instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t generic_perform_write(struct file *file,
struct iov_iter *i, loff_t pos)
{
struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
const struct address_space_operations *a_ops = mapping->a_ops;
long status = 0;
ssize_t written = 0;
unsigned int flags = 0;
/*
* Copies from kernel address space cannot fail (NFSD is a big user).
*/
if (segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS))
flags |= AOP_FLAG_UNINTERRUPTIBLE;
do {
struct page *page;
pgoff_t index; /* Pagecache index for current page */
unsigned long offset; /* Offset into pagecache page */
unsigned long bytes; /* Bytes to write to page */
size_t copied; /* Bytes copied from user */
void *fsdata;
offset = (pos & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1));
index = pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
bytes = min_t(unsigned long, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset,
iov_iter_count(i));
again:
/*
* Bring in the user page that we will copy from _first_.
* Otherwise there's a nasty deadlock on copying from the
* same page as we're writing to, without it being marked
* up-to-date.
*
* Not only is this an optimisation, but it is also required
* to check that the address is actually valid, when atomic
* usercopies are used, below.
*/
if (unlikely(iov_iter_fault_in_readable(i, bytes))) {
status = -EFAULT;
break;
}
status = a_ops->write_begin(file, mapping, pos, bytes, flags,
&page, &fsdata);
if (unlikely(status))
break;
pagefault_disable();
copied = iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic(page, i, offset, bytes);
pagefault_enable();
flush_dcache_page(page);
status = a_ops->write_end(file, mapping, pos, bytes, copied,
page, fsdata);
if (unlikely(status < 0))
break;
copied = status;
cond_resched();
if (unlikely(copied == 0)) {
/*
* If we were unable to copy any data at all, we must
* fall back to a single segment length write.
*
* If we didn't fallback here, we could livelock
* because not all segments in the iov can be copied at
* once without a pagefault.
*/
bytes = min_t(unsigned long, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset,
iov_iter_single_seg_count(i));
goto again;
}
iov_iter_advance(i, copied);
pos += copied;
written += copied;
balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited(mapping);
} while (iov_iter_count(i));
return written ? written : status;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: mm/filemap.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.25 allows local users to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via a writev system call that triggers an iovec of zero length, followed by a page fault for an iovec of nonzero length.
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 167,618
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int packet_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied, err;
struct sockaddr_ll *sll;
int vnet_hdr_len = 0;
err = -EINVAL;
if (flags & ~(MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_TRUNC|MSG_CMSG_COMPAT|MSG_ERRQUEUE))
goto out;
#if 0
/* What error should we return now? EUNATTACH? */
if (pkt_sk(sk)->ifindex < 0)
return -ENODEV;
#endif
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE) {
err = packet_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
goto out;
}
/*
* Call the generic datagram receiver. This handles all sorts
* of horrible races and re-entrancy so we can forget about it
* in the protocol layers.
*
* Now it will return ENETDOWN, if device have just gone down,
* but then it will block.
*/
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
/*
* An error occurred so return it. Because skb_recv_datagram()
* handles the blocking we don't see and worry about blocking
* retries.
*/
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
if (pkt_sk(sk)->has_vnet_hdr) {
struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr = { 0 };
err = -EINVAL;
vnet_hdr_len = sizeof(vnet_hdr);
if (len < vnet_hdr_len)
goto out_free;
len -= vnet_hdr_len;
if (skb_is_gso(skb)) {
struct skb_shared_info *sinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
/* This is a hint as to how much should be linear. */
vnet_hdr.hdr_len = skb_headlen(skb);
vnet_hdr.gso_size = sinfo->gso_size;
if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV4)
vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4;
else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV6)
vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6;
else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP)
vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP;
else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FCOE)
goto out_free;
else
BUG();
if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN)
vnet_hdr.gso_type |= VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN;
} else
vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE;
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
vnet_hdr.flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
vnet_hdr.csum_start = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb);
vnet_hdr.csum_offset = skb->csum_offset;
} /* else everything is zero */
err = memcpy_toiovec(msg->msg_iov, (void *)&vnet_hdr,
vnet_hdr_len);
if (err < 0)
goto out_free;
}
/*
* If the address length field is there to be filled in, we fill
* it in now.
*/
sll = &PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->sa.ll;
if (sock->type == SOCK_PACKET)
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_pkt);
else
msg->msg_namelen = sll->sll_halen + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_addr);
/*
* You lose any data beyond the buffer you gave. If it worries a
* user program they can ask the device for its MTU anyway.
*/
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
copied = len;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto out_free;
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
if (msg->msg_name)
memcpy(msg->msg_name, &PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->sa,
msg->msg_namelen);
if (pkt_sk(sk)->auxdata) {
struct tpacket_auxdata aux;
aux.tp_status = TP_STATUS_USER;
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
aux.tp_status |= TP_STATUS_CSUMNOTREADY;
aux.tp_len = PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->origlen;
aux.tp_snaplen = skb->len;
aux.tp_mac = 0;
aux.tp_net = skb_network_offset(skb);
if (vlan_tx_tag_present(skb)) {
aux.tp_vlan_tci = vlan_tx_tag_get(skb);
aux.tp_status |= TP_STATUS_VLAN_VALID;
} else {
aux.tp_vlan_tci = 0;
}
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_AUXDATA, sizeof(aux), &aux);
}
/*
* Free or return the buffer as appropriate. Again this
* hides all the races and re-entrancy issues from us.
*/
err = vnet_hdr_len + ((flags&MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len : copied);
out_free:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.3 does not properly restrict user-space access to certain packet data structures associated with VLAN Tag Control Information, which allows local users to obtain potentially sensitive information via a crafted application.
Commit Message: af_packet: prevent information leak
In 2.6.27, commit 393e52e33c6c2 (packet: deliver VLAN TCI to userspace)
added a small information leak.
Add padding field and make sure its zeroed before copy to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,847
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void cliRefreshPrompt(void) {
int len;
if (config.eval_ldb) return;
if (config.hostsocket != NULL)
len = snprintf(config.prompt,sizeof(config.prompt),"redis %s",
config.hostsocket);
else
len = anetFormatAddr(config.prompt, sizeof(config.prompt),
config.hostip, config.hostport);
/* Add [dbnum] if needed */
if (config.dbnum != 0)
len += snprintf(config.prompt+len,sizeof(config.prompt)-len,"[%d]",
config.dbnum);
snprintf(config.prompt+len,sizeof(config.prompt)-len,"> ");
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in redis-cli of Redis before 4.0.10 and 5.x before 5.0 RC3 allows an attacker to achieve code execution and escalate to higher privileges via a crafted command line. NOTE: It is unclear whether there are any common situations in which redis-cli is used with, for example, a -h (aka hostname) argument from an untrusted source.
Commit Message: Security: fix redis-cli buffer overflow.
Thanks to Fakhri Zulkifli for reporting it.
The fix switched to dynamic allocation, copying the final prompt in the
static buffer only at the end.
|
Low
| 169,196
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void VRDisplay::ProcessScheduledWindowAnimations(double timestamp) {
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "VRDisplay::window.rAF", "frame", vr_frame_id_);
auto doc = navigator_vr_->GetDocument();
if (!doc)
return;
auto page = doc->GetPage();
if (!page)
return;
page->Animator().ServiceScriptedAnimations(timestamp);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
|
Low
| 171,999
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HTMLFormControlElement::updateVisibleValidationMessage() {
Page* page = document().page();
if (!page)
return;
String message;
if (layoutObject() && willValidate())
message = validationMessage().stripWhiteSpace();
m_hasValidationMessage = true;
ValidationMessageClient* client = &page->validationMessageClient();
TextDirection messageDir = LTR;
TextDirection subMessageDir = LTR;
String subMessage = validationSubMessage().stripWhiteSpace();
if (message.isEmpty())
client->hideValidationMessage(*this);
else
findCustomValidationMessageTextDirection(message, messageDir, subMessage,
subMessageDir);
client->showValidationMessage(*this, message, messageDir, subMessage,
subMessageDir);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-1021
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, failed to prevent certain UI elements from being displayed by non-visible pages, which allowed a remote attacker to show certain UI elements on a page they don't control via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476}
|
Medium
| 172,492
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t MediaPlayer::setDataSource(
const sp<IMediaHTTPService> &httpService,
const char *url, const KeyedVector<String8, String8> *headers)
{
ALOGV("setDataSource(%s)", url);
status_t err = BAD_VALUE;
if (url != NULL) {
const sp<IMediaPlayerService>& service(getMediaPlayerService());
if (service != 0) {
sp<IMediaPlayer> player(service->create(this, mAudioSessionId));
if ((NO_ERROR != doSetRetransmitEndpoint(player)) ||
(NO_ERROR != player->setDataSource(httpService, url, headers))) {
player.clear();
}
err = attachNewPlayer(player);
}
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libmedia in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 has certain incorrect declarations, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference or memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28166152.
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
|
Low
| 173,537
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: eval_condition(uschar *s, BOOL *resetok, BOOL *yield)
{
BOOL testfor = TRUE;
BOOL tempcond, combined_cond;
BOOL *subcondptr;
BOOL sub2_honour_dollar = TRUE;
int i, rc, cond_type, roffset;
int_eximarith_t num[2];
struct stat statbuf;
uschar name[256];
uschar *sub[10];
const pcre *re;
const uschar *rerror;
for (;;)
{
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s == '!') { testfor = !testfor; s++; } else break;
}
/* Numeric comparisons are symbolic */
if (*s == '=' || *s == '>' || *s == '<')
{
int p = 0;
name[p++] = *s++;
if (*s == '=')
{
name[p++] = '=';
s++;
}
name[p] = 0;
}
/* All other conditions are named */
else s = read_name(name, 256, s, US"_");
/* If we haven't read a name, it means some non-alpha character is first. */
if (name[0] == 0)
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("condition name expected, "
"but found \"%.16s\"", s);
return NULL;
}
/* Find which condition we are dealing with, and switch on it */
cond_type = chop_match(name, cond_table, sizeof(cond_table)/sizeof(uschar *));
switch(cond_type)
{
/* def: tests for a non-empty variable, or for the existence of a header. If
yield == NULL we are in a skipping state, and don't care about the answer. */
case ECOND_DEF:
if (*s != ':')
{
expand_string_message = US"\":\" expected after \"def\"";
return NULL;
}
s = read_name(name, 256, s+1, US"_");
/* Test for a header's existence. If the name contains a closing brace
character, this may be a user error where the terminating colon has been
omitted. Set a flag to adjust a subsequent error message in this case. */
if (Ustrncmp(name, "h_", 2) == 0 ||
Ustrncmp(name, "rh_", 3) == 0 ||
Ustrncmp(name, "bh_", 3) == 0 ||
Ustrncmp(name, "header_", 7) == 0 ||
Ustrncmp(name, "rheader_", 8) == 0 ||
Ustrncmp(name, "bheader_", 8) == 0)
{
s = read_header_name(name, 256, s);
/* {-for-text-editors */
if (Ustrchr(name, '}') != NULL) malformed_header = TRUE;
if (yield != NULL) *yield =
(find_header(name, TRUE, NULL, FALSE, NULL) != NULL) == testfor;
}
/* Test for a variable's having a non-empty value. A non-existent variable
causes an expansion failure. */
else
{
uschar *value = find_variable(name, TRUE, yield == NULL, NULL);
if (value == NULL)
{
expand_string_message = (name[0] == 0)?
string_sprintf("variable name omitted after \"def:\"") :
string_sprintf("unknown variable \"%s\" after \"def:\"", name);
check_variable_error_message(name);
return NULL;
}
if (yield != NULL) *yield = (value[0] != 0) == testfor;
}
return s;
/* first_delivery tests for first delivery attempt */
case ECOND_FIRST_DELIVERY:
if (yield != NULL) *yield = deliver_firsttime == testfor;
return s;
/* queue_running tests for any process started by a queue runner */
case ECOND_QUEUE_RUNNING:
if (yield != NULL) *yield = (queue_run_pid != (pid_t)0) == testfor;
return s;
/* exists: tests for file existence
isip: tests for any IP address
isip4: tests for an IPv4 address
isip6: tests for an IPv6 address
pam: does PAM authentication
radius: does RADIUS authentication
ldapauth: does LDAP authentication
pwcheck: does Cyrus SASL pwcheck authentication
*/
case ECOND_EXISTS:
case ECOND_ISIP:
case ECOND_ISIP4:
case ECOND_ISIP6:
case ECOND_PAM:
case ECOND_RADIUS:
case ECOND_LDAPAUTH:
case ECOND_PWCHECK:
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /* }-for-text-editors */
sub[0] = expand_string_internal(s+1, TRUE, &s, yield == NULL, TRUE, resetok);
if (sub[0] == NULL) return NULL;
/* {-for-text-editors */
if (*s++ != '}') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_END;
if (yield == NULL) return s; /* No need to run the test if skipping */
switch(cond_type)
{
case ECOND_EXISTS:
if ((expand_forbid & RDO_EXISTS) != 0)
{
expand_string_message = US"File existence tests are not permitted";
return NULL;
}
*yield = (Ustat(sub[0], &statbuf) == 0) == testfor;
break;
case ECOND_ISIP:
case ECOND_ISIP4:
case ECOND_ISIP6:
rc = string_is_ip_address(sub[0], NULL);
*yield = ((cond_type == ECOND_ISIP)? (rc != 0) :
(cond_type == ECOND_ISIP4)? (rc == 4) : (rc == 6)) == testfor;
break;
/* Various authentication tests - all optionally compiled */
case ECOND_PAM:
#ifdef SUPPORT_PAM
rc = auth_call_pam(sub[0], &expand_string_message);
goto END_AUTH;
#else
goto COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED;
#endif /* SUPPORT_PAM */
case ECOND_RADIUS:
#ifdef RADIUS_CONFIG_FILE
rc = auth_call_radius(sub[0], &expand_string_message);
goto END_AUTH;
#else
goto COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED;
#endif /* RADIUS_CONFIG_FILE */
case ECOND_LDAPAUTH:
#ifdef LOOKUP_LDAP
{
/* Just to keep the interface the same */
BOOL do_cache;
int old_pool = store_pool;
store_pool = POOL_SEARCH;
rc = eldapauth_find((void *)(-1), NULL, sub[0], Ustrlen(sub[0]), NULL,
&expand_string_message, &do_cache);
store_pool = old_pool;
}
goto END_AUTH;
#else
goto COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED;
#endif /* LOOKUP_LDAP */
case ECOND_PWCHECK:
#ifdef CYRUS_PWCHECK_SOCKET
rc = auth_call_pwcheck(sub[0], &expand_string_message);
goto END_AUTH;
#else
goto COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED;
#endif /* CYRUS_PWCHECK_SOCKET */
#if defined(SUPPORT_PAM) || defined(RADIUS_CONFIG_FILE) || \
defined(LOOKUP_LDAP) || defined(CYRUS_PWCHECK_SOCKET)
END_AUTH:
if (rc == ERROR || rc == DEFER) return NULL;
*yield = (rc == OK) == testfor;
#endif
}
return s;
/* call ACL (in a conditional context). Accept true, deny false.
Defer is a forced-fail. Anything set by message= goes to $value.
Up to ten parameters are used; we use the braces round the name+args
like the saslauthd condition does, to permit a variable number of args.
See also the expansion-item version EITEM_ACL and the traditional
acl modifier ACLC_ACL.
Since the ACL may allocate new global variables, tell our caller to not
reclaim memory.
*/
case ECOND_ACL:
/* ${if acl {{name}{arg1}{arg2}...} {yes}{no}} */
{
uschar *user_msg;
BOOL cond = FALSE;
int size = 0;
int ptr = 0;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s++ != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /*}*/
switch(read_subs(sub, sizeof(sub)/sizeof(*sub), 1,
&s, yield == NULL, TRUE, US"acl", resetok))
{
case 1: expand_string_message = US"too few arguments or bracketing "
"error for acl";
case 2:
case 3: return NULL;
}
*resetok = FALSE;
if (yield != NULL) switch(eval_acl(sub, sizeof(sub)/sizeof(*sub), &user_msg))
{
case OK:
cond = TRUE;
case FAIL:
lookup_value = NULL;
if (user_msg)
{
lookup_value = string_cat(NULL, &size, &ptr, user_msg, Ustrlen(user_msg));
lookup_value[ptr] = '\0';
}
*yield = cond == testfor;
break;
case DEFER:
expand_string_forcedfail = TRUE;
default:
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("error from acl \"%s\"", sub[0]);
return NULL;
}
return s;
}
/* saslauthd: does Cyrus saslauthd authentication. Four parameters are used:
${if saslauthd {{username}{password}{service}{realm}} {yes}{no}}
However, the last two are optional. That is why the whole set is enclosed
in their own set of braces. */
case ECOND_SASLAUTHD:
#ifndef CYRUS_SASLAUTHD_SOCKET
goto COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED;
#else
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s++ != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /* }-for-text-editors */
switch(read_subs(sub, 4, 2, &s, yield == NULL, TRUE, US"saslauthd", resetok))
{
case 1: expand_string_message = US"too few arguments or bracketing "
"error for saslauthd";
case 2:
case 3: return NULL;
}
if (sub[2] == NULL) sub[3] = NULL; /* realm if no service */
if (yield != NULL)
{
int rc;
rc = auth_call_saslauthd(sub[0], sub[1], sub[2], sub[3],
&expand_string_message);
if (rc == ERROR || rc == DEFER) return NULL;
*yield = (rc == OK) == testfor;
}
return s;
#endif /* CYRUS_SASLAUTHD_SOCKET */
/* symbolic operators for numeric and string comparison, and a number of
other operators, all requiring two arguments.
crypteq: encrypts plaintext and compares against an encrypted text,
using crypt(), crypt16(), MD5 or SHA-1
inlist/inlisti: checks if first argument is in the list of the second
match: does a regular expression match and sets up the numerical
variables if it succeeds
match_address: matches in an address list
match_domain: matches in a domain list
match_ip: matches a host list that is restricted to IP addresses
match_local_part: matches in a local part list
*/
case ECOND_MATCH_ADDRESS:
case ECOND_MATCH_DOMAIN:
case ECOND_MATCH_IP:
case ECOND_MATCH_LOCAL_PART:
#ifndef EXPAND_LISTMATCH_RHS
sub2_honour_dollar = FALSE;
#endif
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case ECOND_CRYPTEQ:
case ECOND_INLIST:
case ECOND_INLISTI:
case ECOND_MATCH:
case ECOND_NUM_L: /* Numerical comparisons */
case ECOND_NUM_LE:
case ECOND_NUM_E:
case ECOND_NUM_EE:
case ECOND_NUM_G:
case ECOND_NUM_GE:
case ECOND_STR_LT: /* String comparisons */
case ECOND_STR_LTI:
case ECOND_STR_LE:
case ECOND_STR_LEI:
case ECOND_STR_EQ:
case ECOND_STR_EQI:
case ECOND_STR_GT:
case ECOND_STR_GTI:
case ECOND_STR_GE:
case ECOND_STR_GEI:
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
{
/* Sometimes, we don't expand substrings; too many insecure configurations
created using match_address{}{} and friends, where the second param
includes information from untrustworthy sources. */
BOOL honour_dollar = TRUE;
if ((i > 0) && !sub2_honour_dollar)
honour_dollar = FALSE;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s != '{')
{
if (i == 0) goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START;
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("missing 2nd string in {} "
"after \"%s\"", name);
return NULL;
}
sub[i] = expand_string_internal(s+1, TRUE, &s, yield == NULL,
honour_dollar, resetok);
if (sub[i] == NULL) return NULL;
if (*s++ != '}') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_END;
/* Convert to numerical if required; we know that the names of all the
conditions that compare numbers do not start with a letter. This just saves
checking for them individually. */
if (!isalpha(name[0]) && yield != NULL)
{
if (sub[i][0] == 0)
{
num[i] = 0;
DEBUG(D_expand)
debug_printf("empty string cast to zero for numerical comparison\n");
}
else
{
num[i] = expand_string_integer(sub[i], FALSE);
if (expand_string_message != NULL) return NULL;
}
}
}
/* Result not required */
if (yield == NULL) return s;
/* Do an appropriate comparison */
switch(cond_type)
{
case ECOND_NUM_E:
case ECOND_NUM_EE:
tempcond = (num[0] == num[1]);
break;
case ECOND_NUM_G:
tempcond = (num[0] > num[1]);
break;
case ECOND_NUM_GE:
tempcond = (num[0] >= num[1]);
break;
case ECOND_NUM_L:
tempcond = (num[0] < num[1]);
break;
case ECOND_NUM_LE:
tempcond = (num[0] <= num[1]);
break;
case ECOND_STR_LT:
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(sub[0], sub[1]) < 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_LTI:
tempcond = (strcmpic(sub[0], sub[1]) < 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_LE:
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(sub[0], sub[1]) <= 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_LEI:
tempcond = (strcmpic(sub[0], sub[1]) <= 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_EQ:
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(sub[0], sub[1]) == 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_EQI:
tempcond = (strcmpic(sub[0], sub[1]) == 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_GT:
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(sub[0], sub[1]) > 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_GTI:
tempcond = (strcmpic(sub[0], sub[1]) > 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_GE:
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(sub[0], sub[1]) >= 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_GEI:
tempcond = (strcmpic(sub[0], sub[1]) >= 0);
break;
case ECOND_MATCH: /* Regular expression match */
re = pcre_compile(CS sub[1], PCRE_COPT, (const char **)&rerror, &roffset,
NULL);
if (re == NULL)
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("regular expression error in "
"\"%s\": %s at offset %d", sub[1], rerror, roffset);
return NULL;
}
tempcond = regex_match_and_setup(re, sub[0], 0, -1);
break;
case ECOND_MATCH_ADDRESS: /* Match in an address list */
rc = match_address_list(sub[0], TRUE, FALSE, &(sub[1]), NULL, -1, 0, NULL);
goto MATCHED_SOMETHING;
case ECOND_MATCH_DOMAIN: /* Match in a domain list */
rc = match_isinlist(sub[0], &(sub[1]), 0, &domainlist_anchor, NULL,
MCL_DOMAIN + MCL_NOEXPAND, TRUE, NULL);
goto MATCHED_SOMETHING;
case ECOND_MATCH_IP: /* Match IP address in a host list */
if (sub[0][0] != 0 && string_is_ip_address(sub[0], NULL) == 0)
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("\"%s\" is not an IP address",
sub[0]);
return NULL;
}
else
{
unsigned int *nullcache = NULL;
check_host_block cb;
cb.host_name = US"";
cb.host_address = sub[0];
/* If the host address starts off ::ffff: it is an IPv6 address in
IPv4-compatible mode. Find the IPv4 part for checking against IPv4
addresses. */
cb.host_ipv4 = (Ustrncmp(cb.host_address, "::ffff:", 7) == 0)?
cb.host_address + 7 : cb.host_address;
rc = match_check_list(
&sub[1], /* the list */
0, /* separator character */
&hostlist_anchor, /* anchor pointer */
&nullcache, /* cache pointer */
check_host, /* function for testing */
&cb, /* argument for function */
MCL_HOST, /* type of check */
sub[0], /* text for debugging */
NULL); /* where to pass back data */
}
goto MATCHED_SOMETHING;
case ECOND_MATCH_LOCAL_PART:
rc = match_isinlist(sub[0], &(sub[1]), 0, &localpartlist_anchor, NULL,
MCL_LOCALPART + MCL_NOEXPAND, TRUE, NULL);
/* Fall through */
/* VVVVVVVVVVVV */
MATCHED_SOMETHING:
switch(rc)
{
case OK:
tempcond = TRUE;
break;
case FAIL:
tempcond = FALSE;
break;
case DEFER:
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("unable to complete match "
"against \"%s\": %s", sub[1], search_error_message);
return NULL;
}
break;
/* Various "encrypted" comparisons. If the second string starts with
"{" then an encryption type is given. Default to crypt() or crypt16()
(build-time choice). */
/* }-for-text-editors */
case ECOND_CRYPTEQ:
#ifndef SUPPORT_CRYPTEQ
goto COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED;
#else
if (strncmpic(sub[1], US"{md5}", 5) == 0)
{
int sublen = Ustrlen(sub[1]+5);
md5 base;
uschar digest[16];
md5_start(&base);
md5_end(&base, (uschar *)sub[0], Ustrlen(sub[0]), digest);
/* If the length that we are comparing against is 24, the MD5 digest
is expressed as a base64 string. This is the way LDAP does it. However,
some other software uses a straightforward hex representation. We assume
this if the length is 32. Other lengths fail. */
if (sublen == 24)
{
uschar *coded = auth_b64encode((uschar *)digest, 16);
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: using MD5+B64 hashing\n"
" subject=%s\n crypted=%s\n", coded, sub[1]+5);
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(coded, sub[1]+5) == 0);
}
else if (sublen == 32)
{
int i;
uschar coded[36];
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) sprintf(CS (coded+2*i), "%02X", digest[i]);
coded[32] = 0;
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: using MD5+hex hashing\n"
" subject=%s\n crypted=%s\n", coded, sub[1]+5);
tempcond = (strcmpic(coded, sub[1]+5) == 0);
}
else
{
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: length for MD5 not 24 or 32: "
"fail\n crypted=%s\n", sub[1]+5);
tempcond = FALSE;
}
}
else if (strncmpic(sub[1], US"{sha1}", 6) == 0)
{
int sublen = Ustrlen(sub[1]+6);
sha1 base;
uschar digest[20];
sha1_start(&base);
sha1_end(&base, (uschar *)sub[0], Ustrlen(sub[0]), digest);
/* If the length that we are comparing against is 28, assume the SHA1
digest is expressed as a base64 string. If the length is 40, assume a
straightforward hex representation. Other lengths fail. */
if (sublen == 28)
{
uschar *coded = auth_b64encode((uschar *)digest, 20);
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: using SHA1+B64 hashing\n"
" subject=%s\n crypted=%s\n", coded, sub[1]+6);
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(coded, sub[1]+6) == 0);
}
else if (sublen == 40)
{
int i;
uschar coded[44];
for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) sprintf(CS (coded+2*i), "%02X", digest[i]);
coded[40] = 0;
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: using SHA1+hex hashing\n"
" subject=%s\n crypted=%s\n", coded, sub[1]+6);
tempcond = (strcmpic(coded, sub[1]+6) == 0);
}
else
{
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: length for SHA-1 not 28 or 40: "
"fail\n crypted=%s\n", sub[1]+6);
tempcond = FALSE;
}
}
else /* {crypt} or {crypt16} and non-{ at start */
/* }-for-text-editors */
{
int which = 0;
uschar *coded;
if (strncmpic(sub[1], US"{crypt}", 7) == 0)
{
sub[1] += 7;
which = 1;
}
else if (strncmpic(sub[1], US"{crypt16}", 9) == 0)
{
sub[1] += 9;
which = 2;
}
else if (sub[1][0] == '{') /* }-for-text-editors */
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("unknown encryption mechanism "
"in \"%s\"", sub[1]);
return NULL;
}
switch(which)
{
case 0: coded = US DEFAULT_CRYPT(CS sub[0], CS sub[1]); break;
case 1: coded = US crypt(CS sub[0], CS sub[1]); break;
default: coded = US crypt16(CS sub[0], CS sub[1]); break;
}
#define STR(s) # s
#define XSTR(s) STR(s)
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: using %s()\n"
" subject=%s\n crypted=%s\n",
(which == 0)? XSTR(DEFAULT_CRYPT) : (which == 1)? "crypt" : "crypt16",
coded, sub[1]);
#undef STR
#undef XSTR
/* If the encrypted string contains fewer than two characters (for the
salt), force failure. Otherwise we get false positives: with an empty
string the yield of crypt() is an empty string! */
tempcond = (Ustrlen(sub[1]) < 2)? FALSE :
(Ustrcmp(coded, sub[1]) == 0);
}
break;
#endif /* SUPPORT_CRYPTEQ */
case ECOND_INLIST:
case ECOND_INLISTI:
{
int sep = 0;
uschar *save_iterate_item = iterate_item;
int (*compare)(const uschar *, const uschar *);
tempcond = FALSE;
if (cond_type == ECOND_INLISTI)
compare = strcmpic;
else
compare = (int (*)(const uschar *, const uschar *)) strcmp;
while ((iterate_item = string_nextinlist(&sub[1], &sep, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
if (compare(sub[0], iterate_item) == 0)
{
tempcond = TRUE;
break;
}
iterate_item = save_iterate_item;
}
} /* Switch for comparison conditions */
*yield = tempcond == testfor;
return s; /* End of comparison conditions */
/* and/or: computes logical and/or of several conditions */
case ECOND_AND:
case ECOND_OR:
subcondptr = (yield == NULL)? NULL : &tempcond;
combined_cond = (cond_type == ECOND_AND);
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s++ != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /* }-for-text-editors */
for (;;)
{
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
/* {-for-text-editors */
if (*s == '}') break;
if (*s != '{') /* }-for-text-editors */
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("each subcondition "
"inside an \"%s{...}\" condition must be in its own {}", name);
return NULL;
}
if (!(s = eval_condition(s+1, resetok, subcondptr)))
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("%s inside \"%s{...}\" condition",
expand_string_message, name);
return NULL;
}
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
/* {-for-text-editors */
if (*s++ != '}')
{
/* {-for-text-editors */
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("missing } at end of condition "
"inside \"%s\" group", name);
return NULL;
}
if (yield != NULL)
{
if (cond_type == ECOND_AND)
{
combined_cond &= tempcond;
if (!combined_cond) subcondptr = NULL; /* once false, don't */
} /* evaluate any more */
else
{
combined_cond |= tempcond;
if (combined_cond) subcondptr = NULL; /* once true, don't */
} /* evaluate any more */
}
}
if (yield != NULL) *yield = (combined_cond == testfor);
return ++s;
/* forall/forany: iterates a condition with different values */
case ECOND_FORALL:
case ECOND_FORANY:
{
int sep = 0;
uschar *save_iterate_item = iterate_item;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s++ != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /* }-for-text-editors */
sub[0] = expand_string_internal(s, TRUE, &s, (yield == NULL), TRUE, resetok);
if (sub[0] == NULL) return NULL;
/* {-for-text-editors */
if (*s++ != '}') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_END;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s++ != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /* }-for-text-editors */
sub[1] = s;
/* Call eval_condition once, with result discarded (as if scanning a
"false" part). This allows us to find the end of the condition, because if
the list it empty, we won't actually evaluate the condition for real. */
if (!(s = eval_condition(sub[1], resetok, NULL)))
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("%s inside \"%s\" condition",
expand_string_message, name);
return NULL;
}
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
/* {-for-text-editors */
if (*s++ != '}')
{
/* {-for-text-editors */
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("missing } at end of condition "
"inside \"%s\"", name);
return NULL;
}
if (yield != NULL) *yield = !testfor;
while ((iterate_item = string_nextinlist(&sub[0], &sep, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
{
DEBUG(D_expand) debug_printf("%s: $item = \"%s\"\n", name, iterate_item);
if (!eval_condition(sub[1], resetok, &tempcond))
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("%s inside \"%s\" condition",
expand_string_message, name);
iterate_item = save_iterate_item;
return NULL;
}
DEBUG(D_expand) debug_printf("%s: condition evaluated to %s\n", name,
tempcond? "true":"false");
if (yield != NULL) *yield = (tempcond == testfor);
if (tempcond == (cond_type == ECOND_FORANY)) break;
}
iterate_item = save_iterate_item;
return s;
}
/* The bool{} expansion condition maps a string to boolean.
The values supported should match those supported by the ACL condition
(acl.c, ACLC_CONDITION) so that we keep to a minimum the different ideas
of true/false. Note that Router "condition" rules have a different
interpretation, where general data can be used and only a few values
map to FALSE.
Note that readconf.c boolean matching, for boolean configuration options,
only matches true/yes/false/no.
The bool_lax{} condition matches the Router logic, which is much more
liberal. */
case ECOND_BOOL:
case ECOND_BOOL_LAX:
{
uschar *sub_arg[1];
uschar *t, *t2;
uschar *ourname;
size_t len;
BOOL boolvalue = FALSE;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /* }-for-text-editors */
ourname = cond_type == ECOND_BOOL_LAX ? US"bool_lax" : US"bool";
switch(read_subs(sub_arg, 1, 1, &s, yield == NULL, FALSE, ourname, resetok))
{
case 1: expand_string_message = string_sprintf(
"too few arguments or bracketing error for %s",
ourname);
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case 2:
case 3: return NULL;
}
t = sub_arg[0];
while (isspace(*t)) t++;
len = Ustrlen(t);
if (len)
{
/* trailing whitespace: seems like a good idea to ignore it too */
t2 = t + len - 1;
while (isspace(*t2)) t2--;
if (t2 != (t + len))
{
*++t2 = '\0';
len = t2 - t;
}
}
DEBUG(D_expand)
debug_printf("considering %s: %s\n", ourname, len ? t : US"<empty>");
/* logic for the lax case from expand_check_condition(), which also does
expands, and the logic is both short and stable enough that there should
be no maintenance burden from replicating it. */
if (len == 0)
boolvalue = FALSE;
else if (*t == '-'
? Ustrspn(t+1, "0123456789") == len-1
: Ustrspn(t, "0123456789") == len)
{
boolvalue = (Uatoi(t) == 0) ? FALSE : TRUE;
/* expand_check_condition only does a literal string "0" check */
if ((cond_type == ECOND_BOOL_LAX) && (len > 1))
boolvalue = TRUE;
}
else if (strcmpic(t, US"true") == 0 || strcmpic(t, US"yes") == 0)
boolvalue = TRUE;
else if (strcmpic(t, US"false") == 0 || strcmpic(t, US"no") == 0)
boolvalue = FALSE;
else if (cond_type == ECOND_BOOL_LAX)
boolvalue = TRUE;
else
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("unrecognised boolean "
"value \"%s\"", t);
return NULL;
}
if (yield != NULL) *yield = (boolvalue == testfor);
return s;
}
/* Unknown condition */
default:
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("unknown condition \"%s\"", name);
return NULL;
} /* End switch on condition type */
/* Missing braces at start and end of data */
COND_FAILED_CURLY_START:
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("missing { after \"%s\"", name);
return NULL;
COND_FAILED_CURLY_END:
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("missing } at end of \"%s\" condition",
name);
return NULL;
/* A condition requires code that is not compiled */
#if !defined(SUPPORT_PAM) || !defined(RADIUS_CONFIG_FILE) || \
!defined(LOOKUP_LDAP) || !defined(CYRUS_PWCHECK_SOCKET) || \
!defined(SUPPORT_CRYPTEQ) || !defined(CYRUS_SASLAUTHD_SOCKET)
COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED:
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("support for \"%s\" not compiled",
name);
return NULL;
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: expand.c in Exim before 4.83 expands mathematical comparisons twice, which allows local users to gain privileges and execute arbitrary commands via a crafted lookup value.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,190
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: unix_client_connect(hsm_com_client_hdl_t *hdl)
{
int fd, len;
struct sockaddr_un unix_addr;
if ((fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
{
return HSM_COM_ERROR;
}
memset(&unix_addr,0,sizeof(unix_addr));
unix_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if(strlen(hdl->c_path) >= sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path))
{
close(fd);
return HSM_COM_PATH_ERR;
}
snprintf(unix_addr.sun_path, sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path), "%s", hdl->c_path);
len = SUN_LEN(&unix_addr);
unlink(unix_addr.sun_path);
if(bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&unix_addr, len) < 0)
{
unlink(hdl->c_path);
close(fd);
return HSM_COM_BIND_ERR;
}
if(chmod(unix_addr.sun_path, S_IRWXU) < 0)
{
unlink(hdl->c_path);
close(fd);
return HSM_COM_CHMOD_ERR;
}
memset(&unix_addr,0,sizeof(unix_addr));
unix_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strncpy(unix_addr.sun_path, hdl->s_path, sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path));
unix_addr.sun_path[sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path)-1] = 0;
len = SUN_LEN(&unix_addr);
if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &unix_addr, len) < 0)
{
unlink(hdl->c_path);
close(fd);
return HSM_COM_CONX_ERR;
}
hdl->client_fd = fd;
hdl->client_state = HSM_COM_C_STATE_CT;
if(unix_sck_send_conn(hdl, 2) != HSM_COM_OK)
{
hdl->client_state = HSM_COM_C_STATE_IN;
return HSM_COM_SEND_ERR;
}
return HSM_COM_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race conditions in opa-fm before 10.4.0.0.196 and opa-ff before 10.4.0.0.197.
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
|
Medium
| 170,128
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int scsi_disk_emulate_command(SCSIDiskReq *r, uint8_t *outbuf)
{
SCSIRequest *req = &r->req;
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, req->dev);
uint64_t nb_sectors;
int buflen = 0;
switch (req->cmd.buf[0]) {
case TEST_UNIT_READY:
if (s->tray_open || !bdrv_is_inserted(s->bs))
goto not_ready;
break;
case INQUIRY:
buflen = scsi_disk_emulate_inquiry(req, outbuf);
if (buflen < 0)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case MODE_SENSE:
case MODE_SENSE_10:
buflen = scsi_disk_emulate_mode_sense(r, outbuf);
if (buflen < 0)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case READ_TOC:
buflen = scsi_disk_emulate_read_toc(req, outbuf);
if (buflen < 0)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case RESERVE:
if (req->cmd.buf[1] & 1)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case RESERVE_10:
if (req->cmd.buf[1] & 3)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case RELEASE:
if (req->cmd.buf[1] & 1)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case RELEASE_10:
if (req->cmd.buf[1] & 3)
goto illegal_request;
break;
case START_STOP:
if (scsi_disk_emulate_start_stop(r) < 0) {
return -1;
}
break;
case ALLOW_MEDIUM_REMOVAL:
s->tray_locked = req->cmd.buf[4] & 1;
bdrv_lock_medium(s->bs, req->cmd.buf[4] & 1);
break;
case READ_CAPACITY_10:
/* The normal LEN field for this command is zero. */
memset(outbuf, 0, 8);
bdrv_get_geometry(s->bs, &nb_sectors);
if (!nb_sectors)
goto not_ready;
nb_sectors /= s->cluster_size;
/* Returned value is the address of the last sector. */
nb_sectors--;
/* Remember the new size for read/write sanity checking. */
s->max_lba = nb_sectors;
/* Clip to 2TB, instead of returning capacity modulo 2TB. */
if (nb_sectors > UINT32_MAX)
nb_sectors = UINT32_MAX;
outbuf[0] = (nb_sectors >> 24) & 0xff;
outbuf[1] = (nb_sectors >> 16) & 0xff;
outbuf[2] = (nb_sectors >> 8) & 0xff;
outbuf[3] = nb_sectors & 0xff;
outbuf[4] = 0;
outbuf[5] = 0;
outbuf[6] = s->cluster_size * 2;
outbuf[7] = 0;
buflen = 8;
break;
case GET_CONFIGURATION:
memset(outbuf, 0, 8);
/* ??? This should probably return much more information. For now
just return the basic header indicating the CD-ROM profile. */
outbuf[7] = 8; // CD-ROM
buflen = 8;
break;
case SERVICE_ACTION_IN_16:
/* Service Action In subcommands. */
if ((req->cmd.buf[1] & 31) == SAI_READ_CAPACITY_16) {
DPRINTF("SAI READ CAPACITY(16)\n");
memset(outbuf, 0, req->cmd.xfer);
bdrv_get_geometry(s->bs, &nb_sectors);
if (!nb_sectors)
goto not_ready;
nb_sectors /= s->cluster_size;
/* Returned value is the address of the last sector. */
nb_sectors--;
/* Remember the new size for read/write sanity checking. */
s->max_lba = nb_sectors;
outbuf[0] = (nb_sectors >> 56) & 0xff;
outbuf[1] = (nb_sectors >> 48) & 0xff;
outbuf[2] = (nb_sectors >> 40) & 0xff;
outbuf[3] = (nb_sectors >> 32) & 0xff;
outbuf[4] = (nb_sectors >> 24) & 0xff;
outbuf[5] = (nb_sectors >> 16) & 0xff;
outbuf[6] = (nb_sectors >> 8) & 0xff;
outbuf[7] = nb_sectors & 0xff;
outbuf[8] = 0;
outbuf[9] = 0;
outbuf[10] = s->cluster_size * 2;
outbuf[11] = 0;
outbuf[12] = 0;
outbuf[13] = get_physical_block_exp(&s->qdev.conf);
/* set TPE bit if the format supports discard */
if (s->qdev.conf.discard_granularity) {
outbuf[14] = 0x80;
}
/* Protection, exponent and lowest lba field left blank. */
buflen = req->cmd.xfer;
break;
}
DPRINTF("Unsupported Service Action In\n");
goto illegal_request;
case VERIFY_10:
break;
default:
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(INVALID_OPCODE));
return -1;
}
return buflen;
not_ready:
if (s->tray_open || !bdrv_is_inserted(s->bs)) {
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(NO_MEDIUM));
} else {
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(LUN_NOT_READY));
}
return -1;
illegal_request:
if (r->req.status == -1) {
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(INVALID_FIELD));
}
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in hw/scsi-disk.c in the SCSI subsystem in QEMU before 0.15.2, as used by Xen, might allow local guest users with permission to access the CD-ROM to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted SAI READ CAPACITY SCSI command. NOTE: this is only a vulnerability when root has manually modified certain permissions or ACLs.
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
|
High
| 166,551
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: jbig2_image_resize(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Image *image, int width, int height)
{
if (width == image->width) {
/* check for integer multiplication overflow */
int64_t check = ((int64_t) image->stride) * ((int64_t) height);
if (check != (int)check) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "integer multiplication overflow during resize stride(%d)*height(%d)", image->stride, height);
return NULL;
}
/* use the same stride, just change the length */
image->data = jbig2_renew(ctx, image->data, uint8_t, (int)check);
if (image->data == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "could not resize image buffer!");
return NULL;
}
if (height > image->height) {
memset(image->data + image->height * image->stride, 0, (height - image->height) * image->stride);
}
image->height = height;
} else {
/* we must allocate a new image buffer and copy */
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, -1, "jbig2_image_resize called with a different width (NYI)");
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ghostscript before version 9.21 is vulnerable to a heap based buffer overflow that was found in the ghostscript jbig2_decode_gray_scale_image function which is used to decode halftone segments in a JBIG2 image. A document (PostScript or PDF) with an embedded, specially crafted, jbig2 image could trigger a segmentation fault in ghostscript.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,492
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: internalEntityProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
ENTITY *entity;
const char *textStart, *textEnd;
const char *next;
enum XML_Error result;
OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY *openEntity = parser->m_openInternalEntities;
if (! openEntity)
return XML_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_STATE;
entity = openEntity->entity;
textStart = ((char *)entity->textPtr) + entity->processed;
textEnd = (char *)(entity->textPtr + entity->textLen);
/* Set a safe default value in case 'next' does not get set */
next = textStart;
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (entity->is_param) {
int tok
= XmlPrologTok(parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd, &next);
result = doProlog(parser, parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd,
tok, next, &next, XML_FALSE);
} else
#endif /* XML_DTD */
result = doContent(parser, openEntity->startTagLevel,
parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd, &next,
XML_FALSE);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
else if (textEnd != next
&& parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED) {
entity->processed = (int)(next - (char *)entity->textPtr);
return result;
} else {
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = openEntity->next;
/* put openEntity back in list of free instances */
openEntity->next = parser->m_freeInternalEntities;
parser->m_freeInternalEntities = openEntity;
}
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (entity->is_param) {
int tok;
parser->m_processor = prologProcessor;
tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
return doProlog(parser, parser->m_encoding, s, end, tok, next, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer);
} else
#endif /* XML_DTD */
{
parser->m_processor = contentProcessor;
/* see externalEntityContentProcessor vs contentProcessor */
return doContent(parser, parser->m_parentParser ? 1 : 0, parser->m_encoding,
s, end, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-611
Summary: In libexpat before 2.2.8, crafted XML input could fool the parser into changing from DTD parsing to document parsing too early; a consecutive call to XML_GetCurrentLineNumber (or XML_GetCurrentColumnNumber) then resulted in a heap-based buffer over-read.
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
|
Low
| 169,531
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: png_convert_to_rfc1123(png_structp png_ptr, png_timep ptime)
{
static PNG_CONST char short_months[12][4] =
{"Jan", "Feb", "Mar", "Apr", "May", "Jun",
"Jul", "Aug", "Sep", "Oct", "Nov", "Dec"};
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return (NULL);
if (png_ptr->time_buffer == NULL)
{
png_ptr->time_buffer = (png_charp)png_malloc(png_ptr, (png_uint_32)(29*
png_sizeof(char)));
}
#ifdef _WIN32_WCE
{
wchar_t time_buf[29];
wsprintf(time_buf, TEXT("%d %S %d %02d:%02d:%02d +0000"),
ptime->day % 32, short_months[(ptime->month - 1) % 12],
ptime->year, ptime->hour % 24, ptime->minute % 60,
ptime->second % 61);
WideCharToMultiByte(CP_ACP, 0, time_buf, -1, png_ptr->time_buffer,
29, NULL, NULL);
}
#else
#ifdef USE_FAR_KEYWORD
{
char near_time_buf[29];
png_snprintf6(near_time_buf, 29, "%d %s %d %02d:%02d:%02d +0000",
ptime->day % 32, short_months[(ptime->month - 1) % 12],
ptime->year, ptime->hour % 24, ptime->minute % 60,
ptime->second % 61);
png_memcpy(png_ptr->time_buffer, near_time_buf,
29*png_sizeof(char));
}
#else
png_snprintf6(png_ptr->time_buffer, 29, "%d %s %d %02d:%02d:%02d +0000",
ptime->day % 32, short_months[(ptime->month - 1) % 12],
ptime->year, ptime->hour % 24, ptime->minute % 60,
ptime->second % 61);
#endif
#endif /* _WIN32_WCE */
return ((png_charp)png_ptr->time_buffer);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
Low
| 172,161
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FactoryRegistry::ResetFunctions() {
RegisterFunction<GetWindowFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetCurrentWindowFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetLastFocusedWindowFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetAllWindowsFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CreateWindowFunction>();
RegisterFunction<UpdateWindowFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RemoveWindowFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetCurrentTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetSelectedTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetAllTabsInWindowFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CreateTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<UpdateTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MoveTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RemoveTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<DetectTabLanguageFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CaptureVisibleTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<TabsExecuteScriptFunction>();
RegisterFunction<TabsInsertCSSFunction>();
RegisterFunction<EnablePageActionFunction>();
RegisterFunction<DisablePageActionFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PageActionShowFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PageActionHideFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PageActionSetIconFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PageActionSetTitleFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PageActionSetPopupFunction>();
RegisterFunction<BrowserActionSetIconFunction>();
RegisterFunction<BrowserActionSetTitleFunction>();
RegisterFunction<BrowserActionSetBadgeTextFunction>();
RegisterFunction<BrowserActionSetBadgeBackgroundColorFunction>();
RegisterFunction<BrowserActionSetPopupFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetBookmarksFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetBookmarkChildrenFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetBookmarkRecentFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetBookmarkTreeFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetBookmarkSubTreeFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SearchBookmarksFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RemoveBookmarkFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RemoveTreeBookmarkFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CreateBookmarkFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MoveBookmarkFunction>();
RegisterFunction<UpdateBookmarkFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ShowInfoBarFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CopyBookmarkManagerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CutBookmarkManagerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PasteBookmarkManagerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CanPasteBookmarkManagerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ImportBookmarksFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExportBookmarksFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SortChildrenBookmarkManagerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<BookmarkManagerGetStringsFunction>();
RegisterFunction<StartDragBookmarkManagerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<DropBookmarkManagerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetSubtreeBookmarkManagerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CanEditBookmarkManagerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<AddUrlHistoryFunction>();
RegisterFunction<DeleteAllHistoryFunction>();
RegisterFunction<DeleteRangeHistoryFunction>();
RegisterFunction<DeleteUrlHistoryFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetVisitsHistoryFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SearchHistoryFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionIdleQueryStateFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetAcceptLanguagesFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetProcessIdForTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsGetEnabledFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsSetEnabledFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsRecordUserActionFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsRecordValueFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsRecordPercentageFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsRecordCountFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsRecordSmallCountFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsRecordMediumCountFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsRecordTimeFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsRecordMediumTimeFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsRecordLongTimeFunction>();
#if defined(OS_WIN)
RegisterFunction<RlzRecordProductEventFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RlzGetAccessPointRlzFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RlzSendFinancialPingFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RlzClearProductStateFunction>();
#endif
RegisterFunction<GetCookieFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetAllCookiesFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetCookieFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RemoveCookieFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetAllCookieStoresFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTestPassFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTestFailFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTestLogFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTestQuotaResetFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTestCreateIncognitoTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTestSendMessageFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTestGetConfigFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetFocusedControlFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetAccessibilityEnabledFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTtsSpeakFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTtsStopSpeakingFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTtsIsSpeakingFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTtsSpeakCompletedFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CreateContextMenuFunction>();
RegisterFunction<UpdateContextMenuFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RemoveContextMenuFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RemoveAllContextMenusFunction>();
RegisterFunction<OmniboxSendSuggestionsFunction>();
RegisterFunction<OmniboxSetDefaultSuggestionFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CollapseSidebarFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExpandSidebarFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetStateSidebarFunction>();
RegisterFunction<HideSidebarFunction>();
RegisterFunction<NavigateSidebarFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetBadgeTextSidebarFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetIconSidebarFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetTitleSidebarFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ShowSidebarFunction>();
#if defined(TOOLKIT_VIEWS)
RegisterFunction<SendKeyboardEventInputFunction>();
#endif
#if defined(TOUCH_UI)
RegisterFunction<HideKeyboardFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetKeyboardHeightFunction>();
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(TOUCH_UI)
RegisterFunction<CandidateClickedInputUiFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CursorUpInputUiFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CursorDownInputUiFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PageUpInputUiFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PageDownInputUiFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RegisterInputUiFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PageUpInputUiFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PageDownInputUiFunction>();
#endif
RegisterFunction<GetAllExtensionsFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetExtensionByIdFunction>();
RegisterFunction<LaunchAppFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetEnabledFunction>();
RegisterFunction<UninstallFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetUpdateUrlDataFunction>();
RegisterFunction<IsAllowedIncognitoAccessFunction>();
RegisterFunction<IsAllowedFileSchemeAccessFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetBrowserLoginFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetStoreLoginFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetStoreLoginFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PromptBrowserLoginFunction>();
RegisterFunction<BeginInstallFunction>();
RegisterFunction<BeginInstallWithManifestFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CompleteInstallFunction>();
RegisterFunction<WebRequestAddEventListener>();
RegisterFunction<WebRequestEventHandled>();
RegisterFunction<GetPreferenceFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetPreferenceFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ClearPreferenceFunction>();
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
RegisterFunction<GetChromeosInfoFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CancelFileDialogFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExecuteTasksFileBrowserFunction>();
RegisterFunction<FileDialogStringsFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetFileTasksFileBrowserFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetVolumeMetadataFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RequestLocalFileSystemFunction>();
RegisterFunction<AddFileWatchBrowserFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RemoveFileWatchBrowserFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SelectFileFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SelectFilesFunction>();
RegisterFunction<UnmountVolumeFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ViewFilesFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PlayAtMediaplayerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetPlaybackErrorMediaplayerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetPlaylistMediaplayerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<TogglePlaylistPanelMediaplayerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ToggleFullscreenMediaplayerFunction>();
#if defined(TOUCH_UI)
RegisterFunction<SendHandwritingStrokeFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CancelHandwritingStrokesFunction>();
#endif
#endif
RegisterFunction<WebSocketProxyPrivateGetPassportForTCPFunction>();
RegisterFunction<AttachDebuggerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<DetachDebuggerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SendRequestDebuggerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetResourceIdentifiersFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ClearContentSettingsFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetContentSettingFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetContentSettingFunction>();
RegisterFunction<AppNotifyFunction>();
RegisterFunction<AppClearAllNotificationsFunction>();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,373
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: icmp6_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length, const u_char *bp2, int fragmented)
{
const struct icmp6_hdr *dp;
const struct ip6_hdr *ip;
const struct ip6_hdr *oip;
const struct udphdr *ouh;
int dport;
const u_char *ep;
u_int prot;
dp = (const struct icmp6_hdr *)bp;
ip = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp2;
oip = (const struct ip6_hdr *)(dp + 1);
/* 'ep' points to the end of available data. */
ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_cksum);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag && !fragmented) {
uint16_t sum, udp_sum;
if (ND_TTEST2(bp[0], length)) {
udp_sum = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_cksum);
sum = icmp6_cksum(ndo, ip, dp, length);
if (sum != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[bad icmp6 cksum 0x%04x -> 0x%04x!] ",
udp_sum,
in_cksum_shouldbe(udp_sum, sum)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[icmp6 sum ok] "));
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"ICMP6, %s", tok2str(icmp6_type_values,"unknown icmp6 type (%u)",dp->icmp6_type)));
/* display cosmetics: print the packet length for printer that use the vflag now */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag && (dp->icmp6_type == ND_ROUTER_SOLICIT ||
dp->icmp6_type == ND_ROUTER_ADVERT ||
dp->icmp6_type == ND_NEIGHBOR_ADVERT ||
dp->icmp6_type == ND_NEIGHBOR_SOLICIT ||
dp->icmp6_type == ND_REDIRECT ||
dp->icmp6_type == ICMP6_HADISCOV_REPLY ||
dp->icmp6_type == ICMP6_MOBILEPREFIX_ADVERT ))
ND_PRINT((ndo,", length %u", length));
switch (dp->icmp6_type) {
case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH:
ND_TCHECK(oip->ip6_dst);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s", tok2str(icmp6_dst_unreach_code_values,"unknown unreach code (%u)",dp->icmp6_code)));
switch (dp->icmp6_code) {
case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_NOROUTE: /* fall through */
case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_ADMIN:
case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_ADDR:
ND_PRINT((ndo," %s",ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst)));
break;
case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_BEYONDSCOPE:
ND_PRINT((ndo," %s, source address %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst),
ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_src)));
break;
case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_NOPORT:
if ((ouh = get_upperlayer(ndo, (const u_char *)oip, &prot))
== NULL)
goto trunc;
dport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ouh->uh_dport);
switch (prot) {
case IPPROTO_TCP:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s tcp port %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst),
tcpport_string(ndo, dport)));
break;
case IPPROTO_UDP:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s udp port %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst),
udpport_string(ndo, dport)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s protocol %d port %d unreachable",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst),
oip->ip6_nxt, dport));
break;
}
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, bp,"\n\t",length);
return;
}
break;
}
break;
case ICMP6_PACKET_TOO_BIG:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_mtu);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", mtu %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp6_mtu)));
break;
case ICMP6_TIME_EXCEEDED:
ND_TCHECK(oip->ip6_dst);
switch (dp->icmp6_code) {
case ICMP6_TIME_EXCEED_TRANSIT:
ND_PRINT((ndo," for %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst)));
break;
case ICMP6_TIME_EXCEED_REASSEMBLY:
ND_PRINT((ndo," (reassembly)"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", unknown code (%u)", dp->icmp6_code));
break;
}
break;
case ICMP6_PARAM_PROB:
ND_TCHECK(oip->ip6_dst);
switch (dp->icmp6_code) {
case ICMP6_PARAMPROB_HEADER:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", erroneous - octet %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp6_pptr)));
break;
case ICMP6_PARAMPROB_NEXTHEADER:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", next header - octet %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp6_pptr)));
break;
case ICMP6_PARAMPROB_OPTION:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", option - octet %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp6_pptr)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", code-#%d",
dp->icmp6_code));
break;
}
break;
case ICMP6_ECHO_REQUEST:
case ICMP6_ECHO_REPLY:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_seq);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", seq %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_seq)));
break;
case ICMP6_MEMBERSHIP_QUERY:
if (length == MLD_MINLEN) {
mld6_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp);
} else if (length >= MLDV2_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," v2"));
mldv2_query_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp, length);
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo," unknown-version (len %u) ", length));
}
break;
case ICMP6_MEMBERSHIP_REPORT:
mld6_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp);
break;
case ICMP6_MEMBERSHIP_REDUCTION:
mld6_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp);
break;
case ND_ROUTER_SOLICIT:
#define RTSOLLEN 8
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + RTSOLLEN,
length - RTSOLLEN);
}
break;
case ND_ROUTER_ADVERT:
#define RTADVLEN 16
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
const struct nd_router_advert *p;
p = (const struct nd_router_advert *)dp;
ND_TCHECK(p->nd_ra_retransmit);
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n\thop limit %u, Flags [%s]" \
", pref %s, router lifetime %us, reachable time %ums, retrans timer %ums",
(u_int)p->nd_ra_curhoplimit,
bittok2str(icmp6_opt_ra_flag_values,"none",(p->nd_ra_flags_reserved)),
get_rtpref(p->nd_ra_flags_reserved),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&p->nd_ra_router_lifetime),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&p->nd_ra_reachable),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&p->nd_ra_retransmit)));
icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + RTADVLEN,
length - RTADVLEN);
}
break;
case ND_NEIGHBOR_SOLICIT:
{
const struct nd_neighbor_solicit *p;
p = (const struct nd_neighbor_solicit *)dp;
ND_TCHECK(p->nd_ns_target);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", who has %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &p->nd_ns_target)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
#define NDSOLLEN 24
icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + NDSOLLEN,
length - NDSOLLEN);
}
}
break;
case ND_NEIGHBOR_ADVERT:
{
const struct nd_neighbor_advert *p;
p = (const struct nd_neighbor_advert *)dp;
ND_TCHECK(p->nd_na_target);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", tgt is %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &p->nd_na_target)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,", Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(icmp6_nd_na_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&p->nd_na_flags_reserved))));
#define NDADVLEN 24
icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + NDADVLEN,
length - NDADVLEN);
#undef NDADVLEN
}
}
break;
case ND_REDIRECT:
#define RDR(i) ((const struct nd_redirect *)(i))
ND_TCHECK(RDR(dp)->nd_rd_dst);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &RDR(dp)->nd_rd_dst)));
ND_TCHECK(RDR(dp)->nd_rd_target);
ND_PRINT((ndo," to %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &RDR(dp)->nd_rd_target)));
#define REDIRECTLEN 40
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + REDIRECTLEN,
length - REDIRECTLEN);
}
break;
#undef REDIRECTLEN
#undef RDR
case ICMP6_ROUTER_RENUMBERING:
icmp6_rrenum_print(ndo, bp, ep);
break;
case ICMP6_NI_QUERY:
case ICMP6_NI_REPLY:
icmp6_nodeinfo_print(ndo, length, bp, ep);
break;
case IND_SOLICIT:
case IND_ADVERT:
break;
case ICMP6_V2_MEMBERSHIP_REPORT:
mldv2_report_print(ndo, (const u_char *) dp, length);
break;
case ICMP6_MOBILEPREFIX_SOLICIT: /* fall through */
case ICMP6_HADISCOV_REQUEST:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", id 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_data16[0])));
break;
case ICMP6_HADISCOV_REPLY:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
const struct in6_addr *in6;
const u_char *cp;
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", id 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_data16[0])));
cp = (const u_char *)dp + length;
in6 = (const struct in6_addr *)(dp + 1);
for (; (const u_char *)in6 < cp; in6++) {
ND_TCHECK(*in6);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, in6)));
}
}
break;
case ICMP6_MOBILEPREFIX_ADVERT:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", id 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_data16[0])));
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_data16[1]);
if (dp->icmp6_data16[1] & 0xc0)
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (dp->icmp6_data16[1] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"M"));
if (dp->icmp6_data16[1] & 0x40)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"O"));
#define MPADVLEN 8
icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + MPADVLEN,
length - MPADVLEN);
}
break;
case ND_RPL_MESSAGE:
/* plus 4, because struct icmp6_hdr contains 4 bytes of icmp payload */
rpl_print(ndo, dp, &dp->icmp6_data8[0], length-sizeof(struct icmp6_hdr)+4);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", length %u", length));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, bp,"\n\t", length);
return;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", length %u", length));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|icmp6]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ICMPv6 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-icmp6.c.
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check
Moreover:
Add and use *_tstr[] strings.
Update four tests outputs accordingly.
Fix a space.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test.
|
Low
| 169,824
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: http_dissect_hdrs(struct worker *w, struct http *hp, int fd, char *p,
const struct http_conn *htc)
{
char *q, *r;
txt t = htc->rxbuf;
if (*p == '\r')
p++;
hp->nhd = HTTP_HDR_FIRST;
hp->conds = 0;
r = NULL; /* For FlexeLint */
for (; p < t.e; p = r) {
/* Find end of next header */
q = r = p;
while (r < t.e) {
if (!vct_iscrlf(*r)) {
r++;
continue;
}
q = r;
assert(r < t.e);
r += vct_skipcrlf(r);
if (r >= t.e)
break;
/* If line does not continue: got it. */
if (!vct_issp(*r))
break;
/* Clear line continuation LWS to spaces */
while (vct_islws(*q))
*q++ = ' ';
}
if (q - p > htc->maxhdr) {
VSC_C_main->losthdr++;
WSL(w, SLT_LostHeader, fd, "%.*s",
q - p > 20 ? 20 : q - p, p);
return (413);
}
/* Empty header = end of headers */
if (p == q)
break;
if ((p[0] == 'i' || p[0] == 'I') &&
(p[1] == 'f' || p[1] == 'F') &&
p[2] == '-')
hp->conds = 1;
while (q > p && vct_issp(q[-1]))
q--;
*q = '\0';
if (hp->nhd < hp->shd) {
hp->hdf[hp->nhd] = 0;
hp->hd[hp->nhd].b = p;
hp->hd[hp->nhd].e = q;
WSLH(w, fd, hp, hp->nhd);
hp->nhd++;
} else {
VSC_C_main->losthdr++;
WSL(w, SLT_LostHeader, fd, "%.*s",
q - p > 20 ? 20 : q - p, p);
return (413);
}
}
return (0);
}
Vulnerability Type: Http R.Spl.
CWE ID:
Summary: Varnish 3.x before 3.0.7, when used in certain stacked installations, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers and conduct HTTP response splitting attacks via a header line terminated by a r (carriage return) character in conjunction with multiple Content-Length headers in an HTTP request.
Commit Message: Do not consider a CR by itself as a valid line terminator
Varnish (prior to version 4.0) was not following the standard with
regard to line separator.
Spotted and analyzed by: Régis Leroy [regilero] regis.leroy@makina-corpus.com
|
Low
| 169,997
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
{
struct key_user *newowner, *zapowner = NULL;
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
long ret;
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), user);
gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), group);
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((user != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid))
goto error;
if ((group != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid))
goto error;
ret = 0;
if (user == (uid_t) -1 && group == (gid_t) -1)
goto error;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
}
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
/* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chown races */
ret = -EACCES;
down_write(&key->sem);
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
/* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(key->uid, uid))
goto error_put;
/* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other
* than one of those that the current process subscribes to */
if (group != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(gid, key->gid) && !in_group_p(gid))
goto error_put;
}
/* change the UID */
if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(uid, key->uid)) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
newowner = key_user_lookup(uid);
if (!newowner)
goto error_put;
/* transfer the quota burden to the new user */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
spin_lock(&newowner->lock);
if (newowner->qnkeys + 1 >= maxkeys ||
newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen >= maxbytes ||
newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen <
newowner->qnbytes)
goto quota_overrun;
newowner->qnkeys++;
newowner->qnbytes += key->quotalen;
spin_unlock(&newowner->lock);
spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
key->user->qnkeys--;
key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
}
atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
atomic_inc(&newowner->nkeys);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
atomic_inc(&newowner->nikeys);
}
zapowner = key->user;
key->user = newowner;
key->uid = uid;
}
/* change the GID */
if (group != (gid_t) -1)
key->gid = gid;
ret = 0;
error_put:
up_write(&key->sem);
key_put(key);
if (zapowner)
key_user_put(zapowner);
error:
return ret;
quota_overrun:
spin_unlock(&newowner->lock);
zapowner = newowner;
ret = -EDQUOT;
goto error_put;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the *negative* state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
Low
| 167,700
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: P2PQuicTransportImpl::P2PQuicTransportImpl(
P2PQuicTransportConfig p2p_transport_config,
std::unique_ptr<net::QuicChromiumConnectionHelper> helper,
std::unique_ptr<quic::QuicConnection> connection,
const quic::QuicConfig& quic_config,
quic::QuicClock* clock)
: quic::QuicSession(connection.get(),
nullptr /* visitor */,
quic_config,
quic::CurrentSupportedVersions()),
helper_(std::move(helper)),
connection_(std::move(connection)),
perspective_(p2p_transport_config.is_server
? quic::Perspective::IS_SERVER
: quic::Perspective::IS_CLIENT),
packet_transport_(p2p_transport_config.packet_transport),
delegate_(p2p_transport_config.delegate),
clock_(clock) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(delegate_);
DCHECK(clock_);
DCHECK(packet_transport_);
DCHECK_GT(p2p_transport_config.certificates.size(), 0u);
if (p2p_transport_config.can_respond_to_crypto_handshake) {
InitializeCryptoStream();
}
certificate_ = p2p_transport_config.certificates[0];
packet_transport_->SetReceiveDelegate(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The TreeScope::adoptIfNeeded function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/TreeScope.cpp in the DOM implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.102, does not prevent script execution during node-adoption operations, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
|
Medium
| 172,266
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::vector<FilePath> GDataCache::GetCachePaths(
const FilePath& cache_root_path) {
std::vector<FilePath> cache_paths;
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCacheMetaDir));
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCachePinnedDir));
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCacheOutgoingDir));
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCachePersistentDir));
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCacheTmpDir));
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCacheTmpDownloadsDir));
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCacheTmpDocumentsDir));
return cache_paths;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,862
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::AttachInterstitialPage(
InterstitialPageImpl* interstitial_page) {
DCHECK(interstitial_page);
render_manager_.set_interstitial_page(interstitial_page);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_,
DidAttachInterstitialPage());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The WebContentsImpl::AttachInterstitialPage function in content/browser/web_contents/web_contents_impl.cc in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48 does not cancel JavaScript dialogs upon generating an interstitial warning, which allows remote attackers to spoof the address bar via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,160
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadOneJNGImage(MngInfo *mng_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info, ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*alpha_image,
*color_image,
*image,
*jng_image;
ImageInfo
*alpha_image_info,
*color_image_info;
MagickBooleanType
logging;
int
unique_filenames;
ssize_t
y;
MagickBooleanType
status;
png_uint_32
jng_height,
jng_width;
png_byte
jng_color_type,
jng_image_sample_depth,
jng_image_compression_method,
jng_image_interlace_method,
jng_alpha_sample_depth,
jng_alpha_compression_method,
jng_alpha_filter_method,
jng_alpha_interlace_method;
register const PixelPacket
*s;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
unsigned int
read_JSEP,
reading_idat;
size_t
length;
jng_alpha_compression_method=0;
jng_alpha_sample_depth=8;
jng_color_type=0;
jng_height=0;
jng_width=0;
alpha_image=(Image *) NULL;
color_image=(Image *) NULL;
alpha_image_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
color_image_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
unique_filenames=0;
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Enter ReadOneJNGImage()");
image=mng_info->image;
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" AcquireNextImage()");
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
/*
Signature bytes have already been read.
*/
read_JSEP=MagickFalse;
reading_idat=MagickFalse;
for (;;)
{
char
type[MaxTextExtent];
unsigned char
*chunk;
unsigned int
count;
/*
Read a new JNG chunk.
*/
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
2*GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
type[0]='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(type,"errr",MaxTextExtent);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
count=(unsigned int) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading JNG chunk type %c%c%c%c, length: %.20g",
type[0],type[1],type[2],type[3],(double) length);
if (length > PNG_UINT_31_MAX || count == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
p=NULL;
chunk=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (length != 0)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*chunk));
if (chunk == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
{
int
c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
chunk[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
p=chunk;
}
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image); /* read crc word */
if (memcmp(type,mng_JHDR,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 16)
{
jng_width=(size_t) ((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) |
(p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
jng_height=(size_t) ((p[4] << 24) | (p[5] << 16) |
(p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
if ((jng_width == 0) || (jng_height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
jng_color_type=p[8];
jng_image_sample_depth=p[9];
jng_image_compression_method=p[10];
jng_image_interlace_method=p[11];
image->interlace=jng_image_interlace_method != 0 ? PNGInterlace :
NoInterlace;
jng_alpha_sample_depth=p[12];
jng_alpha_compression_method=p[13];
jng_alpha_filter_method=p[14];
jng_alpha_interlace_method=p[15];
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" jng_width: %16lu, jng_height: %16lu\n"
" jng_color_type: %16d, jng_image_sample_depth: %3d\n"
" jng_image_compression_method:%3d",
(unsigned long) jng_width, (unsigned long) jng_height,
jng_color_type, jng_image_sample_depth,
jng_image_compression_method);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" jng_image_interlace_method: %3d"
" jng_alpha_sample_depth: %3d",
jng_image_interlace_method,
jng_alpha_sample_depth);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" jng_alpha_compression_method:%3d\n"
" jng_alpha_filter_method: %3d\n"
" jng_alpha_interlace_method: %3d",
jng_alpha_compression_method,
jng_alpha_filter_method,
jng_alpha_interlace_method);
}
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if ((reading_idat == MagickFalse) && (read_JSEP == MagickFalse) &&
((memcmp(type,mng_JDAT,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_JdAA,4) == 0) ||
(memcmp(type,mng_IDAT,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_JDAA,4) == 0)))
{
/*
o create color_image
o open color_blob, attached to color_image
o if (color type has alpha)
open alpha_blob, attached to alpha_image
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating color_blob.");
color_image_info=(ImageInfo *)AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(ImageInfo));
if (color_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
GetImageInfo(color_image_info);
color_image=AcquireImage(color_image_info);
if (color_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(color_image->filename);
unique_filenames++;
status=OpenBlob(color_image_info,color_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if ((image_info->ping == MagickFalse) && (jng_color_type >= 12))
{
alpha_image_info=(ImageInfo *)
AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(ImageInfo));
if (alpha_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
{
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
GetImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
alpha_image=AcquireImage(alpha_image_info);
if (alpha_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
alpha_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating alpha_blob.");
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(alpha_image->filename);
unique_filenames++;
status=OpenBlob(alpha_image_info,alpha_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
alpha_image=DestroyImage(alpha_image);
alpha_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (jng_alpha_compression_method == 0)
{
unsigned char
data[18];
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing IHDR chunk to alpha_blob.");
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,8,(const unsigned char *)
"\211PNG\r\n\032\n");
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,13L);
PNGType(data,mng_IHDR);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IHDR,13L);
PNGLong(data+4,jng_width);
PNGLong(data+8,jng_height);
data[12]=jng_alpha_sample_depth;
data[13]=0; /* color_type gray */
data[14]=0; /* compression method 0 */
data[15]=0; /* filter_method 0 */
data[16]=0; /* interlace_method 0 */
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,17,data);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,crc32(0,data,17));
}
}
reading_idat=MagickTrue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_JDAT,4) == 0)
{
/* Copy chunk to color_image->blob */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying JDAT chunk data to color_blob.");
if (length != 0)
{
(void) WriteBlob(color_image,length,chunk);
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
}
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_IDAT,4) == 0)
{
png_byte
data[5];
/* Copy IDAT header and chunk data to alpha_image->blob */
if (alpha_image != NULL && image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying IDAT chunk data to alpha_blob.");
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,(size_t) length);
PNGType(data,mng_IDAT);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IDAT,length);
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,4,data);
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,length,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,
crc32(crc32(0,data,4),chunk,(uInt) length));
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if ((memcmp(type,mng_JDAA,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_JdAA,4) == 0))
{
/* Copy chunk data to alpha_image->blob */
if (alpha_image != NULL && image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying JDAA chunk data to alpha_blob.");
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,length,chunk);
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_JSEP,4) == 0)
{
read_JSEP=MagickTrue;
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_bKGD,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 2)
{
image->background_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[1]);
image->background_color.green=image->background_color.red;
image->background_color.blue=image->background_color.red;
}
if (length == 6)
{
image->background_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[1]);
image->background_color.green=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[3]);
image->background_color.blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[5]);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_gAMA,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 4)
image->gamma=((float) mng_get_long(p))*0.00001;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_cHRM,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 32)
{
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(p);
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[4]);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[8]);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[12]);
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[16]);
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[20]);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[24]);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[28]);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_sRGB,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 1)
{
image->rendering_intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(p[0]);
image->gamma=1.000f/2.200f;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=0.6400f;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=0.3300f;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=0.3000f;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=0.6000f;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=0.1500f;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=0.0600f;
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=0.3127f;
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=0.3290f;
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_oFFs,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 8)
{
image->page.x=(ssize_t) mng_get_long(p);
image->page.y=(ssize_t) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
if ((int) p[8] != 0)
{
image->page.x/=10000;
image->page.y/=10000;
}
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_pHYs,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 8)
{
image->x_resolution=(double) mng_get_long(p);
image->y_resolution=(double) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
if ((int) p[8] == PNG_RESOLUTION_METER)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->x_resolution=image->x_resolution/100.0f;
image->y_resolution=image->y_resolution/100.0f;
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
#if 0
if (memcmp(type,mng_iCCP,4) == 0)
{
/* To do: */
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
#endif
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
if (memcmp(type,mng_IEND,4))
continue;
break;
}
/* IEND found */
/*
Finish up reading image data:
o read main image from color_blob.
o close color_blob.
o if (color_type has alpha)
if alpha_encoding is PNG
read secondary image from alpha_blob via ReadPNG
if alpha_encoding is JPEG
read secondary image from alpha_blob via ReadJPEG
o close alpha_blob.
o copy intensity of secondary image into
opacity samples of main image.
o destroy the secondary image.
*/
if (color_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
{
assert(color_image == (Image *) NULL);
assert(alpha_image == (Image *) NULL);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (color_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
assert(alpha_image == (Image *) NULL);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
(void) SeekBlob(color_image,0,SEEK_SET);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading jng_image from color_blob.");
assert(color_image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
(void) FormatLocaleString(color_image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"%s",
color_image->filename);
color_image_info->ping=MagickFalse; /* To do: avoid this */
jng_image=ReadImage(color_image_info,exception);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(color_image->filename);
unique_filenames--;
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
color_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(color_image_info);
if (jng_image == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying jng_image pixels to main image.");
image->columns=jng_width;
image->rows=jng_height;
length=image->columns*sizeof(PixelPacket);
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
s=GetVirtualPixels(jng_image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,s,length);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
jng_image=DestroyImage(jng_image);
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
if (jng_color_type >= 12)
{
if (jng_alpha_compression_method == 0)
{
png_byte
data[5];
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,0x00000000L);
PNGType(data,mng_IEND);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IEND,0L);
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,4,data);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,crc32(0,data,4));
}
(void) SeekBlob(alpha_image,0,SEEK_SET);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading opacity from alpha_blob.");
(void) FormatLocaleString(alpha_image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,
"%s",alpha_image->filename);
jng_image=ReadImage(alpha_image_info,exception);
if (jng_image != (Image *) NULL)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
s=GetVirtualPixels(jng_image,0,y,image->columns,1,
&image->exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; x--,q++,s++)
SetPixelOpacity(q,QuantumRange-
GetPixelRed(s));
else
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; x--,q++,s++)
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,GetPixelRed(s));
if (GetPixelOpacity(q) != OpaqueOpacity)
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(alpha_image->filename);
unique_filenames--;
alpha_image=DestroyImage(alpha_image);
alpha_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
if (jng_image != (Image *) NULL)
jng_image=DestroyImage(jng_image);
}
}
/* Read the JNG image. */
if (mng_info->mng_type == 0)
{
mng_info->mng_width=jng_width;
mng_info->mng_height=jng_height;
}
if (image->page.width == 0 && image->page.height == 0)
{
image->page.width=jng_width;
image->page.height=jng_height;
}
if (image->page.x == 0 && image->page.y == 0)
{
image->page.x=mng_info->x_off[mng_info->object_id];
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[mng_info->object_id];
}
else
{
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[mng_info->object_id];
}
mng_info->image_found++;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,2*TellBlob(image),
2*GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOneJNGImage(); unique_filenames=%d",unique_filenames);
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-754
Summary: In ImageMagick before 6.9.9-0 and 7.x before 7.0.6-1, a crafted PNG file could trigger a crash because there was an insufficient check for short files.
Commit Message: ...
|
Medium
| 170,025
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: char *curl_easy_unescape(CURL *handle, const char *string, int length,
int *olen)
{
int alloc = (length?length:(int)strlen(string))+1;
char *ns = malloc(alloc);
unsigned char in;
int strindex=0;
unsigned long hex;
CURLcode res;
if(!ns)
return NULL;
while(--alloc > 0) {
in = *string;
if(('%' == in) && ISXDIGIT(string[1]) && ISXDIGIT(string[2])) {
/* this is two hexadecimal digits following a '%' */
char hexstr[3];
char *ptr;
hexstr[0] = string[1];
hexstr[1] = string[2];
hexstr[2] = 0;
hex = strtoul(hexstr, &ptr, 16);
in = curlx_ultouc(hex); /* this long is never bigger than 255 anyway */
res = Curl_convert_from_network(handle, &in, 1);
if(res) {
/* Curl_convert_from_network calls failf if unsuccessful */
free(ns);
return NULL;
}
string+=2;
alloc-=2;
}
ns[strindex++] = in;
string++;
}
ns[strindex]=0; /* terminate it */
if(olen)
/* store output size */
*olen = strindex;
return ns;
}
Vulnerability Type: Sql
CWE ID: CWE-89
Summary: curl and libcurl 7.2x before 7.24.0 do not properly consider special characters during extraction of a pathname from a URL, which allows remote attackers to conduct data-injection attacks via a crafted URL, as demonstrated by a CRLF injection attack on the (1) IMAP, (2) POP3, or (3) SMTP protocol.
Commit Message: URL sanitize: reject URLs containing bad data
Protocols (IMAP, POP3 and SMTP) that use the path part of a URL in a
decoded manner now use the new Curl_urldecode() function to reject URLs
with embedded control codes (anything that is or decodes to a byte value
less than 32).
URLs containing such codes could easily otherwise be used to do harm and
allow users to do unintended actions with otherwise innocent tools and
applications. Like for example using a URL like
pop3://pop3.example.com/1%0d%0aDELE%201 when the app wants a URL to get
a mail and instead this would delete one.
This flaw is considered a security vulnerability: CVE-2012-0036
Security advisory at: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20120124.html
Reported by: Dan Fandrich
|
Low
| 165,665
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::WasShown() {
if (!host_->is_hidden())
return;
host_->WasShown();
if (!current_surface_ && host_->is_accelerated_compositing_active() &&
!released_front_lock_.get()) {
released_front_lock_ = GetCompositor()->GetCompositorLock();
}
AdjustSurfaceProtection();
#if defined(OS_WIN)
LPARAM lparam = reinterpret_cast<LPARAM>(this);
EnumChildWindows(ui::GetHiddenWindow(), ShowWindowsCallback, lparam);
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,389
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: file_continue(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
es_ptr pscratch = esp - 2;
file_enum *pfen = r_ptr(esp - 1, file_enum);
int devlen = esp[-3].value.intval;
gx_io_device *iodev = r_ptr(esp - 4, gx_io_device);
uint len = r_size(pscratch);
uint code;
if (len < devlen)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck); /* not even room for device len */
do {
memcpy((char *)pscratch->value.bytes, iodev->dname, devlen);
code = iodev->procs.enumerate_next(pfen, (char *)pscratch->value.bytes + devlen,
len - devlen);
if (code == ~(uint) 0) { /* all done */
esp -= 5; /* pop proc, pfen, devlen, iodev , mark */
return o_pop_estack;
} else if (code > len) /* overran string */
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
else if (iodev != iodev_default(imemory)
|| (check_file_permissions_reduced(i_ctx_p, (char *)pscratch->value.bytes, code + devlen, iodev, "PermitFileReading")) == 0) {
push(1);
ref_assign(op, pscratch);
r_set_size(op, code + devlen);
push_op_estack(file_continue); /* come again */
*++esp = pscratch[2]; /* proc */
return o_push_estack;
}
} while(1);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Artifex Ghostscript 9.22 is affected by: Obtain Information. The impact is: obtain sensitive information. The component is: affected source code file, affected function, affected executable, affected libga (imagemagick used that). The attack vector is: Someone must open a postscript file though ghostscript. Because of imagemagick also use libga, so it was affected as well.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,389
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> methodWithSequenceArgCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.methodWithSequenceArg");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(sequence<ScriptProfile>*, sequenceArg, toNativeArray<ScriptProfile>(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
imp->methodWithSequenceArg(sequenceArg);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,092
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline ulong encode_twos_comp(long n, int prec)
{
ulong result;
assert(prec >= 2);
jas_eprintf("warning: support for signed data is untested\n");
if (n < 0) {
result = -n;
result = (result ^ 0xffffffffUL) + 1;
result &= (1 << prec) - 1;
} else {
result = n;
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,692
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool dump_fd_info(const char *dest_filename, char *source_filename, int source_base_ofs, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
FILE *fp = fopen(dest_filename, "w");
if (!fp)
return false;
unsigned fd = 0;
while (fd <= 99999) /* paranoia check */
{
sprintf(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fd/%u", fd);
char *name = malloc_readlink(source_filename);
if (!name)
break;
fprintf(fp, "%u:%s\n", fd, name);
free(name);
sprintf(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fdinfo/%u", fd);
fd++;
FILE *in = fopen(source_filename, "r");
if (!in)
continue;
char buf[128];
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf)-1, in))
{
/* in case the line is not terminated, terminate it */
char *eol = strchrnul(buf, '\n');
eol[0] = '\n';
eol[1] = '\0';
fputs(buf, fp);
}
fclose(in);
}
const int dest_fd = fileno(fp);
if (fchown(dest_fd, uid, gid) < 0)
{
perror_msg("Can't change '%s' ownership to %lu:%lu", dest_filename, (long)uid, (long)gid);
fclose(fp);
unlink(dest_filename);
return false;
}
fclose(fp);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (ABRT) allows local users to read, change the ownership of, or have other unspecified impact on arbitrary files via a symlink attack on (1) /var/tmp/abrt/*/maps, (2) /tmp/jvm-*/hs_error.log, (3) /proc/*/exe, (4) /etc/os-release in a chroot, or (5) an unspecified root directory related to librpm.
Commit Message: ccpp: open file for dump_fd_info with O_EXCL
To avoid possible races.
Related: #1211835
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 170,138
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: e1000e_ring_empty(E1000ECore *core, const E1000E_RingInfo *r)
{
return core->mac[r->dh] == core->mac[r->dt];
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: QEMU (aka Quick Emulator), when built with the e1000e NIC emulation support, allows local guest OS privileged users to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via vectors related to setting the initial receive / transmit descriptor head (TDH/RDH) outside the allocated descriptor buffer.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,799
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int complete_emulated_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
struct kvm_mmio_fragment *frag;
unsigned len;
BUG_ON(!vcpu->mmio_needed);
/* Complete previous fragment */
frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment];
len = min(8u, frag->len);
if (!vcpu->mmio_is_write)
memcpy(frag->data, run->mmio.data, len);
if (frag->len <= 8) {
/* Switch to the next fragment. */
frag++;
vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment++;
} else {
/* Go forward to the next mmio piece. */
frag->data += len;
frag->gpa += len;
frag->len -= len;
}
if (vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment == vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments) {
vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
/* FIXME: return into emulator if single-stepping. */
if (vcpu->mmio_is_write)
return 1;
vcpu->mmio_read_completed = 1;
return complete_emulated_io(vcpu);
}
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
run->mmio.phys_addr = frag->gpa;
if (vcpu->mmio_is_write)
memcpy(run->mmio.data, frag->data, min(8u, frag->len));
run->mmio.len = min(8u, frag->len);
run->mmio.is_write = vcpu->mmio_is_write;
vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_emulated_mmio;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the complete_emulated_mmio function in arch/x86/kvm/x86.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13.6 allows guest OS users to execute arbitrary code on the host OS by leveraging a loop that triggers an invalid memory copy affecting certain cancel_work_item data.
Commit Message: kvm: x86: fix emulator buffer overflow (CVE-2014-0049)
The problem occurs when the guest performs a pusha with the stack
address pointing to an mmio address (or an invalid guest physical
address) to start with, but then extending into an ordinary guest
physical address. When doing repeated emulated pushes
emulator_read_write sets mmio_needed to 1 on the first one. On a
later push when the stack points to regular memory,
mmio_nr_fragments is set to 0, but mmio_is_needed is not set to 0.
As a result, KVM exits to userspace, and then returns to
complete_emulated_mmio. In complete_emulated_mmio
vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment is incremented. The termination condition of
vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment == vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments is never achieved.
The code bounces back and fourth to userspace incrementing
mmio_cur_fragment past it's buffer. If the guest does nothing else it
eventually leads to a a crash on a memcpy from invalid memory address.
However if a guest code can cause the vm to be destroyed in another
vcpu with excellent timing, then kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue
can be used by the guest to control the data that's pointed to by the
call to cancel_work_item, which can be used to gain execution.
Fixes: f78146b0f9230765c6315b2e14f56112513389ad
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (3.5+)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Medium
| 166,466
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static cJSON *get_object_item(const cJSON * const object, const char * const name, const cJSON_bool case_sensitive)
{
cJSON *current_element = NULL;
if ((object == NULL) || (name == NULL))
{
return NULL;
}
current_element = object->child;
if (case_sensitive)
{
while ((current_element != NULL) && (strcmp(name, current_element->string) != 0))
{
current_element = current_element->next;
}
}
else
{
while ((current_element != NULL) && (case_insensitive_strcmp((const unsigned char*)name, (const unsigned char*)(current_element->string)) != 0))
{
current_element = current_element->next;
}
}
return current_element;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-754
Summary: DaveGamble/cJSON cJSON 1.7.8 is affected by: Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions. The impact is: Null dereference, so attack can cause denial of service. The component is: cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive() function. The attack vector is: crafted json file. The fixed version is: 1.7.9 and later.
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
|
Low
| 169,480
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual size_t GetNumActiveInputMethods() {
scoped_ptr<InputMethodDescriptors> descriptors(GetActiveInputMethods());
return descriptors->size();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,491
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static php_mb_regex_t *php_mbregex_compile_pattern(const char *pattern, int patlen, OnigOptionType options, OnigEncoding enc, OnigSyntaxType *syntax TSRMLS_DC)
{
int err_code = 0;
int found = 0;
php_mb_regex_t *retval = NULL, **rc = NULL;
OnigErrorInfo err_info;
OnigUChar err_str[ONIG_MAX_ERROR_MESSAGE_LEN];
found = zend_hash_find(&MBREX(ht_rc), (char *)pattern, patlen+1, (void **) &rc);
if (found == FAILURE || (*rc)->options != options || (*rc)->enc != enc || (*rc)->syntax != syntax) {
if ((err_code = onig_new(&retval, (OnigUChar *)pattern, (OnigUChar *)(pattern + patlen), options, enc, syntax, &err_info)) != ONIG_NORMAL) {
onig_error_code_to_str(err_str, err_code, err_info);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "mbregex compile err: %s", err_str);
retval = NULL;
goto out;
}
zend_hash_update(&MBREX(ht_rc), (char *) pattern, patlen + 1, (void *) &retval, sizeof(retval), NULL);
} else if (found == SUCCESS) {
retval = *rc;
}
out:
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec function in php_mbregex.c in the mbstring extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (application crash) by leveraging a callback exception.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
|
Low
| 167,123
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static grub_err_t read_foo (struct grub_disk *disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector, grub_size_t size, char *buf) {
if (disk != NULL) {
const int blocksize = 512; // unhardcode 512
int ret;
RIOBind *iob = disk->data;
if (bio) iob = bio;
ret = iob->read_at (iob->io, delta+(blocksize*sector),
(ut8*)buf, size*blocksize);
if (ret == -1)
return 1;
} else eprintf ("oops. no disk\n");
return 0; // 0 is ok
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The grub_ext2_read_block function in fs/ext2.c in GNU GRUB before 2013-11-12, as used in shlr/grub/fs/ext2.c in radare2 1.5.0, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (excessive stack use and application crash) via a crafted binary file, related to use of a variable-size stack array.
Commit Message: Fix #7723 - crash in ext2 GRUB code because of variable size array in stack
|
Low
| 168,091
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MockPrinter::UpdateSettings(int cookie,
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params* params,
const std::vector<int>& pages) {
EXPECT_EQ(document_cookie_, cookie);
params->Reset();
params->pages = pages;
SetPrintParams(&(params->params));
printer_status_ = PRINTER_PRINTING;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 15.0.874.120 allows user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to editing.
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,257
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HTMLFormElement::scheduleFormSubmission(FormSubmission* submission) {
DCHECK(submission->method() == FormSubmission::PostMethod ||
submission->method() == FormSubmission::GetMethod);
DCHECK(submission->data());
DCHECK(submission->form());
if (submission->action().isEmpty())
return;
if (document().isSandboxed(SandboxForms)) {
document().addConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::create(
SecurityMessageSource, ErrorMessageLevel,
"Blocked form submission to '" + submission->action().elidedString() +
"' because the form's frame is sandboxed and the 'allow-forms' "
"permission is not set."));
return;
}
if (protocolIsJavaScript(submission->action())) {
if (!document().contentSecurityPolicy()->allowFormAction(
submission->action()))
return;
document().frame()->script().executeScriptIfJavaScriptURL(
submission->action(), this);
return;
}
Frame* targetFrame = document().frame()->findFrameForNavigation(
submission->target(), *document().frame());
if (!targetFrame) {
if (!LocalDOMWindow::allowPopUp(*document().frame()) &&
!UserGestureIndicator::utilizeUserGesture())
return;
targetFrame = document().frame();
} else {
submission->clearTarget();
}
if (!targetFrame->host())
return;
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::FormsSubmitted);
if (MixedContentChecker::isMixedFormAction(document().frame(),
submission->action()))
UseCounter::count(document().frame(),
UseCounter::MixedContentFormsSubmitted);
if (targetFrame->isLocalFrame()) {
toLocalFrame(targetFrame)
->navigationScheduler()
.scheduleFormSubmission(&document(), submission);
} else {
FrameLoadRequest frameLoadRequest =
submission->createFrameLoadRequest(&document());
toRemoteFrame(targetFrame)->navigate(frameLoadRequest);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android incorrectly handled form actions, which allowed a remote attacker to bypass Content Security Policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Enforce form-action CSP even when form.target is present.
BUG=630332
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2464123004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#429922}
|
Medium
| 172,545
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: exsltFuncRegisterImportFunc (exsltFuncFunctionData *data,
exsltFuncImportRegData *ch,
const xmlChar *URI, const xmlChar *name,
ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED const xmlChar *ignored) {
exsltFuncFunctionData *func=NULL;
if ((data == NULL) || (ch == NULL) || (URI == NULL) || (name == NULL))
return;
if (ch->ctxt == NULL || ch->hash == NULL)
return;
/* Check if already present */
func = (exsltFuncFunctionData*)xmlHashLookup2(ch->hash, URI, name);
if (func == NULL) { /* Not yet present - copy it in */
func = exsltFuncNewFunctionData();
memcpy(func, data, sizeof(exsltFuncFunctionData));
if (xmlHashAddEntry2(ch->hash, URI, name, func) < 0) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"Failed to register function {%s}%s\n",
URI, name);
} else { /* Do the registration */
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"exsltFuncRegisterImportFunc: register {%s}%s\n",
URI, name);
xsltRegisterExtFunction(ch->ctxt, name, URI,
exsltFuncFunctionFunction);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
High
| 173,294
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int _yr_scan_match_callback(
uint8_t* match_data,
int32_t match_length,
int flags,
void* args)
{
CALLBACK_ARGS* callback_args = (CALLBACK_ARGS*) args;
YR_STRING* string = callback_args->string;
YR_MATCH* new_match;
int result = ERROR_SUCCESS;
int tidx = callback_args->context->tidx;
size_t match_offset = match_data - callback_args->data;
match_length += callback_args->forward_matches;
if (callback_args->full_word)
{
if (flags & RE_FLAGS_WIDE)
{
if (match_offset >= 2 &&
*(match_data - 1) == 0 &&
isalnum(*(match_data - 2)))
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
if (match_offset + match_length + 1 < callback_args->data_size &&
*(match_data + match_length + 1) == 0 &&
isalnum(*(match_data + match_length)))
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
else
{
if (match_offset >= 1 &&
isalnum(*(match_data - 1)))
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
if (match_offset + match_length < callback_args->data_size &&
isalnum(*(match_data + match_length)))
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
}
if (STRING_IS_CHAIN_PART(string))
{
result = _yr_scan_verify_chained_string_match(
string,
callback_args->context,
match_data,
callback_args->data_base,
match_offset,
match_length);
}
else
{
if (string->matches[tidx].count == 0)
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
callback_args->context->matching_strings_arena,
&string,
sizeof(string),
NULL));
}
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_allocate_memory(
callback_args->context->matches_arena,
sizeof(YR_MATCH),
(void**) &new_match));
new_match->data_length = yr_min(match_length, MAX_MATCH_DATA);
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
callback_args->context->matches_arena,
match_data,
new_match->data_length,
(void**) &new_match->data));
if (result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
new_match->base = callback_args->data_base;
new_match->offset = match_offset;
new_match->match_length = match_length;
new_match->prev = NULL;
new_match->next = NULL;
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_scan_add_match_to_list(
new_match,
&string->matches[tidx],
STRING_IS_GREEDY_REGEXP(string)));
}
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The yr_arena_write_data function in YARA 3.6.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer over-read and application crash) or obtain sensitive information from process memory via a crafted file that is mishandled in the yr_re_fast_exec function in libyara/re.c and the _yr_scan_match_callback function in libyara/scan.c.
Commit Message: Fix buffer overrun (issue #678). Add assert for detecting this kind of issues earlier.
|
Medium
| 168,099
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ContentSuggestionsNotifierService::RegisterProfilePrefs(
user_prefs::PrefRegistrySyncable* registry) {
registry->RegisterIntegerPref(
prefs::kContentSuggestionsConsecutiveIgnoredPrefName, 0);
registry->RegisterStringPref(kNotificationIDWithinCategory, std::string());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The DragImage::create function in platform/DragImage.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76, does not initialize memory for image drawing, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact by triggering a failed image decoding, as demonstrated by an image for which the default orientation cannot be used.
Commit Message: NTP: cap number of notifications/day
1 by default; Finch-configurable.
BUG=689465
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2691023002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450389}
|
Low
| 172,038
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void sas_eh_finish_cmd(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
{
struct sas_ha_struct *sas_ha = SHOST_TO_SAS_HA(cmd->device->host);
struct sas_task *task = TO_SAS_TASK(cmd);
/* At this point, we only get called following an actual abort
* of the task, so we should be guaranteed not to be racing with
* any completions from the LLD. Task is freed after this.
*/
sas_end_task(cmd, task);
/* now finish the command and move it on to the error
* handler done list, this also takes it off the
* error handler pending list.
*/
scsi_eh_finish_cmd(cmd, &sas_ha->eh_done_q);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: ** DISPUTED ** drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_scsi_host.c in the Linux kernel before 4.16 allows local users to cause a denial of service (ata qc leak) by triggering certain failure conditions. NOTE: a third party disputes the relevance of this report because the failure can only occur for physically proximate attackers who unplug SAS Host Bus Adapter cables.
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata
When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are
not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did
not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed,
but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a
warning like below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037
ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1
......
Call trace:
[<ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
[<ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8
[<ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c
[<ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694
[<ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80
[<ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170
[<ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390
[<ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418
[<ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138
[<ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked
for ever.
As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and
merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle
ata qcs correctly after this.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
|
Low
| 169,261
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IOHandler::IOHandler(DevToolsIOContext* io_context)
: DevToolsDomainHandler(IO::Metainfo::domainName),
io_context_(io_context),
process_host_(nullptr),
weak_factory_(this) {}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,749
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng = &rng_ctx;
unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_mpi h;
if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &h );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx );
ECDSA_RS_ENTER( det );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL )
{
/* redirect to our context */
p_rng = &rs_ctx->det->rng_ctx;
/* jump to current step */
if( rs_ctx->det->state == ecdsa_det_sign )
goto sign;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL )
rs_ctx->det->state = ecdsa_det_sign;
sign:
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng );
#else
ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, rs_ctx );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
cleanup:
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &h );
ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( det );
return( ret );
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Arm Mbed TLS before 2.19.0 and Arm Mbed Crypto before 2.0.0, when deterministic ECDSA is enabled, use an RNG with insufficient entropy for blinding, which might allow an attacker to recover a private key via side-channel attacks if a victim signs the same message many times. (For Mbed TLS, the fix is also available in versions 2.7.12 and 2.16.3.)
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/556' into mbedtls-2.16-restricted
|
High
| 169,505
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: name_len(netdissect_options *ndo,
const unsigned char *s, const unsigned char *maxbuf)
{
const unsigned char *s0 = s;
unsigned char c;
if (s >= maxbuf)
return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */
ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1);
c = *s;
if ((c & 0xC0) == 0xC0)
return(2);
while (*s) {
if (s >= maxbuf)
return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */
ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1);
s += (*s) + 1;
}
return(PTR_DIFF(s, s0) + 1);
trunc:
return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The SMB/CIFS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in smbutil.c:name_len().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12893/SMB/CIFS: Add a bounds check in name_len().
After we advance the pointer by the length value in the buffer, make
sure it points to something in the captured data.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,961
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: raptor_rdfxml_parse_start(raptor_parser* rdf_parser)
{
raptor_uri *uri = rdf_parser->base_uri;
raptor_rdfxml_parser* rdf_xml_parser;
rdf_xml_parser = (raptor_rdfxml_parser*)rdf_parser->context;
/* base URI required for RDF/XML */
if(!uri)
return 1;
/* Optionally normalize language to lowercase
* http://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-concepts/#dfn-language-identifier
*/
raptor_sax2_set_option(rdf_xml_parser->sax2,
RAPTOR_OPTION_NORMALIZE_LANGUAGE, NULL,
RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(rdf_parser, RAPTOR_OPTION_NORMALIZE_LANGUAGE));
/* Optionally forbid internal network and file requests in the XML parser */
raptor_sax2_set_option(rdf_xml_parser->sax2,
RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_NET, NULL,
RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(rdf_parser, RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_NET));
raptor_sax2_set_option(rdf_xml_parser->sax2,
RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_FILE, NULL,
RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(rdf_parser, RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_FILE));
if(rdf_parser->uri_filter)
raptor_sax2_set_uri_filter(rdf_xml_parser->sax2, rdf_parser->uri_filter,
rdf_parser->uri_filter_user_data);
raptor_sax2_parse_start(rdf_xml_parser->sax2, uri);
/* Delete any existing id_set */
if(rdf_xml_parser->id_set) {
raptor_free_id_set(rdf_xml_parser->id_set);
rdf_xml_parser->id_set = NULL;
}
/* Create a new id_set if needed */
if(RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(rdf_parser, RAPTOR_OPTION_CHECK_RDF_ID)) {
rdf_xml_parser->id_set = raptor_new_id_set(rdf_parser->world);
if(!rdf_xml_parser->id_set)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Redland Raptor (aka libraptor) before 2.0.7, as used by OpenOffice 3.3 and 3.4 Beta, LibreOffice before 3.4.6 and 3.5.x before 3.5.1, and other products, allows user-assisted remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a crafted XML external entity (XXE) declaration and reference in an RDF document.
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
|
Medium
| 165,660
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: swabHorAcc32(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint32* wp = (uint32*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 4;
TIFFSwabArrayOfLong(wp, wc);
horAcc32(tif, cp0, cc);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
|
Low
| 166,889
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: XGetModifierMapping(register Display *dpy)
{
xGetModifierMappingReply rep;
register xReq *req;
unsigned long nbytes;
XModifierKeymap *res;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq(GetModifierMapping, req);
(void) _XReply (dpy, (xReply *)&rep, 0, xFalse);
if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
nbytes = (unsigned long)rep.length << 2;
res = Xmalloc(sizeof (XModifierKeymap));
if (res)
} else
res = NULL;
if ((! res) || (! res->modifiermap)) {
Xfree(res);
res = (XModifierKeymap *) NULL;
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
} else {
_XReadPad(dpy, (char *) res->modifiermap, (long) nbytes);
res->max_keypermod = rep.numKeyPerModifier;
}
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (res);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The XListFonts function in X.org libX11 before 1.6.4 might allow remote X servers to gain privileges via vectors involving length fields, which trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,924
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PredictorDecodeTile(TIFF* tif, uint8* op0, tmsize_t occ0, uint16 s)
{
TIFFPredictorState *sp = PredictorState(tif);
assert(sp != NULL);
assert(sp->decodetile != NULL);
if ((*sp->decodetile)(tif, op0, occ0, s)) {
tmsize_t rowsize = sp->rowsize;
assert(rowsize > 0);
assert((occ0%rowsize)==0);
assert(sp->decodepfunc != NULL);
while (occ0 > 0) {
(*sp->decodepfunc)(tif, op0, rowsize);
occ0 -= rowsize;
op0 += rowsize;
}
return 1;
} else
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
|
Low
| 166,877
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xsltAddTemplate(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xsltTemplatePtr cur,
const xmlChar *mode, const xmlChar *modeURI) {
xsltCompMatchPtr pat, list, next;
/*
* 'top' will point to style->xxxMatch ptr - declaring as 'void'
* avoids gcc 'type-punned pointer' warning.
*/
void **top = NULL;
const xmlChar *name = NULL;
float priority; /* the priority */
if ((style == NULL) || (cur == NULL) || (cur->match == NULL))
return(-1);
priority = cur->priority;
pat = xsltCompilePatternInternal(cur->match, style->doc, cur->elem,
style, NULL, 1);
if (pat == NULL)
return(-1);
while (pat) {
next = pat->next;
pat->next = NULL;
name = NULL;
pat->template = cur;
if (mode != NULL)
pat->mode = xmlDictLookup(style->dict, mode, -1);
if (modeURI != NULL)
pat->modeURI = xmlDictLookup(style->dict, modeURI, -1);
if (priority != XSLT_PAT_NO_PRIORITY)
pat->priority = priority;
/*
* insert it in the hash table list corresponding to its lookup name
*/
switch (pat->steps[0].op) {
case XSLT_OP_ATTR:
if (pat->steps[0].value != NULL)
name = pat->steps[0].value;
else
top = &(style->attrMatch);
break;
case XSLT_OP_PARENT:
case XSLT_OP_ANCESTOR:
top = &(style->elemMatch);
break;
case XSLT_OP_ROOT:
top = &(style->rootMatch);
break;
case XSLT_OP_KEY:
top = &(style->keyMatch);
break;
case XSLT_OP_ID:
/* TODO optimize ID !!! */
case XSLT_OP_NS:
case XSLT_OP_ALL:
top = &(style->elemMatch);
break;
case XSLT_OP_END:
case XSLT_OP_PREDICATE:
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, NULL,
"xsltAddTemplate: invalid compiled pattern\n");
xsltFreeCompMatch(pat);
return(-1);
/*
* TODO: some flags at the top level about type based patterns
* would be faster than inclusion in the hash table.
*/
case XSLT_OP_PI:
if (pat->steps[0].value != NULL)
name = pat->steps[0].value;
else
top = &(style->piMatch);
break;
case XSLT_OP_COMMENT:
top = &(style->commentMatch);
break;
case XSLT_OP_TEXT:
top = &(style->textMatch);
break;
case XSLT_OP_ELEM:
case XSLT_OP_NODE:
if (pat->steps[0].value != NULL)
name = pat->steps[0].value;
else
top = &(style->elemMatch);
break;
}
if (name != NULL) {
if (style->templatesHash == NULL) {
style->templatesHash = xmlHashCreate(1024);
if (style->templatesHash == NULL) {
xsltFreeCompMatch(pat);
return(-1);
}
xmlHashAddEntry3(style->templatesHash, name, mode, modeURI, pat);
} else {
list = (xsltCompMatchPtr) xmlHashLookup3(style->templatesHash,
name, mode, modeURI);
if (list == NULL) {
xmlHashAddEntry3(style->templatesHash, name,
mode, modeURI, pat);
} else {
/*
* Note '<=' since one must choose among the matching
* template rules that are left, the one that occurs
* last in the stylesheet
*/
if (list->priority <= pat->priority) {
pat->next = list;
xmlHashUpdateEntry3(style->templatesHash, name,
mode, modeURI, pat, NULL);
} else {
while (list->next != NULL) {
if (list->next->priority <= pat->priority)
break;
list = list->next;
}
pat->next = list->next;
list->next = pat;
}
}
}
} else if (top != NULL) {
list = *top;
if (list == NULL) {
*top = pat;
pat->next = NULL;
} else if (list->priority <= pat->priority) {
pat->next = list;
*top = pat;
} else {
while (list->next != NULL) {
if (list->next->priority <= pat->priority)
break;
list = list->next;
}
pat->next = list->next;
list->next = pat;
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, NULL,
"xsltAddTemplate: invalid compiled pattern\n");
xsltFreeCompMatch(pat);
return(-1);
}
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PATTERN
if (mode)
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"added pattern : '%s' mode '%s' priority %f\n",
pat->pattern, pat->mode, pat->priority);
else
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"added pattern : '%s' priority %f\n",
pat->pattern, pat->priority);
#endif
pat = next;
}
return(0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
High
| 173,310
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: crm_send_remote_msg(void *session, xmlNode * msg, gboolean encrypted)
{
if (encrypted) {
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
cib_send_tls(session, msg);
#else
CRM_ASSERT(encrypted == FALSE);
#endif
} else {
cib_send_plaintext(GPOINTER_TO_INT(session), msg);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Pacemaker 1.1.10, when remote Cluster Information Base (CIB) configuration or resource management is enabled, does not limit the duration of connections to the blocking sockets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (connection blocking).
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
|
Medium
| 166,164
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
int status = 0, size_change;
int inode_locked = 0;
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct ocfs2_super *osb = OCFS2_SB(sb);
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
handle_t *handle = NULL;
struct dquot *transfer_to[MAXQUOTAS] = { };
int qtype;
int had_lock;
struct ocfs2_lock_holder oh;
trace_ocfs2_setattr(inode, dentry,
(unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno,
dentry->d_name.len, dentry->d_name.name,
attr->ia_valid, attr->ia_mode,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, attr->ia_uid),
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, attr->ia_gid));
/* ensuring we don't even attempt to truncate a symlink */
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_SIZE;
#define OCFS2_VALID_ATTRS (ATTR_ATIME | ATTR_MTIME | ATTR_CTIME | ATTR_SIZE \
| ATTR_GID | ATTR_UID | ATTR_MODE)
if (!(attr->ia_valid & OCFS2_VALID_ATTRS))
return 0;
status = setattr_prepare(dentry, attr);
if (status)
return status;
if (is_quota_modification(inode, attr)) {
status = dquot_initialize(inode);
if (status)
return status;
}
size_change = S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE;
if (size_change) {
status = ocfs2_rw_lock(inode, 1);
if (status < 0) {
mlog_errno(status);
goto bail;
}
}
had_lock = ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker(inode, &bh, 1, &oh);
if (had_lock < 0) {
status = had_lock;
goto bail_unlock_rw;
} else if (had_lock) {
/*
* As far as we know, ocfs2_setattr() could only be the first
* VFS entry point in the call chain of recursive cluster
* locking issue.
*
* For instance:
* chmod_common()
* notify_change()
* ocfs2_setattr()
* posix_acl_chmod()
* ocfs2_iop_get_acl()
*
* But, we're not 100% sure if it's always true, because the
* ordering of the VFS entry points in the call chain is out
* of our control. So, we'd better dump the stack here to
* catch the other cases of recursive locking.
*/
mlog(ML_ERROR, "Another case of recursive locking:\n");
dump_stack();
}
inode_locked = 1;
if (size_change) {
status = inode_newsize_ok(inode, attr->ia_size);
if (status)
goto bail_unlock;
inode_dio_wait(inode);
if (i_size_read(inode) >= attr->ia_size) {
if (ocfs2_should_order_data(inode)) {
status = ocfs2_begin_ordered_truncate(inode,
attr->ia_size);
if (status)
goto bail_unlock;
}
status = ocfs2_truncate_file(inode, bh, attr->ia_size);
} else
status = ocfs2_extend_file(inode, bh, attr->ia_size);
if (status < 0) {
if (status != -ENOSPC)
mlog_errno(status);
status = -ENOSPC;
goto bail_unlock;
}
}
if ((attr->ia_valid & ATTR_UID && !uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) ||
(attr->ia_valid & ATTR_GID && !gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) {
/*
* Gather pointers to quota structures so that allocation /
* freeing of quota structures happens here and not inside
* dquot_transfer() where we have problems with lock ordering
*/
if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_UID && !uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)
&& OCFS2_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
OCFS2_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_USRQUOTA)) {
transfer_to[USRQUOTA] = dqget(sb, make_kqid_uid(attr->ia_uid));
if (IS_ERR(transfer_to[USRQUOTA])) {
status = PTR_ERR(transfer_to[USRQUOTA]);
goto bail_unlock;
}
}
if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_GID && !gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid)
&& OCFS2_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
OCFS2_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_GRPQUOTA)) {
transfer_to[GRPQUOTA] = dqget(sb, make_kqid_gid(attr->ia_gid));
if (IS_ERR(transfer_to[GRPQUOTA])) {
status = PTR_ERR(transfer_to[GRPQUOTA]);
goto bail_unlock;
}
}
handle = ocfs2_start_trans(osb, OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS +
2 * ocfs2_quota_trans_credits(sb));
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
status = PTR_ERR(handle);
mlog_errno(status);
goto bail_unlock;
}
status = __dquot_transfer(inode, transfer_to);
if (status < 0)
goto bail_commit;
} else {
handle = ocfs2_start_trans(osb, OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
status = PTR_ERR(handle);
mlog_errno(status);
goto bail_unlock;
}
}
setattr_copy(inode, attr);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
status = ocfs2_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode, bh);
if (status < 0)
mlog_errno(status);
bail_commit:
ocfs2_commit_trans(osb, handle);
bail_unlock:
if (status && inode_locked) {
ocfs2_inode_unlock_tracker(inode, 1, &oh, had_lock);
inode_locked = 0;
}
bail_unlock_rw:
if (size_change)
ocfs2_rw_unlock(inode, 1);
bail:
/* Release quota pointers in case we acquired them */
for (qtype = 0; qtype < OCFS2_MAXQUOTAS; qtype++)
dqput(transfer_to[qtype]);
if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
status = ocfs2_acl_chmod(inode, bh);
if (status < 0)
mlog_errno(status);
}
if (inode_locked)
ocfs2_inode_unlock_tracker(inode, 1, &oh, had_lock);
brelse(bh);
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ocfs2_setattr function in fs/ocfs2/file.c in the Linux kernel before 4.14.2 allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) via DIO requests.
Commit Message: ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()
we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
process 1 process 2 process 3
truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
ocfs2_setattr
ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
ocfs2_inode_lock_full
inode_dio_wait
__inode_dio_wait
-->waiting for all dio
requests finish
dlm_proxy_ast_handler
dlm_do_local_bast
ocfs2_blocking_ast
ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
dio_end_io
dio_bio_end_aio
dio_complete
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_inode_lock
__ocfs2_cluster_lock
ocfs2_wait_for_mask
-->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
flag to be cleared, that is waiting
for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
inode_dio_end
-->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
be called, so a deadlock happened.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59F81636.70508@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 169,410
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ext2_xattr_delete_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct mb_cache_entry *ce;
down_write(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
if (!EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
goto cleanup;
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
if (!bh) {
ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_delete_inode",
"inode %ld: block %d read error", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
goto cleanup;
}
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d", atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)));
if (HDR(bh)->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT2_XATTR_MAGIC) ||
HDR(bh)->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1)) {
ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_delete_inode",
"inode %ld: bad block %d", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
goto cleanup;
}
ce = mb_cache_entry_get(ext2_xattr_cache, bh->b_bdev, bh->b_blocknr);
lock_buffer(bh);
if (HDR(bh)->h_refcount == cpu_to_le32(1)) {
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_free(ce);
ext2_free_blocks(inode, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl, 1);
get_bh(bh);
bforget(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
} else {
le32_add_cpu(&HDR(bh)->h_refcount, -1);
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_release(ce);
ea_bdebug(bh, "refcount now=%d",
le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount));
unlock_buffer(bh);
mark_buffer_dirty(bh);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
sync_dirty_buffer(bh);
dquot_free_block_nodirty(inode, 1);
}
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl = 0;
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
up_write(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 169,979
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int intel_pmu_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
int bit, loops;
u64 status;
int handled;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
/*
* Some chipsets need to unmask the LVTPC in a particular spot
* inside the nmi handler. As a result, the unmasking was pushed
* into all the nmi handlers.
*
* This handler doesn't seem to have any issues with the unmasking
* so it was left at the top.
*/
apic_write(APIC_LVTPC, APIC_DM_NMI);
intel_pmu_disable_all();
handled = intel_pmu_drain_bts_buffer();
status = intel_pmu_get_status();
if (!status) {
intel_pmu_enable_all(0);
return handled;
}
loops = 0;
again:
intel_pmu_ack_status(status);
if (++loops > 100) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "perfevents: irq loop stuck!\n");
perf_event_print_debug();
intel_pmu_reset();
goto done;
}
inc_irq_stat(apic_perf_irqs);
intel_pmu_lbr_read();
/*
* PEBS overflow sets bit 62 in the global status register
*/
if (__test_and_clear_bit(62, (unsigned long *)&status)) {
handled++;
x86_pmu.drain_pebs(regs);
}
for_each_set_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)&status, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX) {
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[bit];
handled++;
if (!test_bit(bit, cpuc->active_mask))
continue;
if (!intel_pmu_save_and_restart(event))
continue;
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 1, &data, regs))
x86_pmu_stop(event, 0);
}
/*
* Repeat if there is more work to be done:
*/
status = intel_pmu_get_status();
if (status)
goto again;
done:
intel_pmu_enable_all(0);
return handled;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,819
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SplitString(const std::wstring& str,
wchar_t c,
std::vector<std::wstring>* r) {
SplitStringT(str, c, true, r);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG fonts.
Commit Message: wstring: remove wstring version of SplitString
Retry of r84336.
BUG=23581
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6930047
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@84355 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,555
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ParseDsdiffHeaderConfig (FILE *infile, char *infilename, char *fourcc, WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackConfig *config)
{
int64_t infilesize, total_samples;
DFFFileHeader dff_file_header;
DFFChunkHeader dff_chunk_header;
uint32_t bcount;
infilesize = DoGetFileSize (infile);
memcpy (&dff_file_header, fourcc, 4);
if ((!DoReadFile (infile, ((char *) &dff_file_header) + 4, sizeof (DFFFileHeader) - 4, &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (DFFFileHeader) - 4) || strncmp (dff_file_header.formType, "DSD ", 4)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &dff_file_header, sizeof (DFFFileHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
#if 1 // this might be a little too picky...
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&dff_file_header, DFFFileHeaderFormat);
if (infilesize && !(config->qmode & QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH) &&
dff_file_header.ckDataSize && dff_file_header.ckDataSize + 1 && dff_file_header.ckDataSize + 12 != infilesize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file (by total size)!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("file header indicated length = %lld", dff_file_header.ckDataSize);
#endif
while (1) {
if (!DoReadFile (infile, &dff_chunk_header, sizeof (DFFChunkHeader), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (DFFChunkHeader)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &dff_chunk_header, sizeof (DFFChunkHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&dff_chunk_header, DFFChunkHeaderFormat);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("chunk header indicated length = %lld", dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "FVER", 4)) {
uint32_t version;
if (dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize != sizeof (version) ||
!DoReadFile (infile, &version, sizeof (version), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (version)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &version, sizeof (version))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&version, "L");
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("dsdiff file version = 0x%08x", version);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "PROP", 4)) {
char *prop_chunk;
if (dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize < 4 || dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize > 1024) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got PROP chunk of %d bytes total", (int) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
prop_chunk = malloc ((size_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, prop_chunk, (uint32_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize, &bcount) ||
bcount != dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, prop_chunk, (uint32_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (!strncmp (prop_chunk, "SND ", 4)) {
char *cptr = prop_chunk + 4, *eptr = prop_chunk + dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
uint16_t numChannels = 0, chansSpecified, chanMask = 0;
uint32_t sampleRate;
while (eptr - cptr >= sizeof (dff_chunk_header)) {
memcpy (&dff_chunk_header, cptr, sizeof (dff_chunk_header));
cptr += sizeof (dff_chunk_header);
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&dff_chunk_header, DFFChunkHeaderFormat);
if (dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize > 0 && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize <= eptr - cptr) {
if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "FS ", 4) && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize == 4) {
memcpy (&sampleRate, cptr, sizeof (sampleRate));
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&sampleRate, "L");
cptr += dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got sample rate of %u Hz", sampleRate);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "CHNL", 4) && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize >= 2) {
memcpy (&numChannels, cptr, sizeof (numChannels));
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&numChannels, "S");
cptr += sizeof (numChannels);
chansSpecified = (int)(dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize - sizeof (numChannels)) / 4;
if (numChannels < chansSpecified || numChannels < 1 || numChannels > 256) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
while (chansSpecified--) {
if (!strncmp (cptr, "SLFT", 4) || !strncmp (cptr, "MLFT", 4))
chanMask |= 0x1;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "SRGT", 4) || !strncmp (cptr, "MRGT", 4))
chanMask |= 0x2;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "LS ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x10;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "RS ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x20;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "C ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x4;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "LFE ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x8;
else
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("undefined channel ID %c%c%c%c", cptr [0], cptr [1], cptr [2], cptr [3]);
cptr += 4;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("%d channels, mask = 0x%08x", numChannels, chanMask);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "CMPR", 4) && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize >= 4) {
if (strncmp (cptr, "DSD ", 4)) {
error_line ("DSDIFF files must be uncompressed, not \"%c%c%c%c\"!",
cptr [0], cptr [1], cptr [2], cptr [3]);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
cptr += dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
}
else {
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got PROP/SND chunk type \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes", dff_chunk_header.ckID [0],
dff_chunk_header.ckID [1], dff_chunk_header.ckID [2], dff_chunk_header.ckID [3], dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
cptr += dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
}
}
else {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
}
if (chanMask && (config->channel_mask || (config->qmode & QMODE_CHANS_UNASSIGNED))) {
error_line ("this DSDIFF file already has channel order information!");
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (chanMask)
config->channel_mask = chanMask;
config->bits_per_sample = 8;
config->bytes_per_sample = 1;
config->num_channels = numChannels;
config->sample_rate = sampleRate / 8;
config->qmode |= QMODE_DSD_MSB_FIRST;
}
else if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got unknown PROP chunk type \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes",
prop_chunk [0], prop_chunk [1], prop_chunk [2], prop_chunk [3], dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
free (prop_chunk);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "DSD ", 4)) {
if (!config->num_channels) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
total_samples = dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize / config->num_channels;
break;
}
else { // just copy unknown chunks to output file
int bytes_to_copy = (int)(((dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize) + 1) & ~(int64_t)1);
char *buff;
if (bytes_to_copy < 0 || bytes_to_copy > 4194304) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
buff = malloc (bytes_to_copy);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("extra unknown chunk \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes",
dff_chunk_header.ckID [0], dff_chunk_header.ckID [1], dff_chunk_header.ckID [2],
dff_chunk_header.ckID [3], dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, buff, bytes_to_copy, &bcount) ||
bcount != bytes_to_copy ||
(!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, buff, bytes_to_copy))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (buff);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
free (buff);
}
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("setting configuration with %lld samples", total_samples);
if (!WavpackSetConfiguration64 (wpc, config, total_samples, NULL)) {
error_line ("%s: %s", infilename, WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
return WAVPACK_NO_ERROR;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-824
Summary: WavpackSetConfiguration64 in pack_utils.c in libwavpack.a in WavPack through 5.1.0 has a *Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value* condition, which might allow attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a DFF file that lacks valid sample-rate data.
Commit Message: issue #67: make sure sample rate is specified and non-zero in DFF files
|
Medium
| 169,692
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: char **XGetFontPath(
register Display *dpy,
int *npaths) /* RETURN */
{
xGetFontPathReply rep;
unsigned long nbytes = 0;
char **flist = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (GetFontPath, req);
(void) _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse);
if (rep.nPaths) {
flist = Xmalloc(rep.nPaths * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
nbytes = (unsigned long) rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (nbytes + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((! flist) || (! ch)) {
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, nbytes);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + (nbytes + 1);
length = *ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nPaths; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
flist[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
length = *ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else
flist[i] = NULL;
}
}
*npaths = count;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (flist);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-682
Summary: An issue was discovered in libX11 through 1.6.5. The function XListExtensions in ListExt.c is vulnerable to an off-by-one error caused by malicious server responses, leading to DoS or possibly unspecified other impact.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,748
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static PHP_RINIT_FUNCTION(libxml)
{
if (_php_libxml_per_request_initialization) {
/* report errors via handler rather than stderr */
xmlSetGenericErrorFunc(NULL, php_libxml_error_handler);
xmlParserInputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_input_buffer_create_filename);
xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_output_buffer_create_filename);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: ext/libxml/libxml.c in PHP before 5.5.22 and 5.6.x before 5.6.6, when PHP-FPM is used, does not isolate each thread from libxml_disable_entity_loader changes in other threads, which allows remote attackers to conduct XML External Entity (XXE) and XML Entity Expansion (XEE) attacks via a crafted XML document, a related issue to CVE-2015-5161.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,273
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: mprint(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m)
{
uint64_t v;
float vf;
double vd;
int64_t t = 0;
char buf[128], tbuf[26];
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_BYTE:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, (uint64_t)p->b);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d",
(unsigned char)v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%d"),
(unsigned char) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(char);
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
case FILE_BESHORT:
case FILE_LESHORT:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, (uint64_t)p->h);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u",
(unsigned short)v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%u"),
(unsigned short) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(short);
break;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_MELONG:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, (uint64_t)p->l);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", (uint32_t) v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%u"), (uint32_t) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case FILE_QUAD:
case FILE_BEQUAD:
case FILE_LEQUAD:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, p->q);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%" INT64_T_FORMAT "u",
(unsigned long long)v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT "u"),
(unsigned long long) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(int64_t);
break;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_PSTRING:
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16:
if (m->reln == '=' || m->reln == '!') {
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), m->value.s) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + m->vallen;
}
else {
char *str = p->s;
/* compute t before we mangle the string? */
t = ms->offset + strlen(str);
if (*m->value.s == '\0')
str[strcspn(str, "\n")] = '\0';
if (m->str_flags & STRING_TRIM) {
char *last;
while (isspace((unsigned char)*str))
str++;
last = str;
while (*last)
last++;
--last;
while (isspace((unsigned char)*last))
last--;
*++last = '\0';
}
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), str) == -1)
return -1;
if (m->type == FILE_PSTRING)
t += file_pstring_length_size(m);
}
break;
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_MEDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->l, FILE_T_LOCAL, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
case FILE_LDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->l, 0, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
case FILE_QDATE:
case FILE_BEQDATE:
case FILE_LEQDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->q, FILE_T_LOCAL, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case FILE_QLDATE:
case FILE_BEQLDATE:
case FILE_LEQLDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->q, 0, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case FILE_QWDATE:
case FILE_BEQWDATE:
case FILE_LEQWDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->q, FILE_T_WINDOWS, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case FILE_FLOAT:
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
vf = p->f;
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%g", vf);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%g"), vf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(float);
break;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
vd = p->d;
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%g", vd);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%g"), vd) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(double);
break;
case FILE_REGEX: {
char *cp;
int rval;
cp = strndup((const char *)ms->search.s, ms->search.rm_len);
if (cp == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, ms->search.rm_len);
return -1;
}
rval = file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), cp);
free(cp);
if (rval == -1)
return -1;
if ((m->str_flags & REGEX_OFFSET_START))
t = ms->search.offset;
else
t = ms->search.offset + ms->search.rm_len;
break;
}
case FILE_SEARCH:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), m->value.s) == -1)
return -1;
if ((m->str_flags & REGEX_OFFSET_START))
t = ms->search.offset;
else
t = ms->search.offset + m->vallen;
break;
case FILE_DEFAULT:
case FILE_CLEAR:
if (file_printf(ms, "%s", m->desc) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset;
break;
case FILE_INDIRECT:
case FILE_USE:
case FILE_NAME:
t = ms->offset;
break;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "invalid m->type (%d) in mprint()", m->type);
return -1;
}
return (int32_t)t;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: file before 5.19 does not properly restrict the amount of data read during a regex search, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted file that triggers backtracking during processing of an awk rule. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2013-7345.
Commit Message: * Enforce limit of 8K on regex searches that have no limits
* Allow the l modifier for regex to mean line count. Default
to byte count. If line count is specified, assume a max
of 80 characters per line to limit the byte count.
* Don't allow conversions to be used for dates, allowing
the mask field to be used as an offset.
* Bump the version of the magic format so that regex changes
are visible.
|
Low
| 166,361
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int hashtable_init(hashtable_t *hashtable)
{
size_t i;
hashtable->size = 0;
hashtable->num_buckets = 0; /* index to primes[] */
hashtable->buckets = jsonp_malloc(num_buckets(hashtable) * sizeof(bucket_t));
if(!hashtable->buckets)
return -1;
list_init(&hashtable->list);
for(i = 0; i < num_buckets(hashtable); i++)
{
hashtable->buckets[i].first = hashtable->buckets[i].last =
&hashtable->list;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: Jansson, possibly 2.4 and earlier, does not restrict the ability to trigger hash collisions predictably, which allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted JSON document.
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
|
Low
| 166,531
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FolderHeaderView::SetFolderItem(AppListFolderItem* folder_item) {
if (folder_item_)
folder_item_->RemoveObserver(this);
folder_item_ = folder_item;
if (!folder_item_)
return;
folder_item_->AddObserver(this);
folder_name_view_->SetEnabled(folder_item->folder_type() !=
AppListFolderItem::FOLDER_TYPE_OEM);
Update();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTMLMediaElement::didMoveToNewDocument function in core/html/HTMLMediaElement.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 29.0.1547.57, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving moving a (1) AUDIO or (2) VIDEO element between documents.
Commit Message: Enforce the maximum length of the folder name in UI.
BUG=355797
R=xiyuan@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/203863005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260156 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,201
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ide_dma_cb(void *opaque, int ret)
{
IDEState *s = opaque;
int n;
int64_t sector_num;
bool stay_active = false;
if (ret == -ECANCELED) {
return;
}
if (ret < 0) {
int op = IDE_RETRY_DMA;
if (s->dma_cmd == IDE_DMA_READ)
op |= IDE_RETRY_READ;
else if (s->dma_cmd == IDE_DMA_TRIM)
op |= IDE_RETRY_TRIM;
if (ide_handle_rw_error(s, -ret, op)) {
return;
}
}
n = s->io_buffer_size >> 9;
if (n > s->nsector) {
/* The PRDs were longer than needed for this request. Shorten them so
* we don't get a negative remainder. The Active bit must remain set
* after the request completes. */
n = s->nsector;
stay_active = true;
}
sector_num = ide_get_sector(s);
if (n > 0) {
assert(s->io_buffer_size == s->sg.size);
dma_buf_commit(s, s->io_buffer_size);
sector_num += n;
ide_set_sector(s, sector_num);
s->nsector -= n;
}
/* end of transfer ? */
if (s->nsector == 0) {
s->status = READY_STAT | SEEK_STAT;
ide_set_irq(s->bus);
goto eot;
}
/* launch next transfer */
n = s->nsector;
s->io_buffer_index = 0;
s->io_buffer_size = n * 512;
if (s->bus->dma->ops->prepare_buf(s->bus->dma, ide_cmd_is_read(s)) == 0) {
/* The PRDs were too short. Reset the Active bit, but don't raise an
* interrupt. */
s->status = READY_STAT | SEEK_STAT;
goto eot;
}
printf("ide_dma_cb: sector_num=%" PRId64 " n=%d, cmd_cmd=%d\n",
sector_num, n, s->dma_cmd);
#endif
if ((s->dma_cmd == IDE_DMA_READ || s->dma_cmd == IDE_DMA_WRITE) &&
!ide_sect_range_ok(s, sector_num, n)) {
ide_dma_error(s);
return;
}
switch (s->dma_cmd) {
case IDE_DMA_READ:
s->bus->dma->aiocb = dma_blk_read(s->blk, &s->sg, sector_num,
ide_dma_cb, s);
break;
case IDE_DMA_WRITE:
s->bus->dma->aiocb = dma_blk_write(s->blk, &s->sg, sector_num,
ide_dma_cb, s);
break;
case IDE_DMA_TRIM:
s->bus->dma->aiocb = dma_blk_io(s->blk, &s->sg, sector_num,
ide_issue_trim, ide_dma_cb, s,
DMA_DIRECTION_TO_DEVICE);
break;
}
return;
eot:
if (s->dma_cmd == IDE_DMA_READ || s->dma_cmd == IDE_DMA_WRITE) {
block_acct_done(blk_get_stats(s->blk), &s->acct);
}
ide_set_inactive(s, stay_active);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The (1) BMDMA and (2) AHCI HBA interfaces in the IDE functionality in QEMU 1.0 through 2.1.3 have multiple interpretations of a function's return value, which allows guest OS users to cause a host OS denial of service (memory consumption or infinite loop, and system crash) via a PRDT with zero complete sectors, related to the bmdma_prepare_buf and ahci_dma_prepare_buf functions.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,839
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct phy *serdes_simple_xlate(struct device *dev,
struct of_phandle_args *args)
{
struct serdes_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
unsigned int port, idx, i;
if (args->args_count != 2)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
port = args->args[0];
idx = args->args[1];
for (i = 0; i <= SERDES_MAX; i++) {
struct serdes_macro *macro = phy_get_drvdata(ctrl->phys[i]);
if (idx != macro->idx)
continue;
/* SERDES6G(0) is the only SerDes capable of QSGMII */
if (idx != SERDES6G(0) && macro->port >= 0)
return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
macro->port = port;
return ctrl->phys[i];
}
return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.20. drivers/phy/mscc/phy-ocelot-serdes.c has an off-by-one error with a resultant ctrl->phys out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message: phy: ocelot-serdes: fix out-of-bounds read
Currently, there is an out-of-bounds read on array ctrl->phys,
once variable i reaches the maximum array size of SERDES_MAX
in the for loop.
Fix this by changing the condition in the for loop from
i <= SERDES_MAX to i < SERDES_MAX.
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1473966 ("Out-of-bounds read")
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1473959 ("Out-of-bounds read")
Fixes: 51f6b410fc22 ("phy: add driver for Microsemi Ocelot SerDes muxing")
Reviewed-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 169,765
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ping_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *isk = inet_sk(sk);
int family = sk->sk_family;
struct sockaddr_in *sin;
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied, err;
pr_debug("ping_recvmsg(sk=%p,sk->num=%u)\n", isk, isk->inet_num);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (addr_len) {
if (family == AF_INET)
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin);
else if (family == AF_INET6 && addr_len)
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin6);
}
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE) {
if (family == AF_INET) {
return ip_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
return pingv6_ops.ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
#endif
}
}
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
/* Don't bother checking the checksum */
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto done;
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address and add cmsg data. */
if (family == AF_INET) {
sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_port = 0 /* skb->h.uh->source */;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
if (isk->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6hdr *ip6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6->sin6_port = 0;
sin6->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
if (np->sndflow)
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ip6);
sin6->sin6_scope_id = ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr,
IP6CB(skb)->iif);
if (inet6_sk(sk)->rxopt.all)
pingv6_ops.ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
#endif
} else {
BUG();
}
err = copied;
done:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
pr_debug("ping_recvmsg -> %d\n", err);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The dgram_recvmsg function in net/ieee802154/dgram.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,477
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void print_bpf_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n",
insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->src_reg);
else
verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n",
insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->imm);
} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, insn->src_reg);
else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD)
verbose("(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
insn->src_reg);
else
verbose("BUG_%02x\n", insn->code);
} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
verbose("BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, insn->imm);
} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
verbose("BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
verbose("(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->src_reg, insn->off);
} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) {
verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->imm);
} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) {
verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->src_reg, insn->imm);
} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM) {
verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%x\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
} else {
verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
} else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
verbose("(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code,
func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
verbose("(%02x) goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->off);
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) {
verbose("(%02x) exit\n", insn->code);
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
insn->src_reg, insn->off);
} else {
verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
insn->imm, insn->off);
}
} else {
verbose("(%02x) %s\n", insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The do_check function in kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel before 4.11.1 does not make the allow_ptr_leaks value available for restricting the output of the print_bpf_insn function, which allows local users to obtain sensitive address information via crafted bpf system calls.
Commit Message: bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged
The patch fixes two things at once:
1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to
the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0
as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is
off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on
this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged.
2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that
we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the
first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to
access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just
constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr().
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 168,121
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int do_tkill(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig)
{
struct siginfo info;
info.si_signo = sig;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = SI_TKILL;
info.si_pid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
info.si_uid = from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid());
return do_send_specific(tgid, pid, sig, &info);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The do_tkill function in kernel/signal.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.9 does not initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted application that makes a (1) tkill or (2) tgkill system call.
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 166,082
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BackendImpl::OnEntryDestroyEnd() {
DecreaseNumRefs();
if (data_->header.num_bytes > max_size_ && !read_only_ &&
(up_ticks_ > kTrimDelay || user_flags_ & kNoRandom))
eviction_.TrimCache(false);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Re-entry of a destructor in Networking Disk Cache in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
|
Medium
| 172,698
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int efx_ethtool_set_ringparam(struct net_device *net_dev,
struct ethtool_ringparam *ring)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = netdev_priv(net_dev);
if (ring->rx_mini_pending || ring->rx_jumbo_pending ||
ring->rx_pending > EFX_MAX_DMAQ_SIZE ||
ring->tx_pending > EFX_MAX_DMAQ_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
if (ring->rx_pending < EFX_MIN_RING_SIZE ||
ring->tx_pending < EFX_MIN_RING_SIZE) {
netif_err(efx, drv, efx->net_dev,
"TX and RX queues cannot be smaller than %ld\n",
EFX_MIN_RING_SIZE);
return -EINVAL;
}
return efx_realloc_channels(efx, ring->rx_pending, ring->tx_pending);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The sfc (aka Solarflare Solarstorm) driver in the Linux kernel before 3.2.30 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (DMA descriptor consumption and network-controller outage) via crafted TCP packets that trigger a small MSS value.
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
Low
| 165,586
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GlobalHistogramAllocator::ReleaseForTesting() {
GlobalHistogramAllocator* histogram_allocator = Get();
if (!histogram_allocator)
return nullptr;
PersistentMemoryAllocator* memory_allocator =
histogram_allocator->memory_allocator();
PersistentMemoryAllocator::Iterator iter(memory_allocator);
const PersistentHistogramData* data;
while ((data = iter.GetNextOfObject<PersistentHistogramData>()) != nullptr) {
StatisticsRecorder::ForgetHistogramForTesting(data->name);
DCHECK_NE(kResultHistogram, data->name);
}
subtle::Release_Store(&g_histogram_allocator, 0);
return WrapUnique(histogram_allocator);
};
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 does not properly maintain own properties, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via crafted JavaScript code that triggers an incorrect cast, related to extensions/renderer/v8_helpers.h and gin/converter.h.
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
|
Medium
| 172,136
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: JSValue JSDirectoryEntry::getFile(ExecState* exec)
{
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
DirectoryEntry* imp = static_cast<DirectoryEntry*>(impl());
const String& path = valueToStringWithUndefinedOrNullCheck(exec, exec->argument(0));
if (exec->hadException())
return jsUndefined();
int argsCount = exec->argumentCount();
if (argsCount <= 1) {
imp->getFile(path);
return jsUndefined();
}
RefPtr<WebKitFlags> flags;
if (!exec->argument(1).isNull() && !exec->argument(1).isUndefined() && exec->argument(1).isObject()) {
JSObject* object = exec->argument(1).getObject();
flags = WebKitFlags::create();
JSValue jsCreate = object->get(exec, Identifier(exec, "create"));
flags->setCreate(jsCreate.toBoolean(exec));
JSValue jsExclusive = object->get(exec, Identifier(exec, "exclusive"));
flags->setExclusive(jsExclusive.toBoolean(exec));
}
if (exec->hadException())
return jsUndefined();
RefPtr<EntryCallback> successCallback;
if (exec->argumentCount() > 2 && !exec->argument(2).isNull() && !exec->argument(2).isUndefined()) {
if (!exec->argument(2).isObject()) {
setDOMException(exec, TYPE_MISMATCH_ERR);
return jsUndefined();
}
successCallback = JSEntryCallback::create(asObject(exec->argument(2)), globalObject());
}
RefPtr<ErrorCallback> errorCallback;
if (exec->argumentCount() > 3 && !exec->argument(3).isNull() && !exec->argument(3).isUndefined()) {
if (!exec->argument(3).isObject()) {
setDOMException(exec, TYPE_MISMATCH_ERR);
return jsUndefined();
}
errorCallback = JSErrorCallback::create(asObject(exec->argument(3)), globalObject());
}
imp->getFile(path, flags, successCallback, errorCallback);
return jsUndefined();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,561
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int snd_ctl_elem_write(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_elem_value *control)
{
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
struct snd_kcontrol_volatile *vd;
unsigned int index_offset;
int result;
down_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
kctl = snd_ctl_find_id(card, &control->id);
if (kctl == NULL) {
result = -ENOENT;
} else {
index_offset = snd_ctl_get_ioff(kctl, &control->id);
vd = &kctl->vd[index_offset];
if (!(vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_WRITE) ||
kctl->put == NULL ||
(file && vd->owner && vd->owner != file)) {
result = -EPERM;
} else {
snd_ctl_build_ioff(&control->id, kctl, index_offset);
result = kctl->put(kctl, control);
}
if (result > 0) {
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_VALUE,
&control->id);
return 0;
}
}
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID:
Summary: sound/core/control.c in the ALSA control implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15.2 does not ensure possession of a read/write lock, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) and obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging /dev/snd/controlCX access.
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Don't access controls outside of protected regions
A control that is visible on the card->controls list can be freed at any time.
This means we must not access any of its memory while not holding the
controls_rw_lock. Otherwise we risk a use after free access.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
Low
| 166,293
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MimeHandlerViewContainer::OnReady() {
if (!render_frame() || !is_embedded_)
return;
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame = render_frame()->GetWebFrame();
blink::WebAssociatedURLLoaderOptions options;
DCHECK(!loader_);
loader_.reset(frame->CreateAssociatedURLLoader(options));
blink::WebURLRequest request(original_url_);
request.SetRequestContext(blink::WebURLRequest::kRequestContextObject);
loader_->LoadAsynchronously(request, this);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A lack of CORS checks, after a Service Worker redirected to a cross-origin PDF, in Service Worker in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to leak limited cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Skip Service workers in requests for mime handler plugins
BUG=808838
TEST=./browser_tests --gtest_filter=*/ServiceWorkerTest.MimeHandlerView*
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I82e75c200091babbab648a04232db47e2938d914
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914150
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Istiaque Ahmed <lazyboy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#537386}
|
Medium
| 172,702
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadSCREENSHOTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=(Image *) NULL;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_WINGDI32_DELEGATE)
{
BITMAPINFO
bmi;
DISPLAY_DEVICE
device;
HBITMAP
bitmap,
bitmapOld;
HDC
bitmapDC,
hDC;
Image
*screen;
int
i;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
RGBTRIPLE
*p;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
i=0;
device.cb = sizeof(device);
image=(Image *) NULL;
while(EnumDisplayDevices(NULL,i,&device,0) && ++i)
{
if ((device.StateFlags & DISPLAY_DEVICE_ACTIVE) != DISPLAY_DEVICE_ACTIVE)
continue;
hDC=CreateDC(device.DeviceName,device.DeviceName,NULL,NULL);
if (hDC == (HDC) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateDC");
screen=AcquireImage(image_info);
screen->columns=(size_t) GetDeviceCaps(hDC,HORZRES);
screen->rows=(size_t) GetDeviceCaps(hDC,VERTRES);
screen->storage_class=DirectClass;
status=SetImageExtent(screen,screen->columns,screen->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
image=screen;
else
AppendImageToList(&image,screen);
bitmapDC=CreateCompatibleDC(hDC);
if (bitmapDC == (HDC) NULL)
{
DeleteDC(hDC);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateDC");
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&bmi,0,sizeof(BITMAPINFO));
bmi.bmiHeader.biSize=sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER);
bmi.bmiHeader.biWidth=(LONG) screen->columns;
bmi.bmiHeader.biHeight=(-1)*(LONG) screen->rows;
bmi.bmiHeader.biPlanes=1;
bmi.bmiHeader.biBitCount=24;
bmi.bmiHeader.biCompression=BI_RGB;
bitmap=CreateDIBSection(hDC,&bmi,DIB_RGB_COLORS,(void **) &p,NULL,0);
if (bitmap == (HBITMAP) NULL)
{
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteDC(bitmapDC);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateBitmap");
}
bitmapOld=(HBITMAP) SelectObject(bitmapDC,bitmap);
if (bitmapOld == (HBITMAP) NULL)
{
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteDC(bitmapDC);
DeleteObject(bitmap);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateBitmap");
}
BitBlt(bitmapDC,0,0,(int) screen->columns,(int) screen->rows,hDC,0,0,
SRCCOPY);
(void) SelectObject(bitmapDC,bitmapOld);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) screen->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(screen,0,y,screen->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) screen->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(p->rgbtRed));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(p->rgbtGreen));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(p->rgbtBlue));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(screen,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteDC(bitmapDC);
DeleteObject(bitmap);
}
}
#elif defined(MAGICKCORE_X11_DELEGATE)
{
const char
*option;
XImportInfo
ximage_info;
(void) exception;
XGetImportInfo(&ximage_info);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"x:screen");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
ximage_info.screen=IsMagickTrue(option);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"x:silent");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
ximage_info.silent=IsMagickTrue(option);
image=XImportImage(image_info,&ximage_info);
}
#endif
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: The ReadSCREENSHOTImage function in coders/screenshot.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.6-1 has memory leaks, causing denial of service.
Commit Message: Fixed potential memory leak.
|
Medium
| 168,037
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(
const gfx::Rect& src_subrect,
const gfx::Size& dst_size,
const base::Callback<void(bool, const SkBitmap&)>& callback,
const SkColorType color_type) {
bool format_support = ((color_type == kRGB_565_SkColorType) ||
(color_type == kN32_SkColorType));
DCHECK(format_support);
if (!CanCopyToBitmap()) {
callback.Run(false, SkBitmap());
return;
}
const gfx::Size& dst_size_in_pixel =
client_->ConvertViewSizeToPixel(dst_size);
scoped_ptr<cc::CopyOutputRequest> request =
cc::CopyOutputRequest::CreateRequest(base::Bind(
&DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurfaceHasResult,
dst_size_in_pixel,
color_type,
callback));
gfx::Rect src_subrect_in_pixel =
ConvertRectToPixel(client_->CurrentDeviceScaleFactor(), src_subrect);
request->set_area(src_subrect_in_pixel);
client_->RequestCopyOfOutput(request.Pass());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the ResourceFetcher::didLoadResource function in core/fetch/ResourceFetcher.cpp in the resource loader in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.66, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering certain callback processing during the reporting of a resource entry.
Commit Message: repairs CopyFromCompositingSurface in HighDPI
This CL removes the DIP=>Pixel transform in
DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(), because said
transformation seems to be happening later in the copy logic
and is currently being applied twice.
BUG=397708
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/421293002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286414 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,193
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static unsigned create_oops_dump_dirs(GList *oops_list, unsigned oops_cnt)
{
unsigned countdown = MAX_DUMPED_DD_COUNT; /* do not report hundreds of oopses */
log_notice("Saving %u oopses as problem dirs", oops_cnt >= countdown ? countdown : oops_cnt);
char *cmdline_str = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose("/proc/cmdline");
char *fips_enabled = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled");
char *proc_modules = xmalloc_open_read_close("/proc/modules", /*maxsize:*/ NULL);
char *suspend_stats = xmalloc_open_read_close("/sys/kernel/debug/suspend_stats", /*maxsize:*/ NULL);
time_t t = time(NULL);
const char *iso_date = iso_date_string(&t);
/* dump should be readable by all if we're run with -x */
uid_t my_euid = (uid_t)-1L;
mode_t mode = DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE | S_IROTH;
/* and readable only for the owner otherwise */
if (!world_readable_dump)
{
mode = DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE;
my_euid = geteuid();
}
pid_t my_pid = getpid();
unsigned idx = 0;
unsigned errors = 0;
while (idx < oops_cnt)
{
char base[sizeof("oops-YYYY-MM-DD-hh:mm:ss-%lu-%lu") + 2 * sizeof(long)*3];
sprintf(base, "oops-%s-%lu-%lu", iso_date, (long)my_pid, (long)idx);
char *path = concat_path_file(debug_dumps_dir, base);
struct dump_dir *dd = dd_create(path, /*uid:*/ my_euid, mode);
if (dd)
{
dd_create_basic_files(dd, /*uid:*/ my_euid, NULL);
save_oops_data_in_dump_dir(dd, (char*)g_list_nth_data(oops_list, idx++), proc_modules);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ABRT_VERSION, VERSION);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ANALYZER, "Kerneloops");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TYPE, "Kerneloops");
if (cmdline_str)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CMDLINE, cmdline_str);
if (proc_modules)
dd_save_text(dd, "proc_modules", proc_modules);
if (fips_enabled && strcmp(fips_enabled, "0") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, "fips_enabled", fips_enabled);
if (suspend_stats)
dd_save_text(dd, "suspend_stats", suspend_stats);
dd_close(dd);
notify_new_path(path);
}
else
errors++;
free(path);
if (--countdown == 0)
break;
if (dd && throttle_dd_creation)
sleep(1);
}
free(cmdline_str);
free(proc_modules);
free(fips_enabled);
free(suspend_stats);
return errors;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The event scripts in Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (ABRT) uses world-readable permission on a copy of sosreport file in problem directories, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from /var/log/messages via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: make the dump directories owned by root by default
It was discovered that the abrt event scripts create a user-readable
copy of a sosreport file in abrt problem directories, and include
excerpts of /var/log/messages selected by the user-controlled process
name, leading to an information disclosure.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Related: #1212868
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 170,152
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: generate_palette(png_colorp palette, png_bytep trans, int bit_depth,
png_const_bytep gamma_table, unsigned int *colors)
{
/*
* 1-bit: entry 0 is transparent-red, entry 1 is opaque-white
* 2-bit: entry 0: transparent-green
* entry 1: 40%-red
* entry 2: 80%-blue
* entry 3: opaque-white
* 4-bit: the 16 combinations of the 2-bit case
* 8-bit: the 256 combinations of the 4-bit case
*/
switch (colors[0])
{
default:
fprintf(stderr, "makepng: --colors=...: invalid count %u\n",
colors[0]);
exit(1);
case 1:
set_color(palette+0, trans+0, colors[1], colors[1], colors[1], 255,
gamma_table);
return 1;
case 2:
set_color(palette+0, trans+0, colors[1], colors[1], colors[1],
colors[2], gamma_table);
return 1;
case 3:
set_color(palette+0, trans+0, colors[1], colors[2], colors[3], 255,
gamma_table);
return 1;
case 4:
set_color(palette+0, trans+0, colors[1], colors[2], colors[3],
colors[4], gamma_table);
return 1;
case 0:
if (bit_depth == 1)
{
set_color(palette+0, trans+0, 255, 0, 0, 0, gamma_table);
set_color(palette+1, trans+1, 255, 255, 255, 255, gamma_table);
return 2;
}
else
{
unsigned int size = 1U << (bit_depth/2); /* 2, 4 or 16 */
unsigned int x, y, ip;
for (x=0; x<size; ++x) for (y=0; y<size; ++y)
{
ip = x + (size * y);
/* size is at most 16, so the scaled value below fits in 16 bits
*/
# define interp(pos, c1, c2) ((pos * c1) + ((size-pos) * c2))
# define xyinterp(x, y, c1, c2, c3, c4) (((size * size / 2) +\
(interp(x, c1, c2) * y + (size-y) * interp(x, c3, c4))) /\
(size*size))
set_color(palette+ip, trans+ip,
/* color: green, red,blue,white */
xyinterp(x, y, 0, 255, 0, 255),
xyinterp(x, y, 255, 0, 0, 255),
xyinterp(x, y, 0, 0, 255, 255),
/* alpha: 0, 102, 204, 255) */
xyinterp(x, y, 0, 102, 204, 255),
gamma_table);
}
return ip+1;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,579
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
bool effective, has_cap = false;
int ret;
effective = false;
ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
/*
* If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
*/
if (has_cap && new->uid != 0 && new->euid == 0) {
warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
goto skip;
}
/*
* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
* executables under compatibility mode, we override the
* capability sets for the file.
*
* If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
*/
if (new->euid == 0 || new->uid == 0) {
/* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
old->cap_inheritable);
}
if (new->euid == 0)
effective = true;
}
skip:
/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
*/
if ((new->euid != old->uid ||
new->egid != old->gid ||
!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
new->euid = new->uid;
new->egid = new->gid;
}
new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,
old->cap_permitted);
}
new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
if (effective)
new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
else
cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
bprm->cap_effective = effective;
/*
* Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
*
* We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
* 1) cap_effective has all caps
* 2) we are root
* 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
* Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
*
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
* that is interesting information to audit.
*/
if (!cap_isclear(new->cap_effective)) {
if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
new->euid != 0 || new->uid != 0 ||
issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
}
new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The cap_bprm_set_creds function in security/commoncap.c in the Linux kernel before 3.3.3 does not properly handle the use of file system capabilities (aka fcaps) for implementing a privileged executable file, which allows local users to bypass intended personality restrictions via a crafted application, as demonstrated by an attack that uses a parent process to disable ASLR.
Commit Message: fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used
If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous
personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared.
Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space
randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it
easier to attack.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
Low
| 165,616
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: nfsd4_encode_getdeviceinfo(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, __be32 nfserr,
struct nfsd4_getdeviceinfo *gdev)
{
struct xdr_stream *xdr = &resp->xdr;
const struct nfsd4_layout_ops *ops =
nfsd4_layout_ops[gdev->gd_layout_type];
u32 starting_len = xdr->buf->len, needed_len;
__be32 *p;
dprintk("%s: err %d\n", __func__, be32_to_cpu(nfserr));
if (nfserr)
goto out;
nfserr = nfserr_resource;
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(gdev->gd_layout_type);
/* If maxcount is 0 then just update notifications */
if (gdev->gd_maxcount != 0) {
nfserr = ops->encode_getdeviceinfo(xdr, gdev);
if (nfserr) {
/*
* We don't bother to burden the layout drivers with
* enforcing gd_maxcount, just tell the client to
* come back with a bigger buffer if it's not enough.
*/
if (xdr->buf->len + 4 > gdev->gd_maxcount)
goto toosmall;
goto out;
}
}
nfserr = nfserr_resource;
if (gdev->gd_notify_types) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4 + 4);
if (!p)
goto out;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1); /* bitmap length */
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(gdev->gd_notify_types);
} else {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out;
*p++ = 0;
}
nfserr = 0;
out:
kfree(gdev->gd_device);
dprintk("%s: done: %d\n", __func__, be32_to_cpu(nfserr));
return nfserr;
toosmall:
dprintk("%s: maxcount too small\n", __func__);
needed_len = xdr->buf->len + 4 /* notifications */;
xdr_truncate_encode(xdr, starting_len);
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p) {
nfserr = nfserr_resource;
} else {
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(needed_len);
nfserr = nfserr_toosmall;
}
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,148
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void LinkChangeSerializerMarkupAccumulator::appendAttribute(StringBuilder& result, Element* element, const Attribute& attribute, Namespaces* namespaces)
{
if (m_replaceLinks && element->isURLAttribute(attribute) && !element->isJavaScriptURLAttribute(attribute)) {
String completeURL = m_document->completeURL(attribute.value());
if (m_replaceLinks->contains(completeURL)) {
result.append(' ');
result.append(attribute.name().toString());
result.appendLiteral("=\"");
if (!m_directoryName.isEmpty()) {
result.appendLiteral("./");
result.append(m_directoryName);
result.append('/');
}
result.append(m_replaceLinks->get(completeURL));
result.appendLiteral("\"");
return;
}
}
MarkupAccumulator::appendAttribute(result, element, attribute, namespaces);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly handle image data in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,565
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_create_iv)
{
char *iv;
long source = RANDOM;
long size;
int n = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|l", &size, &source) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (size <= 0 || size >= INT_MAX) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Cannot create an IV with a size of less than 1 or greater than %d", INT_MAX);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
iv = ecalloc(size + 1, 1);
if (source == RANDOM || source == URANDOM) {
#if PHP_WIN32
/* random/urandom equivalent on Windows */
BYTE *iv_b = (BYTE *) iv;
if (php_win32_get_random_bytes(iv_b, (size_t) size) == FAILURE){
efree(iv);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not gather sufficient random data");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
n = size;
#else
int *fd = &MCG(fd[source]);
size_t read_bytes = 0;
if (*fd < 0) {
*fd = open(source == RANDOM ? "/dev/random" : "/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
if (*fd < 0) {
efree(iv);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Cannot open source device");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
while (read_bytes < size) {
n = read(*fd, iv + read_bytes, size - read_bytes);
if (n < 0) {
break;
}
read_bytes += n;
}
n = read_bytes;
if (n < size) {
efree(iv);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not gather sufficient random data");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#endif
} else {
n = size;
while (size) {
iv[--size] = (char) (255.0 * php_rand(TSRMLS_C) / RAND_MAX);
}
}
RETURN_STRINGL(iv, n, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
|
Low
| 167,111
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void *__alloc_from_pool(size_t size, struct page **ret_page, gfp_t flags)
{
unsigned long val;
void *ptr = NULL;
if (!atomic_pool) {
WARN(1, "coherent pool not initialised!\n");
return NULL;
}
val = gen_pool_alloc(atomic_pool, size);
if (val) {
phys_addr_t phys = gen_pool_virt_to_phys(atomic_pool, val);
*ret_page = phys_to_page(phys);
ptr = (void *)val;
if (flags & __GFP_ZERO)
memset(ptr, 0, size);
}
return ptr;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: arch/arm64/mm/dma-mapping.c in the Linux kernel before 4.0.3, as used in the ION subsystem in Android and other products, does not initialize certain data structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by triggering a dma_mmap call.
Commit Message: arm64: dma-mapping: always clear allocated buffers
Buffers allocated by dma_alloc_coherent() are always zeroed on Alpha,
ARM (32bit), MIPS, PowerPC, x86/x86_64 and probably other architectures.
It turned out that some drivers rely on this 'feature'. Allocated buffer
might be also exposed to userspace with dma_mmap() call, so clearing it
is desired from security point of view to avoid exposing random memory
to userspace. This patch unifies dma_alloc_coherent() behavior on ARM64
architecture with other implementations by unconditionally zeroing
allocated buffer.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.14+
Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
Medium
| 167,470
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::PassesCORSAccessCheck() {
DCHECK(MediaElement());
return (MediaElement()->GetWebMediaPlayer() &&
MediaElement()->GetWebMediaPlayer()->DidPassCORSAccessCheck()) ||
passes_current_src_cors_access_check_;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
|
Medium
| 173,147
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: print_trans(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *words, const u_char *data1, const u_char *buf, const u_char *maxbuf)
{
u_int bcc;
const char *f1, *f2, *f3, *f4;
const u_char *data, *param;
const u_char *w = words + 1;
int datalen, paramlen;
if (request) {
ND_TCHECK2(w[12 * 2], 2);
paramlen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 9 * 2);
param = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 10 * 2);
datalen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 11 * 2);
data = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 12 * 2);
f1 = "TotParamCnt=[d] \nTotDataCnt=[d] \nMaxParmCnt=[d] \nMaxDataCnt=[d]\nMaxSCnt=[d] \nTransFlags=[w] \nRes1=[w] \nRes2=[w] \nRes3=[w]\nParamCnt=[d] \nParamOff=[d] \nDataCnt=[d] \nDataOff=[d] \nSUCnt=[d]\n";
f2 = "|Name=[S]\n";
f3 = "|Param ";
f4 = "|Data ";
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(w[7 * 2], 2);
paramlen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 3 * 2);
param = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 4 * 2);
datalen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 6 * 2);
data = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 7 * 2);
f1 = "TotParamCnt=[d] \nTotDataCnt=[d] \nRes1=[d]\nParamCnt=[d] \nParamOff=[d] \nRes2=[d] \nDataCnt=[d] \nDataOff=[d] \nRes3=[d]\nLsetup=[d]\n";
f2 = "|Unknown ";
f3 = "|Param ";
f4 = "|Data ";
}
smb_fdata(ndo, words + 1, f1, min(words + 1 + 2 * words[0], maxbuf),
unicodestr);
ND_TCHECK2(*data1, 2);
bcc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(data1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "smb_bcc=%u\n", bcc));
if (bcc > 0) {
smb_fdata(ndo, data1 + 2, f2, maxbuf - (paramlen + datalen), unicodestr);
if (strcmp((const char *)(data1 + 2), "\\MAILSLOT\\BROWSE") == 0) {
print_browse(ndo, param, paramlen, data, datalen);
return;
}
if (strcmp((const char *)(data1 + 2), "\\PIPE\\LANMAN") == 0) {
print_ipc(ndo, param, paramlen, data, datalen);
return;
}
if (paramlen)
smb_fdata(ndo, param, f3, min(param + paramlen, maxbuf), unicodestr);
if (datalen)
smb_fdata(ndo, data, f4, min(data + datalen, maxbuf), unicodestr);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The SMB parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has buffer over-reads in print-smb.c:print_trans() for MAILSLOTBROWSE and PIPELANMAN.
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) SMB: Add two missing bounds checks
|
Low
| 169,815
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: mget(struct magic_set *ms, const unsigned char *s, struct magic *m,
size_t nbytes, size_t o, unsigned int cont_level, int mode, int text,
int flip, int recursion_level, int *printed_something,
int *need_separator, int *returnval)
{
uint32_t soffset, offset = ms->offset;
uint32_t count = m->str_range;
int rv, oneed_separator, in_type;
char *sbuf, *rbuf;
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
struct mlist ml;
if (recursion_level >= 20) {
file_error(ms, 0, "recursion nesting exceeded");
return -1;
}
if (mcopy(ms, p, m->type, m->flag & INDIR, s, (uint32_t)(offset + o),
(uint32_t)nbytes, count) == -1)
return -1;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "mget(type=%d, flag=%x, offset=%u, o=%zu, "
"nbytes=%zu, count=%u)\n", m->type, m->flag, offset, o,
nbytes, count);
mdebug(offset, (char *)(void *)p, sizeof(union VALUETYPE));
#ifndef COMPILE_ONLY
file_mdump(m);
#endif
}
if (m->flag & INDIR) {
int off = m->in_offset;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINDIRECT) {
const union VALUETYPE *q = CAST(const union VALUETYPE *,
((const void *)(s + offset + off)));
switch (cvt_flip(m->in_type, flip)) {
case FILE_BYTE:
off = q->b;
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
off = q->h;
break;
case FILE_BESHORT:
off = (short)((q->hs[0]<<8)|(q->hs[1]));
break;
case FILE_LESHORT:
off = (short)((q->hs[1]<<8)|(q->hs[0]));
break;
case FILE_LONG:
off = q->l;
break;
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_BEID3:
off = (int32_t)((q->hl[0]<<24)|(q->hl[1]<<16)|
(q->hl[2]<<8)|(q->hl[3]));
break;
case FILE_LEID3:
case FILE_LELONG:
off = (int32_t)((q->hl[3]<<24)|(q->hl[2]<<16)|
(q->hl[1]<<8)|(q->hl[0]));
break;
case FILE_MELONG:
off = (int32_t)((q->hl[1]<<24)|(q->hl[0]<<16)|
(q->hl[3]<<8)|(q->hl[2]));
break;
}
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "indirect offs=%u\n", off);
}
switch (in_type = cvt_flip(m->in_type, flip)) {
case FILE_BYTE:
if (nbytes < offset || nbytes < (offset + 1))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = p->b & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = p->b | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = p->b ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = p->b + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = p->b - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = p->b * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = p->b / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = p->b % off;
break;
}
} else
offset = p->b;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_BESHORT:
if (nbytes < offset || nbytes < (offset + 2))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|
(p->hs[1])) &
off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|
(p->hs[1])) |
off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|
(p->hs[1])) ^
off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|
(p->hs[1])) +
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|
(p->hs[1])) -
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|
(p->hs[1])) *
off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|
(p->hs[1])) /
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|
(p->hs[1])) %
off;
break;
}
} else
offset = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|
(p->hs[1]));
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_LESHORT:
if (nbytes < offset || nbytes < (offset + 2))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|
(p->hs[0])) &
off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|
(p->hs[0])) |
off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|
(p->hs[0])) ^
off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|
(p->hs[0])) +
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|
(p->hs[0])) -
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|
(p->hs[0])) *
off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|
(p->hs[0])) /
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|
(p->hs[0])) %
off;
break;
}
} else
offset = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|
(p->hs[0]));
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
if (nbytes < offset || nbytes < (offset + 2))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = p->h & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = p->h | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = p->h ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = p->h + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = p->h - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = p->h * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = p->h / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = p->h % off;
break;
}
}
else
offset = p->h;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_BEID3:
if (nbytes < offset || nbytes < (offset + 4))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[0]<<24)|
(p->hl[1]<<16)|
(p->hl[2]<<8)|
(p->hl[3])) &
off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[0]<<24)|
(p->hl[1]<<16)|
(p->hl[2]<<8)|
(p->hl[3])) |
off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[0]<<24)|
(p->hl[1]<<16)|
(p->hl[2]<<8)|
(p->hl[3])) ^
off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[0]<<24)|
(p->hl[1]<<16)|
(p->hl[2]<<8)|
(p->hl[3])) +
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[0]<<24)|
(p->hl[1]<<16)|
(p->hl[2]<<8)|
(p->hl[3])) -
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[0]<<24)|
(p->hl[1]<<16)|
(p->hl[2]<<8)|
(p->hl[3])) *
off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[0]<<24)|
(p->hl[1]<<16)|
(p->hl[2]<<8)|
(p->hl[3])) /
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[0]<<24)|
(p->hl[1]<<16)|
(p->hl[2]<<8)|
(p->hl[3])) %
off;
break;
}
} else
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[0]<<24)|
(p->hl[1]<<16)|
(p->hl[2]<<8)|
(p->hl[3]));
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_LEID3:
if (nbytes < offset || nbytes < (offset + 4))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[3]<<24)|
(p->hl[2]<<16)|
(p->hl[1]<<8)|
(p->hl[0])) &
off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[3]<<24)|
(p->hl[2]<<16)|
(p->hl[1]<<8)|
(p->hl[0])) |
off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[3]<<24)|
(p->hl[2]<<16)|
(p->hl[1]<<8)|
(p->hl[0])) ^
off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[3]<<24)|
(p->hl[2]<<16)|
(p->hl[1]<<8)|
(p->hl[0])) +
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[3]<<24)|
(p->hl[2]<<16)|
(p->hl[1]<<8)|
(p->hl[0])) -
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[3]<<24)|
(p->hl[2]<<16)|
(p->hl[1]<<8)|
(p->hl[0])) *
off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[3]<<24)|
(p->hl[2]<<16)|
(p->hl[1]<<8)|
(p->hl[0])) /
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[3]<<24)|
(p->hl[2]<<16)|
(p->hl[1]<<8)|
(p->hl[0])) %
off;
break;
}
} else
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[3]<<24)|
(p->hl[2]<<16)|
(p->hl[1]<<8)|
(p->hl[0]));
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_MELONG:
if (nbytes < offset || nbytes < (offset + 4))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[1]<<24)|
(p->hl[0]<<16)|
(p->hl[3]<<8)|
(p->hl[2])) &
off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[1]<<24)|
(p->hl[0]<<16)|
(p->hl[3]<<8)|
(p->hl[2])) |
off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[1]<<24)|
(p->hl[0]<<16)|
(p->hl[3]<<8)|
(p->hl[2])) ^
off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[1]<<24)|
(p->hl[0]<<16)|
(p->hl[3]<<8)|
(p->hl[2])) +
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[1]<<24)|
(p->hl[0]<<16)|
(p->hl[3]<<8)|
(p->hl[2])) -
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[1]<<24)|
(p->hl[0]<<16)|
(p->hl[3]<<8)|
(p->hl[2])) *
off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[1]<<24)|
(p->hl[0]<<16)|
(p->hl[3]<<8)|
(p->hl[2])) /
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[1]<<24)|
(p->hl[0]<<16)|
(p->hl[3]<<8)|
(p->hl[2])) %
off;
break;
}
} else
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[1]<<24)|
(p->hl[0]<<16)|
(p->hl[3]<<8)|
(p->hl[2]));
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_LONG:
if (nbytes < offset || nbytes < (offset + 4))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = p->l & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = p->l | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = p->l ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = p->l + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = p->l - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = p->l * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = p->l / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = p->l % off;
break;
}
} else
offset = p->l;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
default:
break;
}
switch (in_type) {
case FILE_LEID3:
case FILE_BEID3:
offset = ((((offset >> 0) & 0x7f) << 0) |
(((offset >> 8) & 0x7f) << 7) |
(((offset >> 16) & 0x7f) << 14) |
(((offset >> 24) & 0x7f) << 21)) + 10;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (m->flag & INDIROFFADD) {
offset += ms->c.li[cont_level-1].off;
if (offset == 0) {
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
fprintf(stderr,
"indirect *zero* offset\n");
return 0;
}
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "indirect +offs=%u\n", offset);
}
if (mcopy(ms, p, m->type, 0, s, offset, nbytes, count) == -1)
return -1;
ms->offset = offset;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0) {
mdebug(offset, (char *)(void *)p,
sizeof(union VALUETYPE));
#ifndef COMPILE_ONLY
file_mdump(m);
#endif
}
}
/* Verify we have enough data to match magic type */
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_BYTE:
if (nbytes < (offset + 1)) /* should alway be true */
return 0;
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
case FILE_BESHORT:
case FILE_LESHORT:
if (nbytes < (offset + 2))
return 0;
break;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_MELONG:
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_MEDATE:
case FILE_LDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
case FILE_FLOAT:
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
if (nbytes < (offset + 4))
return 0;
break;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
if (nbytes < (offset + 8))
return 0;
break;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_PSTRING:
case FILE_SEARCH:
if (nbytes < (offset + m->vallen))
return 0;
break;
case FILE_REGEX:
if (nbytes < offset)
return 0;
break;
case FILE_INDIRECT:
if (nbytes < offset)
return 0;
sbuf = ms->o.buf;
soffset = ms->offset;
ms->o.buf = NULL;
ms->offset = 0;
rv = file_softmagic(ms, s + offset, nbytes - offset,
BINTEST, text);
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "indirect @offs=%u[%d]\n", offset, rv);
rbuf = ms->o.buf;
ms->o.buf = sbuf;
ms->offset = soffset;
if (rv == 1) {
if ((ms->flags & (MAGIC_MIME|MAGIC_APPLE)) == 0 &&
file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%u"), offset) == -1)
return -1;
if (file_printf(ms, "%s", rbuf) == -1)
return -1;
free(rbuf);
}
return rv;
case FILE_USE:
if (nbytes < offset)
return 0;
sbuf = m->value.s;
if (*sbuf == '^') {
sbuf++;
flip = !flip;
}
if (file_magicfind(ms, sbuf, &ml) == -1) {
file_error(ms, 0, "cannot find entry `%s'", sbuf);
return -1;
}
oneed_separator = *need_separator;
if (m->flag & NOSPACE)
*need_separator = 0;
rv = match(ms, ml.magic, ml.nmagic, s, nbytes, offset + o,
mode, text, flip, recursion_level, printed_something,
need_separator, returnval);
if (rv != 1)
*need_separator = oneed_separator;
return rv;
case FILE_NAME:
if (file_printf(ms, "%s", m->desc) == -1)
return -1;
return 1;
case FILE_DEFAULT: /* nothing to check */
case FILE_CLEAR:
default:
break;
}
if (!mconvert(ms, m, flip))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: softmagic.c in file before 5.17 and libmagic allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds memory access and crash) via crafted offsets in the softmagic of a PE executable.
Commit Message: PR/313: Aaron Reffett: Check properly for exceeding the offset.
|
Medium
| 166,423
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: UseCounterPageLoadMetricsObserver::GetAllowedUkmFeatures() {
static base::NoDestructor<UseCounterPageLoadMetricsObserver::UkmFeatureList>
opt_in_features(std::initializer_list<WebFeature>({
WebFeature::kNavigatorVibrate,
WebFeature::kNavigatorVibrateSubFrame,
WebFeature::kTouchEventPreventedNoTouchAction,
WebFeature::kTouchEventPreventedForcedDocumentPassiveNoTouchAction,
WebFeature::kDataUriHasOctothorpe,
WebFeature::kApplicationCacheManifestSelectInsecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kApplicationCacheManifestSelectSecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kMixedContentAudio,
WebFeature::kMixedContentImage,
WebFeature::kMixedContentVideo,
WebFeature::kMixedContentPlugin,
WebFeature::kOpenerNavigationWithoutGesture,
WebFeature::kUsbRequestDevice,
WebFeature::kXMLHttpRequestSynchronous,
WebFeature::kPaymentHandler,
WebFeature::kPaymentRequestShowWithoutGesture,
WebFeature::kHTMLImports,
WebFeature::kHTMLImportsHasStyleSheets,
WebFeature::kElementCreateShadowRoot,
WebFeature::kDocumentRegisterElement,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerCreatePublicKeyCredential,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerGetPublicKeyCredential,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerMakePublicKeyCredentialSuccess,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerGetPublicKeyCredentialSuccess,
WebFeature::kV8AudioContext_Constructor,
WebFeature::kElementAttachShadow,
WebFeature::kElementAttachShadowOpen,
WebFeature::kElementAttachShadowClosed,
WebFeature::kCustomElementRegistryDefine,
WebFeature::kTextToSpeech_Speak,
WebFeature::kTextToSpeech_SpeakDisallowedByAutoplay,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetTop,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetLeft,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetRight,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetBottom,
WebFeature::kMediaControlsDisplayCutoutGesture,
WebFeature::kPolymerV1Detected,
WebFeature::kPolymerV2Detected,
WebFeature::kFullscreenSecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kFullscreenInsecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoEnterFullscreen,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoExitFullscreen,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoEnterFullScreen,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoExitFullScreen,
WebFeature::kDocumentLevelPassiveDefaultEventListenerPreventedWheel,
WebFeature::kDocumentDomainBlockedCrossOriginAccess,
WebFeature::kDocumentDomainEnabledCrossOriginAccess,
WebFeature::kSuppressHistoryEntryWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kCursorImageGT32x32,
WebFeature::kCursorImageLE32x32,
WebFeature::kHistoryPushState,
WebFeature::kHistoryReplaceState,
WebFeature::kCursorImageGT64x64,
WebFeature::kAdClick,
WebFeature::kUpdateWithoutShippingOptionOnShippingAddressChange,
WebFeature::kUpdateWithoutShippingOptionOnShippingOptionChange,
WebFeature::kSignedExchangeInnerResponseInMainFrame,
WebFeature::kSignedExchangeInnerResponseInSubFrame,
WebFeature::kWebShareShare,
WebFeature::kHTMLAnchorElementDownloadInSandboxWithUserGesture,
WebFeature::kHTMLAnchorElementDownloadInSandboxWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kNavigationDownloadInSandboxWithUserGesture,
WebFeature::kNavigationDownloadInSandboxWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kDownloadInAdFrameWithUserGesture,
WebFeature::kDownloadInAdFrameWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kOpenWebDatabase,
WebFeature::kV8MediaCapabilities_DecodingInfo_Method,
}));
return *opt_in_features;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Incorrect handling of download origins in Navigation in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Add kOpenerNavigationDownloadCrossOriginNoGesture to UKM whitelist
Bug: 632514
Change-Id: Ibd09c4d8635873e02f9b484ec720b71ae6e3588f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1399521
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Harrison <csharrison@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#620513}
|
Medium
| 173,060
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cJSON *cJSON_Parse( const char *value )
{
cJSON *c;
ep = 0;
if ( ! ( c = cJSON_New_Item() ) )
return 0; /* memory fail */
if ( ! parse_value( c, skip( value ) ) ) {
cJSON_Delete( c );
return 0;
}
return c;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,292
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::RequestAuthorization(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
const ConfirmationCallback& callback) {
callback.Run(CANCELLED);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,234
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PageInfo::OnWhitelistPasswordReuseButtonPressed(
content::WebContents* web_contents) {
#if defined(FULL_SAFE_BROWSING)
DCHECK(password_protection_service_);
DCHECK(safe_browsing_status_ == SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_SIGN_IN_PASSWORD_REUSE ||
safe_browsing_status_ ==
SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_ENTERPRISE_PASSWORD_REUSE);
password_protection_service_->OnUserAction(
web_contents,
safe_browsing_status_ == SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_SIGN_IN_PASSWORD_REUSE
? PasswordReuseEvent::SIGN_IN_PASSWORD
: PasswordReuseEvent::ENTERPRISE_PASSWORD,
safe_browsing::WarningUIType::PAGE_INFO,
safe_browsing::WarningAction::MARK_AS_LEGITIMATE);
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-311
Summary: Cast in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android sent cookies to sites discovered via SSDP, which allowed an attacker on the local network segment to initiate connections to arbitrary URLs and observe any plaintext cookies sent.
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
|
Low
| 172,437
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ParamTraits<SkBitmap>::Read(const base::Pickle* m,
base::PickleIterator* iter,
SkBitmap* r) {
const char* fixed_data;
int fixed_data_size = 0;
if (!iter->ReadData(&fixed_data, &fixed_data_size) ||
(fixed_data_size <= 0)) {
return false;
}
if (fixed_data_size != sizeof(SkBitmap_Data))
return false; // Message is malformed.
const char* variable_data;
int variable_data_size = 0;
if (!iter->ReadData(&variable_data, &variable_data_size) ||
(variable_data_size < 0)) {
return false;
}
const SkBitmap_Data* bmp_data =
reinterpret_cast<const SkBitmap_Data*>(fixed_data);
return bmp_data->InitSkBitmapFromData(r, variable_data, variable_data_size);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Incorrect IPC serialization in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Update IPC ParamTraits for SkBitmap to follow best practices.
Using memcpy() to serialize a POD struct is highly discouraged. Just use
the standard IPC param traits macros for doing it.
Bug: 779428
Change-Id: I48f52c1f5c245ba274d595829ed92e8b3cb41334
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/899649
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534562}
|
Medium
| 172,894
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static unsigned short get_ushort(const unsigned char *data)
{
unsigned short val = *(const unsigned short *)data;
#ifdef OPJ_BIG_ENDIAN
val = ((val & 0xffU) << 8) | (val >> 8);
#endif
return val;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An invalid write access was discovered in bin/jp2/convert.c in OpenJPEG 2.2.0, triggering a crash in the tgatoimage function. The vulnerability may lead to remote denial of service or possibly unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: tgatoimage(): avoid excessive memory allocation attempt, and fixes unaligned load (#995)
|
Medium
| 167,780
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: opj_pi_iterator_t *opj_pi_create_decode(opj_image_t *p_image,
opj_cp_t *p_cp,
OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no)
{
/* loop */
OPJ_UINT32 pino;
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
/* to store w, h, dx and dy fro all components and resolutions */
OPJ_UINT32 * l_tmp_data;
OPJ_UINT32 ** l_tmp_ptr;
/* encoding prameters to set */
OPJ_UINT32 l_max_res;
OPJ_UINT32 l_max_prec;
OPJ_INT32 l_tx0,l_tx1,l_ty0,l_ty1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_dx_min,l_dy_min;
OPJ_UINT32 l_bound;
OPJ_UINT32 l_step_p , l_step_c , l_step_r , l_step_l ;
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_stride;
/* pointers */
opj_pi_iterator_t *l_pi = 00;
opj_tcp_t *l_tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t *l_tccp = 00;
opj_pi_comp_t *l_current_comp = 00;
opj_image_comp_t * l_img_comp = 00;
opj_pi_iterator_t * l_current_pi = 00;
OPJ_UINT32 * l_encoding_value_ptr = 00;
/* preconditions in debug */
assert(p_cp != 00);
assert(p_image != 00);
assert(p_tile_no < p_cp->tw * p_cp->th);
/* initializations */
l_tcp = &p_cp->tcps[p_tile_no];
l_bound = l_tcp->numpocs+1;
l_data_stride = 4 * OPJ_J2K_MAXRLVLS;
l_tmp_data = (OPJ_UINT32*)opj_malloc(
l_data_stride * p_image->numcomps * sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if
(! l_tmp_data)
{
return 00;
}
l_tmp_ptr = (OPJ_UINT32**)opj_malloc(
p_image->numcomps * sizeof(OPJ_UINT32 *));
if
(! l_tmp_ptr)
{
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
return 00;
}
/* memory allocation for pi */
l_pi = opj_pi_create(p_image, p_cp, p_tile_no);
if (!l_pi) {
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
return 00;
}
l_encoding_value_ptr = l_tmp_data;
/* update pointer array */
for
(compno = 0; compno < p_image->numcomps; ++compno)
{
l_tmp_ptr[compno] = l_encoding_value_ptr;
l_encoding_value_ptr += l_data_stride;
}
/* get encoding parameters */
opj_get_all_encoding_parameters(p_image,p_cp,p_tile_no,&l_tx0,&l_tx1,&l_ty0,&l_ty1,&l_dx_min,&l_dy_min,&l_max_prec,&l_max_res,l_tmp_ptr);
/* step calculations */
l_step_p = 1;
l_step_c = l_max_prec * l_step_p;
l_step_r = p_image->numcomps * l_step_c;
l_step_l = l_max_res * l_step_r;
/* set values for first packet iterator */
l_current_pi = l_pi;
/* memory allocation for include */
/* prevent an integer overflow issue */
l_current_pi->include = 00;
if (l_step_l <= (SIZE_MAX / (l_tcp->numlayers + 1U)))
{
l_current_pi->include = (OPJ_INT16*) opj_calloc((l_tcp->numlayers +1) * l_step_l, sizeof(OPJ_INT16));
}
if
(!l_current_pi->include)
{
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
opj_pi_destroy(l_pi, l_bound);
return 00;
}
/* special treatment for the first packet iterator */
l_current_comp = l_current_pi->comps;
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
l_current_pi->tx0 = l_tx0;
l_current_pi->ty0 = l_ty0;
l_current_pi->tx1 = l_tx1;
l_current_pi->ty1 = l_ty1;
/*l_current_pi->dx = l_img_comp->dx;*/
/*l_current_pi->dy = l_img_comp->dy;*/
l_current_pi->step_p = l_step_p;
l_current_pi->step_c = l_step_c;
l_current_pi->step_r = l_step_r;
l_current_pi->step_l = l_step_l;
/* allocation for components and number of components has already been calculated by opj_pi_create */
for
(compno = 0; compno < l_current_pi->numcomps; ++compno)
{
opj_pi_resolution_t *l_res = l_current_comp->resolutions;
l_encoding_value_ptr = l_tmp_ptr[compno];
l_current_comp->dx = l_img_comp->dx;
l_current_comp->dy = l_img_comp->dy;
/* resolutions have already been initialized */
for
(resno = 0; resno < l_current_comp->numresolutions; resno++)
{
l_res->pdx = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pdy = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pw = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->ph = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
++l_res;
}
++l_current_comp;
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
}
++l_current_pi;
for (pino = 1 ; pino<l_bound ; ++pino )
{
l_current_comp = l_current_pi->comps;
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
l_current_pi->tx0 = l_tx0;
l_current_pi->ty0 = l_ty0;
l_current_pi->tx1 = l_tx1;
l_current_pi->ty1 = l_ty1;
/*l_current_pi->dx = l_dx_min;*/
/*l_current_pi->dy = l_dy_min;*/
l_current_pi->step_p = l_step_p;
l_current_pi->step_c = l_step_c;
l_current_pi->step_r = l_step_r;
l_current_pi->step_l = l_step_l;
/* allocation for components and number of components has already been calculated by opj_pi_create */
for
(compno = 0; compno < l_current_pi->numcomps; ++compno)
{
opj_pi_resolution_t *l_res = l_current_comp->resolutions;
l_encoding_value_ptr = l_tmp_ptr[compno];
l_current_comp->dx = l_img_comp->dx;
l_current_comp->dy = l_img_comp->dy;
/* resolutions have already been initialized */
for
(resno = 0; resno < l_current_comp->numresolutions; resno++)
{
l_res->pdx = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pdy = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pw = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->ph = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
++l_res;
}
++l_current_comp;
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
}
/* special treatment*/
l_current_pi->include = (l_current_pi-1)->include;
++l_current_pi;
}
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
l_tmp_data = 00;
opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
l_tmp_ptr = 00;
if
(l_tcp->POC)
{
opj_pi_update_decode_poc (l_pi,l_tcp,l_max_prec,l_max_res);
}
else
{
opj_pi_update_decode_not_poc(l_pi,l_tcp,l_max_prec,l_max_res);
}
return l_pi;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Integer overflow in the opj_pi_create_decode function in pi.c in OpenJPEG allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted JP2 file, which triggers an out-of-bounds read or write.
Commit Message: Cast to size_t before multiplication
Need to cast to size_t before multiplication otherwise overflow check is useless.
|
Medium
| 169,941
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cib_recv_tls(gnutls_session * session)
{
char *buf = NULL;
int rc = 0;
int len = 0;
int chunk_size = 1024;
if (session == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
buf = calloc(1, chunk_size);
while (TRUE) {
errno = 0;
rc = gnutls_record_recv(*session, buf + len, chunk_size);
crm_trace("Got %d more bytes. errno=%d", rc, errno);
if (rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED || rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) {
crm_trace("Retry");
} else if (rc == GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH) {
crm_trace("Session disconnected");
goto bail;
} else if (rc < 0) {
crm_err("Error receiving message: %s (%d)", gnutls_strerror(rc), rc);
goto bail;
} else if (rc == chunk_size) {
len += rc;
chunk_size *= 2;
buf = realloc(buf, len + chunk_size);
crm_trace("Retry with %d more bytes", (int)chunk_size);
CRM_ASSERT(buf != NULL);
} else if (buf[len + rc - 1] != 0) {
crm_trace("Last char is %d '%c'", buf[len + rc - 1], buf[len + rc - 1]);
crm_trace("Retry with %d more bytes", (int)chunk_size);
len += rc;
buf = realloc(buf, len + chunk_size);
CRM_ASSERT(buf != NULL);
} else {
crm_trace("Got %d more bytes", (int)rc);
return buf;
}
}
bail:
free(buf);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Pacemaker 1.1.10, when remote Cluster Information Base (CIB) configuration or resource management is enabled, does not limit the duration of connections to the blocking sockets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (connection blocking).
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
|
Medium
| 166,159
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cdf_file_property_info(struct magic_set *ms, const cdf_property_info_t *info,
size_t count, const uint64_t clsid[2])
{
size_t i;
cdf_timestamp_t tp;
struct timespec ts;
char buf[64];
const char *str = NULL;
const char *s;
int len;
if (!NOTMIME(ms))
str = cdf_clsid_to_mime(clsid, clsid2mime);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
cdf_print_property_name(buf, sizeof(buf), info[i].pi_id);
switch (info[i].pi_type) {
case CDF_NULL:
break;
case CDF_SIGNED16:
if (NOTMIME(ms) && file_printf(ms, ", %s: %hd", buf,
info[i].pi_s16) == -1)
return -1;
break;
case CDF_SIGNED32:
if (NOTMIME(ms) && file_printf(ms, ", %s: %d", buf,
info[i].pi_s32) == -1)
return -1;
break;
case CDF_UNSIGNED32:
if (NOTMIME(ms) && file_printf(ms, ", %s: %u", buf,
info[i].pi_u32) == -1)
return -1;
break;
case CDF_FLOAT:
if (NOTMIME(ms) && file_printf(ms, ", %s: %g", buf,
info[i].pi_f) == -1)
return -1;
break;
case CDF_DOUBLE:
if (NOTMIME(ms) && file_printf(ms, ", %s: %g", buf,
info[i].pi_d) == -1)
return -1;
break;
case CDF_LENGTH32_STRING:
case CDF_LENGTH32_WSTRING:
len = info[i].pi_str.s_len;
if (len > 1) {
char vbuf[1024];
size_t j, k = 1;
if (info[i].pi_type == CDF_LENGTH32_WSTRING)
k++;
s = info[i].pi_str.s_buf;
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(vbuf) && len--;
j++, s += k) {
if (*s == '\0')
break;
if (isprint((unsigned char)*s))
vbuf[j] = *s;
}
if (j == sizeof(vbuf))
--j;
vbuf[j] = '\0';
if (NOTMIME(ms)) {
if (vbuf[0]) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s: %s",
buf, vbuf) == -1)
return -1;
}
} else if (str == NULL && info[i].pi_id ==
CDF_PROPERTY_NAME_OF_APPLICATION) {
str = cdf_app_to_mime(vbuf, app2mime);
}
}
break;
case CDF_FILETIME:
tp = info[i].pi_tp;
if (tp != 0) {
char tbuf[64];
if (tp < 1000000000000000LL) {
cdf_print_elapsed_time(tbuf,
sizeof(tbuf), tp);
if (NOTMIME(ms) && file_printf(ms,
", %s: %s", buf, tbuf) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
char *c, *ec;
cdf_timestamp_to_timespec(&ts, tp);
c = cdf_ctime(&ts.tv_sec, tbuf);
if (c != NULL &&
(ec = strchr(c, '\n')) != NULL)
*ec = '\0';
if (NOTMIME(ms) && file_printf(ms,
", %s: %s", buf, c) == -1)
return -1;
}
}
break;
case CDF_CLIPBOARD:
break;
default:
return -1;
}
}
if (!NOTMIME(ms)) {
if (str == NULL)
return 0;
if (file_printf(ms, "application/%s", str) == -1)
return -1;
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The cdf_read_short_sector function in cdf.c in file before 5.19, as used in the Fileinfo component in PHP before 5.4.30 and 5.5.x before 5.5.14, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure and application exit) via a crafted CDF file.
Commit Message: Apply patches from file-CVE-2012-1571.patch
From Francisco Alonso Espejo:
file < 5.18/git version can be made to crash when checking some
corrupt CDF files (Using an invalid cdf_read_short_sector size)
The problem I found here, is that in most situations (if
h_short_sec_size_p2 > 8) because the blocksize is 512 and normal
values are 06 which means reading 64 bytes.As long as the check
for the block size copy is not checked properly (there's an assert
that makes wrong/invalid assumptions)
|
Medium
| 166,445
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: my_object_recursive1 (MyObject *obj, GArray *array, guint32 *len_ret, GError **error)
{
*len_ret = array->len;
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,117
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PlatformSensorProviderAndroid::CreateRelativeOrientationEulerAnglesSensor(
JNIEnv* env,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
const CreateSensorCallback& callback) {
if (static_cast<bool>(Java_PlatformSensorProvider_hasSensorType(
env, j_object_,
static_cast<jint>(
mojom::SensorType::RELATIVE_ORIENTATION_QUATERNION)))) {
auto sensor_fusion_algorithm =
std::make_unique<OrientationEulerAnglesFusionAlgorithmUsingQuaternion>(
false /* absolute */);
PlatformSensorFusion::Create(std::move(mapping), this,
std::move(sensor_fusion_algorithm), callback);
} else {
callback.Run(nullptr);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
Medium
| 172,836
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void cJSON_AddItemToArray( cJSON *array, cJSON *item )
{
cJSON *c = array->child;
if ( ! item )
return;
if ( ! c ) {
array->child = item;
} else {
while ( c && c->next )
c = c->next;
suffix_object( c, item );
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,267
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OmniboxPopupViewGtk::~OmniboxPopupViewGtk() {
model_.reset();
g_object_unref(layout_);
gtk_widget_destroy(window_);
for (ImageMap::iterator it = images_.begin(); it != images_.end(); ++it)
delete it->second;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 on Linux allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging an error in the GTK implementation of the omnibox.
Commit Message: GTK: Stop listening to gtk signals in the omnibox before destroying the model.
BUG=123530
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10103012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132498 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,049
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlParseCharDataComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int cdata) {
xmlChar buf[XML_PARSER_BIG_BUFFER_SIZE + 5];
int nbchar = 0;
int cur, l;
int count = 0;
SHRINK;
GROW;
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
while ((cur != '<') && /* checked */
(cur != '&') &&
(IS_CHAR(cur))) /* test also done in xmlCurrentChar() */ {
if ((cur == ']') && (NXT(1) == ']') &&
(NXT(2) == '>')) {
if (cdata) break;
else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_MISPLACED_CDATA_END, NULL);
}
}
COPY_BUF(l,buf,nbchar,cur);
if (nbchar >= XML_PARSER_BIG_BUFFER_SIZE) {
buf[nbchar] = 0;
/*
* OK the segment is to be consumed as chars.
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (areBlanks(ctxt, buf, nbchar, 0)) {
if (ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace != NULL)
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace(ctxt->userData,
buf, nbchar);
} else {
if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData, buf, nbchar);
if ((ctxt->sax->characters !=
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace) &&
(*ctxt->space == -1))
*ctxt->space = -2;
}
}
nbchar = 0;
/* something really bad happened in the SAX callback */
if (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_CONTENT)
return;
}
count++;
if (count > 50) {
GROW;
count = 0;
}
NEXTL(l);
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
if (nbchar != 0) {
buf[nbchar] = 0;
/*
* OK the segment is to be consumed as chars.
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (areBlanks(ctxt, buf, nbchar, 0)) {
if (ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace != NULL)
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace(ctxt->userData, buf, nbchar);
} else {
if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData, buf, nbchar);
if ((ctxt->sax->characters != ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace) &&
(*ctxt->space == -1))
*ctxt->space = -2;
}
}
}
if ((cur != 0) && (!IS_CHAR(cur))) {
/* Generate the error and skip the offending character */
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"PCDATA invalid Char value %d\n",
cur);
NEXTL(l);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,275
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void UrlData::MergeFrom(const scoped_refptr<UrlData>& other) {
if (ValidateDataOrigin(other->data_origin_)) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
valid_until_ = std::max(valid_until_, other->valid_until_);
set_length(other->length_);
cacheable_ |= other->cacheable_;
range_supported_ |= other->range_supported_;
if (last_modified_.is_null()) {
last_modified_ = other->last_modified_;
}
bytes_read_from_cache_ += other->bytes_read_from_cache_;
set_has_opaque_data(other->has_opaque_data_);
multibuffer()->MergeFrom(other->multibuffer());
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Service works could inappropriately gain access to cross origin audio in Media in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy for audio content via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
Medium
| 172,627
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int php_stream_temp_seek(php_stream *stream, off_t offset, int whence, off_t *newoffs TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
int ret;
assert(ts != NULL);
if (!ts->innerstream) {
*newoffs = -1;
return -1;
}
ret = php_stream_seek(ts->innerstream, offset, whence);
*newoffs = php_stream_tell(ts->innerstream);
stream->eof = ts->innerstream->eof;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: In PHP before 5.5.32, 5.6.x before 5.6.18, and 7.x before 7.0.3, all of the return values of stream_get_meta_data can be controlled if the input can be controlled (e.g., during file uploads). For example, a "$uri = stream_get_meta_data(fopen($file, "r"))['uri']" call mishandles the case where $file is data:text/plain;uri=eviluri, -- in other words, metadata can be set by an attacker.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,481
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlParseElementChildrenContentDeclPriv(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int inputchk,
int depth) {
xmlElementContentPtr ret = NULL, cur = NULL, last = NULL, op = NULL;
const xmlChar *elem;
xmlChar type = 0;
if (((depth > 128) && ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) ||
(depth > 2048)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_ELEMCONTENT_NOT_FINISHED,
"xmlParseElementChildrenContentDecl : depth %d too deep, use XML_PARSE_HUGE\n",
depth);
return(NULL);
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
if (RAW == '(') {
int inputid = ctxt->input->id;
/* Recurse on first child */
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
cur = ret = xmlParseElementChildrenContentDeclPriv(ctxt, inputid,
depth + 1);
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
} else {
elem = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (elem == NULL) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ELEMCONTENT_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
cur = ret = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, elem, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ELEMENT);
if (cur == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
GROW;
if (RAW == '?') {
cur->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OPT;
NEXT;
} else if (RAW == '*') {
cur->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
NEXT;
} else if (RAW == '+') {
cur->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_PLUS;
NEXT;
} else {
cur->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ONCE;
}
GROW;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
SHRINK;
while (RAW != ')') {
/*
* Each loop we parse one separator and one element.
*/
if (RAW == ',') {
if (type == 0) type = CUR;
/*
* Detect "Name | Name , Name" error
*/
else if (type != CUR) {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_SEPARATOR_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseElementChildrenContentDecl : '%c' expected\n",
type);
if ((last != NULL) && (last != ret))
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, last);
if (ret != NULL)
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
return(NULL);
}
NEXT;
op = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_SEQ);
if (op == NULL) {
if ((last != NULL) && (last != ret))
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, last);
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
return(NULL);
}
if (last == NULL) {
op->c1 = ret;
if (ret != NULL)
ret->parent = op;
ret = cur = op;
} else {
cur->c2 = op;
if (op != NULL)
op->parent = cur;
op->c1 = last;
if (last != NULL)
last->parent = op;
cur =op;
last = NULL;
}
} else if (RAW == '|') {
if (type == 0) type = CUR;
/*
* Detect "Name , Name | Name" error
*/
else if (type != CUR) {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_SEPARATOR_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseElementChildrenContentDecl : '%c' expected\n",
type);
if ((last != NULL) && (last != ret))
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, last);
if (ret != NULL)
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
return(NULL);
}
NEXT;
op = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OR);
if (op == NULL) {
if ((last != NULL) && (last != ret))
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, last);
if (ret != NULL)
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
return(NULL);
}
if (last == NULL) {
op->c1 = ret;
if (ret != NULL)
ret->parent = op;
ret = cur = op;
} else {
cur->c2 = op;
if (op != NULL)
op->parent = cur;
op->c1 = last;
if (last != NULL)
last->parent = op;
cur =op;
last = NULL;
}
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ELEMCONTENT_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
if ((last != NULL) && (last != ret))
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, last);
if (ret != NULL)
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
return(NULL);
}
GROW;
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
if (RAW == '(') {
int inputid = ctxt->input->id;
/* Recurse on second child */
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
last = xmlParseElementChildrenContentDeclPriv(ctxt, inputid,
depth + 1);
SKIP_BLANKS;
} else {
elem = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (elem == NULL) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ELEMCONTENT_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
if (ret != NULL)
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
return(NULL);
}
last = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, elem, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ELEMENT);
if (last == NULL) {
if (ret != NULL)
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
return(NULL);
}
if (RAW == '?') {
last->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OPT;
NEXT;
} else if (RAW == '*') {
last->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
NEXT;
} else if (RAW == '+') {
last->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_PLUS;
NEXT;
} else {
last->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ONCE;
}
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
}
if ((cur != NULL) && (last != NULL)) {
cur->c2 = last;
if (last != NULL)
last->parent = cur;
}
if ((ctxt->validate) && (ctxt->input->id != inputchk)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"Element content declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n",
NULL, NULL);
}
NEXT;
if (RAW == '?') {
if (ret != NULL) {
if ((ret->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_PLUS) ||
(ret->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT))
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
else
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OPT;
}
NEXT;
} else if (RAW == '*') {
if (ret != NULL) {
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
cur = ret;
/*
* Some normalization:
* (a | b* | c?)* == (a | b | c)*
*/
while ((cur != NULL) && (cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OR)) {
if ((cur->c1 != NULL) &&
((cur->c1->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OPT) ||
(cur->c1->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT)))
cur->c1->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ONCE;
if ((cur->c2 != NULL) &&
((cur->c2->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OPT) ||
(cur->c2->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT)))
cur->c2->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ONCE;
cur = cur->c2;
}
}
NEXT;
} else if (RAW == '+') {
if (ret != NULL) {
int found = 0;
if ((ret->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OPT) ||
(ret->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT))
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
else
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_PLUS;
/*
* Some normalization:
* (a | b*)+ == (a | b)*
* (a | b?)+ == (a | b)*
*/
while ((cur != NULL) && (cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OR)) {
if ((cur->c1 != NULL) &&
((cur->c1->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OPT) ||
(cur->c1->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT))) {
cur->c1->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ONCE;
found = 1;
}
if ((cur->c2 != NULL) &&
((cur->c2->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OPT) ||
(cur->c2->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT))) {
cur->c2->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ONCE;
found = 1;
}
cur = cur->c2;
}
if (found)
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
}
NEXT;
}
return(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,284
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: freeimage(Image *image)
{
freebuffer(image);
png_image_free(&image->image);
if (image->input_file != NULL)
{
fclose(image->input_file);
image->input_file = NULL;
}
if (image->input_memory != NULL)
{
free(image->input_memory);
image->input_memory = NULL;
image->input_memory_size = 0;
}
if (image->tmpfile_name[0] != 0 && (image->opts & KEEP_TMPFILES) == 0)
{
remove(image->tmpfile_name);
image->tmpfile_name[0] = 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,594
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void copyMultiCh24(short *dst, const int *const *src, unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
for (unsigned c = 0; c < nChannels; ++c) {
*dst++ = src[c][i] >> 8;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in FLACExtractor.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34970788.
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
|
Medium
| 174,019
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PlatformSensorProviderLinux::CreateFusionSensor(
mojom::SensorType type,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
const CreateSensorCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(IsFusionSensorType(type));
std::unique_ptr<PlatformSensorFusionAlgorithm> fusion_algorithm;
switch (type) {
case mojom::SensorType::LINEAR_ACCELERATION:
fusion_algorithm = std::make_unique<
LinearAccelerationFusionAlgorithmUsingAccelerometer>();
break;
case mojom::SensorType::RELATIVE_ORIENTATION_EULER_ANGLES:
fusion_algorithm = std::make_unique<
RelativeOrientationEulerAnglesFusionAlgorithmUsingAccelerometer>();
break;
case mojom::SensorType::RELATIVE_ORIENTATION_QUATERNION:
fusion_algorithm = std::make_unique<
OrientationQuaternionFusionAlgorithmUsingEulerAngles>(
false /* absolute */);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
DCHECK(fusion_algorithm);
PlatformSensorFusion::Create(std::move(mapping), this,
std::move(fusion_algorithm), callback);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
Medium
| 172,842
|
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