instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 386
71.4k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 15
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: do_ip_vs_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
{
int ret;
unsigned char arg[MAX_ARG_LEN];
struct ip_vs_service_user *usvc_compat;
struct ip_vs_service_user_kern usvc;
struct ip_vs_service *svc;
struct ip_vs_dest_user *udest_compat;
struct ip_vs_dest_user_kern udest;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (len != set_arglen[SET_CMDID(cmd)]) {
pr_err("set_ctl: len %u != %u\n",
len, set_arglen[SET_CMDID(cmd)]);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_from_user(arg, user, len) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
/* increase the module use count */
ip_vs_use_count_inc();
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&__ip_vs_mutex)) {
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto out_dec;
}
if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_FLUSH) {
/* Flush the virtual service */
ret = ip_vs_flush();
goto out_unlock;
} else if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_TIMEOUT) {
/* Set timeout values for (tcp tcpfin udp) */
ret = ip_vs_set_timeout((struct ip_vs_timeout_user *)arg);
goto out_unlock;
} else if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_STARTDAEMON) {
struct ip_vs_daemon_user *dm = (struct ip_vs_daemon_user *)arg;
ret = start_sync_thread(dm->state, dm->mcast_ifn, dm->syncid);
goto out_unlock;
} else if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_STOPDAEMON) {
struct ip_vs_daemon_user *dm = (struct ip_vs_daemon_user *)arg;
ret = stop_sync_thread(dm->state);
goto out_unlock;
}
usvc_compat = (struct ip_vs_service_user *)arg;
udest_compat = (struct ip_vs_dest_user *)(usvc_compat + 1);
/* We only use the new structs internally, so copy userspace compat
* structs to extended internal versions */
ip_vs_copy_usvc_compat(&usvc, usvc_compat);
ip_vs_copy_udest_compat(&udest, udest_compat);
if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_ZERO) {
/* if no service address is set, zero counters in all */
if (!usvc.fwmark && !usvc.addr.ip && !usvc.port) {
ret = ip_vs_zero_all();
goto out_unlock;
}
}
/* Check for valid protocol: TCP or UDP, even for fwmark!=0 */
if (usvc.protocol != IPPROTO_TCP && usvc.protocol != IPPROTO_UDP) {
pr_err("set_ctl: invalid protocol: %d %pI4:%d %s\n",
usvc.protocol, &usvc.addr.ip,
ntohs(usvc.port), usvc.sched_name);
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Lookup the exact service by <protocol, addr, port> or fwmark */
if (usvc.fwmark == 0)
svc = __ip_vs_service_get(usvc.af, usvc.protocol,
&usvc.addr, usvc.port);
else
svc = __ip_vs_svc_fwm_get(usvc.af, usvc.fwmark);
if (cmd != IP_VS_SO_SET_ADD
&& (svc == NULL || svc->protocol != usvc.protocol)) {
ret = -ESRCH;
goto out_unlock;
}
switch (cmd) {
case IP_VS_SO_SET_ADD:
if (svc != NULL)
ret = -EEXIST;
else
ret = ip_vs_add_service(&usvc, &svc);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_EDIT:
ret = ip_vs_edit_service(svc, &usvc);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_DEL:
ret = ip_vs_del_service(svc);
if (!ret)
goto out_unlock;
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_ZERO:
ret = ip_vs_zero_service(svc);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_ADDDEST:
ret = ip_vs_add_dest(svc, &udest);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_EDITDEST:
ret = ip_vs_edit_dest(svc, &udest);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_DELDEST:
ret = ip_vs_del_dest(svc, &udest);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
}
if (svc)
ip_vs_service_put(svc);
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
out_dec:
/* decrease the module use count */
ip_vs_use_count_dec();
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.33, when CONFIG_IP_VS is used, allow local users to gain privileges by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability for (1) a getsockopt system call, related to the do_ip_vs_get_ctl function, or (2) a setsockopt system call, related to the do_ip_vs_set_ctl function.
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
|
Medium
| 18,331
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RunAccuracyCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
uint32_t max_error = 0;
int64_t total_error = 0;
const int count_test_block = 10000;
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_input_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_temp_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, kNumCoeffs);
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8();
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8();
test_input_block[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block,
test_temp_block, pitch_));
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, dst, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
const uint32_t diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const uint32_t error = diff * diff;
if (max_error < error)
max_error = error;
total_error += error;
}
}
EXPECT_GE(1u, max_error)
<< "Error: 16x16 FHT/IHT has an individual round trip error > 1";
EXPECT_GE(count_test_block , total_error)
<< "Error: 16x16 FHT/IHT has average round trip error > 1 per block";
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 2,902
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_get_notify)
{
zval *pgsql_link;
int id = -1;
long result_type = PGSQL_ASSOC;
PGconn *pgsql;
PGnotify *pgsql_notify;
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r|l",
&pgsql_link, &result_type) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
if (!(result_type & PGSQL_BOTH)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid result type");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PQconsumeInput(pgsql);
pgsql_notify = PQnotifies(pgsql);
if (!pgsql_notify) {
/* no notify message */
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
if (result_type & PGSQL_NUM) {
add_index_string(return_value, 0, pgsql_notify->relname, 1);
add_index_long(return_value, 1, pgsql_notify->be_pid);
#if HAVE_PQPROTOCOLVERSION && HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
if (PQprotocolVersion(pgsql) >= 3 && atof(PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "server_version")) >= 9.0) {
#else
if (atof(PG_VERSION) >= 9.0) {
#endif
#if HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
add_index_string(return_value, 2, pgsql_notify->extra, 1);
#endif
}
}
if (result_type & PGSQL_ASSOC) {
add_assoc_string(return_value, "message", pgsql_notify->relname, 1);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "pid", pgsql_notify->be_pid);
#if HAVE_PQPROTOCOLVERSION && HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
if (PQprotocolVersion(pgsql) >= 3 && atof(PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "server_version")) >= 9.0) {
#else
if (atof(PG_VERSION) >= 9.0) {
#endif
#if HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
add_assoc_string(return_value, "payload", pgsql_notify->extra, 1);
#endif
}
}
PQfreemem(pgsql_notify);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int pg_get_pid([resource connection)
Get backend(server) pid */
PHP_FUNCTION(pg_get_pid)
{
zval *pgsql_link;
int id = -1;
PGconn *pgsql;
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r",
&pgsql_link) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
RETURN_LONG(PQbackendPID(pgsql));
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ php_pgsql_meta_data
* TODO: Add meta_data cache for better performance
*/
PHP_PGSQL_API int php_pgsql_meta_data(PGconn *pg_link, const char *table_name, zval *meta TSRMLS_DC)
{
PGresult *pg_result;
char *src, *tmp_name, *tmp_name2 = NULL;
char *escaped;
smart_str querystr = {0};
size_t new_len;
int i, num_rows;
zval *elem;
if (!*table_name) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The table name must be specified");
return FAILURE;
}
src = estrdup(table_name);
tmp_name = php_strtok_r(src, ".", &tmp_name2);
if (!tmp_name2 || !*tmp_name2) {
/* Default schema */
tmp_name2 = tmp_name;
"SELECT a.attname, a.attnum, t.typname, a.attlen, a.attnotnull, a.atthasdef, a.attndims, t.typtype = 'e' "
"FROM pg_class as c, pg_attribute a, pg_type t, pg_namespace n "
"WHERE a.attnum > 0 AND a.attrelid = c.oid AND c.relname = '");
escaped = (char *)safe_emalloc(strlen(tmp_name2), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, escaped, tmp_name2, strlen(tmp_name2), NULL);
if (new_len) {
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, escaped, new_len);
}
efree(escaped);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "' AND c.relnamespace = n.oid AND n.nspname = '");
escaped = (char *)safe_emalloc(strlen(tmp_name), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, escaped, tmp_name, strlen(tmp_name), NULL);
if (new_len) {
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, escaped, new_len);
}
efree(escaped);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "' AND a.atttypid = t.oid ORDER BY a.attnum;");
smart_str_0(&querystr);
efree(src);
pg_result = PQexec(pg_link, querystr.c);
if (PQresultStatus(pg_result) != PGRES_TUPLES_OK || (num_rows = PQntuples(pg_result)) == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Table '%s' doesn't exists", table_name);
smart_str_free(&querystr);
PQclear(pg_result);
return FAILURE;
}
smart_str_free(&querystr);
for (i = 0; i < num_rows; i++) {
char *name;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(elem);
array_init(elem);
add_assoc_long(elem, "num", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,1)));
add_assoc_string(elem, "type", PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,2), 1);
add_assoc_long(elem, "len", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,3)));
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,4), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "not null", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "not null", 0);
}
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,5), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "has default", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "has default", 0);
}
add_assoc_long(elem, "array dims", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,6)));
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,7), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "is enum", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "is enum", 0);
}
name = PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,0);
add_assoc_zval(meta, name, elem);
}
PQclear(pg_result);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The php_pgsql_meta_data function in pgsql.c in the PostgreSQL (aka pgsql) extension in PHP before 5.4.42, 5.5.x before 5.5.26, and 5.6.x before 5.6.10 does not validate token extraction for table names, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted name. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2015-1352.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 4,068
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TraceEvent::AppendAsJSON(
std::string* out,
const ArgumentFilterPredicate& argument_filter_predicate) const {
int64 time_int64 = timestamp_.ToInternalValue();
int process_id = TraceLog::GetInstance()->process_id();
const char* category_group_name =
TraceLog::GetCategoryGroupName(category_group_enabled_);
DCHECK(!strchr(name_, '"'));
StringAppendF(out, "{\"pid\":%i,\"tid\":%i,\"ts\":%" PRId64
","
"\"ph\":\"%c\",\"cat\":\"%s\",\"name\":\"%s\",\"args\":",
process_id, thread_id_, time_int64, phase_, category_group_name,
name_);
bool strip_args = arg_names_[0] && !argument_filter_predicate.is_null() &&
!argument_filter_predicate.Run(category_group_name, name_);
if (strip_args) {
*out += "\"__stripped__\"";
} else {
*out += "{";
for (int i = 0; i < kTraceMaxNumArgs && arg_names_[i]; ++i) {
if (i > 0)
*out += ",";
*out += "\"";
*out += arg_names_[i];
*out += "\":";
if (arg_types_[i] == TRACE_VALUE_TYPE_CONVERTABLE)
convertable_values_[i]->AppendAsTraceFormat(out);
else
AppendValueAsJSON(arg_types_[i], arg_values_[i], out);
}
*out += "}";
}
if (phase_ == TRACE_EVENT_PHASE_COMPLETE) {
int64 duration = duration_.ToInternalValue();
if (duration != -1)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"dur\":%" PRId64, duration);
if (!thread_timestamp_.is_null()) {
int64 thread_duration = thread_duration_.ToInternalValue();
if (thread_duration != -1)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"tdur\":%" PRId64, thread_duration);
}
}
if (!thread_timestamp_.is_null()) {
int64 thread_time_int64 = thread_timestamp_.ToInternalValue();
StringAppendF(out, ",\"tts\":%" PRId64, thread_time_int64);
}
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_ASYNC_TTS) {
StringAppendF(out, ", \"use_async_tts\":1");
}
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_HAS_ID)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"id\":\"0x%" PRIx64 "\"", static_cast<uint64>(id_));
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_BIND_TO_ENCLOSING)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"bp\":\"e\"");
if ((flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_OUT) ||
(flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_IN)) {
StringAppendF(out, ",\"bind_id\":\"0x%" PRIx64 "\"",
static_cast<uint64>(bind_id_));
}
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_IN)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"flow_in\":true");
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_OUT)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"flow_out\":true");
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_HAS_CONTEXT_ID)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"cid\":\"0x%" PRIx64 "\"",
static_cast<uint64>(context_id_));
if (phase_ == TRACE_EVENT_PHASE_INSTANT) {
char scope = '?';
switch (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_SCOPE_MASK) {
case TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_GLOBAL:
scope = TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_NAME_GLOBAL;
break;
case TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_PROCESS:
scope = TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_NAME_PROCESS;
break;
case TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD:
scope = TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_NAME_THREAD;
break;
}
StringAppendF(out, ",\"s\":\"%c\"", scope);
}
*out += "}";
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the FrameSelection::updateAppearance function in core/editing/FrameSelection.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 34.0.1847.137, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper RenderObject handling.
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
|
Low
| 2,872
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void kvm_unpin_pages(struct kvm *kvm, pfn_t pfn, unsigned long npages)
{
unsigned long i;
for (i = 0; i < npages; ++i)
kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn + i);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The kvm_iommu_map_pages function in virt/kvm/iommu.c in the Linux kernel through 3.16.1 miscalculates the number of pages during the handling of a mapping failure, which allows guest OS users to (1) cause a denial of service (host OS memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large gfn value or (2) cause a denial of service (host OS memory consumption) by triggering a small gfn value that leads to permanently pinned pages.
Commit Message: kvm: iommu: fix the third parameter of kvm_iommu_put_pages (CVE-2014-3601)
The third parameter of kvm_iommu_put_pages is wrong,
It should be 'gfn - slot->base_gfn'.
By making gfn very large, malicious guest or userspace can cause kvm to
go to this error path, and subsequently to pass a huge value as size.
Alternatively if gfn is small, then pages would be pinned but never
unpinned, causing host memory leak and local DOS.
Passing a reasonable but large value could be the most dangerous case,
because it would unpin a page that should have stayed pinned, and thus
allow the device to DMA into arbitrary memory. However, this cannot
happen because of the condition that can trigger the error:
- out of memory (where you can't allocate even a single page)
should not be possible for the attacker to trigger
- when exceeding the iommu's address space, guest pages after gfn
will also exceed the iommu's address space, and inside
kvm_iommu_put_pages() the iommu_iova_to_phys() will fail. The
page thus would not be unpinned at all.
Reported-by: Jack Morgenstein <jackm@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
High
| 16,646
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: isofs_export_encode_fh(struct inode *inode,
__u32 *fh32,
int *max_len,
struct inode *parent)
{
struct iso_inode_info * ei = ISOFS_I(inode);
int len = *max_len;
int type = 1;
__u16 *fh16 = (__u16*)fh32;
/*
* WARNING: max_len is 5 for NFSv2. Because of this
* limitation, we use the lower 16 bits of fh32[1] to hold the
* offset of the inode and the upper 16 bits of fh32[1] to
* hold the offset of the parent.
*/
if (parent && (len < 5)) {
*max_len = 5;
return 255;
} else if (len < 3) {
*max_len = 3;
return 255;
}
len = 3;
fh32[0] = ei->i_iget5_block;
fh16[2] = (__u16)ei->i_iget5_offset; /* fh16 [sic] */
fh32[2] = inode->i_generation;
if (parent) {
struct iso_inode_info *eparent;
eparent = ISOFS_I(parent);
fh32[3] = eparent->i_iget5_block;
fh16[3] = (__u16)eparent->i_iget5_offset; /* fh16 [sic] */
fh32[4] = parent->i_generation;
len = 5;
type = 2;
}
*max_len = len;
return type;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The isofs_export_encode_fh function in fs/isofs/export.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel heap memory via a crafted application.
Commit Message: isofs: avoid info leak on export
For type 1 the parent_offset member in struct isofs_fid gets copied
uninitialized to userland. Fix this by initializing it to 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
|
Medium
| 27,123
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: png_inflate(png_structp png_ptr, const png_byte *data, png_size_t size,
png_bytep output, png_size_t output_size)
{
png_size_t count = 0;
png_ptr->zstream.next_in = (png_bytep)data; /* const_cast: VALID */
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = size;
while (1)
{
int ret, avail;
/* Reset the output buffer each time round - we empty it
* after every inflate call.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->zbuf;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = png_ptr->zbuf_size;
ret = inflate(&png_ptr->zstream, Z_NO_FLUSH);
avail = png_ptr->zbuf_size - png_ptr->zstream.avail_out;
/* First copy/count any new output - but only if we didn't
* get an error code.
*/
if ((ret == Z_OK || ret == Z_STREAM_END) && avail > 0)
{
if (output != 0 && output_size > count)
{
int copy = output_size - count;
if (avail < copy) copy = avail;
png_memcpy(output + count, png_ptr->zbuf, copy);
}
count += avail;
}
if (ret == Z_OK)
continue;
/* Termination conditions - always reset the zstream, it
* must be left in inflateInit state.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = 0;
inflateReset(&png_ptr->zstream);
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
return count; /* NOTE: may be zero. */
/* Now handle the error codes - the API always returns 0
* and the error message is dumped into the uncompressed
* buffer if available.
*/
{
PNG_CONST char *msg;
if (png_ptr->zstream.msg != 0)
msg = png_ptr->zstream.msg;
else
{
#if defined(PNG_STDIO_SUPPORTED) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
char umsg[52];
switch (ret)
{
case Z_BUF_ERROR:
msg = "Buffer error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
case Z_DATA_ERROR:
msg = "Data error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
default:
msg = "Incomplete compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
}
png_snprintf(umsg, sizeof umsg, msg, png_ptr->chunk_name);
msg = umsg;
#else
msg = "Damaged compressed datastream in chunk other than IDAT";
#endif
}
png_warning(png_ptr, msg);
}
/* 0 means an error - notice that this code simple ignores
* zero length compressed chunks as a result.
*/
return 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer signedness error in the png_inflate function in pngrutil.c in libpng before 1.4.10beta01, as used in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PNG file, a different vulnerability than CVE-2011-3026.
Commit Message: Pull follow-up tweak from upstream.
BUG=116162
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9546033
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125311 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 24,755
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSFloat64Array::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSFloat64Array* castedThis = jsCast<JSFloat64Array*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSFloat64Array::s_info);
Float64Array* impl = static_cast<Float64Array*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
Float32Array* array(toFloat32Array(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
JSC::JSValue result = toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), WTF::getPtr(impl->foo(array)));
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 18,416
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: path_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
char *str = PG_GETARG_CSTRING(0);
PATH *path;
int isopen;
char *s;
int npts;
int size;
int depth = 0;
if ((npts = pair_count(str, ',')) <= 0)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type path: \"%s\"", str)));
s = str;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *s))
s++;
/* skip single leading paren */
if ((*s == LDELIM) && (strrchr(s, LDELIM) == s))
{
s++;
depth++;
}
size = offsetof(PATH, p[0]) +sizeof(path->p[0]) * npts;
path = (PATH *) palloc(size);
SET_VARSIZE(path, size);
path->npts = npts;
if ((!path_decode(TRUE, npts, s, &isopen, &s, &(path->p[0])))
&& (!((depth == 0) && (*s == '\0'))) && !((depth >= 1) && (*s == RDELIM)))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type path: \"%s\"", str)));
path->closed = (!isopen);
/* prevent instability in unused pad bytes */
path->dummy = 0;
PG_RETURN_PATH_P(path);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c in PostgreSQL 9.0.x before 9.0.16, 9.1.x before 9.1.12, 9.2.x before 9.2.7, and 9.3.x before 9.3.3 allow remote authenticated users to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the (1) hstore_recv, (2) hstore_from_arrays, and (3) hstore_from_array functions in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c; and the (4) hstoreArrayToPairs function in contrib/hstore/hstore_op.c, which triggers a buffer overflow. NOTE: this issue was SPLIT from CVE-2014-0064 because it has a different set of affected versions.
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
Low
| 331
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xsltFreeTemplateHashes(xsltStylesheetPtr style) {
if (style->templatesHash != NULL)
xmlHashFree((xmlHashTablePtr) style->templatesHash,
(xmlHashDeallocator) xsltFreeCompMatchList);
if (style->rootMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->rootMatch);
if (style->keyMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->keyMatch);
if (style->elemMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->elemMatch);
if (style->attrMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->attrMatch);
if (style->parentMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->parentMatch);
if (style->textMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->textMatch);
if (style->piMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->piMatch);
if (style->commentMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->commentMatch);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
High
| 10,905
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FileAPIMessageFilter::OnCreateSnapshotFile(
int request_id, const GURL& blob_url, const GURL& path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
FileSystemURL url(path);
base::Callback<void(const FilePath&)> register_file_callback =
base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::RegisterFileAsBlob,
this, blob_url, url.path());
FileSystemOperation* operation = GetNewOperation(url, request_id);
if (!operation)
return;
operation->CreateSnapshotFile(
url,
base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::DidCreateSnapshot,
this, request_id, register_file_callback));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly maintain database metadata, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended file-access restrictions via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 8,468
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool AppCache::AddOrModifyEntry(const GURL& url, const AppCacheEntry& entry) {
std::pair<EntryMap::iterator, bool> ret =
entries_.insert(EntryMap::value_type(url, entry));
if (!ret.second)
ret.first->second.add_types(entry.types());
else
cache_size_ += entry.response_size(); // New entry. Add to cache size.
return ret.second;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
|
Medium
| 26,663
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
{
/* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have
* protocol_version alerts */
* protocol_version alerts */
if (desc < 0)
return -1;
/* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
* else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in
* the future
*/
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one) then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data. In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in use. Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain commonly used ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown() twice even if a protocol error has occurred (applications should not do this but some do anyway). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2r (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2q).
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 2,965
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline char *parse_ip_address_ex(const char *str, size_t str_len, int *portno, int get_err, zend_string **err)
{
char *colon;
char *host = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
char *p;
if (*(str) == '[' && str_len > 1) {
/* IPV6 notation to specify raw address with port (i.e. [fe80::1]:80) */
p = memchr(str + 1, ']', str_len - 2);
if (!p || *(p + 1) != ':') {
if (get_err) {
*err = strpprintf(0, "Failed to parse IPv6 address \"%s\"", str);
}
return NULL;
}
*portno = atoi(p + 2);
return estrndup(str + 1, p - str - 1);
}
#endif
if (str_len) {
colon = memchr(str, ':', str_len - 1);
} else {
colon = NULL;
}
if (colon) {
*portno = atoi(colon + 1);
host = estrndup(str, colon - str);
} else {
if (get_err) {
*err = strpprintf(0, "Failed to parse address \"%s\"", str);
}
return NULL;
}
return host;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-918
Summary: PHP through 7.1.11 enables potential SSRF in applications that accept an fsockopen or pfsockopen hostname argument with an expectation that the port number is constrained. Because a :port syntax is recognized, fsockopen will use the port number that is specified in the hostname argument, instead of the port number in the second argument of the function.
Commit Message: Detect invalid port in xp_socket parse ip address
For historical reasons, fsockopen() accepts the port and hostname
separately: fsockopen('127.0.0.1', 80)
However, with the introdcution of stream transports in PHP 4.3,
it became possible to include the port in the hostname specifier:
fsockopen('127.0.0.1:80')
Or more formally: fsockopen('tcp://127.0.0.1:80')
Confusing results when these two forms are combined, however.
fsockopen('127.0.0.1:80', 443) results in fsockopen() attempting
to connect to '127.0.0.1:80:443' which any reasonable stack would
consider invalid.
Unfortunately, PHP parses the address looking for the first colon
(with special handling for IPv6, don't worry) and calls atoi()
from there. atoi() in turn, simply stops parsing at the first
non-numeric character and returns the value so far.
The end result is that the explicitly supplied port is treated
as ignored garbage, rather than producing an error.
This diff replaces atoi() with strtol() and inspects the
stop character. If additional "garbage" of any kind is found,
it fails and returns an error.
|
Medium
| 24,335
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: mountpoint_last(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path)
{
int error = 0;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct dentry *dir = nd->path.dentry;
/* If we're in rcuwalk, drop out of it to handle last component */
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
if (unlazy_walk(nd, NULL)) {
error = -ECHILD;
goto out;
}
}
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
if (unlikely(nd->last_type != LAST_NORM)) {
error = handle_dots(nd, nd->last_type);
if (error)
goto out;
dentry = dget(nd->path.dentry);
goto done;
}
mutex_lock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
dentry = d_lookup(dir, &nd->last);
if (!dentry) {
/*
* No cached dentry. Mounted dentries are pinned in the cache,
* so that means that this dentry is probably a symlink or the
* path doesn't actually point to a mounted dentry.
*/
dentry = d_alloc(dir, &nd->last);
if (!dentry) {
error = -ENOMEM;
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
goto out;
}
dentry = lookup_real(dir->d_inode, dentry, nd->flags);
error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
goto out;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
done:
if (!dentry->d_inode || d_is_negative(dentry)) {
error = -ENOENT;
dput(dentry);
goto out;
}
path->dentry = dentry;
path->mnt = mntget(nd->path.mnt);
if (should_follow_link(dentry, nd->flags & LOOKUP_FOLLOW))
return 1;
follow_mount(path);
error = 0;
out:
terminate_walk(nd);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: The mountpoint_last function in fs/namei.c in the Linux kernel before 3.15.8 does not properly maintain a certain reference count during attempts to use the umount system call in conjunction with a symlink, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via the umount program.
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
High
| 10,422
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void Rp_test(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *text;
int opts;
Resub m;
re = js_toregexp(J, 0);
text = js_tostring(J, 1);
opts = 0;
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G) {
if (re->last > strlen(text)) {
re->last = 0;
js_pushboolean(J, 0);
return;
}
if (re->last > 0) {
text += re->last;
opts |= REG_NOTBOL;
}
}
if (!js_regexec(re->prog, text, &m, opts)) {
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G)
re->last = re->last + (m.sub[0].ep - text);
js_pushboolean(J, 1);
return;
}
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G)
re->last = 0;
js_pushboolean(J, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: An issue was discovered in Artifex MuJS 1.0.5. It has unlimited recursion because the match function in regexp.c lacks a depth check.
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
|
Low
| 3,430
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void umount_tree(struct mount *mnt, enum umount_tree_flags how)
{
LIST_HEAD(tmp_list);
struct mount *p;
if (how & UMOUNT_PROPAGATE)
propagate_mount_unlock(mnt);
/* Gather the mounts to umount */
for (p = mnt; p; p = next_mnt(p, mnt)) {
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_UMOUNT;
list_move(&p->mnt_list, &tmp_list);
}
/* Hide the mounts from mnt_mounts */
list_for_each_entry(p, &tmp_list, mnt_list) {
list_del_init(&p->mnt_child);
}
/* Add propogated mounts to the tmp_list */
if (how & UMOUNT_PROPAGATE)
propagate_umount(&tmp_list);
while (!list_empty(&tmp_list)) {
bool disconnect;
p = list_first_entry(&tmp_list, struct mount, mnt_list);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_expire);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_list);
__touch_mnt_namespace(p->mnt_ns);
p->mnt_ns = NULL;
if (how & UMOUNT_SYNC)
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT;
disconnect = disconnect_mount(p, how);
pin_insert_group(&p->mnt_umount, &p->mnt_parent->mnt,
disconnect ? &unmounted : NULL);
if (mnt_has_parent(p)) {
mnt_add_count(p->mnt_parent, -1);
if (!disconnect) {
/* Don't forget about p */
list_add_tail(&p->mnt_child, &p->mnt_parent->mnt_mounts);
} else {
umount_mnt(p);
}
}
change_mnt_propagation(p, MS_PRIVATE);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: fs/namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9 does not restrict how many mounts may exist in a mount namespace, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and deadlock) via MS_BIND mount system calls, as demonstrated by a loop that triggers exponential growth in the number of mounts.
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
Medium
| 21,454
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void V8RecursionScope::didLeaveScriptContext()
{
Microtask::performCheckpoint();
V8PerIsolateData::from(m_isolate)->runEndOfScopeTasks();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: core/loader/ImageLoader.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, does not properly determine the V8 context of a microtask, which allows remote attackers to bypass Content Security Policy (CSP) restrictions by providing an image from an unintended source.
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 25,166
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int em_fxsave(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct fxregs_state fx_state;
size_t size;
int rc;
rc = check_fxsr(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt);
rc = asm_safe("fxsave %[fx]", , [fx] "+m"(fx_state));
ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
if (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_OSFXSR)
size = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, xmm_space[8 * 16/4]);
else
size = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, xmm_space[0]);
return segmented_write(ctxt, ctxt->memop.addr.mem, &fx_state, size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the Linux kernel through 4.9.3 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) via a crafted application that leverages instruction emulation for fxrstor, fxsave, sgdt, and sidt.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std
Introduces segemented_write_std.
Switches from emulated reads/writes to standard read/writes in fxsave,
fxrstor, sgdt, and sidt. This fixes CVE-2017-2584, a longstanding
kernel memory leak.
Since commit 283c95d0e389 ("KVM: x86: emulate FXSAVE and FXRSTOR",
2016-11-09), which is luckily not yet in any final release, this would
also be an exploitable kernel memory *write*!
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 96051572c819194c37a8367624b285be10297eca
Fixes: 283c95d0e3891b64087706b344a4b545d04a6e62
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 3,352
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: VP8XChunk::VP8XChunk(Container* parent)
: Chunk(parent, kChunk_VP8X)
{
this->needsRewrite = true;
this->size = 10;
this->data.resize(this->size);
this->data.assign(this->size, 0);
XMP_Uns8* bitstream =
(XMP_Uns8*)parent->chunks[WEBP_CHUNK_IMAGE][0]->data.data();
XMP_Uns32 width = ((bitstream[7] << 8) | bitstream[6]) & 0x3fff;
XMP_Uns32 height = ((bitstream[9] << 8) | bitstream[8]) & 0x3fff;
this->width(width);
this->height(height);
parent->vp8x = this;
VP8XChunk::VP8XChunk(Container* parent, WEBP_MetaHandler* handler)
: Chunk(parent, handler)
{
this->size = 10;
this->needsRewrite = true;
parent->vp8x = this;
}
XMP_Uns32 VP8XChunk::width()
{
return GetLE24(&this->data[4]) + 1;
}
void VP8XChunk::width(XMP_Uns32 val)
{
PutLE24(&this->data[4], val > 0 ? val - 1 : 0);
}
XMP_Uns32 VP8XChunk::height()
{
return GetLE24(&this->data[7]) + 1;
}
void VP8XChunk::height(XMP_Uns32 val)
{
PutLE24(&this->data[7], val > 0 ? val - 1 : 0);
}
bool VP8XChunk::xmp()
{
XMP_Uns32 flags = GetLE32(&this->data[0]);
return (bool)((flags >> XMP_FLAG_BIT) & 1);
}
void VP8XChunk::xmp(bool hasXMP)
{
XMP_Uns32 flags = GetLE32(&this->data[0]);
flags ^= (-hasXMP ^ flags) & (1 << XMP_FLAG_BIT);
PutLE32(&this->data[0], flags);
}
Container::Container(WEBP_MetaHandler* handler) : Chunk(NULL, handler)
{
this->needsRewrite = false;
XMP_IO* file = handler->parent->ioRef;
file->Seek(12, kXMP_SeekFromStart);
XMP_Int64 size = handler->initialFileSize;
XMP_Uns32 peek = 0;
while (file->Offset() < size) {
peek = XIO::PeekUns32_LE(file);
switch (peek) {
case kChunk_XMP_:
this->addChunk(new XMPChunk(this, handler));
break;
case kChunk_VP8X:
this->addChunk(new VP8XChunk(this, handler));
break;
default:
this->addChunk(new Chunk(this, handler));
break;
}
}
if (this->chunks[WEBP_CHUNK_IMAGE].size() == 0) {
XMP_Throw("File has no image bitstream", kXMPErr_BadFileFormat);
}
if (this->chunks[WEBP_CHUNK_VP8X].size() == 0) {
this->needsRewrite = true;
this->addChunk(new VP8XChunk(this));
}
if (this->chunks[WEBP_CHUNK_XMP].size() == 0) {
XMPChunk* xmpChunk = new XMPChunk(this);
this->addChunk(xmpChunk);
handler->xmpChunk = xmpChunk;
this->vp8x->xmp(true);
}
}
Chunk* Container::getExifChunk()
{
if (this->chunks[WEBP::WEBP_CHUNK_EXIF].size() == 0) {
return NULL;
}
return this->chunks[WEBP::WEBP_CHUNK_EXIF][0];
}
void Container::addChunk(Chunk* chunk)
{
ChunkId idx;
try {
idx = chunkMap.at(chunk->tag);
}
catch (const std::out_of_range& e) {
idx = WEBP_CHUNK_UNKNOWN;
}
this->chunks[idx].push_back(chunk);
}
void Container::write(WEBP_MetaHandler* handler)
{
XMP_IO* file = handler->parent->ioRef;
file->Rewind();
XIO::WriteUns32_LE(file, this->tag);
XIO::WriteUns32_LE(file, (XMP_Uns32) this->size);
XIO::WriteUns32_LE(file, kChunk_WEBP);
size_t i, j;
std::vector<Chunk*> chunkVect;
for (i = 0; i < WEBP_CHUNK_NIL; i++) {
chunkVect = this->chunks[i];
for (j = 0; j < chunkVect.size(); j++) {
chunkVect.at(j)->write(handler);
}
}
XMP_Int64 lastOffset = file->Offset();
this->size = lastOffset - 8;
file->Seek(this->pos + 4, kXMP_SeekFromStart);
XIO::WriteUns32_LE(file, (XMP_Uns32) this->size);
file->Seek(lastOffset, kXMP_SeekFromStart);
if (lastOffset < handler->initialFileSize) {
file->Truncate(lastOffset);
}
}
Container::~Container()
{
Chunk* chunk;
size_t i;
std::vector<Chunk*> chunkVect;
for (i = 0; i < WEBP_CHUNK_NIL; i++) {
chunkVect = this->chunks[i];
while (!chunkVect.empty()) {
chunk = chunkVect.back();
delete chunk;
chunkVect.pop_back();
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in Exempi through 2.4.4. XMPFiles/source/FormatSupport/WEBP_Support.cpp does not check whether a bitstream has a NULL value, leading to a NULL pointer dereference in the WEBP::VP8XChunk class.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 16,217
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int mwifiex_update_vs_ie(const u8 *ies, int ies_len,
struct mwifiex_ie **ie_ptr, u16 mask,
unsigned int oui, u8 oui_type)
{
struct ieee_types_header *vs_ie;
struct mwifiex_ie *ie = *ie_ptr;
const u8 *vendor_ie;
vendor_ie = cfg80211_find_vendor_ie(oui, oui_type, ies, ies_len);
if (vendor_ie) {
if (!*ie_ptr) {
*ie_ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!*ie_ptr)
return -ENOMEM;
ie = *ie_ptr;
}
vs_ie = (struct ieee_types_header *)vendor_ie;
memcpy(ie->ie_buffer + le16_to_cpu(ie->ie_length),
vs_ie, vs_ie->len + 2);
le16_unaligned_add_cpu(&ie->ie_length, vs_ie->len + 2);
ie->mgmt_subtype_mask = cpu_to_le16(mask);
ie->ie_index = cpu_to_le16(MWIFIEX_AUTO_IDX_MASK);
}
*ie_ptr = ie;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-120
Summary: There is heap-based buffer overflow in kernel, all versions up to, excluding 5.3, in the marvell wifi chip driver in Linux kernel, that allows local users to cause a denial of service(system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message: mwifiex: Fix three heap overflow at parsing element in cfg80211_ap_settings
mwifiex_update_vs_ie(),mwifiex_set_uap_rates() and
mwifiex_set_wmm_params() call memcpy() without checking
the destination size.Since the source is given from
user-space, this may trigger a heap buffer overflow.
Fix them by putting the length check before performing memcpy().
This fix addresses CVE-2019-14814,CVE-2019-14815,CVE-2019-14816.
Signed-off-by: Wen Huang <huangwenabc@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <gbhat@marvell.comg>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
|
Low
| 16,561
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
size_t i;
if (minor_status == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*minor_status = 0;
if (desired_object == GSS_C_NO_OID)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ;
if (data_set == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*data_set = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (!ctx->established)
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops)/
sizeof(krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[0]); i++) {
if (g_OID_prefix_equal(desired_object, &krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[i].oid)) {
return (*krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[i].func)(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
data_set);
}
}
*minor_status = EINVAL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The krb5_gss_process_context_token function in lib/gssapi/krb5/process_context_token.c in the libgssapi_krb5 library in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) through 1.11.5, 1.12.x through 1.12.2, and 1.13.x before 1.13.1 does not properly maintain security-context handles, which allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and double free, and daemon crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via crafted GSSAPI traffic, as demonstrated by traffic to kadmind.
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 18,937
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebp (gdImagePtr im, FILE * outFile)
{
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewFileCtx(outFile);
if (out == NULL) {
return;
}
gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, -1);
out->gd_free(out);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the gdImageWebPtr function in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.4 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via large width and height values.
Commit Message: Fix double-free in gdImageWebPtr()
The issue is that gdImageWebpCtx() (which is called by gdImageWebpPtr() and
the other WebP output functions to do the real work) does not return whether
it succeeded or failed, so this is not checked in gdImageWebpPtr() and the
function wrongly assumes everything is okay, which is not, in this case,
because there is a size limitation for WebP, namely that the width and
height must by less than 16383.
We can't change the signature of gdImageWebpCtx() for API compatibility
reasons, so we introduce the static helper _gdImageWebpCtx() which returns
success respective failure, so gdImageWebpPtr() and gdImageWebpPtrEx() can
check the return value. We leave it solely to libwebp for now to report
warnings regarding the failing write.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6912
|
Low
| 5,174
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)
{
struct key *keyring;
int bucket;
if (!name)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
bucket = keyring_hash(name);
read_lock(&keyring_name_lock);
if (keyring_name_hash[bucket].next) {
/* search this hash bucket for a keyring with a matching name
* that's readable and that hasn't been revoked */
list_for_each_entry(keyring,
&keyring_name_hash[bucket],
name_link
) {
if (!kuid_has_mapping(current_user_ns(), keyring->user->uid))
continue;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
continue;
if (strcmp(keyring->description, name) != 0)
continue;
if (!skip_perm_check &&
key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
continue;
/* we've got a match but we might end up racing with
* key_cleanup() if the keyring is currently 'dead'
* (ie. it has a zero usage count) */
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&keyring->usage))
continue;
keyring->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
goto out;
}
}
keyring = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
out:
read_unlock(&keyring_name_lock);
return keyring;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.13.5, a local user could create keyrings for other users via keyctl commands, setting unwanted defaults or causing a denial of service.
Commit Message: KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user. For example:
sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
sleep 15' &
sleep 1
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us
This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions. In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:
-4: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid.4000
-5: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000
Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING. Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.
Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 9,748
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: UINT32 UIPC_Read(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id, UINT16 *p_msg_evt, UINT8 *p_buf, UINT32 len)
{
int n;
int n_read = 0;
int fd = uipc_main.ch[ch_id].fd;
struct pollfd pfd;
UNUSED(p_msg_evt);
if (ch_id >= UIPC_CH_NUM)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("UIPC_Read : invalid ch id %d", ch_id);
return 0;
}
if (fd == UIPC_DISCONNECTED)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("UIPC_Read : channel %d closed", ch_id);
return 0;
}
while (n_read < (int)len)
{
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN|POLLHUP;
/* make sure there is data prior to attempting read to avoid blocking
a read for more than poll timeout */
if (poll(&pfd, 1, uipc_main.ch[ch_id].read_poll_tmo_ms) == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("poll timeout (%d ms)", uipc_main.ch[ch_id].read_poll_tmo_ms);
break;
}
if (pfd.revents & (POLLHUP|POLLNVAL) )
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("poll : channel detached remotely");
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return 0;
}
n = recv(fd, p_buf+n_read, len-n_read, 0);
if (n == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC_Read : channel detached remotely");
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return 0;
}
if (n < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC_Read : read failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
n_read+=n;
}
return n_read;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 20,103
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport MemoryInfo *RelinquishVirtualMemory(MemoryInfo *memory_info)
{
assert(memory_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL);
assert(memory_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (memory_info->blob != (void *) NULL)
switch (memory_info->type)
{
case AlignedVirtualMemory:
{
memory_info->blob=RelinquishAlignedMemory(memory_info->blob);
RelinquishMagickResource(MemoryResource,memory_info->length);
break;
}
case MapVirtualMemory:
{
(void) UnmapBlob(memory_info->blob,memory_info->length);
memory_info->blob=NULL;
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,memory_info->length);
if (*memory_info->filename != '\0')
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(memory_info->filename);
break;
}
case UnalignedVirtualMemory:
default:
{
memory_info->blob=RelinquishMagickMemory(memory_info->blob);
break;
}
}
memory_info->signature=(~MagickSignature);
memory_info=(MemoryInfo *) RelinquishAlignedMemory(memory_info);
return(memory_info);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer truncation issue in coders/pict.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.5-0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted .pict file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 19,178
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ext3_fsblk_t get_sb_block(void **data, struct super_block *sb)
{
ext3_fsblk_t sb_block;
char *options = (char *) *data;
if (!options || strncmp(options, "sb=", 3) != 0)
return 1; /* Default location */
options += 3;
/*todo: use simple_strtoll with >32bit ext3 */
sb_block = simple_strtoul(options, &options, 0);
if (*options && *options != ',') {
ext3_msg(sb, "error: invalid sb specification: %s",
(char *) *data);
return 1;
}
if (*options == ',')
options++;
*data = (void *) options;
return sb_block;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: fs/ext3/super.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 uses incorrect arguments to functions in certain circumstances related to printk input, which allows local users to conduct format-string attacks and possibly gain privileges via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
|
High
| 5,412
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int em_sysexit(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
struct desc_struct cs, ss;
u64 msr_data;
int usermode;
u16 cs_sel = 0, ss_sel = 0;
/* inject #GP if in real mode or Virtual 8086 mode */
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL ||
ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_VM86)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
setup_syscalls_segments(ctxt, &cs, &ss);
if ((ctxt->rex_prefix & 0x8) != 0x0)
usermode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64;
else
usermode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32;
cs.dpl = 3;
ss.dpl = 3;
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, &msr_data);
switch (usermode) {
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
cs_sel = (u16)(msr_data + 16);
if ((msr_data & 0xfffc) == 0x0)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
ss_sel = (u16)(msr_data + 24);
break;
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
cs_sel = (u16)(msr_data + 32);
if (msr_data == 0x0)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
ss_sel = cs_sel + 8;
cs.d = 0;
cs.l = 1;
break;
}
cs_sel |= SELECTOR_RPL_MASK;
ss_sel |= SELECTOR_RPL_MASK;
ops->set_segment(ctxt, cs_sel, &cs, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS);
ops->set_segment(ctxt, ss_sel, &ss, 0, VCPU_SREG_SS);
ctxt->_eip = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX);
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly perform RIP changes, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.
This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 24,356
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AddExpectationsForSimulatedAttrib0(
GLsizei num_vertices, GLuint buffer_id) {
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, BindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, kServiceAttrib0BufferId))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, BufferData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER,
num_vertices * sizeof(GLfloat) * 4,
_, GL_DYNAMIC_DRAW))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, BufferSubData(
GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, 0, num_vertices * sizeof(GLfloat) * 4, _))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, VertexAttribPointer(0, 4, GL_FLOAT, GL_FALSE, 0, NULL))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, BindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, 0))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, VertexAttribPointer(0, 4, GL_FLOAT, GL_FALSE, 0, NULL))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, BindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, buffer_id))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle triangle arrays, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 13,936
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TestBlinkPlatformSupport::cryptographicallyRandomValues(
unsigned char* buffer,
size_t length) {
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82, does not ensure that a proper cryptographicallyRandomValues random number generator is used, which makes it easier for remote attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
|
Medium
| 2,910
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CopyFromOMX(const OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header) {
if (!mIsBackup) {
return;
}
sp<ABuffer> codec = getBuffer(header, false /* backup */, true /* limit */);
memcpy((OMX_U8 *)mMem->pointer() + header->nOffset, codec->data(), codec->size());
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
|
Medium
| 25,318
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int mpeg4_decode_profile_level(MpegEncContext *s, GetBitContext *gb)
{
s->avctx->profile = get_bits(gb, 4);
s->avctx->level = get_bits(gb, 4);
if (s->avctx->profile == 0 && s->avctx->level == 8) {
s->avctx->level = 0;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: In FFmpeg 4.0.1, due to a missing check of a profile value before setting it, the ff_mpeg4_decode_picture_header function in libavcodec/mpeg4videodec.c may trigger a NULL pointer dereference while converting a crafted AVI file to MPEG4, leading to a denial of service.
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check read profile before setting it
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_7.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 10,242
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void *load_bytes(RBinFile *arch, const ut8 *buf, ut64 sz, ut64 loaddr, Sdb *sdb) {
if (!buf || !sz || sz == UT64_MAX) {
return NULL;
}
RBuffer *tbuf = r_buf_new ();
r_buf_set_bytes (tbuf, buf, sz);
struct r_bin_bflt_obj *res = r_bin_bflt_new_buf (tbuf);
r_buf_free (tbuf);
return res ? res : NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The relocs function in libr/bin/p/bin_bflt.c in radare2 1.2.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted binary file.
Commit Message: Fix #6829 oob write because of using wrong struct
|
Medium
| 27,503
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: base::string16 GetRelyingPartyIdString(
AuthenticatorRequestDialogModel* dialog_model) {
static constexpr char kRpIdUrlPrefix[] = "https://";
static constexpr int kDialogWidth = 300;
const auto& rp_id = dialog_model->relying_party_id();
DCHECK(!rp_id.empty());
GURL rp_id_url(kRpIdUrlPrefix + rp_id);
auto max_static_string_length = gfx::GetStringWidthF(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_GENERIC_TITLE), gfx::FontList(),
gfx::Typesetter::DEFAULT);
return url_formatter::ElideHost(rp_id_url, gfx::FontList(),
kDialogWidth - max_static_string_length);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: V8 in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.98 for Mac, and 54.0.2840.99 for Windows, and 54.0.2840.100 for Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android incorrectly applied type rules, which allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
|
Medium
| 13,488
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static unsigned char mincore_page(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t pgoff)
{
unsigned char present = 0;
struct page *page;
/*
* When tmpfs swaps out a page from a file, any process mapping that
* file will not get a swp_entry_t in its pte, but rather it is like
* any other file mapping (ie. marked !present and faulted in with
* tmpfs's .fault). So swapped out tmpfs mappings are tested here.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
if (shmem_mapping(mapping)) {
page = find_get_entry(mapping, pgoff);
/*
* shmem/tmpfs may return swap: account for swapcache
* page too.
*/
if (xa_is_value(page)) {
swp_entry_t swp = radix_to_swp_entry(page);
page = find_get_page(swap_address_space(swp),
swp_offset(swp));
}
} else
page = find_get_page(mapping, pgoff);
#else
page = find_get_page(mapping, pgoff);
#endif
if (page) {
present = PageUptodate(page);
put_page(page);
}
return present;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The mincore() implementation in mm/mincore.c in the Linux kernel through 4.19.13 allowed local attackers to observe page cache access patterns of other processes on the same system, potentially allowing sniffing of secret information. (Fixing this affects the output of the fincore program.) Limited remote exploitation may be possible, as demonstrated by latency differences in accessing public files from an Apache HTTP Server.
Commit Message: Change mincore() to count "mapped" pages rather than "cached" pages
The semantics of what "in core" means for the mincore() system call are
somewhat unclear, but Linux has always (since 2.3.52, which is when
mincore() was initially done) treated it as "page is available in page
cache" rather than "page is mapped in the mapping".
The problem with that traditional semantic is that it exposes a lot of
system cache state that it really probably shouldn't, and that users
shouldn't really even care about.
So let's try to avoid that information leak by simply changing the
semantics to be that mincore() counts actual mapped pages, not pages
that might be cheaply mapped if they were faulted (note the "might be"
part of the old semantics: being in the cache doesn't actually guarantee
that you can access them without IO anyway, since things like network
filesystems may have to revalidate the cache before use).
In many ways the old semantics were somewhat insane even aside from the
information leak issue. From the very beginning (and that beginning is
a long time ago: 2.3.52 was released in March 2000, I think), the code
had a comment saying
Later we can get more picky about what "in core" means precisely.
and this is that "later". Admittedly it is much later than is really
comfortable.
NOTE! This is a real semantic change, and it is for example known to
change the output of "fincore", since that program literally does a
mmmap without populating it, and then doing "mincore()" on that mapping
that doesn't actually have any pages in it.
I'm hoping that nobody actually has any workflow that cares, and the
info leak is real.
We may have to do something different if it turns out that people have
valid reasons to want the old semantics, and if we can limit the
information leak sanely.
Cc: Kevin Easton <kevin@guarana.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Masatake YAMATO <yamato@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 19,328
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool FakeCentral::IsPowered() const {
switch (state_) {
case mojom::CentralState::POWERED_OFF:
return false;
case mojom::CentralState::POWERED_ON:
return true;
case mojom::CentralState::ABSENT:
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap buffer overflow in filter processing in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
|
Medium
| 18,640
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void sas_eh_finish_cmd(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
{
struct sas_ha_struct *sas_ha = SHOST_TO_SAS_HA(cmd->device->host);
struct sas_task *task = TO_SAS_TASK(cmd);
/* At this point, we only get called following an actual abort
* of the task, so we should be guaranteed not to be racing with
* any completions from the LLD. Task is freed after this.
*/
sas_end_task(cmd, task);
/* now finish the command and move it on to the error
* handler done list, this also takes it off the
* error handler pending list.
*/
scsi_eh_finish_cmd(cmd, &sas_ha->eh_done_q);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: ** DISPUTED ** drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_scsi_host.c in the Linux kernel before 4.16 allows local users to cause a denial of service (ata qc leak) by triggering certain failure conditions. NOTE: a third party disputes the relevance of this report because the failure can only occur for physically proximate attackers who unplug SAS Host Bus Adapter cables.
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata
When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are
not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did
not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed,
but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a
warning like below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037
ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1
......
Call trace:
[<ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
[<ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8
[<ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c
[<ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694
[<ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80
[<ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170
[<ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390
[<ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418
[<ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138
[<ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked
for ever.
As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and
merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle
ata qcs correctly after this.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
|
Low
| 8,737
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int equalizer_get_parameter(effect_context_t *context, effect_param_t *p,
uint32_t *size)
{
equalizer_context_t *eq_ctxt = (equalizer_context_t *)context;
int voffset = ((p->psize - 1) / sizeof(int32_t) + 1) * sizeof(int32_t);
int32_t *param_tmp = (int32_t *)p->data;
int32_t param = *param_tmp++;
int32_t param2;
char *name;
void *value = p->data + voffset;
int i;
ALOGV("%s", __func__);
p->status = 0;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_NUM_BANDS:
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
case EQ_PARAM_GET_NUM_OF_PRESETS:
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
case EQ_PARAM_GET_BAND:
if (p->vsize < sizeof(int16_t))
p->status = -EINVAL;
p->vsize = sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_LEVEL_RANGE:
if (p->vsize < 2 * sizeof(int16_t))
p->status = -EINVAL;
p->vsize = 2 * sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE:
if (p->vsize < 2 * sizeof(int32_t))
p->status = -EINVAL;
p->vsize = 2 * sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ:
if (p->vsize < sizeof(int32_t))
p->status = -EINVAL;
p->vsize = sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_PRESET_NAME:
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES:
if (p->vsize < (2 + NUM_EQ_BANDS) * sizeof(uint16_t))
p->status = -EINVAL;
p->vsize = (2 + NUM_EQ_BANDS) * sizeof(uint16_t);
break;
default:
p->status = -EINVAL;
}
*size = sizeof(effect_param_t) + voffset + p->vsize;
if (p->status != 0)
return 0;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_NUM_BANDS:
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_NUM_BANDS", __func__);
*(uint16_t *)value = (uint16_t)NUM_EQ_BANDS;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_LEVEL_RANGE:
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_LEVEL_RANGE", __func__);
*(int16_t *)value = -1500;
*((int16_t *)value + 1) = 1500;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL", __func__);
param2 = *param_tmp;
if (param2 >= NUM_EQ_BANDS) {
p->status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
*(int16_t *)value = (int16_t)equalizer_get_band_level(eq_ctxt, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ:
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ", __func__);
param2 = *param_tmp;
if (param2 >= NUM_EQ_BANDS) {
p->status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
*(int32_t *)value = equalizer_get_center_frequency(eq_ctxt, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE:
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE", __func__);
param2 = *param_tmp;
if (param2 >= NUM_EQ_BANDS) {
p->status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
equalizer_get_band_freq_range(eq_ctxt, param2, (uint32_t *)value,
((uint32_t *)value + 1));
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_BAND:
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_GET_BAND", __func__);
param2 = *param_tmp;
*(uint16_t *)value = (uint16_t)equalizer_get_band(eq_ctxt, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET", __func__);
*(uint16_t *)value = (uint16_t)equalizer_get_preset(eq_ctxt);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_NUM_OF_PRESETS:
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_GET_NUM_OF_PRESETS", __func__);
*(uint16_t *)value = (uint16_t)equalizer_get_num_presets(eq_ctxt);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_PRESET_NAME:
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_GET_PRESET_NAME", __func__);
param2 = *param_tmp;
ALOGV("param2: %d", param2);
if (param2 >= equalizer_get_num_presets(eq_ctxt)) {
p->status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
name = (char *)value;
strlcpy(name, equalizer_get_preset_name(eq_ctxt, param2), p->vsize - 1);
name[p->vsize - 1] = 0;
p->vsize = strlen(name) + 1;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES: {
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES", __func__);
int16_t *prop = (int16_t *)value;
prop[0] = (int16_t)equalizer_get_preset(eq_ctxt);
prop[1] = (int16_t)NUM_EQ_BANDS;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_EQ_BANDS; i++) {
prop[2 + i] = (int16_t)equalizer_get_band_level(eq_ctxt, i);
}
} break;
default:
p->status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in lvm/wrapper/Bundle/EffectBundle.cpp in libeffects in Audioserver could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1. Android ID: A-32436341.
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability: Equalizer command might allow negative indexes
Bug: 32247948
Bug: 32438598
Bug: 32436341
Test: use POC on bug or cts security test
Change-Id: I56a92582687599b5b313dea1abcb8bcb19c7fc0e
(cherry picked from commit 3f37d4ef89f4f0eef9e201c5a91b7b2c77ed1071)
(cherry picked from commit ceb7b2d7a4c4cb8d03f166c61f5c7551c6c760aa)
|
Medium
| 4,188
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool SubsetterImpl::ResolveCompositeGlyphs(const unsigned int* glyph_ids,
size_t glyph_count,
IntegerSet* glyph_id_processed) {
if (glyph_ids == NULL || glyph_count == 0 || glyph_id_processed == NULL) {
return false;
}
GlyphTablePtr glyph_table =
down_cast<GlyphTable*>(font_->GetTable(Tag::glyf));
LocaTablePtr loca_table = down_cast<LocaTable*>(font_->GetTable(Tag::loca));
if (glyph_table == NULL || loca_table == NULL) {
return false;
}
IntegerSet glyph_id_remaining;
glyph_id_remaining.insert(0); // Always include glyph id 0.
for (size_t i = 0; i < glyph_count; ++i) {
glyph_id_remaining.insert(glyph_ids[i]);
}
while (!glyph_id_remaining.empty()) {
IntegerSet comp_glyph_id;
for (IntegerSet::iterator i = glyph_id_remaining.begin(),
e = glyph_id_remaining.end(); i != e; ++i) {
if (*i < 0 || *i >= loca_table->NumGlyphs()) {
continue;
}
int32_t length = loca_table->GlyphLength(*i);
if (length == 0) {
continue;
}
int32_t offset = loca_table->GlyphOffset(*i);
GlyphPtr glyph;
glyph.Attach(glyph_table->GetGlyph(offset, length));
if (glyph == NULL) {
continue;
}
if (glyph->GlyphType() == GlyphType::kComposite) {
Ptr<GlyphTable::CompositeGlyph> comp_glyph =
down_cast<GlyphTable::CompositeGlyph*>(glyph.p_);
for (int32_t j = 0; j < comp_glyph->NumGlyphs(); ++j) {
int32_t glyph_id = comp_glyph->GlyphIndex(j);
if (glyph_id_processed->find(glyph_id) == glyph_id_processed->end() &&
glyph_id_remaining.find(glyph_id) == glyph_id_remaining.end()) {
comp_glyph_id.insert(comp_glyph->GlyphIndex(j));
}
}
}
glyph_id_processed->insert(*i);
}
glyph_id_remaining.clear();
glyph_id_remaining = comp_glyph_id;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle Tibetan characters, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fix compile warning.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7572039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@95563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 15,212
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetQuantumDepth(const Image *image,
QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const size_t depth)
{
size_t
extent,
quantum;
/*
Allocate the quantum pixel buffer.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
quantum_info->depth=depth;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
if (quantum_info->depth > 32)
quantum_info->depth=64;
else
if (quantum_info->depth > 16)
quantum_info->depth=32;
else
quantum_info->depth=16;
}
if (quantum_info->pixels != (unsigned char **) NULL)
DestroyQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
quantum=(quantum_info->pad+6)*(quantum_info->depth+7)/8;
extent=image->columns*quantum;
if ((image->columns != 0) && (quantum != (extent/image->columns)))
return(MagickFalse);
return(AcquireQuantumPixels(quantum_info,extent));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: The quantum handling code in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error or out-of-bounds write) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/105
|
Medium
| 9,669
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int usb_enumerate_device_otg(struct usb_device *udev)
{
int err = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_USB_OTG
/*
* OTG-aware devices on OTG-capable root hubs may be able to use SRP,
* to wake us after we've powered off VBUS; and HNP, switching roles
* "host" to "peripheral". The OTG descriptor helps figure this out.
*/
if (!udev->bus->is_b_host
&& udev->config
&& udev->parent == udev->bus->root_hub) {
struct usb_otg_descriptor *desc = NULL;
struct usb_bus *bus = udev->bus;
unsigned port1 = udev->portnum;
/* descriptor may appear anywhere in config */
err = __usb_get_extra_descriptor(udev->rawdescriptors[0],
le16_to_cpu(udev->config[0].desc.wTotalLength),
USB_DT_OTG, (void **) &desc);
if (err || !(desc->bmAttributes & USB_OTG_HNP))
return 0;
dev_info(&udev->dev, "Dual-Role OTG device on %sHNP port\n",
(port1 == bus->otg_port) ? "" : "non-");
/* enable HNP before suspend, it's simpler */
if (port1 == bus->otg_port) {
bus->b_hnp_enable = 1;
err = usb_control_msg(udev,
usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, 0),
USB_REQ_SET_FEATURE, 0,
USB_DEVICE_B_HNP_ENABLE,
0, NULL, 0,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (err < 0) {
/*
* OTG MESSAGE: report errors here,
* customize to match your product.
*/
dev_err(&udev->dev, "can't set HNP mode: %d\n",
err);
bus->b_hnp_enable = 0;
}
} else if (desc->bLength == sizeof
(struct usb_otg_descriptor)) {
/* Set a_alt_hnp_support for legacy otg device */
err = usb_control_msg(udev,
usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, 0),
USB_REQ_SET_FEATURE, 0,
USB_DEVICE_A_ALT_HNP_SUPPORT,
0, NULL, 0,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (err < 0)
dev_err(&udev->dev,
"set a_alt_hnp_support failed: %d\n",
err);
}
}
#endif
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.19.9. The USB subsystem mishandles size checks during the reading of an extra descriptor, related to __usb_get_extra_descriptor in drivers/usb/core/usb.c.
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Low
| 12,061
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t BnCrypto::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel &data, Parcel *reply, uint32_t flags) {
switch (code) {
case INIT_CHECK:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(initCheck());
return OK;
}
case IS_CRYPTO_SUPPORTED:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
uint8_t uuid[16];
data.read(uuid, sizeof(uuid));
reply->writeInt32(isCryptoSchemeSupported(uuid));
return OK;
}
case CREATE_PLUGIN:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
uint8_t uuid[16];
data.read(uuid, sizeof(uuid));
size_t opaqueSize = data.readInt32();
void *opaqueData = NULL;
if (opaqueSize > 0) {
opaqueData = malloc(opaqueSize);
data.read(opaqueData, opaqueSize);
}
reply->writeInt32(createPlugin(uuid, opaqueData, opaqueSize));
if (opaqueData != NULL) {
free(opaqueData);
opaqueData = NULL;
}
return OK;
}
case DESTROY_PLUGIN:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(destroyPlugin());
return OK;
}
case REQUIRES_SECURE_COMPONENT:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
const char *mime = data.readCString();
reply->writeInt32(requiresSecureDecoderComponent(mime));
return OK;
}
case DECRYPT:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
bool secure = data.readInt32() != 0;
CryptoPlugin::Mode mode = (CryptoPlugin::Mode)data.readInt32();
uint8_t key[16];
data.read(key, sizeof(key));
uint8_t iv[16];
data.read(iv, sizeof(iv));
size_t totalSize = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> sharedBuffer =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
int32_t offset = data.readInt32();
int32_t numSubSamples = data.readInt32();
CryptoPlugin::SubSample *subSamples =
new CryptoPlugin::SubSample[numSubSamples];
data.read(
subSamples,
sizeof(CryptoPlugin::SubSample) * numSubSamples);
void *secureBufferId, *dstPtr;
if (secure) {
secureBufferId = reinterpret_cast<void *>(static_cast<uintptr_t>(data.readInt64()));
} else {
dstPtr = calloc(1, totalSize);
}
AString errorDetailMsg;
ssize_t result;
size_t sumSubsampleSizes = 0;
bool overflow = false;
for (int32_t i = 0; i < numSubSamples; ++i) {
CryptoPlugin::SubSample &ss = subSamples[i];
if (sumSubsampleSizes <= SIZE_MAX - ss.mNumBytesOfEncryptedData) {
sumSubsampleSizes += ss.mNumBytesOfEncryptedData;
} else {
overflow = true;
}
if (sumSubsampleSizes <= SIZE_MAX - ss.mNumBytesOfClearData) {
sumSubsampleSizes += ss.mNumBytesOfClearData;
} else {
overflow = true;
}
}
if (overflow || sumSubsampleSizes != totalSize) {
result = -EINVAL;
} else if (offset + totalSize > sharedBuffer->size()) {
result = -EINVAL;
} else {
result = decrypt(
secure,
key,
iv,
mode,
sharedBuffer, offset,
subSamples, numSubSamples,
secure ? secureBufferId : dstPtr,
&errorDetailMsg);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
if (isCryptoError(result)) {
reply->writeCString(errorDetailMsg.c_str());
}
if (!secure) {
if (result >= 0) {
CHECK_LE(result, static_cast<ssize_t>(totalSize));
reply->write(dstPtr, result);
}
free(dstPtr);
dstPtr = NULL;
}
delete[] subSamples;
subSamples = NULL;
return OK;
}
case NOTIFY_RESOLUTION:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
int32_t width = data.readInt32();
int32_t height = data.readInt32();
notifyResolution(width, height);
return OK;
}
case SET_MEDIADRM_SESSION:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
reply->writeInt32(setMediaDrmSession(sessionId));
return OK;
}
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Integer overflow in the BnCrypto::onTransact function in media/libmedia/ICrypto.cpp in libmediaplayerservice in Android 6.x before 2016-02-01 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, by triggering an improper size calculation, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 25800375.
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability in ICrypto DO NOT MERGE
b/25800375
Change-Id: I03c9395f7c7de4ac5813a1207452aac57aa39484
|
Low
| 22,977
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadTIMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
typedef struct _TIMInfo
{
size_t
id,
flag;
} TIMInfo;
TIMInfo
tim_info;
Image
*image;
int
bits_per_pixel,
has_clut;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
height,
image_size,
pixel_mode,
width;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*tim_data,
*tim_pixels;
unsigned short
word;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a TIM file.
*/
tim_info.id=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
do
{
/*
Verify TIM identifier.
*/
if (tim_info.id != 0x00000010)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
tim_info.flag=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
has_clut=tim_info.flag & (1 << 3) ? 1 : 0;
pixel_mode=tim_info.flag & 0x07;
switch ((int) pixel_mode)
{
case 0: bits_per_pixel=4; break;
case 1: bits_per_pixel=8; break;
case 2: bits_per_pixel=16; break;
case 3: bits_per_pixel=24; break;
default: bits_per_pixel=4; break;
}
image->depth=8;
if (has_clut)
{
unsigned char
*tim_colormap;
/*
Read TIM raster colormap.
*/
(void)ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
(void)ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void)ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->columns=width;
image->rows=height;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,pixel_mode == 1 ? 256UL : 16UL) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
tim_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
2UL*sizeof(*tim_colormap));
if (tim_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,2*image->colors,tim_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (2*image->colors))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
p=tim_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
word=(*p++);
word|=(unsigned short) (*p++ << 8);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(
ScaleColor5to8(1UL*(word >> 10) & 0x1f));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(
ScaleColor5to8(1UL*(word >> 5) & 0x1f));
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(
ScaleColor5to8(1UL*word & 0x1f));
}
tim_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(tim_colormap);
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
/*
Read image data.
*/
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image_size=2*width*height;
bytes_per_line=width*2;
width=(width*16)/bits_per_pixel;
tim_data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image_size,
sizeof(*tim_data));
if (tim_data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,image_size,tim_data);
if (count != (ssize_t) (image_size))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
tim_pixels=tim_data;
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->columns=width;
image->rows=height;
/*
Convert TIM raster image to pixel packets.
*/
switch (bits_per_pixel)
{
case 4:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
p=tim_pixels+y*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,(*p) & 0x0f);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f);
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f);
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 8:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
p=tim_pixels+y*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,*p++);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=tim_pixels+y*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
word=(*p++);
word|=(*p++ << 8);
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(1UL*word >> 10) & 0x1f)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(1UL*word >> 5) & 0x1f)));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(1UL*word >> 0) & 0x1f)));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 24:
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=tim_pixels+y*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image);
tim_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(tim_pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
tim_info.id=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (tim_info.id == 0x00000010)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (tim_info.id == 0x00000010);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 19,916
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Gfx::Gfx(XRef *xrefA, OutputDev *outA, Dict *resDict, Catalog *catalogA,
PDFRectangle *box, PDFRectangle *cropBox,
GBool (*abortCheckCbkA)(void *data),
void *abortCheckCbkDataA)
#ifdef USE_CMS
: iccColorSpaceCache(5)
#endif
{
int i;
xref = xrefA;
catalog = catalogA;
subPage = gTrue;
printCommands = globalParams->getPrintCommands();
profileCommands = globalParams->getProfileCommands();
textHaveCSPattern = gFalse;
drawText = gFalse;
drawText = gFalse;
maskHaveCSPattern = gFalse;
mcStack = NULL;
res = new GfxResources(xref, resDict, NULL);
out = outA;
state = new GfxState(72, 72, box, 0, gFalse);
stackHeight = 1;
pushStateGuard();
fontChanged = gFalse;
clip = clipNone;
ignoreUndef = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 6; ++i) {
baseMatrix[i] = state->getCTM()[i];
}
formDepth = 0;
abortCheckCbk = abortCheckCbkA;
abortCheckCbkData = abortCheckCbkDataA;
if (cropBox) {
state->moveTo(cropBox->x1, cropBox->y1);
state->lineTo(cropBox->x2, cropBox->y1);
state->lineTo(cropBox->x2, cropBox->y2);
state->lineTo(cropBox->x1, cropBox->y2);
state->closePath();
state->clip();
out->clip(state);
state->clearPath();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Gfx::getPos function in the PDF parser in xpdf before 3.02pl5, poppler 0.8.7 and possibly other versions up to 0.15.1, CUPS, kdegraphics, and possibly other products allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via unknown vectors that trigger an uninitialized pointer dereference.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 21,248
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannelPixels(Image *image,
const size_t channels,const size_t row,const ssize_t type,
const unsigned char *pixels,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Quantum
pixel;
register const unsigned char
*p;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned short
nibble;
p=pixels;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,row,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
packet_size=GetPSDPacketSize(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (packet_size == 1)
pixel=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
else
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&nibble);
pixel=ScaleShortToQuantum(nibble);
}
switch (type)
{
case -1:
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case -2:
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(image,pixel,q);
if (channels == 1 || type == -2)
SetPixelGray(image,pixel,q);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (packet_size == 1)
SetPixelIndex(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(pixel),q);
else
SetPixelIndex(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(pixel),q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t)
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,GetPixelIndex(image,q),exception),q);
if (image->depth == 1)
{
ssize_t
bit,
number_bits;
number_bits=image->columns-x;
if (number_bits > 8)
number_bits=8;
for (bit=0; bit < number_bits; bit++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(((unsigned char) pixel) &
(0x01 << (7-bit))) != 0 ? 0 : 255,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t)
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,GetPixelIndex(image,q),
exception),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
x++;
}
x--;
continue;
}
}
break;
}
case 1:
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
else
SetPixelGreen(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 2:
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
else
SetPixelBlue(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 3:
{
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
SetPixelBlack(image,pixel,q);
else
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 4:
{
if ((IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
(channels > 3))
break;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
return(SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ReadPSDChannelPixels function in coders/psd.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted PSD file.
Commit Message: Rewrite reading pixel values.
|
Medium
| 11,554
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int _make_decode_table(codebook *s,char *lengthlist,long quantvals,
oggpack_buffer *opb,int maptype){
int i;
ogg_uint32_t *work;
if (!lengthlist) return 1;
if(s->dec_nodeb==4){
/* Over-allocate by using s->entries instead of used_entries.
* This means that we can use s->entries to enforce size in
* _make_words without messing up length list looping.
* This probably wastes a bit of space, but it shouldn't
* impact behavior or size too much.
*/
s->dec_table=_ogg_malloc((s->entries*2+1)*sizeof(*work));
if (!s->dec_table) return 1;
/* +1 (rather than -2) is to accommodate 0 and 1 sized books,
which are specialcased to nodeb==4 */
if(_make_words(lengthlist,s->entries,
s->dec_table,quantvals,s,opb,maptype))return 1;
return 0;
}
if (s->used_entries > INT_MAX/2 ||
s->used_entries*2 > INT_MAX/((long) sizeof(*work)) - 1) return 1;
/* Overallocate as above */
work=calloc((s->entries*2+1),sizeof(*work));
if (!work) return 1;
if(_make_words(lengthlist,s->entries,work,quantvals,s,opb,maptype)) goto error_out;
if (s->used_entries > INT_MAX/(s->dec_leafw+1)) goto error_out;
if (s->dec_nodeb && s->used_entries * (s->dec_leafw+1) > INT_MAX/s->dec_nodeb) goto error_out;
s->dec_table=_ogg_malloc((s->used_entries*(s->dec_leafw+1)-2)*
s->dec_nodeb);
if (!s->dec_table) goto error_out;
if(s->dec_leafw==1){
switch(s->dec_nodeb){
case 1:
for(i=0;i<s->used_entries*2-2;i++)
((unsigned char *)s->dec_table)[i]=(unsigned char)
(((work[i] & 0x80000000UL) >> 24) | work[i]);
break;
case 2:
for(i=0;i<s->used_entries*2-2;i++)
((ogg_uint16_t *)s->dec_table)[i]=(ogg_uint16_t)
(((work[i] & 0x80000000UL) >> 16) | work[i]);
break;
}
}else{
/* more complex; we have to do a two-pass repack that updates the
node indexing. */
long top=s->used_entries*3-2;
if(s->dec_nodeb==1){
unsigned char *out=(unsigned char *)s->dec_table;
for(i=s->used_entries*2-4;i>=0;i-=2){
if(work[i]&0x80000000UL){
if(work[i+1]&0x80000000UL){
top-=4;
out[top]=(work[i]>>8 & 0x7f)|0x80;
out[top+1]=(work[i+1]>>8 & 0x7f)|0x80;
out[top+2]=work[i] & 0xff;
out[top+3]=work[i+1] & 0xff;
}else{
top-=3;
out[top]=(work[i]>>8 & 0x7f)|0x80;
out[top+1]=work[work[i+1]*2];
out[top+2]=work[i] & 0xff;
}
}else{
if(work[i+1]&0x80000000UL){
top-=3;
out[top]=work[work[i]*2];
out[top+1]=(work[i+1]>>8 & 0x7f)|0x80;
out[top+2]=work[i+1] & 0xff;
}else{
top-=2;
out[top]=work[work[i]*2];
out[top+1]=work[work[i+1]*2];
}
}
work[i]=top;
}
}else{
ogg_uint16_t *out=(ogg_uint16_t *)s->dec_table;
for(i=s->used_entries*2-4;i>=0;i-=2){
if(work[i]&0x80000000UL){
if(work[i+1]&0x80000000UL){
top-=4;
out[top]=(work[i]>>16 & 0x7fff)|0x8000;
out[top+1]=(work[i+1]>>16 & 0x7fff)|0x8000;
out[top+2]=work[i] & 0xffff;
out[top+3]=work[i+1] & 0xffff;
}else{
top-=3;
out[top]=(work[i]>>16 & 0x7fff)|0x8000;
out[top+1]=work[work[i+1]*2];
out[top+2]=work[i] & 0xffff;
}
}else{
if(work[i+1]&0x80000000UL){
top-=3;
out[top]=work[work[i]*2];
out[top+1]=(work[i+1]>>16 & 0x7fff)|0x8000;
out[top+2]=work[i+1] & 0xffff;
}else{
top-=2;
out[top]=work[work[i]*2];
out[top+1]=work[work[i+1]*2];
}
}
work[i]=top;
}
}
}
free(work);
return 0;
error_out:
free(work);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (n/a). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0. Android ID: A-62800140.
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access in codebook processing
Bug: 62800140
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: I9960d507be62ee0a3b0aa991240951d5a0784f37
(cherry picked from commit 2c4c4bd895f01fdecb90ebdd0412b60608a9ccf0)
|
Low
| 21,350
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void StorageHandler::ClearDataForOrigin(
const std::string& origin,
const std::string& storage_types,
std::unique_ptr<ClearDataForOriginCallback> callback) {
if (!process_)
return callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
StoragePartition* partition = process_->GetStoragePartition();
std::vector<std::string> types = base::SplitString(
storage_types, ",", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_NONEMPTY);
std::unordered_set<std::string> set(types.begin(), types.end());
uint32_t remove_mask = 0;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Appcache))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_APPCACHE;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Cookies))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_COOKIES;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::File_systems))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_FILE_SYSTEMS;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Indexeddb))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_INDEXEDDB;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Local_storage))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_LOCAL_STORAGE;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Shader_cache))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_SHADER_CACHE;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Websql))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_WEBSQL;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Service_workers))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_SERVICE_WORKERS;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Cache_storage))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_CACHE_STORAGE;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::All))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_ALL;
if (!remove_mask) {
return callback->sendFailure(
Response::InvalidParams("No valid storage type specified"));
}
partition->ClearData(remove_mask,
StoragePartition::QUOTA_MANAGED_STORAGE_MASK_ALL,
GURL(origin), StoragePartition::OriginMatcherFunction(),
base::Time(), base::Time::Max(),
base::BindOnce(&ClearDataForOriginCallback::sendSuccess,
std::move(callback)));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 23,688
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int __init pf_init(void)
{ /* preliminary initialisation */
struct pf_unit *pf;
int unit;
if (disable)
return -EINVAL;
pf_init_units();
if (pf_detect())
return -ENODEV;
pf_busy = 0;
if (register_blkdev(major, name)) {
for (pf = units, unit = 0; unit < PF_UNITS; pf++, unit++)
put_disk(pf->disk);
return -EBUSY;
}
for (pf = units, unit = 0; unit < PF_UNITS; pf++, unit++) {
struct gendisk *disk = pf->disk;
if (!pf->present)
continue;
disk->private_data = pf;
add_disk(disk);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.0.9. There is a NULL pointer dereference for a pf data structure if alloc_disk fails in drivers/block/paride/pf.c.
Commit Message: paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
Low
| 4,902
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MediaInterfaceProxy::CreateCdm(
media::mojom::ContentDecryptionModuleRequest request) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
GetMediaInterfaceFactory()->CreateCdm(std::move(request));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: SkPictureShader.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging access to a renderer process and providing crafted serialized data.
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
|
Low
| 4,098
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static u32 svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey(struct rpcrdma_msg *rdma_argp,
struct rpcrdma_write_array *wr_ary,
struct rpcrdma_write_array *rp_ary)
{
struct rpcrdma_read_chunk *rd_ary;
struct rpcrdma_segment *arg_ch;
rd_ary = (struct rpcrdma_read_chunk *)&rdma_argp->rm_body.rm_chunks[0];
if (rd_ary->rc_discrim != xdr_zero)
return be32_to_cpu(rd_ary->rc_target.rs_handle);
if (wr_ary && be32_to_cpu(wr_ary->wc_nchunks)) {
arg_ch = &wr_ary->wc_array[0].wc_target;
return be32_to_cpu(arg_ch->rs_handle);
}
if (rp_ary && be32_to_cpu(rp_ary->wc_nchunks)) {
arg_ch = &rp_ary->wc_array[0].wc_target;
return be32_to_cpu(arg_ch->rs_handle);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 4,423
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer, int whole)
{
struct task_io_accounting acct = task->ioac;
unsigned long flags;
if (whole && lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) {
struct task_struct *t = task;
task_io_accounting_add(&acct, &task->signal->ioac);
while_each_thread(task, t)
task_io_accounting_add(&acct, &t->ioac);
unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags);
}
return sprintf(buffer,
"rchar: %llu\n"
"wchar: %llu\n"
"syscr: %llu\n"
"syscw: %llu\n"
"read_bytes: %llu\n"
"write_bytes: %llu\n"
"cancelled_write_bytes: %llu\n",
(unsigned long long)acct.rchar,
(unsigned long long)acct.wchar,
(unsigned long long)acct.syscr,
(unsigned long long)acct.syscw,
(unsigned long long)acct.read_bytes,
(unsigned long long)acct.write_bytes,
(unsigned long long)acct.cancelled_write_bytes);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: fs/proc/base.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 does not properly restrict access to /proc/#####/io files, which allows local users to obtain sensitive I/O statistics by polling a file, as demonstrated by discovering the length of another user's password.
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 17,399
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
{
struct key_user *newowner, *zapowner = NULL;
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
long ret;
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), user);
gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), group);
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((user != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid))
goto error;
if ((group != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid))
goto error;
ret = 0;
if (user == (uid_t) -1 && group == (gid_t) -1)
goto error;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
}
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
/* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chown races */
ret = -EACCES;
down_write(&key->sem);
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
/* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(key->uid, uid))
goto error_put;
/* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other
* than one of those that the current process subscribes to */
if (group != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(gid, key->gid) && !in_group_p(gid))
goto error_put;
}
/* change the UID */
if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(uid, key->uid)) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
newowner = key_user_lookup(uid);
if (!newowner)
goto error_put;
/* transfer the quota burden to the new user */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
spin_lock(&newowner->lock);
if (newowner->qnkeys + 1 >= maxkeys ||
newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen >= maxbytes ||
newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen <
newowner->qnbytes)
goto quota_overrun;
newowner->qnkeys++;
newowner->qnbytes += key->quotalen;
spin_unlock(&newowner->lock);
spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
key->user->qnkeys--;
key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
}
atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
atomic_inc(&newowner->nkeys);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
atomic_inc(&newowner->nikeys);
}
zapowner = key->user;
key->user = newowner;
key->uid = uid;
}
/* change the GID */
if (group != (gid_t) -1)
key->gid = gid;
ret = 0;
error_put:
up_write(&key->sem);
key_put(key);
if (zapowner)
key_user_put(zapowner);
error:
return ret;
quota_overrun:
spin_unlock(&newowner->lock);
zapowner = newowner;
ret = -EDQUOT;
goto error_put;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the *negative* state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
Low
| 3,012
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: AudioParameters GetInputParametersOnDeviceThread(AudioManager* audio_manager,
const std::string& device_id) {
DCHECK(audio_manager->GetTaskRunner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!audio_manager->HasAudioInputDevices())
return AudioParameters();
return audio_manager->GetInputStreamParameters(device_id);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
|
Low
| 16,259
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::OnRasterTasksRequiredForActivationFinished() {
if (!should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending_)
return;
CheckForCompletedRasterTasks();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of input.
Commit Message: cc: Simplify raster task completion notification logic
(Relanding after missing activation bug fixed in https://codereview.chromium.org/131763003/)
Previously the pixel buffer raster worker pool used a combination of
polling and explicit notifications from the raster worker pool to decide
when to tell the client about the completion of 1) all tasks or 2) the
subset of tasks required for activation. This patch simplifies the logic
by only triggering the notification based on the OnRasterTasksFinished
and OnRasterTasksRequiredForActivationFinished calls from the worker
pool.
BUG=307841,331534
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/99873007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@243991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 14,134
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::RunCompositingDidCommitCallbacks(
ui::Compositor* compositor) {
for (std::vector< base::Callback<void(ui::Compositor*)> >::const_iterator
it = on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.begin();
it != on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.end(); ++it) {
it->Run(compositor);
}
on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.clear();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 15,738
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int store_xauthority(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: invalid .Xauthority file\n");
return 0;
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Firejail before 0.9.44.6 and 0.9.38.x LTS before 0.9.38.10 LTS does not comprehensively address dotfile cases during its attempt to prevent accessing user files with an euid of zero, which allows local users to conduct sandbox-escape attacks via vectors involving a symlink and the --private option. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2017-5180.
Commit Message: security fix
|
Low
| 13,954
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::InsertCache(const CacheRecord* record) {
if (!LazyOpen(kCreateIfNeeded))
return false;
static const char kSql[] =
"INSERT INTO Caches (cache_id, group_id, online_wildcard,"
" update_time, cache_size)"
" VALUES(?, ?, ?, ?, ?)";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt64(0, record->cache_id);
statement.BindInt64(1, record->group_id);
statement.BindBool(2, record->online_wildcard);
statement.BindInt64(3, record->update_time.ToInternalValue());
statement.BindInt64(4, record->cache_size);
return statement.Run();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
|
Medium
| 11,596
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PredictorEncodeRow(TIFF* tif, uint8* bp, tmsize_t cc, uint16 s)
{
TIFFPredictorState *sp = PredictorState(tif);
assert(sp != NULL);
assert(sp->encodepfunc != NULL);
assert(sp->encoderow != NULL);
/* XXX horizontal differencing alters user's data XXX */
(*sp->encodepfunc)(tif, bp, cc);
return (*sp->encoderow)(tif, bp, cc, s);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
|
Low
| 10,351
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int sh_op(RAnal *anal, RAnalOp *op, ut64 addr, const ut8 *data, int len) {
ut8 op_MSB,op_LSB;
int ret;
if (!data)
return 0;
memset (op, '\0', sizeof (RAnalOp));
op->addr = addr;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UNK;
op->jump = op->fail = -1;
op->ptr = op->val = -1;
op->size = 2;
op_MSB = anal->big_endian? data[0]: data[1];
op_LSB = anal->big_endian? data[1]: data[0];
ret = first_nibble_decode[(op_MSB>>4) & 0x0F](anal, op, (ut16)(op_MSB<<8 | op_LSB));
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The sh_op() function in radare2 2.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted ELF file.
Commit Message: Fix #9903 - oobread in RAnal.sh
|
Medium
| 28,042
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int parse_csum_name(const char *name, int len)
{
if (len < 0 && name)
len = strlen(name);
if (!name || (len == 4 && strncasecmp(name, "auto", 4) == 0)) {
if (protocol_version >= 30)
return CSUM_MD5;
if (protocol_version >= 27)
return CSUM_MD4_OLD;
if (protocol_version >= 21)
return CSUM_MD4_BUSTED;
return CSUM_ARCHAIC;
}
if (len == 3 && strncasecmp(name, "md4", 3) == 0)
return CSUM_MD4;
if (len == 3 && strncasecmp(name, "md5", 3) == 0)
return CSUM_MD5;
if (len == 4 && strncasecmp(name, "none", 4) == 0)
return CSUM_NONE;
rprintf(FERROR, "unknown checksum name: %s\n", name);
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-354
Summary: rsync 3.1.3-development before 2017-10-24 mishandles archaic checksums, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions. NOTE: the rsync development branch has significant use beyond the rsync developers, e.g., the code has been copied for use in various GitHub projects.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 6,844
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: secret_core_crt (gcry_mpi_t M, gcry_mpi_t C,
gcry_mpi_t D, unsigned int Nlimbs,
gcry_mpi_t P, gcry_mpi_t Q, gcry_mpi_t U)
{
gcry_mpi_t m1 = mpi_alloc_secure ( Nlimbs + 1 );
gcry_mpi_t m2 = mpi_alloc_secure ( Nlimbs + 1 );
gcry_mpi_t h = mpi_alloc_secure ( Nlimbs + 1 );
/* m1 = c ^ (d mod (p-1)) mod p */
mpi_sub_ui ( h, P, 1 );
mpi_fdiv_r ( h, D, h );
mpi_powm ( m1, C, h, P );
/* m2 = c ^ (d mod (q-1)) mod q */
mpi_sub_ui ( h, Q, 1 );
mpi_fdiv_r ( h, D, h );
mpi_powm ( m2, C, h, Q );
/* h = u * ( m2 - m1 ) mod q */
mpi_sub ( h, m2, m1 );
/* Remove superfluous leading zeroes from INPUT. */
mpi_normalize (input);
if (!skey->p || !skey->q || !skey->u)
{
secret_core_std (output, input, skey->d, skey->n);
}
else
{
secret_core_crt (output, input, skey->d, mpi_get_nlimbs (skey->n),
skey->p, skey->q, skey->u);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: libgcrypt before version 1.7.8 is vulnerable to a cache side-channel attack resulting into a complete break of RSA-1024 while using the left-to-right method for computing the sliding-window expansion. The same attack is believed to work on RSA-2048 with moderately more computation. This side-channel requires that attacker can run arbitrary software on the hardware where the private RSA key is used.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 16,364
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin() {
if (MediaElement()->GetWebMediaPlayer()->DidPassCORSAccessCheck()) {
return false;
}
if (!MediaElement()->HasSingleSecurityOrigin()) {
return true;
}
return Context()->WouldTaintOrigin(MediaElement()->currentSrc());
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Service works could inappropriately gain access to cross origin audio in Media in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy for audio content via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
Medium
| 992
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::PrintNode(const WebKit::WebNode& node) {
if (node.isNull() || !node.document().frame()) {
return;
}
if (is_preview_enabled_) {
print_preview_context_.InitWithNode(node);
RequestPrintPreview(PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_CONTEXT_NODE);
} else {
WebKit::WebNode duplicate_node(node);
Print(duplicate_node.document().frame(), duplicate_node);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to printing.
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 20,151
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: header_put_le_int (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 4)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
} ;
} /* header_put_le_int */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In libsndfile before 1.0.28, an error in the *header_read()* function (common.c) when handling ID3 tags can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow via a specially crafted FLAC file.
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
|
Medium
| 28,148
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ras_getcmap(jas_stream_t *in, ras_hdr_t *hdr, ras_cmap_t *cmap)
{
int i;
int j;
int x;
int c;
int numcolors;
int actualnumcolors;
switch (hdr->maptype) {
case RAS_MT_NONE:
break;
case RAS_MT_EQUALRGB:
{
jas_eprintf("warning: palettized images not fully supported\n");
numcolors = 1 << hdr->depth;
assert(numcolors <= RAS_CMAP_MAXSIZ);
actualnumcolors = hdr->maplength / 3;
for (i = 0; i < numcolors; i++) {
cmap->data[i] = 0;
}
if ((hdr->maplength % 3) || hdr->maplength < 0 ||
hdr->maplength > 3 * numcolors) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < actualnumcolors; j++) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
x = 0;
switch (i) {
case 0:
x = RAS_RED(c);
break;
case 1:
x = RAS_GREEN(c);
break;
case 2:
x = RAS_BLUE(c);
break;
}
cmap->data[j] |= x;
}
}
}
break;
default:
return -1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ras_getcmap function in ras_dec.c in JasPer before 1.900.14 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure) via a crafted image file.
Commit Message: Fixed a few bugs in the RAS encoder and decoder where errors were tested
with assertions instead of being gracefully handled.
|
Medium
| 23,846
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool CSPSourceList::matches(const KURL& url, ContentSecurityPolicy::RedirectStatus redirectStatus) const
{
if (m_allowStar)
return true;
KURL effectiveURL = m_policy->selfMatchesInnerURL() && SecurityOrigin::shouldUseInnerURL(url) ? SecurityOrigin::extractInnerURL(url) : url;
if (m_allowSelf && m_policy->urlMatchesSelf(effectiveURL))
return true;
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_list.size(); ++i) {
if (m_list[i].matches(effectiveURL, redirectStatus))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The CSPSourceList::matches function in WebKit/Source/core/frame/csp/CSPSourceList.cpp in the Content Security Policy (CSP) implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 accepts a blob:, data:, or filesystem: URL as a match for a * pattern, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended scheme restrictions in opportunistic circumstances by leveraging a policy that relies on this pattern.
Commit Message: Disallow CSP source * matching of data:, blob:, and filesystem: URLs
The CSP spec specifically excludes matching of data:, blob:, and
filesystem: URLs with the source '*' wildcard. This adds checks to make
sure that doesn't happen, along with tests.
BUG=534570
R=mkwst@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1361763005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#350950}
|
Medium
| 2,472
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int pptp_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
int sockaddr_len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_pppox *sp = (struct sockaddr_pppox *) uservaddr;
struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk);
struct pptp_opt *opt = &po->proto.pptp;
struct rtable *rt;
struct flowi4 fl4;
int error = 0;
if (sp->sa_protocol != PX_PROTO_PPTP)
return -EINVAL;
if (lookup_chan_dst(sp->sa_addr.pptp.call_id, sp->sa_addr.pptp.sin_addr.s_addr))
return -EALREADY;
lock_sock(sk);
/* Check for already bound sockets */
if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_CONNECTED) {
error = -EBUSY;
goto end;
}
/* Check for already disconnected sockets, on attempts to disconnect */
if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_DEAD) {
error = -EALREADY;
goto end;
}
if (!opt->src_addr.sin_addr.s_addr || !sp->sa_addr.pptp.sin_addr.s_addr) {
error = -EINVAL;
goto end;
}
po->chan.private = sk;
po->chan.ops = &pptp_chan_ops;
rt = ip_route_output_ports(sock_net(sk), &fl4, sk,
opt->dst_addr.sin_addr.s_addr,
opt->src_addr.sin_addr.s_addr,
0, 0,
IPPROTO_GRE, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), 0);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
error = -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto end;
}
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst);
po->chan.mtu = dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
if (!po->chan.mtu)
po->chan.mtu = PPP_MRU;
ip_rt_put(rt);
po->chan.mtu -= PPTP_HEADER_OVERHEAD;
po->chan.hdrlen = 2 + sizeof(struct pptp_gre_header);
error = ppp_register_channel(&po->chan);
if (error) {
pr_err("PPTP: failed to register PPP channel (%d)\n", error);
goto end;
}
opt->dst_addr = sp->sa_addr.pptp;
sk->sk_state = PPPOX_CONNECTED;
end:
release_sock(sk);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The (1) pptp_bind and (2) pptp_connect functions in drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c in the Linux kernel through 4.3.3 do not verify an address length, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory and bypass the KASLR protection mechanism via a crafted application.
Commit Message: pptp: verify sockaddr_len in pptp_bind() and pptp_connect()
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 19,140
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::~BluetoothAdapterChromeOS() {
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothAdapterClient()->RemoveObserver(this);
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothDeviceClient()->RemoveObserver(this);
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothInputClient()->RemoveObserver(this);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 7,538
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void KioskNextHomeInterfaceBrokerImpl::GetAppController(
mojom::AppControllerRequest request) {
app_controller_->BindRequest(std::move(request));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android allows a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via crafted PDF files.
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
|
Medium
| 15,732
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void XMLHttpRequest::networkError()
{
genericError();
if (!m_uploadComplete) {
m_uploadComplete = true;
if (m_upload && m_uploadEventsAllowed)
m_upload->dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().errorEvent));
}
m_progressEventThrottle.dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().errorEvent));
internalAbort();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in core/xml/XMLHttpRequest.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.101, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger multiple conflicting uses of the same XMLHttpRequest object.
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 23,649
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FolderHeaderView::Update() {
if (!folder_item_)
return;
folder_name_view_->SetVisible(folder_name_visible_);
if (folder_name_visible_)
folder_name_view_->SetText(base::UTF8ToUTF16(folder_item_->name()));
Layout();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTMLMediaElement::didMoveToNewDocument function in core/html/HTMLMediaElement.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 29.0.1547.57, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving moving a (1) AUDIO or (2) VIDEO element between documents.
Commit Message: Enforce the maximum length of the folder name in UI.
BUG=355797
R=xiyuan@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/203863005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260156 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 3,545
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: sp<MediaSource> MPEG4Extractor::getTrack(size_t index) {
status_t err;
if ((err = readMetaData()) != OK) {
return NULL;
}
Track *track = mFirstTrack;
while (index > 0) {
if (track == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
track = track->next;
--index;
}
if (track == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
Trex *trex = NULL;
int32_t trackId;
if (track->meta->findInt32(kKeyTrackID, &trackId)) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < mTrex.size(); i++) {
Trex *t = &mTrex.editItemAt(index);
if (t->track_ID == (uint32_t) trackId) {
trex = t;
break;
}
}
}
ALOGV("getTrack called, pssh: %zu", mPssh.size());
return new MPEG4Source(this,
track->meta, mDataSource, track->timescale, track->sampleTable,
mSidxEntries, trex, mMoofOffset);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: media/libmediaplayerservice/nuplayer/GenericSource.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not validate certain track data, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28799341.
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
|
Medium
| 21,002
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FailStoreGroup() {
PushNextTask(base::BindOnce(&AppCacheStorageImplTest::Verify_FailStoreGroup,
base::Unretained(this)));
const int64_t kTooBig = 10 * 1024 * 1024; // 10M
group_ =
new AppCacheGroup(storage(), kManifestUrl, storage()->NewGroupId());
cache_ = new AppCache(storage(), storage()->NewCacheId());
cache_->AddEntry(kManifestUrl,
AppCacheEntry(AppCacheEntry::MANIFEST, 1, kTooBig));
storage()->StoreGroupAndNewestCache(group_.get(), cache_.get(), delegate());
EXPECT_FALSE(delegate()->stored_group_success_); // Expected to be async.
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
|
Medium
| 6,482
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::empty_this_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret1 = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned int nBufferIndex = drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount;
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Empty this buffer in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (buffer == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ETB Buffer is NULL");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (!m_inp_bEnabled) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ETB incorrect state operation, input port is disabled.");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
if (buffer->nInputPortIndex != OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ETB invalid port in header %u", (unsigned int)buffer->nInputPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
#ifdef _ANDROID_
if (iDivXDrmDecrypt) {
OMX_ERRORTYPE drmErr = iDivXDrmDecrypt->Decrypt(buffer);
if (drmErr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ERROR:iDivXDrmDecrypt->Decrypt %d", drmErr);
}
}
#endif //_ANDROID_
if (perf_flag) {
if (!latency) {
dec_time.stop();
latency = dec_time.processing_time_us();
dec_time.start();
}
}
if (arbitrary_bytes) {
nBufferIndex = buffer - m_inp_heap_ptr;
} else {
if (input_use_buffer == true) {
nBufferIndex = buffer - m_inp_heap_ptr;
m_inp_mem_ptr[nBufferIndex].nFilledLen = m_inp_heap_ptr[nBufferIndex].nFilledLen;
m_inp_mem_ptr[nBufferIndex].nTimeStamp = m_inp_heap_ptr[nBufferIndex].nTimeStamp;
m_inp_mem_ptr[nBufferIndex].nFlags = m_inp_heap_ptr[nBufferIndex].nFlags;
buffer = &m_inp_mem_ptr[nBufferIndex];
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Non-Arbitrary mode - buffer address is: malloc %p, pmem%p in Index %d, buffer %p of size %u",
&m_inp_heap_ptr[nBufferIndex], &m_inp_mem_ptr[nBufferIndex],nBufferIndex, buffer, (unsigned int)buffer->nFilledLen);
} else {
nBufferIndex = buffer - m_inp_mem_ptr;
}
}
if (nBufferIndex > drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount ) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ETB nBufferIndex is invalid");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) {
codec_config_flag = true;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("%s: codec_config buffer", __FUNCTION__);
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("[ETB] BHdr(%p) pBuf(%p) nTS(%lld) nFL(%u)",
buffer, buffer->pBuffer, buffer->nTimeStamp, (unsigned int)buffer->nFilledLen);
if (arbitrary_bytes) {
post_event ((unsigned long)hComp,(unsigned long)buffer,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB_ARBITRARY);
} else {
post_event ((unsigned long)hComp,(unsigned long)buffer,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB);
}
time_stamp_dts.insert_timestamp(buffer);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the mm-video-v4l2 vdec component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27890802.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
|
Low
| 8,850
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
a* (toa(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->convert1();
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 22,228
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WT_Interpolate (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 phaseFrac;
EAS_I32 acc0;
const EAS_SAMPLE *pSamples;
const EAS_SAMPLE *loopEnd;
EAS_I32 samp1;
EAS_I32 samp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
loopEnd = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1;
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->phaseAccum;
/*lint -e{713} truncation is OK */
phaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* fetch adjacent samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* linear interpolation */
acc0 = samp2 - samp1;
acc0 = acc0 * phaseFrac;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = samp1 + (acc0 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
/* save new output sample in buffer */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_I16)(acc0 >> 2);
/* increment phase */
phaseFrac += phaseInc;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = phaseFrac >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS;
/* next sample */
if (acc0 > 0) {
/* advance sample pointer */
pSamples += acc0;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)((EAS_U32)phaseFrac & PHASE_FRAC_MASK);
/* check for loop end */
acc0 = (EAS_I32) (pSamples - loopEnd);
if (acc0 >= 0)
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopStart + acc0;
/* fetch new samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
}
}
/* save pointer and phase */
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = (EAS_U32) pSamples;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = (EAS_U32) phaseFrac;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Sonivox in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for a negative number of samples, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtengine.c and arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtsynth.c, aka internal bug 26366256.
Commit Message: Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
|
Low
| 16,536
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void sas_revalidate_domain(struct work_struct *work)
{
int res = 0;
struct sas_discovery_event *ev = to_sas_discovery_event(work);
struct asd_sas_port *port = ev->port;
struct sas_ha_struct *ha = port->ha;
struct domain_device *ddev = port->port_dev;
/* prevent revalidation from finding sata links in recovery */
mutex_lock(&ha->disco_mutex);
if (test_bit(SAS_HA_ATA_EH_ACTIVE, &ha->state)) {
SAS_DPRINTK("REVALIDATION DEFERRED on port %d, pid:%d\n",
port->id, task_pid_nr(current));
goto out;
}
clear_bit(DISCE_REVALIDATE_DOMAIN, &port->disc.pending);
SAS_DPRINTK("REVALIDATING DOMAIN on port %d, pid:%d\n", port->id,
task_pid_nr(current));
if (ddev && (ddev->dev_type == SAS_FANOUT_EXPANDER_DEVICE ||
ddev->dev_type == SAS_EDGE_EXPANDER_DEVICE))
res = sas_ex_revalidate_domain(ddev);
SAS_DPRINTK("done REVALIDATING DOMAIN on port %d, pid:%d, res 0x%x\n",
port->id, task_pid_nr(current), res);
out:
mutex_unlock(&ha->disco_mutex);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.15.9 mishandles a mutex within libsas, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) by triggering certain error-handling code.
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
|
Low
| 4,224
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Plugin::Plugin(PP_Instance pp_instance)
: pp::InstancePrivate(pp_instance),
scriptable_plugin_(NULL),
argc_(-1),
argn_(NULL),
argv_(NULL),
main_subprocess_("main subprocess", NULL, NULL),
nacl_ready_state_(UNSENT),
nexe_error_reported_(false),
wrapper_factory_(NULL),
last_error_string_(""),
ppapi_proxy_(NULL),
enable_dev_interfaces_(false),
init_time_(0),
ready_time_(0),
nexe_size_(0),
time_of_last_progress_event_(0),
using_ipc_proxy_(false) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::Plugin (this=%p, pp_instance=%"
NACL_PRId32")\n", static_cast<void*>(this), pp_instance));
callback_factory_.Initialize(this);
nexe_downloader_.Initialize(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 29,752
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: vrrp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int len,
register const u_char *bp2, int ttl)
{
int version, type, auth_type = VRRP_AUTH_NONE; /* keep compiler happy */
const char *type_s;
ND_TCHECK(bp[0]);
version = (bp[0] & 0xf0) >> 4;
type = bp[0] & 0x0f;
type_s = tok2str(type2str, "unknown type (%u)", type);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "VRRPv%u, %s", version, type_s));
if (ttl != 255)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (ttl %u)", ttl));
if (version < 2 || version > 3 || type != VRRP_TYPE_ADVERTISEMENT)
return;
ND_TCHECK(bp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", vrid %u, prio %u", bp[1], bp[2]));
ND_TCHECK(bp[5]);
if (version == 2) {
auth_type = bp[4];
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", authtype %s", tok2str(auth2str, NULL, auth_type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", intvl %us, length %u", bp[5], len));
} else { /* version == 3 */
uint16_t intvl = (bp[4] & 0x0f) << 8 | bp[5];
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", intvl %ucs, length %u", intvl, len));
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
int naddrs = bp[3];
int i;
char c;
if (version == 2 && ND_TTEST2(bp[0], len)) {
struct cksum_vec vec[1];
vec[0].ptr = bp;
vec[0].len = len;
if (in_cksum(vec, 1))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (bad vrrp cksum %x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[6])));
}
if (version == 3 && ND_TTEST2(bp[0], len)) {
uint16_t cksum = nextproto4_cksum(ndo, (const struct ip *)bp2, bp,
len, len, IPPROTO_VRRP);
if (cksum)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (bad vrrp cksum %x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[6])));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", addrs"));
if (naddrs > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(%d)", naddrs));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ":"));
c = ' ';
bp += 8;
for (i = 0; i < naddrs; i++) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[3]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s", c, ipaddr_string(ndo, bp)));
c = ',';
bp += 4;
}
if (version == 2 && auth_type == VRRP_AUTH_SIMPLE) { /* simple text password */
ND_TCHECK(bp[7]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " auth \""));
if (fn_printn(ndo, bp, 8, ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|vrrp]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The VRRP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-vrrp.c:vrrp_print().
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14463/VRRP: Add a missing bounds check
In vrrp_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 10,577
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: LONG ValidateSignature(HWND hDlg, const char* path)
{
LONG r;
WINTRUST_DATA trust_data = { 0 };
WINTRUST_FILE_INFO trust_file = { 0 };
GUID guid_generic_verify = // WINTRUST_ACTION_GENERIC_VERIFY_V2
{ 0xaac56b, 0xcd44, 0x11d0,{ 0x8c, 0xc2, 0x0, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0xc2, 0x95, 0xee } };
char *signature_name;
size_t i, len;
signature_name = GetSignatureName(path);
if (signature_name == NULL) {
uprintf("PKI: Could not get signature name");
MessageBoxExU(hDlg, lmprintf(MSG_284), lmprintf(MSG_283), MB_OK | MB_ICONERROR | MB_IS_RTL, selected_langid);
return TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE;
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAYSIZE(cert_name); i++) {
len = strlen(cert_name[i]);
if (strncmp(signature_name, cert_name[i], len) == 0) {
if ((len >= strlen(signature_name)) || isspace(signature_name[len]))
break;
}
}
if (i >= ARRAYSIZE(cert_name)) {
uprintf("PKI: Signature '%s' is unexpected...", signature_name);
if (MessageBoxExU(hDlg, lmprintf(MSG_285, signature_name), lmprintf(MSG_283),
MB_YESNO | MB_ICONWARNING | MB_IS_RTL, selected_langid) != IDYES)
return TRUST_E_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST;
}
trust_file.cbStruct = sizeof(trust_file);
trust_file.pcwszFilePath = utf8_to_wchar(path);
if (trust_file.pcwszFilePath == NULL) {
uprintf("PKI: Unable to convert '%s' to UTF16", path);
return ERROR_SEVERITY_ERROR | FAC(FACILITY_CERT) | ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY;
}
trust_data.cbStruct = sizeof(trust_data);
trust_data.dwUIChoice = WTD_UI_ALL;
trust_data.fdwRevocationChecks = WTD_REVOKE_WHOLECHAIN;
trust_data.dwProvFlags = WTD_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN | 0x400;
trust_data.dwUnionChoice = WTD_CHOICE_FILE;
trust_data.pFile = &trust_file;
r = WinVerifyTrust(NULL, &guid_generic_verify, &trust_data);
safe_free(trust_file.pcwszFilePath);
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-494
Summary: Akeo Consulting Rufus prior to version 2.17.1187 does not adequately validate the integrity of updates downloaded over HTTP, allowing an attacker to easily convince a user to execute arbitrary code
Commit Message: [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately.
|
Medium
| 1,780
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SoftMPEG2::setDecodeArgs(
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip,
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op,
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader,
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader,
size_t timeStampIx) {
size_t sizeY = outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight();
size_t sizeUV;
uint8_t *pBuf;
ps_dec_ip->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_ip_t);
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
ps_dec_ip->e_cmd = IVD_CMD_VIDEO_DECODE;
/* When in flush and after EOS with zero byte input,
* inHeader is set to zero. Hence check for non-null */
if (inHeader) {
ps_dec_ip->u4_ts = timeStampIx;
ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer = inHeader->pBuffer
+ inHeader->nOffset;
ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes = inHeader->nFilledLen;
} else {
ps_dec_ip->u4_ts = 0;
ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer = NULL;
ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes = 0;
}
if (outHeader) {
pBuf = outHeader->pBuffer;
} else {
pBuf = mFlushOutBuffer;
}
sizeUV = sizeY / 4;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[0] = sizeY;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[1] = sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[2] = sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0] = pBuf;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1] = pBuf + sizeY;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2] = pBuf + sizeY + sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs = 3;
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27833616.
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
|
Medium
| 19,268
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BlobURLRequestJob::DidGetFileItemLength(size_t index, int64 result) {
if (error_)
return;
if (result == net::ERR_UPLOAD_FILE_CHANGED) {
NotifyFailure(net::ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND);
return;
} else if (result < 0) {
NotifyFailure(result);
return;
}
DCHECK_LT(index, blob_data_->items().size());
const BlobData::Item& item = blob_data_->items().at(index);
DCHECK(IsFileType(item.type()));
int64 item_length = static_cast<int64>(item.length());
if (item_length == -1)
item_length = result - item.offset();
DCHECK_LT(index, item_length_list_.size());
item_length_list_[index] = item_length;
total_size_ += item_length;
if (--pending_get_file_info_count_ == 0)
DidCountSize(net::OK);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a blob.
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob.
BUG=169685
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 21,276
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xsltShallowCopyElem(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr insert, int isLRE)
{
xmlNodePtr copy;
if ((node->type == XML_DTD_NODE) || (insert == NULL))
return(NULL);
if ((node->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) ||
(node->type == XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE))
return(xsltCopyText(ctxt, insert, node, 0));
copy = xmlDocCopyNode(node, insert->doc, 0);
if (copy != NULL) {
copy->doc = ctxt->output;
copy = xsltAddChild(insert, copy);
if (node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
/*
* Add namespaces as they are needed
*/
if (node->nsDef != NULL) {
/*
* TODO: Remove the LRE case in the refactored code
* gets enabled.
*/
if (isLRE)
xsltCopyNamespaceList(ctxt, copy, node->nsDef);
else
xsltCopyNamespaceListInternal(copy, node->nsDef);
}
/*
* URGENT TODO: The problem with this is that it does not
* copy over all namespace nodes in scope.
* The damn thing about this is, that we would need to
* use the xmlGetNsList(), for every single node; this is
* also done in xsltCopyTreeInternal(), but only for the top node.
*/
if (node->ns != NULL) {
if (isLRE) {
/*
* REVISIT TODO: Since the non-refactored code still does
* ns-aliasing, we need to call xsltGetNamespace() here.
* Remove this when ready.
*/
copy->ns = xsltGetNamespace(ctxt, node, node->ns, copy);
} else {
copy->ns = xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt,
node, node->ns->href, node->ns->prefix, copy);
}
} else if ((insert->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(insert->ns != NULL))
{
/*
* "Undeclare" the default namespace.
*/
xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt, node, NULL, NULL, copy);
}
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, node,
"xsltShallowCopyElem: copy %s failed\n", node->name);
}
return(copy);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
High
| 22,114
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static long pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(
struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance,
unsigned int ioctl_cmd,
unsigned int buflen,
unsigned long arg
)
{
struct pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer *buffer;
struct pmcraid_ioarcb *ioarcb;
struct pmcraid_cmd *cmd;
struct pmcraid_cmd *cancel_cmd;
unsigned long request_buffer;
unsigned long request_offset;
unsigned long lock_flags;
void *ioasa;
u32 ioasc;
int request_size;
int buffer_size;
u8 access, direction;
int rc = 0;
/* If IOA reset is in progress, wait 10 secs for reset to complete */
if (pinstance->ioa_reset_in_progress) {
rc = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(
pinstance->reset_wait_q,
!pinstance->ioa_reset_in_progress,
msecs_to_jiffies(10000));
if (!rc)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
else if (rc < 0)
return -ERESTARTSYS;
}
/* If adapter is not in operational state, return error */
if (pinstance->ioa_state != IOA_STATE_OPERATIONAL) {
pmcraid_err("IOA is not operational\n");
return -ENOTTY;
}
buffer_size = sizeof(struct pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer);
buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer) {
pmcraid_err("no memory for passthrough buffer\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
request_offset =
offsetof(struct pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer, request_buffer);
request_buffer = arg + request_offset;
rc = __copy_from_user(buffer,
(struct pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer *) arg,
sizeof(struct pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer));
ioasa =
(void *)(arg +
offsetof(struct pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer, ioasa));
if (rc) {
pmcraid_err("ioctl: can't copy passthrough buffer\n");
rc = -EFAULT;
goto out_free_buffer;
}
request_size = buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length;
if (buffer->ioarcb.request_flags0 & TRANSFER_DIR_WRITE) {
access = VERIFY_READ;
direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
} else {
access = VERIFY_WRITE;
direction = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
}
if (request_size > 0) {
rc = access_ok(access, arg, request_offset + request_size);
if (!rc) {
rc = -EFAULT;
goto out_free_buffer;
}
} else if (request_size < 0) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_free_buffer;
}
/* check if we have any additional command parameters */
if (buffer->ioarcb.add_cmd_param_length > PMCRAID_ADD_CMD_PARAM_LEN) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_free_buffer;
}
cmd = pmcraid_get_free_cmd(pinstance);
if (!cmd) {
pmcraid_err("free command block is not available\n");
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_buffer;
}
cmd->scsi_cmd = NULL;
ioarcb = &(cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb);
/* Copy the user-provided IOARCB stuff field by field */
ioarcb->resource_handle = buffer->ioarcb.resource_handle;
ioarcb->data_transfer_length = buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length;
ioarcb->cmd_timeout = buffer->ioarcb.cmd_timeout;
ioarcb->request_type = buffer->ioarcb.request_type;
ioarcb->request_flags0 = buffer->ioarcb.request_flags0;
ioarcb->request_flags1 = buffer->ioarcb.request_flags1;
memcpy(ioarcb->cdb, buffer->ioarcb.cdb, PMCRAID_MAX_CDB_LEN);
if (buffer->ioarcb.add_cmd_param_length) {
ioarcb->add_cmd_param_length =
buffer->ioarcb.add_cmd_param_length;
ioarcb->add_cmd_param_offset =
buffer->ioarcb.add_cmd_param_offset;
memcpy(ioarcb->add_data.u.add_cmd_params,
buffer->ioarcb.add_data.u.add_cmd_params,
buffer->ioarcb.add_cmd_param_length);
}
/* set hrrq number where the IOA should respond to. Note that all cmds
* generated internally uses hrrq_id 0, exception to this is the cmd
* block of scsi_cmd which is re-used (e.g. cancel/abort), which uses
* hrrq_id assigned here in queuecommand
*/
ioarcb->hrrq_id = atomic_add_return(1, &(pinstance->last_message_id)) %
pinstance->num_hrrq;
if (request_size) {
rc = pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls(cmd,
request_size,
direction);
if (rc) {
pmcraid_err("couldn't build passthrough ioadls\n");
goto out_free_buffer;
}
}
/* If data is being written into the device, copy the data from user
* buffers
*/
if (direction == DMA_TO_DEVICE && request_size > 0) {
rc = pmcraid_copy_sglist(cmd->sglist,
request_buffer,
request_size,
direction);
if (rc) {
pmcraid_err("failed to copy user buffer\n");
goto out_free_sglist;
}
}
/* passthrough ioctl is a blocking command so, put the user to sleep
* until timeout. Note that a timeout value of 0 means, do timeout.
*/
cmd->cmd_done = pmcraid_internal_done;
init_completion(&cmd->wait_for_completion);
cmd->completion_req = 1;
pmcraid_info("command(%d) (CDB[0] = %x) for %x\n",
le32_to_cpu(cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb.response_handle) >> 2,
cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb.cdb[0],
le32_to_cpu(cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb.resource_handle));
spin_lock_irqsave(pinstance->host->host_lock, lock_flags);
_pmcraid_fire_command(cmd);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(pinstance->host->host_lock, lock_flags);
/* NOTE ! Remove the below line once abort_task is implemented
* in firmware. This line disables ioctl command timeout handling logic
* similar to IO command timeout handling, making ioctl commands to wait
* until the command completion regardless of timeout value specified in
* ioarcb
*/
buffer->ioarcb.cmd_timeout = 0;
/* If command timeout is specified put caller to wait till that time,
* otherwise it would be blocking wait. If command gets timed out, it
* will be aborted.
*/
if (buffer->ioarcb.cmd_timeout == 0) {
wait_for_completion(&cmd->wait_for_completion);
} else if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(
&cmd->wait_for_completion,
msecs_to_jiffies(buffer->ioarcb.cmd_timeout * 1000))) {
pmcraid_info("aborting cmd %d (CDB[0] = %x) due to timeout\n",
le32_to_cpu(cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb.response_handle >> 2),
cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb.cdb[0]);
spin_lock_irqsave(pinstance->host->host_lock, lock_flags);
cancel_cmd = pmcraid_abort_cmd(cmd);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(pinstance->host->host_lock, lock_flags);
if (cancel_cmd) {
wait_for_completion(&cancel_cmd->wait_for_completion);
ioasc = cancel_cmd->ioa_cb->ioasa.ioasc;
pmcraid_return_cmd(cancel_cmd);
/* if abort task couldn't find the command i.e it got
* completed prior to aborting, return good completion.
* if command got aborted successfully or there was IOA
* reset due to abort task itself getting timedout then
* return -ETIMEDOUT
*/
if (ioasc == PMCRAID_IOASC_IOA_WAS_RESET ||
PMCRAID_IOASC_SENSE_KEY(ioasc) == 0x00) {
if (ioasc != PMCRAID_IOASC_GC_IOARCB_NOTFOUND)
rc = -ETIMEDOUT;
goto out_handle_response;
}
}
/* no command block for abort task or abort task failed to abort
* the IOARCB, then wait for 150 more seconds and initiate reset
* sequence after timeout
*/
if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(
&cmd->wait_for_completion,
msecs_to_jiffies(150 * 1000))) {
pmcraid_reset_bringup(cmd->drv_inst);
rc = -ETIMEDOUT;
}
}
out_handle_response:
/* copy entire IOASA buffer and return IOCTL success.
* If copying IOASA to user-buffer fails, return
* EFAULT
*/
if (copy_to_user(ioasa, &cmd->ioa_cb->ioasa,
sizeof(struct pmcraid_ioasa))) {
pmcraid_err("failed to copy ioasa buffer to user\n");
rc = -EFAULT;
}
/* If the data transfer was from device, copy the data onto user
* buffers
*/
else if (direction == DMA_FROM_DEVICE && request_size > 0) {
rc = pmcraid_copy_sglist(cmd->sglist,
request_buffer,
request_size,
direction);
if (rc) {
pmcraid_err("failed to copy user buffer\n");
rc = -EFAULT;
}
}
out_free_sglist:
pmcraid_release_passthrough_ioadls(cmd, request_size, direction);
pmcraid_return_cmd(cmd);
out_free_buffer:
kfree(buffer);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: ** DISPUTED ** Integer signedness error in the pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough function in drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c in the Linux kernel before 3.1 might allow local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or memory corruption) via a negative size value in an ioctl call. NOTE: this may be a vulnerability only in unusual environments that provide a privileged program for obtaining the required file descriptor.
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
|
Low
| 24,364
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int Downmix_Reset(downmix_object_t *pDownmixer, bool init) {
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in libeffects in the Audio Policy Service in mediaserver in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allow attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted application, aka internal bug 21953516.
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
|
Medium
| 26,699
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnDidGetPrintedPagesCount(
int cookie, int number_pages) {
if (printer_.get())
printer_->SetPrintedPagesCount(cookie, number_pages);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 2,168
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static enum entity_charset determine_charset(char *charset_hint TSRMLS_DC)
{
int i;
enum entity_charset charset = cs_utf_8;
int len = 0;
const zend_encoding *zenc;
/* Default is now UTF-8 */
if (charset_hint == NULL)
return cs_utf_8;
if ((len = strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
zenc = zend_multibyte_get_internal_encoding(TSRMLS_C);
if (zenc != NULL) {
charset_hint = (char *)zend_multibyte_get_encoding_name(zenc);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
if ((len == 4) /* sizeof (none|auto|pass) */ &&
(!memcmp("pass", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4))) {
charset_hint = NULL;
len = 0;
} else {
goto det_charset;
}
}
}
charset_hint = SG(default_charset);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
/* try to detect the charset for the locale */
#if HAVE_NL_LANGINFO && HAVE_LOCALE_H && defined(CODESET)
charset_hint = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
#endif
#if HAVE_LOCALE_H
/* try to figure out the charset from the locale */
{
char *localename;
char *dot, *at;
/* lang[_territory][.codeset][@modifier] */
localename = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, NULL);
dot = strchr(localename, '.');
if (dot) {
dot++;
/* locale specifies a codeset */
at = strchr(dot, '@');
if (at)
len = at - dot;
else
len = strlen(dot);
charset_hint = dot;
} else {
/* no explicit name; see if the name itself
* is the charset */
charset_hint = localename;
len = strlen(charset_hint);
}
}
#endif
det_charset:
if (charset_hint) {
int found = 0;
/* now walk the charset map and look for the codeset */
for (i = 0; charset_map[i].codeset; i++) {
if (len == strlen(charset_map[i].codeset) && strncasecmp(charset_hint, charset_map[i].codeset, len) == 0) {
charset = charset_map[i].charset;
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "charset `%s' not supported, assuming utf-8",
charset_hint);
}
}
return charset;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_html_entities function in ext/standard/html.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large output string from the htmlspecialchars function.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
|
Low
| 8,616
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
{
int i;
const char *str;
X509 *peer;
long verify_error;
MS_STATIC char buf[BUFSIZ];
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
char *client_princ;
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
const unsigned char *next_proto_neg;
unsigned next_proto_neg_len;
#endif
unsigned char *exportedkeymat;
i = SSL_accept(con);
#ifdef CERT_CB_TEST_RETRY
{
while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP
&& SSL_state(con) == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C) {
fprintf(stderr,
"LOOKUP from certificate callback during accept\n");
i = SSL_accept(con);
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.login);
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.login);
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
return (1);
}
BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR\n");
verify_error = SSL_get_verify_result(con);
if (verify_error != X509_V_OK) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify error:%s\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_error));
}
/* Always print any error messages */
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
return (0);
}
if (s_brief)
print_ssl_summary(bio_err, con);
PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(bio_s_out, SSL_get_session(con));
peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(con);
if (peer != NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Client certificate\n");
PEM_write_bio_X509(bio_s_out, peer);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf);
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "subject=%s\n", buf);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf);
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "issuer=%s\n", buf);
X509_free(peer);
}
if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(con, buf, sizeof buf) != NULL)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Shared ciphers:%s\n", buf);
str = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(con));
ssl_print_sigalgs(bio_s_out, con);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
ssl_print_point_formats(bio_s_out, con);
ssl_print_curves(bio_s_out, con, 0);
#endif
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "CIPHER is %s\n", (str != NULL) ? str : "(NONE)");
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(con, &next_proto_neg, &next_proto_neg_len);
if (next_proto_neg) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "NEXTPROTO is ");
BIO_write(bio_s_out, next_proto_neg, next_proto_neg_len);
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
{
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile
= SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(con);
if (srtp_profile)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n",
srtp_profile->name);
}
#endif
if (SSL_cache_hit(con))
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Reused session-id\n");
if (SSL_ctrl(con, SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS, 0, NULL) &
TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Peer has incorrect TLSv1 block padding\n");
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
client_princ = kssl_ctx_get0_client_princ(SSL_get0_kssl_ctx(con));
if (client_princ != NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Kerberos peer principal is %s\n",
client_princ);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ? "" : " NOT");
if (keymatexportlabel != NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Keying material exporter:\n");
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Label: '%s'\n", keymatexportlabel);
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Length: %i bytes\n", keymatexportlen);
exportedkeymat = OPENSSL_malloc(keymatexportlen);
if (exportedkeymat != NULL) {
if (!SSL_export_keying_material(con, exportedkeymat,
keymatexportlen,
keymatexportlabel,
strlen(keymatexportlabel),
NULL, 0, 0)) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Error\n");
} else {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Keying material: ");
for (i = 0; i < keymatexportlen; i++)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "%02X", exportedkeymat[i]);
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
}
OPENSSL_free(exportedkeymat);
}
}
return (1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Memory leak in the SRP_VBASE_get_by_user implementation in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1s and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2g allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by providing an invalid username in a connection attempt, related to apps/s_server.c and crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 2,477
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: InputImeEventRouter* InputImeEventRouterFactory::GetRouter(Profile* profile) {
if (!profile)
return nullptr;
InputImeEventRouter* router = router_map_[profile];
if (!router) {
router = new InputImeEventRouter(profile);
router_map_[profile] = router;
}
return router;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Incorrect object lifecycle in Extensions in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix the regression caused by http://crrev.com/c/1288350.
Bug: 900124,856135
Change-Id: Ie11ad406bd1ea383dc2a83cc8661076309154865
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1317010
Reviewed-by: Lan Wei <azurewei@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shu Chen <shuchen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605282}
|
Medium
| 9,797
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (!ShouldAllowSession(session))
return false;
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(
GetId(),
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->devtools_frame_token()
: base::UnguessableToken(),
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler(
session->client()->MayAttachToBrowser()
? protocol::TargetHandler::AccessMode::kRegular
: protocol::TargetHandler::AccessMode::kAutoAttachOnly,
GetId(), GetRendererChannel(), session->GetRootSession())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(
emulation_handler, session->client()->MayAffectLocalFiles())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
if (!frame_tree_node_ || !frame_tree_node_->parent()) {
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(
new protocol::TracingHandler(frame_tree_node_, GetIOContext())));
}
if (sessions().empty()) {
bool use_video_capture_api = true;
#ifdef OS_ANDROID
if (!CompositorImpl::IsInitialized())
use_video_capture_api = false;
#endif
if (!use_video_capture_api)
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: DevTools API not correctly gating on extension capability in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to read local files via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Guard DOM.setFileInputFiles under MayAffectLocalFiles
Bug: 805557
Change-Id: Ib6f37ec6e1d091ee54621cc0c5c44f1a6beab10f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1334847
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607902}
|
Medium
| 3,845
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline int btif_hl_select_close_connected(void){
char sig_on = btif_hl_signal_select_close_connected;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_close_connected");
return send(signal_fds[1], &sig_on, sizeof(sig_on), 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 3,466
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xsltCopyTextString(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr target,
const xmlChar *string, int noescape)
{
xmlNodePtr copy;
int len;
if (string == NULL)
return(NULL);
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_COPY_TEXT,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltCopyTextString: copy text %s\n",
string));
#endif
/*
* Play safe and reset the merging mechanism for every new
* target node.
*/
if ((target == NULL) || (target->children == NULL)) {
ctxt->lasttext = NULL;
}
/* handle coalescing of text nodes here */
len = xmlStrlen(string);
if ((ctxt->type == XSLT_OUTPUT_XML) &&
(ctxt->style->cdataSection != NULL) &&
(target != NULL) &&
(target->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(((target->ns == NULL) &&
(xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->style->cdataSection,
target->name, NULL) != NULL)) ||
((target->ns != NULL) &&
(xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->style->cdataSection,
target->name, target->ns->href) != NULL))))
{
/*
* Process "cdata-section-elements".
*/
if ((target->last != NULL) &&
(target->last->type == XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE))
{
return(xsltAddTextString(ctxt, target->last, string, len));
}
copy = xmlNewCDataBlock(ctxt->output, string, len);
} else if (noescape) {
/*
* Process "disable-output-escaping".
*/
if ((target != NULL) && (target->last != NULL) &&
(target->last->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) &&
(target->last->name == xmlStringTextNoenc))
{
return(xsltAddTextString(ctxt, target->last, string, len));
}
copy = xmlNewTextLen(string, len);
if (copy != NULL)
copy->name = xmlStringTextNoenc;
} else {
/*
* Default processing.
*/
if ((target != NULL) && (target->last != NULL) &&
(target->last->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) &&
(target->last->name == xmlStringText)) {
return(xsltAddTextString(ctxt, target->last, string, len));
}
copy = xmlNewTextLen(string, len);
}
if (copy != NULL) {
if (target != NULL)
copy = xsltAddChild(target, copy);
ctxt->lasttext = copy->content;
ctxt->lasttsize = len;
ctxt->lasttuse = len;
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, target,
"xsltCopyTextString: text copy failed\n");
ctxt->lasttext = NULL;
}
return(copy);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
High
| 5,191
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: perf_event_read_event(struct perf_event *event,
struct task_struct *task)
{
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_sample_data sample;
struct perf_read_event read_event = {
.header = {
.type = PERF_RECORD_READ,
.misc = 0,
.size = sizeof(read_event) + event->read_size,
},
.pid = perf_event_pid(event, task),
.tid = perf_event_tid(event, task),
};
int ret;
perf_event_header__init_id(&read_event.header, &sample, event);
ret = perf_output_begin(&handle, event, read_event.header.size, 0, 0);
if (ret)
return;
perf_output_put(&handle, read_event);
perf_output_read(&handle, event);
perf_event__output_id_sample(event, &handle, &sample);
perf_output_end(&handle);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 4,212
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: parse_wbxml_attribute_list_defined (proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb,
guint32 offset, guint32 str_tbl, guint8 level, guint8 *codepage_attr,
const wbxml_decoding *map)
{
guint32 tvb_len = tvb_reported_length (tvb);
guint32 off = offset;
guint32 len;
guint str_len;
guint32 ent;
guint32 idx;
guint8 peek;
guint8 attr_save_known = 0; /* Will contain peek & 0x3F (attr identity) */
const char *attr_save_literal = NULL; /* Will contain the LITERAL attr identity */
DebugLog(("parse_wbxml_attr_defined (level = %u, offset = %u)\n",
level, offset));
/* Parse attributes */
while (off < tvb_len) {
peek = tvb_get_guint8 (tvb, off);
DebugLog(("ATTR: (top of while) level = %3u, peek = 0x%02X, "
"off = %u, tvb_len = %u\n", level, peek, off, tvb_len));
if ((peek & 0x3F) < 5) switch (peek) { /* Global tokens
in state = ATTR */
case 0x00: /* SWITCH_PAGE */
*codepage_attr = tvb_get_guint8 (tvb, off+1);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 2,
" | Attr | A -->%3d "
"| SWITCH_PAGE (Attr code page) |",
*codepage_attr);
off += 2;
break;
case 0x01: /* END */
/* BEWARE
* The Attribute END token means either ">" or "/>"
* and as a consequence both must be treated separately.
* This is done in the TAG state parser.
*/
off++;
DebugLog(("ATTR: level = %u, Return: len = %u\n",
level, off - offset));
return (off - offset);
case 0x02: /* ENTITY */
ent = tvb_get_guintvar (tvb, off+1, &len);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| ENTITY "
"| %s'&#%u;'",
level, *codepage_attr, Indent (level), ent);
off += 1+len;
break;
case 0x03: /* STR_I */
len = tvb_strsize (tvb, off+1);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| STR_I (Inline string) "
"| %s\'%s\'",
level, *codepage_attr, Indent (level),
tvb_format_text (tvb, off+1, len-1));
off += 1+len;
break;
case 0x04: /* LITERAL */
/* ALWAYS means the start of a new attribute,
* and may only contain the NAME of the attribute.
*/
idx = tvb_get_guintvar (tvb, off+1, &len);
str_len = tvb_strsize (tvb, str_tbl+idx);
attr_save_known = 0;
attr_save_literal = tvb_format_text (tvb,
str_tbl+idx, str_len-1);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| LITERAL (Literal Attribute) "
"| %s<%s />",
level, *codepage_attr, Indent (level),
attr_save_literal);
off += 1+len;
break;
case 0x40: /* EXT_I_0 */
case 0x41: /* EXT_I_1 */
case 0x42: /* EXT_I_2 */
/* Extension tokens */
len = tvb_strsize (tvb, off+1);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| EXT_I_%1x (Extension Token) "
"| %s(%s: \'%s\')",
level, *codepage_attr, peek & 0x0f, Indent (level),
map_token (map->global, 0, peek),
tvb_format_text (tvb, off+1, len-1));
off += 1+len;
break;
/* 0x43 impossible in ATTR state */
/* 0x44 impossible in ATTR state */
case 0x80: /* EXT_T_0 */
case 0x81: /* EXT_T_1 */
case 0x82: /* EXT_T_2 */
/* Extension tokens */
idx = tvb_get_guintvar (tvb, off+1, &len);
{ char *s;
if (map->ext_t[peek & 0x03])
s = (map->ext_t[peek & 0x03])(tvb, idx, str_tbl);
else
s = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_packet_scope(), "EXT_T_%1x (%s)", peek & 0x03,
map_token (map->global, 0, peek));
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| EXT_T_%1x (Extension Token) "
"| %s%s)",
level, *codepage_attr, peek & 0x0f, Indent (level),
s);
}
off += 1+len;
break;
case 0x83: /* STR_T */
idx = tvb_get_guintvar (tvb, off+1, &len);
str_len = tvb_strsize (tvb, str_tbl+idx);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| STR_T (Tableref string) "
"| %s\'%s\'",
level, *codepage_attr, Indent (level),
tvb_format_text (tvb, str_tbl+idx, str_len-1));
off += 1+len;
break;
/* 0x84 impossible in ATTR state */
case 0xC0: /* EXT_0 */
case 0xC1: /* EXT_1 */
case 0xC2: /* EXT_2 */
/* Extension tokens */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| EXT_%1x (Extension Token) "
"| %s(%s)",
level, *codepage_attr, peek & 0x0f, Indent (level),
map_token (map->global, 0, peek));
off++;
break;
case 0xC3: /* OPAQUE - WBXML 1.1 and newer */
if (tvb_get_guint8 (tvb, 0)) { /* WBXML 1.x (x > 0) */
char *str;
if (attr_save_known) { /* Knwon attribute */
if (map->opaque_binary_attr) {
str = map->opaque_binary_attr(tvb, off + 1,
attr_save_known, *codepage_attr, &len);
} else {
str = default_opaque_binary_attr(tvb, off + 1,
attr_save_known, *codepage_attr, &len);
}
} else { /* lITERAL attribute */
if (map->opaque_literal_tag) {
str = map->opaque_literal_attr(tvb, off + 1,
attr_save_literal, *codepage_attr, &len);
} else {
str = default_opaque_literal_attr(tvb, off + 1,
attr_save_literal, *codepage_attr, &len);
}
}
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1 + len,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| OPAQUE (Opaque data) "
"| %s%s",
level, *codepage_attr, Indent (level), str);
off += 1 + len;
} else { /* WBXML 1.0 - RESERVED_2 token (invalid) */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| RESERVED_2 (Invalid Token!) "
"| WBXML 1.0 parsing stops here.",
level, *codepage_attr);
/* Stop processing as it is impossible to parse now */
off = tvb_len;
DebugLog(("ATTR: level = %u, Return: len = %u\n",
level, off - offset));
return (off - offset);
}
break;
/* 0xC4 impossible in ATTR state */
default:
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| %-10s (Invalid Token!) "
"| WBXML parsing stops here.",
level, *codepage_attr,
val_to_str_ext (peek, &vals_wbxml1x_global_tokens_ext, "(unknown 0x%x)"));
/* Move to end of buffer */
off = tvb_len;
break;
} else { /* Known atribute token */
if (peek & 0x80) { /* attrValue */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| Known attrValue 0x%02X "
"| %s%s",
level, *codepage_attr, peek & 0x7f, Indent (level),
map_token (map->attrValue, *codepage_attr, peek));
off++;
} else { /* attrStart */
attr_save_known = peek & 0x7f;
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Attr | A %3d "
"| Known attrStart 0x%02X "
"| %s%s",
level, *codepage_attr, attr_save_known, Indent (level),
map_token (map->attrStart, *codepage_attr, peek));
off++;
}
}
} /* End WHILE */
DebugLog(("ATTR: level = %u, Return: len = %u (end of function body)\n",
level, off - offset));
return (off - offset);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: epan/dissectors/packet-wbxml.c in the WBXML dissector in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 mishandles offsets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and infinite loop) via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: WBXML: add a basic sanity check for offset overflow
This is a naive approach allowing to detact that something went wrong,
without the need to replace all proto_tree_add_text() calls as what was
done in master-2.0 branch.
Bug: 12408
Change-Id: Ia14905005e17ae322c2fc639ad5e491fa08b0108
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15310
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Pascal Quantin <pascal.quantin@gmail.com>
|
Medium
| 8,751
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool GetURLRowForAutocompleteMatch(Profile* profile,
const AutocompleteMatch& match,
history::URLRow* url_row) {
DCHECK(url_row);
HistoryService* history_service =
profile->GetHistoryService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (!history_service)
return false;
history::URLDatabase* url_db = history_service->InMemoryDatabase();
return url_db && (url_db->GetRowForURL(match.destination_url, url_row) != 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 does not properly implement SVG filters, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Removing dead code from NetworkActionPredictor.
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358062
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121926 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 29,997
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ras_validate(jas_stream_t *in)
{
uchar buf[RAS_MAGICLEN];
int i;
int n;
uint_fast32_t magic;
assert(JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK >= RAS_MAGICLEN);
/* Read the validation data (i.e., the data used for detecting
the format). */
if ((n = jas_stream_read(in, buf, RAS_MAGICLEN)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
/* Put the validation data back onto the stream, so that the
stream position will not be changed. */
for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
if (jas_stream_ungetc(in, buf[i]) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
}
/* Did we read enough data? */
if (n < RAS_MAGICLEN) {
return -1;
}
magic = (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, buf[0]) << 24) |
(JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, buf[1]) << 16) |
(JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, buf[2]) << 8) |
buf[3];
/* Is the signature correct for the Sun Rasterfile format? */
if (magic != RAS_MAGIC) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 15,757
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAAC2::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
aacParams->nBitRate = 0;
aacParams->nAudioBandWidth = 0;
aacParams->nAACtools = 0;
aacParams->nAACERtools = 0;
aacParams->eAACProfile = OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectMain;
aacParams->eAACStreamFormat =
mIsADTS
? OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4ADTS
: OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF;
aacParams->eChannelMode = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelModeStereo;
if (!isConfigured()) {
aacParams->nChannels = 1;
aacParams->nSampleRate = 44100;
aacParams->nFrameLength = 0;
} else {
aacParams->nChannels = mStreamInfo->numChannels;
aacParams->nSampleRate = mStreamInfo->sampleRate;
aacParams->nFrameLength = mStreamInfo->frameSize;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[2] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelCF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[3] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLFE;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[4] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLS;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[5] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRS;
if (!isConfigured()) {
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = 44100;
} else {
pcmParams->nChannels = mStreamInfo->numChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mStreamInfo->sampleRate;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 25,762
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int jas_iccgetuint64(jas_stream_t *in, jas_iccuint64_t *val)
{
ulonglong tmp;
if (jas_iccgetuint(in, 8, &tmp))
return -1;
*val = tmp;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 3,743
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual void SetUp() {
FakeDBusThreadManager* fake_dbus_thread_manager = new FakeDBusThreadManager;
fake_bluetooth_profile_manager_client_ =
new FakeBluetoothProfileManagerClient;
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothProfileManagerClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothProfileManagerClient>(
fake_bluetooth_profile_manager_client_));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothAdapterClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothAdapterClient>(new FakeBluetoothAdapterClient));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothDeviceClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothDeviceClient>(new FakeBluetoothDeviceClient));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothInputClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothInputClient>(new FakeBluetoothInputClient));
DBusThreadManager::InitializeForTesting(fake_dbus_thread_manager);
device::BluetoothAdapterFactory::GetAdapter(
base::Bind(&BluetoothProfileChromeOSTest::AdapterCallback,
base::Unretained(this)));
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_.get() != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsInitialized());
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsPresent());
adapter_->SetPowered(
true,
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing),
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing));
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsPowered());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 14,954
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MediaControlsHeaderView::MediaControlsHeaderView() {
SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<views::BoxLayout>(
views::BoxLayout::Orientation::kHorizontal, kMediaControlsHeaderInsets,
kMediaControlsHeaderChildSpacing));
auto app_icon_view = std::make_unique<views::ImageView>();
app_icon_view->SetImageSize(gfx::Size(kIconSize, kIconSize));
app_icon_view->SetVerticalAlignment(views::ImageView::Alignment::kLeading);
app_icon_view->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::ImageView::Alignment::kLeading);
app_icon_view->SetBorder(views::CreateEmptyBorder(kIconPadding));
app_icon_view->SetBackground(
views::CreateRoundedRectBackground(SK_ColorWHITE, kIconCornerRadius));
app_icon_view_ = AddChildView(std::move(app_icon_view));
gfx::Font default_font;
int font_size_delta = kHeaderTextFontSize - default_font.GetFontSize();
gfx::Font font = default_font.Derive(font_size_delta, gfx::Font::NORMAL,
gfx::Font::Weight::NORMAL);
gfx::FontList font_list(font);
auto app_name_view = std::make_unique<views::Label>();
app_name_view->SetFontList(font_list);
app_name_view->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
app_name_view->SetEnabledColor(SK_ColorWHITE);
app_name_view->SetAutoColorReadabilityEnabled(false);
app_name_view_ = AddChildView(std::move(app_name_view));
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: A timing attack in SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to extract pixel values from a cross-origin page being iframe'd via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
|
High
| 12,705
|
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