instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.34k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *pdid_buf,
unsigned int pkid_len,
int *valid_kdcPkId)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = pdid_buf;
int status = 1;
X509 *kdc_cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
*valid_kdcPkId = 0;
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
goto cleanup;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
status = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(kdc_cert), is->serial);
if (!status)
*valid_kdcPkId = 1;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID:
|
pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *pdid_buf,
unsigned int pkid_len,
int *valid_kdcPkId)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = pdid_buf;
int status = 1;
X509 *kdc_cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
*valid_kdcPkId = 0;
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
status = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(kdc_cert), is->serial);
if (!status)
*valid_kdcPkId = 1;
}
retval = 0;
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is);
return retval;
}
| 166,133
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_cprl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
OPJ_UINT32 index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
pi->first = 0;
}
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 resno;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1u << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1u << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : opj_uint_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : opj_uint_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dy - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dy))) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dx - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dx))) {
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < opj_uint_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 levelno;
OPJ_INT32 trx0, try0;
OPJ_INT32 trx1, try1;
OPJ_UINT32 rpx, rpy;
OPJ_INT32 prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
trx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->x,
(OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(trx0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx);
prcj = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->y,
(OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(try0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy);
pi->precno = (OPJ_UINT32)(prci + prcj * (OPJ_INT32)res->pw);
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Avoid division by zero in opj_pi_next_rpcl, opj_pi_next_pcrl and opj_pi_next_cprl (#938)
Fixes issues with id:000026,sig:08,src:002419,op:int32,pos:60,val:+32 and
id:000019,sig:08,src:001098,op:flip1,pos:49
CWE ID: CWE-369
|
static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_cprl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
OPJ_UINT32 index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
pi->first = 0;
}
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 resno;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1u << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1u << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : opj_uint_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : opj_uint_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dy - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dy))) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dx - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dx))) {
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < opj_uint_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 levelno;
OPJ_INT32 trx0, try0;
OPJ_INT32 trx1, try1;
OPJ_UINT32 rpx, rpy;
OPJ_INT32 prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
trx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
/* To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift */
/* in below tests */
/* Fixes reading id:000019,sig:08,src:001098,op:flip1,pos:49 */
/* of https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/938 */
if (rpx >= 31 || ((comp->dx << rpx) >> rpx) != comp->dx ||
rpy >= 31 || ((comp->dy << rpy) >> rpy) != comp->dy) {
continue;
}
/* See ISO-15441. B.12.1.5 Component-position-resolution level-layer progression */
if (!((pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->x,
(OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(trx0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx);
prcj = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->y,
(OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(try0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy);
pi->precno = (OPJ_UINT32)(prci + prcj * (OPJ_INT32)res->pw);
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
| 168,455
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int cdxl_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame, AVPacket *pkt)
{
CDXLVideoContext *c = avctx->priv_data;
AVFrame * const p = data;
int ret, w, h, encoding, aligned_width, buf_size = pkt->size;
const uint8_t *buf = pkt->data;
if (buf_size < 32)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
encoding = buf[1] & 7;
c->format = buf[1] & 0xE0;
w = AV_RB16(&buf[14]);
h = AV_RB16(&buf[16]);
c->bpp = buf[19];
c->palette_size = AV_RB16(&buf[20]);
c->palette = buf + 32;
c->video = c->palette + c->palette_size;
c->video_size = buf_size - c->palette_size - 32;
if (c->palette_size > 512)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (buf_size < c->palette_size + 32)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (c->bpp < 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (c->format != BIT_PLANAR && c->format != BIT_LINE && c->format != CHUNKY) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Pixel format 0x%0x", c->format);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if ((ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, w, h)) < 0)
return ret;
if (c->format == CHUNKY)
aligned_width = avctx->width;
else
aligned_width = FFALIGN(c->avctx->width, 16);
c->padded_bits = aligned_width - c->avctx->width;
if (c->video_size < aligned_width * avctx->height * (int64_t)c->bpp / 8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!encoding && c->palette_size && c->bpp <= 8 && c->format != CHUNKY) {
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8;
} else if (encoding == 1 && (c->bpp == 6 || c->bpp == 8)) {
if (c->palette_size != (1 << (c->bpp - 1)))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_BGR24;
} else if (!encoding && c->bpp == 24 && c->format == CHUNKY &&
!c->palette_size) {
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_RGB24;
} else {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Encoding %d, bpp %d and format 0x%x",
encoding, c->bpp, c->format);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if ((ret = ff_get_buffer(avctx, p, 0)) < 0)
return ret;
p->pict_type = AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I;
if (encoding) {
av_fast_padded_malloc(&c->new_video, &c->new_video_size,
h * w + AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if (!c->new_video)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (c->bpp == 8)
cdxl_decode_ham8(c, p);
else
cdxl_decode_ham6(c, p);
} else if (avctx->pix_fmt == AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8) {
cdxl_decode_rgb(c, p);
} else {
cdxl_decode_raw(c, p);
}
*got_frame = 1;
return buf_size;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/cdxl: Check format for BGR24
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1427/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5020737339392000
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int cdxl_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame, AVPacket *pkt)
{
CDXLVideoContext *c = avctx->priv_data;
AVFrame * const p = data;
int ret, w, h, encoding, aligned_width, buf_size = pkt->size;
const uint8_t *buf = pkt->data;
if (buf_size < 32)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
encoding = buf[1] & 7;
c->format = buf[1] & 0xE0;
w = AV_RB16(&buf[14]);
h = AV_RB16(&buf[16]);
c->bpp = buf[19];
c->palette_size = AV_RB16(&buf[20]);
c->palette = buf + 32;
c->video = c->palette + c->palette_size;
c->video_size = buf_size - c->palette_size - 32;
if (c->palette_size > 512)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (buf_size < c->palette_size + 32)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (c->bpp < 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (c->format != BIT_PLANAR && c->format != BIT_LINE && c->format != CHUNKY) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Pixel format 0x%0x", c->format);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if ((ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, w, h)) < 0)
return ret;
if (c->format == CHUNKY)
aligned_width = avctx->width;
else
aligned_width = FFALIGN(c->avctx->width, 16);
c->padded_bits = aligned_width - c->avctx->width;
if (c->video_size < aligned_width * avctx->height * (int64_t)c->bpp / 8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!encoding && c->palette_size && c->bpp <= 8 && c->format != CHUNKY) {
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8;
} else if (encoding == 1 && (c->bpp == 6 || c->bpp == 8) && c->format != CHUNKY) {
if (c->palette_size != (1 << (c->bpp - 1)))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_BGR24;
} else if (!encoding && c->bpp == 24 && c->format == CHUNKY &&
!c->palette_size) {
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_RGB24;
} else {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Encoding %d, bpp %d and format 0x%x",
encoding, c->bpp, c->format);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if ((ret = ff_get_buffer(avctx, p, 0)) < 0)
return ret;
p->pict_type = AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I;
if (encoding) {
av_fast_padded_malloc(&c->new_video, &c->new_video_size,
h * w + AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if (!c->new_video)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (c->bpp == 8)
cdxl_decode_ham8(c, p);
else
cdxl_decode_ham6(c, p);
} else if (avctx->pix_fmt == AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8) {
cdxl_decode_rgb(c, p);
} else {
cdxl_decode_raw(c, p);
}
*got_frame = 1;
return buf_size;
}
| 168,069
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WT_Interpolate (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 phaseFrac;
EAS_I32 acc0;
const EAS_SAMPLE *pSamples;
const EAS_SAMPLE *loopEnd;
EAS_I32 samp1;
EAS_I32 samp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
loopEnd = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1;
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->phaseAccum;
/*lint -e{713} truncation is OK */
phaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* fetch adjacent samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* linear interpolation */
acc0 = samp2 - samp1;
acc0 = acc0 * phaseFrac;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = samp1 + (acc0 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
/* save new output sample in buffer */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_I16)(acc0 >> 2);
/* increment phase */
phaseFrac += phaseInc;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = phaseFrac >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS;
/* next sample */
if (acc0 > 0) {
/* advance sample pointer */
pSamples += acc0;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)((EAS_U32)phaseFrac & PHASE_FRAC_MASK);
/* check for loop end */
acc0 = (EAS_I32) (pSamples - loopEnd);
if (acc0 >= 0)
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopStart + acc0;
/* fetch new samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
}
}
/* save pointer and phase */
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = (EAS_U32) pSamples;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = (EAS_U32) phaseFrac;
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: sanity check numSamples.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: I066888c25035ea4c60c88f316db4508dc4dab6bc
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void WT_Interpolate (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 phaseFrac;
EAS_I32 acc0;
const EAS_SAMPLE *pSamples;
const EAS_SAMPLE *loopEnd;
EAS_I32 samp1;
EAS_I32 samp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
loopEnd = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1;
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->phaseAccum;
/*lint -e{713} truncation is OK */
phaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* fetch adjacent samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* linear interpolation */
acc0 = samp2 - samp1;
acc0 = acc0 * phaseFrac;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = samp1 + (acc0 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
/* save new output sample in buffer */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_I16)(acc0 >> 2);
/* increment phase */
phaseFrac += phaseInc;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = phaseFrac >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS;
/* next sample */
if (acc0 > 0) {
/* advance sample pointer */
pSamples += acc0;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)((EAS_U32)phaseFrac & PHASE_FRAC_MASK);
/* check for loop end */
acc0 = (EAS_I32) (pSamples - loopEnd);
if (acc0 >= 0)
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopStart + acc0;
/* fetch new samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
}
}
/* save pointer and phase */
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = (EAS_U32) pSamples;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = (EAS_U32) phaseFrac;
}
| 173,917
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: s4u_identify_user(krb5_context context,
krb5_creds *in_creds,
krb5_data *subject_cert,
krb5_principal *canon_user)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_preauthtype ptypes[1] = { KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER };
krb5_creds creds;
int use_master = 0;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opts = NULL;
krb5_principal_data client;
krb5_s4u_userid userid;
*canon_user = NULL;
if (in_creds->client == NULL && subject_cert == NULL) {
return EINVAL;
}
if (in_creds->client != NULL &&
in_creds->client->type != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
int anonymous;
anonymous = krb5_principal_compare(context, in_creds->client,
krb5_anonymous_principal());
return krb5_copy_principal(context,
anonymous ? in_creds->server
: in_creds->client,
canon_user);
}
memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
memset(&userid, 0, sizeof(userid));
if (subject_cert != NULL)
userid.subject_cert = *subject_cert;
code = krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc(context, &opts);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life(opts, 15);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life(opts, 0);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable(opts, 0);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable(opts, 0);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_canonicalize(opts, 1);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list(opts, ptypes, 1);
if (in_creds->client != NULL) {
client = *in_creds->client;
client.realm = in_creds->server->realm;
} else {
client.magic = KV5M_PRINCIPAL;
client.realm = in_creds->server->realm;
/* should this be NULL, empty or a fixed string? XXX */
client.data = NULL;
client.length = 0;
client.type = KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL;
}
code = k5_get_init_creds(context, &creds, &client, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL,
opts, krb5_get_as_key_noop, &userid, &use_master,
NULL);
if (code == 0 || code == KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED) {
*canon_user = userid.user;
userid.user = NULL;
code = 0;
}
cleanup:
krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds);
if (opts != NULL)
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_free(context, opts);
if (userid.user != NULL)
krb5_free_principal(context, userid.user);
return code;
}
Commit Message: Ignore password attributes for S4U2Self requests
For consistency with Windows KDCs, allow protocol transition to work
even if the password has expired or needs changing.
Also, when looking up an enterprise principal with an AS request,
treat ERR_KEY_EXP as confirmation that the client is present in the
realm.
[ghudson@mit.edu: added comment in kdc_process_s4u2self_req(); edited
commit message]
ticket: 8763 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.17
CWE ID: CWE-617
|
s4u_identify_user(krb5_context context,
krb5_creds *in_creds,
krb5_data *subject_cert,
krb5_principal *canon_user)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_preauthtype ptypes[1] = { KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER };
krb5_creds creds;
int use_master = 0;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opts = NULL;
krb5_principal_data client;
krb5_s4u_userid userid;
*canon_user = NULL;
if (in_creds->client == NULL && subject_cert == NULL) {
return EINVAL;
}
if (in_creds->client != NULL &&
in_creds->client->type != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
int anonymous;
anonymous = krb5_principal_compare(context, in_creds->client,
krb5_anonymous_principal());
return krb5_copy_principal(context,
anonymous ? in_creds->server
: in_creds->client,
canon_user);
}
memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
memset(&userid, 0, sizeof(userid));
if (subject_cert != NULL)
userid.subject_cert = *subject_cert;
code = krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc(context, &opts);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life(opts, 15);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life(opts, 0);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable(opts, 0);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable(opts, 0);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_canonicalize(opts, 1);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list(opts, ptypes, 1);
if (in_creds->client != NULL) {
client = *in_creds->client;
client.realm = in_creds->server->realm;
} else {
client.magic = KV5M_PRINCIPAL;
client.realm = in_creds->server->realm;
/* should this be NULL, empty or a fixed string? XXX */
client.data = NULL;
client.length = 0;
client.type = KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL;
}
code = k5_get_init_creds(context, &creds, &client, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL,
opts, krb5_get_as_key_noop, &userid, &use_master,
NULL);
if (!code || code == KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED || code == KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP) {
*canon_user = userid.user;
userid.user = NULL;
code = 0;
}
cleanup:
krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds);
if (opts != NULL)
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_free(context, opts);
if (userid.user != NULL)
krb5_free_principal(context, userid.user);
return code;
}
| 168,958
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_cabac_init(cab_ctxt_t *ps_cabac,
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm,
WORD32 qp,
WORD32 cabac_init_idc,
const UWORD8 *pu1_init_ctxt)
{
/* Sanity checks */
ASSERT(ps_cabac != NULL);
ASSERT(ps_bitstrm != NULL);
ASSERT((qp >= 0) && (qp < 52));
ASSERT((cabac_init_idc >= 0) && (cabac_init_idc < 3));
UNUSED(qp);
UNUSED(cabac_init_idc);
/* CABAC engine uses 32 bit range instead of 9 bits as specified by
* the spec. This is done to reduce number of renormalizations
*/
/* cabac engine initialization */
#if FULLRANGE
ps_cabac->u4_range = (UWORD32)510 << RANGE_SHIFT;
BITS_GET(ps_cabac->u4_ofst, ps_bitstrm->pu4_buf, ps_bitstrm->u4_bit_ofst,
ps_bitstrm->u4_cur_word, ps_bitstrm->u4_nxt_word, (9 + RANGE_SHIFT));
#else
ps_cabac->u4_range = (UWORD32)510;
BITS_GET(ps_cabac->u4_ofst, ps_bitstrm->pu4_buf, ps_bitstrm->u4_bit_ofst,
ps_bitstrm->u4_cur_word, ps_bitstrm->u4_nxt_word, 9);
#endif
/* cabac context initialization based on init idc and slice qp */
memcpy(ps_cabac->au1_ctxt_models,
pu1_init_ctxt,
IHEVC_CAB_CTXT_END);
DEBUG_RANGE_OFST("init", ps_cabac->u4_range, ps_cabac->u4_ofst);
return ((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: Return error from cabac init if offset is greater than range
When the offset was greater than range, the bitstream was read
more than the valid range in leaf-level cabac parsing modules.
Error check was added to cabac init to fix this issue. Additionally
end of slice and slice error were signalled to suppress further
parsing of current slice.
Bug: 34897036
Change-Id: I1263f1d1219684ffa6e952c76e5a08e9a933c9d2
(cherry picked from commit 3b175da88a1807d19cdd248b74bce60e57f05c6a)
(cherry picked from commit b92314c860d01d754ef579eafe55d7377962b3ba)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_cabac_init(cab_ctxt_t *ps_cabac,
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm,
WORD32 qp,
WORD32 cabac_init_idc,
const UWORD8 *pu1_init_ctxt)
{
/* Sanity checks */
ASSERT(ps_cabac != NULL);
ASSERT(ps_bitstrm != NULL);
ASSERT((qp >= 0) && (qp < 52));
ASSERT((cabac_init_idc >= 0) && (cabac_init_idc < 3));
UNUSED(qp);
UNUSED(cabac_init_idc);
/* CABAC engine uses 32 bit range instead of 9 bits as specified by
* the spec. This is done to reduce number of renormalizations
*/
/* cabac engine initialization */
#if FULLRANGE
ps_cabac->u4_range = (UWORD32)510 << RANGE_SHIFT;
BITS_GET(ps_cabac->u4_ofst, ps_bitstrm->pu4_buf, ps_bitstrm->u4_bit_ofst,
ps_bitstrm->u4_cur_word, ps_bitstrm->u4_nxt_word, (9 + RANGE_SHIFT));
#else
ps_cabac->u4_range = (UWORD32)510;
BITS_GET(ps_cabac->u4_ofst, ps_bitstrm->pu4_buf, ps_bitstrm->u4_bit_ofst,
ps_bitstrm->u4_cur_word, ps_bitstrm->u4_nxt_word, 9);
#endif
/* cabac context initialization based on init idc and slice qp */
memcpy(ps_cabac->au1_ctxt_models,
pu1_init_ctxt,
IHEVC_CAB_CTXT_END);
DEBUG_RANGE_OFST("init", ps_cabac->u4_range, ps_cabac->u4_ofst);
/*
* If the offset is greater than or equal to range, return fail.
*/
if(ps_cabac->u4_ofst >= ps_cabac->u4_range)
{
return ((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_FAIL);
}
return ((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS);
}
| 174,029
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: get_next_file(FILE *VFile, char *ptr)
{
char *ret;
ret = fgets(ptr, PATH_MAX, VFile);
if (!ret)
return NULL;
if (ptr[strlen(ptr) - 1] == '\n')
ptr[strlen(ptr) - 1] = '\0';
return ret;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14879/fix -V to fail invalid input safely
get_next_file() did not check the return value of strlen() and
underflowed an array index if the line read by fgets() from the file
started with \0. This caused an out-of-bounds read and could cause a
write. Add the missing check.
This vulnerability was discovered by Brian Carpenter & Geeknik Labs.
CWE ID: CWE-120
|
get_next_file(FILE *VFile, char *ptr)
{
char *ret;
size_t len;
ret = fgets(ptr, PATH_MAX, VFile);
if (!ret)
return NULL;
len = strlen (ptr);
if (len > 0 && ptr[len - 1] == '\n')
ptr[len - 1] = '\0';
return ret;
}
| 169,835
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool SVGElement::HasSVGParent() const {
return ParentOrShadowHostElement() &&
ParentOrShadowHostElement()->IsSVGElement();
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704
|
bool SVGElement::HasSVGParent() const {
Element* parent = FlatTreeTraversal::ParentElement(*this);
return parent && parent->IsSVGElement();
}
| 173,065
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PersistentHistogramAllocator::RecordCreateHistogramResult(
CreateHistogramResultType result) {
HistogramBase* result_histogram = GetCreateHistogramResultHistogram();
if (result_histogram)
result_histogram->Add(result);
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void PersistentHistogramAllocator::RecordCreateHistogramResult(
| 172,135
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void scsi_write_data(SCSIRequest *req)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
uint32_t n;
/* No data transfer may already be in progress */
assert(r->req.aiocb == NULL);
if (r->req.cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_TO_DEV) {
DPRINTF("Data transfer direction invalid\n");
scsi_write_complete(r, -EINVAL);
return;
}
n = r->iov.iov_len / 512;
if (n) {
if (s->tray_open) {
scsi_write_complete(r, -ENOMEDIUM);
}
qemu_iovec_init_external(&r->qiov, &r->iov, 1);
bdrv_acct_start(s->bs, &r->acct, n * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE, BDRV_ACCT_WRITE);
r->req.aiocb = bdrv_aio_writev(s->bs, r->sector, &r->qiov, n,
scsi_write_complete, r);
if (r->req.aiocb == NULL) {
scsi_write_complete(r, -ENOMEM);
}
} else {
/* Invoke completion routine to fetch data from host. */
scsi_write_complete(r, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: commonize iovec creation between reads and writes
Also, consistently use qiov.size instead of iov.iov_len.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void scsi_write_data(SCSIRequest *req)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
uint32_t n;
/* No data transfer may already be in progress */
assert(r->req.aiocb == NULL);
if (r->req.cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_TO_DEV) {
DPRINTF("Data transfer direction invalid\n");
scsi_write_complete(r, -EINVAL);
return;
}
n = r->qiov.size / 512;
if (n) {
if (s->tray_open) {
scsi_write_complete(r, -ENOMEDIUM);
}
bdrv_acct_start(s->bs, &r->acct, n * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE, BDRV_ACCT_WRITE);
r->req.aiocb = bdrv_aio_writev(s->bs, r->sector, &r->qiov, n,
scsi_write_complete, r);
if (r->req.aiocb == NULL) {
scsi_write_complete(r, -ENOMEM);
}
} else {
/* Called for the first time. Ask the driver to send us more data. */
scsi_write_complete(r, 0);
}
}
| 169,923
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CuePoint::TrackPosition::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long start_,
long long size_) {
const long long stop = start_ + size_;
long long pos = start_;
m_track = -1;
m_pos = -1;
m_block = 1; // default
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume Size field
assert((pos + size) <= stop);
if (id == 0x77) // CueTrack ID
m_track = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x71) // CueClusterPos ID
m_pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x1378) // CueBlockNumber
m_block = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(m_pos >= 0);
assert(m_track > 0);
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void CuePoint::TrackPosition::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long start_,
bool CuePoint::TrackPosition::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long start_,
long long size_) {
const long long stop = start_ + size_;
long long pos = start_;
m_track = -1;
m_pos = -1;
m_block = 1; // default
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
const long long id = ReadID(pReader, pos, len);
if ((id < 0) || ((pos + len) > stop)) {
return false;
}
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if ((size < 0) || ((pos + len) > stop)) {
return false;
}
pos += len; // consume Size field
if ((pos + size) > stop) {
return false;
}
if (id == 0x77) // CueTrack ID
m_track = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x71) // CueClusterPos ID
m_pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x1378) // CueBlockNumber
m_block = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
pos += size; // consume payload
}
if ((m_pos < 0) || (m_track <= 0)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 173,837
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SavePackage::OnReceivedSavableResourceLinksForCurrentPage(
const std::vector<GURL>& resources_list,
const std::vector<Referrer>& referrers_list,
const std::vector<GURL>& frames_list) {
if (wait_state_ != RESOURCES_LIST)
return;
DCHECK(resources_list.size() == referrers_list.size());
all_save_items_count_ = static_cast<int>(resources_list.size()) +
static_cast<int>(frames_list.size());
if (download_ && download_->IsInProgress())
download_->SetTotalBytes(all_save_items_count_);
if (all_save_items_count_) {
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(resources_list.size()); ++i) {
const GURL& u = resources_list[i];
DCHECK(u.is_valid());
SaveFileCreateInfo::SaveFileSource save_source = u.SchemeIsFile() ?
SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_FILE :
SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_NET;
SaveItem* save_item = new SaveItem(u, referrers_list[i],
this, save_source);
waiting_item_queue_.push(save_item);
}
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(frames_list.size()); ++i) {
const GURL& u = frames_list[i];
DCHECK(u.is_valid());
SaveItem* save_item = new SaveItem(
u, Referrer(), this, SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_DOM);
waiting_item_queue_.push(save_item);
}
wait_state_ = NET_FILES;
DoSavingProcess();
} else {
Cancel(true);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void SavePackage::OnReceivedSavableResourceLinksForCurrentPage(
const std::vector<GURL>& resources_list,
const std::vector<Referrer>& referrers_list,
const std::vector<GURL>& frames_list) {
if (wait_state_ != RESOURCES_LIST)
return;
if (resources_list.size() != referrers_list.size())
return;
all_save_items_count_ = static_cast<int>(resources_list.size()) +
static_cast<int>(frames_list.size());
if (download_ && download_->IsInProgress())
download_->SetTotalBytes(all_save_items_count_);
if (all_save_items_count_) {
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(resources_list.size()); ++i) {
const GURL& u = resources_list[i];
DCHECK(u.is_valid());
SaveFileCreateInfo::SaveFileSource save_source = u.SchemeIsFile() ?
SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_FILE :
SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_NET;
SaveItem* save_item = new SaveItem(u, referrers_list[i],
this, save_source);
waiting_item_queue_.push(save_item);
}
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(frames_list.size()); ++i) {
const GURL& u = frames_list[i];
DCHECK(u.is_valid());
SaveItem* save_item = new SaveItem(
u, Referrer(), this, SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_DOM);
waiting_item_queue_.push(save_item);
}
wait_state_ = NET_FILES;
DoSavingProcess();
} else {
Cancel(true);
}
}
| 171,400
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void jas_matrix_bindsub(jas_matrix_t *mat0, jas_matrix_t *mat1, int r0,
int c0, int r1, int c1)
{
int i;
if (mat0->data_) {
if (!(mat0->flags_ & JAS_MATRIX_REF)) {
jas_free(mat0->data_);
}
mat0->data_ = 0;
mat0->datasize_ = 0;
}
if (mat0->rows_) {
jas_free(mat0->rows_);
mat0->rows_ = 0;
}
mat0->flags_ |= JAS_MATRIX_REF;
mat0->numrows_ = r1 - r0 + 1;
mat0->numcols_ = c1 - c0 + 1;
mat0->maxrows_ = mat0->numrows_;
if (!(mat0->rows_ = jas_alloc2(mat0->maxrows_, sizeof(jas_seqent_t *)))) {
/*
There is no way to indicate failure to the caller.
So, we have no choice but to abort.
Ideally, this function should have a non-void return type.
In practice, a non-void return type probably would not help
much anyways as the caller would just have to terminate anyways.
*/
abort();
}
for (i = 0; i < mat0->numrows_; ++i) {
mat0->rows_[i] = mat1->rows_[r0 + i] + c0;
}
mat0->xstart_ = mat1->xstart_ + c0;
mat0->ystart_ = mat1->ystart_ + r0;
mat0->xend_ = mat0->xstart_ + mat0->numcols_;
mat0->yend_ = mat0->ystart_ + mat0->numrows_;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
void jas_matrix_bindsub(jas_matrix_t *mat0, jas_matrix_t *mat1, int r0,
void jas_matrix_bindsub(jas_matrix_t *mat0, jas_matrix_t *mat1,
jas_matind_t r0, jas_matind_t c0, jas_matind_t r1, jas_matind_t c1)
{
jas_matind_t i;
if (mat0->data_) {
if (!(mat0->flags_ & JAS_MATRIX_REF)) {
jas_free(mat0->data_);
}
mat0->data_ = 0;
mat0->datasize_ = 0;
}
if (mat0->rows_) {
jas_free(mat0->rows_);
mat0->rows_ = 0;
}
mat0->flags_ |= JAS_MATRIX_REF;
mat0->numrows_ = r1 - r0 + 1;
mat0->numcols_ = c1 - c0 + 1;
mat0->maxrows_ = mat0->numrows_;
if (!(mat0->rows_ = jas_alloc2(mat0->maxrows_, sizeof(jas_seqent_t *)))) {
/*
There is no way to indicate failure to the caller.
So, we have no choice but to abort.
Ideally, this function should have a non-void return type.
In practice, a non-void return type probably would not help
much anyways as the caller would just have to terminate anyways.
*/
abort();
}
for (i = 0; i < mat0->numrows_; ++i) {
mat0->rows_[i] = mat1->rows_[r0 + i] + c0;
}
mat0->xstart_ = mat1->xstart_ + c0;
mat0->ystart_ = mat1->ystart_ + r0;
mat0->xend_ = mat0->xstart_ + mat0->numcols_;
mat0->yend_ = mat0->ystart_ + mat0->numrows_;
}
| 168,699
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int usb_get_bos_descriptor(struct usb_device *dev)
{
struct device *ddev = &dev->dev;
struct usb_bos_descriptor *bos;
struct usb_dev_cap_header *cap;
unsigned char *buffer;
int length, total_len, num, i;
int ret;
bos = kzalloc(sizeof(struct usb_bos_descriptor), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bos)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Get BOS descriptor */
ret = usb_get_descriptor(dev, USB_DT_BOS, 0, bos, USB_DT_BOS_SIZE);
if (ret < USB_DT_BOS_SIZE) {
dev_err(ddev, "unable to get BOS descriptor\n");
if (ret >= 0)
ret = -ENOMSG;
kfree(bos);
return ret;
}
length = bos->bLength;
total_len = le16_to_cpu(bos->wTotalLength);
num = bos->bNumDeviceCaps;
kfree(bos);
if (total_len < length)
return -EINVAL;
dev->bos = kzalloc(sizeof(struct usb_host_bos), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->bos)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Now let's get the whole BOS descriptor set */
buffer = kzalloc(total_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
dev->bos->desc = (struct usb_bos_descriptor *)buffer;
ret = usb_get_descriptor(dev, USB_DT_BOS, 0, buffer, total_len);
if (ret < total_len) {
dev_err(ddev, "unable to get BOS descriptor set\n");
if (ret >= 0)
ret = -ENOMSG;
goto err;
}
total_len -= length;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
buffer += length;
cap = (struct usb_dev_cap_header *)buffer;
length = cap->bLength;
if (total_len < length)
break;
total_len -= length;
if (cap->bDescriptorType != USB_DT_DEVICE_CAPABILITY) {
dev_warn(ddev, "descriptor type invalid, skip\n");
continue;
}
switch (cap->bDevCapabilityType) {
case USB_CAP_TYPE_WIRELESS_USB:
/* Wireless USB cap descriptor is handled by wusb */
break;
case USB_CAP_TYPE_EXT:
dev->bos->ext_cap =
(struct usb_ext_cap_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_SS_CAP_TYPE:
dev->bos->ss_cap =
(struct usb_ss_cap_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_SSP_CAP_TYPE:
dev->bos->ssp_cap =
(struct usb_ssp_cap_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case CONTAINER_ID_TYPE:
dev->bos->ss_id =
(struct usb_ss_container_id_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_PTM_CAP_TYPE:
dev->bos->ptm_cap =
(struct usb_ptm_cap_descriptor *)buffer;
default:
break;
}
}
return 0;
err:
usb_release_bos_descriptor(dev);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: USB: core: fix out-of-bounds access bug in usb_get_bos_descriptor()
Andrey used the syzkaller fuzzer to find an out-of-bounds memory
access in usb_get_bos_descriptor(). The code wasn't checking that the
next usb_dev_cap_header structure could fit into the remaining buffer
space.
This patch fixes the error and also reduces the bNumDeviceCaps field
in the header to match the actual number of capabilities found, in
cases where there are fewer than expected.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
int usb_get_bos_descriptor(struct usb_device *dev)
{
struct device *ddev = &dev->dev;
struct usb_bos_descriptor *bos;
struct usb_dev_cap_header *cap;
unsigned char *buffer;
int length, total_len, num, i;
int ret;
bos = kzalloc(sizeof(struct usb_bos_descriptor), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bos)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Get BOS descriptor */
ret = usb_get_descriptor(dev, USB_DT_BOS, 0, bos, USB_DT_BOS_SIZE);
if (ret < USB_DT_BOS_SIZE) {
dev_err(ddev, "unable to get BOS descriptor\n");
if (ret >= 0)
ret = -ENOMSG;
kfree(bos);
return ret;
}
length = bos->bLength;
total_len = le16_to_cpu(bos->wTotalLength);
num = bos->bNumDeviceCaps;
kfree(bos);
if (total_len < length)
return -EINVAL;
dev->bos = kzalloc(sizeof(struct usb_host_bos), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->bos)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Now let's get the whole BOS descriptor set */
buffer = kzalloc(total_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
dev->bos->desc = (struct usb_bos_descriptor *)buffer;
ret = usb_get_descriptor(dev, USB_DT_BOS, 0, buffer, total_len);
if (ret < total_len) {
dev_err(ddev, "unable to get BOS descriptor set\n");
if (ret >= 0)
ret = -ENOMSG;
goto err;
}
total_len -= length;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
buffer += length;
cap = (struct usb_dev_cap_header *)buffer;
if (total_len < sizeof(*cap) || total_len < cap->bLength) {
dev->bos->desc->bNumDeviceCaps = i;
break;
}
length = cap->bLength;
total_len -= length;
if (cap->bDescriptorType != USB_DT_DEVICE_CAPABILITY) {
dev_warn(ddev, "descriptor type invalid, skip\n");
continue;
}
switch (cap->bDevCapabilityType) {
case USB_CAP_TYPE_WIRELESS_USB:
/* Wireless USB cap descriptor is handled by wusb */
break;
case USB_CAP_TYPE_EXT:
dev->bos->ext_cap =
(struct usb_ext_cap_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_SS_CAP_TYPE:
dev->bos->ss_cap =
(struct usb_ss_cap_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_SSP_CAP_TYPE:
dev->bos->ssp_cap =
(struct usb_ssp_cap_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case CONTAINER_ID_TYPE:
dev->bos->ss_id =
(struct usb_ss_container_id_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_PTM_CAP_TYPE:
dev->bos->ptm_cap =
(struct usb_ptm_cap_descriptor *)buffer;
default:
break;
}
}
return 0;
err:
usb_release_bos_descriptor(dev);
return ret;
}
| 167,675
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int VRDisplay::requestAnimationFrame(FrameRequestCallback* callback) {
Document* doc = this->GetDocument();
if (!doc)
return 0;
pending_raf_ = true;
if (!vr_v_sync_provider_.is_bound()) {
ConnectVSyncProvider();
} else if (!display_blurred_ && !pending_vsync_) {
pending_vsync_ = true;
vr_v_sync_provider_->GetVSync(ConvertToBaseCallback(
WTF::Bind(&VRDisplay::OnVSync, WrapWeakPersistent(this))));
}
callback->use_legacy_time_base_ = false;
return EnsureScriptedAnimationController(doc).RegisterCallback(callback);
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID:
|
int VRDisplay::requestAnimationFrame(FrameRequestCallback* callback) {
DVLOG(2) << __FUNCTION__;
Document* doc = this->GetDocument();
if (!doc)
return 0;
pending_vrdisplay_raf_ = true;
if (!vr_v_sync_provider_.is_bound()) {
ConnectVSyncProvider();
} else if (!display_blurred_ && !pending_vsync_) {
pending_vsync_ = true;
vr_v_sync_provider_->GetVSync(ConvertToBaseCallback(
WTF::Bind(&VRDisplay::OnVSync, WrapWeakPersistent(this))));
}
callback->use_legacy_time_base_ = false;
return EnsureScriptedAnimationController(doc).RegisterCallback(callback);
}
| 172,002
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: init_remote_listener(int port, gboolean encrypted)
{
int rc;
int *ssock = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in saddr;
int optval;
static struct mainloop_fd_callbacks remote_listen_fd_callbacks =
{
.dispatch = cib_remote_listen,
.destroy = remote_connection_destroy,
};
if (port <= 0) {
/* dont start it */
return 0;
}
if (encrypted) {
#ifndef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
crm_warn("TLS support is not available");
return 0;
#else
crm_notice("Starting a tls listener on port %d.", port);
gnutls_global_init();
/* gnutls_global_set_log_level (10); */
gnutls_global_set_log_function(debug_log);
gnutls_dh_params_init(&dh_params);
gnutls_dh_params_generate2(dh_params, DH_BITS);
gnutls_anon_allocate_server_credentials(&anon_cred_s);
gnutls_anon_set_server_dh_params(anon_cred_s, dh_params);
#endif
} else {
crm_warn("Starting a plain_text listener on port %d.", port);
}
#ifndef HAVE_PAM
crm_warn("PAM is _not_ enabled!");
#endif
/* create server socket */
ssock = malloc(sizeof(int));
*ssock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (*ssock == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Can not create server socket." ERROR_SUFFIX);
free(ssock);
return -1;
}
/* reuse address */
optval = 1;
rc = setsockopt(*ssock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &optval, sizeof(optval));
if(rc < 0) {
crm_perror(LOG_INFO, "Couldn't allow the reuse of local addresses by our remote listener");
}
/* bind server socket */
memset(&saddr, '\0', sizeof(saddr));
saddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
saddr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
saddr.sin_port = htons(port);
if (bind(*ssock, (struct sockaddr *)&saddr, sizeof(saddr)) == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Can not bind server socket." ERROR_SUFFIX);
close(*ssock);
free(ssock);
return -2;
}
if (listen(*ssock, 10) == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Can not start listen." ERROR_SUFFIX);
close(*ssock);
free(ssock);
return -3;
}
mainloop_add_fd("cib-remote", G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT, *ssock, ssock, &remote_listen_fd_callbacks);
return *ssock;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
init_remote_listener(int port, gboolean encrypted)
{
int rc;
int *ssock = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in saddr;
int optval;
static struct mainloop_fd_callbacks remote_listen_fd_callbacks =
{
.dispatch = cib_remote_listen,
.destroy = remote_connection_destroy,
};
if (port <= 0) {
/* dont start it */
return 0;
}
if (encrypted) {
#ifndef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
crm_warn("TLS support is not available");
return 0;
#else
crm_notice("Starting a tls listener on port %d.", port);
gnutls_global_init();
/* gnutls_global_set_log_level (10); */
gnutls_global_set_log_function(debug_log);
gnutls_dh_params_init(&dh_params);
gnutls_dh_params_generate2(dh_params, DH_BITS);
gnutls_anon_allocate_server_credentials(&anon_cred_s);
gnutls_anon_set_server_dh_params(anon_cred_s, dh_params);
#endif
} else {
crm_warn("Starting a plain_text listener on port %d.", port);
}
#ifndef HAVE_PAM
crm_warn("PAM is _not_ enabled!");
#endif
/* create server socket */
ssock = malloc(sizeof(int));
*ssock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (*ssock == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Can not create server socket." ERROR_SUFFIX);
free(ssock);
return -1;
}
/* reuse address */
optval = 1;
rc = setsockopt(*ssock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &optval, sizeof(optval));
if(rc < 0) {
crm_perror(LOG_INFO, "Couldn't allow the reuse of local addresses by our remote listener");
}
/* bind server socket */
memset(&saddr, '\0', sizeof(saddr));
saddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
saddr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
saddr.sin_port = htons(port);
if (bind(*ssock, (struct sockaddr *)&saddr, sizeof(saddr)) == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Can not bind server socket." ERROR_SUFFIX);
close(*ssock);
free(ssock);
return -2;
}
if (listen(*ssock, 10) == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Can not start listen." ERROR_SUFFIX);
close(*ssock);
free(ssock);
return -3;
}
mainloop_add_fd("cib-remote", G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT, *ssock, ssock, &remote_listen_fd_callbacks);
return *ssock;
}
| 166,150
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool initiate_stratum(struct pool *pool)
{
bool ret = false, recvd = false, noresume = false, sockd = false;
char s[RBUFSIZE], *sret = NULL, *nonce1, *sessionid;
json_t *val = NULL, *res_val, *err_val;
json_error_t err;
int n2size;
resend:
if (!setup_stratum_socket(pool)) {
sockd = false;
goto out;
}
sockd = true;
if (recvd) {
/* Get rid of any crap lying around if we're resending */
clear_sock(pool);
sprintf(s, "{\"id\": %d, \"method\": \"mining.subscribe\", \"params\": []}", swork_id++);
} else {
if (pool->sessionid)
sprintf(s, "{\"id\": %d, \"method\": \"mining.subscribe\", \"params\": [\""PACKAGE"/"VERSION"\", \"%s\"]}", swork_id++, pool->sessionid);
else
sprintf(s, "{\"id\": %d, \"method\": \"mining.subscribe\", \"params\": [\""PACKAGE"/"VERSION"\"]}", swork_id++);
}
if (__stratum_send(pool, s, strlen(s)) != SEND_OK) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to send s in initiate_stratum");
goto out;
}
if (!socket_full(pool, DEFAULT_SOCKWAIT)) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Timed out waiting for response in initiate_stratum");
goto out;
}
sret = recv_line(pool);
if (!sret)
goto out;
recvd = true;
val = JSON_LOADS(sret, &err);
free(sret);
if (!val) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "JSON decode failed(%d): %s", err.line, err.text);
goto out;
}
res_val = json_object_get(val, "result");
err_val = json_object_get(val, "error");
if (!res_val || json_is_null(res_val) ||
(err_val && !json_is_null(err_val))) {
char *ss;
if (err_val)
ss = json_dumps(err_val, JSON_INDENT(3));
else
ss = strdup("(unknown reason)");
applog(LOG_INFO, "JSON-RPC decode failed: %s", ss);
free(ss);
goto out;
}
sessionid = get_sessionid(res_val);
if (!sessionid)
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to get sessionid in initiate_stratum");
nonce1 = json_array_string(res_val, 1);
if (!nonce1) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "Failed to get nonce1 in initiate_stratum");
free(sessionid);
goto out;
}
n2size = json_integer_value(json_array_get(res_val, 2));
if (!n2size) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "Failed to get n2size in initiate_stratum");
free(sessionid);
free(nonce1);
goto out;
}
cg_wlock(&pool->data_lock);
pool->sessionid = sessionid;
pool->nonce1 = nonce1;
pool->n1_len = strlen(nonce1) / 2;
free(pool->nonce1bin);
pool->nonce1bin = calloc(pool->n1_len, 1);
if (unlikely(!pool->nonce1bin))
quithere(1, "Failed to calloc pool->nonce1bin");
hex2bin(pool->nonce1bin, pool->nonce1, pool->n1_len);
pool->n2size = n2size;
cg_wunlock(&pool->data_lock);
if (sessionid)
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Pool %d stratum session id: %s", pool->pool_no, pool->sessionid);
ret = true;
out:
if (ret) {
if (!pool->stratum_url)
pool->stratum_url = pool->sockaddr_url;
pool->stratum_active = true;
pool->sdiff = 1;
if (opt_protocol) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Pool %d confirmed mining.subscribe with extranonce1 %s extran2size %d",
pool->pool_no, pool->nonce1, pool->n2size);
}
} else {
if (recvd && !noresume) {
/* Reset the sessionid used for stratum resuming in case the pool
* does not support it, or does not know how to respond to the
* presence of the sessionid parameter. */
cg_wlock(&pool->data_lock);
free(pool->sessionid);
free(pool->nonce1);
pool->sessionid = pool->nonce1 = NULL;
cg_wunlock(&pool->data_lock);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to resume stratum, trying afresh");
noresume = true;
json_decref(val);
goto resend;
}
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Initiate stratum failed");
if (sockd)
suspend_stratum(pool);
}
json_decref(val);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Do some random sanity checking for stratum message parsing
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool initiate_stratum(struct pool *pool)
{
bool ret = false, recvd = false, noresume = false, sockd = false;
char s[RBUFSIZE], *sret = NULL, *nonce1, *sessionid;
json_t *val = NULL, *res_val, *err_val;
json_error_t err;
int n2size;
resend:
if (!setup_stratum_socket(pool)) {
sockd = false;
goto out;
}
sockd = true;
if (recvd) {
/* Get rid of any crap lying around if we're resending */
clear_sock(pool);
sprintf(s, "{\"id\": %d, \"method\": \"mining.subscribe\", \"params\": []}", swork_id++);
} else {
if (pool->sessionid)
sprintf(s, "{\"id\": %d, \"method\": \"mining.subscribe\", \"params\": [\""PACKAGE"/"VERSION"\", \"%s\"]}", swork_id++, pool->sessionid);
else
sprintf(s, "{\"id\": %d, \"method\": \"mining.subscribe\", \"params\": [\""PACKAGE"/"VERSION"\"]}", swork_id++);
}
if (__stratum_send(pool, s, strlen(s)) != SEND_OK) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to send s in initiate_stratum");
goto out;
}
if (!socket_full(pool, DEFAULT_SOCKWAIT)) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Timed out waiting for response in initiate_stratum");
goto out;
}
sret = recv_line(pool);
if (!sret)
goto out;
recvd = true;
val = JSON_LOADS(sret, &err);
free(sret);
if (!val) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "JSON decode failed(%d): %s", err.line, err.text);
goto out;
}
res_val = json_object_get(val, "result");
err_val = json_object_get(val, "error");
if (!res_val || json_is_null(res_val) ||
(err_val && !json_is_null(err_val))) {
char *ss;
if (err_val)
ss = json_dumps(err_val, JSON_INDENT(3));
else
ss = strdup("(unknown reason)");
applog(LOG_INFO, "JSON-RPC decode failed: %s", ss);
free(ss);
goto out;
}
sessionid = get_sessionid(res_val);
if (!sessionid)
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to get sessionid in initiate_stratum");
nonce1 = json_array_string(res_val, 1);
if (!valid_hex(nonce1)) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "Failed to get valid nonce1 in initiate_stratum");
free(sessionid);
goto out;
}
n2size = json_integer_value(json_array_get(res_val, 2));
if (n2size < 2 || n2size > 16) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "Failed to get valid n2size in initiate_stratum");
free(sessionid);
free(nonce1);
goto out;
}
cg_wlock(&pool->data_lock);
pool->sessionid = sessionid;
pool->nonce1 = nonce1;
pool->n1_len = strlen(nonce1) / 2;
free(pool->nonce1bin);
pool->nonce1bin = calloc(pool->n1_len, 1);
if (unlikely(!pool->nonce1bin))
quithere(1, "Failed to calloc pool->nonce1bin");
hex2bin(pool->nonce1bin, pool->nonce1, pool->n1_len);
pool->n2size = n2size;
cg_wunlock(&pool->data_lock);
if (sessionid)
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Pool %d stratum session id: %s", pool->pool_no, pool->sessionid);
ret = true;
out:
if (ret) {
if (!pool->stratum_url)
pool->stratum_url = pool->sockaddr_url;
pool->stratum_active = true;
pool->sdiff = 1;
if (opt_protocol) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Pool %d confirmed mining.subscribe with extranonce1 %s extran2size %d",
pool->pool_no, pool->nonce1, pool->n2size);
}
} else {
if (recvd && !noresume) {
/* Reset the sessionid used for stratum resuming in case the pool
* does not support it, or does not know how to respond to the
* presence of the sessionid parameter. */
cg_wlock(&pool->data_lock);
free(pool->sessionid);
free(pool->nonce1);
pool->sessionid = pool->nonce1 = NULL;
cg_wunlock(&pool->data_lock);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to resume stratum, trying afresh");
noresume = true;
json_decref(val);
goto resend;
}
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Initiate stratum failed");
if (sockd)
suspend_stratum(pool);
}
json_decref(val);
return ret;
}
| 166,305
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Editor::ChangeSelectionAfterCommand(
const SelectionInDOMTree& new_selection,
const SetSelectionData& options) {
if (new_selection.IsNone())
return;
bool selection_did_not_change_dom_position =
new_selection == GetFrame().Selection().GetSelectionInDOMTree();
GetFrame().Selection().SetSelection(
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder(new_selection)
.SetIsHandleVisible(GetFrame().Selection().IsHandleVisible())
.Build(),
options);
if (selection_did_not_change_dom_position) {
Client().RespondToChangedSelection(
frame_, GetFrame().Selection().GetSelectionInDOMTree().Type());
}
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void Editor::ChangeSelectionAfterCommand(
const SelectionInDOMTree& new_selection,
const SetSelectionData& options) {
if (new_selection.IsNone())
return;
bool selection_did_not_change_dom_position =
new_selection == GetFrame().Selection().GetSelectionInDOMTree();
GetFrame().Selection().SetSelection(
new_selection,
SetSelectionData::Builder(options)
.SetShouldShowHandle(GetFrame().Selection().IsHandleVisible())
.Build());
if (selection_did_not_change_dom_position) {
Client().RespondToChangedSelection(
frame_, GetFrame().Selection().GetSelectionInDOMTree().Type());
}
}
| 171,753
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::OnJobNotification(DWORD message,
DWORD pid) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
switch (message) {
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_ACTIVE_PROCESS_ZERO:
CHECK(SetEvent(process_exit_event_));
break;
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_NEW_PROCESS:
worker_process_.Set(OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid));
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::OnJobNotification(DWORD message,
DWORD pid) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
switch (message) {
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_ACTIVE_PROCESS_ZERO:
CHECK(SetEvent(process_exit_event_));
break;
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_NEW_PROCESS:
worker_process_.Set(OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid));
break;
}
}
| 171,561
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(set_mempolicy, int, mode, compat_ulong_t __user *, nmask,
compat_ulong_t, maxnode)
{
long err = 0;
unsigned long __user *nm = NULL;
unsigned long nr_bits, alloc_size;
DECLARE_BITMAP(bm, MAX_NUMNODES);
nr_bits = min_t(unsigned long, maxnode-1, MAX_NUMNODES);
alloc_size = ALIGN(nr_bits, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
if (nmask) {
err = compat_get_bitmap(bm, nmask, nr_bits);
nm = compat_alloc_user_space(alloc_size);
err |= copy_to_user(nm, bm, alloc_size);
}
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
return sys_set_mempolicy(mode, nm, nr_bits+1);
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-388
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(set_mempolicy, int, mode, compat_ulong_t __user *, nmask,
compat_ulong_t, maxnode)
{
unsigned long __user *nm = NULL;
unsigned long nr_bits, alloc_size;
DECLARE_BITMAP(bm, MAX_NUMNODES);
nr_bits = min_t(unsigned long, maxnode-1, MAX_NUMNODES);
alloc_size = ALIGN(nr_bits, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
if (nmask) {
if (compat_get_bitmap(bm, nmask, nr_bits))
return -EFAULT;
nm = compat_alloc_user_space(alloc_size);
if (copy_to_user(nm, bm, alloc_size))
return -EFAULT;
}
return sys_set_mempolicy(mode, nm, nr_bits+1);
}
| 168,257
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: read_file(gchar* filepath)
{
FILE * f;
size_t length;
gchar *ret = NULL;
f = fopen(filepath, "rb");
if (f) {
fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END);
length = (size_t)ftell(f);
fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET);
/* We can't use MALLOC since it isn't thread safe */
ret = MALLOC(length + 1);
if (ret) {
if (fread(ret, length, 1, f) != 1) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Failed to read all of %s", filepath);
}
ret[length] = '\0';
}
else
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to read Dbus file %s", filepath);
fclose(f);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
|
read_file(gchar* filepath)
{
FILE * f;
size_t length;
gchar *ret = NULL;
f = fopen(filepath, "r");
if (f) {
fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END);
length = (size_t)ftell(f);
fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET);
/* We can't use MALLOC since it isn't thread safe */
ret = MALLOC(length + 1);
if (ret) {
if (fread(ret, length, 1, f) != 1) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Failed to read all of %s", filepath);
}
ret[length] = '\0';
}
else
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to read Dbus file %s", filepath);
fclose(f);
}
return ret;
}
| 168,988
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: findoprnd(ITEM *ptr, int32 *pos)
{
if (ptr[*pos].type == VAL || ptr[*pos].type == VALTRUE)
{
ptr[*pos].left = 0;
(*pos)++;
}
else if (ptr[*pos].val == (int32) '!')
{
ptr[*pos].left = 1;
(*pos)++;
findoprnd(ptr, pos);
}
else
{
ITEM *curitem = &ptr[*pos];
int32 tmp = *pos;
(*pos)++;
findoprnd(ptr, pos);
curitem->left = *pos - tmp;
findoprnd(ptr, pos);
}
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
findoprnd(ITEM *ptr, int32 *pos)
{
/* since this function recurses, it could be driven to stack overflow. */
check_stack_depth();
if (ptr[*pos].type == VAL || ptr[*pos].type == VALTRUE)
{
ptr[*pos].left = 0;
(*pos)++;
}
else if (ptr[*pos].val == (int32) '!')
{
ptr[*pos].left = 1;
(*pos)++;
findoprnd(ptr, pos);
}
else
{
ITEM *curitem = &ptr[*pos];
int32 tmp = *pos;
(*pos)++;
findoprnd(ptr, pos);
curitem->left = *pos - tmp;
findoprnd(ptr, pos);
}
}
| 166,406
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: xsltElementComp(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemElementPtr comp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp;
#endif
/*
* <xsl:element
* name = { qname }
* namespace = { uri-reference }
* use-attribute-sets = qnames>
* <!-- Content: template -->
* </xsl:element>
*/
if ((style == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (inst->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
comp = (xsltStyleItemElementPtr) xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_ELEMENT);
#else
comp = xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_ELEMENT);
#endif
if (comp == NULL)
return;
inst->psvi = comp;
comp->inst = inst;
/*
* Attribute "name".
*/
/*
* TODO: Precompile the AVT. See bug #344894.
*/
comp->name = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"name", NULL, &comp->has_name);
if (! comp->has_name) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:element: The attribute 'name' is missing.\n");
style->errors++;
goto error;
}
/*
* Attribute "namespace".
*/
/*
* TODO: Precompile the AVT. See bug #344894.
*/
comp->ns = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"namespace", NULL, &comp->has_ns);
if (comp->name != NULL) {
if (xmlValidateQName(comp->name, 0)) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:element: The value '%s' of the attribute 'name' is "
"not a valid QName.\n", comp->name);
style->errors++;
} else {
const xmlChar *prefix = NULL, *name;
name = xsltSplitQName(style->dict, comp->name, &prefix);
if (comp->has_ns == 0) {
xmlNsPtr ns;
/*
* SPEC XSLT 1.0:
* "If the namespace attribute is not present, then the QName is
* expanded into an expanded-name using the namespace declarations
* in effect for the xsl:element element, including any default
* namespace declaration.
*/
ns = xmlSearchNs(inst->doc, inst, prefix);
if (ns != NULL) {
comp->ns = xmlDictLookup(style->dict, ns->href, -1);
comp->has_ns = 1;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
comp->nsPrefix = prefix;
comp->name = name;
#endif
} else if (prefix != NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:element: The prefixed QName '%s' "
"has no namespace binding in scope in the "
"stylesheet; this is an error, since the namespace was "
"not specified by the instruction itself.\n", comp->name);
style->errors++;
}
}
if ((prefix != NULL) &&
(!xmlStrncasecmp(prefix, (xmlChar *)"xml", 3)))
{
/*
* Mark is to be skipped.
*/
comp->has_name = 0;
}
}
}
/*
* Attribute "use-attribute-sets",
*/
comp->use = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"use-attribute-sets",
NULL, &comp->has_use);
error:
return;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
xsltElementComp(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemElementPtr comp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp;
#endif
/*
* <xsl:element
* name = { qname }
* namespace = { uri-reference }
* use-attribute-sets = qnames>
* <!-- Content: template -->
* </xsl:element>
*/
if ((style == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (inst->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
comp = (xsltStyleItemElementPtr) xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_ELEMENT);
#else
comp = xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_ELEMENT);
#endif
if (comp == NULL)
return;
inst->psvi = comp;
comp->inst = inst;
/*
* Attribute "name".
*/
/*
* TODO: Precompile the AVT. See bug #344894.
*/
comp->name = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"name", NULL, &comp->has_name);
if (! comp->has_name) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:element: The attribute 'name' is missing.\n");
style->errors++;
goto error;
}
/*
* Attribute "namespace".
*/
/*
* TODO: Precompile the AVT. See bug #344894.
*/
comp->ns = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"namespace", NULL, &comp->has_ns);
if (comp->name != NULL) {
if (xmlValidateQName(comp->name, 0)) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:element: The value '%s' of the attribute 'name' is "
"not a valid QName.\n", comp->name);
style->errors++;
} else {
const xmlChar *prefix = NULL, *name;
name = xsltSplitQName(style->dict, comp->name, &prefix);
if (comp->has_ns == 0) {
xmlNsPtr ns;
/*
* SPEC XSLT 1.0:
* "If the namespace attribute is not present, then the QName is
* expanded into an expanded-name using the namespace declarations
* in effect for the xsl:element element, including any default
* namespace declaration.
*/
ns = xmlSearchNs(inst->doc, inst, prefix);
if (ns != NULL) {
comp->ns = xmlDictLookup(style->dict, ns->href, -1);
comp->has_ns = 1;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
comp->nsPrefix = prefix;
comp->name = name;
#else
(void)name; /* Suppress unused variable warning. */
#endif
} else if (prefix != NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:element: The prefixed QName '%s' "
"has no namespace binding in scope in the "
"stylesheet; this is an error, since the namespace was "
"not specified by the instruction itself.\n", comp->name);
style->errors++;
}
}
if ((prefix != NULL) &&
(!xmlStrncasecmp(prefix, (xmlChar *)"xml", 3)))
{
/*
* Mark is to be skipped.
*/
comp->has_name = 0;
}
}
}
/*
* Attribute "use-attribute-sets",
*/
comp->use = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"use-attribute-sets",
NULL, &comp->has_use);
error:
return;
}
| 173,316
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void UsbDeviceImpl::OpenInterface(int interface_id,
const OpenCallback& callback) {
chromeos::PermissionBrokerClient* client =
chromeos::DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetPermissionBrokerClient();
DCHECK(client) << "Could not get permission broker client.";
client->RequestPathAccess(
device_path_, interface_id,
base::Bind(&UsbDeviceImpl::OnPathAccessRequestComplete, this, callback));
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void UsbDeviceImpl::OpenInterface(int interface_id,
| 171,702
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static sk_sp<SkImage> scaleSkImage(sk_sp<SkImage> skImage,
unsigned resizeWidth,
unsigned resizeHeight,
SkFilterQuality resizeQuality) {
SkImageInfo resizedInfo = SkImageInfo::Make(
resizeWidth, resizeHeight, kN32_SkColorType, kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<ArrayBuffer> dstBuffer = ArrayBuffer::createOrNull(
resizeWidth * resizeHeight, resizedInfo.bytesPerPixel());
if (!dstBuffer)
return nullptr;
RefPtr<Uint8Array> resizedPixels =
Uint8Array::create(dstBuffer, 0, dstBuffer->byteLength());
SkPixmap pixmap(
resizedInfo, resizedPixels->data(),
static_cast<size_t>(resizeWidth) * resizedInfo.bytesPerPixel());
skImage->scalePixels(pixmap, resizeQuality);
return SkImage::MakeFromRaster(pixmap,
[](const void*, void* pixels) {
static_cast<Uint8Array*>(pixels)->deref();
},
resizedPixels.release().leakRef());
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
static sk_sp<SkImage> scaleSkImage(sk_sp<SkImage> skImage,
unsigned resizeWidth,
unsigned resizeHeight,
SkFilterQuality resizeQuality) {
SkImageInfo resizedInfo = SkImageInfo::Make(
resizeWidth, resizeHeight, kN32_SkColorType, kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<ArrayBuffer> dstBuffer = ArrayBuffer::createOrNull(
resizeWidth * resizeHeight, resizedInfo.bytesPerPixel());
if (!dstBuffer)
return nullptr;
RefPtr<Uint8Array> resizedPixels =
Uint8Array::create(dstBuffer, 0, dstBuffer->byteLength());
SkPixmap pixmap(
resizedInfo, resizedPixels->data(),
static_cast<unsigned>(resizeWidth) * resizedInfo.bytesPerPixel());
skImage->scalePixels(pixmap, resizeQuality);
return SkImage::MakeFromRaster(pixmap,
[](const void*, void* pixels) {
static_cast<Uint8Array*>(pixels)->deref();
},
resizedPixels.release().leakRef());
}
| 172,505
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CreateAuthenticatorFactory() {
DCHECK(context_->network_task_runner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
std::string local_certificate = key_pair_.GenerateCertificate();
if (local_certificate.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to generate host certificate.";
Shutdown(kHostInitializationFailed);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<protocol::AuthenticatorFactory> factory(
new protocol::Me2MeHostAuthenticatorFactory(
local_certificate, *key_pair_.private_key(), host_secret_hash_));
host_->SetAuthenticatorFactory(factory.Pass());
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in CreateAuthenticatorFactory().
CreateAuthenticatorFactory() is called asynchronously, but it didn't handle
the case when it's called after host object is destroyed.
BUG=150644
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11090036
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161077 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void CreateAuthenticatorFactory() {
DCHECK(context_->network_task_runner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!host_ || shutting_down_)
return;
std::string local_certificate = key_pair_.GenerateCertificate();
if (local_certificate.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to generate host certificate.";
Shutdown(kHostInitializationFailed);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<protocol::AuthenticatorFactory> factory(
new protocol::Me2MeHostAuthenticatorFactory(
local_certificate, *key_pair_.private_key(), host_secret_hash_));
host_->SetAuthenticatorFactory(factory.Pass());
}
| 171,338
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int g2m_init_buffers(G2MContext *c)
{
int aligned_height;
if (!c->framebuf || c->old_width < c->width || c->old_height < c->height) {
c->framebuf_stride = FFALIGN(c->width * 3, 16);
aligned_height = FFALIGN(c->height, 16);
av_free(c->framebuf);
c->framebuf = av_mallocz(c->framebuf_stride * aligned_height);
if (!c->framebuf)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
if (!c->synth_tile || !c->jpeg_tile ||
c->old_tile_w < c->tile_width ||
c->old_tile_h < c->tile_height) {
c->tile_stride = FFALIGN(c->tile_width * 3, 16);
aligned_height = FFALIGN(c->tile_height, 16);
av_free(c->synth_tile);
av_free(c->jpeg_tile);
av_free(c->kempf_buf);
av_free(c->kempf_flags);
c->synth_tile = av_mallocz(c->tile_stride * aligned_height);
c->jpeg_tile = av_mallocz(c->tile_stride * aligned_height);
c->kempf_buf = av_mallocz((c->tile_width + 1) * aligned_height
+ FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
c->kempf_flags = av_mallocz( c->tile_width * aligned_height);
if (!c->synth_tile || !c->jpeg_tile ||
!c->kempf_buf || !c->kempf_flags)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/g2meet: Fix order of align and pixel size multiplication.
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2922
Found-by: ami_stuff
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
static int g2m_init_buffers(G2MContext *c)
{
int aligned_height;
if (!c->framebuf || c->old_width < c->width || c->old_height < c->height) {
c->framebuf_stride = FFALIGN(c->width * 3, 16);
aligned_height = FFALIGN(c->height, 16);
av_free(c->framebuf);
c->framebuf = av_mallocz(c->framebuf_stride * aligned_height);
if (!c->framebuf)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
if (!c->synth_tile || !c->jpeg_tile ||
c->old_tile_w < c->tile_width ||
c->old_tile_h < c->tile_height) {
c->tile_stride = FFALIGN(c->tile_width, 16) * 3;
aligned_height = FFALIGN(c->tile_height, 16);
av_free(c->synth_tile);
av_free(c->jpeg_tile);
av_free(c->kempf_buf);
av_free(c->kempf_flags);
c->synth_tile = av_mallocz(c->tile_stride * aligned_height);
c->jpeg_tile = av_mallocz(c->tile_stride * aligned_height);
c->kempf_buf = av_mallocz((c->tile_width + 1) * aligned_height
+ FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
c->kempf_flags = av_mallocz( c->tile_width * aligned_height);
if (!c->synth_tile || !c->jpeg_tile ||
!c->kempf_buf || !c->kempf_flags)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
return 0;
}
| 165,926
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreate (int sx, int sy)
{
int i;
gdImagePtr im;
if (overflow2(sx, sy)) {
return NULL;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof (unsigned char *), sy)) {
return NULL;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof (unsigned char), sx)) {
return NULL;
}
im = (gdImage *) gdCalloc(1, sizeof(gdImage));
if (!im) {
return NULL;
}
/* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
im->pixels = (unsigned char **) gdMalloc (sizeof (unsigned char *) * sy);
if (!im->pixels) {
gdFree(im);
return NULL;
}
im->polyInts = 0;
im->polyAllocated = 0;
im->brush = 0;
im->tile = 0;
im->style = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < sy); i++) {
/* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
im->pixels[i] = (unsigned char *) gdCalloc (sx, sizeof (unsigned char));
if (!im->pixels[i]) {
for (--i ; i >= 0; i--) {
gdFree(im->pixels[i]);
}
gdFree(im->pixels);
gdFree(im);
return NULL;
}
}
im->sx = sx;
im->sy = sy;
im->colorsTotal = 0;
im->transparent = (-1);
im->interlace = 0;
im->thick = 1;
im->AA = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < gdMaxColors); i++) {
im->open[i] = 1;
};
im->trueColor = 0;
im->tpixels = 0;
im->cx1 = 0;
im->cy1 = 0;
im->cx2 = im->sx - 1;
im->cy2 = im->sy - 1;
im->res_x = GD_RESOLUTION;
im->res_y = GD_RESOLUTION;
im->interpolation = NULL;
im->interpolation_id = GD_BILINEAR_FIXED;
return im;
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreate (int sx, int sy)
{
int i;
gdImagePtr im;
if (overflow2(sx, sy)) {
return NULL;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof (unsigned char *), sy)) {
return NULL;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof (unsigned char), sx)) {
return NULL;
}
im = (gdImage *) gdCalloc(1, sizeof(gdImage));
if (!im) {
return NULL;
}
/* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
im->pixels = (unsigned char **) gdMalloc (sizeof (unsigned char *) * sy);
if (!im->pixels) {
gdFree(im);
return NULL;
}
im->polyInts = 0;
im->polyAllocated = 0;
im->brush = 0;
im->tile = 0;
im->style = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < sy); i++) {
/* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
im->pixels[i] = (unsigned char *) gdCalloc (sx, sizeof (unsigned char));
if (!im->pixels[i]) {
for (--i ; i >= 0; i--) {
gdFree(im->pixels[i]);
}
gdFree(im->pixels);
gdFree(im);
return NULL;
}
}
im->sx = sx;
im->sy = sy;
im->colorsTotal = 0;
im->transparent = (-1);
im->interlace = 0;
im->thick = 1;
im->AA = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < gdMaxColors); i++) {
im->open[i] = 1;
};
im->trueColor = 0;
im->tpixels = 0;
im->cx1 = 0;
im->cy1 = 0;
im->cx2 = im->sx - 1;
im->cy2 = im->sy - 1;
im->res_x = GD_RESOLUTION;
im->res_y = GD_RESOLUTION;
im->interpolation = NULL;
im->interpolation_id = GD_BILINEAR_FIXED;
return im;
}
| 168,743
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Response StorageHandler::UntrackIndexedDBForOrigin(const std::string& origin) {
if (!process_)
return Response::InternalError();
GURL origin_url(origin);
if (!origin_url.is_valid())
return Response::InvalidParams(origin + " is not a valid URL");
GetIndexedDBObserver()->TaskRunner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&IndexedDBObserver::UntrackOriginOnIDBThread,
base::Unretained(GetIndexedDBObserver()),
url::Origin::Create(origin_url)));
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
Response StorageHandler::UntrackIndexedDBForOrigin(const std::string& origin) {
if (!storage_partition_)
return Response::InternalError();
GURL origin_url(origin);
if (!origin_url.is_valid())
return Response::InvalidParams(origin + " is not a valid URL");
GetIndexedDBObserver()->TaskRunner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&IndexedDBObserver::UntrackOriginOnIDBThread,
base::Unretained(GetIndexedDBObserver()),
url::Origin::Create(origin_url)));
return Response::OK();
}
| 172,779
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void destroy_super(struct super_block *s)
{
int i;
list_lru_destroy(&s->s_dentry_lru);
list_lru_destroy(&s->s_inode_lru);
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
free_percpu(s->s_files);
#endif
for (i = 0; i < SB_FREEZE_LEVELS; i++)
percpu_counter_destroy(&s->s_writers.counter[i]);
security_sb_free(s);
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&s->s_mounts));
kfree(s->s_subtype);
kfree(s->s_options);
kfree_rcu(s, rcu);
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
|
static void destroy_super(struct super_block *s)
{
int i;
list_lru_destroy(&s->s_dentry_lru);
list_lru_destroy(&s->s_inode_lru);
for (i = 0; i < SB_FREEZE_LEVELS; i++)
percpu_counter_destroy(&s->s_writers.counter[i]);
security_sb_free(s);
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&s->s_mounts));
kfree(s->s_subtype);
kfree(s->s_options);
kfree_rcu(s, rcu);
}
| 166,807
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Huff_Compress(msg_t *mbuf, int offset) {
int i, ch, size;
byte seq[65536];
byte* buffer;
huff_t huff;
size = mbuf->cursize - offset;
buffer = mbuf->data+ + offset;
if (size<=0) {
return;
}
Com_Memset(&huff, 0, sizeof(huff_t));
huff.tree = huff.lhead = huff.loc[NYT] = &(huff.nodeList[huff.blocNode++]);
huff.tree->symbol = NYT;
huff.tree->weight = 0;
huff.lhead->next = huff.lhead->prev = NULL;
huff.tree->parent = huff.tree->left = huff.tree->right = NULL;
seq[0] = (size>>8);
seq[1] = size&0xff;
bloc = 16;
for (i=0; i<size; i++ ) {
ch = buffer[i];
Huff_transmit(&huff, ch, seq); /* Transmit symbol */
Huff_addRef(&huff, (byte)ch); /* Do update */
}
bloc += 8; // next byte
mbuf->cursize = (bloc>>3) + offset;
Com_Memcpy(mbuf->data+offset, seq, (bloc>>3));
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void Huff_Compress(msg_t *mbuf, int offset) {
int i, ch, size;
byte seq[65536];
byte* buffer;
huff_t huff;
size = mbuf->cursize - offset;
buffer = mbuf->data+ + offset;
if (size<=0) {
return;
}
Com_Memset(&huff, 0, sizeof(huff_t));
huff.tree = huff.lhead = huff.loc[NYT] = &(huff.nodeList[huff.blocNode++]);
huff.tree->symbol = NYT;
huff.tree->weight = 0;
huff.lhead->next = huff.lhead->prev = NULL;
huff.tree->parent = huff.tree->left = huff.tree->right = NULL;
seq[0] = (size>>8);
seq[1] = size&0xff;
bloc = 16;
for (i=0; i<size; i++ ) {
ch = buffer[i];
Huff_transmit(&huff, ch, seq, size<<3); /* Transmit symbol */
Huff_addRef(&huff, (byte)ch); /* Do update */
}
bloc += 8; // next byte
mbuf->cursize = (bloc>>3) + offset;
Com_Memcpy(mbuf->data+offset, seq, (bloc>>3));
}
| 167,993
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int crypto_report_one(struct crypto_alg *alg,
struct crypto_user_alg *ualg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
memcpy(&ualg->cru_name, &alg->cra_name, sizeof(ualg->cru_name));
memcpy(&ualg->cru_driver_name, &alg->cra_driver_name,
sizeof(ualg->cru_driver_name));
memcpy(&ualg->cru_module_name, module_name(alg->cra_module),
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
ualg->cru_flags = alg->cra_flags;
ualg->cru_refcnt = atomic_read(&alg->cra_refcnt);
if (nla_put_u32(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_PRIORITY_VAL, alg->cra_priority))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_LARVAL) {
struct crypto_report_larval rl;
snprintf(rl.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "larval");
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_LARVAL,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_larval), &rl))
goto nla_put_failure;
goto out;
}
if (alg->cra_type && alg->cra_type->report) {
if (alg->cra_type->report(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
goto out;
}
switch (alg->cra_flags & (CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK | CRYPTO_ALG_LARVAL)) {
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER:
if (crypto_report_cipher(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
break;
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_COMPRESS:
if (crypto_report_comp(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
break;
}
out:
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
|
static int crypto_report_one(struct crypto_alg *alg,
struct crypto_user_alg *ualg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
strncpy(ualg->cru_name, alg->cra_name, sizeof(ualg->cru_name));
strncpy(ualg->cru_driver_name, alg->cra_driver_name,
sizeof(ualg->cru_driver_name));
strncpy(ualg->cru_module_name, module_name(alg->cra_module),
sizeof(ualg->cru_module_name));
ualg->cru_type = 0;
ualg->cru_mask = 0;
ualg->cru_flags = alg->cra_flags;
ualg->cru_refcnt = atomic_read(&alg->cra_refcnt);
if (nla_put_u32(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_PRIORITY_VAL, alg->cra_priority))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_LARVAL) {
struct crypto_report_larval rl;
strncpy(rl.type, "larval", sizeof(rl.type));
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_LARVAL,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_larval), &rl))
goto nla_put_failure;
goto out;
}
if (alg->cra_type && alg->cra_type->report) {
if (alg->cra_type->report(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
goto out;
}
switch (alg->cra_flags & (CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK | CRYPTO_ALG_LARVAL)) {
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER:
if (crypto_report_cipher(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
break;
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_COMPRESS:
if (crypto_report_comp(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
break;
}
out:
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
| 166,069
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SetImePropertyActivated(const char* key, bool activated) {
if (!IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "SetImePropertyActivated: IBus connection is not alive";
return;
}
if (!key || (key[0] == '\0')) {
return;
}
if (input_context_path_.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Input context is unknown";
return;
}
IBusInputContext* context = GetInputContext(input_context_path_, ibus_);
if (!context) {
return;
}
ibus_input_context_property_activate(
context, key, (activated ? PROP_STATE_CHECKED : PROP_STATE_UNCHECKED));
g_object_unref(context);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void SetImePropertyActivated(const char* key, bool activated) {
// IBusController override.
virtual void SetImePropertyActivated(const std::string& key,
bool activated) {
if (!IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "SetImePropertyActivated: IBus connection is not alive";
return;
}
if (key.empty()) {
return;
}
if (input_context_path_.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Input context is unknown";
return;
}
IBusInputContext* context = GetInputContext(input_context_path_, ibus_);
if (!context) {
return;
}
ibus_input_context_property_activate(
context, key.c_str(),
(activated ? PROP_STATE_CHECKED : PROP_STATE_UNCHECKED));
g_object_unref(context);
}
| 170,548
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: upnp_redirect(const char * rhost, unsigned short eport,
const char * iaddr, unsigned short iport,
const char * protocol, const char * desc,
unsigned int leaseduration)
{
int proto, r;
char iaddr_old[32];
char rhost_old[32];
unsigned short iport_old;
struct in_addr address;
unsigned int timestamp;
proto = proto_atoi(protocol);
if(inet_aton(iaddr, &address) <= 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "inet_aton(%s) FAILED", iaddr);
return -1;
}
if(!check_upnp_rule_against_permissions(upnppermlist, num_upnpperm,
eport, address, iport)) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "redirection permission check failed for "
"%hu->%s:%hu %s", eport, iaddr, iport, protocol);
return -3;
}
/* IGDv1 (WANIPConnection:1 Service Template Version 1.01 / Nov 12, 2001)
* - 2.2.20.PortMappingDescription :
* Overwriting Previous / Existing Port Mappings:
* If the RemoteHost, ExternalPort, PortMappingProtocol and InternalClient
* are exactly the same as an existing mapping, the existing mapping values
* for InternalPort, PortMappingDescription, PortMappingEnabled and
* PortMappingLeaseDuration are overwritten.
* Rejecting a New Port Mapping:
* In cases where the RemoteHost, ExternalPort and PortMappingProtocol
* are the same as an existing mapping, but the InternalClient is
* different, the action is rejected with an appropriate error.
* Add or Reject New Port Mapping behavior based on vendor implementation:
* In cases where the ExternalPort, PortMappingProtocol and InternalClient
* are the same, but RemoteHost is different, the vendor can choose to
* support both mappings simultaneously, or reject the second mapping
* with an appropriate error.
*
* - 2.4.16.AddPortMapping
* This action creates a new port mapping or overwrites an existing
* mapping with the same internal client. If the ExternalPort and
* PortMappingProtocol pair is already mapped to another internal client,
* an error is returned.
*
* IGDv2 (WANIPConnection:2 Service Standardized DCP (SDCP) Sep 10, 2010)
* Protocol ExternalPort RemoteHost InternalClient Result
* = = ≠ ≠ Failure
* = = ≠ = Failure or success
* (vendor specific)
* = = = ≠ Failure
* = = = = Success (overwrite)
*/
rhost_old[0] = '\0';
r = get_redirect_rule(ext_if_name, eport, proto,
iaddr_old, sizeof(iaddr_old), &iport_old, 0, 0,
rhost_old, sizeof(rhost_old),
×tamp, 0, 0);
if(r == 0) {
if(strcmp(iaddr, iaddr_old)==0 &&
((rhost == NULL && rhost_old[0]=='\0') ||
(rhost && (strcmp(rhost, "*") == 0) && rhost_old[0]=='\0') ||
(rhost && (strcmp(rhost, rhost_old) == 0)))) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "updating existing port mapping %hu %s (rhost '%s') => %s:%hu",
eport, protocol, rhost_old, iaddr_old, iport_old);
timestamp = (leaseduration > 0) ? upnp_time() + leaseduration : 0;
if(iport != iport_old) {
r = update_portmapping(ext_if_name, eport, proto, iport, desc, timestamp);
} else {
r = update_portmapping_desc_timestamp(ext_if_name, eport, proto, desc, timestamp);
}
#ifdef ENABLE_LEASEFILE
if(r == 0) {
lease_file_remove(eport, proto);
lease_file_add(eport, iaddr, iport, proto, desc, timestamp);
}
#endif /* ENABLE_LEASEFILE */
return r;
} else {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "port %hu %s (rhost '%s') already redirected to %s:%hu",
eport, protocol, rhost_old, iaddr_old, iport_old);
return -2;
}
#ifdef CHECK_PORTINUSE
} else if (port_in_use(ext_if_name, eport, proto, iaddr, iport) > 0) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "port %hu protocol %s already in use",
eport, protocol);
return -4;
#endif /* CHECK_PORTINUSE */
} else {
timestamp = (leaseduration > 0) ? upnp_time() + leaseduration : 0;
syslog(LOG_INFO, "redirecting port %hu to %s:%hu protocol %s for: %s",
eport, iaddr, iport, protocol, desc);
return upnp_redirect_internal(rhost, eport, iaddr, iport, proto,
desc, timestamp);
}
}
Commit Message: upnp_redirect(): accept NULL desc argument
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
upnp_redirect(const char * rhost, unsigned short eport,
const char * iaddr, unsigned short iport,
const char * protocol, const char * desc,
unsigned int leaseduration)
{
int proto, r;
char iaddr_old[32];
char rhost_old[32];
unsigned short iport_old;
struct in_addr address;
unsigned int timestamp;
proto = proto_atoi(protocol);
if(inet_aton(iaddr, &address) <= 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "inet_aton(%s) FAILED", iaddr);
return -1;
}
if(!check_upnp_rule_against_permissions(upnppermlist, num_upnpperm,
eport, address, iport)) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "redirection permission check failed for "
"%hu->%s:%hu %s", eport, iaddr, iport, protocol);
return -3;
}
if (desc == NULL)
desc = ""; /* assume empty description */
/* IGDv1 (WANIPConnection:1 Service Template Version 1.01 / Nov 12, 2001)
* - 2.2.20.PortMappingDescription :
* Overwriting Previous / Existing Port Mappings:
* If the RemoteHost, ExternalPort, PortMappingProtocol and InternalClient
* are exactly the same as an existing mapping, the existing mapping values
* for InternalPort, PortMappingDescription, PortMappingEnabled and
* PortMappingLeaseDuration are overwritten.
* Rejecting a New Port Mapping:
* In cases where the RemoteHost, ExternalPort and PortMappingProtocol
* are the same as an existing mapping, but the InternalClient is
* different, the action is rejected with an appropriate error.
* Add or Reject New Port Mapping behavior based on vendor implementation:
* In cases where the ExternalPort, PortMappingProtocol and InternalClient
* are the same, but RemoteHost is different, the vendor can choose to
* support both mappings simultaneously, or reject the second mapping
* with an appropriate error.
*
* - 2.4.16.AddPortMapping
* This action creates a new port mapping or overwrites an existing
* mapping with the same internal client. If the ExternalPort and
* PortMappingProtocol pair is already mapped to another internal client,
* an error is returned.
*
* IGDv2 (WANIPConnection:2 Service Standardized DCP (SDCP) Sep 10, 2010)
* Protocol ExternalPort RemoteHost InternalClient Result
* = = ≠ ≠ Failure
* = = ≠ = Failure or success
* (vendor specific)
* = = = ≠ Failure
* = = = = Success (overwrite)
*/
rhost_old[0] = '\0';
r = get_redirect_rule(ext_if_name, eport, proto,
iaddr_old, sizeof(iaddr_old), &iport_old, 0, 0,
rhost_old, sizeof(rhost_old),
×tamp, 0, 0);
if(r == 0) {
if(strcmp(iaddr, iaddr_old)==0 &&
((rhost == NULL && rhost_old[0]=='\0') ||
(rhost && (strcmp(rhost, "*") == 0) && rhost_old[0]=='\0') ||
(rhost && (strcmp(rhost, rhost_old) == 0)))) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "updating existing port mapping %hu %s (rhost '%s') => %s:%hu",
eport, protocol, rhost_old, iaddr_old, iport_old);
timestamp = (leaseduration > 0) ? upnp_time() + leaseduration : 0;
if(iport != iport_old) {
r = update_portmapping(ext_if_name, eport, proto, iport, desc, timestamp);
} else {
r = update_portmapping_desc_timestamp(ext_if_name, eport, proto, desc, timestamp);
}
#ifdef ENABLE_LEASEFILE
if(r == 0) {
lease_file_remove(eport, proto);
lease_file_add(eport, iaddr, iport, proto, desc, timestamp);
}
#endif /* ENABLE_LEASEFILE */
return r;
} else {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "port %hu %s (rhost '%s') already redirected to %s:%hu",
eport, protocol, rhost_old, iaddr_old, iport_old);
return -2;
}
#ifdef CHECK_PORTINUSE
} else if (port_in_use(ext_if_name, eport, proto, iaddr, iport) > 0) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "port %hu protocol %s already in use",
eport, protocol);
return -4;
#endif /* CHECK_PORTINUSE */
} else {
timestamp = (leaseduration > 0) ? upnp_time() + leaseduration : 0;
syslog(LOG_INFO, "redirecting port %hu to %s:%hu protocol %s for: %s",
eport, iaddr, iport, protocol, desc);
return upnp_redirect_internal(rhost, eport, iaddr, iport, proto,
desc, timestamp);
}
}
| 169,666
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool mkvparser::Match(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos, unsigned long id_,
long long& val) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
long long total, available;
const long status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
assert(status >= 0);
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
if (status < 0)
return false;
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
if ((unsigned long)id != id_)
return false;
pos += len; // consume id
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert(size <= 8);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
pos += len; // consume length of size of payload
val = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
assert(val >= 0);
pos += size; // consume size of payload
return true;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool mkvparser::Match(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos, unsigned long id_,
bool Match(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos, unsigned long expected_id,
long long& val) {
if (!pReader || pos < 0)
return false;
long long total = 0;
long long available = 0;
const long status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
if (status < 0 || (total >= 0 && available > total))
return false;
long len = 0;
const long long id = ReadID(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0 || (available - pos) > len)
return false;
if (static_cast<unsigned long>(id) != expected_id)
return false;
pos += len; // consume id
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0 || size > 8 || len < 1 || len > 8 || (available - pos) > len)
return false;
pos += len; // consume length of size of payload
val = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (val < 0)
return false;
pos += size; // consume size of payload
return true;
}
| 173,832
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void gdImageWBMPCtx (gdImagePtr image, int fg, gdIOCtx * out)
{
int x, y, pos;
Wbmp *wbmp;
/* create the WBMP */
if ((wbmp = createwbmp (gdImageSX (image), gdImageSY (image), WBMP_WHITE)) == NULL) {
gd_error("Could not create WBMP");
return;
}
/* fill up the WBMP structure */
pos = 0;
for (y = 0; y < gdImageSY(image); y++) {
for (x = 0; x < gdImageSX(image); x++) {
if (gdImageGetPixel (image, x, y) == fg) {
wbmp->bitmap[pos] = WBMP_BLACK;
}
pos++;
}
}
/* write the WBMP to a gd file descriptor */
if (writewbmp (wbmp, &gd_putout, out)) {
gd_error("Could not save WBMP");
}
/* des submitted this bugfix: gdFree the memory. */
freewbmp(wbmp);
}
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
CWE ID: CWE-415
|
void gdImageWBMPCtx (gdImagePtr image, int fg, gdIOCtx * out)
{
_gdImageWBMPCtx(image, fg, out);
}
/* returns 0 on success, 1 on failure */
static int _gdImageWBMPCtx(gdImagePtr image, int fg, gdIOCtx *out)
{
int x, y, pos;
Wbmp *wbmp;
/* create the WBMP */
if ((wbmp = createwbmp (gdImageSX (image), gdImageSY (image), WBMP_WHITE)) == NULL) {
gd_error("Could not create WBMP");
return 1;
}
/* fill up the WBMP structure */
pos = 0;
for (y = 0; y < gdImageSY(image); y++) {
for (x = 0; x < gdImageSX(image); x++) {
if (gdImageGetPixel (image, x, y) == fg) {
wbmp->bitmap[pos] = WBMP_BLACK;
}
pos++;
}
}
/* write the WBMP to a gd file descriptor */
if (writewbmp (wbmp, &gd_putout, out)) {
freewbmp(wbmp);
gd_error("Could not save WBMP");
return 1;
}
/* des submitted this bugfix: gdFree the memory. */
freewbmp(wbmp);
}
| 169,737
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: _TIFFmalloc(tmsize_t s)
{
return (malloc((size_t) s));
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
CWE ID: CWE-369
|
_TIFFmalloc(tmsize_t s)
{
if (s == 0)
return ((void *) NULL);
return (malloc((size_t) s));
}
| 169,459
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AppShortcutManager::OnceOffCreateShortcuts() {
bool was_enabled = prefs_->GetBoolean(prefs::kAppShortcutsHaveBeenCreated);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
bool is_now_enabled = apps::IsAppShimsEnabled();
#else
bool is_now_enabled = true;
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (was_enabled != is_now_enabled)
prefs_->SetBoolean(prefs::kAppShortcutsHaveBeenCreated, is_now_enabled);
if (was_enabled || !is_now_enabled)
return;
extensions::ExtensionSystem* extension_system;
ExtensionServiceInterface* extension_service;
if (!(extension_system = extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)) ||
!(extension_service = extension_system->extension_service()))
return;
const extensions::ExtensionSet* apps = extension_service->extensions();
for (extensions::ExtensionSet::const_iterator it = apps->begin();
it != apps->end(); ++it) {
if (ShouldCreateShortcutFor(profile_, it->get()))
CreateShortcutsInApplicationsMenu(profile_, it->get());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void AppShortcutManager::OnceOffCreateShortcuts() {
if (prefs_->GetBoolean(prefs::kAppShortcutsHaveBeenCreated))
return;
prefs_->SetBoolean(prefs::kAppShortcutsHaveBeenCreated, true);
extensions::ExtensionSystem* extension_system;
ExtensionServiceInterface* extension_service;
if (!(extension_system = extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)) ||
!(extension_service = extension_system->extension_service()))
return;
const extensions::ExtensionSet* apps = extension_service->extensions();
for (extensions::ExtensionSet::const_iterator it = apps->begin();
it != apps->end(); ++it) {
if (ShouldCreateShortcutFor(profile_, it->get()))
CreateShortcutsInApplicationsMenu(profile_, it->get());
}
}
| 171,146
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: make_size(png_store* PNG_CONST ps, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type, int bdlo,
int PNG_CONST bdhi)
{
for (; bdlo <= bdhi; ++bdlo)
{
png_uint_32 width;
for (width = 1; width <= 16; ++width)
{
png_uint_32 height;
for (height = 1; height <= 16; ++height)
{
/* The four combinations of DIY interlace and interlace or not -
* no interlace + DIY should be identical to no interlace with
* libpng doing it.
*/
make_size_image(ps, colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), PNG_INTERLACE_NONE,
width, height, 0);
make_size_image(ps, colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), PNG_INTERLACE_NONE,
width, height, 1);
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
make_size_image(ps, colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7,
width, height, 0);
make_size_image(ps, colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7,
width, height, 1);
# endif
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
make_size(png_store* PNG_CONST ps, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type, int bdlo,
make_size(png_store* const ps, png_byte const colour_type, int bdlo,
int const bdhi)
{
for (; bdlo <= bdhi; ++bdlo)
{
png_uint_32 width;
for (width = 1; width <= 16; ++width)
{
png_uint_32 height;
for (height = 1; height <= 16; ++height)
{
/* The four combinations of DIY interlace and interlace or not -
* no interlace + DIY should be identical to no interlace with
* libpng doing it.
*/
make_size_image(ps, colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), PNG_INTERLACE_NONE,
width, height, 0);
make_size_image(ps, colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), PNG_INTERLACE_NONE,
width, height, 1);
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
make_size_image(ps, colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7,
width, height, 0);
# endif
# if CAN_WRITE_INTERLACE
/* 1.7.0 removes the hack that prevented app write of an interlaced
* image if WRITE_INTERLACE was not supported
*/
make_size_image(ps, colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7,
width, height, 1);
# endif
}
}
}
}
| 173,663
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: MagickExport size_t GetQuantumExtent(const Image *image,
const QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const QuantumType quantum_type)
{
size_t
extent,
packet_size;
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
packet_size=1;
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case IndexAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case RGBQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case BGRQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case RGBAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case RGBOQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case BGRAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKAQuantum: packet_size=5; break;
default: break;
}
extent=MagickMax(image->columns,image->rows);
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
return((size_t) (packet_size*extent*((quantum_info->depth+7)/8)));
return((size_t) ((packet_size*extent*quantum_info->depth+7)/8));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/126
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
MagickExport size_t GetQuantumExtent(const Image *image,
const QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const QuantumType quantum_type)
{
size_t
extent,
packet_size;
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
packet_size=1;
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case IndexAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case RGBQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case BGRQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case RGBAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case RGBOQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case BGRAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKAQuantum: packet_size=5; break;
case CbYCrAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CbYCrQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case CbYCrYQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
default: break;
}
extent=MagickMax(image->columns,image->rows);
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
return((size_t) (packet_size*extent*((quantum_info->depth+7)/8)));
return((size_t) ((packet_size*extent*quantum_info->depth+7)/8));
}
| 168,794
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int sock_recv_all(int sock_fd, uint8_t* buf, int len)
{
int r = len;
int ret = -1;
while(r)
{
do ret = recv(sock_fd, buf, r, MSG_WAITALL);
while(ret < 0 && errno == EINTR);
if(ret <= 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("sock fd:%d recv errno:%d, ret:%d", sock_fd, errno, ret);
return -1;
}
buf += ret;
r -= ret;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
int sock_recv_all(int sock_fd, uint8_t* buf, int len)
{
int r = len;
int ret = -1;
while(r)
{
do ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(recv(sock_fd, buf, r, MSG_WAITALL));
while(ret < 0 && errno == EINTR);
if(ret <= 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("sock fd:%d recv errno:%d, ret:%d", sock_fd, errno, ret);
return -1;
}
buf += ret;
r -= ret;
}
return len;
}
| 173,468
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void *arm_dma_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size, dma_addr_t *handle,
gfp_t gfp, struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
pgprot_t prot = __get_dma_pgprot(attrs, pgprot_kernel);
void *memory;
if (dma_alloc_from_coherent(dev, size, handle, &memory))
return memory;
return __dma_alloc(dev, size, handle, gfp, prot, false,
__builtin_return_address(0));
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void *arm_dma_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size, dma_addr_t *handle,
gfp_t gfp, struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
pgprot_t prot = __get_dma_pgprot(attrs, PAGE_KERNEL);
void *memory;
if (dma_alloc_from_coherent(dev, size, handle, &memory))
return memory;
return __dma_alloc(dev, size, handle, gfp, prot, false,
__builtin_return_address(0));
}
| 167,578
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int vcc_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct atm_vcc *vcc;
int len;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (__SO_LEVEL_MATCH(optname, level) && len != __SO_SIZE(optname))
return -EINVAL;
vcc = ATM_SD(sock);
switch (optname) {
case SO_ATMQOS:
if (!test_bit(ATM_VF_HASQOS, &vcc->flags))
return -EINVAL;
return copy_to_user(optval, &vcc->qos, sizeof(vcc->qos))
? -EFAULT : 0;
case SO_SETCLP:
return put_user(vcc->atm_options & ATM_ATMOPT_CLP ? 1 : 0,
(unsigned long __user *)optval) ? -EFAULT : 0;
case SO_ATMPVC:
{
struct sockaddr_atmpvc pvc;
if (!vcc->dev || !test_bit(ATM_VF_ADDR, &vcc->flags))
return -ENOTCONN;
pvc.sap_family = AF_ATMPVC;
pvc.sap_addr.itf = vcc->dev->number;
pvc.sap_addr.vpi = vcc->vpi;
pvc.sap_addr.vci = vcc->vci;
return copy_to_user(optval, &pvc, sizeof(pvc)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
default:
if (level == SOL_SOCKET)
return -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (!vcc->dev || !vcc->dev->ops->getsockopt)
return -EINVAL;
return vcc->dev->ops->getsockopt(vcc, level, optname, optval, len);
}
Commit Message: atm: fix info leak in getsockopt(SO_ATMPVC)
The ATM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_atmpvc inserted for alignment. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
int vcc_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct atm_vcc *vcc;
int len;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (__SO_LEVEL_MATCH(optname, level) && len != __SO_SIZE(optname))
return -EINVAL;
vcc = ATM_SD(sock);
switch (optname) {
case SO_ATMQOS:
if (!test_bit(ATM_VF_HASQOS, &vcc->flags))
return -EINVAL;
return copy_to_user(optval, &vcc->qos, sizeof(vcc->qos))
? -EFAULT : 0;
case SO_SETCLP:
return put_user(vcc->atm_options & ATM_ATMOPT_CLP ? 1 : 0,
(unsigned long __user *)optval) ? -EFAULT : 0;
case SO_ATMPVC:
{
struct sockaddr_atmpvc pvc;
if (!vcc->dev || !test_bit(ATM_VF_ADDR, &vcc->flags))
return -ENOTCONN;
memset(&pvc, 0, sizeof(pvc));
pvc.sap_family = AF_ATMPVC;
pvc.sap_addr.itf = vcc->dev->number;
pvc.sap_addr.vpi = vcc->vpi;
pvc.sap_addr.vci = vcc->vci;
return copy_to_user(optval, &pvc, sizeof(pvc)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
default:
if (level == SOL_SOCKET)
return -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (!vcc->dev || !vcc->dev->ops->getsockopt)
return -EINVAL;
return vcc->dev->ops->getsockopt(vcc, level, optname, optval, len);
}
| 166,180
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ResourceTracker::UnrefResource(PP_Resource res) {
DLOG_IF(ERROR, !CheckIdType(res, PP_ID_TYPE_RESOURCE))
<< res << " is not a PP_Resource.";
ResourceMap::iterator i = live_resources_.find(res);
if (i != live_resources_.end()) {
if (!--i->second.second) {
Resource* to_release = i->second.first;
PP_Instance instance = to_release->instance()->pp_instance();
to_release->LastPluginRefWasDeleted(false);
instance_map_[instance]->resources.erase(res);
live_resources_.erase(i);
}
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool ResourceTracker::UnrefResource(PP_Resource res) {
DLOG_IF(ERROR, !CheckIdType(res, PP_ID_TYPE_RESOURCE))
<< res << " is not a PP_Resource.";
ResourceMap::iterator i = live_resources_.find(res);
if (i != live_resources_.end()) {
if (!--i->second.second) {
Resource* to_release = i->second.first;
PP_Instance instance = to_release->instance()->pp_instance();
to_release->LastPluginRefWasDeleted();
instance_map_[instance]->ref_resources.erase(res);
live_resources_.erase(i);
}
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
}
| 170,419
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BurnLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetBurnLibrary() {
return burn_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
BurnLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetBurnLibrary() {
| 170,621
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int dccp_print_option(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *option, u_int hlen)
{
uint8_t optlen, i;
ND_TCHECK(*option);
if (*option >= 32) {
ND_TCHECK(*(option+1));
optlen = *(option +1);
if (optlen < 2) {
if (*option >= 128)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CCID option %u optlen too short", *option));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s optlen too short",
tok2str(dccp_option_values, "Option %u", *option)));
return 0;
}
} else
optlen = 1;
if (hlen < optlen) {
if (*option >= 128)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CCID option %u optlen goes past header length",
*option));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s optlen goes past header length",
tok2str(dccp_option_values, "Option %u", *option)));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*option, optlen);
if (*option >= 128) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CCID option %d", *option));
switch (optlen) {
case 4:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(option + 2)));
break;
case 6:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
break;
default:
break;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(dccp_option_values, "Option %u", *option)));
switch (*option) {
case 32:
case 33:
case 34:
case 35:
if (optlen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " optlen too short"));
return optlen;
}
if (*(option + 2) < 10){
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", dccp_feature_nums[*(option + 2)]));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 3; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d", *(option + 3 + i)));
}
break;
case 36:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 37:
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d", *(option + 2 + i)));
break;
case 38:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 39:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 40:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 41:
if (optlen == 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " optlen != 4"));
break;
case 42:
if (optlen == 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " optlen != 4"));
break;
case 43:
if (optlen == 6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
else if (optlen == 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(option + 2)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " optlen != 4 or 6"));
break;
case 44:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
}
}
return optlen;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16229/DCCP: Fix printing "Timestamp" and "Timestamp Echo" options
Add some comments.
Moreover:
Put a function definition name at the beginning of the line.
(This change was ported from commit 6df4852 in the master branch.)
Ryan Ackroyd had independently identified this buffer over-read later by
means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture file for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static int dccp_print_option(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *option, u_int hlen)
static int
dccp_print_option(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *option, u_int hlen)
{
uint8_t optlen, i;
ND_TCHECK(*option);
if (*option >= 32) {
ND_TCHECK(*(option+1));
optlen = *(option +1);
if (optlen < 2) {
if (*option >= 128)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CCID option %u optlen too short", *option));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s optlen too short",
tok2str(dccp_option_values, "Option %u", *option)));
return 0;
}
} else
optlen = 1;
if (hlen < optlen) {
if (*option >= 128)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CCID option %u optlen goes past header length",
*option));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s optlen goes past header length",
tok2str(dccp_option_values, "Option %u", *option)));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*option, optlen);
if (*option >= 128) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CCID option %d", *option));
switch (optlen) {
case 4:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(option + 2)));
break;
case 6:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
break;
default:
break;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(dccp_option_values, "Option %u", *option)));
switch (*option) {
case 32:
case 33:
case 34:
case 35:
if (optlen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " optlen too short"));
return optlen;
}
if (*(option + 2) < 10){
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", dccp_feature_nums[*(option + 2)]));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 3; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d", *(option + 3 + i)));
}
break;
case 36:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 37:
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d", *(option + 2 + i)));
break;
case 38:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 39:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 40:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 41:
/*
* 13.1. Timestamp Option
*
* +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
* |00101001|00000110| Timestamp Value |
* +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
* Type=41 Length=6
*/
if (optlen == 6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [optlen != 6]"));
break;
case 42:
/*
* 13.3. Timestamp Echo Option
*
* +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
* |00101010|00000110| Timestamp Echo |
* +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
* Type=42 Len=6
*
* +--------+--------+------- ... -------+--------+--------+
* |00101010|00001000| Timestamp Echo | Elapsed Time |
* +--------+--------+------- ... -------+--------+--------+
* Type=42 Len=8 (4 bytes)
*
* +--------+--------+------- ... -------+------- ... -------+
* |00101010|00001010| Timestamp Echo | Elapsed Time |
* +--------+--------+------- ... -------+------- ... -------+
* Type=42 Len=10 (4 bytes) (4 bytes)
*/
switch (optlen) {
case 6:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
break;
case 8:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (elapsed time %u)", EXTRACT_16BITS(option + 6)));
break;
case 10:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (elapsed time %u)", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 6)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [optlen != 6 or 8 or 10]"));
break;
}
break;
case 43:
if (optlen == 6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
else if (optlen == 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(option + 2)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [optlen != 4 or 6]"));
break;
case 44:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
}
}
return optlen;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return 0;
}
| 169,819
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: file_trycdf(struct magic_set *ms, int fd, const unsigned char *buf,
size_t nbytes)
{
cdf_info_t info;
cdf_header_t h;
cdf_sat_t sat, ssat;
cdf_stream_t sst, scn;
cdf_dir_t dir;
int i;
const char *expn = "";
const char *corrupt = "corrupt: ";
info.i_fd = fd;
info.i_buf = buf;
info.i_len = nbytes;
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_APPLE)
return 0;
if (cdf_read_header(&info, &h) == -1)
return 0;
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_header(&h);
#endif
if ((i = cdf_read_sat(&info, &h, &sat)) == -1) {
expn = "Can't read SAT";
goto out0;
}
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_sat("SAT", &sat, CDF_SEC_SIZE(&h));
#endif
if ((i = cdf_read_ssat(&info, &h, &sat, &ssat)) == -1) {
expn = "Can't read SSAT";
goto out1;
}
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_sat("SSAT", &ssat, CDF_SHORT_SEC_SIZE(&h));
#endif
if ((i = cdf_read_dir(&info, &h, &sat, &dir)) == -1) {
expn = "Can't read directory";
goto out2;
}
const cdf_directory_t *root_storage;
if ((i = cdf_read_short_stream(&info, &h, &sat, &dir, &sst,
&root_storage)) == -1) {
expn = "Cannot read short stream";
goto out3;
}
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_dir(&info, &h, &sat, &ssat, &sst, &dir);
#endif
#ifdef notdef
if (root_storage) {
if (NOTMIME(ms)) {
char clsbuf[128];
if (file_printf(ms, "CLSID %s, ",
format_clsid(clsbuf, sizeof(clsbuf),
root_storage->d_storage_uuid)) == -1)
return -1;
}
}
#endif
if ((i = cdf_read_summary_info(&info, &h, &sat, &ssat, &sst, &dir,
&scn)) == -1) {
if (errno == ESRCH) {
corrupt = expn;
expn = "No summary info";
} else {
expn = "Cannot read summary info";
}
goto out4;
}
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_summary_info(&h, &scn);
#endif
if ((i = cdf_file_summary_info(ms, &h, &scn,
root_storage->d_storage_uuid)) < 0)
expn = "Can't expand summary_info";
if (i == 0) {
const char *str = NULL;
cdf_directory_t *d;
char name[__arraycount(d->d_name)];
size_t j, k;
for (j = 0; str == NULL && j < dir.dir_len; j++) {
d = &dir.dir_tab[j];
for (k = 0; k < sizeof(name); k++)
name[k] = (char)cdf_tole2(d->d_name[k]);
str = cdf_app_to_mime(name,
NOTMIME(ms) ? name2desc : name2mime);
}
if (NOTMIME(ms)) {
if (str != NULL) {
if (file_printf(ms, "%s", str) == -1)
return -1;
i = 1;
}
} else {
if (str == NULL)
str = "vnd.ms-office";
if (file_printf(ms, "application/%s", str) == -1)
return -1;
i = 1;
}
}
free(scn.sst_tab);
out4:
free(sst.sst_tab);
out3:
free(dir.dir_tab);
out2:
free(ssat.sat_tab);
out1:
free(sat.sat_tab);
out0:
if (i == -1) {
if (NOTMIME(ms)) {
if (file_printf(ms,
"Composite Document File V2 Document") == -1)
return -1;
if (*expn)
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s%s", corrupt, expn) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
if (file_printf(ms, "application/CDFV2-corrupt") == -1)
return -1;
}
i = 1;
}
return i;
}
Commit Message: Apply patches from file-CVE-2012-1571.patch
From Francisco Alonso Espejo:
file < 5.18/git version can be made to crash when checking some
corrupt CDF files (Using an invalid cdf_read_short_sector size)
The problem I found here, is that in most situations (if
h_short_sec_size_p2 > 8) because the blocksize is 512 and normal
values are 06 which means reading 64 bytes.As long as the check
for the block size copy is not checked properly (there's an assert
that makes wrong/invalid assumptions)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
file_trycdf(struct magic_set *ms, int fd, const unsigned char *buf,
size_t nbytes)
{
cdf_info_t info;
cdf_header_t h;
cdf_sat_t sat, ssat;
cdf_stream_t sst, scn;
cdf_dir_t dir;
int i;
const char *expn = "";
const char *corrupt = "corrupt: ";
info.i_fd = fd;
info.i_buf = buf;
info.i_len = nbytes;
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_APPLE)
return 0;
if (cdf_read_header(&info, &h) == -1)
return 0;
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_header(&h);
#endif
if ((i = cdf_read_sat(&info, &h, &sat)) == -1) {
expn = "Can't read SAT";
goto out0;
}
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_sat("SAT", &sat, CDF_SEC_SIZE(&h));
#endif
if ((i = cdf_read_ssat(&info, &h, &sat, &ssat)) == -1) {
expn = "Can't read SSAT";
goto out1;
}
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_sat("SSAT", &ssat, CDF_SHORT_SEC_SIZE(&h));
#endif
if ((i = cdf_read_dir(&info, &h, &sat, &dir)) == -1) {
expn = "Can't read directory";
goto out2;
}
const cdf_directory_t *root_storage;
if ((i = cdf_read_short_stream(&info, &h, &sat, &dir, &sst,
&root_storage)) == -1) {
expn = "Cannot read short stream";
goto out3;
}
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_dir(&info, &h, &sat, &ssat, &sst, &dir);
#endif
#ifdef notdef
if (root_storage) {
if (NOTMIME(ms)) {
char clsbuf[128];
if (file_printf(ms, "CLSID %s, ",
format_clsid(clsbuf, sizeof(clsbuf),
root_storage->d_storage_uuid)) == -1)
return -1;
}
}
#endif
if ((i = cdf_read_summary_info(&info, &h, &sat, &ssat, &sst, &dir,
&scn)) == -1) {
if (errno == ESRCH) {
corrupt = expn;
expn = "No summary info";
} else {
expn = "Cannot read summary info";
}
goto out4;
}
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_summary_info(&h, &scn);
#endif
if ((i = cdf_file_summary_info(ms, &h, &scn, root_storage)) < 0)
expn = "Can't expand summary_info";
if (i == 0) {
const char *str = NULL;
cdf_directory_t *d;
char name[__arraycount(d->d_name)];
size_t j, k;
for (j = 0; str == NULL && j < dir.dir_len; j++) {
d = &dir.dir_tab[j];
for (k = 0; k < sizeof(name); k++)
name[k] = (char)cdf_tole2(d->d_name[k]);
str = cdf_app_to_mime(name,
NOTMIME(ms) ? name2desc : name2mime);
}
if (NOTMIME(ms)) {
if (str != NULL) {
if (file_printf(ms, "%s", str) == -1)
return -1;
i = 1;
}
} else {
if (str == NULL)
str = "vnd.ms-office";
if (file_printf(ms, "application/%s", str) == -1)
return -1;
i = 1;
}
}
free(scn.sst_tab);
out4:
free(sst.sst_tab);
out3:
free(dir.dir_tab);
out2:
free(ssat.sat_tab);
out1:
free(sat.sat_tab);
out0:
if (i == -1) {
if (NOTMIME(ms)) {
if (file_printf(ms,
"Composite Document File V2 Document") == -1)
return -1;
if (*expn)
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s%s", corrupt, expn) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
if (file_printf(ms, "application/CDFV2-corrupt") == -1)
return -1;
}
i = 1;
}
return i;
}
| 166,447
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void inotify_free_group_priv(struct fsnotify_group *group)
{
/* ideally the idr is empty and we won't hit the BUG in teh callback */
idr_for_each(&group->inotify_data.idr, idr_callback, group);
idr_remove_all(&group->inotify_data.idr);
idr_destroy(&group->inotify_data.idr);
free_uid(group->inotify_data.user);
}
Commit Message: inotify: fix double free/corruption of stuct user
On an error path in inotify_init1 a normal user can trigger a double
free of struct user. This is a regression introduced by a2ae4cc9a16e
("inotify: stop kernel memory leak on file creation failure").
We fix this by making sure that if a group exists the user reference is
dropped when the group is cleaned up. We should not explictly drop the
reference on error and also drop the reference when the group is cleaned
up.
The new lifetime rules are that an inotify group lives from
inotify_new_group to the last fsnotify_put_group. Since the struct user
and inotify_devs are directly tied to this lifetime they are only
changed/updated in those two locations. We get rid of all special
casing of struct user or user->inotify_devs.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.37 and up)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void inotify_free_group_priv(struct fsnotify_group *group)
{
/* ideally the idr is empty and we won't hit the BUG in teh callback */
idr_for_each(&group->inotify_data.idr, idr_callback, group);
idr_remove_all(&group->inotify_data.idr);
idr_destroy(&group->inotify_data.idr);
atomic_dec(&group->inotify_data.user->inotify_devs);
free_uid(group->inotify_data.user);
}
| 165,886
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ResourceFetcher::canRequest(Resource::Type type, const KURL& url, const ResourceLoaderOptions& options, bool forPreload, FetchRequest::OriginRestriction originRestriction) const
{
SecurityOrigin* securityOrigin = options.securityOrigin.get();
if (!securityOrigin && document())
securityOrigin = document()->securityOrigin();
if (securityOrigin && !securityOrigin->canDisplay(url)) {
if (!forPreload)
context().reportLocalLoadFailed(url);
WTF_LOG(ResourceLoading, "ResourceFetcher::requestResource URL was not allowed by SecurityOrigin::canDisplay");
return 0;
}
bool shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy = (frame() && frame()->script().shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy()) || (options.contentSecurityPolicyOption == DoNotCheckContentSecurityPolicy);
switch (type) {
case Resource::MainResource:
case Resource::Image:
case Resource::CSSStyleSheet:
case Resource::Script:
case Resource::Font:
case Resource::Raw:
case Resource::LinkPrefetch:
case Resource::LinkSubresource:
case Resource::TextTrack:
case Resource::ImportResource:
case Resource::Media:
if (originRestriction == FetchRequest::RestrictToSameOrigin && !securityOrigin->canRequest(url)) {
printAccessDeniedMessage(url);
return false;
}
break;
case Resource::XSLStyleSheet:
ASSERT(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::xsltEnabled());
case Resource::SVGDocument:
if (!securityOrigin->canRequest(url)) {
printAccessDeniedMessage(url);
return false;
}
break;
}
ContentSecurityPolicy::ReportingStatus cspReporting = forPreload ?
ContentSecurityPolicy::SuppressReport : ContentSecurityPolicy::SendReport;
switch (type) {
case Resource::XSLStyleSheet:
ASSERT(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::xsltEnabled());
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowScriptFromSource(url, cspReporting))
return false;
break;
case Resource::Script:
case Resource::ImportResource:
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowScriptFromSource(url, cspReporting))
return false;
if (frame()) {
Settings* settings = frame()->settings();
if (!frame()->loader().client()->allowScriptFromSource(!settings || settings->scriptEnabled(), url)) {
frame()->loader().client()->didNotAllowScript();
return false;
}
}
break;
case Resource::CSSStyleSheet:
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowStyleFromSource(url, cspReporting))
return false;
break;
case Resource::SVGDocument:
case Resource::Image:
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowImageFromSource(url, cspReporting))
return false;
break;
case Resource::Font: {
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowFontFromSource(url, cspReporting))
return false;
break;
}
case Resource::MainResource:
case Resource::Raw:
case Resource::LinkPrefetch:
case Resource::LinkSubresource:
break;
case Resource::Media:
case Resource::TextTrack:
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowMediaFromSource(url, cspReporting))
return false;
break;
}
if (!checkInsecureContent(type, url, options.mixedContentBlockingTreatment))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
bool ResourceFetcher::canRequest(Resource::Type type, const KURL& url, const ResourceLoaderOptions& options, bool forPreload, FetchRequest::OriginRestriction originRestriction) const
{
SecurityOrigin* securityOrigin = options.securityOrigin.get();
if (!securityOrigin && document())
securityOrigin = document()->securityOrigin();
if (securityOrigin && !securityOrigin->canDisplay(url)) {
if (!forPreload)
context().reportLocalLoadFailed(url);
WTF_LOG(ResourceLoading, "ResourceFetcher::requestResource URL was not allowed by SecurityOrigin::canDisplay");
return 0;
}
bool shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy = (frame() && frame()->script().shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy()) || (options.contentSecurityPolicyOption == DoNotCheckContentSecurityPolicy);
switch (type) {
case Resource::MainResource:
case Resource::Image:
case Resource::CSSStyleSheet:
case Resource::Script:
case Resource::Font:
case Resource::Raw:
case Resource::LinkPrefetch:
case Resource::LinkSubresource:
case Resource::TextTrack:
case Resource::ImportResource:
case Resource::Media:
if (originRestriction == FetchRequest::RestrictToSameOrigin && !securityOrigin->canRequest(url)) {
printAccessDeniedMessage(url);
return false;
}
break;
case Resource::XSLStyleSheet:
ASSERT(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::xsltEnabled());
case Resource::SVGDocument:
if (!securityOrigin->canRequest(url)) {
printAccessDeniedMessage(url);
return false;
}
break;
}
ContentSecurityPolicy::ReportingStatus cspReporting = forPreload ?
ContentSecurityPolicy::SuppressReport : ContentSecurityPolicy::SendReport;
switch (type) {
case Resource::XSLStyleSheet:
ASSERT(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::xsltEnabled());
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowScriptFromSource(url, cspReporting))
return false;
break;
case Resource::Script:
case Resource::ImportResource:
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowScriptFromSource(url, cspReporting))
return false;
if (frame()) {
Settings* settings = frame()->settings();
if (!frame()->loader().client()->allowScriptFromSource(!settings || settings->scriptEnabled(), url)) {
frame()->loader().client()->didNotAllowScript();
return false;
}
}
break;
case Resource::CSSStyleSheet:
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowStyleFromSource(url, cspReporting))
return false;
break;
case Resource::SVGDocument:
case Resource::Image:
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowImageFromSource(url, cspReporting))
return false;
break;
case Resource::Font: {
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowFontFromSource(url, cspReporting))
return false;
break;
}
case Resource::MainResource:
case Resource::Raw:
case Resource::LinkPrefetch:
case Resource::LinkSubresource:
break;
case Resource::Media:
case Resource::TextTrack:
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowMediaFromSource(url, cspReporting))
return false;
break;
}
// SVG Images have unique security rules that prevent all subresource requests
// except for data urls.
if (type != Resource::MainResource) {
if (frame() && frame()->chromeClient().isSVGImageChromeClient() && !url.protocolIsData())
return false;
}
if (!checkInsecureContent(type, url, options.mixedContentBlockingTreatment))
return false;
return true;
}
| 171,671
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void* H264SwDecMalloc(u32 size)
{
#if defined(CHECK_MEMORY_USAGE)
/* Note that if the decoder has to free and reallocate some of the buffers
* the total value will be invalid */
static u32 numBytes = 0;
numBytes += size;
DEBUG(("Allocated %d bytes, total %d\n", size, numBytes));
#endif
return malloc(size);
}
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void* H264SwDecMalloc(u32 size)
void* H264SwDecMalloc(u32 size, u32 num)
{
if (size > UINT32_MAX / num) {
return NULL;
}
#if defined(CHECK_MEMORY_USAGE)
/* Note that if the decoder has to free and reallocate some of the buffers
* the total value will be invalid */
static u32 numBytes = 0;
numBytes += size * num;
DEBUG(("Allocated %d bytes, total %d\n", size, numBytes));
#endif
return malloc(size * num);
}
| 173,871
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY DeleteSecurityContext(PCtxtHandle phContext)
{
char* Name;
SECURITY_STATUS status;
SecurityFunctionTableA* table;
Name = (char*) sspi_SecureHandleGetUpperPointer(phContext);
if (!Name)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
table = sspi_GetSecurityFunctionTableAByNameA(Name);
if (!table)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
if (table->DeleteSecurityContext == NULL)
return SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION;
status = table->DeleteSecurityContext(phContext);
return status;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY DeleteSecurityContext(PCtxtHandle phContext)
{
char* Name = NULL;
SECURITY_STATUS status;
SecurityFunctionTableA* table;
Name = (char*) sspi_SecureHandleGetUpperPointer(phContext);
if (!Name)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
table = sspi_GetSecurityFunctionTableAByNameA(Name);
if (!table)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
if (table->DeleteSecurityContext == NULL)
return SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION;
status = table->DeleteSecurityContext(phContext);
return status;
}
| 167,603
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool AddPolicyForGPU(CommandLine* cmd_line, sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
#if !defined(NACL_WIN64) // We don't need this code on win nacl64.
if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003) {
if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) ==
gfx::kGLImplementationDesktopName) {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
} else {
if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) ==
gfx::kGLImplementationSwiftShaderName ||
cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kReduceGpuSandbox)) {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LIMITED_USER,
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_SYSTEMPARAMETERS |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DESKTOP |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_EXITWINDOWS |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DISPLAYSETTINGS);
} else {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN,
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_HANDLES);
}
policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
}
} else {
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
}
sandbox::ResultCode result = policy->AddRule(
sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.gpu.*");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
#endif
return true;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
bool AddPolicyForGPU(CommandLine* cmd_line, sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
#if !defined(NACL_WIN64) // We don't need this code on win nacl64.
if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003) {
if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) ==
gfx::kGLImplementationDesktopName) {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
} else {
if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) ==
gfx::kGLImplementationSwiftShaderName ||
cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kReduceGpuSandbox)) {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LIMITED_USER,
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_SYSTEMPARAMETERS |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DESKTOP |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_EXITWINDOWS |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DISPLAYSETTINGS);
} else {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN,
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_HANDLES);
}
policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
}
} else {
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
}
sandbox::ResultCode result = policy->AddRule(
sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.gpu.*");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
// GPU needs to copy sections to renderers.
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
L"Section");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
#endif
return true;
}
| 170,944
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static uint64_t pci_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned int size)
{
AcpiPciHpState *s = opaque;
uint32_t val = 0;
int bsel = s->hotplug_select;
if (bsel < 0 || bsel > ACPI_PCIHP_MAX_HOTPLUG_BUS) {
return 0;
}
switch (addr) {
case PCI_UP_BASE:
val = s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].up;
if (!s->legacy_piix) {
s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].up = 0;
}
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_up_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_DOWN_BASE:
val = s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].down;
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_down_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_EJ_BASE:
/* No feature defined yet */
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_features_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_RMV_BASE:
val = s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].hotplug_enable;
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_rmv_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_SEL_BASE:
val = s->hotplug_select;
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_sel_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
default:
break;
}
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static uint64_t pci_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned int size)
{
AcpiPciHpState *s = opaque;
uint32_t val = 0;
int bsel = s->hotplug_select;
if (bsel < 0 || bsel >= ACPI_PCIHP_MAX_HOTPLUG_BUS) {
return 0;
}
switch (addr) {
case PCI_UP_BASE:
val = s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].up;
if (!s->legacy_piix) {
s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].up = 0;
}
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_up_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_DOWN_BASE:
val = s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].down;
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_down_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_EJ_BASE:
/* No feature defined yet */
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_features_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_RMV_BASE:
val = s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].hotplug_enable;
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_rmv_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_SEL_BASE:
val = s->hotplug_select;
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_sel_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
default:
break;
}
return val;
}
| 165,019
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int _nfs4_do_open(struct inode *dir, struct path *path, int flags, struct iattr *sattr, struct rpc_cred *cred, struct nfs4_state **res)
{
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp;
struct nfs4_state *state = NULL;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
struct nfs4_opendata *opendata;
int status;
/* Protect against reboot recovery conflicts */
status = -ENOMEM;
if (!(sp = nfs4_get_state_owner(server, cred))) {
dprintk("nfs4_do_open: nfs4_get_state_owner failed!\n");
goto out_err;
}
status = nfs4_recover_expired_lease(server);
if (status != 0)
goto err_put_state_owner;
if (path->dentry->d_inode != NULL)
nfs4_return_incompatible_delegation(path->dentry->d_inode, flags & (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE));
status = -ENOMEM;
opendata = nfs4_opendata_alloc(path, sp, flags, sattr);
if (opendata == NULL)
goto err_put_state_owner;
if (path->dentry->d_inode != NULL)
opendata->state = nfs4_get_open_state(path->dentry->d_inode, sp);
status = _nfs4_proc_open(opendata);
if (status != 0)
goto err_opendata_put;
if (opendata->o_arg.open_flags & O_EXCL)
nfs4_exclusive_attrset(opendata, sattr);
state = nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state(opendata);
status = PTR_ERR(state);
if (IS_ERR(state))
goto err_opendata_put;
nfs4_opendata_put(opendata);
nfs4_put_state_owner(sp);
*res = state;
return 0;
err_opendata_put:
nfs4_opendata_put(opendata);
err_put_state_owner:
nfs4_put_state_owner(sp);
out_err:
*res = NULL;
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
|
static int _nfs4_do_open(struct inode *dir, struct path *path, int flags, struct iattr *sattr, struct rpc_cred *cred, struct nfs4_state **res)
static int _nfs4_do_open(struct inode *dir, struct path *path, fmode_t fmode, int flags, struct iattr *sattr, struct rpc_cred *cred, struct nfs4_state **res)
{
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp;
struct nfs4_state *state = NULL;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
struct nfs4_opendata *opendata;
int status;
/* Protect against reboot recovery conflicts */
status = -ENOMEM;
if (!(sp = nfs4_get_state_owner(server, cred))) {
dprintk("nfs4_do_open: nfs4_get_state_owner failed!\n");
goto out_err;
}
status = nfs4_recover_expired_lease(server);
if (status != 0)
goto err_put_state_owner;
if (path->dentry->d_inode != NULL)
nfs4_return_incompatible_delegation(path->dentry->d_inode, fmode);
status = -ENOMEM;
opendata = nfs4_opendata_alloc(path, sp, fmode, flags, sattr);
if (opendata == NULL)
goto err_put_state_owner;
if (path->dentry->d_inode != NULL)
opendata->state = nfs4_get_open_state(path->dentry->d_inode, sp);
status = _nfs4_proc_open(opendata);
if (status != 0)
goto err_opendata_put;
if (opendata->o_arg.open_flags & O_EXCL)
nfs4_exclusive_attrset(opendata, sattr);
state = nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state(opendata);
status = PTR_ERR(state);
if (IS_ERR(state))
goto err_opendata_put;
nfs4_opendata_put(opendata);
nfs4_put_state_owner(sp);
*res = state;
return 0;
err_opendata_put:
nfs4_opendata_put(opendata);
err_put_state_owner:
nfs4_put_state_owner(sp);
out_err:
*res = NULL;
return status;
}
| 165,684
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: EntrySync* WorkerGlobalScopeFileSystem::webkitResolveLocalFileSystemSyncURL(WorkerGlobalScope& worker, const String& url, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
KURL completedURL = worker.completeURL(url);
ExecutionContext* secureContext = worker.executionContext();
if (!secureContext->securityOrigin()->canAccessFileSystem() || !secureContext->securityOrigin()->canRequest(completedURL)) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError(FileError::securityErrorMessage);
return 0;
}
if (!completedURL.isValid()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(EncodingError, "the URL '" + url + "' is invalid.");
return 0;
}
RefPtr<EntrySyncCallbackHelper> resolveURLHelper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
OwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks = ResolveURICallbacks::create(resolveURLHelper->successCallback(), resolveURLHelper->errorCallback(), &worker);
callbacks->setShouldBlockUntilCompletion(true);
LocalFileSystem::from(worker)->resolveURL(&worker, completedURL, callbacks.release());
return resolveURLHelper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
EntrySync* WorkerGlobalScopeFileSystem::webkitResolveLocalFileSystemSyncURL(WorkerGlobalScope& worker, const String& url, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
KURL completedURL = worker.completeURL(url);
ExecutionContext* secureContext = worker.executionContext();
if (!secureContext->securityOrigin()->canAccessFileSystem() || !secureContext->securityOrigin()->canRequest(completedURL)) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError(FileError::securityErrorMessage);
return 0;
}
if (!completedURL.isValid()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(EncodingError, "the URL '" + url + "' is invalid.");
return 0;
}
EntrySyncCallbackHelper* resolveURLHelper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
OwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks = ResolveURICallbacks::create(resolveURLHelper->successCallback(), resolveURLHelper->errorCallback(), &worker);
callbacks->setShouldBlockUntilCompletion(true);
LocalFileSystem::from(worker)->resolveURL(&worker, completedURL, callbacks.release());
return resolveURLHelper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
| 171,433
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int yyinput (yyscan_t yyscanner)
#else
static int input (yyscan_t yyscanner)
#endif
{
int c;
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
*yyg->yy_c_buf_p = yyg->yy_hold_char;
if ( *yyg->yy_c_buf_p == YY_END_OF_BUFFER_CHAR )
{
/* yy_c_buf_p now points to the character we want to return.
* If this occurs *before* the EOB characters, then it's a
* valid NUL; if not, then we've hit the end of the buffer.
*/
if ( yyg->yy_c_buf_p < &YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf[yyg->yy_n_chars] )
/* This was really a NUL. */
*yyg->yy_c_buf_p = '\0';
else
{ /* need more input */
yy_size_t offset = yyg->yy_c_buf_p - yyg->yytext_ptr;
++yyg->yy_c_buf_p;
switch ( yy_get_next_buffer( yyscanner ) )
{
case EOB_ACT_LAST_MATCH:
/* This happens because yy_g_n_b()
* sees that we've accumulated a
* token and flags that we need to
* try matching the token before
* proceeding. But for input(),
* there's no matching to consider.
* So convert the EOB_ACT_LAST_MATCH
* to EOB_ACT_END_OF_FILE.
*/
/* Reset buffer status. */
re_yyrestart(yyin ,yyscanner);
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case EOB_ACT_END_OF_FILE:
{
if ( re_yywrap(yyscanner ) )
return EOF;
if ( ! yyg->yy_did_buffer_switch_on_eof )
YY_NEW_FILE;
#ifdef __cplusplus
return yyinput(yyscanner);
#else
return input(yyscanner);
#endif
}
case EOB_ACT_CONTINUE_SCAN:
yyg->yy_c_buf_p = yyg->yytext_ptr + offset;
break;
}
}
}
c = *(unsigned char *) yyg->yy_c_buf_p; /* cast for 8-bit char's */
*yyg->yy_c_buf_p = '\0'; /* preserve yytext */
yyg->yy_hold_char = *++yyg->yy_c_buf_p;
if ( c == '\n' )
do{ yylineno++;
yycolumn=0;
}while(0)
;
return c;
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
static int yyinput (yyscan_t yyscanner)
#else
static int input (yyscan_t yyscanner)
#endif
{
int c;
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
*yyg->yy_c_buf_p = yyg->yy_hold_char;
if ( *yyg->yy_c_buf_p == YY_END_OF_BUFFER_CHAR )
{
/* yy_c_buf_p now points to the character we want to return.
* If this occurs *before* the EOB characters, then it's a
* valid NUL; if not, then we've hit the end of the buffer.
*/
if ( yyg->yy_c_buf_p < &YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf[yyg->yy_n_chars] )
/* This was really a NUL. */
*yyg->yy_c_buf_p = '\0';
else
{ /* need more input */
yy_size_t offset = yyg->yy_c_buf_p - yyg->yytext_ptr;
++yyg->yy_c_buf_p;
switch ( yy_get_next_buffer( yyscanner ) )
{
case EOB_ACT_LAST_MATCH:
/* This happens because yy_g_n_b()
* sees that we've accumulated a
* token and flags that we need to
* try matching the token before
* proceeding. But for input(),
* there's no matching to consider.
* So convert the EOB_ACT_LAST_MATCH
* to EOB_ACT_END_OF_FILE.
*/
/* Reset buffer status. */
re_yyrestart(yyin ,yyscanner);
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case EOB_ACT_END_OF_FILE:
{
if ( re_yywrap(yyscanner ) )
return EOF;
if ( ! yyg->yy_did_buffer_switch_on_eof )
YY_NEW_FILE;
#ifdef __cplusplus
return yyinput(yyscanner);
#else
return input(yyscanner);
#endif
}
case EOB_ACT_CONTINUE_SCAN:
yyg->yy_c_buf_p = yyg->yytext_ptr + offset;
break;
}
}
}
c = *(unsigned char *) yyg->yy_c_buf_p; /* cast for 8-bit char's */
*yyg->yy_c_buf_p = '\0'; /* preserve yytext */
yyg->yy_hold_char = *++yyg->yy_c_buf_p;
if ( c == '\n' )
do{ yylineno++;
yycolumn=0;
}while(0)
;
return c;
}
| 168,487
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintTabBackground(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
bool active,
int fill_id,
int y_inset,
const SkPath* clip) const {
DCHECK(!y_inset || fill_id);
const SkColor active_color =
tab_->controller()->GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_ACTIVE);
const SkColor inactive_color =
tab_->GetThemeProvider()->GetDisplayProperty(
ThemeProperties::SHOULD_FILL_BACKGROUND_TAB_COLOR)
? tab_->controller()->GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_INACTIVE)
: SK_ColorTRANSPARENT;
const SkColor stroke_color =
tab_->controller()->GetToolbarTopSeparatorColor();
const bool paint_hover_effect = !active && IsHoverActive();
const float stroke_thickness = GetStrokeThickness(active);
PaintTabBackgroundFill(canvas, active, paint_hover_effect, active_color,
inactive_color, fill_id, y_inset);
if (stroke_thickness > 0) {
gfx::ScopedCanvas scoped_canvas(clip ? canvas : nullptr);
if (clip)
canvas->sk_canvas()->clipPath(*clip, SkClipOp::kDifference, true);
PaintBackgroundStroke(canvas, active, stroke_color);
}
PaintSeparators(canvas);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void GM2TabStyle::PaintTabBackground(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
TabState active_state,
int fill_id,
int y_inset,
const SkPath* clip) const {
DCHECK(!y_inset || fill_id);
const SkColor stroke_color =
tab_->controller()->GetToolbarTopSeparatorColor();
const bool paint_hover_effect =
active_state == TAB_INACTIVE && IsHoverActive();
const float stroke_thickness = GetStrokeThickness(active_state == TAB_ACTIVE);
PaintTabBackgroundFill(canvas, active_state, paint_hover_effect, fill_id,
y_inset);
if (stroke_thickness > 0) {
gfx::ScopedCanvas scoped_canvas(clip ? canvas : nullptr);
if (clip)
canvas->sk_canvas()->clipPath(*clip, SkClipOp::kDifference, true);
PaintBackgroundStroke(canvas, active_state, stroke_color);
}
PaintSeparators(canvas);
}
| 172,525
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintForSystemDialog() {
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame = print_preview_context_.source_frame();
if (!frame) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
Print(frame, print_preview_context_.source_node(), false);
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID:
|
void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintForSystemDialog() {
CHECK_LE(ipc_nesting_level_, 1);
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame = print_preview_context_.source_frame();
if (!frame) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
Print(frame, print_preview_context_.source_node(), false);
}
| 171,874
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: unsigned long Tracks::GetTracksCount() const
{
const ptrdiff_t result = m_trackEntriesEnd - m_trackEntries;
assert(result >= 0);
return static_cast<unsigned long>(result);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
unsigned long Tracks::GetTracksCount() const
| 174,374
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BlockEntry::~BlockEntry()
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
BlockEntry::~BlockEntry()
| 174,456
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void OMX::binderDied(const wp<IBinder> &the_late_who) {
OMXNodeInstance *instance;
{
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
ssize_t index = mLiveNodes.indexOfKey(the_late_who);
CHECK(index >= 0);
instance = mLiveNodes.editValueAt(index);
mLiveNodes.removeItemsAt(index);
index = mDispatchers.indexOfKey(instance->nodeID());
CHECK(index >= 0);
mDispatchers.removeItemsAt(index);
invalidateNodeID_l(instance->nodeID());
}
instance->onObserverDied(mMaster);
}
Commit Message: Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void OMX::binderDied(const wp<IBinder> &the_late_who) {
OMXNodeInstance *instance;
{
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
ssize_t index = mLiveNodes.indexOfKey(the_late_who);
if (index < 0) {
ALOGE("b/27597103, nonexistent observer on binderDied");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27597103");
return;
}
instance = mLiveNodes.editValueAt(index);
mLiveNodes.removeItemsAt(index);
index = mDispatchers.indexOfKey(instance->nodeID());
CHECK(index >= 0);
mDispatchers.removeItemsAt(index);
invalidateNodeID_l(instance->nodeID());
}
instance->onObserverDied(mMaster);
}
| 173,881
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void xfrm6_tunnel_spi_fini(void)
{
kmem_cache_destroy(xfrm6_tunnel_spi_kmem);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
static void xfrm6_tunnel_spi_fini(void)
| 165,881
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isBuffer(WebGLBuffer* buffer) {
if (!buffer || isContextLost())
return 0;
if (!buffer->HasEverBeenBound())
return 0;
if (buffer->IsDeleted())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsBuffer(buffer->Object());
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isBuffer(WebGLBuffer* buffer) {
if (!buffer || isContextLost() || !buffer->Validate(ContextGroup(), this))
return 0;
if (!buffer->HasEverBeenBound())
return 0;
if (buffer->IsDeleted())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsBuffer(buffer->Object());
}
| 173,128
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ContentEncoding::ContentCompression::ContentCompression()
: algo(0),
settings(NULL),
settings_len(0) {
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
ContentEncoding::ContentCompression::ContentCompression()
| 174,250
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(xml)
{
le_xml_parser = zend_register_list_destructors_ex(xml_parser_dtor, NULL, "xml", module_number);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_NONE", XML_ERROR_NONE, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY", XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_SYNTAX", XML_ERROR_SYNTAX, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS", XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN", XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN", XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR", XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_TAG_MISMATCH", XML_ERROR_TAG_MISMATCH, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ATTRIBUTE", XML_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ATTRIBUTE, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_JUNK_AFTER_DOC_ELEMENT", XML_ERROR_JUNK_AFTER_DOC_ELEMENT, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_PARAM_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_PARAM_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNDEFINED_ENTITY", XML_ERROR_UNDEFINED_ENTITY, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_RECURSIVE_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_RECURSIVE_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY", XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_BAD_CHAR_REF", XML_ERROR_BAD_CHAR_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_BINARY_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_BINARY_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_ATTRIBUTE_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_ATTRIBUTE_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI", XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ENCODING", XML_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ENCODING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_INCORRECT_ENCODING", XML_ERROR_INCORRECT_ENCODING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_CDATA_SECTION", XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_CDATA_SECTION, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING", XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_CASE_FOLDING", PHP_XML_OPTION_CASE_FOLDING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_TARGET_ENCODING", PHP_XML_OPTION_TARGET_ENCODING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_SKIP_TAGSTART", PHP_XML_OPTION_SKIP_TAGSTART, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_SKIP_WHITE", PHP_XML_OPTION_SKIP_WHITE, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* this object should not be pre-initialised at compile time,
as the order of members may vary */
php_xml_mem_hdlrs.malloc_fcn = php_xml_malloc_wrapper;
php_xml_mem_hdlrs.realloc_fcn = php_xml_realloc_wrapper;
php_xml_mem_hdlrs.free_fcn = php_xml_free_wrapper;
#ifdef LIBXML_EXPAT_COMPAT
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("XML_SAX_IMPL", "libxml", CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#else
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("XML_SAX_IMPL", "expat", CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(xml)
{
le_xml_parser = zend_register_list_destructors_ex(xml_parser_dtor, NULL, "xml", module_number);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_NONE", XML_ERROR_NONE, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY", XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_SYNTAX", XML_ERROR_SYNTAX, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS", XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN", XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN", XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR", XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_TAG_MISMATCH", XML_ERROR_TAG_MISMATCH, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ATTRIBUTE", XML_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ATTRIBUTE, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_JUNK_AFTER_DOC_ELEMENT", XML_ERROR_JUNK_AFTER_DOC_ELEMENT, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_PARAM_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_PARAM_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNDEFINED_ENTITY", XML_ERROR_UNDEFINED_ENTITY, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_RECURSIVE_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_RECURSIVE_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY", XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_BAD_CHAR_REF", XML_ERROR_BAD_CHAR_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_BINARY_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_BINARY_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_ATTRIBUTE_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_ATTRIBUTE_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI", XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ENCODING", XML_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ENCODING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_INCORRECT_ENCODING", XML_ERROR_INCORRECT_ENCODING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_CDATA_SECTION", XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_CDATA_SECTION, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING", XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_CASE_FOLDING", PHP_XML_OPTION_CASE_FOLDING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_TARGET_ENCODING", PHP_XML_OPTION_TARGET_ENCODING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_SKIP_TAGSTART", PHP_XML_OPTION_SKIP_TAGSTART, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_SKIP_WHITE", PHP_XML_OPTION_SKIP_WHITE, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* this object should not be pre-initialised at compile time,
as the order of members may vary */
php_xml_mem_hdlrs.malloc_fcn = php_xml_malloc_wrapper;
php_xml_mem_hdlrs.realloc_fcn = php_xml_realloc_wrapper;
php_xml_mem_hdlrs.free_fcn = php_xml_free_wrapper;
#ifdef LIBXML_EXPAT_COMPAT
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("XML_SAX_IMPL", "libxml", CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#else
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("XML_SAX_IMPL", "expat", CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
return SUCCESS;
}
| 165,038
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_newkeys){
ssh_string sig_blob = NULL;
int rc;
(void)packet;
(void)user;
(void)type;
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL, "Received SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS");
if(session->session_state!= SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH &&
session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT){
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"ssh_packet_newkeys called in wrong state : %d:%d",
session->session_state,session->dh_handshake_state);
goto error;
}
if(session->server){
/* server things are done in server.c */
session->dh_handshake_state=DH_STATE_FINISHED;
if (rc != SSH_OK) {
goto error;
}
/*
* Set the cryptographic functions for the next crypto
* (it is needed for generate_session_keys for key lengths)
*/
if (crypt_set_algorithms(session, SSH_3DES) /* knows nothing about DES*/ ) {
goto error;
}
if (generate_session_keys(session) < 0) {
goto error;
}
/* Verify the host's signature. FIXME do it sooner */
sig_blob = session->next_crypto->dh_server_signature;
session->next_crypto->dh_server_signature = NULL;
/* get the server public key */
rc = ssh_pki_import_pubkey_blob(session->next_crypto->server_pubkey, &key);
if (rc < 0) {
return SSH_ERROR;
}
/* check if public key from server matches user preferences */
if (session->opts.wanted_methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS]) {
if(!ssh_match_group(session->opts.wanted_methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS],
key->type_c)) {
ssh_set_error(session,
SSH_FATAL,
"Public key from server (%s) doesn't match user "
"preference (%s)",
key->type_c,
session->opts.wanted_methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS]);
ssh_key_free(key);
return -1;
}
}
rc = ssh_pki_signature_verify_blob(session,
sig_blob,
key,
session->next_crypto->secret_hash,
session->next_crypto->digest_len);
/* Set the server public key type for known host checking */
session->next_crypto->server_pubkey_type = key->type_c;
ssh_key_free(key);
ssh_string_burn(sig_blob);
ssh_string_free(sig_blob);
sig_blob = NULL;
if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
goto error;
}
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL,"Signature verified and valid");
/*
* Once we got SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS we can switch next_crypto and
* current_crypto
*/
if (session->current_crypto) {
crypto_free(session->current_crypto);
session->current_crypto=NULL;
}
/* FIXME later, include a function to change keys */
session->current_crypto = session->next_crypto;
session->next_crypto = crypto_new();
if (session->next_crypto == NULL) {
ssh_set_error_oom(session);
goto error;
}
session->next_crypto->session_id = malloc(session->current_crypto->digest_len);
if (session->next_crypto->session_id == NULL) {
ssh_set_error_oom(session);
goto error;
}
memcpy(session->next_crypto->session_id, session->current_crypto->session_id,
session->current_crypto->digest_len);
}
session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_FINISHED;
session->ssh_connection_callback(session);
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
error:
session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
|
SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_newkeys){
ssh_string sig_blob = NULL;
int rc;
(void)packet;
(void)user;
(void)type;
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL, "Received SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS");
if (session->session_state != SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH ||
session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT) {
ssh_set_error(session,
SSH_FATAL,
"ssh_packet_newkeys called in wrong state : %d:%d",
session->session_state,session->dh_handshake_state);
goto error;
}
if(session->server){
/* server things are done in server.c */
session->dh_handshake_state=DH_STATE_FINISHED;
if (rc != SSH_OK) {
goto error;
}
/*
* Set the cryptographic functions for the next crypto
* (it is needed for generate_session_keys for key lengths)
*/
if (crypt_set_algorithms(session, SSH_3DES) /* knows nothing about DES*/ ) {
goto error;
}
if (generate_session_keys(session) < 0) {
goto error;
}
/* Verify the host's signature. FIXME do it sooner */
sig_blob = session->next_crypto->dh_server_signature;
session->next_crypto->dh_server_signature = NULL;
/* get the server public key */
rc = ssh_pki_import_pubkey_blob(session->next_crypto->server_pubkey, &key);
if (rc < 0) {
return SSH_ERROR;
}
/* check if public key from server matches user preferences */
if (session->opts.wanted_methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS]) {
if(!ssh_match_group(session->opts.wanted_methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS],
key->type_c)) {
ssh_set_error(session,
SSH_FATAL,
"Public key from server (%s) doesn't match user "
"preference (%s)",
key->type_c,
session->opts.wanted_methods[SSH_HOSTKEYS]);
ssh_key_free(key);
return -1;
}
}
rc = ssh_pki_signature_verify_blob(session,
sig_blob,
key,
session->next_crypto->secret_hash,
session->next_crypto->digest_len);
/* Set the server public key type for known host checking */
session->next_crypto->server_pubkey_type = key->type_c;
ssh_key_free(key);
ssh_string_burn(sig_blob);
ssh_string_free(sig_blob);
sig_blob = NULL;
if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
goto error;
}
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL,"Signature verified and valid");
/*
* Once we got SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS we can switch next_crypto and
* current_crypto
*/
if (session->current_crypto) {
crypto_free(session->current_crypto);
session->current_crypto=NULL;
}
/* FIXME later, include a function to change keys */
session->current_crypto = session->next_crypto;
session->next_crypto = crypto_new();
if (session->next_crypto == NULL) {
ssh_set_error_oom(session);
goto error;
}
session->next_crypto->session_id = malloc(session->current_crypto->digest_len);
if (session->next_crypto->session_id == NULL) {
ssh_set_error_oom(session);
goto error;
}
memcpy(session->next_crypto->session_id, session->current_crypto->session_id,
session->current_crypto->digest_len);
}
session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_FINISHED;
session->ssh_connection_callback(session);
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
error:
session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
| 165,324
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void LaunchServiceProcessControl(bool wait) {
ServiceProcessControl::GetInstance()->Launch(
base::Bind(&ServiceProcessControlBrowserTest::ProcessControlLaunched,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::Bind(
&ServiceProcessControlBrowserTest::ProcessControlLaunchFailed,
base::Unretained(this)));
if (wait)
content::RunMessageLoop();
}
Commit Message: Migrate ServiceProcessControl tests off of QuitCurrent*Deprecated().
Bug: 844016
Change-Id: I9403b850456c8ee06cd2539f7cec9599302e81a0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1126576
Commit-Queue: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573131}
CWE ID: CWE-94
|
void LaunchServiceProcessControl(bool wait) {
void LaunchServiceProcessControl(base::RepeatingClosure on_launched) {
ServiceProcessControl::GetInstance()->Launch(
base::BindOnce(
&ServiceProcessControlBrowserTest::ProcessControlLaunched,
base::Unretained(this), on_launched),
base::BindOnce(
&ServiceProcessControlBrowserTest::ProcessControlLaunchFailed,
| 172,051
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int orinoco_ioctl_set_auth(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
union iwreq_data *wrqu, char *extra)
{
struct orinoco_private *priv = ndev_priv(dev);
hermes_t *hw = &priv->hw;
struct iw_param *param = &wrqu->param;
unsigned long flags;
int ret = -EINPROGRESS;
if (orinoco_lock(priv, &flags) != 0)
return -EBUSY;
switch (param->flags & IW_AUTH_INDEX) {
case IW_AUTH_WPA_VERSION:
case IW_AUTH_CIPHER_PAIRWISE:
case IW_AUTH_CIPHER_GROUP:
case IW_AUTH_RX_UNENCRYPTED_EAPOL:
case IW_AUTH_PRIVACY_INVOKED:
case IW_AUTH_DROP_UNENCRYPTED:
/*
* orinoco does not use these parameters
*/
break;
case IW_AUTH_KEY_MGMT:
/* wl_lkm implies value 2 == PSK for Hermes I
* which ties in with WEXT
* no other hints tho :(
*/
priv->key_mgmt = param->value;
break;
case IW_AUTH_TKIP_COUNTERMEASURES:
/* When countermeasures are enabled, shut down the
* card; when disabled, re-enable the card. This must
* take effect immediately.
*
* TODO: Make sure that the EAPOL message is getting
* out before card disabled
*/
if (param->value) {
priv->tkip_cm_active = 1;
ret = hermes_enable_port(hw, 0);
} else {
priv->tkip_cm_active = 0;
ret = hermes_disable_port(hw, 0);
}
break;
case IW_AUTH_80211_AUTH_ALG:
if (param->value & IW_AUTH_ALG_SHARED_KEY)
priv->wep_restrict = 1;
else if (param->value & IW_AUTH_ALG_OPEN_SYSTEM)
priv->wep_restrict = 0;
else
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
case IW_AUTH_WPA_ENABLED:
if (priv->has_wpa) {
priv->wpa_enabled = param->value ? 1 : 0;
} else {
if (param->value)
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* else silently accept disable of WPA */
priv->wpa_enabled = 0;
}
break;
default:
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
orinoco_unlock(priv, &flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: orinoco: fix TKIP countermeasure behaviour
Enable the port when disabling countermeasures, and disable it on
enabling countermeasures.
This bug causes the response of the system to certain attacks to be
ineffective.
It also prevents wpa_supplicant from getting scan results, as
wpa_supplicant disables countermeasures on startup - preventing the
hardware from scanning.
wpa_supplicant works with ap_mode=2 despite this bug because the commit
handler re-enables the port.
The log tends to look like:
State: DISCONNECTED -> SCANNING
Starting AP scan for wildcard SSID
Scan requested (ret=0) - scan timeout 5 seconds
EAPOL: disable timer tick
EAPOL: Supplicant port status: Unauthorized
Scan timeout - try to get results
Failed to get scan results
Failed to get scan results - try scanning again
Setting scan request: 1 sec 0 usec
Starting AP scan for wildcard SSID
Scan requested (ret=-1) - scan timeout 5 seconds
Failed to initiate AP scan.
Reported by: Giacomo Comes <comes@naic.edu>
Signed-off by: David Kilroy <kilroyd@googlemail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID:
|
static int orinoco_ioctl_set_auth(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
union iwreq_data *wrqu, char *extra)
{
struct orinoco_private *priv = ndev_priv(dev);
hermes_t *hw = &priv->hw;
struct iw_param *param = &wrqu->param;
unsigned long flags;
int ret = -EINPROGRESS;
if (orinoco_lock(priv, &flags) != 0)
return -EBUSY;
switch (param->flags & IW_AUTH_INDEX) {
case IW_AUTH_WPA_VERSION:
case IW_AUTH_CIPHER_PAIRWISE:
case IW_AUTH_CIPHER_GROUP:
case IW_AUTH_RX_UNENCRYPTED_EAPOL:
case IW_AUTH_PRIVACY_INVOKED:
case IW_AUTH_DROP_UNENCRYPTED:
/*
* orinoco does not use these parameters
*/
break;
case IW_AUTH_KEY_MGMT:
/* wl_lkm implies value 2 == PSK for Hermes I
* which ties in with WEXT
* no other hints tho :(
*/
priv->key_mgmt = param->value;
break;
case IW_AUTH_TKIP_COUNTERMEASURES:
/* When countermeasures are enabled, shut down the
* card; when disabled, re-enable the card. This must
* take effect immediately.
*
* TODO: Make sure that the EAPOL message is getting
* out before card disabled
*/
if (param->value) {
priv->tkip_cm_active = 1;
ret = hermes_disable_port(hw, 0);
} else {
priv->tkip_cm_active = 0;
ret = hermes_enable_port(hw, 0);
}
break;
case IW_AUTH_80211_AUTH_ALG:
if (param->value & IW_AUTH_ALG_SHARED_KEY)
priv->wep_restrict = 1;
else if (param->value & IW_AUTH_ALG_OPEN_SYSTEM)
priv->wep_restrict = 0;
else
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
case IW_AUTH_WPA_ENABLED:
if (priv->has_wpa) {
priv->wpa_enabled = param->value ? 1 : 0;
} else {
if (param->value)
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* else silently accept disable of WPA */
priv->wpa_enabled = 0;
}
break;
default:
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
orinoco_unlock(priv, &flags);
return ret;
}
| 165,907
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void InProcessBrowserTest::PrepareTestCommandLine(CommandLine* command_line) {
test_launcher_utils::PrepareBrowserCommandLineForTests(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kTestType, kBrowserTestType);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAshBrowserTests)) {
command_line->AppendSwitchNative(switches::kViewerLaunchViaAppId,
win8::test::kDefaultTestAppUserModelId);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kSilentLaunch);
}
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::FilePath subprocess_path;
PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &subprocess_path);
subprocess_path = subprocess_path.DirName().DirName();
DCHECK_EQ(subprocess_path.BaseName().value(), "Contents");
subprocess_path =
subprocess_path.Append("Versions").Append(chrome::kChromeVersion);
subprocess_path =
subprocess_path.Append(chrome::kHelperProcessExecutablePath);
command_line->AppendSwitchPath(switches::kBrowserSubprocessPath,
subprocess_path);
#endif
if (exit_when_last_browser_closes_)
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableZeroBrowsersOpenForTests);
if (command_line->GetArgs().empty())
command_line->AppendArg(url::kAboutBlankURL);
}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void InProcessBrowserTest::PrepareTestCommandLine(CommandLine* command_line) {
test_launcher_utils::PrepareBrowserCommandLineForTests(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kTestType, kBrowserTestType);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAshBrowserTests)) {
command_line->AppendSwitchNative(switches::kViewerLaunchViaAppId,
win8::test::kDefaultTestAppUserModelId);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kSilentLaunch);
}
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::FilePath subprocess_path;
PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &subprocess_path);
subprocess_path = subprocess_path.DirName().DirName();
DCHECK_EQ(subprocess_path.BaseName().value(), "Contents");
subprocess_path =
subprocess_path.Append("Versions").Append(chrome::kChromeVersion);
subprocess_path =
subprocess_path.Append(chrome::kHelperProcessExecutablePath);
command_line->AppendSwitchPath(switches::kBrowserSubprocessPath,
subprocess_path);
#endif
if (exit_when_last_browser_closes_)
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableZeroBrowsersOpenForTests);
if (open_about_blank_on_browser_launch_ && command_line->GetArgs().empty())
command_line->AppendArg(url::kAboutBlankURL);
}
| 171,152
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int encode_open_downgrade(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct nfs_closeargs *arg)
{
__be32 *p;
RESERVE_SPACE(4+NFS4_STATEID_SIZE+4);
WRITE32(OP_OPEN_DOWNGRADE);
WRITEMEM(arg->stateid->data, NFS4_STATEID_SIZE);
WRITE32(arg->seqid->sequence->counter);
encode_share_access(xdr, arg->open_flags);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
|
static int encode_open_downgrade(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct nfs_closeargs *arg)
{
__be32 *p;
RESERVE_SPACE(4+NFS4_STATEID_SIZE+4);
WRITE32(OP_OPEN_DOWNGRADE);
WRITEMEM(arg->stateid->data, NFS4_STATEID_SIZE);
WRITE32(arg->seqid->sequence->counter);
encode_share_access(xdr, arg->fmode);
return 0;
}
| 165,713
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static Image *ReadWBMPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
int
byte;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
bit;
unsigned short
header;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) &header) == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (header != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"OnlyLevelZerofilesSupported");
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
if (WBMPReadInteger(image,&image->columns) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptWBMPimage");
if (WBMPReadInteger(image,&image->rows) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptWBMPimage");
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,2) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Convert bi-level image to pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (bit == 0)
{
byte=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (byte == EOF)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,(byte & (0x01 << (7-bit))) ? 1 : 0);
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
bit=0;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static Image *ReadWBMPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
int
byte;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
bit;
unsigned short
header;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) &header) == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (header != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"OnlyLevelZerofilesSupported");
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
if (WBMPReadInteger(image,&image->columns) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptWBMPimage");
if (WBMPReadInteger(image,&image->rows) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptWBMPimage");
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,2) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Convert bi-level image to pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (bit == 0)
{
byte=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (byte == EOF)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,(byte & (0x01 << (7-bit))) ? 1 : 0);
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
bit=0;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 168,619
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: struct bio *bio_map_user_iov(struct request_queue *q,
const struct iov_iter *iter,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
int j;
int nr_pages = 0;
struct page **pages;
struct bio *bio;
int cur_page = 0;
int ret, offset;
struct iov_iter i;
struct iovec iov;
iov_for_each(iov, i, *iter) {
unsigned long uaddr = (unsigned long) iov.iov_base;
unsigned long len = iov.iov_len;
unsigned long end = (uaddr + len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long start = uaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/*
* Overflow, abort
*/
if (end < start)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
nr_pages += end - start;
/*
* buffer must be aligned to at least logical block size for now
*/
if (uaddr & queue_dma_alignment(q))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
if (!nr_pages)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
bio = bio_kmalloc(gfp_mask, nr_pages);
if (!bio)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
ret = -ENOMEM;
pages = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(struct page *), gfp_mask);
if (!pages)
goto out;
iov_for_each(iov, i, *iter) {
unsigned long uaddr = (unsigned long) iov.iov_base;
unsigned long len = iov.iov_len;
unsigned long end = (uaddr + len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long start = uaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
const int local_nr_pages = end - start;
const int page_limit = cur_page + local_nr_pages;
ret = get_user_pages_fast(uaddr, local_nr_pages,
(iter->type & WRITE) != WRITE,
&pages[cur_page]);
if (ret < local_nr_pages) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_unmap;
}
offset = offset_in_page(uaddr);
for (j = cur_page; j < page_limit; j++) {
unsigned int bytes = PAGE_SIZE - offset;
unsigned short prev_bi_vcnt = bio->bi_vcnt;
if (len <= 0)
break;
if (bytes > len)
bytes = len;
/*
* sorry...
*/
if (bio_add_pc_page(q, bio, pages[j], bytes, offset) <
bytes)
break;
/*
* check if vector was merged with previous
* drop page reference if needed
*/
if (bio->bi_vcnt == prev_bi_vcnt)
put_page(pages[j]);
len -= bytes;
offset = 0;
}
cur_page = j;
/*
* release the pages we didn't map into the bio, if any
*/
while (j < page_limit)
put_page(pages[j++]);
}
kfree(pages);
bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_USER_MAPPED);
/*
* subtle -- if bio_map_user_iov() ended up bouncing a bio,
* it would normally disappear when its bi_end_io is run.
* however, we need it for the unmap, so grab an extra
* reference to it
*/
bio_get(bio);
return bio;
out_unmap:
for (j = 0; j < nr_pages; j++) {
if (!pages[j])
break;
put_page(pages[j]);
}
out:
kfree(pages);
bio_put(bio);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Commit Message: more bio_map_user_iov() leak fixes
we need to take care of failure exit as well - pages already
in bio should be dropped by analogue of bio_unmap_pages(),
since their refcounts had been bumped only once per reference
in bio.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-772
|
struct bio *bio_map_user_iov(struct request_queue *q,
const struct iov_iter *iter,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
int j;
int nr_pages = 0;
struct page **pages;
struct bio *bio;
int cur_page = 0;
int ret, offset;
struct iov_iter i;
struct iovec iov;
struct bio_vec *bvec;
iov_for_each(iov, i, *iter) {
unsigned long uaddr = (unsigned long) iov.iov_base;
unsigned long len = iov.iov_len;
unsigned long end = (uaddr + len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long start = uaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/*
* Overflow, abort
*/
if (end < start)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
nr_pages += end - start;
/*
* buffer must be aligned to at least logical block size for now
*/
if (uaddr & queue_dma_alignment(q))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
if (!nr_pages)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
bio = bio_kmalloc(gfp_mask, nr_pages);
if (!bio)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
ret = -ENOMEM;
pages = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(struct page *), gfp_mask);
if (!pages)
goto out;
iov_for_each(iov, i, *iter) {
unsigned long uaddr = (unsigned long) iov.iov_base;
unsigned long len = iov.iov_len;
unsigned long end = (uaddr + len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long start = uaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
const int local_nr_pages = end - start;
const int page_limit = cur_page + local_nr_pages;
ret = get_user_pages_fast(uaddr, local_nr_pages,
(iter->type & WRITE) != WRITE,
&pages[cur_page]);
if (unlikely(ret < local_nr_pages)) {
for (j = cur_page; j < page_limit; j++) {
if (!pages[j])
break;
put_page(pages[j]);
}
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_unmap;
}
offset = offset_in_page(uaddr);
for (j = cur_page; j < page_limit; j++) {
unsigned int bytes = PAGE_SIZE - offset;
unsigned short prev_bi_vcnt = bio->bi_vcnt;
if (len <= 0)
break;
if (bytes > len)
bytes = len;
/*
* sorry...
*/
if (bio_add_pc_page(q, bio, pages[j], bytes, offset) <
bytes)
break;
/*
* check if vector was merged with previous
* drop page reference if needed
*/
if (bio->bi_vcnt == prev_bi_vcnt)
put_page(pages[j]);
len -= bytes;
offset = 0;
}
cur_page = j;
/*
* release the pages we didn't map into the bio, if any
*/
while (j < page_limit)
put_page(pages[j++]);
}
kfree(pages);
bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_USER_MAPPED);
/*
* subtle -- if bio_map_user_iov() ended up bouncing a bio,
* it would normally disappear when its bi_end_io is run.
* however, we need it for the unmap, so grab an extra
* reference to it
*/
bio_get(bio);
return bio;
out_unmap:
bio_for_each_segment_all(bvec, bio, j) {
put_page(bvec->bv_page);
}
out:
kfree(pages);
bio_put(bio);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
| 170,037
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int CLASS ljpeg_start (struct jhead *jh, int info_only)
{
int c, tag, len;
uchar data[0x10000];
const uchar *dp;
memset (jh, 0, sizeof *jh);
jh->restart = INT_MAX;
fread (data, 2, 1, ifp);
if (data[1] != 0xd8) return 0;
do {
fread (data, 2, 2, ifp);
tag = data[0] << 8 | data[1];
len = (data[2] << 8 | data[3]) - 2;
if (tag <= 0xff00) return 0;
fread (data, 1, len, ifp);
switch (tag) {
case 0xffc3:
jh->sraw = ((data[7] >> 4) * (data[7] & 15) - 1) & 3;
case 0xffc0:
jh->bits = data[0];
jh->high = data[1] << 8 | data[2];
jh->wide = data[3] << 8 | data[4];
jh->clrs = data[5] + jh->sraw;
if (len == 9 && !dng_version) getc(ifp);
break;
case 0xffc4:
if (info_only) break;
for (dp = data; dp < data+len && (c = *dp++) < 4; )
jh->free[c] = jh->huff[c] = make_decoder_ref (&dp);
break;
case 0xffda:
jh->psv = data[1+data[0]*2];
jh->bits -= data[3+data[0]*2] & 15;
break;
case 0xffdd:
jh->restart = data[0] << 8 | data[1];
}
} while (tag != 0xffda);
if (info_only) return 1;
FORC(5) if (!jh->huff[c+1]) jh->huff[c+1] = jh->huff[c];
if (jh->sraw) {
FORC(4) jh->huff[2+c] = jh->huff[1];
FORC(jh->sraw) jh->huff[1+c] = jh->huff[0];
}
jh->row = (ushort *) calloc (jh->wide*jh->clrs, 4);
merror (jh->row, "ljpeg_start()");
return zero_after_ff = 1;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
int CLASS ljpeg_start (struct jhead *jh, int info_only)
{
int c, tag;
ushort len;
uchar data[0x10000];
const uchar *dp;
memset (jh, 0, sizeof *jh);
jh->restart = INT_MAX;
fread (data, 2, 1, ifp);
if (data[1] != 0xd8) return 0;
do {
fread (data, 2, 2, ifp);
tag = data[0] << 8 | data[1];
len = (data[2] << 8 | data[3]) - 2;
if (tag <= 0xff00) return 0;
fread (data, 1, len, ifp);
switch (tag) {
case 0xffc3:
jh->sraw = ((data[7] >> 4) * (data[7] & 15) - 1) & 3;
case 0xffc0:
jh->bits = data[0];
jh->high = data[1] << 8 | data[2];
jh->wide = data[3] << 8 | data[4];
jh->clrs = data[5] + jh->sraw;
if (len == 9 && !dng_version) getc(ifp);
break;
case 0xffc4:
if (info_only) break;
for (dp = data; dp < data+len && (c = *dp++) < 4; )
jh->free[c] = jh->huff[c] = make_decoder_ref (&dp);
break;
case 0xffda:
jh->psv = data[1+data[0]*2];
jh->bits -= data[3+data[0]*2] & 15;
break;
case 0xffdd:
jh->restart = data[0] << 8 | data[1];
}
} while (tag != 0xffda);
if (info_only) return 1;
FORC(5) if (!jh->huff[c+1]) jh->huff[c+1] = jh->huff[c];
if (jh->sraw) {
FORC(4) jh->huff[2+c] = jh->huff[1];
FORC(jh->sraw) jh->huff[1+c] = jh->huff[0];
}
jh->row = (ushort *) calloc (jh->wide*jh->clrs, 4);
merror (jh->row, "ljpeg_start()");
return zero_after_ff = 1;
}
| 166,622
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline void build_tablename(smart_str *querystr, PGconn *pg_link, const char *table) /* {{{ */
{
char *table_copy, *escaped, *token, *tmp;
size_t len;
/* schame.table should be "schame"."table" */
table_copy = estrdup(table);
token = php_strtok_r(table_copy, ".", &tmp);
len = strlen(token);
if (_php_pgsql_detect_identifier_escape(token, len) == SUCCESS) {
smart_str_appendl(querystr, token, len);
PGSQLfree(escaped);
}
if (tmp && *tmp) {
len = strlen(tmp);
/* "schema"."table" format */
if (_php_pgsql_detect_identifier_escape(tmp, len) == SUCCESS) {
smart_str_appendc(querystr, '.');
smart_str_appendl(querystr, tmp, len);
} else {
escaped = PGSQLescapeIdentifier(pg_link, tmp, len);
smart_str_appendc(querystr, '.');
smart_str_appends(querystr, escaped);
PGSQLfree(escaped);
}
}
efree(table_copy);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
|
static inline void build_tablename(smart_str *querystr, PGconn *pg_link, const char *table) /* {{{ */
{
char *table_copy, *escaped, *token, *tmp;
size_t len;
/* schame.table should be "schame"."table" */
table_copy = estrdup(table);
token = php_strtok_r(table_copy, ".", &tmp);
if (token == NULL) {
token = table;
}
len = strlen(token);
if (_php_pgsql_detect_identifier_escape(token, len) == SUCCESS) {
smart_str_appendl(querystr, token, len);
PGSQLfree(escaped);
}
if (tmp && *tmp) {
len = strlen(tmp);
/* "schema"."table" format */
if (_php_pgsql_detect_identifier_escape(tmp, len) == SUCCESS) {
smart_str_appendc(querystr, '.');
smart_str_appendl(querystr, tmp, len);
} else {
escaped = PGSQLescapeIdentifier(pg_link, tmp, len);
smart_str_appendc(querystr, '.');
smart_str_appends(querystr, escaped);
PGSQLfree(escaped);
}
}
efree(table_copy);
}
/* }}} */
| 164,769
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԗԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8(
"[æӕ] > ae; [þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋпԥก] > n; œ > ce;"
"[ŧтҭԏ] > t; [ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщพฟພຟ] > w;"
"[мӎ] > m; [єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f;"
"[ҫင] > c; ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടรຣຮ] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зҙӡउওဒვპ] > 3; [บບ] > u"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Mapping several Indic characters to confusables.
A number of characters from several Indian scripts are confusable,
especially with numbers. This change maps these characters to their
ASCII lookalike to allow fallback to punycode when displaying probable
spoofing URLs.
Bug: 849421
Bug: 892646
Bug: 896722
Change-Id: I6d463642f3541454dc39bf4b32b8291417697c52
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1295179
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#602032}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԗԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
// - {U+0966 (०), U+09E6 (০), U+0A66 (੦), U+0AE6 (૦), U+0B30 (ଠ),
// U+0B66 (୦), U+0CE6 (೦)} => o,
// - {U+09ED (৭), U+0A67 (੧), U+0AE7 (૧)} => q,
// - {U+0E1A (บ), U+0E9A (ບ)} => u
// - {U+0968 (२), U+09E8 (২), U+0A68 (੨), U+0A68 (੨), U+0AE8 (૨),
// U+0ce9 (೩), U+0ced (೭)} => 2,
// U+0A69 (੩), U+0AE9 (૩), U+0C69 (౩),
// - {U+0A6B (੫)} => 4,
// - {U+09EA (৪), U+0A6A (੪), U+0b6b (୫)} => 8,
// - {U+0AED (૭), U+0b68 (୨), U+0C68 (౨)} => 9,
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8(
"[æӕ] > ae; [þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋпԥก] > n; œ > ce;"
"[ŧтҭԏ] > t; [ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщพฟພຟ] > w;"
"[мӎ] > m; [єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f;"
"[ҫင] > c; ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടรຣຮ] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[०০੦૦ଠ୦೦] > o;"
"[৭੧૧] > q;"
"[บບ] > u;"
"[२২੨੨૨೩೭] > 2;"
"[зҙӡउও੩૩౩ဒვპ] > 3;"
"[੫] > 4;"
"[৪੪୫] > 8;"
"[૭୨౨] > 9;"
),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
| 173,115
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool AXTableCell::isColumnHeaderCell() const {
const AtomicString& scope = getAttribute(scopeAttr);
return equalIgnoringCase(scope, "col") ||
equalIgnoringCase(scope, "colgroup");
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
bool AXTableCell::isColumnHeaderCell() const {
const AtomicString& scope = getAttribute(scopeAttr);
return equalIgnoringASCIICase(scope, "col") ||
equalIgnoringASCIICase(scope, "colgroup");
}
| 171,932
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DownloadController::StartAndroidDownload(
const content::ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& wc_getter,
bool must_download, const DownloadInfo& info) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
WebContents* web_contents = wc_getter.Run();
if (!web_contents) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Download failed on URL:" << info.url.spec();
return;
}
AcquireFileAccessPermission(
web_contents,
base::Bind(&DownloadController::StartAndroidDownloadInternal,
base::Unretained(this), wc_getter, must_download, info));
}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
void DownloadController::StartAndroidDownload(
| 171,883
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ExtensionTtsController::ExtensionTtsController()
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(method_factory_(this)),
current_utterance_(NULL),
platform_impl_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
ExtensionTtsController::ExtensionTtsController()
| 170,376
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: setup_arch (char **cmdline_p)
{
unw_init();
ia64_patch_vtop((u64) __start___vtop_patchlist, (u64) __end___vtop_patchlist);
*cmdline_p = __va(ia64_boot_param->command_line);
strlcpy(boot_command_line, *cmdline_p, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
efi_init();
io_port_init();
#ifdef CONFIG_IA64_GENERIC
/* machvec needs to be parsed from the command line
* before parse_early_param() is called to ensure
* that ia64_mv is initialised before any command line
* settings may cause console setup to occur
*/
machvec_init_from_cmdline(*cmdline_p);
#endif
parse_early_param();
if (early_console_setup(*cmdline_p) == 0)
mark_bsp_online();
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
/* Initialize the ACPI boot-time table parser */
acpi_table_init();
# ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA
acpi_numa_init();
per_cpu_scan_finalize((cpus_weight(early_cpu_possible_map) == 0 ?
32 : cpus_weight(early_cpu_possible_map)), additional_cpus);
# endif
#else
# ifdef CONFIG_SMP
smp_build_cpu_map(); /* happens, e.g., with the Ski simulator */
# endif
#endif /* CONFIG_APCI_BOOT */
find_memory();
/* process SAL system table: */
ia64_sal_init(__va(efi.sal_systab));
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
cpu_physical_id(0) = hard_smp_processor_id();
#endif
cpu_init(); /* initialize the bootstrap CPU */
mmu_context_init(); /* initialize context_id bitmap */
check_sal_cache_flush();
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
acpi_boot_init();
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_VT
if (!conswitchp) {
# if defined(CONFIG_DUMMY_CONSOLE)
conswitchp = &dummy_con;
# endif
# if defined(CONFIG_VGA_CONSOLE)
/*
* Non-legacy systems may route legacy VGA MMIO range to system
* memory. vga_con probes the MMIO hole, so memory looks like
* a VGA device to it. The EFI memory map can tell us if it's
* memory so we can avoid this problem.
*/
if (efi_mem_type(0xA0000) != EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY)
conswitchp = &vga_con;
# endif
}
#endif
/* enable IA-64 Machine Check Abort Handling unless disabled */
if (!nomca)
ia64_mca_init();
platform_setup(cmdline_p);
paging_init();
}
Commit Message: [IA64] Workaround for RSE issue
Problem: An application violating the architectural rules regarding
operation dependencies and having specific Register Stack Engine (RSE)
state at the time of the violation, may result in an illegal operation
fault and invalid RSE state. Such faults may initiate a cascade of
repeated illegal operation faults within OS interruption handlers.
The specific behavior is OS dependent.
Implication: An application causing an illegal operation fault with
specific RSE state may result in a series of illegal operation faults
and an eventual OS stack overflow condition.
Workaround: OS interruption handlers that switch to kernel backing
store implement a check for invalid RSE state to avoid the series
of illegal operation faults.
The core of the workaround is the RSE_WORKAROUND code sequence
inserted into each invocation of the SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER and
SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER_R19 macros. This sequence includes hard-coded
constants that depend on the number of stacked physical registers
being 96. The rest of this patch consists of code to disable this
workaround should this not be the case (with the presumption that
if a future Itanium processor increases the number of registers, it
would also remove the need for this patch).
Move the start of the RBS up to a mod32 boundary to avoid some
corner cases.
The dispatch_illegal_op_fault code outgrew the spot it was
squatting in when built with this patch and CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING=y
Move it out to the end of the ivt.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
setup_arch (char **cmdline_p)
{
unw_init();
ia64_patch_vtop((u64) __start___vtop_patchlist, (u64) __end___vtop_patchlist);
*cmdline_p = __va(ia64_boot_param->command_line);
strlcpy(boot_command_line, *cmdline_p, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
efi_init();
io_port_init();
#ifdef CONFIG_IA64_GENERIC
/* machvec needs to be parsed from the command line
* before parse_early_param() is called to ensure
* that ia64_mv is initialised before any command line
* settings may cause console setup to occur
*/
machvec_init_from_cmdline(*cmdline_p);
#endif
parse_early_param();
if (early_console_setup(*cmdline_p) == 0)
mark_bsp_online();
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
/* Initialize the ACPI boot-time table parser */
acpi_table_init();
# ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA
acpi_numa_init();
per_cpu_scan_finalize((cpus_weight(early_cpu_possible_map) == 0 ?
32 : cpus_weight(early_cpu_possible_map)), additional_cpus);
# endif
#else
# ifdef CONFIG_SMP
smp_build_cpu_map(); /* happens, e.g., with the Ski simulator */
# endif
#endif /* CONFIG_APCI_BOOT */
find_memory();
/* process SAL system table: */
ia64_sal_init(__va(efi.sal_systab));
#ifdef CONFIG_ITANIUM
ia64_patch_rse((u64) __start___rse_patchlist, (u64) __end___rse_patchlist);
#else
{
u64 num_phys_stacked;
if (ia64_pal_rse_info(&num_phys_stacked, 0) == 0 && num_phys_stacked > 96)
ia64_patch_rse((u64) __start___rse_patchlist, (u64) __end___rse_patchlist);
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
cpu_physical_id(0) = hard_smp_processor_id();
#endif
cpu_init(); /* initialize the bootstrap CPU */
mmu_context_init(); /* initialize context_id bitmap */
check_sal_cache_flush();
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
acpi_boot_init();
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_VT
if (!conswitchp) {
# if defined(CONFIG_DUMMY_CONSOLE)
conswitchp = &dummy_con;
# endif
# if defined(CONFIG_VGA_CONSOLE)
/*
* Non-legacy systems may route legacy VGA MMIO range to system
* memory. vga_con probes the MMIO hole, so memory looks like
* a VGA device to it. The EFI memory map can tell us if it's
* memory so we can avoid this problem.
*/
if (efi_mem_type(0xA0000) != EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY)
conswitchp = &vga_con;
# endif
}
#endif
/* enable IA-64 Machine Check Abort Handling unless disabled */
if (!nomca)
ia64_mca_init();
platform_setup(cmdline_p);
paging_init();
}
| 168,921
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool AXTableCell::isRowHeaderCell() const {
const AtomicString& scope = getAttribute(scopeAttr);
return equalIgnoringCase(scope, "row") ||
equalIgnoringCase(scope, "rowgroup");
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
bool AXTableCell::isRowHeaderCell() const {
const AtomicString& scope = getAttribute(scopeAttr);
return equalIgnoringASCIICase(scope, "row") ||
equalIgnoringASCIICase(scope, "rowgroup");
}
| 171,933
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
/* The general expand case depends on what the colour type is: */
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
else if (that->bit_depth < 8) /* grayscale */
that->sample_depth = that->bit_depth = 8;
if (that->have_tRNS)
image_pixel_add_alpha(that, &display->this);
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_transform_png_set_expand_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_expand_mod(const image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
const transform_display *display)
{
/* The general expand case depends on what the colour type is: */
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
else if (that->bit_depth < 8) /* grayscale */
that->sample_depth = that->bit_depth = 8;
if (that->have_tRNS)
image_pixel_add_alpha(that, &display->this, 0/*!for background*/);
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
| 173,633
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: __xml_acl_post_process(xmlNode * xml)
{
xmlNode *cIter = __xml_first_child(xml);
xml_private_t *p = xml->_private;
if(is_set(p->flags, xpf_created)) {
xmlAttr *xIter = NULL;
/* Always allow new scaffolding, ie. node with no attributes or only an 'id' */
for (xIter = crm_first_attr(xml); xIter != NULL; xIter = xIter->next) {
const char *prop_name = (const char *)xIter->name;
if (strcmp(prop_name, XML_ATTR_ID) == 0) {
/* Delay the acl check */
continue;
} else if(__xml_acl_check(xml, NULL, xpf_acl_write)) {
crm_trace("Creation of %s=%s is allowed", crm_element_name(xml), ID(xml));
break;
} else {
char *path = xml_get_path(xml);
crm_trace("Cannot add new node %s at %s", crm_element_name(xml), path);
if(xml != xmlDocGetRootElement(xml->doc)) {
xmlUnlinkNode(xml);
xmlFreeNode(xml);
}
free(path);
return;
}
}
}
while (cIter != NULL) {
xmlNode *child = cIter;
cIter = __xml_next(cIter); /* In case it is free'd */
__xml_acl_post_process(child);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
__xml_acl_post_process(xmlNode * xml)
{
xmlNode *cIter = __xml_first_child(xml);
xml_private_t *p = xml->_private;
if(is_set(p->flags, xpf_created)) {
xmlAttr *xIter = NULL;
char *path = xml_get_path(xml);
/* Always allow new scaffolding, ie. node with no attributes or only an 'id'
* Except in the ACLs section
*/
for (xIter = crm_first_attr(xml); xIter != NULL; xIter = xIter->next) {
const char *prop_name = (const char *)xIter->name;
if (strcmp(prop_name, XML_ATTR_ID) == 0 && strstr(path, "/"XML_CIB_TAG_ACLS"/") == NULL) {
/* Delay the acl check */
continue;
} else if(__xml_acl_check(xml, NULL, xpf_acl_write)) {
crm_trace("Creation of %s=%s is allowed", crm_element_name(xml), ID(xml));
break;
} else {
crm_trace("Cannot add new node %s at %s", crm_element_name(xml), path);
if(xml != xmlDocGetRootElement(xml->doc)) {
xmlUnlinkNode(xml);
xmlFreeNode(xml);
}
free(path);
return;
}
}
free(path);
}
while (cIter != NULL) {
xmlNode *child = cIter;
cIter = __xml_next(cIter); /* In case it is free'd */
__xml_acl_post_process(child);
}
}
| 166,684
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: UNCURL_EXPORT int32_t uncurl_ws_accept(struct uncurl_conn *ucc, char **origins, int32_t n_origins)
{
int32_t e;
e = uncurl_read_header(ucc);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
uncurl_set_header_str(ucc, "Upgrade", "websocket");
uncurl_set_header_str(ucc, "Connection", "Upgrade");
char *origin = NULL;
e = uncurl_get_header_str(ucc, "Origin", &origin);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
bool origin_ok = false;
for (int32_t x = 0; x < n_origins; x++)
if (strstr(origin, origins[x])) {origin_ok = true; break;}
if (!origin_ok) return UNCURL_WS_ERR_ORIGIN;
char *sec_key = NULL;
e = uncurl_get_header_str(ucc, "Sec-WebSocket-Key", &sec_key);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
char *accept_key = ws_create_accept_key(sec_key);
uncurl_set_header_str(ucc, "Sec-WebSocket-Accept", accept_key);
free(accept_key);
e = uncurl_write_header(ucc, "101", "Switching Protocols", UNCURL_RESPONSE);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
ucc->ws_mask = 0;
return UNCURL_OK;
}
Commit Message: origin matching must come at str end
CWE ID: CWE-352
|
UNCURL_EXPORT int32_t uncurl_ws_accept(struct uncurl_conn *ucc, char **origins, int32_t n_origins)
{
int32_t e;
e = uncurl_read_header(ucc);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
uncurl_set_header_str(ucc, "Upgrade", "websocket");
uncurl_set_header_str(ucc, "Connection", "Upgrade");
char *origin = NULL;
e = uncurl_get_header_str(ucc, "Origin", &origin);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
//the substring MUST came at the end of the origin header, thus a strstr AND a strcmp
bool origin_ok = false;
for (int32_t x = 0; x < n_origins; x++) {
char *match = strstr(origin, origins[x]);
if (match && !strcmp(match, origins[x])) {origin_ok = true; break;}
}
if (!origin_ok) return UNCURL_WS_ERR_ORIGIN;
char *sec_key = NULL;
e = uncurl_get_header_str(ucc, "Sec-WebSocket-Key", &sec_key);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
char *accept_key = ws_create_accept_key(sec_key);
uncurl_set_header_str(ucc, "Sec-WebSocket-Accept", accept_key);
free(accept_key);
e = uncurl_write_header(ucc, "101", "Switching Protocols", UNCURL_RESPONSE);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
ucc->ws_mask = 0;
return UNCURL_OK;
}
| 169,336
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int do_setxattr(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct inode *inode, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct btrfs_dir_item *di;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_path *path;
size_t name_len = strlen(name);
int ret = 0;
if (name_len + size > BTRFS_MAX_XATTR_SIZE(root))
return -ENOSPC;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
if (flags & XATTR_REPLACE) {
di = btrfs_lookup_xattr(trans, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode), name,
name_len, -1);
if (IS_ERR(di)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(di);
goto out;
} else if (!di) {
ret = -ENODATA;
goto out;
}
ret = btrfs_delete_one_dir_name(trans, root, path, di);
if (ret)
goto out;
btrfs_release_path(path);
/*
* remove the attribute
*/
if (!value)
goto out;
} else {
di = btrfs_lookup_xattr(NULL, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode),
name, name_len, 0);
if (IS_ERR(di)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(di);
goto out;
}
if (!di && !value)
goto out;
btrfs_release_path(path);
}
again:
ret = btrfs_insert_xattr_item(trans, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode),
name, name_len, value, size);
/*
* If we're setting an xattr to a new value but the new value is say
* exactly BTRFS_MAX_XATTR_SIZE, we could end up with EOVERFLOW getting
* back from split_leaf. This is because it thinks we'll be extending
* the existing item size, but we're asking for enough space to add the
* item itself. So if we get EOVERFLOW just set ret to EEXIST and let
* the rest of the function figure it out.
*/
if (ret == -EOVERFLOW)
ret = -EEXIST;
if (ret == -EEXIST) {
if (flags & XATTR_CREATE)
goto out;
/*
* We can't use the path we already have since we won't have the
* proper locking for a delete, so release the path and
* re-lookup to delete the thing.
*/
btrfs_release_path(path);
di = btrfs_lookup_xattr(trans, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode),
name, name_len, -1);
if (IS_ERR(di)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(di);
goto out;
} else if (!di) {
/* Shouldn't happen but just in case... */
btrfs_release_path(path);
goto again;
}
ret = btrfs_delete_one_dir_name(trans, root, path, di);
if (ret)
goto out;
/*
* We have a value to set, so go back and try to insert it now.
*/
if (value) {
btrfs_release_path(path);
goto again;
}
}
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
static int do_setxattr(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct inode *inode, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct btrfs_dir_item *di = NULL;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_path *path;
size_t name_len = strlen(name);
int ret = 0;
if (name_len + size > BTRFS_MAX_XATTR_SIZE(root))
return -ENOSPC;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
path->skip_release_on_error = 1;
if (!value) {
di = btrfs_lookup_xattr(trans, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode),
name, name_len, -1);
if (!di && (flags & XATTR_REPLACE))
ret = -ENODATA;
else if (di)
ret = btrfs_delete_one_dir_name(trans, root, path, di);
goto out;
}
/*
* For a replace we can't just do the insert blindly.
* Do a lookup first (read-only btrfs_search_slot), and return if xattr
* doesn't exist. If it exists, fall down below to the insert/replace
* path - we can't race with a concurrent xattr delete, because the VFS
* locks the inode's i_mutex before calling setxattr or removexattr.
*/
if (flags & XATTR_REPLACE) {
ASSERT(mutex_is_locked(&inode->i_mutex));
di = btrfs_lookup_xattr(NULL, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode),
name, name_len, 0);
if (!di) {
ret = -ENODATA;
goto out;
}
btrfs_release_path(path);
di = NULL;
}
ret = btrfs_insert_xattr_item(trans, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode),
name, name_len, value, size);
if (ret == -EOVERFLOW) {
/*
* We have an existing item in a leaf, split_leaf couldn't
* expand it. That item might have or not a dir_item that
* matches our target xattr, so lets check.
*/
ret = 0;
btrfs_assert_tree_locked(path->nodes[0]);
di = btrfs_match_dir_item_name(root, path, name, name_len);
if (!di && !(flags & XATTR_REPLACE)) {
ret = -ENOSPC;
goto out;
}
} else if (ret == -EEXIST) {
ret = 0;
di = btrfs_match_dir_item_name(root, path, name, name_len);
ASSERT(di); /* logic error */
} else if (ret) {
goto out;
}
if (di && (flags & XATTR_CREATE)) {
ret = -EEXIST;
goto out;
}
if (di) {
/*
* We're doing a replace, and it must be atomic, that is, at
* any point in time we have either the old or the new xattr
* value in the tree. We don't want readers (getxattr and
* listxattrs) to miss a value, this is specially important
* for ACLs.
*/
const int slot = path->slots[0];
struct extent_buffer *leaf = path->nodes[0];
const u16 old_data_len = btrfs_dir_data_len(leaf, di);
const u32 item_size = btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, slot);
const u32 data_size = sizeof(*di) + name_len + size;
struct btrfs_item *item;
unsigned long data_ptr;
char *ptr;
if (size > old_data_len) {
if (btrfs_leaf_free_space(root, leaf) <
(size - old_data_len)) {
ret = -ENOSPC;
goto out;
}
}
if (old_data_len + name_len + sizeof(*di) == item_size) {
/* No other xattrs packed in the same leaf item. */
if (size > old_data_len)
btrfs_extend_item(root, path,
size - old_data_len);
else if (size < old_data_len)
btrfs_truncate_item(root, path, data_size, 1);
} else {
/* There are other xattrs packed in the same item. */
ret = btrfs_delete_one_dir_name(trans, root, path, di);
if (ret)
goto out;
btrfs_extend_item(root, path, data_size);
}
item = btrfs_item_nr(slot);
ptr = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, char);
ptr += btrfs_item_size(leaf, item) - data_size;
di = (struct btrfs_dir_item *)ptr;
btrfs_set_dir_data_len(leaf, di, size);
data_ptr = ((unsigned long)(di + 1)) + name_len;
write_extent_buffer(leaf, value, data_ptr, size);
btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty(leaf);
} else {
/*
* Insert, and we had space for the xattr, so path->slots[0] is
* where our xattr dir_item is and btrfs_insert_xattr_item()
* filled it.
*/
}
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
}
| 166,765
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: CompositorFrameMetadata LayerTreeHostImpl::MakeCompositorFrameMetadata() const {
CompositorFrameMetadata metadata;
metadata.device_scale_factor = active_tree_->painted_device_scale_factor() *
active_tree_->device_scale_factor();
metadata.page_scale_factor = active_tree_->current_page_scale_factor();
metadata.scrollable_viewport_size = active_tree_->ScrollableViewportSize();
metadata.root_layer_size = active_tree_->ScrollableSize();
metadata.min_page_scale_factor = active_tree_->min_page_scale_factor();
metadata.max_page_scale_factor = active_tree_->max_page_scale_factor();
metadata.top_controls_height =
browser_controls_offset_manager_->TopControlsHeight();
metadata.top_controls_shown_ratio =
browser_controls_offset_manager_->TopControlsShownRatio();
metadata.bottom_controls_height =
browser_controls_offset_manager_->BottomControlsHeight();
metadata.bottom_controls_shown_ratio =
browser_controls_offset_manager_->BottomControlsShownRatio();
metadata.root_background_color = active_tree_->background_color();
active_tree_->GetViewportSelection(&metadata.selection);
if (OuterViewportScrollLayer()) {
metadata.root_overflow_x_hidden =
!OuterViewportScrollLayer()->user_scrollable_horizontal();
metadata.root_overflow_y_hidden =
!OuterViewportScrollLayer()->user_scrollable_vertical();
}
if (GetDrawMode() == DRAW_MODE_RESOURCELESS_SOFTWARE) {
metadata.is_resourceless_software_draw_with_scroll_or_animation =
IsActivelyScrolling() || mutator_host_->NeedsTickAnimations();
}
for (LayerImpl* surface_layer : active_tree_->SurfaceLayers()) {
SurfaceLayerImpl* surface_layer_impl =
static_cast<SurfaceLayerImpl*>(surface_layer);
metadata.referenced_surfaces.push_back(
surface_layer_impl->primary_surface_info().id());
if (surface_layer_impl->fallback_surface_info().is_valid()) {
metadata.referenced_surfaces.push_back(
surface_layer_impl->fallback_surface_info().id());
}
}
if (!InnerViewportScrollLayer())
return metadata;
metadata.root_overflow_x_hidden |=
!InnerViewportScrollLayer()->user_scrollable_horizontal();
metadata.root_overflow_y_hidden |=
!InnerViewportScrollLayer()->user_scrollable_vertical();
metadata.root_scroll_offset =
gfx::ScrollOffsetToVector2dF(active_tree_->TotalScrollOffset());
return metadata;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
CompositorFrameMetadata LayerTreeHostImpl::MakeCompositorFrameMetadata() const {
CompositorFrameMetadata metadata;
metadata.device_scale_factor = active_tree_->painted_device_scale_factor() *
active_tree_->device_scale_factor();
metadata.page_scale_factor = active_tree_->current_page_scale_factor();
metadata.scrollable_viewport_size = active_tree_->ScrollableViewportSize();
metadata.root_layer_size = active_tree_->ScrollableSize();
metadata.min_page_scale_factor = active_tree_->min_page_scale_factor();
metadata.max_page_scale_factor = active_tree_->max_page_scale_factor();
metadata.top_controls_height =
browser_controls_offset_manager_->TopControlsHeight();
metadata.top_controls_shown_ratio =
browser_controls_offset_manager_->TopControlsShownRatio();
metadata.bottom_controls_height =
browser_controls_offset_manager_->BottomControlsHeight();
metadata.bottom_controls_shown_ratio =
browser_controls_offset_manager_->BottomControlsShownRatio();
metadata.root_background_color = active_tree_->background_color();
metadata.content_source_id = active_tree_->content_source_id();
active_tree_->GetViewportSelection(&metadata.selection);
if (OuterViewportScrollLayer()) {
metadata.root_overflow_x_hidden =
!OuterViewportScrollLayer()->user_scrollable_horizontal();
metadata.root_overflow_y_hidden =
!OuterViewportScrollLayer()->user_scrollable_vertical();
}
if (GetDrawMode() == DRAW_MODE_RESOURCELESS_SOFTWARE) {
metadata.is_resourceless_software_draw_with_scroll_or_animation =
IsActivelyScrolling() || mutator_host_->NeedsTickAnimations();
}
for (LayerImpl* surface_layer : active_tree_->SurfaceLayers()) {
SurfaceLayerImpl* surface_layer_impl =
static_cast<SurfaceLayerImpl*>(surface_layer);
metadata.referenced_surfaces.push_back(
surface_layer_impl->primary_surface_info().id());
if (surface_layer_impl->fallback_surface_info().is_valid()) {
metadata.referenced_surfaces.push_back(
surface_layer_impl->fallback_surface_info().id());
}
}
if (!InnerViewportScrollLayer())
return metadata;
metadata.root_overflow_x_hidden |=
!InnerViewportScrollLayer()->user_scrollable_horizontal();
metadata.root_overflow_y_hidden |=
!InnerViewportScrollLayer()->user_scrollable_vertical();
metadata.root_scroll_offset =
gfx::ScrollOffsetToVector2dF(active_tree_->TotalScrollOffset());
return metadata;
}
| 172,396
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void igmp_heard_query(struct in_device *in_dev, struct sk_buff *skb,
int len)
{
struct igmphdr *ih = igmp_hdr(skb);
struct igmpv3_query *ih3 = igmpv3_query_hdr(skb);
struct ip_mc_list *im;
__be32 group = ih->group;
int max_delay;
int mark = 0;
if (len == 8) {
if (ih->code == 0) {
/* Alas, old v1 router presents here. */
max_delay = IGMP_Query_Response_Interval;
in_dev->mr_v1_seen = jiffies +
IGMP_V1_Router_Present_Timeout;
group = 0;
} else {
/* v2 router present */
max_delay = ih->code*(HZ/IGMP_TIMER_SCALE);
in_dev->mr_v2_seen = jiffies +
IGMP_V2_Router_Present_Timeout;
}
/* cancel the interface change timer */
in_dev->mr_ifc_count = 0;
if (del_timer(&in_dev->mr_ifc_timer))
__in_dev_put(in_dev);
/* clear deleted report items */
igmpv3_clear_delrec(in_dev);
} else if (len < 12) {
return; /* ignore bogus packet; freed by caller */
} else if (IGMP_V1_SEEN(in_dev)) {
/* This is a v3 query with v1 queriers present */
max_delay = IGMP_Query_Response_Interval;
group = 0;
} else if (IGMP_V2_SEEN(in_dev)) {
/* this is a v3 query with v2 queriers present;
* Interpretation of the max_delay code is problematic here.
* A real v2 host would use ih_code directly, while v3 has a
* different encoding. We use the v3 encoding as more likely
* to be intended in a v3 query.
*/
max_delay = IGMPV3_MRC(ih3->code)*(HZ/IGMP_TIMER_SCALE);
} else { /* v3 */
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct igmpv3_query)))
return;
ih3 = igmpv3_query_hdr(skb);
if (ih3->nsrcs) {
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct igmpv3_query)
+ ntohs(ih3->nsrcs)*sizeof(__be32)))
return;
ih3 = igmpv3_query_hdr(skb);
}
max_delay = IGMPV3_MRC(ih3->code)*(HZ/IGMP_TIMER_SCALE);
if (!max_delay)
max_delay = 1; /* can't mod w/ 0 */
in_dev->mr_maxdelay = max_delay;
if (ih3->qrv)
in_dev->mr_qrv = ih3->qrv;
if (!group) { /* general query */
if (ih3->nsrcs)
return; /* no sources allowed */
igmp_gq_start_timer(in_dev);
return;
}
/* mark sources to include, if group & source-specific */
mark = ih3->nsrcs != 0;
}
/*
* - Start the timers in all of our membership records
* that the query applies to for the interface on
* which the query arrived excl. those that belong
* to a "local" group (224.0.0.X)
* - For timers already running check if they need to
* be reset.
* - Use the igmp->igmp_code field as the maximum
* delay possible
*/
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_pmc_rcu(in_dev, im) {
int changed;
if (group && group != im->multiaddr)
continue;
if (im->multiaddr == IGMP_ALL_HOSTS)
continue;
spin_lock_bh(&im->lock);
if (im->tm_running)
im->gsquery = im->gsquery && mark;
else
im->gsquery = mark;
changed = !im->gsquery ||
igmp_marksources(im, ntohs(ih3->nsrcs), ih3->srcs);
spin_unlock_bh(&im->lock);
if (changed)
igmp_mod_timer(im, max_delay);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void igmp_heard_query(struct in_device *in_dev, struct sk_buff *skb,
int len)
{
struct igmphdr *ih = igmp_hdr(skb);
struct igmpv3_query *ih3 = igmpv3_query_hdr(skb);
struct ip_mc_list *im;
__be32 group = ih->group;
int max_delay;
int mark = 0;
if (len == 8) {
if (ih->code == 0) {
/* Alas, old v1 router presents here. */
max_delay = IGMP_Query_Response_Interval;
in_dev->mr_v1_seen = jiffies +
IGMP_V1_Router_Present_Timeout;
group = 0;
} else {
/* v2 router present */
max_delay = ih->code*(HZ/IGMP_TIMER_SCALE);
in_dev->mr_v2_seen = jiffies +
IGMP_V2_Router_Present_Timeout;
}
/* cancel the interface change timer */
in_dev->mr_ifc_count = 0;
if (del_timer(&in_dev->mr_ifc_timer))
__in_dev_put(in_dev);
/* clear deleted report items */
igmpv3_clear_delrec(in_dev);
} else if (len < 12) {
return; /* ignore bogus packet; freed by caller */
} else if (IGMP_V1_SEEN(in_dev)) {
/* This is a v3 query with v1 queriers present */
max_delay = IGMP_Query_Response_Interval;
group = 0;
} else if (IGMP_V2_SEEN(in_dev)) {
/* this is a v3 query with v2 queriers present;
* Interpretation of the max_delay code is problematic here.
* A real v2 host would use ih_code directly, while v3 has a
* different encoding. We use the v3 encoding as more likely
* to be intended in a v3 query.
*/
max_delay = IGMPV3_MRC(ih3->code)*(HZ/IGMP_TIMER_SCALE);
if (!max_delay)
max_delay = 1; /* can't mod w/ 0 */
} else { /* v3 */
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct igmpv3_query)))
return;
ih3 = igmpv3_query_hdr(skb);
if (ih3->nsrcs) {
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct igmpv3_query)
+ ntohs(ih3->nsrcs)*sizeof(__be32)))
return;
ih3 = igmpv3_query_hdr(skb);
}
max_delay = IGMPV3_MRC(ih3->code)*(HZ/IGMP_TIMER_SCALE);
if (!max_delay)
max_delay = 1; /* can't mod w/ 0 */
in_dev->mr_maxdelay = max_delay;
if (ih3->qrv)
in_dev->mr_qrv = ih3->qrv;
if (!group) { /* general query */
if (ih3->nsrcs)
return; /* no sources allowed */
igmp_gq_start_timer(in_dev);
return;
}
/* mark sources to include, if group & source-specific */
mark = ih3->nsrcs != 0;
}
/*
* - Start the timers in all of our membership records
* that the query applies to for the interface on
* which the query arrived excl. those that belong
* to a "local" group (224.0.0.X)
* - For timers already running check if they need to
* be reset.
* - Use the igmp->igmp_code field as the maximum
* delay possible
*/
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_pmc_rcu(in_dev, im) {
int changed;
if (group && group != im->multiaddr)
continue;
if (im->multiaddr == IGMP_ALL_HOSTS)
continue;
spin_lock_bh(&im->lock);
if (im->tm_running)
im->gsquery = im->gsquery && mark;
else
im->gsquery = mark;
changed = !im->gsquery ||
igmp_marksources(im, ntohs(ih3->nsrcs), ih3->srcs);
spin_unlock_bh(&im->lock);
if (changed)
igmp_mod_timer(im, max_delay);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
| 165,651
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int kvm_iommu_unmap_memslots(struct kvm *kvm)
{
int idx;
struct kvm_memslots *slots;
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
slots = kvm_memslots(kvm);
kvm_for_each_memslot(memslot, slots)
kvm_iommu_put_pages(kvm, memslot->base_gfn, memslot->npages);
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
static int kvm_iommu_unmap_memslots(struct kvm *kvm)
{
int idx;
struct kvm_memslots *slots;
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
slots = kvm_memslots(kvm);
kvm_for_each_memslot(memslot, slots)
kvm_iommu_unmap_pages(kvm, memslot);
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
return 0;
}
| 165,617
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void spl_filesystem_tree_it_rewind(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator = (spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter;
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object(iterator);
object->u.dir.index = 0;
if (object->u.dir.dirp) {
php_stream_rewinddir(object->u.dir.dirp);
}
do {
spl_filesystem_dir_read(object TSRMLS_CC);
} while (spl_filesystem_is_dot(object->u.dir.entry.d_name));
if (iterator->current) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iterator->current);
iterator->current = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static void spl_filesystem_tree_it_rewind(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator = (spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter;
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object(iterator);
object->u.dir.index = 0;
if (object->u.dir.dirp) {
php_stream_rewinddir(object->u.dir.dirp);
}
do {
spl_filesystem_dir_read(object TSRMLS_CC);
} while (spl_filesystem_is_dot(object->u.dir.entry.d_name));
if (iterator->current) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&iterator->current);
iterator->current = NULL;
}
}
| 167,088
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int store_asoundrc(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_ASOUNDRC_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0644);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.asoundrc", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid .asoundrc file\n");
exit(1);
}
pid_t child = fork();
if (child < 0)
errExit("fork");
if (child == 0) {
drop_privs(0);
int rv = copy_file(src, dest);
if (rv)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot transfer .asoundrc in private home directory\n");
else {
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
}
_exit(0);
}
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
if (chown(dest, getuid(), getgid()) == -1)
errExit("fchown");
if (chmod(dest, 0644) == -1)
errExit("fchmod");
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269
|
static int store_asoundrc(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_ASOUNDRC_FILE;
// create an empty file as root, and change ownership to user
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0644);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.asoundrc", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
// make sure the real path of the file is inside the home directory
/* coverity[toctou] */
char* rp = realpath(src, NULL);
if (!rp) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: Cannot access %s\n", src);
exit(1);
}
if (strncmp(rp, cfg.homedir, strlen(cfg.homedir)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: .asoundrc is a symbolic link pointing to a file outside home directory\n");
exit(1);
}
free(rp);
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0644); // regular user
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
| 170,099
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long Cluster::CreateBlock(
long long id,
long long pos, //absolute pos of payload
long long size,
long long discard_padding)
{
assert((id == 0x20) || (id == 0x23)); //BlockGroup or SimpleBlock
if (m_entries_count < 0) //haven't parsed anything yet
{
assert(m_entries == NULL);
assert(m_entries_size == 0);
m_entries_size = 1024;
m_entries = new BlockEntry*[m_entries_size];
m_entries_count = 0;
}
else
{
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count <= m_entries_size);
if (m_entries_count >= m_entries_size)
{
const long entries_size = 2 * m_entries_size;
BlockEntry** const entries = new BlockEntry*[entries_size];
assert(entries);
BlockEntry** src = m_entries;
BlockEntry** const src_end = src + m_entries_count;
BlockEntry** dst = entries;
while (src != src_end)
*dst++ = *src++;
delete[] m_entries;
m_entries = entries;
m_entries_size = entries_size;
}
}
if (id == 0x20) //BlockGroup ID
return CreateBlockGroup(pos, size, discard_padding);
else //SimpleBlock ID
return CreateSimpleBlock(pos, size);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
long Cluster::CreateBlock(
if (status < 0) { // error
pFirst = NULL;
return status;
}
if (m_entries_count <= 0) { // empty cluster
pFirst = NULL;
return 0;
}
}
assert(m_entries);
pFirst = m_entries[0];
assert(pFirst);
return 0; // success
}
| 174,257
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: GF_Err gf_isom_oinf_read_entry(void *entry, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_OperatingPointsInformation* ptr = (GF_OperatingPointsInformation *)entry;
u32 i, j, count;
if (!ptr) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
ptr->scalability_mask = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);//reserved
count = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 6);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
LHEVC_ProfileTierLevel *ptl;
GF_SAFEALLOC(ptl, LHEVC_ProfileTierLevel);
if (!ptl) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
ptl->general_profile_space = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
ptl->general_tier_flag= gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
ptl->general_profile_idc = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 5);
ptl->general_profile_compatibility_flags = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptl->general_constraint_indicator_flags = gf_bs_read_long_int(bs, 48);
ptl->general_level_idc = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
gf_list_add(ptr->profile_tier_levels, ptl);
}
count = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
LHEVC_OperatingPoint *op;
GF_SAFEALLOC(op, LHEVC_OperatingPoint);
if (!op) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
op->output_layer_set_idx = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->max_temporal_id = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
op->layer_count = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
for (j = 0; j < op->layer_count; j++) {
op->layers_info[j].ptl_idx = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
op->layers_info[j].layer_id = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 6);
op->layers_info[j].is_outputlayer = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
op->layers_info[j].is_alternate_outputlayer = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
}
op->minPicWidth = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->minPicHeight = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->maxPicWidth = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->maxPicHeight = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->maxChromaFormat = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
op->maxBitDepth = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 3) + 8;
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);//reserved
op->frame_rate_info_flag = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
op->bit_rate_info_flag = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
if (op->frame_rate_info_flag) {
op->avgFrameRate = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 6); //reserved
op->constantFrameRate = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
}
if (op->bit_rate_info_flag) {
op->maxBitRate = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
op->avgBitRate = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
}
gf_list_add(ptr->operating_points, op);
}
count = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
LHEVC_DependentLayer *dep;
GF_SAFEALLOC(dep, LHEVC_DependentLayer);
if (!dep) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
dep->dependent_layerID = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
dep->num_layers_dependent_on = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
for (j = 0; j < dep->num_layers_dependent_on; j++)
dep->dependent_on_layerID[j] = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
if (ptr->scalability_mask & (1 << j))
dep->dimension_identifier[j] = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
}
gf_list_add(ptr->dependency_layers, dep);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
GF_Err gf_isom_oinf_read_entry(void *entry, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_OperatingPointsInformation* ptr = (GF_OperatingPointsInformation *)entry;
u32 i, j, count;
if (!ptr) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
ptr->scalability_mask = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);//reserved
count = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 6);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
LHEVC_ProfileTierLevel *ptl;
GF_SAFEALLOC(ptl, LHEVC_ProfileTierLevel);
if (!ptl) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
ptl->general_profile_space = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
ptl->general_tier_flag= gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
ptl->general_profile_idc = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 5);
ptl->general_profile_compatibility_flags = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptl->general_constraint_indicator_flags = gf_bs_read_long_int(bs, 48);
ptl->general_level_idc = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
gf_list_add(ptr->profile_tier_levels, ptl);
}
count = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
LHEVC_OperatingPoint *op;
GF_SAFEALLOC(op, LHEVC_OperatingPoint);
if (!op) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
op->output_layer_set_idx = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->max_temporal_id = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
op->layer_count = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
if (op->layer_count > ARRAY_LENGTH(op->layers_info))
return GF_NON_COMPLIANT_BITSTREAM;
for (j = 0; j < op->layer_count; j++) {
op->layers_info[j].ptl_idx = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
op->layers_info[j].layer_id = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 6);
op->layers_info[j].is_outputlayer = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
op->layers_info[j].is_alternate_outputlayer = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
}
op->minPicWidth = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->minPicHeight = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->maxPicWidth = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->maxPicHeight = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
op->maxChromaFormat = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
op->maxBitDepth = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 3) + 8;
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);//reserved
op->frame_rate_info_flag = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
op->bit_rate_info_flag = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
if (op->frame_rate_info_flag) {
op->avgFrameRate = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 6); //reserved
op->constantFrameRate = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
}
if (op->bit_rate_info_flag) {
op->maxBitRate = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
op->avgBitRate = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
}
gf_list_add(ptr->operating_points, op);
}
count = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
LHEVC_DependentLayer *dep;
GF_SAFEALLOC(dep, LHEVC_DependentLayer);
if (!dep) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
dep->dependent_layerID = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
dep->num_layers_dependent_on = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
for (j = 0; j < dep->num_layers_dependent_on; j++)
dep->dependent_on_layerID[j] = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
if (ptr->scalability_mask & (1 << j))
dep->dimension_identifier[j] = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
}
gf_list_add(ptr->dependency_layers, dep);
}
return GF_OK;
}
| 169,306
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void Sp_search(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *text;
Resub m;
text = checkstring(J, 0);
if (js_isregexp(J, 1))
js_copy(J, 1);
else if (js_isundefined(J, 1))
js_newregexp(J, "", 0);
else
js_newregexp(J, js_tostring(J, 1), 0);
re = js_toregexp(J, -1);
if (!js_regexec(re->prog, text, &m, 0))
js_pushnumber(J, js_utfptrtoidx(text, m.sub[0].sp));
else
js_pushnumber(J, -1);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400
|
static void Sp_search(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *text;
Resub m;
text = checkstring(J, 0);
if (js_isregexp(J, 1))
js_copy(J, 1);
else if (js_isundefined(J, 1))
js_newregexp(J, "", 0);
else
js_newregexp(J, js_tostring(J, 1), 0);
re = js_toregexp(J, -1);
if (!js_doregexec(J, re->prog, text, &m, 0))
js_pushnumber(J, js_utfptrtoidx(text, m.sub[0].sp));
else
js_pushnumber(J, -1);
}
| 169,700
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int jas_matrix_resize(jas_matrix_t *matrix, int numrows, int numcols)
{
int size;
int i;
size = numrows * numcols;
if (size > matrix->datasize_ || numrows > matrix->maxrows_) {
return -1;
}
matrix->numrows_ = numrows;
matrix->numcols_ = numcols;
for (i = 0; i < numrows; ++i) {
matrix->rows_[i] = &matrix->data_[numcols * i];
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
int jas_matrix_resize(jas_matrix_t *matrix, int numrows, int numcols)
int jas_matrix_resize(jas_matrix_t *matrix, jas_matind_t numrows,
jas_matind_t numcols)
{
jas_matind_t size;
jas_matind_t i;
size = numrows * numcols;
if (size > matrix->datasize_ || numrows > matrix->maxrows_) {
return -1;
}
matrix->numrows_ = numrows;
matrix->numcols_ = numcols;
for (i = 0; i < numrows; ++i) {
matrix->rows_[i] = &matrix->data_[numcols * i];
}
return 0;
}
| 168,705
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static ssize_t ib_ucm_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct ib_ucm_file *file = filp->private_data;
struct ib_ucm_cmd_hdr hdr;
ssize_t result;
if (len < sizeof(hdr))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&hdr, buf, sizeof(hdr)))
return -EFAULT;
if (hdr.cmd >= ARRAY_SIZE(ucm_cmd_table))
return -EINVAL;
if (hdr.in + sizeof(hdr) > len)
return -EINVAL;
result = ucm_cmd_table[hdr.cmd](file, buf + sizeof(hdr),
hdr.in, hdr.out);
if (!result)
result = len;
return result;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
static ssize_t ib_ucm_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct ib_ucm_file *file = filp->private_data;
struct ib_ucm_cmd_hdr hdr;
ssize_t result;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ib_safe_file_access(filp)))
return -EACCES;
if (len < sizeof(hdr))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&hdr, buf, sizeof(hdr)))
return -EFAULT;
if (hdr.cmd >= ARRAY_SIZE(ucm_cmd_table))
return -EINVAL;
if (hdr.in + sizeof(hdr) > len)
return -EINVAL;
result = ucm_cmd_table[hdr.cmd](file, buf + sizeof(hdr),
hdr.in, hdr.out);
if (!result)
result = len;
return result;
}
| 167,238
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void copyMono16(
short *dst,
const int *const *src,
unsigned nSamples,
unsigned /* nChannels */) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
*dst++ = src[0][i];
}
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void copyMono16(
short *dst,
const int * src[FLACParser::kMaxChannels],
unsigned nSamples,
unsigned /* nChannels */) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
*dst++ = src[0][i];
}
}
| 174,015
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(xml_parse_into_struct)
{
xml_parser *parser;
zval *pind, **xdata, **info = NULL;
char *data;
int data_len, ret;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rsZ|Z", &pind, &data, &data_len, &xdata, &info) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (info) {
zval_dtor(*info);
array_init(*info);
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(parser,xml_parser *, &pind, -1, "XML Parser", le_xml_parser);
zval_dtor(*xdata);
array_init(*xdata);
parser->data = *xdata;
if (info) {
parser->info = *info;
}
parser->level = 0;
parser->ltags = safe_emalloc(XML_MAXLEVEL, sizeof(char *), 0);
XML_SetDefaultHandler(parser->parser, _xml_defaultHandler);
XML_SetElementHandler(parser->parser, _xml_startElementHandler, _xml_endElementHandler);
XML_SetCharacterDataHandler(parser->parser, _xml_characterDataHandler);
parser->isparsing = 1;
ret = XML_Parse(parser->parser, data, data_len, 1);
parser->isparsing = 0;
RETVAL_LONG(ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
PHP_FUNCTION(xml_parse_into_struct)
{
xml_parser *parser;
zval *pind, **xdata, **info = NULL;
char *data;
int data_len, ret;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rsZ|Z", &pind, &data, &data_len, &xdata, &info) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (info) {
zval_dtor(*info);
array_init(*info);
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(parser,xml_parser *, &pind, -1, "XML Parser", le_xml_parser);
zval_dtor(*xdata);
array_init(*xdata);
parser->data = *xdata;
if (info) {
parser->info = *info;
}
parser->level = 0;
parser->ltags = safe_emalloc(XML_MAXLEVEL, sizeof(char *), 0);
XML_SetDefaultHandler(parser->parser, _xml_defaultHandler);
XML_SetElementHandler(parser->parser, _xml_startElementHandler, _xml_endElementHandler);
XML_SetCharacterDataHandler(parser->parser, _xml_characterDataHandler);
parser->isparsing = 1;
ret = XML_Parse(parser->parser, data, data_len, 1);
parser->isparsing = 0;
RETVAL_LONG(ret);
}
| 165,037
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int sco_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sco_pinfo *pi = sco_pi(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECT2 &&
test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags)) {
hci_conn_accept(pi->conn->hcon, 0);
sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
release_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
release_sock(sk);
return bt_sock_recvmsg(iocb, sock, msg, len, flags);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: SCO - Fix missing msg_namelen update in sco_sock_recvmsg()
If the socket is in state BT_CONNECT2 and BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP is set in
the flags, sco_sock_recvmsg() returns early with 0 without updating the
possibly set msg_namelen member. This, in turn, leads to a 128 byte
kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix this by updating msg_namelen in this case. For all other cases it
will be handled in bt_sock_recvmsg().
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
static int sco_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sco_pinfo *pi = sco_pi(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECT2 &&
test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags)) {
hci_conn_accept(pi->conn->hcon, 0);
sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
release_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
release_sock(sk);
return bt_sock_recvmsg(iocb, sock, msg, len, flags);
}
| 166,041
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void recalculate_apic_map(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_apic_map *new, *old = NULL;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
int i;
new = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_apic_map), GFP_KERNEL);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
if (!new)
goto out;
new->ldr_bits = 8;
/* flat mode is default */
new->cid_shift = 8;
new->cid_mask = 0;
new->lid_mask = 0xff;
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
u16 cid, lid;
u32 ldr;
if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
continue;
/*
* All APICs have to be configured in the same mode by an OS.
* We take advatage of this while building logical id loockup
* table. After reset APICs are in xapic/flat mode, so if we
* find apic with different setting we assume this is the mode
* OS wants all apics to be in; build lookup table accordingly.
*/
if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic)) {
new->ldr_bits = 32;
new->cid_shift = 16;
new->cid_mask = new->lid_mask = 0xffff;
} else if (kvm_apic_sw_enabled(apic) &&
!new->cid_mask /* flat mode */ &&
kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_DFR) == APIC_DFR_CLUSTER) {
new->cid_shift = 4;
new->cid_mask = 0xf;
new->lid_mask = 0xf;
}
new->phys_map[kvm_apic_id(apic)] = apic;
ldr = kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LDR);
cid = apic_cluster_id(new, ldr);
lid = apic_logical_id(new, ldr);
if (lid)
new->logical_map[cid][ffs(lid) - 1] = apic;
}
out:
old = rcu_dereference_protected(kvm->arch.apic_map,
lockdep_is_held(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock));
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->arch.apic_map, new);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
if (old)
kfree_rcu(old, rcu);
kvm_vcpu_request_scan_ioapic(kvm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
static void recalculate_apic_map(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_apic_map *new, *old = NULL;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
int i;
new = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_apic_map), GFP_KERNEL);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
if (!new)
goto out;
new->ldr_bits = 8;
/* flat mode is default */
new->cid_shift = 8;
new->cid_mask = 0;
new->lid_mask = 0xff;
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
u16 cid, lid;
u32 ldr;
if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
continue;
/*
* All APICs have to be configured in the same mode by an OS.
* We take advatage of this while building logical id loockup
* table. After reset APICs are in xapic/flat mode, so if we
* find apic with different setting we assume this is the mode
* OS wants all apics to be in; build lookup table accordingly.
*/
if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic)) {
new->ldr_bits = 32;
new->cid_shift = 16;
new->cid_mask = (1 << KVM_X2APIC_CID_BITS) - 1;
new->lid_mask = 0xffff;
} else if (kvm_apic_sw_enabled(apic) &&
!new->cid_mask /* flat mode */ &&
kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_DFR) == APIC_DFR_CLUSTER) {
new->cid_shift = 4;
new->cid_mask = 0xf;
new->lid_mask = 0xf;
}
new->phys_map[kvm_apic_id(apic)] = apic;
ldr = kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LDR);
cid = apic_cluster_id(new, ldr);
lid = apic_logical_id(new, ldr);
if (lid)
new->logical_map[cid][ffs(lid) - 1] = apic;
}
out:
old = rcu_dereference_protected(kvm->arch.apic_map,
lockdep_is_held(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock));
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->arch.apic_map, new);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
if (old)
kfree_rcu(old, rcu);
kvm_vcpu_request_scan_ioapic(kvm);
}
| 165,943
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: gamma_image_validate(gamma_display *dp, png_const_structp pp,
png_infop pi)
{
/* Get some constants derived from the input and output file formats: */
PNG_CONST png_store* PNG_CONST ps = dp->this.ps;
PNG_CONST png_byte in_ct = dp->this.colour_type;
PNG_CONST png_byte in_bd = dp->this.bit_depth;
PNG_CONST png_uint_32 w = dp->this.w;
PNG_CONST png_uint_32 h = dp->this.h;
PNG_CONST size_t cbRow = dp->this.cbRow;
PNG_CONST png_byte out_ct = png_get_color_type(pp, pi);
PNG_CONST png_byte out_bd = png_get_bit_depth(pp, pi);
/* There are three sources of error, firstly the quantization in the
* file encoding, determined by sbit and/or the file depth, secondly
* the output (screen) gamma and thirdly the output file encoding.
*
* Since this API receives the screen and file gamma in double
* precision it is possible to calculate an exact answer given an input
* pixel value. Therefore we assume that the *input* value is exact -
* sample/maxsample - calculate the corresponding gamma corrected
* output to the limits of double precision arithmetic and compare with
* what libpng returns.
*
* Since the library must quantize the output to 8 or 16 bits there is
* a fundamental limit on the accuracy of the output of +/-.5 - this
* quantization limit is included in addition to the other limits
* specified by the paramaters to the API. (Effectively, add .5
* everywhere.)
*
* The behavior of the 'sbit' paramter is defined by section 12.5
* (sample depth scaling) of the PNG spec. That section forces the
* decoder to assume that the PNG values have been scaled if sBIT is
* present:
*
* png-sample = floor( input-sample * (max-out/max-in) + .5);
*
* This means that only a subset of the possible PNG values should
* appear in the input. However, the spec allows the encoder to use a
* variety of approximations to the above and doesn't require any
* restriction of the values produced.
*
* Nevertheless the spec requires that the upper 'sBIT' bits of the
* value stored in a PNG file be the original sample bits.
* Consequently the code below simply scales the top sbit bits by
* (1<<sbit)-1 to obtain an original sample value.
*
* Because there is limited precision in the input it is arguable that
* an acceptable result is any valid result from input-.5 to input+.5.
* The basic tests below do not do this, however if 'use_input_precision'
* is set a subsequent test is performed above.
*/
PNG_CONST unsigned int samples_per_pixel = (out_ct & 2U) ? 3U : 1U;
int processing;
png_uint_32 y;
PNG_CONST store_palette_entry *in_palette = dp->this.palette;
PNG_CONST int in_is_transparent = dp->this.is_transparent;
int out_npalette = -1;
int out_is_transparent = 0; /* Just refers to the palette case */
store_palette out_palette;
validate_info vi;
/* Check for row overwrite errors */
store_image_check(dp->this.ps, pp, 0);
/* Supply the input and output sample depths here - 8 for an indexed image,
* otherwise the bit depth.
*/
init_validate_info(&vi, dp, pp, in_ct==3?8:in_bd, out_ct==3?8:out_bd);
processing = (vi.gamma_correction > 0 && !dp->threshold_test)
|| in_bd != out_bd || in_ct != out_ct || vi.do_background;
/* TODO: FIX THIS: MAJOR BUG! If the transformations all happen inside
* the palette there is no way of finding out, because libpng fails to
* update the palette on png_read_update_info. Indeed, libpng doesn't
* even do the required work until much later, when it doesn't have any
* info pointer. Oops. For the moment 'processing' is turned off if
* out_ct is palette.
*/
if (in_ct == 3 && out_ct == 3)
processing = 0;
if (processing && out_ct == 3)
out_is_transparent = read_palette(out_palette, &out_npalette, pp, pi);
for (y=0; y<h; ++y)
{
png_const_bytep pRow = store_image_row(ps, pp, 0, y);
png_byte std[STANDARD_ROWMAX];
transform_row(pp, std, in_ct, in_bd, y);
if (processing)
{
unsigned int x;
for (x=0; x<w; ++x)
{
double alpha = 1; /* serves as a flag value */
/* Record the palette index for index images. */
PNG_CONST unsigned int in_index =
in_ct == 3 ? sample(std, 3, in_bd, x, 0) : 256;
PNG_CONST unsigned int out_index =
out_ct == 3 ? sample(std, 3, out_bd, x, 0) : 256;
/* Handle input alpha - png_set_background will cause the output
* alpha to disappear so there is nothing to check.
*/
if ((in_ct & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) != 0 || (in_ct == 3 &&
in_is_transparent))
{
PNG_CONST unsigned int input_alpha = in_ct == 3 ?
dp->this.palette[in_index].alpha :
sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, samples_per_pixel);
unsigned int output_alpha = 65536 /* as a flag value */;
if (out_ct == 3)
{
if (out_is_transparent)
output_alpha = out_palette[out_index].alpha;
}
else if ((out_ct & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) != 0)
output_alpha = sample(pRow, out_ct, out_bd, x,
samples_per_pixel);
if (output_alpha != 65536)
alpha = gamma_component_validate("alpha", &vi, input_alpha,
output_alpha, -1/*alpha*/, 0/*background*/);
else /* no alpha in output */
{
/* This is a copy of the calculation of 'i' above in order to
* have the alpha value to use in the background calculation.
*/
alpha = input_alpha >> vi.isbit_shift;
alpha /= vi.sbit_max;
}
}
/* Handle grayscale or RGB components. */
if ((in_ct & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) == 0) /* grayscale */
(void)gamma_component_validate("gray", &vi,
sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, 0),
sample(pRow, out_ct, out_bd, x, 0), alpha/*component*/,
vi.background_red);
else /* RGB or palette */
{
(void)gamma_component_validate("red", &vi,
in_ct == 3 ? in_palette[in_index].red :
sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, 0),
out_ct == 3 ? out_palette[out_index].red :
sample(pRow, out_ct, out_bd, x, 0),
alpha/*component*/, vi.background_red);
(void)gamma_component_validate("green", &vi,
in_ct == 3 ? in_palette[in_index].green :
sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, 1),
out_ct == 3 ? out_palette[out_index].green :
sample(pRow, out_ct, out_bd, x, 1),
alpha/*component*/, vi.background_green);
(void)gamma_component_validate("blue", &vi,
in_ct == 3 ? in_palette[in_index].blue :
sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, 2),
out_ct == 3 ? out_palette[out_index].blue :
sample(pRow, out_ct, out_bd, x, 2),
alpha/*component*/, vi.background_blue);
}
}
}
else if (memcmp(std, pRow, cbRow) != 0)
{
char msg[64];
/* No transform is expected on the threshold tests. */
sprintf(msg, "gamma: below threshold row %lu changed",
(unsigned long)y);
png_error(pp, msg);
}
} /* row (y) loop */
dp->this.ps->validated = 1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
gamma_image_validate(gamma_display *dp, png_const_structp pp,
png_infop pi)
{
/* Get some constants derived from the input and output file formats: */
const png_store* const ps = dp->this.ps;
const png_byte in_ct = dp->this.colour_type;
const png_byte in_bd = dp->this.bit_depth;
const png_uint_32 w = dp->this.w;
const png_uint_32 h = dp->this.h;
const size_t cbRow = dp->this.cbRow;
const png_byte out_ct = png_get_color_type(pp, pi);
const png_byte out_bd = png_get_bit_depth(pp, pi);
/* There are three sources of error, firstly the quantization in the
* file encoding, determined by sbit and/or the file depth, secondly
* the output (screen) gamma and thirdly the output file encoding.
*
* Since this API receives the screen and file gamma in double
* precision it is possible to calculate an exact answer given an input
* pixel value. Therefore we assume that the *input* value is exact -
* sample/maxsample - calculate the corresponding gamma corrected
* output to the limits of double precision arithmetic and compare with
* what libpng returns.
*
* Since the library must quantize the output to 8 or 16 bits there is
* a fundamental limit on the accuracy of the output of +/-.5 - this
* quantization limit is included in addition to the other limits
* specified by the paramaters to the API. (Effectively, add .5
* everywhere.)
*
* The behavior of the 'sbit' paramter is defined by section 12.5
* (sample depth scaling) of the PNG spec. That section forces the
* decoder to assume that the PNG values have been scaled if sBIT is
* present:
*
* png-sample = floor( input-sample * (max-out/max-in) + .5);
*
* This means that only a subset of the possible PNG values should
* appear in the input. However, the spec allows the encoder to use a
* variety of approximations to the above and doesn't require any
* restriction of the values produced.
*
* Nevertheless the spec requires that the upper 'sBIT' bits of the
* value stored in a PNG file be the original sample bits.
* Consequently the code below simply scales the top sbit bits by
* (1<<sbit)-1 to obtain an original sample value.
*
* Because there is limited precision in the input it is arguable that
* an acceptable result is any valid result from input-.5 to input+.5.
* The basic tests below do not do this, however if 'use_input_precision'
* is set a subsequent test is performed above.
*/
const unsigned int samples_per_pixel = (out_ct & 2U) ? 3U : 1U;
int processing;
png_uint_32 y;
const store_palette_entry *in_palette = dp->this.palette;
const int in_is_transparent = dp->this.is_transparent;
int process_tRNS;
int out_npalette = -1;
int out_is_transparent = 0; /* Just refers to the palette case */
store_palette out_palette;
validate_info vi;
/* Check for row overwrite errors */
store_image_check(dp->this.ps, pp, 0);
/* Supply the input and output sample depths here - 8 for an indexed image,
* otherwise the bit depth.
*/
init_validate_info(&vi, dp, pp, in_ct==3?8:in_bd, out_ct==3?8:out_bd);
processing = (vi.gamma_correction > 0 && !dp->threshold_test)
|| in_bd != out_bd || in_ct != out_ct || vi.do_background;
process_tRNS = dp->this.has_tRNS && vi.do_background;
/* TODO: FIX THIS: MAJOR BUG! If the transformations all happen inside
* the palette there is no way of finding out, because libpng fails to
* update the palette on png_read_update_info. Indeed, libpng doesn't
* even do the required work until much later, when it doesn't have any
* info pointer. Oops. For the moment 'processing' is turned off if
* out_ct is palette.
*/
if (in_ct == 3 && out_ct == 3)
processing = 0;
if (processing && out_ct == 3)
out_is_transparent = read_palette(out_palette, &out_npalette, pp, pi);
for (y=0; y<h; ++y)
{
png_const_bytep pRow = store_image_row(ps, pp, 0, y);
png_byte std[STANDARD_ROWMAX];
transform_row(pp, std, in_ct, in_bd, y);
if (processing)
{
unsigned int x;
for (x=0; x<w; ++x)
{
double alpha = 1; /* serves as a flag value */
/* Record the palette index for index images. */
const unsigned int in_index =
in_ct == 3 ? sample(std, 3, in_bd, x, 0, 0, 0) : 256;
const unsigned int out_index =
out_ct == 3 ? sample(std, 3, out_bd, x, 0, 0, 0) : 256;
/* Handle input alpha - png_set_background will cause the output
* alpha to disappear so there is nothing to check.
*/
if ((in_ct & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) != 0 ||
(in_ct == 3 && in_is_transparent))
{
const unsigned int input_alpha = in_ct == 3 ?
dp->this.palette[in_index].alpha :
sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, samples_per_pixel, 0, 0);
unsigned int output_alpha = 65536 /* as a flag value */;
if (out_ct == 3)
{
if (out_is_transparent)
output_alpha = out_palette[out_index].alpha;
}
else if ((out_ct & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) != 0)
output_alpha = sample(pRow, out_ct, out_bd, x,
samples_per_pixel, 0, 0);
if (output_alpha != 65536)
alpha = gamma_component_validate("alpha", &vi, input_alpha,
output_alpha, -1/*alpha*/, 0/*background*/);
else /* no alpha in output */
{
/* This is a copy of the calculation of 'i' above in order to
* have the alpha value to use in the background calculation.
*/
alpha = input_alpha >> vi.isbit_shift;
alpha /= vi.sbit_max;
}
}
else if (process_tRNS)
{
/* alpha needs to be set appropriately for this pixel, it is
* currently 1 and needs to be 0 for an input pixel which matches
* the values in tRNS.
*/
switch (in_ct)
{
case 0: /* gray */
if (sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, 0, 0, 0) ==
dp->this.transparent.red)
alpha = 0;
break;
case 2: /* RGB */
if (sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, 0, 0, 0) ==
dp->this.transparent.red &&
sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, 1, 0, 0) ==
dp->this.transparent.green &&
sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, 2, 0, 0) ==
dp->this.transparent.blue)
alpha = 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/* Handle grayscale or RGB components. */
if ((in_ct & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) == 0) /* grayscale */
(void)gamma_component_validate("gray", &vi,
sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, 0, 0, 0),
sample(pRow, out_ct, out_bd, x, 0, 0, 0),
alpha/*component*/, vi.background_red);
else /* RGB or palette */
{
(void)gamma_component_validate("red", &vi,
in_ct == 3 ? in_palette[in_index].red :
sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, 0, 0, 0),
out_ct == 3 ? out_palette[out_index].red :
sample(pRow, out_ct, out_bd, x, 0, 0, 0),
alpha/*component*/, vi.background_red);
(void)gamma_component_validate("green", &vi,
in_ct == 3 ? in_palette[in_index].green :
sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, 1, 0, 0),
out_ct == 3 ? out_palette[out_index].green :
sample(pRow, out_ct, out_bd, x, 1, 0, 0),
alpha/*component*/, vi.background_green);
(void)gamma_component_validate("blue", &vi,
in_ct == 3 ? in_palette[in_index].blue :
sample(std, in_ct, in_bd, x, 2, 0, 0),
out_ct == 3 ? out_palette[out_index].blue :
sample(pRow, out_ct, out_bd, x, 2, 0, 0),
alpha/*component*/, vi.background_blue);
}
}
}
else if (memcmp(std, pRow, cbRow) != 0)
{
char msg[64];
/* No transform is expected on the threshold tests. */
sprintf(msg, "gamma: below threshold row %lu changed",
(unsigned long)y);
png_error(pp, msg);
}
} /* row (y) loop */
dp->this.ps->validated = 1;
}
| 173,612
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int svc_rdma_init(void)
{
dprintk("SVCRDMA Module Init, register RPC RDMA transport\n");
dprintk("\tsvcrdma_ord : %d\n", svcrdma_ord);
dprintk("\tmax_requests : %u\n", svcrdma_max_requests);
dprintk("\tsq_depth : %u\n",
svcrdma_max_requests * RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT);
dprintk("\tmax_bc_requests : %u\n", svcrdma_max_bc_requests);
dprintk("\tmax_inline : %d\n", svcrdma_max_req_size);
svc_rdma_wq = alloc_workqueue("svc_rdma", 0, 0);
if (!svc_rdma_wq)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!svcrdma_table_header)
svcrdma_table_header =
register_sysctl_table(svcrdma_root_table);
/* Register RDMA with the SVC transport switch */
svc_reg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_class);
#if defined(CONFIG_SUNRPC_BACKCHANNEL)
svc_reg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_bc_class);
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
|
int svc_rdma_init(void)
{
dprintk("SVCRDMA Module Init, register RPC RDMA transport\n");
dprintk("\tsvcrdma_ord : %d\n", svcrdma_ord);
dprintk("\tmax_requests : %u\n", svcrdma_max_requests);
dprintk("\tmax_bc_requests : %u\n", svcrdma_max_bc_requests);
dprintk("\tmax_inline : %d\n", svcrdma_max_req_size);
svc_rdma_wq = alloc_workqueue("svc_rdma", 0, 0);
if (!svc_rdma_wq)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!svcrdma_table_header)
svcrdma_table_header =
register_sysctl_table(svcrdma_root_table);
/* Register RDMA with the SVC transport switch */
svc_reg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_class);
#if defined(CONFIG_SUNRPC_BACKCHANNEL)
svc_reg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_bc_class);
#endif
return 0;
}
| 168,156
|
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