt, &sel, &desc, NULL,
addr.seg);
if (!usable)
goto bad;
/* code segment in protected mode or read-only data segment */
if ((((ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_REAL) && (desc.type & 8))
|| !(desc.type & 2)) && write)
goto bad;
/* unreadable code segment */
if (!fetch && (desc.type & 8) && !(desc.type & 2))
goto bad;
lim = desc_limit_scaled(&desc);
if (!(desc.type & 8) && (desc.type & 4)) {
/* expand-down segment */
if (addr.ea <= lim)
goto bad;
lim = desc.d ? 0xffffffff : 0xffff;
}
if (addr.ea > lim)
goto bad;
if (lim == 0xffffffff)
*max_size = ~0u;
else {
*max_size = (u64)lim + 1 - addr.ea;
if (size > *max_size)
goto bad;
}
break;
}
if (insn_aligned(ctxt, size) && ((la & (size - 1)) != 0))
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
bad:
if (addr.seg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
return emulate_ss(ctxt, 0);
else
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 18,089
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NDIS_STATUS ParaNdis6_SendPauseRestart(
PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext,
BOOLEAN bPause,
ONPAUSECOMPLETEPROC Callback
)
{
NDIS_STATUS status = NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
DEBUG_ENTRY(4);
if (bPause)
{
ParaNdis_DebugHistory(pContext, hopInternalSendPause, NULL, 1, 0, 0);
if (pContext->SendState == srsEnabled)
{
{
CNdisPassiveWriteAutoLock tLock(pContext->m_PauseLock);
pContext->SendState = srsPausing;
pContext->SendPauseCompletionProc = Callback;
}
for (UINT i = 0; i < pContext->nPathBundles; i++)
{
if (!pContext->pPathBundles[i].txPath.Pause())
{
status = NDIS_STATUS_PENDING;
}
}
if (status == NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS)
{
pContext->SendState = srsDisabled;
}
}
if (status == NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS)
{
ParaNdis_DebugHistory(pContext, hopInternalSendPause, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
}
}
else
{
pContext->SendState = srsEnabled;
ParaNdis_DebugHistory(pContext, hopInternalSendResume, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,223
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int on_http_body(http_parser* parser, const char* at, size_t length)
{
struct clt_info *info = parser->data;
info->request->body = sdsnewlen(at, length);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #131 from benjaminchodroff/master
fix memory corruption and other 32bit overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 11,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::EnableTreeOnlyAccessibilityMode() {
if (GetAccessibilityMode() != AccessibilityModeOff) {
for (RenderFrameHost* rfh : GetAllFrames())
ResetAccessibility(rfh);
} else {
AddAccessibilityMode(AccessibilityModeTreeOnly);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,511
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct inode *new_simple_dir(struct super_block *s,
struct btrfs_key *key,
struct btrfs_root *root)
{
struct inode *inode = new_inode(s);
if (!inode)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
BTRFS_I(inode)->root = root;
memcpy(&BTRFS_I(inode)->location, key, sizeof(*key));
set_bit(BTRFS_INODE_DUMMY, &BTRFS_I(inode)->runtime_flags);
inode->i_ino = BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID;
inode->i_op = &btrfs_dir_ro_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR | S_IXUGO;
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
return inode;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 23,936
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tg3_phy_gather_ump_data(struct tg3 *tp, u32 *data)
{
u32 reg, val;
val = 0;
if (!tg3_readphy(tp, MII_BMCR, ®))
val = reg << 16;
if (!tg3_readphy(tp, MII_BMSR, ®))
val |= (reg & 0xffff);
*data++ = val;
val = 0;
if (!tg3_readphy(tp, MII_ADVERTISE, ®))
val = reg << 16;
if (!tg3_readphy(tp, MII_LPA, ®))
val |= (reg & 0xffff);
*data++ = val;
val = 0;
if (!(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_MII_SERDES)) {
if (!tg3_readphy(tp, MII_CTRL1000, ®))
val = reg << 16;
if (!tg3_readphy(tp, MII_STAT1000, ®))
val |= (reg & 0xffff);
}
*data++ = val;
if (!tg3_readphy(tp, MII_PHYADDR, ®))
val = reg << 16;
else
val = 0;
*data++ = val;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,940
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SetCompositionText(
const ui::CompositionText& composition) {
if (!host_)
return;
COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(ui::CompositionUnderline) ==
sizeof(WebKit::WebCompositionUnderline),
ui_CompositionUnderline__WebKit_WebCompositionUnderline_diff);
const std::vector<WebKit::WebCompositionUnderline>& underlines =
reinterpret_cast<const std::vector<WebKit::WebCompositionUnderline>&>(
composition.underlines);
host_->ImeSetComposition(composition.text, underlines,
composition.selection.end(),
composition.selection.end());
has_composition_text_ = !composition.text.empty();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jp2_boxinfo_t *jp2_boxinfolookup(int type)
{
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
for (boxinfo = jp2_boxinfos; boxinfo->name; ++boxinfo) {
if (boxinfo->type == type) {
return boxinfo;
}
}
return &jp2_boxinfo_unk;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 28,993
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Ins_RUTG( INS_ARG )
{ (void)args;
CUR.GS.round_state = TT_Round_Up_To_Grid;
CUR.func_round = (TRound_Function)Round_Up_To_Grid;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 20,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CWebServer::Cmd_GetUserVariables(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
std::vector<std::vector<std::string> > result;
result = m_sql.safe_query("SELECT ID, Name, ValueType, Value, LastUpdate FROM UserVariables");
int ii = 0;
for (const auto & itt : result)
{
std::vector<std::string> sd = itt;
root["result"][ii]["idx"] = sd[0];
root["result"][ii]["Name"] = sd[1];
root["result"][ii]["Type"] = sd[2];
root["result"][ii]["Value"] = sd[3];
root["result"][ii]["LastUpdate"] = sd[4];
ii++;
}
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "GetUserVariables";
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89
| 0
| 17,201
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutofillDialogViews::InitInputsView(DialogSection section) {
DetailsGroup* group = GroupForSection(section);
EraseInvalidViewsInGroup(group);
TextfieldMap* textfields = &group->textfields;
textfields->clear();
ComboboxMap* comboboxes = &group->comboboxes;
comboboxes->clear();
views::View* view = group->manual_input;
view->RemoveAllChildViews(true);
views::GridLayout* layout = new views::GridLayout(view);
view->SetLayoutManager(layout);
int column_set_id = 0;
const DetailInputs& inputs = delegate_->RequestedFieldsForSection(section);
for (DetailInputs::const_iterator it = inputs.begin();
it != inputs.end(); ++it) {
const DetailInput& input = *it;
ui::ComboboxModel* input_model =
delegate_->ComboboxModelForAutofillType(input.type);
scoped_ptr<views::View> view_to_add;
if (input_model) {
views::Combobox* combobox = new views::Combobox(input_model);
combobox->set_listener(this);
comboboxes->insert(std::make_pair(input.type, combobox));
SelectComboboxValueOrSetToDefault(combobox, input.initial_value);
view_to_add.reset(combobox);
} else {
ExpandingTextfield* field = new ExpandingTextfield(input.initial_value,
input.placeholder_text,
input.IsMultiline(),
this);
textfields->insert(std::make_pair(input.type, field));
view_to_add.reset(field);
}
if (input.length == DetailInput::NONE) {
other_owned_views_.push_back(view_to_add.release());
continue;
}
if (input.length == DetailInput::LONG)
++column_set_id;
views::ColumnSet* column_set = layout->GetColumnSet(column_set_id);
if (!column_set) {
column_set = layout->AddColumnSet(column_set_id);
if (it != inputs.begin())
layout->AddPaddingRow(0, kManualInputRowPadding);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
} else {
column_set->AddPaddingColumn(0, views::kRelatedControlHorizontalSpacing);
layout->SkipColumns(1);
}
float expand = input.expand_weight;
column_set->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::FILL,
views::GridLayout::FILL,
expand ? expand : 1.0,
views::GridLayout::USE_PREF,
0,
0);
layout->AddView(view_to_add.release(), 1, 1,
views::GridLayout::FILL, views::GridLayout::FILL,
1, 0);
if (input.length == DetailInput::LONG ||
input.length == DetailInput::SHORT_EOL) {
++column_set_id;
}
}
SetIconsForSection(section);
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,325
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool is_cow_mapping(vm_flags_t flags)
{
return (flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYWRITE)) == VM_MAYWRITE;
}
Commit Message: vm: add vm_iomap_memory() helper function
Various drivers end up replicating the code to mmap() their memory
buffers into user space, and our core memory remapping function may be
very flexible but it is unnecessarily complicated for the common cases
to use.
Our internal VM uses pfn's ("page frame numbers") which simplifies
things for the VM, and allows us to pass physical addresses around in a
denser and more efficient format than passing a "phys_addr_t" around,
and having to shift it up and down by the page size. But it just means
that drivers end up doing that shifting instead at the interface level.
It also means that drivers end up mucking around with internal VM things
like the vma details (vm_pgoff, vm_start/end) way more than they really
need to.
So this just exports a function to map a certain physical memory range
into user space (using a phys_addr_t based interface that is much more
natural for a driver) and hides all the complexity from the driver.
Some drivers will still end up tweaking the vm_page_prot details for
things like prefetching or cacheability etc, but that's actually
relevant to the driver, rather than caring about what the page offset of
the mapping is into the particular IO memory region.
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 33
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SMB2_lock(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
const __u64 persist_fid, const __u64 volatile_fid, const __u32 pid,
const __u64 length, const __u64 offset, const __u32 lock_flags,
const bool wait)
{
struct smb2_lock_element lock;
lock.Offset = cpu_to_le64(offset);
lock.Length = cpu_to_le64(length);
lock.Flags = cpu_to_le32(lock_flags);
if (!wait && lock_flags != SMB2_LOCKFLAG_UNLOCK)
lock.Flags |= cpu_to_le32(SMB2_LOCKFLAG_FAIL_IMMEDIATELY);
return smb2_lockv(xid, tcon, persist_fid, volatile_fid, pid, 1, &lock);
}
Commit Message: [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,702
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderBox::autoWidthShouldFitContent() const
{
return node() && (isHTMLInputElement(*node()) || isHTMLSelectElement(*node()) || isHTMLButtonElement(*node())
|| isHTMLTextAreaElement(*node()) || (isHTMLLegendElement(*node()) && !style()->hasOutOfFlowPosition()));
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,227
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: readextension(void)
{
int count;
char buf[255];
(void) getc(infile);
while ((count = getc(infile)))
fread(buf, 1, count, infile);
}
Commit Message: fix possible OOB write in gif2tiff.c
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,911
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebViewExperimental::schemeDelegates_Clear(QQmlListProperty<QQuickUrlSchemeDelegate>* property)
{
const QObjectList children = property->object->children();
for (int index = 0; index < children.count(); index++) {
QObject* child = children.at(index);
child->setParent(0);
delete child;
}
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,840
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::SetVertexAttribValue(
const char* function_name, GLuint index, const T* value) {
if (index >= state_.attrib_values.size()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "index out of range");
return false;
}
state_.attrib_values[index].SetValues(value);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 23,043
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EXPORTED void mboxlist_close(void)
{
int r;
if (mboxlist_dbopen) {
r = cyrusdb_close(mbdb);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "DBERROR: error closing mailboxes: %s",
cyrusdb_strerror(r));
}
mboxlist_dbopen = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,167
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr TIFFReadDirEntryLong8Array(TIFF* tif, TIFFDirEntry* direntry, uint64** value)
{
enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr err;
uint32 count;
void* origdata;
uint64* data;
switch (direntry->tdir_type)
{
case TIFF_BYTE:
case TIFF_SBYTE:
case TIFF_SHORT:
case TIFF_SSHORT:
case TIFF_LONG:
case TIFF_SLONG:
case TIFF_LONG8:
case TIFF_SLONG8:
break;
default:
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrType);
}
err=TIFFReadDirEntryArray(tif,direntry,&count,8,&origdata);
if ((err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)||(origdata==0))
{
*value=0;
return(err);
}
switch (direntry->tdir_type)
{
case TIFF_LONG8:
*value=(uint64*)origdata;
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabArrayOfLong8(*value,count);
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
case TIFF_SLONG8:
{
int64* m;
uint32 n;
m=(int64*)origdata;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
{
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabLong8((uint64*)m);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeLong8Slong8(*m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
{
_TIFFfree(origdata);
return(err);
}
m++;
}
*value=(uint64*)origdata;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
}
data=(uint64*)_TIFFmalloc(count*8);
if (data==0)
{
_TIFFfree(origdata);
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrAlloc);
}
switch (direntry->tdir_type)
{
case TIFF_BYTE:
{
uint8* ma;
uint64* mb;
uint32 n;
ma=(uint8*)origdata;
mb=data;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
*mb++=(uint64)(*ma++);
}
break;
case TIFF_SBYTE:
{
int8* ma;
uint64* mb;
uint32 n;
ma=(int8*)origdata;
mb=data;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
{
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeLong8Sbyte(*ma);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
break;
*mb++=(uint64)(*ma++);
}
}
break;
case TIFF_SHORT:
{
uint16* ma;
uint64* mb;
uint32 n;
ma=(uint16*)origdata;
mb=data;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
{
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabShort(ma);
*mb++=(uint64)(*ma++);
}
}
break;
case TIFF_SSHORT:
{
int16* ma;
uint64* mb;
uint32 n;
ma=(int16*)origdata;
mb=data;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
{
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabShort((uint16*)ma);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeLong8Sshort(*ma);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
break;
*mb++=(uint64)(*ma++);
}
}
break;
case TIFF_LONG:
{
uint32* ma;
uint64* mb;
uint32 n;
ma=(uint32*)origdata;
mb=data;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
{
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabLong(ma);
*mb++=(uint64)(*ma++);
}
}
break;
case TIFF_SLONG:
{
int32* ma;
uint64* mb;
uint32 n;
ma=(int32*)origdata;
mb=data;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
{
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabLong((uint32*)ma);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeLong8Slong(*ma);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
break;
*mb++=(uint64)(*ma++);
}
}
break;
}
_TIFFfree(origdata);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
{
_TIFFfree(data);
return(err);
}
*value=data;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 27,286
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Part::saveFile()
{
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 6,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LoadingPredictor* loading_predictor() { return loading_predictor_; }
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 12,538
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mwifiex_update_vs_ie(const u8 *ies, int ies_len,
struct mwifiex_ie **ie_ptr, u16 mask,
unsigned int oui, u8 oui_type)
{
struct ieee_types_header *vs_ie;
struct mwifiex_ie *ie = *ie_ptr;
const u8 *vendor_ie;
vendor_ie = cfg80211_find_vendor_ie(oui, oui_type, ies, ies_len);
if (vendor_ie) {
if (!*ie_ptr) {
*ie_ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!*ie_ptr)
return -ENOMEM;
ie = *ie_ptr;
}
vs_ie = (struct ieee_types_header *)vendor_ie;
memcpy(ie->ie_buffer + le16_to_cpu(ie->ie_length),
vs_ie, vs_ie->len + 2);
le16_unaligned_add_cpu(&ie->ie_length, vs_ie->len + 2);
ie->mgmt_subtype_mask = cpu_to_le16(mask);
ie->ie_index = cpu_to_le16(MWIFIEX_AUTO_IDX_MASK);
}
*ie_ptr = ie;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mwifiex: Fix three heap overflow at parsing element in cfg80211_ap_settings
mwifiex_update_vs_ie(),mwifiex_set_uap_rates() and
mwifiex_set_wmm_params() call memcpy() without checking
the destination size.Since the source is given from
user-space, this may trigger a heap buffer overflow.
Fix them by putting the length check before performing memcpy().
This fix addresses CVE-2019-14814,CVE-2019-14815,CVE-2019-14816.
Signed-off-by: Wen Huang <huangwenabc@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <gbhat@marvell.comg>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-120
| 1
| 16,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
{
int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/*
* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
* suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
* must contain uncompressed.
*/
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
&& (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
&& (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
&& (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
&& ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
|| (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
/* we are using an ECC cipher */
size_t i;
unsigned char *list;
int found_uncompressed = 0;
list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
found_uncompressed = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found_uncompressed) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
return -1;
}
}
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
ret =
s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
&& s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
ret =
s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
s->
initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
/*
* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
* using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
* value from the server too.
*/
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
}
/*
* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
* check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
*/
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
}
}
# endif
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
/*
* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
* callback
*/
if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
&& !(s->hit) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
int r;
/*
* Call callback with resp == NULL and resplen == -1 so callback
* knows there is no response
*/
r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
if (r == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
}
if (r < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
}
}
switch (ret) {
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return -1;
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
return 1;
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
s->servername_done = 0;
default:
return 1;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 11,238
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::AudioOutput::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) const
{
const size_t SIZE = 256;
char buffer[SIZE];
String8 result;
result.append(" AudioOutput\n");
snprintf(buffer, 255, " stream type(%d), left - right volume(%f, %f)\n",
mStreamType, mLeftVolume, mRightVolume);
result.append(buffer);
snprintf(buffer, 255, " msec per frame(%f), latency (%d)\n",
mMsecsPerFrame, (mTrack != 0) ? mTrack->latency() : -1);
result.append(buffer);
snprintf(buffer, 255, " aux effect id(%d), send level (%f)\n",
mAuxEffectId, mSendLevel);
result.append(buffer);
::write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
if (mTrack != 0) {
mTrack->dump(fd, args);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,954
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification, val;
int cr;
int reg;
int err;
int ret;
exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
cr = exit_qualification & 15;
reg = (exit_qualification >> 8) & 15;
switch ((exit_qualification >> 4) & 3) {
case 0: /* mov to cr */
val = kvm_register_readl(vcpu, reg);
trace_kvm_cr_write(cr, val);
switch (cr) {
case 0:
err = handle_set_cr0(vcpu, val);
return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
case 3:
err = kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, val);
return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
case 4:
err = handle_set_cr4(vcpu, val);
return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
case 8: {
u8 cr8_prev = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
u8 cr8 = (u8)val;
err = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, cr8);
ret = kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
return ret;
if (cr8_prev <= cr8)
return ret;
/*
* TODO: we might be squashing a
* KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP-triggered
* KVM_EXIT_DEBUG here.
*/
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SET_TPR;
return 0;
}
}
break;
case 2: /* clts */
handle_clts(vcpu);
trace_kvm_cr_write(0, kvm_read_cr0(vcpu));
vmx_fpu_activate(vcpu);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
case 1: /*mov from cr*/
switch (cr) {
case 3:
val = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
case 8:
val = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
break;
case 3: /* lmsw */
val = (exit_qualification >> LMSW_SOURCE_DATA_SHIFT) & 0x0f;
trace_kvm_cr_write(0, (kvm_read_cr0(vcpu) & ~0xful) | val);
kvm_lmsw(vcpu, val);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
default:
break;
}
vcpu->run->exit_reason = 0;
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unhandled control register: op %d cr %d\n",
(int)(exit_qualification >> 4) & 3, cr);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 23,314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SubtreeContentTransformScope::~SubtreeContentTransformScope()
{
m_savedContentTransformation.copyTransformTo(s_currentContentTransformation);
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,678
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const BIGNUM *g,
const BIGNUM *N)
{
vinfo->N = N;
vinfo->g = g;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,785
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual status_t getGraphicBufferUsage(
node_id node, OMX_U32 port_index, OMX_U32* usage) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IOMX::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32((int32_t)node);
data.writeInt32(port_index);
remote()->transact(GET_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_USAGE, data, &reply);
status_t err = reply.readInt32();
*usage = reply.readInt32();
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix size check for OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits
since it doesn't follow the OMX convention. And remove support
for the kClientNeedsFrameBuffer flag.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: Ia2c119e2456ebf9e2f4e1de5104ef9032a212255
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void tcp_rcv_rtt_measure(struct tcp_sock *tp)
{
if (tp->rcv_rtt_est.time == 0)
goto new_measure;
if (before(tp->rcv_nxt, tp->rcv_rtt_est.seq))
return;
tcp_rcv_rtt_update(tp, jiffies - tp->rcv_rtt_est.time, 1);
new_measure:
tp->rcv_rtt_est.seq = tp->rcv_nxt + tp->rcv_wnd;
tp->rcv_rtt_est.time = tcp_time_stamp;
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CheckDeviceWallpaperMatchHash(const base::FilePath& device_wallpaper_file,
const std::string& hash) {
std::string image_data;
if (base::ReadFileToString(device_wallpaper_file, &image_data)) {
std::string sha_hash = crypto::SHA256HashString(image_data);
if (base::ToLowerASCII(base::HexEncode(
sha_hash.c_str(), sha_hash.size())) == base::ToLowerASCII(hash)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 21
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ftrace_hash_rec_enable(struct ftrace_ops *ops,
int filter_hash)
{
__ftrace_hash_rec_update(ops, filter_hash, 1);
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static UINT drdynvc_virtual_channel_event_disconnected(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc)
{
UINT status;
if (drdynvc->OpenHandle == 0)
return CHANNEL_RC_OK;
if (!drdynvc)
return CHANNEL_RC_BAD_CHANNEL_HANDLE;
if (!MessageQueue_PostQuit(drdynvc->queue, 0))
{
status = GetLastError();
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "MessageQueue_PostQuit failed with error %"PRIu32"", status);
return status;
}
if (WaitForSingleObject(drdynvc->thread, INFINITE) != WAIT_OBJECT_0)
{
status = GetLastError();
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "WaitForSingleObject failed with error %"PRIu32"", status);
return status;
}
MessageQueue_Free(drdynvc->queue);
CloseHandle(drdynvc->thread);
drdynvc->queue = NULL;
drdynvc->thread = NULL;
status = drdynvc->channelEntryPoints.pVirtualChannelCloseEx(drdynvc->InitHandle,
drdynvc->OpenHandle);
if (status != CHANNEL_RC_OK)
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "pVirtualChannelClose failed with %s [%08"PRIX32"]",
WTSErrorToString(status), status);
}
drdynvc->OpenHandle = 0;
if (drdynvc->data_in)
{
Stream_Free(drdynvc->data_in, TRUE);
drdynvc->data_in = NULL;
}
if (drdynvc->channel_mgr)
{
dvcman_free(drdynvc, drdynvc->channel_mgr);
drdynvc->channel_mgr = NULL;
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,885
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int task_switch_32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 tss_selector, u16 old_tss_sel,
ulong old_tss_base, struct desc_struct *new_desc)
{
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
struct tss_segment_32 tss_seg;
int ret;
u32 new_tss_base = get_desc_base(new_desc);
u32 eip_offset = offsetof(struct tss_segment_32, eip);
u32 ldt_sel_offset = offsetof(struct tss_segment_32, ldt_selector);
ret = ops->read_std(ctxt, old_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof tss_seg,
&ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
/* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */
return ret;
save_state_to_tss32(ctxt, &tss_seg);
/* Only GP registers and segment selectors are saved */
ret = ops->write_std(ctxt, old_tss_base + eip_offset, &tss_seg.eip,
ldt_sel_offset - eip_offset, &ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
/* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */
return ret;
ret = ops->read_std(ctxt, new_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof tss_seg,
&ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
/* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */
return ret;
if (old_tss_sel != 0xffff) {
tss_seg.prev_task_link = old_tss_sel;
ret = ops->write_std(ctxt, new_tss_base,
&tss_seg.prev_task_link,
sizeof tss_seg.prev_task_link,
&ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
/* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */
return ret;
}
return load_state_from_tss32(ctxt, &tss_seg);
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,085
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: map_engine_set_subject(person_t* person)
{
s_camera_person = person;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 6,606
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void set_profile_to_activate(Profile* profile) {
profile_to_activate_ = profile;
MaybeActivateProfile();
}
Commit Message: Prevent regular mode session startup pref type turning to default.
When user loses past session tabs of regular mode after
invoking a new window from the incognito mode.
This was happening because the SessionStartUpPref type was being set
to default, from last, for regular user mode. This was happening in
the RestoreIfNecessary method where the restoration was taking place
for users whose SessionStartUpPref type was set to last.
The fix was to make the protocol of changing the pref type to
default more explicit to incognito users and not regular users
of pref type last.
Bug: 481373
Change-Id: I96efb4cf196949312181c83c6dcd45986ddded13
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1774441
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rohit Agarwal <roagarwal@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691726}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 12,623
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BuildTestPacket(uint16_t id, uint16_t off, int mf, const char content,
int content_len)
{
Packet *p = NULL;
int hlen = 20;
int ttl = 64;
uint8_t *pcontent;
IPV4Hdr ip4h;
p = SCCalloc(1, sizeof(*p) + default_packet_size);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return NULL;
PACKET_INITIALIZE(p);
gettimeofday(&p->ts, NULL);
ip4h.ip_verhl = 4 << 4;
ip4h.ip_verhl |= hlen >> 2;
ip4h.ip_len = htons(hlen + content_len);
ip4h.ip_id = htons(id);
ip4h.ip_off = htons(off);
if (mf)
ip4h.ip_off = htons(IP_MF | off);
else
ip4h.ip_off = htons(off);
ip4h.ip_ttl = ttl;
ip4h.ip_proto = IPPROTO_ICMP;
ip4h.s_ip_src.s_addr = 0x01010101; /* 1.1.1.1 */
ip4h.s_ip_dst.s_addr = 0x02020202; /* 2.2.2.2 */
/* copy content_len crap, we need full length */
PacketCopyData(p, (uint8_t *)&ip4h, sizeof(ip4h));
p->ip4h = (IPV4Hdr *)GET_PKT_DATA(p);
SET_IPV4_SRC_ADDR(p, &p->src);
SET_IPV4_DST_ADDR(p, &p->dst);
pcontent = SCCalloc(1, content_len);
if (unlikely(pcontent == NULL))
return NULL;
memset(pcontent, content, content_len);
PacketCopyDataOffset(p, hlen, pcontent, content_len);
SET_PKT_LEN(p, hlen + content_len);
SCFree(pcontent);
p->ip4h->ip_csum = IPV4CalculateChecksum((uint16_t *)GET_PKT_DATA(p), hlen);
/* Self test. */
if (IPV4_GET_VER(p) != 4)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_HLEN(p) != hlen)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPLEN(p) != hlen + content_len)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPID(p) != id)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPOFFSET(p) != off)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_MF(p) != mf)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPTTL(p) != ttl)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPPROTO(p) != IPPROTO_ICMP)
goto error;
return p;
error:
if (p != NULL)
SCFree(p);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358
| 1
| 18,330
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_peer_addrs(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc;
int cnt = 0;
struct sctp_getaddrs getaddrs;
struct sctp_transport *from;
void __user *to;
union sctp_addr temp;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
int addrlen;
size_t space_left;
int bytes_copied;
if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_getaddrs))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&getaddrs, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_getaddrs)))
return -EFAULT;
/* For UDP-style sockets, id specifies the association to query. */
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, getaddrs.assoc_id);
if (!asoc)
return -EINVAL;
to = optval + offsetof(struct sctp_getaddrs,addrs);
space_left = len - offsetof(struct sctp_getaddrs,addrs);
list_for_each_entry(from, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
transports) {
memcpy(&temp, &from->ipaddr, sizeof(temp));
sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)->addr_v4map(sp, &temp);
addrlen = sctp_get_af_specific(temp.sa.sa_family)->sockaddr_len;
if (space_left < addrlen)
return -ENOMEM;
if (copy_to_user(to, &temp, addrlen))
return -EFAULT;
to += addrlen;
cnt++;
space_left -= addrlen;
}
if (put_user(cnt, &((struct sctp_getaddrs __user *)optval)->addr_num))
return -EFAULT;
bytes_copied = ((char __user *)to) - optval;
if (put_user(bytes_copied, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 4,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AudioRendererAlgorithm::IncreaseQueueCapacity() {
audio_buffer_.set_forward_capacity(
std::min(2 * audio_buffer_.forward_capacity(), kMaxBufferSizeInBytes));
}
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: double BaseRenderingContext2D::shadowOffsetY() const {
return GetState().ShadowOffset().Height();
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 17,849
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_mod_module_function(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value mod)
{
mrb_value *argv;
mrb_int argc, i;
mrb_sym mid;
mrb_method_t m;
struct RClass *rclass;
int ai;
mrb_check_type(mrb, mod, MRB_TT_MODULE);
mrb_get_args(mrb, "*", &argv, &argc);
if (argc == 0) {
/* set MODFUNC SCOPE if implemented */
return mod;
}
/* set PRIVATE method visibility if implemented */
/* mrb_mod_dummy_visibility(mrb, mod); */
for (i=0; i<argc; i++) {
mrb_check_type(mrb, argv[i], MRB_TT_SYMBOL);
mid = mrb_symbol(argv[i]);
rclass = mrb_class_ptr(mod);
m = mrb_method_search(mrb, rclass, mid);
prepare_singleton_class(mrb, (struct RBasic*)rclass);
ai = mrb_gc_arena_save(mrb);
mrb_define_method_raw(mrb, rclass->c, mid, m);
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
}
return mod;
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 18,649
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabCloseableStateWatcher::TabStripWatcher::TabClosingAt(
TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
TabContentsWrapper* tab_contents,
int index) {
if (tab_strip_model->count() == 1)
main_watcher_->OnTabStripChanged(browser_, true);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,644
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool InputType::ShouldSaveAndRestoreFormControlState() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FoFiType1C::~FoFiType1C() {
int i;
if (name) {
delete name;
}
if (encoding &&
encoding != fofiType1StandardEncoding &&
encoding != fofiType1ExpertEncoding) {
for (i = 0; i < 256; ++i) {
gfree(encoding[i]);
}
gfree(encoding);
}
if (privateDicts) {
gfree(privateDicts);
}
if (fdSelect) {
gfree(fdSelect);
}
if (charset &&
charset != fofiType1CISOAdobeCharset &&
charset != fofiType1CExpertCharset &&
charset != fofiType1CExpertSubsetCharset) {
gfree(charset);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 616
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PeopleHandler::OnPinLoginAvailable(bool is_available) {
FireWebUIListener("pin-login-available-changed", base::Value(is_available));
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,799
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vm_lock_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, struct address_space *mapping)
{
if (!test_bit(AS_MM_ALL_LOCKS, &mapping->flags)) {
/*
* AS_MM_ALL_LOCKS can't change from under us because
* we hold the mm_all_locks_mutex.
*
* Operations on ->flags have to be atomic because
* even if AS_MM_ALL_LOCKS is stable thanks to the
* mm_all_locks_mutex, there may be other cpus
* changing other bitflags in parallel to us.
*/
if (test_and_set_bit(AS_MM_ALL_LOCKS, &mapping->flags))
BUG();
down_write_nest_lock(&mapping->i_mmap_rwsem, &mm->mmap_sem);
}
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 20,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: handle_from_string(const u_char *handle, u_int hlen)
{
int val;
if (hlen != sizeof(int32_t))
return -1;
val = get_u32(handle);
if (handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_FILE) ||
handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_DIR))
return val;
return -1;
}
Commit Message: disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; reported by
Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 25,436
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LookupModMask(struct xkb_context *ctx, const void *priv, xkb_atom_t field,
enum expr_value_type type, xkb_mod_mask_t *val_rtrn)
{
const char *str;
xkb_mod_index_t ndx;
const LookupModMaskPriv *arg = priv;
const struct xkb_mod_set *mods = arg->mods;
enum mod_type mod_type = arg->mod_type;
if (type != EXPR_TYPE_INT)
return false;
str = xkb_atom_text(ctx, field);
if (!str)
return false;
if (istreq(str, "all")) {
*val_rtrn = MOD_REAL_MASK_ALL;
return true;
}
if (istreq(str, "none")) {
*val_rtrn = 0;
return true;
}
ndx = XkbModNameToIndex(mods, field, mod_type);
if (ndx == XKB_MOD_INVALID)
return false;
*val_rtrn = (1u << ndx);
return true;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: Don't falsely promise from ExprResolveLhs
Every user of ExprReturnLhs goes on to unconditionally dereference the
field return, which can be NULL if xkb_intern_atom fails. Return false
if this is the case, so we fail safely.
testcase: splice geometry data into interp
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 758
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct trusted_key_payload *p;
struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
struct trusted_key_options *new_o;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
char *datablob;
int ret = 0;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
return -ENOKEY;
p = key->payload.data[0];
if (!p->migratable)
return -EPERM;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
return -EINVAL;
datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!datablob)
return -ENOMEM;
new_o = trusted_options_alloc();
if (!new_o) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
if (!new_p) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
datablob[datalen] = '\0';
ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
if (ret != Opt_update) {
ret = -EINVAL;
kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
if (!new_o->keyhandle) {
ret = -EINVAL;
kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
/* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */
new_p->migratable = p->migratable;
new_p->key_len = p->key_len;
memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len);
dump_payload(p);
dump_payload(new_p);
ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
if (new_o->pcrlock) {
ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
}
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);
call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
out:
kzfree(datablob);
kzfree(new_o);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 16,616
|
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