instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static enum gro_result dev_gro_receive(struct napi_struct *napi, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sk_buff **pp = NULL;
struct packet_offload *ptype;
__be16 type = skb->protocol;
struct list_head *head = &offload_base;
int same_flow;
enum gro_result ret;
int grow;
if (!(skb->dev->features & NETIF_F_GRO))
goto normal;
if (skb_is_gso(skb) || skb_has_frag_list(skb) || skb->csum_bad)
goto normal;
gro_list_prepare(napi, skb);
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptype, head, list) {
if (ptype->type != type || !ptype->callbacks.gro_receive)
continue;
skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb));
skb_reset_mac_len(skb);
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->same_flow = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->free = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->udp_mark = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->gro_remcsum_start = 0;
/* Setup for GRO checksum validation */
switch (skb->ip_summed) {
case CHECKSUM_COMPLETE:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum = skb->csum;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_valid = 1;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_cnt = 0;
break;
case CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_cnt = skb->csum_level + 1;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_valid = 0;
break;
default:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_cnt = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_valid = 0;
}
pp = ptype->callbacks.gro_receive(&napi->gro_list, skb);
break;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (&ptype->list == head)
goto normal;
same_flow = NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->same_flow;
ret = NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->free ? GRO_MERGED_FREE : GRO_MERGED;
if (pp) {
struct sk_buff *nskb = *pp;
*pp = nskb->next;
nskb->next = NULL;
napi_gro_complete(nskb);
napi->gro_count--;
}
if (same_flow)
goto ok;
if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush)
goto normal;
if (unlikely(napi->gro_count >= MAX_GRO_SKBS)) {
struct sk_buff *nskb = napi->gro_list;
/* locate the end of the list to select the 'oldest' flow */
while (nskb->next) {
pp = &nskb->next;
nskb = *pp;
}
*pp = NULL;
nskb->next = NULL;
napi_gro_complete(nskb);
} else {
napi->gro_count++;
}
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->count = 1;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->age = jiffies;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->last = skb;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = skb_gro_len(skb);
skb->next = napi->gro_list;
napi->gro_list = skb;
ret = GRO_HELD;
pull:
grow = skb_gro_offset(skb) - skb_headlen(skb);
if (grow > 0)
gro_pull_from_frag0(skb, grow);
ok:
return ret;
normal:
ret = GRO_NORMAL;
goto pull;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: The IP stack in the Linux kernel before 4.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack consumption and panic) or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering use of the GRO path for packets with tunnel stacking, as demonstrated by interleaved IPv4 headers and GRE headers, a related issue to CVE-2016-7039.
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,905
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t CameraDeviceClient::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
String8 result;
result.appendFormat("CameraDeviceClient[%d] (%p) PID: %d, dump:\n",
mCameraId,
getRemoteCallback()->asBinder().get(),
mClientPid);
result.append(" State: ");
mFrameProcessor->dump(fd, args);
return dumpDevice(fd, args);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: libcameraservice in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.x before 2016-03-01 does not require use of the ICameraService::dump method for a camera service dump, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application that directly dumps, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26265403.
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
|
Medium
| 173,939
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int packet_do_bind(struct sock *sk, const char *name, int ifindex,
__be16 proto)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct net_device *dev_curr;
__be16 proto_curr;
bool need_rehook;
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
int ret = 0;
bool unlisted = false;
if (po->fanout)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
rcu_read_lock();
if (name) {
dev = dev_get_by_name_rcu(sock_net(sk), name);
if (!dev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
} else if (ifindex) {
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), ifindex);
if (!dev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
if (dev)
dev_hold(dev);
proto_curr = po->prot_hook.type;
dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev;
need_rehook = proto_curr != proto || dev_curr != dev;
if (need_rehook) {
if (po->running) {
rcu_read_unlock();
__unregister_prot_hook(sk, true);
rcu_read_lock();
dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev;
if (dev)
unlisted = !dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk),
dev->ifindex);
}
po->num = proto;
po->prot_hook.type = proto;
if (unlikely(unlisted)) {
dev_put(dev);
po->prot_hook.dev = NULL;
po->ifindex = -1;
packet_cached_dev_reset(po);
} else {
po->prot_hook.dev = dev;
po->ifindex = dev ? dev->ifindex : 0;
packet_cached_dev_assign(po, dev);
}
}
if (dev_curr)
dev_put(dev_curr);
if (proto == 0 || !need_rehook)
goto out_unlock;
if (!unlisted && (!dev || (dev->flags & IFF_UP))) {
register_prot_hook(sk);
} else {
sk->sk_err = ENETDOWN;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
}
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.6 allows local users to gain privileges via crafted system calls that trigger mishandling of packet_fanout data structures, because of a race condition (involving fanout_add and packet_do_bind) that leads to a use-after-free, a different vulnerability than CVE-2017-6346.
Commit Message: packet: in packet_do_bind, test fanout with bind_lock held
Once a socket has po->fanout set, it remains a member of the group
until it is destroyed. The prot_hook must be constant and identical
across sockets in the group.
If fanout_add races with packet_do_bind between the test of po->fanout
and taking the lock, the bind call may make type or dev inconsistent
with that of the fanout group.
Hold po->bind_lock when testing po->fanout to avoid this race.
I had to introduce artificial delay (local_bh_enable) to actually
observe the race.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,717
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GPMF_ERR IsValidSize(GPMF_stream *ms, uint32_t size) // size is in longs not bytes.
{
if (ms)
{
int32_t nestsize = (int32_t)ms->nest_size[ms->nest_level];
if (nestsize == 0 && ms->nest_level == 0)
nestsize = ms->buffer_size_longs;
if (size + 2 <= nestsize) return GPMF_OK;
}
return GPMF_ERROR_BAD_STRUCTURE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: GoPro GPMF-parser 1.2.2 has an out-of-bounds write in OpenMP4Source in demo/GPMF_mp4reader.c.
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader
|
Medium
| 169,544
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void jpc_qmfb_split_colres(jpc_fix_t *a, int numrows, int numcols,
int stride, int parity)
{
int bufsize = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(numrows, 1);
jpc_fix_t splitbuf[QMFB_SPLITBUFSIZE * JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE];
jpc_fix_t *buf = splitbuf;
jpc_fix_t *srcptr;
jpc_fix_t *dstptr;
register jpc_fix_t *srcptr2;
register jpc_fix_t *dstptr2;
register int n;
register int i;
int m;
int hstartcol;
/* Get a buffer. */
if (bufsize > QMFB_SPLITBUFSIZE) {
if (!(buf = jas_alloc2(bufsize, sizeof(jpc_fix_t)))) {
/* We have no choice but to commit suicide in this case. */
abort();
}
}
if (numrows >= 2) {
hstartcol = (numrows + 1 - parity) >> 1;
m = numrows - hstartcol;
/* Save the samples destined for the highpass channel. */
n = m;
dstptr = buf;
srcptr = &a[(1 - parity) * stride];
while (n-- > 0) {
dstptr2 = dstptr;
srcptr2 = srcptr;
for (i = 0; i < numcols; ++i) {
*dstptr2 = *srcptr2;
++dstptr2;
++srcptr2;
}
dstptr += numcols;
srcptr += stride << 1;
}
/* Copy the appropriate samples into the lowpass channel. */
dstptr = &a[(1 - parity) * stride];
srcptr = &a[(2 - parity) * stride];
n = numrows - m - (!parity);
while (n-- > 0) {
dstptr2 = dstptr;
srcptr2 = srcptr;
for (i = 0; i < numcols; ++i) {
*dstptr2 = *srcptr2;
++dstptr2;
++srcptr2;
}
dstptr += stride;
srcptr += stride << 1;
}
/* Copy the saved samples into the highpass channel. */
dstptr = &a[hstartcol * stride];
srcptr = buf;
n = m;
while (n-- > 0) {
dstptr2 = dstptr;
srcptr2 = srcptr;
for (i = 0; i < numcols; ++i) {
*dstptr2 = *srcptr2;
++dstptr2;
++srcptr2;
}
dstptr += stride;
srcptr += numcols;
}
}
/* If the split buffer was allocated on the heap, free this memory. */
if (buf != splitbuf) {
jas_free(buf);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A heap-buffer overflow vulnerability was found in QMFB code in JPC codec caused by buffer being allocated with too small size. jasper versions before 2.0.0 are affected.
Commit Message: Fixed a buffer overrun problem in the QMFB code in the JPC codec
that was caused by a buffer being allocated with a size that was too small
in some cases.
Added a new regression test case.
|
Medium
| 169,447
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: spnego_gss_init_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_name_t target_name,
gss_OID mech_type,
OM_uint32 req_flags,
OM_uint32 time_req,
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_buffer_t input_token,
gss_OID *actual_mech,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
OM_uint32 *time_rec)
{
send_token_flag send_token = NO_TOKEN_SEND;
OM_uint32 tmpmin, ret, negState;
gss_buffer_t mechtok_in, mechListMIC_in, mechListMIC_out;
gss_buffer_desc mechtok_out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred = NULL;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t spnego_ctx = NULL;
dsyslog("Entering init_sec_context\n");
mechtok_in = mechListMIC_out = mechListMIC_in = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
negState = REJECT;
/*
* This function works in three steps:
*
* 1. Perform mechanism negotiation.
* 2. Invoke the negotiated or optimistic mech's gss_init_sec_context
* function and examine the results.
* 3. Process or generate MICs if necessary.
*
* The three steps share responsibility for determining when the
* exchange is complete. If the selected mech completed in a previous
* call and no MIC exchange is expected, then step 1 will decide. If
* the selected mech completes in this call and no MIC exchange is
* expected, then step 2 will decide. If a MIC exchange is expected,
* then step 3 will decide. If an error occurs in any step, the
* exchange will be aborted, possibly with an error token.
*
* negState determines the state of the negotiation, and is
* communicated to the acceptor if a continuing token is sent.
* send_token is used to indicate what type of token, if any, should be
* generated.
*/
/* Validate arguments. */
if (minor_status != NULL)
*minor_status = 0;
if (output_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
}
if (minor_status == NULL ||
output_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER ||
context_handle == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
if (actual_mech != NULL)
*actual_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
/* Step 1: perform mechanism negotiation. */
spcred = (spnego_gss_cred_id_t)claimant_cred_handle;
if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
ret = init_ctx_new(minor_status, spcred,
context_handle, &send_token);
if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
ret = init_ctx_cont(minor_status, context_handle,
input_token, &mechtok_in,
&mechListMIC_in, &negState, &send_token);
if (HARD_ERROR(ret)) {
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* Step 2: invoke the selected or optimistic mechanism's
* gss_init_sec_context function, if it didn't complete previously. */
spnego_ctx = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
if (!spnego_ctx->mech_complete) {
ret = init_ctx_call_init(
minor_status, spnego_ctx, spcred,
target_name, req_flags,
time_req, mechtok_in,
actual_mech, &mechtok_out,
ret_flags, time_rec,
&negState, &send_token);
/* Give the mechanism a chance to force a mechlistMIC. */
if (!HARD_ERROR(ret) && mech_requires_mechlistMIC(spnego_ctx))
spnego_ctx->mic_reqd = 1;
}
/* Step 3: process or generate the MIC, if the negotiated mech is
* complete and supports MICs. */
if (!HARD_ERROR(ret) && spnego_ctx->mech_complete &&
(spnego_ctx->ctx_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
ret = handle_mic(minor_status,
mechListMIC_in,
(mechtok_out.length != 0),
spnego_ctx, &mechListMIC_out,
&negState, &send_token);
}
cleanup:
if (send_token == INIT_TOKEN_SEND) {
if (make_spnego_tokenInit_msg(spnego_ctx,
0,
mechListMIC_out,
req_flags,
&mechtok_out, send_token,
output_token) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
} else if (send_token != NO_TOKEN_SEND) {
if (make_spnego_tokenTarg_msg(negState, GSS_C_NO_OID,
&mechtok_out, mechListMIC_out,
send_token,
output_token) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
}
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, &mechtok_out);
if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
/*
* Now, switch the output context to refer to the
* negotiated mechanism's context.
*/
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)spnego_ctx->ctx_handle;
if (actual_mech != NULL)
*actual_mech = spnego_ctx->actual_mech;
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = spnego_ctx->ctx_flags;
release_spnego_ctx(&spnego_ctx);
} else if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
if (spnego_ctx != NULL) {
gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin,
&spnego_ctx->ctx_handle,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
release_spnego_ctx(&spnego_ctx);
}
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (mechtok_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mechtok_in);
free(mechtok_in);
}
if (mechListMIC_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mechListMIC_in);
free(mechListMIC_in);
}
if (mechListMIC_out != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mechListMIC_out);
free(mechListMIC_out);
}
return ret;
} /* init_sec_context */
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,660
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t out_write(struct audio_stream_out *stream, const void* buffer,
size_t bytes)
{
struct a2dp_stream_out *out = (struct a2dp_stream_out *)stream;
int sent;
DEBUG("write %zu bytes (fd %d)", bytes, out->common.audio_fd);
pthread_mutex_lock(&out->common.lock);
if (out->common.state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_SUSPENDED)
{
DEBUG("stream suspended");
pthread_mutex_unlock(&out->common.lock);
return -1;
}
/* only allow autostarting if we are in stopped or standby */
if ((out->common.state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STOPPED) ||
(out->common.state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STANDBY))
{
if (start_audio_datapath(&out->common) < 0)
{
/* emulate time this write represents to avoid very fast write
failures during transition periods or remote suspend */
int us_delay = calc_audiotime(out->common.cfg, bytes);
DEBUG("emulate a2dp write delay (%d us)", us_delay);
usleep(us_delay);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&out->common.lock);
return -1;
}
}
else if (out->common.state != AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STARTED)
{
ERROR("stream not in stopped or standby");
pthread_mutex_unlock(&out->common.lock);
return -1;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&out->common.lock);
sent = skt_write(out->common.audio_fd, buffer, bytes);
if (sent == -1) {
skt_disconnect(out->common.audio_fd);
out->common.audio_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
if (out->common.state != AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_SUSPENDED)
out->common.state = AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STOPPED;
else
ERROR("write failed : stream suspended, avoid resetting state");
} else {
const size_t frames = bytes / audio_stream_out_frame_size(stream);
out->frames_rendered += frames;
out->frames_presented += frames;
}
DEBUG("wrote %d bytes out of %zu bytes", sent, bytes);
return sent;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,427
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: php_stream *php_stream_zip_opener(php_stream_wrapper *wrapper,
char *path,
char *mode,
int options,
char **opened_path,
php_stream_context *context STREAMS_DC TSRMLS_DC)
{
int path_len;
char *file_basename;
size_t file_basename_len;
char file_dirname[MAXPATHLEN];
struct zip *za;
struct zip_file *zf = NULL;
char *fragment;
int fragment_len;
int err;
php_stream *stream = NULL;
struct php_zip_stream_data_t *self;
fragment = strchr(path, '#');
if (!fragment) {
return NULL;
}
if (strncasecmp("zip://", path, 6) == 0) {
path += 6;
}
fragment_len = strlen(fragment);
if (fragment_len < 1) {
return NULL;
}
path_len = strlen(path);
if (path_len >= MAXPATHLEN || mode[0] != 'r') {
return NULL;
}
memcpy(file_dirname, path, path_len - fragment_len);
file_dirname[path_len - fragment_len] = '\0';
php_basename(path, path_len - fragment_len, NULL, 0, &file_basename, &file_basename_len TSRMLS_CC);
fragment++;
if (ZIP_OPENBASEDIR_CHECKPATH(file_dirname)) {
efree(file_basename);
return NULL;
}
za = zip_open(file_dirname, ZIP_CREATE, &err);
if (za) {
zf = zip_fopen(za, fragment, 0);
if (zf) {
self = emalloc(sizeof(*self));
self->za = za;
self->zf = zf;
self->stream = NULL;
self->cursor = 0;
stream = php_stream_alloc(&php_stream_zipio_ops, self, NULL, mode);
if (opened_path) {
*opened_path = estrdup(path);
}
} else {
zip_close(za);
}
}
efree(file_basename);
if (!stream) {
return NULL;
} else {
return stream;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_stream_zip_opener function in ext/zip/zip_stream.c in PHP before 5.5.38, 5.6.x before 5.6.24, and 7.x before 7.0.9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted zip:// URL.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,969
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int l2tp_ip_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
size_t copied = 0;
int err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
struct sk_buff *skb;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (addr_len)
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin);
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto done;
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address. */
if (sin) {
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
sin->sin_port = 0;
memset(&sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
}
if (inet->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
copied = skb->len;
done:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
return err ? err : copied;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The dgram_recvmsg function in net/ieee802154/dgram.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,482
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: base::MessageLoopProxy* ProxyChannelDelegate::GetIPCMessageLoop() {
return RenderThread::Get()->GetIOMessageLoopProxy().get();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,733
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void jsR_calllwfunction(js_State *J, int n, js_Function *F, js_Environment *scope)
{
js_Value v;
int i;
jsR_savescope(J, scope);
if (n > F->numparams) {
js_pop(J, F->numparams - n);
n = F->numparams;
}
for (i = n; i < F->varlen; ++i)
js_pushundefined(J);
jsR_run(J, F);
v = *stackidx(J, -1);
TOP = --BOT; /* clear stack */
js_pushvalue(J, v);
jsR_restorescope(J);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the js_stackoverflow function in jsrun.c in Artifex Software, Inc. MuJS allows attackers to have unspecified impact by leveraging an error when dropping extra arguments to lightweight functions.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,240
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void setup_token_decoder(VP8D_COMP *pbi,
const unsigned char* token_part_sizes)
{
vp8_reader *bool_decoder = &pbi->mbc[0];
unsigned int partition_idx;
unsigned int fragment_idx;
unsigned int num_token_partitions;
const unsigned char *first_fragment_end = pbi->fragments.ptrs[0] +
pbi->fragments.sizes[0];
TOKEN_PARTITION multi_token_partition =
(TOKEN_PARTITION)vp8_read_literal(&pbi->mbc[8], 2);
if (!vp8dx_bool_error(&pbi->mbc[8]))
pbi->common.multi_token_partition = multi_token_partition;
num_token_partitions = 1 << pbi->common.multi_token_partition;
/* Check for partitions within the fragments and unpack the fragments
* so that each fragment pointer points to its corresponding partition. */
for (fragment_idx = 0; fragment_idx < pbi->fragments.count; ++fragment_idx)
{
unsigned int fragment_size = pbi->fragments.sizes[fragment_idx];
const unsigned char *fragment_end = pbi->fragments.ptrs[fragment_idx] +
fragment_size;
/* Special case for handling the first partition since we have already
* read its size. */
if (fragment_idx == 0)
{
/* Size of first partition + token partition sizes element */
ptrdiff_t ext_first_part_size = token_part_sizes -
pbi->fragments.ptrs[0] + 3 * (num_token_partitions - 1);
fragment_size -= (unsigned int)ext_first_part_size;
if (fragment_size > 0)
{
pbi->fragments.sizes[0] = (unsigned int)ext_first_part_size;
/* The fragment contains an additional partition. Move to
* next. */
fragment_idx++;
pbi->fragments.ptrs[fragment_idx] = pbi->fragments.ptrs[0] +
pbi->fragments.sizes[0];
}
}
/* Split the chunk into partitions read from the bitstream */
while (fragment_size > 0)
{
ptrdiff_t partition_size = read_available_partition_size(
pbi,
token_part_sizes,
pbi->fragments.ptrs[fragment_idx],
first_fragment_end,
fragment_end,
fragment_idx - 1,
num_token_partitions);
pbi->fragments.sizes[fragment_idx] = (unsigned int)partition_size;
fragment_size -= (unsigned int)partition_size;
assert(fragment_idx <= num_token_partitions);
if (fragment_size > 0)
{
/* The fragment contains an additional partition.
* Move to next. */
fragment_idx++;
pbi->fragments.ptrs[fragment_idx] =
pbi->fragments.ptrs[fragment_idx - 1] + partition_size;
}
}
}
pbi->fragments.count = num_token_partitions + 1;
for (partition_idx = 1; partition_idx < pbi->fragments.count; ++partition_idx)
{
if (vp8dx_start_decode(bool_decoder,
pbi->fragments.ptrs[partition_idx],
pbi->fragments.sizes[partition_idx],
pbi->decrypt_cb, pbi->decrypt_state))
vpx_internal_error(&pbi->common.error, VPX_CODEC_MEM_ERROR,
"Failed to allocate bool decoder %d",
partition_idx);
bool_decoder++;
}
#if CONFIG_MULTITHREAD
/* Clamp number of decoder threads */
if (pbi->decoding_thread_count > num_token_partitions - 1)
pbi->decoding_thread_count = num_token_partitions - 1;
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: A denial of service vulnerability in libvpx in Mediaserver could enable a remote attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as High due to the possibility of remote denial of service. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1. Android ID: A-30436808.
Commit Message: vp8:fix threading issues
1 - stops de allocating before threads are closed.
2 - limits threads to mb_rows when mb_rows < partitions
BUG=webm:851
Bug: 30436808
Change-Id: Ie017818ed28103ca9d26d57087f31361b642e09b
(cherry picked from commit 70cca742efa20617c70c3209aa614a70f282f90e)
|
Medium
| 174,064
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
const char *type,
const char *description,
const void *payload,
size_t plen,
key_perm_t perm,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct keyring_index_key index_key = {
.description = description,
};
struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *keyring, *key = NULL;
key_ref_t key_ref;
int ret;
/* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel
* types */
index_key.type = key_type_lookup(type);
if (IS_ERR(index_key.type)) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
goto error;
}
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (!index_key.type->match || !index_key.type->instantiate ||
(!index_key.description && !index_key.type->preparse))
goto error_put_type;
keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
key_check(keyring);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
goto error_put_type;
memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
prep.data = payload;
prep.datalen = plen;
prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen;
prep.trusted = flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED;
prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX;
if (index_key.type->preparse) {
ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep);
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error_free_prep;
}
if (!index_key.description)
index_key.description = prep.description;
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (!index_key.description)
goto error_free_prep;
}
index_key.desc_len = strlen(index_key.description);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
if (!prep.trusted && test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags))
goto error_free_prep;
flags |= prep.trusted ? KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED : 0;
ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &index_key, &edit);
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error_free_prep;
}
/* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have
* to modify the keyring */
ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error_link_end;
}
/* if it's possible to update this type of key, search for an existing
* key of the same type and description in the destination keyring and
* update that instead if possible
*/
if (index_key.type->update) {
key_ref = find_key_to_update(keyring_ref, &index_key);
if (key_ref)
goto found_matching_key;
}
/* if the client doesn't provide, decide on the permissions we want */
if (perm == KEY_PERM_UNDEF) {
perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
if (index_key.type->read)
perm |= KEY_POS_READ;
if (index_key.type == &key_type_keyring ||
index_key.type->update)
perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;
}
/* allocate a new key */
key = key_alloc(index_key.type, index_key.description,
cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, perm, flags);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
goto error_link_end;
}
/* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */
ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, NULL, &edit);
if (ret < 0) {
key_put(key);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error_link_end;
}
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
error_link_end:
__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit);
error_free_prep:
if (index_key.type->preparse)
index_key.type->free_preparse(&prep);
error_put_type:
key_type_put(index_key.type);
error:
return key_ref;
found_matching_key:
/* we found a matching key, so we're going to try to update it
* - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned
*/
__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit);
key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
goto error_free_prep;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.18 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via vectors involving a NULL value for a certain match field, related to the keyring_search_iterator function in keyring.c.
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 168,439
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: my_object_increment_val (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
{
obj->val++;
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,108
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool check_client_passwd(PgSocket *client, const char *passwd)
{
char md5[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
const char *correct;
PgUser *user = client->auth_user;
/* disallow empty passwords */
if (!*passwd || !*user->passwd)
return false;
switch (cf_auth_type) {
case AUTH_PLAIN:
return strcmp(user->passwd, passwd) == 0;
case AUTH_CRYPT:
correct = crypt(user->passwd, (char *)client->tmp_login_salt);
return correct && strcmp(correct, passwd) == 0;
case AUTH_MD5:
if (strlen(passwd) != MD5_PASSWD_LEN)
return false;
if (!isMD5(user->passwd))
pg_md5_encrypt(user->passwd, user->name, strlen(user->name), user->passwd);
pg_md5_encrypt(user->passwd + 3, (char *)client->tmp_login_salt, 4, md5);
return strcmp(md5, passwd) == 0;
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: PgBouncer before 1.5.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) by sending a password packet before a startup packet.
Commit Message: Check if auth_user is set.
Fixes a crash if password packet appears before startup packet (#42).
|
Low
| 170,132
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: jas_matrix_t *jas_matrix_copy(jas_matrix_t *x)
{
jas_matrix_t *y;
int i;
int j;
y = jas_matrix_create(x->numrows_, x->numcols_);
for (i = 0; i < x->numrows_; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < x->numcols_; ++j) {
*jas_matrix_getref(y, i, j) = jas_matrix_get(x, i, j);
}
}
return y;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,702
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xsltResolveSASCallback(xsltAttrElemPtr values, xsltStylesheetPtr style,
const xmlChar *name, const xmlChar *ns,
ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED const xmlChar *ignored) {
xsltAttrElemPtr tmp;
xsltAttrElemPtr refs;
tmp = values;
while (tmp != NULL) {
if (tmp->set != NULL) {
/*
* Check against cycles !
*/
if ((xmlStrEqual(name, tmp->set)) && (xmlStrEqual(ns, tmp->ns))) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"xsl:attribute-set : use-attribute-sets recursion detected on %s\n",
name);
} else {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_ATTRIBUTES
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Importing attribute list %s\n", tmp->set);
#endif
refs = xsltGetSAS(style, tmp->set, tmp->ns);
if (refs == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"xsl:attribute-set : use-attribute-sets %s reference missing %s\n",
name, tmp->set);
} else {
/*
* recurse first for cleanup
*/
xsltResolveSASCallback(refs, style, name, ns, NULL);
/*
* Then merge
*/
xsltMergeAttrElemList(style, values, refs);
/*
* Then suppress the reference
*/
tmp->set = NULL;
tmp->ns = NULL;
}
}
}
tmp = tmp->next;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
High
| 173,299
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspeAssignmentExpression(JsVar *lhs) {
if (lex->tk=='=' || lex->tk==LEX_PLUSEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_MINUSEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_MULEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_DIVEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_MODEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_ANDEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_OREQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_XOREQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_RSHIFTEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_LSHIFTEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNEDEQUAL) {
JsVar *rhs;
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
rhs = jspeAssignmentExpression();
rhs = jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(rhs); // ensure we get rid of any references on the RHS
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE && lhs) {
if (op=='=') {
/* If we're assigning to this and we don't have a parent,
* add it to the symbol table root */
if (!jsvGetRefs(lhs) && jsvIsName(lhs)) {
if (!jsvIsArrayBufferName(lhs) && !jsvIsNewChild(lhs))
jsvAddName(execInfo.root, lhs);
}
jspReplaceWith(lhs, rhs);
} else {
if (op==LEX_PLUSEQUAL) op='+';
else if (op==LEX_MINUSEQUAL) op='-';
else if (op==LEX_MULEQUAL) op='*';
else if (op==LEX_DIVEQUAL) op='/';
else if (op==LEX_MODEQUAL) op='%';
else if (op==LEX_ANDEQUAL) op='&';
else if (op==LEX_OREQUAL) op='|';
else if (op==LEX_XOREQUAL) op='^';
else if (op==LEX_RSHIFTEQUAL) op=LEX_RSHIFT;
else if (op==LEX_LSHIFTEQUAL) op=LEX_LSHIFT;
else if (op==LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNEDEQUAL) op=LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNED;
if (op=='+' && jsvIsName(lhs)) {
JsVar *currentValue = jsvSkipName(lhs);
if (jsvIsString(currentValue) && !jsvIsFlatString(currentValue) && jsvGetRefs(currentValue)==1 && rhs!=currentValue) {
/* A special case for string += where this is the only use of the string
* and we're not appending to ourselves. In this case we can do a
* simple append (rather than clone + append)*/
JsVar *str = jsvAsString(rhs, false);
jsvAppendStringVarComplete(currentValue, str);
jsvUnLock(str);
op = 0;
}
jsvUnLock(currentValue);
}
if (op) {
/* Fallback which does a proper add */
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(lhs,rhs,op);
jspReplaceWith(lhs, res);
jsvUnLock(res);
}
}
}
jsvUnLock(rhs);
}
return lhs;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Espruino before 1.99 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) and a potential Information Disclosure with user crafted input files via a Buffer Overflow or Out-of-bounds Read during syntax parsing of certain for loops in jsparse.c.
Commit Message: Fix bug if using an undefined member of an object for for..in (fix #1437)
|
Medium
| 169,207
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void set_task_cpu(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int new_cpu)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG
/*
* We should never call set_task_cpu() on a blocked task,
* ttwu() will sort out the placement.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(p->state != TASK_RUNNING && p->state != TASK_WAKING &&
!(task_thread_info(p)->preempt_count & PREEMPT_ACTIVE));
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
/*
* The caller should hold either p->pi_lock or rq->lock, when changing
* a task's CPU. ->pi_lock for waking tasks, rq->lock for runnable tasks.
*
* sched_move_task() holds both and thus holding either pins the cgroup,
* see set_task_rq().
*
* Furthermore, all task_rq users should acquire both locks, see
* task_rq_lock().
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(debug_locks && !(lockdep_is_held(&p->pi_lock) ||
lockdep_is_held(&task_rq(p)->lock)));
#endif
#endif
trace_sched_migrate_task(p, new_cpu);
if (task_cpu(p) != new_cpu) {
p->se.nr_migrations++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_MIGRATIONS, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
}
__set_task_cpu(p, new_cpu);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,843
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: iperf_json_printf(const char *format, ...)
{
cJSON* o;
va_list argp;
const char *cp;
char name[100];
char* np;
cJSON* j;
o = cJSON_CreateObject();
if (o == NULL)
return NULL;
va_start(argp, format);
np = name;
for (cp = format; *cp != '\0'; ++cp) {
switch (*cp) {
case ' ':
break;
case ':':
*np = '\0';
break;
case '%':
++cp;
switch (*cp) {
case 'b':
j = cJSON_CreateBool(va_arg(argp, int));
break;
case 'd':
j = cJSON_CreateInt(va_arg(argp, int64_t));
break;
case 'f':
j = cJSON_CreateFloat(va_arg(argp, double));
break;
case 's':
j = cJSON_CreateString(va_arg(argp, char *));
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
if (j == NULL)
return NULL;
cJSON_AddItemToObject(o, name, j);
np = name;
break;
default:
*np++ = *cp;
break;
}
}
va_end(argp);
return o;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,318
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl::clear_error() {
error_ = std::string();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,393
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: stf_status ikev2parent_inI1outR1(struct msg_digest *md)
{
struct state *st = md->st;
lset_t policy = POLICY_IKEV2_ALLOW;
struct connection *c = find_host_connection(&md->iface->ip_addr,
md->iface->port,
&md->sender,
md->sender_port,
POLICY_IKEV2_ALLOW);
/* retrieve st->st_gi */
#if 0
if (c == NULL) {
/*
* make up a policy from the thing that was proposed, and see
* if we can find a connection with that policy.
*/
pb_stream pre_sa_pbs = sa_pd->pbs;
policy = preparse_isakmp_sa_body(&pre_sa_pbs);
c = find_host_connection(&md->iface->ip_addr, pluto_port,
(ip_address*)NULL, md->sender_port,
policy);
}
#endif
if (c == NULL) {
/* See if a wildcarded connection can be found.
* We cannot pick the right connection, so we're making a guess.
* All Road Warrior connections are fair game:
* we pick the first we come across (if any).
* If we don't find any, we pick the first opportunistic
* with the smallest subnet that includes the peer.
* There is, of course, no necessary relationship between
* an Initiator's address and that of its client,
* but Food Groups kind of assumes one.
*/
{
struct connection *d;
d = find_host_connection(&md->iface->ip_addr,
pluto_port,
(ip_address*)NULL,
md->sender_port, policy);
for (; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next) {
if (d->kind == CK_GROUP) {
/* ignore */
} else {
if (d->kind == CK_TEMPLATE &&
!(d->policy & POLICY_OPPO)) {
/* must be Road Warrior: we have a winner */
c = d;
break;
}
/* Opportunistic or Shunt: pick tightest match */
if (addrinsubnet(&md->sender,
&d->spd.that.client)
&&
(c == NULL ||
!subnetinsubnet(&c->spd.that.
client,
&d->spd.that.
client)))
c = d;
}
}
}
if (c == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "initial parent SA message received on %s:%u"
" but no connection has been authorized%s%s",
ip_str(
&md->iface->ip_addr),
ntohs(portof(&md->iface->ip_addr)),
(policy != LEMPTY) ? " with policy=" : "",
(policy !=
LEMPTY) ? bitnamesof(sa_policy_bit_names,
policy) : "");
return STF_FAIL + v2N_NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN;
}
if (c->kind != CK_TEMPLATE) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "initial parent SA message received on %s:%u"
" but \"%s\" forbids connection",
ip_str(
&md->iface->ip_addr), pluto_port,
c->name);
return STF_FAIL + v2N_NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN;
}
c = rw_instantiate(c, &md->sender, NULL, NULL);
} else {
/* we found a non-wildcard conn. double check if it needs instantiation anyway (eg vnet=) */
/* vnet=/vhost= should have set CK_TEMPLATE on connection loading */
if ((c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE) && c->spd.that.virt) {
DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
DBG_log(
"local endpoint has virt (vnet/vhost) set without wildcards - needs instantiation"));
c = rw_instantiate(c, &md->sender, NULL, NULL);
} else if ((c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE) &&
(c->policy & POLICY_IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING)) {
DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
DBG_log(
"local endpoint has narrowing=yes - needs instantiation"));
c = rw_instantiate(c, &md->sender, NULL, NULL);
}
}
DBG_log("found connection: %s\n", c ? c->name : "<none>");
if (!st) {
st = new_state();
/* set up new state */
memcpy(st->st_icookie, md->hdr.isa_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
/* initialize_new_state expects valid icookie/rcookie values, so create it now */
get_cookie(FALSE, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE, &md->sender);
initialize_new_state(st, c, policy, 0, NULL_FD,
pcim_stranger_crypto);
st->st_ikev2 = TRUE;
change_state(st, STATE_PARENT_R1);
st->st_msgid_lastack = INVALID_MSGID;
st->st_msgid_nextuse = 0;
md->st = st;
md->from_state = STATE_IKEv2_BASE;
}
/* check,as a responder, are we under dos attack or not
* if yes go to 6 message exchange mode. it is a config option for now.
* TBD set force_busy dynamically
* Paul: Can we check for STF_TOOMUCHCRYPTO ?
*/
if (force_busy == TRUE) {
u_char dcookie[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
chunk_t dc;
ikev2_get_dcookie( dcookie, st->st_ni, &md->sender,
st->st_icookie);
dc.ptr = dcookie;
dc.len = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
/* check if I1 packet contian KE and a v2N payload with type COOKIE */
if ( md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE] &&
md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N] &&
(md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N]->payload.v2n.isan_type ==
v2N_COOKIE)) {
u_int8_t spisize;
const pb_stream *dc_pbs;
chunk_t blob;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("received a DOS cookie in I1 verify it"));
/* we received dcookie we send earlier verify it */
spisize =
md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N]->payload.v2n.
isan_spisize;
dc_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N]->pbs;
blob.ptr = dc_pbs->cur + spisize;
blob.len = pbs_left(dc_pbs) - spisize;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_dump_chunk("dcookie received in I1 Packet",
blob);
DBG_dump("dcookie computed", dcookie,
SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE));
if (memcmp(blob.ptr, dcookie, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) != 0) {
libreswan_log(
"mismatch in DOS v2N_COOKIE,send a new one");
SEND_NOTIFICATION_AA(v2N_COOKIE, &dc);
return STF_FAIL + v2N_INVALID_IKE_SPI;
}
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("dcookie received match with computed one"));
} else {
/* we are under DOS attack I1 contains no DOS COOKIE */
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log(
"busy mode on. receieved I1 without a valid dcookie");
DBG_log("send a dcookie and forget this state"));
SEND_NOTIFICATION_AA(v2N_COOKIE, &dc);
return STF_FAIL;
}
} else {
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("will not send/process a dcookie"));
}
/*
* We have to agree to the DH group before we actually know who
* we are talking to. If we support the group, we use it.
*
* It is really too hard here to go through all the possible policies
* that might permit this group. If we think we are being DOS'ed
* then we should demand a cookie.
*/
{
struct ikev2_ke *ke;
ke = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE]->payload.v2ke;
st->st_oakley.group = lookup_group(ke->isak_group);
if (st->st_oakley.group == NULL) {
char fromname[ADDRTOT_BUF];
addrtot(&md->sender, 0, fromname, ADDRTOT_BUF);
libreswan_log(
"rejecting I1 from %s:%u, invalid DH group=%u",
fromname, md->sender_port,
ke->isak_group);
return v2N_INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD;
}
}
/* now. we need to go calculate the nonce, and the KE */
{
struct ke_continuation *ke = alloc_thing(
struct ke_continuation,
"ikev2_inI1outR1 KE");
stf_status e;
ke->md = md;
set_suspended(st, ke->md);
if (!st->st_sec_in_use) {
pcrc_init(&ke->ke_pcrc);
ke->ke_pcrc.pcrc_func =
ikev2_parent_inI1outR1_continue;
e = build_ke(&ke->ke_pcrc, st, st->st_oakley.group,
pcim_stranger_crypto);
if (e != STF_SUSPEND && e != STF_INLINE) {
loglog(RC_CRYPTOFAILED, "system too busy");
delete_state(st);
}
} else {
e =
ikev2_parent_inI1outR1_tail((struct
pluto_crypto_req_cont
*)ke,
NULL);
}
reset_globals();
return e;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ikev2parent_inI1outR1 function in pluto/ikev2_parent.c in libreswan before 3.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (restart) via an IKEv2 I1 notification without a KE payload.
Commit Message: SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload
|
Low
| 166,474
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PlatformSensorProviderBase::MapSharedBufferForType(mojom::SensorType type) {
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping = shared_buffer_handle_->MapAtOffset(
kReadingBufferSize, SensorReadingSharedBuffer::GetOffset(type));
if (mapping)
memset(mapping.get(), 0, kReadingBufferSize);
return mapping;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
Medium
| 172,841
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct sctp_chunk *sctp_assoc_lookup_asconf_ack(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__be32 serial)
{
struct sctp_chunk *ack;
/* Walk through the list of cached ASCONF-ACKs and find the
* ack chunk whose serial number matches that of the request.
*/
list_for_each_entry(ack, &asoc->asconf_ack_list, transmitted_list) {
if (ack->subh.addip_hdr->serial == serial) {
sctp_chunk_hold(ack);
return ack;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The sctp_assoc_lookup_asconf_ack function in net/sctp/associola.c in the SCTP implementation in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (panic) via duplicate ASCONF chunks that trigger an incorrect uncork within the side-effect interpreter.
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix panic on duplicate ASCONF chunks
When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the
form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b ----------------->
... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials
need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server!
The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with
ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a
same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do
not need to process them again on the server side (that was the
idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached
and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good.
Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that
is, sctp_cmd_interpreter():
While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked
!end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context,
we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the
ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it
queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd54b1
changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming
chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before
this commit, we would just flush the output queue.
Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we
continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As
we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and
do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip
the chunk->list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk
another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked
with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus
crashing the kernel.
Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if
that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output
queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet,
but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right
before transmission.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,332
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RunExtremalCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
int max_error = 0;
int total_error = 0;
const int count_test_block = 100000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_input_block, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_temp_block, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, 64);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8() % 2 ? 255 : 0;
dst[j] = src[j] > 0 ? 0 : 255;
test_input_block[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block, test_temp_block, pitch_));
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, dst, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
const int diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const int error = diff * diff;
if (max_error < error)
max_error = error;
total_error += error;
}
EXPECT_GE(1, max_error)
<< "Error: Extremal 8x8 FDCT/IDCT or FHT/IHT has"
<< "an individual roundtrip error > 1";
EXPECT_GE(count_test_block/5, total_error)
<< "Error: Extremal 8x8 FDCT/IDCT or FHT/IHT has average"
<< " roundtrip error > 1/5 per block";
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,559
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void willRemoveChildren(ContainerNode* container)
{
NodeVector children;
getChildNodes(container, children);
container->document().nodeChildrenWillBeRemoved(container);
ChildListMutationScope mutation(container);
for (NodeVector::const_iterator it = children.begin(); it != children.end(); it++) {
Node* child = it->get();
mutation.willRemoveChild(child);
child->notifyMutationObserversNodeWillDetach();
dispatchChildRemovalEvents(child);
}
ChildFrameDisconnector(container).disconnect(ChildFrameDisconnector::DescendantsOnly);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in core/dom/ContainerNode.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper handling of DOM range objects in circumstances that require child node removal after a (1) mutation or (2) blur event.
Commit Message: Notify nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event
This patch changes notifying nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event. In willRemoveChildren(), like willRemoveChild(); r115686 did same change, although it didn't change willRemoveChildren().
The issue 295010, use-after-free, is caused by setting removed node to Selection in mutation event handler.
BUG=295010
TEST=LayoutTests/fast/dom/Range/range-created-during-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-mutation-event-by-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-blur-event-by-remove-children.html
R=tkent@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25389004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,159
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SoftMPEG4::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!inQueue.empty() && outQueue.size() == kNumOutputBuffers) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader == NULL) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
continue;
}
PortInfo *port = editPortInfo(1);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader =
port->mBuffers.editItemAt(mNumSamplesOutput & 1).mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
++mInputBufferCount;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
List<BufferInfo *>::iterator it = outQueue.begin();
while ((*it)->mHeader != outHeader) {
++it;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *it;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(it);
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
return;
}
uint8_t *bitstream = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
uint32_t *start_code = (uint32_t *)bitstream;
bool volHeader = *start_code == 0xB0010000;
if (volHeader) {
PVCleanUpVideoDecoder(mHandle);
mInitialized = false;
}
if (!mInitialized) {
uint8_t *vol_data[1];
int32_t vol_size = 0;
vol_data[0] = NULL;
if ((inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) || volHeader) {
vol_data[0] = bitstream;
vol_size = inHeader->nFilledLen;
}
MP4DecodingMode mode =
(mMode == MODE_MPEG4) ? MPEG4_MODE : H263_MODE;
Bool success = PVInitVideoDecoder(
mHandle, vol_data, &vol_size, 1,
outputBufferWidth(), outputBufferHeight(), mode);
if (!success) {
ALOGW("PVInitVideoDecoder failed. Unsupported content?");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
MP4DecodingMode actualMode = PVGetDecBitstreamMode(mHandle);
if (mode != actualMode) {
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
PVSetPostProcType((VideoDecControls *) mHandle, 0);
bool hasFrameData = false;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
} else if (volHeader) {
hasFrameData = true;
}
mInitialized = true;
if (mode == MPEG4_MODE && handlePortSettingsChange()) {
return;
}
if (!hasFrameData) {
continue;
}
}
if (!mFramesConfigured) {
PortInfo *port = editPortInfo(1);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = port->mBuffers.editItemAt(1).mHeader;
PVSetReferenceYUV(mHandle, outHeader->pBuffer);
mFramesConfigured = true;
}
uint32_t useExtTimestamp = (inHeader->nOffset == 0);
uint32_t timestamp = 0xFFFFFFFF;
if (useExtTimestamp) {
mPvToOmxTimeMap.add(mPvTime, inHeader->nTimeStamp);
timestamp = mPvTime;
mPvTime++;
}
int32_t bufferSize = inHeader->nFilledLen;
int32_t tmp = bufferSize;
if (PVDecodeVideoFrame(
mHandle, &bitstream, ×tamp, &tmp,
&useExtTimestamp,
outHeader->pBuffer) != PV_TRUE) {
ALOGE("failed to decode video frame.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
if (handlePortSettingsChange()) {
return;
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mPvToOmxTimeMap.valueFor(timestamp);
mPvToOmxTimeMap.removeItem(timestamp);
inHeader->nOffset += bufferSize;
inHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
} else {
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
++mInputBufferCount;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = (mWidth * mHeight * 3) / 2;
List<BufferInfo *>::iterator it = outQueue.begin();
while ((*it)->mHeader != outHeader) {
++it;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *it;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(it);
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
++mNumSamplesOutput;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27833616.
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (h263|h264)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I0fd599b3da431425d89236ffdd9df423c11947c0
|
Medium
| 174,175
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void *arm_dma_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size, dma_addr_t *handle,
gfp_t gfp, struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
pgprot_t prot = __get_dma_pgprot(attrs, pgprot_kernel);
void *memory;
if (dma_alloc_from_coherent(dev, size, handle, &memory))
return memory;
return __dma_alloc(dev, size, handle, gfp, prot, false,
__builtin_return_address(0));
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/arm/mm/dma-mapping.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13 on ARM platforms, as used in Android before 2016-08-05 on Nexus 5 and 7 (2013) devices, does not prevent executable DMA mappings, which might allow local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka Android internal bug 28803642 and Qualcomm internal bug CR642735.
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 167,578
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: read_file(gchar* filepath)
{
FILE * f;
size_t length;
gchar *ret = NULL;
f = fopen(filepath, "rb");
if (f) {
fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END);
length = (size_t)ftell(f);
fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET);
/* We can't use MALLOC since it isn't thread safe */
ret = MALLOC(length + 1);
if (ret) {
if (fread(ret, length, 1, f) != 1) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Failed to read all of %s", filepath);
}
ret[length] = '\0';
}
else
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to read Dbus file %s", filepath);
fclose(f);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: keepalived 2.0.8 didn't check for pathnames with symlinks when writing data to a temporary file upon a call to PrintData or PrintStats. This allowed local users to overwrite arbitrary files if fs.protected_symlinks is set to 0, as demonstrated by a symlink from /tmp/keepalived.data or /tmp/keepalived.stats to /etc/passwd.
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
|
Medium
| 168,988
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Part::slotOpenExtractedEntry(KJob *job)
{
if (!job->error()) {
OpenJob *openJob = qobject_cast<OpenJob*>(job);
Q_ASSERT(openJob);
m_tmpExtractDirList << openJob->tempDir();
const QString fullName = openJob->validatedFilePath();
bool isWritable = m_model->archive() && !m_model->archive()->isReadOnly();
if (!isWritable) {
QFile::setPermissions(fullName, QFileDevice::ReadOwner | QFileDevice::ReadGroup | QFileDevice::ReadOther);
}
if (isWritable) {
m_fileWatcher = new QFileSystemWatcher;
connect(m_fileWatcher, &QFileSystemWatcher::fileChanged, this, &Part::slotWatchedFileModified);
m_fileWatcher->addPath(fullName);
}
if (qobject_cast<OpenWithJob*>(job)) {
const QList<QUrl> urls = {QUrl::fromUserInput(fullName, QString(), QUrl::AssumeLocalFile)};
KRun::displayOpenWithDialog(urls, widget());
} else {
KRun::runUrl(QUrl::fromUserInput(fullName, QString(), QUrl::AssumeLocalFile),
QMimeDatabase().mimeTypeForFile(fullName).name(),
widget());
}
} else if (job->error() != KJob::KilledJobError) {
KMessageBox::error(widget(), job->errorString());
}
setReadyGui();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-78
Summary: ark before 16.12.1 might allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via an executable in an archive, related to associated applications.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,992
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadSGIImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
SGIInfo
iris_info;
size_t
bytes_per_pixel,
quantum;
ssize_t
count,
y,
z;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read SGI raster header.
*/
iris_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
do
{
/*
Verify SGI identifier.
*/
if (iris_info.magic != 0x01DA)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
iris_info.storage=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
switch (iris_info.storage)
{
case 0x00: image->compression=NoCompression; break;
case 0x01: image->compression=RLECompression; break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
iris_info.bytes_per_pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((iris_info.bytes_per_pixel == 0) || (iris_info.bytes_per_pixel > 2))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
iris_info.dimension=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
iris_info.columns=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
iris_info.rows=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
iris_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((iris_info.depth == 0) || (iris_info.depth > 4))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
iris_info.minimum_value=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
iris_info.maximum_value=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
iris_info.sans=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(iris_info.name),(unsigned char *)
iris_info.name);
iris_info.name[sizeof(iris_info.name)-1]='\0';
if (*iris_info.name != '\0')
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"label",iris_info.name,exception);
iris_info.pixel_format=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (iris_info.pixel_format != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
count=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(iris_info.filler),iris_info.filler);
(void) count;
image->columns=iris_info.columns;
image->rows=iris_info.rows;
image->depth=(size_t) MagickMin(iris_info.depth,MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH);
if (iris_info.pixel_format == 0)
image->depth=(size_t) MagickMin((size_t) 8*
iris_info.bytes_per_pixel,MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH);
if (iris_info.depth < 3)
{
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=iris_info.bytes_per_pixel > 1 ? 65535 : 256;
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/*
Allocate SGI pixels.
*/
bytes_per_pixel=(size_t) iris_info.bytes_per_pixel;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) iris_info.columns*iris_info.rows;
if ((4*bytes_per_pixel*number_pixels) != ((MagickSizeType) (size_t)
(4*bytes_per_pixel*number_pixels)))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(iris_info.columns,iris_info.rows*4*
bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if ((int) iris_info.storage != 0x01)
{
unsigned char
*scanline;
/*
Read standard image format.
*/
scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(iris_info.columns,
bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*scanline));
if (scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (z=0; z < (ssize_t) iris_info.depth; z++)
{
p=pixels+bytes_per_pixel*z;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) iris_info.rows; y++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*iris_info.columns,scanline);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
if (bytes_per_pixel == 2)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) iris_info.columns; x++)
{
*p=scanline[2*x];
*(p+1)=scanline[2*x+1];
p+=8;
}
else
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) iris_info.columns; x++)
{
*p=scanline[x];
p+=4;
}
}
}
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
}
else
{
MemoryInfo
*packet_info;
size_t
*runlength;
ssize_t
offset,
*offsets;
unsigned char
*packets;
unsigned int
data_order;
/*
Read runlength-encoded image format.
*/
offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) iris_info.rows,
iris_info.depth*sizeof(*offsets));
runlength=(size_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(iris_info.rows,
iris_info.depth*sizeof(*runlength));
packet_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) iris_info.columns+10UL,4UL*
sizeof(*packets));
if ((offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL) ||
(runlength == (size_t *) NULL) ||
(packet_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL))
{
if (offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
offsets=(ssize_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(offsets);
if (runlength == (size_t *) NULL)
runlength=(size_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(runlength);
if (packet_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
packet_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(packet_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
packets=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(packet_info);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (iris_info.rows*iris_info.depth); i++)
offsets[i]=ReadBlobMSBSignedLong(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (iris_info.rows*iris_info.depth); i++)
{
runlength[i]=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (runlength[i] > (4*(size_t) iris_info.columns+10))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
/*
Check data order.
*/
offset=0;
data_order=0;
for (y=0; ((y < (ssize_t) iris_info.rows) && (data_order == 0)); y++)
for (z=0; ((z < (ssize_t) iris_info.depth) && (data_order == 0)); z++)
{
if (offsets[y+z*iris_info.rows] < offset)
data_order=1;
offset=offsets[y+z*iris_info.rows];
}
offset=(ssize_t) TellBlob(image);
if (data_order == 1)
{
for (z=0; z < (ssize_t) iris_info.depth; z++)
{
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) iris_info.rows; y++)
{
if (offset != offsets[y+z*iris_info.rows])
{
offset=offsets[y+z*iris_info.rows];
offset=(ssize_t) SeekBlob(image,(ssize_t) offset,SEEK_SET);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) runlength[y+z*iris_info.rows],
packets);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
offset+=(ssize_t) runlength[y+z*iris_info.rows];
status=SGIDecode(bytes_per_pixel,(ssize_t)
(runlength[y+z*iris_info.rows]/bytes_per_pixel),packets,
1L*iris_info.columns,p+bytes_per_pixel*z);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
p+=(iris_info.columns*4*bytes_per_pixel);
}
}
}
else
{
MagickOffsetType
position;
position=TellBlob(image);
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) iris_info.rows; y++)
{
for (z=0; z < (ssize_t) iris_info.depth; z++)
{
if (offset != offsets[y+z*iris_info.rows])
{
offset=offsets[y+z*iris_info.rows];
offset=(ssize_t) SeekBlob(image,(ssize_t) offset,SEEK_SET);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) runlength[y+z*iris_info.rows],
packets);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
offset+=(ssize_t) runlength[y+z*iris_info.rows];
status=SGIDecode(bytes_per_pixel,(ssize_t)
(runlength[y+z*iris_info.rows]/bytes_per_pixel),packets,
1L*iris_info.columns,p+bytes_per_pixel*z);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
p+=(iris_info.columns*4*bytes_per_pixel);
}
offset=(ssize_t) SeekBlob(image,position,SEEK_SET);
}
packet_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(packet_info);
runlength=(size_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(runlength);
offsets=(ssize_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(offsets);
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->alpha_trait=iris_info.depth == 4 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
image->columns=iris_info.columns;
image->rows=iris_info.rows;
/*
Convert SGI raster image to pixel packets.
*/
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
{
/*
Convert SGI image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
if (bytes_per_pixel == 2)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*8*image->columns;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
((*(p+0) << 8) | (*(p+1)))),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
((*(p+2) << 8) | (*(p+3)))),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
((*(p+4) << 8) | (*(p+5)))),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
((*(p+6) << 8) | (*(p+7)))),q);
p+=8;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*4*image->columns;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+1)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+2)),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+3)),q);
p+=4;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
/*
Create grayscale map.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Convert SGI image to PseudoClass pixel packets.
*/
if (bytes_per_pixel == 2)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*8*image->columns;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
quantum=(*p << 8);
quantum|=(*(p+1));
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) quantum,q);
p+=8;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*4*image->columns;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p,q);
p+=4;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
iris_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (iris_info.magic == 0x01DA)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (iris_info.magic == 0x01DA);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The SGI coder in ImageMagick before 7.0.2-10 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a large row value in an sgi file.
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in BMP & SGI coders (bug report from pwchen&rayzhong of tencent)
|
Medium
| 168,815
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, creds->uid);
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(cred->user_ns, creds->gid);
if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
return -EINVAL;
if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) ||
ns_capable(current->nsproxy->pid_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The scm_check_creds function in net/core/scm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.11 performs a capability check in an incorrect namespace, which allows local users to gain privileges via PID spoofing.
Commit Message: net: Check the correct namespace when spoofing pid over SCM_RIGHTS
This is a security bug.
The follow-up will fix nsproxy to discourage this type of issue from
happening again.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,991
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void php_wddx_pop_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name)
{
st_entry *ent1, *ent2;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
HashTable *target_hash;
zend_class_entry **pce;
zval *obj;
zval *tmp;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
if (stack->top == 0) {
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRING) || !strcmp(name, EL_NUMBER) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_BOOLEAN) || !strcmp(name, EL_NULL) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_ARRAY) || !strcmp(name, EL_STRUCT) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_RECORDSET) || !strcmp(name, EL_BINARY) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_DATETIME)) {
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent1);
if (!ent1->data) {
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_BINARY)) {
int new_len=0;
unsigned char *new_str;
new_str = php_base64_decode(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data), &new_len);
STR_FREE(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data));
Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data) = new_str;
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) = new_len;
}
/* Call __wakeup() method on the object. */
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zval *fname, *retval = NULL;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(fname);
ZVAL_STRING(fname, "__wakeup", 1);
call_user_function_ex(NULL, &ent1->data, fname, &retval, 0, 0, 0, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(fname);
FREE_ZVAL(fname);
if (retval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent2);
/* if non-existent field */
if (ent2->type == ST_FIELD && ent2->data == NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY || Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
target_hash = HASH_OF(ent2->data);
if (ent1->varname) {
if (!strcmp(ent1->varname, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR) &&
Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) &&
ent2->type == ST_STRUCT && Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_bool incomplete_class = 0;
zend_str_tolower(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
if (zend_hash_find(EG(class_table), Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data),
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data)+1, (void **) &pce)==FAILURE) {
incomplete_class = 1;
pce = &PHP_IC_ENTRY;
}
/* Initialize target object */
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(obj);
object_init_ex(obj, *pce);
/* Merge current hashtable with object's default properties */
zend_hash_merge(Z_OBJPROP_P(obj),
Z_ARRVAL_P(ent2->data),
(void (*)(void *)) zval_add_ref,
(void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *), 0);
if (incomplete_class) {
php_store_class_name(obj, Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
}
/* Clean up old array entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent2->data);
/* Set stack entry to point to the newly created object */
ent2->data = obj;
/* Clean up class name var entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_class_entry *old_scope = EG(scope);
EG(scope) = Z_OBJCE_P(ent2->data);
Z_DELREF_P(ent1->data);
add_property_zval(ent2->data, ent1->varname, ent1->data);
EG(scope) = old_scope;
} else {
zend_symtable_update(target_hash, ent1->varname, strlen(ent1->varname)+1, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
efree(ent1->varname);
} else {
zend_hash_next_index_insert(target_hash, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
}
efree(ent1);
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_VAR) && stack->varname) {
efree(stack->varname);
stack->varname = NULL;
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_FIELD)) {
st_entry *ent;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void **)&ent);
efree(ent);
stack->top--;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The php_wddx_pop_element function in ext/wddx/wddx.c in PHP before 5.6.25 and 7.x before 7.0.10 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an invalid base64 binary value, as demonstrated by a wddx_deserialize call that mishandles a binary element in a wddxPacket XML document.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72750: wddx_deserialize null dereference
|
Low
| 166,950
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TextTrack::addCue(TextTrackCue* cue) {
DCHECK(cue);
if (std::isnan(cue->startTime()) || std::isnan(cue->endTime()) ||
cue->startTime() < 0 || cue->endTime() < 0)
return;
if (TextTrack* cue_track = cue->track())
cue_track->removeCue(cue, ASSERT_NO_EXCEPTION);
cue->SetTrack(this);
EnsureTextTrackCueList()->Add(cue);
if (GetCueTimeline() && mode_ != DisabledKeyword())
GetCueTimeline()->AddCue(this, cue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: fpdfsdk/src/jsapi/fxjs_v8.cpp in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73, does not use signatures, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
|
Low
| 171,768
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int __get_data_block(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock,
struct buffer_head *bh, int create, int flag,
pgoff_t *next_pgofs)
{
struct f2fs_map_blocks map;
int err;
map.m_lblk = iblock;
map.m_len = bh->b_size >> inode->i_blkbits;
map.m_next_pgofs = next_pgofs;
err = f2fs_map_blocks(inode, &map, create, flag);
if (!err) {
map_bh(bh, inode->i_sb, map.m_pblk);
bh->b_state = (bh->b_state & ~F2FS_MAP_FLAGS) | map.m_flags;
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: The __get_data_block function in fs/f2fs/data.c in the Linux kernel before 4.11 allows local users to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and loop) via crafted use of the open and fallocate system calls with an FS_IOC_FIEMAP ioctl.
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a dead loop in f2fs_fiemap()
A dead loop can be triggered in f2fs_fiemap() using the test case
as below:
...
fd = open();
fallocate(fd, 0, 0, 4294967296);
ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fiemap_buf);
...
It's caused by an overflow in __get_data_block():
...
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
...
map.m_len is an unsigned int, and bh->b_size is a size_t which is 64 bits
on 64 bits archtecture, type conversion from an unsigned int to a size_t
will result in an overflow.
In the above-mentioned case, bh->b_size will be zero, and f2fs_fiemap()
will call get_data_block() at block 0 again an again.
Fix this by adding a force conversion before left shift.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
|
Low
| 169,377
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GURL GetFileManagerBaseUrl() {
return GetFileManagerUrl("/");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in core/html/HTMLTemplateElement.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.66, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code that operates on a TEMPLATE element.
Commit Message: Reland r286968: The CL borrows ShareDialog from Files.app and add it to Gallery.
Previous Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/431293002
BUG=374667
TEST=manually
R=yoshiki@chromium.org, mtomasz@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/433733004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286975 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,195
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const char* Track::GetCodecNameAsUTF8() const
{
return m_info.codecNameAsUTF8;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,294
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage::Draw(cc::PaintCanvas* canvas,
const cc::PaintFlags& flags,
const FloatRect& dst_rect,
const FloatRect& src_rect,
RespectImageOrientationEnum,
ImageClampingMode clamp_mode,
ImageDecodingMode) {
StaticBitmapImage::DrawHelper(canvas, flags, dst_rect, src_rect, clamp_mode,
PaintImageForCurrentFrame());
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect, thread-unsafe use of SkImage in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
|
Medium
| 172,600
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool parse_notify(struct pool *pool, json_t *val)
{
char *job_id, *prev_hash, *coinbase1, *coinbase2, *bbversion, *nbit,
*ntime, header[228];
unsigned char *cb1 = NULL, *cb2 = NULL;
size_t cb1_len, cb2_len, alloc_len;
bool clean, ret = false;
int merkles, i;
json_t *arr;
arr = json_array_get(val, 4);
if (!arr || !json_is_array(arr))
goto out;
merkles = json_array_size(arr);
job_id = json_array_string(val, 0);
prev_hash = __json_array_string(val, 1);
coinbase1 = json_array_string(val, 2);
coinbase2 = json_array_string(val, 3);
bbversion = __json_array_string(val, 5);
nbit = __json_array_string(val, 6);
ntime = __json_array_string(val, 7);
clean = json_is_true(json_array_get(val, 8));
if (!job_id || !prev_hash || !coinbase1 || !coinbase2 || !bbversion || !nbit || !ntime) {
/* Annoying but we must not leak memory */
if (job_id)
free(job_id);
if (coinbase1)
free(coinbase1);
if (coinbase2)
free(coinbase2);
goto out;
}
cg_wlock(&pool->data_lock);
free(pool->swork.job_id);
pool->swork.job_id = job_id;
snprintf(pool->prev_hash, 65, "%s", prev_hash);
cb1_len = strlen(coinbase1) / 2;
cb2_len = strlen(coinbase2) / 2;
snprintf(pool->bbversion, 9, "%s", bbversion);
snprintf(pool->nbit, 9, "%s", nbit);
snprintf(pool->ntime, 9, "%s", ntime);
pool->swork.clean = clean;
alloc_len = pool->coinbase_len = cb1_len + pool->n1_len + pool->n2size + cb2_len;
pool->nonce2_offset = cb1_len + pool->n1_len;
for (i = 0; i < pool->merkles; i++)
free(pool->swork.merkle_bin[i]);
if (merkles) {
pool->swork.merkle_bin = realloc(pool->swork.merkle_bin,
sizeof(char *) * merkles + 1);
for (i = 0; i < merkles; i++) {
char *merkle = json_array_string(arr, i);
pool->swork.merkle_bin[i] = malloc(32);
if (unlikely(!pool->swork.merkle_bin[i]))
quit(1, "Failed to malloc pool swork merkle_bin");
if (opt_protocol)
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "merkle %d: %s", i, merkle);
ret = hex2bin(pool->swork.merkle_bin[i], merkle, 32);
free(merkle);
if (unlikely(!ret)) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to convert merkle to merkle_bin in parse_notify");
goto out_unlock;
}
}
}
pool->merkles = merkles;
if (clean)
pool->nonce2 = 0;
#if 0
header_len = strlen(pool->bbversion) +
strlen(pool->prev_hash);
/* merkle_hash */ 32 +
strlen(pool->ntime) +
strlen(pool->nbit) +
/* nonce */ 8 +
/* workpadding */ 96;
#endif
snprintf(header, 225,
"%s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
pool->bbversion,
pool->prev_hash,
blank_merkle,
pool->ntime,
pool->nbit,
"00000000", /* nonce */
workpadding);
ret = hex2bin(pool->header_bin, header, 112);
if (unlikely(!ret)) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to convert header to header_bin in parse_notify");
goto out_unlock;
}
cb1 = alloca(cb1_len);
ret = hex2bin(cb1, coinbase1, cb1_len);
if (unlikely(!ret)) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to convert cb1 to cb1_bin in parse_notify");
goto out_unlock;
}
cb2 = alloca(cb2_len);
ret = hex2bin(cb2, coinbase2, cb2_len);
if (unlikely(!ret)) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to convert cb2 to cb2_bin in parse_notify");
goto out_unlock;
}
free(pool->coinbase);
align_len(&alloc_len);
pool->coinbase = calloc(alloc_len, 1);
if (unlikely(!pool->coinbase))
quit(1, "Failed to calloc pool coinbase in parse_notify");
memcpy(pool->coinbase, cb1, cb1_len);
memcpy(pool->coinbase + cb1_len, pool->nonce1bin, pool->n1_len);
memcpy(pool->coinbase + cb1_len + pool->n1_len + pool->n2size, cb2, cb2_len);
if (opt_debug) {
char *cb = bin2hex(pool->coinbase, pool->coinbase_len);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Pool %d coinbase %s", pool->pool_no, cb);
free(cb);
}
out_unlock:
cg_wunlock(&pool->data_lock);
if (opt_protocol) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "job_id: %s", job_id);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "prev_hash: %s", prev_hash);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "coinbase1: %s", coinbase1);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "coinbase2: %s", coinbase2);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "bbversion: %s", bbversion);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "nbit: %s", nbit);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "ntime: %s", ntime);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "clean: %s", clean ? "yes" : "no");
}
free(coinbase1);
free(coinbase2);
/* A notify message is the closest stratum gets to a getwork */
pool->getwork_requested++;
total_getworks++;
if (pool == current_pool())
opt_work_update = true;
out:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the parse_notify function in sgminer before 4.2.2, cgminer before 4.3.5, and BFGMiner before 4.1.0 allow remote pool servers to have unspecified impact via a (1) large or (2) negative value in the Extranonc2_size parameter in a mining.subscribe response and a crafted mining.notify request.
Commit Message: Do some random sanity checking for stratum message parsing
|
Low
| 166,306
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: InternalWebIntentsDispatcherTest() {
replied_ = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Fix uninitialized member in ctor.
TBR=darin@chromium.org
R=jhawkins@chromium.org
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10377180
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137606 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,761
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(curl_unescape)
{
char *str = NULL, *out = NULL;
size_t str_len = 0;
int out_len;
zval *zid;
php_curl *ch;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "rs", &zid, &str, &str_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((ch = (php_curl*)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(zid), le_curl_name, le_curl)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (str_len > INT_MAX) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if ((out = curl_easy_unescape(ch->cp, str, str_len, &out_len))) {
RETVAL_STRINGL(out, out_len);
curl_free(out);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ext/curl/interface.c in PHP 7.x before 7.0.10 does not work around a libcurl integer overflow, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (allocation error and heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a long string that is mishandled in a curl_escape call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72674 - check both curl_escape and curl_unescape
|
Low
| 166,947
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
{
edge_connection_t *n_stream;
relay_header_t rh;
char *address = NULL;
uint16_t port = 0;
or_circuit_t *or_circ = NULL;
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
begin_cell_t bcell;
int rv;
uint8_t end_reason=0;
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
if (rh.length > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE)
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
/* Note: we have to use relay_send_command_from_edge here, not
* connection_edge_end or connection_edge_send_command, since those require
* that we have a stream connected to a circuit, and we don't connect to a
* circuit until we have a pending/successful resolve. */
if (!server_mode(options) &&
circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Relay begin cell at non-server. Closing.");
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY, NULL);
return 0;
}
rv = begin_cell_parse(cell, &bcell, &end_reason);
if (rv < -1) {
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
} else if (rv == -1) {
tor_free(bcell.address);
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ, end_reason, NULL);
return 0;
}
if (! bcell.is_begindir) {
/* Steal reference */
address = bcell.address;
port = bcell.port;
if (or_circ && or_circ->p_chan) {
if (!options->AllowSingleHopExits &&
(or_circ->is_first_hop ||
(!connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(
or_circ->p_chan->identity_digest) &&
should_refuse_unknown_exits(options)))) {
/* Don't let clients use us as a single-hop proxy, unless the user
* has explicitly allowed that in the config. It attracts attackers
* and users who'd be better off with, well, single-hop proxies.
*/
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Attempt by %s to open a stream %s. Closing.",
safe_str(channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(or_circ->p_chan)),
or_circ->is_first_hop ? "on first hop of circuit" :
"from unknown relay");
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
or_circ->is_first_hop ?
END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL :
END_STREAM_REASON_MISC,
NULL);
tor_free(address);
return 0;
}
}
} else if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR) {
if (!directory_permits_begindir_requests(options) ||
circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR) {
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
END_STREAM_REASON_NOTDIRECTORY, NULL);
return 0;
}
/* Make sure to get the 'real' address of the previous hop: the
* caller might want to know whether the remote IP address has changed,
* and we might already have corrected base_.addr[ess] for the relay's
* canonical IP address. */
if (or_circ && or_circ->p_chan)
address = tor_strdup(channel_get_actual_remote_address(or_circ->p_chan));
else
address = tor_strdup("127.0.0.1");
port = 1; /* XXXX This value is never actually used anywhere, and there
* isn't "really" a connection here. But we
* need to set it to something nonzero. */
} else {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Got an unexpected command %d", (int)rh.command);
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL, NULL);
return 0;
}
if (! options->IPv6Exit) {
/* I don't care if you prefer IPv6; I can't give you any. */
bcell.flags &= ~BEGIN_FLAG_IPV6_PREFERRED;
/* If you don't want IPv4, I can't help. */
if (bcell.flags & BEGIN_FLAG_IPV4_NOT_OK) {
tor_free(address);
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY, NULL);
return 0;
}
}
log_debug(LD_EXIT,"Creating new exit connection.");
/* The 'AF_INET' here is temporary; we might need to change it later in
* connection_exit_connect(). */
n_stream = edge_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXIT, AF_INET);
/* Remember the tunneled request ID in the new edge connection, so that
* we can measure download times. */
n_stream->dirreq_id = circ->dirreq_id;
n_stream->base_.purpose = EXIT_PURPOSE_CONNECT;
n_stream->begincell_flags = bcell.flags;
n_stream->stream_id = rh.stream_id;
n_stream->base_.port = port;
/* leave n_stream->s at -1, because it's not yet valid */
n_stream->package_window = STREAMWINDOW_START;
n_stream->deliver_window = STREAMWINDOW_START;
if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED) {
origin_circuit_t *origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
log_info(LD_REND,"begin is for rendezvous. configuring stream.");
n_stream->base_.address = tor_strdup("(rendezvous)");
n_stream->base_.state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING;
n_stream->rend_data = rend_data_dup(origin_circ->rend_data);
tor_assert(connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(n_stream));
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
const int r = rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(n_stream, origin_circ);
if (r < 0) {
log_info(LD_REND,"Didn't find rendezvous service (port %d)",
n_stream->base_.port);
/* Send back reason DONE because we want to make hidden service port
* scanning harder thus instead of returning that the exit policy
* didn't match, which makes it obvious that the port is closed,
* return DONE and kill the circuit. That way, a user (malicious or
* not) needs one circuit per bad port unless it matches the policy of
* the hidden service. */
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
END_STREAM_REASON_DONE,
origin_circ->cpath->prev);
connection_free(TO_CONN(n_stream));
tor_free(address);
/* Drop the circuit here since it might be someone deliberately
* scanning the hidden service ports. Note that this mitigates port
* scanning by adding more work on the attacker side to successfully
* scan but does not fully solve it. */
if (r < -1)
return END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN;
else
return 0;
}
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
log_debug(LD_REND,"Finished assigning addr/port");
n_stream->cpath_layer = origin_circ->cpath->prev; /* link it */
/* add it into the linked list of p_streams on this circuit */
n_stream->next_stream = origin_circ->p_streams;
n_stream->on_circuit = circ;
origin_circ->p_streams = n_stream;
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
origin_circ->rend_data->nr_streams++;
connection_exit_connect(n_stream);
/* For path bias: This circuit was used successfully */
pathbias_mark_use_success(origin_circ);
tor_free(address);
return 0;
}
tor_strlower(address);
n_stream->base_.address = address;
n_stream->base_.state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVEFAILED;
/* default to failed, change in dns_resolve if it turns out not to fail */
if (we_are_hibernating()) {
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
END_STREAM_REASON_HIBERNATING, NULL);
connection_free(TO_CONN(n_stream));
return 0;
}
n_stream->on_circuit = circ;
if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR) {
tor_addr_t tmp_addr;
tor_assert(or_circ);
if (or_circ->p_chan &&
channel_get_addr_if_possible(or_circ->p_chan, &tmp_addr)) {
tor_addr_copy(&n_stream->base_.addr, &tmp_addr);
}
return connection_exit_connect_dir(n_stream);
}
log_debug(LD_EXIT,"about to start the dns_resolve().");
/* send it off to the gethostbyname farm */
switch (dns_resolve(n_stream)) {
case 1: /* resolve worked; now n_stream is attached to circ. */
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
log_debug(LD_EXIT,"about to call connection_exit_connect().");
connection_exit_connect(n_stream);
return 0;
case -1: /* resolve failed */
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED, NULL);
/* n_stream got freed. don't touch it. */
break;
case 0: /* resolve added to pending list */
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
break;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-617
Summary: The hidden-service feature in Tor before 0.3.0.8 allows a denial of service (assertion failure and daemon exit) in the relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_ function via a malformed BEGIN cell.
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-004: Fix assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_
This fixes an assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_() when an
origin circuit and a cpath_layer = NULL were passed.
A service rendezvous circuit could do such a thing when a malformed BEGIN cell
is received but shouldn't in the first place because the service needs to send
an END cell on the circuit for which it can not do without a cpath_layer.
Fixes #22493
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
|
Low
| 168,452
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: sc_parse_ef_gdo_content(const unsigned char *gdo, size_t gdo_len,
unsigned char *iccsn, size_t *iccsn_len,
unsigned char *chn, size_t *chn_len)
{
int r = SC_SUCCESS, iccsn_found = 0, chn_found = 0;
const unsigned char *p = gdo;
size_t left = gdo_len;
while (left >= 2) {
unsigned int cla, tag;
size_t tag_len;
r = sc_asn1_read_tag(&p, left, &cla, &tag, &tag_len);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS) {
if (r == SC_ERROR_ASN1_END_OF_CONTENTS) {
/* not enough data */
r = SC_SUCCESS;
}
break;
}
if (p == NULL) {
/* done parsing */
break;
}
if (cla == SC_ASN1_TAG_APPLICATION) {
switch (tag) {
case 0x1A:
iccsn_found = 1;
if (iccsn && iccsn_len) {
memcpy(iccsn, p, MIN(tag_len, *iccsn_len));
*iccsn_len = MIN(tag_len, *iccsn_len);
}
break;
case 0x1F20:
chn_found = 1;
if (chn && chn_len) {
memcpy(chn, p, MIN(tag_len, *chn_len));
*chn_len = MIN(tag_len, *chn_len);
}
break;
}
}
p += tag_len;
left -= (p - gdo);
}
if (!iccsn_found && iccsn_len)
*iccsn_len = 0;
if (!chn_found && chn_len)
*chn_len = 0;
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Various out of bounds reads when handling responses in OpenSC before 0.19.0-rc1 could be used by attackers able to supply crafted smartcards to potentially crash the opensc library using programs.
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
Low
| 169,065
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MaybeRestoreConnections() {
if (IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
return;
}
MaybeCreateIBus();
MaybeRestoreIBusConfig();
if (IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
ConnectPanelServiceSignals();
if (connection_change_handler_) {
LOG(INFO) << "Notifying Chrome that IBus is ready.";
connection_change_handler_(language_library_, true);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,542
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: parse_object(JsonLexContext *lex, JsonSemAction *sem)
{
/*
* an object is a possibly empty sequence of object fields, separated by
* commas and surrounded by curly braces.
*/
json_struct_action ostart = sem->object_start;
json_struct_action oend = sem->object_end;
JsonTokenType tok;
if (ostart != NULL)
(*ostart) (sem->semstate);
* itself. Note that we increment this after we call the semantic routine
* for the object start and restore it before we call the routine for the
* object end.
*/
lex->lex_level++;
/* we know this will succeeed, just clearing the token */
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_OBJECT_START, lex, JSON_TOKEN_OBJECT_START);
tok = lex_peek(lex);
switch (tok)
{
case JSON_TOKEN_STRING:
parse_object_field(lex, sem);
while (lex_accept(lex, JSON_TOKEN_COMMA, NULL))
parse_object_field(lex, sem);
break;
case JSON_TOKEN_OBJECT_END:
break;
default:
/* case of an invalid initial token inside the object */
report_parse_error(JSON_PARSE_OBJECT_START, lex);
}
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_OBJECT_NEXT, lex, JSON_TOKEN_OBJECT_END);
lex->lex_level--;
if (oend != NULL)
(*oend) (sem->semstate);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in json parsing in PostgreSQL before 9.3.x before 9.3.10 and 9.4.x before 9.4.5 allow attackers to cause a denial of service (server crash) via unspecified vectors, which are not properly handled in (1) json or (2) jsonb values.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,680
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: update_info_partition_on_linux_dmmp (Device *device)
{
const gchar *dm_name;
const gchar* const *targets_type;
const gchar* const *targets_params;
gchar *params;
gint linear_slave_major;
gint linear_slave_minor;
guint64 offset_sectors;
Device *linear_slave;
gchar *s;
params = NULL;
dm_name = g_udev_device_get_property (device->priv->d, "DM_NAME");
if (dm_name == NULL)
goto out;
targets_type = g_udev_device_get_property_as_strv (device->priv->d, "UDISKS_DM_TARGETS_TYPE");
if (targets_type == NULL || g_strcmp0 (targets_type[0], "linear") != 0)
goto out;
goto out;
params = decode_udev_encoded_string (targets_params[0]);
if (sscanf (params,
"%d:%d %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT,
&linear_slave_major,
&linear_slave_minor,
&offset_sectors) != 3)
goto out;
linear_slave = daemon_local_find_by_dev (device->priv->daemon,
makedev (linear_slave_major, linear_slave_minor));
if (linear_slave == NULL)
goto out;
if (!linear_slave->priv->device_is_linux_dmmp)
goto out;
/* The Partition* properties has been set as part of
* update_info_partition() by reading UDISKS_PARTITION_*
* properties.. so here we bascially just update the presentation
* device file name and and whether the device is a drive.
*/
s = g_strdup_printf ("/dev/mapper/%s", dm_name);
device_set_device_file_presentation (device, s);
g_free (s);
device_set_device_is_drive (device, FALSE);
out:
g_free (params);
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: probers/udisks-dm-export.c in udisks before 1.0.1 exports UDISKS_DM_TARGETS_PARAMS information to udev even for a crypt UDISKS_DM_TARGETS_TYPE, which allows local users to discover encryption keys by (1) running a certain udevadm command or (2) reading a certain file under /dev/.udev/db/.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,132
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gdImagePtr gdImageCreate (int sx, int sy)
{
int i;
gdImagePtr im;
if (overflow2(sx, sy)) {
return NULL;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof(unsigned char *), sy)) {
return NULL;
}
im = (gdImage *) gdCalloc(1, sizeof(gdImage));
/* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
im->pixels = (unsigned char **) gdMalloc(sizeof(unsigned char *) * sy);
im->AA_opacity = (unsigned char **) gdMalloc(sizeof(unsigned char *) * sy);
im->polyInts = 0;
im->polyAllocated = 0;
im->brush = 0;
im->tile = 0;
im->style = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sy; i++) {
/* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
im->pixels[i] = (unsigned char *) gdCalloc(sx, sizeof(unsigned char));
im->AA_opacity[i] = (unsigned char *) gdCalloc(sx, sizeof(unsigned char));
}
im->sx = sx;
im->sy = sy;
im->colorsTotal = 0;
im->transparent = (-1);
im->interlace = 0;
im->thick = 1;
im->AA = 0;
im->AA_polygon = 0;
for (i = 0; i < gdMaxColors; i++) {
im->open[i] = 1;
im->red[i] = 0;
im->green[i] = 0;
im->blue[i] = 0;
}
im->trueColor = 0;
im->tpixels = 0;
im->cx1 = 0;
im->cy1 = 0;
im->cx2 = im->sx - 1;
im->cy2 = im->sy - 1;
im->interpolation = NULL;
im->interpolation_id = GD_BILINEAR_FIXED;
return im;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the gdImageCreate function in gd.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.0.34RC1, as used in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted image dimensions.
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
|
Medium
| 167,127
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
if (s) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) {
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link));
list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
} else {
BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
}
unix_tot_inflight++;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Linux kernel before 4.4.1 allows local users to bypass file-descriptor limits and cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by sending each descriptor over a UNIX socket before closing it, related to net/unix/af_unix.c and net/unix/garbage.c.
Commit Message: unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets
It is possible for a process to allocate and accumulate far more FDs than
the process' limit by sending them over a unix socket then closing them
to keep the process' fd count low.
This change addresses this problem by keeping track of the number of FDs
in flight per user and preventing non-privileged processes from having
more FDs in flight than their configured FD limit.
Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,597
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int val;
int valbool;
struct linger ling;
int ret = 0;
/*
* Options without arguments
*/
if (optname == SO_BINDTODEVICE)
return sock_bindtodevice(sk, optval, optlen);
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(val, (int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
valbool = val ? 1 : 0;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case SO_DEBUG:
if (val && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
ret = -EACCES;
else
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_DBG, valbool);
break;
case SO_REUSEADDR:
sk->sk_reuse = (valbool ? SK_CAN_REUSE : SK_NO_REUSE);
break;
case SO_TYPE:
case SO_PROTOCOL:
case SO_DOMAIN:
case SO_ERROR:
ret = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
case SO_DONTROUTE:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_LOCALROUTE, valbool);
break;
case SO_BROADCAST:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_BROADCAST, valbool);
break;
case SO_SNDBUF:
/* Don't error on this BSD doesn't and if you think
* about it this is right. Otherwise apps have to
* play 'guess the biggest size' games. RCVBUF/SNDBUF
* are treated in BSD as hints
*/
val = min_t(u32, val, sysctl_wmem_max);
set_sndbuf:
sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_SNDBUF_LOCK;
sk->sk_sndbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF);
/* Wake up sending tasks if we upped the value. */
sk->sk_write_space(sk);
break;
case SO_SNDBUFFORCE:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
ret = -EPERM;
break;
}
goto set_sndbuf;
case SO_RCVBUF:
/* Don't error on this BSD doesn't and if you think
* about it this is right. Otherwise apps have to
* play 'guess the biggest size' games. RCVBUF/SNDBUF
* are treated in BSD as hints
*/
val = min_t(u32, val, sysctl_rmem_max);
set_rcvbuf:
sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_RCVBUF_LOCK;
/*
* We double it on the way in to account for
* "struct sk_buff" etc. overhead. Applications
* assume that the SO_RCVBUF setting they make will
* allow that much actual data to be received on that
* socket.
*
* Applications are unaware that "struct sk_buff" and
* other overheads allocate from the receive buffer
* during socket buffer allocation.
*
* And after considering the possible alternatives,
* returning the value we actually used in getsockopt
* is the most desirable behavior.
*/
sk->sk_rcvbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF);
break;
case SO_RCVBUFFORCE:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
ret = -EPERM;
break;
}
goto set_rcvbuf;
case SO_KEEPALIVE:
#ifdef CONFIG_INET
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP)
tcp_set_keepalive(sk, valbool);
#endif
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_KEEPOPEN, valbool);
break;
case SO_OOBINLINE:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_URGINLINE, valbool);
break;
case SO_NO_CHECK:
sk->sk_no_check = valbool;
break;
case SO_PRIORITY:
if ((val >= 0 && val <= 6) || capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
sk->sk_priority = val;
else
ret = -EPERM;
break;
case SO_LINGER:
if (optlen < sizeof(ling)) {
ret = -EINVAL; /* 1003.1g */
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&ling, optval, sizeof(ling))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (!ling.l_onoff)
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_LINGER);
else {
#if (BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
if ((unsigned int)ling.l_linger >= MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT/HZ)
sk->sk_lingertime = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
else
#endif
sk->sk_lingertime = (unsigned int)ling.l_linger * HZ;
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_LINGER);
}
break;
case SO_BSDCOMPAT:
sock_warn_obsolete_bsdism("setsockopt");
break;
case SO_PASSCRED:
if (valbool)
set_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags);
else
clear_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags);
break;
case SO_TIMESTAMP:
case SO_TIMESTAMPNS:
if (valbool) {
if (optname == SO_TIMESTAMP)
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS);
else
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS);
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP);
sock_enable_timestamp(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMP);
} else {
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP);
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS);
}
break;
case SO_TIMESTAMPING:
if (val & ~SOF_TIMESTAMPING_MASK) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_TX_HARDWARE,
val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_HARDWARE);
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_TX_SOFTWARE,
val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_SOFTWARE);
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_RX_HARDWARE,
val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RX_HARDWARE);
if (val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE)
sock_enable_timestamp(sk,
SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE);
else
sock_disable_timestamp(sk,
(1UL << SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE));
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_SOFTWARE,
val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_SOFTWARE);
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_SYS_HARDWARE,
val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_SYS_HARDWARE);
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE,
val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE);
break;
case SO_RCVLOWAT:
if (val < 0)
val = INT_MAX;
sk->sk_rcvlowat = val ? : 1;
break;
case SO_RCVTIMEO:
ret = sock_set_timeout(&sk->sk_rcvtimeo, optval, optlen);
break;
case SO_SNDTIMEO:
ret = sock_set_timeout(&sk->sk_sndtimeo, optval, optlen);
break;
case SO_ATTACH_FILTER:
ret = -EINVAL;
if (optlen == sizeof(struct sock_fprog)) {
struct sock_fprog fprog;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&fprog, optval, sizeof(fprog)))
break;
ret = sk_attach_filter(&fprog, sk);
}
break;
case SO_DETACH_FILTER:
ret = sk_detach_filter(sk);
break;
case SO_PASSSEC:
if (valbool)
set_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags);
else
clear_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags);
break;
case SO_MARK:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
ret = -EPERM;
else
sk->sk_mark = val;
break;
/* We implement the SO_SNDLOWAT etc to
not be settable (1003.1g 5.3) */
case SO_RXQ_OVFL:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_RXQ_OVFL, valbool);
break;
case SO_WIFI_STATUS:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_WIFI_STATUS, valbool);
break;
case SO_PEEK_OFF:
if (sock->ops->set_peek_off)
sock->ops->set_peek_off(sk, val);
else
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
case SO_NOFCS:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_NOFCS, valbool);
break;
default:
ret = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The sock_setsockopt function in net/core/sock.c in the Linux kernel before 3.5.7 does not ensure that a keepalive action is associated with a stream socket, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by leveraging the ability to create a raw socket.
Commit Message: net: guard tcp_set_keepalive() to tcp sockets
Its possible to use RAW sockets to get a crash in
tcp_set_keepalive() / sk_reset_timer()
Fix is to make sure socket is a SOCK_STREAM one.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,547
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadBMPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
BMPInfo
bmp_info;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
start_position;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
Quantum
index;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bit,
bytes_per_line,
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
magick[12],
*pixels;
unsigned int
blue,
green,
offset_bits,
red;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a BMP file.
*/
(void) memset(&bmp_info,0,sizeof(bmp_info));
bmp_info.ba_offset=0;
start_position=0;
offset_bits=0;
count=ReadBlob(image,2,magick);
if (count != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
PixelInfo
quantum_bits;
PixelPacket
shift;
/*
Verify BMP identifier.
*/
start_position=TellBlob(image)-2;
bmp_info.ba_offset=0;
while (LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"BA",2) == 0)
{
bmp_info.file_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.ba_offset=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.offset_bits=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,magick);
if (count != 2)
break;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Magick: %c%c",
magick[0],magick[1]);
if ((count != 2) || ((LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"BM",2) != 0) &&
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"CI",2) != 0)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bmp_info.file_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.offset_bits=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," BMP size: %u",
bmp_info.size);
if (bmp_info.size == 12)
{
/*
OS/2 BMP image file.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,"BMP2",MagickPathExtent);
bmp_info.width=(ssize_t) ((short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
bmp_info.height=(ssize_t) ((short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
bmp_info.planes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.x_pixels=0;
bmp_info.y_pixels=0;
bmp_info.number_colors=0;
bmp_info.compression=BI_RGB;
bmp_info.image_size=0;
bmp_info.alpha_mask=0;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Format: OS/2 Bitmap");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Geometry: %.20gx%.20g",(double) bmp_info.width,(double)
bmp_info.height);
}
}
else
{
/*
Microsoft Windows BMP image file.
*/
if (bmp_info.size < 40)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NonOS2HeaderSizeError");
bmp_info.width=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
bmp_info.height=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
bmp_info.planes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.compression=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.image_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.x_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.y_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.number_colors=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (bmp_info.number_colors > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
bmp_info.colors_important=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Format: MS Windows bitmap");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Geometry: %.20gx%.20g",(double) bmp_info.width,(double)
bmp_info.height);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Bits per pixel: %.20g",(double) bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
switch (bmp_info.compression)
{
case BI_RGB:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_RGB");
break;
}
case BI_RLE4:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_RLE4");
break;
}
case BI_RLE8:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_RLE8");
break;
}
case BI_BITFIELDS:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_BITFIELDS");
break;
}
case BI_PNG:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_PNG");
break;
}
case BI_JPEG:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_JPEG");
break;
}
default:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: UNKNOWN (%u)",bmp_info.compression);
}
}
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Number of colors: %u",bmp_info.number_colors);
}
bmp_info.red_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.green_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.blue_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (bmp_info.size > 40)
{
double
gamma;
/*
Read color management information.
*/
bmp_info.alpha_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.colorspace=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
/*
Decode 2^30 fixed point formatted CIE primaries.
*/
# define BMP_DENOM ((double) 0x40000000)
bmp_info.red_primary.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.red_primary.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.red_primary.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.green_primary.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.green_primary.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.green_primary.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.blue_primary.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.blue_primary.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.blue_primary.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
gamma=bmp_info.red_primary.x+bmp_info.red_primary.y+
bmp_info.red_primary.z;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
bmp_info.red_primary.x*=gamma;
bmp_info.red_primary.y*=gamma;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=bmp_info.red_primary.x;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=bmp_info.red_primary.y;
gamma=bmp_info.green_primary.x+bmp_info.green_primary.y+
bmp_info.green_primary.z;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
bmp_info.green_primary.x*=gamma;
bmp_info.green_primary.y*=gamma;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=bmp_info.green_primary.x;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=bmp_info.green_primary.y;
gamma=bmp_info.blue_primary.x+bmp_info.blue_primary.y+
bmp_info.blue_primary.z;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
bmp_info.blue_primary.x*=gamma;
bmp_info.blue_primary.y*=gamma;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=bmp_info.blue_primary.x;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=bmp_info.blue_primary.y;
/*
Decode 16^16 fixed point formatted gamma_scales.
*/
bmp_info.gamma_scale.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/0x10000;
bmp_info.gamma_scale.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/0x10000;
bmp_info.gamma_scale.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/0x10000;
/*
Compute a single gamma from the BMP 3-channel gamma.
*/
image->gamma=(bmp_info.gamma_scale.x+bmp_info.gamma_scale.y+
bmp_info.gamma_scale.z)/3.0;
}
else
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,"BMP3",MagickPathExtent);
if (bmp_info.size > 108)
{
size_t
intent;
/*
Read BMP Version 5 color management information.
*/
intent=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
switch ((int) intent)
{
case LCS_GM_BUSINESS:
{
image->rendering_intent=SaturationIntent;
break;
}
case LCS_GM_GRAPHICS:
{
image->rendering_intent=RelativeIntent;
break;
}
case LCS_GM_IMAGES:
{
image->rendering_intent=PerceptualIntent;
break;
}
case LCS_GM_ABS_COLORIMETRIC:
{
image->rendering_intent=AbsoluteIntent;
break;
}
}
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /* Profile data */
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /* Profile size */
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /* Reserved byte */
}
}
if ((MagickSizeType) bmp_info.file_size > GetBlobSize(image))
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageError,
"LengthAndFilesizeDoNotMatch","`%s'",image->filename);
else
if ((MagickSizeType) bmp_info.file_size < GetBlobSize(image))
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageWarning,"LengthAndFilesizeDoNotMatch","`%s'",
image->filename);
if (bmp_info.width <= 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
if (bmp_info.height == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
if (bmp_info.planes != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"StaticPlanesValueNotEqualToOne");
if ((bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 1) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 4) &&
(bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 8) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 16) &&
(bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 24) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedBitsPerPixel");
if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel < 16 &&
bmp_info.number_colors > (1U << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedNumberOfColors");
if ((bmp_info.compression == 1) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 8))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedBitsPerPixel");
if ((bmp_info.compression == 2) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 4))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedBitsPerPixel");
if ((bmp_info.compression == 3) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel < 16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedBitsPerPixel");
switch (bmp_info.compression)
{
case BI_RGB:
image->compression=NoCompression;
break;
case BI_RLE8:
case BI_RLE4:
image->compression=RLECompression;
break;
case BI_BITFIELDS:
break;
case BI_JPEG:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"JPEGCompressNotSupported");
case BI_PNG:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"PNGCompressNotSupported");
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
}
image->columns=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(bmp_info.width);
image->rows=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(bmp_info.height);
image->depth=bmp_info.bits_per_pixel <= 8 ? bmp_info.bits_per_pixel : 8;
image->alpha_trait=((bmp_info.alpha_mask != 0) &&
(bmp_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS)) ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel < 16)
{
size_t
one;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=bmp_info.number_colors;
one=1;
if (image->colors == 0)
image->colors=one << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel;
}
image->resolution.x=(double) bmp_info.x_pixels/100.0;
image->resolution.y=(double) bmp_info.y_pixels/100.0;
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
unsigned char
*bmp_colormap;
size_t
packet_size;
/*
Read BMP raster colormap.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading colormap of %.20g colors",(double) image->colors);
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
image->colors,4*sizeof(*bmp_colormap));
if (bmp_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((bmp_info.size == 12) || (bmp_info.size == 64))
packet_size=3;
else
packet_size=4;
offset=SeekBlob(image,start_position+14+bmp_info.size,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
{
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,bmp_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (packet_size*image->colors))
{
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
p=bmp_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
if (packet_size == 4)
p++;
}
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
}
/*
Read image data.
*/
if (bmp_info.offset_bits == offset_bits)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
offset_bits=bmp_info.offset_bits;
offset=SeekBlob(image,start_position+bmp_info.offset_bits,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (bmp_info.compression == BI_RLE4)
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel<<=1;
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*bmp_info.bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
length=(size_t) bytes_per_line*image->rows;
if ((bmp_info.compression == BI_RGB) ||
(bmp_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS))
{
if ((MagickSizeType) length > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->rows,
MagickMax(bytes_per_line,image->columns+256UL)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading pixels (%.20g bytes)",(double) length);
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
}
else
{
/*
Convert run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->rows,
MagickMax(bytes_per_line,image->columns+256UL)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
status=DecodeImage(image,bmp_info.compression,pixels,
image->columns*image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnableToRunlengthDecodeImage");
}
}
/*
Convert BMP raster image to pixel packets.
*/
if (bmp_info.compression == BI_RGB)
{
/*
We should ignore the alpha value in BMP3 files but there have been
reports about 32 bit files with alpha. We do a quick check to see if
the alpha channel contains a value that is not zero (default value).
If we find a non zero value we asume the program that wrote the file
wants to use the alpha channel.
*/
if ((image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait) && (bmp_info.size == 40) &&
(bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 32))
{
bytes_per_line=4*(image->columns);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (*(p+3) != 0)
{
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
y=-1;
break;
}
p+=4;
}
}
}
bmp_info.alpha_mask=image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ?
0xff000000U : 0U;
bmp_info.red_mask=0x00ff0000U;
bmp_info.green_mask=0x0000ff00U;
bmp_info.blue_mask=0x000000ffU;
if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 16)
{
/*
RGB555.
*/
bmp_info.red_mask=0x00007c00U;
bmp_info.green_mask=0x000003e0U;
bmp_info.blue_mask=0x0000001fU;
}
}
(void) memset(&shift,0,sizeof(shift));
(void) memset(&quantum_bits,0,sizeof(quantum_bits));
if ((bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 16) || (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 32))
{
register unsigned int
sample;
/*
Get shift and quantum bits info from bitfield masks.
*/
if (bmp_info.red_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.red_mask << shift.red) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.red++;
if (shift.red >= 32U)
break;
}
if (bmp_info.green_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.green_mask << shift.green) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.green++;
if (shift.green >= 32U)
break;
}
if (bmp_info.blue_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.blue_mask << shift.blue) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.blue++;
if (shift.blue >= 32U)
break;
}
if (bmp_info.alpha_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.alpha_mask << shift.alpha) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.alpha++;
if (shift.alpha >= 32U)
break;
}
sample=shift.red;
while (((bmp_info.red_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.red=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.red);
sample=shift.green;
while (((bmp_info.green_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.green=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.green);
sample=shift.blue;
while (((bmp_info.blue_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.blue=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.blue);
sample=shift.alpha;
while (((bmp_info.alpha_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.alpha=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.alpha);
}
switch (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=(Quantum) (((*p) & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
index=(Quantum) (((*p) & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
break;
}
case 4:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) ((*p >> 4) & 0x0f),&index,
exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) (*p & 0x0f),&index,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) ((*p >> 4) & 0xf),&index,
exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p++;
x++;
}
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
break;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
break;
}
case 8:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
if ((bmp_info.compression == BI_RLE8) ||
(bmp_info.compression == BI_RLE4))
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; --x)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) *p++,&index,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned int
alpha,
pixel;
/*
Convert bitfield encoded 16-bit PseudoColor scanline.
*/
if ((bmp_info.compression != BI_RGB) &&
(bmp_info.compression != BI_BITFIELDS))
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
}
bytes_per_line=2*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=(unsigned int) (*p++);
pixel|=(*p++) << 8;
red=((pixel & bmp_info.red_mask) << shift.red) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.red == 5)
red|=((red & 0xe000) >> 5);
if (quantum_bits.red <= 8)
red|=((red & 0xff00) >> 8);
green=((pixel & bmp_info.green_mask) << shift.green) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.green == 5)
green|=((green & 0xe000) >> 5);
if (quantum_bits.green == 6)
green|=((green & 0xc000) >> 6);
if (quantum_bits.green <= 8)
green|=((green & 0xff00) >> 8);
blue=((pixel & bmp_info.blue_mask) << shift.blue) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.blue == 5)
blue|=((blue & 0xe000) >> 5);
if (quantum_bits.blue <= 8)
blue|=((blue & 0xff00) >> 8);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) blue),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
alpha=((pixel & bmp_info.alpha_mask) << shift.alpha) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.alpha <= 8)
alpha|=((alpha & 0xff00) >> 8);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) alpha),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 24:
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*24+31)/32);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
/*
Convert bitfield encoded DirectColor scanline.
*/
if ((bmp_info.compression != BI_RGB) &&
(bmp_info.compression != BI_BITFIELDS))
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
}
bytes_per_line=4*(image->columns);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
unsigned int
alpha,
pixel;
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=(unsigned int) (*p++);
pixel|=((unsigned int) *p++ << 8);
pixel|=((unsigned int) *p++ << 16);
pixel|=((unsigned int) *p++ << 24);
red=((pixel & bmp_info.red_mask) << shift.red) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.red == 8)
red|=(red >> 8);
green=((pixel & bmp_info.green_mask) << shift.green) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.green == 8)
green|=(green >> 8);
blue=((pixel & bmp_info.blue_mask) << shift.blue) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.blue == 8)
blue|=(blue >> 8);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) blue),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
alpha=((pixel & bmp_info.alpha_mask) << shift.alpha) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.alpha == 8)
alpha|=(alpha >> 8);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) alpha),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
default:
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (y > 0)
break;
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
if (bmp_info.height < 0)
{
Image
*flipped_image;
/*
Correct image orientation.
*/
flipped_image=FlipImage(image,exception);
if (flipped_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
DuplicateBlob(flipped_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image, flipped_image);
image=flipped_image;
}
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
*magick='\0';
if (bmp_info.ba_offset != 0)
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) bmp_info.ba_offset,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,2,magick);
if ((count == 2) && (IsBMP(magick,2) != MagickFalse))
{
/*
Acquire next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (IsBMP(magick,2) != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: In coders/bmp.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.8-16, an input file can result in an infinite loop and hang, with high CPU and memory consumption. Remote attackers could leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial of service via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Prevent infinite loop
|
Medium
| 168,953
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnAcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer",
"GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnAcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer");
ScopedSendOnIOThread delayed_send(
host_id_,
new AcceleratedSurfaceMsg_BufferPresented(params.route_id, false, 0));
RenderWidgetHostViewPort* view =
GetRenderWidgetHostViewFromSurfaceID(params.surface_id);
if (!view)
return;
delayed_send.Cancel();
view->AcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer(params, host_id_);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,359
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int readContigStripsIntoBuffer (TIFF* in, uint8* buf)
{
uint8* bufp = buf;
int32 bytes_read = 0;
uint32 strip, nstrips = TIFFNumberOfStrips(in);
uint32 stripsize = TIFFStripSize(in);
uint32 rows = 0;
uint32 rps = TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, &rps);
tsize_t scanline_size = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
if (scanline_size == 0) {
TIFFError("", "TIFF scanline size is zero!");
return 0;
}
for (strip = 0; strip < nstrips; strip++) {
bytes_read = TIFFReadEncodedStrip (in, strip, bufp, -1);
rows = bytes_read / scanline_size;
if ((strip < (nstrips - 1)) && (bytes_read != (int32)stripsize))
TIFFError("", "Strip %d: read %lu bytes, strip size %lu",
(int)strip + 1, (unsigned long) bytes_read,
(unsigned long)stripsize);
if (bytes_read < 0 && !ignore) {
TIFFError("", "Error reading strip %lu after %lu rows",
(unsigned long) strip, (unsigned long)rows);
return 0;
}
bufp += bytes_read;
}
return 1;
} /* end readContigStripsIntoBuffer */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: LibTIFF 4.0.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TIFF image, related to *WRITE of size 2048* and libtiff/tif_next.c:64:9.
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix readContigStripsIntoBuffer() in -i (ignore) mode so
that the output buffer is correctly incremented to avoid write outside bounds.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2620
|
Medium
| 168,461
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Cluster* Cluster::Create(Segment* pSegment, long idx, long long off)
{
assert(pSegment);
assert(off >= 0);
const long long element_start = pSegment->m_start + off;
Cluster* const pCluster = new Cluster(pSegment, idx, element_start);
assert(pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,804
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool PrintDialogGtk::UpdateSettings(const DictionaryValue& settings,
const printing::PageRanges& ranges) {
bool collate;
int color;
bool landscape;
bool print_to_pdf;
int copies;
int duplex_mode;
std::string device_name;
if (!settings.GetBoolean(printing::kSettingLandscape, &landscape) ||
!settings.GetBoolean(printing::kSettingCollate, &collate) ||
!settings.GetInteger(printing::kSettingColor, &color) ||
!settings.GetBoolean(printing::kSettingPrintToPDF, &print_to_pdf) ||
!settings.GetInteger(printing::kSettingDuplexMode, &duplex_mode) ||
!settings.GetInteger(printing::kSettingCopies, &copies) ||
!settings.GetString(printing::kSettingDeviceName, &device_name)) {
return false;
}
if (!print_to_pdf) {
scoped_ptr<GtkPrinterList> printer_list(new GtkPrinterList);
printer_ = printer_list->GetPrinterWithName(device_name.c_str());
if (printer_) {
g_object_ref(printer_);
gtk_print_settings_set_printer(gtk_settings_,
gtk_printer_get_name(printer_));
}
gtk_print_settings_set_n_copies(gtk_settings_, copies);
gtk_print_settings_set_collate(gtk_settings_, collate);
const char* color_mode;
switch (color) {
case printing::COLOR:
color_mode = kColor;
break;
case printing::CMYK:
color_mode = kCMYK;
break;
default:
color_mode = kGrayscale;
break;
}
gtk_print_settings_set(gtk_settings_, kCUPSColorModel, color_mode);
if (duplex_mode != printing::UNKNOWN_DUPLEX_MODE) {
const char* cups_duplex_mode = NULL;
switch (duplex_mode) {
case printing::LONG_EDGE:
cups_duplex_mode = kDuplexNoTumble;
break;
case printing::SHORT_EDGE:
cups_duplex_mode = kDuplexTumble;
break;
case printing::SIMPLEX:
cups_duplex_mode = kDuplexNone;
break;
default: // UNKNOWN_DUPLEX_MODE
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
gtk_print_settings_set(gtk_settings_, kCUPSDuplex, cups_duplex_mode);
}
}
gtk_print_settings_set_orientation(
gtk_settings_,
landscape ? GTK_PAGE_ORIENTATION_LANDSCAPE :
GTK_PAGE_ORIENTATION_PORTRAIT);
InitPrintSettings(ranges);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 15.0.874.120 allows user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to editing.
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,254
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::ClearDelegatedFrame() {
EvictDelegatedFrame();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An insufficient watchdog timer in navigation in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.62 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: mac: Make RWHVMac::ClearCompositorFrame clear locks
Ensure that the BrowserCompositorMac not hold on to a compositor lock
when requested to clear its compositor frame. This lock may be held
indefinitely (if the renderer hangs) and so the frame will never be
cleared.
Bug: 739621
Change-Id: I15d0e82bdf632f3379a48e959f198afb8a4ac218
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/608239
Commit-Queue: ccameron chromium <ccameron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#493563}
|
Medium
| 172,954
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int btrfs_truncate_inode_items(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root,
struct inode *inode,
u64 new_size, u32 min_type)
{
struct btrfs_path *path;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
struct btrfs_file_extent_item *fi;
struct btrfs_key key;
struct btrfs_key found_key;
u64 extent_start = 0;
u64 extent_num_bytes = 0;
u64 extent_offset = 0;
u64 item_end = 0;
u64 last_size = new_size;
u32 found_type = (u8)-1;
int found_extent;
int del_item;
int pending_del_nr = 0;
int pending_del_slot = 0;
int extent_type = -1;
int ret;
int err = 0;
u64 ino = btrfs_ino(inode);
u64 bytes_deleted = 0;
bool be_nice = 0;
bool should_throttle = 0;
bool should_end = 0;
BUG_ON(new_size > 0 && min_type != BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY);
/*
* for non-free space inodes and ref cows, we want to back off from
* time to time
*/
if (!btrfs_is_free_space_inode(inode) &&
test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_REF_COWS, &root->state))
be_nice = 1;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
path->reada = -1;
/*
* We want to drop from the next block forward in case this new size is
* not block aligned since we will be keeping the last block of the
* extent just the way it is.
*/
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_REF_COWS, &root->state) ||
root == root->fs_info->tree_root)
btrfs_drop_extent_cache(inode, ALIGN(new_size,
root->sectorsize), (u64)-1, 0);
/*
* This function is also used to drop the items in the log tree before
* we relog the inode, so if root != BTRFS_I(inode)->root, it means
* it is used to drop the loged items. So we shouldn't kill the delayed
* items.
*/
if (min_type == 0 && root == BTRFS_I(inode)->root)
btrfs_kill_delayed_inode_items(inode);
key.objectid = ino;
key.offset = (u64)-1;
key.type = (u8)-1;
search_again:
/*
* with a 16K leaf size and 128MB extents, you can actually queue
* up a huge file in a single leaf. Most of the time that
* bytes_deleted is > 0, it will be huge by the time we get here
*/
if (be_nice && bytes_deleted > 32 * 1024 * 1024) {
if (btrfs_should_end_transaction(trans, root)) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto error;
}
}
path->leave_spinning = 1;
ret = btrfs_search_slot(trans, root, &key, path, -1, 1);
if (ret < 0) {
err = ret;
goto out;
}
if (ret > 0) {
/* there are no items in the tree for us to truncate, we're
* done
*/
if (path->slots[0] == 0)
goto out;
path->slots[0]--;
}
while (1) {
fi = NULL;
leaf = path->nodes[0];
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &found_key, path->slots[0]);
found_type = found_key.type;
if (found_key.objectid != ino)
break;
if (found_type < min_type)
break;
item_end = found_key.offset;
if (found_type == BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY) {
fi = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, path->slots[0],
struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
extent_type = btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, fi);
if (extent_type != BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
item_end +=
btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi);
} else if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
item_end += btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(leaf,
path->slots[0], fi);
}
item_end--;
}
if (found_type > min_type) {
del_item = 1;
} else {
if (item_end < new_size)
break;
if (found_key.offset >= new_size)
del_item = 1;
else
del_item = 0;
}
found_extent = 0;
/* FIXME, shrink the extent if the ref count is only 1 */
if (found_type != BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY)
goto delete;
if (del_item)
last_size = found_key.offset;
else
last_size = new_size;
if (extent_type != BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
u64 num_dec;
extent_start = btrfs_file_extent_disk_bytenr(leaf, fi);
if (!del_item) {
u64 orig_num_bytes =
btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi);
extent_num_bytes = ALIGN(new_size -
found_key.offset,
root->sectorsize);
btrfs_set_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi,
extent_num_bytes);
num_dec = (orig_num_bytes -
extent_num_bytes);
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_REF_COWS,
&root->state) &&
extent_start != 0)
inode_sub_bytes(inode, num_dec);
btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty(leaf);
} else {
extent_num_bytes =
btrfs_file_extent_disk_num_bytes(leaf,
fi);
extent_offset = found_key.offset -
btrfs_file_extent_offset(leaf, fi);
/* FIXME blocksize != 4096 */
num_dec = btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi);
if (extent_start != 0) {
found_extent = 1;
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_REF_COWS,
&root->state))
inode_sub_bytes(inode, num_dec);
}
}
} else if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
/*
* we can't truncate inline items that have had
* special encodings
*/
if (!del_item &&
btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, fi) == 0 &&
btrfs_file_extent_encryption(leaf, fi) == 0 &&
btrfs_file_extent_other_encoding(leaf, fi) == 0) {
u32 size = new_size - found_key.offset;
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_REF_COWS, &root->state))
inode_sub_bytes(inode, item_end + 1 -
new_size);
/*
* update the ram bytes to properly reflect
* the new size of our item
*/
btrfs_set_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi, size);
size =
btrfs_file_extent_calc_inline_size(size);
btrfs_truncate_item(root, path, size, 1);
} else if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_REF_COWS,
&root->state)) {
inode_sub_bytes(inode, item_end + 1 -
found_key.offset);
}
}
delete:
if (del_item) {
if (!pending_del_nr) {
/* no pending yet, add ourselves */
pending_del_slot = path->slots[0];
pending_del_nr = 1;
} else if (pending_del_nr &&
path->slots[0] + 1 == pending_del_slot) {
/* hop on the pending chunk */
pending_del_nr++;
pending_del_slot = path->slots[0];
} else {
BUG();
}
} else {
break;
}
should_throttle = 0;
if (found_extent &&
(test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_REF_COWS, &root->state) ||
root == root->fs_info->tree_root)) {
btrfs_set_path_blocking(path);
bytes_deleted += extent_num_bytes;
ret = btrfs_free_extent(trans, root, extent_start,
extent_num_bytes, 0,
btrfs_header_owner(leaf),
ino, extent_offset, 0);
BUG_ON(ret);
if (btrfs_should_throttle_delayed_refs(trans, root))
btrfs_async_run_delayed_refs(root,
trans->delayed_ref_updates * 2, 0);
if (be_nice) {
if (truncate_space_check(trans, root,
extent_num_bytes)) {
should_end = 1;
}
if (btrfs_should_throttle_delayed_refs(trans,
root)) {
should_throttle = 1;
}
}
}
if (found_type == BTRFS_INODE_ITEM_KEY)
break;
if (path->slots[0] == 0 ||
path->slots[0] != pending_del_slot ||
should_throttle || should_end) {
if (pending_del_nr) {
ret = btrfs_del_items(trans, root, path,
pending_del_slot,
pending_del_nr);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans,
root, ret);
goto error;
}
pending_del_nr = 0;
}
btrfs_release_path(path);
if (should_throttle) {
unsigned long updates = trans->delayed_ref_updates;
if (updates) {
trans->delayed_ref_updates = 0;
ret = btrfs_run_delayed_refs(trans, root, updates * 2);
if (ret && !err)
err = ret;
}
}
/*
* if we failed to refill our space rsv, bail out
* and let the transaction restart
*/
if (should_end) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto error;
}
goto search_again;
} else {
path->slots[0]--;
}
}
out:
if (pending_del_nr) {
ret = btrfs_del_items(trans, root, path, pending_del_slot,
pending_del_nr);
if (ret)
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
}
error:
if (root->root_key.objectid != BTRFS_TREE_LOG_OBJECTID)
btrfs_ordered_update_i_size(inode, last_size, NULL);
btrfs_free_path(path);
if (be_nice && bytes_deleted > 32 * 1024 * 1024) {
unsigned long updates = trans->delayed_ref_updates;
if (updates) {
trans->delayed_ref_updates = 0;
ret = btrfs_run_delayed_refs(trans, root, updates * 2);
if (ret && !err)
err = ret;
}
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: fs/btrfs/inode.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles compressed inline extents, which allows local users to obtain sensitive pre-truncation information from a file via a clone action.
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
|
Low
| 166,567
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ExtensionTtsSpeakFunction::SpeechFinished() {
error_ = utterance_->error();
bool success = error_.empty();
SendResponse(success);
Release(); // Balanced in RunImpl().
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,390
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(timer_getoverrun, timer_t, timer_id)
{
struct k_itimer *timr;
int overrun;
unsigned long flags;
timr = lock_timer(timer_id, &flags);
if (!timr)
return -EINVAL;
overrun = timr->it_overrun_last;
unlock_timer(timr, flags);
return overrun;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel through 4.17.3. An Integer Overflow in kernel/time/posix-timers.c in the POSIX timer code is caused by the way the overrun accounting works. Depending on interval and expiry time values, the overrun can be larger than INT_MAX, but the accounting is int based. This basically makes the accounting values, which are visible to user space via timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun, random. For example, a local user can cause a denial of service (signed integer overflow) via crafted mmap, futex, timer_create, and timer_settime system calls.
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
|
Low
| 169,178
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Cluster::~Cluster()
{
if (m_entries_count <= 0)
return;
BlockEntry** i = m_entries;
BlockEntry** const j = m_entries + m_entries_count;
while (i != j)
{
BlockEntry* p = *i++;
assert(p);
delete p;
}
delete[] m_entries;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,458
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: asmlinkage void user_unaligned_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int insn)
{
enum direction dir;
if(!(current->thread.flags & SPARC_FLAG_UNALIGNED) ||
(((insn >> 30) & 3) != 3))
goto kill_user;
dir = decode_direction(insn);
if(!ok_for_user(regs, insn, dir)) {
goto kill_user;
} else {
int err, size = decode_access_size(insn);
unsigned long addr;
if(floating_point_load_or_store_p(insn)) {
printk("User FPU load/store unaligned unsupported.\n");
goto kill_user;
}
addr = compute_effective_address(regs, insn);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, addr);
switch(dir) {
case load:
err = do_int_load(fetch_reg_addr(((insn>>25)&0x1f),
regs),
size, (unsigned long *) addr,
decode_signedness(insn));
break;
case store:
err = do_int_store(((insn>>25)&0x1f), size,
(unsigned long *) addr, regs);
break;
case both:
/*
* This was supported in 2.4. However, we question
* the value of SWAP instruction across word boundaries.
*/
printk("Unaligned SWAP unsupported.\n");
err = -EFAULT;
break;
default:
unaligned_panic("Impossible user unaligned trap.");
goto out;
}
if (err)
goto kill_user;
else
advance(regs);
goto out;
}
kill_user:
user_mna_trap_fault(regs, insn);
out:
;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,806
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const Chapters::Edition* Chapters::GetEdition(int idx) const
{
if (idx < 0)
return NULL;
if (idx >= m_editions_count)
return NULL;
return m_editions + idx;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,310
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: DataReductionProxyIOData::DataReductionProxyIOData(
Client client,
PrefService* prefs,
network::NetworkConnectionTracker* network_connection_tracker,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> io_task_runner,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> ui_task_runner,
bool enabled,
const std::string& user_agent,
const std::string& channel)
: client_(client),
network_connection_tracker_(network_connection_tracker),
io_task_runner_(io_task_runner),
ui_task_runner_(ui_task_runner),
enabled_(enabled),
channel_(channel),
effective_connection_type_(net::EFFECTIVE_CONNECTION_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
DCHECK(io_task_runner_);
DCHECK(ui_task_runner_);
configurator_.reset(new DataReductionProxyConfigurator());
configurator_->SetConfigUpdatedCallback(base::BindRepeating(
&DataReductionProxyIOData::OnProxyConfigUpdated, base::Unretained(this)));
DataReductionProxyMutableConfigValues* raw_mutable_config = nullptr;
std::unique_ptr<DataReductionProxyMutableConfigValues> mutable_config =
std::make_unique<DataReductionProxyMutableConfigValues>();
raw_mutable_config = mutable_config.get();
config_.reset(new DataReductionProxyConfig(
io_task_runner, ui_task_runner, network_connection_tracker_,
std::move(mutable_config), configurator_.get()));
request_options_.reset(
new DataReductionProxyRequestOptions(client_, config_.get()));
request_options_->Init();
request_options_->SetUpdateHeaderCallback(base::BindRepeating(
&DataReductionProxyIOData::UpdateProxyRequestHeaders,
base::Unretained(this)));
config_client_.reset(new DataReductionProxyConfigServiceClient(
GetBackoffPolicy(), request_options_.get(), raw_mutable_config,
config_.get(), this, network_connection_tracker_,
base::BindRepeating(&DataReductionProxyIOData::StoreSerializedConfig,
base::Unretained(this))));
network_properties_manager_.reset(new NetworkPropertiesManager(
base::DefaultClock::GetInstance(), prefs, ui_task_runner_));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
|
Medium
| 172,421
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int find_high_bit(unsigned int x)
{
int i;
for(i=31;i>=0;i--) {
if(x&(1<<i)) return i;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-682
Summary: libimageworsener.a in ImageWorsener before 1.3.1 has *left shift cannot be represented in type int* undefined behavior issues, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted image, related to imagew-bmp.c and imagew-util.c.
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
|
Medium
| 168,194
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: dns_stricmp(const char* str1, const char* str2)
{
char c1, c2;
*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* DNS variables */
static struct udp_pcb *dns_pcb;
static u8_t dns_seqno;
static struct dns_table_entry dns_table[DNS_TABLE_SIZE];
static struct dns_req_entry dns_requests[DNS_MAX_REQUESTS];
if (c1_upc != c2_upc) {
/* still not equal */
/* don't care for < or > */
return 1;
}
} else {
/* characters are not equal but none is in the alphabet range */
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-345
Summary: resolv.c in the DNS resolver in uIP, and dns.c in the DNS resolver in lwIP 1.4.1 and earlier, does not use random values for ID fields and source ports of DNS query packets, which makes it easier for man-in-the-middle attackers to conduct cache-poisoning attacks via spoofed reply packets.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,048
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: my_object_str_hash_len (MyObject *obj, GHashTable *table, guint *len, GError **error)
{
*len = 0;
g_hash_table_foreach (table, hash_foreach, len);
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,121
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: views::View* AutofillDialogViews::CreateFootnoteView() {
footnote_view_ = new LayoutPropagationView();
footnote_view_->SetLayoutManager(
new views::BoxLayout(views::BoxLayout::kVertical,
kDialogEdgePadding,
kDialogEdgePadding,
0));
footnote_view_->SetBorder(
views::Border::CreateSolidSidedBorder(1, 0, 0, 0, kSubtleBorderColor));
footnote_view_->set_background(
views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(kShadingColor));
legal_document_view_ = new views::StyledLabel(base::string16(), this);
footnote_view_->AddChildView(legal_document_view_);
footnote_view_->SetVisible(false);
return footnote_view_;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The FrameLoader::notifyIfInitialDocumentAccessed function in core/loader/FrameLoader.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.63, makes an incorrect check for an empty document during presentation of a modal dialog, which allows remote attackers to spoof the address bar via vectors involving the document.write method.
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
|
Medium
| 171,139
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: init_util(void)
{
filegen_register(statsdir, "peerstats", &peerstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "loopstats", &loopstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "clockstats", &clockstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "rawstats", &rawstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "sysstats", &sysstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "protostats", &protostats);
#ifdef AUTOKEY
filegen_register(statsdir, "cryptostats", &cryptostats);
#endif /* AUTOKEY */
#ifdef DEBUG_TIMING
filegen_register(statsdir, "timingstats", &timingstats);
#endif /* DEBUG_TIMING */
/*
* register with libntp ntp_set_tod() to call us back
* when time is stepped.
*/
step_callback = &ntpd_time_stepped;
#ifdef DEBUG
atexit(&uninit_util);
#endif /* DEBUG */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: ntp_openssl.m4 in ntpd in NTP before 4.2.7p112 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) via a crafted statistics or filegen configuration command that is not enabled during compilation.
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
|
Low
| 168,876
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SMB2_tcon(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, const char *tree,
struct cifs_tcon *tcon, const struct nls_table *cp)
{
struct smb2_tree_connect_req *req;
struct smb2_tree_connect_rsp *rsp = NULL;
struct kvec iov[2];
int rc = 0;
int resp_buftype;
int unc_path_len;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server;
__le16 *unc_path = NULL;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "TCON\n");
if ((ses->server) && tree)
server = ses->server;
else
return -EIO;
if (tcon && tcon->bad_network_name)
return -ENOENT;
unc_path = kmalloc(MAX_SHARENAME_LENGTH * 2, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unc_path == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
unc_path_len = cifs_strtoUTF16(unc_path, tree, strlen(tree), cp) + 1;
unc_path_len *= 2;
if (unc_path_len < 2) {
kfree(unc_path);
return -EINVAL;
}
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_TREE_CONNECT, tcon, (void **) &req);
if (rc) {
kfree(unc_path);
return rc;
}
if (tcon == NULL) {
/* since no tcon, smb2_init can not do this, so do here */
req->hdr.SessionId = ses->Suid;
/* if (ses->server->sec_mode & SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED)
req->hdr.Flags |= SMB2_FLAGS_SIGNED; */
}
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field and 1 for pad */
iov[0].iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4 - 1;
/* Testing shows that buffer offset must be at location of Buffer[0] */
req->PathOffset = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct smb2_tree_connect_req)
- 1 /* pad */ - 4 /* do not count rfc1001 len field */);
req->PathLength = cpu_to_le16(unc_path_len - 2);
iov[1].iov_base = unc_path;
iov[1].iov_len = unc_path_len;
inc_rfc1001_len(req, unc_path_len - 1 /* pad */);
rc = SendReceive2(xid, ses, iov, 2, &resp_buftype, 0);
rsp = (struct smb2_tree_connect_rsp *)iov[0].iov_base;
if (rc != 0) {
if (tcon) {
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_TREE_CONNECT_HE);
tcon->need_reconnect = true;
}
goto tcon_error_exit;
}
if (tcon == NULL) {
ses->ipc_tid = rsp->hdr.TreeId;
goto tcon_exit;
}
if (rsp->ShareType & SMB2_SHARE_TYPE_DISK)
cifs_dbg(FYI, "connection to disk share\n");
else if (rsp->ShareType & SMB2_SHARE_TYPE_PIPE) {
tcon->ipc = true;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "connection to pipe share\n");
} else if (rsp->ShareType & SMB2_SHARE_TYPE_PRINT) {
tcon->print = true;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "connection to printer\n");
} else {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "unknown share type %d\n", rsp->ShareType);
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto tcon_error_exit;
}
tcon->share_flags = le32_to_cpu(rsp->ShareFlags);
tcon->capabilities = rsp->Capabilities; /* we keep caps little endian */
tcon->maximal_access = le32_to_cpu(rsp->MaximalAccess);
tcon->tidStatus = CifsGood;
tcon->need_reconnect = false;
tcon->tid = rsp->hdr.TreeId;
strlcpy(tcon->treeName, tree, sizeof(tcon->treeName));
if ((rsp->Capabilities & SMB2_SHARE_CAP_DFS) &&
((tcon->share_flags & SHI1005_FLAGS_DFS) == 0))
cifs_dbg(VFS, "DFS capability contradicts DFS flag\n");
init_copy_chunk_defaults(tcon);
if (tcon->ses->server->ops->validate_negotiate)
rc = tcon->ses->server->ops->validate_negotiate(xid, tcon);
tcon_exit:
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp);
kfree(unc_path);
return rc;
tcon_error_exit:
if (rsp->hdr.Status == STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "BAD_NETWORK_NAME: %s\n", tree);
tcon->bad_network_name = true;
}
goto tcon_exit;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The SMB2_tcon function in fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c in the Linux kernel before 3.16.3 allows remote CIFS servers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and client system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by deleting the IPC$ share during resolution of DFS referrals.
Commit Message: [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
|
Low
| 166,261
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(shmctl, int, shmid, int, cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *, buf)
{
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
int err, version;
struct ipc_namespace *ns;
if (cmd < 0 || shmid < 0)
return -EINVAL;
version = ipc_parse_version(&cmd);
ns = current->nsproxy->ipc_ns;
switch (cmd) {
case IPC_INFO:
case SHM_INFO:
case SHM_STAT:
case IPC_STAT:
return shmctl_nolock(ns, shmid, cmd, version, buf);
case IPC_RMID:
case IPC_SET:
return shmctl_down(ns, shmid, cmd, buf, version);
case SHM_LOCK:
case SHM_UNLOCK:
{
struct file *shm_file;
rcu_read_lock();
shp = shm_obtain_object_check(ns, shmid);
if (IS_ERR(shp)) {
err = PTR_ERR(shp);
goto out_unlock1;
}
audit_ipc_obj(&(shp->shm_perm));
err = security_shm_shmctl(shp, cmd);
if (err)
goto out_unlock1;
ipc_lock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
kuid_t euid = current_euid();
err = -EPERM;
if (!uid_eq(euid, shp->shm_perm.uid) &&
!uid_eq(euid, shp->shm_perm.cuid))
goto out_unlock0;
if (cmd == SHM_LOCK && !rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK))
goto out_unlock0;
}
shm_file = shp->shm_file;
if (is_file_hugepages(shm_file))
goto out_unlock0;
if (cmd == SHM_LOCK) {
struct user_struct *user = current_user();
err = shmem_lock(shm_file, 1, user);
if (!err && !(shp->shm_perm.mode & SHM_LOCKED)) {
shp->shm_perm.mode |= SHM_LOCKED;
shp->mlock_user = user;
}
goto out_unlock0;
}
/* SHM_UNLOCK */
if (!(shp->shm_perm.mode & SHM_LOCKED))
goto out_unlock0;
shmem_lock(shm_file, 0, shp->mlock_user);
shp->shm_perm.mode &= ~SHM_LOCKED;
shp->mlock_user = NULL;
get_file(shm_file);
ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
rcu_read_unlock();
shmem_unlock_mapping(shm_file->f_mapping);
fput(shm_file);
return err;
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
out_unlock0:
ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
out_unlock1:
rcu_read_unlock();
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in ipc/shm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.2 allow local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application that uses shmctl IPC_RMID operations in conjunction with other shm system calls.
Commit Message: ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 165,910
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiVP9Accelerator::OutputPicture(
const scoped_refptr<VP9Picture>& pic) {
scoped_refptr<VaapiDecodeSurface> dec_surface =
VP9PictureToVaapiDecodeSurface(pic);
dec_surface->set_visible_rect(pic->visible_rect);
vaapi_dec_->SurfaceReady(dec_surface);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
|
High
| 172,806
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: destroy_one_secret (gpointer data)
{
char *secret = (char *) data;
/* Don't leave the secret lying around in memory */
g_message ("%s: destroying %s", __func__, secret);
memset (secret, 0, strlen (secret));
g_free (secret);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The destroy_one_secret function in nm-setting-vpn.c in libnm-util in the NetworkManager package 0.8.999-3.git20110526 in Fedora 15 creates a log entry containing a certificate password, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information by reading a log file.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,689
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Cluster::GetFirst(const BlockEntry*& pFirst) const
{
if (m_entries_count <= 0)
{
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) //error
{
pFirst = NULL;
return status;
}
if (m_entries_count <= 0) //empty cluster
{
pFirst = NULL;
return 0;
}
}
assert(m_entries);
pFirst = m_entries[0];
assert(pFirst);
return 0; //success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,320
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CtcpHandler::parse(Message::Type messageType, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QByteArray &message) {
QByteArray ctcp;
QByteArray dequotedMessage = lowLevelDequote(message);
CtcpType ctcptype = messageType == Message::Notice
? CtcpReply
: CtcpQuery;
Message::Flags flags = (messageType == Message::Notice && !network()->isChannelName(target))
? Message::Redirected
: Message::None;
int xdelimPos = -1;
int xdelimEndPos = -1;
int spacePos = -1;
while((xdelimPos = dequotedMessage.indexOf(XDELIM)) != -1) {
if(xdelimPos > 0)
displayMsg(messageType, target, userDecode(target, dequotedMessage.left(xdelimPos)), prefix, flags);
xdelimEndPos = dequotedMessage.indexOf(XDELIM, xdelimPos + 1);
if(xdelimEndPos == -1) {
xdelimEndPos = dequotedMessage.count();
}
ctcp = xdelimDequote(dequotedMessage.mid(xdelimPos + 1, xdelimEndPos - xdelimPos - 1));
dequotedMessage = dequotedMessage.mid(xdelimEndPos + 1);
QString ctcpcmd = userDecode(target, ctcp.left(spacePos));
QString ctcpparam = userDecode(target, ctcp.mid(spacePos + 1));
spacePos = ctcp.indexOf(' ');
if(spacePos != -1) {
ctcpcmd = userDecode(target, ctcp.left(spacePos));
ctcpparam = userDecode(target, ctcp.mid(spacePos + 1));
} else {
ctcpcmd = userDecode(target, ctcp);
ctcpparam = QString();
ctcpparam = QString();
}
handle(ctcpcmd, Q_ARG(CtcpType, ctcptype), Q_ARG(QString, prefix), Q_ARG(QString, target), Q_ARG(QString, ctcpparam));
}
if(!dequotedMessage.isEmpty())
void CtcpHandler::query(const QString &bufname, const QString &ctcpTag, const QString &message) {
QList<QByteArray> params;
params << serverEncode(bufname) << lowLevelQuote(pack(serverEncode(ctcpTag), userEncode(bufname, message)));
emit putCmd("PRIVMSG", params);
}
void CtcpHandler::reply(const QString &bufname, const QString &ctcpTag, const QString &message) {
QList<QByteArray> params;
params << serverEncode(bufname) << lowLevelQuote(pack(serverEncode(ctcpTag), userEncode(bufname, message)));
emit putCmd("NOTICE", params);
}
void CtcpHandler::handleAction(CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m) {
Q_UNUSED(ctcptype)
emit displayMsg(Message::Action, typeByTarget(target), target, param, prefix);
}
emit putCmd("NOTICE", params);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ctcphandler.cpp in Quassel before 0.6.3 and 0.7.x before 0.7.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (unresponsive IRC) via multiple Client-To-Client Protocol (CTCP) requests in a PRIVMSG message.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,881
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ScrollHitTestDisplayItem::ScrollHitTestDisplayItem(
const DisplayItemClient& client,
Type type,
scoped_refptr<const TransformPaintPropertyNode> scroll_offset_node)
: DisplayItem(client, type, sizeof(*this)),
scroll_offset_node_(std::move(scroll_offset_node)) {
DCHECK(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled());
DCHECK(IsScrollHitTestType(type));
DCHECK(scroll_offset_node_->ScrollNode());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,842
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void sas_destruct_devices(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct domain_device *dev, *n;
struct sas_discovery_event *ev = to_sas_discovery_event(work);
struct asd_sas_port *port = ev->port;
clear_bit(DISCE_DESTRUCT, &port->disc.pending);
list_for_each_entry_safe(dev, n, &port->destroy_list, disco_list_node) {
list_del_init(&dev->disco_list_node);
sas_remove_children(&dev->rphy->dev);
sas_rphy_delete(dev->rphy);
sas_unregister_common_dev(port, dev);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.15.9 mishandles a mutex within libsas, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) by triggering certain error-handling code.
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
|
Low
| 169,384
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: comics_check_decompress_command (gchar *mime_type,
ComicsDocument *comics_document,
GError **error)
{
gboolean success;
gchar *std_out, *std_err;
gint retval;
GError *err = NULL;
/* FIXME, use proper cbr/cbz mime types once they're
* included in shared-mime-info */
if (g_content_type_is_a (mime_type, "application/x-cbr") ||
g_content_type_is_a (mime_type, "application/x-rar")) {
/* The RARLAB provides a no-charge proprietary (freeware)
* decompress-only client for Linux called unrar. Another
* option is a GPLv2-licensed command-line tool developed by
* the Gna! project. Confusingly enough, the free software RAR
* decoder is also named unrar. For this reason we need to add
* some lines for disambiguation. Sorry for the added the
* complexity but it's life :)
* Finally, some distributions, like Debian, rename this free
* option as unrar-free.
* */
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("unrar");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
/* We only use std_err to avoid printing useless error
* messages on the terminal */
success =
g_spawn_command_line_sync (
comics_document->selected_command,
&std_out, &std_err,
&retval, &err);
if (!success) {
g_propagate_error (error, err);
g_error_free (err);
return FALSE;
/* I don't check retval status because RARLAB unrar
* doesn't have a way to return 0 without involving an
* operation with a file*/
} else if (WIFEXITED (retval)) {
if (g_strrstr (std_out,"freeware") != NULL)
/* The RARLAB freeware client */
comics_document->command_usage = RARLABS;
else
/* The Gna! free software client */
comics_document->command_usage = GNAUNRAR;
g_free (std_out);
g_free (std_err);
return TRUE;
}
}
/* The Gna! free software client with Debian naming convention */
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("unrar-free");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = GNAUNRAR;
return TRUE;
}
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("bsdtar");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = TAR;
return TRUE;
}
} else if (g_content_type_is_a (mime_type, "application/x-cbz") ||
g_content_type_is_a (mime_type, "application/zip")) {
/* InfoZIP's unzip program */
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("unzip");
comics_document->alternative_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("zipnote");
if (comics_document->selected_command &&
comics_document->alternative_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = UNZIP;
return TRUE;
}
/* fallback mode using 7za and 7z from p7zip project */
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("7za");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = P7ZIP;
return TRUE;
}
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("7z");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = P7ZIP;
return TRUE;
}
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("bsdtar");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = TAR;
return TRUE;
}
} else if (g_content_type_is_a (mime_type, "application/x-cb7") ||
g_content_type_is_a (mime_type, "application/x-7z-compressed")) {
/* 7zr, 7za and 7z are the commands from the p7zip project able
* to decompress .7z files */
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("7zr");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = P7ZIP;
return TRUE;
}
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("7za");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = P7ZIP;
return TRUE;
}
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("7z");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = P7ZIP;
return TRUE;
}
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("bsdtar");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = TAR;
return TRUE;
}
} else if (g_content_type_is_a (mime_type, "application/x-cbt") ||
g_content_type_is_a (mime_type, "application/x-tar")) {
/* tar utility (Tape ARchive) */
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("tar");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = TAR;
return TRUE;
}
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("bsdtar");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = TAR;
return TRUE;
}
} else {
g_set_error (error,
EV_DOCUMENT_ERROR,
EV_DOCUMENT_ERROR_INVALID,
_("Not a comic book MIME type: %s"),
mime_type);
return FALSE;
}
g_set_error_literal (error,
EV_DOCUMENT_ERROR,
EV_DOCUMENT_ERROR_INVALID,
_("Can’t find an appropriate command to "
"decompress this type of comic book"));
return FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: backend/comics/comics-document.c (aka the comic book backend) in GNOME Evince before 3.24.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a .cbt file that is a TAR archive containing a filename beginning with a *--* command-line option substring, as demonstrated by a --checkpoint-action=exec=bash at the beginning of the filename.
Commit Message: comics: Remove support for tar and tar-like commands
When handling tar files, or using a command with tar-compatible syntax,
to open comic-book archives, both the archive name (the name of the
comics file) and the filename (the name of a page within the archive)
are quoted to not be interpreted by the shell.
But the filename is completely with the attacker's control and can start
with "--" which leads to tar interpreting it as a command line flag.
This can be exploited by creating a CBT file (a tar archive with the
.cbt suffix) with an embedded file named something like this:
"--checkpoint-action=exec=bash -c 'touch ~/hacked;'.jpg"
CBT files are infinitely rare (CBZ is usually used for DRM-free
commercial releases, CBR for those from more dubious provenance), so
removing support is the easiest way to avoid the bug triggering. All
this code was rewritten in the development release for GNOME 3.26 to not
shell out to any command, closing off this particular attack vector.
This also removes the ability to use libarchive's bsdtar-compatible
binary for CBZ (ZIP), CB7 (7zip), and CBR (RAR) formats. The first two
are already supported by unzip and 7zip respectively. libarchive's RAR
support is limited, so unrar is a requirement anyway.
Discovered by Felix Wilhelm from the Google Security Team.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=784630
|
Medium
| 167,636
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst,
struct request_sock *req_unhash,
bool *own_req)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp;
const struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct tcp6_sock *newtcp6sk;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct tcp_sock *newtp;
struct sock *newsk;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
struct tcp_md5sig_key *key;
#endif
struct flowi6 fl6;
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
/*
* v6 mapped
*/
newsk = tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst,
req_unhash, own_req);
if (!newsk)
return NULL;
newtcp6sk = (struct tcp6_sock *)newsk;
inet_sk(newsk)->pinet6 = &newtcp6sk->inet6;
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
newnp->saddr = newsk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_af_ops = &ipv6_mapped;
newsk->sk_backlog_rcv = tcp_v4_do_rcv;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
newtp->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv6_mapped_specific;
#endif
newnp->ipv6_ac_list = NULL;
newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = tcp_v6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
newnp->rcv_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ipv6_hdr(skb));
if (np->repflow)
newnp->flow_label = ip6_flowlabel(ipv6_hdr(skb));
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks count
* here, tcp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the comment in
* that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
/* It is tricky place. Until this moment IPv4 tcp
worked with IPv6 icsk.icsk_af_ops.
Sync it now.
*/
tcp_sync_mss(newsk, inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
return newsk;
}
ireq = inet_rsk(req);
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto out_overflow;
if (!dst) {
dst = inet6_csk_route_req(sk, &fl6, req, IPPROTO_TCP);
if (!dst)
goto out;
}
newsk = tcp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (!newsk)
goto out_nonewsk;
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks
* count here, tcp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the
* comment in that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
newsk->sk_gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
ip6_dst_store(newsk, dst, NULL, NULL);
inet6_sk_rx_dst_set(newsk, skb);
newtcp6sk = (struct tcp6_sock *)newsk;
inet_sk(newsk)->pinet6 = &newtcp6sk->inet6;
newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
newsk->sk_v6_daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
newnp->saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
newsk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
newsk->sk_bound_dev_if = ireq->ir_iif;
/* Now IPv6 options...
First: no IPv4 options.
*/
newinet->inet_opt = NULL;
newnp->ipv6_ac_list = NULL;
newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
/* Clone RX bits */
newnp->rxopt.all = np->rxopt.all;
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = tcp_v6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
newnp->rcv_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ipv6_hdr(skb));
if (np->repflow)
newnp->flow_label = ip6_flowlabel(ipv6_hdr(skb));
/* Clone native IPv6 options from listening socket (if any)
Yes, keeping reference count would be much more clever,
but we make one more one thing there: reattach optmem
to newsk.
*/
opt = ireq->ipv6_opt;
if (!opt)
opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
if (opt) {
opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(newnp->opt, opt);
}
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (opt)
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_nflen +
opt->opt_flen;
tcp_ca_openreq_child(newsk, dst);
tcp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
newtp->advmss = tcp_mss_clamp(tcp_sk(sk), dst_metric_advmss(dst));
tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(newsk);
newinet->inet_daddr = newinet->inet_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
/* Copy over the MD5 key from the original socket */
key = tcp_v6_md5_do_lookup(sk, &newsk->sk_v6_daddr);
if (key) {
/* We're using one, so create a matching key
* on the newsk structure. If we fail to get
* memory, then we end up not copying the key
* across. Shucks.
*/
tcp_md5_do_add(newsk, (union tcp_md5_addr *)&newsk->sk_v6_daddr,
AF_INET6, key->key, key->keylen,
sk_gfp_mask(sk, GFP_ATOMIC));
}
#endif
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0) {
inet_csk_prepare_forced_close(newsk);
tcp_done(newsk);
goto out;
}
*own_req = inet_ehash_nolisten(newsk, req_to_sk(req_unhash));
if (*own_req) {
tcp_move_syn(newtp, req);
/* Clone pktoptions received with SYN, if we own the req */
if (ireq->pktopts) {
newnp->pktoptions = skb_clone(ireq->pktopts,
sk_gfp_mask(sk, GFP_ATOMIC));
consume_skb(ireq->pktopts);
ireq->pktopts = NULL;
if (newnp->pktoptions) {
tcp_v6_restore_cb(newnp->pktoptions);
skb_set_owner_r(newnp->pktoptions, newsk);
}
}
}
return newsk;
out_overflow:
__NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
out_nonewsk:
dst_release(dst);
out:
tcp_listendrop(sk);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock function in net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 mishandles inheritance, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls, a related issue to CVE-2017-8890.
Commit Message: ipv6/dccp: do not inherit ipv6_mc_list from parent
Like commit 657831ffc38e ("dccp/tcp: do not inherit mc_list from parent")
we should clear ipv6_mc_list etc. for IPv6 sockets too.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 168,128
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int tipc_nl_publ_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
int err;
u32 tsk_portid = cb->args[0];
u32 last_publ = cb->args[1];
u32 done = cb->args[2];
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct tipc_sock *tsk;
if (!tsk_portid) {
struct nlattr **attrs;
struct nlattr *sock[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_MAX + 1];
err = tipc_nlmsg_parse(cb->nlh, &attrs);
if (err)
return err;
err = nla_parse_nested(sock, TIPC_NLA_SOCK_MAX,
attrs[TIPC_NLA_SOCK],
tipc_nl_sock_policy);
if (err)
return err;
if (!sock[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_REF])
return -EINVAL;
tsk_portid = nla_get_u32(sock[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_REF]);
}
if (done)
return 0;
tsk = tipc_sk_lookup(net, tsk_portid);
if (!tsk)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(&tsk->sk);
err = __tipc_nl_list_sk_publ(skb, cb, tsk, &last_publ);
if (!err)
done = 1;
release_sock(&tsk->sk);
sock_put(&tsk->sk);
cb->args[0] = tsk_portid;
cb->args[1] = last_publ;
cb->args[2] = done;
return skb->len;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The tipc_nl_publ_dump function in net/tipc/socket.c in the Linux kernel through 4.6 does not verify socket existence, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a dumpit operation.
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,223
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xsltNumberFormatGetMultipleLevel(xsltTransformContextPtr context,
xmlNodePtr node,
xsltCompMatchPtr countPat,
xsltCompMatchPtr fromPat,
double *array,
int max,
xmlDocPtr doc,
xmlNodePtr elem)
{
int amount = 0;
int cnt;
xmlNodePtr ancestor;
xmlNodePtr preceding;
xmlXPathParserContextPtr parser;
context->xpathCtxt->node = node;
parser = xmlXPathNewParserContext(NULL, context->xpathCtxt);
if (parser) {
/* ancestor-or-self::*[count] */
for (ancestor = node;
(ancestor != NULL) && (ancestor->type != XML_DOCUMENT_NODE);
ancestor = xmlXPathNextAncestor(parser, ancestor)) {
if ((fromPat != NULL) &&
xsltTestCompMatchList(context, ancestor, fromPat))
break; /* for */
if ((countPat == NULL && node->type == ancestor->type &&
xmlStrEqual(node->name, ancestor->name)) ||
xsltTestCompMatchList(context, ancestor, countPat)) {
/* count(preceding-sibling::*) */
cnt = 0;
for (preceding = ancestor;
preceding != NULL;
preceding =
xmlXPathNextPrecedingSibling(parser, preceding)) {
if (countPat == NULL) {
if ((preceding->type == ancestor->type) &&
xmlStrEqual(preceding->name, ancestor->name)){
if ((preceding->ns == ancestor->ns) ||
((preceding->ns != NULL) &&
(ancestor->ns != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(preceding->ns->href,
ancestor->ns->href) )))
cnt++;
}
} else {
if (xsltTestCompMatchList(context, preceding,
countPat))
cnt++;
}
}
array[amount++] = (double)cnt;
if (amount >= max)
break; /* for */
}
}
xmlXPathFreeParserContext(parser);
}
return amount;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
High
| 173,309
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: decrypt_response(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, unsigned char *out, size_t * out_len)
{
size_t cipher_len;
size_t i;
unsigned char iv[16] = { 0 };
unsigned char plaintext[4096] = { 0 };
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
/* no cipher */
if (in[0] == 0x99)
return 0;
/* parse cipher length */
if (0x01 == in[2] && 0x82 != in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[1];
i = 3;
}
else if (0x01 == in[3] && 0x81 == in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[2];
i = 4;
}
else if (0x01 == in[4] && 0x82 == in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[2] * 0x100;
cipher_len += in[3];
i = 5;
}
else {
return -1;
}
if (cipher_len < 2 || i+cipher_len > inlen || cipher_len > sizeof plaintext)
return -1;
/* decrypt */
if (KEY_TYPE_AES == exdata->smtype)
aes128_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], cipher_len - 1, plaintext);
else
des3_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], cipher_len - 1, plaintext);
/* unpadding */
while (0x80 != plaintext[cipher_len - 2] && (cipher_len - 2 > 0))
cipher_len--;
if (2 == cipher_len)
return -1;
memcpy(out, plaintext, cipher_len - 2);
*out_len = cipher_len - 2;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: A double free when handling responses from an HSM Card in sc_pkcs15emu_sc_hsm_init in libopensc/pkcs15-sc-hsm.c in OpenSC before 0.19.0-rc1 could be used by attackers able to supply crafted smartcards to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
|
Low
| 169,072
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: juniper_atm2_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
int llc_hdrlen;
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ATM2;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
if (l2info.cookie[7] & ATM2_PKT_TYPE_MASK) { /* OAM cell ? */
oam_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, ATM_OAM_NOHEC);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xfefe03 || /* NLPID encaps ? */
EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xaaaa03) { /* SNAP encaps ? */
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
if (llc_hdrlen > 0)
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (l2info.direction != JUNIPER_BPF_PKT_IN && /* ether-over-1483 encaps ? */
(EXTRACT_32BITS(l2info.cookie) & ATM2_GAP_COUNT_MASK)) {
ether_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (p[0] == 0x03) { /* Cisco style NLPID encaps ? */
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1, l2info.caplen - 1);
/* FIXME check if frame was recognized */
return l2info.header_len;
}
if(juniper_ppp_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* PPPoA vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* last try - vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
return l2info.header_len;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,949
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *buf)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
FPSContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
int64_t delta;
int i, ret;
s->frames_in++;
/* discard frames until we get the first timestamp */
if (s->pts == AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
if (buf->pts != AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, buf);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (s->start_time != DBL_MAX && s->start_time != AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
double first_pts = s->start_time * AV_TIME_BASE;
first_pts = FFMIN(FFMAX(first_pts, INT64_MIN), INT64_MAX);
s->first_pts = s->pts = av_rescale_q(first_pts, AV_TIME_BASE_Q,
inlink->time_base);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Set first pts to (in:%"PRId64" out:%"PRId64")\n",
s->first_pts, av_rescale_q(first_pts, AV_TIME_BASE_Q,
outlink->time_base));
} else {
s->first_pts = s->pts = buf->pts;
}
} else {
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Discarding initial frame(s) with no "
"timestamp.\n");
av_frame_free(&buf);
s->drop++;
}
return 0;
}
/* now wait for the next timestamp */
if (buf->pts == AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
return write_to_fifo(s->fifo, buf);
}
/* number of output frames */
delta = av_rescale_q_rnd(buf->pts - s->pts, inlink->time_base,
outlink->time_base, s->rounding);
if (delta < 1) {
/* drop the frame and everything buffered except the first */
AVFrame *tmp;
int drop = av_fifo_size(s->fifo)/sizeof(AVFrame*);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Dropping %d frame(s).\n", drop);
s->drop += drop;
av_fifo_generic_read(s->fifo, &tmp, sizeof(tmp), NULL);
flush_fifo(s->fifo);
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, tmp);
av_frame_free(&buf);
return ret;
}
/* can output >= 1 frames */
for (i = 0; i < delta; i++) {
AVFrame *buf_out;
av_fifo_generic_read(s->fifo, &buf_out, sizeof(buf_out), NULL);
/* duplicate the frame if needed */
if (!av_fifo_size(s->fifo) && i < delta - 1) {
AVFrame *dup = av_frame_clone(buf_out);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Duplicating frame.\n");
if (dup)
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, dup);
else
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (ret < 0) {
av_frame_free(&buf_out);
av_frame_free(&buf);
return ret;
}
s->dup++;
}
buf_out->pts = av_rescale_q(s->first_pts, inlink->time_base,
outlink->time_base) + s->frames_out;
if ((ret = ff_filter_frame(outlink, buf_out)) < 0) {
av_frame_free(&buf);
return ret;
}
s->frames_out++;
}
flush_fifo(s->fifo);
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, buf);
s->pts = s->first_pts + av_rescale_q(s->frames_out, outlink->time_base, inlink->time_base);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The filter_frame function in libavfilter/vf_fps.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not properly ensure the availability of FIFO content, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (double free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted data.
Commit Message: avfilter/vf_fps: make sure the fifo is not empty before using it
Fixes Ticket2905
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
|
Medium
| 165,916
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int rds_ib_xmit(struct rds_connection *conn, struct rds_message *rm,
unsigned int hdr_off, unsigned int sg, unsigned int off)
{
struct rds_ib_connection *ic = conn->c_transport_data;
struct ib_device *dev = ic->i_cm_id->device;
struct rds_ib_send_work *send = NULL;
struct rds_ib_send_work *first;
struct rds_ib_send_work *prev;
struct ib_send_wr *failed_wr;
struct scatterlist *scat;
u32 pos;
u32 i;
u32 work_alloc;
u32 credit_alloc = 0;
u32 posted;
u32 adv_credits = 0;
int send_flags = 0;
int bytes_sent = 0;
int ret;
int flow_controlled = 0;
int nr_sig = 0;
BUG_ON(off % RDS_FRAG_SIZE);
BUG_ON(hdr_off != 0 && hdr_off != sizeof(struct rds_header));
/* Do not send cong updates to IB loopback */
if (conn->c_loopback
&& rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_flags & RDS_FLAG_CONG_BITMAP) {
rds_cong_map_updated(conn->c_fcong, ~(u64) 0);
return sizeof(struct rds_header) + RDS_CONG_MAP_BYTES;
}
/* FIXME we may overallocate here */
if (be32_to_cpu(rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_len) == 0)
i = 1;
else
i = ceil(be32_to_cpu(rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_len), RDS_FRAG_SIZE);
work_alloc = rds_ib_ring_alloc(&ic->i_send_ring, i, &pos);
if (work_alloc == 0) {
set_bit(RDS_LL_SEND_FULL, &conn->c_flags);
rds_ib_stats_inc(s_ib_tx_ring_full);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (ic->i_flowctl) {
credit_alloc = rds_ib_send_grab_credits(ic, work_alloc, &posted, 0, RDS_MAX_ADV_CREDIT);
adv_credits += posted;
if (credit_alloc < work_alloc) {
rds_ib_ring_unalloc(&ic->i_send_ring, work_alloc - credit_alloc);
work_alloc = credit_alloc;
flow_controlled = 1;
}
if (work_alloc == 0) {
set_bit(RDS_LL_SEND_FULL, &conn->c_flags);
rds_ib_stats_inc(s_ib_tx_throttle);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
}
/* map the message the first time we see it */
if (!ic->i_data_op) {
if (rm->data.op_nents) {
rm->data.op_count = ib_dma_map_sg(dev,
rm->data.op_sg,
rm->data.op_nents,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
rdsdebug("ic %p mapping rm %p: %d\n", ic, rm, rm->data.op_count);
if (rm->data.op_count == 0) {
rds_ib_stats_inc(s_ib_tx_sg_mapping_failure);
rds_ib_ring_unalloc(&ic->i_send_ring, work_alloc);
ret = -ENOMEM; /* XXX ? */
goto out;
}
} else {
rm->data.op_count = 0;
}
rds_message_addref(rm);
ic->i_data_op = &rm->data;
/* Finalize the header */
if (test_bit(RDS_MSG_ACK_REQUIRED, &rm->m_flags))
rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_flags |= RDS_FLAG_ACK_REQUIRED;
if (test_bit(RDS_MSG_RETRANSMITTED, &rm->m_flags))
rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_flags |= RDS_FLAG_RETRANSMITTED;
/* If it has a RDMA op, tell the peer we did it. This is
* used by the peer to release use-once RDMA MRs. */
if (rm->rdma.op_active) {
struct rds_ext_header_rdma ext_hdr;
ext_hdr.h_rdma_rkey = cpu_to_be32(rm->rdma.op_rkey);
rds_message_add_extension(&rm->m_inc.i_hdr,
RDS_EXTHDR_RDMA, &ext_hdr, sizeof(ext_hdr));
}
if (rm->m_rdma_cookie) {
rds_message_add_rdma_dest_extension(&rm->m_inc.i_hdr,
rds_rdma_cookie_key(rm->m_rdma_cookie),
rds_rdma_cookie_offset(rm->m_rdma_cookie));
}
/* Note - rds_ib_piggyb_ack clears the ACK_REQUIRED bit, so
* we should not do this unless we have a chance of at least
* sticking the header into the send ring. Which is why we
* should call rds_ib_ring_alloc first. */
rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_ack = cpu_to_be64(rds_ib_piggyb_ack(ic));
rds_message_make_checksum(&rm->m_inc.i_hdr);
/*
* Update adv_credits since we reset the ACK_REQUIRED bit.
*/
if (ic->i_flowctl) {
rds_ib_send_grab_credits(ic, 0, &posted, 1, RDS_MAX_ADV_CREDIT - adv_credits);
adv_credits += posted;
BUG_ON(adv_credits > 255);
}
}
/* Sometimes you want to put a fence between an RDMA
* READ and the following SEND.
* We could either do this all the time
* or when requested by the user. Right now, we let
* the application choose.
*/
if (rm->rdma.op_active && rm->rdma.op_fence)
send_flags = IB_SEND_FENCE;
/* Each frag gets a header. Msgs may be 0 bytes */
send = &ic->i_sends[pos];
first = send;
prev = NULL;
scat = &ic->i_data_op->op_sg[sg];
i = 0;
do {
unsigned int len = 0;
/* Set up the header */
send->s_wr.send_flags = send_flags;
send->s_wr.opcode = IB_WR_SEND;
send->s_wr.num_sge = 1;
send->s_wr.next = NULL;
send->s_queued = jiffies;
send->s_op = NULL;
send->s_sge[0].addr = ic->i_send_hdrs_dma
+ (pos * sizeof(struct rds_header));
send->s_sge[0].length = sizeof(struct rds_header);
memcpy(&ic->i_send_hdrs[pos], &rm->m_inc.i_hdr, sizeof(struct rds_header));
/* Set up the data, if present */
if (i < work_alloc
&& scat != &rm->data.op_sg[rm->data.op_count]) {
len = min(RDS_FRAG_SIZE, ib_sg_dma_len(dev, scat) - off);
send->s_wr.num_sge = 2;
send->s_sge[1].addr = ib_sg_dma_address(dev, scat) + off;
send->s_sge[1].length = len;
bytes_sent += len;
off += len;
if (off == ib_sg_dma_len(dev, scat)) {
scat++;
off = 0;
}
}
rds_ib_set_wr_signal_state(ic, send, 0);
/*
* Always signal the last one if we're stopping due to flow control.
*/
if (ic->i_flowctl && flow_controlled && i == (work_alloc-1))
send->s_wr.send_flags |= IB_SEND_SIGNALED | IB_SEND_SOLICITED;
if (send->s_wr.send_flags & IB_SEND_SIGNALED)
nr_sig++;
rdsdebug("send %p wr %p num_sge %u next %p\n", send,
&send->s_wr, send->s_wr.num_sge, send->s_wr.next);
if (ic->i_flowctl && adv_credits) {
struct rds_header *hdr = &ic->i_send_hdrs[pos];
/* add credit and redo the header checksum */
hdr->h_credit = adv_credits;
rds_message_make_checksum(hdr);
adv_credits = 0;
rds_ib_stats_inc(s_ib_tx_credit_updates);
}
if (prev)
prev->s_wr.next = &send->s_wr;
prev = send;
pos = (pos + 1) % ic->i_send_ring.w_nr;
send = &ic->i_sends[pos];
i++;
} while (i < work_alloc
&& scat != &rm->data.op_sg[rm->data.op_count]);
/* Account the RDS header in the number of bytes we sent, but just once.
* The caller has no concept of fragmentation. */
if (hdr_off == 0)
bytes_sent += sizeof(struct rds_header);
/* if we finished the message then send completion owns it */
if (scat == &rm->data.op_sg[rm->data.op_count]) {
prev->s_op = ic->i_data_op;
prev->s_wr.send_flags |= IB_SEND_SOLICITED;
ic->i_data_op = NULL;
}
/* Put back wrs & credits we didn't use */
if (i < work_alloc) {
rds_ib_ring_unalloc(&ic->i_send_ring, work_alloc - i);
work_alloc = i;
}
if (ic->i_flowctl && i < credit_alloc)
rds_ib_send_add_credits(conn, credit_alloc - i);
if (nr_sig)
atomic_add(nr_sig, &ic->i_signaled_sends);
/* XXX need to worry about failed_wr and partial sends. */
failed_wr = &first->s_wr;
ret = ib_post_send(ic->i_cm_id->qp, &first->s_wr, &failed_wr);
rdsdebug("ic %p first %p (wr %p) ret %d wr %p\n", ic,
first, &first->s_wr, ret, failed_wr);
BUG_ON(failed_wr != &first->s_wr);
if (ret) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "RDS/IB: ib_post_send to %pI4 "
"returned %d\n", &conn->c_faddr, ret);
rds_ib_ring_unalloc(&ic->i_send_ring, work_alloc);
rds_ib_sub_signaled(ic, nr_sig);
if (prev->s_op) {
ic->i_data_op = prev->s_op;
prev->s_op = NULL;
}
rds_ib_conn_error(ic->conn, "ib_post_send failed\n");
goto out;
}
ret = bytes_sent;
out:
BUG_ON(adv_credits);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The Reliable Datagram Sockets (RDS) subsystem in the Linux kernel before 2.6.38 does not properly handle congestion map updates, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG_ON and system crash) via vectors involving (1) a loopback (aka loop) transmit operation or (2) an InfiniBand (aka ib) transmit operation.
Commit Message: rds: prevent BUG_ON triggering on congestion map updates
Recently had this bug halt reported to me:
kernel BUG at net/rds/send.c:329!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
SMP NR_CPUS=1024 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in: rds sunrpc ipv6 dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log ibmveth sg
ext4 jbd2 mbcache sd_mod crc_t10dif ibmvscsic scsi_transport_srp scsi_tgt
dm_mod [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan]
NIP: d000000003ca68f4 LR: d000000003ca67fc CTR: d000000003ca8770
REGS: c000000175cab980 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (2.6.32-118.el6.ppc64)
MSR: 8000000000029032 <EE,ME,CE,IR,DR> CR: 44000022 XER: 00000000
TASK = c00000017586ec90[1896] 'krdsd' THREAD: c000000175ca8000 CPU: 0
GPR00: 0000000000000150 c000000175cabc00 d000000003cb7340 0000000000002030
GPR04: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000030 0000000000000000 0000000000000030
GPR08: 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 c0000001756b1e30 0000000000010000
GPR12: d000000003caac90 c000000000fa2500 c0000001742b2858 c0000001742b2a00
GPR16: c0000001742b2a08 c0000001742b2820 0000000000000001 0000000000000001
GPR20: 0000000000000040 c0000001742b2814 c000000175cabc70 0800000000000000
GPR24: 0000000000000004 0200000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000001742b2860
GPR28: 0000000000000000 c0000001756b1c80 d000000003cb68e8 c0000001742b27b8
NIP [d000000003ca68f4] .rds_send_xmit+0x4c4/0x8a0 [rds]
LR [d000000003ca67fc] .rds_send_xmit+0x3cc/0x8a0 [rds]
Call Trace:
[c000000175cabc00] [d000000003ca67fc] .rds_send_xmit+0x3cc/0x8a0 [rds]
(unreliable)
[c000000175cabd30] [d000000003ca7e64] .rds_send_worker+0x54/0x100 [rds]
[c000000175cabdb0] [c0000000000b475c] .worker_thread+0x1dc/0x3c0
[c000000175cabed0] [c0000000000baa9c] .kthread+0xbc/0xd0
[c000000175cabf90] [c000000000032114] .kernel_thread+0x54/0x70
Instruction dump:
4bfffd50 60000000 60000000 39080001 935f004c f91f0040 41820024 813d017c
7d094a78 7d290074 7929d182 394a0020 <0b090000> 40e2ff68 4bffffa4 39200000
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Call Trace:
[c000000175cab560] [c000000000012e04] .show_stack+0x74/0x1c0 (unreliable)
[c000000175cab610] [c0000000005a365c] .panic+0x80/0x1b4
[c000000175cab6a0] [c00000000002fbcc] .die+0x21c/0x2a0
[c000000175cab750] [c000000000030000] ._exception+0x110/0x220
[c000000175cab910] [c000000000004b9c] program_check_common+0x11c/0x180
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,899
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *in)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
LutContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
AVFrame *out;
uint8_t *inrow, *outrow, *inrow0, *outrow0;
int i, j, plane, direct = 0;
if (av_frame_is_writable(in)) {
direct = 1;
out = in;
} else {
out = ff_get_video_buffer(outlink, outlink->w, outlink->h);
if (!out) {
av_frame_free(&in);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
av_frame_copy_props(out, in);
}
if (s->is_rgb) {
/* packed */
inrow0 = in ->data[0];
outrow0 = out->data[0];
for (i = 0; i < in->height; i ++) {
int w = inlink->w;
const uint8_t (*tab)[256] = (const uint8_t (*)[256])s->lut;
inrow = inrow0;
outrow = outrow0;
for (j = 0; j < w; j++) {
switch (s->step) {
case 4: outrow[3] = tab[3][inrow[3]]; // Fall-through
case 3: outrow[2] = tab[2][inrow[2]]; // Fall-through
case 2: outrow[1] = tab[1][inrow[1]]; // Fall-through
default: outrow[0] = tab[0][inrow[0]];
}
outrow += s->step;
inrow += s->step;
}
inrow0 += in ->linesize[0];
outrow0 += out->linesize[0];
}
} else {
/* planar */
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && in->data[plane]; plane++) {
int vsub = plane == 1 || plane == 2 ? s->vsub : 0;
int hsub = plane == 1 || plane == 2 ? s->hsub : 0;
int h = FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->h, vsub);
int w = FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->w, hsub);
inrow = in ->data[plane];
outrow = out->data[plane];
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
const uint8_t *tab = s->lut[plane];
for (j = 0; j < w; j++)
outrow[j] = tab[inrow[j]];
inrow += in ->linesize[plane];
outrow += out->linesize[plane];
}
}
}
if (!direct)
av_frame_free(&in);
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, out);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libavfilter in FFmpeg before 2.0.1 has unspecified impact and remote vectors related to a crafted *plane,* which triggers an out-of-bounds heap write.
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
|
Low
| 166,004
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void flush_tlb_current_task(void)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
preempt_disable();
count_vm_tlb_event(NR_TLB_LOCAL_FLUSH_ALL);
local_flush_tlb();
trace_tlb_flush(TLB_LOCAL_SHOOTDOWN, TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
if (cpumask_any_but(mm_cpumask(mm), smp_processor_id()) < nr_cpu_ids)
flush_tlb_others(mm_cpumask(mm), mm, 0UL, TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
preempt_enable();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in arch/x86/mm/tlb.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.1 allows local users to gain privileges by triggering access to a paging structure by a different CPU.
Commit Message: x86/mm: Add barriers and document switch_mm()-vs-flush synchronization
When switch_mm() activates a new PGD, it also sets a bit that
tells other CPUs that the PGD is in use so that TLB flush IPIs
will be sent. In order for that to work correctly, the bit
needs to be visible prior to loading the PGD and therefore
starting to fill the local TLB.
Document all the barriers that make this work correctly and add
a couple that were missing.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
Medium
| 167,439
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool NavigationRateLimiter::CanProceed() {
if (!enabled)
return true;
static constexpr int kStateUpdateLimit = 200;
static constexpr base::TimeDelta kStateUpdateLimitResetInterval =
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(10);
if (++count_ <= kStateUpdateLimit)
return true;
const base::TimeTicks now = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (now - time_first_count_ > kStateUpdateLimitResetInterval) {
time_first_count_ = now;
count_ = 1;
error_message_sent_ = false;
return true;
}
if (!error_message_sent_) {
error_message_sent_ = true;
if (auto* local_frame = DynamicTo<LocalFrame>(frame_.Get())) {
local_frame->Console().AddMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
mojom::ConsoleMessageSource::kJavaScript,
mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel::kWarning,
"Throttling navigation to prevent the browser from hanging. See "
"https://crbug.com/882238. Command line switch "
"--disable-ipc-flooding-protection can be used to bypass the "
"protection"));
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
Medium
| 172,491
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline int ip6_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
int transhdrlen, int mtu,unsigned int flags)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
/* There is support for UDP large send offload by network
* device, so create one single skb packet containing complete
* udp datagram
*/
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
hh_len + fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + 20,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
/* reserve space for Hardware header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
/* create space for UDP/IP header */
skb_put(skb,fragheaderlen + transhdrlen);
/* initialize network header pointer */
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
/* initialize protocol header pointer */
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + fragheaderlen;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
skb->csum = 0;
}
err = skb_append_datato_frags(sk,skb, getfrag, from,
(length - transhdrlen));
if (!err) {
struct frag_hdr fhdr;
/* Specify the length of each IPv6 datagram fragment.
* It has to be a multiple of 8.
*/
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = (mtu - fragheaderlen -
sizeof(struct frag_hdr)) & ~7;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
ipv6_select_ident(&fhdr);
skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id = fhdr.identification;
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
return 0;
}
/* There is not enough support do UPD LSO,
* so follow normal path
*/
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The IPv6 implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not generate Fragment Identification values separately for each destination, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (disrupted networking) by predicting these values and sending crafted packets.
Commit Message: ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,853
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ovl_rename2(struct inode *olddir, struct dentry *old,
struct inode *newdir, struct dentry *new,
unsigned int flags)
{
int err;
enum ovl_path_type old_type;
enum ovl_path_type new_type;
struct dentry *old_upperdir;
struct dentry *new_upperdir;
struct dentry *olddentry;
struct dentry *newdentry;
struct dentry *trap;
bool old_opaque;
bool new_opaque;
bool new_create = false;
bool cleanup_whiteout = false;
bool overwrite = !(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE);
bool is_dir = d_is_dir(old);
bool new_is_dir = false;
struct dentry *opaquedir = NULL;
const struct cred *old_cred = NULL;
struct cred *override_cred = NULL;
err = -EINVAL;
if (flags & ~(RENAME_EXCHANGE | RENAME_NOREPLACE))
goto out;
flags &= ~RENAME_NOREPLACE;
err = ovl_check_sticky(old);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Don't copy up directory trees */
old_type = ovl_path_type(old);
err = -EXDEV;
if (OVL_TYPE_MERGE_OR_LOWER(old_type) && is_dir)
goto out;
if (new->d_inode) {
err = ovl_check_sticky(new);
if (err)
goto out;
if (d_is_dir(new))
new_is_dir = true;
new_type = ovl_path_type(new);
err = -EXDEV;
if (!overwrite && OVL_TYPE_MERGE_OR_LOWER(new_type) && new_is_dir)
goto out;
err = 0;
if (!OVL_TYPE_UPPER(new_type) && !OVL_TYPE_UPPER(old_type)) {
if (ovl_dentry_lower(old)->d_inode ==
ovl_dentry_lower(new)->d_inode)
goto out;
}
if (OVL_TYPE_UPPER(new_type) && OVL_TYPE_UPPER(old_type)) {
if (ovl_dentry_upper(old)->d_inode ==
ovl_dentry_upper(new)->d_inode)
goto out;
}
} else {
if (ovl_dentry_is_opaque(new))
new_type = __OVL_PATH_UPPER;
else
new_type = __OVL_PATH_UPPER | __OVL_PATH_PURE;
}
err = ovl_want_write(old);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ovl_copy_up(old);
if (err)
goto out_drop_write;
err = ovl_copy_up(new->d_parent);
if (err)
goto out_drop_write;
if (!overwrite) {
err = ovl_copy_up(new);
if (err)
goto out_drop_write;
}
old_opaque = !OVL_TYPE_PURE_UPPER(old_type);
new_opaque = !OVL_TYPE_PURE_UPPER(new_type);
if (old_opaque || new_opaque) {
err = -ENOMEM;
override_cred = prepare_creds();
if (!override_cred)
goto out_drop_write;
/*
* CAP_SYS_ADMIN for setting xattr on whiteout, opaque dir
* CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE for create in workdir
* CAP_FOWNER for removing whiteout from sticky dir
* CAP_FSETID for chmod of opaque dir
* CAP_CHOWN for chown of opaque dir
*/
cap_raise(override_cred->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
cap_raise(override_cred->cap_effective, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE);
cap_raise(override_cred->cap_effective, CAP_FOWNER);
cap_raise(override_cred->cap_effective, CAP_FSETID);
cap_raise(override_cred->cap_effective, CAP_CHOWN);
old_cred = override_creds(override_cred);
}
if (overwrite && OVL_TYPE_MERGE_OR_LOWER(new_type) && new_is_dir) {
opaquedir = ovl_check_empty_and_clear(new);
err = PTR_ERR(opaquedir);
if (IS_ERR(opaquedir)) {
opaquedir = NULL;
goto out_revert_creds;
}
}
if (overwrite) {
if (old_opaque) {
if (new->d_inode || !new_opaque) {
/* Whiteout source */
flags |= RENAME_WHITEOUT;
} else {
/* Switch whiteouts */
flags |= RENAME_EXCHANGE;
}
} else if (is_dir && !new->d_inode && new_opaque) {
flags |= RENAME_EXCHANGE;
cleanup_whiteout = true;
}
}
old_upperdir = ovl_dentry_upper(old->d_parent);
new_upperdir = ovl_dentry_upper(new->d_parent);
trap = lock_rename(new_upperdir, old_upperdir);
olddentry = ovl_dentry_upper(old);
newdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(new);
if (newdentry) {
if (opaquedir) {
newdentry = opaquedir;
opaquedir = NULL;
} else {
dget(newdentry);
}
} else {
new_create = true;
newdentry = lookup_one_len(new->d_name.name, new_upperdir,
new->d_name.len);
err = PTR_ERR(newdentry);
if (IS_ERR(newdentry))
goto out_unlock;
}
err = -ESTALE;
if (olddentry->d_parent != old_upperdir)
goto out_dput;
if (newdentry->d_parent != new_upperdir)
goto out_dput;
if (olddentry == trap)
goto out_dput;
if (newdentry == trap)
goto out_dput;
if (is_dir && !old_opaque && new_opaque) {
err = ovl_set_opaque(olddentry);
if (err)
goto out_dput;
}
if (!overwrite && new_is_dir && old_opaque && !new_opaque) {
err = ovl_set_opaque(newdentry);
if (err)
goto out_dput;
}
if (old_opaque || new_opaque) {
err = ovl_do_rename(old_upperdir->d_inode, olddentry,
new_upperdir->d_inode, newdentry,
flags);
} else {
/* No debug for the plain case */
BUG_ON(flags & ~RENAME_EXCHANGE);
err = vfs_rename(old_upperdir->d_inode, olddentry,
new_upperdir->d_inode, newdentry,
NULL, flags);
}
if (err) {
if (is_dir && !old_opaque && new_opaque)
ovl_remove_opaque(olddentry);
if (!overwrite && new_is_dir && old_opaque && !new_opaque)
ovl_remove_opaque(newdentry);
goto out_dput;
}
if (is_dir && old_opaque && !new_opaque)
ovl_remove_opaque(olddentry);
if (!overwrite && new_is_dir && !old_opaque && new_opaque)
ovl_remove_opaque(newdentry);
/*
* Old dentry now lives in different location. Dentries in
* lowerstack are stale. We cannot drop them here because
* access to them is lockless. This could be only pure upper
* or opaque directory - numlower is zero. Or upper non-dir
* entry - its pureness is tracked by flag opaque.
*/
if (old_opaque != new_opaque) {
ovl_dentry_set_opaque(old, new_opaque);
if (!overwrite)
ovl_dentry_set_opaque(new, old_opaque);
}
if (cleanup_whiteout)
ovl_cleanup(old_upperdir->d_inode, newdentry);
ovl_dentry_version_inc(old->d_parent);
ovl_dentry_version_inc(new->d_parent);
out_dput:
dput(newdentry);
out_unlock:
unlock_rename(new_upperdir, old_upperdir);
out_revert_creds:
if (old_opaque || new_opaque) {
revert_creds(old_cred);
put_cred(override_cred);
}
out_drop_write:
ovl_drop_write(old);
out:
dput(opaquedir);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: fs/overlayfs/dir.c in the OverlayFS filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.6 does not properly verify the upper dentry before proceeding with unlink and rename system-call processing, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a rename system call that specifies a self-hardlink.
Commit Message: ovl: verify upper dentry before unlink and rename
Unlink and rename in overlayfs checked the upper dentry for staleness by
verifying upper->d_parent against upperdir. However the dentry can go
stale also by being unhashed, for example.
Expand the verification to actually look up the name again (under parent
lock) and check if it matches the upper dentry. This matches what the VFS
does before passing the dentry to filesytem's unlink/rename methods, which
excludes any inconsistency caused by overlayfs.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 167,015
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HandleCompleteLogin(const base::ListValue* args) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
oauth2_delegate_.reset(new InlineLoginUIOAuth2Delegate(web_ui()));
oauth2_token_fetcher_.reset(new chromeos::OAuth2TokenFetcher(
oauth2_delegate_.get(), profile_->GetRequestContext()));
oauth2_token_fetcher_->StartExchangeFromCookies();
#elif !defined(OS_ANDROID)
const base::DictionaryValue* dict = NULL;
string16 email;
string16 password;
if (!args->GetDictionary(0, &dict) || !dict ||
!dict->GetString("email", &email) ||
!dict->GetString("password", &password)) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
new OneClickSigninSyncStarter(
profile_, NULL, "0" /* session_index 0 for the default user */,
UTF16ToASCII(email), UTF16ToASCII(password),
OneClickSigninSyncStarter::SYNC_WITH_DEFAULT_SETTINGS,
true /* force_same_tab_navigation */,
OneClickSigninSyncStarter::NO_CONFIRMATION);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("inline.login.closeDialog");
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly determine the circumstances in which a renderer process can be considered a trusted process for sign-in and subsequent sync operations, which makes it easier for remote attackers to conduct phishing attacks via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Display confirmation dialog for untrusted signins
BUG=252062
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17482002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@208520 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,247
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ProcessStateChangesUnifiedPlan(
WebRtcSetDescriptionObserver::States states) {
DCHECK_EQ(sdp_semantics_, webrtc::SdpSemantics::kUnifiedPlan);
handler_->OnModifyTransceivers(
std::move(states.transceiver_states),
action_ == PeerConnectionTracker::ACTION_SET_REMOTE_DESCRIPTION);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Insufficient checks of pointer validity in WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
|
Medium
| 173,075
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void v9fs_attach(void *opaque)
{
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
int32_t fid, afid, n_uname;
V9fsString uname, aname;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsQID qid;
ssize_t err;
v9fs_string_init(&uname);
v9fs_string_init(&aname);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "ddssd", &fid,
&afid, &uname, &aname, &n_uname);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_attach(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, afid, uname.data, aname.data);
fidp = alloc_fid(s, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp->uid = n_uname;
err = v9fs_co_name_to_path(pdu, NULL, "/", &fidp->path);
if (err < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err = fid_to_qid(pdu, fidp, &qid);
if (err < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "Q", &qid);
if (err < 0) {
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err += offset;
trace_v9fs_attach_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id,
qid.type, qid.version, qid.path);
/*
* attach could get called multiple times for the same export.
*/
if (!s->migration_blocker) {
s->root_fid = fid;
error_setg(&s->migration_blocker,
"Migration is disabled when VirtFS export path '%s' is mounted in the guest using mount_tag '%s'",
s->ctx.fs_root ? s->ctx.fs_root : "NULL", s->tag);
migrate_add_blocker(s->migration_blocker);
}
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&uname);
v9fs_string_free(&aname);
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: Directory traversal vulnerability in hw/9pfs/9p.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to access host files outside the export path via a .. (dot dot) in an unspecified string.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,938
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_vld_decode(
dec_state_t *ps_dec,
WORD16 *pi2_outAddr, /*!< Address where decoded symbols will be stored */
const UWORD8 *pu1_scan, /*!< Scan table to be used */
UWORD8 *pu1_pos, /*!< Scan table to be used */
UWORD16 u2_intra_flag, /*!< Intra Macroblock or not */
UWORD16 u2_chroma_flag, /*!< Chroma Block or not */
UWORD16 u2_d_picture, /*!< D Picture or not */
UWORD16 u2_intra_vlc_format, /*!< Intra VLC format */
UWORD16 u2_mpeg2, /*!< MPEG-2 or not */
WORD32 *pi4_num_coeffs /*!< Returns the number of coeffs in block */
)
{
UWORD32 u4_sym_len;
UWORD32 u4_decoded_value;
UWORD32 u4_level_first_byte;
WORD32 u4_level;
UWORD32 u4_run, u4_numCoeffs;
UWORD32 u4_buf;
UWORD32 u4_buf_nxt;
UWORD32 u4_offset;
UWORD32 *pu4_buf_aligned;
UWORD32 u4_bits;
stream_t *ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
WORD32 u4_pos;
UWORD32 u4_nz_cols;
UWORD32 u4_nz_rows;
*pi4_num_coeffs = 0;
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols = 0;
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows = 0;
u4_nz_cols = ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols;
u4_nz_rows = ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows;
GET_TEMP_STREAM_DATA(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,pu4_buf_aligned,ps_stream)
/**************************************************************************/
/* Decode the DC coefficient in case of Intra block */
/**************************************************************************/
if(u2_intra_flag)
{
WORD32 dc_size;
WORD32 dc_diff;
WORD32 maxLen;
WORD32 idx;
maxLen = MPEG2_DCT_DC_SIZE_LEN;
idx = 0;
if(u2_chroma_flag != 0)
{
maxLen += 1;
idx++;
}
{
WORD16 end = 0;
UWORD32 maxLen_tmp = maxLen;
UWORD16 m_iBit;
/* Get the maximum number of bits needed to decode a symbol */
IBITS_NXT(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,maxLen)
do
{
maxLen_tmp--;
/* Read one bit at a time from the variable to decode the huffman code */
m_iBit = (UWORD8)((u4_bits >> maxLen_tmp) & 0x1);
/* Get the next node pointer or the symbol from the tree */
end = gai2_impeg2d_dct_dc_size[idx][end][m_iBit];
}while(end > 0);
dc_size = end + MPEG2_DCT_DC_SIZE_OFFSET;
/* Flush the appropriate number of bits from the stream */
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,(maxLen - maxLen_tmp),pu4_buf_aligned)
}
if (dc_size != 0)
{
UWORD32 u4_bits;
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned, dc_size)
dc_diff = u4_bits;
if ((dc_diff & (1 << (dc_size - 1))) == 0) //v Probably the prediction algo?
dc_diff -= (1 << dc_size) - 1;
}
else
{
dc_diff = 0;
}
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = dc_diff;
/* This indicates the position of the coefficient. Since this is the DC
* coefficient, we put the position as 0.
*/
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = pu1_scan[0];
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
if (0 != dc_diff)
{
u4_nz_cols |= 0x01;
u4_nz_rows |= 0x01;
}
u4_numCoeffs = 1;
}
/**************************************************************************/
/* Decoding of first AC coefficient in case of non Intra block */
/**************************************************************************/
else
{
/* First symbol can be 1s */
UWORD32 u4_bits;
IBITS_NXT(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,1)
if(u4_bits == 1)
{
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,1, pu4_buf_aligned)
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned, 1)
if(u4_bits == 1)
{
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = -1;
}
else
{
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = 1;
}
/* This indicates the position of the coefficient. Since this is the DC
* coefficient, we put the position as 0.
*/
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = pu1_scan[0];
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
u4_numCoeffs = 1;
u4_nz_cols |= 0x01;
u4_nz_rows |= 0x01;
}
else
{
u4_numCoeffs = 0;
}
}
if (1 == u2_d_picture)
{
PUT_TEMP_STREAM_DATA(u4_buf, u4_buf_nxt, u4_offset, pu4_buf_aligned, ps_stream)
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols = u4_nz_cols;
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows = u4_nz_rows;
return ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE);
}
if (1 == u2_intra_vlc_format && u2_intra_flag)
{
while(1)
{
UWORD32 lead_zeros;
WORD16 DecodedValue;
u4_sym_len = 17;
IBITS_NXT(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,u4_sym_len)
DecodedValue = gau2_impeg2d_tab_one_1_9[u4_bits >> 8];
u4_sym_len = (DecodedValue & 0xf);
u4_level = DecodedValue >> 9;
/* One table lookup */
if(0 != u4_level)
{
u4_run = ((DecodedValue >> 4) & 0x1f);
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
else
{
if (DecodedValue == END_OF_BLOCK_ONE)
{
u4_sym_len = 4;
break;
}
else
{
/*Second table lookup*/
lead_zeros = CLZ(u4_bits) - 20;/* -16 since we are dealing with WORD32 */
if (0 != lead_zeros)
{
u4_bits = (u4_bits >> (6 - lead_zeros)) & 0x001F;
/* Flush the number of bits */
if (1 == lead_zeros)
{
u4_sym_len = ((u4_bits & 0x18) >> 3) == 2 ? 11:10;
}
else
{
u4_sym_len = 11 + lead_zeros;
}
/* flushing */
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
/* Calculate the address */
u4_bits = ((lead_zeros - 1) << 5) + u4_bits;
DecodedValue = gau2_impeg2d_tab_one_10_16[u4_bits];
u4_run = BITS(DecodedValue, 8,4);
u4_level = ((WORD16) DecodedValue) >> 9;
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
/*********************************************************************/
/* MPEG2 Escape Code */
/*********************************************************************/
else if(u2_mpeg2 == 1)
{
u4_sym_len = 6;
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,18)
u4_decoded_value = u4_bits;
u4_run = (u4_decoded_value >> 12);
u4_level = (u4_decoded_value & 0x0FFF);
if (u4_level)
u4_level = (u4_level - ((u4_level & 0x0800) << 1));
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
/*********************************************************************/
/* MPEG1 Escape Code */
/*********************************************************************/
else
{
/*-----------------------------------------------------------
* MPEG-1 Stream
*
* <See D.9.3 of MPEG-2> Run-level escape syntax
* Run-level values that cannot be coded with a VLC are coded
* by the escape code '0000 01' followed by
* either a 14-bit FLC (127 <= level <= 127),
* or a 22-bit FLC (255 <= level <= 255).
* This is described in Annex B,B.5f of MPEG-1.standard
*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
/*-----------------------------------------------------------
* First 6 bits are the value of the Run. Next is First 8 bits
* of Level. These bits decide whether it is 14 bit FLC or
* 22-bit FLC.
*
* If( first 8 bits of Level == '1000000' or '00000000')
* then its is 22-bit FLC.
* else
* it is 14-bit FLC.
*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_sym_len = 6;
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,14)
u4_decoded_value = u4_bits;
u4_run = (u4_decoded_value >> 8);
u4_level_first_byte = (u4_decoded_value & 0x0FF);
if(u4_level_first_byte & 0x7F)
{
/*-------------------------------------------------------
* First 8 bits of level are neither 1000000 nor 00000000
* Hence 14-bit FLC (Last 8 bits are used to get level)
*
* Level = (msb of Level_First_Byte is 1)?
* Level_First_Byte - 256 : Level_First_Byte
*-------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_level = (u4_level_first_byte -
((u4_level_first_byte & 0x80) << 1));
}
else
{
/*-------------------------------------------------------
* Next 8 bits are either 1000000 or 00000000
* Hence 22-bit FLC (Last 16 bits are used to get level)
*
* Level = (msb of Level_First_Byte is 1)?
* Level_Second_Byte - 256 : Level_Second_Byte
*-------------------------------------------------------*/
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,8)
u4_level = u4_bits;
u4_level = (u4_level - (u4_level_first_byte << 1));
}
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
}
}
u4_nz_cols |= 1 << (u4_pos & 0x7);
u4_nz_rows |= 1 << (u4_pos >> 0x3);
}
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,u4_sym_len)
if (u4_numCoeffs > 64)
{
return IMPEG2D_MB_TEX_DECODE_ERR;
}
}
else
{
while(1)
{
UWORD32 lead_zeros;
UWORD16 DecodedValue;
u4_sym_len = 17;
IBITS_NXT(u4_buf, u4_buf_nxt, u4_offset, u4_bits, u4_sym_len)
DecodedValue = gau2_impeg2d_tab_zero_1_9[u4_bits >> 8];
u4_sym_len = BITS(DecodedValue, 3, 0);
u4_level = ((WORD16) DecodedValue) >> 9;
if (0 != u4_level)
{
u4_run = BITS(DecodedValue, 8,4);
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
else
{
if(DecodedValue == END_OF_BLOCK_ZERO)
{
u4_sym_len = 2;
break;
}
else
{
lead_zeros = CLZ(u4_bits) - 20;/* -15 since we are dealing with WORD32 */
/*Second table lookup*/
if (0 != lead_zeros)
{
u4_bits = (u4_bits >> (6 - lead_zeros)) & 0x001F;
/* Flush the number of bits */
u4_sym_len = 11 + lead_zeros;
/* Calculate the address */
u4_bits = ((lead_zeros - 1) << 5) + u4_bits;
DecodedValue = gau2_impeg2d_tab_zero_10_16[u4_bits];
u4_run = BITS(DecodedValue, 8,4);
u4_level = ((WORD16) DecodedValue) >> 9;
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
if (1 == lead_zeros)
u4_sym_len--;
/* flushing */
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
/*Escape Sequence*/
else if(u2_mpeg2 == 1)
{
u4_sym_len = 6;
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,18)
u4_decoded_value = u4_bits;
u4_run = (u4_decoded_value >> 12);
u4_level = (u4_decoded_value & 0x0FFF);
if (u4_level)
u4_level = (u4_level - ((u4_level & 0x0800) << 1));
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
/*********************************************************************/
/* MPEG1 Escape Code */
/*********************************************************************/
else
{
/*-----------------------------------------------------------
* MPEG-1 Stream
*
* <See D.9.3 of MPEG-2> Run-level escape syntax
* Run-level values that cannot be coded with a VLC are coded
* by the escape code '0000 01' followed by
* either a 14-bit FLC (127 <= level <= 127),
* or a 22-bit FLC (255 <= level <= 255).
* This is described in Annex B,B.5f of MPEG-1.standard
*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
/*-----------------------------------------------------------
* First 6 bits are the value of the Run. Next is First 8 bits
* of Level. These bits decide whether it is 14 bit FLC or
* 22-bit FLC.
*
* If( first 8 bits of Level == '1000000' or '00000000')
* then its is 22-bit FLC.
* else
* it is 14-bit FLC.
*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_sym_len = 6;
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,14)
u4_decoded_value = u4_bits;
u4_run = (u4_decoded_value >> 8);
u4_level_first_byte = (u4_decoded_value & 0x0FF);
if(u4_level_first_byte & 0x7F)
{
/*-------------------------------------------------------
* First 8 bits of level are neither 1000000 nor 00000000
* Hence 14-bit FLC (Last 8 bits are used to get level)
*
* Level = (msb of Level_First_Byte is 1)?
* Level_First_Byte - 256 : Level_First_Byte
*-------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_level = (u4_level_first_byte -
((u4_level_first_byte & 0x80) << 1));
}
else
{
/*-------------------------------------------------------
* Next 8 bits are either 1000000 or 00000000
* Hence 22-bit FLC (Last 16 bits are used to get level)
*
* Level = (msb of Level_First_Byte is 1)?
* Level_Second_Byte - 256 : Level_Second_Byte
*-------------------------------------------------------*/
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,8)
u4_level = u4_bits;
u4_level = (u4_level - (u4_level_first_byte << 1));
}
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
}
}
u4_nz_cols |= 1 << (u4_pos & 0x7);
u4_nz_rows |= 1 << (u4_pos >> 0x3);
}
if (u4_numCoeffs > 64)
{
return IMPEG2D_MB_TEX_DECODE_ERR;
}
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,u4_sym_len)
}
PUT_TEMP_STREAM_DATA(u4_buf, u4_buf_nxt, u4_offset, pu4_buf_aligned, ps_stream)
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols = u4_nz_cols;
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows = u4_nz_rows;
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in decoder/impeg2d_vld.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 25812590.
Commit Message: Fixed stack buffer overflow
Bugfix: 25812590
Moved check for numCoeffs > 64 inside the coeff decode loop
Change-Id: I444b77ef2a3da9233ec14bb72ac70b7e2fa56bd1
(cherry picked from commit ff3496c45c571da7eb93d6f9f05758813468fc72)
|
Low
| 173,925
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void OomInterventionTabHelper::StartDetectionInRenderer() {
auto* config = OomInterventionConfig::GetInstance();
bool renderer_pause_enabled = config->is_renderer_pause_enabled();
bool navigate_ads_enabled = config->is_navigate_ads_enabled();
if ((renderer_pause_enabled || navigate_ads_enabled) && decider_) {
DCHECK(!web_contents()->GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord());
const std::string& host = web_contents()->GetVisibleURL().host();
if (!decider_->CanTriggerIntervention(host)) {
renderer_pause_enabled = false;
navigate_ads_enabled = false;
}
}
content::RenderFrameHost* main_frame = web_contents()->GetMainFrame();
DCHECK(main_frame);
content::RenderProcessHost* render_process_host = main_frame->GetProcess();
DCHECK(render_process_host);
content::BindInterface(render_process_host,
mojo::MakeRequest(&intervention_));
DCHECK(!binding_.is_bound());
blink::mojom::OomInterventionHostPtr host;
binding_.Bind(mojo::MakeRequest(&host));
blink::mojom::DetectionArgsPtr detection_args =
config->GetRendererOomDetectionArgs();
intervention_->StartDetection(std::move(host), std::move(detection_args),
renderer_pause_enabled, navigate_ads_enabled);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Array.prototype.concat implementation in builtins.cc in Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.108, does not properly consider element data types, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: OomIntervention opt-out should work properly with 'show original'
OomIntervention should not be re-triggered on the same page if the user declines the intervention once.
This CL fixes the bug.
Bug: 889131, 887119
Change-Id: Idb9eebb2bb9f79756b63f0e010fe018ba5c490e8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1245019
Commit-Queue: Yuzu Saijo <yuzus@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594574}
|
Medium
| 172,114
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ptrace_triggered(struct perf_event *bp, int nmi,
struct perf_sample_data *data, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_event_attr attr;
/*
* Disable the breakpoint request here since ptrace has defined a
* one-shot behaviour for breakpoint exceptions.
*/
attr = bp->attr;
attr.disabled = true;
modify_user_hw_breakpoint(bp, &attr);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,795
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool LayoutSVGTransformableContainer::calculateLocalTransform()
{
SVGGraphicsElement* element = toSVGGraphicsElement(this->element());
ASSERT(element);
SVGUseElement* useElement = nullptr;
if (isSVGUseElement(*element)) {
useElement = toSVGUseElement(element);
} else if (isSVGGElement(*element) && toSVGGElement(element)->inUseShadowTree()) {
SVGElement* correspondingElement = element->correspondingElement();
if (isSVGUseElement(correspondingElement))
useElement = toSVGUseElement(correspondingElement);
}
if (useElement) {
SVGLengthContext lengthContext(useElement);
FloatSize translation(
useElement->x()->currentValue()->value(lengthContext),
useElement->y()->currentValue()->value(lengthContext));
if (translation != m_additionalTranslation)
m_needsTransformUpdate = true;
m_additionalTranslation = translation;
}
if (!m_needsTransformUpdate)
return false;
m_localTransform = element->calculateAnimatedLocalTransform();
m_localTransform.translate(m_additionalTranslation.width(), m_additionalTranslation.height());
m_needsTransformUpdate = false;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 36.0.1985.143 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
|
Low
| 171,666
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int cg_getattr(const char *path, struct stat *sb)
{
struct timespec now;
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
char * cgdir = NULL;
char *fpath = NULL, *path1, *path2;
struct cgfs_files *k = NULL;
const char *cgroup;
const char *controller = NULL;
int ret = -ENOENT;
if (!fc)
return -EIO;
memset(sb, 0, sizeof(struct stat));
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
sb->st_uid = sb->st_gid = 0;
sb->st_atim = sb->st_mtim = sb->st_ctim = now;
sb->st_size = 0;
if (strcmp(path, "/cgroup") == 0) {
sb->st_mode = S_IFDIR | 00755;
sb->st_nlink = 2;
return 0;
}
controller = pick_controller_from_path(fc, path);
if (!controller)
return -EIO;
cgroup = find_cgroup_in_path(path);
if (!cgroup) {
/* this is just /cgroup/controller, return it as a dir */
sb->st_mode = S_IFDIR | 00755;
sb->st_nlink = 2;
return 0;
}
get_cgdir_and_path(cgroup, &cgdir, &fpath);
if (!fpath) {
path1 = "/";
path2 = cgdir;
} else {
path1 = cgdir;
path2 = fpath;
}
/* check that cgcopy is either a child cgroup of cgdir, or listed in its keys.
* Then check that caller's cgroup is under path if fpath is a child
* cgroup, or cgdir if fpath is a file */
if (is_child_cgroup(controller, path1, path2)) {
if (!caller_is_in_ancestor(fc->pid, controller, cgroup, NULL)) {
/* this is just /cgroup/controller, return it as a dir */
sb->st_mode = S_IFDIR | 00555;
sb->st_nlink = 2;
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
if (!fc_may_access(fc, controller, cgroup, NULL, O_RDONLY)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
sb->st_mode = S_IFDIR | 00755;
k = cgfs_get_key(controller, cgroup, "tasks");
if (!k) {
sb->st_uid = sb->st_gid = 0;
} else {
sb->st_uid = k->uid;
sb->st_gid = k->gid;
}
free_key(k);
sb->st_nlink = 2;
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
if ((k = cgfs_get_key(controller, path1, path2)) != NULL) {
sb->st_mode = S_IFREG | k->mode;
sb->st_nlink = 1;
sb->st_uid = k->uid;
sb->st_gid = k->gid;
sb->st_size = 0;
free_key(k);
if (!caller_is_in_ancestor(fc->pid, controller, path1, NULL)) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
if (!fc_may_access(fc, controller, path1, path2, O_RDONLY)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
}
out:
free(cgdir);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: LXCFS before 0.12 does not properly enforce directory escapes, which might allow local users to gain privileges by (1) querying or (2) updating a cgroup.
Commit Message: Fix checking of parent directories
Taken from the justification in the launchpad bug:
To a task in freezer cgroup /a/b/c/d, it should appear that there are no
cgroups other than its descendents. Since this is a filesystem, we must have
the parent directories, but each parent cgroup should only contain the child
which the task can see.
So, when this task looks at /a/b, it should see only directory 'c' and no
files. Attempt to create /a/b/x should result in -EPERM, whether /a/b/x already
exists or not. Attempts to query /a/b/x should result in -ENOENT whether /a/b/x
exists or not. Opening /a/b/tasks should result in -ENOENT.
The caller_may_see_dir checks specifically whether a task may see a cgroup
directory - i.e. /a/b/x if opening /a/b/x/tasks, and /a/b/c/d if doing
opendir('/a/b/c/d').
caller_is_in_ancestor() will return true if the caller in /a/b/c/d looks at
/a/b/c/d/e. If the caller is in a child cgroup of the queried one - i.e. if the
task in /a/b/c/d queries /a/b, then *nextcg will container the next (the only)
directory which he can see in the path - 'c'.
Beyond this, regular DAC permissions should apply, with the
root-in-user-namespace privilege over its mapped uids being respected. The
fc_may_access check does this check for both directories and files.
This is CVE-2015-1342 (LP: #1508481)
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
|
Low
| 166,704
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void umount_tree(struct mount *mnt, enum umount_tree_flags how)
{
LIST_HEAD(tmp_list);
struct mount *p;
if (how & UMOUNT_PROPAGATE)
propagate_mount_unlock(mnt);
/* Gather the mounts to umount */
for (p = mnt; p; p = next_mnt(p, mnt)) {
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_UMOUNT;
list_move(&p->mnt_list, &tmp_list);
}
/* Hide the mounts from mnt_mounts */
list_for_each_entry(p, &tmp_list, mnt_list) {
list_del_init(&p->mnt_child);
}
/* Add propogated mounts to the tmp_list */
if (how & UMOUNT_PROPAGATE)
propagate_umount(&tmp_list);
while (!list_empty(&tmp_list)) {
p = list_first_entry(&tmp_list, struct mount, mnt_list);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_expire);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_list);
__touch_mnt_namespace(p->mnt_ns);
p->mnt_ns = NULL;
if (how & UMOUNT_SYNC)
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT;
pin_insert_group(&p->mnt_umount, &p->mnt_parent->mnt, &unmounted);
if (mnt_has_parent(p)) {
mnt_add_count(p->mnt_parent, -1);
umount_mnt(p);
}
change_mnt_propagation(p, MS_PRIVATE);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: fs/namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 4.0.2 processes MNT_DETACH umount2 system calls without verifying that the MNT_LOCKED flag is unset, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and navigate to filesystem locations beneath a mount by calling umount2 within a user namespace.
Commit Message: mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts
Modify umount(MNT_DETACH) to keep mounts in the hash table that are
locked to their parent mounts, when the parent is lazily unmounted.
In mntput_no_expire detach the children from the hash table, depending
on mnt_pin_kill in cleanup_mnt to decrement the mnt_count of the children.
In __detach_mounts if there are any mounts that have been unmounted
but still are on the list of mounts of a mountpoint, remove their
children from the mount hash table and those children to the unmounted
list so they won't linger potentially indefinitely waiting for their
final mntput, now that the mounts serve no purpose.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
Low
| 167,590
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t ucma_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct ucma_file *file = filp->private_data;
struct rdma_ucm_cmd_hdr hdr;
ssize_t ret;
if (len < sizeof(hdr))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&hdr, buf, sizeof(hdr)))
return -EFAULT;
if (hdr.cmd >= ARRAY_SIZE(ucma_cmd_table))
return -EINVAL;
if (hdr.in + sizeof(hdr) > len)
return -EINVAL;
if (!ucma_cmd_table[hdr.cmd])
return -ENOSYS;
ret = ucma_cmd_table[hdr.cmd](file, buf + sizeof(hdr), hdr.in, hdr.out);
if (!ret)
ret = len;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The InfiniBand (aka IB) stack in the Linux kernel before 4.5.3 incorrectly relies on the write system call, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (kernel memory write operation) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a uAPI interface.
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 167,239
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateFloat( double num )
{
cJSON *item = cJSON_New_Item();
if ( item ) {
item->type = cJSON_Number;
item->valuefloat = num;
item->valueint = num;
}
return item;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,272
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ContextImpl::CreateFrame(
fidl::InterfaceHandle<chromium::web::FrameObserver> observer,
fidl::InterfaceRequest<chromium::web::Frame> frame_request) {
auto web_contents = content::WebContents::Create(
content::WebContents::CreateParams(browser_context_, nullptr));
frame_bindings_.AddBinding(
std::make_unique<FrameImpl>(std::move(web_contents), observer.Bind()),
std::move(frame_request));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PendingScript::notifyFinished function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/PendingScript.cpp in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 relies on memory-cache information about integrity-check occurrences instead of integrity-check successes, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Subresource Integrity (aka SRI) protection mechanism by triggering two loads of the same resource.
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
|
Low
| 172,151
|
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