instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: yyparse (void *yyscanner, YR_COMPILER* compiler)
{
/* The lookahead symbol. */
int yychar;
/* The semantic value of the lookahead symbol. */
/* Default value used for initialization, for pacifying older GCCs
or non-GCC compilers. */
YY_INITIAL_VALUE (static YYSTYPE yyval_default;)
YYSTYPE yylval YY_INITIAL_VALUE (= yyval_default);
/* Number of syntax errors so far. */
int yynerrs;
int yystate;
/* Number of tokens to shift before error messages enabled. */
int yyerrstatus;
/* The stacks and their tools:
'yyss': related to states.
'yyvs': related to semantic values.
Refer to the stacks through separate pointers, to allow yyoverflow
to reallocate them elsewhere. */
/* The state stack. */
yytype_int16 yyssa[YYINITDEPTH];
yytype_int16 *yyss;
yytype_int16 *yyssp;
/* The semantic value stack. */
YYSTYPE yyvsa[YYINITDEPTH];
YYSTYPE *yyvs;
YYSTYPE *yyvsp;
YYSIZE_T yystacksize;
int yyn;
int yyresult;
/* Lookahead token as an internal (translated) token number. */
int yytoken = 0;
/* The variables used to return semantic value and location from the
action routines. */
YYSTYPE yyval;
#if YYERROR_VERBOSE
/* Buffer for error messages, and its allocated size. */
char yymsgbuf[128];
char *yymsg = yymsgbuf;
YYSIZE_T yymsg_alloc = sizeof yymsgbuf;
#endif
#define YYPOPSTACK(N) (yyvsp -= (N), yyssp -= (N))
/* The number of symbols on the RHS of the reduced rule.
Keep to zero when no symbol should be popped. */
int yylen = 0;
yyssp = yyss = yyssa;
yyvsp = yyvs = yyvsa;
yystacksize = YYINITDEPTH;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Starting parse\n"));
yystate = 0;
yyerrstatus = 0;
yynerrs = 0;
yychar = YYEMPTY; /* Cause a token to be read. */
goto yysetstate;
/*------------------------------------------------------------.
| yynewstate -- Push a new state, which is found in yystate. |
`------------------------------------------------------------*/
yynewstate:
/* In all cases, when you get here, the value and location stacks
have just been pushed. So pushing a state here evens the stacks. */
yyssp++;
yysetstate:
*yyssp = yystate;
if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp)
{
/* Get the current used size of the three stacks, in elements. */
YYSIZE_T yysize = yyssp - yyss + 1;
#ifdef yyoverflow
{
/* Give user a chance to reallocate the stack. Use copies of
these so that the &'s don't force the real ones into
memory. */
YYSTYPE *yyvs1 = yyvs;
yytype_int16 *yyss1 = yyss;
/* Each stack pointer address is followed by the size of the
data in use in that stack, in bytes. This used to be a
conditional around just the two extra args, but that might
be undefined if yyoverflow is a macro. */
yyoverflow (YY_("memory exhausted"),
&yyss1, yysize * sizeof (*yyssp),
&yyvs1, yysize * sizeof (*yyvsp),
&yystacksize);
yyss = yyss1;
yyvs = yyvs1;
}
#else /* no yyoverflow */
# ifndef YYSTACK_RELOCATE
goto yyexhaustedlab;
# else
/* Extend the stack our own way. */
if (YYMAXDEPTH <= yystacksize)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
yystacksize *= 2;
if (YYMAXDEPTH < yystacksize)
yystacksize = YYMAXDEPTH;
{
yytype_int16 *yyss1 = yyss;
union yyalloc *yyptr =
(union yyalloc *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (YYSTACK_BYTES (yystacksize));
if (! yyptr)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyss_alloc, yyss);
YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyvs_alloc, yyvs);
# undef YYSTACK_RELOCATE
if (yyss1 != yyssa)
YYSTACK_FREE (yyss1);
}
# endif
#endif /* no yyoverflow */
yyssp = yyss + yysize - 1;
yyvsp = yyvs + yysize - 1;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Stack size increased to %lu\n",
(unsigned long int) yystacksize));
if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp)
YYABORT;
}
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Entering state %d\n", yystate));
if (yystate == YYFINAL)
YYACCEPT;
goto yybackup;
/*-----------.
| yybackup. |
`-----------*/
yybackup:
/* Do appropriate processing given the current state. Read a
lookahead token if we need one and don't already have one. */
/* First try to decide what to do without reference to lookahead token. */
yyn = yypact[yystate];
if (yypact_value_is_default (yyn))
goto yydefault;
/* Not known => get a lookahead token if don't already have one. */
/* YYCHAR is either YYEMPTY or YYEOF or a valid lookahead symbol. */
if (yychar == YYEMPTY)
{
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Reading a token: "));
yychar = yylex (&yylval, yyscanner, compiler);
}
if (yychar <= YYEOF)
{
yychar = yytoken = YYEOF;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Now at end of input.\n"));
}
else
{
yytoken = YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Next token is", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc);
}
/* If the proper action on seeing token YYTOKEN is to reduce or to
detect an error, take that action. */
yyn += yytoken;
if (yyn < 0 || YYLAST < yyn || yycheck[yyn] != yytoken)
goto yydefault;
yyn = yytable[yyn];
if (yyn <= 0)
{
if (yytable_value_is_error (yyn))
goto yyerrlab;
yyn = -yyn;
goto yyreduce;
}
/* Count tokens shifted since error; after three, turn off error
status. */
if (yyerrstatus)
yyerrstatus--;
/* Shift the lookahead token. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc);
/* Discard the shifted token. */
yychar = YYEMPTY;
yystate = yyn;
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
*++yyvsp = yylval;
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_END
goto yynewstate;
/*-----------------------------------------------------------.
| yydefault -- do the default action for the current state. |
`-----------------------------------------------------------*/
yydefault:
yyn = yydefact[yystate];
if (yyn == 0)
goto yyerrlab;
goto yyreduce;
/*-----------------------------.
| yyreduce -- Do a reduction. |
`-----------------------------*/
yyreduce:
/* yyn is the number of a rule to reduce with. */
yylen = yyr2[yyn];
/* If YYLEN is nonzero, implement the default value of the action:
'$$ = $1'.
Otherwise, the following line sets YYVAL to garbage.
This behavior is undocumented and Bison
users should not rely upon it. Assigning to YYVAL
unconditionally makes the parser a bit smaller, and it avoids a
GCC warning that YYVAL may be used uninitialized. */
yyval = yyvsp[1-yylen];
YY_REDUCE_PRINT (yyn);
switch (yyn)
{
case 8:
#line 230 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
int result = yr_parser_reduce_import(yyscanner, (yyvsp[0].sized_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[0].sized_string));
ERROR_IF(result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 1661 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 9:
#line 242 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_RULE* rule = yr_parser_reduce_rule_declaration_phase_1(
yyscanner, (int32_t) (yyvsp[-2].integer), (yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(rule == NULL);
(yyval.rule) = rule;
}
#line 1674 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 10:
#line 251 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_RULE* rule = (yyvsp[-4].rule); // rule created in phase 1
rule->tags = (yyvsp[-3].c_string);
rule->metas = (yyvsp[-1].meta);
rule->strings = (yyvsp[0].string);
}
#line 1686 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 11:
#line 259 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_RULE* rule = (yyvsp[-7].rule); // rule created in phase 1
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_rule_declaration_phase_2(
yyscanner, rule);
yr_free((yyvsp[-8].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 1701 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 12:
#line 274 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.meta) = NULL;
}
#line 1709 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 13:
#line 278 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_META null_meta;
memset(&null_meta, 0xFF, sizeof(YR_META));
null_meta.type = META_TYPE_NULL;
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_write_data(
compiler->metas_arena,
&null_meta,
sizeof(YR_META),
NULL);
(yyval.meta) = (yyvsp[0].meta);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 1736 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 14:
#line 305 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.string) = NULL;
}
#line 1744 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 15:
#line 309 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_STRING null_string;
memset(&null_string, 0xFF, sizeof(YR_STRING));
null_string.g_flags = STRING_GFLAGS_NULL;
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_write_data(
compiler->strings_arena,
&null_string,
sizeof(YR_STRING),
NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.string) = (yyvsp[0].string);
}
#line 1771 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 17:
#line 340 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = 0; }
#line 1777 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 18:
#line 341 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = (yyvsp[-1].integer) | (yyvsp[0].integer); }
#line 1783 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 19:
#line 346 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = RULE_GFLAGS_PRIVATE; }
#line 1789 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 20:
#line 347 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = RULE_GFLAGS_GLOBAL; }
#line 1795 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 21:
#line 353 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.c_string) = NULL;
}
#line 1803 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 22:
#line 357 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_write_string(
yyget_extra(yyscanner)->sz_arena, "", NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.c_string) = (yyvsp[0].c_string);
}
#line 1821 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 23:
#line 375 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
char* identifier;
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_write_string(
yyget_extra(yyscanner)->sz_arena, (yyvsp[0].c_string), &identifier);
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.c_string) = identifier;
}
#line 1838 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 24:
#line 388 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
char* tag_name = (yyvsp[-1].c_string);
size_t tag_length = tag_name != NULL ? strlen(tag_name) : 0;
while (tag_length > 0)
{
if (strcmp(tag_name, (yyvsp[0].c_string)) == 0)
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(compiler, tag_name);
compiler->last_result = ERROR_DUPLICATED_TAG_IDENTIFIER;
break;
}
tag_name = (char*) yr_arena_next_address(
yyget_extra(yyscanner)->sz_arena,
tag_name,
tag_length + 1);
tag_length = tag_name != NULL ? strlen(tag_name) : 0;
}
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_write_string(
yyget_extra(yyscanner)->sz_arena, (yyvsp[0].c_string), NULL);
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.c_string) = (yyvsp[-1].c_string);
}
#line 1874 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 25:
#line 424 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.meta) = (yyvsp[0].meta); }
#line 1880 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 26:
#line 425 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.meta) = (yyvsp[-1].meta); }
#line 1886 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 27:
#line 431 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
SIZED_STRING* sized_string = (yyvsp[0].sized_string);
(yyval.meta) = yr_parser_reduce_meta_declaration(
yyscanner,
META_TYPE_STRING,
(yyvsp[-2].c_string),
sized_string->c_string,
0);
yr_free((yyvsp[-2].c_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[0].sized_string));
ERROR_IF((yyval.meta) == NULL);
}
#line 1906 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 28:
#line 447 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.meta) = yr_parser_reduce_meta_declaration(
yyscanner,
META_TYPE_INTEGER,
(yyvsp[-2].c_string),
NULL,
(yyvsp[0].integer));
yr_free((yyvsp[-2].c_string));
ERROR_IF((yyval.meta) == NULL);
}
#line 1923 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 29:
#line 460 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.meta) = yr_parser_reduce_meta_declaration(
yyscanner,
META_TYPE_INTEGER,
(yyvsp[-3].c_string),
NULL,
-(yyvsp[0].integer));
yr_free((yyvsp[-3].c_string));
ERROR_IF((yyval.meta) == NULL);
}
#line 1940 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 30:
#line 473 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.meta) = yr_parser_reduce_meta_declaration(
yyscanner,
META_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
(yyvsp[-2].c_string),
NULL,
TRUE);
yr_free((yyvsp[-2].c_string));
ERROR_IF((yyval.meta) == NULL);
}
#line 1957 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 31:
#line 486 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.meta) = yr_parser_reduce_meta_declaration(
yyscanner,
META_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
(yyvsp[-2].c_string),
NULL,
FALSE);
yr_free((yyvsp[-2].c_string));
ERROR_IF((yyval.meta) == NULL);
}
#line 1974 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 32:
#line 502 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.string) = (yyvsp[0].string); }
#line 1980 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 33:
#line 503 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.string) = (yyvsp[-1].string); }
#line 1986 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 34:
#line 509 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->error_line = yyget_lineno(yyscanner);
}
#line 1994 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 35:
#line 513 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.string) = yr_parser_reduce_string_declaration(
yyscanner, (int32_t) (yyvsp[0].integer), (yyvsp[-4].c_string), (yyvsp[-1].sized_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[-4].c_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[-1].sized_string));
ERROR_IF((yyval.string) == NULL);
compiler->error_line = 0;
}
#line 2009 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 36:
#line 524 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->error_line = yyget_lineno(yyscanner);
}
#line 2017 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 37:
#line 528 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.string) = yr_parser_reduce_string_declaration(
yyscanner, (int32_t) (yyvsp[0].integer) | STRING_GFLAGS_REGEXP, (yyvsp[-4].c_string), (yyvsp[-1].sized_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[-4].c_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[-1].sized_string));
ERROR_IF((yyval.string) == NULL);
compiler->error_line = 0;
}
#line 2033 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 38:
#line 540 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.string) = yr_parser_reduce_string_declaration(
yyscanner, STRING_GFLAGS_HEXADECIMAL, (yyvsp[-2].c_string), (yyvsp[0].sized_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[-2].c_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[0].sized_string));
ERROR_IF((yyval.string) == NULL);
}
#line 2047 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 39:
#line 553 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = 0; }
#line 2053 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 40:
#line 554 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = (yyvsp[-1].integer) | (yyvsp[0].integer); }
#line 2059 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 41:
#line 559 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = STRING_GFLAGS_WIDE; }
#line 2065 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 42:
#line 560 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = STRING_GFLAGS_ASCII; }
#line 2071 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 43:
#line 561 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = STRING_GFLAGS_NO_CASE; }
#line 2077 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 44:
#line 562 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = STRING_GFLAGS_FULL_WORD; }
#line 2083 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 45:
#line 568 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
int var_index = yr_parser_lookup_loop_variable(yyscanner, (yyvsp[0].c_string));
if (var_index >= 0)
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner,
OP_PUSH_M,
LOOP_LOCAL_VARS * var_index,
NULL,
NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
(yyval.expression).identifier = compiler->loop_identifier[var_index];
}
else
{
YR_OBJECT* object = (YR_OBJECT*) yr_hash_table_lookup(
compiler->objects_table, (yyvsp[0].c_string), NULL);
if (object == NULL)
{
char* ns = compiler->current_namespace->name;
object = (YR_OBJECT*) yr_hash_table_lookup(
compiler->objects_table, (yyvsp[0].c_string), ns);
}
if (object != NULL)
{
char* id;
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_write_string(
compiler->sz_arena, (yyvsp[0].c_string), &id);
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_OBJ_LOAD,
id,
NULL,
NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT;
(yyval.expression).value.object = object;
(yyval.expression).identifier = object->identifier;
}
else
{
YR_RULE* rule = (YR_RULE*) yr_hash_table_lookup(
compiler->rules_table,
(yyvsp[0].c_string),
compiler->current_namespace->name);
if (rule != NULL)
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_PUSH_RULE,
rule,
NULL,
NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
(yyval.expression).identifier = rule->identifier;
}
else
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(compiler, (yyvsp[0].c_string));
compiler->last_result = ERROR_UNDEFINED_IDENTIFIER;
}
}
}
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 2172 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 46:
#line 653 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_OBJECT* field = NULL;
if ((yyvsp[-2].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT &&
(yyvsp[-2].expression).value.object->type == OBJECT_TYPE_STRUCTURE)
{
field = yr_object_lookup_field((yyvsp[-2].expression).value.object, (yyvsp[0].c_string));
if (field != NULL)
{
char* ident;
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_write_string(
compiler->sz_arena, (yyvsp[0].c_string), &ident);
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_OBJ_FIELD,
ident,
NULL,
NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT;
(yyval.expression).value.object = field;
(yyval.expression).identifier = field->identifier;
}
else
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(compiler, (yyvsp[0].c_string));
compiler->last_result = ERROR_INVALID_FIELD_NAME;
}
}
else
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, (yyvsp[-2].expression).identifier);
compiler->last_result = ERROR_NOT_A_STRUCTURE;
}
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 2222 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 47:
#line 699 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_OBJECT_ARRAY* array;
YR_OBJECT_DICTIONARY* dict;
if ((yyvsp[-3].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT &&
(yyvsp[-3].expression).value.object->type == OBJECT_TYPE_ARRAY)
{
if ((yyvsp[-1].expression).type != EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, "array indexes must be of integer type");
compiler->last_result = ERROR_WRONG_TYPE;
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(
yyscanner, OP_INDEX_ARRAY, NULL);
array = (YR_OBJECT_ARRAY*) (yyvsp[-3].expression).value.object;
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT;
(yyval.expression).value.object = array->prototype_item;
(yyval.expression).identifier = array->identifier;
}
else if ((yyvsp[-3].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT &&
(yyvsp[-3].expression).value.object->type == OBJECT_TYPE_DICTIONARY)
{
if ((yyvsp[-1].expression).type != EXPRESSION_TYPE_STRING)
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, "dictionary keys must be of string type");
compiler->last_result = ERROR_WRONG_TYPE;
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(
yyscanner, OP_LOOKUP_DICT, NULL);
dict = (YR_OBJECT_DICTIONARY*) (yyvsp[-3].expression).value.object;
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT;
(yyval.expression).value.object = dict->prototype_item;
(yyval.expression).identifier = dict->identifier;
}
else
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, (yyvsp[-3].expression).identifier);
compiler->last_result = ERROR_NOT_INDEXABLE;
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 2283 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 48:
#line 757 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION* function;
char* args_fmt;
if ((yyvsp[-3].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT &&
(yyvsp[-3].expression).value.object->type == OBJECT_TYPE_FUNCTION)
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_check_types(
compiler, (YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION*) (yyvsp[-3].expression).value.object, (yyvsp[-1].c_string));
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_write_string(
compiler->sz_arena, (yyvsp[-1].c_string), &args_fmt);
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_CALL,
args_fmt,
NULL,
NULL);
function = (YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION*) (yyvsp[-3].expression).value.object;
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT;
(yyval.expression).value.object = function->return_obj;
(yyval.expression).identifier = function->identifier;
}
else
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, (yyvsp[-3].expression).identifier);
compiler->last_result = ERROR_NOT_A_FUNCTION;
}
yr_free((yyvsp[-1].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 2328 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 49:
#line 801 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.c_string) = yr_strdup(""); }
#line 2334 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 50:
#line 802 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.c_string) = (yyvsp[0].c_string); }
#line 2340 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 51:
#line 807 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.c_string) = (char*) yr_malloc(MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS + 1);
switch((yyvsp[0].expression).type)
{
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER:
strlcpy((yyval.c_string), "i", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT:
strlcpy((yyval.c_string), "f", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
strlcpy((yyval.c_string), "b", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_STRING:
strlcpy((yyval.c_string), "s", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_REGEXP:
strlcpy((yyval.c_string), "r", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
}
ERROR_IF((yyval.c_string) == NULL);
}
#line 2369 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 52:
#line 832 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if (strlen((yyvsp[-2].c_string)) == MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
compiler->last_result = ERROR_TOO_MANY_ARGUMENTS;
}
else
{
switch((yyvsp[0].expression).type)
{
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER:
strlcat((yyvsp[-2].c_string), "i", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT:
strlcat((yyvsp[-2].c_string), "f", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
strlcat((yyvsp[-2].c_string), "b", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_STRING:
strlcat((yyvsp[-2].c_string), "s", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_REGEXP:
strlcat((yyvsp[-2].c_string), "r", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
}
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.c_string) = (yyvsp[-2].c_string);
}
#line 2405 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 53:
#line 868 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
SIZED_STRING* sized_string = (yyvsp[0].sized_string);
RE* re;
RE_ERROR error;
int re_flags = 0;
if (sized_string->flags & SIZED_STRING_FLAGS_NO_CASE)
re_flags |= RE_FLAGS_NO_CASE;
if (sized_string->flags & SIZED_STRING_FLAGS_DOT_ALL)
re_flags |= RE_FLAGS_DOT_ALL;
compiler->last_result = yr_re_compile(
sized_string->c_string,
re_flags,
compiler->re_code_arena,
&re,
&error);
yr_free((yyvsp[0].sized_string));
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_INVALID_REGULAR_EXPRESSION)
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(compiler, error.message);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_PUSH,
re->root_node->forward_code,
NULL,
NULL);
yr_re_destroy(re);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_REGEXP;
}
#line 2451 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 54:
#line 914 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if ((yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_STRING)
{
if ((yyvsp[0].expression).value.sized_string != NULL)
{
yywarning(yyscanner,
"Using literal string \"%s\" in a boolean operation.",
(yyvsp[0].expression).value.sized_string->c_string);
}
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(
yyscanner, OP_STR_TO_BOOL, NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2474 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 55:
#line 936 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH, 1, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2487 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 56:
#line 945 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH, 0, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2500 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 57:
#line 954 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[-2].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_STRING, "matches");
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_REGEXP, "matches");
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(
yyscanner,
OP_MATCHES,
NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2519 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 58:
#line 969 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[-2].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_STRING, "contains");
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_STRING, "contains");
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(
yyscanner, OP_CONTAINS, NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2535 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 59:
#line 981 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
int result = yr_parser_reduce_string_identifier(
yyscanner,
(yyvsp[0].c_string),
OP_FOUND,
UNDEFINED);
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2553 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 60:
#line 995 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "at");
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_string_identifier(
yyscanner, (yyvsp[-2].c_string), OP_FOUND_AT, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
yr_free((yyvsp[-2].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2570 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 61:
#line 1008 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_string_identifier(
yyscanner, (yyvsp[-2].c_string), OP_FOUND_IN, UNDEFINED);
yr_free((yyvsp[-2].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result!= ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2585 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 62:
#line 1019 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
int var_index;
if (compiler->loop_depth == MAX_LOOP_NESTING)
compiler->last_result = \
ERROR_LOOP_NESTING_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
var_index = yr_parser_lookup_loop_variable(
yyscanner, (yyvsp[-1].c_string));
if (var_index >= 0)
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, (yyvsp[-1].c_string));
compiler->last_result = \
ERROR_DUPLICATED_LOOP_IDENTIFIER;
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH, UNDEFINED, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 2619 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 63:
#line 1049 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
int mem_offset = LOOP_LOCAL_VARS * compiler->loop_depth;
uint8_t* addr;
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_CLEAR_M, mem_offset + 1, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_CLEAR_M, mem_offset + 2, NULL, NULL);
if ((yyvsp[-1].integer) == INTEGER_SET_ENUMERATION)
{
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_POP_M, mem_offset, &addr, NULL);
}
else // INTEGER_SET_RANGE
{
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_POP_M, mem_offset + 3, &addr, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_POP_M, mem_offset, NULL, NULL);
}
compiler->loop_address[compiler->loop_depth] = addr;
compiler->loop_identifier[compiler->loop_depth] = (yyvsp[-4].c_string);
compiler->loop_depth++;
}
#line 2658 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 64:
#line 1084 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
int mem_offset;
compiler->loop_depth--;
mem_offset = LOOP_LOCAL_VARS * compiler->loop_depth;
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_ADD_M, mem_offset + 1, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_INCR_M, mem_offset + 2, NULL, NULL);
if ((yyvsp[-5].integer) == INTEGER_SET_ENUMERATION)
{
yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_JNUNDEF,
compiler->loop_address[compiler->loop_depth],
NULL,
NULL);
}
else // INTEGER_SET_RANGE
{
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_INCR_M, mem_offset, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH_M, mem_offset, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH_M, mem_offset + 3, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_JLE,
compiler->loop_address[compiler->loop_depth],
NULL,
NULL);
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_POP, NULL);
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_POP, NULL);
}
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_POP, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_SWAPUNDEF, mem_offset + 2, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH_M, mem_offset + 1, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_INT_LE, NULL);
compiler->loop_identifier[compiler->loop_depth] = NULL;
yr_free((yyvsp[-8].c_string));
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2741 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 65:
#line 1163 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
int mem_offset = LOOP_LOCAL_VARS * compiler->loop_depth;
uint8_t* addr;
if (compiler->loop_depth == MAX_LOOP_NESTING)
compiler->last_result = \
ERROR_LOOP_NESTING_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
if (compiler->loop_for_of_mem_offset != -1)
compiler->last_result = \
ERROR_NESTED_FOR_OF_LOOP;
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_CLEAR_M, mem_offset + 1, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_CLEAR_M, mem_offset + 2, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_POP_M, mem_offset, &addr, NULL);
compiler->loop_for_of_mem_offset = mem_offset;
compiler->loop_address[compiler->loop_depth] = addr;
compiler->loop_identifier[compiler->loop_depth] = NULL;
compiler->loop_depth++;
}
#line 2775 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 66:
#line 1193 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
int mem_offset;
compiler->loop_depth--;
compiler->loop_for_of_mem_offset = -1;
mem_offset = LOOP_LOCAL_VARS * compiler->loop_depth;
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_ADD_M, mem_offset + 1, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_INCR_M, mem_offset + 2, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_JNUNDEF,
compiler->loop_address[compiler->loop_depth],
NULL,
NULL);
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_POP, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_SWAPUNDEF, mem_offset + 2, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH_M, mem_offset + 1, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_INT_LE, NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2828 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 67:
#line 1242 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_OF, NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2838 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 68:
#line 1248 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_NOT, NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2848 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 69:
#line 1254 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_FIXUP* fixup;
void* jmp_destination_addr;
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_JFALSE,
0, // still don't know the jump destination
NULL,
&jmp_destination_addr);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
fixup = (YR_FIXUP*) yr_malloc(sizeof(YR_FIXUP));
if (fixup == NULL)
compiler->last_error = ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
fixup->address = jmp_destination_addr;
fixup->next = compiler->fixup_stack_head;
compiler->fixup_stack_head = fixup;
}
#line 2878 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 70:
#line 1280 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_FIXUP* fixup;
uint8_t* and_addr;
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_reserve_memory(
compiler->code_arena, 2);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_AND, &and_addr);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
fixup = compiler->fixup_stack_head;
*(void**)(fixup->address) = (void*)(and_addr + 1);
compiler->fixup_stack_head = fixup->next;
yr_free(fixup);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2918 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 71:
#line 1316 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_FIXUP* fixup;
void* jmp_destination_addr;
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_JTRUE,
0, // still don't know the jump destination
NULL,
&jmp_destination_addr);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
fixup = (YR_FIXUP*) yr_malloc(sizeof(YR_FIXUP));
if (fixup == NULL)
compiler->last_error = ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
fixup->address = jmp_destination_addr;
fixup->next = compiler->fixup_stack_head;
compiler->fixup_stack_head = fixup;
}
#line 2947 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 72:
#line 1341 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_FIXUP* fixup;
uint8_t* or_addr;
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_reserve_memory(
compiler->code_arena, 2);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_OR, &or_addr);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
fixup = compiler->fixup_stack_head;
*(void**)(fixup->address) = (void*)(or_addr + 1);
compiler->fixup_stack_head = fixup->next;
yr_free(fixup);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2987 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 73:
#line 1377 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, "<", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 3000 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 74:
#line 1386 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, ">", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 3013 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 75:
#line 1395 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, "<=", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 3026 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 76:
#line 1404 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, ">=", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 3039 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 77:
#line 1413 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, "==", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 3052 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 78:
#line 1422 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, "!=", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 3065 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 79:
#line 1431 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.expression) = (yyvsp[0].expression);
}
#line 3073 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 80:
#line 1435 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.expression) = (yyvsp[-1].expression);
}
#line 3081 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 81:
#line 1442 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = INTEGER_SET_ENUMERATION; }
#line 3087 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 82:
#line 1443 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = INTEGER_SET_RANGE; }
#line 3093 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 83:
#line 1449 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if ((yyvsp[-3].expression).type != EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, "wrong type for range's lower bound");
compiler->last_result = ERROR_WRONG_TYPE;
}
if ((yyvsp[-1].expression).type != EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, "wrong type for range's upper bound");
compiler->last_result = ERROR_WRONG_TYPE;
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 3115 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 84:
#line 1471 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if ((yyvsp[0].expression).type != EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, "wrong type for enumeration item");
compiler->last_result = ERROR_WRONG_TYPE;
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 3131 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 85:
#line 1483 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if ((yyvsp[0].expression).type != EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, "wrong type for enumeration item");
compiler->last_result = ERROR_WRONG_TYPE;
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 3146 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 86:
#line 1498 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(yyscanner, OP_PUSH, UNDEFINED, NULL, NULL);
}
#line 3155 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 88:
#line 1504 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(yyscanner, OP_PUSH, UNDEFINED, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_pushes_for_strings(yyscanner, "$*");
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 3166 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 91:
#line 1521 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
yr_parser_emit_pushes_for_strings(yyscanner, (yyvsp[0].c_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 3177 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 92:
#line 1528 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
yr_parser_emit_pushes_for_strings(yyscanner, (yyvsp[0].c_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 3188 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 94:
#line 1540 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(yyscanner, OP_PUSH, UNDEFINED, NULL, NULL);
}
#line 3196 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 95:
#line 1544 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(yyscanner, OP_PUSH, 1, NULL, NULL);
}
#line 3204 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 96:
#line 1552 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.expression) = (yyvsp[-1].expression);
}
#line 3212 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 97:
#line 1556 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(
yyscanner, OP_FILESIZE, NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
#line 3226 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 98:
#line 1566 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
yywarning(yyscanner,
"Using deprecated \"entrypoint\" keyword. Use the \"entry_point\" "
"function from PE module instead.");
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(
yyscanner, OP_ENTRYPOINT, NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
#line 3244 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 99:
#line 1580 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[-1].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "intXXXX or uintXXXX");
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(
yyscanner, (uint8_t) (OP_READ_INT + (yyvsp[-3].integer)), NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
#line 3264 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 100:
#line 1596 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH, (yyvsp[0].integer), NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = (yyvsp[0].integer);
}
#line 3278 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 101:
#line 1606 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg_double(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH, (yyvsp[0].double_), NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT;
}
#line 3291 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 102:
#line 1615 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
SIZED_STRING* sized_string;
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_write_data(
compiler->sz_arena,
(yyvsp[0].sized_string),
(yyvsp[0].sized_string)->length + sizeof(SIZED_STRING),
(void**) &sized_string);
yr_free((yyvsp[0].sized_string));
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_PUSH,
sized_string,
NULL,
NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_STRING;
(yyval.expression).value.sized_string = sized_string;
}
#line 3320 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 103:
#line 1640 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_string_identifier(
yyscanner, (yyvsp[0].c_string), OP_COUNT, UNDEFINED);
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
#line 3336 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 104:
#line 1652 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_string_identifier(
yyscanner, (yyvsp[-3].c_string), OP_OFFSET, UNDEFINED);
yr_free((yyvsp[-3].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
#line 3352 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 105:
#line 1664 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH, 1, NULL, NULL);
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_string_identifier(
yyscanner, (yyvsp[0].c_string), OP_OFFSET, UNDEFINED);
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
#line 3372 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 106:
#line 1680 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_string_identifier(
yyscanner, (yyvsp[-3].c_string), OP_LENGTH, UNDEFINED);
yr_free((yyvsp[-3].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
#line 3388 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 107:
#line 1692 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH, 1, NULL, NULL);
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_string_identifier(
yyscanner, (yyvsp[0].c_string), OP_LENGTH, UNDEFINED);
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
#line 3408 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 108:
#line 1708 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if ((yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER) // loop identifier
{
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
else if ((yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN) // rule identifier
{
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
else if ((yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT)
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(
yyscanner, OP_OBJ_VALUE, NULL);
switch((yyvsp[0].expression).value.object->type)
{
case OBJECT_TYPE_INTEGER:
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_FLOAT:
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRING:
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_STRING;
(yyval.expression).value.sized_string = NULL;
break;
default:
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info_fmt(
compiler,
"wrong usage of identifier \"%s\"",
(yyvsp[0].expression).identifier);
compiler->last_result = ERROR_WRONG_TYPE;
}
}
else
{
assert(FALSE);
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 3457 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 109:
#line 1753 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER | EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT, "-");
if ((yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = ((yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer == UNDEFINED) ?
UNDEFINED : -((yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_INT_MINUS, NULL);
}
else if ((yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT)
{
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT;
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_DBL_MINUS, NULL);
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 3480 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 110:
#line 1772 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, "+", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
if ((yyvsp[-2].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER &&
(yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(+, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
}
else
{
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT;
}
}
#line 3502 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 111:
#line 1790 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, "-", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
if ((yyvsp[-2].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER &&
(yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(-, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
}
else
{
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT;
}
}
#line 3524 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 112:
#line 1808 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, "*", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
if ((yyvsp[-2].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER &&
(yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(*, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
}
else
{
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT;
}
}
#line 3546 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 113:
#line 1826 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, "\\", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
if ((yyvsp[-2].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER &&
(yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
if ((yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer != 0)
{
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(/, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
}
else
{
compiler->last_result = ERROR_DIVISION_BY_ZERO;
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
}
else
{
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT;
}
}
#line 3576 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 114:
#line 1852 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[-2].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "%");
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "%");
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_MOD, NULL);
if ((yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer != 0)
{
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(%, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
}
else
{
compiler->last_result = ERROR_DIVISION_BY_ZERO;
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
}
#line 3598 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 115:
#line 1870 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[-2].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "^");
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "^");
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_BITWISE_XOR, NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(^, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
}
#line 3612 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 116:
#line 1880 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[-2].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "^");
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "^");
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_BITWISE_AND, NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(&, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
}
#line 3626 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 117:
#line 1890 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[-2].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "|");
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "|");
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_BITWISE_OR, NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(|, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
}
#line 3640 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 118:
#line 1900 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "~");
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_BITWISE_NOT, NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = ((yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer == UNDEFINED) ?
UNDEFINED : ~((yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
}
#line 3654 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 119:
#line 1910 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[-2].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "<<");
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "<<");
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_SHL, NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(<<, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
}
#line 3668 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 120:
#line 1920 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[-2].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, ">>");
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, ">>");
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_SHR, NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(>>, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
}
#line 3682 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 121:
#line 1930 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.expression) = (yyvsp[0].expression);
}
#line 3690 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
#line 3694 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
default: break;
}
/* User semantic actions sometimes alter yychar, and that requires
that yytoken be updated with the new translation. We take the
approach of translating immediately before every use of yytoken.
One alternative is translating here after every semantic action,
but that translation would be missed if the semantic action invokes
YYABORT, YYACCEPT, or YYERROR immediately after altering yychar or
if it invokes YYBACKUP. In the case of YYABORT or YYACCEPT, an
incorrect destructor might then be invoked immediately. In the
case of YYERROR or YYBACKUP, subsequent parser actions might lead
to an incorrect destructor call or verbose syntax error message
before the lookahead is translated. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("-> $$ =", yyr1[yyn], &yyval, &yyloc);
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
yylen = 0;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
*++yyvsp = yyval;
/* Now 'shift' the result of the reduction. Determine what state
that goes to, based on the state we popped back to and the rule
number reduced by. */
yyn = yyr1[yyn];
yystate = yypgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS] + *yyssp;
if (0 <= yystate && yystate <= YYLAST && yycheck[yystate] == *yyssp)
yystate = yytable[yystate];
else
yystate = yydefgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS];
goto yynewstate;
/*--------------------------------------.
| yyerrlab -- here on detecting error. |
`--------------------------------------*/
yyerrlab:
/* Make sure we have latest lookahead translation. See comments at
user semantic actions for why this is necessary. */
yytoken = yychar == YYEMPTY ? YYEMPTY : YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
/* If not already recovering from an error, report this error. */
if (!yyerrstatus)
{
++yynerrs;
#if ! YYERROR_VERBOSE
yyerror (yyscanner, compiler, YY_("syntax error"));
#else
# define YYSYNTAX_ERROR yysyntax_error (&yymsg_alloc, &yymsg, \
yyssp, yytoken)
{
char const *yymsgp = YY_("syntax error");
int yysyntax_error_status;
yysyntax_error_status = YYSYNTAX_ERROR;
if (yysyntax_error_status == 0)
yymsgp = yymsg;
else if (yysyntax_error_status == 1)
{
if (yymsg != yymsgbuf)
YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg);
yymsg = (char *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (yymsg_alloc);
if (!yymsg)
{
yymsg = yymsgbuf;
yymsg_alloc = sizeof yymsgbuf;
yysyntax_error_status = 2;
}
else
{
yysyntax_error_status = YYSYNTAX_ERROR;
yymsgp = yymsg;
}
}
yyerror (yyscanner, compiler, yymsgp);
if (yysyntax_error_status == 2)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
}
# undef YYSYNTAX_ERROR
#endif
}
if (yyerrstatus == 3)
{
/* If just tried and failed to reuse lookahead token after an
error, discard it. */
if (yychar <= YYEOF)
{
/* Return failure if at end of input. */
if (yychar == YYEOF)
YYABORT;
}
else
{
yydestruct ("Error: discarding",
yytoken, &yylval, yyscanner, compiler);
yychar = YYEMPTY;
}
}
/* Else will try to reuse lookahead token after shifting the error
token. */
goto yyerrlab1;
/*---------------------------------------------------.
| yyerrorlab -- error raised explicitly by YYERROR. |
`---------------------------------------------------*/
yyerrorlab:
/* Pacify compilers like GCC when the user code never invokes
YYERROR and the label yyerrorlab therefore never appears in user
code. */
if (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0)
goto yyerrorlab;
/* Do not reclaim the symbols of the rule whose action triggered
this YYERROR. */
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
yylen = 0;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
yystate = *yyssp;
goto yyerrlab1;
/*-------------------------------------------------------------.
| yyerrlab1 -- common code for both syntax error and YYERROR. |
`-------------------------------------------------------------*/
yyerrlab1:
yyerrstatus = 3; /* Each real token shifted decrements this. */
for (;;)
{
yyn = yypact[yystate];
if (!yypact_value_is_default (yyn))
{
yyn += YYTERROR;
if (0 <= yyn && yyn <= YYLAST && yycheck[yyn] == YYTERROR)
{
yyn = yytable[yyn];
if (0 < yyn)
break;
}
}
/* Pop the current state because it cannot handle the error token. */
if (yyssp == yyss)
YYABORT;
yydestruct ("Error: popping",
yystos[yystate], yyvsp, yyscanner, compiler);
YYPOPSTACK (1);
yystate = *yyssp;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
}
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
*++yyvsp = yylval;
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_END
/* Shift the error token. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yystos[yyn], yyvsp, yylsp);
yystate = yyn;
goto yynewstate;
/*-------------------------------------.
| yyacceptlab -- YYACCEPT comes here. |
`-------------------------------------*/
yyacceptlab:
yyresult = 0;
goto yyreturn;
/*-----------------------------------.
| yyabortlab -- YYABORT comes here. |
`-----------------------------------*/
yyabortlab:
yyresult = 1;
goto yyreturn;
#if !defined yyoverflow || YYERROR_VERBOSE
/*-------------------------------------------------.
| yyexhaustedlab -- memory exhaustion comes here. |
`-------------------------------------------------*/
yyexhaustedlab:
yyerror (yyscanner, compiler, YY_("memory exhausted"));
yyresult = 2;
/* Fall through. */
#endif
yyreturn:
if (yychar != YYEMPTY)
{
/* Make sure we have latest lookahead translation. See comments at
user semantic actions for why this is necessary. */
yytoken = YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
yydestruct ("Cleanup: discarding lookahead",
yytoken, &yylval, yyscanner, compiler);
}
/* Do not reclaim the symbols of the rule whose action triggered
this YYABORT or YYACCEPT. */
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
while (yyssp != yyss)
{
yydestruct ("Cleanup: popping",
yystos[*yyssp], yyvsp, yyscanner, compiler);
YYPOPSTACK (1);
}
#ifndef yyoverflow
if (yyss != yyssa)
YYSTACK_FREE (yyss);
#endif
#if YYERROR_VERBOSE
if (yymsg != yymsgbuf)
YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg);
#endif
return yyresult;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: libyara/grammar.y in YARA 3.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) via a crafted rule that is mishandled in the yr_parser_lookup_loop_variable function.
Commit Message: Fix issue #575
|
Low
| 168,481
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadPCXImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ThrowPCXException(severity,tag) \
{ \
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline); \
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info); \
ThrowReaderException(severity,tag); \
}
Image
*image;
int
bits,
id,
mask;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
*page_table;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
PCXInfo
pcx_info;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p,
*r;
size_t
one,
pcx_packets;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
packet,
pcx_colormap[768],
*pixels,
*scanline;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a PCX file.
*/
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) NULL;
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"DCX") == 0)
{
size_t
magic;
/*
Read the DCX page table.
*/
magic=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (magic != 987654321)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) AcquireQuantumMemory(1024UL,
sizeof(*page_table));
if (page_table == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (id=0; id < 1024; id++)
{
page_table[id]=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (page_table[id] == 0)
break;
}
}
if (page_table != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) page_table[0],SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&pcx_info.identifier);
for (id=1; id < 1024; id++)
{
int
bits_per_pixel;
/*
Verify PCX identifier.
*/
pcx_info.version=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((count == 0) || (pcx_info.identifier != 0x0a))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
pcx_info.encoding=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (bits_per_pixel == -1)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
pcx_info.bits_per_pixel=(unsigned char) bits_per_pixel;
pcx_info.left=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
pcx_info.top=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
pcx_info.right=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
pcx_info.bottom=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
pcx_info.horizontal_resolution=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
pcx_info.vertical_resolution=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
/*
Read PCX raster colormap.
*/
image->columns=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue((ssize_t) pcx_info.right-
pcx_info.left)+1UL;
image->rows=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue((ssize_t) pcx_info.bottom-
pcx_info.top)+1UL;
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0) ||
(pcx_info.bits_per_pixel == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->depth=pcx_info.bits_per_pixel <= 8 ? 8U : MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
image->x_resolution=(double) pcx_info.horizontal_resolution;
image->y_resolution=(double) pcx_info.vertical_resolution;
image->colors=16;
count=ReadBlob(image,3*image->colors,pcx_colormap);
pcx_info.reserved=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
pcx_info.planes=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((pcx_info.bits_per_pixel*pcx_info.planes) >= 64)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
one=1;
if ((pcx_info.bits_per_pixel != 8) || (pcx_info.planes == 1))
if ((pcx_info.version == 3) || (pcx_info.version == 5) ||
((pcx_info.bits_per_pixel*pcx_info.planes) == 1))
image->colors=(size_t) MagickMin(one << (1UL*
(pcx_info.bits_per_pixel*pcx_info.planes)),256UL);
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((pcx_info.bits_per_pixel >= 8) && (pcx_info.planes != 1))
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
p=pcx_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
}
pcx_info.bytes_per_line=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
pcx_info.palette_info=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
for (i=0; i < 58; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
/*
Read image data.
*/
pcx_packets=(size_t) image->rows*pcx_info.bytes_per_line*pcx_info.planes;
if ((size_t) (pcx_info.bits_per_pixel*pcx_info.planes*image->columns) >
(pcx_packets*8U))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(image->columns,
pcx_info.bytes_per_line),MagickMax(8,pcx_info.planes)*sizeof(*scanline));
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(pcx_packets,2*sizeof(*pixels));
if ((scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL))
{
if (scanline != (unsigned char *) NULL)
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
if (pixel_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Uncompress image data.
*/
p=pixels;
if (pcx_info.encoding == 0)
while (pcx_packets != 0)
{
packet=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
*p++=packet;
pcx_packets--;
}
else
while (pcx_packets != 0)
{
packet=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
if ((packet & 0xc0) != 0xc0)
{
*p++=packet;
pcx_packets--;
continue;
}
count=(ssize_t) (packet & 0x3f);
packet=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for ( ; count != 0; count--)
{
*p++=packet;
pcx_packets--;
if (pcx_packets == 0)
break;
}
}
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
image->matte=pcx_info.planes > 3 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
else
if ((pcx_info.version == 5) ||
((pcx_info.bits_per_pixel*pcx_info.planes) == 1))
{
/*
Initialize image colormap.
*/
if (image->colors > 256)
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"ColormapExceeds256Colors");
if ((pcx_info.bits_per_pixel*pcx_info.planes) == 1)
{
/*
Monochrome colormap.
*/
image->colormap[0].red=(Quantum) 0;
image->colormap[0].green=(Quantum) 0;
image->colormap[0].blue=(Quantum) 0;
image->colormap[1].red=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[1].green=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[1].blue=QuantumRange;
}
else
if (image->colors > 16)
{
/*
256 color images have their color map at the end of the file.
*/
pcx_info.colormap_signature=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,3*image->colors,pcx_colormap);
p=pcx_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
}
}
}
/*
Convert PCX raster image to pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=pixels+(y*pcx_info.bytes_per_line*pcx_info.planes);
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
r=scanline;
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
for (i=0; i < pcx_info.planes; i++)
{
r=scanline+i;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x++)
{
switch (i)
{
case 0:
{
*r=(*p++);
break;
}
case 1:
{
*r=(*p++);
break;
}
case 2:
{
*r=(*p++);
break;
}
case 3:
default:
{
*r=(*p++);
break;
}
}
r+=pcx_info.planes;
}
}
else
if (pcx_info.planes > 1)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
*r++=0;
for (i=0; i < pcx_info.planes; i++)
{
r=scanline;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x++)
{
bits=(*p++);
for (mask=0x80; mask != 0; mask>>=1)
{
if (bits & mask)
*r|=1 << i;
r++;
}
}
}
}
else
switch (pcx_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
register ssize_t
bit;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= 0; bit--)
*r++=(unsigned char) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= (ssize_t) (8-(image->columns % 8)); bit--)
*r++=(unsigned char) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
p++;
}
break;
}
case 2:
{
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-3); x+=4)
{
*r++=(*p >> 6) & 0x3;
*r++=(*p >> 4) & 0x3;
*r++=(*p >> 2) & 0x3;
*r++=(*p) & 0x3;
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 4) != 0)
{
for (i=3; i >= (ssize_t) (4-(image->columns % 4)); i--)
*r++=(unsigned char) ((*p >> (i*2)) & 0x03);
p++;
}
break;
}
case 4:
{
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
*r++=(*p >> 4) & 0xf;
*r++=(*p) & 0xf;
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
*r++=(*p++ >> 4) & 0xf;
break;
}
case 8:
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(r,p,image->columns);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
/*
Transfer image scanline.
*/
r=scanline;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,*r++)
else
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*r++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*r++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*r++));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*r++));
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image);
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (page_table == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
break;
if (page_table[id] == 0)
break;
offset=SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) page_table[id],SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&pcx_info.identifier);
if ((count != 0) && (pcx_info.identifier == 0x0a))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (page_table != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(page_table);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,591
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: jiffies_to_compat_timeval(unsigned long jiffies, struct compat_timeval *value)
{
/*
* Convert jiffies to nanoseconds and separate with
* one divide.
*/
u64 nsec = (u64)jiffies * TICK_NSEC;
long rem;
value->tv_sec = div_long_long_rem(nsec, NSEC_PER_SEC, &rem);
value->tv_usec = rem / NSEC_PER_USEC;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The div_long_long_rem implementation in include/asm-x86/div64.h in the Linux kernel before 2.6.26 on the x86 platform allows local users to cause a denial of service (Divide Error Fault and panic) via a clock_gettime system call.
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,748
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: RenderThread::~RenderThread() {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderProcessObserver, observers_, OnRenderProcessShutdown());
if (web_database_observer_impl_.get())
web_database_observer_impl_->WaitForAllDatabasesToClose();
RemoveFilter(audio_input_message_filter_.get());
audio_input_message_filter_ = NULL;
RemoveFilter(audio_message_filter_.get());
audio_message_filter_ = NULL;
RemoveFilter(vc_manager_->video_capture_message_filter());
RemoveFilter(db_message_filter_.get());
db_message_filter_ = NULL;
if (file_thread_.get())
file_thread_->Stop();
if (webkit_client_.get())
WebKit::shutdown();
lazy_tls.Pointer()->Set(NULL);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
PluginChannelBase::CleanupChannels();
if (RenderProcessImpl::InProcessPlugins())
CoUninitialize();
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle strings in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted document that triggers an incorrect read operation.
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,327
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: RenderProcessHost* RenderProcessHostImpl::GetProcessHostForSite(
BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& url) {
SiteProcessMap* map =
GetSiteProcessMapForBrowserContext(browser_context);
std::string site = SiteInstance::GetSiteForURL(browser_context, url)
.possibly_invalid_spec();
return map->FindProcess(site);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.152 does not properly manage bindings of extension processes, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Check for appropriate bindings in process-per-site mode.
BUG=174059
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12188025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181386 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,467
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void virtio_gpu_set_scanout(VirtIOGPU *g,
struct virtio_gpu_ctrl_command *cmd)
{
struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource *res;
struct virtio_gpu_scanout *scanout;
pixman_format_code_t format;
uint32_t offset;
int bpp;
struct virtio_gpu_set_scanout ss;
VIRTIO_GPU_FILL_CMD(ss);
trace_virtio_gpu_cmd_set_scanout(ss.scanout_id, ss.resource_id,
ss.r.width, ss.r.height, ss.r.x, ss.r.y);
if (ss.scanout_id >= g->conf.max_outputs) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: illegal scanout id specified %d",
__func__, ss.scanout_id);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_SCANOUT_ID;
return;
}
g->enable = 1;
if (ss.resource_id == 0) {
scanout = &g->scanout[ss.scanout_id];
if (scanout->resource_id) {
res = virtio_gpu_find_resource(g, scanout->resource_id);
if (res) {
res->scanout_bitmask &= ~(1 << ss.scanout_id);
}
}
if (ss.scanout_id == 0) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"%s: illegal scanout id specified %d",
__func__, ss.scanout_id);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_SCANOUT_ID;
return;
}
dpy_gfx_replace_surface(g->scanout[ss.scanout_id].con, NULL);
scanout->ds = NULL;
scanout->width = 0;
scanout->height = 0;
return;
}
/* create a surface for this scanout */
res = virtio_gpu_find_resource(g, ss.resource_id);
if (!res) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: illegal resource specified %d\n",
__func__, ss.resource_id);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_RESOURCE_ID;
return;
}
if (ss.r.x > res->width ||
ss.r.y > res->height ||
ss.r.width > res->width ||
ss.r.height > res->height ||
ss.r.x + ss.r.width > res->width ||
ss.r.y + ss.r.height > res->height) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: illegal scanout %d bounds for"
" resource %d, (%d,%d)+%d,%d vs %d %d\n",
__func__, ss.scanout_id, ss.resource_id, ss.r.x, ss.r.y,
ss.r.width, ss.r.height, res->width, res->height);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
return;
}
scanout = &g->scanout[ss.scanout_id];
format = pixman_image_get_format(res->image);
bpp = (PIXMAN_FORMAT_BPP(format) + 7) / 8;
offset = (ss.r.x * bpp) + ss.r.y * pixman_image_get_stride(res->image);
if (!scanout->ds || surface_data(scanout->ds)
!= ((uint8_t *)pixman_image_get_data(res->image) + offset) ||
scanout->width != ss.r.width ||
scanout->height != ss.r.height) {
pixman_image_t *rect;
void *ptr = (uint8_t *)pixman_image_get_data(res->image) + offset;
rect = pixman_image_create_bits(format, ss.r.width, ss.r.height, ptr,
pixman_image_get_stride(res->image));
pixman_image_ref(res->image);
pixman_image_set_destroy_function(rect, virtio_unref_resource,
res->image);
/* realloc the surface ptr */
scanout->ds = qemu_create_displaysurface_pixman(rect);
if (!scanout->ds) {
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_UNSPEC;
return;
}
dpy_gfx_replace_surface(g->scanout[ss.scanout_id].con, scanout->ds);
}
scanout->resource_id = ss.resource_id;
scanout->x = ss.r.x;
scanout->y = ss.r.y;
scanout->width = ss.r.width;
scanout->height = ss.r.height;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: Memory leak in the virtio_gpu_set_scanout function in hw/display/virtio-gpu.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a large number of "VIRTIO_GPU_CMD_SET_SCANOUT:" commands.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,813
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long ContentEncoding::ParseContentEncodingEntry(long long start, long long size,
IMkvReader* pReader) {
assert(pReader);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
int compression_count = 0;
int encryption_count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x1034) // ContentCompression ID
++compression_count;
if (id == 0x1035) // ContentEncryption ID
++encryption_count;
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (compression_count <= 0 && encryption_count <= 0)
return -1;
if (compression_count > 0) {
compression_entries_ =
new (std::nothrow) ContentCompression* [compression_count];
if (!compression_entries_)
return -1;
compression_entries_end_ = compression_entries_;
}
if (encryption_count > 0) {
encryption_entries_ =
new (std::nothrow) ContentEncryption* [encryption_count];
if (!encryption_entries_) {
delete[] compression_entries_;
return -1;
}
encryption_entries_end_ = encryption_entries_;
}
pos = start;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x1031) {
encoding_order_ = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
} else if (id == 0x1032) {
encoding_scope_ = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (encoding_scope_ < 1)
return -1;
} else if (id == 0x1033) {
encoding_type_ = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
} else if (id == 0x1034) {
ContentCompression* const compression =
new (std::nothrow) ContentCompression();
if (!compression)
return -1;
status = ParseCompressionEntry(pos, size, pReader, compression);
if (status) {
delete compression;
return status;
}
*compression_entries_end_++ = compression;
} else if (id == 0x1035) {
ContentEncryption* const encryption =
new (std::nothrow) ContentEncryption();
if (!encryption)
return -1;
status = ParseEncryptionEntry(pos, size, pReader, encryption);
if (status) {
delete encryption;
return status;
}
*encryption_entries_end_++ = encryption;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,850
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadFPXImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
FPXColorspace
colorspace;
FPXImageComponentDesc
*alpha_component,
*blue_component,
*green_component,
*red_component;
FPXImageDesc
fpx_info;
FPXImageHandle
*flashpix;
FPXStatus
fpx_status;
FPXSummaryInformation
summary_info;
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*a,
*b,
*g,
*r;
size_t
memory_limit;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
unsigned int
height,
tile_width,
tile_height,
width;
size_t
scene;
/*
Open image.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
/*
Initialize FPX toolkit.
*/
fpx_status=FPX_InitSystem();
if (fpx_status != FPX_OK)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToInitializeFPXLibrary");
memory_limit=20000000;
fpx_status=FPX_SetToolkitMemoryLimit(&memory_limit);
if (fpx_status != FPX_OK)
{
FPX_ClearSystem();
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToInitializeFPXLibrary");
}
tile_width=64;
tile_height=64;
flashpix=(FPXImageHandle *) NULL;
{
#if defined(macintosh)
FSSpec
fsspec;
FilenameToFSSpec(image->filename,&fsspec);
fpx_status=FPX_OpenImageByFilename((const FSSpec &) fsspec,(char *) NULL,
#else
fpx_status=FPX_OpenImageByFilename(image->filename,(char *) NULL,
#endif
&width,&height,&tile_width,&tile_height,&colorspace,&flashpix);
}
if (fpx_status == FPX_LOW_MEMORY_ERROR)
{
FPX_ClearSystem();
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (fpx_status != FPX_OK)
{
FPX_ClearSystem();
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile",
image->filename);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (colorspace.numberOfComponents == 0)
{
FPX_ClearSystem();
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImageTypeNotSupported");
}
if (image_info->view == (char *) NULL)
{
float
aspect_ratio;
/*
Get the aspect ratio.
*/
aspect_ratio=(float) width/height;
fpx_status=FPX_GetImageResultAspectRatio(flashpix,&aspect_ratio);
if (fpx_status != FPX_OK)
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"UnableToReadAspectRatio");
if (width != (size_t) floor((aspect_ratio*height)+0.5))
Swap(width,height);
}
fpx_status=FPX_GetSummaryInformation(flashpix,&summary_info);
if (fpx_status != FPX_OK)
{
FPX_ClearSystem();
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"UnableToReadSummaryInfo");
}
if (summary_info.title_valid)
if ((summary_info.title.length != 0) &&
(summary_info.title.ptr != (unsigned char *) NULL))
{
char
*label;
/*
Note image label.
*/
label=(char *) NULL;
if (~summary_info.title.length >= (MaxTextExtent-1))
label=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(summary_info.title.length+
MaxTextExtent,sizeof(*label));
if (label == (char *) NULL)
{
FPX_ClearSystem();
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
(void) CopyMagickString(label,(char *) summary_info.title.ptr,
summary_info.title.length+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"label",label);
label=DestroyString(label);
}
if (summary_info.comments_valid)
if ((summary_info.comments.length != 0) &&
(summary_info.comments.ptr != (unsigned char *) NULL))
{
char
*comments;
/*
Note image comment.
*/
comments=(char *) NULL;
if (~summary_info.comments.length >= (MaxTextExtent-1))
comments=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(summary_info.comments.length+
MaxTextExtent,sizeof(*comments));
if (comments == (char *) NULL)
{
FPX_ClearSystem();
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
(void) CopyMagickString(comments,(char *) summary_info.comments.ptr,
summary_info.comments.length+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comments);
comments=DestroyString(comments);
}
/*
Determine resolution by scene specification.
*/
for (i=1; ; i++)
if (((width >> i) < tile_width) || ((height >> i) < tile_height))
break;
scene=i;
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
while (scene > image_info->scene)
{
width>>=1;
height>>=1;
scene--;
}
if (image_info->size != (char *) NULL)
while ((width > image->columns) || (height > image->rows))
{
width>>=1;
height>>=1;
scene--;
}
image->depth=8;
image->columns=width;
image->rows=height;
if ((colorspace.numberOfComponents % 2) == 0)
image->matte=MagickTrue;
if (colorspace.numberOfComponents == 1)
{
/*
Create linear colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,MaxColormapSize) == MagickFalse)
{
FPX_ClearSystem();
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) FPX_CloseImage(flashpix);
FPX_ClearSystem();
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Allocate memory for the image and pixel buffer.
*/
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,(tile_height+
1UL)*colorspace.numberOfComponents*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
FPX_ClearSystem();
(void) FPX_CloseImage(flashpix);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
/*
Initialize FlashPix image description.
*/
fpx_info.numberOfComponents=colorspace.numberOfComponents;
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
fpx_info.components[i].myColorType.myDataType=DATA_TYPE_UNSIGNED_BYTE;
fpx_info.components[i].horzSubSampFactor=1;
fpx_info.components[i].vertSubSampFactor=1;
fpx_info.components[i].columnStride=fpx_info.numberOfComponents;
fpx_info.components[i].lineStride=image->columns*
fpx_info.components[i].columnStride;
fpx_info.components[i].theData=pixels+i;
}
fpx_info.components[0].myColorType.myColor=fpx_info.numberOfComponents > 2 ?
NIFRGB_R : MONOCHROME;
red_component=(&fpx_info.components[0]);
fpx_info.components[1].myColorType.myColor=fpx_info.numberOfComponents > 2 ?
NIFRGB_G : ALPHA;
green_component=(&fpx_info.components[1]);
fpx_info.components[2].myColorType.myColor=NIFRGB_B;
blue_component=(&fpx_info.components[2]);
fpx_info.components[3].myColorType.myColor=ALPHA;
alpha_component=(&fpx_info.components[fpx_info.numberOfComponents-1]);
FPX_SetResampleMethod(FPX_LINEAR_INTERPOLATION);
/*
Initialize image pixels.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
if ((y % tile_height) == 0)
{
/*
Read FPX image tile (with or without viewing affine)..
*/
if (image_info->view != (char *) NULL)
fpx_status=FPX_ReadImageRectangle(flashpix,0,y,image->columns,y+
tile_height-1,scene,&fpx_info);
else
fpx_status=FPX_ReadImageTransformRectangle(flashpix,0.0F,
(float) y/image->rows,(float) image->columns/image->rows,
(float) (y+tile_height-1)/image->rows,(ssize_t) image->columns,
(ssize_t) tile_height,&fpx_info);
if (fpx_status == FPX_LOW_MEMORY_ERROR)
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
(void) FPX_CloseImage(flashpix);
FPX_ClearSystem();
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
/*
Transfer a FPX pixels.
*/
r=red_component->theData+(y % tile_height)*red_component->lineStride;
g=green_component->theData+(y % tile_height)*green_component->lineStride;
b=blue_component->theData+(y % tile_height)*blue_component->lineStride;
a=alpha_component->theData+(y % tile_height)*alpha_component->lineStride;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (fpx_info.numberOfComponents > 2)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*r));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*g));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*b));
}
else
{
index=ScaleCharToQuantum(*r);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRed(q,index);
SetPixelGreen(q,index);
SetPixelBlue(q,index);
}
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*a));
q++;
r+=red_component->columnStride;
g+=green_component->columnStride;
b+=blue_component->columnStride;
a+=alpha_component->columnStride;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
(void) FPX_CloseImage(flashpix);
FPX_ClearSystem();
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,566
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: base::string16 TranslateInfoBarDelegate::GetLanguageDisplayableName(
const std::string& language_code) {
return l10n_util::GetDisplayNameForLocale(
language_code, g_browser_process->GetApplicationLocale(), true);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the Web Audio implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.66, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to threading in core/html/HTMLMediaElement.cpp, core/platform/audio/AudioDSPKernelProcessor.cpp, core/platform/audio/HRTFElevation.cpp, and modules/webaudio/ConvolverNode.cpp.
Commit Message: Remove dependency of TranslateInfobarDelegate on profile
This CL uses TranslateTabHelper instead of Profile and also cleans up
some unused code and irrelevant dependencies.
BUG=371845
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/286973003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@270758 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,173
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool PlatformFontSkia::InitDefaultFont() {
if (g_default_font.Get())
return true;
bool success = false;
std::string family = kFallbackFontFamilyName;
int size_pixels = 12;
int style = Font::NORMAL;
Font::Weight weight = Font::Weight::NORMAL;
FontRenderParams params;
const SkiaFontDelegate* delegate = SkiaFontDelegate::instance();
if (delegate) {
delegate->GetDefaultFontDescription(&family, &size_pixels, &style, &weight,
¶ms);
} else if (default_font_description_) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
FontRenderParamsQuery query;
CHECK(FontList::ParseDescription(*default_font_description_,
&query.families, &query.style,
&query.pixel_size, &query.weight))
<< "Failed to parse font description " << *default_font_description_;
params = gfx::GetFontRenderParams(query, &family);
size_pixels = query.pixel_size;
style = query.style;
weight = query.weight;
#else
NOTREACHED();
#endif
}
sk_sp<SkTypeface> typeface =
CreateSkTypeface(style & Font::ITALIC, weight, &family, &success);
if (!success)
return false;
g_default_font.Get() = new PlatformFontSkia(
std::move(typeface), family, size_pixels, style, weight, params);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-862
Summary: Allowing the chrome.debugger API to run on file:// URLs in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to access files on the local file system without file access permission via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: Take default system font size from PlatformFont
The default font returned by Skia should take the initial size from the
default value kDefaultBaseFontSize specified in PlatformFont.
R=robliao@chromium.org, asvitkine@chromium.org
CC=benck@google.com
Bug: 944227
Change-Id: I6b230b80c349abbe5968edb3cebdd6e89db4c4a6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1642738
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Etienne Bergeron <etienneb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#666299}
|
Medium
| 173,209
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
int len, int peek)
{
int al, i, j, ret;
unsigned int n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) {
/* Not initialized yet */
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
return (-1);
}
if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
(type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
(peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/*
* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting
*/
if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len)))
return ret;
/*
* Now s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if
* type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/*
* Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with
* SCTP.
*/
if ((!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
(BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))
&& ossl_statem_in_sctp_read_sock(s)
&& s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
#else
if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s))
#endif
{
/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
i = s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0)
return (i);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return (-1);
}
}
start:
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
/*-
* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
* s->s3->rrec.data, - data
* s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
*/
rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
/*
* We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
* during the last handshake in advance, if any.
*/
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
pitem *item;
item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q);
if (item) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
}
#endif
dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
}
/* Check for timeout */
if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
goto start;
/* get new packet if necessary */
if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
|| (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
if (ret <= 0) {
ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
/* anything other than a timeout is an error */
if (ret <= 0)
return (ret);
else
goto start;
}
}
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr)) < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
goto start;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: A denial of service flaw was found in OpenSSL 0.9.8, 1.0.1, 1.0.2 through 1.0.2h, and 1.1.0 in the way the TLS/SSL protocol defined processing of ALERT packets during a connection handshake. A remote attacker could use this flaw to make a TLS/SSL server consume an excessive amount of CPU and fail to accept connections from other clients.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,262
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAAC2::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch ((int)index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.aac",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (aacParams->eAACStreamFormat == OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF) {
mIsADTS = false;
} else if (aacParams->eAACStreamFormat
== OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4ADTS) {
mIsADTS = true;
} else {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidAacPresentation:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_AACPRESENTATIONTYPE *aacPresParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_AACPRESENTATIONTYPE *)params;
if (aacPresParams->nMaxOutputChannels >= 0) {
int max;
if (aacPresParams->nMaxOutputChannels >= 8) { max = 8; }
else if (aacPresParams->nMaxOutputChannels >= 6) { max = 6; }
else if (aacPresParams->nMaxOutputChannels >= 2) { max = 2; }
else {
max = aacPresParams->nMaxOutputChannels;
}
ALOGV("set nMaxOutputChannels=%d", max);
aacDecoder_SetParam(mAACDecoder, AAC_PCM_MAX_OUTPUT_CHANNELS, max);
}
bool updateDrcWrapper = false;
if (aacPresParams->nDrcBoost >= 0) {
ALOGV("set nDrcBoost=%d", aacPresParams->nDrcBoost);
mDrcWrap.setParam(DRC_PRES_MODE_WRAP_DESIRED_BOOST_FACTOR,
aacPresParams->nDrcBoost);
updateDrcWrapper = true;
}
if (aacPresParams->nDrcCut >= 0) {
ALOGV("set nDrcCut=%d", aacPresParams->nDrcCut);
mDrcWrap.setParam(DRC_PRES_MODE_WRAP_DESIRED_ATT_FACTOR, aacPresParams->nDrcCut);
updateDrcWrapper = true;
}
if (aacPresParams->nHeavyCompression >= 0) {
ALOGV("set nHeavyCompression=%d", aacPresParams->nHeavyCompression);
mDrcWrap.setParam(DRC_PRES_MODE_WRAP_DESIRED_HEAVY,
aacPresParams->nHeavyCompression);
updateDrcWrapper = true;
}
if (aacPresParams->nTargetReferenceLevel >= 0) {
ALOGV("set nTargetReferenceLevel=%d", aacPresParams->nTargetReferenceLevel);
mDrcWrap.setParam(DRC_PRES_MODE_WRAP_DESIRED_TARGET,
aacPresParams->nTargetReferenceLevel);
updateDrcWrapper = true;
}
if (aacPresParams->nEncodedTargetLevel >= 0) {
ALOGV("set nEncodedTargetLevel=%d", aacPresParams->nEncodedTargetLevel);
mDrcWrap.setParam(DRC_PRES_MODE_WRAP_ENCODER_TARGET,
aacPresParams->nEncodedTargetLevel);
updateDrcWrapper = true;
}
if (aacPresParams->nPCMLimiterEnable >= 0) {
aacDecoder_SetParam(mAACDecoder, AAC_PCM_LIMITER_ENABLE,
(aacPresParams->nPCMLimiterEnable != 0));
}
if (updateDrcWrapper) {
mDrcWrap.update();
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,187
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool CanCapture(const Extension& extension, const GURL& url) {
return extension.permissions_data()->CanCaptureVisiblePage(
url, kTabId, nullptr /*error*/);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to bypass restrictions on file URIs via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
|
Medium
| 173,006
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Document::detach(const AttachContext& context)
{
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "Document::detach");
ASSERT(!m_frame || m_frame->tree().childCount() == 0);
if (!isActive())
return;
FrameNavigationDisabler navigationDisabler(*m_frame);
HTMLFrameOwnerElement::UpdateSuspendScope suspendWidgetHierarchyUpdates;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbidScript;
view()->dispose();
m_markers->prepareForDestruction();
if (LocalDOMWindow* window = this->domWindow())
window->willDetachDocumentFromFrame();
m_lifecycle.advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::Stopping);
if (page())
page()->documentDetached(this);
InspectorInstrumentation::documentDetached(this);
if (m_frame->loader().client()->sharedWorkerRepositoryClient())
m_frame->loader().client()->sharedWorkerRepositoryClient()->documentDetached(this);
stopActiveDOMObjects();
if (m_scriptedAnimationController)
m_scriptedAnimationController->clearDocumentPointer();
m_scriptedAnimationController.clear();
m_scriptedIdleTaskController.clear();
if (svgExtensions())
accessSVGExtensions().pauseAnimations();
if (m_domWindow)
m_domWindow->clearEventQueue();
if (m_layoutView)
m_layoutView->setIsInWindow(false);
if (registrationContext())
registrationContext()->documentWasDetached();
m_hoverNode = nullptr;
m_activeHoverElement = nullptr;
m_autofocusElement = nullptr;
if (m_focusedElement.get()) {
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Element> oldFocusedElement = m_focusedElement;
m_focusedElement = nullptr;
if (frameHost())
frameHost()->chromeClient().focusedNodeChanged(oldFocusedElement.get(), nullptr);
}
if (this == &axObjectCacheOwner())
clearAXObjectCache();
m_layoutView = nullptr;
ContainerNode::detach(context);
if (this != &axObjectCacheOwner()) {
if (AXObjectCache* cache = existingAXObjectCache()) {
for (Node& node : NodeTraversal::descendantsOf(*this)) {
cache->remove(&node);
}
}
}
styleEngine().didDetach();
frameHost()->eventHandlerRegistry().documentDetached(*this);
m_frame->inputMethodController().documentDetached();
if (!loader())
m_fetcher->clearContext();
if (m_importsController)
HTMLImportsController::removeFrom(*this);
m_timers.setTimerTaskRunner(
Platform::current()->currentThread()->scheduler()->timerTaskRunner()->adoptClone());
m_frame = nullptr;
if (m_mediaQueryMatcher)
m_mediaQueryMatcher->documentDetached();
DocumentLifecycleNotifier::notifyDocumentWasDetached();
m_lifecycle.advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::Stopped);
DocumentLifecycleNotifier::notifyContextDestroyed();
ExecutionContext::notifyContextDestroyed();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The DOM implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-6770.
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
|
Low
| 171,746
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadTIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
float
*chromaticity,
x_position,
y_position,
x_resolution,
y_resolution;
Image
*image;
int
tiff_status;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
pad;
ssize_t
y;
TIFF
*tiff;
TIFFMethodType
method;
uint16
compress_tag,
bits_per_sample,
endian,
extra_samples,
interlace,
max_sample_value,
min_sample_value,
orientation,
pages,
photometric,
*sample_info,
sample_format,
samples_per_pixel,
units,
value;
uint32
height,
rows_per_strip,
width;
unsigned char
*tiff_pixels;
/*
Open image.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) SetMagickThreadValue(tiff_exception,exception);
tiff=TIFFClientOpen(image->filename,"rb",(thandle_t) image,TIFFReadBlob,
TIFFWriteBlob,TIFFSeekBlob,TIFFCloseBlob,TIFFGetBlobSize,TIFFMapBlob,
TIFFUnmapBlob);
if (tiff == (TIFF *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
/*
Generate blank images for subimage specification (e.g. image.tif[4].
We need to check the number of directores because it is possible that
the subimage(s) are stored in the photoshop profile.
*/
if (image_info->scene < (size_t)TIFFNumberOfDirectories(tiff))
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image_info->scene; i++)
{
status=TIFFReadDirectory(tiff) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
}
}
do
{
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (0 && (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse))
TIFFPrintDirectory(tiff,stdout,MagickFalse);
RestoreMSCWarning
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH,&width) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,&height) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION,&compress_tag) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_FILLORDER,&endian) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG,&interlace) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,&samples_per_pixel) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,&bits_per_sample) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT,&sample_format) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_MINSAMPLEVALUE,&min_sample_value) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_MAXSAMPLEVALUE,&max_sample_value) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC,&photometric) != 1))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"quantum:format","floating-point");
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","min-is-black");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","min-is-white");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","palette");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_RGB:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","RGB");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","CIELAB");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","CIE Log2(L)");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGLUV:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","LOGLUV");
break;
}
#if defined(PHOTOMETRIC_MASK)
case PHOTOMETRIC_MASK:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","MASK");
break;
}
#endif
case PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","separated");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","YCBCR");
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","unknown");
break;
}
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Geometry: %ux%u",
(unsigned int) width,(unsigned int) height);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Interlace: %u",
interlace);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Bits per sample: %u",bits_per_sample);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Min sample value: %u",min_sample_value);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Max sample value: %u",max_sample_value);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Photometric "
"interpretation: %s",GetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric"));
}
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
image->depth=(size_t) bits_per_sample;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Image depth: %.20g",
(double) image->depth);
image->endian=MSBEndian;
if (endian == FILLORDER_LSB2MSB)
image->endian=LSBEndian;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISBIGENDIAN)
if (TIFFIsBigEndian(tiff) == 0)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:endian","lsb");
image->endian=LSBEndian;
}
else
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:endian","msb");
image->endian=MSBEndian;
}
#endif
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED)
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB)
SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace);
TIFFGetProfiles(tiff,image,image_info->ping);
TIFFGetProperties(tiff,image);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:exif-properties");
if ((option == (const char *) NULL) ||
(IsMagickTrue(option) != MagickFalse))
TIFFGetEXIFProperties(tiff,image);
if ((TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_XRESOLUTION,&x_resolution) == 1) &&
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YRESOLUTION,&y_resolution) == 1))
{
image->x_resolution=x_resolution;
image->y_resolution=y_resolution;
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_RESOLUTIONUNIT,&units) == 1)
{
if (units == RESUNIT_INCH)
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
if (units == RESUNIT_CENTIMETER)
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
}
if ((TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_XPOSITION,&x_position) == 1) &&
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YPOSITION,&y_position) == 1))
{
image->page.x=(ssize_t) ceil(x_position*image->x_resolution-0.5);
image->page.y=(ssize_t) ceil(y_position*image->y_resolution-0.5);
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION,&orientation) == 1)
image->orientation=(OrientationType) orientation;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_WHITEPOINT,&chromaticity) == 1)
{
if (chromaticity != (float *) NULL)
{
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=chromaticity[1];
}
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PRIMARYCHROMATICITIES,&chromaticity) == 1)
{
if (chromaticity != (float *) NULL)
{
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=chromaticity[1];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=chromaticity[2];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=chromaticity[3];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=chromaticity[4];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=chromaticity[5];
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISCODECCONFIGURED) || (TIFFLIB_VERSION > 20040919)
if ((compress_tag != COMPRESSION_NONE) &&
(TIFFIsCODECConfigured(compress_tag) == 0))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"CompressNotSupported");
}
#endif
switch (compress_tag)
{
case COMPRESSION_NONE: image->compression=NoCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3: image->compression=FaxCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4: image->compression=Group4Compression; break;
case COMPRESSION_JPEG:
{
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
#if defined(JPEG_SUPPORT)
{
char
sampling_factor[MaxTextExtent];
int
tiff_status;
uint16
horizontal,
vertical;
tiff_status=TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,&horizontal,
&vertical);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(sampling_factor,MaxTextExtent,"%dx%d",
horizontal,vertical);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"jpeg:sampling-factor",
sampling_factor);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Sampling Factors: %s",sampling_factor);
}
}
#endif
break;
}
case COMPRESSION_OJPEG: image->compression=JPEGCompression; break;
#if defined(COMPRESSION_LZMA)
case COMPRESSION_LZMA: image->compression=LZMACompression; break;
#endif
case COMPRESSION_LZW: image->compression=LZWCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_DEFLATE: image->compression=ZipCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE: image->compression=ZipCompression; break;
default: image->compression=RLECompression; break;
}
quantum_info=(QuantumInfo *) NULL;
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE) &&
(pow(2.0,1.0*bits_per_sample) <= MaxColormapSize))
{
size_t
colors;
colors=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(bits_per_sample)+1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,colors) == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER,&value,&pages) == 1)
image->scene=value;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
int
tiff_status;
size_t
range;
uint16
*blue_colormap,
*green_colormap,
*red_colormap;
/*
Initialize colormap.
*/
tiff_status=TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COLORMAP,&red_colormap,
&green_colormap,&blue_colormap);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
if ((red_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL) &&
(green_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL) &&
(blue_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL))
{
range=255; /* might be old style 8-bit colormap */
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if ((red_colormap[i] >= 256) || (green_colormap[i] >= 256) ||
(blue_colormap[i] >= 256))
{
range=65535;
break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*red_colormap[i])/range);
image->colormap[i].green=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*green_colormap[i])/range);
image->colormap[i].blue=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*blue_colormap[i])/range);
}
}
}
}
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
goto next_tiff_frame;
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Allocate memory for the image and pixel buffer.
*/
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,UnsignedQuantumFormat);
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_INT)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,SignedQuantumFormat);
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
status=MagickTrue;
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
{
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
{
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
tiff_status=TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_EXTRASAMPLES,&extra_samples,
&sample_info);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","unspecified");
if (extra_samples == 0)
{
if ((samples_per_pixel == 4) && (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB))
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
else
for (i=0; i < extra_samples; i++)
{
image->matte=MagickTrue;
if (sample_info[i] == EXTRASAMPLE_ASSOCALPHA)
{
SetQuantumAlphaType(quantum_info,DisassociatedQuantumAlpha);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","associated");
}
else
if (sample_info[i] == EXTRASAMPLE_UNASSALPHA)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","unassociated");
}
}
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,&rows_per_strip) == 1)
{
char
value[MaxTextExtent];
method=ReadStripMethod;
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MaxTextExtent,"%u",(unsigned int)
rows_per_strip);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:rows-per-strip",value);
}
if ((samples_per_pixel >= 3) && (interlace == PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG))
method=ReadRGBAMethod;
if ((samples_per_pixel >= 4) && (interlace == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE))
method=ReadCMYKAMethod;
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED))
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
method=ReadSingleSampleMethod;
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
method=ReadSingleSampleMethod;
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED) &&
(interlace == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE) && (bits_per_sample < 64))
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (image->compression == JPEGCompression)
method=GetJPEGMethod(image,tiff,photometric,bits_per_sample,
samples_per_pixel);
if (compress_tag == COMPRESSION_JBIG)
method=ReadStripMethod;
if (TIFFIsTiled(tiff) != MagickFalse)
method=ReadTileMethod;
quantum_info->endian=LSBEndian;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
tiff_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireMagickMemory(TIFFScanlineSize(tiff)+
sizeof(uint32));
if (tiff_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
switch (method)
{
case ReadSingleSampleMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to PseudoClass MIFF image.
*/
quantum_type=IndexQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-1,0);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
quantum_type=samples_per_pixel == 1 ? AlphaQuantum :
GrayAlphaQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-2,0);
}
else
{
quantum_type=IndexAlphaQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-2,0);
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-1,0);
}
status=SetQuantumPad(image,quantum_info,pad*pow(2,ceil(log(
bits_per_sample)/log(2))));
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) tiff_pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,tiff_pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadRGBAMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-3,0);
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-4,0);
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-4,0);
quantum_type=CMYKQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
quantum_type=CMYKAQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-5,0);
}
}
status=SetQuantumPad(image,quantum_info,pad*((bits_per_sample+7) >> 3));
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) tiff_pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,tiff_pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadCMYKAMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) samples_per_pixel; i++)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
int
status;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,(tsample_t) i,y,(char *)
tiff_pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
switch (i)
{
case 0: quantum_type=RedQuantum; break;
case 1: quantum_type=GreenQuantum; break;
case 2: quantum_type=BlueQuantum; break;
case 3: quantum_type=AlphaQuantum; break;
default: quantum_type=UndefinedQuantum; break;
}
else
switch (i)
{
case 0: quantum_type=CyanQuantum; break;
case 1: quantum_type=MagentaQuantum; break;
case 2: quantum_type=YellowQuantum; break;
case 3: quantum_type=BlackQuantum; break;
case 4: quantum_type=AlphaQuantum; break;
default: quantum_type=UndefinedQuantum; break;
}
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,tiff_pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadYCCKMethod:
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned char
*p;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) tiff_pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
p=tiff_pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelCyan(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p+
(1.402*(double) *(p+2))-179.456)));
SetPixelMagenta(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p-
(0.34414*(double) *(p+1))-(0.71414*(double ) *(p+2))+
135.45984)));
SetPixelYellow(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p+
(1.772*(double) *(p+1))-226.816)));
SetPixelBlack(indexes+x,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)*(p+3)));
q++;
p+=4;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadStripMethod:
{
register uint32
*p;
/*
Convert stripped TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
i=0;
p=(uint32 *) NULL;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
if (i == 0)
{
if (TIFFReadRGBAStrip(tiff,(tstrip_t) y,(uint32 *) tiff_pixels) == 0)
break;
i=(ssize_t) MagickMin((ssize_t) rows_per_strip,(ssize_t)
image->rows-y);
}
i--;
p=((uint32 *) tiff_pixels)+image->columns*i;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetR(*p))));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetG(*p))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetB(*p))));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetA(*p))));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadTileMethod:
{
register uint32
*p;
uint32
*tile_pixels,
columns,
rows;
/*
Convert tiled TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH,&columns) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH,&rows) != 1))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ImageIsNotTiled");
}
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) columns*rows;
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck(rows,sizeof(*tile_pixels)) != MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
tile_pixels=(uint32 *) AcquireQuantumMemory(columns,rows*
sizeof(*tile_pixels));
if (tile_pixels == (uint32 *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y+=rows)
{
PixelPacket
*tile;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
size_t
columns_remaining,
rows_remaining;
rows_remaining=image->rows-y;
if ((ssize_t) (y+rows) < (ssize_t) image->rows)
rows_remaining=rows;
tile=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,rows_remaining,
exception);
if (tile == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x+=columns)
{
size_t
column,
row;
if (TIFFReadRGBATile(tiff,(uint32) x,(uint32) y,tile_pixels) == 0)
break;
columns_remaining=image->columns-x;
if ((ssize_t) (x+columns) < (ssize_t) image->columns)
columns_remaining=columns;
p=tile_pixels+(rows-rows_remaining)*columns;
q=tile+(image->columns*(rows_remaining-1)+x);
for (row=rows_remaining; row > 0; row--)
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
for (column=columns_remaining; column > 0; column--)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)));
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetA(*p)));
q++;
p++;
}
else
for (column=columns_remaining; column > 0; column--)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)));
q++;
p++;
}
p+=columns-columns_remaining;
q-=(image->columns+columns_remaining);
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
tile_pixels=(uint32 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(tile_pixels);
break;
}
case ReadGenericMethod:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register uint32
*p;
uint32
*pixels;
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck(image->rows,sizeof(*pixels)) != MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->columns,image->rows*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(uint32 *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
(void) TIFFReadRGBAImage(tiff,(uint32) image->columns,(uint32)
image->rows,(uint32 *) pixels,0);
/*
Convert image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
p=pixels+number_pixels-1;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
q+=image->columns-1;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) TIFFGetR(*p)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) TIFFGetG(*p)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) TIFFGetB(*p)));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) TIFFGetA(*p)));
p--;
q--;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
break;
}
}
tiff_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(tiff_pixels);
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
next_tiff_frame:
if (quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB)
DecodeLabImage(image,exception);
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
{
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (bits_per_sample == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=TIFFReadDirectory(tiff) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,image->scene-1,
image->scene);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (status != MagickFalse);
TIFFClose(tiff);
TIFFReadPhotoshopLayers(image,image_info,exception);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
if (image_info->scene >= GetImageListLength(image))
{
/* Subimage was not found in the Photoshop layer */
image = DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *)NULL);
}
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the PushQuantumPixel function in ImageMagick before 6.9.7-3 and 7.x before 7.0.4-3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted TIFF file.
Commit Message: https://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=31161
|
Medium
| 168,407
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: check_1_6_dummy(kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask,
int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple, char **passptr)
{
int i;
char *password = *passptr;
/* Old-style randkey operations disallowed tickets to start. */
if (!(mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) ||
!(entry->attributes & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX))
return;
/* The 1.6 dummy password was the octets 1..255. */
for (i = 0; (unsigned char) password[i] == i + 1; i++);
if (password[i] != '\0' || i != 255)
return;
/* This will make the caller use a random password instead. */
*passptr = NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The check_1_6_dummy function in lib/kadm5/srv/svr_principal.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.8.x, 1.9.x, and 1.10.x before 1.10.2 allows remote authenticated administrators to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) via a KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX create request that lacks a password.
Commit Message: Null pointer deref in kadmind [CVE-2012-1013]
The fix for #6626 could cause kadmind to dereference a null pointer if
a create-principal request contains no password but does contain the
KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX flag (e.g. "addprinc -randkey -allow_tix
name"). Only clients authorized to create principals can trigger the
bug. Fix the bug by testing for a null password in check_1_6_dummy.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: Minor style change and commit message]
ticket: 7152
target_version: 1.10.2
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 165,646
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateTransformForNonRootSVG() {
DCHECK(properties_);
DCHECK(object_.IsSVGChild());
DCHECK(object_.IsSVGForeignObject() ||
context_.current.paint_offset == LayoutPoint());
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
AffineTransform transform = object_.LocalToSVGParentTransform();
if (NeedsTransformForNonRootSVG(object_)) {
OnUpdate(properties_->UpdateTransform(
context_.current.transform,
TransformPaintPropertyNode::State{transform}));
} else {
OnClear(properties_->ClearTransform());
}
}
if (properties_->Transform()) {
context_.current.transform = properties_->Transform();
context_.current.should_flatten_inherited_transform = false;
context_.current.rendering_context_id = 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,807
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void common_timer_get(struct k_itimer *timr, struct itimerspec64 *cur_setting)
{
const struct k_clock *kc = timr->kclock;
ktime_t now, remaining, iv;
struct timespec64 ts64;
bool sig_none;
sig_none = (timr->it_sigev_notify & ~SIGEV_THREAD_ID) == SIGEV_NONE;
iv = timr->it_interval;
/* interval timer ? */
if (iv) {
cur_setting->it_interval = ktime_to_timespec64(iv);
} else if (!timr->it_active) {
/*
* SIGEV_NONE oneshot timers are never queued. Check them
* below.
*/
if (!sig_none)
return;
}
/*
* The timespec64 based conversion is suboptimal, but it's not
* worth to implement yet another callback.
*/
kc->clock_get(timr->it_clock, &ts64);
now = timespec64_to_ktime(ts64);
/*
* When a requeue is pending or this is a SIGEV_NONE timer move the
* expiry time forward by intervals, so expiry is > now.
*/
if (iv && (timr->it_requeue_pending & REQUEUE_PENDING || sig_none))
timr->it_overrun += kc->timer_forward(timr, now);
remaining = kc->timer_remaining(timr, now);
/* Return 0 only, when the timer is expired and not pending */
if (remaining <= 0) {
/*
* A single shot SIGEV_NONE timer must return 0, when
* it is expired !
*/
if (!sig_none)
cur_setting->it_value.tv_nsec = 1;
} else {
cur_setting->it_value = ktime_to_timespec64(remaining);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The timer_create syscall implementation in kernel/time/posix-timers.c in the Linux kernel before 4.14.8 doesn't properly validate the sigevent->sigev_notify field, which leads to out-of-bounds access in the show_timer function (called when /proc/$PID/timers is read). This allows userspace applications to read arbitrary kernel memory (on a kernel built with CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS and CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE).
Commit Message: posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify
timer_create() specifies via sigevent->sigev_notify the signal delivery for
the new timer. The valid modes are SIGEV_NONE, SIGEV_SIGNAL, SIGEV_THREAD
and (SIGEV_SIGNAL | SIGEV_THREAD_ID).
The sanity check in good_sigevent() is only checking the valid combination
for the SIGEV_THREAD_ID bit, i.e. SIGEV_SIGNAL, but if SIGEV_THREAD_ID is
not set it accepts any random value.
This has no real effects on the posix timer and signal delivery code, but
it affects show_timer() which handles the output of /proc/$PID/timers. That
function uses a string array to pretty print sigev_notify. The access to
that array has no bound checks, so random sigev_notify cause access beyond
the array bounds.
Add proper checks for the valid notify modes and remove the SIGEV_THREAD_ID
masking from various code pathes as SIGEV_NONE can never be set in
combination with SIGEV_THREAD_ID.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
Low
| 169,371
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DevToolsDownloadManagerDelegate::OnDownloadPathGenerated(
uint32_t download_id,
const content::DownloadTargetCallback& callback,
const base::FilePath& suggested_path) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
callback.Run(suggested_path,
content::DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_OVERWRITE,
download::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_NOT_DANGEROUS,
suggested_path.AddExtension(FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".crdownload")),
content::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NONE);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The implementation of the Page.downloadBehavior backend unconditionally marked downloaded files as safe, regardless of file type in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page and user interaction.
Commit Message: Always mark content downloaded by devtools delegate as potentially dangerous
Bug: 805445
Change-Id: I7051f519205e178db57e23320ab979f8fa9ce38b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894782
Commit-Queue: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533215}
|
???
| 173,170
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::empty_this_buffer_proxy(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
(void) hComp;
int push_cnt = 0,i=0;
unsigned nPortIndex = 0;
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret = OMX_ErrorNone;
struct vdec_input_frameinfo frameinfo;
struct vdec_bufferpayload *temp_buffer;
struct vdec_seqheader seq_header;
bool port_setting_changed = true;
/*Should we generate a Aync error event*/
if (buffer == NULL || buffer->pInputPortPrivate == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:empty_this_buffer_proxy is invalid");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
nPortIndex = buffer-((OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *)m_inp_mem_ptr);
if (nPortIndex > drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:empty_this_buffer_proxy invalid nPortIndex[%u]",
nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
pending_input_buffers++;
/* return zero length and not an EOS buffer */
if (!arbitrary_bytes && (buffer->nFilledLen == 0) &&
((buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) == 0)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("return zero legth buffer");
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer,VDEC_S_SUCCESS,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
if (input_flush_progress == true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Flush in progress return buffer ");
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer,VDEC_S_SUCCESS,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
temp_buffer = (struct vdec_bufferpayload *)buffer->pInputPortPrivate;
if ((temp_buffer - drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer) > (int)drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
/* If its first frame, H264 codec and reject is true, then parse the nal
and get the profile. Based on this, reject the clip playback */
if (first_frame == 0 && codec_type_parse == CODEC_TYPE_H264 &&
m_reject_avc_1080p_mp) {
first_frame = 1;
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Parse nal to get the profile");
h264_parser->parse_nal((OMX_U8*)buffer->pBuffer, buffer->nFilledLen,
NALU_TYPE_SPS);
m_profile = h264_parser->get_profile();
ret = is_video_session_supported();
if (ret) {
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer,VDEC_S_SUCCESS,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
post_event(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorInvalidState,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
/* Move the state to Invalid to avoid queueing of pending ETB to the driver */
m_state = OMX_StateInvalid;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETBProxy: bufhdr = %p, bufhdr->pBuffer = %p", buffer, buffer->pBuffer);
/*for use buffer we need to memcpy the data*/
temp_buffer->buffer_len = buffer->nFilledLen;
if (input_use_buffer) {
if (buffer->nFilledLen <= temp_buffer->buffer_len) {
if (arbitrary_bytes) {
memcpy (temp_buffer->bufferaddr, (buffer->pBuffer + buffer->nOffset),buffer->nFilledLen);
} else {
memcpy (temp_buffer->bufferaddr, (m_inp_heap_ptr[nPortIndex].pBuffer + m_inp_heap_ptr[nPortIndex].nOffset),
buffer->nFilledLen);
}
} else {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
frameinfo.bufferaddr = temp_buffer->bufferaddr;
frameinfo.client_data = (void *) buffer;
frameinfo.datalen = temp_buffer->buffer_len;
frameinfo.flags = 0;
frameinfo.offset = buffer->nOffset;
frameinfo.pmem_fd = temp_buffer->pmem_fd;
frameinfo.pmem_offset = temp_buffer->offset;
frameinfo.timestamp = buffer->nTimeStamp;
if (drv_ctx.disable_dmx && m_desc_buffer_ptr && m_desc_buffer_ptr[nPortIndex].buf_addr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETB: dmx enabled");
if (m_demux_entries == 0) {
extract_demux_addr_offsets(buffer);
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETB: handle_demux_data - entries=%u",(unsigned int)m_demux_entries);
handle_demux_data(buffer);
frameinfo.desc_addr = (OMX_U8 *)m_desc_buffer_ptr[nPortIndex].buf_addr;
frameinfo.desc_size = m_desc_buffer_ptr[nPortIndex].desc_data_size;
} else {
frameinfo.desc_addr = NULL;
frameinfo.desc_size = 0;
}
if (!arbitrary_bytes) {
frameinfo.flags |= buffer->nFlags;
}
#ifdef _ANDROID_
if (m_debug_timestamp) {
if (arbitrary_bytes) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Inserting TIMESTAMP (%lld) into queue", buffer->nTimeStamp);
m_timestamp_list.insert_ts(buffer->nTimeStamp);
} else if (!arbitrary_bytes && !(buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Inserting TIMESTAMP (%lld) into queue", buffer->nTimeStamp);
m_timestamp_list.insert_ts(buffer->nTimeStamp);
}
}
#endif
log_input_buffers((const char *)temp_buffer->bufferaddr, temp_buffer->buffer_len);
if (buffer->nFlags & QOMX_VIDEO_BUFFERFLAG_EOSEQ) {
frameinfo.flags |= QOMX_VIDEO_BUFFERFLAG_EOSEQ;
buffer->nFlags &= ~QOMX_VIDEO_BUFFERFLAG_EOSEQ;
}
if (temp_buffer->buffer_len == 0 || (buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Rxd i/p EOS, Notify Driver that EOS has been reached");
frameinfo.flags |= VDEC_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
h264_scratch.nFilledLen = 0;
nal_count = 0;
look_ahead_nal = false;
frame_count = 0;
if (m_frame_parser.mutils)
m_frame_parser.mutils->initialize_frame_checking_environment();
m_frame_parser.flush();
h264_last_au_ts = LLONG_MAX;
h264_last_au_flags = 0;
memset(m_demux_offsets, 0, ( sizeof(OMX_U32) * 8192) );
m_demux_entries = 0;
}
struct v4l2_buffer buf;
struct v4l2_plane plane;
memset( (void *)&buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
memset( (void *)&plane, 0, sizeof(plane));
int rc;
unsigned long print_count;
if (temp_buffer->buffer_len == 0 || (buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS)) {
buf.flags = V4L2_QCOM_BUF_FLAG_EOS;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("INPUT EOS reached") ;
}
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
buf.index = nPortIndex;
buf.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
buf.memory = V4L2_MEMORY_USERPTR;
plane.bytesused = temp_buffer->buffer_len;
plane.length = drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size;
plane.m.userptr = (unsigned long)temp_buffer->bufferaddr -
(unsigned long)temp_buffer->offset;
plane.reserved[0] = temp_buffer->pmem_fd;
plane.reserved[1] = temp_buffer->offset;
plane.data_offset = 0;
buf.m.planes = &plane;
buf.length = 1;
if (frameinfo.timestamp >= LLONG_MAX) {
buf.flags |= V4L2_QCOM_BUF_TIMESTAMP_INVALID;
}
buf.timestamp.tv_sec = frameinfo.timestamp / 1000000;
buf.timestamp.tv_usec = (frameinfo.timestamp % 1000000);
buf.flags |= (buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) ? V4L2_QCOM_BUF_FLAG_CODECCONFIG: 0;
buf.flags |= (buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_DECODEONLY) ? V4L2_QCOM_BUF_FLAG_DECODEONLY: 0;
if (buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Increment codec_config buffer counter");
android_atomic_inc(&m_queued_codec_config_count);
}
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_QBUF, &buf);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to qbuf Input buffer to driver");
return OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
if (codec_config_flag && !(buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG)) {
codec_config_flag = false;
}
if (!streaming[OUTPUT_PORT]) {
enum v4l2_buf_type buf_type;
int ret,r;
buf_type=V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("send_command_proxy(): Idle-->Executing");
ret=ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_STREAMON,&buf_type);
if (!ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Streamon on OUTPUT Plane was successful");
streaming[OUTPUT_PORT] = true;
} else if (errno == EBUSY) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to call stream on OUTPUT due to HW_OVERLOAD");
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer, VDEC_S_SUCCESS,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to call streamon on OUTPUT");
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("If Stream on failed no buffer should be queued");
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer,VDEC_S_SUCCESS,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("[ETBP] pBuf(%p) nTS(%lld) Sz(%u)",
frameinfo.bufferaddr, (long long)frameinfo.timestamp,
(unsigned int)frameinfo.datalen);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the mm-video-v4l2 vdec component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27890802.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
|
Low
| 173,750
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
int ret, mt;
unsigned long len = 0;
int (*transition) (SSL *s, int mt);
PACKET pkt;
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN(*process_message) (SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
WORK_STATE(*post_process_message) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
unsigned long (*max_message_size) (SSL *s);
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
cb = get_callback(s);
if (s->server) {
transition = ossl_statem_server_read_transition;
process_message = ossl_statem_server_process_message;
max_message_size = ossl_statem_server_max_message_size;
post_process_message = ossl_statem_server_post_process_message;
} else {
transition = ossl_statem_client_read_transition;
process_message = ossl_statem_client_process_message;
max_message_size = ossl_statem_client_max_message_size;
post_process_message = ossl_statem_client_post_process_message;
}
if (st->read_state_first_init) {
s->first_packet = 1;
st->read_state_first_init = 0;
}
while (1) {
switch (st->read_state) {
case READ_STATE_HEADER:
/* Get the state the peer wants to move to */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* In DTLS we get the whole message in one go - header and body
*/
ret = dtls_get_message(s, &mt, &len);
} else {
ret = tls_get_message_header(s, &mt);
}
if (ret == 0) {
/* Could be non-blocking IO */
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
if (cb != NULL) {
/* Notify callback of an impending state change */
if (s->server)
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
else
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
}
/*
* Validate that we are allowed to move to the new state and move
* to that state if so
*/
if (!transition(s, mt)) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_size > max_message_size(s)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
st->read_state = READ_STATE_BODY;
/* Fall through */
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
ret = process_message(s, &pkt);
/* Discard the packet data */
s->init_num = 0;
switch (ret) {
case MSG_PROCESS_ERROR:
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
case MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
}
return SUB_STATE_FINISHED;
case MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING:
st->read_state = READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS;
st->read_state_work = WORK_MORE_A;
break;
default:
st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER;
break;
}
break;
case READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS:
st->read_state_work = post_process_message(s, st->read_state_work);
switch (st->read_state_work) {
default:
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE:
st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER;
break;
case WORK_FINISHED_STOP:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
}
return SUB_STATE_FINISHED;
}
break;
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: The state-machine implementation in OpenSSL 1.1.0 before 1.1.0a allocates memory before checking for an excessive length, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via crafted TLS messages, related to statem/statem.c and statem/statem_lib.c.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,962
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xps_load_sfnt_name(xps_font_t *font, char *namep)
{
byte *namedata;
int offset, length;
/*int format;*/
int count, stringoffset;
int found;
int i, k;
found = 0;
strcpy(namep, "Unknown");
offset = xps_find_sfnt_table(font, "name", &length);
if (offset < 0 || length < 6)
{
gs_warn("cannot find name table");
return;
}
namedata = font->data + offset;
/*format = u16(namedata + 0);*/
count = u16(namedata + 2);
stringoffset = u16(namedata + 4);
if (length < 6 + (count * 12))
{
gs_warn("name table too short");
{
if (pid == 1 && eid == 0 && langid == 0) /* mac roman, english */
{
if (found < 3)
{
memcpy(namep, namedata + stringoffset + offset, length);
namep[length] = 0;
found = 3;
}
}
if (pid == 3 && eid == 1 && langid == 0x409) /* windows unicode ucs-2, US */
{
if (found < 2)
{
unsigned char *s = namedata + stringoffset + offset;
int n = length / 2;
for (k = 0; k < n; k ++)
{
int c = u16(s + k * 2);
namep[k] = isprint(c) ? c : '?';
}
namep[k] = 0;
found = 2;
}
}
if (pid == 3 && eid == 10 && langid == 0x409) /* windows unicode ucs-4, US */
{
if (found < 1)
{
unsigned char *s = namedata + stringoffset + offset;
int n = length / 4;
for (k = 0; k < n; k ++)
{
int c = u32(s + k * 4);
namep[k] = isprint(c) ? c : '?';
}
namep[k] = 0;
found = 1;
}
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The xps_load_sfnt_name function in xps/xpsfont.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,787
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: find_referral_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_principal *krbtgt_princ)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
char **realms = NULL, *hostname = NULL;
krb5_data srealm = request->server->realm;
if (!is_referral_req(kdc_active_realm, request))
goto cleanup;
hostname = data2string(krb5_princ_component(kdc_context,
request->server, 1));
if (hostname == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* If the hostname doesn't contain a '.', it's not a FQDN. */
if (strchr(hostname, '.') == NULL)
goto cleanup;
retval = krb5_get_host_realm(kdc_context, hostname, &realms);
if (retval) {
/* no match found */
kdc_err(kdc_context, retval, "unable to find realm of host");
goto cleanup;
}
/* Don't return a referral to the empty realm or the service realm. */
if (realms == NULL || realms[0] == '\0' ||
data_eq_string(srealm, realms[0])) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = krb5_build_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt_princ,
srealm.length, srealm.data,
"krbtgt", realms[0], (char *)0);
cleanup:
krb5_free_host_realm(kdc_context, realms);
free(hostname);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: do_tgs_req.c in the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.11 before 1.11.4, when a single-component realm name is used, allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via a TGS-REQ request that triggers an attempted cross-realm referral for a host-based service principal.
Commit Message: KDC null deref due to referrals [CVE-2013-1417]
An authenticated remote client can cause a KDC to crash by making a
valid TGS-REQ to a KDC serving a realm with a single-component name.
The process_tgs_req() function dereferences a null pointer because an
unusual failure condition causes a helper function to return success.
While attempting to provide cross-realm referrals for host-based
service principals, the find_referral_tgs() function could return a
TGS principal for a zero-length realm name (indicating that the
hostname in the service principal has no known realm associated with
it).
Subsequently, the find_alternate_tgs() function would attempt to
construct a path to this empty-string realm, and return success along
with a null pointer in its output parameter. This happens because
krb5_walk_realm_tree() returns a list of length one when it attempts
to construct a transit path between a single-component realm and the
empty-string realm. This list causes a loop in find_alternate_tgs()
to iterate over zero elements, resulting in the unexpected output of a
null pointer, which process_tgs_req() proceeds to dereference because
there is no error condition.
Add an error condition to find_referral_tgs() when
krb5_get_host_realm() returns an empty realm name. Also add an error
condition to find_alternate_tgs() to handle the length-one output from
krb5_walk_realm_tree().
The vulnerable configuration is not likely to arise in practice.
(Realm names that have a single component are likely to be test
realms.) Releases prior to krb5-1.11 are not vulnerable.
Thanks to Sol Jerome for reporting this problem.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
(cherry picked from commit 3c7f1c21ffaaf6c90f1045f0f5440303c766acc0)
ticket: 7668
version_fixed: 1.11.4
status: resolved
|
Medium
| 166,131
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::string TemplateURLRef::HandleReplacements(
const SearchTermsArgs& search_terms_args,
const SearchTermsData& search_terms_data,
PostContent* post_content) const {
if (replacements_.empty()) {
if (!post_params_.empty())
EncodeFormData(post_params_, post_content);
return parsed_url_;
}
bool is_in_query = true;
for (Replacements::iterator i = replacements_.begin();
i != replacements_.end(); ++i) {
if (i->type == SEARCH_TERMS) {
base::string16::size_type query_start = parsed_url_.find('?');
is_in_query = query_start != base::string16::npos &&
(static_cast<base::string16::size_type>(i->index) > query_start);
break;
}
}
std::string input_encoding;
base::string16 encoded_terms;
base::string16 encoded_original_query;
owner_->EncodeSearchTerms(search_terms_args, is_in_query, &input_encoding,
&encoded_terms, &encoded_original_query);
std::string url = parsed_url_;
for (Replacements::reverse_iterator i = replacements_.rbegin();
i != replacements_.rend(); ++i) {
switch (i->type) {
case ENCODING:
HandleReplacement(std::string(), input_encoding, *i, &url);
break;
case GOOGLE_ASSISTED_QUERY_STATS:
DCHECK(!i->is_post_param);
if (!search_terms_args.assisted_query_stats.empty()) {
SearchTermsArgs search_terms_args_without_aqs(search_terms_args);
search_terms_args_without_aqs.assisted_query_stats.clear();
GURL base_url(ReplaceSearchTerms(
search_terms_args_without_aqs, search_terms_data, NULL));
if (base_url.SchemeIsCryptographic()) {
HandleReplacement(
"aqs", search_terms_args.assisted_query_stats, *i, &url);
}
}
break;
case GOOGLE_BASE_URL:
DCHECK(!i->is_post_param);
HandleReplacement(
std::string(), search_terms_data.GoogleBaseURLValue(), *i, &url);
break;
case GOOGLE_BASE_SUGGEST_URL:
DCHECK(!i->is_post_param);
HandleReplacement(
std::string(), search_terms_data.GoogleBaseSuggestURLValue(), *i,
&url);
break;
case GOOGLE_CURRENT_PAGE_URL:
DCHECK(!i->is_post_param);
if (!search_terms_args.current_page_url.empty()) {
const std::string& escaped_current_page_url =
net::EscapeQueryParamValue(search_terms_args.current_page_url,
true);
HandleReplacement("url", escaped_current_page_url, *i, &url);
}
break;
case GOOGLE_CURSOR_POSITION:
DCHECK(!i->is_post_param);
if (search_terms_args.cursor_position != base::string16::npos)
HandleReplacement(
"cp",
base::StringPrintf("%" PRIuS, search_terms_args.cursor_position),
*i,
&url);
break;
case GOOGLE_FORCE_INSTANT_RESULTS:
DCHECK(!i->is_post_param);
HandleReplacement(std::string(),
search_terms_data.ForceInstantResultsParam(
search_terms_args.force_instant_results),
*i,
&url);
break;
case GOOGLE_INPUT_TYPE:
DCHECK(!i->is_post_param);
HandleReplacement(
"oit", base::IntToString(search_terms_args.input_type), *i, &url);
break;
case GOOGLE_INSTANT_EXTENDED_ENABLED:
DCHECK(!i->is_post_param);
HandleReplacement(std::string(),
search_terms_data.InstantExtendedEnabledParam(
type_ == SEARCH),
*i,
&url);
break;
case GOOGLE_CONTEXTUAL_SEARCH_VERSION:
if (search_terms_args.contextual_search_params.version >= 0) {
HandleReplacement(
"ctxs",
base::IntToString(
search_terms_args.contextual_search_params.version),
*i,
&url);
}
break;
case GOOGLE_CONTEXTUAL_SEARCH_CONTEXT_DATA: {
DCHECK(!i->is_post_param);
std::string context_data;
const SearchTermsArgs::ContextualSearchParams& params =
search_terms_args.contextual_search_params;
if (params.start != std::string::npos) {
context_data.append("ctxs_start=" +
base::SizeTToString(params.start) + "&");
}
if (params.end != std::string::npos) {
context_data.append("ctxs_end=" +
base::SizeTToString(params.end) + "&");
}
if (!params.selection.empty())
context_data.append("q=" + params.selection + "&");
if (!params.content.empty())
context_data.append("ctxs_content=" + params.content + "&");
if (!params.base_page_url.empty())
context_data.append("ctxsl_url=" + params.base_page_url + "&");
if (!params.encoding.empty()) {
context_data.append("ctxs_encoding=" + params.encoding + "&");
}
context_data.append("ctxsl_coca=" +
base::IntToString(params.now_on_tap_version));
HandleReplacement(std::string(), context_data, *i, &url);
break;
}
case GOOGLE_ORIGINAL_QUERY_FOR_SUGGESTION:
DCHECK(!i->is_post_param);
if (search_terms_args.accepted_suggestion >= 0 ||
!search_terms_args.assisted_query_stats.empty()) {
HandleReplacement(
"oq", base::UTF16ToUTF8(encoded_original_query), *i, &url);
}
break;
case GOOGLE_PAGE_CLASSIFICATION:
if (search_terms_args.page_classification !=
metrics::OmniboxEventProto::INVALID_SPEC) {
HandleReplacement(
"pgcl", base::IntToString(search_terms_args.page_classification),
*i, &url);
}
break;
case GOOGLE_PREFETCH_QUERY: {
const std::string& query = search_terms_args.prefetch_query;
const std::string& type = search_terms_args.prefetch_query_type;
if (!query.empty() && !type.empty()) {
HandleReplacement(
std::string(), "pfq=" + query + "&qha=" + type + "&", *i, &url);
}
break;
}
case GOOGLE_RLZ: {
DCHECK(!i->is_post_param);
base::string16 rlz_string = search_terms_data.GetRlzParameterValue(
search_terms_args.from_app_list);
if (!rlz_string.empty()) {
HandleReplacement("rlz", base::UTF16ToUTF8(rlz_string), *i, &url);
}
break;
}
case GOOGLE_SEARCH_CLIENT: {
DCHECK(!i->is_post_param);
std::string client = search_terms_data.GetSearchClient();
if (!client.empty())
HandleReplacement("client", client, *i, &url);
break;
}
case GOOGLE_SEARCH_FIELDTRIAL_GROUP:
break;
case GOOGLE_SEARCH_VERSION:
HandleReplacement("gs_rn", "42", *i, &url);
break;
case GOOGLE_SESSION_TOKEN: {
std::string token = search_terms_args.session_token;
if (!token.empty())
HandleReplacement("psi", token, *i, &url);
break;
}
case GOOGLE_SUGGEST_CLIENT:
HandleReplacement(
std::string(), search_terms_data.GetSuggestClient(), *i, &url);
break;
case GOOGLE_SUGGEST_REQUEST_ID:
HandleReplacement(
std::string(), search_terms_data.GetSuggestRequestIdentifier(), *i,
&url);
break;
case GOOGLE_UNESCAPED_SEARCH_TERMS: {
std::string unescaped_terms;
base::UTF16ToCodepage(search_terms_args.search_terms,
input_encoding.c_str(),
base::OnStringConversionError::SKIP,
&unescaped_terms);
HandleReplacement(std::string(), unescaped_terms, *i, &url);
break;
}
case LANGUAGE:
HandleReplacement(
std::string(), search_terms_data.GetApplicationLocale(), *i, &url);
break;
case SEARCH_TERMS:
HandleReplacement(
std::string(), base::UTF16ToUTF8(encoded_terms), *i, &url);
break;
case GOOGLE_IMAGE_THUMBNAIL:
HandleReplacement(
std::string(), search_terms_args.image_thumbnail_content, *i, &url);
post_params_[i->index].content_type = "image/jpeg";
break;
case GOOGLE_IMAGE_URL:
if (search_terms_args.image_url.is_valid()) {
HandleReplacement(
std::string(), search_terms_args.image_url.spec(), *i, &url);
}
break;
case GOOGLE_IMAGE_ORIGINAL_WIDTH:
if (!search_terms_args.image_original_size.IsEmpty()) {
HandleReplacement(
std::string(),
base::IntToString(search_terms_args.image_original_size.width()),
*i, &url);
}
break;
case GOOGLE_IMAGE_ORIGINAL_HEIGHT:
if (!search_terms_args.image_original_size.IsEmpty()) {
HandleReplacement(
std::string(),
base::IntToString(search_terms_args.image_original_size.height()),
*i, &url);
}
break;
case GOOGLE_IMAGE_SEARCH_SOURCE:
HandleReplacement(
std::string(), search_terms_data.GoogleImageSearchSource(), *i,
&url);
break;
case GOOGLE_IOS_SEARCH_LANGUAGE:
#if defined(OS_IOS)
HandleReplacement("hl", search_terms_data.GetApplicationLocale(), *i,
&url);
#endif
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
if (!post_params_.empty())
EncodeFormData(post_params_, post_content);
return url;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 38.0.2125.101 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
|
Low
| 171,648
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SampleTable::SampleTable(const sp<DataSource> &source)
: mDataSource(source),
mChunkOffsetOffset(-1),
mChunkOffsetType(0),
mNumChunkOffsets(0),
mSampleToChunkOffset(-1),
mNumSampleToChunkOffsets(0),
mSampleSizeOffset(-1),
mSampleSizeFieldSize(0),
mDefaultSampleSize(0),
mNumSampleSizes(0),
mTimeToSampleCount(0),
mTimeToSample(),
mSampleTimeEntries(NULL),
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries(NULL),
mNumCompositionTimeDeltaEntries(0),
mCompositionDeltaLookup(new CompositionDeltaLookup),
mSyncSampleOffset(-1),
mNumSyncSamples(0),
mSyncSamples(NULL),
mLastSyncSampleIndex(0),
mSampleToChunkEntries(NULL) {
mSampleIterator = new SampleIterator(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: SampleTable.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted file, aka internal bug 28076789.
Commit Message: SampleTable.cpp: Fixed a regression caused by a fix for bug
28076789.
Detail: Before the original fix
(Id207f369ab7b27787d83f5d8fc48dc53ed9fcdc9) for 28076789, the
code allowed a time-to-sample table size to be 0. The change
made in that fix disallowed such situation, which in fact should
be allowed. This current patch allows it again while maintaining
the security of the previous fix.
Bug: 28288202
Bug: 28076789
Change-Id: I1c9a60c7f0cfcbd3d908f24998dde15d5136a295
|
Medium
| 173,771
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnLostResources() {
image_transport_clients_.clear();
current_surface_ = 0;
protection_state_id_ = 0;
current_surface_is_protected_ = true;
current_surface_in_use_by_compositor_ = true;
surface_route_id_ = 0;
UpdateExternalTexture();
locks_pending_commit_.clear();
DCHECK(!shared_surface_handle_.is_null());
ImageTransportFactory* factory = ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance();
factory->DestroySharedSurfaceHandle(shared_surface_handle_);
shared_surface_handle_ = factory->CreateSharedSurfaceHandle();
host_->CompositingSurfaceUpdated();
host_->ScheduleComposite();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,381
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: validate_body_helper (DBusTypeReader *reader,
int byte_order,
dbus_bool_t walk_reader_to_end,
const unsigned char *p,
const unsigned char *end,
const unsigned char **new_p)
{
int current_type;
while ((current_type = _dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (reader)) != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID)
{
const unsigned char *a;
case DBUS_TYPE_BYTE:
++p;
break;
case DBUS_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
case DBUS_TYPE_INT16:
case DBUS_TYPE_UINT16:
case DBUS_TYPE_INT32:
case DBUS_TYPE_UINT32:
case DBUS_TYPE_UNIX_FD:
case DBUS_TYPE_INT64:
case DBUS_TYPE_UINT64:
case DBUS_TYPE_DOUBLE:
alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (current_type);
a = _DBUS_ALIGN_ADDRESS (p, alignment);
if (a >= end)
return DBUS_INVALID_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
while (p != a)
{
if (*p != '\0')
return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL;
++p;
}
if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_BOOLEAN)
{
dbus_uint32_t v = _dbus_unpack_uint32 (byte_order,
p);
if (!(v == 0 || v == 1))
return DBUS_INVALID_BOOLEAN_NOT_ZERO_OR_ONE;
}
p += alignment;
break;
case DBUS_TYPE_ARRAY:
case DBUS_TYPE_STRING:
case DBUS_TYPE_OBJECT_PATH:
{
dbus_uint32_t claimed_len;
a = _DBUS_ALIGN_ADDRESS (p, 4);
if (a + 4 > end)
return DBUS_INVALID_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
while (p != a)
{
if (*p != '\0')
return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL;
++p;
}
claimed_len = _dbus_unpack_uint32 (byte_order, p);
p += 4;
/* p may now be == end */
_dbus_assert (p <= end);
if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_ARRAY)
{
int array_elem_type = _dbus_type_reader_get_element_type (reader);
if (!_dbus_type_is_valid (array_elem_type))
{
return DBUS_INVALID_UNKNOWN_TYPECODE;
}
alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (array_elem_type);
a = _DBUS_ALIGN_ADDRESS (p, alignment);
/* a may now be == end */
if (a > end)
return DBUS_INVALID_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
while (p != a)
{
if (*p != '\0')
return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL;
++p;
}
}
if (claimed_len > (unsigned long) (end - p))
return DBUS_INVALID_LENGTH_OUT_OF_BOUNDS;
if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_OBJECT_PATH)
{
DBusString str;
_dbus_string_init_const_len (&str, p, claimed_len);
if (!_dbus_validate_path (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
return DBUS_INVALID_BAD_PATH;
p += claimed_len;
}
else if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_STRING)
{
DBusString str;
_dbus_string_init_const_len (&str, p, claimed_len);
if (!_dbus_string_validate_utf8 (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
return DBUS_INVALID_BAD_UTF8_IN_STRING;
p += claimed_len;
}
else if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_ARRAY && claimed_len > 0)
{
DBusTypeReader sub;
DBusValidity validity;
const unsigned char *array_end;
int array_elem_type;
if (claimed_len > DBUS_MAXIMUM_ARRAY_LENGTH)
return DBUS_INVALID_ARRAY_LENGTH_EXCEEDS_MAXIMUM;
/* Remember that the reader is types only, so we can't
* use it to iterate over elements. It stays the same
* for all elements.
*/
_dbus_type_reader_recurse (reader, &sub);
array_end = p + claimed_len;
array_elem_type = _dbus_type_reader_get_element_type (reader);
/* avoid recursive call to validate_body_helper if this is an array
* of fixed-size elements
*/
if (dbus_type_is_fixed (array_elem_type))
{
/* bools need to be handled differently, because they can
* have an invalid value
*/
if (array_elem_type == DBUS_TYPE_BOOLEAN)
{
dbus_uint32_t v;
alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (array_elem_type);
while (p < array_end)
{
v = _dbus_unpack_uint32 (byte_order, p);
if (!(v == 0 || v == 1))
return DBUS_INVALID_BOOLEAN_NOT_ZERO_OR_ONE;
p += alignment;
}
}
else
{
p = array_end;
}
}
else
{
while (p < array_end)
{
validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, FALSE, p, end, &p);
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
return validity;
}
}
if (p != array_end)
return DBUS_INVALID_ARRAY_LENGTH_INCORRECT;
}
/* check nul termination */
{
while (p < array_end)
{
validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, FALSE, p, end, &p);
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
return validity;
}
}
break;
case DBUS_TYPE_SIGNATURE:
{
dbus_uint32_t claimed_len;
DBusString str;
DBusValidity validity;
claimed_len = *p;
++p;
/* 1 is for nul termination */
if (claimed_len + 1 > (unsigned long) (end - p))
return DBUS_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH_OUT_OF_BOUNDS;
_dbus_string_init_const_len (&str, p, claimed_len);
validity =
_dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str));
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
return validity;
p += claimed_len;
_dbus_assert (p < end);
if (*p != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID)
return DBUS_INVALID_SIGNATURE_MISSING_NUL;
++p;
_dbus_verbose ("p = %p end = %p claimed_len %u\n", p, end, claimed_len);
}
break;
case DBUS_TYPE_VARIANT:
{
/* 1 byte sig len, sig typecodes, align to
* contained-type-boundary, values.
*/
/* In addition to normal signature validation, we need to be sure
* the signature contains only a single (possibly container) type.
*/
dbus_uint32_t claimed_len;
DBusString sig;
DBusTypeReader sub;
DBusValidity validity;
int contained_alignment;
int contained_type;
DBusValidity reason;
claimed_len = *p;
++p;
/* + 1 for nul */
if (claimed_len + 1 > (unsigned long) (end - p))
return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_LENGTH_OUT_OF_BOUNDS;
_dbus_string_init_const_len (&sig, p, claimed_len);
reason = _dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (&sig, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&sig));
if (!(reason == DBUS_VALID))
{
if (reason == DBUS_VALIDITY_UNKNOWN_OOM_ERROR)
return reason;
else
return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_BAD;
}
p += claimed_len;
if (*p != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID)
return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_MISSING_NUL;
++p;
contained_type = _dbus_first_type_in_signature (&sig, 0);
if (contained_type == DBUS_TYPE_INVALID)
return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_EMPTY;
contained_alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (contained_type);
a = _DBUS_ALIGN_ADDRESS (p, contained_alignment);
if (a > end)
return DBUS_INVALID_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
while (p != a)
{
if (*p != '\0')
return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL;
++p;
}
_dbus_type_reader_init_types_only (&sub, &sig, 0);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&sub) != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID);
validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, FALSE, p, end, &p);
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
return validity;
if (_dbus_type_reader_next (&sub))
return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_SPECIFIES_MULTIPLE_VALUES;
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&sub) == DBUS_TYPE_INVALID);
}
break;
case DBUS_TYPE_DICT_ENTRY:
case DBUS_TYPE_STRUCT:
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&sub) != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID);
validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, FALSE, p, end, &p);
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
return validity;
if (*p != '\0')
return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL;
++p;
}
_dbus_type_reader_recurse (reader, &sub);
validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, TRUE, p, end, &p);
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
return validity;
}
break;
default:
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("invalid typecode in supposedly-validated signature");
break;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Stack consumption vulnerability in D-Bus (aka DBus) before 1.4.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via a message containing many nested variants.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,886
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int tipc_nl_compat_link_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX + 1];
struct tipc_link_info link_info;
int err;
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK])
return -EINVAL;
err = nla_parse_nested(link, TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX, attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK],
NULL);
if (err)
return err;
link_info.dest = nla_get_flag(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_DEST]);
link_info.up = htonl(nla_get_flag(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_UP]));
strcpy(link_info.str, nla_data(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME]));
return tipc_add_tlv(msg->rep, TIPC_TLV_LINK_INFO,
&link_info, sizeof(link_info));
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The tipc_nl_compat_link_dump function in net/tipc/netlink_compat.c in the Linux kernel through 4.6.3 does not properly copy a certain string, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory by reading a Netlink message.
Commit Message: tipc: fix an infoleak in tipc_nl_compat_link_dump
link_info.str is a char array of size 60. Memory after the NULL
byte is not initialized. Sending the whole object out can cause
a leak.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,162
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator(WebPage* webPage)
: LayerTreeHost(webPage)
, m_notifyAfterScheduledLayerFlush(false)
, m_isValid(true)
, m_waitingForUIProcess(true)
, m_isSuspended(false)
, m_contentsScale(1)
, m_shouldSendScrollPositionUpdate(true)
, m_shouldSyncFrame(false)
, m_shouldSyncRootLayer(true)
, m_layerFlushTimer(this, &LayerTreeCoordinator::layerFlushTimerFired)
, m_layerFlushSchedulingEnabled(true)
, m_forceRepaintAsyncCallbackID(0)
{
m_rootLayer = GraphicsLayer::create(this);
CoordinatedGraphicsLayer* webRootLayer = toCoordinatedGraphicsLayer(m_rootLayer.get());
webRootLayer->setRootLayer(true);
#ifndef NDEBUG
m_rootLayer->setName("LayerTreeCoordinator root layer");
#endif
m_rootLayer->setDrawsContent(false);
m_rootLayer->setSize(m_webPage->size());
m_layerTreeContext.webLayerID = toCoordinatedGraphicsLayer(webRootLayer)->id();
m_nonCompositedContentLayer = GraphicsLayer::create(this);
toCoordinatedGraphicsLayer(m_rootLayer.get())->setCoordinatedGraphicsLayerClient(this);
#ifndef NDEBUG
m_nonCompositedContentLayer->setName("LayerTreeCoordinator non-composited content");
#endif
m_nonCompositedContentLayer->setDrawsContent(true);
m_nonCompositedContentLayer->setSize(m_webPage->size());
m_rootLayer->addChild(m_nonCompositedContentLayer.get());
if (m_webPage->hasPageOverlay())
createPageOverlayLayer();
scheduleLayerFlush();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.202 does not properly handle SVG text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors that lead to *stale font.*
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,268
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void serial_update_parameters(SerialState *s)
{
int speed, parity, data_bits, stop_bits, frame_size;
QEMUSerialSetParams ssp;
if (s->divider == 0)
return;
/* Start bit. */
frame_size = 1;
/* Parity bit. */
frame_size++;
if (s->lcr & 0x10)
parity = 'E';
else
parity = 'O';
} else {
parity = 'N';
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: The serial_update_parameters function in hw/char/serial.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and QEMU process crash) via vectors involving a value of divider greater than baud base.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,910
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message &msg) {
if (!render_frame_created_)
return false;
ScopedActiveURL scoped_active_url(this);
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderFrameHostImpl, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RenderProcessGone, OnRenderProcessGone)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
if (handled)
return true;
if (delegate_->OnMessageReceived(this, msg))
return true;
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy =
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->GetProxyToParent();
if (proxy && proxy->cross_process_frame_connector() &&
proxy->cross_process_frame_connector()->OnMessageReceived(msg))
return true;
handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderFrameHostImpl, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole,
OnDidAddMessageToConsole)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_Detach, OnDetach)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_FrameFocused, OnFrameFocused)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidStartProvisionalLoad,
OnDidStartProvisionalLoad)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError,
OnDidFailProvisionalLoadWithError)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidFailLoadWithError,
OnDidFailLoadWithError)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateState, OnUpdateState)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_OpenURL, OnOpenURL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DocumentOnLoadCompleted,
OnDocumentOnLoadCompleted)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_BeforeUnload_ACK, OnBeforeUnloadACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SwapOut_ACK, OnSwapOutACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ContextMenu, OnContextMenu)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_JavaScriptExecuteResponse,
OnJavaScriptExecuteResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_VisualStateResponse,
OnVisualStateResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(FrameHostMsg_RunJavaScriptDialog,
OnRunJavaScriptDialog)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(FrameHostMsg_RunBeforeUnloadConfirm,
OnRunBeforeUnloadConfirm)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RunFileChooser, OnRunFileChooser)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAccessInitialDocument,
OnDidAccessInitialDocument)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeOpener, OnDidChangeOpener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAddContentSecurityPolicies,
OnDidAddContentSecurityPolicies)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeFramePolicy,
OnDidChangeFramePolicy)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeFrameOwnerProperties,
OnDidChangeFrameOwnerProperties)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateTitle, OnUpdateTitle)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidBlockFramebust, OnDidBlockFramebust)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_AbortNavigation, OnAbortNavigation)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DispatchLoad, OnDispatchLoad)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ForwardResourceTimingToParent,
OnForwardResourceTimingToParent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_TextSurroundingSelectionResponse,
OnTextSurroundingSelectionResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_Events, OnAccessibilityEvents)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_LocationChanges,
OnAccessibilityLocationChanges)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_FindInPageResult,
OnAccessibilityFindInPageResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_ChildFrameHitTestResult,
OnAccessibilityChildFrameHitTestResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_SnapshotResponse,
OnAccessibilitySnapshotResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ToggleFullscreen, OnToggleFullscreen)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SuddenTerminationDisablerChanged,
OnSuddenTerminationDisablerChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidStartLoading, OnDidStartLoading)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidStopLoading, OnDidStopLoading)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeLoadProgress,
OnDidChangeLoadProgress)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SerializeAsMHTMLResponse,
OnSerializeAsMHTMLResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SelectionChanged, OnSelectionChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_FocusedNodeChanged, OnFocusedNodeChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SetHasReceivedUserGesture,
OnSetHasReceivedUserGesture)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation,
OnSetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ScrollRectToVisibleInParentFrame,
OnScrollRectToVisibleInParentFrame)
#if BUILDFLAG(USE_EXTERNAL_POPUP_MENU)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ShowPopup, OnShowPopup)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_HidePopup, OnHidePopup)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RequestOverlayRoutingToken,
OnRequestOverlayRoutingToken)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ShowCreatedWindow, OnShowCreatedWindow)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_StreamHandleConsumed,
OnStreamHandleConsumed)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: A JavaScript focused window could overlap the fullscreen notification in Fullscreen in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to obscure the full screen warning via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
|
???
| 172,717
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: update_display(struct display *dp)
/* called once after the first read to update all the info, original_pp and
* original_ip must have been filled in.
*/
{
png_structp pp;
png_infop ip;
/* Now perform the initial read with a 0 tranform. */
read_png(dp, &dp->original_file, "original read", 0/*no transform*/);
/* Move the result to the 'original' fields */
dp->original_pp = pp = dp->read_pp, dp->read_pp = NULL;
dp->original_ip = ip = dp->read_ip, dp->read_ip = NULL;
dp->original_rowbytes = png_get_rowbytes(pp, ip);
if (dp->original_rowbytes == 0)
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG, "png_get_rowbytes returned 0");
dp->chunks = png_get_valid(pp, ip, 0xffffffff);
if ((dp->chunks & PNG_INFO_IDAT) == 0) /* set by png_read_png */
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG, "png_read_png did not set IDAT flag");
dp->original_rows = png_get_rows(pp, ip);
if (dp->original_rows == NULL)
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG, "png_read_png did not create row buffers");
if (!png_get_IHDR(pp, ip,
&dp->width, &dp->height, &dp->bit_depth, &dp->color_type,
&dp->interlace_method, &dp->compression_method, &dp->filter_method))
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG, "png_get_IHDR failed");
/* 'active' transforms are discovered based on the original image format;
* running one active transform can activate others. At present the code
* does not attempt to determine the closure.
*/
{
png_uint_32 chunks = dp->chunks;
int active = 0, inactive = 0;
int ct = dp->color_type;
int bd = dp->bit_depth;
unsigned int i;
for (i=0; i<TTABLE_SIZE; ++i)
{
int transform = transform_info[i].transform;
if ((transform_info[i].valid_chunks == 0 ||
(transform_info[i].valid_chunks & chunks) != 0) &&
(transform_info[i].color_mask_required & ct) ==
transform_info[i].color_mask_required &&
(transform_info[i].color_mask_absent & ct) == 0 &&
(transform_info[i].bit_depths & bd) != 0 &&
(transform_info[i].when & TRANSFORM_R) != 0)
active |= transform;
else if ((transform_info[i].when & TRANSFORM_R) != 0)
inactive |= transform;
}
/* Some transforms appear multiple times in the table; the 'active' status
* is the logical OR of these and the inactive status must be adjusted to
* take this into account.
*/
inactive &= ~active;
dp->active_transforms = active;
dp->ignored_transforms = inactive; /* excluding write-only transforms */
if (active == 0)
display_log(dp, INTERNAL_ERROR, "bad transform table");
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,591
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ChromeDownloadDelegate::OnDownloadStarted(const std::string& filename,
const std::string& mime_type) {
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jfilename = ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(
env, filename);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jmime_type =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, mime_type);
Java_ChromeDownloadDelegate_onDownloadStarted(env, java_ref_, jfilename,
jmime_type);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The UnescapeURLWithAdjustmentsImpl implementation in net/base/escape.cc in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85 does not prevent display of Unicode LOCK characters in the omnibox, which makes it easier for remote attackers to spoof the SSL lock icon by placing one of these characters at the end of a URL, as demonstrated by the omnibox in localizations for right-to-left languages.
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
|
Low
| 171,879
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int em_jmp_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc;
unsigned short sel, old_sel;
struct desc_struct old_desc, new_desc;
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
u8 cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
/* Assignment of RIP may only fail in 64-bit mode */
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
ops->get_segment(ctxt, &old_sel, &old_desc, NULL,
VCPU_SREG_CS);
memcpy(&sel, ctxt->src.valptr + ctxt->op_bytes, 2);
rc = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, sel, VCPU_SREG_CS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_CALL_JMP,
&new_desc);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, ctxt->src.val, &new_desc);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
WARN_ON(ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64);
/* assigning eip failed; restore the old cs */
ops->set_segment(ctxt, old_sel, &old_desc, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS);
return rc;
}
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the Linux kernel before 4.8.12 does not properly initialize Code Segment (CS) in certain error cases, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 166,848
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static enum entity_charset determine_charset(char *charset_hint TSRMLS_DC)
{
int i;
enum entity_charset charset = cs_utf_8;
int len = 0;
const zend_encoding *zenc;
/* Default is now UTF-8 */
if (charset_hint == NULL)
return cs_utf_8;
if ((len = strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
zenc = zend_multibyte_get_internal_encoding(TSRMLS_C);
if (zenc != NULL) {
charset_hint = (char *)zend_multibyte_get_encoding_name(zenc);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
if ((len == 4) /* sizeof (none|auto|pass) */ &&
(!memcmp("pass", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4))) {
charset_hint = NULL;
len = 0;
} else {
goto det_charset;
}
}
}
charset_hint = SG(default_charset);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
/* try to detect the charset for the locale */
#if HAVE_NL_LANGINFO && HAVE_LOCALE_H && defined(CODESET)
charset_hint = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
#endif
#if HAVE_LOCALE_H
/* try to figure out the charset from the locale */
{
char *localename;
char *dot, *at;
/* lang[_territory][.codeset][@modifier] */
localename = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, NULL);
dot = strchr(localename, '.');
if (dot) {
dot++;
/* locale specifies a codeset */
at = strchr(dot, '@');
if (at)
len = at - dot;
else
len = strlen(dot);
charset_hint = dot;
} else {
/* no explicit name; see if the name itself
* is the charset */
charset_hint = localename;
len = strlen(charset_hint);
}
}
#endif
det_charset:
if (charset_hint) {
int found = 0;
/* now walk the charset map and look for the codeset */
for (i = 0; charset_map[i].codeset; i++) {
if (len == strlen(charset_map[i].codeset) && strncasecmp(charset_hint, charset_map[i].codeset, len) == 0) {
charset = charset_map[i].charset;
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "charset `%s' not supported, assuming utf-8",
charset_hint);
}
}
return charset;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_html_entities function in ext/standard/html.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large output string from the htmlspecialchars function.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
|
Low
| 167,169
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::ChangeNetworkStateFromLoadingToIdle() {
progress_event_timer_.Stop();
if (GetWebMediaPlayer() && GetWebMediaPlayer()->DidLoadingProgress())
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::progress);
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::suspend);
SetNetworkState(kNetworkIdle);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Information leak in media engine in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
|
Medium
| 173,161
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void hugetlbfs_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct hugetlbfs_sb_info *sbi = HUGETLBFS_SB(sb);
if (sbi) {
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
kfree(sbi);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel before 3.3.6, when huge pages are enabled, allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly gain privileges by interacting with a hugetlbfs filesystem, as demonstrated by a umount operation that triggers improper handling of quota data.
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
High
| 165,606
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int jpc_dec_process_siz(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_ms_t *ms)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
int compno;
int tileno;
jpc_dec_tile_t *tile;
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
int htileno;
int vtileno;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
size_t size;
dec->xstart = siz->xoff;
dec->ystart = siz->yoff;
dec->xend = siz->width;
dec->yend = siz->height;
dec->tilewidth = siz->tilewidth;
dec->tileheight = siz->tileheight;
dec->tilexoff = siz->tilexoff;
dec->tileyoff = siz->tileyoff;
dec->numcomps = siz->numcomps;
if (!(dec->cp = jpc_dec_cp_create(dec->numcomps))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(dec->cmpts = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_dec_cmpt_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno,
++cmpt) {
cmpt->prec = siz->comps[compno].prec;
cmpt->sgnd = siz->comps[compno].sgnd;
cmpt->hstep = siz->comps[compno].hsamp;
cmpt->vstep = siz->comps[compno].vsamp;
cmpt->width = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend, cmpt->hstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
cmpt->height = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend, cmpt->vstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
cmpt->hsubstep = 0;
cmpt->vsubstep = 0;
}
dec->image = 0;
dec->numhtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend - dec->tilexoff, dec->tilewidth);
dec->numvtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend - dec->tileyoff, dec->tileheight);
if (!jas_safe_size_mul(dec->numhtiles, dec->numvtiles, &size)) {
return -1;
}
dec->numtiles = size;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("numtiles = %d; numhtiles = %d; numvtiles = %d;\n",
dec->numtiles, dec->numhtiles, dec->numvtiles));
if (!(dec->tiles = jas_alloc2(dec->numtiles, sizeof(jpc_dec_tile_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (tileno = 0, tile = dec->tiles; tileno < dec->numtiles; ++tileno,
++tile) {
htileno = tileno % dec->numhtiles;
vtileno = tileno / dec->numhtiles;
tile->realmode = 0;
tile->state = JPC_TILE_INIT;
tile->xstart = JAS_MAX(dec->tilexoff + htileno * dec->tilewidth,
dec->xstart);
tile->ystart = JAS_MAX(dec->tileyoff + vtileno * dec->tileheight,
dec->ystart);
tile->xend = JAS_MIN(dec->tilexoff + (htileno + 1) *
dec->tilewidth, dec->xend);
tile->yend = JAS_MIN(dec->tileyoff + (vtileno + 1) *
dec->tileheight, dec->yend);
tile->numparts = 0;
tile->partno = 0;
tile->pkthdrstream = 0;
tile->pkthdrstreampos = 0;
tile->pptstab = 0;
tile->cp = 0;
tile->pi = 0;
if (!(tile->tcomps = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps,
sizeof(jpc_dec_tcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts, tcomp = tile->tcomps;
compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++cmpt, ++tcomp) {
tcomp->rlvls = 0;
tcomp->numrlvls = 0;
tcomp->data = 0;
tcomp->xstart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->ystart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->xend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xend, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->yend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->yend, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->tsfb = 0;
}
}
dec->pkthdrstreams = 0;
/* We should expect to encounter other main header marker segments
or an SOT marker segment next. */
dec->state = JPC_MH;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The jas_seq2d_create function in jas_seq.c in JasPer before 1.900.14 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure) via a crafted image file.
Commit Message: Ensure that not all tiles lie outside the image area.
|
Medium
| 168,737
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool Plugin::LoadNaClModuleContinuationIntern(ErrorInfo* error_info) {
if (using_ipc_proxy_)
return true;
if (!main_subprocess_.StartSrpcServices()) {
error_info->SetReport(ERROR_SRPC_CONNECTION_FAIL,
"SRPC connection failure for " +
main_subprocess_.description());
return false;
}
if (!main_subprocess_.StartJSObjectProxy(this, error_info)) {
return false;
}
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::LoadNaClModule (%s)\n",
main_subprocess_.detailed_description().c_str()));
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,743
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: size_t mptsas_config_manufacturing_1(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address)
{
/* VPD - all zeros */
return MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK(1, MPI_CONFIG_PAGETYPE_MANUFACTURING, 0x00,
"s256");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The (1) mptsas_config_manufacturing_1 and (2) mptsas_config_ioc_0 functions in hw/scsi/mptconfig.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allow local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (QEMU process crash) via vectors involving MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,935
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GpuDataManager::UpdateGpuInfo(const GPUInfo& gpu_info) {
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(gpu_info_lock_);
if (!gpu_info_.Merge(gpu_info))
return;
RunGpuInfoUpdateCallbacks();
content::GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(gpu_info_);
}
UpdateGpuFeatureFlags();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly address re-entrancy issues associated with the GPU lock, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fix a lock re-entry bug in GpuDataManager::UpdateGpuInfo.
The issue is that the registered callbacks could request GPUInfo, so they could re-enter the lock. Therefore, we should release the lock before we run through callbacks.
BUG=84805
TEST=the issue in 84805 is gone.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7054063
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87898 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,410
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void UpdateProperty(IBusProperty* ibus_prop) {
DLOG(INFO) << "UpdateProperty";
DCHECK(ibus_prop);
ImePropertyList prop_list; // our representation.
if (!FlattenProperty(ibus_prop, &prop_list)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Malformed properties are detected";
return;
}
if (!prop_list.empty()) {
update_ime_property_(language_library_, prop_list);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,550
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FrameSelection::MoveRangeSelectionExtent(const IntPoint& contents_point) {
if (ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().IsNone())
return;
SetSelection(
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder(
GetGranularityStrategy()->UpdateExtent(contents_point, frame_))
.SetIsHandleVisible(true)
.Build(),
SetSelectionData::Builder()
.SetShouldCloseTyping(true)
.SetShouldClearTypingStyle(true)
.SetDoNotClearStrategy(true)
.SetSetSelectionBy(SetSelectionBy::kUser)
.Build());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The convolution implementation in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73, does not properly constrain row lengths, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted graphics data.
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
|
Low
| 171,758
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping FakePlatformSensorProvider::GetMapping(
mojom::SensorType type) {
return CreateSharedBufferIfNeeded() ? MapSharedBufferForType(type) : nullptr;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
Medium
| 172,820
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_decode_slice(UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD8 u1_nal_ref_idc,
dec_struct_t *ps_dec /* Decoder parameters */
)
{
dec_bit_stream_t * ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_pic_params_t *ps_pps;
dec_seq_params_t *ps_seq;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
pocstruct_t s_tmp_poc;
WORD32 i_delta_poc[2];
WORD32 i4_poc = 0;
UWORD16 u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frame_num;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag, u1_redundant_pic_cnt = 0, u1_slice_type;
UWORD32 u4_idr_pic_id = 0;
UWORD8 u1_bottom_field_flag, u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
UWORD8 u1_nal_unit_type;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
WORD8 i1_is_end_of_poc;
WORD32 ret, end_of_frame;
WORD32 prev_slice_err, num_mb_skipped;
UWORD8 u1_mbaff;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc;
UWORD32 u4_temp;
WORD32 i_temp;
UWORD32 u4_call_end_of_pic = 0;
/* read FirstMbInSlice and slice type*/
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_dpb_commands_read_slc = 0;
u2_first_mb_in_slice = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice
> (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
/*we currently don not support ASO*/
if(((u2_first_mb_in_slice << ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
<= ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr) && (ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr != 0)
&& (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 0))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: first_mb_in_slice",u2_first_mb_in_slice);
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > 9)
return ERROR_INV_SLC_TYPE_T;
u1_slice_type = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_type",(u1_slice_type));
ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 0;
/* Find Out the Slice Type is 5 to 9 or not then Set the Flag */
/* u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 1 .Which tells that all the slices in the Pic*/
/* will be of same type of current */
if(u1_slice_type > 4)
{
u1_slice_type -= 5;
ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 1;
}
{
UWORD32 skip;
if((ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_PB)
|| (ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_PB))
{
UWORD32 u4_bit_stream_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
skip = 0;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
}
else if((I_SLICE == u1_slice_type)
&& (1 >= ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_num_ref_frames))
{
skip = 0;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
}
/* If one frame worth of data is already skipped, do not skip the next one */
if((0 == u2_first_mb_in_slice) && (1 == ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped))
{
skip = 0;
}
if(skip)
{
ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped = 1;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_PB;
return 0;
}
else
{
/* If the previous NAL was skipped, then
do not process that buffer in this call.
Return to app and process it in the next call.
This is necessary to handle cases where I/IDR is not complete in
the current buffer and application intends to fill the remaining part of the bitstream
later. This ensures we process only frame worth of data in every call */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped)
{
ps_dec->u4_return_to_app = 1;
return 0;
}
}
}
}
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp & MASK_ERR_PIC_SET_ID)
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
/* discard slice if pic param is invalid */
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: pic_parameter_set_id", u4_temp);
ps_pps = &ps_dec->ps_pps[u4_temp];
if(FALSE == ps_pps->u1_is_valid)
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
ps_seq = ps_pps->ps_sps;
if(!ps_seq)
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
if(FALSE == ps_seq->u1_is_valid)
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
/* Get the frame num */
u2_frame_num = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm,
ps_seq->u1_bits_in_frm_num);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: frame_num", u2_frame_num);
/* Get the field related flags */
if(!ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
{
u1_field_pic_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: field_pic_flag", u1_field_pic_flag);
u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_fld;
u1_bottom_field_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: bottom_field_flag", u1_bottom_field_flag);
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan;
}
}
else
{
u1_field_pic_flag = 0;
u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan;
}
u1_nal_unit_type = SLICE_NAL;
if(u1_is_idr_slice)
{
if(0 == u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY;
}
u1_nal_unit_type = IDR_SLICE_NAL;
u4_idr_pic_id = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_idr_pic_id > 65535)
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: ", u4_idr_pic_id);
}
/* read delta pic order count information*/
i_delta_poc[0] = i_delta_poc[1] = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = 0;
u1_pic_order_cnt_type = ps_seq->u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
if(u1_pic_order_cnt_type == 0)
{
i_temp = ih264d_get_bits_h264(
ps_bitstrm,
ps_seq->u1_log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb_minus);
if(i_temp < 0 || i_temp >= ps_seq->i4_max_pic_order_cntLsb)
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: pic_order_cnt_lsb", s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb);
if((ps_pps->u1_pic_order_present_flag == 1) && (!u1_field_pic_flag))
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = ih264d_sev(
pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom);
}
}
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = 0;
if(u1_pic_order_cnt_type == 1
&& (!ps_seq->u1_delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag))
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt[0]",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0]);
if(ps_pps->u1_pic_order_present_flag && !u1_field_pic_flag)
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = ih264d_sev(
pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt[1]",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1]);
}
}
if(ps_pps->u1_redundant_pic_cnt_present_flag)
{
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > MAX_REDUNDANT_PIC_CNT)
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: redundant_pic_cnt", u1_redundant_pic_cnt);
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Check if the slice is part of new picture */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
i1_is_end_of_poc = 0;
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
i1_is_end_of_poc = ih264d_is_end_of_pic(u2_frame_num, u1_nal_ref_idc,
&s_tmp_poc, &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc,
ps_cur_slice, u1_pic_order_cnt_type,
u1_nal_unit_type, u4_idr_pic_id,
u1_field_pic_flag,
u1_bottom_field_flag);
/* since we support only Full frame decode, every new process should
* process a new pic
*/
if((ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2) && (i1_is_end_of_poc == 0))
{
/* if it is the first slice is process call ,it should be a new frame. If it is not
* reject current pic and dont add it to dpb
*/
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag |= REJECT_CUR_PIC;
i1_is_end_of_poc = 1;
}
else
{
/* reset REJECT_CUR_PIC */
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag &= MASK_REJECT_CUR_PIC;
}
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Check for error in slice and parse the missing/corrupted MB's */
/* as skip-MB's in an inserted P-slice */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
u1_mbaff = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag && (!u1_field_pic_flag);
prev_slice_err = 0;
if(i1_is_end_of_poc || ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
if(u2_frame_num != ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num
&& ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded != 0
&& ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded
!= (TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY))
{
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 1;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic)
{
prev_slice_err = 1;
}
else
{
prev_slice_err = 2;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded ==TOP_FIELD_ONLY)
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 1;
else
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
num_mb_skipped = (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
ps_cur_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
u1_is_idr_slice = ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL;
}
else if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice > 0)
{
prev_slice_err = 1;
num_mb_skipped = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
ps_cur_slice->u4_idr_pic_id = u4_idr_pic_id;
ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_cur_slice->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb =
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = u1_nal_unit_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u1_redundant_pic_cnt;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = u1_nal_ref_idc;
ps_cur_slice->u1_pic_order_cnt_type = u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
}
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic)
{
/* if valid slice header is not decoded do start of pic processing
* since in the current process call, frame num is not updated in the slice structure yet
* ih264d_is_end_of_pic is checked with valid frame num of previous process call,
* although i1_is_end_of_poc is set there could be more slices in the frame,
* so conceal only till cur slice */
prev_slice_err = 1;
num_mb_skipped = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
}
else
{
/* since i1_is_end_of_poc is set ,means new frame num is encountered. so conceal the current frame
* completely */
prev_slice_err = 2;
num_mb_skipped = (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
}
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
}
}
else
{
if((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff) > ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded)
{
prev_slice_err = 2;
num_mb_skipped = (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
}
else if((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff) < ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded)
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
}
if(prev_slice_err)
{
ret = ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(ps_dec, num_mb_skipped, u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num, ps_cur_poc, prev_slice_err);
if(ps_dec->u1_dangling_field == 1)
{
ps_dec->u1_second_field = 1 - ps_dec->u1_second_field;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC;
}
if(prev_slice_err == 2)
{
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
/* return if all MBs in frame are parsed*/
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_IN_LAST_SLICE_OF_PIC;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return ERROR_NEW_FRAME_EXPECTED;
}
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
i1_is_end_of_poc = 0;
}
if (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0)
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 0;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* If the slice is part of new picture, do End of Pic processing. */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
UWORD8 uc_mbs_exceed = 0;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
== (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr + 1))
{
/*u2_total_mbs_coded is forced to u2_max_mb_addr+ 1 at the end of decode ,so
,if it is first slice in pic dont consider u2_total_mbs_coded to detect new picture */
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0)
uc_mbs_exceed = 1;
}
if(i1_is_end_of_poc || uc_mbs_exceed)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded)
{
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
#if WIN32
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT(" ------ PIC SKIPPED ------\n");
#endif
return RET_LAST_SKIP;
}
else
{
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
}
}
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
}
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5)
{
WORD32 i4_temp_poc;
WORD32 i4_top_field_order_poc, i4_bot_field_order_poc;
if(!ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag) // or a complementary field pair
{
i4_top_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
i4_bot_field_order_poc =
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
i4_temp_poc = MIN(i4_top_field_order_poc,
i4_bot_field_order_poc);
}
else if(!ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag)
i4_temp_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
else
i4_temp_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt = i4_temp_poc
- ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt = i4_temp_poc
- ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc = i4_temp_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = i4_temp_poc;
}
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
ret = ih264d_decode_pic_order_cnt(u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->s_prev_pic_poc,
&s_tmp_poc, ps_cur_slice, ps_pps,
u1_nal_ref_idc,
u1_bottom_field_flag,
u1_field_pic_flag, &i4_poc);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
/* Display seq no calculations */
if(i4_poc >= ps_dec->i4_max_poc)
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = i4_poc;
/* IDR Picture or POC wrap around */
if(i4_poc == 0)
{
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq = ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq
+ ps_dec->i4_max_poc
+ ps_dec->u1_max_dec_frame_buffering + 1;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
}
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Copy the values read from the bitstream to the slice header and then*/
/* If the slice is first slice in picture, then do Start of Picture */
/* processing. */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_cur_slice->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = i_delta_poc[0];
ps_cur_slice->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = i_delta_poc[1];
ps_cur_slice->u4_idr_pic_id = u4_idr_pic_id;
ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = u2_first_mb_in_slice;
ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = u1_slice_type;
ps_cur_slice->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = u1_nal_unit_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u1_redundant_pic_cnt;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = u1_nal_ref_idc;
ps_cur_slice->u1_pic_order_cnt_type = u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
if(ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag =
ps_seq->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag;
else
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag = 1;
if(u1_slice_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(
ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag",
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag);
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag)
ps_cur_slice->pf_decodeDirect = ih264d_decode_spatial_direct;
else
ps_cur_slice->pf_decodeDirect = ih264d_decode_temporal_direct;
if(!((ps_pps->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag) && (!u1_field_pic_flag)))
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaffB;
}
else
{
if(!((ps_pps->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag) && (!u1_field_pic_flag)))
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
}
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice == 0)
{
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, i4_poc, &s_tmp_poc, u2_frame_num, ps_pps);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
/* INITIALIZATION of fn ptrs for MC and formMbPartInfo functions */
{
UWORD8 uc_nofield_nombaff;
uc_nofield_nombaff = ((ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag == 0)
&& (ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag == 0)
&& (u1_slice_type != B_SLICE)
&& (ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_wted_pred_flag == 0));
/* Initialise MC and formMbPartInfo fn ptrs one time based on profile_idc */
if(uc_nofield_nombaff)
{
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
}
else
{
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_mp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_mp;
}
}
/*
* Decide whether to decode the current picture or not
*/
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_err->u4_frm_sei_sync == u2_frame_num)
{
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
ps_err->u4_frm_sei_sync = SYNC_FRM_DEFAULT;
}
ps_err->u4_cur_frm = u2_frame_num;
}
/* Decision for decoding if the picture is to be skipped */
{
WORD32 i4_skip_b_pic, i4_skip_p_pic;
i4_skip_b_pic = (ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask & B_SLC_BIT)
&& (B_SLICE == u1_slice_type) && (0 == u1_nal_ref_idc);
i4_skip_p_pic = (ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask & P_SLC_BIT)
&& (P_SLICE == u1_slice_type) && (0 == u1_nal_ref_idc);
/**************************************************************/
/* Skip the B picture if skip mask is set for B picture and */
/* Current B picture is a non reference B picture or there is */
/* no user for reference B picture */
/**************************************************************/
if(i4_skip_b_pic)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= B_SLC_BIT;
/* Don't decode the picture in SKIP-B mode if that picture is B */
/* and also it is not to be used as a reference picture */
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 1;
return OK;
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Skip the P picture if skip mask is set for P picture and */
/* Current P picture is a non reference P picture or there is */
/* no user for reference P picture */
/**************************************************************/
if(i4_skip_p_pic)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= P_SLC_BIT;
/* Don't decode the picture in SKIP-P mode if that picture is P */
/* and also it is not to be used as a reference picture */
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 1;
return OK;
}
}
{
UWORD16 u2_mb_x, u2_mb_y;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst = ((u2_first_mb_in_slice
<< ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag) * SUB_BLK_SIZE)
- SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_aff;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic;
UWORD16 u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
u2_frm_wd_in_mbs = ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
u1_mb_aff = ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
u1_field_pic = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
{
UWORD32 x_offset;
UWORD32 y_offset;
UWORD32 u4_frame_stride;
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_trns_addr; // = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
}
else
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
}
u2_mb_x = MOD(u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frm_wd_in_mbs);
u2_mb_y = DIV(u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frm_wd_in_mbs);
u2_mb_y <<= u1_mb_aff;
if((u2_mb_x > u2_frm_wd_in_mbs - 1)
|| (u2_mb_y > ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs - 1))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
u4_frame_stride = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y << u1_field_pic;
x_offset = u2_mb_x << 4;
y_offset = (u2_mb_y * u4_frame_stride) << 4;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
u4_frame_stride = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv << u1_field_pic;
x_offset >>= 1;
y_offset = (u2_mb_y * u4_frame_stride) << 3;
x_offset *= YUV420SP_FACTOR;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_y = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_u = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_v = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic
+ (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic
+ (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
}
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv
+ ((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff) << 4);
}
}
else
{
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_trns_addr;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
}
else
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
}
u2_mb_x = 0xffff;
u2_mb_y = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = 0;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_y = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_u = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_v = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v;
}
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->u2_mbx =
(MOD(u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby =
(DIV(u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby <<= ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
}
/* RBSP stop bit is used for CABAC decoding*/
ps_bitstrm->u4_max_ofst += ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_entropy_coding_mode;
ps_dec->u1_B = (u1_slice_type == B_SLICE);
ps_dec->u4_next_mb_skip = 0;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type;
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 1;
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MAX_FRAMES;
if((1 >= ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_num_ref_frames) &&
(0 == ps_dec->i4_display_delay))
{
num_entries = 1;
}
num_entries = ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
if(BASE_PROFILE_IDC != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_profile_idc)
{
num_entries *= 2;
}
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = ( void *)pu1_buf;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
ps_dec->pu4_wt_ofsts = ps_dec->pu4_wts_ofsts_mat;
if(u1_slice_type == I_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= I_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_islice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type != B_SLICE && ps_dec->i4_pic_type != P_SLICE)
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = I_SLICE;
}
else if(u1_slice_type == P_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= P_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_pslice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type = u1_slice_type;
if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type != B_SLICE)
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = P_SLICE;
}
else if(u1_slice_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= B_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_bslice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type = u1_slice_type;
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = B_SLICE;
}
else
return ERROR_INV_SLC_TYPE_T;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done)
{
/* set to zero to indicate a valid slice has been decoded */
/* first slice header successfully decoded */
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 0;
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
}
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
/* storing last Mb X and MbY of the slice */
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
/* End of Picture detection */
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >= (ps_seq->u2_max_mb_addr + 1))
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if((ps_err->u1_err_flag & REJECT_PB_PICS)
&& (ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type == PIC_TYPE_I))
{
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
}
}
PRINT_BIN_BIT_RATIO(ps_dec)
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The H.264 decoder in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not initialize certain slice data, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28165661.
Commit Message: Decoder: Initialize slice parameters before concealing error MBs
Also memset ps_dec_op structure to zero.
For error input, this ensures dimensions are initialized to zero
Bug: 28165661
Change-Id: I66eb2ddc5e02e74b7ff04da5f749443920f37141
|
Low
| 174,164
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const SegmentInfo* Segment::GetInfo() const
{
return m_pInfo;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,330
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int vt_reset_keyboard(int fd) {
int kb;
/* If we can't read the default, then default to unicode. It's 2017 after all. */
kb = vt_default_utf8() != 0 ? K_UNICODE : K_XLATE;
if (ioctl(fd, KDSKBMODE, kb) < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-255
Summary: systemd 242 changes the VT1 mode upon a logout, which allows attackers to read cleartext passwords in certain circumstances, such as watching a shutdown, or using Ctrl-Alt-F1 and Ctrl-Alt-F2. This occurs because the KDGKBMODE (aka current keyboard mode) check is mishandled.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
|
Low
| 169,776
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport void RemoveDuplicateLayers(Image **images,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register Image
*curr,
*next;
RectangleInfo
bounds;
assert((*images) != (const Image *) NULL);
assert((*images)->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((*images)->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",(*images)->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
curr=GetFirstImageInList(*images);
for (; (next=GetNextImageInList(curr)) != (Image *) NULL; curr=next)
{
if ( curr->columns != next->columns || curr->rows != next->rows
|| curr->page.x != next->page.x || curr->page.y != next->page.y )
continue;
bounds=CompareImageBounds(curr,next,CompareAnyLayer,exception);
if ( bounds.x < 0 ) {
/*
the two images are the same, merge time delays and delete one.
*/
size_t time;
time = curr->delay*1000/curr->ticks_per_second;
time += next->delay*1000/next->ticks_per_second;
next->ticks_per_second = 100L;
next->delay = time*curr->ticks_per_second/1000;
next->iterations = curr->iterations;
*images = curr;
(void) DeleteImageFromList(images);
}
}
*images = GetFirstImageInList(*images);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-54 Q16 allows Division by Zero in RemoveDuplicateLayers in MagickCore/layer.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1629
|
Medium
| 169,588
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
struct hid_report *report, u8 *data, int size)
{
struct magicmouse_sc *msc = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct input_dev *input = msc->input;
int x = 0, y = 0, ii, clicks = 0, npoints;
switch (data[0]) {
case TRACKPAD_REPORT_ID:
/* Expect four bytes of prefix, and N*9 bytes of touch data. */
if (size < 4 || ((size - 4) % 9) != 0)
return 0;
npoints = (size - 4) / 9;
msc->ntouches = 0;
for (ii = 0; ii < npoints; ii++)
magicmouse_emit_touch(msc, ii, data + ii * 9 + 4);
clicks = data[1];
/* The following bits provide a device specific timestamp. They
* are unused here.
*
* ts = data[1] >> 6 | data[2] << 2 | data[3] << 10;
*/
break;
case MOUSE_REPORT_ID:
/* Expect six bytes of prefix, and N*8 bytes of touch data. */
if (size < 6 || ((size - 6) % 8) != 0)
return 0;
npoints = (size - 6) / 8;
msc->ntouches = 0;
for (ii = 0; ii < npoints; ii++)
magicmouse_emit_touch(msc, ii, data + ii * 8 + 6);
/* When emulating three-button mode, it is important
* to have the current touch information before
* generating a click event.
*/
x = (int)(((data[3] & 0x0c) << 28) | (data[1] << 22)) >> 22;
y = (int)(((data[3] & 0x30) << 26) | (data[2] << 22)) >> 22;
clicks = data[3];
/* The following bits provide a device specific timestamp. They
* are unused here.
*
* ts = data[3] >> 6 | data[4] << 2 | data[5] << 10;
*/
break;
case DOUBLE_REPORT_ID:
/* Sometimes the trackpad sends two touch reports in one
* packet.
*/
magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2, data[1]);
magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2 + data[1],
size - 2 - data[1]);
break;
default:
return 0;
}
if (input->id.product == USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICMOUSE) {
magicmouse_emit_buttons(msc, clicks & 3);
input_report_rel(input, REL_X, x);
input_report_rel(input, REL_Y, y);
} else { /* USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICTRACKPAD */
input_report_key(input, BTN_MOUSE, clicks & 1);
input_mt_report_pointer_emulation(input, true);
}
input_sync(input);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in the magicmouse_raw_event function in drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c in the Magic Mouse HID driver in the Linux kernel through 3.16.3 allow physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted device that provides a large amount of (1) EHCI or (2) XHCI data associated with an event.
Commit Message: HID: magicmouse: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback
The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that
magicmouse_emit_touch() gets only valid values of raw_id.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Steven Vittitoe <scvitti@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
|
Medium
| 166,379
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: TestPaintArtifact& TestPaintArtifact::Chunk(
DisplayItemClient& client,
scoped_refptr<const TransformPaintPropertyNode> transform,
scoped_refptr<const ClipPaintPropertyNode> clip,
scoped_refptr<const EffectPaintPropertyNode> effect) {
return Chunk(client,
PropertyTreeState(transform.get(), clip.get(), effect.get()));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,847
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int jp2_box_put(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *out)
{
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
bool extlen;
bool dataflag;
tmpstream = 0;
dataflag = !(box->info->flags & (JP2_BOX_SUPER | JP2_BOX_NODATA));
if (dataflag) {
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (box->ops->putdata) {
if ((*box->ops->putdata)(box, tmpstream)) {
goto error;
}
}
box->len = jas_stream_tell(tmpstream) + JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false);
jas_stream_rewind(tmpstream);
}
extlen = (box->len >= (((uint_fast64_t)1) << 32)) != 0;
if (jp2_putuint32(out, extlen ? 1 : box->len)) {
goto error;
}
if (jp2_putuint32(out, box->type)) {
goto error;
}
if (extlen) {
if (jp2_putuint64(out, box->len)) {
goto error;
}
}
if (dataflag) {
if (jas_stream_copy(out, tmpstream, box->len - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false))) {
goto error;
}
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return 0;
error:
if (tmpstream) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The jp2_cdef_destroy function in jp2_cod.c in JasPer before 2.0.13 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted image.
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
|
Medium
| 168,319
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::fillBuffer(OMX::buffer_id buffer, int fenceFd) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer);
header->nFilledLen = 0;
header->nOffset = 0;
header->nFlags = 0;
status_t res = storeFenceInMeta_l(header, fenceFd, kPortIndexOutput);
if (res != OK) {
CLOG_ERROR(fillBuffer::storeFenceInMeta, res, EMPTY_BUFFER(buffer, header, fenceFd));
return res;
}
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
mOutputBuffersWithCodec.add(header);
CLOG_BUMPED_BUFFER(fillBuffer, WITH_STATS(EMPTY_BUFFER(buffer, header, fenceFd)));
}
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_FillThisBuffer(mHandle, header);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(fillBuffer, err, EMPTY_BUFFER(buffer, header, fenceFd));
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
mOutputBuffersWithCodec.remove(header);
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the buffer port, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816827.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
|
Low
| 173,527
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static zend_object_value spl_filesystem_object_clone(zval *zobject TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object_value new_obj_val;
zend_object *old_object;
zend_object *new_object;
zend_object_handle handle = Z_OBJ_HANDLE_P(zobject);
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
spl_filesystem_object *source;
int index, skip_dots;
old_object = zend_objects_get_address(zobject TSRMLS_CC);
source = (spl_filesystem_object*)old_object;
new_obj_val = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(old_object->ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
new_object = &intern->std;
intern->flags = source->flags;
switch (source->type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
intern->_path_len = source->_path_len;
intern->_path = estrndup(source->_path, source->_path_len);
intern->file_name_len = source->file_name_len;
intern->file_name = estrndup(source->file_name, intern->file_name_len);
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
spl_filesystem_dir_open(intern, source->_path TSRMLS_CC);
/* read until we hit the position in which we were before */
skip_dots = SPL_HAS_FLAG(source->flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS);
for(index = 0; index < source->u.dir.index; ++index) {
do {
spl_filesystem_dir_read(intern TSRMLS_CC);
} while (skip_dots && spl_filesystem_is_dot(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name));
}
intern->u.dir.index = index;
break;
case SPL_FS_FILE:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_ERROR, "An object of class %s cannot be cloned", old_object->ce->name);
break;
}
intern->file_class = source->file_class;
intern->info_class = source->info_class;
intern->oth = source->oth;
intern->oth_handler = source->oth_handler;
zend_objects_clone_members(new_object, new_obj_val, old_object, handle TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern->oth_handler && intern->oth_handler->clone) {
intern->oth_handler->clone(source, intern TSRMLS_CC);
}
return new_obj_val;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,080
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void nsc_encode_argb_to_aycocg(NSC_CONTEXT* context, const BYTE* data,
UINT32 scanline)
{
UINT16 x;
UINT16 y;
UINT16 rw;
BYTE ccl;
const BYTE* src;
BYTE* yplane = NULL;
BYTE* coplane = NULL;
BYTE* cgplane = NULL;
BYTE* aplane = NULL;
INT16 r_val;
INT16 g_val;
INT16 b_val;
BYTE a_val;
UINT32 tempWidth;
tempWidth = ROUND_UP_TO(context->width, 8);
rw = (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel ? tempWidth : context->width);
ccl = context->ColorLossLevel;
for (y = 0; y < context->height; y++)
{
src = data + (context->height - 1 - y) * scanline;
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * rw;
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * rw;
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * rw;
aplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[3] + y * context->width;
for (x = 0; x < context->width; x++)
{
switch (context->format)
{
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGRX32:
b_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
r_val = *src++;
src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGRA32:
b_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
r_val = *src++;
a_val = *src++;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGBX32:
r_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
b_val = *src++;
src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGBA32:
r_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
b_val = *src++;
a_val = *src++;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGR24:
b_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
r_val = *src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB24:
r_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
b_val = *src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGR16:
b_val = (INT16)(((*(src + 1)) & 0xF8) | ((*(src + 1)) >> 5));
g_val = (INT16)((((*(src + 1)) & 0x07) << 5) | (((*src) & 0xE0) >> 3));
r_val = (INT16)((((*src) & 0x1F) << 3) | (((*src) >> 2) & 0x07));
a_val = 0xFF;
src += 2;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB16:
r_val = (INT16)(((*(src + 1)) & 0xF8) | ((*(src + 1)) >> 5));
g_val = (INT16)((((*(src + 1)) & 0x07) << 5) | (((*src) & 0xE0) >> 3));
b_val = (INT16)((((*src) & 0x1F) << 3) | (((*src) >> 2) & 0x07));
a_val = 0xFF;
src += 2;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_A4:
{
int shift;
BYTE idx;
shift = (7 - (x % 8));
idx = ((*src) >> shift) & 1;
idx |= (((*(src + 1)) >> shift) & 1) << 1;
idx |= (((*(src + 2)) >> shift) & 1) << 2;
idx |= (((*(src + 3)) >> shift) & 1) << 3;
idx *= 3;
r_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx];
g_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 1];
b_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 2];
if (shift == 0)
src += 4;
}
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB8:
{
int idx = (*src) * 3;
r_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx];
g_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 1];
b_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 2];
src++;
}
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
default:
r_val = g_val = b_val = a_val = 0;
break;
}
*yplane++ = (BYTE)((r_val >> 2) + (g_val >> 1) + (b_val >> 2));
/* Perform color loss reduction here */
*coplane++ = (BYTE)((r_val - b_val) >> ccl);
*cgplane++ = (BYTE)((-(r_val >> 1) + g_val - (b_val >> 1)) >> ccl);
*aplane++ = a_val;
}
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel && (x % 2) == 1)
{
*yplane = *(yplane - 1);
*coplane = *(coplane - 1);
*cgplane = *(cgplane - 1);
}
}
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel && (y % 2) == 1)
{
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * rw;
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * rw;
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * rw;
CopyMemory(yplane, yplane - rw, rw);
CopyMemory(coplane, coplane - rw, rw);
CopyMemory(cgplane, cgplane - rw, rw);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains an Out-Of-Bounds Write of up to 4 bytes in function nsc_rle_decode() that results in a memory corruption and possibly even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
|
Low
| 169,288
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MojoAudioInputIPC::StreamCreated(
media::mojom::AudioInputStreamPtr stream,
media::mojom::AudioInputStreamClientRequest stream_client_request,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle shared_memory,
mojo::ScopedHandle socket,
bool initially_muted) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
DCHECK(delegate_);
DCHECK(socket.is_valid());
DCHECK(shared_memory.is_valid());
DCHECK(!stream_);
DCHECK(!stream_client_binding_.is_bound());
stream_ = std::move(stream);
stream_client_binding_.Bind(std::move(stream_client_request));
base::PlatformFile socket_handle;
auto result = mojo::UnwrapPlatformFile(std::move(socket), &socket_handle);
DCHECK_EQ(result, MOJO_RESULT_OK);
base::SharedMemoryHandle memory_handle;
bool read_only = true;
result = mojo::UnwrapSharedMemoryHandle(std::move(shared_memory),
&memory_handle, nullptr, &read_only);
DCHECK_EQ(result, MOJO_RESULT_OK);
DCHECK(read_only);
delegate_->OnStreamCreated(memory_handle, socket_handle, initially_muted);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
Medium
| 172,863
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: svc_set_num_threads(struct svc_serv *serv, struct svc_pool *pool, int nrservs)
{
struct svc_rqst *rqstp;
struct task_struct *task;
struct svc_pool *chosen_pool;
int error = 0;
unsigned int state = serv->sv_nrthreads-1;
int node;
if (pool == NULL) {
/* The -1 assumes caller has done a svc_get() */
nrservs -= (serv->sv_nrthreads-1);
} else {
spin_lock_bh(&pool->sp_lock);
nrservs -= pool->sp_nrthreads;
spin_unlock_bh(&pool->sp_lock);
}
/* create new threads */
while (nrservs > 0) {
nrservs--;
chosen_pool = choose_pool(serv, pool, &state);
node = svc_pool_map_get_node(chosen_pool->sp_id);
rqstp = svc_prepare_thread(serv, chosen_pool, node);
if (IS_ERR(rqstp)) {
error = PTR_ERR(rqstp);
break;
}
__module_get(serv->sv_ops->svo_module);
task = kthread_create_on_node(serv->sv_ops->svo_function, rqstp,
node, "%s", serv->sv_name);
if (IS_ERR(task)) {
error = PTR_ERR(task);
module_put(serv->sv_ops->svo_module);
svc_exit_thread(rqstp);
break;
}
rqstp->rq_task = task;
if (serv->sv_nrpools > 1)
svc_pool_map_set_cpumask(task, chosen_pool->sp_id);
svc_sock_update_bufs(serv);
wake_up_process(task);
}
/* destroy old threads */
while (nrservs < 0 &&
(task = choose_victim(serv, pool, &state)) != NULL) {
send_sig(SIGINT, task, 1);
nrservs++;
}
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,155
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int x509_crt_verify_child(
mbedtls_x509_crt *child, mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
int path_cnt, int self_cnt, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy )
{
int ret;
uint32_t parent_flags = 0;
unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
mbedtls_x509_crt *grandparent;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
/* Counting intermediate self signed certificates */
if( ( path_cnt != 0 ) && x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &child->subject ) == 0 )
self_cnt++;
/* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA */
if( 1 + path_cnt > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA )
{
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED );
}
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &child->valid_to ) )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED;
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &child->valid_from ) )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE;
if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, child->sig_md ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD;
if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, child->sig_pk ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( child->sig_md );
if( md_info == NULL )
{
/*
* Cannot check 'unknown' hash
*/
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
}
else
{
mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash );
if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, child->sig_pk, &parent->pk ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
if( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk,
child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) != 0 )
{
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
/* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */
*flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl(child, parent, ca_crl, profile );
#endif
/* Look for a grandparent in trusted CAs */
for( grandparent = trust_ca;
grandparent != NULL;
grandparent = grandparent->next )
{
if( x509_crt_check_parent( parent, grandparent,
0, path_cnt == 0 ) == 0 )
break;
}
if( grandparent != NULL )
{
ret = x509_crt_verify_top( parent, grandparent, ca_crl, profile,
path_cnt + 1, self_cnt, &parent_flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
{
/* Look for a grandparent upwards the chain */
for( grandparent = parent->next;
grandparent != NULL;
grandparent = grandparent->next )
{
/* +2 because the current step is not yet accounted for
* and because max_pathlen is one higher than it should be.
* Also self signed certificates do not count to the limit. */
if( grandparent->max_pathlen > 0 &&
grandparent->max_pathlen < 2 + path_cnt - self_cnt )
{
continue;
}
if( x509_crt_check_parent( parent, grandparent,
0, path_cnt == 0 ) == 0 )
break;
}
/* Is our parent part of the chain or at the top? */
if( grandparent != NULL )
{
ret = x509_crt_verify_child( parent, grandparent, trust_ca, ca_crl,
profile, path_cnt + 1, self_cnt, &parent_flags,
f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
{
ret = x509_crt_verify_top( parent, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile,
path_cnt + 1, self_cnt, &parent_flags,
f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
}
/* child is verified to be a child of the parent, call verify callback */
if( NULL != f_vrfy )
if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, child, path_cnt, flags ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
*flags |= parent_flags;
return( 0 );
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: ARM mbed TLS before 1.3.21 and 2.x before 2.1.9, if optional authentication is configured, allows remote attackers to bypass peer authentication via an X.509 certificate chain with many intermediates. NOTE: although mbed TLS was formerly known as PolarSSL, the releases shipped with the PolarSSL name are not affected.
Commit Message: Only return VERIFY_FAILED from a single point
Everything else is a fatal error. Also improve documentation about that for
the vrfy callback.
|
Medium
| 170,020
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8_mod(
PNG_CONST image_transform *this, image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
image_transform_png_set_expand_mod(this, that, pp, display);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,631
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ZSTD_compressSequences_internal(seqStore_t* seqStorePtr,
ZSTD_entropyCTables_t const* prevEntropy,
ZSTD_entropyCTables_t* nextEntropy,
ZSTD_CCtx_params const* cctxParams,
void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
void* workspace, size_t wkspSize,
const int bmi2)
{
const int longOffsets = cctxParams->cParams.windowLog > STREAM_ACCUMULATOR_MIN;
ZSTD_strategy const strategy = cctxParams->cParams.strategy;
U32 count[MaxSeq+1];
FSE_CTable* CTable_LitLength = nextEntropy->fse.litlengthCTable;
FSE_CTable* CTable_OffsetBits = nextEntropy->fse.offcodeCTable;
FSE_CTable* CTable_MatchLength = nextEntropy->fse.matchlengthCTable;
U32 LLtype, Offtype, MLtype; /* compressed, raw or rle */
const seqDef* const sequences = seqStorePtr->sequencesStart;
const BYTE* const ofCodeTable = seqStorePtr->ofCode;
const BYTE* const llCodeTable = seqStorePtr->llCode;
const BYTE* const mlCodeTable = seqStorePtr->mlCode;
BYTE* const ostart = (BYTE*)dst;
BYTE* const oend = ostart + dstCapacity;
BYTE* op = ostart;
size_t const nbSeq = seqStorePtr->sequences - seqStorePtr->sequencesStart;
BYTE* seqHead;
BYTE* lastNCount = NULL;
ZSTD_STATIC_ASSERT(HUF_WORKSPACE_SIZE >= (1<<MAX(MLFSELog,LLFSELog)));
/* Compress literals */
{ const BYTE* const literals = seqStorePtr->litStart;
size_t const litSize = seqStorePtr->lit - literals;
int const disableLiteralCompression = (cctxParams->cParams.strategy == ZSTD_fast) && (cctxParams->cParams.targetLength > 0);
size_t const cSize = ZSTD_compressLiterals(
&prevEntropy->huf, &nextEntropy->huf,
cctxParams->cParams.strategy, disableLiteralCompression,
op, dstCapacity,
literals, litSize,
workspace, wkspSize,
bmi2);
if (ZSTD_isError(cSize))
return cSize;
assert(cSize <= dstCapacity);
op += cSize;
}
/* Sequences Header */
if ((oend-op) < 3 /*max nbSeq Size*/ + 1 /*seqHead*/) return ERROR(dstSize_tooSmall);
if (nbSeq < 0x7F)
*op++ = (BYTE)nbSeq;
else if (nbSeq < LONGNBSEQ)
op[0] = (BYTE)((nbSeq>>8) + 0x80), op[1] = (BYTE)nbSeq, op+=2;
else
op[0]=0xFF, MEM_writeLE16(op+1, (U16)(nbSeq - LONGNBSEQ)), op+=3;
if (nbSeq==0) {
/* Copy the old tables over as if we repeated them */
memcpy(&nextEntropy->fse, &prevEntropy->fse, sizeof(prevEntropy->fse));
return op - ostart;
}
/* seqHead : flags for FSE encoding type */
seqHead = op++;
/* convert length/distances into codes */
ZSTD_seqToCodes(seqStorePtr);
/* build CTable for Literal Lengths */
{ U32 max = MaxLL;
size_t const mostFrequent = HIST_countFast_wksp(count, &max, llCodeTable, nbSeq, workspace, wkspSize); /* can't fail */
DEBUGLOG(5, "Building LL table");
nextEntropy->fse.litlength_repeatMode = prevEntropy->fse.litlength_repeatMode;
LLtype = ZSTD_selectEncodingType(&nextEntropy->fse.litlength_repeatMode, count, max, mostFrequent, nbSeq, LLFSELog, prevEntropy->fse.litlengthCTable, LL_defaultNorm, LL_defaultNormLog, ZSTD_defaultAllowed, strategy);
assert(set_basic < set_compressed && set_rle < set_compressed);
assert(!(LLtype < set_compressed && nextEntropy->fse.litlength_repeatMode != FSE_repeat_none)); /* We don't copy tables */
{ size_t const countSize = ZSTD_buildCTable(op, oend - op, CTable_LitLength, LLFSELog, (symbolEncodingType_e)LLtype,
count, max, llCodeTable, nbSeq, LL_defaultNorm, LL_defaultNormLog, MaxLL,
prevEntropy->fse.litlengthCTable, sizeof(prevEntropy->fse.litlengthCTable),
workspace, wkspSize);
if (ZSTD_isError(countSize)) return countSize;
if (LLtype == set_compressed)
lastNCount = op;
op += countSize;
} }
/* build CTable for Offsets */
{ U32 max = MaxOff;
size_t const mostFrequent = HIST_countFast_wksp(count, &max, ofCodeTable, nbSeq, workspace, wkspSize); /* can't fail */
/* We can only use the basic table if max <= DefaultMaxOff, otherwise the offsets are too large */
ZSTD_defaultPolicy_e const defaultPolicy = (max <= DefaultMaxOff) ? ZSTD_defaultAllowed : ZSTD_defaultDisallowed;
DEBUGLOG(5, "Building OF table");
nextEntropy->fse.offcode_repeatMode = prevEntropy->fse.offcode_repeatMode;
Offtype = ZSTD_selectEncodingType(&nextEntropy->fse.offcode_repeatMode, count, max, mostFrequent, nbSeq, OffFSELog, prevEntropy->fse.offcodeCTable, OF_defaultNorm, OF_defaultNormLog, defaultPolicy, strategy);
assert(!(Offtype < set_compressed && nextEntropy->fse.offcode_repeatMode != FSE_repeat_none)); /* We don't copy tables */
{ size_t const countSize = ZSTD_buildCTable(op, oend - op, CTable_OffsetBits, OffFSELog, (symbolEncodingType_e)Offtype,
count, max, ofCodeTable, nbSeq, OF_defaultNorm, OF_defaultNormLog, DefaultMaxOff,
prevEntropy->fse.offcodeCTable, sizeof(prevEntropy->fse.offcodeCTable),
workspace, wkspSize);
if (ZSTD_isError(countSize)) return countSize;
if (Offtype == set_compressed)
lastNCount = op;
op += countSize;
} }
/* build CTable for MatchLengths */
{ U32 max = MaxML;
size_t const mostFrequent = HIST_countFast_wksp(count, &max, mlCodeTable, nbSeq, workspace, wkspSize); /* can't fail */
DEBUGLOG(5, "Building ML table");
nextEntropy->fse.matchlength_repeatMode = prevEntropy->fse.matchlength_repeatMode;
MLtype = ZSTD_selectEncodingType(&nextEntropy->fse.matchlength_repeatMode, count, max, mostFrequent, nbSeq, MLFSELog, prevEntropy->fse.matchlengthCTable, ML_defaultNorm, ML_defaultNormLog, ZSTD_defaultAllowed, strategy);
assert(!(MLtype < set_compressed && nextEntropy->fse.matchlength_repeatMode != FSE_repeat_none)); /* We don't copy tables */
{ size_t const countSize = ZSTD_buildCTable(op, oend - op, CTable_MatchLength, MLFSELog, (symbolEncodingType_e)MLtype,
count, max, mlCodeTable, nbSeq, ML_defaultNorm, ML_defaultNormLog, MaxML,
prevEntropy->fse.matchlengthCTable, sizeof(prevEntropy->fse.matchlengthCTable),
workspace, wkspSize);
if (ZSTD_isError(countSize)) return countSize;
if (MLtype == set_compressed)
lastNCount = op;
op += countSize;
} }
*seqHead = (BYTE)((LLtype<<6) + (Offtype<<4) + (MLtype<<2));
{ size_t const bitstreamSize = ZSTD_encodeSequences(
op, oend - op,
CTable_MatchLength, mlCodeTable,
CTable_OffsetBits, ofCodeTable,
CTable_LitLength, llCodeTable,
sequences, nbSeq,
longOffsets, bmi2);
if (ZSTD_isError(bitstreamSize)) return bitstreamSize;
op += bitstreamSize;
/* zstd versions <= 1.3.4 mistakenly report corruption when
* FSE_readNCount() recieves a buffer < 4 bytes.
* Fixed by https://github.com/facebook/zstd/pull/1146.
* This can happen when the last set_compressed table present is 2
* bytes and the bitstream is only one byte.
* In this exceedingly rare case, we will simply emit an uncompressed
* block, since it isn't worth optimizing.
*/
if (lastNCount && (op - lastNCount) < 4) {
/* NCountSize >= 2 && bitstreamSize > 0 ==> lastCountSize == 3 */
assert(op - lastNCount == 3);
DEBUGLOG(5, "Avoiding bug in zstd decoder in versions <= 1.3.4 by "
"emitting an uncompressed block.");
return 0;
}
}
return op - ostart;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race condition in the one-pass compression functions of Zstandard prior to version 1.3.8 could allow an attacker to write bytes out of bounds if an output buffer smaller than the recommended size was used.
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
|
Medium
| 169,672
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool generic_new(struct nf_conn *ct, const struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int dataoff, unsigned int *timeouts)
{
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_generic.c in the Linux kernel before 3.18 generates incorrect conntrack entries during handling of certain iptables rule sets for the SCTP, DCCP, GRE, and UDP-Lite protocols, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via packets with disallowed port numbers.
Commit Message: netfilter: conntrack: disable generic tracking for known protocols
Given following iptables ruleset:
-P FORWARD DROP
-A FORWARD -m sctp --dport 9 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -p tcp -m conntrack -m state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
One would assume that this allows SCTP on port 9 and TCP on port 80.
Unfortunately, if the SCTP conntrack module is not loaded, this allows
*all* SCTP communication, to pass though, i.e. -p sctp -j ACCEPT,
which we think is a security issue.
This is because on the first SCTP packet on port 9, we create a dummy
"generic l4" conntrack entry without any port information (since
conntrack doesn't know how to extract this information).
All subsequent packets that are unknown will then be in established
state since they will fallback to proto_generic and will match the
'generic' entry.
Our originally proposed version [1] completely disabled generic protocol
tracking, but Jozsef suggests to not track protocols for which a more
suitable helper is available, hence we now mitigate the issue for in
tree known ct protocol helpers only, so that at least NAT and direction
information will still be preserved for others.
[1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/netfilter-devel/msg33430.html
Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
Low
| 166,809
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ikev2_n_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev2_n *p;
struct ikev2_n n;
const u_char *cp;
u_char showspi, showdata, showsomedata;
const char *notify_name;
uint32_t type;
p = (const struct ikev2_n *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&n, ext, sizeof(n));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N), n.h.critical);
showspi = 1;
showdata = 0;
showsomedata=0;
notify_name=NULL;
ND_PRINT((ndo," prot_id=%s", PROTOIDSTR(n.prot_id)));
type = ntohs(n.type);
/* notify space is annoying sparse */
switch(type) {
case IV2_NOTIFY_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD:
notify_name = "unsupported_critical_payload";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_IKE_SPI:
notify_name = "invalid_ike_spi";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION:
notify_name = "invalid_major_version";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_SYNTAX:
notify_name = "invalid_syntax";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_MESSAGE_ID:
notify_name = "invalid_message_id";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_SPI:
notify_name = "invalid_spi";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN:
notify_name = "no_protocol_chosen";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD:
notify_name = "invalid_ke_payload";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED:
notify_name = "authentication_failed";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_SINGLE_PAIR_REQUIRED:
notify_name = "single_pair_required";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_NO_ADDITIONAL_SAS:
notify_name = "no_additional_sas";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INTERNAL_ADDRESS_FAILURE:
notify_name = "internal_address_failure";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_FAILED_CP_REQUIRED:
notify_name = "failed:cp_required";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_SELECTORS:
notify_name = "invalid_selectors";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INITIAL_CONTACT:
notify_name = "initial_contact";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_SET_WINDOW_SIZE:
notify_name = "set_window_size";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE:
notify_name = "additional_ts_possible";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_IPCOMP_SUPPORTED:
notify_name = "ipcomp_supported";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP:
notify_name = "nat_detection_source_ip";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP:
notify_name = "nat_detection_destination_ip";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_COOKIE:
notify_name = "cookie";
showspi = 1;
showsomedata= 1;
showdata= 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_USE_TRANSPORT_MODE:
notify_name = "use_transport_mode";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED:
notify_name = "http_cert_lookup_supported";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_REKEY_SA:
notify_name = "rekey_sa";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED:
notify_name = "tfc_padding_not_supported";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO:
notify_name = "non_first_fragment_also";
showspi = 0;
break;
default:
if (type < 8192) {
notify_name="error";
} else if(type < 16384) {
notify_name="private-error";
} else if(type < 40960) {
notify_name="status";
} else {
notify_name="private-status";
}
}
if(notify_name) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%u(%s)", type, notify_name));
}
if (showspi && n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
if(3 < ndo->ndo_vflag) {
showdata = 1;
}
if ((showdata || (showsomedata && ep-cp < 30)) && cp < ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," data=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(cp), ep - cp))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
} else if(showsomedata && cp < ep) {
if(!ike_show_somedata(ndo, cp, ep)) goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: The ISAKMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could enter an infinite loop due to bugs in print-isakmp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12990/Fix printing of ISAKMPv1 Notification payload data.
The closest thing to a specification for the contents of the payload
data is draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04, and nothing in there says that it
is ever a complete ISAKMP message, so don't dissect types we don't have
specific code for as a complete ISAKMP message.
While we're at it, fix a comment, and clean up printing of V1 Nonce,
V2 Authentication payloads, and v2 Notice payloads.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,927
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BrowserViewRenderer::SetTotalRootLayerScrollOffset(
gfx::Vector2dF scroll_offset_dip) {
if (scroll_offset_dip_ == scroll_offset_dip)
return;
scroll_offset_dip_ = scroll_offset_dip;
gfx::Vector2d max_offset = max_scroll_offset();
gfx::Vector2d scroll_offset;
if (max_scroll_offset_dip_.x()) {
scroll_offset.set_x((scroll_offset_dip.x() * max_offset.x()) /
max_scroll_offset_dip_.x());
}
if (max_scroll_offset_dip_.y()) {
scroll_offset.set_y((scroll_offset_dip.y() * max_offset.y()) /
max_scroll_offset_dip_.y());
}
DCHECK_LE(0, scroll_offset.x());
DCHECK_LE(0, scroll_offset.y());
DCHECK_LE(scroll_offset.x(), max_offset.x());
DCHECK_LE(scroll_offset.y(), max_offset.y());
client_->ScrollContainerViewTo(scroll_offset);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the StyleElement::removedFromDocument function in core/dom/StyleElement.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 35.0.1916.114, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code that triggers tree mutation.
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
|
Low
| 171,615
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ossl_cipher_init(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self, int mode)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], *p_key = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *p_iv = NULL;
VALUE pass, init_v;
if(rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "02", &pass, &init_v) > 0){
/*
* oops. this code mistakes salt for IV.
* We deprecated the arguments for this method, but we decided
* keeping this behaviour for backward compatibility.
*/
VALUE cname = rb_class_path(rb_obj_class(self));
rb_warn("arguments for %"PRIsVALUE"#encrypt and %"PRIsVALUE"#decrypt were deprecated; "
"use %"PRIsVALUE"#pkcs5_keyivgen to derive key and IV",
cname, cname, cname);
StringValue(pass);
GetCipher(self, ctx);
if (NIL_P(init_v)) memcpy(iv, "OpenSSL for Ruby rulez!", sizeof(iv));
else{
StringValue(init_v);
if (EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH > RSTRING_LEN(init_v)) {
memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
memcpy(iv, RSTRING_PTR(init_v), RSTRING_LEN(init_v));
}
else memcpy(iv, RSTRING_PTR(init_v), sizeof(iv));
}
EVP_BytesToKey(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx), EVP_md5(), iv,
(unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(pass), RSTRING_LENINT(pass), 1, key, NULL);
p_key = key;
p_iv = iv;
}
else {
GetCipher(self, ctx);
}
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, p_key, p_iv, mode) != 1) {
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
}
return self;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The openssl gem for Ruby uses the same initialization vector (IV) in GCM Mode (aes-*-gcm) when the IV is set before the key, which makes it easier for context-dependent attackers to bypass the encryption protection mechanism.
Commit Message: cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initialize
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This
is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES
encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28).
r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for
Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate()
before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem
until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be
overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the
case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order
causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV.
The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL.
So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the
user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any
sense, this should not break existing applications.
Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with
their own responsibility.
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221
Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49
|
Low
| 168,779
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ContentEncoding::~ContentEncoding() {
ContentCompression** comp_i = compression_entries_;
ContentCompression** const comp_j = compression_entries_end_;
while (comp_i != comp_j) {
ContentCompression* const comp = *comp_i++;
delete comp;
}
delete [] compression_entries_;
ContentEncryption** enc_i = encryption_entries_;
ContentEncryption** const enc_j = encryption_entries_end_;
while (enc_i != enc_j) {
ContentEncryption* const enc = *enc_i++;
delete enc;
}
delete [] encryption_entries_;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,460
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, current)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
} else if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_object_create_type(0, intern, SPL_FS_INFO, NULL, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
RETURN_ZVAL(getThis(), 1, 0);
/*RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);*/
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,036
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: getprivs_ret * get_privs_2_svc(krb5_ui_4 *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static getprivs_ret ret;
gss_buffer_desc client_name, service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_getprivs_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(*arg, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
ret.code = kadm5_get_privs((void *)handle, &ret.privs);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_privs", client_name.value, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 167,517
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *pdid_buf,
unsigned int pkid_len,
int *valid_kdcPkId)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = pdid_buf;
int status = 1;
X509 *kdc_cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
*valid_kdcPkId = 0;
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
goto cleanup;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
status = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(kdc_cert), is->serial);
if (!status)
*valid_kdcPkId = 1;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The pkinit_check_kdc_pkid function in plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c in the PKINIT implementation in the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.10.4 and 1.11.x before 1.11.1 does not properly handle errors during extraction of fields from an X.509 certificate, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) via a malformed KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ AS-REQ request.
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
|
Medium
| 166,133
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RunScrollbarThumbDragLatencyTest() {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
blink::WebFloatPoint scrollbar_thumb(795, 30);
blink::WebMouseEvent mouse_down = SyntheticWebMouseEventBuilder::Build(
blink::WebInputEvent::kMouseDown, scrollbar_thumb.x, scrollbar_thumb.y,
0);
mouse_down.button = blink::WebMouseEvent::Button::kLeft;
mouse_down.SetTimeStamp(base::TimeTicks::Now());
GetWidgetHost()->ForwardMouseEvent(mouse_down);
blink::WebMouseEvent mouse_move = SyntheticWebMouseEventBuilder::Build(
blink::WebInputEvent::kMouseMove, scrollbar_thumb.x,
scrollbar_thumb.y + 10, 0);
mouse_move.button = blink::WebMouseEvent::Button::kLeft;
mouse_move.SetTimeStamp(base::TimeTicks::Now());
GetWidgetHost()->ForwardMouseEvent(mouse_move);
RunUntilInputProcessed(GetWidgetHost());
mouse_move.SetPositionInWidget(scrollbar_thumb.x, scrollbar_thumb.y + 20);
mouse_move.SetPositionInScreen(scrollbar_thumb.x, scrollbar_thumb.y + 20);
GetWidgetHost()->ForwardMouseEvent(mouse_move);
RunUntilInputProcessed(GetWidgetHost());
blink::WebMouseEvent mouse_up = SyntheticWebMouseEventBuilder::Build(
blink::WebInputEvent::kMouseUp, scrollbar_thumb.x,
scrollbar_thumb.y + 20, 0);
mouse_up.button = blink::WebMouseEvent::Button::kLeft;
mouse_up.SetTimeStamp(base::TimeTicks::Now());
GetWidgetHost()->ForwardMouseEvent(mouse_up);
RunUntilInputProcessed(GetWidgetHost());
FetchHistogramsFromChildProcesses();
const std::string scroll_types[] = {"ScrollBegin", "ScrollUpdate"};
for (const std::string& scroll_type : scroll_types) {
EXPECT_TRUE(VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1, "Event.Latency." + scroll_type +
".Scrollbar.TimeToScrollUpdateSwapBegin4"));
EXPECT_TRUE(VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1, "Event.Latency." + scroll_type +
".Scrollbar.RendererSwapToBrowserNotified2"));
EXPECT_TRUE(VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1, "Event.Latency." + scroll_type +
".Scrollbar.BrowserNotifiedToBeforeGpuSwap2"));
EXPECT_TRUE(VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1, "Event.Latency." + scroll_type + ".Scrollbar.GpuSwap2"));
std::string thread_name =
DoesScrollbarScrollOnMainThread() ? "Main" : "Impl";
EXPECT_TRUE(VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1, "Event.Latency." + scroll_type + ".Scrollbar.TimeToHandled2_" +
thread_name));
EXPECT_TRUE(VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1, "Event.Latency." + scroll_type +
".Scrollbar.HandledToRendererSwap2_" + thread_name));
}
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-281
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android failed to correctly propagate CSP restrictions to local scheme pages, which allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page, related to the unsafe-inline keyword.
Commit Message: Revert "Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures"
This reverts commit d9a56afcbdf9850bc39bb3edb56d07d11a1eb2b2.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 669086 as the
culprit for flakes in the build cycles as shown on:
https://analysis.chromium.org/p/chromium/flake-portal/analysis/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyQwsSDEZsYWtlQ3VscHJpdCIxY2hyb21pdW0vZDlhNTZhZmNiZGY5ODUwYmMzOWJiM2VkYjU2ZDA3ZDExYTFlYjJiMgw
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.chromiumos/linux-chromeos-rel/25818
Sample Failed Step: content_browsertests on Ubuntu-16.04
Sample Flaky Test: ScrollLatencyScrollbarBrowserTest.ScrollbarThumbDragLatency
Original change's description:
> Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures
>
> The original change to enable scrollbar latency for the composited
> scrollbars incorrectly used an existing member to try and determine
> whether a GestureScrollUpdate was the first one in an injected sequence
> or not. is_first_gesture_scroll_update_ was incorrect because it is only
> updated when input is actually dispatched to InputHandlerProxy, and the
> flag is cleared for all GSUs before the location where it was being
> read.
>
> This bug was missed because of incorrect tests. The
> VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram method doesn't actually assert or
> expect anything - the return value must be inspected.
>
> As part of fixing up the tests, I made a few other changes to get them
> passing consistently across all platforms:
> - turn on main thread scrollbar injection feature (in case it's ever
> turned off we don't want the tests to start failing)
> - enable mock scrollbars
> - disable smooth scrolling
> - don't run scrollbar tests on Android
>
> The composited scrollbar button test is disabled due to a bug in how
> the mock theme reports its button sizes, which throws off the region
> detection in ScrollbarLayerImplBase::IdentifyScrollbarPart (filed
> crbug.com/974063 for this issue).
>
> Change-Id: Ie1a762a5f6ecc264d22f0256db68f141fc76b950
>
> Bug: 954007
> Change-Id: Ib258e08e083e79da90ba2e4e4216e4879cf00cf7
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1652741
> Commit-Queue: Daniel Libby <dlibby@microsoft.com>
> Reviewed-by: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669086}
Change-Id: Icc743e48fa740fe27f0cb0cfa21b209a696f518c
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 954007
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1660114
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669150}
|
Medium
| 172,429
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void sas_revalidate_domain(struct work_struct *work)
{
int res = 0;
struct sas_discovery_event *ev = to_sas_discovery_event(work);
struct asd_sas_port *port = ev->port;
struct sas_ha_struct *ha = port->ha;
struct domain_device *ddev = port->port_dev;
/* prevent revalidation from finding sata links in recovery */
mutex_lock(&ha->disco_mutex);
if (test_bit(SAS_HA_ATA_EH_ACTIVE, &ha->state)) {
SAS_DPRINTK("REVALIDATION DEFERRED on port %d, pid:%d\n",
port->id, task_pid_nr(current));
goto out;
}
clear_bit(DISCE_REVALIDATE_DOMAIN, &port->disc.pending);
SAS_DPRINTK("REVALIDATING DOMAIN on port %d, pid:%d\n", port->id,
task_pid_nr(current));
if (ddev && (ddev->dev_type == SAS_FANOUT_EXPANDER_DEVICE ||
ddev->dev_type == SAS_EDGE_EXPANDER_DEVICE))
res = sas_ex_revalidate_domain(ddev);
SAS_DPRINTK("done REVALIDATING DOMAIN on port %d, pid:%d, res 0x%x\n",
port->id, task_pid_nr(current), res);
out:
mutex_unlock(&ha->disco_mutex);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.15.9 mishandles a mutex within libsas, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) by triggering certain error-handling code.
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
|
Low
| 169,389
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int fpm_stdio_init_child(struct fpm_worker_pool_s *wp) /* {{{ */
{
#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_H
if (fpm_globals.error_log_fd == ZLOG_SYSLOG) {
closelog(); /* ensure to close syslog not to interrupt with PHP syslog code */
} else
#endif
/* Notice: child cannot use master error_log
* because not aware when being reopen
* else, should use if (!fpm_use_error_log())
*/
if (fpm_globals.error_log_fd > 0) {
close(fpm_globals.error_log_fd);
}
fpm_globals.error_log_fd = -1;
zlog_set_fd(-1);
if (wp->listening_socket != STDIN_FILENO) {
if (0 > dup2(wp->listening_socket, STDIN_FILENO)) {
zlog(ZLOG_SYSERROR, "failed to init child stdio: dup2()");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: An issue was discovered in PHP 7.3.x before 7.3.0alpha3, 7.2.x before 7.2.8, and before 7.1.20. The php-fpm master process restarts a child process in an endless loop when using program execution functions (e.g., passthru, exec, shell_exec, or system) with a non-blocking STDIN stream, causing this master process to consume 100% of the CPU, and consume disk space with a large volume of error logs, as demonstrated by an attack by a customer of a shared-hosting facility.
Commit Message: Fixed bug #73342
Directly listen on socket, instead of duping it to STDIN and
listening on that.
|
Low
| 169,452
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SMB2_negotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses)
{
struct smb_rqst rqst;
struct smb2_negotiate_req *req;
struct smb2_negotiate_rsp *rsp;
struct kvec iov[1];
struct kvec rsp_iov;
int rc = 0;
int resp_buftype;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = ses->server;
int blob_offset, blob_length;
char *security_blob;
int flags = CIFS_NEG_OP;
unsigned int total_len;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Negotiate protocol\n");
if (!server) {
WARN(1, "%s: server is NULL!\n", __func__);
return -EIO;
}
rc = smb2_plain_req_init(SMB2_NEGOTIATE, NULL, (void **) &req, &total_len);
if (rc)
return rc;
req->sync_hdr.SessionId = 0;
memset(server->preauth_sha_hash, 0, SMB2_PREAUTH_HASH_SIZE);
memset(ses->preauth_sha_hash, 0, SMB2_PREAUTH_HASH_SIZE);
if (strcmp(ses->server->vals->version_string,
SMB3ANY_VERSION_STRING) == 0) {
req->Dialects[0] = cpu_to_le16(SMB30_PROT_ID);
req->Dialects[1] = cpu_to_le16(SMB302_PROT_ID);
req->DialectCount = cpu_to_le16(2);
total_len += 4;
} else if (strcmp(ses->server->vals->version_string,
SMBDEFAULT_VERSION_STRING) == 0) {
req->Dialects[0] = cpu_to_le16(SMB21_PROT_ID);
req->Dialects[1] = cpu_to_le16(SMB30_PROT_ID);
req->Dialects[2] = cpu_to_le16(SMB302_PROT_ID);
req->Dialects[3] = cpu_to_le16(SMB311_PROT_ID);
req->DialectCount = cpu_to_le16(4);
total_len += 8;
} else {
/* otherwise send specific dialect */
req->Dialects[0] = cpu_to_le16(ses->server->vals->protocol_id);
req->DialectCount = cpu_to_le16(1);
total_len += 2;
}
/* only one of SMB2 signing flags may be set in SMB2 request */
if (ses->sign)
req->SecurityMode = cpu_to_le16(SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_REQUIRED);
else if (global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_SIGN)
req->SecurityMode = cpu_to_le16(SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_ENABLED);
else
req->SecurityMode = 0;
req->Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(ses->server->vals->req_capabilities);
/* ClientGUID must be zero for SMB2.02 dialect */
if (ses->server->vals->protocol_id == SMB20_PROT_ID)
memset(req->ClientGUID, 0, SMB2_CLIENT_GUID_SIZE);
else {
memcpy(req->ClientGUID, server->client_guid,
SMB2_CLIENT_GUID_SIZE);
if ((ses->server->vals->protocol_id == SMB311_PROT_ID) ||
(strcmp(ses->server->vals->version_string,
SMBDEFAULT_VERSION_STRING) == 0))
assemble_neg_contexts(req, &total_len);
}
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
iov[0].iov_len = total_len;
memset(&rqst, 0, sizeof(struct smb_rqst));
rqst.rq_iov = iov;
rqst.rq_nvec = 1;
rc = cifs_send_recv(xid, ses, &rqst, &resp_buftype, flags, &rsp_iov);
cifs_small_buf_release(req);
rsp = (struct smb2_negotiate_rsp *)rsp_iov.iov_base;
/*
* No tcon so can't do
* cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->stats.smb2_stats.smb2_com_fail[SMB2...]);
*/
if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Dialect not supported by server. Consider "
"specifying vers=1.0 or vers=2.0 on mount for accessing"
" older servers\n");
goto neg_exit;
} else if (rc != 0)
goto neg_exit;
if (strcmp(ses->server->vals->version_string,
SMB3ANY_VERSION_STRING) == 0) {
if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB20_PROT_ID)) {
cifs_dbg(VFS,
"SMB2 dialect returned but not requested\n");
return -EIO;
} else if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB21_PROT_ID)) {
cifs_dbg(VFS,
"SMB2.1 dialect returned but not requested\n");
return -EIO;
}
} else if (strcmp(ses->server->vals->version_string,
SMBDEFAULT_VERSION_STRING) == 0) {
if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB20_PROT_ID)) {
cifs_dbg(VFS,
"SMB2 dialect returned but not requested\n");
return -EIO;
} else if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB21_PROT_ID)) {
/* ops set to 3.0 by default for default so update */
ses->server->ops = &smb21_operations;
} else if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB311_PROT_ID))
ses->server->ops = &smb311_operations;
} else if (le16_to_cpu(rsp->DialectRevision) !=
ses->server->vals->protocol_id) {
/* if requested single dialect ensure returned dialect matched */
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Illegal 0x%x dialect returned: not requested\n",
le16_to_cpu(rsp->DialectRevision));
return -EIO;
}
cifs_dbg(FYI, "mode 0x%x\n", rsp->SecurityMode);
if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB20_PROT_ID))
cifs_dbg(FYI, "negotiated smb2.0 dialect\n");
else if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB21_PROT_ID))
cifs_dbg(FYI, "negotiated smb2.1 dialect\n");
else if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB30_PROT_ID))
cifs_dbg(FYI, "negotiated smb3.0 dialect\n");
else if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB302_PROT_ID))
cifs_dbg(FYI, "negotiated smb3.02 dialect\n");
else if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB311_PROT_ID))
cifs_dbg(FYI, "negotiated smb3.1.1 dialect\n");
else {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Illegal dialect returned by server 0x%x\n",
le16_to_cpu(rsp->DialectRevision));
rc = -EIO;
goto neg_exit;
}
server->dialect = le16_to_cpu(rsp->DialectRevision);
/*
* Keep a copy of the hash after negprot. This hash will be
* the starting hash value for all sessions made from this
* server.
*/
memcpy(server->preauth_sha_hash, ses->preauth_sha_hash,
SMB2_PREAUTH_HASH_SIZE);
/* SMB2 only has an extended negflavor */
server->negflavor = CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED;
/* set it to the maximum buffer size value we can send with 1 credit */
server->maxBuf = min_t(unsigned int, le32_to_cpu(rsp->MaxTransactSize),
SMB2_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE);
server->max_read = le32_to_cpu(rsp->MaxReadSize);
server->max_write = le32_to_cpu(rsp->MaxWriteSize);
server->sec_mode = le16_to_cpu(rsp->SecurityMode);
if ((server->sec_mode & SMB2_SEC_MODE_FLAGS_ALL) != server->sec_mode)
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Server returned unexpected security mode 0x%x\n",
server->sec_mode);
server->capabilities = le32_to_cpu(rsp->Capabilities);
/* Internal types */
server->capabilities |= SMB2_NT_FIND | SMB2_LARGE_FILES;
security_blob = smb2_get_data_area_len(&blob_offset, &blob_length,
(struct smb2_sync_hdr *)rsp);
/*
* See MS-SMB2 section 2.2.4: if no blob, client picks default which
* for us will be
* ses->sectype = RawNTLMSSP;
* but for time being this is our only auth choice so doesn't matter.
* We just found a server which sets blob length to zero expecting raw.
*/
if (blob_length == 0) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "missing security blob on negprot\n");
server->sec_ntlmssp = true;
}
rc = cifs_enable_signing(server, ses->sign);
if (rc)
goto neg_exit;
if (blob_length) {
rc = decode_negTokenInit(security_blob, blob_length, server);
if (rc == 1)
rc = 0;
else if (rc == 0)
rc = -EIO;
}
if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB311_PROT_ID)) {
if (rsp->NegotiateContextCount)
rc = smb311_decode_neg_context(rsp, server,
rsp_iov.iov_len);
else
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Missing expected negotiate contexts\n");
}
neg_exit:
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.0.10. SMB2_negotiate in fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c has an out-of-bounds read because data structures are incompletely updated after a change from smb30 to smb21.
Commit Message: cifs: Fix lease buffer length error
There is a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_iter_full+0x783/0xaa0
Read of size 80 at addr ffff88810c35e180 by task mount.cifs/539
CPU: 1 PID: 539 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 4.19 #10
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.12.0-0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xdd/0x12a
print_address_description+0xa7/0x540
kasan_report+0x1ff/0x550
check_memory_region+0x2f1/0x310
memcpy+0x2f/0x80
_copy_from_iter_full+0x783/0xaa0
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x1840/0x4140
tcp_sendmsg+0x37/0x60
inet_sendmsg+0x18c/0x490
sock_sendmsg+0xae/0x130
smb_send_kvec+0x29c/0x520
__smb_send_rqst+0x3ef/0xc60
smb_send_rqst+0x25a/0x2e0
compound_send_recv+0x9e8/0x2af0
cifs_send_recv+0x24/0x30
SMB2_open+0x35e/0x1620
open_shroot+0x27b/0x490
smb2_open_op_close+0x4e1/0x590
smb2_query_path_info+0x2ac/0x650
cifs_get_inode_info+0x1058/0x28f0
cifs_root_iget+0x3bb/0xf80
cifs_smb3_do_mount+0xe00/0x14c0
cifs_do_mount+0x15/0x20
mount_fs+0x5e/0x290
vfs_kern_mount+0x88/0x460
do_mount+0x398/0x31e0
ksys_mount+0xc6/0x150
__x64_sys_mount+0xea/0x190
do_syscall_64+0x122/0x590
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
It can be reproduced by the following step:
1. samba configured with: server max protocol = SMB2_10
2. mount -o vers=default
When parse the mount version parameter, the 'ops' and 'vals'
was setted to smb30, if negotiate result is smb21, just
update the 'ops' to smb21, but the 'vals' is still smb30.
When add lease context, the iov_base is allocated with smb21
ops, but the iov_len is initiallited with the smb30. Because
the iov_len is longer than iov_base, when send the message,
copy array out of bounds.
we need to keep the 'ops' and 'vals' consistent.
Fixes: 9764c02fcbad ("SMB3: Add support for multidialect negotiate (SMB2.1 and later)")
Fixes: d5c7076b772a ("smb3: add smb3.1.1 to default dialect list")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
|
Low
| 169,527
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: build_unc_path_to_root(const struct smb_vol *vol,
const struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb)
{
char *full_path, *pos;
unsigned int pplen = vol->prepath ? strlen(vol->prepath) + 1 : 0;
unsigned int unc_len = strnlen(vol->UNC, MAX_TREE_SIZE + 1);
full_path = kmalloc(unc_len + pplen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (full_path == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
strncpy(full_path, vol->UNC, unc_len);
pos = full_path + unc_len;
if (pplen) {
*pos++ = CIFS_DIR_SEP(cifs_sb);
strncpy(pos, vol->prepath, pplen);
pos += pplen;
}
*pos = '\0'; /* add trailing null */
convert_delimiter(full_path, CIFS_DIR_SEP(cifs_sb));
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: full_path=%s\n", __func__, full_path);
return full_path;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Off-by-one error in the build_unc_path_to_root function in fs/cifs/connect.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash) via a DFS share mount operation that triggers use of an unexpected DFS referral name length.
Commit Message: cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <marcus.moeller@gmx.ch>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <ken.fallon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
|
Low
| 166,010
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int rxrpc_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp;
struct rxrpc_call *call = NULL, *continue_call = NULL;
struct rxrpc_sock *rx = rxrpc_sk(sock->sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
long timeo;
int copy, ret, ullen, offset, copied = 0;
u32 abort_code;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
_enter(",,,%zu,%d", len, flags);
if (flags & (MSG_OOB | MSG_TRUNC))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ullen = msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT ? 4 : sizeof(unsigned long);
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(&rx->sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_MORE;
lock_sock(&rx->sk);
for (;;) {
/* return immediately if a client socket has no outstanding
* calls */
if (RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&rx->calls)) {
if (copied)
goto out;
if (rx->sk.sk_state != RXRPC_SERVER_LISTENING) {
release_sock(&rx->sk);
if (continue_call)
rxrpc_put_call(continue_call);
return -ENODATA;
}
}
/* get the next message on the Rx queue */
skb = skb_peek(&rx->sk.sk_receive_queue);
if (!skb) {
/* nothing remains on the queue */
if (copied &&
(msg->msg_flags & MSG_PEEK || timeo == 0))
goto out;
/* wait for a message to turn up */
release_sock(&rx->sk);
prepare_to_wait_exclusive(sk_sleep(&rx->sk), &wait,
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
ret = sock_error(&rx->sk);
if (ret)
goto wait_error;
if (skb_queue_empty(&rx->sk.sk_receive_queue)) {
if (signal_pending(current))
goto wait_interrupted;
timeo = schedule_timeout(timeo);
}
finish_wait(sk_sleep(&rx->sk), &wait);
lock_sock(&rx->sk);
continue;
}
peek_next_packet:
sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
call = sp->call;
ASSERT(call != NULL);
_debug("next pkt %s", rxrpc_pkts[sp->hdr.type]);
/* make sure we wait for the state to be updated in this call */
spin_lock_bh(&call->lock);
spin_unlock_bh(&call->lock);
if (test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_RELEASED, &call->flags)) {
_debug("packet from released call");
if (skb_dequeue(&rx->sk.sk_receive_queue) != skb)
BUG();
rxrpc_free_skb(skb);
continue;
}
/* determine whether to continue last data receive */
if (continue_call) {
_debug("maybe cont");
if (call != continue_call ||
skb->mark != RXRPC_SKB_MARK_DATA) {
release_sock(&rx->sk);
rxrpc_put_call(continue_call);
_leave(" = %d [noncont]", copied);
return copied;
}
}
rxrpc_get_call(call);
/* copy the peer address and timestamp */
if (!continue_call) {
if (msg->msg_name && msg->msg_namelen > 0)
memcpy(msg->msg_name,
&call->conn->trans->peer->srx,
sizeof(call->conn->trans->peer->srx));
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, &rx->sk, skb);
}
/* receive the message */
if (skb->mark != RXRPC_SKB_MARK_DATA)
goto receive_non_data_message;
_debug("recvmsg DATA #%u { %d, %d }",
ntohl(sp->hdr.seq), skb->len, sp->offset);
if (!continue_call) {
/* only set the control data once per recvmsg() */
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_USER_CALL_ID,
ullen, &call->user_call_ID);
if (ret < 0)
goto copy_error;
ASSERT(test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_HAS_USERID, &call->flags));
}
ASSERTCMP(ntohl(sp->hdr.seq), >=, call->rx_data_recv);
ASSERTCMP(ntohl(sp->hdr.seq), <=, call->rx_data_recv + 1);
call->rx_data_recv = ntohl(sp->hdr.seq);
ASSERTCMP(ntohl(sp->hdr.seq), >, call->rx_data_eaten);
offset = sp->offset;
copy = skb->len - offset;
if (copy > len - copied)
copy = len - copied;
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY) {
ret = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, offset,
msg->msg_iov, copy);
} else {
ret = skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, offset,
msg->msg_iov);
if (ret == -EINVAL)
goto csum_copy_error;
}
if (ret < 0)
goto copy_error;
/* handle piecemeal consumption of data packets */
_debug("copied %d+%d", copy, copied);
offset += copy;
copied += copy;
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK))
sp->offset = offset;
if (sp->offset < skb->len) {
_debug("buffer full");
ASSERTCMP(copied, ==, len);
break;
}
/* we transferred the whole data packet */
if (sp->hdr.flags & RXRPC_LAST_PACKET) {
_debug("last");
if (call->conn->out_clientflag) {
/* last byte of reply received */
ret = copied;
goto terminal_message;
}
/* last bit of request received */
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
_debug("eat packet");
if (skb_dequeue(&rx->sk.sk_receive_queue) !=
skb)
BUG();
rxrpc_free_skb(skb);
}
msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_MORE;
break;
}
/* move on to the next data message */
_debug("next");
if (!continue_call)
continue_call = sp->call;
else
rxrpc_put_call(call);
call = NULL;
if (flags & MSG_PEEK) {
_debug("peek next");
skb = skb->next;
if (skb == (struct sk_buff *) &rx->sk.sk_receive_queue)
break;
goto peek_next_packet;
}
_debug("eat packet");
if (skb_dequeue(&rx->sk.sk_receive_queue) != skb)
BUG();
rxrpc_free_skb(skb);
}
/* end of non-terminal data packet reception for the moment */
_debug("end rcv data");
out:
release_sock(&rx->sk);
if (call)
rxrpc_put_call(call);
if (continue_call)
rxrpc_put_call(continue_call);
_leave(" = %d [data]", copied);
return copied;
/* handle non-DATA messages such as aborts, incoming connections and
* final ACKs */
receive_non_data_message:
_debug("non-data");
if (skb->mark == RXRPC_SKB_MARK_NEW_CALL) {
_debug("RECV NEW CALL");
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_NEW_CALL, 0, &abort_code);
if (ret < 0)
goto copy_error;
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
if (skb_dequeue(&rx->sk.sk_receive_queue) != skb)
BUG();
rxrpc_free_skb(skb);
}
goto out;
}
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_USER_CALL_ID,
ullen, &call->user_call_ID);
if (ret < 0)
goto copy_error;
ASSERT(test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_HAS_USERID, &call->flags));
switch (skb->mark) {
case RXRPC_SKB_MARK_DATA:
BUG();
case RXRPC_SKB_MARK_FINAL_ACK:
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_ACK, 0, &abort_code);
break;
case RXRPC_SKB_MARK_BUSY:
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_BUSY, 0, &abort_code);
break;
case RXRPC_SKB_MARK_REMOTE_ABORT:
abort_code = call->abort_code;
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_ABORT, 4, &abort_code);
break;
case RXRPC_SKB_MARK_NET_ERROR:
_debug("RECV NET ERROR %d", sp->error);
abort_code = sp->error;
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_NET_ERROR, 4, &abort_code);
break;
case RXRPC_SKB_MARK_LOCAL_ERROR:
_debug("RECV LOCAL ERROR %d", sp->error);
abort_code = sp->error;
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_LOCAL_ERROR, 4,
&abort_code);
break;
default:
BUG();
break;
}
if (ret < 0)
goto copy_error;
terminal_message:
_debug("terminal");
msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_MORE;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
_net("free terminal skb %p", skb);
if (skb_dequeue(&rx->sk.sk_receive_queue) != skb)
BUG();
rxrpc_free_skb(skb);
rxrpc_remove_user_ID(rx, call);
}
release_sock(&rx->sk);
rxrpc_put_call(call);
if (continue_call)
rxrpc_put_call(continue_call);
_leave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
copy_error:
_debug("copy error");
release_sock(&rx->sk);
rxrpc_put_call(call);
if (continue_call)
rxrpc_put_call(continue_call);
_leave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
csum_copy_error:
_debug("csum error");
release_sock(&rx->sk);
if (continue_call)
rxrpc_put_call(continue_call);
rxrpc_kill_skb(skb);
skb_kill_datagram(&rx->sk, skb, flags);
rxrpc_put_call(call);
return -EAGAIN;
wait_interrupted:
ret = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
wait_error:
finish_wait(sk_sleep(&rx->sk), &wait);
if (continue_call)
rxrpc_put_call(continue_call);
if (copied)
copied = ret;
_leave(" = %d [waitfail %d]", copied, ret);
return copied;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,514
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouter::OnDangerousDeepScanningResult(
const GURL& url,
const std::string& file_name,
const std::string& download_digest_sha256) {
if (client_) {
base::Value event(base::Value::Type::DICTIONARY);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyUrl, url.spec());
event.SetStringKey(kKeyFileName, file_name);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyDownloadDigestSha256, download_digest_sha256);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyProfileUserName, GetProfileUserName());
ReportRealtimeEvent(kKeyDangerousDownloadEvent, std::move(event));
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android allowed a remote attacker to have an unspecified impact via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: Add reporting for DLP deep scanning
For each triggered rule in the DLP response, we report the download as
violating that rule.
This also implements the UnsafeReportingEnabled enterprise policy, which
controls whether or not we do any reporting.
Bug: 980777
Change-Id: I48100cfb4dd5aa92ed80da1f34e64a6e393be2fa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1772381
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691371}
|
Medium
| 172,412
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ff_h263_decode_picture_header(MpegEncContext *s)
{
int format, width, height, i;
uint32_t startcode;
align_get_bits(&s->gb);
startcode= get_bits(&s->gb, 22-8);
for(i= get_bits_left(&s->gb); i>24; i-=8) {
startcode = ((startcode << 8) | get_bits(&s->gb, 8)) & 0x003FFFFF;
if(startcode == 0x20)
break;
}
if (startcode != 0x20) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Bad picture start code\n");
return -1;
}
/* temporal reference */
i = get_bits(&s->gb, 8); /* picture timestamp */
if( (s->picture_number&~0xFF)+i < s->picture_number)
i+= 256;
s->picture_number= (s->picture_number&~0xFF) + i;
/* PTYPE starts here */
if (get_bits1(&s->gb) != 1) {
/* marker */
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Bad marker\n");
return -1;
}
if (get_bits1(&s->gb) != 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Bad H263 id\n");
return -1; /* h263 id */
}
skip_bits1(&s->gb); /* split screen off */
skip_bits1(&s->gb); /* camera off */
skip_bits1(&s->gb); /* freeze picture release off */
format = get_bits(&s->gb, 3);
/*
0 forbidden
1 sub-QCIF
10 QCIF
7 extended PTYPE (PLUSPTYPE)
*/
if (format != 7 && format != 6) {
s->h263_plus = 0;
/* H.263v1 */
/* H.263v1 */
width = ff_h263_format[format][0];
height = ff_h263_format[format][1];
if (!width)
return -1;
s->pict_type = AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I + get_bits1(&s->gb);
s->h263_long_vectors = get_bits1(&s->gb);
if (get_bits1(&s->gb) != 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "H263 SAC not supported\n");
return -1; /* SAC: off */
}
s->obmc= get_bits1(&s->gb); /* Advanced prediction mode */
s->unrestricted_mv = s->h263_long_vectors || s->obmc;
s->pb_frame = get_bits1(&s->gb);
s->chroma_qscale= s->qscale = get_bits(&s->gb, 5);
skip_bits1(&s->gb); /* Continuous Presence Multipoint mode: off */
s->width = width;
s->height = height;
s->avctx->sample_aspect_ratio= (AVRational){12,11};
s->avctx->framerate = (AVRational){ 30000, 1001 };
} else {
int ufep;
/* H.263v2 */
s->h263_plus = 1;
ufep = get_bits(&s->gb, 3); /* Update Full Extended PTYPE */
/* ufep other than 0 and 1 are reserved */
if (ufep == 1) {
/* OPPTYPE */
format = get_bits(&s->gb, 3);
ff_dlog(s->avctx, "ufep=1, format: %d\n", format);
s->custom_pcf= get_bits1(&s->gb);
s->umvplus = get_bits1(&s->gb); /* Unrestricted Motion Vector */
if (get_bits1(&s->gb) != 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Syntax-based Arithmetic Coding (SAC) not supported\n");
}
s->obmc= get_bits1(&s->gb); /* Advanced prediction mode */
s->h263_aic = get_bits1(&s->gb); /* Advanced Intra Coding (AIC) */
s->loop_filter= get_bits1(&s->gb);
s->unrestricted_mv = s->umvplus || s->obmc || s->loop_filter;
s->h263_slice_structured= get_bits1(&s->gb);
if (get_bits1(&s->gb) != 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Reference Picture Selection not supported\n");
}
if (get_bits1(&s->gb) != 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Independent Segment Decoding not supported\n");
}
s->alt_inter_vlc= get_bits1(&s->gb);
s->modified_quant= get_bits1(&s->gb);
if(s->modified_quant)
s->chroma_qscale_table= ff_h263_chroma_qscale_table;
skip_bits(&s->gb, 1); /* Prevent start code emulation */
skip_bits(&s->gb, 3); /* Reserved */
} else if (ufep != 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Bad UFEP type (%d)\n", ufep);
return -1;
}
/* MPPTYPE */
s->pict_type = get_bits(&s->gb, 3);
switch(s->pict_type){
case 0: s->pict_type= AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I;break;
case 1: s->pict_type= AV_PICTURE_TYPE_P;break;
case 2: s->pict_type= AV_PICTURE_TYPE_P;s->pb_frame = 3;break;
case 3: s->pict_type= AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B;break;
case 7: s->pict_type= AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I;break; //ZYGO
default:
return -1;
}
skip_bits(&s->gb, 2);
s->no_rounding = get_bits1(&s->gb);
skip_bits(&s->gb, 4);
/* Get the picture dimensions */
if (ufep) {
if (format == 6) {
/* Custom Picture Format (CPFMT) */
s->aspect_ratio_info = get_bits(&s->gb, 4);
ff_dlog(s->avctx, "aspect: %d\n", s->aspect_ratio_info);
/* aspect ratios:
0 - forbidden
1 - 1:1
2 - 12:11 (CIF 4:3)
3 - 10:11 (525-type 4:3)
4 - 16:11 (CIF 16:9)
5 - 40:33 (525-type 16:9)
6-14 - reserved
*/
width = (get_bits(&s->gb, 9) + 1) * 4;
skip_bits1(&s->gb);
height = get_bits(&s->gb, 9) * 4;
ff_dlog(s->avctx, "\nH.263+ Custom picture: %dx%d\n",width,height);
if (s->aspect_ratio_info == FF_ASPECT_EXTENDED) {
/* aspected dimensions */
s->avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.num= get_bits(&s->gb, 8);
s->avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.den= get_bits(&s->gb, 8);
}else{
s->avctx->sample_aspect_ratio= ff_h263_pixel_aspect[s->aspect_ratio_info];
}
} else {
width = ff_h263_format[format][0];
height = ff_h263_format[format][1];
s->avctx->sample_aspect_ratio= (AVRational){12,11};
}
if ((width == 0) || (height == 0))
return -1;
s->width = width;
s->height = height;
if(s->custom_pcf){
int gcd;
s->avctx->framerate.num = 1800000;
s->avctx->framerate.den = 1000 + get_bits1(&s->gb);
s->avctx->framerate.den *= get_bits(&s->gb, 7);
if(s->avctx->framerate.den == 0){
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "zero framerate\n");
return -1;
}
gcd= av_gcd(s->avctx->framerate.den, s->avctx->framerate.num);
s->avctx->framerate.den /= gcd;
s->avctx->framerate.num /= gcd;
}else{
s->avctx->framerate = (AVRational){ 30000, 1001 };
}
}
if(s->custom_pcf){
skip_bits(&s->gb, 2); //extended Temporal reference
}
if (ufep) {
if (s->umvplus) {
if(get_bits1(&s->gb)==0) /* Unlimited Unrestricted Motion Vectors Indicator (UUI) */
skip_bits1(&s->gb);
}
if(s->h263_slice_structured){
if (get_bits1(&s->gb) != 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "rectangular slices not supported\n");
}
if (get_bits1(&s->gb) != 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "unordered slices not supported\n");
}
}
}
s->qscale = get_bits(&s->gb, 5);
}
s->mb_width = (s->width + 15) / 16;
s->mb_height = (s->height + 15) / 16;
s->mb_num = s->mb_width * s->mb_height;
skip_bits(&s->gb, 3); /* Temporal reference for B-pictures */
if (s->custom_pcf)
skip_bits(&s->gb, 2); //extended Temporal reference
skip_bits(&s->gb, 2); /* Quantization information for B-pictures */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ff_h263_decode_mba function in libavcodec/ituh263dec.c in Libav before 11.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and application crash) via a file with crafted dimensions.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,298
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static unsigned HuffmanTree_makeFromFrequencies(HuffmanTree* tree, const unsigned* frequencies,
size_t mincodes, size_t numcodes, unsigned maxbitlen)
{
unsigned error = 0;
while(!frequencies[numcodes - 1] && numcodes > mincodes) numcodes--; /*trim zeroes*/
tree->maxbitlen = maxbitlen;
tree->numcodes = (unsigned)numcodes; /*number of symbols*/
tree->lengths = (unsigned*)realloc(tree->lengths, numcodes * sizeof(unsigned));
if(!tree->lengths) return 83; /*alloc fail*/
/*initialize all lengths to 0*/
memset(tree->lengths, 0, numcodes * sizeof(unsigned));
error = lodepng_huffman_code_lengths(tree->lengths, frequencies, numcodes, maxbitlen);
if(!error) error = HuffmanTree_makeFromLengths2(tree);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: HuffmanTree_makeFromFrequencies in lodepng.c in LodePNG through 2019-09-28, as used in WinPR in FreeRDP and other products, has a memory leak because a supplied realloc pointer (i.e., the first argument to realloc) is also used for a realloc return value.
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
|
Low
| 169,499
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct tcp_options_received tcp_opt;
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct tcp_request_sock *treq;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
__u32 cookie = ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1;
struct sock *ret = sk;
struct request_sock *req;
int mss;
struct dst_entry *dst;
__u8 rcv_wscale;
if (!sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack || th->rst)
goto out;
if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(sk))
goto out;
mss = __cookie_v6_check(ipv6_hdr(skb), th, cookie);
if (mss == 0) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESFAILED);
goto out;
}
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESRECV);
/* check for timestamp cookie support */
memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt));
tcp_parse_options(skb, &tcp_opt, 0, NULL);
if (!cookie_timestamp_decode(&tcp_opt))
goto out;
ret = NULL;
req = inet_reqsk_alloc(&tcp6_request_sock_ops, sk, false);
if (!req)
goto out;
ireq = inet_rsk(req);
treq = tcp_rsk(req);
treq->tfo_listener = false;
if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req))
goto out_free;
req->mss = mss;
ireq->ir_rmt_port = th->source;
ireq->ir_num = ntohs(th->dest);
ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;
if (ipv6_opt_accepted(sk, skb, &TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h6) ||
np->rxopt.bits.rxinfo || np->rxopt.bits.rxoinfo ||
np->rxopt.bits.rxhlim || np->rxopt.bits.rxohlim) {
atomic_inc(&skb->users);
ireq->pktopts = skb;
}
ireq->ir_iif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
/* So that link locals have meaning */
if (!sk->sk_bound_dev_if &&
ipv6_addr_type(&ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
ireq->ir_iif = tcp_v6_iif(skb);
ireq->ir_mark = inet_request_mark(sk, skb);
req->num_retrans = 0;
ireq->snd_wscale = tcp_opt.snd_wscale;
ireq->sack_ok = tcp_opt.sack_ok;
ireq->wscale_ok = tcp_opt.wscale_ok;
ireq->tstamp_ok = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp;
req->ts_recent = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp ? tcp_opt.rcv_tsval : 0;
treq->snt_synack.v64 = 0;
treq->rcv_isn = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
treq->snt_isn = cookie;
/*
* We need to lookup the dst_entry to get the correct window size.
* This is taken from tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock. Somebody please enlighten
* me if there is a preferred way.
*/
{
struct in6_addr *final_p, final;
struct flowi6 fl6;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
fl6.daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
fl6.saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = ireq->ir_mark;
fl6.fl6_dport = ireq->ir_rmt_port;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet_sk(sk)->inet_sport;
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst))
goto out_free;
}
req->rsk_window_clamp = tp->window_clamp ? :dst_metric(dst, RTAX_WINDOW);
tcp_select_initial_window(tcp_full_space(sk), req->mss,
&req->rsk_rcv_wnd, &req->rsk_window_clamp,
ireq->wscale_ok, &rcv_wscale,
dst_metric(dst, RTAX_INITRWND));
ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale;
ireq->ecn_ok = cookie_ecn_ok(&tcp_opt, sock_net(sk), dst);
ret = tcp_get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, dst);
out:
return ret;
out_free:
reqsk_free(req);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,339
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t wdm_read
(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
int rv, cntr;
int i = 0;
struct wdm_device *desc = file->private_data;
rv = mutex_lock_interruptible(&desc->rlock); /*concurrent reads */
if (rv < 0)
return -ERESTARTSYS;
cntr = ACCESS_ONCE(desc->length);
if (cntr == 0) {
desc->read = 0;
retry:
if (test_bit(WDM_DISCONNECTING, &desc->flags)) {
rv = -ENODEV;
goto err;
}
i++;
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
if (!test_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags)) {
rv = cntr ? cntr : -EAGAIN;
goto err;
}
rv = 0;
} else {
rv = wait_event_interruptible(desc->wait,
test_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags));
}
/* may have happened while we slept */
if (test_bit(WDM_DISCONNECTING, &desc->flags)) {
rv = -ENODEV;
goto err;
}
if (test_bit(WDM_RESETTING, &desc->flags)) {
rv = -EIO;
goto err;
}
usb_mark_last_busy(interface_to_usbdev(desc->intf));
if (rv < 0) {
rv = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto err;
}
spin_lock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
if (desc->rerr) { /* read completed, error happened */
desc->rerr = 0;
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
rv = -EIO;
goto err;
}
/*
* recheck whether we've lost the race
* against the completion handler
*/
if (!test_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags)) { /* lost race */
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
goto retry;
}
if (!desc->reslength) { /* zero length read */
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev, "%s: zero length - clearing WDM_READ\n", __func__);
clear_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags);
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
goto retry;
}
cntr = desc->length;
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
}
if (cntr > count)
cntr = count;
rv = copy_to_user(buffer, desc->ubuf, cntr);
if (rv > 0) {
rv = -EFAULT;
goto err;
}
spin_lock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
for (i = 0; i < desc->length - cntr; i++)
desc->ubuf[i] = desc->ubuf[i + cntr];
desc->length -= cntr;
/* in case we had outstanding data */
if (!desc->length)
clear_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags);
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
rv = cntr;
err:
mutex_unlock(&desc->rlock);
return rv;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the wdm_in_callback function in drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted cdc-wdm USB device.
Commit Message: USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Medium
| 166,105
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sock_iocb *siocb = kiocb_to_siocb(kiocb);
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_nl *addr = msg->msg_name;
u32 dst_pid;
u32 dst_group;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
struct scm_cookie scm;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (NULL == siocb->scm)
siocb->scm = &scm;
err = scm_send(sock, msg, siocb->scm);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (msg->msg_namelen) {
err = -EINVAL;
if (addr->nl_family != AF_NETLINK)
goto out;
dst_pid = addr->nl_pid;
dst_group = ffs(addr->nl_groups);
err = -EPERM;
if (dst_group && !netlink_capable(sock, NL_NONROOT_SEND))
goto out;
} else {
dst_pid = nlk->dst_pid;
dst_group = nlk->dst_group;
}
if (!nlk->pid) {
err = netlink_autobind(sock);
if (err)
goto out;
}
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (len > sk->sk_sndbuf - 32)
goto out;
err = -ENOBUFS;
skb = alloc_skb(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
NETLINK_CB(skb).pid = nlk->pid;
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = dst_group;
memcpy(NETLINK_CREDS(skb), &siocb->scm->creds, sizeof(struct ucred));
err = -EFAULT;
if (memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto out;
}
err = security_netlink_send(sk, skb);
if (err) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto out;
}
if (dst_group) {
atomic_inc(&skb->users);
netlink_broadcast(sk, skb, dst_pid, dst_group, GFP_KERNEL);
}
err = netlink_unicast(sk, skb, dst_pid, msg->msg_flags&MSG_DONTWAIT);
out:
scm_destroy(siocb->scm);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: The Netlink implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.2.30 does not properly handle messages that lack SCM_CREDENTIALS data, which might allow local users to spoof Netlink communication via a crafted message, as demonstrated by a message to (1) Avahi or (2) NetworkManager.
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 165,578
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: StateBase* writeBlob(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value, StateBase* next)
{
Blob* blob = V8Blob::toNative(value.As<v8::Object>());
if (!blob)
return 0;
if (blob->hasBeenClosed())
return handleError(DataCloneError, "A Blob object has been closed, and could therefore not be cloned.", next);
int blobIndex = -1;
m_blobDataHandles.add(blob->uuid(), blob->blobDataHandle());
if (appendBlobInfo(blob->uuid(), blob->type(), blob->size(), &blobIndex))
m_writer.writeBlobIndex(blobIndex);
else
m_writer.writeBlob(blob->uuid(), blob->type(), blob->size());
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the V8 bindings in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 37.0.2062.94, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper use of HashMap add operations instead of HashMap set operations, related to bindings/core/v8/DOMWrapperMap.h and bindings/core/v8/SerializedScriptValue.cpp.
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,650
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *, lsa, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
struct flowi6 fl6;
int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
int hlimit = -1;
int tclass = -1;
int dontfrag = -1;
int transhdrlen = 4; /* zero session-id */
int ulen = len + transhdrlen;
int err;
/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
better check is made in ip6_append_data().
*/
if (len > INT_MAX)
return -EMSGSIZE;
/* Mirror BSD error message compatibility */
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (lsa) {
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
if (lsa->l2tp_family && lsa->l2tp_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
daddr = &lsa->l2tp_addr;
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = lsa->l2tp_flowinfo & IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Otherwise it will be difficult to maintain
* sk->sk_dst_cache.
*/
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED &&
ipv6_addr_equal(daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr))
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
lsa->l2tp_scope_id &&
ipv6_addr_type(daddr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
fl6.flowi6_oif = lsa->l2tp_scope_id;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
}
if (fl6.flowi6_oif == 0)
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
opt = &opt_space;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions);
err = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(sock_net(sk), sk, msg, &fl6, opt,
&hlimit, &tclass, &dontfrag);
if (err < 0) {
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err;
}
if ((fl6.flowlabel & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) && !flowlabel) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
}
if (opt == NULL)
opt = np->opt;
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(daddr))
fl6.daddr = *daddr;
else
fl6.daddr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1; /* :: means loopback (BSD'ism) */
if (ipv6_addr_any(&fl6.saddr) && !ipv6_addr_any(&np->saddr))
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr))
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
else if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
goto out;
}
if (hlimit < 0)
hlimit = ip6_sk_dst_hoplimit(np, &fl6, dst);
if (tclass < 0)
tclass = np->tclass;
if (dontfrag < 0)
dontfrag = np->dontfrag;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
lock_sock(sk);
err = ip6_append_data(sk, ip_generic_getfrag, msg,
ulen, transhdrlen, hlimit, tclass, opt,
&fl6, (struct rt6_info *)dst,
msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
if (err)
ip6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE))
err = l2tp_ip6_push_pending_frames(sk);
release_sock(sk);
done:
dst_release(dst);
out:
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err < 0 ? err : len;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto done;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,344
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: zsetcolor(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
es_ptr ep;
const gs_color_space * pcs = gs_currentcolorspace(igs);
gs_client_color cc;
int n_comps, n_numeric_comps, num_offset = 0, code, depth;
PS_colour_space_t *space;
/* initialize the client color pattern pointer for GC */
cc.pattern = 0;
/* check for a pattern color space */
if ((n_comps = cs_num_components(pcs)) < 0) {
n_comps = -n_comps;
if (r_has_type(op, t_dictionary)) {
ref *pImpl, pPatInst;
code = dict_find_string(op, "Implementation", &pImpl);
if (code != 0) {
code = array_get(imemory, pImpl, 0, &pPatInst);
if (code < 0)
return code;
n_numeric_comps = ( pattern_instance_uses_base_space(cc.pattern)
? n_comps - 1
: 0 );
} else
n_numeric_comps = 0;
} else
n_numeric_comps = 0;
num_offset = 1;
} else
n_numeric_comps = n_comps;
/* gather the numeric operands */
code = float_params(op - num_offset, n_numeric_comps, cc.paint.values);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* The values are copied to graphic state and compared with */
/* other colors by memcmp() in gx_hld_saved_color_equal() */
/* This is the easiest way to avoid indeterminism */
memset(cc.paint.values + n_numeric_comps, 0,
sizeof(cc.paint.values) - sizeof(*cc.paint.values)*n_numeric_comps);
code = get_space_object(i_ctx_p, &istate->colorspace[0].array, &space);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (space->validatecomponents) {
code = space->validatecomponents(i_ctx_p,
&istate->colorspace[0].array,
cc.paint.values, n_numeric_comps);
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
/* pass the color to the graphic library */
if ((code = gs_setcolor(igs, &cc)) >= 0) {
if (n_comps > n_numeric_comps) {
istate->pattern[0] = *op; /* save pattern dict or null */
}
}
/* Check the color spaces, to see if we need to run any tint transform
* procedures. Some Adobe applications *eg Photoshop) expect that the
* tint transform will be run and use this to set up duotone DeviceN
* spaces.
*/
code = validate_spaces(i_ctx_p, &istate->colorspace[0].array, &depth);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* Set up for the continuation procedure which will do the work */
/* Make sure the exec stack has enough space */
check_estack(5);
/* A place holder for data potentially used by transform functions */
ep = esp += 1;
make_int(ep, 0);
/* Store the 'depth' of the space returned during checking above */
ep = esp += 1;
make_int(ep, 0);
/* Store the 'stage' of processing (initially 0) */
ep = esp += 1;
make_int(ep, 0);
/* Store a pointer to the color space stored on the operand stack
* as the stack may grow unpredictably making further access
* to the space difficult
*/
ep = esp += 1;
*ep = istate->colorspace[0].array;
/* Finally, the actual continuation routine */
push_op_estack(setcolor_cont);
return o_push_estack;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-704
Summary: In Artifex Ghostscript before 9.24, attackers able to supply crafted PostScript files could use a type confusion in the setcolor function to crash the interpreter or possibly have unspecified other impact.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,697
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ethertype_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_short ether_type, const u_char *p,
u_int length, u_int caplen,
const struct lladdr_info *src, const struct lladdr_info *dst)
{
switch (ether_type) {
case ETHERTYPE_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_ARP:
case ETHERTYPE_REVARP:
arp_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_DN:
decnet_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_ATALK:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "et1 "));
atalk_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_AARP:
aarp_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_IPX:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(NOV-ETHII) "));
ipx_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_ISO:
if (length == 0 || caplen == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|osi]"));
return (1);
}
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1, caplen - 1);
return(1);
case ETHERTYPE_PPPOED:
case ETHERTYPE_PPPOES:
case ETHERTYPE_PPPOED2:
case ETHERTYPE_PPPOES2:
pppoe_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_EAPOL:
eap_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_RRCP:
rrcp_print(ndo, p, length, src, dst);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_PPP:
if (length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": "));
ppp_print(ndo, p, length);
}
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_MPCP:
mpcp_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_SLOW:
slow_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_CFM:
case ETHERTYPE_CFM_OLD:
cfm_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_LLDP:
lldp_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_NSH:
nsh_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_LOOPBACK:
loopback_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS:
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS_MULTI:
mpls_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_TIPC:
tipc_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_MS_NLB_HB:
msnlb_print(ndo, p);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_GEONET_OLD:
case ETHERTYPE_GEONET:
geonet_print(ndo, p, length, src);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_CALM_FAST:
calm_fast_print(ndo, p, length, src);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_AOE:
aoe_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_MEDSA:
medsa_print(ndo, p, length, caplen, src, dst);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_LAT:
case ETHERTYPE_SCA:
case ETHERTYPE_MOPRC:
case ETHERTYPE_MOPDL:
case ETHERTYPE_IEEE1905_1:
/* default_print for now */
default:
return (0);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,944
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: TEE_Result syscall_cryp_derive_key(unsigned long state,
const struct utee_attribute *usr_params,
unsigned long param_count, unsigned long derived_key)
{
TEE_Result res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
struct tee_obj *ko;
struct tee_obj *so;
struct tee_cryp_state *cs;
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *sk;
const struct tee_cryp_obj_type_props *type_props;
TEE_Attribute *params = NULL;
struct user_ta_ctx *utc;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
utc = to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx);
res = tee_svc_cryp_get_state(sess, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(state), &cs);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
params = malloc(sizeof(TEE_Attribute) * param_count);
if (!params)
return TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
res = copy_in_attrs(utc, usr_params, param_count, params);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Get key set in operation */
res = tee_obj_get(utc, cs->key1, &ko);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
res = tee_obj_get(utc, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(derived_key), &so);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Find information needed about the object to initialize */
sk = so->attr;
/* Find description of object */
type_props = tee_svc_find_type_props(so->info.objectType);
if (!type_props) {
res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
goto out;
}
if (cs->algo == TEE_ALG_DH_DERIVE_SHARED_SECRET) {
size_t alloc_size;
struct bignum *pub;
struct bignum *ss;
if (param_count != 1 ||
params[0].attributeID != TEE_ATTR_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
alloc_size = params[0].content.ref.length * 8;
pub = crypto_bignum_allocate(alloc_size);
ss = crypto_bignum_allocate(alloc_size);
if (pub && ss) {
crypto_bignum_bin2bn(params[0].content.ref.buffer,
params[0].content.ref.length, pub);
res = crypto_acipher_dh_shared_secret(ko->attr,
pub, ss);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = crypto_bignum_num_bytes(ss);
crypto_bignum_bn2bin(ss, (uint8_t *)(sk + 1));
so->info.handleFlags |=
TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props,
TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
} else {
res = TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
crypto_bignum_free(pub);
crypto_bignum_free(ss);
} else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_ECDH) {
size_t alloc_size;
struct ecc_public_key key_public;
uint8_t *pt_secret;
unsigned long pt_secret_len;
if (param_count != 2 ||
params[0].attributeID != TEE_ATTR_ECC_PUBLIC_VALUE_X ||
params[1].attributeID != TEE_ATTR_ECC_PUBLIC_VALUE_Y) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
switch (cs->algo) {
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P192:
alloc_size = 192;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P224:
alloc_size = 224;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P256:
alloc_size = 256;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P384:
alloc_size = 384;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P521:
alloc_size = 521;
break;
default:
res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
goto out;
}
/* Create the public key */
res = crypto_acipher_alloc_ecc_public_key(&key_public,
alloc_size);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
key_public.curve = ((struct ecc_keypair *)ko->attr)->curve;
crypto_bignum_bin2bn(params[0].content.ref.buffer,
params[0].content.ref.length,
key_public.x);
crypto_bignum_bin2bn(params[1].content.ref.buffer,
params[1].content.ref.length,
key_public.y);
pt_secret = (uint8_t *)(sk + 1);
pt_secret_len = sk->alloc_size;
res = crypto_acipher_ecc_shared_secret(ko->attr, &key_public,
pt_secret,
&pt_secret_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = pt_secret_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
/* free the public key */
crypto_acipher_free_ecc_public_key(&key_public);
}
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_HKDF)
else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_HKDF) {
void *salt, *info;
size_t salt_len, info_len, okm_len;
uint32_t hash_id = TEE_ALG_GET_DIGEST_HASH(cs->algo);
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *ik = ko->attr;
const uint8_t *ikm = (const uint8_t *)(ik + 1);
res = get_hkdf_params(params, param_count, &salt, &salt_len,
&info, &info_len, &okm_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Requested size must fit into the output object's buffer */
if (okm_len > ik->alloc_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
res = tee_cryp_hkdf(hash_id, ikm, ik->key_size, salt, salt_len,
info, info_len, (uint8_t *)(sk + 1),
okm_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = okm_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
}
#endif
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_CONCAT_KDF)
else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_CONCAT_KDF) {
void *info;
size_t info_len, derived_key_len;
uint32_t hash_id = TEE_ALG_GET_DIGEST_HASH(cs->algo);
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *ss = ko->attr;
const uint8_t *shared_secret = (const uint8_t *)(ss + 1);
res = get_concat_kdf_params(params, param_count, &info,
&info_len, &derived_key_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Requested size must fit into the output object's buffer */
if (derived_key_len > ss->alloc_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
res = tee_cryp_concat_kdf(hash_id, shared_secret, ss->key_size,
info, info_len, (uint8_t *)(sk + 1),
derived_key_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = derived_key_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
}
#endif
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_PBKDF2)
else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_PBKDF2) {
void *salt;
size_t salt_len, iteration_count, derived_key_len;
uint32_t hash_id = TEE_ALG_GET_DIGEST_HASH(cs->algo);
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *ss = ko->attr;
const uint8_t *password = (const uint8_t *)(ss + 1);
res = get_pbkdf2_params(params, param_count, &salt, &salt_len,
&derived_key_len, &iteration_count);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Requested size must fit into the output object's buffer */
if (derived_key_len > ss->alloc_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
res = tee_cryp_pbkdf2(hash_id, password, ss->key_size, salt,
salt_len, iteration_count,
(uint8_t *)(sk + 1), derived_key_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = derived_key_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
}
#endif
else
res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
out:
free(params);
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Linaro/OP-TEE OP-TEE 3.3.0 and earlier is affected by: Buffer Overflow. The impact is: Execution of code in TEE core (kernel) context. The component is: optee_os. The fixed version is: 3.4.0 and later.
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0010: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
|
Low
| 169,467
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: rx_cache_find(const struct rx_header *rxh, const struct ip *ip, int sport,
int32_t *opcode)
{
int i;
struct rx_cache_entry *rxent;
uint32_t clip;
uint32_t sip;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&clip, &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(uint32_t));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&sip, &ip->ip_src, sizeof(uint32_t));
/* Start the search where we last left off */
i = rx_cache_hint;
do {
rxent = &rx_cache[i];
if (rxent->callnum == EXTRACT_32BITS(&rxh->callNumber) &&
rxent->client.s_addr == clip &&
rxent->server.s_addr == sip &&
rxent->serviceId == EXTRACT_32BITS(&rxh->serviceId) &&
rxent->dport == sport) {
/* We got a match! */
rx_cache_hint = i;
*opcode = rxent->opcode;
return(1);
}
if (++i >= RX_CACHE_SIZE)
i = 0;
} while (i != rx_cache_hint);
/* Our search failed */
return(0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The Rx parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-rx.c:rx_cache_find() and rx_cache_insert().
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14466/Rx: fix an over-read bug
In rx_cache_insert() and rx_cache_find() properly read the serviceId
field of the rx_header structure as a 16-bit integer. When those
functions tried to read 32 bits the extra 16 bits could be outside of
the bounds checked in rx_print() for the rx_header structure, as
serviceId is the last field in that structure.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 169,845
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DevToolsDataSource::StartDataRequest(
const std::string& path,
const content::ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& wc_getter,
const content::URLDataSource::GotDataCallback& callback) {
std::string bundled_path_prefix(chrome::kChromeUIDevToolsBundledPath);
bundled_path_prefix += "/";
if (base::StartsWith(path, bundled_path_prefix,
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) {
StartBundledDataRequest(path.substr(bundled_path_prefix.length()),
callback);
return;
}
std::string empty_path_prefix(chrome::kChromeUIDevToolsBlankPath);
if (base::StartsWith(path, empty_path_prefix,
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) {
callback.Run(new base::RefCountedStaticMemory());
return;
}
std::string remote_path_prefix(chrome::kChromeUIDevToolsRemotePath);
remote_path_prefix += "/";
if (base::StartsWith(path, remote_path_prefix,
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) {
GURL url(kRemoteFrontendBase + path.substr(remote_path_prefix.length()));
CHECK_EQ(url.host(), kRemoteFrontendDomain);
if (url.is_valid() && DevToolsUIBindings::IsValidRemoteFrontendURL(url)) {
StartRemoteDataRequest(url, callback);
} else {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Refusing to load invalid remote front-end URL";
callback.Run(new base::RefCountedStaticMemory(kHttpNotFound,
strlen(kHttpNotFound)));
}
return;
}
std::string custom_frontend_url =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kCustomDevtoolsFrontend);
if (custom_frontend_url.empty()) {
callback.Run(NULL);
return;
}
std::string custom_path_prefix(chrome::kChromeUIDevToolsCustomPath);
custom_path_prefix += "/";
if (base::StartsWith(path, custom_path_prefix,
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) {
GURL url = GURL(custom_frontend_url +
path.substr(custom_path_prefix.length()));
StartCustomDataRequest(url, callback);
return;
}
callback.Run(NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to potentially leak user local file data via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
|
Medium
| 172,671
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> uniformMatrixHelper(const v8::Arguments& args,
int matrixSize)
{
if (args.Length() != 3)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
WebGLRenderingContext* context = V8WebGLRenderingContext::toNative(args.Holder());
if (args.Length() > 0 && !isUndefinedOrNull(args[0]) && !V8WebGLUniformLocation::HasInstance(args[0])) {
V8Proxy::throwTypeError();
return notHandledByInterceptor();
}
bool ok = false;
WebGLUniformLocation* location = toWebGLUniformLocation(args[0], ok);
bool transpose = args[1]->BooleanValue();
if (V8Float32Array::HasInstance(args[2])) {
Float32Array* array = V8Float32Array::toNative(args[2]->ToObject());
ASSERT(array != NULL);
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
switch (matrixSize) {
case 2: context->uniformMatrix2fv(location, transpose, array, ec); break;
case 3: context->uniformMatrix3fv(location, transpose, array, ec); break;
case 4: context->uniformMatrix4fv(location, transpose, array, ec); break;
default: ASSERT_NOT_REACHED(); break;
}
if (ec)
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Undefined();
}
if (args[2].IsEmpty() || !args[2]->IsArray()) {
V8Proxy::throwTypeError();
return notHandledByInterceptor();
}
v8::Handle<v8::Array> array =
v8::Local<v8::Array>::Cast(args[2]);
uint32_t len = array->Length();
float* data = jsArrayToFloatArray(array, len);
if (!data) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(SYNTAX_ERR, args.GetIsolate());
return notHandledByInterceptor();
}
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
switch (matrixSize) {
case 2: context->uniformMatrix2fv(location, transpose, data, len, ec); break;
case 3: context->uniformMatrix3fv(location, transpose, data, len, ec); break;
case 4: context->uniformMatrix4fv(location, transpose, data, len, ec); break;
default: ASSERT_NOT_REACHED(); break;
}
fastFree(data);
if (ec)
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Undefined();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,129
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: krb5_init_creds_step(krb5_context context,
krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
krb5_data *in,
krb5_data *out,
krb5_krbhst_info *hostinfo,
unsigned int *flags)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
size_t len = 0;
size_t size;
AS_REQ req2;
krb5_data_zero(out);
if (ctx->as_req.req_body.cname == NULL) {
ret = init_as_req(context, ctx->flags, &ctx->cred,
ctx->addrs, ctx->etypes, &ctx->as_req);
if (ret) {
free_init_creds_ctx(context, ctx);
return ret;
}
}
#define MAX_PA_COUNTER 10
if (ctx->pa_counter > MAX_PA_COUNTER) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_GET_IN_TKT_LOOP,
N_("Looping %d times while getting "
"initial credentials", ""),
ctx->pa_counter);
return KRB5_GET_IN_TKT_LOOP;
}
ctx->pa_counter++;
_krb5_debug(context, 5, "krb5_get_init_creds: loop %d", ctx->pa_counter);
/* Lets process the input packet */
if (in && in->length) {
krb5_kdc_rep rep;
memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
_krb5_debug(context, 5, "krb5_get_init_creds: processing input");
ret = decode_AS_REP(in->data, in->length, &rep.kdc_rep, &size);
if (ret == 0) {
unsigned eflags = EXTRACT_TICKET_AS_REQ | EXTRACT_TICKET_TIMESYNC;
krb5_data data;
/*
* Unwrap AS-REP
*/
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Ticket, data.data, data.length,
&rep.kdc_rep.ticket, &size, ret);
if (ret)
goto out;
heim_assert(data.length == size, "ASN.1 internal error");
ret = fast_unwrap_as_rep(context, ctx->nonce, &data,
&ctx->fast_state, &rep.kdc_rep);
krb5_data_free(&data);
if (ret)
goto out;
/*
* Now check and extract the ticket
*/
if (ctx->flags.canonicalize) {
eflags |= EXTRACT_TICKET_ALLOW_SERVER_MISMATCH;
eflags |= EXTRACT_TICKET_MATCH_REALM;
}
if (ctx->ic_flags & KRB5_INIT_CREDS_NO_C_CANON_CHECK)
eflags |= EXTRACT_TICKET_ALLOW_CNAME_MISMATCH;
ret = process_pa_data_to_key(context, ctx, &ctx->cred,
&ctx->as_req, &rep.kdc_rep,
hostinfo, &ctx->fast_state.reply_key);
if (ret) {
free_AS_REP(&rep.kdc_rep);
goto out;
}
_krb5_debug(context, 5, "krb5_get_init_creds: extracting ticket");
ret = _krb5_extract_ticket(context,
&rep,
&ctx->cred,
ctx->fast_state.reply_key,
NULL,
KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART,
NULL,
ctx->nonce,
eflags,
&ctx->req_buffer,
NULL,
NULL);
if (ret == 0)
ret = copy_EncKDCRepPart(&rep.enc_part, &ctx->enc_part);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, ctx->fast_state.reply_key);
ctx->fast_state.reply_key = NULL;
*flags = 0;
free_AS_REP(&rep.kdc_rep);
free_EncASRepPart(&rep.enc_part);
return ret;
} else {
/* let's try to parse it as a KRB-ERROR */
_krb5_debug(context, 5, "krb5_get_init_creds: got an error");
free_KRB_ERROR(&ctx->error);
ret = krb5_rd_error(context, in, &ctx->error);
if(ret && in->length && ((char*)in->data)[0] == 4)
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_V4_REPLY;
if (ret) {
_krb5_debug(context, 5, "krb5_get_init_creds: failed to read error");
goto out;
}
/*
* Unwrap KRB-ERROR
*/
ret = fast_unwrap_error(context, &ctx->fast_state, &ctx->error);
if (ret)
goto out;
/*
*
*/
ret = krb5_error_from_rd_error(context, &ctx->error, &ctx->cred);
_krb5_debug(context, 5, "krb5_get_init_creds: KRB-ERROR %d", ret);
/*
* If no preauth was set and KDC requires it, give it one
* more try.
*/
if (ret == KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED) {
free_METHOD_DATA(&ctx->md);
memset(&ctx->md, 0, sizeof(ctx->md));
if (ctx->error.e_data) {
ret = decode_METHOD_DATA(ctx->error.e_data->data,
ctx->error.e_data->length,
&ctx->md,
NULL);
if (ret)
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("Failed to decode METHOD-DATA", ""));
} else {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("Preauth required but no preauth "
"options send by KDC", ""));
}
} else if (ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW && context->kdc_sec_offset == 0) {
/*
* Try adapt to timeskrew when we are using pre-auth, and
* if there was a time skew, try again.
*/
krb5_set_real_time(context, ctx->error.stime, -1);
if (context->kdc_sec_offset)
ret = 0;
_krb5_debug(context, 10, "init_creds: err skew updateing kdc offset to %d",
context->kdc_sec_offset);
ctx->used_pa_types = 0;
} else if (ret == KRB5_KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM && ctx->flags.canonicalize) {
/* client referal to a new realm */
if (ctx->error.crealm == NULL) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("Got a client referral, not but no realm", ""));
goto out;
}
_krb5_debug(context, 5,
"krb5_get_init_creds: got referal to realm %s",
*ctx->error.crealm);
ret = krb5_principal_set_realm(context,
ctx->cred.client,
*ctx->error.crealm);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context, ctx->cred.server)) {
ret = krb5_init_creds_set_service(context, ctx, NULL);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
free_AS_REQ(&ctx->as_req);
memset(&ctx->as_req, 0, sizeof(ctx->as_req));
ctx->used_pa_types = 0;
} else if (ret == KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP && ctx->runflags.change_password == 0 && ctx->prompter) {
char buf2[1024];
ctx->runflags.change_password = 1;
ctx->prompter(context, ctx->prompter_data, NULL, N_("Password has expired", ""), 0, NULL);
/* try to avoid recursion */
if (ctx->in_tkt_service != NULL && strcmp(ctx->in_tkt_service, "kadmin/changepw") == 0)
goto out;
/* don't try to change password where then where none */
if (ctx->prompter == NULL)
goto out;
ret = change_password(context,
ctx->cred.client,
ctx->password,
buf2,
sizeof(buf2),
ctx->prompter,
ctx->prompter_data,
NULL);
if (ret)
goto out;
krb5_init_creds_set_password(context, ctx, buf2);
ctx->used_pa_types = 0;
ret = 0;
} else if (ret == KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED) {
if (ctx->fast_state.flags & KRB5_FAST_DISABLED)
goto out;
if (ctx->fast_state.flags & (KRB5_FAST_REQUIRED | KRB5_FAST_EXPECTED))
goto out;
_krb5_debug(context, 10, "preauth failed with FAST, "
"and told by KD or user, trying w/o FAST");
ctx->fast_state.flags |= KRB5_FAST_DISABLED;
ctx->used_pa_types = 0;
ret = 0;
}
if (ret)
goto out;
}
}
if (ctx->as_req.req_body.cname == NULL) {
ret = init_as_req(context, ctx->flags, &ctx->cred,
ctx->addrs, ctx->etypes, &ctx->as_req);
if (ret) {
free_init_creds_ctx(context, ctx);
return ret;
}
}
if (ctx->as_req.padata) {
free_METHOD_DATA(ctx->as_req.padata);
free(ctx->as_req.padata);
ctx->as_req.padata = NULL;
}
/* Set a new nonce. */
ctx->as_req.req_body.nonce = ctx->nonce;
/* fill_in_md_data */
ret = process_pa_data_to_md(context, &ctx->cred, &ctx->as_req, ctx,
&ctx->md, &ctx->as_req.padata,
ctx->prompter, ctx->prompter_data);
if (ret)
goto out;
/*
* Wrap with FAST
*/
copy_AS_REQ(&ctx->as_req, &req2);
ret = fast_wrap_req(context, &ctx->fast_state, &req2);
if (ret) {
free_AS_REQ(&req2);
goto out;
}
krb5_data_free(&ctx->req_buffer);
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AS_REQ,
ctx->req_buffer.data, ctx->req_buffer.length,
&req2, &len, ret);
free_AS_REQ(&req2);
if (ret)
goto out;
if(len != ctx->req_buffer.length)
krb5_abortx(context, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
out->data = ctx->req_buffer.data;
out->length = ctx->req_buffer.length;
*flags = KRB5_INIT_CREDS_STEP_FLAG_CONTINUE;
return 0;
out:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-320
Summary: In the client side of Heimdal before 7.6.0, failure to verify anonymous PKINIT PA-PKINIT-KX key exchange permits a man-in-the-middle attack. This issue is in krb5_init_creds_step in lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c.
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auritor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
|
Medium
| 169,670
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BufferMeta(const sp<IMemory> &mem, bool is_backup = false)
: mMem(mem),
mIsBackup(is_backup) {
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the buffer port, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816827.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
|
Low
| 173,521
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: modifier_init(png_modifier *pm)
{
memset(pm, 0, sizeof *pm);
store_init(&pm->this);
pm->modifications = NULL;
pm->state = modifier_start;
pm->sbitlow = 1U;
pm->ngammas = 0;
pm->ngamma_tests = 0;
pm->gammas = 0;
pm->current_gamma = 0;
pm->encodings = 0;
pm->nencodings = 0;
pm->current_encoding = 0;
pm->encoding_counter = 0;
pm->encoding_ignored = 0;
pm->repeat = 0;
pm->test_uses_encoding = 0;
pm->maxout8 = pm->maxpc8 = pm->maxabs8 = pm->maxcalc8 = 0;
pm->maxout16 = pm->maxpc16 = pm->maxabs16 = pm->maxcalc16 = 0;
pm->maxcalcG = 0;
pm->limit = 4E-3;
pm->log8 = pm->log16 = 0; /* Means 'off' */
pm->error_gray_2 = pm->error_gray_4 = pm->error_gray_8 = 0;
pm->error_gray_16 = pm->error_color_8 = pm->error_color_16 = 0;
pm->error_indexed = 0;
pm->use_update_info = 0;
pm->interlace_type = PNG_INTERLACE_NONE;
pm->test_standard = 0;
pm->test_size = 0;
pm->test_transform = 0;
pm->use_input_precision = 0;
pm->use_input_precision_sbit = 0;
pm->use_input_precision_16to8 = 0;
pm->calculations_use_input_precision = 0;
pm->assume_16_bit_calculations = 0;
pm->test_gamma_threshold = 0;
pm->test_gamma_transform = 0;
pm->test_gamma_sbit = 0;
pm->test_gamma_scale16 = 0;
pm->test_gamma_background = 0;
pm->test_gamma_alpha_mode = 0;
pm->test_gamma_expand16 = 0;
pm->test_exhaustive = 0;
pm->log = 0;
/* Rely on the memset for all the other fields - there are no pointers */
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,670
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
{
int al,i,j,ret;
unsigned int n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
return(-1);
if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
(type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
(peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
return ret;
/* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read
* app data with SCTP.
*/
if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
(BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
(s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK) &&
s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
#else
if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
#endif
{
/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
i=s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0) return(i);
if (i == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return(-1);
}
}
start:
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
/*-
* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
* s->s3->rrec.data, - data
* s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
*/
rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
/* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
* so process data buffered during the last handshake
* in advance, if any.
*/
if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
{
pitem *item;
item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
if (item)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
{
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
}
#endif
dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
}
/* Check for timeout */
if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
goto start;
/* get new packet if necessary */
if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
{
ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
if (ret <= 0)
{
ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
/* anything other than a timeout is an error */
if (ret <= 0)
return(ret);
else
goto start;
}
}
if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
{
rr->length = 0;
goto start;
}
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
* reset by ssl3_get_finished */
&& (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
{
/* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
* Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
* buffer the application data for later processing rather
* than dropping the connection.
*/
dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num);
rr->length = 0;
goto start;
}
/* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
* (even in 'peek' mode) */
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
{
rr->length=0;
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
return(0);
}
if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
{
/* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
* are doing a handshake for the first time */
if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
goto f_err;
}
if (len <= 0) return(len);
if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
n = rr->length;
else
n = (unsigned int)len;
memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
if (!peek)
{
rr->length-=n;
rr->off+=n;
if (rr->length == 0)
{
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
rr->off=0;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* We were about to renegotiate but had to read
* belated application data first, so retry.
*/
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
(s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK))
{
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
}
/* We might had to delay a close_notify alert because
* of reordered app data. If there was an alert and there
* is no message to read anymore, finally set shutdown.
*/
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
s->d1->shutdown_received && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
{
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
return(0);
}
#endif
return(n);
}
/* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
* message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
/* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
* fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
*/
{
unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
unsigned char *dest = NULL;
unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
{
dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
}
else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
{
dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
{
dtls1_process_heartbeat(s);
/* Exit and notify application to read again */
rr->length = 0;
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
return(-1);
}
#endif
/* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
{
/* Application data while renegotiating
* is allowed. Try again reading.
*/
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
{
BIO *bio;
s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return(-1);
}
/* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
goto f_err;
}
if (dest_maxlen > 0)
{
/* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
* may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
{
#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
/*
* for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
* dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
* non-existing alert...
*/
FIX ME
#endif
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
rr->length = 0;
goto start;
}
/* now move 'n' bytes: */
for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
{
dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
rr->length--;
}
*dest_len = dest_maxlen;
}
}
/* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
* s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
if ((!s->server) &&
(s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
(s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
{
s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
(s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
(s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
goto err;
}
/* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
!s->s3->renegotiate)
{
s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
s->new_session = 1;
ssl3_renegotiate(s);
if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
{
i=s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0) return(i);
if (i == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return(-1);
}
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
{
if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
{
BIO *bio;
/* In the case where we try to read application data,
* but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
* the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
* cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return(-1);
}
}
}
}
/* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
* now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
goto start;
}
if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
if (cb != NULL)
{
j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
}
if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
{
s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
* after a close_notify alert. We have to check this
* first so that nothing gets discarded.
*/
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
{
s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
return -1;
}
#endif
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
return(0);
}
#if 0
/* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
/* now check if it's a missing record */
if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
{
unsigned short seq;
unsigned int frag_off;
unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
n2s(p, seq);
n2l3(p, frag_off);
dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
frag_off, &found);
if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
{
/* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
/* requested a message not yet sent,
send an alert ourselves */
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
}
}
#endif
}
else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
{
char tmp[16];
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
return(0);
}
else
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
goto start;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
{
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
rr->length=0;
return(0);
}
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
{
struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
ccs_hdr_len = 3;
/* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
* exactly what the record payload has to look like */
/* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
if ( (rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
(rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
{
i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
goto err;
}
rr->length=0;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
* messages are still missing, so just drop it.
*/
if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
{
goto start;
}
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
goto err;
/* do this whenever CCS is processed */
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Remember that a CCS has been received,
* so that an old key of SCTP-Auth can be
* deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored
* if no SCTP is used
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
#endif
goto start;
}
/* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
!s->in_handshake)
{
struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
/* this may just be a stale retransmit */
dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
{
rr->length = 0;
goto start;
}
/* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
* client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
*/
if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
{
if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
return -1;
dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
rr->length = 0;
goto start;
}
if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
{
#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
* because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
* protocol violations): */
s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:SSL_ST_CONNECT;
#else
s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
#endif
s->renegotiate=1;
s->new_session=1;
}
i=s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0) return(i);
if (i == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return(-1);
}
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
{
if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
{
BIO *bio;
/* In the case where we try to read application data,
* but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
* the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
* cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return(-1);
}
}
goto start;
}
switch (rr->type)
{
default:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
/* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
{
rr->length = 0;
goto start;
}
#endif
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
goto f_err;
case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
/* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
* of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
* should not happen when type != rr->type */
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
/* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
* but have application data. If the library was
* running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
* is set) and it makes sense to read application data
* at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
* we will indulge it.
*/
if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
(s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
((
(s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
(s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
(s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
) || (
(s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
(s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
(s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
)
))
{
s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
return(-1);
}
else
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
goto f_err;
}
}
/* not reached */
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
return(-1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Memory leak in the dtls1_buffer_record function in d1_pkt.c in OpenSSL 1.0.0 before 1.0.0p and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1k allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by sending many duplicate records for the next epoch, leading to failure of replay detection.
Commit Message: A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
|
Low
| 166,749
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: CURLcode Curl_auth_create_plain_message(struct Curl_easy *data,
const char *userp,
const char *passwdp,
char **outptr, size_t *outlen)
{
CURLcode result;
char *plainauth;
size_t ulen;
size_t plen;
size_t plainlen;
*outlen = 0;
*outptr = NULL;
ulen = strlen(userp);
plen = strlen(passwdp);
/* Compute binary message length. Check for overflows. */
if((ulen > SIZE_T_MAX/2) || (plen > (SIZE_T_MAX/2 - 2)))
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
plainlen = 2 * ulen + plen + 2;
plainauth = malloc(plainlen);
if(!plainauth)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
/* Calculate the reply */
memcpy(plainauth, userp, ulen);
plainauth[ulen] = '\0';
memcpy(plainauth + ulen + 1, userp, ulen);
plainauth[2 * ulen + 1] = '\0';
memcpy(plainauth + 2 * ulen + 2, passwdp, plen);
/* Base64 encode the reply */
result = Curl_base64_encode(data, plainauth, plainlen, outptr, outlen);
free(plainauth);
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Curl versions 7.33.0 through 7.61.1 are vulnerable to a buffer overrun in the SASL authentication code that may lead to denial of service.
Commit Message: Curl_auth_create_plain_message: fix too-large-input-check
CVE-2018-16839
Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16839.html
|
Low
| 169,031
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadRLAImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
typedef struct _WindowFrame
{
short
left,
right,
bottom,
top;
} WindowFrame;
typedef struct _RLAInfo
{
WindowFrame
window,
active_window;
short
frame,
storage_type,
number_channels,
number_matte_channels,
number_auxiliary_channels,
revision;
char
gamma[16],
red_primary[24],
green_primary[24],
blue_primary[24],
white_point[24];
ssize_t
job_number;
char
name[128],
description[128],
program[64],
machine[32],
user[32],
date[20],
aspect[24],
aspect_ratio[8],
chan[32];
short
field;
char
time[12],
filter[32];
short
bits_per_channel,
matte_type,
matte_bits,
auxiliary_type,
auxiliary_bits;
char
auxiliary[32],
space[36];
ssize_t
next;
} RLAInfo;
Image
*image;
int
channel,
length,
runlength;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
count,
*scanlines,
y;
RLAInfo
rla_info;
unsigned char
byte;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
rla_info.window.left=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rla_info.window.right=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rla_info.window.bottom=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rla_info.window.top=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rla_info.active_window.left=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rla_info.active_window.right=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rla_info.active_window.bottom=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rla_info.active_window.top=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rla_info.frame=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rla_info.storage_type=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rla_info.number_channels=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rla_info.number_matte_channels=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (rla_info.number_channels == 0)
rla_info.number_channels=3;
rla_info.number_channels+=rla_info.number_matte_channels;
rla_info.number_auxiliary_channels=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rla_info.revision=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,16,(unsigned char *) rla_info.gamma);
count=ReadBlob(image,24,(unsigned char *) rla_info.red_primary);
count=ReadBlob(image,24,(unsigned char *) rla_info.green_primary);
count=ReadBlob(image,24,(unsigned char *) rla_info.blue_primary);
count=ReadBlob(image,24,(unsigned char *) rla_info.white_point);
rla_info.job_number=(int) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,128,(unsigned char *) rla_info.name);
count=ReadBlob(image,128,(unsigned char *) rla_info.description);
rla_info.description[127]='\0';
count=ReadBlob(image,64,(unsigned char *) rla_info.program);
count=ReadBlob(image,32,(unsigned char *) rla_info.machine);
count=ReadBlob(image,32,(unsigned char *) rla_info.user);
count=ReadBlob(image,20,(unsigned char *) rla_info.date);
count=ReadBlob(image,24,(unsigned char *) rla_info.aspect);
count=ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) rla_info.aspect_ratio);
count=ReadBlob(image,32,(unsigned char *) rla_info.chan);
rla_info.field=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,12,(unsigned char *) rla_info.time);
count=ReadBlob(image,32,(unsigned char *) rla_info.filter);
rla_info.bits_per_channel=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rla_info.matte_type=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rla_info.matte_bits=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rla_info.auxiliary_type=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rla_info.auxiliary_bits=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,32,(unsigned char *) rla_info.auxiliary);
count=ReadBlob(image,36,(unsigned char *) rla_info.space);
if ((size_t) count != 36)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
rla_info.next=(int) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->matte=rla_info.number_matte_channels != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
image->columns=1UL*rla_info.active_window.right-rla_info.active_window.left+1;
image->rows=1UL*rla_info.active_window.top-rla_info.active_window.bottom+1;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
scanlines=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->rows,sizeof(*scanlines));
if (scanlines == (ssize_t *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (*rla_info.description != '\0')
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",(char *) rla_info.description);
/*
Read offsets to each scanline data.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->rows; i++)
scanlines[i]=(int) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
/*
Read image data.
*/
x=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,scanlines[image->rows-y-1],SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
for (channel=0; channel < (int) rla_info.number_channels; channel++)
{
length=(int) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
while (length > 0)
{
byte=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
runlength=byte;
if (byte > 127)
runlength=byte-256;
length--;
if (length == 0)
break;
if (runlength < 0)
{
while (runlength < 0)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,(ssize_t) (x % image->columns),
(ssize_t) (y % image->rows),1,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
byte=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
length--;
switch (channel)
{
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(byte));
break;
}
case 1:
{
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(byte));
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(byte));
break;
}
case 3:
default:
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(byte));
break;
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
x++;
runlength++;
}
continue;
}
byte=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
length--;
runlength++;
do
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,(ssize_t) (x % image->columns),
(ssize_t) (y % image->rows),1,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
switch (channel)
{
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(byte));
break;
}
case 1:
{
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(byte));
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(byte));
break;
}
case 3:
default:
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(byte));
break;
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
x++;
runlength--;
}
while (runlength > 0);
}
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,599
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: tChecksumCheckResult ParaNdis_CheckRxChecksum(
PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext,
ULONG virtioFlags,
tCompletePhysicalAddress *pPacketPages,
ULONG ulPacketLength,
ULONG ulDataOffset)
{
tOffloadSettingsFlags f = pContext->Offload.flags;
tChecksumCheckResult res, resIp;
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ppr;
ULONG flagsToCalculate = 0;
res.value = 0;
resIp.value = 0;
if (f.fRxIPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrIpChecksum; // check only
if (!(virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID))
{
if (virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM)
{
flagsToCalculate |= pcrFixXxpChecksum | pcrTcpChecksum | pcrUdpChecksum;
}
else
{
if (f.fRxTCPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrTcpV4Checksum;
if (f.fRxUDPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrUdpV4Checksum;
if (f.fRxTCPv6Checksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrTcpV6Checksum;
if (f.fRxUDPv6Checksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrUdpV6Checksum;
}
}
ppr = ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(pPacketPages, ulPacketLength - ETH_HEADER_SIZE, ulDataOffset + ETH_HEADER_SIZE, flagsToCalculate, __FUNCTION__);
if (virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID)
{
pContext->extraStatistics.framesRxCSHwOK++;
ppr.xxpCheckSum = ppresCSOK;
}
if (ppr.ipStatus == ppresIPV4 && !ppr.IsFragment)
{
if (f.fRxIPChecksum)
{
res.flags.IpOK = ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresCSOK;
res.flags.IpFailed = ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresCSBad;
}
if(ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if(ppr.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if (f.fRxTCPChecksum)
{
res.flags.TcpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.TcpFailed = !res.flags.TcpOK;
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (f.fRxUDPChecksum)
{
res.flags.UdpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.UdpFailed = !res.flags.UdpOK;
}
}
}
}
else if (ppr.ipStatus == ppresIPV6)
{
if(ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if(ppr.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if (f.fRxTCPv6Checksum)
{
res.flags.TcpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.TcpFailed = !res.flags.TcpOK;
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (f.fRxUDPv6Checksum)
{
res.flags.UdpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.UdpFailed = !res.flags.UdpOK;
}
}
}
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The NetKVM Windows Virtio driver allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted length value in an IP packet, as demonstrated by a value that does not account for the size of the IP options.
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
|
Low
| 168,887
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BrowserContextDestroyer::DestroyContext(BrowserContext* context) {
CHECK(context->IsOffTheRecord() || !context->HasOffTheRecordContext());
content::BrowserContext::NotifyWillBeDestroyed(context);
std::set<content::RenderProcessHost*> hosts;
for (content::RenderProcessHost::iterator it =
content::RenderProcessHost::AllHostsIterator();
!it.IsAtEnd(); it.Advance()) {
content::RenderProcessHost* host = it.GetCurrentValue();
if (host->GetBrowserContext() != context) {
continue;
}
hosts.insert(host);
//// static
}
if (hosts.empty()) {
delete context;
} else {
new BrowserContextDestroyer(context, hosts);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A malicious webview could install long-lived unload handlers that re-use an incognito BrowserContext that is queued for destruction in versions of Oxide before 1.18.3.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,419
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
{
struct cred *new;
int ret, old_setting;
old_setting = current_cred_xxx(jit_keyring);
if (reqkey_defl == KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE)
return old_setting;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
switch (reqkey_defl) {
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
goto set;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret != -EEXIST)
goto error;
ret = 0;
}
goto set;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
goto set;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto error;
}
set:
new->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl;
commit_creds(new);
return old_setting;
error:
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.10.13 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a series of KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings
This fixes CVE-2017-7472.
Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:
#include <keyutils.h>
int main()
{
for (;;)
keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
}
Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.
Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.29+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 168,273
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ResetScreenHandler::UpdateStatusChanged(
const UpdateEngineClient::Status& status) {
if (status.status == UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_ERROR) {
base::DictionaryValue params;
params.SetInteger("uiState", kErrorUIStateRollback);
ShowScreen(OobeUI::kScreenErrorMessage, ¶ms);
} else if (status.status ==
UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_UPDATED_NEED_REBOOT) {
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetPowerManagerClient()->RequestRestart();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in modules/webaudio/AudioScheduledSourceNode.cpp in the Web Audio implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.66, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Rollback option put behind the flag.
BUG=368860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/267393011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269753 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,182
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
int val, valbool;
int retv = -ENOPROTOOPT;
bool needs_rtnl = setsockopt_needs_rtnl(optname);
if (!optval)
val = 0;
else {
if (optlen >= sizeof(int)) {
if (get_user(val, (int __user *) optval))
return -EFAULT;
} else
val = 0;
}
valbool = (val != 0);
if (ip6_mroute_opt(optname))
return ip6_mroute_setsockopt(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
if (needs_rtnl)
rtnl_lock();
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_ADDRFORM:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val == PF_INET) {
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct sk_buff *pktopt;
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_RAW)
break;
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP ||
sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDPLITE) {
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
if (up->pending == AF_INET6) {
retv = -EBUSY;
break;
}
} else if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
break;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
retv = -ENOTCONN;
break;
}
if (ipv6_only_sock(sk) ||
!ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr)) {
retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
break;
}
fl6_free_socklist(sk);
ipv6_sock_mc_close(sk);
/*
* Sock is moving from IPv6 to IPv4 (sk_prot), so
* remove it from the refcnt debug socks count in the
* original family...
*/
sk_refcnt_debug_dec(sk);
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP) {
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
local_bh_disable();
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, sk->sk_prot, -1);
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, &tcp_prot, 1);
local_bh_enable();
sk->sk_prot = &tcp_prot;
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &ipv4_specific;
sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_stream_ops;
sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
tcp_sync_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
} else {
struct proto *prot = &udp_prot;
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDPLITE)
prot = &udplite_prot;
local_bh_disable();
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, sk->sk_prot, -1);
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, prot, 1);
local_bh_enable();
sk->sk_prot = prot;
sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
}
opt = xchg(&np->opt, NULL);
if (opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
pktopt = xchg(&np->pktoptions, NULL);
kfree_skb(pktopt);
sk->sk_destruct = inet_sock_destruct;
/*
* ... and add it to the refcnt debug socks count
* in the new family. -acme
*/
sk_refcnt_debug_inc(sk);
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
retv = 0;
break;
}
goto e_inval;
case IPV6_V6ONLY:
if (optlen < sizeof(int) ||
inet_sk(sk)->inet_num)
goto e_inval;
sk->sk_ipv6only = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVPKTINFO:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxinfo = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292PKTINFO:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxoinfo = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVHOPLIMIT:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxhlim = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292HOPLIMIT:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxohlim = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVRTHDR:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.srcrt = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292RTHDR:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.osrcrt = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVHOPOPTS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.hopopts = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292HOPOPTS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.ohopopts = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVDSTOPTS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.dstopts = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292DSTOPTS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.odstopts = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_TCLASS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val < -1 || val > 0xff)
goto e_inval;
/* RFC 3542, 6.5: default traffic class of 0x0 */
if (val == -1)
val = 0;
np->tclass = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVTCLASS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxtclass = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWINFO:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxflow = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVPATHMTU:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxpmtu = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_TRANSPARENT:
if (valbool && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)) {
retv = -EPERM;
break;
}
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
/* we don't have a separate transparent bit for IPV6 we use the one in the IPv4 socket */
inet_sk(sk)->transparent = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVORIGDSTADDR:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxorigdstaddr = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_HOPOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDR:
case IPV6_DSTOPTS:
{
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
/* remove any sticky options header with a zero option
* length, per RFC3542.
*/
if (optlen == 0)
optval = NULL;
else if (!optval)
goto e_inval;
else if (optlen < sizeof(struct ipv6_opt_hdr) ||
optlen & 0x7 || optlen > 8 * 255)
goto e_inval;
/* hop-by-hop / destination options are privileged option */
retv = -EPERM;
if (optname != IPV6_RTHDR && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
break;
opt = ipv6_renew_options(sk, np->opt, optname,
(struct ipv6_opt_hdr __user *)optval,
optlen);
if (IS_ERR(opt)) {
retv = PTR_ERR(opt);
break;
}
/* routing header option needs extra check */
retv = -EINVAL;
if (optname == IPV6_RTHDR && opt && opt->srcrt) {
struct ipv6_rt_hdr *rthdr = opt->srcrt;
switch (rthdr->type) {
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6_MIP6)
case IPV6_SRCRT_TYPE_2:
if (rthdr->hdrlen != 2 ||
rthdr->segments_left != 1)
goto sticky_done;
break;
#endif
default:
goto sticky_done;
}
}
retv = 0;
opt = ipv6_update_options(sk, opt);
sticky_done:
if (opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
break;
}
case IPV6_PKTINFO:
{
struct in6_pktinfo pkt;
if (optlen == 0)
goto e_inval;
else if (optlen < sizeof(struct in6_pktinfo) || !optval)
goto e_inval;
if (copy_from_user(&pkt, optval, sizeof(struct in6_pktinfo))) {
retv = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && pkt.ipi6_ifindex != sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
goto e_inval;
np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex = pkt.ipi6_ifindex;
np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_addr = pkt.ipi6_addr;
retv = 0;
break;
}
case IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS:
{
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct msghdr msg;
struct flowi6 fl6;
int junk;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (optlen == 0)
goto update;
/* 1K is probably excessive
* 1K is surely not enough, 2K per standard header is 16K.
*/
retv = -EINVAL;
if (optlen > 64*1024)
break;
opt = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*opt) + optlen, GFP_KERNEL);
retv = -ENOBUFS;
if (!opt)
break;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(*opt) + optlen;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(opt+1, optval, optlen))
goto done;
msg.msg_controllen = optlen;
msg.msg_control = (void *)(opt+1);
retv = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(net, sk, &msg, &fl6, opt, &junk,
&junk, &junk);
if (retv)
goto done;
update:
retv = 0;
opt = ipv6_update_options(sk, opt);
done:
if (opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
break;
}
case IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val > 255 || val < -1)
goto e_inval;
np->hop_limit = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS:
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
break;
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val > 255 || val < -1)
goto e_inval;
np->mcast_hops = (val == -1 ? IPV6_DEFAULT_MCASTHOPS : val);
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_MULTICAST_LOOP:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val != valbool)
goto e_inval;
np->mc_loop = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_UNICAST_IF:
{
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
int ifindex;
if (optlen != sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
ifindex = (__force int)ntohl((__force __be32)val);
if (ifindex == 0) {
np->ucast_oif = 0;
retv = 0;
break;
}
dev = dev_get_by_index(net, ifindex);
retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (!dev)
break;
dev_put(dev);
retv = -EINVAL;
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
break;
np->ucast_oif = ifindex;
retv = 0;
break;
}
case IPV6_MULTICAST_IF:
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
break;
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val) {
struct net_device *dev;
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && sk->sk_bound_dev_if != val)
goto e_inval;
dev = dev_get_by_index(net, val);
if (!dev) {
retv = -ENODEV;
break;
}
dev_put(dev);
}
np->mcast_oif = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP:
case IPV6_DROP_MEMBERSHIP:
{
struct ipv6_mreq mreq;
if (optlen < sizeof(struct ipv6_mreq))
goto e_inval;
retv = -EPROTO;
if (inet_sk(sk)->is_icsk)
break;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&mreq, optval, sizeof(struct ipv6_mreq)))
break;
if (optname == IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP)
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_join(sk, mreq.ipv6mr_ifindex, &mreq.ipv6mr_multiaddr);
else
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_drop(sk, mreq.ipv6mr_ifindex, &mreq.ipv6mr_multiaddr);
break;
}
case IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST:
case IPV6_LEAVE_ANYCAST:
{
struct ipv6_mreq mreq;
if (optlen < sizeof(struct ipv6_mreq))
goto e_inval;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&mreq, optval, sizeof(struct ipv6_mreq)))
break;
if (optname == IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST)
retv = ipv6_sock_ac_join(sk, mreq.ipv6mr_ifindex, &mreq.ipv6mr_acaddr);
else
retv = ipv6_sock_ac_drop(sk, mreq.ipv6mr_ifindex, &mreq.ipv6mr_acaddr);
break;
}
case MCAST_JOIN_GROUP:
case MCAST_LEAVE_GROUP:
{
struct group_req greq;
struct sockaddr_in6 *psin6;
if (optlen < sizeof(struct group_req))
goto e_inval;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&greq, optval, sizeof(struct group_req)))
break;
if (greq.gr_group.ss_family != AF_INET6) {
retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
break;
}
psin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&greq.gr_group;
if (optname == MCAST_JOIN_GROUP)
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_join(sk, greq.gr_interface,
&psin6->sin6_addr);
else
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_drop(sk, greq.gr_interface,
&psin6->sin6_addr);
break;
}
case MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP:
case MCAST_LEAVE_SOURCE_GROUP:
case MCAST_BLOCK_SOURCE:
case MCAST_UNBLOCK_SOURCE:
{
struct group_source_req greqs;
int omode, add;
if (optlen < sizeof(struct group_source_req))
goto e_inval;
if (copy_from_user(&greqs, optval, sizeof(greqs))) {
retv = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (greqs.gsr_group.ss_family != AF_INET6 ||
greqs.gsr_source.ss_family != AF_INET6) {
retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
break;
}
if (optname == MCAST_BLOCK_SOURCE) {
omode = MCAST_EXCLUDE;
add = 1;
} else if (optname == MCAST_UNBLOCK_SOURCE) {
omode = MCAST_EXCLUDE;
add = 0;
} else if (optname == MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP) {
struct sockaddr_in6 *psin6;
psin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&greqs.gsr_group;
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_join(sk, greqs.gsr_interface,
&psin6->sin6_addr);
/* prior join w/ different source is ok */
if (retv && retv != -EADDRINUSE)
break;
omode = MCAST_INCLUDE;
add = 1;
} else /* MCAST_LEAVE_SOURCE_GROUP */ {
omode = MCAST_INCLUDE;
add = 0;
}
retv = ip6_mc_source(add, omode, sk, &greqs);
break;
}
case MCAST_MSFILTER:
{
struct group_filter *gsf;
if (optlen < GROUP_FILTER_SIZE(0))
goto e_inval;
if (optlen > sysctl_optmem_max) {
retv = -ENOBUFS;
break;
}
gsf = kmalloc(optlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!gsf) {
retv = -ENOBUFS;
break;
}
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(gsf, optval, optlen)) {
kfree(gsf);
break;
}
/* numsrc >= (4G-140)/128 overflow in 32 bits */
if (gsf->gf_numsrc >= 0x1ffffffU ||
gsf->gf_numsrc > sysctl_mld_max_msf) {
kfree(gsf);
retv = -ENOBUFS;
break;
}
if (GROUP_FILTER_SIZE(gsf->gf_numsrc) > optlen) {
kfree(gsf);
retv = -EINVAL;
break;
}
retv = ip6_mc_msfilter(sk, gsf);
kfree(gsf);
break;
}
case IPV6_ROUTER_ALERT:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
retv = ip6_ra_control(sk, val);
break;
case IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val < IPV6_PMTUDISC_DONT || val > IPV6_PMTUDISC_OMIT)
goto e_inval;
np->pmtudisc = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_MTU:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val && val < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
goto e_inval;
np->frag_size = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVERR:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->recverr = valbool;
if (!val)
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_error_queue);
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWINFO_SEND:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->sndflow = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR:
retv = ipv6_flowlabel_opt(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY:
case IPV6_XFRM_POLICY:
retv = -EPERM;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
retv = xfrm_user_policy(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
break;
case IPV6_ADDR_PREFERENCES:
{
unsigned int pref = 0;
unsigned int prefmask = ~0;
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
retv = -EINVAL;
/* check PUBLIC/TMP/PUBTMP_DEFAULT conflicts */
switch (val & (IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC|
IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP|
IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBTMP_DEFAULT)) {
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC:
pref |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC;
break;
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP:
pref |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP;
break;
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBTMP_DEFAULT:
break;
case 0:
goto pref_skip_pubtmp;
default:
goto e_inval;
}
prefmask &= ~(IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC|
IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP);
pref_skip_pubtmp:
/* check HOME/COA conflicts */
switch (val & (IPV6_PREFER_SRC_HOME|IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA)) {
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_HOME:
break;
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA:
pref |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA;
case 0:
goto pref_skip_coa;
default:
goto e_inval;
}
prefmask &= ~IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA;
pref_skip_coa:
/* check CGA/NONCGA conflicts */
switch (val & (IPV6_PREFER_SRC_CGA|IPV6_PREFER_SRC_NONCGA)) {
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_CGA:
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_NONCGA:
case 0:
break;
default:
goto e_inval;
}
np->srcprefs = (np->srcprefs & prefmask) | pref;
retv = 0;
break;
}
case IPV6_MINHOPCOUNT:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val < 0 || val > 255)
goto e_inval;
np->min_hopcount = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_DONTFRAG:
np->dontfrag = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL:
np->autoflowlabel = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
if (needs_rtnl)
rtnl_unlock();
return retv;
e_inval:
release_sock(sk);
if (needs_rtnl)
rtnl_unlock();
return -EINVAL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,336
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void sig_server_setup_fill_chatnet(IRC_SERVER_CONNECT_REC *conn,
IRC_CHATNET_REC *ircnet)
{
if (!IS_IRC_SERVER_CONNECT(conn))
return;
g_return_if_fail(IS_IRCNET(ircnet));
if (ircnet->alternate_nick != NULL) {
g_free_and_null(conn->alternate_nick);
conn->alternate_nick = g_strdup(ircnet->alternate_nick);
}
if (ircnet->usermode != NULL) {
g_free_and_null(conn->usermode);
conn->usermode = g_strdup(ircnet->usermode);
}
if (ircnet->max_kicks > 0) conn->max_kicks = ircnet->max_kicks;
if (ircnet->max_msgs > 0) conn->max_msgs = ircnet->max_msgs;
if (ircnet->max_modes > 0) conn->max_modes = ircnet->max_modes;
if (ircnet->max_whois > 0) conn->max_whois = ircnet->max_whois;
if (ircnet->max_cmds_at_once > 0)
conn->max_cmds_at_once = ircnet->max_cmds_at_once;
if (ircnet->cmd_queue_speed > 0)
conn->cmd_queue_speed = ircnet->cmd_queue_speed;
if (ircnet->max_query_chans > 0)
conn->max_query_chans = ircnet->max_query_chans;
/* Validate the SASL parameters filled by sig_chatnet_read() or cmd_network_add */
conn->sasl_mechanism = SASL_MECHANISM_NONE;
conn->sasl_username = NULL;
conn->sasl_password = NULL;
if (ircnet->sasl_mechanism != NULL) {
if (!g_ascii_strcasecmp(ircnet->sasl_mechanism, "plain")) {
/* The PLAIN method needs both the username and the password */
conn->sasl_mechanism = SASL_MECHANISM_PLAIN;
if (ircnet->sasl_username != NULL && *ircnet->sasl_username &&
ircnet->sasl_password != NULL && *ircnet->sasl_password) {
conn->sasl_username = ircnet->sasl_username;
conn->sasl_password = ircnet->sasl_password;
} else
g_warning("The fields sasl_username and sasl_password are either missing or empty");
}
else if (!g_ascii_strcasecmp(ircnet->sasl_mechanism, "external")) {
conn->sasl_mechanism = SASL_MECHANISM_EXTERNAL;
}
else
g_warning("Unsupported SASL mechanism \"%s\" selected", ircnet->sasl_mechanism);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Irssi before 1.0.8, 1.1.x before 1.1.3, and 1.2.x before 1.2.1, when SASL is enabled, has a use after free when sending SASL login to the server.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1058 from ailin-nemui/sasl-reconnect
copy sasl username and password values
|
Medium
| 169,644
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlParsePEReference(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
const xmlChar *name;
xmlEntityPtr entity = NULL;
xmlParserInputPtr input;
if (RAW != '%')
return;
NEXT;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_PEREF_NO_NAME, "PEReference: no name\n");
return;
}
if (xmlParserDebugEntities)
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PEReference: %s\n", name);
if (RAW != ';') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PEREF_SEMICOL_MISSING, NULL);
return;
}
NEXT;
/*
* Increate the number of entity references parsed
*/
ctxt->nbentities++;
/*
* Request the entity from SAX
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity != NULL))
entity = ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
if (entity == NULL) {
/*
* [ WFC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document without any DTD, a document with only an
* internal DTD subset which contains no parameter entity
* references, or a document with "standalone='yes'", ...
* ... The declaration of a parameter entity must precede
* any reference to it...
*/
if ((ctxt->standalone == 1) ||
((ctxt->hasExternalSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->hasPErefs == 0))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name);
} else {
/*
* [ VC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document with an external subset or external
* parameter entities with "standalone='no'", ...
* ... The declaration of a parameter entity must
* precede any reference to it...
*/
if ((ctxt->validate) && (ctxt->vctxt.error != NULL)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name, NULL);
} else
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name, NULL);
ctxt->valid = 0;
}
xmlParserEntityCheck(ctxt, 0, NULL, 0);
} else {
/*
* Internal checking in case the entity quest barfed
*/
if ((entity->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
(entity->etype != XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY)) {
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Internal: %%%s; is not a parameter entity\n",
name, NULL);
} else {
xmlChar start[4];
xmlCharEncoding enc;
if ((entity->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_NOENT) == 0) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_DTDVALID) == 0) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD) == 0) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_DTDATTR) == 0) &&
(ctxt->replaceEntities == 0) &&
(ctxt->validate == 0))
return;
input = xmlNewEntityInputStream(ctxt, entity);
if (xmlPushInput(ctxt, input) < 0)
return;
if (entity->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) {
/*
* Get the 4 first bytes and decode the charset
* if enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE
* plug some encoding conversion routines.
* Note that, since we may have some non-UTF8
* encoding (like UTF16, bug 135229), the 'length'
* is not known, but we can calculate based upon
* the amount of data in the buffer.
*/
GROW
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
if ((ctxt->input->end - ctxt->input->cur)>=4) {
start[0] = RAW;
start[1] = NXT(1);
start[2] = NXT(2);
start[3] = NXT(3);
enc = xmlDetectCharEncoding(start, 4);
if (enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) {
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
}
}
if ((CMP5(CUR_PTR, '<', '?', 'x', 'm', 'l')) &&
(IS_BLANK_CH(NXT(5)))) {
xmlParseTextDecl(ctxt);
}
}
}
}
ctxt->hasPErefs = 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.5 does not prevent infinite recursion in parameter entities.
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
|
Low
| 167,665
|
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