instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pause_tube_peek()
{
int i;
tube t, nt = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < tubes.used; i++) {
t = tubes.items[i];
if (t->pause) {
if (!nt || t->deadline_at < nt->deadline_at) nt = t;
}
}
return nt;
}
Commit Message: Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int rds_ib_xmit_rdma(struct rds_connection *conn, struct rm_rdma_op *op)
{
struct rds_ib_connection *ic = conn->c_transport_data;
struct rds_ib_send_work *send = NULL;
struct rds_ib_send_work *first;
struct rds_ib_send_work *prev;
struct ib_send_wr *failed_wr;
struct scatterlist *scat;
unsigned long len;
u64 remote_addr = op->op_remote_addr;
u32 max_sge = ic->rds_ibdev->max_sge;
u32 pos;
u32 work_alloc;
u32 i;
u32 j;
int sent;
int ret;
int num_sge;
int nr_sig = 0;
/* map the op the first time we see it */
if (!op->op_mapped) {
op->op_count = ib_dma_map_sg(ic->i_cm_id->device,
op->op_sg, op->op_nents, (op->op_write) ?
DMA_TO_DEVICE : DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
rdsdebug("ic %p mapping op %p: %d\n", ic, op, op->op_count);
if (op->op_count == 0) {
rds_ib_stats_inc(s_ib_tx_sg_mapping_failure);
ret = -ENOMEM; /* XXX ? */
goto out;
}
op->op_mapped = 1;
}
/*
* Instead of knowing how to return a partial rdma read/write we insist that there
* be enough work requests to send the entire message.
*/
i = ceil(op->op_count, max_sge);
work_alloc = rds_ib_ring_alloc(&ic->i_send_ring, i, &pos);
if (work_alloc != i) {
rds_ib_ring_unalloc(&ic->i_send_ring, work_alloc);
rds_ib_stats_inc(s_ib_tx_ring_full);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
send = &ic->i_sends[pos];
first = send;
prev = NULL;
scat = &op->op_sg[0];
sent = 0;
num_sge = op->op_count;
for (i = 0; i < work_alloc && scat != &op->op_sg[op->op_count]; i++) {
send->s_wr.send_flags = 0;
send->s_queued = jiffies;
send->s_op = NULL;
nr_sig += rds_ib_set_wr_signal_state(ic, send, op->op_notify);
send->s_wr.opcode = op->op_write ? IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE : IB_WR_RDMA_READ;
send->s_wr.wr.rdma.remote_addr = remote_addr;
send->s_wr.wr.rdma.rkey = op->op_rkey;
if (num_sge > max_sge) {
send->s_wr.num_sge = max_sge;
num_sge -= max_sge;
} else {
send->s_wr.num_sge = num_sge;
}
send->s_wr.next = NULL;
if (prev)
prev->s_wr.next = &send->s_wr;
for (j = 0; j < send->s_wr.num_sge && scat != &op->op_sg[op->op_count]; j++) {
len = ib_sg_dma_len(ic->i_cm_id->device, scat);
send->s_sge[j].addr =
ib_sg_dma_address(ic->i_cm_id->device, scat);
send->s_sge[j].length = len;
send->s_sge[j].lkey = ic->i_mr->lkey;
sent += len;
rdsdebug("ic %p sent %d remote_addr %llu\n", ic, sent, remote_addr);
remote_addr += len;
scat++;
}
rdsdebug("send %p wr %p num_sge %u next %p\n", send,
&send->s_wr, send->s_wr.num_sge, send->s_wr.next);
prev = send;
if (++send == &ic->i_sends[ic->i_send_ring.w_nr])
send = ic->i_sends;
}
/* give a reference to the last op */
if (scat == &op->op_sg[op->op_count]) {
prev->s_op = op;
rds_message_addref(container_of(op, struct rds_message, rdma));
}
if (i < work_alloc) {
rds_ib_ring_unalloc(&ic->i_send_ring, work_alloc - i);
work_alloc = i;
}
if (nr_sig)
atomic_add(nr_sig, &ic->i_signaled_sends);
failed_wr = &first->s_wr;
ret = ib_post_send(ic->i_cm_id->qp, &first->s_wr, &failed_wr);
rdsdebug("ic %p first %p (wr %p) ret %d wr %p\n", ic,
first, &first->s_wr, ret, failed_wr);
BUG_ON(failed_wr != &first->s_wr);
if (ret) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "RDS/IB: rdma ib_post_send to %pI4 "
"returned %d\n", &conn->c_faddr, ret);
rds_ib_ring_unalloc(&ic->i_send_ring, work_alloc);
rds_ib_sub_signaled(ic, nr_sig);
goto out;
}
if (unlikely(failed_wr != &first->s_wr)) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "RDS/IB: ib_post_send() rc=%d, but failed_wqe updated!\n", ret);
BUG_ON(failed_wr != &first->s_wr);
}
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: rds: prevent BUG_ON triggering on congestion map updates
Recently had this bug halt reported to me:
kernel BUG at net/rds/send.c:329!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
SMP NR_CPUS=1024 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in: rds sunrpc ipv6 dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log ibmveth sg
ext4 jbd2 mbcache sd_mod crc_t10dif ibmvscsic scsi_transport_srp scsi_tgt
dm_mod [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan]
NIP: d000000003ca68f4 LR: d000000003ca67fc CTR: d000000003ca8770
REGS: c000000175cab980 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (2.6.32-118.el6.ppc64)
MSR: 8000000000029032 <EE,ME,CE,IR,DR> CR: 44000022 XER: 00000000
TASK = c00000017586ec90[1896] 'krdsd' THREAD: c000000175ca8000 CPU: 0
GPR00: 0000000000000150 c000000175cabc00 d000000003cb7340 0000000000002030
GPR04: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000030 0000000000000000 0000000000000030
GPR08: 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 c0000001756b1e30 0000000000010000
GPR12: d000000003caac90 c000000000fa2500 c0000001742b2858 c0000001742b2a00
GPR16: c0000001742b2a08 c0000001742b2820 0000000000000001 0000000000000001
GPR20: 0000000000000040 c0000001742b2814 c000000175cabc70 0800000000000000
GPR24: 0000000000000004 0200000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000001742b2860
GPR28: 0000000000000000 c0000001756b1c80 d000000003cb68e8 c0000001742b27b8
NIP [d000000003ca68f4] .rds_send_xmit+0x4c4/0x8a0 [rds]
LR [d000000003ca67fc] .rds_send_xmit+0x3cc/0x8a0 [rds]
Call Trace:
[c000000175cabc00] [d000000003ca67fc] .rds_send_xmit+0x3cc/0x8a0 [rds]
(unreliable)
[c000000175cabd30] [d000000003ca7e64] .rds_send_worker+0x54/0x100 [rds]
[c000000175cabdb0] [c0000000000b475c] .worker_thread+0x1dc/0x3c0
[c000000175cabed0] [c0000000000baa9c] .kthread+0xbc/0xd0
[c000000175cabf90] [c000000000032114] .kernel_thread+0x54/0x70
Instruction dump:
4bfffd50 60000000 60000000 39080001 935f004c f91f0040 41820024 813d017c
7d094a78 7d290074 7929d182 394a0020 <0b090000> 40e2ff68 4bffffa4 39200000
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Call Trace:
[c000000175cab560] [c000000000012e04] .show_stack+0x74/0x1c0 (unreliable)
[c000000175cab610] [c0000000005a365c] .panic+0x80/0x1b4
[c000000175cab6a0] [c00000000002fbcc] .die+0x21c/0x2a0
[c000000175cab750] [c000000000030000] ._exception+0x110/0x220
[c000000175cab910] [c000000000004b9c] program_check_common+0x11c/0x180
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 8,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void compileoptionusedFunc(
sqlite3_context *context,
int argc,
sqlite3_value **argv
){
const char *zOptName;
assert( argc==1 );
UNUSED_PARAMETER(argc);
/* IMP: R-39564-36305 The sqlite_compileoption_used() SQL
** function is a wrapper around the sqlite3_compileoption_used() C/C++
** function.
*/
if( (zOptName = (const char*)sqlite3_value_text(argv[0]))!=0 ){
sqlite3_result_int(context, sqlite3_compileoption_used(zOptName));
}
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: select_opt_map(OptMap* now, OptMap* alt)
{
static int z = 1<<15; /* 32768: something big value */
int vn, va;
if (alt->value == 0) return ;
if (now->value == 0) {
copy_opt_map(now, alt);
return ;
}
vn = z / now->value;
va = z / alt->value;
if (comp_distance_value(&now->mmd, &alt->mmd, vn, va) > 0)
copy_opt_map(now, alt);
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 5,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: notify_script_compare(notify_script_t *a, notify_script_t *b)
{
int i;
if (a->num_args != b->num_args)
return false;
for (i = 0; i < a->num_args; i++) {
if (strcmp(a->args[i], b->args[i]))
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 1,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TextCheckerClient* EditorClientBlackBerry::textChecker()
{
return this;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,329 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int color_table_compare(const void *lhs, const void *rhs)
{
return av_strcasecmp(lhs, ((const ColorEntry *)rhs)->name);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/xpmdec: Fix multiple pointer/memory issues
Most of these were found through code review in response to
fixing 1466/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5961584419536896
There is thus no testcase for most of this.
The initial issue was Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillPopupViewNativeViews::Hide() {
controller_ = nullptr;
DoHide();
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 20,191 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UsbChooserContext::GetDevice(
const std::string& guid,
device::mojom::UsbDeviceRequest device_request,
device::mojom::UsbDeviceClientPtr device_client) {
EnsureConnectionWithDeviceManager();
device_manager_->GetDevice(guid, std::move(device_request),
std::move(device_client));
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AwContents::GetMessagePortMessageFilter() {
if (message_port_message_filter_.get() == nullptr) {
message_port_message_filter_ =
new AwMessagePortMessageFilter(
web_contents_->GetMainFrame()->GetRoutingID());
web_contents_->GetRenderProcessHost()->AddFilter(
message_port_message_filter_.get());
}
return message_port_message_filter_;
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 15,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rtecp_logout(sc_card_t *card)
{
sc_apdu_t apdu;
int r;
assert(card && card->ctx);
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_1, 0x40, 0, 0);
apdu.cla = 0x80;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 28,770 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UWORD32 ih264d_unpack_luma_coeff8x8_mb(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
dec_mb_info_t * ps_cur_mb_info)
{
WORD32 blk_8x8_cnt;
WORD16 *pi2_out_coeff_data = ps_dec->pi2_coeff_data;
UWORD8 u1_field_coding_flag = ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_fld;
UWORD8 *pu1_inv_scan;
UWORD32 u4_luma_dc_only_cbp = 0;
PROFILE_DISABLE_UNPACK_LUMA()
if(!u1_field_coding_flag)
{
/*******************************************************************/
/* initializing inverse scan matrices */
/*******************************************************************/
pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_prog8x8_cabac;
}
else
{
/*******************************************************************/
/* initializing inverse scan matrices */
/*******************************************************************/
pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_int8x8_cabac;
}
for(blk_8x8_cnt = 0; blk_8x8_cnt < 4; blk_8x8_cnt++)
{
if(CHECKBIT(ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp, blk_8x8_cnt))
{
tu_blk8x8_coeff_data_t *ps_tu_8x8 = (tu_blk8x8_coeff_data_t *)ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data;
UWORD32 u4_sig_coeff_map;
WORD32 idx = 0;
WORD16 *pi2_coeff_data = &ps_tu_8x8->ai2_level[0];
WORD32 num_coeff = 0;
/* memset 64 coefficient to zero */
memset(pi2_out_coeff_data,0,64*sizeof(WORD16));
u4_sig_coeff_map = ps_tu_8x8->au4_sig_coeff_map[1];
while(u4_sig_coeff_map)
{
idx = CLZ(u4_sig_coeff_map);
idx = 31 - idx;
RESET_BIT(u4_sig_coeff_map,idx);
idx = pu1_inv_scan[idx + 32];
pi2_out_coeff_data[idx] = *pi2_coeff_data++;
num_coeff++;
}
u4_sig_coeff_map = ps_tu_8x8->au4_sig_coeff_map[0];
while(u4_sig_coeff_map)
{
idx = CLZ(u4_sig_coeff_map);
idx = 31 - idx;
RESET_BIT(u4_sig_coeff_map,idx);
idx = pu1_inv_scan[idx];
pi2_out_coeff_data[idx] = *pi2_coeff_data++;
num_coeff++;
}
if((num_coeff == 1) && (idx == 0))
{
SET_BIT(u4_luma_dc_only_cbp,blk_8x8_cnt);
}
{
WORD32 offset;
offset = (UWORD8 *)pi2_coeff_data - (UWORD8 *)ps_tu_8x8;
offset = ALIGN4(offset);
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = (void *)((UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data + offset);
}
}
pi2_out_coeff_data += 64;
}
return u4_luma_dc_only_cbp;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fix for handling invalid intra mode
Bug: 28165659
Change-Id: I2291a287c27291695f4f3d6e753b6bbd7dfd9e42
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationRequest::UpdateCommitNavigationParamsHistory() {
NavigationController* navigation_controller =
frame_tree_node_->navigator()->GetController();
commit_params_.current_history_list_offset =
navigation_controller->GetCurrentEntryIndex();
commit_params_.current_history_list_length =
navigation_controller->GetEntryCount();
}
Commit Message: Show an error page if a URL redirects to a javascript: URL.
BUG=935175
Change-Id: Id4a9198d5dff823bc3d324b9de9bff2ee86dc499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1488152
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635848}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost(
FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node)
: DevToolsAgentHostImpl(frame_tree_node->devtools_frame_token().ToString()),
frame_tree_node_(nullptr) {
SetFrameTreeNode(frame_tree_node);
frame_host_ = frame_tree_node->current_frame_host();
render_frame_alive_ = frame_host_ && frame_host_->IsRenderFrameLive();
AddRef(); // Balanced in DestroyOnRenderFrameGone.
NotifyCreated();
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PermissionsData::ShouldSkipPermissionWarnings(
const std::string& extension_id) {
return extension_id == extension_misc::kProdHangoutsExtensionId;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err gf_sm_aggregate(GF_SceneManager *ctx, u16 ESID)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 i, stream_count;
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_VRML
u32 j;
GF_AUContext *au;
GF_Command *com;
#endif
e = GF_OK;
#if DEBUG_RAP
com_count = 0;
stream_count = gf_list_count(ctx->streams);
for (i=0; i<stream_count; i++) {
GF_StreamContext *sc = (GF_StreamContext *)gf_list_get(ctx->streams, i);
if (sc->streamType == GF_STREAM_SCENE) {
au_count = gf_list_count(sc->AUs);
for (j=0; j<au_count; j++) {
au = (GF_AUContext *)gf_list_get(sc->AUs, j);
com_count += gf_list_count(au->commands);
}
}
}
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_INFO, GF_LOG_SCENE, ("[SceneManager] Making RAP with %d commands\n", com_count));
#endif
stream_count = gf_list_count(ctx->streams);
for (i=0; i<stream_count; i++) {
GF_AUContext *carousel_au;
GF_List *carousel_commands;
GF_StreamContext *aggregate_on_stream;
GF_StreamContext *sc = (GF_StreamContext *)gf_list_get(ctx->streams, i);
if (ESID && (sc->ESID!=ESID)) continue;
/*locate the AU in which our commands will be aggregated*/
carousel_au = NULL;
carousel_commands = NULL;
aggregate_on_stream = sc->aggregate_on_esid ? gf_sm_get_stream(ctx, sc->aggregate_on_esid) : NULL;
if (aggregate_on_stream==sc) {
carousel_commands = gf_list_new();
} else if (aggregate_on_stream) {
if (!gf_list_count(aggregate_on_stream->AUs)) {
carousel_au = gf_sm_stream_au_new(aggregate_on_stream, 0, 0, 1);
} else {
/* assert we already performed aggregation */
assert(gf_list_count(aggregate_on_stream->AUs)==1);
carousel_au = gf_list_get(aggregate_on_stream->AUs, 0);
}
carousel_commands = carousel_au->commands;
}
/*TODO - do this as well for ODs*/
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_VRML
if (sc->streamType == GF_STREAM_SCENE) {
Bool has_modif = 0;
/*we check for each stream if it is a base stream (SceneReplace ...) - several streams may carry RAPs if inline nodes are used*/
Bool base_stream_found = 0;
/*in DIMS we use an empty initial AU with no commands to signal the RAP*/
if (sc->objectType == GPAC_OTI_SCENE_DIMS) base_stream_found = 1;
/*apply all commands - this will also apply the SceneReplace*/
while (gf_list_count(sc->AUs)) {
u32 count;
au = (GF_AUContext *) gf_list_get(sc->AUs, 0);
gf_list_rem(sc->AUs, 0);
/*AU not aggregated*/
if (au->flags & GF_SM_AU_NOT_AGGREGATED) {
gf_sm_au_del(sc, au);
continue;
}
count = gf_list_count(au->commands);
for (j=0; j<count; j++) {
u32 store=0;
com = gf_list_get(au->commands, j);
if (!base_stream_found) {
switch (com->tag) {
case GF_SG_SCENE_REPLACE:
case GF_SG_LSR_NEW_SCENE:
case GF_SG_LSR_REFRESH_SCENE:
base_stream_found = 1;
break;
}
}
/*aggregate the command*/
/*if stream doesn't carry a carousel or carries the base carousel (scene replace), always apply the command*/
if (base_stream_found || !sc->aggregate_on_esid) {
store = 0;
}
/*otherwise, check wether the command should be kept in this stream as is, or can be aggregated on this stream*/
else {
switch (com->tag) {
/*the following commands do not impact a sub-tree (eg do not deal with nodes), we cannot
aggregate them... */
case GF_SG_ROUTE_REPLACE:
case GF_SG_ROUTE_DELETE:
case GF_SG_ROUTE_INSERT:
case GF_SG_PROTO_INSERT:
case GF_SG_PROTO_DELETE:
case GF_SG_PROTO_DELETE_ALL:
case GF_SG_GLOBAL_QUANTIZER:
case GF_SG_LSR_RESTORE:
case GF_SG_LSR_SAVE:
case GF_SG_LSR_SEND_EVENT:
case GF_SG_LSR_CLEAN:
/*todo check in which category to put these commands*/
store = 1;
break;
/*other commands:
!!! we need to know if the target node of the command has been inserted in this stream !!!
This is a tedious task, for now we will consider the following cases:
- locate a similar command in the stored list: remove the similar one and aggregate on stream
- by default all AUs are stored if the stream is in aggregate mode - we should fix that by checking insertion points:
if a command apllies on a node that has been inserted in this stream, we can aggregate, otherwise store
*/
default:
/*check if we can directly store the command*/
assert(carousel_commands);
store = store_or_aggregate(sc, com, carousel_commands, &has_modif);
break;
}
}
switch (store) {
/*command has been merged with a previous command in carousel and needs to be destroyed*/
case 2:
gf_list_rem(au->commands, j);
j--;
count--;
gf_sg_command_del((GF_Command *)com);
break;
/*command shall be moved to carousel without being applied*/
case 1:
gf_list_insert(carousel_commands, com, 0);
gf_list_rem(au->commands, j);
j--;
count--;
break;
/*command can be applied*/
default:
e = gf_sg_command_apply(ctx->scene_graph, com, 0);
break;
}
}
gf_sm_au_del(sc, au);
}
/*and recreate scene replace*/
if (base_stream_found) {
au = gf_sm_stream_au_new(sc, 0, 0, 1);
switch (sc->objectType) {
case GPAC_OTI_SCENE_BIFS:
case GPAC_OTI_SCENE_BIFS_V2:
com = gf_sg_command_new(ctx->scene_graph, GF_SG_SCENE_REPLACE);
break;
case GPAC_OTI_SCENE_LASER:
com = gf_sg_command_new(ctx->scene_graph, GF_SG_LSR_NEW_SCENE);
break;
case GPAC_OTI_SCENE_DIMS:
/* We do not create a new command, empty AU is enough in DIMS*/
default:
com = NULL;
break;
}
if (com) {
com->node = ctx->scene_graph->RootNode;
ctx->scene_graph->RootNode = NULL;
gf_list_del(com->new_proto_list);
com->new_proto_list = ctx->scene_graph->protos;
ctx->scene_graph->protos = NULL;
/*indicate the command is the aggregated scene graph, so that PROTOs and ROUTEs
are taken from the scenegraph when encoding*/
com->aggregated = 1;
gf_list_add(au->commands, com);
}
}
/*update carousel flags of the AU*/
else if (carousel_commands) {
/*if current stream caries its own carousel*/
if (!carousel_au) {
carousel_au = gf_sm_stream_au_new(sc, 0, 0, 1);
gf_list_del(carousel_au->commands);
carousel_au->commands = carousel_commands;
}
carousel_au->flags |= GF_SM_AU_RAP | GF_SM_AU_CAROUSEL;
if (has_modif) carousel_au->flags |= GF_SM_AU_MODIFIED;
}
}
#endif
}
return e;
}
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CanRemoveUser(const user_manager::User* user) {
const bool is_single_user =
user_manager::UserManager::Get()->GetUsers().size() == 1;
if (is_single_user && !IsEnterpriseManaged())
return false;
if (!user->GetAccountId().is_valid())
return false;
if (user->GetAccountId() == GetOwnerAccountId())
return false;
if (user->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_PUBLIC_ACCOUNT ||
user->is_logged_in() || IsSigninToAdd())
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType StripImage(Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
DestroyImageProfiles(image);
(void) DeleteImageProperty(image,"comment");
(void) DeleteImageProperty(image,"date:create");
(void) DeleteImageProperty(image,"date:modify");
status=SetImageArtifact(image,"png:exclude-chunk",
"bKGD,cHRM,EXIF,gAMA,iCCP,iTXt,sRGB,tEXt,zCCP,zTXt,date");
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Fixed incorrect call to DestroyImage reported in #491.
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 26,026 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jbd2_journal_stop(handle_t *handle)
{
transaction_t *transaction = handle->h_transaction;
journal_t *journal = transaction->t_journal;
int err, wait_for_commit = 0;
tid_t tid;
pid_t pid;
J_ASSERT(journal_current_handle() == handle);
if (is_handle_aborted(handle))
err = -EIO;
else {
J_ASSERT(atomic_read(&transaction->t_updates) > 0);
err = 0;
}
if (--handle->h_ref > 0) {
jbd_debug(4, "h_ref %d -> %d\n", handle->h_ref + 1,
handle->h_ref);
return err;
}
jbd_debug(4, "Handle %p going down\n", handle);
/*
* Implement synchronous transaction batching. If the handle
* was synchronous, don't force a commit immediately. Let's
* yield and let another thread piggyback onto this
* transaction. Keep doing that while new threads continue to
* arrive. It doesn't cost much - we're about to run a commit
* and sleep on IO anyway. Speeds up many-threaded, many-dir
* operations by 30x or more...
*
* We try and optimize the sleep time against what the
* underlying disk can do, instead of having a static sleep
* time. This is useful for the case where our storage is so
* fast that it is more optimal to go ahead and force a flush
* and wait for the transaction to be committed than it is to
* wait for an arbitrary amount of time for new writers to
* join the transaction. We achieve this by measuring how
* long it takes to commit a transaction, and compare it with
* how long this transaction has been running, and if run time
* < commit time then we sleep for the delta and commit. This
* greatly helps super fast disks that would see slowdowns as
* more threads started doing fsyncs.
*
* But don't do this if this process was the most recent one
* to perform a synchronous write. We do this to detect the
* case where a single process is doing a stream of sync
* writes. No point in waiting for joiners in that case.
*/
pid = current->pid;
if (handle->h_sync && journal->j_last_sync_writer != pid) {
u64 commit_time, trans_time;
journal->j_last_sync_writer = pid;
read_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
commit_time = journal->j_average_commit_time;
read_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
trans_time = ktime_to_ns(ktime_sub(ktime_get(),
transaction->t_start_time));
commit_time = max_t(u64, commit_time,
1000*journal->j_min_batch_time);
commit_time = min_t(u64, commit_time,
1000*journal->j_max_batch_time);
if (trans_time < commit_time) {
ktime_t expires = ktime_add_ns(ktime_get(),
commit_time);
set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
schedule_hrtimeout(&expires, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
}
}
if (handle->h_sync)
transaction->t_synchronous_commit = 1;
current->journal_info = NULL;
atomic_sub(handle->h_buffer_credits,
&transaction->t_outstanding_credits);
/*
* If the handle is marked SYNC, we need to set another commit
* going! We also want to force a commit if the current
* transaction is occupying too much of the log, or if the
* transaction is too old now.
*/
if (handle->h_sync ||
(atomic_read(&transaction->t_outstanding_credits) >
journal->j_max_transaction_buffers) ||
time_after_eq(jiffies, transaction->t_expires)) {
/* Do this even for aborted journals: an abort still
* completes the commit thread, it just doesn't write
* anything to disk. */
jbd_debug(2, "transaction too old, requesting commit for "
"handle %p\n", handle);
/* This is non-blocking */
jbd2_log_start_commit(journal, transaction->t_tid);
/*
* Special case: JBD2_SYNC synchronous updates require us
* to wait for the commit to complete.
*/
if (handle->h_sync && !(current->flags & PF_MEMALLOC))
wait_for_commit = 1;
}
/*
* Once we drop t_updates, if it goes to zero the transaction
* could start committing on us and eventually disappear. So
* once we do this, we must not dereference transaction
* pointer again.
*/
tid = transaction->t_tid;
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&transaction->t_updates)) {
wake_up(&journal->j_wait_updates);
if (journal->j_barrier_count)
wake_up(&journal->j_wait_transaction_locked);
}
if (wait_for_commit)
err = jbd2_log_wait_commit(journal, tid);
lock_map_release(&handle->h_lockdep_map);
jbd2_free_handle(handle);
return err;
}
Commit Message: jbd2: clear BH_Delay & BH_Unwritten in journal_unmap_buffer
journal_unmap_buffer()'s zap_buffer: code clears a lot of buffer head
state ala discard_buffer(), but does not touch _Delay or _Unwritten as
discard_buffer() does.
This can be problematic in some areas of the ext4 code which assume
that if they have found a buffer marked unwritten or delay, then it's
a live one. Perhaps those spots should check whether it is mapped
as well, but if jbd2 is going to tear down a buffer, let's really
tear it down completely.
Without this I get some fsx failures on sub-page-block filesystems
up until v3.2, at which point 4e96b2dbbf1d7e81f22047a50f862555a6cb87cb
and 189e868fa8fdca702eb9db9d8afc46b5cb9144c9 make the failures go
away, because buried within that large change is some more flag
clearing. I still think it's worth doing in jbd2, since
->invalidatepage leads here directly, and it's the right place
to clear away these flags.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t WritePSDChannel(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
const QuantumType quantum_type, unsigned char *compact_pixels,
MagickOffsetType size_offset,const MagickBooleanType separate,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
int
y;
MagickBooleanType
monochrome;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
count,
length;
unsigned char
*pixels;
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
#define CHUNK 16384
int
flush,
level;
unsigned char
*compressed_pixels;
z_stream
stream;
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
flush=Z_NO_FLUSH;
#endif
count=0;
if (separate != MagickFalse)
{
size_offset=TellBlob(image)+2;
count+=WriteCompressionStart(psd_info,image,next_image,1);
}
if (next_image->depth > 8)
next_image->depth=16;
monochrome=IsImageMonochrome(image) && (image->depth == 1) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
return(0);
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(CHUNK,
sizeof(*compressed_pixels));
if (compressed_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
ResetMagickMemory(&stream,0,sizeof(stream));
stream.data_type=Z_BINARY;
level=Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
if ((image_info->quality > 0 && image_info->quality < 10))
level=(int) image_info->quality;
if (deflateInit(&stream,level) != Z_OK)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
}
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) next_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(next_image,0,y,next_image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(next_image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (monochrome != MagickFalse)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
pixels[i]=(~pixels[i]);
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
length=PSDPackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,compact_pixels,
exception);
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compact_pixels);
size_offset+=WritePSDOffset(psd_info,image,length,size_offset);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
else if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
stream.avail_in=(uInt) length;
stream.next_in=(Bytef *) pixels;
if (y == (ssize_t) next_image->rows-1)
flush=Z_FINISH;
do {
stream.avail_out=(uInt) CHUNK;
stream.next_out=(Bytef *) compressed_pixels;
if (deflate(&stream,flush) == Z_STREAM_ERROR)
break;
length=(size_t) CHUNK-stream.avail_out;
if (length > 0)
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compressed_pixels);
} while (stream.avail_out == 0);
}
#endif
else
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
(void) deflateEnd(&stream);
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
compressed_pixels);
}
#endif
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(count);
}
Commit Message: Fix improper cast that could cause an overflow as demonstrated in #347.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static HistoryCommitType LoadTypeToCommitType(FrameLoadType type) {
switch (type) {
case kFrameLoadTypeStandard:
return kStandardCommit;
case kFrameLoadTypeInitialInChildFrame:
case kFrameLoadTypeInitialHistoryLoad:
return kInitialCommitInChildFrame;
case kFrameLoadTypeBackForward:
return kBackForwardCommit;
default:
break;
}
return kHistoryInertCommit;
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 12,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ohci_sysbus_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
{
DeviceClass *dc = DEVICE_CLASS(klass);
dc->realize = ohci_realize_pxa;
set_bit(DEVICE_CATEGORY_USB, dc->categories);
dc->desc = "OHCI USB Controller";
dc->props = ohci_sysbus_properties;
dc->reset = usb_ohci_reset_sysbus;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 8,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> booleanSequenceAttrAttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.booleanSequenceAttr._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
return v8Array(imp->booleanSequenceAttr(), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,420 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err iref_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_ItemReferenceBox *p = (GF_ItemReferenceBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "ItemReferenceBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
gf_isom_box_array_dump(p->references, trace);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("ItemReferenceBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 3,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ref_param_read_array(iparam_list * plist, gs_param_name pkey, iparam_loc * ploc)
{
int code = ref_param_read(plist, pkey, ploc, -1);
if (code != 0)
return code;
if (!r_is_array(ploc->pvalue))
return iparam_note_error(*ploc, gs_error_typecheck);
iparam_check_read(*ploc);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 29,906 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteTXTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
buffer[MagickPathExtent],
colorspace[MagickPathExtent],
tuple[MagickPathExtent];
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
PixelInfo
pixel;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
scene=0;
do
{
ComplianceType
compliance;
const char
*value;
(void) CopyMagickString(colorspace,CommandOptionToMnemonic(
MagickColorspaceOptions,(ssize_t) image->colorspace),MagickPathExtent);
LocaleLower(colorspace);
image->depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickTrue);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(colorspace,"a",MagickPathExtent);
compliance=NoCompliance;
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"txt:compliance");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
compliance=(ComplianceType) ParseCommandOption(MagickComplianceOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"SPARSE-COLOR") != 0)
{
size_t
depth;
depth=compliance == SVGCompliance ? image->depth :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"# ImageMagick pixel enumeration: %.20g,%.20g,%.20g,%s\n",(double)
image->columns,(double) image->rows,(double) ((MagickOffsetType)
GetQuantumRange(depth)),colorspace);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
GetPixelInfo(image,&pixel);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,p,&pixel);
if (pixel.colorspace == LabColorspace)
{
pixel.green-=(QuantumRange+1)/2.0;
pixel.blue-=(QuantumRange+1)/2.0;
}
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"SPARSE-COLOR") == 0)
{
/*
Sparse-color format.
*/
if (GetPixelAlpha(image,p) == (Quantum) OpaqueAlpha)
{
GetColorTuple(&pixel,MagickFalse,tuple);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%.20g,%.20g,",(double) x,(double) y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,tuple);
(void) WriteBlobString(image," ");
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
continue;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g,%.20g: ",
(double) x,(double) y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) CopyMagickString(tuple,"(",MagickPathExtent);
if (pixel.colorspace == GRAYColorspace)
ConcatenateColorComponent(&pixel,GrayPixelChannel,compliance,
tuple);
else
{
ConcatenateColorComponent(&pixel,RedPixelChannel,compliance,tuple);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(tuple,",",MagickPathExtent);
ConcatenateColorComponent(&pixel,GreenPixelChannel,compliance,
tuple);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(tuple,",",MagickPathExtent);
ConcatenateColorComponent(&pixel,BluePixelChannel,compliance,tuple);
}
if (pixel.colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(tuple,",",MagickPathExtent);
ConcatenateColorComponent(&pixel,BlackPixelChannel,compliance,
tuple);
}
if (pixel.alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(tuple,",",MagickPathExtent);
ConcatenateColorComponent(&pixel,AlphaPixelChannel,compliance,
tuple);
}
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(tuple,")",MagickPathExtent);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,tuple);
(void) WriteBlobString(image," ");
GetColorTuple(&pixel,MagickTrue,tuple);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%s",tuple);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image," ");
(void) QueryColorname(image,&pixel,SVGCompliance,tuple,exception);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,tuple);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\n");
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,
GetImageListLength(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/298
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 17,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvm_vm_ioctl_deassign_device(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_assigned_pci_dev *assigned_dev)
{
int r = 0;
struct kvm_assigned_dev_kernel *match;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
match = kvm_find_assigned_dev(&kvm->arch.assigned_dev_head,
assigned_dev->assigned_dev_id);
if (!match) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: device hasn't been assigned before, "
"so cannot be deassigned\n", __func__);
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
kvm_deassign_device(kvm, match);
kvm_free_assigned_device(kvm, match);
out:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Device assignment permission checks
(cherry picked from commit 3d27e23b17010c668db311140b17bbbb70c78fb9)
Only allow KVM device assignment to attach to devices which:
- Are not bridges
- Have BAR resources (assume others are special devices)
- The user has permissions to use
Assigning a bridge is a configuration error, it's not supported, and
typically doesn't result in the behavior the user is expecting anyway.
Devices without BAR resources are typically chipset components that
also don't have host drivers. We don't want users to hold such devices
captive or cause system problems by fencing them off into an iommu
domain. We determine "permission to use" by testing whether the user
has access to the PCI sysfs resource files. By default a normal user
will not have access to these files, so it provides a good indication
that an administration agent has granted the user access to the device.
[Yang Bai: add missing #include]
[avi: fix comment style]
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Bai <hamo.by@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 17,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnGetRunningPath(drive::FileError error,
const base::FilePath& file_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (error != drive::FILE_ERROR_OK) {
StartParseFileInfo(false);
return;
}
drive::FileSystemInterface* const file_system =
drive::util::GetFileSystemByProfile(running_profile_);
if (!file_system) {
StartParseFileInfo(false);
return;
}
file_system->GetResourceEntry(
file_path,
base::Bind(&SingleDriveEntryPropertiesGetter::OnGetShareInfo,
GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: Reland r286968: The CL borrows ShareDialog from Files.app and add it to Gallery.
Previous Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/431293002
BUG=374667
TEST=manually
R=yoshiki@chromium.org, mtomasz@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/433733004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286975 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _asn1_set_value_m (asn1_node node, void *value, unsigned int len)
{
if (node == NULL)
return node;
if (node->value)
{
if (node->value != node->small_value)
free (node->value);
node->value = NULL;
node->value_len = 0;
}
if (!len)
return node;
node->value = value;
node->value_len = len;
return node;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Part::slotShowContextMenu()
{
if (!factory()) {
return;
}
QMenu *popup = static_cast<QMenu *>(factory()->container(QStringLiteral("context_menu"), this));
popup->popup(QCursor::pos());
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 18,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void CustomGetterImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "customGetterImplementedAsLongAttribute");
int32_t cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setImplementedAsNameWithCustomGetter(cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AccessibilityRole AXTableCell::determineAccessibilityRole() {
if (!isTableCell())
return AXLayoutObject::determineAccessibilityRole();
return scanToDecideHeaderRole();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 5,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::SetDelegate(DownloadManagerDelegate* delegate) {
delegate_ = delegate;
if (initialized_ || in_progress_cache_initialized_)
return;
base::RepeatingClosure post_init_callback = base::BindRepeating(
&DownloadManagerImpl::PostInitialization, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
DOWNLOAD_INITIALIZATION_DEPENDENCY_IN_PROGRESS_CACHE);
if (delegate_) {
download::InProgressCache* in_progress_cache =
delegate_->GetInProgressCache();
if (in_progress_cache) {
in_progress_cache->Initialize(post_init_callback);
return;
}
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE, post_init_callback);
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void* DupNamedColorList(cmsStage* mpe)
{
cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* List = (cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST*) mpe ->Data;
return cmsDupNamedColorList(List);
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorPageAgent::Will(const probe::UpdateLayout&) {}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,399 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ihevcd_set_default_params(codec_t *ps_codec)
{
WORD32 ret = IV_SUCCESS;
ps_codec->e_pic_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
ps_codec->i4_strd = 0;
ps_codec->i4_disp_strd = 0;
ps_codec->i4_header_mode = 0;
ps_codec->e_pic_out_order = IVD_DISPLAY_FRAME_OUT;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Handle ps_codec_obj memory allocation failure gracefully
If memory allocation for ps_codec_obj fails, return gracefully
with an error code. All other allocation failures are
handled correctly.
Bug: 68299873
Test: before/after with always-failing malloc
Change-Id: I5e6c07b147b13df81e65476851662d4b55d33b83
(cherry picked from commit a966e2a65dd901151ce7f4481d0084840c9a0f7e)
CWE ID: CWE-770 | 0 | 12,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void DebugRepaint(ttfFont *ttf)
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 2,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: add_xml_comment(xmlNode * parent, xmlNode * target, xmlNode * update)
{
CRM_CHECK(update != NULL, return 0);
CRM_CHECK(update->type == XML_COMMENT_NODE, return 0);
if (target == NULL) {
target = find_xml_comment(parent, update);
}
if (target == NULL) {
add_node_copy(parent, update);
/* We wont reach here currently */
} else if (safe_str_neq((const char *)target->content, (const char *)update->content)) {
xmlFree(target->content);
target->content = xmlStrdup(update->content);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleWaitAllAsyncTexImage2DCHROMIUM(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::WaitAllAsyncTexImage2DCHROMIUM& c) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleWaitAsyncTexImage2DCHROMIUM");
GetAsyncPixelTransferManager()->WaitAllAsyncTexImage2D();
ProcessFinishedAsyncTransfers();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AudioMixerAlsa::AudioMixerAlsa()
: min_volume_db_(kDefaultMinVolumeDb),
max_volume_db_(kDefaultMaxVolumeDb),
volume_db_(kDefaultVolumeDb),
is_muted_(false),
apply_is_pending_(true),
alsa_mixer_(NULL),
pcm_element_(NULL),
prefs_(NULL),
disconnected_event_(true, false),
num_connection_attempts_(0) {
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 18,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void activityLoggingForAllWorldsPerWorldBindingsVoidMethodMethodForMainWorld(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
imp->activityLoggingForAllWorldsPerWorldBindingsVoidMethod();
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool spd_can_coalesce(const struct splice_pipe_desc *spd,
struct page *page,
unsigned int offset)
{
return spd->nr_pages &&
spd->pages[spd->nr_pages - 1] == page &&
(spd->partial[spd->nr_pages - 1].offset +
spd->partial[spd->nr_pages - 1].len == offset);
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 18,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BOOL OmniboxViewWin::OnMouseWheel(UINT flags, short delta, CPoint point) {
if (!ui::RerouteMouseWheel(m_hWnd, MAKEWPARAM(flags, delta),
MAKELPARAM(point.x, point.y)))
SetMsgHandled(false);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didReceiveTitle(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebString& title,
blink::WebTextDirection direction) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
render_view_->didReceiveTitle(frame, title, direction);
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 17,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK(args.Length() == 2);
CHECK(args[0]->IsInt32());
CHECK(args[1]->IsFunction());
int frame_id = args[0]->Int32Value();
content::RenderFrame* frame = content::RenderFrame::FromRoutingID(frame_id);
if (!frame) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No render frame found to register LoadWatcher.";
return;
}
new LoadWatcher(context(), frame, args[1].As<v8::Function>());
args.GetReturnValue().Set(true);
}
Commit Message: Fix re-entrancy and lifetime issue in RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated
BUG=585268,568130
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1684953002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374758}
CWE ID: | 1 | 11,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExpandableContainerView::AnimationProgressed(
const gfx::Animation* animation) {
DCHECK_EQ(&slide_animation_, animation);
if (details_view_)
details_view_->AnimateToState(animation->GetCurrentValue());
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 2,888 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SMB2_sess_setup(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
struct smb2_sess_setup_req *req;
struct smb2_sess_setup_rsp *rsp = NULL;
struct kvec iov[2];
int rc = 0;
int resp_buftype;
__le32 phase = NtLmNegotiate; /* NTLMSSP, if needed, is multistage */
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = ses->server;
u16 blob_length = 0;
char *security_blob;
char *ntlmssp_blob = NULL;
bool use_spnego = false; /* else use raw ntlmssp */
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Session Setup\n");
if (!server) {
WARN(1, "%s: server is NULL!\n", __func__);
return -EIO;
}
/*
* If we are here due to reconnect, free per-smb session key
* in case signing was required.
*/
kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
/*
* If memory allocation is successful, caller of this function
* frees it.
*/
ses->ntlmssp = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ntlmssp_auth), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ses->ntlmssp)
return -ENOMEM;
ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess = true;
/* FIXME: allow for other auth types besides NTLMSSP (e.g. krb5) */
ses->sectype = RawNTLMSSP;
ssetup_ntlmssp_authenticate:
if (phase == NtLmChallenge)
phase = NtLmAuthenticate; /* if ntlmssp, now final phase */
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_SESSION_SETUP, NULL, (void **) &req);
if (rc)
return rc;
req->hdr.SessionId = 0; /* First session, not a reauthenticate */
req->VcNumber = 0; /* MBZ */
/* to enable echos and oplocks */
req->hdr.CreditRequest = cpu_to_le16(3);
/* only one of SMB2 signing flags may be set in SMB2 request */
if (server->sign)
req->SecurityMode = SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
else if (global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_SIGN) /* one flag unlike MUST_ */
req->SecurityMode = SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_ENABLED;
else
req->SecurityMode = 0;
req->Capabilities = 0;
req->Channel = 0; /* MBZ */
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field and 1 for pad */
iov[0].iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4 - 1;
if (phase == NtLmNegotiate) {
ntlmssp_blob = kmalloc(sizeof(struct _NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (ntlmssp_blob == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto ssetup_exit;
}
build_ntlmssp_negotiate_blob(ntlmssp_blob, ses);
if (use_spnego) {
/* blob_length = build_spnego_ntlmssp_blob(
&security_blob,
sizeof(struct _NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE),
ntlmssp_blob); */
/* BB eventually need to add this */
cifs_dbg(VFS, "spnego not supported for SMB2 yet\n");
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
kfree(ntlmssp_blob);
goto ssetup_exit;
} else {
blob_length = sizeof(struct _NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE);
/* with raw NTLMSSP we don't encapsulate in SPNEGO */
security_blob = ntlmssp_blob;
}
} else if (phase == NtLmAuthenticate) {
req->hdr.SessionId = ses->Suid;
ntlmssp_blob = kzalloc(sizeof(struct _NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE) + 500,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (ntlmssp_blob == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto ssetup_exit;
}
rc = build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(ntlmssp_blob, &blob_length, ses,
nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "build_ntlmssp_auth_blob failed %d\n",
rc);
goto ssetup_exit; /* BB double check error handling */
}
if (use_spnego) {
/* blob_length = build_spnego_ntlmssp_blob(
&security_blob,
blob_length,
ntlmssp_blob); */
cifs_dbg(VFS, "spnego not supported for SMB2 yet\n");
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
kfree(ntlmssp_blob);
goto ssetup_exit;
} else {
security_blob = ntlmssp_blob;
}
} else {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "illegal ntlmssp phase\n");
rc = -EIO;
goto ssetup_exit;
}
/* Testing shows that buffer offset must be at location of Buffer[0] */
req->SecurityBufferOffset =
cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct smb2_sess_setup_req) -
1 /* pad */ - 4 /* rfc1001 len */);
req->SecurityBufferLength = cpu_to_le16(blob_length);
iov[1].iov_base = security_blob;
iov[1].iov_len = blob_length;
inc_rfc1001_len(req, blob_length - 1 /* pad */);
/* BB add code to build os and lm fields */
rc = SendReceive2(xid, ses, iov, 2, &resp_buftype,
CIFS_LOG_ERROR | CIFS_NEG_OP);
kfree(security_blob);
rsp = (struct smb2_sess_setup_rsp *)iov[0].iov_base;
if (resp_buftype != CIFS_NO_BUFFER &&
rsp->hdr.Status == STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED) {
if (phase != NtLmNegotiate) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Unexpected more processing error\n");
goto ssetup_exit;
}
if (offsetof(struct smb2_sess_setup_rsp, Buffer) - 4 !=
le16_to_cpu(rsp->SecurityBufferOffset)) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Invalid security buffer offset %d\n",
le16_to_cpu(rsp->SecurityBufferOffset));
rc = -EIO;
goto ssetup_exit;
}
/* NTLMSSP Negotiate sent now processing challenge (response) */
phase = NtLmChallenge; /* process ntlmssp challenge */
rc = 0; /* MORE_PROCESSING is not an error here but expected */
ses->Suid = rsp->hdr.SessionId;
rc = decode_ntlmssp_challenge(rsp->Buffer,
le16_to_cpu(rsp->SecurityBufferLength), ses);
}
/*
* BB eventually add code for SPNEGO decoding of NtlmChallenge blob,
* but at least the raw NTLMSSP case works.
*/
/*
* No tcon so can't do
* cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->stats.smb2_stats.smb2_com_fail[SMB2...]);
*/
if (rc != 0)
goto ssetup_exit;
ses->session_flags = le16_to_cpu(rsp->SessionFlags);
if (ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA)
cifs_dbg(VFS, "SMB3 encryption not supported yet\n");
ssetup_exit:
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp);
/* if ntlmssp, and negotiate succeeded, proceed to authenticate phase */
if ((phase == NtLmChallenge) && (rc == 0))
goto ssetup_ntlmssp_authenticate;
if (!rc) {
mutex_lock(&server->srv_mutex);
if (server->sign && server->ops->generate_signingkey) {
rc = server->ops->generate_signingkey(ses);
kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI,
"SMB3 session key generation failed\n");
mutex_unlock(&server->srv_mutex);
goto keygen_exit;
}
}
if (!server->session_estab) {
server->sequence_number = 0x2;
server->session_estab = true;
}
mutex_unlock(&server->srv_mutex);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "SMB2/3 session established successfully\n");
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
ses->status = CifsGood;
ses->need_reconnect = false;
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
}
keygen_exit:
if (!server->sign) {
kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
}
kfree(ses->ntlmssp);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int init_wvx_bitstream (WavpackStream *wps, WavpackMetadata *wpmd)
{
unsigned char *cp = wpmd->data;
if (wpmd->byte_length <= 4 || (wpmd->byte_length & 1))
return FALSE;
wps->crc_wvx = *cp++;
wps->crc_wvx |= (int32_t) *cp++ << 8;
wps->crc_wvx |= (int32_t) *cp++ << 16;
wps->crc_wvx |= (int32_t) *cp++ << 24;
bs_open_read (&wps->wvxbits, cp, (unsigned char *) wpmd->data + wpmd->byte_length);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: fixes for 4 fuzz failures posted to SourceForge mailing list
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 19,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmw_hw_surface_destroy(struct vmw_resource *res)
{
struct vmw_private *dev_priv = res->dev_priv;
struct vmw_surface *srf;
void *cmd;
if (res->func->destroy == vmw_gb_surface_destroy) {
(void) vmw_gb_surface_destroy(res);
return;
}
if (res->id != -1) {
cmd = vmw_fifo_reserve(dev_priv, vmw_surface_destroy_size());
if (unlikely(!cmd)) {
DRM_ERROR("Failed reserving FIFO space for surface "
"destruction.\n");
return;
}
vmw_surface_destroy_encode(res->id, cmd);
vmw_fifo_commit(dev_priv, vmw_surface_destroy_size());
/*
* used_memory_size_atomic, or separate lock
* to avoid taking dev_priv::cmdbuf_mutex in
* the destroy path.
*/
mutex_lock(&dev_priv->cmdbuf_mutex);
srf = vmw_res_to_srf(res);
dev_priv->used_memory_size -= res->backup_size;
mutex_unlock(&dev_priv->cmdbuf_mutex);
}
vmw_fifo_resource_dec(dev_priv);
}
Commit Message: drm/vmwgfx: Make sure backup_handle is always valid
When vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is called with an existing buffer,
we end up returning an uninitialized variable in the backup_handle.
The fix is to first initialize backup_handle to 0 just to be sure, and
second, when a user-provided buffer is found, we will use the
req->buffer_handle as the backup_handle.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Murray McAllister <murray.mcallister@insomniasec.com>
Signed-off-by: Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat <drawat@vmware.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 17,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::SetCommitCallbackInterceptorForTesting(
CommitCallbackInterceptor* interceptor) {
DCHECK(!commit_callback_interceptor_ || !interceptor);
commit_callback_interceptor_ = interceptor;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 15,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: KURL Document::CompleteURL(const String& url) const {
return CompleteURLWithOverride(url, base_url_);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 21,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int get_ctty(pid_t pid, dev_t *ret_devnr, char **ret) {
_cleanup_free_ char *fn = NULL, *b = NULL;
dev_t devnr;
int r;
r = get_ctty_devnr(pid, &devnr);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = device_path_make_canonical(S_IFCHR, devnr, &fn);
if (r < 0) {
if (r != -ENOENT) /* No symlink for this in /dev/char/? */
return r;
if (major(devnr) == 136) {
/* This is an ugly hack: PTY devices are not listed in /dev/char/, as they don't follow the
* Linux device model. This means we have no nice way to match them up against their actual
* device node. Let's hence do the check by the fixed, assigned major number. Normally we try
* to avoid such fixed major/minor matches, but there appears to nother nice way to handle
* this. */
if (asprintf(&b, "pts/%u", minor(devnr)) < 0)
return -ENOMEM;
} else {
/* Probably something similar to the ptys which have no symlink in /dev/char/. Let's return
* something vaguely useful. */
r = device_path_make_major_minor(S_IFCHR, devnr, &fn);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
}
if (!b) {
const char *w;
w = path_startswith(fn, "/dev/");
if (w) {
b = strdup(w);
if (!b)
return -ENOMEM;
} else
b = TAKE_PTR(fn);
}
if (ret)
*ret = TAKE_PTR(b);
if (ret_devnr)
*ret_devnr = devnr;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255 | 0 | 16,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int veth_get_settings(struct net_device *dev, struct ethtool_cmd *cmd)
{
cmd->supported = 0;
cmd->advertising = 0;
ethtool_cmd_speed_set(cmd, SPEED_10000);
cmd->duplex = DUPLEX_FULL;
cmd->port = PORT_TP;
cmd->phy_address = 0;
cmd->transceiver = XCVR_INTERNAL;
cmd->autoneg = AUTONEG_DISABLE;
cmd->maxtxpkt = 0;
cmd->maxrxpkt = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 12,158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnGetNearestFindResult(int nfr_request_id,
float x,
float y) {
float distance = frame_->DistanceToNearestFindMatch(WebFloatPoint(x, y));
Send(new FrameHostMsg_GetNearestFindResult_Reply(
routing_id_, nfr_request_id, distance));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,662 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jint JNI_OnLoad(JavaVM *jvm, void *reserved)
{
JNIEnv *e;
int status;
ALOGV("Bluetooth Adapter Service : loading JNI\n");
if (jvm->GetEnv((void **)&e, JNI_VERSION_1_6)) {
ALOGE("JNI version mismatch error");
return JNI_ERR;
}
if ((status = android::register_com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService(e)) < 0) {
ALOGE("jni adapter service registration failure, status: %d", status);
return JNI_ERR;
}
if ((status = android::register_com_android_bluetooth_hfp(e)) < 0) {
ALOGE("jni hfp registration failure, status: %d", status);
return JNI_ERR;
}
if ((status = android::register_com_android_bluetooth_hfpclient(e)) < 0) {
ALOGE("jni hfp client registration failure, status: %d", status);
return JNI_ERR;
}
if ((status = android::register_com_android_bluetooth_a2dp(e)) < 0) {
ALOGE("jni a2dp source registration failure: %d", status);
return JNI_ERR;
}
if ((status = android::register_com_android_bluetooth_a2dp_sink(e)) < 0) {
ALOGE("jni a2dp sink registration failure: %d", status);
return JNI_ERR;
}
if ((status = android::register_com_android_bluetooth_avrcp(e)) < 0) {
ALOGE("jni avrcp target registration failure: %d", status);
return JNI_ERR;
}
if ((status = android::register_com_android_bluetooth_avrcp_controller(e)) < 0) {
ALOGE("jni avrcp controller registration failure: %d", status);
return JNI_ERR;
}
if ((status = android::register_com_android_bluetooth_hid(e)) < 0) {
ALOGE("jni hid registration failure: %d", status);
return JNI_ERR;
}
if ((status = android::register_com_android_bluetooth_hdp(e)) < 0) {
ALOGE("jni hdp registration failure: %d", status);
return JNI_ERR;
}
if ((status = android::register_com_android_bluetooth_pan(e)) < 0) {
ALOGE("jni pan registration failure: %d", status);
return JNI_ERR;
}
if ((status = android::register_com_android_bluetooth_gatt(e)) < 0) {
ALOGE("jni gatt registration failure: %d", status);
return JNI_ERR;
}
if ((status = android::register_com_android_bluetooth_sdp(e)) < 0) {
ALOGE("jni sdp registration failure: %d", status);
return JNI_ERR;
}
return JNI_VERSION_1_6;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint(const BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint& point)
: m_id(point.m_id)
, m_screenPos(point.m_screenPos)
, m_pos(point.m_pos)
{
switch (point.m_state) {
case BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint::TouchReleased:
m_state = TouchReleased;
break;
case BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint::TouchMoved:
m_state = TouchMoved;
break;
case BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint::TouchPressed:
m_state = TouchPressed;
break;
case BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint::TouchStationary:
m_state = TouchStationary;
break;
default:
m_state = TouchStationary; // make sure m_state is initialized
BLACKBERRY_ASSERT(false);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 1 | 1,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _fb_wrunlock(void)
{
slurm_mutex_lock(&file_bcast_mutex);
fb_write_lock--;
pthread_cond_broadcast(&file_bcast_cond);
slurm_mutex_unlock(&file_bcast_mutex);
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 27,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int xstateregs_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
struct fpu *fpu = &target->thread.fpu;
struct xregs_state *xsave;
int ret;
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
return -ENODEV;
/*
* A whole standard-format XSAVE buffer is needed:
*/
if ((pos != 0) || (count < fpu_user_xstate_size))
return -EFAULT;
xsave = &fpu->state.xsave;
fpu__activate_fpstate_write(fpu);
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)) {
if (kbuf)
ret = copy_kernel_to_xstate(xsave, kbuf);
else
ret = copy_user_to_xstate(xsave, ubuf);
} else {
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, xsave, 0, -1);
}
/*
* In case of failure, mark all states as init:
*/
if (ret)
fpstate_init(&fpu->state);
/*
* mxcsr reserved bits must be masked to zero for security reasons.
*/
xsave->i387.mxcsr &= mxcsr_feature_mask;
xsave->header.xfeatures &= xfeatures_mask;
/*
* These bits must be zero.
*/
memset(&xsave->header.reserved, 0, 48);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: x86/fpu: Don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
On x86, userspace can use the ptrace() or rt_sigreturn() system calls to
set a task's extended state (xstate) or "FPU" registers. ptrace() can
set them for another task using the PTRACE_SETREGSET request with
NT_X86_XSTATE, while rt_sigreturn() can set them for the current task.
In either case, registers can be set to any value, but the kernel
assumes that the XSAVE area itself remains valid in the sense that the
CPU can restore it.
However, in the case where the kernel is using the uncompacted xstate
format (which it does whenever the XSAVES instruction is unavailable),
it was possible for userspace to set the xcomp_bv field in the
xstate_header to an arbitrary value. However, all bits in that field
are reserved in the uncompacted case, so when switching to a task with
nonzero xcomp_bv, the XRSTOR instruction failed with a #GP fault. This
caused the WARN_ON_FPU(err) in copy_kernel_to_xregs() to be hit. In
addition, since the error is otherwise ignored, the FPU registers from
the task previously executing on the CPU were leaked.
Fix the bug by checking that the user-supplied value of xcomp_bv is 0 in
the uncompacted case, and returning an error otherwise.
The reason for validating xcomp_bv rather than simply overwriting it
with 0 is that we want userspace to see an error if it (incorrectly)
provides an XSAVE area in compacted format rather than in uncompacted
format.
Note that as before, in case of error we clear the task's FPU state.
This is perhaps non-ideal, especially for PTRACE_SETREGSET; it might be
better to return an error before changing anything. But it seems the
"clear on error" behavior is fine for now, and it's a little tricky to
do otherwise because it would mean we couldn't simply copy the full
userspace state into kernel memory in one __copy_from_user().
This bug was found by syzkaller, which hit the above-mentioned
WARN_ON_FPU():
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at ./arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:373 __switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.13.0 #453
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0 task.stack: ffffa78cc036c000
RIP: 0010:__switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
RSP: 0000:ffffa78cc08bbb88 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9ba2b8bf2180 RCX: 00000000c0000100
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 000000005cb10700 RDI: ffff9ba2b8bf36c0
RBP: ffffa78cc08bbbd0 R08: 00000000929fdf46 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9ba2b8bf3680 R15: ffff9ba2bf5d7b40
FS: 00007f7e5cb10700(0000) GS:ffff9ba2bf400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004005cc CR3: 0000000079fd5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Call Trace:
Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 11 fd ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 e7 fa ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 c2 fa ff ff <0f> ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 d4 fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f
Here is a C reproducer. The expected behavior is that the program spin
forever with no output. However, on a buggy kernel running on a
processor with the "xsave" feature but without the "xsaves" feature
(e.g. Sandy Bridge through Broadwell for Intel), within a second or two
the program reports that the xmm registers were corrupted, i.e. were not
restored correctly. With CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y it also hits the above
kernel warning.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void)
{
int pid = fork();
uint64_t xstate[512];
struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = xstate, .iov_len = sizeof(xstate) };
if (pid == 0) {
bool tracee = true;
for (int i = 0; i < sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) && tracee; i++)
tracee = (fork() != 0);
uint32_t xmm0[4] = { [0 ... 3] = tracee ? 0x00000000 : 0xDEADBEEF };
asm volatile(" movdqu %0, %%xmm0\n"
" mov %0, %%rbx\n"
"1: movdqu %%xmm0, %0\n"
" mov %0, %%rax\n"
" cmp %%rax, %%rbx\n"
" je 1b\n"
: "+m" (xmm0) : : "rax", "rbx", "xmm0");
printf("BUG: xmm registers corrupted! tracee=%d, xmm0=%08X%08X%08X%08X\n",
tracee, xmm0[0], xmm0[1], xmm0[2], xmm0[3]);
} else {
usleep(100000);
ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
xstate[65] = -1;
ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
}
return 1;
}
Note: the program only tests for the bug using the ptrace() system call.
The bug can also be reproduced using the rt_sigreturn() system call, but
only when called from a 32-bit program, since for 64-bit programs the
kernel restores the FPU state from the signal frame by doing XRSTOR
directly from userspace memory (with proper error checking).
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.17+]
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Fixes: 0b29643a5843 ("x86/xsaves: Change compacted format xsave area header")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922174156.16780-2-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170923130016.21448-25-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 17,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabContentsWrapper* Browser::CreateTabContentsForURL(
const GURL& url, const GURL& referrer, Profile* profile,
PageTransition::Type transition, bool defer_load,
SiteInstance* instance) const {
TabContentsWrapper* contents = TabContentsFactory(profile, instance,
MSG_ROUTING_NONE,
GetSelectedTabContents(), NULL);
if (!defer_load) {
contents->controller().LoadURL(url, referrer, transition);
}
return contents;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool attach()
{
GRefPtr<WebKitWebViewBase> inspectorView = webkit_web_inspector_get_web_view(m_inspector);
if (m_inspectorWindow) {
gtk_container_remove(GTK_CONTAINER(m_inspectorWindow), GTK_WIDGET(inspectorView.get()));
gtk_widget_destroy(m_inspectorWindow);
m_inspectorWindow = 0;
}
GtkWidget* pane;
if (gtk_bin_get_child(GTK_BIN(m_parentWindow)) == GTK_WIDGET(m_webView)) {
GRefPtr<WebKitWebView> inspectedView = m_webView;
gtk_container_remove(GTK_CONTAINER(m_parentWindow), GTK_WIDGET(m_webView));
pane = gtk_paned_new(GTK_ORIENTATION_VERTICAL);
gtk_paned_add1(GTK_PANED(pane), GTK_WIDGET(m_webView));
gtk_container_add(GTK_CONTAINER(m_parentWindow), pane);
gtk_widget_show_all(pane);
} else
pane = gtk_bin_get_child(GTK_BIN(m_parentWindow));
gtk_paned_add2(GTK_PANED(pane), GTK_WIDGET(inspectorView.get()));
return InspectorTest::attach();
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 18,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dm_suspended_internally_md(struct mapped_device *md)
{
return test_bit(DMF_SUSPENDED_INTERNALLY, &md->flags);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 29,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aodv_rreq(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
u_int i;
const struct aodv_rreq *ap = (const struct aodv_rreq *)dat;
ND_TCHECK(*ap);
if (length < sizeof(*ap))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rreq %u %s%s%s%s%shops %u id 0x%08lx\n"
"\tdst %s seq %lu src %s seq %lu", length,
ap->rreq_type & RREQ_JOIN ? "[J]" : "",
ap->rreq_type & RREQ_REPAIR ? "[R]" : "",
ap->rreq_type & RREQ_GRAT ? "[G]" : "",
ap->rreq_type & RREQ_DEST ? "[D]" : "",
ap->rreq_type & RREQ_UNKNOWN ? "[U] " : " ",
ap->rreq_hops,
(unsigned long)EXTRACT_32BITS(&ap->rreq_id),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ap->rreq_da),
(unsigned long)EXTRACT_32BITS(&ap->rreq_ds),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ap->rreq_oa),
(unsigned long)EXTRACT_32BITS(&ap->rreq_os)));
i = length - sizeof(*ap);
if (i >= sizeof(struct aodv_ext))
aodv_extension(ndo, (const struct aodv_ext *)(dat + sizeof(*ap)), i);
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|rreq"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13002/AODV: Add some missing bounds checks.
In aodv_extension() do a bounds check on the extension header before we
look at it.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, add the RFC number, and check the validity of the
length for the Hello extension.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 25,087 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int atl2_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
{
struct net_device *netdev;
struct atl2_adapter *adapter;
static int cards_found;
unsigned long mmio_start;
int mmio_len;
int err;
cards_found = 0;
err = pci_enable_device(pdev);
if (err)
return err;
/*
* atl2 is a shared-high-32-bit device, so we're stuck with 32-bit DMA
* until the kernel has the proper infrastructure to support 64-bit DMA
* on these devices.
*/
if (pci_set_dma_mask(pdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32)) &&
pci_set_consistent_dma_mask(pdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32))) {
printk(KERN_ERR "atl2: No usable DMA configuration, aborting\n");
goto err_dma;
}
/* Mark all PCI regions associated with PCI device
* pdev as being reserved by owner atl2_driver_name */
err = pci_request_regions(pdev, atl2_driver_name);
if (err)
goto err_pci_reg;
/* Enables bus-mastering on the device and calls
* pcibios_set_master to do the needed arch specific settings */
pci_set_master(pdev);
err = -ENOMEM;
netdev = alloc_etherdev(sizeof(struct atl2_adapter));
if (!netdev)
goto err_alloc_etherdev;
SET_NETDEV_DEV(netdev, &pdev->dev);
pci_set_drvdata(pdev, netdev);
adapter = netdev_priv(netdev);
adapter->netdev = netdev;
adapter->pdev = pdev;
adapter->hw.back = adapter;
mmio_start = pci_resource_start(pdev, 0x0);
mmio_len = pci_resource_len(pdev, 0x0);
adapter->hw.mem_rang = (u32)mmio_len;
adapter->hw.hw_addr = ioremap(mmio_start, mmio_len);
if (!adapter->hw.hw_addr) {
err = -EIO;
goto err_ioremap;
}
atl2_setup_pcicmd(pdev);
netdev->netdev_ops = &atl2_netdev_ops;
netdev->ethtool_ops = &atl2_ethtool_ops;
netdev->watchdog_timeo = 5 * HZ;
strncpy(netdev->name, pci_name(pdev), sizeof(netdev->name) - 1);
netdev->mem_start = mmio_start;
netdev->mem_end = mmio_start + mmio_len;
adapter->bd_number = cards_found;
adapter->pci_using_64 = false;
/* setup the private structure */
err = atl2_sw_init(adapter);
if (err)
goto err_sw_init;
err = -EIO;
netdev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_RX;
netdev->features |= (NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_RX);
/* Init PHY as early as possible due to power saving issue */
atl2_phy_init(&adapter->hw);
/* reset the controller to
* put the device in a known good starting state */
if (atl2_reset_hw(&adapter->hw)) {
err = -EIO;
goto err_reset;
}
/* copy the MAC address out of the EEPROM */
atl2_read_mac_addr(&adapter->hw);
memcpy(netdev->dev_addr, adapter->hw.mac_addr, netdev->addr_len);
if (!is_valid_ether_addr(netdev->dev_addr)) {
err = -EIO;
goto err_eeprom;
}
atl2_check_options(adapter);
setup_timer(&adapter->watchdog_timer, atl2_watchdog,
(unsigned long)adapter);
setup_timer(&adapter->phy_config_timer, atl2_phy_config,
(unsigned long)adapter);
INIT_WORK(&adapter->reset_task, atl2_reset_task);
INIT_WORK(&adapter->link_chg_task, atl2_link_chg_task);
strcpy(netdev->name, "eth%d"); /* ?? */
err = register_netdev(netdev);
if (err)
goto err_register;
/* assume we have no link for now */
netif_carrier_off(netdev);
netif_stop_queue(netdev);
cards_found++;
return 0;
err_reset:
err_register:
err_sw_init:
err_eeprom:
iounmap(adapter->hw.hw_addr);
err_ioremap:
free_netdev(netdev);
err_alloc_etherdev:
pci_release_regions(pdev);
err_pci_reg:
err_dma:
pci_disable_device(pdev);
return err;
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 19,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ImeObserver::OnKeyEvent(
const std::string& component_id,
const InputMethodEngineBase::KeyboardEvent& event,
IMEEngineHandlerInterface::KeyEventDoneCallback key_data) {
if (extension_id_.empty())
return;
if (!ShouldForwardKeyEvent()) {
std::move(key_data).Run(false);
return;
}
extensions::InputImeEventRouter* event_router =
extensions::GetInputImeEventRouter(profile_);
if (!event_router || !event_router->GetActiveEngine(extension_id_))
return;
const std::string request_id =
event_router->GetActiveEngine(extension_id_)
->AddRequest(component_id, std::move(key_data));
input_ime::KeyboardEvent key_data_value;
key_data_value.type = input_ime::ParseKeyboardEventType(event.type);
key_data_value.request_id = request_id;
if (!event.extension_id.empty())
key_data_value.extension_id.reset(new std::string(event.extension_id));
key_data_value.key = event.key;
key_data_value.code = event.code;
key_data_value.alt_key.reset(new bool(event.alt_key));
key_data_value.ctrl_key.reset(new bool(event.ctrl_key));
key_data_value.shift_key.reset(new bool(event.shift_key));
key_data_value.caps_lock.reset(new bool(event.caps_lock));
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> args(
input_ime::OnKeyEvent::Create(component_id, key_data_value));
DispatchEventToExtension(extensions::events::INPUT_IME_ON_KEY_EVENT,
input_ime::OnKeyEvent::kEventName, std::move(args));
}
Commit Message: Fix the regression caused by http://crrev.com/c/1288350.
Bug: 900124,856135
Change-Id: Ie11ad406bd1ea383dc2a83cc8661076309154865
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1317010
Reviewed-by: Lan Wei <azurewei@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shu Chen <shuchen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605282}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 29,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gp_ag16(Pixel *p, png_const_voidp pb)
{
png_const_uint_16p pp = voidcast(png_const_uint_16p, pb);
p->r = p->g = p->b = pp[1];
p->a = pp[0];
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_FLOOR( INS_ARG )
{
DO_FLOOR
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SWFOutput_writeGlyphShape(SWFOutput out, SWFShape shape)
{
unsigned char c;
int styleDone = 0;
int i;
c = 1<<4;
SWFOutput_writeUInt8(out, c);
shape->nFills = 1;
shape->nLines = 0;
for ( i=0; i<shape->nRecords; ++i )
{
if(!styleDone && shape->records[i].type == SHAPERECORD_STATECHANGE)
{
shape->records[i].record.stateChange->flags |= SWF_SHAPE_FILLSTYLE0FLAG;
shape->records[i].record.stateChange->leftFill = 1;
styleDone = 1;
}
if ( i < shape->nRecords-1 ||
shape->records[i].type != SHAPERECORD_STATECHANGE )
{
SWFShape_writeShapeRecord(shape, shape->records[i], out);
}
}
SWFOutput_writeBits(out, 0, 6); /* end tag */
SWFOutput_byteAlign(out);
}
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,490 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DownloadResourceHandler::DownloadResourceHandler(
net::URLRequest* request,
const std::string& request_origin,
download::DownloadSource download_source,
bool follow_cross_origin_redirects)
: ResourceHandler(request),
tab_info_(new DownloadTabInfo()),
follow_cross_origin_redirects_(follow_cross_origin_redirects),
first_origin_(url::Origin::Create(request->url())),
core_(request, this, false, request_origin, download_source) {
const ResourceRequestInfoImpl* request_info = GetRequestInfo();
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::UI},
base::BindOnce(
&InitializeDownloadTabInfoOnUIThread,
DownloadRequestHandle(AsWeakPtr(),
request_info->GetWebContentsGetterForRequest()),
tab_info_.get()));
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 3,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlAddDefAttrs(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt,
const xmlChar *fullname,
const xmlChar *fullattr,
const xmlChar *value) {
xmlDefAttrsPtr defaults;
int len;
const xmlChar *name;
const xmlChar *prefix;
/*
* Allows to detect attribute redefinitions
*/
if (ctxt->attsSpecial != NULL) {
if (xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->attsSpecial, fullname, fullattr) != NULL)
return;
}
if (ctxt->attsDefault == NULL) {
ctxt->attsDefault = xmlHashCreateDict(10, ctxt->dict);
if (ctxt->attsDefault == NULL)
goto mem_error;
}
/*
* split the element name into prefix:localname , the string found
* are within the DTD and then not associated to namespace names.
*/
name = xmlSplitQName3(fullname, &len);
if (name == NULL) {
name = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, fullname, -1);
prefix = NULL;
} else {
name = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, name, -1);
prefix = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, fullname, len);
}
/*
* make sure there is some storage
*/
defaults = xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->attsDefault, name, prefix);
if (defaults == NULL) {
defaults = (xmlDefAttrsPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlDefAttrs) +
(4 * 5) * sizeof(const xmlChar *));
if (defaults == NULL)
goto mem_error;
defaults->nbAttrs = 0;
defaults->maxAttrs = 4;
if (xmlHashUpdateEntry2(ctxt->attsDefault, name, prefix,
defaults, NULL) < 0) {
xmlFree(defaults);
goto mem_error;
}
} else if (defaults->nbAttrs >= defaults->maxAttrs) {
xmlDefAttrsPtr temp;
temp = (xmlDefAttrsPtr) xmlRealloc(defaults, sizeof(xmlDefAttrs) +
(2 * defaults->maxAttrs * 5) * sizeof(const xmlChar *));
if (temp == NULL)
goto mem_error;
defaults = temp;
defaults->maxAttrs *= 2;
if (xmlHashUpdateEntry2(ctxt->attsDefault, name, prefix,
defaults, NULL) < 0) {
xmlFree(defaults);
goto mem_error;
}
}
/*
* Split the element name into prefix:localname , the string found
* are within the DTD and hen not associated to namespace names.
*/
name = xmlSplitQName3(fullattr, &len);
if (name == NULL) {
name = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, fullattr, -1);
prefix = NULL;
} else {
name = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, name, -1);
prefix = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, fullattr, len);
}
defaults->values[5 * defaults->nbAttrs] = name;
defaults->values[5 * defaults->nbAttrs + 1] = prefix;
/* intern the string and precompute the end */
len = xmlStrlen(value);
value = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, value, len);
defaults->values[5 * defaults->nbAttrs + 2] = value;
defaults->values[5 * defaults->nbAttrs + 3] = value + len;
if (ctxt->external)
defaults->values[5 * defaults->nbAttrs + 4] = BAD_CAST "external";
else
defaults->values[5 * defaults->nbAttrs + 4] = NULL;
defaults->nbAttrs++;
return;
mem_error:
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return;
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 17,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Element::parseAttributeName(QualifiedName& out, const AtomicString& namespaceURI, const AtomicString& qualifiedName, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
String prefix, localName;
if (!Document::parseQualifiedName(qualifiedName, prefix, localName, ec))
return false;
ASSERT(!ec);
QualifiedName qName(prefix, localName, namespaceURI);
if (!Document::hasValidNamespaceForAttributes(qName)) {
ec = NAMESPACE_ERR;
return false;
}
out = qName;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 5,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string LookupMatchInTopDomains(const std::string& skeleton) {
DCHECK(!skeleton.empty());
DCHECK_NE(skeleton.back(), '.');
TopDomainPreloadDecoder preload_decoder(
g_trie_params.huffman_tree, g_trie_params.huffman_tree_size,
g_trie_params.trie, g_trie_params.trie_bits,
g_trie_params.trie_root_position);
auto labels = base::SplitStringPiece(skeleton, ".", base::KEEP_WHITESPACE,
base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
if (labels.size() > kNumberOfLabelsToCheck) {
labels.erase(labels.begin(),
labels.begin() + labels.size() - kNumberOfLabelsToCheck);
}
while (labels.size() > 1) {
std::string partial_skeleton = base::JoinString(labels, ".");
bool match = false;
bool decoded = preload_decoder.Decode(partial_skeleton, &match);
DCHECK(decoded);
if (!decoded)
return std::string();
if (match)
return preload_decoder.matching_top_domain();
labels.erase(labels.begin());
}
return std::string();
}
Commit Message: Map U+10DE to 3 when checking for confusables
Georgian letter U+10DE (პ) looks similar to the number 3. This cl adds
U+10DE to the mapping to 3 when determining whether to fall back to
punycode when displaying URLs.
Bug: 895207
Change-Id: I49713d7772428f8d364f371850a42913669acc4b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1284396
Commit-Queue: Livvie Lin <livvielin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600193}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: archive_read_format_rar_cleanup(struct archive_read *a)
{
struct rar *rar;
rar = (struct rar *)(a->format->data);
free_codes(a);
free(rar->filename);
free(rar->filename_save);
free(rar->dbo);
free(rar->unp_buffer);
free(rar->lzss.window);
__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Free(&rar->ppmd7_context);
free(rar);
(a->format->data) = NULL;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: rar: file split across multi-part archives must match
Fuzzing uncovered some UAF and memory overrun bugs where a file in a
single file archive reported that it was split across multiple
volumes. This was caused by ppmd7 operations calling
rar_br_fillup. This would invoke rar_read_ahead, which would in some
situations invoke archive_read_format_rar_read_header. That would
check the new file name against the old file name, and if they didn't
match up it would free the ppmd7 buffer and allocate a new
one. However, because the ppmd7 decoder wasn't actually done with the
buffer, it would continue to used the freed buffer. Both reads and
writes to the freed region can be observed.
This is quite tricky to solve: once the buffer has been freed it is
too late, as the ppmd7 decoder functions almost universally assume
success - there's no way for ppmd_read to signal error, nor are there
good ways for functions like Range_Normalise to propagate them. So we
can't detect after the fact that we're in an invalid state - e.g. by
checking rar->cursor, we have to prevent ourselves from ever ending up
there. So, when we are in the dangerous part or rar_read_ahead that
assumes a valid split, we set a flag force read_header to either go
down the path for split files or bail. This means that the ppmd7
decoder keeps a valid buffer and just runs out of data.
Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb and qsym.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 6,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const Extension* ExtensionBrowserTest::GetExtensionByPath(
const extensions::ExtensionSet& extensions,
const base::FilePath& path) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowIO allow_io;
base::FilePath extension_path = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(path);
EXPECT_TRUE(!extension_path.empty());
for (const scoped_refptr<const Extension>& extension : extensions) {
if (extension->path() == extension_path) {
return extension.get();
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint8_t get_tlm(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s, int n)
{
uint8_t Stlm, ST, SP, tile_tlm, i;
bytestream2_get_byte(&s->g); /* Ztlm: skipped */
Stlm = bytestream2_get_byte(&s->g);
ST = (Stlm >> 4) & 0x03;
SP = (Stlm >> 6) & 0x01;
tile_tlm = (n - 4) / ((SP + 1) * 2 + ST);
for (i = 0; i < tile_tlm; i++) {
switch (ST) {
case 0:
break;
case 1:
bytestream2_get_byte(&s->g);
break;
case 2:
bytestream2_get_be16(&s->g);
break;
case 3:
bytestream2_get_be32(&s->g);
break;
}
if (SP == 0) {
bytestream2_get_be16(&s->g);
} else {
bytestream2_get_be32(&s->g);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/jpeg2000dec: prevent out of array accesses in pixel addressing
Fixes Ticket2921
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,040 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual const std::string GetError() { return std::string(); }
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DocumentLoader::ShouldClearWindowName(
const LocalFrame& frame,
const SecurityOrigin* previous_security_origin,
const Document& new_document) {
if (!previous_security_origin)
return false;
if (!frame.IsMainFrame())
return false;
if (frame.Loader().Opener())
return false;
return !new_document.GetSecurityOrigin()->IsSameSchemeHostPort(
previous_security_origin);
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 6,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncTest::EnableNotificationsImpl() {
ASSERT_TRUE(ServerSupportsNotificationControl());
std::string path = "chromiumsync/enablenotifications";
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser(), sync_server_.GetURL(path));
ASSERT_EQ("Notifications enabled",
UTF16ToASCII(browser()->GetSelectedWebContents()->GetTitle()));
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 15,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: armpmu_read(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
/* Don't read disabled counters! */
if (hwc->idx < 0)
return;
armpmu_event_update(event, hwc, hwc->idx);
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_ccm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_ccm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx *pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx(req);
struct skcipher_request *skreq = &pctx->skreq;
struct scatterlist *dst;
unsigned int cryptlen = req->cryptlen;
u8 *odata = pctx->odata;
u8 *iv = req->iv;
int err;
err = crypto_ccm_init_crypt(req, odata);
if (err)
return err;
err = crypto_ccm_auth(req, sg_next(pctx->src), cryptlen);
if (err)
return err;
dst = pctx->src;
if (req->src != req->dst)
dst = pctx->dst;
skcipher_request_set_tfm(skreq, ctx->ctr);
skcipher_request_set_callback(skreq, pctx->flags,
crypto_ccm_encrypt_done, req);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(skreq, pctx->src, dst, cryptlen + 16, iv);
err = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(skreq);
if (err)
return err;
/* copy authtag to end of dst */
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(odata, sg_next(dst), cryptlen,
crypto_aead_authsize(aead), 1);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: ccm - move cbcmac input off the stack
Commit f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
refactored the CCM driver to allow separate implementations of the
underlying MAC to be provided by a platform. However, in doing so, it
moved some data from the linear region to the stack, which violates the
SG constraints when the stack is virtually mapped.
So move idata/odata back to the request ctx struct, of which we can
reasonably expect that it has been allocated using kmalloc() et al.
Reported-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Fixes: f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void no_batched_update(int ndx, BOOL is_redo)
{
struct file_list *flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "no_batched_update");
struct file_struct *file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "(No batched update for%s \"%s\")\n",
is_redo ? " resend of" : "", f_name(file, NULL));
if (inc_recurse && !dry_run)
send_msg_int(MSG_NO_SEND, ndx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AXObjectCache* FrameView::axObjectCache() const
{
if (frame().document())
return frame().document()->existingAXObjectCache();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 22,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u16 SQLITE_NOINLINE computeNumericType(Mem *pMem){
assert( (pMem->flags & (MEM_Int|MEM_Real))==0 );
assert( (pMem->flags & (MEM_Str|MEM_Blob))!=0 );
ExpandBlob(pMem);
if( sqlite3AtoF(pMem->z, &pMem->u.r, pMem->n, pMem->enc)==0 ){
return 0;
}
if( sqlite3Atoi64(pMem->z, &pMem->u.i, pMem->n, pMem->enc)==0 ){
return MEM_Int;
}
return MEM_Real;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 2,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const views::Widget* ShellSurface::GetWidget() const {
return widget_;
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 21,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sco_sock_init(struct sock *sk, struct sock *parent)
{
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (parent)
sk->sk_type = parent->sk_type;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: sco: fix information leak to userspace
struct sco_conninfo has one padding byte in the end. Local variable
cinfo of type sco_conninfo is copied to userspace with this uninizialized
one byte, leading to old stack contents leak.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 4,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _handle_esc_csi_reset_mode(Termpty *ty, Eina_Unicode cc, Eina_Unicode *b)
{
int mode = 0, priv = 0, arg;
if (cc == 'h') mode = 1;
if (*b == '?')
{
priv = 1;
b++;
}
if (priv) /* DEC Private Mode Reset (DECRST) */
{
while (b)
{
arg = _csi_arg_get(&b);
if (b)
{
switch (arg)
{
case 1:
ty->termstate.appcursor = mode;
break;
case 2:
ty->termstate.kbd_lock = mode;
break;
case 3: // 132 column mode… should we handle this?
#if defined(SUPPORT_80_132_COLUMNS)
if (ty->termstate.att.is_80_132_mode_allowed)
{
/* ONLY FOR TESTING PURPOSE FTM */
Evas_Object *wn;
int w, h;
wn = termio_win_get(ty->obj);
elm_win_size_step_get(wn, &w, &h);
evas_object_resize(wn,
4 +
(mode ? 132 : 80) * w,
4 + ty->h * h);
termpty_resize(ty, mode ? 132 : 80,
ty->h);
termpty_reset_state(ty);
termpty_clear_screen(ty,
TERMPTY_CLR_ALL);
}
#endif
break;
case 4:
WRN("TODO: scrolling mode (DECSCLM): %i", mode);
break;
case 5:
ty->termstate.reverse = mode;
break;
case 6:
if (mode)
{
ty->termstate.margin_top = ty->cursor_state.cy;
ty->cursor_state.cx = 0;
}
else
{
ty->cursor_state.cx = 0;
ty->termstate.margin_top = 0;
}
DBG("origin mode (%d): cursor is at 0,0"
" cursor limited to screen/start point"
" for line #'s depends on top margin",
mode);
break;
case 7:
DBG("set wrap mode to %i", mode);
ty->termstate.wrap = mode;
break;
case 8:
ty->termstate.no_autorepeat = !mode;
DBG("auto repeat %i", mode);
break;
case 9:
DBG("set mouse (X10) %i", mode);
if (mode) ty->mouse_mode = MOUSE_X10;
else ty->mouse_mode = MOUSE_OFF;
break;
case 12: // ignore
WRN("TODO: set blinking cursor to (stop?) %i or local echo (ignored)", mode);
break;
case 19: // never seen this - what to do?
WRN("TODO: set print extent to full screen");
break;
case 20: // crfl==1 -> cur moves to col 0 on LF, FF or VT, ==0 -> mode is cr+lf
ty->termstate.crlf = mode;
break;
case 25:
ty->termstate.hide_cursor = !mode;
DBG("hide cursor: %d", !mode);
break;
case 30: // ignore
WRN("TODO: set scrollbar mapping %i", mode);
break;
case 33: // ignore
WRN("TODO: Stop cursor blink %i", mode);
break;
case 34: // ignore
WRN("TODO: Underline cursor mode %i", mode);
break;
case 35: // ignore
WRN("TODO: set shift keys %i", mode);
break;
case 38: // ignore
WRN("TODO: switch to tek window %i", mode);
break;
case 40:
DBG("Allow 80 -> 132 Mode %i", mode);
#if defined(SUPPORT_80_132_COLUMNS)
ty->termstate.att.is_80_132_mode_allowed = mode;
#endif
break;
case 45: // ignore
WRN("TODO: Reverse-wraparound Mode");
break;
case 59: // ignore
WRN("TODO: kanji terminal mode %i", mode);
break;
case 66:
WRN("TODO: app keypad mode %i", mode);
break;
case 67:
ty->termstate.send_bs = mode;
DBG("backspace send bs not del = %i", mode);
break;
case 1000:
if (mode) ty->mouse_mode = MOUSE_NORMAL;
else ty->mouse_mode = MOUSE_OFF;
DBG("set mouse (press+release only) to %i", mode);
break;
case 1001:
WRN("TODO: x11 mouse highlighting %i", mode);
break;
case 1002:
if (mode) ty->mouse_mode = MOUSE_NORMAL_BTN_MOVE;
else ty->mouse_mode = MOUSE_OFF;
DBG("set mouse (press+release+motion while pressed) %i", mode);
break;
case 1003:
if (mode) ty->mouse_mode = MOUSE_NORMAL_ALL_MOVE;
else ty->mouse_mode = MOUSE_OFF;
DBG("set mouse (press+release+all motion) %i", mode);
break;
case 1004: // i dont know what focus repporting is?
WRN("TODO: enable focus reporting %i", mode);
break;
case 1005:
if (mode) ty->mouse_ext = MOUSE_EXT_UTF8;
else ty->mouse_ext = MOUSE_EXT_NONE;
DBG("set mouse (xterm utf8 style) %i", mode);
break;
case 1006:
if (mode) ty->mouse_ext = MOUSE_EXT_SGR;
else ty->mouse_ext = MOUSE_EXT_NONE;
DBG("set mouse (xterm sgr style) %i", mode);
break;
case 1010: // ignore
WRN("TODO: set home on tty output %i", mode);
break;
case 1012: // ignore
WRN("TODO: set home on tty input %i", mode);
break;
case 1015:
if (mode) ty->mouse_ext = MOUSE_EXT_URXVT;
else ty->mouse_ext = MOUSE_EXT_NONE;
DBG("set mouse (rxvt-unicode style) %i", mode);
break;
case 1034: // ignore
/* libreadline6 emits it but it shouldn't.
See http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=577012
*/
DBG("Ignored screen mode %i", arg);
break;
case 1047:
case 47:
_switch_to_alternative_screen(ty, mode);
break;
case 1048:
case 1049:
termpty_cursor_copy(ty, mode);
if (arg == 1049)
_switch_to_alternative_screen(ty, mode);
break;
case 2004:
ty->bracketed_paste = mode;
break;
case 7727: // ignore
WRN("TODO: enable application escape mode %i", mode);
break;
case 7786: // ignore
WRN("TODO: enable mouse wheel -> cursor key xlation %i", mode);
break;
default:
ERR("Unhandled DEC Private Reset Mode arg %i", arg);
break;
}
}
}
}
else /* Reset Mode (RM) */
{
while (b)
{
arg = _csi_arg_get(&b);
if (b)
{
switch (arg)
{
case 1:
ty->termstate.appcursor = mode;
break;
case 4:
DBG("set insert mode to %i", mode);
ty->termstate.insert = mode;
break;
case 34:
WRN("TODO: hebrew keyboard mapping: %i", mode);
break;
case 36:
WRN("TODO: hebrew encoding mode: %i", mode);
break;
default:
ERR("Unhandled ANSI Reset Mode arg %i", arg);
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 6,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::Form_DisplayCaret(FPDF_FORMFILLINFO* param,
FPDF_PAGE page,
FPDF_BOOL visible,
double left,
double top,
double right,
double bottom) {
PDFiumEngine* engine = static_cast<PDFiumEngine*>(param);
engine->client_->UpdateCursor(PP_CURSORTYPE_IBEAM);
std::vector<pp::Rect> tickmarks;
pp::Rect rect(left, top, right, bottom);
tickmarks.push_back(rect);
engine->client_->UpdateTickMarks(tickmarks);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 6,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err cprt_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_CopyrightBox *p;
p = (GF_CopyrightBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "CopyrightBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "LanguageCode=\"%s\" CopyrightNotice=\"%s\">\n", p->packedLanguageCode, p->notice);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("CopyrightBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 21,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int yr_object_create(
int8_t type,
const char* identifier,
YR_OBJECT* parent,
YR_OBJECT** object)
{
YR_OBJECT* obj;
int i;
size_t object_size = 0;
assert(parent != NULL || object != NULL);
switch (type)
{
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRUCTURE:
object_size = sizeof(YR_OBJECT_STRUCTURE);
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_ARRAY:
object_size = sizeof(YR_OBJECT_ARRAY);
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_DICTIONARY:
object_size = sizeof(YR_OBJECT_DICTIONARY);
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_INTEGER:
object_size = sizeof(YR_OBJECT_INTEGER);
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_FLOAT:
object_size = sizeof(YR_OBJECT_DOUBLE);
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRING:
object_size = sizeof(YR_OBJECT_STRING);
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_FUNCTION:
object_size = sizeof(YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION);
break;
default:
assert(FALSE);
}
obj = (YR_OBJECT*) yr_malloc(object_size);
if (obj == NULL)
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
obj->type = type;
obj->identifier = yr_strdup(identifier);
obj->parent = parent;
obj->data = NULL;
switch(type)
{
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRUCTURE:
((YR_OBJECT_STRUCTURE*) obj)->members = NULL;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_ARRAY:
((YR_OBJECT_ARRAY*) obj)->items = NULL;
((YR_OBJECT_ARRAY*) obj)->prototype_item = NULL;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_DICTIONARY:
((YR_OBJECT_DICTIONARY*) obj)->items = NULL;
((YR_OBJECT_DICTIONARY*) obj)->prototype_item = NULL;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_INTEGER:
((YR_OBJECT_INTEGER*) obj)->value = UNDEFINED;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_FLOAT:
((YR_OBJECT_DOUBLE*) obj)->value = NAN;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRING:
((YR_OBJECT_STRING*) obj)->value = NULL;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_FUNCTION:
((YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION*) obj)->return_obj = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_OVERLOADED_FUNCTIONS; i++)
{
((YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION*) obj)->prototypes[i].arguments_fmt = NULL;
((YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION*) obj)->prototypes[i].code = NULL;
}
break;
}
if (obj->identifier == NULL)
{
yr_free(obj);
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
}
if (parent != NULL)
{
assert(parent->type == OBJECT_TYPE_STRUCTURE ||
parent->type == OBJECT_TYPE_ARRAY ||
parent->type == OBJECT_TYPE_DICTIONARY ||
parent->type == OBJECT_TYPE_FUNCTION);
switch(parent->type)
{
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRUCTURE:
FAIL_ON_ERROR_WITH_CLEANUP(
yr_object_structure_set_member(parent, obj),
{
yr_free((void*) obj->identifier);
yr_free(obj);
});
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_ARRAY:
((YR_OBJECT_ARRAY*) parent)->prototype_item = obj;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_DICTIONARY:
((YR_OBJECT_DICTIONARY*) parent)->prototype_item = obj;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_FUNCTION:
((YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION*) parent)->return_obj = obj;
break;
}
}
if (object != NULL)
*object = obj;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #658
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 26,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaRequestState state(MediaStreamType stream_type) const {
return state_[stream_type];
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OomInterventionTabHelper::OnHighMemoryUsage() {
auto* config = OomInterventionConfig::GetInstance();
if (config->is_renderer_pause_enabled() ||
config->is_navigate_ads_enabled()) {
NearOomReductionInfoBar::Show(web_contents(), this);
intervention_state_ = InterventionState::UI_SHOWN;
if (!last_navigation_timestamp_.is_null()) {
base::TimeDelta time_since_last_navigation =
base::TimeTicks::Now() - last_navigation_timestamp_;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_1M(
"Memory.Experimental.OomIntervention."
"RendererTimeSinceLastNavigationAtIntervention",
time_since_last_navigation.InSeconds());
}
}
near_oom_detected_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
renderer_detection_timer_.AbandonAndStop();
}
Commit Message: OomIntervention opt-out should work properly with 'show original'
OomIntervention should not be re-triggered on the same page if the user declines the intervention once.
This CL fixes the bug.
Bug: 889131, 887119
Change-Id: Idb9eebb2bb9f79756b63f0e010fe018ba5c490e8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1245019
Commit-Queue: Yuzu Saijo <yuzus@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594574}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void do_syscall_trace(void)
{
/*
* The 0x80 provides a way for the tracing parent to distinguish
* between a syscall stop and SIGTRAP delivery
*/
ptrace_notify(SIGTRAP|((current->ptrace & PT_TRACESYSGOOD) ? 0x80 : 0));
/*
* this isn't the same as continuing with a signal, but it will do
* for normal use. strace only continues with a signal if the
* stopping signal is not SIGTRAP. -brl
*/
if (current->exit_code) {
send_sig(current->exit_code, current, 1);
current->exit_code = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: xtensa: prevent arbitrary read in ptrace
Prevent an arbitrary kernel read. Check the user pointer with access_ok()
before copying data in.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/EIO/EFAULT/]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Christian Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __ablkcipher_walk_complete(struct ablkcipher_walk *walk)
{
struct ablkcipher_buffer *p, *tmp;
list_for_each_entry_safe(p, tmp, &walk->buffers, entry) {
ablkcipher_buffer_write(p);
list_del(&p->entry);
kfree(p);
}
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 24,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResetScreenHandler::OnRollbackCheck(bool can_rollback) {
VLOG(1) << "Callback from CanRollbackCheck, result " << can_rollback;
rollback_available_ = can_rollback;
ShowWithParams();
}
Commit Message: Rollback option put behind the flag.
BUG=368860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/267393011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269753 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int remote_socket_enqueue(asocket* s, apacket* p) {
D("entered remote_socket_enqueue RS(%d) WRITE fd=%d peer.fd=%d", s->id, s->fd, s->peer->fd);
p->msg.command = A_WRTE;
p->msg.arg0 = s->peer->id;
p->msg.arg1 = s->id;
p->msg.data_length = p->len;
send_packet(p, s->transport);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: adb: use asocket's close function when closing.
close_all_sockets was assuming that all registered local sockets used
local_socket_close as their close function. However, this is not true
for JDWP sockets.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I40a1174845cd33f15f30ce70828a7081cd5a087e
(cherry picked from commit 53eb31d87cb84a4212f4850bf745646e1fb12814)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 14,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewDataService::GetDataEntry(
const std::string& preview_ui_addr_str,
int index,
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes>* data_bytes) {
*data_bytes = NULL;
PreviewDataStoreMap::iterator it = data_store_map_.find(preview_ui_addr_str);
if (it != data_store_map_.end())
it->second->GetPreviewDataForIndex(index, data_bytes);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 24,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API void ZEND_FASTCALL zend_hash_extend(HashTable *ht, uint32_t nSize, zend_bool packed)
{
HT_ASSERT(GC_REFCOUNT(ht) == 1);
if (nSize == 0) return;
if (UNEXPECTED(!((ht)->u.flags & HASH_FLAG_INITIALIZED))) {
if (nSize > ht->nTableSize) {
ht->nTableSize = zend_hash_check_size(nSize);
}
zend_hash_check_init(ht, packed);
} else {
if (packed) {
ZEND_ASSERT(ht->u.flags & HASH_FLAG_PACKED);
if (nSize > ht->nTableSize) {
HANDLE_BLOCK_INTERRUPTIONS();
ht->nTableSize = zend_hash_check_size(nSize);
HT_SET_DATA_ADDR(ht, perealloc2(HT_GET_DATA_ADDR(ht), HT_SIZE(ht), HT_USED_SIZE(ht), ht->u.flags & HASH_FLAG_PERSISTENT));
HANDLE_UNBLOCK_INTERRUPTIONS();
}
} else {
ZEND_ASSERT(!(ht->u.flags & HASH_FLAG_PACKED));
if (nSize > ht->nTableSize) {
void *new_data, *old_data = HT_GET_DATA_ADDR(ht);
Bucket *old_buckets = ht->arData;
nSize = zend_hash_check_size(nSize);
HANDLE_BLOCK_INTERRUPTIONS();
new_data = pemalloc(HT_SIZE_EX(nSize, -nSize), ht->u.flags & HASH_FLAG_PERSISTENT);
ht->nTableSize = nSize;
ht->nTableMask = -ht->nTableSize;
HT_SET_DATA_ADDR(ht, new_data);
memcpy(ht->arData, old_buckets, sizeof(Bucket) * ht->nNumUsed);
pefree(old_data, ht->u.flags & HASH_FLAG_PERSISTENT);
zend_hash_rehash(ht);
HANDLE_UNBLOCK_INTERRUPTIONS();
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 25,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t BnGraphicBufferProducer::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case REQUEST_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferIdx = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer;
int result = requestBuffer(bufferIdx, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(buffer != 0);
if (buffer != 0) {
reply->write(*buffer);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferCount = data.readInt32();
int result = setBufferCount(bufferCount);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DEQUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
bool async = static_cast<bool>(data.readInt32());
uint32_t width = data.readUint32();
uint32_t height = data.readUint32();
PixelFormat format = static_cast<PixelFormat>(data.readInt32());
uint32_t usage = data.readUint32();
int buf = 0;
sp<Fence> fence;
int result = dequeueBuffer(&buf, &fence, async, width, height,
format, usage);
reply->writeInt32(buf);
reply->writeInt32(fence != NULL);
if (fence != NULL) {
reply->write(*fence);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DETACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int slot = data.readInt32();
int result = detachBuffer(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DETACH_NEXT_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer;
sp<Fence> fence;
int32_t result = detachNextBuffer(&buffer, &fence);
reply->writeInt32(result);
if (result == NO_ERROR) {
reply->writeInt32(buffer != NULL);
if (buffer != NULL) {
reply->write(*buffer);
}
reply->writeInt32(fence != NULL);
if (fence != NULL) {
reply->write(*fence);
}
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ATTACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*buffer.get());
int slot = 0;
int result = attachBuffer(&slot, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case QUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferInput input(data);
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
memset(output, 0, sizeof(QueueBufferOutput));
status_t result = queueBuffer(buf, input, output);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CANCEL_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
sp<Fence> fence = new Fence();
data.read(*fence.get());
cancelBuffer(buf, fence);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case QUERY: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int value = 0;
int what = data.readInt32();
int res = query(what, &value);
reply->writeInt32(value);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<IProducerListener> listener;
if (data.readInt32() == 1) {
listener = IProducerListener::asInterface(data.readStrongBinder());
}
int api = data.readInt32();
bool producerControlledByApp = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
status_t res = connect(listener, api, producerControlledByApp, output);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DISCONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int api = data.readInt32();
status_t res = disconnect(api);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_SIDEBAND_STREAM: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<NativeHandle> stream;
if (data.readInt32()) {
stream = NativeHandle::create(data.readNativeHandle(), true);
}
status_t result = setSidebandStream(stream);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOCATE_BUFFERS: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
bool async = static_cast<bool>(data.readInt32());
uint32_t width = data.readUint32();
uint32_t height = data.readUint32();
PixelFormat format = static_cast<PixelFormat>(data.readInt32());
uint32_t usage = data.readUint32();
allocateBuffers(async, width, height, format, usage);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOW_ALLOCATION: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
bool allow = static_cast<bool>(data.readInt32());
status_t result = allowAllocation(allow);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_GENERATION_NUMBER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
uint32_t generationNumber = data.readUint32();
status_t result = setGenerationNumber(generationNumber);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_CONSUMER_NAME: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
reply->writeString8(getConsumerName());
return NO_ERROR;
}
}
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 15,909 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void GetStandardDeviationPixelList(PixelList *pixel_list,
MagickPixelPacket *pixel)
{
MagickRealType
sum,
sum_squared;
register SkipList
*list;
register ssize_t
channel;
size_t
color;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned short
channels[ListChannels];
/*
Find the standard-deviation value for each of the color.
*/
for (channel=0; channel < 5; channel++)
{
list=pixel_list->lists+channel;
color=65536L;
count=0;
sum=0.0;
sum_squared=0.0;
do
{
register ssize_t
i;
color=list->nodes[color].next[0];
sum+=(MagickRealType) list->nodes[color].count*color;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) list->nodes[color].count; i++)
sum_squared+=((MagickRealType) color)*((MagickRealType) color);
count+=list->nodes[color].count;
} while (count < (ssize_t) pixel_list->length);
sum/=pixel_list->length;
sum_squared/=pixel_list->length;
channels[channel]=(unsigned short) sqrt(sum_squared-(sum*sum));
}
pixel->red=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[0]);
pixel->green=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[1]);
pixel->blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[2]);
pixel->opacity=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[3]);
pixel->index=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[4]);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vdi_port_send_tokens_to_client(RedClient *client, uint32_t tokens, void *opaque)
{
main_channel_client_push_agent_tokens(red_client_get_main(client),
tokens);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IRCView::lastBlockIsLine(int select)
{
Burr *b = dynamic_cast<Burr*>(document()->lastBlock().userData());
int state = -1;
if (b)
state = b->m_format;
if (select == -1)
return (state == BlockIsRemember || state == BlockIsMarker);
return state == select;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,759 |
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