instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 386 112k | output stringclasses 3 values | __index_level_0__ int64 15 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void HTMLElement::setInnerHTML(const String& html, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
RefPtr<DocumentFragment> fragment = createFragmentFromSource(html, this, ec);
if (fragment)
replaceChildrenWithFragment(this, fragment.release(), ec);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not prevent calls to functions in other frames, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted web site, related to a *cross-frame function leak.*
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 6,744 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int ext4_insert_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
handle_t *handle;
struct ext4_ext_path *path;
struct ext4_extent *extent;
ext4_lblk_t offset_lblk, len_lblk, ee_start_lblk = 0;
unsigned int credits, ee_len;
int ret = 0, depth, split_flag = 0;
loff_t ioffset;
/*
* We need to test this early because xfstests assumes that an
* insert range of (0, 1) will return EOPNOTSUPP if the file
* system does not support insert range.
*/
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Insert range works only on fs block size aligned offsets. */
if (offset & (EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(sb) - 1) ||
len & (EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(sb) - 1))
return -EINVAL;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
trace_ext4_insert_range(inode, offset, len);
offset_lblk = offset >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
len_lblk = len >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
/* Call ext4_force_commit to flush all data in case of data=journal */
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
ret = ext4_force_commit(inode->i_sb);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* Need to round down to align start offset to page size boundary
* for page size > block size.
*/
ioffset = round_down(offset, PAGE_SIZE);
/* Write out all dirty pages */
ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(inode->i_mapping, ioffset,
LLONG_MAX);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* Take mutex lock */
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/* Currently just for extent based files */
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Check for wrap through zero */
if (inode->i_size + len > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes) {
ret = -EFBIG;
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Offset should be less than i_size */
if (offset >= i_size_read(inode)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_mutex;
}
truncate_pagecache(inode, ioffset);
/* Wait for existing dio to complete */
ext4_inode_block_unlocked_dio(inode);
inode_dio_wait(inode);
credits = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_TRUNCATE, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto out_dio;
}
/* Expand file to avoid data loss if there is error while shifting */
inode->i_size += len;
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize += len;
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ret = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
if (ret)
goto out_stop;
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
path = ext4_find_extent(inode, offset_lblk, NULL, 0);
if (IS_ERR(path)) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
depth = ext_depth(inode);
extent = path[depth].p_ext;
if (extent) {
ee_start_lblk = le32_to_cpu(extent->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(extent);
/*
* If offset_lblk is not the starting block of extent, split
* the extent @offset_lblk
*/
if ((offset_lblk > ee_start_lblk) &&
(offset_lblk < (ee_start_lblk + ee_len))) {
if (ext4_ext_is_unwritten(extent))
split_flag = EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT1 |
EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2;
ret = ext4_split_extent_at(handle, inode, &path,
offset_lblk, split_flag,
EXT4_EX_NOCACHE |
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO |
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_METADATA_NOFAIL);
}
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
kfree(path);
if (ret < 0) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
}
ret = ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, offset_lblk,
EXT_MAX_BLOCKS - offset_lblk);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
/*
* if offset_lblk lies in a hole which is at start of file, use
* ee_start_lblk to shift extents
*/
ret = ext4_ext_shift_extents(inode, handle,
ee_start_lblk > offset_lblk ? ee_start_lblk : offset_lblk,
len_lblk, SHIFT_RIGHT);
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
out_stop:
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out_dio:
ext4_inode_resume_unlocked_dio(inode);
out_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the ext4 filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allow local users to cause a denial of service (disk corruption) by writing to a page that is associated with a different user's file after unsynchronized hole punching and page-fault handling.
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> | Low | 7,366 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void CaptivePortalDetector::DetectCaptivePortal(
const GURL& url,
const DetectionCallback& detection_callback) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(!FetchingURL());
DCHECK(detection_callback_.is_null());
detection_callback_ = detection_callback;
url_fetcher_ = net::URLFetcher::Create(0, url, net::URLFetcher::GET, this);
url_fetcher_->SetAutomaticallyRetryOn5xx(false);
url_fetcher_->SetRequestContext(request_context_.get());
url_fetcher_->SetLoadFlags(
net::LOAD_BYPASS_CACHE |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SAVE_COOKIES |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_COOKIES |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_AUTH_DATA);
url_fetcher_->Start();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SkAutoSTArray implementation in include/core/SkTemplates.h in the filters implementation in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger a reset action with a large count value, leading to an out-of-bounds write operation.
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810} | High | 25,545 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> uniformMatrixHelper(const v8::Arguments& args,
int matrixSize)
{
if (args.Length() != 3)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
WebGLRenderingContext* context = V8WebGLRenderingContext::toNative(args.Holder());
if (args.Length() > 0 && !isUndefinedOrNull(args[0]) && !V8WebGLUniformLocation::HasInstance(args[0])) {
V8Proxy::throwTypeError();
return notHandledByInterceptor();
}
bool ok = false;
WebGLUniformLocation* location = toWebGLUniformLocation(args[0], ok);
bool transpose = args[1]->BooleanValue();
if (V8Float32Array::HasInstance(args[2])) {
Float32Array* array = V8Float32Array::toNative(args[2]->ToObject());
ASSERT(array != NULL);
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
switch (matrixSize) {
case 2: context->uniformMatrix2fv(location, transpose, array, ec); break;
case 3: context->uniformMatrix3fv(location, transpose, array, ec); break;
case 4: context->uniformMatrix4fv(location, transpose, array, ec); break;
default: ASSERT_NOT_REACHED(); break;
}
if (ec)
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Undefined();
}
if (args[2].IsEmpty() || !args[2]->IsArray()) {
V8Proxy::throwTypeError();
return notHandledByInterceptor();
}
v8::Handle<v8::Array> array =
v8::Local<v8::Array>::Cast(args[2]);
uint32_t len = array->Length();
float* data = jsArrayToFloatArray(array, len);
if (!data) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(SYNTAX_ERR, args.GetIsolate());
return notHandledByInterceptor();
}
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
switch (matrixSize) {
case 2: context->uniformMatrix2fv(location, transpose, data, len, ec); break;
case 3: context->uniformMatrix3fv(location, transpose, data, len, ec); break;
case 4: context->uniformMatrix4fv(location, transpose, data, len, ec); break;
default: ASSERT_NOT_REACHED(); break;
}
fastFree(data);
if (ec)
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Undefined();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 17,382 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
int val, valbool;
int retv = -ENOPROTOOPT;
bool needs_rtnl = setsockopt_needs_rtnl(optname);
if (!optval)
val = 0;
else {
if (optlen >= sizeof(int)) {
if (get_user(val, (int __user *) optval))
return -EFAULT;
} else
val = 0;
}
valbool = (val != 0);
if (ip6_mroute_opt(optname))
return ip6_mroute_setsockopt(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
if (needs_rtnl)
rtnl_lock();
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_ADDRFORM:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val == PF_INET) {
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct sk_buff *pktopt;
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_RAW)
break;
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP ||
sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDPLITE) {
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
if (up->pending == AF_INET6) {
retv = -EBUSY;
break;
}
} else if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
break;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
retv = -ENOTCONN;
break;
}
if (ipv6_only_sock(sk) ||
!ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr)) {
retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
break;
}
fl6_free_socklist(sk);
ipv6_sock_mc_close(sk);
/*
* Sock is moving from IPv6 to IPv4 (sk_prot), so
* remove it from the refcnt debug socks count in the
* original family...
*/
sk_refcnt_debug_dec(sk);
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP) {
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
local_bh_disable();
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, sk->sk_prot, -1);
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, &tcp_prot, 1);
local_bh_enable();
sk->sk_prot = &tcp_prot;
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &ipv4_specific;
sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_stream_ops;
sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
tcp_sync_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
} else {
struct proto *prot = &udp_prot;
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDPLITE)
prot = &udplite_prot;
local_bh_disable();
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, sk->sk_prot, -1);
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, prot, 1);
local_bh_enable();
sk->sk_prot = prot;
sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
}
opt = xchg(&np->opt, NULL);
if (opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
pktopt = xchg(&np->pktoptions, NULL);
kfree_skb(pktopt);
sk->sk_destruct = inet_sock_destruct;
/*
* ... and add it to the refcnt debug socks count
* in the new family. -acme
*/
sk_refcnt_debug_inc(sk);
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
retv = 0;
break;
}
goto e_inval;
case IPV6_V6ONLY:
if (optlen < sizeof(int) ||
inet_sk(sk)->inet_num)
goto e_inval;
sk->sk_ipv6only = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVPKTINFO:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxinfo = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292PKTINFO:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxoinfo = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVHOPLIMIT:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxhlim = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292HOPLIMIT:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxohlim = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVRTHDR:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.srcrt = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292RTHDR:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.osrcrt = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVHOPOPTS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.hopopts = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292HOPOPTS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.ohopopts = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVDSTOPTS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.dstopts = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292DSTOPTS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.odstopts = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_TCLASS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val < -1 || val > 0xff)
goto e_inval;
/* RFC 3542, 6.5: default traffic class of 0x0 */
if (val == -1)
val = 0;
np->tclass = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVTCLASS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxtclass = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWINFO:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxflow = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVPATHMTU:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxpmtu = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_TRANSPARENT:
if (valbool && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)) {
retv = -EPERM;
break;
}
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
/* we don't have a separate transparent bit for IPV6 we use the one in the IPv4 socket */
inet_sk(sk)->transparent = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVORIGDSTADDR:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxorigdstaddr = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_HOPOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDR:
case IPV6_DSTOPTS:
{
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
/* remove any sticky options header with a zero option
* length, per RFC3542.
*/
if (optlen == 0)
optval = NULL;
else if (!optval)
goto e_inval;
else if (optlen < sizeof(struct ipv6_opt_hdr) ||
optlen & 0x7 || optlen > 8 * 255)
goto e_inval;
/* hop-by-hop / destination options are privileged option */
retv = -EPERM;
if (optname != IPV6_RTHDR && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
break;
opt = ipv6_renew_options(sk, np->opt, optname,
(struct ipv6_opt_hdr __user *)optval,
optlen);
if (IS_ERR(opt)) {
retv = PTR_ERR(opt);
break;
}
/* routing header option needs extra check */
retv = -EINVAL;
if (optname == IPV6_RTHDR && opt && opt->srcrt) {
struct ipv6_rt_hdr *rthdr = opt->srcrt;
switch (rthdr->type) {
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6_MIP6)
case IPV6_SRCRT_TYPE_2:
if (rthdr->hdrlen != 2 ||
rthdr->segments_left != 1)
goto sticky_done;
break;
#endif
default:
goto sticky_done;
}
}
retv = 0;
opt = ipv6_update_options(sk, opt);
sticky_done:
if (opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
break;
}
case IPV6_PKTINFO:
{
struct in6_pktinfo pkt;
if (optlen == 0)
goto e_inval;
else if (optlen < sizeof(struct in6_pktinfo) || !optval)
goto e_inval;
if (copy_from_user(&pkt, optval, sizeof(struct in6_pktinfo))) {
retv = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && pkt.ipi6_ifindex != sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
goto e_inval;
np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex = pkt.ipi6_ifindex;
np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_addr = pkt.ipi6_addr;
retv = 0;
break;
}
case IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS:
{
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct msghdr msg;
struct flowi6 fl6;
int junk;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (optlen == 0)
goto update;
/* 1K is probably excessive
* 1K is surely not enough, 2K per standard header is 16K.
*/
retv = -EINVAL;
if (optlen > 64*1024)
break;
opt = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*opt) + optlen, GFP_KERNEL);
retv = -ENOBUFS;
if (!opt)
break;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(*opt) + optlen;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(opt+1, optval, optlen))
goto done;
msg.msg_controllen = optlen;
msg.msg_control = (void *)(opt+1);
retv = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(net, sk, &msg, &fl6, opt, &junk,
&junk, &junk);
if (retv)
goto done;
update:
retv = 0;
opt = ipv6_update_options(sk, opt);
done:
if (opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
break;
}
case IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val > 255 || val < -1)
goto e_inval;
np->hop_limit = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS:
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
break;
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val > 255 || val < -1)
goto e_inval;
np->mcast_hops = (val == -1 ? IPV6_DEFAULT_MCASTHOPS : val);
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_MULTICAST_LOOP:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val != valbool)
goto e_inval;
np->mc_loop = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_UNICAST_IF:
{
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
int ifindex;
if (optlen != sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
ifindex = (__force int)ntohl((__force __be32)val);
if (ifindex == 0) {
np->ucast_oif = 0;
retv = 0;
break;
}
dev = dev_get_by_index(net, ifindex);
retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (!dev)
break;
dev_put(dev);
retv = -EINVAL;
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
break;
np->ucast_oif = ifindex;
retv = 0;
break;
}
case IPV6_MULTICAST_IF:
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
break;
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val) {
struct net_device *dev;
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && sk->sk_bound_dev_if != val)
goto e_inval;
dev = dev_get_by_index(net, val);
if (!dev) {
retv = -ENODEV;
break;
}
dev_put(dev);
}
np->mcast_oif = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP:
case IPV6_DROP_MEMBERSHIP:
{
struct ipv6_mreq mreq;
if (optlen < sizeof(struct ipv6_mreq))
goto e_inval;
retv = -EPROTO;
if (inet_sk(sk)->is_icsk)
break;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&mreq, optval, sizeof(struct ipv6_mreq)))
break;
if (optname == IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP)
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_join(sk, mreq.ipv6mr_ifindex, &mreq.ipv6mr_multiaddr);
else
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_drop(sk, mreq.ipv6mr_ifindex, &mreq.ipv6mr_multiaddr);
break;
}
case IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST:
case IPV6_LEAVE_ANYCAST:
{
struct ipv6_mreq mreq;
if (optlen < sizeof(struct ipv6_mreq))
goto e_inval;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&mreq, optval, sizeof(struct ipv6_mreq)))
break;
if (optname == IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST)
retv = ipv6_sock_ac_join(sk, mreq.ipv6mr_ifindex, &mreq.ipv6mr_acaddr);
else
retv = ipv6_sock_ac_drop(sk, mreq.ipv6mr_ifindex, &mreq.ipv6mr_acaddr);
break;
}
case MCAST_JOIN_GROUP:
case MCAST_LEAVE_GROUP:
{
struct group_req greq;
struct sockaddr_in6 *psin6;
if (optlen < sizeof(struct group_req))
goto e_inval;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&greq, optval, sizeof(struct group_req)))
break;
if (greq.gr_group.ss_family != AF_INET6) {
retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
break;
}
psin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&greq.gr_group;
if (optname == MCAST_JOIN_GROUP)
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_join(sk, greq.gr_interface,
&psin6->sin6_addr);
else
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_drop(sk, greq.gr_interface,
&psin6->sin6_addr);
break;
}
case MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP:
case MCAST_LEAVE_SOURCE_GROUP:
case MCAST_BLOCK_SOURCE:
case MCAST_UNBLOCK_SOURCE:
{
struct group_source_req greqs;
int omode, add;
if (optlen < sizeof(struct group_source_req))
goto e_inval;
if (copy_from_user(&greqs, optval, sizeof(greqs))) {
retv = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (greqs.gsr_group.ss_family != AF_INET6 ||
greqs.gsr_source.ss_family != AF_INET6) {
retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
break;
}
if (optname == MCAST_BLOCK_SOURCE) {
omode = MCAST_EXCLUDE;
add = 1;
} else if (optname == MCAST_UNBLOCK_SOURCE) {
omode = MCAST_EXCLUDE;
add = 0;
} else if (optname == MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP) {
struct sockaddr_in6 *psin6;
psin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&greqs.gsr_group;
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_join(sk, greqs.gsr_interface,
&psin6->sin6_addr);
/* prior join w/ different source is ok */
if (retv && retv != -EADDRINUSE)
break;
omode = MCAST_INCLUDE;
add = 1;
} else /* MCAST_LEAVE_SOURCE_GROUP */ {
omode = MCAST_INCLUDE;
add = 0;
}
retv = ip6_mc_source(add, omode, sk, &greqs);
break;
}
case MCAST_MSFILTER:
{
struct group_filter *gsf;
if (optlen < GROUP_FILTER_SIZE(0))
goto e_inval;
if (optlen > sysctl_optmem_max) {
retv = -ENOBUFS;
break;
}
gsf = kmalloc(optlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!gsf) {
retv = -ENOBUFS;
break;
}
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(gsf, optval, optlen)) {
kfree(gsf);
break;
}
/* numsrc >= (4G-140)/128 overflow in 32 bits */
if (gsf->gf_numsrc >= 0x1ffffffU ||
gsf->gf_numsrc > sysctl_mld_max_msf) {
kfree(gsf);
retv = -ENOBUFS;
break;
}
if (GROUP_FILTER_SIZE(gsf->gf_numsrc) > optlen) {
kfree(gsf);
retv = -EINVAL;
break;
}
retv = ip6_mc_msfilter(sk, gsf);
kfree(gsf);
break;
}
case IPV6_ROUTER_ALERT:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
retv = ip6_ra_control(sk, val);
break;
case IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val < IPV6_PMTUDISC_DONT || val > IPV6_PMTUDISC_OMIT)
goto e_inval;
np->pmtudisc = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_MTU:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val && val < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
goto e_inval;
np->frag_size = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVERR:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->recverr = valbool;
if (!val)
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_error_queue);
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWINFO_SEND:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->sndflow = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR:
retv = ipv6_flowlabel_opt(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY:
case IPV6_XFRM_POLICY:
retv = -EPERM;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
retv = xfrm_user_policy(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
break;
case IPV6_ADDR_PREFERENCES:
{
unsigned int pref = 0;
unsigned int prefmask = ~0;
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
retv = -EINVAL;
/* check PUBLIC/TMP/PUBTMP_DEFAULT conflicts */
switch (val & (IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC|
IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP|
IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBTMP_DEFAULT)) {
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC:
pref |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC;
break;
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP:
pref |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP;
break;
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBTMP_DEFAULT:
break;
case 0:
goto pref_skip_pubtmp;
default:
goto e_inval;
}
prefmask &= ~(IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC|
IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP);
pref_skip_pubtmp:
/* check HOME/COA conflicts */
switch (val & (IPV6_PREFER_SRC_HOME|IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA)) {
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_HOME:
break;
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA:
pref |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA;
case 0:
goto pref_skip_coa;
default:
goto e_inval;
}
prefmask &= ~IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA;
pref_skip_coa:
/* check CGA/NONCGA conflicts */
switch (val & (IPV6_PREFER_SRC_CGA|IPV6_PREFER_SRC_NONCGA)) {
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_CGA:
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_NONCGA:
case 0:
break;
default:
goto e_inval;
}
np->srcprefs = (np->srcprefs & prefmask) | pref;
retv = 0;
break;
}
case IPV6_MINHOPCOUNT:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val < 0 || val > 255)
goto e_inval;
np->min_hopcount = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_DONTFRAG:
np->dontfrag = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL:
np->autoflowlabel = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
if (needs_rtnl)
rtnl_unlock();
return retv;
e_inval:
release_sock(sk);
if (needs_rtnl)
rtnl_unlock();
return -EINVAL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | High | 23,686 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void DisconnectWindowLinux::Show(remoting::ChromotingHost* host,
const std::string& username) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to display box rendering.
Commit Message: Initial implementation of DisconnectWindow on Linux.
BUG=None
TEST=Manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7089016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88889 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 19,111 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool AXObject::isHiddenForTextAlternativeCalculation() const {
if (equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "false"))
return false;
if (getLayoutObject())
return getLayoutObject()->style()->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible;
Document* document = getDocument();
if (!document || !document->frame())
return false;
if (Node* node = getNode()) {
if (node->isConnected() && node->isElementNode()) {
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> style =
document->ensureStyleResolver().styleForElement(toElement(node));
return style->display() == EDisplay::kNone ||
style->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible;
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | Medium | 3,903 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool __net_get_random_once(void *buf, int nbytes, bool *done,
struct static_key *done_key)
{
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&lock, flags);
if (*done) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lock, flags);
return false;
}
get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
*done = true;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lock, flags);
__net_random_once_disable_jump(done_key);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The net_get_random_once implementation in net/core/utils.c in the Linux kernel 3.13.x and 3.14.x before 3.14.5 on certain Intel processors does not perform the intended slow-path operation to initialize random seeds, which makes it easier for remote attackers to spoof or disrupt IP communication by leveraging the predictability of TCP sequence numbers, TCP and UDP port numbers, and IP ID values.
Commit Message: net: avoid dependency of net_get_random_once on nop patching
net_get_random_once depends on the static keys infrastructure to patch up
the branch to the slow path during boot. This was realized by abusing the
static keys api and defining a new initializer to not enable the call
site while still indicating that the branch point should get patched
up. This was needed to have the fast path considered likely by gcc.
The static key initialization during boot up normally walks through all
the registered keys and either patches in ideal nops or enables the jump
site but omitted that step on x86 if ideal nops where already placed at
static_key branch points. Thus net_get_random_once branches not always
became active.
This patch switches net_get_random_once to the ordinary static_key
api and thus places the kernel fast path in the - by gcc considered -
unlikely path. Microbenchmarks on Intel and AMD x86-64 showed that
the unlikely path actually beats the likely path in terms of cycle cost
and that different nop patterns did not make much difference, thus this
switch should not be noticeable.
Fixes: a48e42920ff38b ("net: introduce new macro net_get_random_once")
Reported-by: Tuomas Räsänen <tuomasjjrasanen@tjjr.fi>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | Medium | 2,124 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: Plugin::Plugin(PP_Instance pp_instance)
: pp::InstancePrivate(pp_instance),
scriptable_plugin_(NULL),
argc_(-1),
argn_(NULL),
argv_(NULL),
main_subprocess_("main subprocess", NULL, NULL),
nacl_ready_state_(UNSENT),
nexe_error_reported_(false),
wrapper_factory_(NULL),
last_error_string_(""),
ppapi_proxy_(NULL),
enable_dev_interfaces_(false),
init_time_(0),
ready_time_(0),
nexe_size_(0),
time_of_last_progress_event_(0),
using_ipc_proxy_(false) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::Plugin (this=%p, pp_instance=%"
NACL_PRId32")\n", static_cast<void*>(this), pp_instance));
callback_factory_.Initialize(this);
nexe_downloader_.Initialize(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 29,752 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void mark_object(struct object *obj, struct strbuf *path,
const char *name, void *data)
{
update_progress(data);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Integer overflow in Git before 2.7.4 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a (1) long filename or (2) many nested trees, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | High | 15,806 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xsltCopyTextString(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr target,
const xmlChar *string, int noescape)
{
xmlNodePtr copy;
int len;
if (string == NULL)
return(NULL);
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_COPY_TEXT,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltCopyTextString: copy text %s\n",
string));
#endif
/*
* Play safe and reset the merging mechanism for every new
* target node.
*/
if ((target == NULL) || (target->children == NULL)) {
ctxt->lasttext = NULL;
}
/* handle coalescing of text nodes here */
len = xmlStrlen(string);
if ((ctxt->type == XSLT_OUTPUT_XML) &&
(ctxt->style->cdataSection != NULL) &&
(target != NULL) &&
(target->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(((target->ns == NULL) &&
(xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->style->cdataSection,
target->name, NULL) != NULL)) ||
((target->ns != NULL) &&
(xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->style->cdataSection,
target->name, target->ns->href) != NULL))))
{
/*
* Process "cdata-section-elements".
*/
if ((target->last != NULL) &&
(target->last->type == XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE))
{
return(xsltAddTextString(ctxt, target->last, string, len));
}
copy = xmlNewCDataBlock(ctxt->output, string, len);
} else if (noescape) {
/*
* Process "disable-output-escaping".
*/
if ((target != NULL) && (target->last != NULL) &&
(target->last->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) &&
(target->last->name == xmlStringTextNoenc))
{
return(xsltAddTextString(ctxt, target->last, string, len));
}
copy = xmlNewTextLen(string, len);
if (copy != NULL)
copy->name = xmlStringTextNoenc;
} else {
/*
* Default processing.
*/
if ((target != NULL) && (target->last != NULL) &&
(target->last->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) &&
(target->last->name == xmlStringText)) {
return(xsltAddTextString(ctxt, target->last, string, len));
}
copy = xmlNewTextLen(string, len);
}
if (copy != NULL) {
if (target != NULL)
copy = xsltAddChild(target, copy);
ctxt->lasttext = copy->content;
ctxt->lasttsize = len;
ctxt->lasttuse = len;
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, target,
"xsltCopyTextString: text copy failed\n");
ctxt->lasttext = NULL;
}
return(copy);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 5,191 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: RenderFrameObserverNatives::RenderFrameObserverNatives(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context), weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
RouteFunction(
"OnDocumentElementCreated",
base::Bind(&RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.79 does not properly restrict bindings access, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710} | Medium | 14,997 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ProcXFixesSetCursorName(ClientPtr client)
{
CursorPtr pCursor;
char *tchar;
REQUEST(xXFixesSetCursorNameReq);
REQUEST(xXFixesSetCursorNameReq);
Atom atom;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXFixesSetCursorNameReq);
VERIFY_CURSOR(pCursor, stuff->cursor, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
tchar = (char *) &stuff[1];
atom = MakeAtom(tchar, stuff->nbytes, TRUE);
return BadAlloc;
pCursor->name = atom;
return Success;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: xorg-x11-server before 1.19.5 was missing length validation in XFIXES extension allowing malicious X client to cause X server to crash or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message: | High | 8,156 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::PrintNode(const WebKit::WebNode& node) {
if (node.isNull() || !node.document().frame()) {
return;
}
if (is_preview_enabled_) {
print_preview_context_.InitWithNode(node);
RequestPrintPreview(PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_CONTEXT_NODE);
} else {
WebKit::WebNode duplicate_node(node);
Print(duplicate_node.document().frame(), duplicate_node);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to printing.
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 20,151 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void SetManualFallbacks(bool enabled) {
std::vector<std::string> features = {
password_manager::features::kEnableManualFallbacksFilling.name,
password_manager::features::kEnableManualFallbacksFillingStandalone
.name,
password_manager::features::kEnableManualFallbacksGeneration.name};
if (enabled) {
scoped_feature_list_.InitFromCommandLine(base::JoinString(features, ","),
std::string());
} else {
scoped_feature_list_.InitFromCommandLine(std::string(),
base::JoinString(features, ","));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The provisional-load commit implementation in WebKit/Source/bindings/core/v8/WindowProxy.cpp in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy by leveraging a delay in window proxy clearing.
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923} | High | 23,572 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintTabBackground(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
bool active,
int fill_id,
int y_inset,
const SkPath* clip) const {
DCHECK(!y_inset || fill_id);
const SkColor active_color =
tab_->controller()->GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_ACTIVE);
const SkColor inactive_color =
tab_->GetThemeProvider()->GetDisplayProperty(
ThemeProperties::SHOULD_FILL_BACKGROUND_TAB_COLOR)
? tab_->controller()->GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_INACTIVE)
: SK_ColorTRANSPARENT;
const SkColor stroke_color =
tab_->controller()->GetToolbarTopSeparatorColor();
const bool paint_hover_effect = !active && IsHoverActive();
const float stroke_thickness = GetStrokeThickness(active);
PaintTabBackgroundFill(canvas, active, paint_hover_effect, active_color,
inactive_color, fill_id, y_inset);
if (stroke_thickness > 0) {
gfx::ScopedCanvas scoped_canvas(clip ? canvas : nullptr);
if (clip)
canvas->sk_canvas()->clipPath(*clip, SkClipOp::kDifference, true);
PaintBackgroundStroke(canvas, active, stroke_color);
}
PaintSeparators(canvas);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android incorrectly handled navigation within PDFs, which allowed a remote attacker to temporarily spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page containing PDF data.
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498} | Medium | 9,185 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ProxyChannelDelegate::ProxyChannelDelegate()
: shutdown_event_(true, false) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 6,622 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void Huff_offsetReceive (node_t *node, int *ch, byte *fin, int *offset) {
bloc = *offset;
while (node && node->symbol == INTERNAL_NODE) {
if (get_bit(fin)) {
node = node->right;
} else {
node = node->left;
}
}
if (!node) {
*ch = 0;
return;
}
*ch = node->symbol;
*offset = bloc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in ioquake3 before 2017-08-02 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left. | High | 16,990 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: mountpoint_last(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path)
{
int error = 0;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct dentry *dir = nd->path.dentry;
/* If we're in rcuwalk, drop out of it to handle last component */
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
if (unlazy_walk(nd, NULL)) {
error = -ECHILD;
goto out;
}
}
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
if (unlikely(nd->last_type != LAST_NORM)) {
error = handle_dots(nd, nd->last_type);
if (error)
goto out;
dentry = dget(nd->path.dentry);
goto done;
}
mutex_lock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
dentry = d_lookup(dir, &nd->last);
if (!dentry) {
/*
* No cached dentry. Mounted dentries are pinned in the cache,
* so that means that this dentry is probably a symlink or the
* path doesn't actually point to a mounted dentry.
*/
dentry = d_alloc(dir, &nd->last);
if (!dentry) {
error = -ENOMEM;
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
goto out;
}
dentry = lookup_real(dir->d_inode, dentry, nd->flags);
error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
goto out;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
done:
if (!dentry->d_inode || d_is_negative(dentry)) {
error = -ENOENT;
dput(dentry);
goto out;
}
path->dentry = dentry;
path->mnt = mntget(nd->path.mnt);
if (should_follow_link(dentry, nd->flags & LOOKUP_FOLLOW))
return 1;
follow_mount(path);
error = 0;
out:
terminate_walk(nd);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: The mountpoint_last function in fs/namei.c in the Linux kernel before 3.15.8 does not properly maintain a certain reference count during attempts to use the umount system call in conjunction with a symlink, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via the umount program.
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> | Medium | 10,422 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: iasecc_get_serialnr(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_serial_number *serial)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct sc_iin *iin = &card->serialnr.iin;
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned char rbuf[0xC0];
size_t ii, offs;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
if (card->serialnr.len)
goto end;
memset(&card->serialnr, 0, sizeof(card->serialnr));
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xB0, 0x80 | IASECC_SFI_EF_SN, 0);
apdu.le = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Get 'serial number' data failed");
if (rbuf[0] != ISO7812_PAN_SN_TAG)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED, "serial number parse error");
iin->mii = (rbuf[2] >> 4) & 0x0F;
iin->country = 0;
for (ii=5; ii<8; ii++) {
iin->country *= 10;
iin->country += (rbuf[ii/2] >> ((ii & 0x01) ? 0 : 4)) & 0x0F;
}
iin->issuer_id = 0;
for (ii=8; ii<10; ii++) {
iin->issuer_id *= 10;
iin->issuer_id += (rbuf[ii/2] >> (ii & 0x01 ? 0 : 4)) & 0x0F;
}
offs = rbuf[1] > 8 ? rbuf[1] - 8 : 0;
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_SAGEM) {
/* 5A 0A 92 50 00 20 10 10 25 00 01 3F */
/* 00 02 01 01 02 50 00 13 */
for (ii=0; ii < rbuf[1] - offs; ii++)
*(card->serialnr.value + ii) = ((rbuf[ii + offs + 1] & 0x0F) << 4)
+ ((rbuf[ii + offs + 2] & 0xF0) >> 4) ;
card->serialnr.len = ii;
}
else {
for (ii=0; ii < rbuf[1] - offs; ii++)
*(card->serialnr.value + ii) = rbuf[ii + offs + 2];
card->serialnr.len = ii;
}
do {
char txt[0x200];
for (ii=0;ii<card->serialnr.len;ii++)
sprintf(txt + ii*2, "%02X", *(card->serialnr.value + ii));
sc_log(ctx, "serial number '%s'; mii %i; country %i; issuer_id %li", txt, iin->mii, iin->country, iin->issuer_id);
} while(0);
end:
if (serial)
memcpy(serial, &card->serialnr, sizeof(*serial));
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Various out of bounds reads when handling responses in OpenSC before 0.19.0-rc1 could be used by attackers able to supply crafted smartcards to potentially crash the opensc library using programs.
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes. | Low | 4,338 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void *hashtable_get(hashtable_t *hashtable, const char *key)
{
pair_t *pair;
size_t hash;
bucket_t *bucket;
hash = hash_str(key);
bucket = &hashtable->buckets[hash % num_buckets(hashtable)];
pair = hashtable_find_pair(hashtable, bucket, key, hash);
if(!pair)
return NULL;
return pair->value;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: Jansson, possibly 2.4 and earlier, does not restrict the ability to trigger hash collisions predictably, which allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted JSON document.
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing. | Medium | 7,855 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct arpt_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.5.2 does not validate certain offset fields, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) via an IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt call.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> | High | 15,971 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void EnsureInitializeForAndroidLayoutTests() {
CHECK(CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kDumpRenderTree));
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
content::NestedMessagePumpAndroid::RegisterJni(env);
content::RegisterNativesImpl(env);
bool success = base::MessageLoop::InitMessagePumpForUIFactory(
&CreateMessagePumpForUI);
CHECK(success) << "Unable to initialize the message pump for Android.";
base::FilePath files_dir(GetTestFilesDirectory(env));
base::FilePath stdout_fifo(files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("test.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stdout_fifo);
base::FilePath stderr_fifo(
files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("stderr.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stderr_fifo);
base::FilePath stdin_fifo(files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("stdin.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stdin_fifo);
success = base::android::RedirectStream(stdout, stdout_fifo, "w") &&
base::android::RedirectStream(stdin, stdin_fifo, "r") &&
base::android::RedirectStream(stderr, stderr_fifo, "w");
CHECK(success) << "Unable to initialize the Android FIFOs.";
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: net/http/http_stream_parser.cc in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48 does not properly process HTTP Informational (aka 1xx) status codes, which allows remote web servers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted response.
Commit Message: Content Shell: Move shell_layout_tests_android into layout_tests/.
BUG=420994
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/661743002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299892} | Medium | 27,116 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int dpcm_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame_ptr, AVPacket *avpkt)
{
const uint8_t *buf = avpkt->data;
int buf_size = avpkt->size;
const uint8_t *buf_end = buf + buf_size;
DPCMContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int out = 0, ret;
int predictor[2];
int ch = 0;
int stereo = s->channels - 1;
int16_t *output_samples;
/* calculate output size */
switch(avctx->codec->id) {
case CODEC_ID_ROQ_DPCM:
case CODEC_ID_XAN_DPCM:
out = buf_size - 2 * s->channels;
break;
case CODEC_ID_SOL_DPCM:
if (avctx->codec_tag != 3)
out = buf_size * 2;
else
out = buf_size;
break;
}
if (out <= 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "packet is too small\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
/* get output buffer */
s->frame.nb_samples = out / s->channels;
if ((ret = avctx->get_buffer(avctx, &s->frame)) < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "get_buffer() failed\n");
return ret;
}
output_samples = (int16_t *)s->frame.data[0];
switch(avctx->codec->id) {
case CODEC_ID_ROQ_DPCM:
buf += 6;
if (stereo) {
predictor[1] = (int16_t)(bytestream_get_byte(&buf) << 8);
predictor[0] = (int16_t)(bytestream_get_byte(&buf) << 8);
} else {
predictor[0] = (int16_t)bytestream_get_le16(&buf);
}
/* decode the samples */
while (buf < buf_end) {
predictor[ch] += s->roq_square_array[*buf++];
predictor[ch] = av_clip_int16(predictor[ch]);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
break;
case CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_DPCM:
buf += 6; /* skip over the stream mask and stream length */
for (ch = 0; ch < s->channels; ch++) {
predictor[ch] = (int16_t)bytestream_get_le16(&buf);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
}
ch = 0;
while (buf < buf_end) {
predictor[ch] += interplay_delta_table[*buf++];
predictor[ch] = av_clip_int16(predictor[ch]);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
break;
case CODEC_ID_XAN_DPCM:
{
int shift[2] = { 4, 4 };
for (ch = 0; ch < s->channels; ch++)
predictor[ch] = (int16_t)bytestream_get_le16(&buf);
ch = 0;
while (buf < buf_end) {
uint8_t n = *buf++;
int16_t diff = (n & 0xFC) << 8;
if ((n & 0x03) == 3)
shift[ch]++;
else
shift[ch] -= (2 * (n & 3));
/* saturate the shifter to a lower limit of 0 */
if (shift[ch] < 0)
shift[ch] = 0;
diff >>= shift[ch];
predictor[ch] += diff;
predictor[ch] = av_clip_int16(predictor[ch]);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
break;
}
case CODEC_ID_SOL_DPCM:
if (avctx->codec_tag != 3) {
uint8_t *output_samples_u8 = s->frame.data[0];
while (buf < buf_end) {
uint8_t n = *buf++;
s->sample[0] += s->sol_table[n >> 4];
s->sample[0] = av_clip_uint8(s->sample[0]);
*output_samples_u8++ = s->sample[0];
s->sample[stereo] += s->sol_table[n & 0x0F];
s->sample[stereo] = av_clip_uint8(s->sample[stereo]);
*output_samples_u8++ = s->sample[stereo];
}
} else {
while (buf < buf_end) {
uint8_t n = *buf++;
if (n & 0x80) s->sample[ch] -= sol_table_16[n & 0x7F];
else s->sample[ch] += sol_table_16[n & 0x7F];
s->sample[ch] = av_clip_int16(s->sample[ch]);
*output_samples++ = s->sample[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
}
break;
}
*got_frame_ptr = 1;
*(AVFrame *)data = s->frame;
return buf_size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The dpcm_decode_frame function in dpcm.c in libavcodec in FFmpeg before 0.10 and in Libav 0.5.x before 0.5.9, 0.6.x before 0.6.6, 0.7.x before 0.7.6, and 0.8.x before 0.8.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted stereo stream in a media file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 1,032 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void sas_eh_finish_cmd(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
{
struct sas_ha_struct *sas_ha = SHOST_TO_SAS_HA(cmd->device->host);
struct sas_task *task = TO_SAS_TASK(cmd);
/* At this point, we only get called following an actual abort
* of the task, so we should be guaranteed not to be racing with
* any completions from the LLD. Task is freed after this.
*/
sas_end_task(cmd, task);
/* now finish the command and move it on to the error
* handler done list, this also takes it off the
* error handler pending list.
*/
scsi_eh_finish_cmd(cmd, &sas_ha->eh_done_q);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: ** DISPUTED ** drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_scsi_host.c in the Linux kernel before 4.16 allows local users to cause a denial of service (ata qc leak) by triggering certain failure conditions. NOTE: a third party disputes the relevance of this report because the failure can only occur for physically proximate attackers who unplug SAS Host Bus Adapter cables.
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata
When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are
not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did
not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed,
but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a
warning like below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037
ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1
......
Call trace:
[<ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
[<ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8
[<ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c
[<ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694
[<ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80
[<ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170
[<ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390
[<ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418
[<ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138
[<ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked
for ever.
As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and
merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle
ata qcs correctly after this.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> | Medium | 8,737 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int gup_huge_pud(pud_t orig, pud_t *pudp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
struct page *head, *page;
int refs;
if (!pud_access_permitted(orig, write))
return 0;
if (pud_devmap(orig))
return __gup_device_huge_pud(orig, pudp, addr, end, pages, nr);
refs = 0;
page = pud_page(orig) + ((addr & ~PUD_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
do {
pages[*nr] = page;
(*nr)++;
page++;
refs++;
} while (addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
head = compound_head(pud_page(orig));
if (!page_cache_add_speculative(head, refs)) {
*nr -= refs;
return 0;
}
if (unlikely(pud_val(orig) != pud_val(*pudp))) {
*nr -= refs;
while (refs--)
put_page(head);
return 0;
}
SetPageReferenced(head);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The Linux kernel before 5.1-rc5 allows page->_refcount reference count overflow, with resultant use-after-free issues, if about 140 GiB of RAM exists. This is related to fs/fuse/dev.c, fs/pipe.c, fs/splice.c, include/linux/mm.h, include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h, kernel/trace/trace.c, mm/gup.c, and mm/hugetlb.c. It can occur with FUSE requests.
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit | High | 22,792 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: get_strings_2_svc(gstrings_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gstrings_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gstrings_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (! cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ) &&
(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE,
arg->princ,
NULL))) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
log_unauth("kadm5_get_strings", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_strings((void *)handle, arg->princ, &ret.strings,
&ret.count);
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_strings", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup | Medium | 22,947 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::AttachInterstitialPage(
InterstitialPageImpl* interstitial_page) {
DCHECK(interstitial_page);
GetRenderManager()->set_interstitial_page(interstitial_page);
CancelActiveAndPendingDialogs();
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidAttachInterstitialPage();
if (frame_tree_.IsLoading())
LoadingStateChanged(true, true, nullptr);
if (node_.OuterContentsFrameTreeNode()) {
if (GetRenderManager()->GetProxyToOuterDelegate()) {
DCHECK(
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(interstitial_page->GetView())
->IsRenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame());
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame* view =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame*>(
interstitial_page->GetView());
GetRenderManager()->SetRWHViewForInnerContents(view);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117} | Medium | 5,984 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xmlParseExternalSubset(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *ExternalID,
const xmlChar *SystemID) {
xmlDetectSAX2(ctxt);
GROW;
if ((ctxt->encoding == (const xmlChar *)XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) &&
(ctxt->input->end - ctxt->input->cur >= 4)) {
xmlChar start[4];
xmlCharEncoding enc;
start[0] = RAW;
start[1] = NXT(1);
start[2] = NXT(2);
start[3] = NXT(3);
enc = xmlDetectCharEncoding(start, 4);
if (enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE)
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
}
if (CMP5(CUR_PTR, '<', '?', 'x', 'm', 'l')) {
xmlParseTextDecl(ctxt);
if (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing right here
*/
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
return;
}
}
if (ctxt->myDoc == NULL) {
ctxt->myDoc = xmlNewDoc(BAD_CAST "1.0");
if (ctxt->myDoc == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, "New Doc failed");
return;
}
ctxt->myDoc->properties = XML_DOC_INTERNAL;
}
if ((ctxt->myDoc != NULL) && (ctxt->myDoc->intSubset == NULL))
xmlCreateIntSubset(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, ExternalID, SystemID);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
ctxt->external = 1;
while (((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '?')) ||
((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '!')) ||
(RAW == '%') || IS_BLANK_CH(CUR)) {
const xmlChar *check = CUR_PTR;
unsigned int cons = ctxt->input->consumed;
GROW;
if ((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '!') && (NXT(2) == '[')) {
xmlParseConditionalSections(ctxt);
} else if (IS_BLANK_CH(CUR)) {
NEXT;
} else if (RAW == '%') {
xmlParsePEReference(ctxt);
} else
xmlParseMarkupDecl(ctxt);
/*
* Pop-up of finished entities.
*/
while ((RAW == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr > 1))
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
if ((CUR_PTR == check) && (cons == ctxt->input->consumed)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_EXT_SUBSET_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
break;
}
}
if (RAW != 0) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_EXT_SUBSET_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 8,082 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void reference_32x32_dct_1d(const double in[32], double out[32], int stride) {
const double kInvSqrt2 = 0.707106781186547524400844362104;
for (int k = 0; k < 32; k++) {
out[k] = 0.0;
for (int n = 0; n < 32; n++)
out[k] += in[n] * cos(kPi * (2 * n + 1) * k / 64.0);
if (k == 0)
out[k] = out[k] * kInvSqrt2;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 10,873 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int read_tfra(MOVContext *mov, AVIOContext *f)
{
MOVFragmentIndex* index = NULL;
int version, fieldlength, i, j;
int64_t pos = avio_tell(f);
uint32_t size = avio_rb32(f);
void *tmp;
if (avio_rb32(f) != MKBETAG('t', 'f', 'r', 'a')) {
return 1;
}
av_log(mov->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "found tfra\n");
index = av_mallocz(sizeof(MOVFragmentIndex));
if (!index) {
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
tmp = av_realloc_array(mov->fragment_index_data,
mov->fragment_index_count + 1,
sizeof(MOVFragmentIndex*));
if (!tmp) {
av_freep(&index);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
mov->fragment_index_data = tmp;
mov->fragment_index_data[mov->fragment_index_count++] = index;
version = avio_r8(f);
avio_rb24(f);
index->track_id = avio_rb32(f);
fieldlength = avio_rb32(f);
index->item_count = avio_rb32(f);
index->items = av_mallocz_array(
index->item_count, sizeof(MOVFragmentIndexItem));
if (!index->items) {
index->item_count = 0;
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
for (i = 0; i < index->item_count; i++) {
int64_t time, offset;
if (version == 1) {
time = avio_rb64(f);
offset = avio_rb64(f);
} else {
time = avio_rb32(f);
offset = avio_rb32(f);
}
index->items[i].time = time;
index->items[i].moof_offset = offset;
for (j = 0; j < ((fieldlength >> 4) & 3) + 1; j++)
avio_r8(f);
for (j = 0; j < ((fieldlength >> 2) & 3) + 1; j++)
avio_r8(f);
for (j = 0; j < ((fieldlength >> 0) & 3) + 1; j++)
avio_r8(f);
}
avio_seek(f, pos + size, SEEK_SET);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-834
Summary: In libavformat/mov.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3, a DoS in read_tfra() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU and memory consumption. When a crafted MOV file, which claims a large *item_count* field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loop would consume huge CPU and memory resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc> | High | 8,200 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void free_pipe_info(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < pipe->buffers; i++) {
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + i;
if (buf->ops)
buf->ops->release(pipe, buf);
}
if (pipe->tmp_page)
__free_page(pipe->tmp_page);
kfree(pipe->bufs);
kfree(pipe);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: fs/pipe.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 does not limit the amount of unread data in pipes, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by creating many pipes with non-default sizes.
Commit Message: pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes
On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an
OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A
typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of
memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to
prevent this from happening.
This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above
which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting
them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may
be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system
against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing
pipes to work correctly though with less data at once.
The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and
pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The
default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024)
to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB
before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited
to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB =
1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by
default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use
of pipes (eg: for splicing).
Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | Medium | 17,191 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::Reshape(const gfx::Size& size,
float device_scale_factor,
const gfx::ColorSpace& color_space,
bool has_alpha,
bool use_stencil) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (initialize_waitable_event_) {
initialize_waitable_event_->Wait();
initialize_waitable_event_ = nullptr;
}
SkSurfaceCharacterization* characterization = nullptr;
if (characterization_.isValid()) {
characterization_ =
characterization_.createResized(size.width(), size.height());
RecreateRootRecorder();
} else {
characterization = &characterization_;
initialize_waitable_event_ = std::make_unique<base::WaitableEvent>(
base::WaitableEvent::ResetPolicy::MANUAL,
base::WaitableEvent::InitialState::NOT_SIGNALED);
}
auto callback = base::BindOnce(
&SkiaOutputSurfaceImplOnGpu::Reshape,
base::Unretained(impl_on_gpu_.get()), size, device_scale_factor,
std::move(color_space), has_alpha, use_stencil, pre_transform_,
characterization, initialize_waitable_event_.get());
ScheduleGpuTask(std::move(callback), std::vector<gpu::SyncToken>());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-704
Summary: Type confusion in extensions JavaScript bindings in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac, Windows, Linux, and Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially maliciously modify objects via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946} | Medium | 29,547 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: row_copy(png_bytep toBuffer, png_const_bytep fromBuffer, unsigned int bitWidth)
{
memcpy(toBuffer, fromBuffer, bitWidth >> 3);
if ((bitWidth & 7) != 0)
{
unsigned int mask;
toBuffer += bitWidth >> 3;
fromBuffer += bitWidth >> 3;
/* The remaining bits are in the top of the byte, the mask is the bits to
* retain.
*/
mask = 0xff >> (bitWidth & 7);
*toBuffer = (png_byte)((*toBuffer & mask) | (*fromBuffer & ~mask));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 18,255 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static inline int mount_entry_on_systemfs(struct mntent *mntent)
{
return mount_entry_on_generic(mntent, mntent->mnt_dir);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: lxc-start in lxc before 1.0.8 and 1.1.x before 1.1.4 allows local container administrators to escape AppArmor confinement via a symlink attack on a (1) mount target or (2) bind mount source.
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com> | High | 21,951 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: my_object_rec_arrays (MyObject *obj, GPtrArray *in, GPtrArray **ret, GError **error)
{
char **strs;
GArray *ints;
guint v_UINT;
if (in->len != 2)
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid array len");
return FALSE;
}
strs = g_ptr_array_index (in, 0);
if (!*strs || strcmp (*strs, "foo"))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string 0");
return FALSE;
}
strs++;
if (!*strs || strcmp (*strs, "bar"))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string 1");
return FALSE;
}
strs++;
if (*strs)
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string array len in pos 0");
return FALSE;
}
strs = g_ptr_array_index (in, 1);
if (!*strs || strcmp (*strs, "baz"))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string 0");
return FALSE;
}
strs++;
if (!*strs || strcmp (*strs, "whee"))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string 1");
return FALSE;
}
strs++;
if (!*strs || strcmp (*strs, "moo"))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string 2");
return FALSE;
}
strs++;
if (*strs)
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string array len in pos 1");
return FALSE;
}
*ret = g_ptr_array_new ();
ints = g_array_new (TRUE, TRUE, sizeof (guint));
v_UINT = 10;
g_array_append_val (ints, v_UINT);
v_UINT = 42;
g_array_append_val (ints, v_UINT);
v_UINT = 27;
g_array_append_val (ints, v_UINT);
g_ptr_array_add (*ret, ints);
ints = g_array_new (TRUE, TRUE, sizeof (guint));
v_UINT = 30;
g_array_append_val (ints, v_UINT);
g_ptr_array_add (*ret, ints);
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message: | Low | 11,363 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ZSTD_compressSequences_internal(seqStore_t* seqStorePtr,
ZSTD_entropyCTables_t const* prevEntropy,
ZSTD_entropyCTables_t* nextEntropy,
ZSTD_CCtx_params const* cctxParams,
void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
void* workspace, size_t wkspSize,
const int bmi2)
{
const int longOffsets = cctxParams->cParams.windowLog > STREAM_ACCUMULATOR_MIN;
ZSTD_strategy const strategy = cctxParams->cParams.strategy;
U32 count[MaxSeq+1];
FSE_CTable* CTable_LitLength = nextEntropy->fse.litlengthCTable;
FSE_CTable* CTable_OffsetBits = nextEntropy->fse.offcodeCTable;
FSE_CTable* CTable_MatchLength = nextEntropy->fse.matchlengthCTable;
U32 LLtype, Offtype, MLtype; /* compressed, raw or rle */
const seqDef* const sequences = seqStorePtr->sequencesStart;
const BYTE* const ofCodeTable = seqStorePtr->ofCode;
const BYTE* const llCodeTable = seqStorePtr->llCode;
const BYTE* const mlCodeTable = seqStorePtr->mlCode;
BYTE* const ostart = (BYTE*)dst;
BYTE* const oend = ostart + dstCapacity;
BYTE* op = ostart;
size_t const nbSeq = seqStorePtr->sequences - seqStorePtr->sequencesStart;
BYTE* seqHead;
BYTE* lastNCount = NULL;
ZSTD_STATIC_ASSERT(HUF_WORKSPACE_SIZE >= (1<<MAX(MLFSELog,LLFSELog)));
/* Compress literals */
{ const BYTE* const literals = seqStorePtr->litStart;
size_t const litSize = seqStorePtr->lit - literals;
int const disableLiteralCompression = (cctxParams->cParams.strategy == ZSTD_fast) && (cctxParams->cParams.targetLength > 0);
size_t const cSize = ZSTD_compressLiterals(
&prevEntropy->huf, &nextEntropy->huf,
cctxParams->cParams.strategy, disableLiteralCompression,
op, dstCapacity,
literals, litSize,
workspace, wkspSize,
bmi2);
if (ZSTD_isError(cSize))
return cSize;
assert(cSize <= dstCapacity);
op += cSize;
}
/* Sequences Header */
if ((oend-op) < 3 /*max nbSeq Size*/ + 1 /*seqHead*/) return ERROR(dstSize_tooSmall);
if (nbSeq < 0x7F)
*op++ = (BYTE)nbSeq;
else if (nbSeq < LONGNBSEQ)
op[0] = (BYTE)((nbSeq>>8) + 0x80), op[1] = (BYTE)nbSeq, op+=2;
else
op[0]=0xFF, MEM_writeLE16(op+1, (U16)(nbSeq - LONGNBSEQ)), op+=3;
if (nbSeq==0) {
/* Copy the old tables over as if we repeated them */
memcpy(&nextEntropy->fse, &prevEntropy->fse, sizeof(prevEntropy->fse));
return op - ostart;
}
/* seqHead : flags for FSE encoding type */
seqHead = op++;
/* convert length/distances into codes */
ZSTD_seqToCodes(seqStorePtr);
/* build CTable for Literal Lengths */
{ U32 max = MaxLL;
size_t const mostFrequent = HIST_countFast_wksp(count, &max, llCodeTable, nbSeq, workspace, wkspSize); /* can't fail */
DEBUGLOG(5, "Building LL table");
nextEntropy->fse.litlength_repeatMode = prevEntropy->fse.litlength_repeatMode;
LLtype = ZSTD_selectEncodingType(&nextEntropy->fse.litlength_repeatMode, count, max, mostFrequent, nbSeq, LLFSELog, prevEntropy->fse.litlengthCTable, LL_defaultNorm, LL_defaultNormLog, ZSTD_defaultAllowed, strategy);
assert(set_basic < set_compressed && set_rle < set_compressed);
assert(!(LLtype < set_compressed && nextEntropy->fse.litlength_repeatMode != FSE_repeat_none)); /* We don't copy tables */
{ size_t const countSize = ZSTD_buildCTable(op, oend - op, CTable_LitLength, LLFSELog, (symbolEncodingType_e)LLtype,
count, max, llCodeTable, nbSeq, LL_defaultNorm, LL_defaultNormLog, MaxLL,
prevEntropy->fse.litlengthCTable, sizeof(prevEntropy->fse.litlengthCTable),
workspace, wkspSize);
if (ZSTD_isError(countSize)) return countSize;
if (LLtype == set_compressed)
lastNCount = op;
op += countSize;
} }
/* build CTable for Offsets */
{ U32 max = MaxOff;
size_t const mostFrequent = HIST_countFast_wksp(count, &max, ofCodeTable, nbSeq, workspace, wkspSize); /* can't fail */
/* We can only use the basic table if max <= DefaultMaxOff, otherwise the offsets are too large */
ZSTD_defaultPolicy_e const defaultPolicy = (max <= DefaultMaxOff) ? ZSTD_defaultAllowed : ZSTD_defaultDisallowed;
DEBUGLOG(5, "Building OF table");
nextEntropy->fse.offcode_repeatMode = prevEntropy->fse.offcode_repeatMode;
Offtype = ZSTD_selectEncodingType(&nextEntropy->fse.offcode_repeatMode, count, max, mostFrequent, nbSeq, OffFSELog, prevEntropy->fse.offcodeCTable, OF_defaultNorm, OF_defaultNormLog, defaultPolicy, strategy);
assert(!(Offtype < set_compressed && nextEntropy->fse.offcode_repeatMode != FSE_repeat_none)); /* We don't copy tables */
{ size_t const countSize = ZSTD_buildCTable(op, oend - op, CTable_OffsetBits, OffFSELog, (symbolEncodingType_e)Offtype,
count, max, ofCodeTable, nbSeq, OF_defaultNorm, OF_defaultNormLog, DefaultMaxOff,
prevEntropy->fse.offcodeCTable, sizeof(prevEntropy->fse.offcodeCTable),
workspace, wkspSize);
if (ZSTD_isError(countSize)) return countSize;
if (Offtype == set_compressed)
lastNCount = op;
op += countSize;
} }
/* build CTable for MatchLengths */
{ U32 max = MaxML;
size_t const mostFrequent = HIST_countFast_wksp(count, &max, mlCodeTable, nbSeq, workspace, wkspSize); /* can't fail */
DEBUGLOG(5, "Building ML table");
nextEntropy->fse.matchlength_repeatMode = prevEntropy->fse.matchlength_repeatMode;
MLtype = ZSTD_selectEncodingType(&nextEntropy->fse.matchlength_repeatMode, count, max, mostFrequent, nbSeq, MLFSELog, prevEntropy->fse.matchlengthCTable, ML_defaultNorm, ML_defaultNormLog, ZSTD_defaultAllowed, strategy);
assert(!(MLtype < set_compressed && nextEntropy->fse.matchlength_repeatMode != FSE_repeat_none)); /* We don't copy tables */
{ size_t const countSize = ZSTD_buildCTable(op, oend - op, CTable_MatchLength, MLFSELog, (symbolEncodingType_e)MLtype,
count, max, mlCodeTable, nbSeq, ML_defaultNorm, ML_defaultNormLog, MaxML,
prevEntropy->fse.matchlengthCTable, sizeof(prevEntropy->fse.matchlengthCTable),
workspace, wkspSize);
if (ZSTD_isError(countSize)) return countSize;
if (MLtype == set_compressed)
lastNCount = op;
op += countSize;
} }
*seqHead = (BYTE)((LLtype<<6) + (Offtype<<4) + (MLtype<<2));
{ size_t const bitstreamSize = ZSTD_encodeSequences(
op, oend - op,
CTable_MatchLength, mlCodeTable,
CTable_OffsetBits, ofCodeTable,
CTable_LitLength, llCodeTable,
sequences, nbSeq,
longOffsets, bmi2);
if (ZSTD_isError(bitstreamSize)) return bitstreamSize;
op += bitstreamSize;
/* zstd versions <= 1.3.4 mistakenly report corruption when
* FSE_readNCount() recieves a buffer < 4 bytes.
* Fixed by https://github.com/facebook/zstd/pull/1146.
* This can happen when the last set_compressed table present is 2
* bytes and the bitstream is only one byte.
* In this exceedingly rare case, we will simply emit an uncompressed
* block, since it isn't worth optimizing.
*/
if (lastNCount && (op - lastNCount) < 4) {
/* NCountSize >= 2 && bitstreamSize > 0 ==> lastCountSize == 3 */
assert(op - lastNCount == 3);
DEBUGLOG(5, "Avoiding bug in zstd decoder in versions <= 1.3.4 by "
"emitting an uncompressed block.");
return 0;
}
}
return op - ostart;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race condition in the one-pass compression functions of Zstandard prior to version 1.3.8 could allow an attacker to write bytes out of bounds if an output buffer smaller than the recommended size was used.
Commit Message: fixed T36302429 | Medium | 3,737 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
TestObj* objArg(toTestObj(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
size_t argsCount = exec->argumentCount();
if (argsCount <= 1) {
impl->overloadedMethod(objArg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
int intArg(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->overloadedMethod(objArg, intArg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 5,277 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool ParamTraits<FilePath>::Read(const Message* m,
PickleIterator* iter,
param_type* r) {
FilePath::StringType value;
if (!ParamTraits<FilePath::StringType>::Read(m, iter, &value))
return false;
*r = FilePath(value);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 does not properly handle %00 characters in pathnames, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 3,750 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::~RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid() {
SetContentViewCore(NULL);
if (!shared_surface_.is_null()) {
ImageTransportFactoryAndroid::GetInstance()->DestroySharedSurfaceHandle(
shared_surface_);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 9,171 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int kvm_ioctl_create_device(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_create_device *cd)
{
struct kvm_device_ops *ops = NULL;
struct kvm_device *dev;
bool test = cd->flags & KVM_CREATE_DEVICE_TEST;
int ret;
if (cd->type >= ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_device_ops_table))
return -ENODEV;
ops = kvm_device_ops_table[cd->type];
if (ops == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
if (test)
return 0;
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
dev->ops = ops;
dev->kvm = kvm;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
ret = ops->create(dev, cd->type);
if (ret < 0) {
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
kfree(dev);
return ret;
}
list_add(&dev->vm_node, &kvm->devices);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
if (ops->init)
ops->init(dev);
ret = anon_inode_getfd(ops->name, &kvm_device_fops, dev, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
if (ret < 0) {
ops->destroy(dev);
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
list_del(&dev->vm_node);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
return ret;
}
kvm_get_kvm(kvm);
cd->fd = ret;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the kvm_ioctl_create_device function in virt/kvm/kvm_main.c in the Linux kernel before 4.8.13 allows host OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS crash) or possibly gain privileges via crafted ioctl calls on the /dev/kvm device.
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> | High | 20,931 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int hfsplus_readdir(struct file *filp, void *dirent, filldir_t filldir)
{
struct inode *inode = filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
int len, err;
char strbuf[HFSPLUS_MAX_STRLEN + 1];
hfsplus_cat_entry entry;
struct hfs_find_data fd;
struct hfsplus_readdir_data *rd;
u16 type;
if (filp->f_pos >= inode->i_size)
return 0;
err = hfs_find_init(HFSPLUS_SB(sb)->cat_tree, &fd);
if (err)
return err;
hfsplus_cat_build_key(sb, fd.search_key, inode->i_ino, NULL);
err = hfs_brec_find(&fd);
if (err)
goto out;
switch ((u32)filp->f_pos) {
case 0:
/* This is completely artificial... */
if (filldir(dirent, ".", 1, 0, inode->i_ino, DT_DIR))
goto out;
filp->f_pos++;
/* fall through */
case 1:
hfs_bnode_read(fd.bnode, &entry, fd.entryoffset,
fd.entrylength);
if (be16_to_cpu(entry.type) != HFSPLUS_FOLDER_THREAD) {
printk(KERN_ERR "hfs: bad catalog folder thread\n");
err = -EIO;
goto out;
}
if (fd.entrylength < HFSPLUS_MIN_THREAD_SZ) {
printk(KERN_ERR "hfs: truncated catalog thread\n");
err = -EIO;
goto out;
}
if (filldir(dirent, "..", 2, 1,
be32_to_cpu(entry.thread.parentID), DT_DIR))
goto out;
filp->f_pos++;
/* fall through */
default:
if (filp->f_pos >= inode->i_size)
goto out;
err = hfs_brec_goto(&fd, filp->f_pos - 1);
if (err)
goto out;
}
for (;;) {
if (be32_to_cpu(fd.key->cat.parent) != inode->i_ino) {
printk(KERN_ERR "hfs: walked past end of dir\n");
err = -EIO;
goto out;
}
hfs_bnode_read(fd.bnode, &entry, fd.entryoffset,
fd.entrylength);
type = be16_to_cpu(entry.type);
len = HFSPLUS_MAX_STRLEN;
err = hfsplus_uni2asc(sb, &fd.key->cat.name, strbuf, &len);
if (err)
goto out;
if (type == HFSPLUS_FOLDER) {
if (fd.entrylength <
sizeof(struct hfsplus_cat_folder)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "hfs: small dir entry\n");
err = -EIO;
goto out;
}
if (HFSPLUS_SB(sb)->hidden_dir &&
HFSPLUS_SB(sb)->hidden_dir->i_ino ==
be32_to_cpu(entry.folder.id))
goto next;
if (filldir(dirent, strbuf, len, filp->f_pos,
be32_to_cpu(entry.folder.id), DT_DIR))
break;
} else if (type == HFSPLUS_FILE) {
if (fd.entrylength < sizeof(struct hfsplus_cat_file)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "hfs: small file entry\n");
err = -EIO;
goto out;
}
if (filldir(dirent, strbuf, len, filp->f_pos,
be32_to_cpu(entry.file.id), DT_REG))
break;
} else {
printk(KERN_ERR "hfs: bad catalog entry type\n");
err = -EIO;
goto out;
}
next:
filp->f_pos++;
if (filp->f_pos >= inode->i_size)
goto out;
err = hfs_brec_goto(&fd, 1);
if (err)
goto out;
}
rd = filp->private_data;
if (!rd) {
rd = kmalloc(sizeof(struct hfsplus_readdir_data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rd) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
filp->private_data = rd;
rd->file = filp;
list_add(&rd->list, &HFSPLUS_I(inode)->open_dir_list);
}
memcpy(&rd->key, fd.key, sizeof(struct hfsplus_cat_key));
out:
hfs_find_exit(&fd);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the hfsplus filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.3.5 allow local users to gain privileges via a crafted HFS plus filesystem, a related issue to CVE-2009-4020.
Commit Message: hfsplus: Fix potential buffer overflows
Commit ec81aecb2966 ("hfs: fix a potential buffer overflow") fixed a few
potential buffer overflows in the hfs filesystem. But as Timo Warns
pointed out, these changes also need to be made on the hfsplus
filesystem as well.
Reported-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Acked-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Cc: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Anderson <anderson@redhat.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | High | 15,747 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: png_inflate(png_structp png_ptr, const png_byte *data, png_size_t size,
png_bytep output, png_size_t output_size)
{
png_size_t count = 0;
png_ptr->zstream.next_in = (png_bytep)data; /* const_cast: VALID */
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = size;
while (1)
{
int ret, avail;
/* Reset the output buffer each time round - we empty it
* after every inflate call.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->zbuf;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = png_ptr->zbuf_size;
ret = inflate(&png_ptr->zstream, Z_NO_FLUSH);
avail = png_ptr->zbuf_size - png_ptr->zstream.avail_out;
/* First copy/count any new output - but only if we didn't
* get an error code.
*/
if ((ret == Z_OK || ret == Z_STREAM_END) && avail > 0)
{
if (output != 0 && output_size > count)
{
int copy = output_size - count;
if (avail < copy) copy = avail;
png_memcpy(output + count, png_ptr->zbuf, copy);
}
count += avail;
}
if (ret == Z_OK)
continue;
/* Termination conditions - always reset the zstream, it
* must be left in inflateInit state.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = 0;
inflateReset(&png_ptr->zstream);
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
return count; /* NOTE: may be zero. */
/* Now handle the error codes - the API always returns 0
* and the error message is dumped into the uncompressed
* buffer if available.
*/
{
PNG_CONST char *msg;
if (png_ptr->zstream.msg != 0)
msg = png_ptr->zstream.msg;
else
{
#if defined(PNG_STDIO_SUPPORTED) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
char umsg[52];
switch (ret)
{
case Z_BUF_ERROR:
msg = "Buffer error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
case Z_DATA_ERROR:
msg = "Data error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
default:
msg = "Incomplete compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
}
png_snprintf(umsg, sizeof umsg, msg, png_ptr->chunk_name);
msg = umsg;
#else
msg = "Damaged compressed datastream in chunk other than IDAT";
#endif
}
png_warning(png_ptr, msg);
}
/* 0 means an error - notice that this code simple ignores
* zero length compressed chunks as a result.
*/
return 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer signedness error in the png_inflate function in pngrutil.c in libpng before 1.4.10beta01, as used in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PNG file, a different vulnerability than CVE-2011-3026.
Commit Message: Pull follow-up tweak from upstream.
BUG=116162
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9546033
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125311 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 24,755 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void reflectStringAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
Element* impl = V8Element::toImpl(holder);
v8SetReturnValueString(info, impl->fastGetAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectstringattributeAttr), info.GetIsolate());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the opj_t2_read_packet_data function in fxcodec/fx_libopenjpeg/libopenjpeg20/t2.c in OpenJPEG in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 39.0.2171.65, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a long segment in a JPEG image.
Commit Message: binding: Removes unused code in templates/attributes.cpp.
Faking {{cpp_class}} and {{c8_class}} doesn't make sense.
Probably it made sense before the introduction of virtual
ScriptWrappable::wrap().
Checking the existence of window->document() doesn't seem
making sense to me, and CQ tests seem passing without the
check.
BUG=
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2268433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#413375} | High | 2,239 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::GetExternalFileEntry(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
//// TODO(zelidrag): Make this magic work on other platforms when file browser
//// matures enough on ChromeOS.
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
CHECK(args.Length() == 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsObject());
v8::Local<v8::Object> file_def = args[0]->ToObject();
std::string file_system_name(
*v8::String::Utf8Value(file_def->Get(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(args.GetIsolate(), "fileSystemName"))));
GURL file_system_root(
*v8::String::Utf8Value(file_def->Get(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(args.GetIsolate(), "fileSystemRoot"))));
std::string file_full_path(
*v8::String::Utf8Value(file_def->Get(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(args.GetIsolate(), "fileFullPath"))));
bool is_directory = file_def->Get(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
args.GetIsolate(), "fileIsDirectory"))->ToBoolean()->Value();
blink::WebDOMFileSystem::EntryType entry_type =
is_directory ? blink::WebDOMFileSystem::EntryTypeDirectory
: blink::WebDOMFileSystem::EntryTypeFile;
blink::WebLocalFrame* webframe =
blink::WebLocalFrame::frameForContext(context()->v8_context());
args.GetReturnValue().Set(
blink::WebDOMFileSystem::create(
webframe,
blink::WebFileSystemTypeExternal,
blink::WebString::fromUTF8(file_system_name),
file_system_root)
.createV8Entry(blink::WebString::fromUTF8(file_full_path),
entry_type,
args.Holder(),
args.GetIsolate()));
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63 allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282} | Medium | 17,484 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: jbig2_page_add_result(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Page *page, Jbig2Image *image, int x, int y, Jbig2ComposeOp op)
{
/* ensure image exists first */
if (page->image == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, -1, "page info possibly missing, no image defined");
return 0;
}
/* grow the page to accomodate a new stripe if necessary */
if (page->striped) {
int new_height = y + image->height + page->end_row;
if (page->image->height < new_height) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, -1, "growing page buffer to %d rows " "to accomodate new stripe", new_height);
jbig2_image_resize(ctx, page->image, page->image->width, new_height);
}
}
jbig2_image_compose(ctx, page->image, image, x, y + page->end_row, op);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ghostscript before version 9.21 is vulnerable to a heap based buffer overflow that was found in the ghostscript jbig2_decode_gray_scale_image function which is used to decode halftone segments in a JBIG2 image. A document (PostScript or PDF) with an embedded, specially crafted, jbig2 image could trigger a segmentation fault in ghostscript.
Commit Message: | Medium | 8,884 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int hns_gmac_get_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)
return ARRAY_SIZE(g_gmac_stats_string);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.12, Hisilicon Network Subsystem (HNS) does not consider the ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS case when retrieving sset_count data, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact, as demonstrated by incompatibility between hns_get_sset_count and ethtool_get_strings.
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | Medium | 13,867 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xps_select_font_encoding(xps_font_t *font, int idx)
{
byte *cmapdata, *entry;
int pid, eid;
if (idx < 0 || idx >= font->cmapsubcount)
return;
cmapdata = font->data + font->cmaptable;
entry = cmapdata + 4 + idx * 8;
pid = u16(entry + 0);
eid = u16(entry + 2);
font->cmapsubtable = font->cmaptable + u32(entry + 4);
font->usepua = (pid == 3 && eid == 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The xps_select_font_encoding function in xps/xpsfont.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document, related to the xps_encode_font_char_imp function.
Commit Message: | Medium | 6,018 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMP3::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.mp3",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mNumChannels = pcmParams->nChannels;
mSamplingRate = pcmParams->nSamplingRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
| High | 647 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void BlobURLRegistry::unregisterURL(const KURL& url)
{
ThreadableBlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(url);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 on Mac OS X does not properly mitigate improper rendering behavior in the Intel GPU driver, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 6,401 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_video_decode(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
/* ! */
dec_struct_t * ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)(dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle);
WORD32 i4_err_status = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf = NULL;
WORD32 buflen;
UWORD32 u4_max_ofst, u4_length_of_start_code = 0;
UWORD32 bytes_consumed = 0;
UWORD32 cur_slice_is_nonref = 0;
UWORD32 u4_next_is_aud;
UWORD32 u4_first_start_code_found = 0;
WORD32 ret = 0,api_ret_value = IV_SUCCESS;
WORD32 header_data_left = 0,frame_data_left = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_bitstrm_buf;
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op;
ithread_set_name((void*)"Parse_thread");
ps_dec_ip = (ivd_video_decode_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_op = (ivd_video_decode_op_t *)pv_api_op;
{
UWORD32 u4_size;
u4_size = ps_dec_op->u4_size;
memset(ps_dec_op, 0, sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t));
ps_dec_op->u4_size = u4_size;
}
ps_dec->pv_dec_out = ps_dec_op;
ps_dec->process_called = 1;
if(ps_dec->init_done != 1)
{
return IV_FAIL;
}
/*Data memory barries instruction,so that bitstream write by the application is complete*/
DATA_SYNC();
if(0 == ps_dec->u1_flushfrm)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_FRM_BS_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes <= 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_NUMBYTES_INV;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer = NULL;
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_size
>= offsetof(ivd_video_decode_ip_t, s_out_buffer))
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer = &ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code = 1;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = FMT_CONV_NUM_ROWS;
ps_dec->u4_stop_threads = 0;
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf
&& ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUFS;
return IV_FAIL;
}
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs; i++)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->pu1_bufs[i] == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_OP_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_min_out_buf_size[i] == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |=
IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded >= NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = ERROR_FRAME_LIMIT_OVER;
return IV_FAIL;
}
/* ! */
ps_dec->u4_ts = ps_dec_ip->u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = -1;
ps_dec_op->u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec->i4_frametype = -1;
ps_dec->i4_content_type = -1;
ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found = 0;
/* In case the deocder is not in flush mode(in shared mode),
then decoder has to pick up a buffer to write current frame.
Check if a frame is available in such cases */
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag == 1 && ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf == 1
&& ps_dec->u1_flushfrm == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
WORD32 disp_avail = 0, free_id;
/* Check if at least one buffer is available with the codec */
/* If not then return to application with error */
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->u1_pic_bufs; i++)
{
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i]
|| 1 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i])
{
disp_avail = 1;
break;
}
}
if(0 == disp_avail)
{
/* If something is queued for display wait for that buffer to be returned */
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return (IV_FAIL);
}
while(1)
{
pic_buffer_t *ps_pic_buf;
ps_pic_buf = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, &free_id);
if(ps_pic_buf == NULL)
{
UWORD32 i, display_queued = 0;
/* check if any buffer was given for display which is not returned yet */
for(i = 0; i < (MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW); i++)
{
if(0 != ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i])
{
display_queued = 1;
break;
}
}
/* If some buffer is queued for display, then codec has to singal an error and wait
for that buffer to be returned.
If nothing is queued for display then codec has ownership of all display buffers
and it can reuse any of the existing buffers and continue decoding */
if(1 == display_queued)
{
/* If something is queued for display wait for that buffer to be returned */
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1
<< IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return (IV_FAIL);
}
}
else
{
/* If the buffer is with display, then mark it as in use and then look for a buffer again */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[free_id])
{
ih264_buf_mgr_set_status(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
free_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
else
{
/**
* Found a free buffer for present call. Release it now.
* Will be again obtained later.
*/
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
free_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
break;
}
}
}
}
if(ps_dec->u1_flushfrm && ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag)
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
ih264d_format_convert(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op),
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row,
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows);
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row += ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
ih264d_release_display_field(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
ps_dec_op->u4_new_seq = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_output_present = ps_dec->u4_output_present;
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag =
ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_progressive_frame_flag;
ps_dec_op->e_output_format =
ps_dec->s_disp_op.e_output_format;
ps_dec_op->s_disp_frm_buf = ps_dec->s_disp_op.s_disp_frm_buf;
ps_dec_op->e4_fld_type = ps_dec->s_disp_op.e4_fld_type;
ps_dec_op->u4_ts = ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->u4_disp_buf_id = ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_disp_buf_id;
/*In the case of flush ,since no frame is decoded set pic type as invalid*/
ps_dec_op->u4_is_ref_flag = -1;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
return (IV_SUCCESS);
}
else
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if(ps_dec->u1_res_changed == 1)
{
/*if resolution has changed and all buffers have been flushed, reset decoder*/
ih264d_init_decoder(ps_dec);
}
ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = 0;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num = 0;
ps_dec->cur_dec_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->cur_recon_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 2;
ps_dec->u1_first_pb_nal_in_pic = 1;
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 0;
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 0;
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 0;
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 0;
ps_dec->u4_cur_bs_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
DEBUG_THREADS_PRINTF(" Starting process call\n");
ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got = 0;
do
{
pu1_buf = (UWORD8*)ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer
+ ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed;
u4_max_ofst = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes
- ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed;
pu1_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->ps_mem_tab[MEM_REC_BITSBUF].pv_base;
u4_next_is_aud = 0;
buflen = ih264d_find_start_code(pu1_buf, 0, u4_max_ofst,
&u4_length_of_start_code,
&u4_next_is_aud);
if(buflen == -1)
buflen = 0;
/* Ignore bytes beyond the allocated size of intermediate buffer */
/* Since 8 bytes are read ahead, ensure 8 bytes are free at the
end of the buffer, which will be memset to 0 after emulation prevention */
buflen = MIN(buflen, (WORD32)(ps_dec->ps_mem_tab[MEM_REC_BITSBUF].u4_mem_size - 8));
bytes_consumed = buflen + u4_length_of_start_code;
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed += bytes_consumed;
if(buflen >= MAX_NAL_UNIT_SIZE)
{
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec, ps_dec_op);
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT(
"\nNal Size exceeded %d, Processing Stopped..\n",
MAX_NAL_UNIT_SIZE);
ps_dec->i4_error_code = 1 << IVD_CORRUPTEDDATA;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = -1;
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/*signal end of frame decode for curren frame*/
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0)
{
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded == 3)
{
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded =
ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr + 1;
}
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return IV_FAIL;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
continue;
}
}
{
UWORD8 u1_firstbyte, u1_nal_ref_idc;
if(ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_B)
{
u1_firstbyte = *(pu1_buf + u4_length_of_start_code);
u1_nal_ref_idc = (UWORD8)(NAL_REF_IDC(u1_firstbyte));
if(u1_nal_ref_idc == 0)
{
/*skip non reference frames*/
cur_slice_is_nonref = 1;
continue;
}
else
{
if(1 == cur_slice_is_nonref)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -=
bytes_consumed;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = IV_B_FRAME;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code =
IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1
<< IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size =
sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
}
}
}
if(buflen)
{
memcpy(pu1_bitstrm_buf, pu1_buf + u4_length_of_start_code,
buflen);
u4_first_start_code_found = 1;
}
else
{
/*start code not found*/
if(u4_first_start_code_found == 0)
{
/*no start codes found in current process call*/
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_START_CODE_NOT_FOUND;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA;
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0)
{
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec,
ps_dec_op);
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = ps_dec->i4_error_code;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
return (IV_FAIL);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
continue;
}
}
else
{
/* a start code has already been found earlier in the same process call*/
frame_data_left = 0;
header_data_left = 0;
continue;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_return_to_app = 0;
ret = ih264d_parse_nal_unit(dec_hdl, ps_dec_op,
pu1_bitstrm_buf, buflen);
if(ret != OK)
{
UWORD32 error = ih264d_map_error(ret);
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = error | ret;
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
if((ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
|| (ret == IVD_STREAM_WIDTH_HEIGHT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T))
{
ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found = 0;
break;
}
if((ret == ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME) || (ret == ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC))
{
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
break;
}
if(ret == ERROR_IN_LAST_SLICE_OF_PIC)
{
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
break;
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_return_to_app)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
header_data_left = ((ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1)
&& (ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
&& (ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed
< ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes));
frame_data_left = (((ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 0)
&& ((ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done == 0)
|| (u4_next_is_aud == 1)))
&& (ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed
< ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes));
}
while(( header_data_left == 1)||(frame_data_left == 1));
if((ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found == 1)
&& ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded < ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
WORD32 num_mb_skipped;
WORD32 prev_slice_err;
pocstruct_t temp_poc;
WORD32 ret1;
WORD32 ht_in_mbs;
ht_in_mbs = ps_dec->u2_pic_ht >> (4 + ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag);
num_mb_skipped = (ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic && (ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0))
prev_slice_err = 1;
else
prev_slice_err = 2;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic && (ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded == 0))
prev_slice_err = 1;
ret1 = ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(ps_dec, num_mb_skipped, ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL, ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&temp_poc, prev_slice_err);
if((ret1 == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T) || (ret1 == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T) ||
(ret1 == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T))
{
ret = ret1;
}
}
if((ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
|| (ret == IVD_STREAM_WIDTH_HEIGHT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T))
{
/* signal the decode thread */
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet */
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
/* dont consume bitstream for change in resolution case */
if(ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
}
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
/* If Format conversion is not complete,
complete it here */
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 2)
{
/*do deblocking of all mbs*/
if((ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk == 0) &&(ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk == 1) && (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag == 0))
{
UWORD32 u4_num_mbs,u4_max_addr;
tfr_ctxt_t s_tfr_ctxt;
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_tfr_cxt = &s_tfr_ctxt;
pad_mgr_t *ps_pad_mgr = &ps_dec->s_pad_mgr;
/*BS is done for all mbs while parsing*/
u4_max_addr = (ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs) - 1;
ps_dec->u4_cur_bs_mb_num = u4_max_addr + 1;
ih264d_init_deblk_tfr_ctxt(ps_dec, ps_pad_mgr, ps_tfr_cxt,
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs, 0);
u4_num_mbs = u4_max_addr
- ps_dec->u4_cur_deblk_mb_num + 1;
DEBUG_PERF_PRINTF("mbs left for deblocking= %d \n",u4_num_mbs);
if(u4_num_mbs != 0)
ih264d_check_mb_map_deblk(ps_dec, u4_num_mbs,
ps_tfr_cxt,1);
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
}
}
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
}
DATA_SYNC();
if((ps_dec_op->u4_error_code & 0xff)
!= ERROR_DYNAMIC_RESOLUTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
}
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA);
}
if(ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1 && ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA);
}
if(ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if((ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found == 1)
&& (ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC != i4_err_status))
{
/*
* For field pictures, set the bottom and top picture decoded u4_flag correctly.
*/
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded |= BOT_FIELD_ONLY;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded |= TOP_FIELD_ONLY;
}
}
/* if new frame in not found (if we are still getting slices from previous frame)
* ih264d_deblock_display is not called. Such frames will not be added to reference /display
*/
if (((ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC) == 0)
&& (ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 1))
{
/* Calling Function to deblock Picture and Display */
ret = ih264d_deblock_display(ps_dec);
}
/*set to complete ,as we dont support partial frame decode*/
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded == 3)
{
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr + 1;
}
/*Update the i4_frametype at the end of picture*/
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_IDR_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_B_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == P_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_P_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == I_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_I_FRAME;
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Shouldn't come here\n");
}
ps_dec->i4_content_type = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded + 2;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded
- ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
}
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
{
/* In case the decoder is configured to run in low delay mode,
* then get display buffer and then format convert.
* Note in this mode, format conversion does not run paralelly in a thread and adds to the codec cycles
*/
if((0 == ps_dec->u4_num_reorder_frames_at_init)
&& ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag)
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
}
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec, ps_dec_op);
/* If Format conversion is not complete,
complete it here */
if(ps_dec->u4_output_present &&
(ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row < ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht))
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht
- ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row;
ih264d_format_convert(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op),
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row,
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows);
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row += ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows;
}
ih264d_release_display_field(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
}
if(ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1 && (ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) == 1)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag = 1;
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps) && (1 == (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_is_valid)))
{
if((0 == ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
&& (0 == ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag))
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag = 0;
}
}
if((TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY) == ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = 0;
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Do End of Pic processing. */
/* Should be called only if frame was decoded in previous process call*/
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 1)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded)
{
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
else
{
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
}
/*Data memory barrier instruction,so that yuv write by the library is complete*/
DATA_SYNC();
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("The num bytes consumed: %d\n",
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed);
return api_ret_value;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libavc in Mediaserver could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-33551775.
Commit Message: Decoder: Fixed initialization of first_slice_in_pic
To handle some errors, first_slice_in_pic was being set to 2.
This is now cleaned up and first_slice_in_pic is set to 1 only once per pic.
This will ensure picture level initializations are done only once even in case
of error clips
Bug: 33717589
Bug: 33551775
Bug: 33716442
Bug: 33677995
Change-Id: If341436b3cbaa724017eedddd88c2e6fac36d8ba
| Medium | 9,243 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
FakeDBusThreadManager* fake_dbus_thread_manager = new FakeDBusThreadManager;
fake_bluetooth_profile_manager_client_ =
new FakeBluetoothProfileManagerClient;
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothProfileManagerClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothProfileManagerClient>(
fake_bluetooth_profile_manager_client_));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothAdapterClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothAdapterClient>(new FakeBluetoothAdapterClient));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothDeviceClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothDeviceClient>(new FakeBluetoothDeviceClient));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothInputClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothInputClient>(new FakeBluetoothInputClient));
DBusThreadManager::InitializeForTesting(fake_dbus_thread_manager);
device::BluetoothAdapterFactory::GetAdapter(
base::Bind(&BluetoothProfileChromeOSTest::AdapterCallback,
base::Unretained(this)));
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_.get() != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsInitialized());
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsPresent());
adapter_->SetPowered(
true,
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing),
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing));
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsPowered());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 24,618 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int sr_do_ioctl(Scsi_CD *cd, struct packet_command *cgc)
{
struct scsi_device *SDev;
struct scsi_sense_hdr sshdr;
int result, err = 0, retries = 0;
SDev = cd->device;
retry:
if (!scsi_block_when_processing_errors(SDev)) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto out;
}
result = scsi_execute(SDev, cgc->cmd, cgc->data_direction,
cgc->buffer, cgc->buflen,
(unsigned char *)cgc->sense, &sshdr,
cgc->timeout, IOCTL_RETRIES, 0, 0, NULL);
/* Minimal error checking. Ignore cases we know about, and report the rest. */
if (driver_byte(result) != 0) {
switch (sshdr.sense_key) {
case UNIT_ATTENTION:
SDev->changed = 1;
if (!cgc->quiet)
sr_printk(KERN_INFO, cd,
"disc change detected.\n");
if (retries++ < 10)
goto retry;
err = -ENOMEDIUM;
break;
case NOT_READY: /* This happens if there is no disc in drive */
if (sshdr.asc == 0x04 &&
sshdr.ascq == 0x01) {
/* sense: Logical unit is in process of becoming ready */
if (!cgc->quiet)
sr_printk(KERN_INFO, cd,
"CDROM not ready yet.\n");
if (retries++ < 10) {
/* sleep 2 sec and try again */
ssleep(2);
goto retry;
} else {
/* 20 secs are enough? */
err = -ENOMEDIUM;
break;
}
}
if (!cgc->quiet)
sr_printk(KERN_INFO, cd,
"CDROM not ready. Make sure there "
"is a disc in the drive.\n");
err = -ENOMEDIUM;
break;
case ILLEGAL_REQUEST:
err = -EIO;
if (sshdr.asc == 0x20 &&
sshdr.ascq == 0x00)
/* sense: Invalid command operation code */
err = -EDRIVE_CANT_DO_THIS;
break;
default:
err = -EIO;
}
}
/* Wake up a process waiting for device */
out:
cgc->stat = err;
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The sr_do_ioctl function in drivers/scsi/sr_ioctl.c in the Linux kernel through 4.16.12 allows local users to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact because sense buffers have different sizes at the CDROM layer and the SCSI layer, as demonstrated by a CDROMREADMODE2 ioctl call.
Commit Message: sr: pass down correctly sized SCSI sense buffer
We're casting the CDROM layer request_sense to the SCSI sense
buffer, but the former is 64 bytes and the latter is 96 bytes.
As we generally allocate these on the stack, we end up blowing
up the stack.
Fix this by wrapping the scsi_execute() call with a properly
sized sense buffer, and copying back the bits for the CDROM
layer.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Piotr Gabriel Kosinski <pg.kosinski@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Daniel Shapira <daniel@twistlock.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Fixes: 82ed4db499b8 ("block: split scsi_request out of struct request")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> | High | 25,203 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static bool caller_is_in_ancestor(pid_t pid, const char *contrl, const char *cg, char **nextcg)
{
char fnam[PROCLEN];
FILE *f;
bool answer = false;
char *line = NULL;
size_t len = 0;
int ret;
ret = snprintf(fnam, PROCLEN, "/proc/%d/cgroup", pid);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= PROCLEN)
return false;
if (!(f = fopen(fnam, "r")))
return false;
while (getline(&line, &len, f) != -1) {
char *c1, *c2, *linecmp;
if (!line[0])
continue;
c1 = strchr(line, ':');
if (!c1)
goto out;
c1++;
c2 = strchr(c1, ':');
if (!c2)
goto out;
*c2 = '\0';
if (strcmp(c1, contrl) != 0)
continue;
c2++;
stripnewline(c2);
prune_init_slice(c2);
/*
* callers pass in '/' for root cgroup, otherwise they pass
* in a cgroup without leading '/'
*/
linecmp = *cg == '/' ? c2 : c2+1;
if (strncmp(linecmp, cg, strlen(linecmp)) != 0) {
if (nextcg)
*nextcg = get_next_cgroup_dir(linecmp, cg);
goto out;
}
answer = true;
goto out;
}
out:
fclose(f);
free(line);
return answer;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: LXCFS before 0.12 does not properly enforce directory escapes, which might allow local users to gain privileges by (1) querying or (2) updating a cgroup.
Commit Message: Fix checking of parent directories
Taken from the justification in the launchpad bug:
To a task in freezer cgroup /a/b/c/d, it should appear that there are no
cgroups other than its descendents. Since this is a filesystem, we must have
the parent directories, but each parent cgroup should only contain the child
which the task can see.
So, when this task looks at /a/b, it should see only directory 'c' and no
files. Attempt to create /a/b/x should result in -EPERM, whether /a/b/x already
exists or not. Attempts to query /a/b/x should result in -ENOENT whether /a/b/x
exists or not. Opening /a/b/tasks should result in -ENOENT.
The caller_may_see_dir checks specifically whether a task may see a cgroup
directory - i.e. /a/b/x if opening /a/b/x/tasks, and /a/b/c/d if doing
opendir('/a/b/c/d').
caller_is_in_ancestor() will return true if the caller in /a/b/c/d looks at
/a/b/c/d/e. If the caller is in a child cgroup of the queried one - i.e. if the
task in /a/b/c/d queries /a/b, then *nextcg will container the next (the only)
directory which he can see in the path - 'c'.
Beyond this, regular DAC permissions should apply, with the
root-in-user-namespace privilege over its mapped uids being respected. The
fc_may_access check does this check for both directories and files.
This is CVE-2015-1342 (LP: #1508481)
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> | Medium | 1,930 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int chmd_read_headers(struct mspack_system *sys, struct mspack_file *fh,
struct mschmd_header *chm, int entire)
{
unsigned int section, name_len, x, errors, num_chunks;
unsigned char buf[0x54], *chunk = NULL, *name, *p, *end;
struct mschmd_file *fi, *link = NULL;
off_t offset, length;
int num_entries;
/* initialise pointers */
chm->files = NULL;
chm->sysfiles = NULL;
chm->chunk_cache = NULL;
chm->sec0.base.chm = chm;
chm->sec0.base.id = 0;
chm->sec1.base.chm = chm;
chm->sec1.base.id = 1;
chm->sec1.content = NULL;
chm->sec1.control = NULL;
chm->sec1.spaninfo = NULL;
chm->sec1.rtable = NULL;
/* read the first header */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], chmhead_SIZEOF) != chmhead_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* check ITSF signature */
if (EndGetI32(&buf[chmhead_Signature]) != 0x46535449) {
return MSPACK_ERR_SIGNATURE;
}
/* check both header GUIDs */
if (memcmp(&buf[chmhead_GUID1], &guids[0], 32L) != 0) {
D(("incorrect GUIDs"))
return MSPACK_ERR_SIGNATURE;
}
chm->version = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhead_Version]);
chm->timestamp = EndGetM32(&buf[chmhead_Timestamp]);
chm->language = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhead_LanguageID]);
if (chm->version > 3) {
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; CHM version > 3");
}
/* read the header section table */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], chmhst3_SIZEOF) != chmhst3_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* chmhst3_OffsetCS0 does not exist in version 1 or 2 CHM files.
* The offset will be corrected later, once HS1 is read.
*/
if (read_off64(&offset, &buf[chmhst_OffsetHS0], sys, fh) ||
read_off64(&chm->dir_offset, &buf[chmhst_OffsetHS1], sys, fh) ||
read_off64(&chm->sec0.offset, &buf[chmhst3_OffsetCS0], sys, fh))
{
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* seek to header section 0 */
if (sys->seek(fh, offset, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START)) {
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
/* read header section 0 */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], chmhs0_SIZEOF) != chmhs0_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
if (read_off64(&chm->length, &buf[chmhs0_FileLen], sys, fh)) {
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* seek to header section 1 */
if (sys->seek(fh, chm->dir_offset, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START)) {
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
/* read header section 1 */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], chmhs1_SIZEOF) != chmhs1_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
chm->dir_offset = sys->tell(fh);
chm->chunk_size = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_ChunkSize]);
chm->density = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_Density]);
chm->depth = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_Depth]);
chm->index_root = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_IndexRoot]);
chm->num_chunks = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_NumChunks]);
chm->first_pmgl = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_FirstPMGL]);
chm->last_pmgl = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_LastPMGL]);
if (chm->version < 3) {
/* versions before 3 don't have chmhst3_OffsetCS0 */
chm->sec0.offset = chm->dir_offset + (chm->chunk_size * chm->num_chunks);
}
/* check if content offset or file size is wrong */
if (chm->sec0.offset > chm->length) {
D(("content section begins after file has ended"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* ensure there are chunks and that chunk size is
* large enough for signature and num_entries */
if (chm->chunk_size < (pmgl_Entries + 2)) {
D(("chunk size not large enough"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
if (chm->num_chunks == 0) {
D(("no chunks"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* The chunk_cache data structure is not great; large values for num_chunks
* or num_chunks*chunk_size can exhaust all memory. Until a better chunk
* cache is implemented, put arbitrary limits on num_chunks and chunk size.
*/
if (chm->num_chunks > 100000) {
D(("more than 100,000 chunks"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
if ((off_t)chm->chunk_size * (off_t)chm->num_chunks > chm->length) {
D(("chunks larger than entire file"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* common sense checks on header section 1 fields */
if ((chm->chunk_size & (chm->chunk_size - 1)) != 0) {
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; chunk size is not a power of two");
}
if (chm->first_pmgl != 0) {
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; first PMGL chunk is not zero");
}
if (chm->first_pmgl > chm->last_pmgl) {
D(("first pmgl chunk is after last pmgl chunk"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
if (chm->index_root != 0xFFFFFFFF && chm->index_root >= chm->num_chunks) {
D(("index_root outside valid range"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* if we are doing a quick read, stop here! */
if (!entire) {
return MSPACK_ERR_OK;
}
/* seek to the first PMGL chunk, and reduce the number of chunks to read */
if ((x = chm->first_pmgl) != 0) {
if (sys->seek(fh,(off_t) (x * chm->chunk_size), MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_CUR)) {
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
}
num_chunks = chm->last_pmgl - x + 1;
if (!(chunk = (unsigned char *) sys->alloc(sys, (size_t)chm->chunk_size))) {
return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
}
/* read and process all chunks from FirstPMGL to LastPMGL */
errors = 0;
while (num_chunks--) {
/* read next chunk */
if (sys->read(fh, chunk, (int)chm->chunk_size) != (int)chm->chunk_size) {
sys->free(chunk);
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* process only directory (PMGL) chunks */
if (EndGetI32(&chunk[pmgl_Signature]) != 0x4C474D50) continue;
if (EndGetI32(&chunk[pmgl_QuickRefSize]) < 2) {
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; PMGL quickref area is too small");
}
if (EndGetI32(&chunk[pmgl_QuickRefSize]) >
((int)chm->chunk_size - pmgl_Entries))
{
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; PMGL quickref area is too large");
}
p = &chunk[pmgl_Entries];
end = &chunk[chm->chunk_size - 2];
num_entries = EndGetI16(end);
while (num_entries--) {
READ_ENCINT(name_len);
if (name_len > (unsigned int) (end - p)) goto chunk_end;
name = p; p += name_len;
READ_ENCINT(section);
READ_ENCINT(offset);
READ_ENCINT(length);
/* ignore blank or one-char (e.g. "/") filenames we'd return as blank */
if (name_len < 2 || !name[0] || !name[1]) continue;
/* empty files and directory names are stored as a file entry at
* offset 0 with length 0. We want to keep empty files, but not
* directory names, which end with a "/" */
if ((offset == 0) && (length == 0)) {
if ((name_len > 0) && (name[name_len-1] == '/')) continue;
}
if (section > 1) {
sys->message(fh, "invalid section number '%u'.", section);
continue;
}
if (!(fi = (struct mschmd_file *) sys->alloc(sys, sizeof(struct mschmd_file) + name_len + 1))) {
sys->free(chunk);
return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
}
fi->next = NULL;
fi->filename = (char *) &fi[1];
fi->section = ((section == 0) ? (struct mschmd_section *) (&chm->sec0)
: (struct mschmd_section *) (&chm->sec1));
fi->offset = offset;
fi->length = length;
sys->copy(name, fi->filename, (size_t) name_len);
fi->filename[name_len] = '\0';
if (name[0] == ':' && name[1] == ':') {
/* system file */
if (memcmp(&name[2], &content_name[2], 31L) == 0) {
if (memcmp(&name[33], &content_name[33], 8L) == 0) {
chm->sec1.content = fi;
}
else if (memcmp(&name[33], &control_name[33], 11L) == 0) {
chm->sec1.control = fi;
}
else if (memcmp(&name[33], &spaninfo_name[33], 8L) == 0) {
chm->sec1.spaninfo = fi;
}
else if (memcmp(&name[33], &rtable_name[33], 72L) == 0) {
chm->sec1.rtable = fi;
}
}
fi->next = chm->sysfiles;
chm->sysfiles = fi;
}
else {
/* normal file */
if (link) link->next = fi; else chm->files = fi;
link = fi;
}
}
/* this is reached either when num_entries runs out, or if
* reading data from the chunk reached a premature end of chunk */
chunk_end:
if (num_entries >= 0) {
D(("chunk ended before all entries could be read"))
errors++;
}
}
sys->free(chunk);
return (errors > 0) ? MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT : MSPACK_ERR_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libmspack 0.9.1alpha is affected by: Buffer Overflow. The impact is: Information Disclosure. The component is: function chmd_read_headers() in libmspack(file libmspack/mspack/chmd.c). The attack vector is: the victim must open a specially crafted chm file. The fixed version is: after commit 2f084136cfe0d05e5bf5703f3e83c6d955234b4d.
Commit Message: length checks when looking for control files | Medium | 17,012 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: unsigned long Tracks::GetTracksCount() const
{
const ptrdiff_t result = m_trackEntriesEnd - m_trackEntries;
assert(result >= 0);
return static_cast<unsigned long>(result);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 10,086 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int ext4_dax_pmd_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
pmd_t *pmd, unsigned int flags)
{
int result;
handle_t *handle = NULL;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
bool write = flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
if (write) {
sb_start_pagefault(sb);
file_update_time(vma->vm_file);
handle = ext4_journal_start_sb(sb, EXT4_HT_WRITE_PAGE,
ext4_chunk_trans_blocks(inode,
PMD_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE));
}
if (IS_ERR(handle))
result = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
else
result = __dax_pmd_fault(vma, addr, pmd, flags,
ext4_get_block_dax, ext4_end_io_unwritten);
if (write) {
if (!IS_ERR(handle))
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
sb_end_pagefault(sb);
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the ext4 filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allow local users to cause a denial of service (disk corruption) by writing to a page that is associated with a different user's file after unsynchronized hole punching and page-fault handling.
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> | Low | 17,318 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int gup_huge_pgd(pgd_t orig, pgd_t *pgdp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, int write,
struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
int refs;
struct page *head, *page;
if (!pgd_access_permitted(orig, write))
return 0;
BUILD_BUG_ON(pgd_devmap(orig));
refs = 0;
page = pgd_page(orig) + ((addr & ~PGDIR_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
do {
pages[*nr] = page;
(*nr)++;
page++;
refs++;
} while (addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
head = compound_head(pgd_page(orig));
if (!page_cache_add_speculative(head, refs)) {
*nr -= refs;
return 0;
}
if (unlikely(pgd_val(orig) != pgd_val(*pgdp))) {
*nr -= refs;
while (refs--)
put_page(head);
return 0;
}
SetPageReferenced(head);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The Linux kernel before 5.1-rc5 allows page->_refcount reference count overflow, with resultant use-after-free issues, if about 140 GiB of RAM exists. This is related to fs/fuse/dev.c, fs/pipe.c, fs/splice.c, include/linux/mm.h, include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h, kernel/trace/trace.c, mm/gup.c, and mm/hugetlb.c. It can occur with FUSE requests.
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit | High | 27,450 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: NavigationPolicy EffectiveNavigationPolicy(NavigationPolicy policy,
const WebInputEvent* current_event,
const WebWindowFeatures& features) {
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyIgnore)
return GetNavigationPolicy(current_event, features);
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab &&
GetNavigationPolicy(current_event, features) !=
kNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab &&
!UIEventWithKeyState::NewTabModifierSetFromIsolatedWorld()) {
return kNavigationPolicyNewForegroundTab;
}
return policy;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: A missing check for JS-simulated input events in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to download arbitrary files with no user input via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Only allow downloading in response to real keyboard modifiers
BUG=848531
Change-Id: I97554c8d312243b55647f1376945aee32dbd95bf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1082216
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564051} | Low | 24,094 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma_create_xprt(struct svc_serv *serv,
int listener)
{
struct svcxprt_rdma *cma_xprt = kzalloc(sizeof *cma_xprt, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cma_xprt)
return NULL;
svc_xprt_init(&init_net, &svc_rdma_class, &cma_xprt->sc_xprt, serv);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cma_xprt->sc_accept_q);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cma_xprt->sc_rq_dto_q);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cma_xprt->sc_read_complete_q);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cma_xprt->sc_frmr_q);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cma_xprt->sc_ctxts);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cma_xprt->sc_maps);
init_waitqueue_head(&cma_xprt->sc_send_wait);
spin_lock_init(&cma_xprt->sc_lock);
spin_lock_init(&cma_xprt->sc_rq_dto_lock);
spin_lock_init(&cma_xprt->sc_frmr_q_lock);
spin_lock_init(&cma_xprt->sc_ctxt_lock);
spin_lock_init(&cma_xprt->sc_map_lock);
/*
* Note that this implies that the underlying transport support
* has some form of congestion control (see RFC 7530 section 3.1
* paragraph 2). For now, we assume that all supported RDMA
* transports are suitable here.
*/
set_bit(XPT_CONG_CTRL, &cma_xprt->sc_xprt.xpt_flags);
if (listener)
set_bit(XPT_LISTENER, &cma_xprt->sc_xprt.xpt_flags);
return cma_xprt;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Medium | 3,659 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent(WebContents* contents,
Profile* profile,
const Extension* extension,
ListValue* event_args) {
DictionaryValue* tab_value = ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
contents, extension);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not ensure that an extension has the tabs (aka APIPermission::kTab) permission before providing a URL to this extension, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 13,475 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
{
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
pitem *item = NULL;
int i = -1, is_complete;
unsigned char seq64be[8];
unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
goto err;
/* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
* maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
*/
if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list)
max_len = s->max_cert_list;
else
max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
goto err;
/* Try to find item in queue */
memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
if (item == NULL)
{
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1);
if ( frag == NULL)
goto err;
memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
}
else
frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
* retransmit and can be dropped.
frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
if (i<=0) goto err;
frag_len -= i;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The dtls1_reassemble_fragment function in d1_both.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8za, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0m, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1h does not properly validate fragment lengths in DTLS ClientHello messages, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and application crash) via a long non-initial fragment.
Commit Message: | Medium | 25,230 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static spl_filesystem_object * spl_filesystem_object_create_type(int ht, spl_filesystem_object *source, int type, zend_class_entry *ce, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
zend_bool use_include_path = 0;
zval *arg1, *arg2;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
switch (source->type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
case SPL_FS_FILE:
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
if (!source->u.dir.entry.d_name[0]) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Could not open file");
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return NULL;
}
}
switch (type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
ce = ce ? ce : source->info_class;
zend_update_class_constants(ce TSRMLS_CC);
return_value->value.obj = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_OBJECT;
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(source TSRMLS_CC);
if (ce->constructor->common.scope != spl_ce_SplFileInfo) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg1, source->file_name, source->file_name_len, 1);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&return_value, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, arg1);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg1);
} else {
intern->file_name = estrndup(source->file_name, source->file_name_len);
intern->file_name_len = source->file_name_len;
intern->_path = spl_filesystem_object_get_path(source, &intern->_path_len TSRMLS_CC);
intern->_path = estrndup(intern->_path, intern->_path_len);
}
break;
case SPL_FS_FILE:
ce = ce ? ce : source->file_class;
zend_update_class_constants(ce TSRMLS_CC);
return_value->value.obj = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_OBJECT;
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(source TSRMLS_CC);
if (ce->constructor->common.scope != spl_ce_SplFileObject) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg2);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg1, source->file_name, source->file_name_len, 1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg2, "r", 1, 1);
zend_call_method_with_2_params(&return_value, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, arg1, arg2);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg1);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg2);
} else {
intern->file_name = source->file_name;
intern->file_name_len = source->file_name_len;
intern->_path = spl_filesystem_object_get_path(source, &intern->_path_len TSRMLS_CC);
intern->_path = estrndup(intern->_path, intern->_path_len);
intern->u.file.open_mode = "r";
intern->u.file.open_mode_len = 1;
if (ht && zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|sbr",
&intern->u.file.open_mode, &intern->u.file.open_mode_len,
&use_include_path, &intern->u.file.zcontext) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
intern->file_name = NULL;
zval_dtor(return_value);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_NULL;
return NULL;
}
if (spl_filesystem_file_open(intern, use_include_path, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(return_value);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_NULL;
return NULL;
}
}
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Operation not supported");
return NULL;
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return NULL;
} /* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int | High | 2,739 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int set_register(pegasus_t *pegasus, __u16 indx, __u8 data)
{
int ret;
ret = usb_control_msg(pegasus->usb, usb_sndctrlpipe(pegasus->usb, 0),
PEGASUS_REQ_SET_REG, PEGASUS_REQT_WRITE, data,
indx, &data, 1, 1000);
if (ret < 0)
netif_dbg(pegasus, drv, pegasus->net,
"%s returned %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/net/usb/pegasus.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.11 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: pegasus: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
References: https://bugs.debian.org/852556
Reported-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <lisandro@debian.org>
Tested-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <lisandro@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | High | 11,361 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static spl_filesystem_object * spl_filesystem_object_create_info(spl_filesystem_object *source, char *file_path, int file_path_len, int use_copy, zend_class_entry *ce, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
zval *arg1;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
if (!file_path || !file_path_len) {
#if defined(PHP_WIN32)
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot create SplFileInfo for empty path");
if (file_path && !use_copy) {
efree(file_path);
}
#else
if (file_path && !use_copy) {
efree(file_path);
}
file_path_len = 1;
file_path = "/";
#endif
return NULL;
}
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
ce = ce ? ce : source->info_class;
zend_update_class_constants(ce TSRMLS_CC);
return_value->value.obj = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_OBJECT;
if (ce->constructor->common.scope != spl_ce_SplFileInfo) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg1, file_path, file_path_len, use_copy);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&return_value, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, arg1);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg1);
} else {
spl_filesystem_info_set_filename(intern, file_path, file_path_len, use_copy TSRMLS_CC);
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return intern;
} /* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int | High | 29,250 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool asn1_read_BOOLEAN_context(struct asn1_data *data, bool *v, int context)
{
uint8_t tmp = 0;
asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(context));
asn1_read_uint8(data, &tmp);
if (tmp == 0xFF) {
*v = true;
} else {
*v = false;
}
asn1_end_tag(data);
return !data->has_error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The LDAP server in the AD domain controller in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22 does not check return values to ensure successful ASN.1 memory allocation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and daemon crash) via crafted packets.
Commit Message: | Medium | 27,869 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: AudioSystemImplTest()
: use_audio_thread_(GetParam()), audio_thread_("AudioSystemThread") {
if (use_audio_thread_) {
audio_thread_.StartAndWaitForTesting();
audio_manager_.reset(
new media::MockAudioManager(audio_thread_.task_runner()));
} else {
audio_manager_.reset(new media::MockAudioManager(
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get().get()));
}
audio_manager_->SetInputStreamParameters(
media::AudioParameters::UnavailableDeviceParams());
audio_system_ = media::AudioSystemImpl::Create(audio_manager_.get());
EXPECT_EQ(AudioSystem::Get(), audio_system_.get());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939} | High | 19,927 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void inode_init_owner(struct inode *inode, const struct inode *dir,
umode_t mode)
{
inode->i_uid = current_fsuid();
if (dir && dir->i_mode & S_ISGID) {
inode->i_gid = dir->i_gid;
if (S_ISDIR(mode))
mode |= S_ISGID;
} else
inode->i_gid = current_fsgid();
inode->i_mode = mode;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: The inode_init_owner function in fs/inode.c in the Linux kernel through 4.17.4 allows local users to create files with an unintended group ownership, in a scenario where a directory is SGID to a certain group and is writable by a user who is not a member of that group. Here, the non-member can trigger creation of a plain file whose group ownership is that group. The intended behavior was that the non-member can trigger creation of a directory (but not a plain file) whose group ownership is that group. The non-member can escalate privileges by making the plain file executable and SGID.
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | Medium | 17,058 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void recalculate_apic_map(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_apic_map *new, *old = NULL;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
int i;
new = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_apic_map), GFP_KERNEL);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
if (!new)
goto out;
new->ldr_bits = 8;
/* flat mode is default */
new->cid_shift = 8;
new->cid_mask = 0;
new->lid_mask = 0xff;
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
u16 cid, lid;
u32 ldr;
if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
continue;
/*
* All APICs have to be configured in the same mode by an OS.
* We take advatage of this while building logical id loockup
* table. After reset APICs are in xapic/flat mode, so if we
* find apic with different setting we assume this is the mode
* OS wants all apics to be in; build lookup table accordingly.
*/
if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic)) {
new->ldr_bits = 32;
new->cid_shift = 16;
new->cid_mask = new->lid_mask = 0xffff;
} else if (kvm_apic_sw_enabled(apic) &&
!new->cid_mask /* flat mode */ &&
kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_DFR) == APIC_DFR_CLUSTER) {
new->cid_shift = 4;
new->cid_mask = 0xf;
new->lid_mask = 0xf;
}
new->phys_map[kvm_apic_id(apic)] = apic;
ldr = kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LDR);
cid = apic_cluster_id(new, ldr);
lid = apic_logical_id(new, ldr);
if (lid)
new->logical_map[cid][ffs(lid) - 1] = apic;
}
out:
old = rcu_dereference_protected(kvm->arch.apic_map,
lockdep_is_held(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock));
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->arch.apic_map, new);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
if (old)
kfree_rcu(old, rcu);
kvm_vcpu_request_scan_ioapic(kvm);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The recalculate_apic_map function in arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.12.5 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS crash) via a crafted ICR write operation in x2apic mode.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | Medium | 26,879 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int snd_timer_user_tselect(struct file *file,
struct snd_timer_select __user *_tselect)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
struct snd_timer_select tselect;
char str[32];
int err = 0;
tu = file->private_data;
mutex_lock(&tu->tread_sem);
if (tu->timeri) {
snd_timer_close(tu->timeri);
tu->timeri = NULL;
}
if (copy_from_user(&tselect, _tselect, sizeof(tselect))) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto __err;
}
sprintf(str, "application %i", current->pid);
if (tselect.id.dev_class != SNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_SLAVE)
tselect.id.dev_sclass = SNDRV_TIMER_SCLASS_APPLICATION;
err = snd_timer_open(&tu->timeri, str, &tselect.id, current->pid);
if (err < 0)
goto __err;
kfree(tu->queue);
tu->queue = NULL;
kfree(tu->tqueue);
tu->tqueue = NULL;
if (tu->tread) {
tu->tqueue = kmalloc(tu->queue_size * sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (tu->tqueue == NULL)
err = -ENOMEM;
} else {
tu->queue = kmalloc(tu->queue_size * sizeof(struct snd_timer_read),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (tu->queue == NULL)
err = -ENOMEM;
}
if (err < 0) {
snd_timer_close(tu->timeri);
tu->timeri = NULL;
} else {
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_FAST;
tu->timeri->callback = tu->tread
? snd_timer_user_tinterrupt : snd_timer_user_interrupt;
tu->timeri->ccallback = snd_timer_user_ccallback;
tu->timeri->callback_data = (void *)tu;
}
__err:
mutex_unlock(&tu->tread_sem);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: sound/core/timer.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.1 uses an incorrect type of mutex, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (race condition, use-after-free, and system crash) via a crafted ioctl call.
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix race among timer ioctls
ALSA timer ioctls have an open race and this may lead to a
use-after-free of timer instance object. A simplistic fix is to make
each ioctl exclusive. We have already tread_sem for controlling the
tread, and extend this as a global mutex to be applied to each ioctl.
The downside is, of course, the worse concurrency. But these ioctls
aren't to be parallel accessible, in anyway, so it should be fine to
serialize there.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> | Medium | 19,585 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void ncq_err(NCQTransferState *ncq_tfs)
{
IDEState *ide_state = &ncq_tfs->drive->port.ifs[0];
ide_state->error = ABRT_ERR;
ide_state->status = READY_STAT | ERR_STAT;
ncq_tfs->drive->port_regs.scr_err |= (1 << ncq_tfs->tag);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in hw/ide/ahci.c in QEMU, when built with IDE AHCI Emulation support, allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (instance crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via an invalid AHCI Native Command Queuing (NCQ) AIO command.
Commit Message: | High | 23,964 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static const ut8 *r_bin_dwarf_parse_attr_value(const ut8 *obuf, int obuf_len,
RBinDwarfAttrSpec *spec, RBinDwarfAttrValue *value,
const RBinDwarfCompUnitHdr *hdr,
const ut8 *debug_str, size_t debug_str_len) {
const ut8 *buf = obuf;
const ut8 *buf_end = obuf + obuf_len;
size_t j;
if (!spec || !value || !hdr || !obuf || obuf_len < 0) {
return NULL;
}
value->form = spec->attr_form;
value->name = spec->attr_name;
value->encoding.block.data = NULL;
value->encoding.str_struct.string = NULL;
value->encoding.str_struct.offset = 0;
switch (spec->attr_form) {
case DW_FORM_addr:
switch (hdr->pointer_size) {
case 1:
value->encoding.address = READ (buf, ut8);
break;
case 2:
value->encoding.address = READ (buf, ut16);
break;
case 4:
value->encoding.address = READ (buf, ut32);
break;
case 8:
value->encoding.address = READ (buf, ut64);
break;
default:
eprintf("DWARF: Unexpected pointer size: %u\n", (unsigned)hdr->pointer_size);
return NULL;
}
break;
case DW_FORM_block2:
value->encoding.block.length = READ (buf, ut16);
if (value->encoding.block.length > 0) {
value->encoding.block.data = calloc (sizeof(ut8), value->encoding.block.length);
for (j = 0; j < value->encoding.block.length; j++) {
value->encoding.block.data[j] = READ (buf, ut8);
}
}
break;
case DW_FORM_block4:
value->encoding.block.length = READ (buf, ut32);
if (value->encoding.block.length > 0) {
ut8 *data = calloc (sizeof (ut8), value->encoding.block.length);
if (data) {
for (j = 0; j < value->encoding.block.length; j++) {
data[j] = READ (buf, ut8);
}
}
value->encoding.block.data = data;
}
break;
//// This causes segfaults to happen
case DW_FORM_data2:
value->encoding.data = READ (buf, ut16);
break;
case DW_FORM_data4:
value->encoding.data = READ (buf, ut32);
break;
case DW_FORM_data8:
value->encoding.data = READ (buf, ut64);
break;
case DW_FORM_string:
value->encoding.str_struct.string = *buf? strdup ((const char*)buf) : NULL;
buf += (strlen ((const char*)buf) + 1);
break;
case DW_FORM_block:
buf = r_uleb128 (buf, buf_end - buf, &value->encoding.block.length);
if (!buf) {
return NULL;
}
value->encoding.block.data = calloc (sizeof(ut8), value->encoding.block.length);
for (j = 0; j < value->encoding.block.length; j++) {
value->encoding.block.data[j] = READ (buf, ut8);
}
break;
case DW_FORM_block1:
value->encoding.block.length = READ (buf, ut8);
value->encoding.block.data = calloc (sizeof (ut8), value->encoding.block.length + 1);
for (j = 0; j < value->encoding.block.length; j++) {
value->encoding.block.data[j] = READ (buf, ut8);
}
break;
case DW_FORM_flag:
value->encoding.flag = READ (buf, ut8);
break;
case DW_FORM_sdata:
buf = r_leb128 (buf, &value->encoding.sdata);
break;
case DW_FORM_strp:
value->encoding.str_struct.offset = READ (buf, ut32);
if (debug_str && value->encoding.str_struct.offset < debug_str_len) {
value->encoding.str_struct.string = strdup (
(const char *)(debug_str +
value->encoding.str_struct.offset));
} else {
value->encoding.str_struct.string = NULL;
}
break;
case DW_FORM_udata:
{
ut64 ndata = 0;
const ut8 *data = (const ut8*)&ndata;
buf = r_uleb128 (buf, R_MIN (sizeof (data), (size_t)(buf_end - buf)), &ndata);
memcpy (&value->encoding.data, data, sizeof (value->encoding.data));
value->encoding.str_struct.string = NULL;
}
break;
case DW_FORM_ref_addr:
value->encoding.reference = READ (buf, ut64); // addr size of machine
break;
case DW_FORM_ref1:
value->encoding.reference = READ (buf, ut8);
break;
case DW_FORM_ref2:
value->encoding.reference = READ (buf, ut16);
break;
case DW_FORM_ref4:
value->encoding.reference = READ (buf, ut32);
break;
case DW_FORM_ref8:
value->encoding.reference = READ (buf, ut64);
break;
case DW_FORM_data1:
value->encoding.data = READ (buf, ut8);
break;
default:
eprintf ("Unknown DW_FORM 0x%02"PFMT64x"\n", spec->attr_form);
value->encoding.data = 0;
return NULL;
}
return buf;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: In radare2 2.0.1, libr/bin/dwarf.c allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid read and application crash) via a crafted ELF file, related to r_bin_dwarf_parse_comp_unit in dwarf.c and sdb_set_internal in shlr/sdb/src/sdb.c.
Commit Message: Fix #8813 - segfault in dwarf parser | Medium | 3,940 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, extractTo)
{
char *error = NULL;
php_stream *fp;
php_stream_statbuf ssb;
phar_entry_info *entry;
char *pathto, *filename;
size_t pathto_len, filename_len;
int ret, i;
int nelems;
zval *zval_files = NULL;
zend_bool overwrite = 0;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|z!b", &pathto, &pathto_len, &zval_files, &overwrite) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
fp = php_stream_open_wrapper(phar_obj->archive->fname, "rb", IGNORE_URL|STREAM_MUST_SEEK, NULL);
if (!fp) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_InvalidArgumentException, 0,
"Invalid argument, %s cannot be found", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
php_stream_close(fp);
if (pathto_len < 1) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_InvalidArgumentException, 0,
"Invalid argument, extraction path must be non-zero length");
return;
}
if (pathto_len >= MAXPATHLEN) {
char *tmp = estrndup(pathto, 50);
/* truncate for error message */
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_InvalidArgumentException, 0, "Cannot extract to \"%s...\", destination directory is too long for filesystem", tmp);
efree(tmp);
return;
}
if (php_stream_stat_path(pathto, &ssb) < 0) {
ret = php_stream_mkdir(pathto, 0777, PHP_STREAM_MKDIR_RECURSIVE, NULL);
if (!ret) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0,
"Unable to create path \"%s\" for extraction", pathto);
return;
}
} else if (!(ssb.sb.st_mode & S_IFDIR)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0,
"Unable to use path \"%s\" for extraction, it is a file, must be a directory", pathto);
return;
}
if (zval_files) {
switch (Z_TYPE_P(zval_files)) {
case IS_NULL:
goto all_files;
case IS_STRING:
filename = Z_STRVAL_P(zval_files);
filename_len = Z_STRLEN_P(zval_files);
break;
case IS_ARRAY:
nelems = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(zval_files));
if (nelems == 0 ) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
for (i = 0; i < nelems; i++) {
zval *zval_file;
if ((zval_file = zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(zval_files), i)) != NULL) {
switch (Z_TYPE_P(zval_file)) {
case IS_STRING:
break;
default:
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_InvalidArgumentException, 0,
"Invalid argument, array of filenames to extract contains non-string value");
return;
}
if (NULL == (entry = zend_hash_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, Z_STR_P(zval_file)))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0,
"Phar Error: attempted to extract non-existent file \"%s\" from phar \"%s\"", Z_STRVAL_P(zval_file), phar_obj->archive->fname);
}
if (FAILURE == phar_extract_file(overwrite, entry, pathto, pathto_len, &error)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0,
"Extraction from phar \"%s\" failed: %s", phar_obj->archive->fname, error);
efree(error);
return;
}
}
}
RETURN_TRUE;
default:
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_InvalidArgumentException, 0,
"Invalid argument, expected a filename (string) or array of filenames");
return;
}
if (NULL == (entry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, filename, filename_len))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0,
"Phar Error: attempted to extract non-existent file \"%s\" from phar \"%s\"", filename, phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (FAILURE == phar_extract_file(overwrite, entry, pathto, pathto_len, &error)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0,
"Extraction from phar \"%s\" failed: %s", phar_obj->archive->fname, error);
efree(error);
return;
}
} else {
phar_archive_data *phar;
all_files:
phar = phar_obj->archive;
/* Extract all files */
if (!zend_hash_num_elements(&(phar->manifest))) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_PTR(&phar->manifest, entry) {
if (FAILURE == phar_extract_file(overwrite, entry, pathto, pathto_len, &error)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0,
"Extraction from phar \"%s\" failed: %s", phar->fname, error);
efree(error);
return;
}
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Phar extension in PHP before 5.5.34, 5.6.x before 5.6.20, and 7.x before 7.0.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted filename, as demonstrated by mishandling of \0 characters by the phar_analyze_path function in ext/phar/phar.c.
Commit Message: | High | 2,926 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool GDataCache::CreateCacheDirectories(
const std::vector<FilePath>& paths_to_create) {
bool success = true;
for (size_t i = 0; i < paths_to_create.size(); ++i) {
if (file_util::DirectoryExists(paths_to_create[i]))
continue;
if (!file_util::CreateDirectory(paths_to_create[i])) {
success = false;
PLOG(ERROR) << "Error creating directory " << paths_to_create[i].value();
} else {
DVLOG(1) << "Created directory " << paths_to_create[i].value();
}
}
return success;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 6,609 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static ssize_t yurex_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t count,
loff_t *ppos)
{
struct usb_yurex *dev;
int retval = 0;
int bytes_read = 0;
char in_buffer[20];
unsigned long flags;
dev = file->private_data;
mutex_lock(&dev->io_mutex);
if (!dev->interface) { /* already disconnected */
retval = -ENODEV;
goto exit;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
bytes_read = snprintf(in_buffer, 20, "%lld\n", dev->bbu);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
if (*ppos < bytes_read) {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, in_buffer + *ppos, bytes_read - *ppos))
retval = -EFAULT;
else {
retval = bytes_read - *ppos;
*ppos += bytes_read;
}
}
exit:
mutex_unlock(&dev->io_mutex);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An issue was discovered in yurex_read in drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c in the Linux kernel before 4.17.7. Local attackers could use user access read/writes with incorrect bounds checking in the yurex USB driver to crash the kernel or potentially escalate privileges.
Commit Message: USB: yurex: fix out-of-bounds uaccess in read handler
In general, accessing userspace memory beyond the length of the supplied
buffer in VFS read/write handlers can lead to both kernel memory corruption
(via kernel_read()/kernel_write(), which can e.g. be triggered via
sys_splice()) and privilege escalation inside userspace.
Fix it by using simple_read_from_buffer() instead of custom logic.
Fixes: 6bc235a2e24a ("USB: add driver for Meywa-Denki & Kayac YUREX")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | High | 28,780 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> ModuleSystem::LoadModule(const std::string& module_name) {
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Context> v8_context = context()->v8_context();
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(v8_context);
v8::Local<v8::Value> source(GetSource(module_name));
if (source.IsEmpty() || source->IsUndefined()) {
Fatal(context_, "No source for require(" + module_name + ")");
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::String> wrapped_source(
WrapSource(v8::Local<v8::String>::Cast(source)));
v8::Local<v8::String> v8_module_name;
if (!ToV8String(GetIsolate(), module_name.c_str(), &v8_module_name)) {
NOTREACHED() << "module_name is too long";
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> func_as_value =
RunString(wrapped_source, v8_module_name);
if (func_as_value.IsEmpty() || func_as_value->IsUndefined()) {
Fatal(context_, "Bad source for require(" + module_name + ")");
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::Function> func = v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(func_as_value);
v8::Local<v8::Object> define_object = v8::Object::New(GetIsolate());
gin::ModuleRegistry::InstallGlobals(GetIsolate(), define_object);
v8::Local<v8::Value> exports = v8::Object::New(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Object> natives(NewInstance());
CHECK(!natives.IsEmpty()); // this can fail if v8 has issues
v8::Local<v8::Value> args[] = {
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, define_object, "define"),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "require",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "requireNative",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "requireAsync",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
exports,
console::AsV8Object(GetIsolate()),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "privates",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetArray(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetFunction(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetJSON(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetObjekt(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetRegExp(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetString(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetError(),
};
{
v8::TryCatch try_catch(GetIsolate());
try_catch.SetCaptureMessage(true);
context_->CallFunction(func, arraysize(args), args);
if (try_catch.HasCaught()) {
HandleException(try_catch);
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
}
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.109 does not prevent use of the Object.defineProperty method to override intended extension behavior, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654} | Medium | 26,045 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
{
struct user_namespace *ns, *parent_ns = new->user_ns;
kuid_t owner = new->euid;
kgid_t group = new->egid;
int ret;
/* The creator needs a mapping in the parent user namespace
* or else we won't be able to reasonably tell userspace who
* created a user_namespace.
*/
if (!kuid_has_mapping(parent_ns, owner) ||
!kgid_has_mapping(parent_ns, group))
return -EPERM;
ns = kmem_cache_zalloc(user_ns_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ns)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = proc_alloc_inum(&ns->proc_inum);
if (ret) {
kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns);
return ret;
}
atomic_set(&ns->count, 1);
/* Leave the new->user_ns reference with the new user namespace. */
ns->parent = parent_ns;
ns->owner = owner;
ns->group = group;
set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The create_user_ns function in kernel/user_namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.6 does not check whether a chroot directory exists that differs from the namespace root directory, which allows local users to bypass intended filesystem restrictions via a crafted clone system call.
Commit Message: userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted
Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.
Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.
For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace. Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.
Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead. With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> | Low | 10,237 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: long long EBMLHeader::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos) {
assert(pReader);
long long total, available;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
pos = 0;
long long end = (available >= 1024) ? 1024 : available;
for (;;) {
unsigned char b = 0;
while (pos < end) {
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (b == 0x1A)
break;
++pos;
}
if (b != 0x1A) {
if (pos >= 1024)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; // don't bother looking anymore
if ((total >= 0) && ((total - available) < 5))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return available + 5; // 5 = 4-byte ID + 1st byte of size
}
if ((total >= 0) && ((total - pos) < 5))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((available - pos) < 5)
return pos + 5; // try again later
long len;
const long long result = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return result;
if (result == 0x0A45DFA3) { // EBML Header ID
pos += len; // consume ID
break;
}
++pos; // throw away just the 0x1A byte, and try again
}
long len;
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return result;
if (result > 0) // need more data
return result;
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
if ((total >= 0) && ((total - pos) < len))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((available - pos) < len)
return pos + len; // try again later
result = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return result;
pos += len; // consume size field
if ((total >= 0) && ((total - pos) < result))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((available - pos) < result)
return pos + result;
end = pos + result;
Init();
while (pos < end) {
long long id, size;
status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, end, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x0286) { // version
m_version = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (m_version <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x02F7) { // read version
m_readVersion = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (m_readVersion <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x02F2) { // max id length
m_maxIdLength = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (m_maxIdLength <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x02F3) { // max size length
m_maxSizeLength = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (m_maxSizeLength <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x0282) { // doctype
if (m_docType)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_docType);
if (status) // error
return status;
} else if (id == 0x0287) { // doctype version
m_docTypeVersion = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (m_docTypeVersion <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x0285) { // doctype read version
m_docTypeReadVersion = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (m_docTypeReadVersion <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size;
}
assert(pos == end);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 14,390 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: PowerPopupView() {
SetHorizontalAlignment(ALIGN_RIGHT);
UpdateText();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.57 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to counter handling.
Commit Message: ash: Fix right-alignment of power-status text.
It turns out setting ALING_RIGHT on a Label isn't enough to get proper
right-aligned text. Label has to be explicitly told that it is multi-lined.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9918026
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@129898 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 18,869 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteMAPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
depth,
packet_size;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*colormap,
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
/*
Allocate colormap.
*/
if (IsPaletteImage(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteType);
depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickTrue);
packet_size=(size_t) (depth/8);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,packet_size*
sizeof(*pixels));
packet_size=(size_t) (image->colors > 256 ? 6UL : 3UL);
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,packet_size*
sizeof(*colormap));
if ((pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL))
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Write colormap to file.
*/
q=colormap;
if (image->depth <= 8)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) image->colormap[i].red;
*q++=(unsigned char) image->colormap[i].green;
*q++=(unsigned char) image->colormap[i].blue;
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) ((size_t) image->colormap[i].red >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) image->colormap[i].red;
*q++=(unsigned char) ((size_t) image->colormap[i].green >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) image->colormap[i].green;
*q++=(unsigned char) ((size_t) image->colormap[i].blue >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) image->colormap[i].blue;
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,colormap);
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
/*
Write image pixels to file.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
q=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->colors > 256)
*q++=(unsigned char) ((size_t) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x) >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (q-pixels),pixels);
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the WriteGROUP4Image function in coders/tiff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.5-8 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or have other unspecified impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in SIXEL, PDB, MAP, and CALS coders (bug report from Donghai Zhu) | Medium | 11,066 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xps_begin_opacity(xps_document *doc, const fz_matrix *ctm, const fz_rect *area,
char *base_uri, xps_resource *dict,
char *opacity_att, fz_xml *opacity_mask_tag)
{
float opacity;
if (!opacity_att && !opacity_mask_tag)
return;
opacity = 1;
if (opacity_att)
opacity = fz_atof(opacity_att);
if (opacity_mask_tag && !strcmp(fz_xml_tag(opacity_mask_tag), "SolidColorBrush"))
{
char *scb_opacity_att = fz_xml_att(opacity_mask_tag, "Opacity");
char *scb_color_att = fz_xml_att(opacity_mask_tag, "Color");
if (scb_opacity_att)
opacity = opacity * fz_atof(scb_opacity_att);
if (scb_color_att)
{
fz_colorspace *colorspace;
float samples[32];
xps_parse_color(doc, base_uri, scb_color_att, &colorspace, samples);
opacity = opacity * samples[0];
}
opacity_mask_tag = NULL;
}
if (doc->opacity_top + 1 < nelem(doc->opacity))
{
doc->opacity[doc->opacity_top + 1] = doc->opacity[doc->opacity_top] * opacity;
doc->opacity_top++;
}
if (opacity_mask_tag)
{
fz_begin_mask(doc->dev, area, 0, NULL, NULL);
xps_parse_brush(doc, ctm, area, base_uri, dict, opacity_mask_tag);
fz_end_mask(doc->dev);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the xps_parse_color function in xps/xps-common.c in MuPDF 1.3 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a large number of entries in the ContextColor value of the Fill attribute in a Path element.
Commit Message: | High | 14,162 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static enum gro_result dev_gro_receive(struct napi_struct *napi, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sk_buff **pp = NULL;
struct packet_offload *ptype;
__be16 type = skb->protocol;
struct list_head *head = &offload_base;
int same_flow;
enum gro_result ret;
int grow;
if (!(skb->dev->features & NETIF_F_GRO))
goto normal;
if (skb_is_gso(skb) || skb_has_frag_list(skb) || skb->csum_bad)
goto normal;
gro_list_prepare(napi, skb);
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptype, head, list) {
if (ptype->type != type || !ptype->callbacks.gro_receive)
continue;
skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb));
skb_reset_mac_len(skb);
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->same_flow = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->free = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->udp_mark = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->gro_remcsum_start = 0;
/* Setup for GRO checksum validation */
switch (skb->ip_summed) {
case CHECKSUM_COMPLETE:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum = skb->csum;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_valid = 1;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_cnt = 0;
break;
case CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_cnt = skb->csum_level + 1;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_valid = 0;
break;
default:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_cnt = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_valid = 0;
}
pp = ptype->callbacks.gro_receive(&napi->gro_list, skb);
break;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (&ptype->list == head)
goto normal;
same_flow = NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->same_flow;
ret = NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->free ? GRO_MERGED_FREE : GRO_MERGED;
if (pp) {
struct sk_buff *nskb = *pp;
*pp = nskb->next;
nskb->next = NULL;
napi_gro_complete(nskb);
napi->gro_count--;
}
if (same_flow)
goto ok;
if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush)
goto normal;
if (unlikely(napi->gro_count >= MAX_GRO_SKBS)) {
struct sk_buff *nskb = napi->gro_list;
/* locate the end of the list to select the 'oldest' flow */
while (nskb->next) {
pp = &nskb->next;
nskb = *pp;
}
*pp = NULL;
nskb->next = NULL;
napi_gro_complete(nskb);
} else {
napi->gro_count++;
}
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->count = 1;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->age = jiffies;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->last = skb;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = skb_gro_len(skb);
skb->next = napi->gro_list;
napi->gro_list = skb;
ret = GRO_HELD;
pull:
grow = skb_gro_offset(skb) - skb_headlen(skb);
if (grow > 0)
gro_pull_from_frag0(skb, grow);
ok:
return ret;
normal:
ret = GRO_NORMAL;
goto pull;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: The IP stack in the Linux kernel before 4.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack consumption and panic) or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering use of the GRO path for packets with tunnel stacking, as demonstrated by interleaved IPv4 headers and GRE headers, a related issue to CVE-2016-7039.
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | High | 18,547 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void wdm_in_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct wdm_device *desc = urb->context;
int status = urb->status;
spin_lock(&desc->iuspin);
clear_bit(WDM_RESPONDING, &desc->flags);
if (status) {
switch (status) {
case -ENOENT:
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -ENOENT");
goto skip_error;
case -ECONNRESET:
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -ECONNRESET");
goto skip_error;
case -ESHUTDOWN:
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -ESHUTDOWN");
goto skip_error;
case -EPIPE:
dev_err(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -EPIPE\n");
break;
default:
dev_err(&desc->intf->dev,
"Unexpected error %d\n", status);
break;
}
}
desc->rerr = status;
desc->reslength = urb->actual_length;
memmove(desc->ubuf + desc->length, desc->inbuf, desc->reslength);
desc->length += desc->reslength;
skip_error:
wake_up(&desc->wait);
set_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags);
spin_unlock(&desc->iuspin);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the wdm_in_callback function in drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted cdc-wdm USB device.
Commit Message: USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | Medium | 12,748 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: omx_vdec::omx_vdec(): m_error_propogated(false),
m_state(OMX_StateInvalid),
m_app_data(NULL),
m_inp_mem_ptr(NULL),
m_out_mem_ptr(NULL),
input_flush_progress (false),
output_flush_progress (false),
input_use_buffer (false),
output_use_buffer (false),
ouput_egl_buffers(false),
m_use_output_pmem(OMX_FALSE),
m_out_mem_region_smi(OMX_FALSE),
m_out_pvt_entry_pmem(OMX_FALSE),
pending_input_buffers(0),
pending_output_buffers(0),
m_out_bm_count(0),
m_inp_bm_count(0),
m_inp_bPopulated(OMX_FALSE),
m_out_bPopulated(OMX_FALSE),
m_flags(0),
#ifdef _ANDROID_
m_heap_ptr(NULL),
#endif
m_inp_bEnabled(OMX_TRUE),
m_out_bEnabled(OMX_TRUE),
m_in_alloc_cnt(0),
m_platform_list(NULL),
m_platform_entry(NULL),
m_pmem_info(NULL),
h264_parser(NULL),
arbitrary_bytes (true),
psource_frame (NULL),
pdest_frame (NULL),
m_inp_heap_ptr (NULL),
m_phdr_pmem_ptr(NULL),
m_heap_inp_bm_count (0),
codec_type_parse ((codec_type)0),
first_frame_meta (true),
frame_count (0),
nal_count (0),
nal_length(0),
look_ahead_nal (false),
first_frame(0),
first_buffer(NULL),
first_frame_size (0),
m_device_file_ptr(NULL),
m_vc1_profile((vc1_profile_type)0),
h264_last_au_ts(LLONG_MAX),
h264_last_au_flags(0),
m_disp_hor_size(0),
m_disp_vert_size(0),
prev_ts(LLONG_MAX),
rst_prev_ts(true),
frm_int(0),
in_reconfig(false),
m_display_id(NULL),
client_extradata(0),
m_reject_avc_1080p_mp (0),
#ifdef _ANDROID_
m_enable_android_native_buffers(OMX_FALSE),
m_use_android_native_buffers(OMX_FALSE),
iDivXDrmDecrypt(NULL),
#endif
m_desc_buffer_ptr(NULL),
secure_mode(false),
m_other_extradata(NULL),
m_profile(0),
client_set_fps(false),
m_last_rendered_TS(-1),
m_queued_codec_config_count(0),
secure_scaling_to_non_secure_opb(false)
{
/* Assumption is that , to begin with , we have all the frames with decoder */
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("In %u bit OMX vdec Constructor", (unsigned int)sizeof(long) * 8);
memset(&m_debug,0,sizeof(m_debug));
#ifdef _ANDROID_
char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
property_get("vidc.debug.level", property_value, "1");
debug_level = atoi(property_value);
property_value[0] = '\0';
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("In OMX vdec Constructor");
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.perf", property_value, "0");
perf_flag = atoi(property_value);
if (perf_flag) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.perf is %d", perf_flag);
dec_time.start();
proc_frms = latency = 0;
}
prev_n_filled_len = 0;
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.ts", property_value, "0");
m_debug_timestamp = atoi(property_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.ts value is %d",m_debug_timestamp);
if (m_debug_timestamp) {
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(true);
time_stamp_dts.enable_debug_print(true);
}
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.concealedmb", property_value, "0");
m_debug_concealedmb = atoi(property_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.concealedmb value is %d",m_debug_concealedmb);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.profile.check", property_value, "0");
m_reject_avc_1080p_mp = atoi(property_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.profile.check value is %d",m_reject_avc_1080p_mp);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.log.in", property_value, "0");
m_debug.in_buffer_log = atoi(property_value);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.log.out", property_value, "0");
m_debug.out_buffer_log = atoi(property_value);
sprintf(m_debug.log_loc, "%s", BUFFER_LOG_LOC);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.log.loc", property_value, "");
if (*property_value)
strlcpy(m_debug.log_loc, property_value, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.120fps.enabled", property_value, "0");
if(atoi(property_value)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("feature 120 FPS decode enabled");
m_last_rendered_TS = 0;
}
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.dyn.disabled", property_value, "0");
m_disable_dynamic_buf_mode = atoi(property_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.dyn.disabled value is %d",m_disable_dynamic_buf_mode);
#endif
memset(&m_cmp,0,sizeof(m_cmp));
memset(&m_cb,0,sizeof(m_cb));
memset (&drv_ctx,0,sizeof(drv_ctx));
memset (&h264_scratch,0,sizeof (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE));
memset (m_hwdevice_name,0,sizeof(m_hwdevice_name));
memset(m_demux_offsets, 0, ( sizeof(OMX_U32) * 8192) );
memset(&m_custom_buffersize, 0, sizeof(m_custom_buffersize));
m_demux_entries = 0;
msg_thread_id = 0;
async_thread_id = 0;
msg_thread_created = false;
async_thread_created = false;
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
memset(&native_buffer, 0 ,(sizeof(struct nativebuffer) * MAX_NUM_INPUT_OUTPUT_BUFFERS));
#endif
memset(&drv_ctx.extradata_info, 0, sizeof(drv_ctx.extradata_info));
/* invalidate m_frame_pack_arrangement */
memset(&m_frame_pack_arrangement, 0, sizeof(OMX_QCOM_FRAME_PACK_ARRANGEMENT));
m_frame_pack_arrangement.cancel_flag = 1;
drv_ctx.timestamp_adjust = false;
drv_ctx.video_driver_fd = -1;
m_vendor_config.pData = NULL;
pthread_mutex_init(&m_lock, NULL);
pthread_mutex_init(&c_lock, NULL);
sem_init(&m_cmd_lock,0,0);
sem_init(&m_safe_flush, 0, 0);
streaming[CAPTURE_PORT] =
streaming[OUTPUT_PORT] = false;
#ifdef _ANDROID_
char extradata_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.extradata", extradata_value, "0");
m_debug_extradata = atoi(extradata_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.extradata value is %d",m_debug_extradata);
#endif
m_fill_output_msg = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_FTB;
client_buffers.set_vdec_client(this);
dynamic_buf_mode = false;
out_dynamic_list = NULL;
is_down_scalar_enabled = false;
m_smoothstreaming_mode = false;
m_smoothstreaming_width = 0;
m_smoothstreaming_height = 0;
is_q6_platform = false;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the mm-video-v4l2 vdec component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27890802.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
| High | 1,172 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void icmp6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info,
const struct in6_addr *force_saddr)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
struct inet6_dev *idev = NULL;
struct ipv6hdr *hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
struct sock *sk;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np;
const struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL;
struct dst_entry *dst;
struct icmp6hdr tmp_hdr;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct icmpv6_msg msg;
struct sockcm_cookie sockc_unused = {0};
struct ipcm6_cookie ipc6;
int iif = 0;
int addr_type = 0;
int len;
int err = 0;
u32 mark = IP6_REPLY_MARK(net, skb->mark);
if ((u8 *)hdr < skb->head ||
(skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(*hdr)) > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
return;
/*
* Make sure we respect the rules
* i.e. RFC 1885 2.4(e)
* Rule (e.1) is enforced by not using icmp6_send
* in any code that processes icmp errors.
*/
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&hdr->daddr);
if (ipv6_chk_addr(net, &hdr->daddr, skb->dev, 0) ||
ipv6_chk_acast_addr_src(net, skb->dev, &hdr->daddr))
saddr = &hdr->daddr;
/*
* Dest addr check
*/
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST || skb->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST) {
if (type != ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG &&
!(type == ICMPV6_PARAMPROB &&
code == ICMPV6_UNK_OPTION &&
(opt_unrec(skb, info))))
return;
saddr = NULL;
}
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&hdr->saddr);
/*
* Source addr check
*/
if (__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(addr_type))
iif = skb->dev->ifindex;
else
iif = l3mdev_master_ifindex(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
/*
* Must not send error if the source does not uniquely
* identify a single node (RFC2463 Section 2.4).
* We check unspecified / multicast addresses here,
* and anycast addresses will be checked later.
*/
if ((addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_ANY) || (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)) {
net_dbg_ratelimited("icmp6_send: addr_any/mcast source [%pI6c > %pI6c]\n",
&hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr);
return;
}
/*
* Never answer to a ICMP packet.
*/
if (is_ineligible(skb)) {
net_dbg_ratelimited("icmp6_send: no reply to icmp error [%pI6c > %pI6c]\n",
&hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr);
return;
}
mip6_addr_swap(skb);
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_ICMPV6;
fl6.daddr = hdr->saddr;
if (force_saddr)
saddr = force_saddr;
if (saddr)
fl6.saddr = *saddr;
fl6.flowi6_mark = mark;
fl6.flowi6_oif = iif;
fl6.fl6_icmp_type = type;
fl6.fl6_icmp_code = code;
security_skb_classify_flow(skb, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
sk = icmpv6_xmit_lock(net);
if (!sk)
return;
sk->sk_mark = mark;
np = inet6_sk(sk);
if (!icmpv6_xrlim_allow(sk, type, &fl6))
goto out;
tmp_hdr.icmp6_type = type;
tmp_hdr.icmp6_code = code;
tmp_hdr.icmp6_cksum = 0;
tmp_hdr.icmp6_pointer = htonl(info);
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr))
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
else if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
ipc6.tclass = np->tclass;
fl6.flowlabel = ip6_make_flowinfo(ipc6.tclass, fl6.flowlabel);
dst = icmpv6_route_lookup(net, skb, sk, &fl6);
if (IS_ERR(dst))
goto out;
ipc6.hlimit = ip6_sk_dst_hoplimit(np, &fl6, dst);
ipc6.dontfrag = np->dontfrag;
ipc6.opt = NULL;
msg.skb = skb;
msg.offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
msg.type = type;
len = skb->len - msg.offset;
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, IPV6_MIN_MTU - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) - sizeof(struct icmp6hdr));
if (len < 0) {
net_dbg_ratelimited("icmp: len problem [%pI6c > %pI6c]\n",
&hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr);
goto out_dst_release;
}
rcu_read_lock();
idev = __in6_dev_get(skb->dev);
err = ip6_append_data(sk, icmpv6_getfrag, &msg,
len + sizeof(struct icmp6hdr),
sizeof(struct icmp6hdr),
&ipc6, &fl6, (struct rt6_info *)dst,
MSG_DONTWAIT, &sockc_unused);
if (err) {
ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTERRORS);
ip6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
} else {
err = icmpv6_push_pending_frames(sk, &fl6, &tmp_hdr,
len + sizeof(struct icmp6hdr));
}
rcu_read_unlock();
out_dst_release:
dst_release(dst);
out:
icmpv6_xmit_unlock(sk);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The icmp6_send function in net/ipv6/icmp.c in the Linux kernel through 4.8.12 omits a certain check of the dst data structure, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (panic) via a fragmented IPv6 packet.
Commit Message: net: handle no dst on skb in icmp6_send
Andrey reported the following while fuzzing the kernel with syzkaller:
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3859 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6+ #429
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff8800666d4200 task.stack: ffff880067348000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff833617ec>] [<ffffffff833617ec>]
icmp6_send+0x5fc/0x1e30 net/ipv6/icmp.c:451
RSP: 0018:ffff88006734f2c0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: ffff8800666d4200 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 0000000000000018
RBP: ffff88006734f630 R08: ffff880064138418 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffff84e7e200 R14: ffff880064138484 R15: ffff8800641383c0
FS: 00007fb3887a07c0(0000) GS:ffff88006cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 000000006b040000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Stack:
ffff8800666d4200 ffff8800666d49f8 ffff8800666d4200 ffffffff84c02460
ffff8800666d4a1a 1ffff1000ccdaa2f ffff88006734f498 0000000000000046
ffff88006734f440 ffffffff832f4269 ffff880064ba7456 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff83364ddc>] icmpv6_param_prob+0x2c/0x40 net/ipv6/icmp.c:557
[< inline >] ip6_tlvopt_unknown net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:88
[<ffffffff83394405>] ip6_parse_tlv+0x555/0x670 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:157
[<ffffffff8339a759>] ipv6_parse_hopopts+0x199/0x460 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:663
[<ffffffff832ee773>] ipv6_rcv+0xfa3/0x1dc0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:191
...
icmp6_send / icmpv6_send is invoked for both rx and tx paths. In both
cases the dst->dev should be preferred for determining the L3 domain
if the dst has been set on the skb. Fallback to the skb->dev if it has
not. This covers the case reported here where icmp6_send is invoked on
Rx before the route lookup.
Fixes: 5d41ce29e ("net: icmp6_send should use dst dev to determine L3 domain")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | High | 28,624 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: flac_read_loop (SF_PRIVATE *psf, unsigned len)
{ FLAC_PRIVATE* pflac = (FLAC_PRIVATE*) psf->codec_data ;
pflac->pos = 0 ;
pflac->len = len ;
pflac->remain = len ;
/* First copy data that has already been decoded and buffered. */
if (pflac->frame != NULL && pflac->bufferpos < pflac->frame->header.blocksize)
flac_buffer_copy (psf) ;
/* Decode some more. */
while (pflac->pos < pflac->len)
{ if (FLAC__stream_decoder_process_single (pflac->fsd) == 0)
break ;
if (FLAC__stream_decoder_get_state (pflac->fsd) >= FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_END_OF_STREAM)
break ;
} ;
pflac->ptr = NULL ;
return pflac->pos ;
} /* flac_read_loop */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In libsndfile before 1.0.28, an error in the *flac_buffer_copy()* function (flac.c) can be exploited to cause a segmentation violation (with read memory access) via a specially crafted FLAC file during a resample attempt, a similar issue to CVE-2017-7585.
Commit Message: src/flac.c: Improve error handling
Especially when dealing with corrupt or malicious files. | Medium | 11,820 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct ipt_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip))
return -EINVAL;
err = xt_check_entry_offsets(e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The compat IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE and IP6T_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt implementations in the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.6.3 allow local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) by leveraging in-container root access to provide a crafted offset value that triggers an unintended decrement.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> | High | 29,256 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int aac_send_raw_srb(struct aac_dev* dev, void __user * arg)
{
struct fib* srbfib;
int status;
struct aac_srb *srbcmd = NULL;
struct user_aac_srb *user_srbcmd = NULL;
struct user_aac_srb __user *user_srb = arg;
struct aac_srb_reply __user *user_reply;
struct aac_srb_reply* reply;
u32 fibsize = 0;
u32 flags = 0;
s32 rcode = 0;
u32 data_dir;
void __user *sg_user[32];
void *sg_list[32];
u32 sg_indx = 0;
u32 byte_count = 0;
u32 actual_fibsize64, actual_fibsize = 0;
int i;
if (dev->in_reset) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: send raw srb -EBUSY\n"));
return -EBUSY;
}
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)){
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: No permission to send raw srb\n"));
return -EPERM;
}
/*
* Allocate and initialize a Fib then setup a SRB command
*/
if (!(srbfib = aac_fib_alloc(dev))) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
aac_fib_init(srbfib);
/* raw_srb FIB is not FastResponseCapable */
srbfib->hw_fib_va->header.XferState &= ~cpu_to_le32(FastResponseCapable);
srbcmd = (struct aac_srb*) fib_data(srbfib);
memset(sg_list, 0, sizeof(sg_list)); /* cleanup may take issue */
if(copy_from_user(&fibsize, &user_srb->count,sizeof(u32))){
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not copy data size from user\n"));
rcode = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
if (fibsize > (dev->max_fib_size - sizeof(struct aac_fibhdr))) {
rcode = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
user_srbcmd = kmalloc(fibsize, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!user_srbcmd) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not make a copy of the srb\n"));
rcode = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if(copy_from_user(user_srbcmd, user_srb,fibsize)){
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not copy srb from user\n"));
rcode = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
user_reply = arg+fibsize;
flags = user_srbcmd->flags; /* from user in cpu order */
srbcmd->function = cpu_to_le32(SRBF_ExecuteScsi); // Force this
srbcmd->channel = cpu_to_le32(user_srbcmd->channel);
srbcmd->id = cpu_to_le32(user_srbcmd->id);
srbcmd->lun = cpu_to_le32(user_srbcmd->lun);
srbcmd->timeout = cpu_to_le32(user_srbcmd->timeout);
srbcmd->flags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
srbcmd->retry_limit = 0; // Obsolete parameter
srbcmd->cdb_size = cpu_to_le32(user_srbcmd->cdb_size);
memcpy(srbcmd->cdb, user_srbcmd->cdb, sizeof(srbcmd->cdb));
switch (flags & (SRB_DataIn | SRB_DataOut)) {
case SRB_DataOut:
data_dir = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
break;
case (SRB_DataIn | SRB_DataOut):
data_dir = DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL;
break;
case SRB_DataIn:
data_dir = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
break;
default:
data_dir = DMA_NONE;
}
if (user_srbcmd->sg.count > ARRAY_SIZE(sg_list)) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: too many sg entries %d\n",
le32_to_cpu(srbcmd->sg.count)));
rcode = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
actual_fibsize = sizeof(struct aac_srb) - sizeof(struct sgentry) +
((user_srbcmd->sg.count & 0xff) * sizeof(struct sgentry));
actual_fibsize64 = actual_fibsize + (user_srbcmd->sg.count & 0xff) *
(sizeof(struct sgentry64) - sizeof(struct sgentry));
/* User made a mistake - should not continue */
if ((actual_fibsize != fibsize) && (actual_fibsize64 != fibsize)) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Bad Size specified in "
"Raw SRB command calculated fibsize=%lu;%lu "
"user_srbcmd->sg.count=%d aac_srb=%lu sgentry=%lu;%lu "
"issued fibsize=%d\n",
actual_fibsize, actual_fibsize64, user_srbcmd->sg.count,
sizeof(struct aac_srb), sizeof(struct sgentry),
sizeof(struct sgentry64), fibsize));
rcode = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((data_dir == DMA_NONE) && user_srbcmd->sg.count) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: SG with no direction specified in Raw SRB command\n"));
rcode = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
byte_count = 0;
if (dev->adapter_info.options & AAC_OPT_SGMAP_HOST64) {
struct user_sgmap64* upsg = (struct user_sgmap64*)&user_srbcmd->sg;
struct sgmap64* psg = (struct sgmap64*)&srbcmd->sg;
/*
* This should also catch if user used the 32 bit sgmap
*/
if (actual_fibsize64 == fibsize) {
actual_fibsize = actual_fibsize64;
for (i = 0; i < upsg->count; i++) {
u64 addr;
void* p;
if (upsg->sg[i].count >
((dev->adapter_info.options &
AAC_OPT_NEW_COMM) ?
(dev->scsi_host_ptr->max_sectors << 9) :
65536)) {
rcode = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Does this really need to be GFP_DMA? */
p = kmalloc(upsg->sg[i].count,GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_DMA);
if(!p) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not allocate SG buffer - size = %d buffer number %d of %d\n",
upsg->sg[i].count,i,upsg->count));
rcode = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
addr = (u64)upsg->sg[i].addr[0];
addr += ((u64)upsg->sg[i].addr[1]) << 32;
sg_user[i] = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)addr;
sg_list[i] = p; // save so we can clean up later
sg_indx = i;
if (flags & SRB_DataOut) {
if(copy_from_user(p,sg_user[i],upsg->sg[i].count)){
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not copy sg data from user\n"));
rcode = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
}
addr = pci_map_single(dev->pdev, p, upsg->sg[i].count, data_dir);
psg->sg[i].addr[0] = cpu_to_le32(addr & 0xffffffff);
psg->sg[i].addr[1] = cpu_to_le32(addr>>32);
byte_count += upsg->sg[i].count;
psg->sg[i].count = cpu_to_le32(upsg->sg[i].count);
}
} else {
struct user_sgmap* usg;
usg = kmalloc(actual_fibsize - sizeof(struct aac_srb)
+ sizeof(struct sgmap), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!usg) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Allocation error in Raw SRB command\n"));
rcode = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
memcpy (usg, upsg, actual_fibsize - sizeof(struct aac_srb)
+ sizeof(struct sgmap));
actual_fibsize = actual_fibsize64;
for (i = 0; i < usg->count; i++) {
u64 addr;
void* p;
if (usg->sg[i].count >
((dev->adapter_info.options &
AAC_OPT_NEW_COMM) ?
(dev->scsi_host_ptr->max_sectors << 9) :
65536)) {
kfree(usg);
rcode = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Does this really need to be GFP_DMA? */
p = kmalloc(usg->sg[i].count,GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_DMA);
if(!p) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG "aacraid: Could not allocate SG buffer - size = %d buffer number %d of %d\n",
usg->sg[i].count,i,usg->count));
kfree(usg);
rcode = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
sg_user[i] = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)usg->sg[i].addr;
sg_list[i] = p; // save so we can clean up later
sg_indx = i;
if (flags & SRB_DataOut) {
if(copy_from_user(p,sg_user[i],upsg->sg[i].count)){
kfree (usg);
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not copy sg data from user\n"));
rcode = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
}
addr = pci_map_single(dev->pdev, p, usg->sg[i].count, data_dir);
psg->sg[i].addr[0] = cpu_to_le32(addr & 0xffffffff);
psg->sg[i].addr[1] = cpu_to_le32(addr>>32);
byte_count += usg->sg[i].count;
psg->sg[i].count = cpu_to_le32(usg->sg[i].count);
}
kfree (usg);
}
srbcmd->count = cpu_to_le32(byte_count);
psg->count = cpu_to_le32(sg_indx+1);
status = aac_fib_send(ScsiPortCommand64, srbfib, actual_fibsize, FsaNormal, 1, 1,NULL,NULL);
} else {
struct user_sgmap* upsg = &user_srbcmd->sg;
struct sgmap* psg = &srbcmd->sg;
if (actual_fibsize64 == fibsize) {
struct user_sgmap64* usg = (struct user_sgmap64 *)upsg;
for (i = 0; i < upsg->count; i++) {
uintptr_t addr;
void* p;
if (usg->sg[i].count >
((dev->adapter_info.options &
AAC_OPT_NEW_COMM) ?
(dev->scsi_host_ptr->max_sectors << 9) :
65536)) {
rcode = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Does this really need to be GFP_DMA? */
p = kmalloc(usg->sg[i].count,GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_DMA);
if(!p) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not allocate SG buffer - size = %d buffer number %d of %d\n",
usg->sg[i].count,i,usg->count));
rcode = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
addr = (u64)usg->sg[i].addr[0];
addr += ((u64)usg->sg[i].addr[1]) << 32;
sg_user[i] = (void __user *)addr;
sg_list[i] = p; // save so we can clean up later
sg_indx = i;
if (flags & SRB_DataOut) {
if(copy_from_user(p,sg_user[i],usg->sg[i].count)){
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not copy sg data from user\n"));
rcode = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
}
addr = pci_map_single(dev->pdev, p, usg->sg[i].count, data_dir);
psg->sg[i].addr = cpu_to_le32(addr & 0xffffffff);
byte_count += usg->sg[i].count;
psg->sg[i].count = cpu_to_le32(usg->sg[i].count);
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < upsg->count; i++) {
dma_addr_t addr;
void* p;
if (upsg->sg[i].count >
((dev->adapter_info.options &
AAC_OPT_NEW_COMM) ?
(dev->scsi_host_ptr->max_sectors << 9) :
65536)) {
rcode = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
p = kmalloc(upsg->sg[i].count, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not allocate SG buffer - size = %d buffer number %d of %d\n",
upsg->sg[i].count, i, upsg->count));
rcode = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
sg_user[i] = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)upsg->sg[i].addr;
sg_list[i] = p; // save so we can clean up later
sg_indx = i;
if (flags & SRB_DataOut) {
if(copy_from_user(p, sg_user[i],
upsg->sg[i].count)) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not copy sg data from user\n"));
rcode = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
}
addr = pci_map_single(dev->pdev, p,
upsg->sg[i].count, data_dir);
psg->sg[i].addr = cpu_to_le32(addr);
byte_count += upsg->sg[i].count;
psg->sg[i].count = cpu_to_le32(upsg->sg[i].count);
}
}
srbcmd->count = cpu_to_le32(byte_count);
psg->count = cpu_to_le32(sg_indx+1);
status = aac_fib_send(ScsiPortCommand, srbfib, actual_fibsize, FsaNormal, 1, 1, NULL, NULL);
}
if (status == -ERESTARTSYS) {
rcode = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto cleanup;
}
if (status != 0){
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not send raw srb fib to hba\n"));
rcode = -ENXIO;
goto cleanup;
}
if (flags & SRB_DataIn) {
for(i = 0 ; i <= sg_indx; i++){
byte_count = le32_to_cpu(
(dev->adapter_info.options & AAC_OPT_SGMAP_HOST64)
? ((struct sgmap64*)&srbcmd->sg)->sg[i].count
: srbcmd->sg.sg[i].count);
if(copy_to_user(sg_user[i], sg_list[i], byte_count)){
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not copy sg data to user\n"));
rcode = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
reply = (struct aac_srb_reply *) fib_data(srbfib);
if(copy_to_user(user_reply,reply,sizeof(struct aac_srb_reply))){
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not copy reply to user\n"));
rcode = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
kfree(user_srbcmd);
for(i=0; i <= sg_indx; i++){
kfree(sg_list[i]);
}
if (rcode != -ERESTARTSYS) {
aac_fib_complete(srbfib);
aac_fib_free(srbfib);
}
return rcode;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The aac_send_raw_srb function in drivers/scsi/aacraid/commctrl.c in the Linux kernel through 3.12.1 does not properly validate a certain size value, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (invalid pointer dereference) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an FSACTL_SEND_RAW_SRB ioctl call that triggers a crafted SRB command.
Commit Message: aacraid: prevent invalid pointer dereference
It appears that driver runs into a problem here if fibsize is too small
because we allocate user_srbcmd with fibsize size only but later we
access it until user_srbcmd->sg.count to copy it over to srbcmd.
It is not correct to test (fibsize < sizeof(*user_srbcmd)) because this
structure already includes one sg element and this is not needed for
commands without data. So, we would recommend to add the following
(instead of test for fibsize == 0).
Signed-off-by: Mahesh Rajashekhara <Mahesh.Rajashekhara@pmcs.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | Medium | 16,050 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: jas_iccprof_t *jas_iccprof_createfrombuf(uchar *buf, int len)
{
jas_stream_t *in;
jas_iccprof_t *prof;
if (!(in = jas_stream_memopen(JAS_CAST(char *, buf), len)))
goto error;
if (!(prof = jas_iccprof_load(in)))
goto error;
jas_stream_close(in);
return prof;
error:
if (in)
jas_stream_close(in);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. | Medium | 23,060 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int mailimf_group_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx,
struct mailimf_group ** result)
{
size_t cur_token;
char * display_name;
struct mailimf_mailbox_list * mailbox_list;
struct mailimf_group * group;
int r;
int res;
cur_token = * indx;
mailbox_list = NULL;
r = mailimf_display_name_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &display_name);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_display_name;
}
r = mailimf_mailbox_list_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &mailbox_list);
switch (r) {
case MAILIMF_NO_ERROR:
break;
case MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE:
r = mailimf_cfws_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if ((r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) && (r != MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE)) {
res = r;
goto free_display_name;
}
break;
default:
res = r;
goto free_display_name;
}
r = mailimf_semi_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_mailbox_list;
}
group = mailimf_group_new(display_name, mailbox_list);
if (group == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_mailbox_list;
}
* indx = cur_token;
* result = group;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
free_mailbox_list:
if (mailbox_list != NULL) {
mailimf_mailbox_list_free(mailbox_list);
}
free_display_name:
mailimf_display_name_free(display_name);
err:
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: A null dereference vulnerability has been found in the MIME handling component of LibEtPan before 1.8, as used in MailCore and MailCore 2. A crash can occur in low-level/imf/mailimf.c during a failed parse of a Cc header containing multiple e-mail addresses.
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274 | Medium | 26,984 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void testInspectorDefault(InspectorTest* test, gconstpointer)
{
test->showInWindowAndWaitUntilMapped(GTK_WINDOW_TOPLEVEL);
test->resizeView(200, 200);
test->loadHtml("<html><body><p>WebKitGTK+ Inspector test</p></body></html>", 0);
test->waitUntilLoadFinished();
test->showAndWaitUntilFinished(false);
GRefPtr<WebKitWebViewBase> inspectorView = webkit_web_inspector_get_web_view(test->m_inspector);
g_assert(inspectorView.get());
test->assertObjectIsDeletedWhenTestFinishes(G_OBJECT(inspectorView.get()));
g_assert(!webkit_web_inspector_is_attached(test->m_inspector));
g_assert_cmpuint(webkit_web_inspector_get_attached_height(test->m_inspector), ==, 0);
Vector<InspectorTest::InspectorEvents>& events = test->m_events;
g_assert_cmpint(events.size(), ==, 2);
g_assert_cmpint(events[0], ==, InspectorTest::BringToFront);
g_assert_cmpint(events[1], ==, InspectorTest::OpenWindow);
test->m_events.clear();
test->showAndWaitUntilFinished(true);
events = test->m_events;
g_assert_cmpint(events.size(), ==, 1);
g_assert_cmpint(events[0], ==, InspectorTest::BringToFront);
test->m_events.clear();
test->resizeViewAndAttach();
g_assert(webkit_web_inspector_is_attached(test->m_inspector));
events = test->m_events;
g_assert_cmpint(events.size(), ==, 1);
g_assert_cmpint(events[0], ==, InspectorTest::Attach);
test->m_events.clear();
test->detachAndWaitUntilWindowOpened();
g_assert(!webkit_web_inspector_is_attached(test->m_inspector));
events = test->m_events;
g_assert_cmpint(events.size(), ==, 2);
g_assert_cmpint(events[0], ==, InspectorTest::Detach);
g_assert_cmpint(events[1], ==, InspectorTest::OpenWindow);
test->m_events.clear();
test->closeAndWaitUntilClosed();
events = test->m_events;
g_assert_cmpint(events.size(), ==, 1);
g_assert_cmpint(events[0], ==, InspectorTest::Closed);
test->m_events.clear();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving a malformed name for the font encoding.
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 12,319 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: const net::HttpRequestHeaders& request_headers() const {
return request_headers_;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652} | High | 25,870 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void DataReductionProxyConfig::InitializeOnIOThread(
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> url_loader_factory,
WarmupURLFetcher::CreateCustomProxyConfigCallback
create_custom_proxy_config_callback,
NetworkPropertiesManager* manager,
const std::string& user_agent) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
network_properties_manager_ = manager;
network_properties_manager_->ResetWarmupURLFetchMetrics();
secure_proxy_checker_.reset(new SecureProxyChecker(url_loader_factory));
warmup_url_fetcher_.reset(new WarmupURLFetcher(
create_custom_proxy_config_callback,
base::BindRepeating(
&DataReductionProxyConfig::HandleWarmupFetcherResponse,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::BindRepeating(&DataReductionProxyConfig::GetHttpRttEstimate,
base::Unretained(this)),
ui_task_runner_, user_agent));
AddDefaultProxyBypassRules();
network_connection_tracker_->AddNetworkConnectionObserver(this);
network_connection_tracker_->GetConnectionType(
&connection_type_,
base::BindOnce(&DataReductionProxyConfig::OnConnectionChanged,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649} | Medium | 20,196 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void userfaultfd_event_wait_completion(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx,
struct userfaultfd_wait_queue *ewq)
{
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(current->flags & PF_EXITING))
goto out;
ewq->ctx = ctx;
init_waitqueue_entry(&ewq->wq, current);
spin_lock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
/*
* After the __add_wait_queue the uwq is visible to userland
* through poll/read().
*/
__add_wait_queue(&ctx->event_wqh, &ewq->wq);
for (;;) {
set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE);
if (ewq->msg.event == 0)
break;
if (ACCESS_ONCE(ctx->released) ||
fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
__remove_wait_queue(&ctx->event_wqh, &ewq->wq);
if (ewq->msg.event == UFFD_EVENT_FORK) {
struct userfaultfd_ctx *new;
new = (struct userfaultfd_ctx *)
(unsigned long)
ewq->msg.arg.reserved.reserved1;
userfaultfd_ctx_put(new);
}
break;
}
spin_unlock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
wake_up_poll(&ctx->fd_wqh, POLLIN);
schedule();
spin_lock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
}
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
spin_unlock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
/*
* ctx may go away after this if the userfault pseudo fd is
* already released.
*/
out:
userfaultfd_ctx_put(ctx);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use-after-free flaw was found in fs/userfaultfd.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.6. The issue is related to the handling of fork failure when dealing with event messages. Failure to fork correctly can lead to a situation where a fork event will be removed from an already freed list of events with userfaultfd_ctx_put().
Commit Message: userfaultfd: non-cooperative: fix fork use after free
When reading the event from the uffd, we put it on a temporary
fork_event list to detect if we can still access it after releasing and
retaking the event_wqh.lock.
If fork aborts and removes the event from the fork_event all is fine as
long as we're still in the userfault read context and fork_event head is
still alive.
We've to put the event allocated in the fork kernel stack, back from
fork_event list-head to the event_wqh head, before returning from
userfaultfd_ctx_read, because the fork_event head lifetime is limited to
the userfaultfd_ctx_read stack lifetime.
Forgetting to move the event back to its event_wqh place then results in
__remove_wait_queue(&ctx->event_wqh, &ewq->wq); in
userfaultfd_event_wait_completion to remove it from a head that has been
already freed from the reader stack.
This could only happen if resolve_userfault_fork failed (for example if
there are no file descriptors available to allocate the fork uffd). If
it succeeded it was put back correctly.
Furthermore, after find_userfault_evt receives a fork event, the forked
userfault context in fork_nctx and uwq->msg.arg.reserved.reserved1 can
be released by the fork thread as soon as the event_wqh.lock is
released. Taking a reference on the fork_nctx before dropping the lock
prevents an use after free in resolve_userfault_fork().
If the fork side aborted and it already released everything, we still
try to succeed resolve_userfault_fork(), if possible.
Fixes: 893e26e61d04eac9 ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: Add fork() event")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170920180413.26713-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | High | 27,987 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateArray( void )
{
cJSON *item = cJSON_New_Item();
if ( item )
item->type = cJSON_Array;
return item;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net> | High | 28,133 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool CheckClientDownloadRequest::ShouldUploadForDlpScan() {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kDeepScanningOfDownloads))
return false;
int check_content_compliance = g_browser_process->local_state()->GetInteger(
prefs::kCheckContentCompliance);
if (check_content_compliance !=
CheckContentComplianceValues::CHECK_DOWNLOADS &&
check_content_compliance !=
CheckContentComplianceValues::CHECK_UPLOADS_AND_DOWNLOADS)
return false;
if (policy::BrowserDMTokenStorage::Get()->RetrieveDMToken().empty())
return false;
const base::ListValue* domains = g_browser_process->local_state()->GetList(
prefs::kURLsToCheckComplianceOfDownloadedContent);
url_matcher::URLMatcher matcher;
policy::url_util::AddAllowFilters(&matcher, domains);
return !matcher.MatchURL(item_->GetURL()).empty();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.104 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196} | Medium | 24,975 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiVP8Accelerator::OutputPicture(
const scoped_refptr<VP8Picture>& pic) {
scoped_refptr<VaapiDecodeSurface> dec_surface =
VP8PictureToVaapiDecodeSurface(pic);
dec_surface->set_visible_rect(pic->visible_rect);
vaapi_dec_->SurfaceReady(dec_surface);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372} | Medium | 11,250 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::OnCompositorSurfaceBuffersSwappedNoHost(
int32 surface_id,
uint64 surface_handle,
int32 route_id,
const gfx::Size& size,
int32 gpu_process_host_id) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer_host",
"RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnCompositorSurfaceBuffersSwappedNoHost");
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(route_id,
gpu_process_host_id,
false,
0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 12,752 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void NormalPageArena::promptlyFreeObject(HeapObjectHeader* header) {
ASSERT(!getThreadState()->sweepForbidden());
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
Address address = reinterpret_cast<Address>(header);
Address payload = header->payload();
size_t size = header->size();
size_t payloadSize = header->payloadSize();
ASSERT(size > 0);
ASSERT(pageFromObject(address) == findPageFromAddress(address));
{
ThreadState::SweepForbiddenScope forbiddenScope(getThreadState());
header->finalize(payload, payloadSize);
if (address + size == m_currentAllocationPoint) {
m_currentAllocationPoint = address;
setRemainingAllocationSize(m_remainingAllocationSize + size);
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(address, size);
return;
}
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(payload, payloadSize);
header->markPromptlyFreed();
}
m_promptlyFreedSize += size;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Inline metadata in GarbageCollection in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489} | Medium | 13,557 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int read_header(FFV1Context *f)
{
uint8_t state[CONTEXT_SIZE];
int i, j, context_count = -1; //-1 to avoid warning
RangeCoder *const c = &f->slice_context[0]->c;
memset(state, 128, sizeof(state));
if (f->version < 2) {
unsigned v= get_symbol(c, state, 0);
if (v >= 2) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid version %d in ver01 header\n", v);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
f->version = v;
f->ac = f->avctx->coder_type = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
if (f->ac > 1) {
for (i = 1; i < 256; i++)
f->state_transition[i] = get_symbol(c, state, 1) + c->one_state[i];
}
f->colorspace = get_symbol(c, state, 0); //YUV cs type
if (f->version > 0)
f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
f->chroma_planes = get_rac(c, state);
f->chroma_h_shift = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
f->chroma_v_shift = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
f->transparency = get_rac(c, state);
f->plane_count = 2 + f->transparency;
}
if (f->colorspace == 0) {
if (!f->transparency && !f->chroma_planes) {
if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample <= 8)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY8;
else
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY16;
} else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample<=8 && !f->transparency) {
switch(16 * f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P; break;
case 0x01: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV440P; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P; break;
case 0x20: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV411P; break;
case 0x22: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV410P; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
} else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample <= 8 && f->transparency) {
switch(16*f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
} else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 9) {
f->packed_at_lsb = 1;
switch(16 * f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P9; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P9; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P9; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
} else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 10) {
f->packed_at_lsb = 1;
switch(16 * f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P10; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P10; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P10; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
} else {
switch(16 * f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P16; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P16; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P16; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
}
} else if (f->colorspace == 1) {
if (f->chroma_h_shift || f->chroma_v_shift) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"chroma subsampling not supported in this colorspace\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
if ( f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 9)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP9;
else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 10)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP10;
else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 12)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP12;
else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 14)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP14;
else
if (f->transparency) f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_RGB32;
else f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_0RGB32;
} else {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "colorspace not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
av_dlog(f->avctx, "%d %d %d\n",
f->chroma_h_shift, f->chroma_v_shift, f->avctx->pix_fmt);
if (f->version < 2) {
context_count = read_quant_tables(c, f->quant_table);
if (context_count < 0) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "read_quant_table error\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
} else if (f->version < 3) {
f->slice_count = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
} else {
const uint8_t *p = c->bytestream_end;
for (f->slice_count = 0;
f->slice_count < MAX_SLICES && 3 < p - c->bytestream_start;
f->slice_count++) {
int trailer = 3 + 5*!!f->ec;
int size = AV_RB24(p-trailer);
if (size + trailer > p - c->bytestream_start)
break;
p -= size + trailer;
}
}
if (f->slice_count > (unsigned)MAX_SLICES || f->slice_count <= 0) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "slice count %d is invalid\n", f->slice_count);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
for (j = 0; j < f->slice_count; j++) {
FFV1Context *fs = f->slice_context[j];
fs->ac = f->ac;
fs->packed_at_lsb = f->packed_at_lsb;
fs->slice_damaged = 0;
if (f->version == 2) {
fs->slice_x = get_symbol(c, state, 0) * f->width ;
fs->slice_y = get_symbol(c, state, 0) * f->height;
fs->slice_width = (get_symbol(c, state, 0) + 1) * f->width + fs->slice_x;
fs->slice_height = (get_symbol(c, state, 0) + 1) * f->height + fs->slice_y;
fs->slice_x /= f->num_h_slices;
fs->slice_y /= f->num_v_slices;
fs->slice_width = fs->slice_width / f->num_h_slices - fs->slice_x;
fs->slice_height = fs->slice_height / f->num_v_slices - fs->slice_y;
if ((unsigned)fs->slice_width > f->width ||
(unsigned)fs->slice_height > f->height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if ( (unsigned)fs->slice_x + (uint64_t)fs->slice_width > f->width
|| (unsigned)fs->slice_y + (uint64_t)fs->slice_height > f->height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
for (i = 0; i < f->plane_count; i++) {
PlaneContext *const p = &fs->plane[i];
if (f->version == 2) {
int idx = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
if (idx > (unsigned)f->quant_table_count) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"quant_table_index out of range\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
p->quant_table_index = idx;
memcpy(p->quant_table, f->quant_tables[idx],
sizeof(p->quant_table));
context_count = f->context_count[idx];
} else {
memcpy(p->quant_table, f->quant_table, sizeof(p->quant_table));
}
if (f->version <= 2) {
av_assert0(context_count >= 0);
if (p->context_count < context_count) {
av_freep(&p->state);
av_freep(&p->vlc_state);
}
p->context_count = context_count;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The read_header function in libavcodec/ffv1dec.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not prevent changes to global parameters, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted FFV1 data.
Commit Message: ffv1dec: check that global parameters dont change in version 0/1
Such changes are not allowed nor supported
Fixes Ticket2906
Found-by: ami_stuff
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | Medium | 4,538 |
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