instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.34k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ImageTransportClientTexture(
WebKit::WebGraphicsContext3D* host_context,
const gfx::Size& size,
float device_scale_factor,
uint64 surface_id)
: ui::Texture(true, size, device_scale_factor),
host_context_(host_context),
texture_id_(surface_id) {
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
ImageTransportClientTexture(
| 171,362
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static struct svc_serv *nfs_callback_create_svc(int minorversion)
{
struct nfs_callback_data *cb_info = &nfs_callback_info[minorversion];
struct svc_serv *serv;
struct svc_serv_ops *sv_ops;
/*
* Check whether we're already up and running.
*/
if (cb_info->serv) {
/*
* Note: increase service usage, because later in case of error
* svc_destroy() will be called.
*/
svc_get(cb_info->serv);
return cb_info->serv;
}
switch (minorversion) {
case 0:
sv_ops = nfs4_cb_sv_ops[0];
break;
default:
sv_ops = nfs4_cb_sv_ops[1];
}
if (sv_ops == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
/*
* Sanity check: if there's no task,
* we should be the first user ...
*/
if (cb_info->users)
printk(KERN_WARNING "nfs_callback_create_svc: no kthread, %d users??\n",
cb_info->users);
serv = svc_create(&nfs4_callback_program, NFS4_CALLBACK_BUFSIZE, sv_ops);
if (!serv) {
printk(KERN_ERR "nfs_callback_create_svc: create service failed\n");
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
cb_info->serv = serv;
/* As there is only one thread we need to over-ride the
* default maximum of 80 connections
*/
serv->sv_maxconn = 1024;
dprintk("nfs_callback_create_svc: service created\n");
return serv;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
|
static struct svc_serv *nfs_callback_create_svc(int minorversion)
{
struct nfs_callback_data *cb_info = &nfs_callback_info[minorversion];
struct svc_serv *serv;
struct svc_serv_ops *sv_ops;
/*
* Check whether we're already up and running.
*/
if (cb_info->serv) {
/*
* Note: increase service usage, because later in case of error
* svc_destroy() will be called.
*/
svc_get(cb_info->serv);
return cb_info->serv;
}
switch (minorversion) {
case 0:
sv_ops = nfs4_cb_sv_ops[0];
break;
default:
sv_ops = nfs4_cb_sv_ops[1];
}
if (sv_ops == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
/*
* Sanity check: if there's no task,
* we should be the first user ...
*/
if (cb_info->users)
printk(KERN_WARNING "nfs_callback_create_svc: no kthread, %d users??\n",
cb_info->users);
serv = svc_create_pooled(&nfs4_callback_program, NFS4_CALLBACK_BUFSIZE, sv_ops);
if (!serv) {
printk(KERN_ERR "nfs_callback_create_svc: create service failed\n");
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
cb_info->serv = serv;
/* As there is only one thread we need to over-ride the
* default maximum of 80 connections
*/
serv->sv_maxconn = 1024;
dprintk("nfs_callback_create_svc: service created\n");
return serv;
}
| 168,139
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int svc_rdma_xdr_encode_error(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
struct rpcrdma_msg *rmsgp,
enum rpcrdma_errcode err, __be32 *va)
{
__be32 *startp = va;
*va++ = rmsgp->rm_xid;
*va++ = rmsgp->rm_vers;
*va++ = xprt->sc_fc_credits;
*va++ = rdma_error;
*va++ = cpu_to_be32(err);
if (err == ERR_VERS) {
*va++ = rpcrdma_version;
*va++ = rpcrdma_version;
}
return (int)((unsigned long)va - (unsigned long)startp);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
|
int svc_rdma_xdr_encode_error(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
| 168,160
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: xmlParseCDSect(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int len = 0;
int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
int r, rl;
int s, sl;
int cur, l;
int count = 0;
/* Check 2.6.0 was NXT(0) not RAW */
if (CMP9(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', '[', 'C', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A', '[')) {
SKIP(9);
} else
return;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CDATA_SECTION;
r = CUR_CHAR(rl);
if (!IS_CHAR(r)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CDATA_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
return;
}
NEXTL(rl);
s = CUR_CHAR(sl);
if (!IS_CHAR(s)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CDATA_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
return;
}
NEXTL(sl);
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return;
}
while (IS_CHAR(cur) &&
((r != ']') || (s != ']') || (cur != '>'))) {
if (len + 5 >= size) {
xmlChar *tmp;
size *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlFree(buf);
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return;
}
buf = tmp;
}
COPY_BUF(rl,buf,len,r);
r = s;
rl = sl;
s = cur;
sl = l;
count++;
if (count > 50) {
GROW;
count = 0;
}
NEXTL(l);
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
buf[len] = 0;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
if (cur != '>') {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CDATA_NOT_FINISHED,
"CData section not finished\n%.50s\n", buf);
xmlFree(buf);
return;
}
NEXTL(l);
/*
* OK the buffer is to be consumed as cdata.
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (ctxt->sax->cdataBlock != NULL)
ctxt->sax->cdataBlock(ctxt->userData, buf, len);
else if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData, buf, len);
}
xmlFree(buf);
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
xmlParseCDSect(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int len = 0;
int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
int r, rl;
int s, sl;
int cur, l;
int count = 0;
/* Check 2.6.0 was NXT(0) not RAW */
if (CMP9(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', '[', 'C', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A', '[')) {
SKIP(9);
} else
return;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CDATA_SECTION;
r = CUR_CHAR(rl);
if (!IS_CHAR(r)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CDATA_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
return;
}
NEXTL(rl);
s = CUR_CHAR(sl);
if (!IS_CHAR(s)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CDATA_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
return;
}
NEXTL(sl);
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return;
}
while (IS_CHAR(cur) &&
((r != ']') || (s != ']') || (cur != '>'))) {
if (len + 5 >= size) {
xmlChar *tmp;
size *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlFree(buf);
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return;
}
buf = tmp;
}
COPY_BUF(rl,buf,len,r);
r = s;
rl = sl;
s = cur;
sl = l;
count++;
if (count > 50) {
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
xmlFree(buf);
return;
}
count = 0;
}
NEXTL(l);
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
buf[len] = 0;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
if (cur != '>') {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CDATA_NOT_FINISHED,
"CData section not finished\n%.50s\n", buf);
xmlFree(buf);
return;
}
NEXTL(l);
/*
* OK the buffer is to be consumed as cdata.
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (ctxt->sax->cdataBlock != NULL)
ctxt->sax->cdataBlock(ctxt->userData, buf, len);
else if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData, buf, len);
}
xmlFree(buf);
}
| 171,273
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void RegisterPropertiesHandler(
void* object, const ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->RegisterProperties(prop_list);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void RegisterPropertiesHandler(
// IBusController override.
virtual void OnRegisterImeProperties(
const input_method::ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
RegisterProperties(prop_list);
}
| 170,502
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void check_pointer_type_change(Notifier *notifier, void *data)
{
VncState *vs = container_of(notifier, VncState, mouse_mode_notifier);
int absolute = qemu_input_is_absolute();
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE) && vs->absolute != absolute) {
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1);
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, absolute, 0,
surface_width(vs->vd->ds),
surface_height(vs->vd->ds),
VNC_ENCODING_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
}
vs->absolute = absolute;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static void check_pointer_type_change(Notifier *notifier, void *data)
{
VncState *vs = container_of(notifier, VncState, mouse_mode_notifier);
int absolute = qemu_input_is_absolute();
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE) && vs->absolute != absolute) {
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1);
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, absolute, 0,
pixman_image_get_width(vs->vd->server),
pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server),
VNC_ENCODING_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
}
vs->absolute = absolute;
}
| 165,458
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool AudioRendererAlgorithm::OutputFasterPlayback(uint8* dest) {
DCHECK_LT(index_into_window_, window_size_);
DCHECK_GT(playback_rate_, 1.0);
if (audio_buffer_.forward_bytes() < bytes_per_frame_)
return false;
int input_step = window_size_;
int output_step = ceil(window_size_ / playback_rate_);
AlignToFrameBoundary(&output_step);
DCHECK_GT(input_step, output_step);
int bytes_to_crossfade = bytes_in_crossfade_;
if (muted_ || bytes_to_crossfade > output_step)
bytes_to_crossfade = 0;
int outtro_crossfade_begin = output_step - bytes_to_crossfade;
int outtro_crossfade_end = output_step;
int intro_crossfade_begin = input_step - bytes_to_crossfade;
if (index_into_window_ < outtro_crossfade_begin) {
CopyWithAdvance(dest);
index_into_window_ += bytes_per_frame_;
return true;
}
while (index_into_window_ < outtro_crossfade_end) {
if (audio_buffer_.forward_bytes() < bytes_per_frame_)
return false;
DCHECK_GT(bytes_to_crossfade, 0);
uint8* place_to_copy = crossfade_buffer_.get() +
(index_into_window_ - outtro_crossfade_begin);
CopyWithAdvance(place_to_copy);
index_into_window_ += bytes_per_frame_;
}
while (index_into_window_ < intro_crossfade_begin) {
if (audio_buffer_.forward_bytes() < bytes_per_frame_)
return false;
DropFrame();
index_into_window_ += bytes_per_frame_;
}
if (audio_buffer_.forward_bytes() < bytes_per_frame_)
return false;
if (bytes_to_crossfade == 0) {
DCHECK_EQ(index_into_window_, window_size_);
return false;
}
DCHECK_LT(index_into_window_, window_size_);
int offset_into_buffer = index_into_window_ - intro_crossfade_begin;
memcpy(dest, crossfade_buffer_.get() + offset_into_buffer,
bytes_per_frame_);
scoped_array<uint8> intro_frame_ptr(new uint8[bytes_per_frame_]);
audio_buffer_.Read(intro_frame_ptr.get(), bytes_per_frame_);
OutputCrossfadedFrame(dest, intro_frame_ptr.get());
index_into_window_ += bytes_per_frame_;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool AudioRendererAlgorithm::OutputFasterPlayback(uint8* dest) {
bool AudioRendererAlgorithm::OutputFasterPlayback(uint8* dest,
int input_step,
int output_step) {
// Ensure we don't run into OOB read/write situation.
CHECK_GT(input_step, output_step);
DCHECK_LT(index_into_window_, window_size_);
DCHECK_GT(playback_rate_, 1.0);
if (audio_buffer_.forward_bytes() < bytes_per_frame_)
return false;
int bytes_to_crossfade = bytes_in_crossfade_;
if (muted_ || bytes_to_crossfade > output_step)
bytes_to_crossfade = 0;
int outtro_crossfade_begin = output_step - bytes_to_crossfade;
int outtro_crossfade_end = output_step;
int intro_crossfade_begin = input_step - bytes_to_crossfade;
if (index_into_window_ < outtro_crossfade_begin) {
CopyWithAdvance(dest);
index_into_window_ += bytes_per_frame_;
return true;
}
while (index_into_window_ < outtro_crossfade_end) {
if (audio_buffer_.forward_bytes() < bytes_per_frame_)
return false;
DCHECK_GT(bytes_to_crossfade, 0);
uint8* place_to_copy = crossfade_buffer_.get() +
(index_into_window_ - outtro_crossfade_begin);
CopyWithAdvance(place_to_copy);
index_into_window_ += bytes_per_frame_;
}
while (index_into_window_ < intro_crossfade_begin) {
if (audio_buffer_.forward_bytes() < bytes_per_frame_)
return false;
DropFrame();
index_into_window_ += bytes_per_frame_;
}
if (audio_buffer_.forward_bytes() < bytes_per_frame_)
return false;
if (bytes_to_crossfade == 0) {
DCHECK_EQ(index_into_window_, window_size_);
return false;
}
DCHECK_LT(index_into_window_, window_size_);
int offset_into_buffer = index_into_window_ - intro_crossfade_begin;
memcpy(dest, crossfade_buffer_.get() + offset_into_buffer,
bytes_per_frame_);
scoped_array<uint8> intro_frame_ptr(new uint8[bytes_per_frame_]);
audio_buffer_.Read(intro_frame_ptr.get(), bytes_per_frame_);
OutputCrossfadedFrame(dest, intro_frame_ptr.get());
index_into_window_ += bytes_per_frame_;
return true;
}
| 171,528
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RunInvAccuracyCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 1000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, in, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, coeff, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, kNumCoeffs);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8();
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8();
in[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
fwd_txfm_ref(in, coeff, pitch_, tx_type_);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunInvTxfm(coeff, dst, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
const uint32_t diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const uint32_t error = diff * diff;
EXPECT_GE(1u, error)
<< "Error: 16x16 IDCT has error " << error
<< " at index " << j;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void RunInvAccuracyCheck() {
void RunInvAccuracyCheck(int limit) {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 1000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, int16_t, in[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, coeff[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint8_t, dst[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint8_t, src[kNumCoeffs]);
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint16_t, dst16[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint16_t, src16[kNumCoeffs]);
#endif
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
// Initialize a test block with input range [-mask_, mask_].
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
if (bit_depth_ == VPX_BITS_8) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8();
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8();
in[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
src16[j] = rnd.Rand16() & mask_;
dst16[j] = rnd.Rand16() & mask_;
in[j] = src16[j] - dst16[j];
#endif
}
}
fwd_txfm_ref(in, coeff, pitch_, tx_type_);
if (bit_depth_ == VPX_BITS_8) {
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunInvTxfm(coeff, dst, pitch_));
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunInvTxfm(coeff, CONVERT_TO_BYTEPTR(dst16),
pitch_));
#endif
}
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
const uint32_t diff =
bit_depth_ == VPX_BITS_8 ? dst[j] - src[j] : dst16[j] - src16[j];
#else
const uint32_t diff = dst[j] - src[j];
#endif
const uint32_t error = diff * diff;
EXPECT_GE(static_cast<uint32_t>(limit), error)
<< "Error: 4x4 IDCT has error " << error
<< " at index " << j;
}
}
}
| 174,551
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, ftell)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
long ret = php_stream_tell(intern->u.file.stream);
if (ret == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
RETURN_LONG(ret);
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int SplFileObject::fseek(int pos [, int whence = SEEK_SET])
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, ftell)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
long ret = php_stream_tell(intern->u.file.stream);
if (ret == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
RETURN_LONG(ret);
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int SplFileObject::fseek(int pos [, int whence = SEEK_SET])
| 167,065
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int sbusfb_ioctl_helper(unsigned long cmd, unsigned long arg,
struct fb_info *info,
int type, int fb_depth, unsigned long fb_size)
{
switch(cmd) {
case FBIOGTYPE: {
struct fbtype __user *f = (struct fbtype __user *) arg;
if (put_user(type, &f->fb_type) ||
__put_user(info->var.yres, &f->fb_height) ||
__put_user(info->var.xres, &f->fb_width) ||
__put_user(fb_depth, &f->fb_depth) ||
__put_user(0, &f->fb_cmsize) ||
__put_user(fb_size, &f->fb_cmsize))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
case FBIOPUTCMAP_SPARC: {
struct fbcmap __user *c = (struct fbcmap __user *) arg;
struct fb_cmap cmap;
u16 red, green, blue;
u8 red8, green8, blue8;
unsigned char __user *ured;
unsigned char __user *ugreen;
unsigned char __user *ublue;
int index, count, i;
if (get_user(index, &c->index) ||
__get_user(count, &c->count) ||
__get_user(ured, &c->red) ||
__get_user(ugreen, &c->green) ||
__get_user(ublue, &c->blue))
return -EFAULT;
cmap.len = 1;
cmap.red = &red;
cmap.green = &green;
cmap.blue = &blue;
cmap.transp = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
int err;
if (get_user(red8, &ured[i]) ||
get_user(green8, &ugreen[i]) ||
get_user(blue8, &ublue[i]))
return -EFAULT;
red = red8 << 8;
green = green8 << 8;
blue = blue8 << 8;
cmap.start = index + i;
err = fb_set_cmap(&cmap, info);
if (err)
return err;
}
return 0;
}
case FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC: {
struct fbcmap __user *c = (struct fbcmap __user *) arg;
unsigned char __user *ured;
unsigned char __user *ugreen;
unsigned char __user *ublue;
struct fb_cmap *cmap = &info->cmap;
int index, count, i;
u8 red, green, blue;
if (get_user(index, &c->index) ||
__get_user(count, &c->count) ||
__get_user(ured, &c->red) ||
__get_user(ugreen, &c->green) ||
__get_user(ublue, &c->blue))
return -EFAULT;
if (index + count > cmap->len)
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
red = cmap->red[index + i] >> 8;
green = cmap->green[index + i] >> 8;
blue = cmap->blue[index + i] >> 8;
if (put_user(red, &ured[i]) ||
put_user(green, &ugreen[i]) ||
put_user(blue, &ublue[i]))
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: fbdev: Fixing arbitrary kernel leak in case FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC in sbusfb_ioctl_helper().
Fixing arbitrary kernel leak in case FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC in
sbusfb_ioctl_helper().
'index' is defined as an int in sbusfb_ioctl_helper().
We retrieve this from the user:
if (get_user(index, &c->index) ||
__get_user(count, &c->count) ||
__get_user(ured, &c->red) ||
__get_user(ugreen, &c->green) ||
__get_user(ublue, &c->blue))
return -EFAULT;
and then we use 'index' in the following way:
red = cmap->red[index + i] >> 8;
green = cmap->green[index + i] >> 8;
blue = cmap->blue[index + i] >> 8;
This is a classic information leak vulnerability. 'index' should be
an unsigned int, given its usage above.
This patch is straight-forward; it changes 'index' to unsigned int
in two switch-cases: FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC && FBIOPUTCMAP_SPARC.
This patch fixes CVE-2018-6412.
Signed-off-by: Peter Malone <peter.malone@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
int sbusfb_ioctl_helper(unsigned long cmd, unsigned long arg,
struct fb_info *info,
int type, int fb_depth, unsigned long fb_size)
{
switch(cmd) {
case FBIOGTYPE: {
struct fbtype __user *f = (struct fbtype __user *) arg;
if (put_user(type, &f->fb_type) ||
__put_user(info->var.yres, &f->fb_height) ||
__put_user(info->var.xres, &f->fb_width) ||
__put_user(fb_depth, &f->fb_depth) ||
__put_user(0, &f->fb_cmsize) ||
__put_user(fb_size, &f->fb_cmsize))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
case FBIOPUTCMAP_SPARC: {
struct fbcmap __user *c = (struct fbcmap __user *) arg;
struct fb_cmap cmap;
u16 red, green, blue;
u8 red8, green8, blue8;
unsigned char __user *ured;
unsigned char __user *ugreen;
unsigned char __user *ublue;
unsigned int index, count, i;
if (get_user(index, &c->index) ||
__get_user(count, &c->count) ||
__get_user(ured, &c->red) ||
__get_user(ugreen, &c->green) ||
__get_user(ublue, &c->blue))
return -EFAULT;
cmap.len = 1;
cmap.red = &red;
cmap.green = &green;
cmap.blue = &blue;
cmap.transp = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
int err;
if (get_user(red8, &ured[i]) ||
get_user(green8, &ugreen[i]) ||
get_user(blue8, &ublue[i]))
return -EFAULT;
red = red8 << 8;
green = green8 << 8;
blue = blue8 << 8;
cmap.start = index + i;
err = fb_set_cmap(&cmap, info);
if (err)
return err;
}
return 0;
}
case FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC: {
struct fbcmap __user *c = (struct fbcmap __user *) arg;
unsigned char __user *ured;
unsigned char __user *ugreen;
unsigned char __user *ublue;
struct fb_cmap *cmap = &info->cmap;
unsigned int index, count, i;
u8 red, green, blue;
if (get_user(index, &c->index) ||
__get_user(count, &c->count) ||
__get_user(ured, &c->red) ||
__get_user(ugreen, &c->green) ||
__get_user(ublue, &c->blue))
return -EFAULT;
if (index + count > cmap->len)
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
red = cmap->red[index + i] >> 8;
green = cmap->green[index + i] >> 8;
blue = cmap->blue[index + i] >> 8;
if (put_user(red, &ured[i]) ||
put_user(green, &ugreen[i]) ||
put_user(blue, &ublue[i]))
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
| 169,344
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void rng_backend_request_entropy(RngBackend *s, size_t size,
EntropyReceiveFunc *receive_entropy,
void *opaque)
{
RngBackendClass *k = RNG_BACKEND_GET_CLASS(s);
if (k->request_entropy) {
k->request_entropy(s, size, receive_entropy, opaque);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void rng_backend_request_entropy(RngBackend *s, size_t size,
EntropyReceiveFunc *receive_entropy,
void *opaque)
{
RngBackendClass *k = RNG_BACKEND_GET_CLASS(s);
RngRequest *req;
if (k->request_entropy) {
req = g_malloc(sizeof(*req));
req->offset = 0;
req->size = size;
req->receive_entropy = receive_entropy;
req->opaque = opaque;
req->data = g_malloc(req->size);
k->request_entropy(s, req);
s->requests = g_slist_append(s->requests, req);
}
}
| 165,181
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: spnego_gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_qop_t qop_req,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count)
{
return gss_get_mic_iov_length(minor_status, context_handle, qop_req, iov,
iov_count);
}
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-18
|
spnego_gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_qop_t qop_req,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count)
{
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
return gss_get_mic_iov_length(minor_status, sc->ctx_handle, qop_req, iov,
iov_count);
}
| 166,658
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static struct desc_struct *get_desc(unsigned short sel)
{
struct desc_ptr gdt_desc = {0, 0};
unsigned long desc_base;
#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
if ((sel & SEGMENT_TI_MASK) == SEGMENT_LDT) {
struct desc_struct *desc = NULL;
struct ldt_struct *ldt;
/* Bits [15:3] contain the index of the desired entry. */
sel >>= 3;
mutex_lock(¤t->active_mm->context.lock);
ldt = current->active_mm->context.ldt;
if (ldt && sel < ldt->nr_entries)
desc = &ldt->entries[sel];
mutex_unlock(¤t->active_mm->context.lock);
return desc;
}
#endif
native_store_gdt(&gdt_desc);
/*
* Segment descriptors have a size of 8 bytes. Thus, the index is
* multiplied by 8 to obtain the memory offset of the desired descriptor
* from the base of the GDT. As bits [15:3] of the segment selector
* contain the index, it can be regarded as multiplied by 8 already.
* All that remains is to clear bits [2:0].
*/
desc_base = sel & ~(SEGMENT_RPL_MASK | SEGMENT_TI_MASK);
if (desc_base > gdt_desc.size)
return NULL;
return (struct desc_struct *)(gdt_desc.address + desc_base);
}
Commit Message: x86/insn-eval: Fix use-after-free access to LDT entry
get_desc() computes a pointer into the LDT while holding a lock that
protects the LDT from being freed, but then drops the lock and returns the
(now potentially dangling) pointer to its caller.
Fix it by giving the caller a copy of the LDT entry instead.
Fixes: 670f928ba09b ("x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment descriptor")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
static struct desc_struct *get_desc(unsigned short sel)
static bool get_desc(struct desc_struct *out, unsigned short sel)
{
struct desc_ptr gdt_desc = {0, 0};
unsigned long desc_base;
#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
if ((sel & SEGMENT_TI_MASK) == SEGMENT_LDT) {
bool success = false;
struct ldt_struct *ldt;
/* Bits [15:3] contain the index of the desired entry. */
sel >>= 3;
mutex_lock(¤t->active_mm->context.lock);
ldt = current->active_mm->context.ldt;
if (ldt && sel < ldt->nr_entries) {
*out = ldt->entries[sel];
success = true;
}
mutex_unlock(¤t->active_mm->context.lock);
return success;
}
#endif
native_store_gdt(&gdt_desc);
/*
* Segment descriptors have a size of 8 bytes. Thus, the index is
* multiplied by 8 to obtain the memory offset of the desired descriptor
* from the base of the GDT. As bits [15:3] of the segment selector
* contain the index, it can be regarded as multiplied by 8 already.
* All that remains is to clear bits [2:0].
*/
desc_base = sel & ~(SEGMENT_RPL_MASK | SEGMENT_TI_MASK);
if (desc_base > gdt_desc.size)
return false;
*out = *(struct desc_struct *)(gdt_desc.address + desc_base);
return true;
}
| 169,607
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static bool check_allocations(ASS_Shaper *shaper, size_t new_size)
{
if (new_size > shaper->n_glyphs) {
if (!ASS_REALLOC_ARRAY(shaper->event_text, new_size) ||
!ASS_REALLOC_ARRAY(shaper->ctypes, new_size) ||
!ASS_REALLOC_ARRAY(shaper->emblevels, new_size) ||
!ASS_REALLOC_ARRAY(shaper->cmap, new_size))
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: shaper: fix reallocation
Update the variable that tracks the allocated size. This potentially
improves performance and avoid some side effects, which lead to
undefined behavior in some cases.
Fixes fuzzer test case id:000051,sig:11,sync:fuzzer3,src:004221.
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static bool check_allocations(ASS_Shaper *shaper, size_t new_size)
{
if (new_size > shaper->n_glyphs) {
if (!ASS_REALLOC_ARRAY(shaper->event_text, new_size) ||
!ASS_REALLOC_ARRAY(shaper->ctypes, new_size) ||
!ASS_REALLOC_ARRAY(shaper->emblevels, new_size) ||
!ASS_REALLOC_ARRAY(shaper->cmap, new_size))
return false;
shaper->n_glyphs = new_size;
}
return true;
}
| 168,774
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void sctp_sock_migrate(struct sock *oldsk, struct sock *newsk,
struct sctp_association *assoc,
sctp_socket_type_t type)
{
struct sctp_sock *oldsp = sctp_sk(oldsk);
struct sctp_sock *newsp = sctp_sk(newsk);
struct sctp_bind_bucket *pp; /* hash list port iterator */
struct sctp_endpoint *newep = newsp->ep;
struct sk_buff *skb, *tmp;
struct sctp_ulpevent *event;
int flags = 0;
/* Migrate socket buffer sizes and all the socket level options to the
* new socket.
*/
newsk->sk_sndbuf = oldsk->sk_sndbuf;
newsk->sk_rcvbuf = oldsk->sk_rcvbuf;
/* Brute force copy old sctp opt. */
inet_sk_copy_descendant(newsk, oldsk);
/* Restore the ep value that was overwritten with the above structure
* copy.
*/
newsp->ep = newep;
newsp->hmac = NULL;
/* Hook this new socket in to the bind_hash list. */
pp = sctp_sk(oldsk)->bind_hash;
sk_add_bind_node(newsk, &pp->owner);
sctp_sk(newsk)->bind_hash = pp;
inet_sk(newsk)->num = inet_sk(oldsk)->num;
/* Copy the bind_addr list from the original endpoint to the new
* endpoint so that we can handle restarts properly
*/
if (PF_INET6 == assoc->base.sk->sk_family)
flags = SCTP_ADDR6_ALLOWED;
if (assoc->peer.ipv4_address)
flags |= SCTP_ADDR4_PEERSUPP;
if (assoc->peer.ipv6_address)
flags |= SCTP_ADDR6_PEERSUPP;
sctp_bind_addr_copy(&newsp->ep->base.bind_addr,
&oldsp->ep->base.bind_addr,
SCTP_SCOPE_GLOBAL, GFP_KERNEL, flags);
/* Move any messages in the old socket's receive queue that are for the
* peeled off association to the new socket's receive queue.
*/
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &oldsk->sk_receive_queue, tmp) {
event = sctp_skb2event(skb);
if (event->asoc == assoc) {
sctp_sock_rfree(skb);
__skb_unlink(skb, &oldsk->sk_receive_queue);
__skb_queue_tail(&newsk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
sctp_skb_set_owner_r(skb, newsk);
}
}
/* Clean up any messages pending delivery due to partial
* delivery. Three cases:
* 1) No partial deliver; no work.
* 2) Peeling off partial delivery; keep pd_lobby in new pd_lobby.
* 3) Peeling off non-partial delivery; move pd_lobby to receive_queue.
*/
skb_queue_head_init(&newsp->pd_lobby);
sctp_sk(newsk)->pd_mode = assoc->ulpq.pd_mode;
if (sctp_sk(oldsk)->pd_mode) {
struct sk_buff_head *queue;
/* Decide which queue to move pd_lobby skbs to. */
if (assoc->ulpq.pd_mode) {
queue = &newsp->pd_lobby;
} else
queue = &newsk->sk_receive_queue;
/* Walk through the pd_lobby, looking for skbs that
* need moved to the new socket.
*/
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &oldsp->pd_lobby, tmp) {
event = sctp_skb2event(skb);
if (event->asoc == assoc) {
sctp_sock_rfree(skb);
__skb_unlink(skb, &oldsp->pd_lobby);
__skb_queue_tail(queue, skb);
sctp_skb_set_owner_r(skb, newsk);
}
}
/* Clear up any skbs waiting for the partial
* delivery to finish.
*/
if (assoc->ulpq.pd_mode)
sctp_clear_pd(oldsk);
}
/* Set the type of socket to indicate that it is peeled off from the
* original UDP-style socket or created with the accept() call on a
* TCP-style socket..
*/
newsp->type = type;
/* Mark the new socket "in-use" by the user so that any packets
* that may arrive on the association after we've moved it are
* queued to the backlog. This prevents a potential race between
* backlog processing on the old socket and new-packet processing
* on the new socket.
*/
sctp_lock_sock(newsk);
sctp_assoc_migrate(assoc, newsk);
/* If the association on the newsk is already closed before accept()
* is called, set RCV_SHUTDOWN flag.
*/
if (sctp_state(assoc, CLOSED) && sctp_style(newsk, TCP))
newsk->sk_shutdown |= RCV_SHUTDOWN;
newsk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_ESTABLISHED;
sctp_release_sock(newsk);
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
|
static void sctp_sock_migrate(struct sock *oldsk, struct sock *newsk,
struct sctp_association *assoc,
sctp_socket_type_t type)
{
struct sctp_sock *oldsp = sctp_sk(oldsk);
struct sctp_sock *newsp = sctp_sk(newsk);
struct sctp_bind_bucket *pp; /* hash list port iterator */
struct sctp_endpoint *newep = newsp->ep;
struct sk_buff *skb, *tmp;
struct sctp_ulpevent *event;
int flags = 0;
/* Migrate socket buffer sizes and all the socket level options to the
* new socket.
*/
newsk->sk_sndbuf = oldsk->sk_sndbuf;
newsk->sk_rcvbuf = oldsk->sk_rcvbuf;
/* Brute force copy old sctp opt. */
inet_sk_copy_descendant(newsk, oldsk);
/* Restore the ep value that was overwritten with the above structure
* copy.
*/
newsp->ep = newep;
newsp->hmac = NULL;
/* Hook this new socket in to the bind_hash list. */
pp = sctp_sk(oldsk)->bind_hash;
sk_add_bind_node(newsk, &pp->owner);
sctp_sk(newsk)->bind_hash = pp;
inet_sk(newsk)->num = inet_sk(oldsk)->num;
/* Copy the bind_addr list from the original endpoint to the new
* endpoint so that we can handle restarts properly
*/
if (PF_INET6 == assoc->base.sk->sk_family)
flags = SCTP_ADDR6_ALLOWED;
if (assoc->peer.ipv4_address)
flags |= SCTP_ADDR4_PEERSUPP;
if (assoc->peer.ipv6_address)
flags |= SCTP_ADDR6_PEERSUPP;
sctp_bind_addr_copy(&newsp->ep->base.bind_addr,
&oldsp->ep->base.bind_addr,
SCTP_SCOPE_GLOBAL, GFP_KERNEL, flags);
/* Move any messages in the old socket's receive queue that are for the
* peeled off association to the new socket's receive queue.
*/
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &oldsk->sk_receive_queue, tmp) {
event = sctp_skb2event(skb);
if (event->asoc == assoc) {
sctp_sock_rfree_frag(skb);
__skb_unlink(skb, &oldsk->sk_receive_queue);
__skb_queue_tail(&newsk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
sctp_skb_set_owner_r_frag(skb, newsk);
}
}
/* Clean up any messages pending delivery due to partial
* delivery. Three cases:
* 1) No partial deliver; no work.
* 2) Peeling off partial delivery; keep pd_lobby in new pd_lobby.
* 3) Peeling off non-partial delivery; move pd_lobby to receive_queue.
*/
skb_queue_head_init(&newsp->pd_lobby);
sctp_sk(newsk)->pd_mode = assoc->ulpq.pd_mode;
if (sctp_sk(oldsk)->pd_mode) {
struct sk_buff_head *queue;
/* Decide which queue to move pd_lobby skbs to. */
if (assoc->ulpq.pd_mode) {
queue = &newsp->pd_lobby;
} else
queue = &newsk->sk_receive_queue;
/* Walk through the pd_lobby, looking for skbs that
* need moved to the new socket.
*/
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &oldsp->pd_lobby, tmp) {
event = sctp_skb2event(skb);
if (event->asoc == assoc) {
sctp_sock_rfree_frag(skb);
__skb_unlink(skb, &oldsp->pd_lobby);
__skb_queue_tail(queue, skb);
sctp_skb_set_owner_r_frag(skb, newsk);
}
}
/* Clear up any skbs waiting for the partial
* delivery to finish.
*/
if (assoc->ulpq.pd_mode)
sctp_clear_pd(oldsk);
}
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &assoc->ulpq.reasm, tmp) {
sctp_sock_rfree_frag(skb);
sctp_skb_set_owner_r_frag(skb, newsk);
}
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &assoc->ulpq.lobby, tmp) {
sctp_sock_rfree_frag(skb);
sctp_skb_set_owner_r_frag(skb, newsk);
}
/* Set the type of socket to indicate that it is peeled off from the
* original UDP-style socket or created with the accept() call on a
* TCP-style socket..
*/
newsp->type = type;
/* Mark the new socket "in-use" by the user so that any packets
* that may arrive on the association after we've moved it are
* queued to the backlog. This prevents a potential race between
* backlog processing on the old socket and new-packet processing
* on the new socket.
*/
sctp_lock_sock(newsk);
sctp_assoc_migrate(assoc, newsk);
/* If the association on the newsk is already closed before accept()
* is called, set RCV_SHUTDOWN flag.
*/
if (sctp_state(assoc, CLOSED) && sctp_style(newsk, TCP))
newsk->sk_shutdown |= RCV_SHUTDOWN;
newsk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_ESTABLISHED;
sctp_release_sock(newsk);
}
| 166,224
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::CommitPendingTransaction(
SwapCompletionCallback completion_callback,
PresentationCallback present_callback) {
DCHECK(pending_transaction_);
ResourceRefs resources_to_release;
resources_to_release.swap(current_frame_resources_);
current_frame_resources_.clear();
current_frame_resources_.swap(pending_frame_resources_);
pending_frame_resources_.clear();
SurfaceControl::Transaction::OnCompleteCb callback = base::BindOnce(
&GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::OnTransactionAckOnGpuThread,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), std::move(completion_callback),
std::move(present_callback), std::move(resources_to_release));
pending_transaction_->SetOnCompleteCb(std::move(callback), gpu_task_runner_);
pending_transaction_->Apply();
pending_transaction_.reset();
DCHECK_GE(surface_list_.size(), pending_surfaces_count_);
surface_list_.resize(pending_surfaces_count_);
pending_surfaces_count_ = 0u;
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID:
|
void GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::CommitPendingTransaction(
const gfx::Rect& damage_rect,
SwapCompletionCallback completion_callback,
PresentationCallback present_callback) {
DCHECK(pending_transaction_);
// Mark the intersection of a surface's rect with the damage rect as the dirty
// rect for that surface.
DCHECK_LE(pending_surfaces_count_, surface_list_.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < pending_surfaces_count_; ++i) {
const auto& surface_state = surface_list_[i];
if (!surface_state.buffer_updated_in_pending_transaction)
continue;
gfx::Rect surface_damage_rect = surface_state.dst;
surface_damage_rect.Intersect(damage_rect);
pending_transaction_->SetDamageRect(*surface_state.surface,
surface_damage_rect);
}
ResourceRefs resources_to_release;
resources_to_release.swap(current_frame_resources_);
current_frame_resources_.clear();
current_frame_resources_.swap(pending_frame_resources_);
pending_frame_resources_.clear();
SurfaceControl::Transaction::OnCompleteCb callback = base::BindOnce(
&GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::OnTransactionAckOnGpuThread,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), std::move(completion_callback),
std::move(present_callback), std::move(resources_to_release));
pending_transaction_->SetOnCompleteCb(std::move(callback), gpu_task_runner_);
pending_transaction_->Apply();
pending_transaction_.reset();
DCHECK_GE(surface_list_.size(), pending_surfaces_count_);
surface_list_.resize(pending_surfaces_count_);
pending_surfaces_count_ = 0u;
}
| 172,108
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ext2_xattr_set2(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *old_bh,
struct ext2_xattr_header *header)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct buffer_head *new_bh = NULL;
int error;
if (header) {
new_bh = ext2_xattr_cache_find(inode, header);
if (new_bh) {
/* We found an identical block in the cache. */
if (new_bh == old_bh) {
ea_bdebug(new_bh, "keeping this block");
} else {
/* The old block is released after updating
the inode. */
ea_bdebug(new_bh, "reusing block");
error = dquot_alloc_block(inode, 1);
if (error) {
unlock_buffer(new_bh);
goto cleanup;
}
le32_add_cpu(&HDR(new_bh)->h_refcount, 1);
ea_bdebug(new_bh, "refcount now=%d",
le32_to_cpu(HDR(new_bh)->h_refcount));
}
unlock_buffer(new_bh);
} else if (old_bh && header == HDR(old_bh)) {
/* Keep this block. No need to lock the block as we
don't need to change the reference count. */
new_bh = old_bh;
get_bh(new_bh);
ext2_xattr_cache_insert(new_bh);
} else {
/* We need to allocate a new block */
ext2_fsblk_t goal = ext2_group_first_block_no(sb,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_block_group);
int block = ext2_new_block(inode, goal, &error);
if (error)
goto cleanup;
ea_idebug(inode, "creating block %d", block);
new_bh = sb_getblk(sb, block);
if (unlikely(!new_bh)) {
ext2_free_blocks(inode, block, 1);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
error = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
lock_buffer(new_bh);
memcpy(new_bh->b_data, header, new_bh->b_size);
set_buffer_uptodate(new_bh);
unlock_buffer(new_bh);
ext2_xattr_cache_insert(new_bh);
ext2_xattr_update_super_block(sb);
}
mark_buffer_dirty(new_bh);
if (IS_SYNC(inode)) {
sync_dirty_buffer(new_bh);
error = -EIO;
if (buffer_req(new_bh) && !buffer_uptodate(new_bh))
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* Update the inode. */
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl = new_bh ? new_bh->b_blocknr : 0;
inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
if (IS_SYNC(inode)) {
error = sync_inode_metadata(inode, 1);
/* In case sync failed due to ENOSPC the inode was actually
* written (only some dirty data were not) so we just proceed
* as if nothing happened and cleanup the unused block */
if (error && error != -ENOSPC) {
if (new_bh && new_bh != old_bh) {
dquot_free_block_nodirty(inode, 1);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
}
goto cleanup;
}
} else
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
error = 0;
if (old_bh && old_bh != new_bh) {
struct mb_cache_entry *ce;
/*
* If there was an old block and we are no longer using it,
* release the old block.
*/
ce = mb_cache_entry_get(ext2_xattr_cache, old_bh->b_bdev,
old_bh->b_blocknr);
lock_buffer(old_bh);
if (HDR(old_bh)->h_refcount == cpu_to_le32(1)) {
/* Free the old block. */
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_free(ce);
ea_bdebug(old_bh, "freeing");
ext2_free_blocks(inode, old_bh->b_blocknr, 1);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
/* We let our caller release old_bh, so we
* need to duplicate the buffer before. */
get_bh(old_bh);
bforget(old_bh);
} else {
/* Decrement the refcount only. */
le32_add_cpu(&HDR(old_bh)->h_refcount, -1);
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_release(ce);
dquot_free_block_nodirty(inode, 1);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
mark_buffer_dirty(old_bh);
ea_bdebug(old_bh, "refcount now=%d",
le32_to_cpu(HDR(old_bh)->h_refcount));
}
unlock_buffer(old_bh);
}
cleanup:
brelse(new_bh);
return error;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19
|
ext2_xattr_set2(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *old_bh,
struct ext2_xattr_header *header)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct buffer_head *new_bh = NULL;
int error;
struct mb2_cache *ext2_mb_cache = EXT2_SB(sb)->s_mb_cache;
if (header) {
new_bh = ext2_xattr_cache_find(inode, header);
if (new_bh) {
/* We found an identical block in the cache. */
if (new_bh == old_bh) {
ea_bdebug(new_bh, "keeping this block");
} else {
/* The old block is released after updating
the inode. */
ea_bdebug(new_bh, "reusing block");
error = dquot_alloc_block(inode, 1);
if (error) {
unlock_buffer(new_bh);
goto cleanup;
}
le32_add_cpu(&HDR(new_bh)->h_refcount, 1);
ea_bdebug(new_bh, "refcount now=%d",
le32_to_cpu(HDR(new_bh)->h_refcount));
}
unlock_buffer(new_bh);
} else if (old_bh && header == HDR(old_bh)) {
/* Keep this block. No need to lock the block as we
don't need to change the reference count. */
new_bh = old_bh;
get_bh(new_bh);
ext2_xattr_cache_insert(ext2_mb_cache, new_bh);
} else {
/* We need to allocate a new block */
ext2_fsblk_t goal = ext2_group_first_block_no(sb,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_block_group);
int block = ext2_new_block(inode, goal, &error);
if (error)
goto cleanup;
ea_idebug(inode, "creating block %d", block);
new_bh = sb_getblk(sb, block);
if (unlikely(!new_bh)) {
ext2_free_blocks(inode, block, 1);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
error = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
lock_buffer(new_bh);
memcpy(new_bh->b_data, header, new_bh->b_size);
set_buffer_uptodate(new_bh);
unlock_buffer(new_bh);
ext2_xattr_cache_insert(ext2_mb_cache, new_bh);
ext2_xattr_update_super_block(sb);
}
mark_buffer_dirty(new_bh);
if (IS_SYNC(inode)) {
sync_dirty_buffer(new_bh);
error = -EIO;
if (buffer_req(new_bh) && !buffer_uptodate(new_bh))
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* Update the inode. */
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl = new_bh ? new_bh->b_blocknr : 0;
inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
if (IS_SYNC(inode)) {
error = sync_inode_metadata(inode, 1);
/* In case sync failed due to ENOSPC the inode was actually
* written (only some dirty data were not) so we just proceed
* as if nothing happened and cleanup the unused block */
if (error && error != -ENOSPC) {
if (new_bh && new_bh != old_bh) {
dquot_free_block_nodirty(inode, 1);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
}
goto cleanup;
}
} else
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
error = 0;
if (old_bh && old_bh != new_bh) {
/*
* If there was an old block and we are no longer using it,
* release the old block.
*/
lock_buffer(old_bh);
if (HDR(old_bh)->h_refcount == cpu_to_le32(1)) {
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(HDR(old_bh)->h_hash);
/*
* This must happen under buffer lock for
* ext2_xattr_set2() to reliably detect freed block
*/
mb2_cache_entry_delete_block(ext2_mb_cache,
hash, old_bh->b_blocknr);
/* Free the old block. */
ea_bdebug(old_bh, "freeing");
ext2_free_blocks(inode, old_bh->b_blocknr, 1);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
/* We let our caller release old_bh, so we
* need to duplicate the buffer before. */
get_bh(old_bh);
bforget(old_bh);
} else {
/* Decrement the refcount only. */
le32_add_cpu(&HDR(old_bh)->h_refcount, -1);
dquot_free_block_nodirty(inode, 1);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
mark_buffer_dirty(old_bh);
ea_bdebug(old_bh, "refcount now=%d",
le32_to_cpu(HDR(old_bh)->h_refcount));
}
unlock_buffer(old_bh);
}
cleanup:
brelse(new_bh);
return error;
}
| 169,984
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static bool ExecuteTranspose(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
frame.GetEditor().Transpose();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
|
static bool ExecuteTranspose(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
Transpose(frame);
return true;
}
| 172,012
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void net_checksum_calculate(uint8_t *data, int length)
{
int hlen, plen, proto, csum_offset;
uint16_t csum;
if ((data[14] & 0xf0) != 0x40)
return; /* not IPv4 */
hlen = (data[14] & 0x0f) * 4;
csum_offset = 16;
break;
case PROTO_UDP:
csum_offset = 6;
break;
default:
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void net_checksum_calculate(uint8_t *data, int length)
{
int hlen, plen, proto, csum_offset;
uint16_t csum;
/* Ensure data has complete L2 & L3 headers. */
if (length < 14 + 20) {
return;
}
if ((data[14] & 0xf0) != 0x40)
return; /* not IPv4 */
hlen = (data[14] & 0x0f) * 4;
csum_offset = 16;
break;
case PROTO_UDP:
csum_offset = 6;
break;
default:
return;
}
| 165,182
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr(PVSCSIRingInfo *mgr)
{
uint32_t ready_ptr = RS_GET_FIELD(mgr, reqProdIdx);
if (ready_ptr != mgr->consumed_ptr) {
uint32_t next_ready_ptr =
mgr->consumed_ptr++ & mgr->txr_len_mask;
uint32_t next_ready_page =
return mgr->req_ring_pages_pa[next_ready_page] +
inpage_idx * sizeof(PVSCSIRingReqDesc);
} else {
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr(PVSCSIRingInfo *mgr)
{
uint32_t ready_ptr = RS_GET_FIELD(mgr, reqProdIdx);
uint32_t ring_size = PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_PAGES_REQ_RING
* PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_REQ_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
if (ready_ptr != mgr->consumed_ptr
&& ready_ptr - mgr->consumed_ptr < ring_size) {
uint32_t next_ready_ptr =
mgr->consumed_ptr++ & mgr->txr_len_mask;
uint32_t next_ready_page =
return mgr->req_ring_pages_pa[next_ready_page] +
inpage_idx * sizeof(PVSCSIRingReqDesc);
} else {
return 0;
}
}
| 164,929
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static struct posix_acl *jffs2_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
struct jffs2_inode_info *f = JFFS2_INODE_INFO(inode);
struct posix_acl *acl;
char *value = NULL;
int rc, xprefix;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
acl = jffs2_iget_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_access);
if (acl != JFFS2_ACL_NOT_CACHED)
return acl;
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_ACCESS;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
acl = jffs2_iget_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_default);
if (acl != JFFS2_ACL_NOT_CACHED)
return acl;
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
rc = do_jffs2_getxattr(inode, xprefix, "", NULL, 0);
if (rc > 0) {
value = kmalloc(rc, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
rc = do_jffs2_getxattr(inode, xprefix, "", value, rc);
}
if (rc > 0) {
acl = jffs2_acl_from_medium(value, rc);
} else if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -ENOSYS) {
acl = NULL;
} else {
acl = ERR_PTR(rc);
}
if (value)
kfree(value);
if (!IS_ERR(acl)) {
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
jffs2_iset_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_access, acl);
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
jffs2_iset_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_default, acl);
break;
}
}
return acl;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
static struct posix_acl *jffs2_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
struct posix_acl *jffs2_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
struct jffs2_inode_info *f = JFFS2_INODE_INFO(inode);
struct posix_acl *acl;
char *value = NULL;
int rc, xprefix;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
acl = jffs2_iget_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_access);
if (acl != JFFS2_ACL_NOT_CACHED)
return acl;
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_ACCESS;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
acl = jffs2_iget_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_default);
if (acl != JFFS2_ACL_NOT_CACHED)
return acl;
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
rc = do_jffs2_getxattr(inode, xprefix, "", NULL, 0);
if (rc > 0) {
value = kmalloc(rc, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
rc = do_jffs2_getxattr(inode, xprefix, "", value, rc);
}
if (rc > 0) {
acl = jffs2_acl_from_medium(value, rc);
} else if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -ENOSYS) {
acl = NULL;
} else {
acl = ERR_PTR(rc);
}
if (value)
kfree(value);
if (!IS_ERR(acl)) {
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
jffs2_iset_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_access, acl);
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
jffs2_iset_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_default, acl);
break;
}
}
return acl;
}
| 164,655
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::~RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid() {
SetContentViewCore(NULL);
if (!shared_surface_.is_null()) {
ImageTransportFactoryAndroid::GetInstance()->DestroySharedSurfaceHandle(
shared_surface_);
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::~RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid() {
SetContentViewCore(NULL);
if (!shared_surface_.is_null()) {
ImageTransportFactoryAndroid::GetInstance()->DestroySharedSurfaceHandle(
shared_surface_);
}
if (texture_id_in_layer_) {
ImageTransportFactoryAndroid::GetInstance()->DeleteTexture(
texture_id_in_layer_);
}
}
| 171,371
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: php_http_url_t *php_http_url_parse(const char *str, size_t len, unsigned flags TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t maxlen = 3 * len;
struct parse_state *state = ecalloc(1, sizeof(*state) + maxlen);
state->end = str + len;
state->ptr = str;
state->flags = flags;
state->maxlen = maxlen;
TSRMLS_SET_CTX(state->ts);
if (!parse_scheme(state)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to parse URL scheme: '%s'", state->ptr);
efree(state);
return NULL;
}
if (!parse_hier(state)) {
efree(state);
return NULL;
}
if (!parse_query(state)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to parse URL query: '%s'", state->ptr);
efree(state);
return NULL;
}
if (!parse_fragment(state)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to parse URL fragment: '%s'", state->ptr);
efree(state);
return NULL;
}
return (php_http_url_t *) state;
}
Commit Message: fix bug #71719 (Buffer overflow in HTTP url parsing functions)
The parser's offset was not reset when we softfail in scheme
parsing and continue to parse a path.
Thanks to hlt99 at blinkenshell dot org for the report.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
php_http_url_t *php_http_url_parse(const char *str, size_t len, unsigned flags TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t maxlen = 3 * len + 8 /* null bytes for all components */;
struct parse_state *state = ecalloc(1, sizeof(*state) + maxlen);
state->end = str + len;
state->ptr = str;
state->flags = flags;
state->maxlen = maxlen;
TSRMLS_SET_CTX(state->ts);
if (!parse_scheme(state)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to parse URL scheme: '%s'", state->ptr);
efree(state);
return NULL;
}
if (!parse_hier(state)) {
efree(state);
return NULL;
}
if (!parse_query(state)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to parse URL query: '%s'", state->ptr);
efree(state);
return NULL;
}
if (!parse_fragment(state)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to parse URL fragment: '%s'", state->ptr);
efree(state);
return NULL;
}
return (php_http_url_t *) state;
}
| 168,834
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void __fput_sync(struct file *file)
{
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) {
struct task_struct *task = current;
file_sb_list_del(file);
BUG_ON(!(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD));
__fput(file);
}
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
|
void __fput_sync(struct file *file)
{
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) {
struct task_struct *task = current;
BUG_ON(!(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD));
__fput(file);
}
}
| 166,796
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Reset() {
events_.clear();
tap_ = false;
tap_down_ = false;
tap_cancel_ = false;
begin_ = false;
end_ = false;
scroll_begin_ = false;
scroll_update_ = false;
scroll_end_ = false;
pinch_begin_ = false;
pinch_update_ = false;
pinch_end_ = false;
long_press_ = false;
fling_ = false;
two_finger_tap_ = false;
show_press_ = false;
swipe_left_ = false;
swipe_right_ = false;
swipe_up_ = false;
swipe_down_ = false;
scroll_begin_position_.SetPoint(0, 0);
tap_location_.SetPoint(0, 0);
gesture_end_location_.SetPoint(0, 0);
scroll_x_ = 0;
scroll_y_ = 0;
scroll_velocity_x_ = 0;
scroll_velocity_y_ = 0;
velocity_x_ = 0;
velocity_y_ = 0;
scroll_x_hint_ = 0;
scroll_y_hint_ = 0;
tap_count_ = 0;
scale_ = 0;
flags_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void Reset() {
events_.clear();
tap_ = false;
tap_down_ = false;
tap_cancel_ = false;
begin_ = false;
end_ = false;
scroll_begin_ = false;
scroll_update_ = false;
scroll_end_ = false;
pinch_begin_ = false;
pinch_update_ = false;
pinch_end_ = false;
long_press_ = false;
fling_ = false;
two_finger_tap_ = false;
show_press_ = false;
swipe_left_ = false;
swipe_right_ = false;
swipe_up_ = false;
swipe_down_ = false;
scroll_begin_position_.SetPoint(0, 0);
tap_location_.SetPoint(0, 0);
gesture_end_location_.SetPoint(0, 0);
scroll_x_ = 0;
scroll_y_ = 0;
scroll_velocity_x_ = 0;
scroll_velocity_y_ = 0;
velocity_x_ = 0;
velocity_y_ = 0;
scroll_x_hint_ = 0;
scroll_y_hint_ = 0;
tap_count_ = 0;
scale_ = 0;
flags_ = 0;
latency_info_.Clear();
}
| 171,203
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::createGraphicBufferSource(
OMX_U32 portIndex, sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> bufferConsumer, MetadataBufferType *type) {
status_t err;
const sp<GraphicBufferSource>& surfaceCheck = getGraphicBufferSource();
if (surfaceCheck != NULL) {
if (portIndex < NELEM(mMetadataType) && type != NULL) {
*type = mMetadataType[portIndex];
}
return ALREADY_EXISTS;
}
if (type != NULL) {
*type = kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer;
}
err = storeMetaDataInBuffers_l(portIndex, OMX_TRUE, type);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = portIndex;
OMX_ERRORTYPE oerr = OMX_GetParameter(
mHandle, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def);
if (oerr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
OMX_INDEXTYPE index = OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition;
CLOG_ERROR(getParameter, oerr, "%s(%#x): %s:%u",
asString(index), index, portString(portIndex), portIndex);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
if (def.format.video.eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque) {
CLOGW("createInputSurface requires COLOR_FormatSurface "
"(AndroidOpaque) color format instead of %s(%#x)",
asString(def.format.video.eColorFormat), def.format.video.eColorFormat);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
uint32_t usageBits;
oerr = OMX_GetParameter(
mHandle, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits, &usageBits);
if (oerr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
usageBits = 0;
}
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource = new GraphicBufferSource(this,
def.format.video.nFrameWidth,
def.format.video.nFrameHeight,
def.nBufferCountActual,
usageBits,
bufferConsumer);
if ((err = bufferSource->initCheck()) != OK) {
return err;
}
setGraphicBufferSource(bufferSource);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
status_t OMXNodeInstance::createGraphicBufferSource(
OMX_U32 portIndex, sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> bufferConsumer, MetadataBufferType *type) {
status_t err;
// only allow graphic source on input port, when there are no allocated buffers yet
if (portIndex != kPortIndexInput) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422020");
return BAD_VALUE;
} else if (mNumPortBuffers[portIndex] > 0) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422020");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
const sp<GraphicBufferSource> surfaceCheck = getGraphicBufferSource();
if (surfaceCheck != NULL) {
if (portIndex < NELEM(mMetadataType) && type != NULL) {
*type = mMetadataType[portIndex];
}
return ALREADY_EXISTS;
}
if (type != NULL) {
*type = kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer;
}
err = storeMetaDataInBuffers_l(portIndex, OMX_TRUE, type);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = portIndex;
OMX_ERRORTYPE oerr = OMX_GetParameter(
mHandle, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def);
if (oerr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
OMX_INDEXTYPE index = OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition;
CLOG_ERROR(getParameter, oerr, "%s(%#x): %s:%u",
asString(index), index, portString(portIndex), portIndex);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
if (def.format.video.eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque) {
CLOGW("createInputSurface requires COLOR_FormatSurface "
"(AndroidOpaque) color format instead of %s(%#x)",
asString(def.format.video.eColorFormat), def.format.video.eColorFormat);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
uint32_t usageBits;
oerr = OMX_GetParameter(
mHandle, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits, &usageBits);
if (oerr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
usageBits = 0;
}
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource = new GraphicBufferSource(this,
def.format.video.nFrameWidth,
def.format.video.nFrameHeight,
def.nBufferCountActual,
usageBits,
bufferConsumer);
if ((err = bufferSource->initCheck()) != OK) {
return err;
}
setGraphicBufferSource(bufferSource);
return OK;
}
| 174,132
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void cmd_parse_status(struct ImapData *idata, char *s)
{
char *value = NULL;
struct Buffy *inc = NULL;
struct ImapMbox mx;
struct ImapStatus *status = NULL;
unsigned int olduv, oldun;
unsigned int litlen;
short new = 0;
short new_msg_count = 0;
char *mailbox = imap_next_word(s);
/* We need a real tokenizer. */
if (imap_get_literal_count(mailbox, &litlen) == 0)
{
if (imap_cmd_step(idata) != IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE)
{
idata->status = IMAP_FATAL;
return;
}
mailbox = idata->buf;
s = mailbox + litlen;
*s = '\0';
s++;
SKIPWS(s);
}
else
{
s = imap_next_word(mailbox);
*(s - 1) = '\0';
imap_unmunge_mbox_name(idata, mailbox);
}
status = imap_mboxcache_get(idata, mailbox, 1);
olduv = status->uidvalidity;
oldun = status->uidnext;
if (*s++ != '(')
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error parsing STATUS\n");
return;
}
while (*s && *s != ')')
{
value = imap_next_word(s);
errno = 0;
const unsigned long ulcount = strtoul(value, &value, 10);
if (((errno == ERANGE) && (ulcount == ULONG_MAX)) || ((unsigned int) ulcount != ulcount))
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error parsing STATUS number\n");
return;
}
const unsigned int count = (unsigned int) ulcount;
if (mutt_str_strncmp("MESSAGES", s, 8) == 0)
{
status->messages = count;
new_msg_count = 1;
}
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("RECENT", s, 6) == 0)
status->recent = count;
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("UIDNEXT", s, 7) == 0)
status->uidnext = count;
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("UIDVALIDITY", s, 11) == 0)
status->uidvalidity = count;
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("UNSEEN", s, 6) == 0)
status->unseen = count;
s = value;
if (*s && *s != ')')
s = imap_next_word(s);
}
mutt_debug(3, "%s (UIDVALIDITY: %u, UIDNEXT: %u) %d messages, %d recent, %d unseen\n",
status->name, status->uidvalidity, status->uidnext,
status->messages, status->recent, status->unseen);
/* caller is prepared to handle the result herself */
if (idata->cmddata && idata->cmdtype == IMAP_CT_STATUS)
{
memcpy(idata->cmddata, status, sizeof(struct ImapStatus));
return;
}
mutt_debug(3, "Running default STATUS handler\n");
/* should perhaps move this code back to imap_buffy_check */
for (inc = Incoming; inc; inc = inc->next)
{
if (inc->magic != MUTT_IMAP)
continue;
if (imap_parse_path(inc->path, &mx) < 0)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error parsing mailbox %s, skipping\n", inc->path);
continue;
}
if (imap_account_match(&idata->conn->account, &mx.account))
{
if (mx.mbox)
{
value = mutt_str_strdup(mx.mbox);
imap_fix_path(idata, mx.mbox, value, mutt_str_strlen(value) + 1);
FREE(&mx.mbox);
}
else
value = mutt_str_strdup("INBOX");
if (value && (imap_mxcmp(mailbox, value) == 0))
{
mutt_debug(3, "Found %s in buffy list (OV: %u ON: %u U: %d)\n", mailbox,
olduv, oldun, status->unseen);
if (MailCheckRecent)
{
if (olduv && olduv == status->uidvalidity)
{
if (oldun < status->uidnext)
new = (status->unseen > 0);
}
else if (!olduv && !oldun)
{
/* first check per session, use recent. might need a flag for this. */
new = (status->recent > 0);
}
else
new = (status->unseen > 0);
}
else
new = (status->unseen > 0);
#ifdef USE_SIDEBAR
if ((inc->new != new) || (inc->msg_count != status->messages) ||
(inc->msg_unread != status->unseen))
{
mutt_menu_set_current_redraw(REDRAW_SIDEBAR);
}
#endif
inc->new = new;
if (new_msg_count)
inc->msg_count = status->messages;
inc->msg_unread = status->unseen;
if (inc->new)
{
/* force back to keep detecting new mail until the mailbox is
opened */
status->uidnext = oldun;
}
FREE(&value);
return;
}
FREE(&value);
}
FREE(&mx.mbox);
}
}
Commit Message: Ensure litlen isn't larger than our mailbox
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static void cmd_parse_status(struct ImapData *idata, char *s)
{
char *value = NULL;
struct Buffy *inc = NULL;
struct ImapMbox mx;
struct ImapStatus *status = NULL;
unsigned int olduv, oldun;
unsigned int litlen;
short new = 0;
short new_msg_count = 0;
char *mailbox = imap_next_word(s);
/* We need a real tokenizer. */
if (imap_get_literal_count(mailbox, &litlen) == 0)
{
if (imap_cmd_step(idata) != IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE)
{
idata->status = IMAP_FATAL;
return;
}
if (strlen(idata->buf) < litlen)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error parsing STATUS mailbox\n");
return;
}
mailbox = idata->buf;
s = mailbox + litlen;
*s = '\0';
s++;
SKIPWS(s);
}
else
{
s = imap_next_word(mailbox);
*(s - 1) = '\0';
imap_unmunge_mbox_name(idata, mailbox);
}
status = imap_mboxcache_get(idata, mailbox, 1);
olduv = status->uidvalidity;
oldun = status->uidnext;
if (*s++ != '(')
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error parsing STATUS\n");
return;
}
while (*s && *s != ')')
{
value = imap_next_word(s);
errno = 0;
const unsigned long ulcount = strtoul(value, &value, 10);
if (((errno == ERANGE) && (ulcount == ULONG_MAX)) || ((unsigned int) ulcount != ulcount))
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error parsing STATUS number\n");
return;
}
const unsigned int count = (unsigned int) ulcount;
if (mutt_str_strncmp("MESSAGES", s, 8) == 0)
{
status->messages = count;
new_msg_count = 1;
}
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("RECENT", s, 6) == 0)
status->recent = count;
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("UIDNEXT", s, 7) == 0)
status->uidnext = count;
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("UIDVALIDITY", s, 11) == 0)
status->uidvalidity = count;
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("UNSEEN", s, 6) == 0)
status->unseen = count;
s = value;
if (*s && *s != ')')
s = imap_next_word(s);
}
mutt_debug(3, "%s (UIDVALIDITY: %u, UIDNEXT: %u) %d messages, %d recent, %d unseen\n",
status->name, status->uidvalidity, status->uidnext,
status->messages, status->recent, status->unseen);
/* caller is prepared to handle the result herself */
if (idata->cmddata && idata->cmdtype == IMAP_CT_STATUS)
{
memcpy(idata->cmddata, status, sizeof(struct ImapStatus));
return;
}
mutt_debug(3, "Running default STATUS handler\n");
/* should perhaps move this code back to imap_buffy_check */
for (inc = Incoming; inc; inc = inc->next)
{
if (inc->magic != MUTT_IMAP)
continue;
if (imap_parse_path(inc->path, &mx) < 0)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error parsing mailbox %s, skipping\n", inc->path);
continue;
}
if (imap_account_match(&idata->conn->account, &mx.account))
{
if (mx.mbox)
{
value = mutt_str_strdup(mx.mbox);
imap_fix_path(idata, mx.mbox, value, mutt_str_strlen(value) + 1);
FREE(&mx.mbox);
}
else
value = mutt_str_strdup("INBOX");
if (value && (imap_mxcmp(mailbox, value) == 0))
{
mutt_debug(3, "Found %s in buffy list (OV: %u ON: %u U: %d)\n", mailbox,
olduv, oldun, status->unseen);
if (MailCheckRecent)
{
if (olduv && olduv == status->uidvalidity)
{
if (oldun < status->uidnext)
new = (status->unseen > 0);
}
else if (!olduv && !oldun)
{
/* first check per session, use recent. might need a flag for this. */
new = (status->recent > 0);
}
else
new = (status->unseen > 0);
}
else
new = (status->unseen > 0);
#ifdef USE_SIDEBAR
if ((inc->new != new) || (inc->msg_count != status->messages) ||
(inc->msg_unread != status->unseen))
{
mutt_menu_set_current_redraw(REDRAW_SIDEBAR);
}
#endif
inc->new = new;
if (new_msg_count)
inc->msg_count = status->messages;
inc->msg_unread = status->unseen;
if (inc->new)
{
/* force back to keep detecting new mail until the mailbox is
opened */
status->uidnext = oldun;
}
FREE(&value);
return;
}
FREE(&value);
}
FREE(&mx.mbox);
}
}
| 169,138
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void V8Window::namedPropertyGetterCustom(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
DOMWindow* window = V8Window::toNative(info.Holder());
if (!window)
return;
Frame* frame = window->frame();
if (!frame)
return;
AtomicString propName = toWebCoreAtomicString(name);
Frame* child = frame->tree().scopedChild(propName);
if (child) {
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, child->domWindow(), window);
return;
}
if (!info.Holder()->GetRealNamedProperty(name).IsEmpty())
return;
Document* doc = frame->document();
if (doc && doc->isHTMLDocument()) {
if (toHTMLDocument(doc)->hasNamedItem(propName.impl()) || doc->hasElementWithId(propName.impl())) {
RefPtr<HTMLCollection> items = doc->windowNamedItems(propName);
if (!items->isEmpty()) {
if (items->hasExactlyOneItem()) {
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, items->item(0), window);
return;
}
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, items.release(), window);
return;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void V8Window::namedPropertyGetterCustom(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
DOMWindow* window = V8Window::toNative(info.Holder());
if (!window)
return;
Frame* frame = window->frame();
if (!frame)
return;
AtomicString propName = toWebCoreAtomicString(name);
Frame* child = frame->tree().scopedChild(propName);
if (child) {
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, child->domWindow(), window);
return;
}
if (!info.Holder()->GetRealNamedProperty(name).IsEmpty())
return;
Document* doc = frame->document();
if (doc && doc->isHTMLDocument()) {
if (toHTMLDocument(doc)->hasNamedItem(propName) || doc->hasElementWithId(propName.impl())) {
RefPtr<HTMLCollection> items = doc->windowNamedItems(propName);
if (!items->isEmpty()) {
if (items->hasExactlyOneItem()) {
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, items->item(0), window);
return;
}
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, items.release(), window);
return;
}
}
}
}
| 171,155
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool asn1_write_DATA_BLOB_LDAPString(struct asn1_data *data, const DATA_BLOB *s)
{
asn1_write(data, s->data, s->length);
return !data->has_error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool asn1_write_DATA_BLOB_LDAPString(struct asn1_data *data, const DATA_BLOB *s)
{
return asn1_write(data, s->data, s->length);
}
| 164,588
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: my_object_increment_val (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
{
obj->val++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
my_object_increment_val (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
| 165,108
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: get_principal_2_svc(gprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gprinc_ret ret;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gprinc_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_get_principal";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (! cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ) &&
(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE,
arg->princ,
NULL))) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_principal(handle, arg->princ, &ret.rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
get_principal_2_svc(gprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gprinc_ret ret;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gprinc_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_get_principal";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (! cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ) &&
(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE,
arg->princ,
NULL))) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_principal(handle, arg->princ, &ret.rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,515
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static Image *ReadRAWImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*canvas_image,
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
/*
Create virtual canvas to support cropping (i.e. image.gray[100x100+10+20]).
*/
canvas_image=CloneImage(image,image->extract_info.width,1,MagickFalse,
exception);
(void) SetImageVirtualPixelMethod(canvas_image,BlackVirtualPixelMethod);
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,canvas_image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
while (image->scene < image_info->scene)
{
/*
Skip to next image.
*/
image->scene++;
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
}
scene=0;
count=0;
length=0;
do
{
/*
Read pixels to virtual canvas image then push to image.
*/
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (scene == 0)
{
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
image->columns,1,exception);
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,image->columns,
1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) || (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,GetPixelRed(p));
SetPixelGreen(q,GetPixelGreen(p));
SetPixelBlue(q,GetPixelBlue(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (count == (ssize_t) length)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
scene++;
} while (count == (ssize_t) length);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
InheritException(&image->exception,&canvas_image->exception);
canvas_image=DestroyImage(canvas_image);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static Image *ReadRAWImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*canvas_image,
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
/*
Create virtual canvas to support cropping (i.e. image.gray[100x100+10+20]).
*/
canvas_image=CloneImage(image,image->extract_info.width,1,MagickFalse,
exception);
(void) SetImageVirtualPixelMethod(canvas_image,BlackVirtualPixelMethod);
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,canvas_image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
while (image->scene < image_info->scene)
{
/*
Skip to next image.
*/
image->scene++;
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
}
scene=0;
count=0;
length=0;
do
{
/*
Read pixels to virtual canvas image then push to image.
*/
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (scene == 0)
{
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
image->columns,1,exception);
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,image->columns,
1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) || (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,GetPixelRed(p));
SetPixelGreen(q,GetPixelGreen(p));
SetPixelBlue(q,GetPixelBlue(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (count == (ssize_t) length)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
scene++;
} while (count == (ssize_t) length);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
InheritException(&image->exception,&canvas_image->exception);
canvas_image=DestroyImage(canvas_image);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 168,596
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static long vhost_net_set_backend(struct vhost_net *n, unsigned index, int fd)
{
struct socket *sock, *oldsock;
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq;
struct vhost_net_ubuf_ref *ubufs, *oldubufs = NULL;
int r;
mutex_lock(&n->dev.mutex);
r = vhost_dev_check_owner(&n->dev);
if (r)
goto err;
if (index >= VHOST_NET_VQ_MAX) {
r = -ENOBUFS;
goto err;
}
vq = &n->vqs[index].vq;
nvq = &n->vqs[index];
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
/* Verify that ring has been setup correctly. */
if (!vhost_vq_access_ok(vq)) {
r = -EFAULT;
goto err_vq;
}
sock = get_socket(fd);
if (IS_ERR(sock)) {
r = PTR_ERR(sock);
goto err_vq;
}
/* start polling new socket */
oldsock = rcu_dereference_protected(vq->private_data,
lockdep_is_held(&vq->mutex));
if (sock != oldsock) {
ubufs = vhost_net_ubuf_alloc(vq,
sock && vhost_sock_zcopy(sock));
if (IS_ERR(ubufs)) {
r = PTR_ERR(ubufs);
goto err_ubufs;
}
vhost_net_disable_vq(n, vq);
rcu_assign_pointer(vq->private_data, sock);
r = vhost_init_used(vq);
if (r)
goto err_used;
r = vhost_net_enable_vq(n, vq);
if (r)
goto err_used;
oldubufs = nvq->ubufs;
nvq->ubufs = ubufs;
n->tx_packets = 0;
n->tx_zcopy_err = 0;
n->tx_flush = false;
}
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
if (oldubufs) {
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait(oldubufs);
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
vhost_zerocopy_signal_used(n, vq);
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
}
if (oldsock) {
vhost_net_flush_vq(n, index);
fput(oldsock->file);
}
mutex_unlock(&n->dev.mutex);
return 0;
err_used:
rcu_assign_pointer(vq->private_data, oldsock);
vhost_net_enable_vq(n, vq);
if (ubufs)
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait(ubufs);
err_ubufs:
fput(sock->file);
err_vq:
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
err:
mutex_unlock(&n->dev.mutex);
return r;
}
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <asias@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static long vhost_net_set_backend(struct vhost_net *n, unsigned index, int fd)
{
struct socket *sock, *oldsock;
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq;
struct vhost_net_ubuf_ref *ubufs, *oldubufs = NULL;
int r;
mutex_lock(&n->dev.mutex);
r = vhost_dev_check_owner(&n->dev);
if (r)
goto err;
if (index >= VHOST_NET_VQ_MAX) {
r = -ENOBUFS;
goto err;
}
vq = &n->vqs[index].vq;
nvq = &n->vqs[index];
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
/* Verify that ring has been setup correctly. */
if (!vhost_vq_access_ok(vq)) {
r = -EFAULT;
goto err_vq;
}
sock = get_socket(fd);
if (IS_ERR(sock)) {
r = PTR_ERR(sock);
goto err_vq;
}
/* start polling new socket */
oldsock = rcu_dereference_protected(vq->private_data,
lockdep_is_held(&vq->mutex));
if (sock != oldsock) {
ubufs = vhost_net_ubuf_alloc(vq,
sock && vhost_sock_zcopy(sock));
if (IS_ERR(ubufs)) {
r = PTR_ERR(ubufs);
goto err_ubufs;
}
vhost_net_disable_vq(n, vq);
rcu_assign_pointer(vq->private_data, sock);
r = vhost_init_used(vq);
if (r)
goto err_used;
r = vhost_net_enable_vq(n, vq);
if (r)
goto err_used;
oldubufs = nvq->ubufs;
nvq->ubufs = ubufs;
n->tx_packets = 0;
n->tx_zcopy_err = 0;
n->tx_flush = false;
}
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
if (oldubufs) {
vhost_net_ubuf_put_wait_and_free(oldubufs);
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
vhost_zerocopy_signal_used(n, vq);
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
}
if (oldsock) {
vhost_net_flush_vq(n, index);
fput(oldsock->file);
}
mutex_unlock(&n->dev.mutex);
return 0;
err_used:
rcu_assign_pointer(vq->private_data, oldsock);
vhost_net_enable_vq(n, vq);
if (ubufs)
vhost_net_ubuf_put_wait_and_free(ubufs);
err_ubufs:
fput(sock->file);
err_vq:
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
err:
mutex_unlock(&n->dev.mutex);
return r;
}
| 166,020
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parse3GPPMetaData(off64_t offset, size_t size, int depth) {
if (size < 4 || size == SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + 1];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
offset, buffer, size) != (ssize_t)size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t metadataKey = 0;
switch (mPath[depth]) {
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyTitle;
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyArtist;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyWriter;
break;
}
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyGenre;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
{
if (buffer[size - 1] != '\0') {
char tmp[4];
sprintf(tmp, "%u", buffer[size - 1]);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyCDTrackNumber, tmp);
}
metadataKey = kKeyAlbum;
break;
}
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
char tmp[5];
uint16_t year = U16_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (year < 10000) {
sprintf(tmp, "%u", year);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyYear, tmp);
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (metadataKey > 0) {
bool isUTF8 = true; // Common case
char16_t *framedata = NULL;
int len16 = 0; // Number of UTF-16 characters
if (size - 6 >= 4) {
len16 = ((size - 6) / 2) - 1; // don't include 0x0000 terminator
framedata = (char16_t *)(buffer + 6);
if (0xfffe == *framedata) {
for (int i = 0; i < len16; i++) {
framedata[i] = bswap_16(framedata[i]);
}
}
if (0xfeff == *framedata) {
framedata++;
len16--;
isUTF8 = false;
}
}
if (isUTF8) {
buffer[size] = 0;
mFileMetaData->setCString(metadataKey, (const char *)buffer + 6);
} else {
String8 tmpUTF8str(framedata, len16);
mFileMetaData->setCString(metadataKey, tmpUTF8str.string());
}
}
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Prevent integer underflow if size is below 6
When processing 3GPP metadata, a subtraction operation may underflow and
lead to a rather large linear byteswap operation in the subsequent
framedata decoding code. Bound the 'size' value to prevent this from
occurring.
Bug: 20923261
Change-Id: I35dfbc8878c6b65cfe8b8adb7351a77ad4d604e5
(cherry picked from commit 9458e715d391ee8fe455fc31f07ff35ce12e0531)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
status_t MPEG4Extractor::parse3GPPMetaData(off64_t offset, size_t size, int depth) {
if (size < 4 || size == SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + 1];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
offset, buffer, size) != (ssize_t)size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t metadataKey = 0;
switch (mPath[depth]) {
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyTitle;
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyArtist;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyWriter;
break;
}
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyGenre;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
{
if (buffer[size - 1] != '\0') {
char tmp[4];
sprintf(tmp, "%u", buffer[size - 1]);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyCDTrackNumber, tmp);
}
metadataKey = kKeyAlbum;
break;
}
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
char tmp[5];
uint16_t year = U16_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (year < 10000) {
sprintf(tmp, "%u", year);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyYear, tmp);
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (metadataKey > 0) {
bool isUTF8 = true; // Common case
char16_t *framedata = NULL;
int len16 = 0; // Number of UTF-16 characters
if (size < 6) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size - 6 >= 4) {
len16 = ((size - 6) / 2) - 1; // don't include 0x0000 terminator
framedata = (char16_t *)(buffer + 6);
if (0xfffe == *framedata) {
for (int i = 0; i < len16; i++) {
framedata[i] = bswap_16(framedata[i]);
}
}
if (0xfeff == *framedata) {
framedata++;
len16--;
isUTF8 = false;
}
}
if (isUTF8) {
buffer[size] = 0;
mFileMetaData->setCString(metadataKey, (const char *)buffer + 6);
} else {
String8 tmpUTF8str(framedata, len16);
mFileMetaData->setCString(metadataKey, tmpUTF8str.string());
}
}
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
| 173,367
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ProcessBackingStore(HeapObjectHeader* header) {
EXPECT_TRUE(header->IsValid());
EXPECT_TRUE(header->IsMarked());
header->Unmark();
ThreadHeap::GcInfo(header->GcInfoIndex())->trace_(this, header->Payload());
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
void ProcessBackingStore(HeapObjectHeader* header) {
EXPECT_TRUE(header->IsValid());
EXPECT_TRUE(header->IsMarked());
header->Unmark();
GCInfoTable::Get()
.GCInfoFromIndex(header->GcInfoIndex())
->trace_(this, header->Payload());
}
| 173,140
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool GetURLRowForAutocompleteMatch(Profile* profile,
const AutocompleteMatch& match,
history::URLRow* url_row) {
DCHECK(url_row);
HistoryService* history_service =
profile->GetHistoryService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (!history_service)
return false;
history::URLDatabase* url_db = history_service->InMemoryDatabase();
return url_db && (url_db->GetRowForURL(match.destination_url, url_row) != 0);
}
Commit Message: Removing dead code from NetworkActionPredictor.
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358062
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121926 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool GetURLRowForAutocompleteMatch(Profile* profile,
| 170,958
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void vmacache_flush_all(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct task_struct *g, *p;
count_vm_vmacache_event(VMACACHE_FULL_FLUSHES);
/*
* Single threaded tasks need not iterate the entire
* list of process. We can avoid the flushing as well
* since the mm's seqnum was increased and don't have
* to worry about other threads' seqnum. Current's
* flush will occur upon the next lookup.
*/
if (atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) == 1)
return;
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_process_thread(g, p) {
/*
* Only flush the vmacache pointers as the
* mm seqnum is already set and curr's will
* be set upon invalidation when the next
* lookup is done.
*/
if (mm == p->mm)
vmacache_flush(p);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: mm: get rid of vmacache_flush_all() entirely
Jann Horn points out that the vmacache_flush_all() function is not only
potentially expensive, it's buggy too. It also happens to be entirely
unnecessary, because the sequence number overflow case can be avoided by
simply making the sequence number be 64-bit. That doesn't even grow the
data structures in question, because the other adjacent fields are
already 64-bit.
So simplify the whole thing by just making the sequence number overflow
case go away entirely, which gets rid of all the complications and makes
the code faster too. Win-win.
[ Oleg Nesterov points out that the VMACACHE_FULL_FLUSHES statistics
also just goes away entirely with this ]
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void vmacache_flush_all(struct mm_struct *mm)
| 169,027
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const AXObject* AXObject::ariaHiddenRoot() const {
for (const AXObject* object = this; object; object = object->parentObject()) {
if (equalIgnoringCase(object->getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "true"))
return object;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
const AXObject* AXObject::ariaHiddenRoot() const {
for (const AXObject* object = this; object; object = object->parentObject()) {
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(object->getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "true"))
return object;
}
return 0;
}
| 171,923
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void buf_to_pages(const void *buf, size_t buflen,
struct page **pages, unsigned int *pgbase)
{
const void *p = buf;
*pgbase = offset_in_page(buf);
p -= *pgbase;
while (p < buf + buflen) {
*(pages++) = virt_to_page(p);
p += PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
}
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
static void buf_to_pages(const void *buf, size_t buflen,
| 165,717
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void nfs4_close_sync(struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state, mode_t mode)
{
__nfs4_close(path, state, mode, 1);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
|
void nfs4_close_sync(struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state, mode_t mode)
void nfs4_close_sync(struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state, fmode_t fmode)
{
__nfs4_close(path, state, fmode, 1);
}
| 165,711
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static bool compare_img(const vpx_image_t *img1,
const vpx_image_t *img2) {
bool match = (img1->fmt == img2->fmt) &&
(img1->d_w == img2->d_w) &&
(img1->d_h == img2->d_h);
const unsigned int width_y = img1->d_w;
const unsigned int height_y = img1->d_h;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < height_y; ++i)
match = (memcmp(img1->planes[VPX_PLANE_Y] + i * img1->stride[VPX_PLANE_Y],
img2->planes[VPX_PLANE_Y] + i * img2->stride[VPX_PLANE_Y],
width_y) == 0) && match;
const unsigned int width_uv = (img1->d_w + 1) >> 1;
const unsigned int height_uv = (img1->d_h + 1) >> 1;
for (i = 0; i < height_uv; ++i)
match = (memcmp(img1->planes[VPX_PLANE_U] + i * img1->stride[VPX_PLANE_U],
img2->planes[VPX_PLANE_U] + i * img2->stride[VPX_PLANE_U],
width_uv) == 0) && match;
for (i = 0; i < height_uv; ++i)
match = (memcmp(img1->planes[VPX_PLANE_V] + i * img1->stride[VPX_PLANE_V],
img2->planes[VPX_PLANE_V] + i * img2->stride[VPX_PLANE_V],
width_uv) == 0) && match;
return match;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static bool compare_img(const vpx_image_t *img1,
const vpx_image_t *img2) {
bool match = (img1->fmt == img2->fmt) &&
(img1->cs == img2->cs) &&
(img1->d_w == img2->d_w) &&
(img1->d_h == img2->d_h);
const unsigned int width_y = img1->d_w;
const unsigned int height_y = img1->d_h;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < height_y; ++i)
match = (memcmp(img1->planes[VPX_PLANE_Y] + i * img1->stride[VPX_PLANE_Y],
img2->planes[VPX_PLANE_Y] + i * img2->stride[VPX_PLANE_Y],
width_y) == 0) && match;
const unsigned int width_uv = (img1->d_w + 1) >> 1;
const unsigned int height_uv = (img1->d_h + 1) >> 1;
for (i = 0; i < height_uv; ++i)
match = (memcmp(img1->planes[VPX_PLANE_U] + i * img1->stride[VPX_PLANE_U],
img2->planes[VPX_PLANE_U] + i * img2->stride[VPX_PLANE_U],
width_uv) == 0) && match;
for (i = 0; i < height_uv; ++i)
match = (memcmp(img1->planes[VPX_PLANE_V] + i * img1->stride[VPX_PLANE_V],
img2->planes[VPX_PLANE_V] + i * img2->stride[VPX_PLANE_V],
width_uv) == 0) && match;
return match;
}
| 174,541
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int hns_ppe_get_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)
return ETH_PPE_STATIC_NUM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
int hns_ppe_get_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS || stringset == ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS)
return ETH_PPE_STATIC_NUM;
return 0;
}
| 169,399
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: mobility_opt_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const unsigned len)
{
unsigned i, optlen;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += optlen) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i]);
if (bp[i] == IP6MOPT_PAD1)
optlen = 1;
else {
if (i + 1 < len) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + 1]);
optlen = bp[i + 1] + 2;
}
else
goto trunc;
}
if (i + optlen > len)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + optlen]);
switch (bp[i]) {
case IP6MOPT_PAD1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(pad1)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_PADN:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_REFRESH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_REFRESH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: %u)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]) << 2));
break;
case IP6MOPT_ALTCOA:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_ALTCOA_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(altcoa: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(alt-CoA: %s)", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[i+2])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_NONCEID:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_NONCEID_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: ho=0x%04x co=0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+4])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_AUTH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_AUTH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth)"));
break;
default:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(sopt_type %u: trunc)", bp[i]));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(type-0x%02x: len=%u)", bp[i], bp[i + 1]));
break;
}
}
return 0;
trunc:
return 1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13024/IPv6 mobility: Add a bounds check before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't cause 'tcpdump: pcap_loop: truncated dump file'
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
mobility_opt_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const unsigned len)
{
unsigned i, optlen;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += optlen) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i]);
if (bp[i] == IP6MOPT_PAD1)
optlen = 1;
else {
if (i + 1 < len) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + 1]);
optlen = bp[i + 1] + 2;
}
else
goto trunc;
}
if (i + optlen > len)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + optlen]);
switch (bp[i]) {
case IP6MOPT_PAD1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(pad1)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_PADN:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_REFRESH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_REFRESH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: %u)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]) << 2));
break;
case IP6MOPT_ALTCOA:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_ALTCOA_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(altcoa: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(alt-CoA: %s)", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[i+2])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_NONCEID:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_NONCEID_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+2]);
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: ho=0x%04x co=0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+4])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_AUTH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_AUTH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth)"));
break;
default:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(sopt_type %u: trunc)", bp[i]));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(type-0x%02x: len=%u)", bp[i], bp[i + 1]));
break;
}
}
return 0;
trunc:
return 1;
}
| 167,867
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: OJPEGPreDecode(TIFF* tif, uint16 s)
{
OJPEGState* sp=(OJPEGState*)tif->tif_data;
uint32 m;
if (sp->subsamplingcorrect_done==0)
OJPEGSubsamplingCorrect(tif);
if (sp->readheader_done==0)
{
if (OJPEGReadHeaderInfo(tif)==0)
return(0);
}
if (sp->sos_end[s].log==0)
{
if (OJPEGReadSecondarySos(tif,s)==0)
return(0);
}
if isTiled(tif)
m=tif->tif_curtile;
else
m=tif->tif_curstrip;
if ((sp->writeheader_done!=0) && ((sp->write_cursample!=s) || (sp->write_curstrile>m)))
{
if (sp->libjpeg_session_active!=0)
OJPEGLibjpegSessionAbort(tif);
sp->writeheader_done=0;
}
if (sp->writeheader_done==0)
{
sp->plane_sample_offset=(uint8)s;
sp->write_cursample=s;
sp->write_curstrile=s*tif->tif_dir.td_stripsperimage;
if ((sp->in_buffer_file_pos_log==0) ||
(sp->in_buffer_file_pos-sp->in_buffer_togo!=sp->sos_end[s].in_buffer_file_pos))
{
sp->in_buffer_source=sp->sos_end[s].in_buffer_source;
sp->in_buffer_next_strile=sp->sos_end[s].in_buffer_next_strile;
sp->in_buffer_file_pos=sp->sos_end[s].in_buffer_file_pos;
sp->in_buffer_file_pos_log=0;
sp->in_buffer_file_togo=sp->sos_end[s].in_buffer_file_togo;
sp->in_buffer_togo=0;
sp->in_buffer_cur=0;
}
if (OJPEGWriteHeaderInfo(tif)==0)
return(0);
}
while (sp->write_curstrile<m)
{
if (sp->libjpeg_jpeg_query_style==0)
{
if (OJPEGPreDecodeSkipRaw(tif)==0)
return(0);
}
else
{
if (OJPEGPreDecodeSkipScanlines(tif)==0)
return(0);
}
sp->write_curstrile++;
}
return(1);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure in
OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other issues.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611
CWE ID: CWE-369
|
OJPEGPreDecode(TIFF* tif, uint16 s)
{
OJPEGState* sp=(OJPEGState*)tif->tif_data;
uint32 m;
if (sp->subsamplingcorrect_done==0)
OJPEGSubsamplingCorrect(tif);
if (sp->readheader_done==0)
{
if (OJPEGReadHeaderInfo(tif)==0)
return(0);
}
if (sp->sos_end[s].log==0)
{
if (OJPEGReadSecondarySos(tif,s)==0)
return(0);
}
if isTiled(tif)
m=tif->tif_curtile;
else
m=tif->tif_curstrip;
if ((sp->writeheader_done!=0) && ((sp->write_cursample!=s) || (sp->write_curstrile>m)))
{
if (sp->libjpeg_session_active!=0)
OJPEGLibjpegSessionAbort(tif);
sp->writeheader_done=0;
}
if (sp->writeheader_done==0)
{
sp->plane_sample_offset=(uint8)s;
sp->write_cursample=s;
sp->write_curstrile=s*tif->tif_dir.td_stripsperimage;
if ((sp->in_buffer_file_pos_log==0) ||
(sp->in_buffer_file_pos-sp->in_buffer_togo!=sp->sos_end[s].in_buffer_file_pos))
{
sp->in_buffer_source=sp->sos_end[s].in_buffer_source;
sp->in_buffer_next_strile=sp->sos_end[s].in_buffer_next_strile;
sp->in_buffer_file_pos=sp->sos_end[s].in_buffer_file_pos;
sp->in_buffer_file_pos_log=0;
sp->in_buffer_file_togo=sp->sos_end[s].in_buffer_file_togo;
sp->in_buffer_togo=0;
sp->in_buffer_cur=0;
}
if (OJPEGWriteHeaderInfo(tif)==0)
return(0);
}
while (sp->write_curstrile<m)
{
if (sp->libjpeg_jpeg_query_style==0)
{
if (OJPEGPreDecodeSkipRaw(tif)==0)
return(0);
}
else
{
if (OJPEGPreDecodeSkipScanlines(tif)==0)
return(0);
}
sp->write_curstrile++;
}
sp->decoder_ok = 1;
return(1);
}
| 168,469
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void __kvm_migrate_pit_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_pit *pit = vcpu->kvm->arch.vpit;
struct hrtimer *timer;
if (!kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(vcpu) || !pit)
return;
timer = &pit->pit_state.timer;
if (hrtimer_cancel(timer))
hrtimer_start_expires(timer, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Improve thread safety in pit
There's a race condition in the PIT emulation code in KVM. In
__kvm_migrate_pit_timer the pit_timer object is accessed without
synchronization. If the race condition occurs at the wrong time this
can crash the host kernel.
This fixes CVE-2014-3611.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
void __kvm_migrate_pit_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_pit *pit = vcpu->kvm->arch.vpit;
struct hrtimer *timer;
if (!kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(vcpu) || !pit)
return;
timer = &pit->pit_state.timer;
mutex_lock(&pit->pit_state.lock);
if (hrtimer_cancel(timer))
hrtimer_start_expires(timer, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
mutex_unlock(&pit->pit_state.lock);
}
| 166,347
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void GraphicsContext::drawFocusRing(const Path& path, int width, int offset, const Color& color)
{
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void GraphicsContext::drawFocusRing(const Path& path, int width, int offset, const Color& color)
{
notImplemented();
}
| 170,425
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintTab(gfx::Canvas* canvas, const SkPath& clip) const {
int active_tab_fill_id = 0;
int active_tab_y_inset = 0;
if (tab_->GetThemeProvider()->HasCustomImage(IDR_THEME_TOOLBAR)) {
active_tab_fill_id = IDR_THEME_TOOLBAR;
active_tab_y_inset = GetStrokeThickness(true);
}
if (tab_->IsActive()) {
PaintTabBackground(canvas, true /* active */, active_tab_fill_id,
active_tab_y_inset, nullptr /* clip */);
} else {
PaintInactiveTabBackground(canvas, clip);
const float throb_value = GetThrobValue();
if (throb_value > 0) {
canvas->SaveLayerAlpha(gfx::ToRoundedInt(throb_value * 0xff),
tab_->GetLocalBounds());
PaintTabBackground(canvas, true /* active */, active_tab_fill_id,
active_tab_y_inset, nullptr /* clip */);
canvas->Restore();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void GM2TabStyle::PaintTab(gfx::Canvas* canvas, const SkPath& clip) const {
int active_tab_fill_id = 0;
int active_tab_y_inset = 0;
if (tab_->GetThemeProvider()->HasCustomImage(IDR_THEME_TOOLBAR)) {
active_tab_fill_id = IDR_THEME_TOOLBAR;
active_tab_y_inset = GetStrokeThickness(true);
}
if (tab_->IsActive()) {
PaintTabBackground(canvas, TAB_ACTIVE, active_tab_fill_id,
active_tab_y_inset, nullptr /* clip */);
} else {
PaintInactiveTabBackground(canvas, clip);
const float throb_value = GetThrobValue();
if (throb_value > 0) {
canvas->SaveLayerAlpha(gfx::ToRoundedInt(throb_value * 0xff),
tab_->GetLocalBounds());
PaintTabBackground(canvas, TAB_ACTIVE, active_tab_fill_id,
active_tab_y_inset, nullptr /* clip */);
canvas->Restore();
}
}
}
| 172,524
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: selaGetCombName(SELA *sela,
l_int32 size,
l_int32 direction)
{
char *selname;
char combname[L_BUF_SIZE];
l_int32 i, nsels, sx, sy, found;
SEL *sel;
PROCNAME("selaGetCombName");
if (!sela)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sela not defined", procName, NULL);
if (direction != L_HORIZ && direction != L_VERT)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("invalid direction", procName, NULL);
/* Derive the comb name we're looking for */
if (direction == L_HORIZ)
snprintf(combname, L_BUF_SIZE, "sel_comb_%dh", size);
else /* direction == L_VERT */
snprintf(combname, L_BUF_SIZE, "sel_comb_%dv", size);
found = FALSE;
nsels = selaGetCount(sela);
for (i = 0; i < nsels; i++) {
sel = selaGetSel(sela, i);
selGetParameters(sel, &sy, &sx, NULL, NULL);
if (sy != 1 && sx != 1) /* 2-D; not a comb */
continue;
selname = selGetName(sel);
if (!strcmp(selname, combname)) {
found = TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (found)
return stringNew(selname);
else
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sel not found", procName, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
selaGetCombName(SELA *sela,
l_int32 size,
l_int32 direction)
{
char *selname;
char combname[L_BUFSIZE];
l_int32 i, nsels, sx, sy, found;
SEL *sel;
PROCNAME("selaGetCombName");
if (!sela)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sela not defined", procName, NULL);
if (direction != L_HORIZ && direction != L_VERT)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("invalid direction", procName, NULL);
/* Derive the comb name we're looking for */
if (direction == L_HORIZ)
snprintf(combname, L_BUFSIZE, "sel_comb_%dh", size);
else /* direction == L_VERT */
snprintf(combname, L_BUFSIZE, "sel_comb_%dv", size);
found = FALSE;
nsels = selaGetCount(sela);
for (i = 0; i < nsels; i++) {
sel = selaGetSel(sela, i);
selGetParameters(sel, &sy, &sx, NULL, NULL);
if (sy != 1 && sx != 1) /* 2-D; not a comb */
continue;
selname = selGetName(sel);
if (!strcmp(selname, combname)) {
found = TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (found)
return stringNew(selname);
else
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sel not found", procName, NULL);
}
| 169,330
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
(BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
verbose("BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM &&
BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) {
verbose("BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
struct bpf_map *map;
struct fd f;
if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
insn[1].off != 0) {
verbose("invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn->src_reg == 0)
/* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
goto next_insn;
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
verbose("unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
f = fdget(insn->imm);
map = __bpf_map_get(f);
if (IS_ERR(map)) {
verbose("fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
insn->imm);
fdput(f);
return PTR_ERR(map);
}
/* store map pointer inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
insn[0].imm = (u32) (unsigned long) map;
insn[1].imm = ((u64) (unsigned long) map) >> 32;
/* check whether we recorded this map already */
for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++)
if (env->used_maps[j] == map) {
fdput(f);
goto next_insn;
}
if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
fdput(f);
return -E2BIG;
}
/* remember this map */
env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
/* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
* the map will be released by release_maps() or it
* will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
* and all maps are released in free_bpf_prog_info()
*/
bpf_map_inc(map, false);
fdput(f);
next_insn:
insn++;
i++;
}
}
/* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid
* 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd.
* These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access.
*/
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix double-fdput in replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr()
When bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD, ...) was invoked with a BPF program whose bytecode
references a non-map file descriptor as a map file descriptor, the error
handling code called fdput() twice instead of once (in __bpf_map_get() and
in replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr()). If the file descriptor table of the
current task is shared, this causes f_count to be decremented too much,
allowing the struct file to be freed while it is still in use
(use-after-free). This can be exploited to gain root privileges by an
unprivileged user.
This bug was introduced in
commit 0246e64d9a5f ("bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn"), but is only
exploitable since
commit 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") because
previously, CAP_SYS_ADMIN was required to reach the vulnerable code.
(posted publicly according to request by maintainer)
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
|
static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
(BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
verbose("BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM &&
BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) {
verbose("BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
struct bpf_map *map;
struct fd f;
if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
insn[1].off != 0) {
verbose("invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn->src_reg == 0)
/* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
goto next_insn;
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
verbose("unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
f = fdget(insn->imm);
map = __bpf_map_get(f);
if (IS_ERR(map)) {
verbose("fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
insn->imm);
return PTR_ERR(map);
}
/* store map pointer inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
insn[0].imm = (u32) (unsigned long) map;
insn[1].imm = ((u64) (unsigned long) map) >> 32;
/* check whether we recorded this map already */
for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++)
if (env->used_maps[j] == map) {
fdput(f);
goto next_insn;
}
if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
fdput(f);
return -E2BIG;
}
/* remember this map */
env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
/* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
* the map will be released by release_maps() or it
* will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
* and all maps are released in free_bpf_prog_info()
*/
bpf_map_inc(map, false);
fdput(f);
next_insn:
insn++;
i++;
}
}
/* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid
* 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd.
* These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access.
*/
return 0;
}
| 167,256
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int btsock_thread_exit(int h)
{
if(h < 0 || h >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("invalid bt thread handle:%d", h);
return FALSE;
}
if(ts[h].cmd_fdw == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("cmd socket is not created");
return FALSE;
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_EXIT, 0, 0, 0, 0};
if(send(ts[h].cmd_fdw, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0) == sizeof(cmd))
{
pthread_join(ts[h].thread_id, 0);
pthread_mutex_lock(&thread_slot_lock);
free_thread_slot(h);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&thread_slot_lock);
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
int btsock_thread_exit(int h)
{
if(h < 0 || h >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("invalid bt thread handle:%d", h);
return FALSE;
}
if(ts[h].cmd_fdw == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("cmd socket is not created");
return FALSE;
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_EXIT, 0, 0, 0, 0};
if(TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(ts[h].cmd_fdw, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0)) == sizeof(cmd))
{
pthread_join(ts[h].thread_id, 0);
pthread_mutex_lock(&thread_slot_lock);
free_thread_slot(h);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&thread_slot_lock);
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
| 173,461
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 prog_len,
u32 off, u32 cnt)
{
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data;
if (cnt == 1)
return 0;
new_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * prog_len);
if (!new_data)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off);
memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off,
sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1));
env->insn_aux_data = new_data;
vfree(old_data);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 prog_len,
u32 off, u32 cnt)
{
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data;
int i;
if (cnt == 1)
return 0;
new_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * prog_len);
if (!new_data)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off);
memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off,
sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1));
for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++)
new_data[i].seen = true;
env->insn_aux_data = new_data;
vfree(old_data);
return 0;
}
| 167,637
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
{
char *provider = NULL, *pin;
int r, i, version, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
u_int seconds;
time_t death = 0;
u_char type;
struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
Identity *id;
Idtab *tab;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
switch (type) {
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
death = monotime() + seconds;
break;
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
confirm = 1;
break;
default:
error("process_add_smartcard_key: "
"Unknown constraint type %d", type);
goto send;
}
}
if (lifetime && !death)
death = monotime() + lifetime;
count = pkcs11_add_provider(provider, pin, &keys);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
k = keys[i];
version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
tab = idtab_lookup(version);
if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
id->key = k;
id->provider = xstrdup(provider);
id->comment = xstrdup(provider); /* XXX */
id->death = death;
id->confirm = confirm;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
tab->nentries++;
success = 1;
} else {
sshkey_free(k);
}
keys[i] = NULL;
}
send:
free(pin);
free(provider);
free(keys);
send_status(e, success);
}
Commit Message: add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load (via
ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@
CWE ID: CWE-426
|
process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
{
char *provider = NULL, *pin, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
int r, i, version, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
u_int seconds;
time_t death = 0;
u_char type;
struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
Identity *id;
Idtab *tab;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
switch (type) {
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
death = monotime() + seconds;
break;
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
confirm = 1;
break;
default:
error("process_add_smartcard_key: "
"Unknown constraint type %d", type);
goto send;
}
}
if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
provider, strerror(errno));
goto send;
}
if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, pkcs11_whitelist, 0) != 1) {
verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": "
"provider not whitelisted", canonical_provider);
goto send;
}
debug("%s: add %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
if (lifetime && !death)
death = monotime() + lifetime;
count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
k = keys[i];
version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
tab = idtab_lookup(version);
if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
id->key = k;
id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider); /* XXX */
id->death = death;
id->confirm = confirm;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
tab->nentries++;
success = 1;
} else {
sshkey_free(k);
}
keys[i] = NULL;
}
send:
free(pin);
free(provider);
free(keys);
send_status(e, success);
}
| 168,664
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void HostCache::clear() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
RecordEraseAll(ERASE_CLEAR, base::TimeTicks::Now());
entries_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Add PersistenceDelegate to HostCache
PersistenceDelegate is a new interface for persisting the contents of
the HostCache. This commit includes the interface itself, the logic in
HostCache for interacting with it, and a mock implementation of the
interface for testing. It does not include support for immediate data
removal since that won't be needed for the currently planned use case.
BUG=605149
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2943143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#481015}
CWE ID:
|
void HostCache::clear() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
RecordEraseAll(ERASE_CLEAR, base::TimeTicks::Now());
// Don't bother scheduling a write if there's nothing to clear.
if (size() == 0)
return;
entries_.clear();
if (delegate_)
delegate_->ScheduleWrite();
}
| 172,010
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void FolderHeaderView::ContentsChanged(views::Textfield* sender,
const base::string16& new_contents) {
if (!folder_item_)
return;
folder_item_->RemoveObserver(this);
std::string name = base::UTF16ToUTF8(folder_name_view_->text());
delegate_->SetItemName(folder_item_, name);
folder_item_->AddObserver(this);
Layout();
}
Commit Message: Enforce the maximum length of the folder name in UI.
BUG=355797
R=xiyuan@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/203863005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260156 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void FolderHeaderView::ContentsChanged(views::Textfield* sender,
const base::string16& new_contents) {
if (!folder_item_)
return;
folder_name_view_->Update();
folder_item_->RemoveObserver(this);
// Enforce the maximum folder name length in UI.
std::string name = base::UTF16ToUTF8(
folder_name_view_->text().substr(0, kMaxFolderNameChars));
if (name != folder_item_->name())
delegate_->SetItemName(folder_item_, name);
folder_item_->AddObserver(this);
Layout();
}
| 171,200
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BufferMeta(size_t size)
: mSize(size),
mIsBackup(false) {
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
BufferMeta(size_t size)
BufferMeta(size_t size, OMX_U32 portIndex)
: mSize(size),
mIsBackup(false),
mPortIndex(portIndex) {
}
| 173,522
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool MessageLoop::DoDelayedWork(TimeTicks* next_delayed_work_time) {
if (!nestable_tasks_allowed_ ||
!SweepDelayedWorkQueueAndReturnTrueIfStillHasWork()) {
recent_time_ = *next_delayed_work_time = TimeTicks();
return false;
}
TimeTicks next_run_time = delayed_work_queue_.top().delayed_run_time;
if (next_run_time > recent_time_) {
recent_time_ = TimeTicks::Now(); // Get a better view of Now();
if (next_run_time > recent_time_) {
*next_delayed_work_time = next_run_time;
return false;
}
}
PendingTask pending_task =
std::move(const_cast<PendingTask&>(delayed_work_queue_.top()));
delayed_work_queue_.pop();
if (SweepDelayedWorkQueueAndReturnTrueIfStillHasWork())
*next_delayed_work_time = delayed_work_queue_.top().delayed_run_time;
return DeferOrRunPendingTask(std::move(pending_task));
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID:
|
bool MessageLoop::DoDelayedWork(TimeTicks* next_delayed_work_time) {
if (!NestableTasksAllowed() ||
!SweepDelayedWorkQueueAndReturnTrueIfStillHasWork()) {
recent_time_ = *next_delayed_work_time = TimeTicks();
return false;
}
TimeTicks next_run_time = delayed_work_queue_.top().delayed_run_time;
if (next_run_time > recent_time_) {
recent_time_ = TimeTicks::Now(); // Get a better view of Now();
if (next_run_time > recent_time_) {
*next_delayed_work_time = next_run_time;
return false;
}
}
PendingTask pending_task =
std::move(const_cast<PendingTask&>(delayed_work_queue_.top()));
delayed_work_queue_.pop();
if (SweepDelayedWorkQueueAndReturnTrueIfStillHasWork())
*next_delayed_work_time = delayed_work_queue_.top().delayed_run_time;
return DeferOrRunPendingTask(std::move(pending_task));
}
| 171,863
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool UserActivityDetector::PreHandleMouseEvent(aura::Window* target,
aura::MouseEvent* event) {
MaybeNotify();
return false;
}
Commit Message: ash: Make UserActivityDetector ignore synthetic mouse events
This may have been preventing us from suspending (e.g.
mouse event is synthesized in response to lock window being
shown so Chrome tells powerd that the user is active).
BUG=133419
TEST=added
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10574044
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143437 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79
|
bool UserActivityDetector::PreHandleMouseEvent(aura::Window* target,
aura::MouseEvent* event) {
if (!(event->flags() & ui::EF_IS_SYNTHESIZED))
MaybeNotify();
return false;
}
| 170,720
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static mif_hdr_t *mif_hdr_get(jas_stream_t *in)
{
uchar magicbuf[MIF_MAGICLEN];
char buf[4096];
mif_hdr_t *hdr;
bool done;
jas_tvparser_t *tvp;
int id;
hdr = 0;
tvp = 0;
if (jas_stream_read(in, magicbuf, MIF_MAGICLEN) != MIF_MAGICLEN) {
goto error;
}
if (magicbuf[0] != (MIF_MAGIC >> 24) || magicbuf[1] != ((MIF_MAGIC >> 16) &
0xff) || magicbuf[2] != ((MIF_MAGIC >> 8) & 0xff) || magicbuf[3] !=
(MIF_MAGIC & 0xff)) {
jas_eprintf("error: bad signature\n");
goto error;
}
if (!(hdr = mif_hdr_create(0))) {
goto error;
}
done = false;
do {
if (!mif_getline(in, buf, sizeof(buf))) {
jas_eprintf("mif_getline failed\n");
goto error;
}
if (buf[0] == '\0') {
continue;
}
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("header line: len=%d; %s\n", strlen(buf), buf));
if (!(tvp = jas_tvparser_create(buf))) {
jas_eprintf("jas_tvparser_create failed\n");
goto error;
}
if (jas_tvparser_next(tvp)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get record type\n");
goto error;
}
id = jas_taginfo_nonull(jas_taginfos_lookup(mif_tags2,
jas_tvparser_gettag(tvp)))->id;
jas_tvparser_destroy(tvp);
tvp = 0;
switch (id) {
case MIF_CMPT:
if (mif_process_cmpt(hdr, buf)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get component information\n");
goto error;
}
break;
case MIF_END:
done = 1;
break;
default:
jas_eprintf("invalid header information: %s\n", buf);
goto error;
break;
}
} while (!done);
return hdr;
error:
if (hdr) {
mif_hdr_destroy(hdr);
}
if (tvp) {
jas_tvparser_destroy(tvp);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static mif_hdr_t *mif_hdr_get(jas_stream_t *in)
{
jas_uchar magicbuf[MIF_MAGICLEN];
char buf[4096];
mif_hdr_t *hdr;
bool done;
jas_tvparser_t *tvp;
int id;
hdr = 0;
tvp = 0;
if (jas_stream_read(in, magicbuf, MIF_MAGICLEN) != MIF_MAGICLEN) {
goto error;
}
if (magicbuf[0] != (MIF_MAGIC >> 24) || magicbuf[1] != ((MIF_MAGIC >> 16) &
0xff) || magicbuf[2] != ((MIF_MAGIC >> 8) & 0xff) || magicbuf[3] !=
(MIF_MAGIC & 0xff)) {
jas_eprintf("error: bad signature\n");
goto error;
}
if (!(hdr = mif_hdr_create(0))) {
goto error;
}
done = false;
do {
if (!mif_getline(in, buf, sizeof(buf))) {
jas_eprintf("mif_getline failed\n");
goto error;
}
if (buf[0] == '\0') {
continue;
}
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("header line: len=%d; %s\n", strlen(buf), buf));
if (!(tvp = jas_tvparser_create(buf))) {
jas_eprintf("jas_tvparser_create failed\n");
goto error;
}
if (jas_tvparser_next(tvp)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get record type\n");
goto error;
}
id = jas_taginfo_nonull(jas_taginfos_lookup(mif_tags2,
jas_tvparser_gettag(tvp)))->id;
jas_tvparser_destroy(tvp);
tvp = 0;
switch (id) {
case MIF_CMPT:
if (mif_process_cmpt(hdr, buf)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get component information\n");
goto error;
}
break;
case MIF_END:
done = 1;
break;
default:
jas_eprintf("invalid header information: %s\n", buf);
goto error;
break;
}
} while (!done);
return hdr;
error:
if (hdr) {
mif_hdr_destroy(hdr);
}
if (tvp) {
jas_tvparser_destroy(tvp);
}
return 0;
}
| 168,724
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SetState(MediaStreamType stream_type, MediaRequestState new_state) {
if (stream_type == NUM_MEDIA_TYPES) {
for (int i = MEDIA_NO_SERVICE + 1; i < NUM_MEDIA_TYPES; ++i) {
state_[static_cast<MediaStreamType>(i)] = new_state;
}
} else {
state_[stream_type] = new_state;
}
MediaObserver* media_observer =
GetContentClient()->browser()->GetMediaObserver();
if (!media_observer)
return;
media_observer->OnMediaRequestStateChanged(
target_process_id_, target_frame_id_, page_request_id,
security_origin.GetURL(), stream_type, new_state);
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void SetState(MediaStreamType stream_type, MediaRequestState new_state) {
if (stream_type == NUM_MEDIA_TYPES) {
for (int i = MEDIA_NO_SERVICE + 1; i < NUM_MEDIA_TYPES; ++i) {
state_[static_cast<MediaStreamType>(i)] = new_state;
}
} else {
state_[stream_type] = new_state;
}
MediaObserver* media_observer =
GetContentClient()->browser()->GetMediaObserver();
if (!media_observer)
return;
if (stream_type == NUM_MEDIA_TYPES) {
for (int i = MEDIA_NO_SERVICE + 1; i < NUM_MEDIA_TYPES; ++i) {
media_observer->OnMediaRequestStateChanged(
target_process_id_, target_frame_id_, page_request_id,
security_origin.GetURL(), static_cast<MediaStreamType>(i),
new_state);
}
} else {
media_observer->OnMediaRequestStateChanged(
target_process_id_, target_frame_id_, page_request_id,
security_origin.GetURL(), stream_type, new_state);
}
}
| 172,734
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static struct vrend_linked_shader_program *add_shader_program(struct vrend_context *ctx,
struct vrend_shader *vs,
struct vrend_shader *fs,
struct vrend_shader *gs)
{
struct vrend_linked_shader_program *sprog = CALLOC_STRUCT(vrend_linked_shader_program);
char name[16];
int i;
GLuint prog_id;
GLint lret;
int id;
int last_shader;
if (!sprog)
return NULL;
/* need to rewrite VS code to add interpolation params */
if ((gs && gs->compiled_fs_id != fs->id) ||
(!gs && vs->compiled_fs_id != fs->id)) {
bool ret;
if (gs)
vrend_patch_vertex_shader_interpolants(gs->glsl_prog,
&gs->sel->sinfo,
&fs->sel->sinfo, true, fs->key.flatshade);
else
vrend_patch_vertex_shader_interpolants(vs->glsl_prog,
&vs->sel->sinfo,
&fs->sel->sinfo, false, fs->key.flatshade);
ret = vrend_compile_shader(ctx, gs ? gs : vs);
if (ret == false) {
glDeleteShader(gs ? gs->id : vs->id);
free(sprog);
return NULL;
}
if (gs)
gs->compiled_fs_id = fs->id;
else
vs->compiled_fs_id = fs->id;
}
prog_id = glCreateProgram();
glAttachShader(prog_id, vs->id);
if (gs) {
if (gs->id > 0)
glAttachShader(prog_id, gs->id);
set_stream_out_varyings(prog_id, &gs->sel->sinfo);
}
else
set_stream_out_varyings(prog_id, &vs->sel->sinfo);
glAttachShader(prog_id, fs->id);
if (fs->sel->sinfo.num_outputs > 1) {
if (util_blend_state_is_dual(&ctx->sub->blend_state, 0)) {
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 0, 0, "fsout_c0");
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 0, 1, "fsout_c1");
sprog->dual_src_linked = true;
} else {
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 0, 0, "fsout_c0");
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 1, 0, "fsout_c1");
sprog->dual_src_linked = false;
}
} else
sprog->dual_src_linked = false;
if (vrend_state.have_vertex_attrib_binding) {
uint32_t mask = vs->sel->sinfo.attrib_input_mask;
while (mask) {
i = u_bit_scan(&mask);
snprintf(name, 10, "in_%d", i);
glBindAttribLocation(prog_id, i, name);
}
}
glLinkProgram(prog_id);
glGetProgramiv(prog_id, GL_LINK_STATUS, &lret);
if (lret == GL_FALSE) {
char infolog[65536];
int len;
glGetProgramInfoLog(prog_id, 65536, &len, infolog);
fprintf(stderr,"got error linking\n%s\n", infolog);
/* dump shaders */
report_context_error(ctx, VIRGL_ERROR_CTX_ILLEGAL_SHADER, 0);
fprintf(stderr,"vert shader: %d GLSL\n%s\n", vs->id, vs->glsl_prog);
if (gs)
fprintf(stderr,"geom shader: %d GLSL\n%s\n", gs->id, gs->glsl_prog);
fprintf(stderr,"frag shader: %d GLSL\n%s\n", fs->id, fs->glsl_prog);
glDeleteProgram(prog_id);
return NULL;
}
sprog->ss[PIPE_SHADER_FRAGMENT] = fs;
sprog->ss[PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY] = gs;
list_add(&sprog->sl[PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX], &vs->programs);
list_add(&sprog->sl[PIPE_SHADER_FRAGMENT], &fs->programs);
if (gs)
list_add(&sprog->sl[PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY], &gs->programs);
last_shader = gs ? PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY : PIPE_SHADER_FRAGMENT;
sprog->id = prog_id;
list_addtail(&sprog->head, &ctx->sub->programs);
if (fs->key.pstipple_tex)
sprog->fs_stipple_loc = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, "pstipple_sampler");
else
sprog->fs_stipple_loc = -1;
sprog->vs_ws_adjust_loc = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, "winsys_adjust");
for (id = PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX; id <= last_shader; id++) {
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask) {
uint32_t mask = sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask;
int nsamp = util_bitcount(sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask);
int index;
sprog->shadow_samp_mask[id] = sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.shadow_samp_mask;
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.shadow_samp_mask) {
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id] = calloc(nsamp, sizeof(uint32_t));
sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id] = calloc(nsamp, sizeof(uint32_t));
} else {
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id] = sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id] = NULL;
}
sprog->samp_locs[id] = calloc(nsamp, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (sprog->samp_locs[id]) {
const char *prefix = pipe_shader_to_prefix(id);
index = 0;
while(mask) {
i = u_bit_scan(&mask);
snprintf(name, 10, "%ssamp%d", prefix, i);
sprog->samp_locs[id][index] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.shadow_samp_mask & (1 << i)) {
snprintf(name, 14, "%sshadmask%d", prefix, i);
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id][index] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
snprintf(name, 14, "%sshadadd%d", prefix, i);
sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id][index] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
}
index++;
}
}
} else {
sprog->samp_locs[id] = NULL;
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id] = NULL;
sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id] = NULL;
sprog->shadow_samp_mask[id] = 0;
}
sprog->samplers_used_mask[id] = sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask;
}
for (id = PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX; id <= last_shader; id++) {
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_consts) {
sprog->const_locs[id] = calloc(sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_consts, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (sprog->const_locs[id]) {
const char *prefix = pipe_shader_to_prefix(id);
for (i = 0; i < sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_consts; i++) {
snprintf(name, 16, "%sconst0[%d]", prefix, i);
sprog->const_locs[id][i] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
}
}
} else
sprog->const_locs[id] = NULL;
}
if (!vrend_state.have_vertex_attrib_binding) {
if (vs->sel->sinfo.num_inputs) {
sprog->attrib_locs = calloc(vs->sel->sinfo.num_inputs, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (sprog->attrib_locs) {
for (i = 0; i < vs->sel->sinfo.num_inputs; i++) {
snprintf(name, 10, "in_%d", i);
sprog->attrib_locs[i] = glGetAttribLocation(prog_id, name);
}
}
} else
sprog->attrib_locs = NULL;
}
for (id = PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX; id <= last_shader; id++) {
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_ubos) {
const char *prefix = pipe_shader_to_prefix(id);
sprog->ubo_locs[id] = calloc(sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_ubos, sizeof(uint32_t));
for (i = 0; i < sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_ubos; i++) {
snprintf(name, 16, "%subo%d", prefix, i + 1);
sprog->ubo_locs[id][i] = glGetUniformBlockIndex(prog_id, name);
}
} else
sprog->ubo_locs[id] = NULL;
}
if (vs->sel->sinfo.num_ucp) {
for (i = 0; i < vs->sel->sinfo.num_ucp; i++) {
snprintf(name, 10, "clipp[%d]", i);
sprog->clip_locs[i] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
}
}
return sprog;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
|
static struct vrend_linked_shader_program *add_shader_program(struct vrend_context *ctx,
struct vrend_shader *vs,
struct vrend_shader *fs,
struct vrend_shader *gs)
{
struct vrend_linked_shader_program *sprog = CALLOC_STRUCT(vrend_linked_shader_program);
char name[16];
int i;
GLuint prog_id;
GLint lret;
int id;
int last_shader;
if (!sprog)
return NULL;
/* need to rewrite VS code to add interpolation params */
if ((gs && gs->compiled_fs_id != fs->id) ||
(!gs && vs->compiled_fs_id != fs->id)) {
bool ret;
if (gs)
vrend_patch_vertex_shader_interpolants(gs->glsl_prog,
&gs->sel->sinfo,
&fs->sel->sinfo, true, fs->key.flatshade);
else
vrend_patch_vertex_shader_interpolants(vs->glsl_prog,
&vs->sel->sinfo,
&fs->sel->sinfo, false, fs->key.flatshade);
ret = vrend_compile_shader(ctx, gs ? gs : vs);
if (ret == false) {
glDeleteShader(gs ? gs->id : vs->id);
free(sprog);
return NULL;
}
if (gs)
gs->compiled_fs_id = fs->id;
else
vs->compiled_fs_id = fs->id;
}
prog_id = glCreateProgram();
glAttachShader(prog_id, vs->id);
if (gs) {
if (gs->id > 0)
glAttachShader(prog_id, gs->id);
set_stream_out_varyings(prog_id, &gs->sel->sinfo);
}
else
set_stream_out_varyings(prog_id, &vs->sel->sinfo);
glAttachShader(prog_id, fs->id);
if (fs->sel->sinfo.num_outputs > 1) {
if (util_blend_state_is_dual(&ctx->sub->blend_state, 0)) {
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 0, 0, "fsout_c0");
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 0, 1, "fsout_c1");
sprog->dual_src_linked = true;
} else {
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 0, 0, "fsout_c0");
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 1, 0, "fsout_c1");
sprog->dual_src_linked = false;
}
} else
sprog->dual_src_linked = false;
if (vrend_state.have_vertex_attrib_binding) {
uint32_t mask = vs->sel->sinfo.attrib_input_mask;
while (mask) {
i = u_bit_scan(&mask);
snprintf(name, 10, "in_%d", i);
glBindAttribLocation(prog_id, i, name);
}
}
glLinkProgram(prog_id);
glGetProgramiv(prog_id, GL_LINK_STATUS, &lret);
if (lret == GL_FALSE) {
char infolog[65536];
int len;
glGetProgramInfoLog(prog_id, 65536, &len, infolog);
fprintf(stderr,"got error linking\n%s\n", infolog);
/* dump shaders */
report_context_error(ctx, VIRGL_ERROR_CTX_ILLEGAL_SHADER, 0);
fprintf(stderr,"vert shader: %d GLSL\n%s\n", vs->id, vs->glsl_prog);
if (gs)
fprintf(stderr,"geom shader: %d GLSL\n%s\n", gs->id, gs->glsl_prog);
fprintf(stderr,"frag shader: %d GLSL\n%s\n", fs->id, fs->glsl_prog);
glDeleteProgram(prog_id);
free(sprog);
return NULL;
}
sprog->ss[PIPE_SHADER_FRAGMENT] = fs;
sprog->ss[PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY] = gs;
list_add(&sprog->sl[PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX], &vs->programs);
list_add(&sprog->sl[PIPE_SHADER_FRAGMENT], &fs->programs);
if (gs)
list_add(&sprog->sl[PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY], &gs->programs);
last_shader = gs ? PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY : PIPE_SHADER_FRAGMENT;
sprog->id = prog_id;
list_addtail(&sprog->head, &ctx->sub->programs);
if (fs->key.pstipple_tex)
sprog->fs_stipple_loc = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, "pstipple_sampler");
else
sprog->fs_stipple_loc = -1;
sprog->vs_ws_adjust_loc = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, "winsys_adjust");
for (id = PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX; id <= last_shader; id++) {
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask) {
uint32_t mask = sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask;
int nsamp = util_bitcount(sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask);
int index;
sprog->shadow_samp_mask[id] = sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.shadow_samp_mask;
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.shadow_samp_mask) {
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id] = calloc(nsamp, sizeof(uint32_t));
sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id] = calloc(nsamp, sizeof(uint32_t));
} else {
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id] = sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id] = NULL;
}
sprog->samp_locs[id] = calloc(nsamp, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (sprog->samp_locs[id]) {
const char *prefix = pipe_shader_to_prefix(id);
index = 0;
while(mask) {
i = u_bit_scan(&mask);
snprintf(name, 10, "%ssamp%d", prefix, i);
sprog->samp_locs[id][index] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.shadow_samp_mask & (1 << i)) {
snprintf(name, 14, "%sshadmask%d", prefix, i);
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id][index] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
snprintf(name, 14, "%sshadadd%d", prefix, i);
sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id][index] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
}
index++;
}
}
} else {
sprog->samp_locs[id] = NULL;
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id] = NULL;
sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id] = NULL;
sprog->shadow_samp_mask[id] = 0;
}
sprog->samplers_used_mask[id] = sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask;
}
for (id = PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX; id <= last_shader; id++) {
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_consts) {
sprog->const_locs[id] = calloc(sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_consts, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (sprog->const_locs[id]) {
const char *prefix = pipe_shader_to_prefix(id);
for (i = 0; i < sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_consts; i++) {
snprintf(name, 16, "%sconst0[%d]", prefix, i);
sprog->const_locs[id][i] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
}
}
} else
sprog->const_locs[id] = NULL;
}
if (!vrend_state.have_vertex_attrib_binding) {
if (vs->sel->sinfo.num_inputs) {
sprog->attrib_locs = calloc(vs->sel->sinfo.num_inputs, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (sprog->attrib_locs) {
for (i = 0; i < vs->sel->sinfo.num_inputs; i++) {
snprintf(name, 10, "in_%d", i);
sprog->attrib_locs[i] = glGetAttribLocation(prog_id, name);
}
}
} else
sprog->attrib_locs = NULL;
}
for (id = PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX; id <= last_shader; id++) {
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_ubos) {
const char *prefix = pipe_shader_to_prefix(id);
sprog->ubo_locs[id] = calloc(sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_ubos, sizeof(uint32_t));
for (i = 0; i < sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_ubos; i++) {
snprintf(name, 16, "%subo%d", prefix, i + 1);
sprog->ubo_locs[id][i] = glGetUniformBlockIndex(prog_id, name);
}
} else
sprog->ubo_locs[id] = NULL;
}
if (vs->sel->sinfo.num_ucp) {
for (i = 0; i < vs->sel->sinfo.num_ucp; i++) {
snprintf(name, 10, "clipp[%d]", i);
sprog->clip_locs[i] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
}
}
return sprog;
}
| 164,946
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void usage_exit() {
fprintf(stderr,
"Usage: %s <codec> <width> <height> <infile> <outfile> "
"<keyframe-interval> [<error-resilient>]\nSee comments in "
"simple_encoder.c for more information.\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void usage_exit() {
void usage_exit(void) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Usage: %s <codec> <width> <height> <infile> <outfile> "
"<keyframe-interval> [<error-resilient>]\nSee comments in "
"simple_encoder.c for more information.\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
| 174,490
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void NormalPageArena::promptlyFreeObject(HeapObjectHeader* header) {
ASSERT(!getThreadState()->sweepForbidden());
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
Address address = reinterpret_cast<Address>(header);
Address payload = header->payload();
size_t size = header->size();
size_t payloadSize = header->payloadSize();
ASSERT(size > 0);
ASSERT(pageFromObject(address) == findPageFromAddress(address));
{
ThreadState::SweepForbiddenScope forbiddenScope(getThreadState());
header->finalize(payload, payloadSize);
if (address + size == m_currentAllocationPoint) {
m_currentAllocationPoint = address;
setRemainingAllocationSize(m_remainingAllocationSize + size);
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(address, size);
return;
}
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(payload, payloadSize);
header->markPromptlyFreed();
}
m_promptlyFreedSize += size;
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void NormalPageArena::promptlyFreeObject(HeapObjectHeader* header) {
ASSERT(!getThreadState()->sweepForbidden());
header->checkHeader();
Address address = reinterpret_cast<Address>(header);
Address payload = header->payload();
size_t size = header->size();
size_t payloadSize = header->payloadSize();
ASSERT(size > 0);
ASSERT(pageFromObject(address) == findPageFromAddress(address));
{
ThreadState::SweepForbiddenScope forbiddenScope(getThreadState());
header->finalize(payload, payloadSize);
if (address + size == m_currentAllocationPoint) {
m_currentAllocationPoint = address;
setRemainingAllocationSize(m_remainingAllocationSize + size);
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(address, size);
return;
}
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(payload, payloadSize);
header->markPromptlyFreed();
}
m_promptlyFreedSize += size;
}
| 172,714
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void DefragTrackerInit(DefragTracker *dt, Packet *p)
{
/* copy address */
COPY_ADDRESS(&p->src, &dt->src_addr);
COPY_ADDRESS(&p->dst, &dt->dst_addr);
if (PKT_IS_IPV4(p)) {
dt->id = (int32_t)IPV4_GET_IPID(p);
dt->af = AF_INET;
} else {
dt->id = (int32_t)IPV6_EXTHDR_GET_FH_ID(p);
dt->af = AF_INET6;
}
dt->vlan_id[0] = p->vlan_id[0];
dt->vlan_id[1] = p->vlan_id[1];
dt->policy = DefragGetOsPolicy(p);
dt->host_timeout = DefragPolicyGetHostTimeout(p);
dt->remove = 0;
dt->seen_last = 0;
TAILQ_INIT(&dt->frags);
(void) DefragTrackerIncrUsecnt(dt);
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358
|
static void DefragTrackerInit(DefragTracker *dt, Packet *p)
{
/* copy address */
COPY_ADDRESS(&p->src, &dt->src_addr);
COPY_ADDRESS(&p->dst, &dt->dst_addr);
if (PKT_IS_IPV4(p)) {
dt->id = (int32_t)IPV4_GET_IPID(p);
dt->af = AF_INET;
} else {
dt->id = (int32_t)IPV6_EXTHDR_GET_FH_ID(p);
dt->af = AF_INET6;
}
dt->proto = IP_GET_IPPROTO(p);
dt->vlan_id[0] = p->vlan_id[0];
dt->vlan_id[1] = p->vlan_id[1];
dt->policy = DefragGetOsPolicy(p);
dt->host_timeout = DefragPolicyGetHostTimeout(p);
dt->remove = 0;
dt->seen_last = 0;
TAILQ_INIT(&dt->frags);
(void) DefragTrackerIncrUsecnt(dt);
}
| 168,293
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static struct net_device *_init_airo_card( unsigned short irq, int port,
int is_pcmcia, struct pci_dev *pci,
struct device *dmdev )
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct airo_info *ai;
int i, rc;
CapabilityRid cap_rid;
/* Create the network device object. */
dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(*ai), "", ether_setup);
if (!dev) {
airo_print_err("", "Couldn't alloc_etherdev");
return NULL;
}
ai = dev->ml_priv = netdev_priv(dev);
ai->wifidev = NULL;
ai->flags = 1 << FLAG_RADIO_DOWN;
ai->jobs = 0;
ai->dev = dev;
if (pci && (pci->device == 0x5000 || pci->device == 0xa504)) {
airo_print_dbg("", "Found an MPI350 card");
set_bit(FLAG_MPI, &ai->flags);
}
spin_lock_init(&ai->aux_lock);
sema_init(&ai->sem, 1);
ai->config.len = 0;
ai->pci = pci;
init_waitqueue_head (&ai->thr_wait);
ai->tfm = NULL;
add_airo_dev(ai);
if (airo_networks_allocate (ai))
goto err_out_free;
airo_networks_initialize (ai);
skb_queue_head_init (&ai->txq);
/* The Airo-specific entries in the device structure. */
if (test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags))
dev->netdev_ops = &mpi_netdev_ops;
else
dev->netdev_ops = &airo_netdev_ops;
dev->wireless_handlers = &airo_handler_def;
ai->wireless_data.spy_data = &ai->spy_data;
dev->wireless_data = &ai->wireless_data;
dev->irq = irq;
dev->base_addr = port;
SET_NETDEV_DEV(dev, dmdev);
reset_card (dev, 1);
msleep(400);
if (!is_pcmcia) {
if (!request_region(dev->base_addr, 64, DRV_NAME)) {
rc = -EBUSY;
airo_print_err(dev->name, "Couldn't request region");
goto err_out_nets;
}
}
if (test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags)) {
if (mpi_map_card(ai, pci)) {
airo_print_err("", "Could not map memory");
goto err_out_res;
}
}
if (probe) {
if (setup_card(ai, dev->dev_addr, 1) != SUCCESS) {
airo_print_err(dev->name, "MAC could not be enabled" );
rc = -EIO;
goto err_out_map;
}
} else if (!test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags)) {
ai->bap_read = fast_bap_read;
set_bit(FLAG_FLASHING, &ai->flags);
}
strcpy(dev->name, "eth%d");
rc = register_netdev(dev);
if (rc) {
airo_print_err(dev->name, "Couldn't register_netdev");
goto err_out_map;
}
ai->wifidev = init_wifidev(ai, dev);
if (!ai->wifidev)
goto err_out_reg;
rc = readCapabilityRid(ai, &cap_rid, 1);
if (rc != SUCCESS) {
rc = -EIO;
goto err_out_wifi;
}
/* WEP capability discovery */
ai->wep_capable = (cap_rid.softCap & cpu_to_le16(0x02)) ? 1 : 0;
ai->max_wep_idx = (cap_rid.softCap & cpu_to_le16(0x80)) ? 3 : 0;
airo_print_info(dev->name, "Firmware version %x.%x.%02d",
((le16_to_cpu(cap_rid.softVer) >> 8) & 0xF),
(le16_to_cpu(cap_rid.softVer) & 0xFF),
le16_to_cpu(cap_rid.softSubVer));
/* Test for WPA support */
/* Only firmware versions 5.30.17 or better can do WPA */
if (le16_to_cpu(cap_rid.softVer) > 0x530
|| (le16_to_cpu(cap_rid.softVer) == 0x530
&& le16_to_cpu(cap_rid.softSubVer) >= 17)) {
airo_print_info(ai->dev->name, "WPA supported.");
set_bit(FLAG_WPA_CAPABLE, &ai->flags);
ai->bssListFirst = RID_WPA_BSSLISTFIRST;
ai->bssListNext = RID_WPA_BSSLISTNEXT;
ai->bssListRidLen = sizeof(BSSListRid);
} else {
airo_print_info(ai->dev->name, "WPA unsupported with firmware "
"versions older than 5.30.17.");
ai->bssListFirst = RID_BSSLISTFIRST;
ai->bssListNext = RID_BSSLISTNEXT;
ai->bssListRidLen = sizeof(BSSListRid) - sizeof(BSSListRidExtra);
}
set_bit(FLAG_REGISTERED,&ai->flags);
airo_print_info(dev->name, "MAC enabled %pM", dev->dev_addr);
/* Allocate the transmit buffers */
if (probe && !test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags))
for( i = 0; i < MAX_FIDS; i++ )
ai->fids[i] = transmit_allocate(ai,AIRO_DEF_MTU,i>=MAX_FIDS/2);
if (setup_proc_entry(dev, dev->ml_priv) < 0)
goto err_out_wifi;
return dev;
err_out_wifi:
unregister_netdev(ai->wifidev);
free_netdev(ai->wifidev);
err_out_reg:
unregister_netdev(dev);
err_out_map:
if (test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags) && pci) {
pci_free_consistent(pci, PCI_SHARED_LEN, ai->shared, ai->shared_dma);
iounmap(ai->pciaux);
iounmap(ai->pcimem);
mpi_unmap_card(ai->pci);
}
err_out_res:
if (!is_pcmcia)
release_region( dev->base_addr, 64 );
err_out_nets:
airo_networks_free(ai);
err_out_free:
del_airo_dev(ai);
free_netdev(dev);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
static struct net_device *_init_airo_card( unsigned short irq, int port,
int is_pcmcia, struct pci_dev *pci,
struct device *dmdev )
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct airo_info *ai;
int i, rc;
CapabilityRid cap_rid;
/* Create the network device object. */
dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(*ai), "", ether_setup);
if (!dev) {
airo_print_err("", "Couldn't alloc_etherdev");
return NULL;
}
ai = dev->ml_priv = netdev_priv(dev);
ai->wifidev = NULL;
ai->flags = 1 << FLAG_RADIO_DOWN;
ai->jobs = 0;
ai->dev = dev;
if (pci && (pci->device == 0x5000 || pci->device == 0xa504)) {
airo_print_dbg("", "Found an MPI350 card");
set_bit(FLAG_MPI, &ai->flags);
}
spin_lock_init(&ai->aux_lock);
sema_init(&ai->sem, 1);
ai->config.len = 0;
ai->pci = pci;
init_waitqueue_head (&ai->thr_wait);
ai->tfm = NULL;
add_airo_dev(ai);
if (airo_networks_allocate (ai))
goto err_out_free;
airo_networks_initialize (ai);
skb_queue_head_init (&ai->txq);
/* The Airo-specific entries in the device structure. */
if (test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags))
dev->netdev_ops = &mpi_netdev_ops;
else
dev->netdev_ops = &airo_netdev_ops;
dev->wireless_handlers = &airo_handler_def;
ai->wireless_data.spy_data = &ai->spy_data;
dev->wireless_data = &ai->wireless_data;
dev->irq = irq;
dev->base_addr = port;
dev->priv_flags &= ~IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING;
SET_NETDEV_DEV(dev, dmdev);
reset_card (dev, 1);
msleep(400);
if (!is_pcmcia) {
if (!request_region(dev->base_addr, 64, DRV_NAME)) {
rc = -EBUSY;
airo_print_err(dev->name, "Couldn't request region");
goto err_out_nets;
}
}
if (test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags)) {
if (mpi_map_card(ai, pci)) {
airo_print_err("", "Could not map memory");
goto err_out_res;
}
}
if (probe) {
if (setup_card(ai, dev->dev_addr, 1) != SUCCESS) {
airo_print_err(dev->name, "MAC could not be enabled" );
rc = -EIO;
goto err_out_map;
}
} else if (!test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags)) {
ai->bap_read = fast_bap_read;
set_bit(FLAG_FLASHING, &ai->flags);
}
strcpy(dev->name, "eth%d");
rc = register_netdev(dev);
if (rc) {
airo_print_err(dev->name, "Couldn't register_netdev");
goto err_out_map;
}
ai->wifidev = init_wifidev(ai, dev);
if (!ai->wifidev)
goto err_out_reg;
rc = readCapabilityRid(ai, &cap_rid, 1);
if (rc != SUCCESS) {
rc = -EIO;
goto err_out_wifi;
}
/* WEP capability discovery */
ai->wep_capable = (cap_rid.softCap & cpu_to_le16(0x02)) ? 1 : 0;
ai->max_wep_idx = (cap_rid.softCap & cpu_to_le16(0x80)) ? 3 : 0;
airo_print_info(dev->name, "Firmware version %x.%x.%02d",
((le16_to_cpu(cap_rid.softVer) >> 8) & 0xF),
(le16_to_cpu(cap_rid.softVer) & 0xFF),
le16_to_cpu(cap_rid.softSubVer));
/* Test for WPA support */
/* Only firmware versions 5.30.17 or better can do WPA */
if (le16_to_cpu(cap_rid.softVer) > 0x530
|| (le16_to_cpu(cap_rid.softVer) == 0x530
&& le16_to_cpu(cap_rid.softSubVer) >= 17)) {
airo_print_info(ai->dev->name, "WPA supported.");
set_bit(FLAG_WPA_CAPABLE, &ai->flags);
ai->bssListFirst = RID_WPA_BSSLISTFIRST;
ai->bssListNext = RID_WPA_BSSLISTNEXT;
ai->bssListRidLen = sizeof(BSSListRid);
} else {
airo_print_info(ai->dev->name, "WPA unsupported with firmware "
"versions older than 5.30.17.");
ai->bssListFirst = RID_BSSLISTFIRST;
ai->bssListNext = RID_BSSLISTNEXT;
ai->bssListRidLen = sizeof(BSSListRid) - sizeof(BSSListRidExtra);
}
set_bit(FLAG_REGISTERED,&ai->flags);
airo_print_info(dev->name, "MAC enabled %pM", dev->dev_addr);
/* Allocate the transmit buffers */
if (probe && !test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags))
for( i = 0; i < MAX_FIDS; i++ )
ai->fids[i] = transmit_allocate(ai,AIRO_DEF_MTU,i>=MAX_FIDS/2);
if (setup_proc_entry(dev, dev->ml_priv) < 0)
goto err_out_wifi;
return dev;
err_out_wifi:
unregister_netdev(ai->wifidev);
free_netdev(ai->wifidev);
err_out_reg:
unregister_netdev(dev);
err_out_map:
if (test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags) && pci) {
pci_free_consistent(pci, PCI_SHARED_LEN, ai->shared, ai->shared_dma);
iounmap(ai->pciaux);
iounmap(ai->pcimem);
mpi_unmap_card(ai->pci);
}
err_out_res:
if (!is_pcmcia)
release_region( dev->base_addr, 64 );
err_out_nets:
airo_networks_free(ai);
err_out_free:
del_airo_dev(ai);
free_netdev(dev);
return NULL;
}
| 165,733
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static UINT drdynvc_order_recv(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, wStream* s)
{
int value;
int Cmd;
int Sp;
int cbChId;
Stream_Read_UINT8(s, value);
Cmd = (value & 0xf0) >> 4;
Sp = (value & 0x0c) >> 2;
cbChId = (value & 0x03) >> 0;
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_DEBUG, "order_recv: Cmd=0x%x, Sp=%d cbChId=%d", Cmd, Sp, cbChId);
switch (Cmd)
{
case CAPABILITY_REQUEST_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_capability_request(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
case CREATE_REQUEST_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_create_request(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
case DATA_FIRST_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_data_first(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
case DATA_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_data(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
case CLOSE_REQUEST_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_close_request(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
default:
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "unknown drdynvc cmd 0x%x", Cmd);
return ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID:
|
static UINT drdynvc_order_recv(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, wStream* s)
{
int value;
int Cmd;
int Sp;
int cbChId;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 1)
return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
Stream_Read_UINT8(s, value);
Cmd = (value & 0xf0) >> 4;
Sp = (value & 0x0c) >> 2;
cbChId = (value & 0x03) >> 0;
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_DEBUG, "order_recv: Cmd=0x%x, Sp=%d cbChId=%d", Cmd, Sp, cbChId);
switch (Cmd)
{
case CAPABILITY_REQUEST_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_capability_request(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
case CREATE_REQUEST_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_create_request(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
case DATA_FIRST_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_data_first(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
case DATA_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_data(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
case CLOSE_REQUEST_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_close_request(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
default:
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "unknown drdynvc cmd 0x%x", Cmd);
return ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
}
| 168,933
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int BrowserNonClientFrameViewAura::NonClientTopBorderHeight(
bool force_restored) const {
if (frame()->widget_delegate() &&
frame()->widget_delegate()->ShouldShowWindowTitle()) {
return close_button_->bounds().bottom();
}
if (!frame()->IsMaximized() || force_restored)
return kTabstripTopSpacingRestored;
return kTabstripTopSpacingMaximized;
}
Commit Message: Ash: Fix fullscreen window bounds
I was computing the non-client frame top border height incorrectly for fullscreen windows, so it was trying to draw a few pixels of transparent non-client border.
BUG=118774
TEST=visual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9810014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@128014 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
int BrowserNonClientFrameViewAura::NonClientTopBorderHeight(
bool force_restored) const {
if (force_restored)
return kTabstripTopSpacingRestored;
if (frame()->IsFullscreen())
return 0;
if (frame()->IsMaximized())
return kTabstripTopSpacingMaximized;
if (frame()->widget_delegate() &&
frame()->widget_delegate()->ShouldShowWindowTitle()) {
return close_button_->bounds().bottom();
}
return kTabstripTopSpacingRestored;
}
| 171,004
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ScopedRequest(PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper* owner,
const Delegate::EnumerateDevicesCallback& callback)
: owner_(owner),
callback_(callback),
requested_(false),
request_id_(0),
sync_call_(false) {
if (!owner_->document_url_.is_valid())
return;
requested_ = true;
sync_call_ = true;
request_id_ = owner_->delegate_->EnumerateDevices(
owner_->device_type_,
owner_->document_url_,
base::Bind(&ScopedRequest::EnumerateDevicesCallbackBody, AsWeakPtr()));
sync_call_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
ScopedRequest(PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper* owner,
const Delegate::EnumerateDevicesCallback& callback)
: owner_(owner),
callback_(callback),
requested_(false),
request_id_(0),
sync_call_(false) {
if (!owner_->document_url_.is_valid())
return;
requested_ = true;
sync_call_ = true;
DCHECK(owner_->delegate_);
request_id_ = owner_->delegate_->EnumerateDevices(
owner_->device_type_,
owner_->document_url_,
base::Bind(&ScopedRequest::EnumerateDevicesCallbackBody, AsWeakPtr()));
sync_call_ = false;
}
| 171,605
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int get_int32_le(QEMUFile *f, void *pv, size_t size)
{
int32_t loaded;
int32_t loaded;
qemu_get_sbe32s(f, &loaded);
if (loaded <= *cur) {
*cur = loaded;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int get_int32_le(QEMUFile *f, void *pv, size_t size)
{
int32_t loaded;
int32_t loaded;
qemu_get_sbe32s(f, &loaded);
if (loaded >= 0 && loaded <= *cur) {
*cur = loaded;
return 0;
}
}
| 165,359
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int cdc_ncm_bind(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf)
{
int ret;
/* MBIM backwards compatible function? */
if (cdc_ncm_select_altsetting(intf) != CDC_NCM_COMM_ALTSETTING_NCM)
return -ENODEV;
/* The NCM data altsetting is fixed, so we hard-coded it.
* Additionally, generic NCM devices are assumed to accept arbitrarily
* placed NDP.
*/
ret = cdc_ncm_bind_common(dev, intf, CDC_NCM_DATA_ALTSETTING_NCM, 0);
/*
* We should get an event when network connection is "connected" or
* "disconnected". Set network connection in "disconnected" state
* (carrier is OFF) during attach, so the IP network stack does not
* start IPv6 negotiation and more.
*/
usbnet_link_change(dev, 0, 0);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
|
static int cdc_ncm_bind(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf)
{
/* MBIM backwards compatible function? */
if (cdc_ncm_select_altsetting(intf) != CDC_NCM_COMM_ALTSETTING_NCM)
return -ENODEV;
/* The NCM data altsetting is fixed, so we hard-coded it.
* Additionally, generic NCM devices are assumed to accept arbitrarily
* placed NDP.
*/
return cdc_ncm_bind_common(dev, intf, CDC_NCM_DATA_ALTSETTING_NCM, 0);
}
| 167,323
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(xml_parser_create)
{
php_xml_parser_create_impl(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
PHP_FUNCTION(xml_parser_create)
{
php_xml_parser_create_impl(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 0);
}
| 165,035
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void nsc_rle_decode(BYTE* in, BYTE* out, UINT32 originalSize)
{
UINT32 len;
UINT32 left;
BYTE value;
left = originalSize;
while (left > 4)
{
value = *in++;
if (left == 5)
{
*out++ = value;
left--;
}
else if (value == *in)
{
in++;
if (*in < 0xFF)
{
len = (UINT32) * in++;
len += 2;
}
else
{
in++;
len = *((UINT32*) in);
in += 4;
}
FillMemory(out, len, value);
out += len;
left -= len;
}
else
{
*out++ = value;
left--;
}
}
*((UINT32*)out) = *((UINT32*)in);
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
static void nsc_rle_decode(BYTE* in, BYTE* out, UINT32 originalSize)
static BOOL nsc_rle_decode(BYTE* in, BYTE* out, UINT32 outSize, UINT32 originalSize)
{
UINT32 len;
UINT32 left;
BYTE value;
left = originalSize;
while (left > 4)
{
value = *in++;
if (left == 5)
{
if (outSize < 1)
return FALSE;
outSize--;
*out++ = value;
left--;
}
else if (value == *in)
{
in++;
if (*in < 0xFF)
{
len = (UINT32) * in++;
len += 2;
}
else
{
in++;
len = *((UINT32*) in);
in += 4;
}
if (outSize < len)
return FALSE;
outSize -= len;
FillMemory(out, len, value);
out += len;
left -= len;
}
else
{
if (outSize < 1)
return FALSE;
outSize--;
*out++ = value;
left--;
}
}
if ((outSize < 4) || (left < 4))
return FALSE;
memcpy(out, in, 4);
return TRUE;
}
| 169,284
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PP_Resource ResourceTracker::AddResource(Resource* resource) {
if (last_resource_id_ ==
(std::numeric_limits<PP_Resource>::max() >> kPPIdTypeBits))
return 0;
PP_Resource new_id = MakeTypedId(++last_resource_id_, PP_ID_TYPE_RESOURCE);
live_resources_.insert(std::make_pair(new_id, std::make_pair(resource, 1)));
PP_Instance pp_instance = resource->instance()->pp_instance();
DCHECK(instance_map_.find(pp_instance) != instance_map_.end());
instance_map_[pp_instance]->resources.insert(new_id);
return new_id;
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
PP_Resource ResourceTracker::AddResource(Resource* resource) {
if (last_resource_id_ ==
(std::numeric_limits<PP_Resource>::max() >> kPPIdTypeBits))
return 0;
PP_Resource new_id = MakeTypedId(++last_resource_id_, PP_ID_TYPE_RESOURCE);
live_resources_.insert(std::make_pair(new_id, std::make_pair(resource, 1)));
PP_Instance pp_instance = resource->instance()->pp_instance();
DCHECK(instance_map_.find(pp_instance) != instance_map_.end());
instance_map_[pp_instance]->ref_resources.insert(new_id);
return new_id;
}
| 170,416
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_@_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, char *name, size_t sizeof_name,
size_t *pos, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
*pos = safecat(name, sizeof_name, *pos, " +@");
return 1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_transform_png_set_@_add(image_transform *this,
| 173,600
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterPSImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPI");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString(
"Encapsulated PostScript Interchange format");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPS");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Encapsulated PostScript");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPSF");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Encapsulated PostScript");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPSI");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString(
"Encapsulated PostScript Interchange format");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("PS");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("PostScript");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/715
CWE ID: CWE-834
|
ModuleExport size_t RegisterPSImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPI");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString(
"Encapsulated PostScript Interchange format");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPS");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Encapsulated PostScript");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPSF");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Encapsulated PostScript");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPSI");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString(
"Encapsulated PostScript Interchange format");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("PS");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("PostScript");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
| 167,763
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Document::open(Document* entered_document,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (ImportLoader()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError, "Imported document doesn't support open().");
return;
}
if (!IsHTMLDocument()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(kInvalidStateError,
"Only HTML documents support open().");
return;
}
if (throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError,
"Custom Element constructor should not use open().");
return;
}
if (entered_document) {
if (!GetSecurityOrigin()->IsSameSchemeHostPortAndSuborigin(
entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin())) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"Can only call open() on same-origin documents.");
return;
}
SetSecurityOrigin(entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin());
if (this != entered_document) {
KURL new_url = entered_document->Url();
new_url.SetFragmentIdentifier(String());
SetURL(new_url);
}
cookie_url_ = entered_document->CookieURL();
}
open();
}
Commit Message: Inherit referrer and policy when creating a nested browsing context
BUG=763194
R=estark@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ide3950269adf26ba221f573dfa088e95291ab676
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/732652
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark <estark@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511211}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void Document::open(Document* entered_document,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (ImportLoader()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError, "Imported document doesn't support open().");
return;
}
if (!IsHTMLDocument()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(kInvalidStateError,
"Only HTML documents support open().");
return;
}
if (throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError,
"Custom Element constructor should not use open().");
return;
}
if (entered_document) {
if (!GetSecurityOrigin()->IsSameSchemeHostPortAndSuborigin(
entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin())) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"Can only call open() on same-origin documents.");
return;
}
SetSecurityOrigin(entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin());
if (this != entered_document) {
KURL new_url = entered_document->Url();
new_url.SetFragmentIdentifier(String());
SetURL(new_url);
SetReferrerPolicy(entered_document->GetReferrerPolicy());
}
cookie_url_ = entered_document->CookieURL();
}
open();
}
| 172,691
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
char buff[1024];
int fd, nr, nw;
if (argc < 2) {
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: %s output-filename\n"
" %s |output-command\n"
" %s :host:port\n", argv[0], argv[0], argv[0]);
return 1;
}
fd = open_gen_fd(argv[1]);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("open_gen_fd");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
while ((nr = read(0, buff, sizeof (buff))) != 0) {
if (nr < 0) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
perror("read");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
nw = write(fd, buff, nr);
if (nw < 0) {
perror("write");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: misc oom and possible memory leak fix
CWE ID:
|
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
char buff[1024];
int fd, nr, nw;
if (argc < 2) {
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: %s output-filename\n"
" %s |output-command\n"
" %s :host:port\n", argv[0], argv[0], argv[0]);
return 1;
}
fd = open_gen_fd(argv[1]);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("open_gen_fd");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
while ((nr = read(0, buff, sizeof (buff))) != 0) {
if (nr < 0) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
perror("read");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
nw = write(fd, buff, nr);
if (nw < 0) {
perror("write");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
close(fd);
return 0;
}
| 169,758
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PrintViewManagerBase::PrintViewManagerBase(content::WebContents* web_contents)
: PrintManager(web_contents),
printing_rfh_(nullptr),
printing_succeeded_(false),
inside_inner_message_loop_(false),
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
expecting_first_page_(true),
#endif
queue_(g_browser_process->print_job_manager()->queue()) {
DCHECK(queue_.get());
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
printing_enabled_.Init(
prefs::kPrintingEnabled, profile->GetPrefs(),
base::Bind(&PrintViewManagerBase::UpdatePrintingEnabled,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
PrintViewManagerBase::PrintViewManagerBase(content::WebContents* web_contents)
: PrintManager(web_contents),
printing_rfh_(nullptr),
printing_succeeded_(false),
inside_inner_message_loop_(false),
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
expecting_first_page_(true),
#endif
queue_(g_browser_process->print_job_manager()->queue()),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(queue_.get());
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
printing_enabled_.Init(
prefs::kPrintingEnabled, profile->GetPrefs(),
base::Bind(&PrintViewManagerBase::UpdatePrintingEnabled,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 171,893
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fputcsv)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char delimiter = intern->u.file.delimiter, enclosure = intern->u.file.enclosure, escape = intern->u.file.escape;
char *delim = NULL, *enclo = NULL, *esc = NULL;
int d_len = 0, e_len = 0, esc_len = 0, ret;
zval *fields = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "a|sss", &fields, &delim, &d_len, &enclo, &e_len, &esc, &esc_len) == SUCCESS) {
switch(ZEND_NUM_ARGS())
{
case 4:
if (esc_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "escape must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
escape = esc[0];
/* no break */
case 3:
if (e_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "enclosure must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
enclosure = enclo[0];
/* no break */
case 2:
if (d_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "delimiter must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
delimiter = delim[0];
/* no break */
case 1:
case 0:
break;
}
ret = php_fputcsv(intern->u.file.stream, fields, delimiter, enclosure, escape TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_LONG(ret);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fputcsv)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char delimiter = intern->u.file.delimiter, enclosure = intern->u.file.enclosure, escape = intern->u.file.escape;
char *delim = NULL, *enclo = NULL, *esc = NULL;
int d_len = 0, e_len = 0, esc_len = 0, ret;
zval *fields = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "a|sss", &fields, &delim, &d_len, &enclo, &e_len, &esc, &esc_len) == SUCCESS) {
switch(ZEND_NUM_ARGS())
{
case 4:
if (esc_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "escape must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
escape = esc[0];
/* no break */
case 3:
if (e_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "enclosure must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
enclosure = enclo[0];
/* no break */
case 2:
if (d_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "delimiter must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
delimiter = delim[0];
/* no break */
case 1:
case 0:
break;
}
ret = php_fputcsv(intern->u.file.stream, fields, delimiter, enclosure, escape TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_LONG(ret);
}
}
| 167,062
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_strip_16_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_strip_16(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_transform_png_set_strip_16_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_strip_16_set(const image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_strip_16(pp);
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10700
/* libpng will limit the gamma table size: */
that->max_gamma_8 = PNG_MAX_GAMMA_8;
# endif
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
| 173,650
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: restore_page_device(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, const gs_gstate * pgs_old, const gs_gstate * pgs_new)
{
gx_device *dev_old = gs_currentdevice(pgs_old);
gx_device *dev_new;
gx_device *dev_t1;
gx_device *dev_t2;
bool samepagedevice = obj_eq(dev_old->memory, &gs_int_gstate(pgs_old)->pagedevice,
&gs_int_gstate(pgs_new)->pagedevice);
bool LockSafetyParams = dev_old->LockSafetyParams;
if ((dev_t1 = (*dev_proc(dev_old, get_page_device)) (dev_old)) == 0)
return 0;
/* If we are going to putdeviceparams in a callout, we need to */
/* unlock temporarily. The device will be re-locked as needed */
/* by putdeviceparams from the pgs_old->pagedevice dict state. */
if (!samepagedevice)
dev_old->LockSafetyParams = false;
dev_new = gs_currentdevice(pgs_new);
if (dev_old != dev_new) {
if ((dev_t2 = (*dev_proc(dev_new, get_page_device)) (dev_new)) == 0)
samepagedevice = true;
else if (dev_t1 != dev_t2)
samepagedevice = false;
}
if (LockSafetyParams && !samepagedevice) {
const int required_ops = 512;
const int required_es = 32;
/* The %grestorepagedevice must complete: the biggest danger
is operand stack overflow. As we use get/putdeviceparams
that means pushing all the device params onto the stack,
pdfwrite having by far the largest number of parameters
at (currently) 212 key/value pairs - thus needing (currently)
424 entries on the op stack. Allowing for working stack
space, and safety margin.....
*/
if (required_ops + ref_stack_count(&o_stack) >= ref_stack_max_count(&o_stack)) {
gs_currentdevice(pgs_old)->LockSafetyParams = LockSafetyParams;
return_error(gs_error_stackoverflow);
}
/* We also want enough exec stack space - 32 is an overestimate of
what we need to complete the Postscript call out.
*/
if (required_es + ref_stack_count(&e_stack) >= ref_stack_max_count(&e_stack)) {
gs_currentdevice(pgs_old)->LockSafetyParams = LockSafetyParams;
return_error(gs_error_execstackoverflow);
}
}
/*
* The current implementation of setpagedevice just sets new
* parameters in the same device object, so we have to check
* whether the page device dictionaries are the same.
*/
return samepagedevice ? 0 : 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
|
restore_page_device(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, const gs_gstate * pgs_old, const gs_gstate * pgs_new)
{
gx_device *dev_old = gs_currentdevice(pgs_old);
gx_device *dev_new;
gx_device *dev_t1;
gx_device *dev_t2;
bool samepagedevice = obj_eq(dev_old->memory, &gs_int_gstate(pgs_old)->pagedevice,
&gs_int_gstate(pgs_new)->pagedevice);
bool LockSafetyParams = dev_old->LockSafetyParams;
if ((dev_t1 = (*dev_proc(dev_old, get_page_device)) (dev_old)) == 0)
return 0;
/* If we are going to putdeviceparams in a callout, we need to */
/* unlock temporarily. The device will be re-locked as needed */
/* by putdeviceparams from the pgs_old->pagedevice dict state. */
if (!samepagedevice)
dev_old->LockSafetyParams = false;
dev_new = gs_currentdevice(pgs_new);
if (dev_old != dev_new) {
if ((dev_t2 = (*dev_proc(dev_new, get_page_device)) (dev_new)) == 0)
samepagedevice = true;
else if (dev_t1 != dev_t2)
samepagedevice = false;
}
if (LockSafetyParams) {
const int required_ops = 512;
const int required_es = 32;
/* The %grestorepagedevice must complete: the biggest danger
is operand stack overflow. As we use get/putdeviceparams
that means pushing all the device params onto the stack,
pdfwrite having by far the largest number of parameters
at (currently) 212 key/value pairs - thus needing (currently)
424 entries on the op stack. Allowing for working stack
space, and safety margin.....
*/
if (required_ops + ref_stack_count(&o_stack) >= ref_stack_max_count(&o_stack)) {
gs_currentdevice(pgs_old)->LockSafetyParams = LockSafetyParams;
return_error(gs_error_stackoverflow);
}
/* We also want enough exec stack space - 32 is an overestimate of
what we need to complete the Postscript call out.
*/
if (required_es + ref_stack_count(&e_stack) >= ref_stack_max_count(&e_stack)) {
gs_currentdevice(pgs_old)->LockSafetyParams = LockSafetyParams;
return_error(gs_error_execstackoverflow);
}
}
/*
* The current implementation of setpagedevice just sets new
* parameters in the same device object, so we have to check
* whether the page device dictionaries are the same.
*/
return samepagedevice ? 0 : 1;
}
| 164,637
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION( locale_get_region )
{
get_icu_value_src_php( LOC_REGION_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
PHP_FUNCTION( locale_get_region )
PHP_FUNCTION( locale_get_region )
{
get_icu_value_src_php( LOC_REGION_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
| 167,183
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: allocate(struct file *file, int allocate_idat)
{
struct control *control = png_voidcast(struct control*, file->alloc_ptr);
if (allocate_idat)
{
assert(file->idat == NULL);
IDAT_init(&control->idat, file);
}
else /* chunk */
{
assert(file->chunk == NULL);
chunk_init(&control->chunk, file);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
allocate(struct file *file, int allocate_idat)
{
struct control *control = voidcast(struct control*, file->alloc_ptr);
if (allocate_idat)
{
assert(file->idat == NULL);
IDAT_init(&control->idat, file);
}
else /* chunk */
{
assert(file->chunk == NULL);
chunk_init(&control->chunk, file);
}
}
| 173,729
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int atusb_get_and_show_build(struct atusb *atusb)
{
struct usb_device *usb_dev = atusb->usb_dev;
char build[ATUSB_BUILD_SIZE + 1];
int ret;
ret = atusb_control_msg(atusb, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0),
ATUSB_BUILD, ATUSB_REQ_FROM_DEV, 0, 0,
build, ATUSB_BUILD_SIZE, 1000);
if (ret >= 0) {
build[ret] = 0;
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev, "Firmware: build %s\n", build);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ieee802154: atusb: do not use the stack for buffers to make them DMA able
From 4.9 we should really avoid using the stack here as this will not be DMA
able on various platforms. This changes the buffers already being present in
time of 4.9 being released. This should go into stable as well.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int atusb_get_and_show_build(struct atusb *atusb)
{
struct usb_device *usb_dev = atusb->usb_dev;
char *build;
int ret;
build = kmalloc(ATUSB_BUILD_SIZE + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!build)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = atusb_control_msg(atusb, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0),
ATUSB_BUILD, ATUSB_REQ_FROM_DEV, 0, 0,
build, ATUSB_BUILD_SIZE, 1000);
if (ret >= 0) {
build[ret] = 0;
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev, "Firmware: build %s\n", build);
}
kfree(build);
return ret;
}
| 168,390
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: HeapObjectHeader* NormalPage::findHeaderFromAddress(Address address) {
if (address < payload())
return nullptr;
if (!m_objectStartBitMapComputed)
populateObjectStartBitMap();
size_t objectOffset = address - payload();
size_t objectStartNumber = objectOffset / allocationGranularity;
size_t mapIndex = objectStartNumber / 8;
ASSERT(mapIndex < objectStartBitMapSize);
size_t bit = objectStartNumber & 7;
uint8_t byte = m_objectStartBitMap[mapIndex] & ((1 << (bit + 1)) - 1);
while (!byte) {
ASSERT(mapIndex > 0);
byte = m_objectStartBitMap[--mapIndex];
}
int leadingZeroes = numberOfLeadingZeroes(byte);
objectStartNumber = (mapIndex * 8) + 7 - leadingZeroes;
objectOffset = objectStartNumber * allocationGranularity;
Address objectAddress = objectOffset + payload();
HeapObjectHeader* header = reinterpret_cast<HeapObjectHeader*>(objectAddress);
if (header->isFree())
return nullptr;
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
return header;
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
HeapObjectHeader* NormalPage::findHeaderFromAddress(Address address) {
if (address < payload())
return nullptr;
if (!m_objectStartBitMapComputed)
populateObjectStartBitMap();
size_t objectOffset = address - payload();
size_t objectStartNumber = objectOffset / allocationGranularity;
size_t mapIndex = objectStartNumber / 8;
ASSERT(mapIndex < objectStartBitMapSize);
size_t bit = objectStartNumber & 7;
uint8_t byte = m_objectStartBitMap[mapIndex] & ((1 << (bit + 1)) - 1);
while (!byte) {
ASSERT(mapIndex > 0);
byte = m_objectStartBitMap[--mapIndex];
}
int leadingZeroes = numberOfLeadingZeroes(byte);
objectStartNumber = (mapIndex * 8) + 7 - leadingZeroes;
objectOffset = objectStartNumber * allocationGranularity;
Address objectAddress = objectOffset + payload();
HeapObjectHeader* header = reinterpret_cast<HeapObjectHeader*>(objectAddress);
if (header->isFree())
return nullptr;
header->checkHeader();
return header;
}
| 172,711
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int sock_queue_err_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) + skb->truesize >=
(unsigned int)sk->sk_rcvbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
skb_orphan(skb);
skb->sk = sk;
skb->destructor = sock_rmem_free;
atomic_add(skb->truesize, &sk->sk_rmem_alloc);
/* before exiting rcu section, make sure dst is refcounted */
skb_dst_force(skb);
skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_error_queue, skb);
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
int sock_queue_err_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) + skb->truesize >=
(unsigned int)sk->sk_rcvbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
skb_orphan(skb);
skb->sk = sk;
skb->destructor = sock_rmem_free;
atomic_add(skb->truesize, &sk->sk_rmem_alloc);
skb_set_err_queue(skb);
/* before exiting rcu section, make sure dst is refcounted */
skb_dst_force(skb);
skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_error_queue, skb);
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
return 0;
}
| 168,285
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> create(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<CreateFileResult> result, const String& name, const KURL& url, FileSystemType type)
{
return adoptPtr(static_cast<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks*>(new CreateFileHelper(result, name, url, type)));
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> create(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<CreateFileResult> result, const String& name, const KURL& url, FileSystemType type)
static PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> create(CreateFileResult* result, const String& name, const KURL& url, FileSystemType type)
{
return adoptPtr(static_cast<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks*>(new CreateFileHelper(result, name, url, type)));
}
| 171,414
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: xmlParseMisc(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
while (((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '?')) ||
(CMP4(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', '-', '-')) ||
IS_BLANK_CH(CUR)) {
if ((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '?')) {
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
} else if (IS_BLANK_CH(CUR)) {
NEXT;
} else
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
}
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
xmlParseMisc(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
while ((ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF) &&
(((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '?')) ||
(CMP4(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', '-', '-')) ||
IS_BLANK_CH(CUR))) {
if ((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '?')) {
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
} else if (IS_BLANK_CH(CUR)) {
NEXT;
} else
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
}
}
| 171,294
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void VRDisplay::ProcessScheduledAnimations(double timestamp) {
Document* doc = this->GetDocument();
if (!doc || display_blurred_ || !scripted_animation_controller_)
return;
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "VRDisplay::OnVSync", "frame", vr_frame_id_);
AutoReset<bool> animating(&in_animation_frame_, true);
pending_raf_ = false;
scripted_animation_controller_->ServiceScriptedAnimations(timestamp);
if (is_presenting_ && !capabilities_->hasExternalDisplay()) {
Platform::Current()->CurrentThread()->GetWebTaskRunner()->PostTask(
BLINK_FROM_HERE, WTF::Bind(&VRDisplay::ProcessScheduledWindowAnimations,
WrapWeakPersistent(this), timestamp));
}
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID:
|
void VRDisplay::ProcessScheduledAnimations(double timestamp) {
DVLOG(2) << __FUNCTION__;
Document* doc = this->GetDocument();
if (!doc || display_blurred_) {
DVLOG(2) << __FUNCTION__ << ": early exit, doc=" << doc
<< " display_blurred_=" << display_blurred_;
return;
}
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "VRDisplay::OnVSync", "frame", vr_frame_id_);
if (pending_vrdisplay_raf_ && scripted_animation_controller_) {
// Run the callback, making sure that in_animation_frame_ is only
// true for the vrDisplay rAF and not for a legacy window rAF
// that may be called later.
AutoReset<bool> animating(&in_animation_frame_, true);
pending_vrdisplay_raf_ = false;
scripted_animation_controller_->ServiceScriptedAnimations(timestamp);
}
if (is_presenting_ && !capabilities_->hasExternalDisplay()) {
Platform::Current()->CurrentThread()->GetWebTaskRunner()->PostTask(
BLINK_FROM_HERE, WTF::Bind(&VRDisplay::ProcessScheduledWindowAnimations,
WrapWeakPersistent(this), timestamp));
}
}
| 171,998
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int inet_sk_reselect_saddr(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
__be32 old_saddr = inet->inet_saddr;
__be32 daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
__be32 new_saddr;
if (inet->opt && inet->opt->srr)
daddr = inet->opt->faddr;
/* Query new route. */
rt = ip_route_connect(&fl4, daddr, 0, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk),
sk->sk_bound_dev_if, sk->sk_protocol,
inet->inet_sport, inet->inet_dport, sk, false);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
return PTR_ERR(rt);
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst);
new_saddr = rt->rt_src;
if (new_saddr == old_saddr)
return 0;
if (sysctl_ip_dynaddr > 1) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s(): shifting inet->saddr from %pI4 to %pI4\n",
__func__, &old_saddr, &new_saddr);
}
inet->inet_saddr = inet->inet_rcv_saddr = new_saddr;
/*
* XXX The only one ugly spot where we need to
* XXX really change the sockets identity after
* XXX it has entered the hashes. -DaveM
*
* Besides that, it does not check for connection
* uniqueness. Wait for troubles.
*/
__sk_prot_rehash(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
static int inet_sk_reselect_saddr(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
__be32 old_saddr = inet->inet_saddr;
__be32 daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
__be32 new_saddr;
struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
inet_opt = rcu_dereference_protected(inet->inet_opt,
sock_owned_by_user(sk));
if (inet_opt && inet_opt->opt.srr)
daddr = inet_opt->opt.faddr;
/* Query new route. */
rt = ip_route_connect(&fl4, daddr, 0, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk),
sk->sk_bound_dev_if, sk->sk_protocol,
inet->inet_sport, inet->inet_dport, sk, false);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
return PTR_ERR(rt);
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst);
new_saddr = rt->rt_src;
if (new_saddr == old_saddr)
return 0;
if (sysctl_ip_dynaddr > 1) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s(): shifting inet->saddr from %pI4 to %pI4\n",
__func__, &old_saddr, &new_saddr);
}
inet->inet_saddr = inet->inet_rcv_saddr = new_saddr;
/*
* XXX The only one ugly spot where we need to
* XXX really change the sockets identity after
* XXX it has entered the hashes. -DaveM
*
* Besides that, it does not check for connection
* uniqueness. Wait for troubles.
*/
__sk_prot_rehash(sk);
return 0;
}
| 165,544
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: mobility_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const u_char *bp2 _U_)
{
const struct ip6_mobility *mh;
const u_char *ep;
unsigned mhlen, hlen;
uint8_t type;
mh = (const struct ip6_mobility *)bp;
/* 'ep' points to the end of available data. */
ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
if (!ND_TTEST(mh->ip6m_len)) {
/*
* There's not enough captured data to include the
* mobility header length.
*
* Our caller expects us to return the length, however,
* so return a value that will run to the end of the
* captured data.
*
* XXX - "ip6_print()" doesn't do anything with the
* returned length, however, as it breaks out of the
* header-processing loop.
*/
mhlen = ep - bp;
goto trunc;
}
mhlen = (mh->ip6m_len + 1) << 3;
/* XXX ip6m_cksum */
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_type);
type = mh->ip6m_type;
if (type <= IP6M_MAX && mhlen < ip6m_hdrlen[type]) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(header length %u is too small for type %u)", mhlen, type));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "mobility: %s", tok2str(ip6m_str, "type-#%u", type)));
switch (type) {
case IP6M_BINDING_REQUEST:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST_INIT:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nonce id=0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Keygen Token=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_UPDATE:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 1);
if (bp[hlen] & 0xf0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x40)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "H"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x20)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "L"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x10)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "K"));
/* Reserved (4bits) */
hlen += 1;
/* Reserved (8bits) */
hlen += 1;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ACK:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
if (mh->ip6m_data8[1] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " K"));
/* Reserved (7bits) */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen])));
hlen += 2;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ERROR:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
/* Reserved */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 16);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " homeaddr %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[hlen])));
hlen += 16;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " len=%u", mh->ip6m_len));
return(mhlen);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
if (mobility_opt_print(ndo, &bp[hlen], mhlen - hlen))
goto trunc;
return(mhlen);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(mhlen);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12985/IPv6: Check for print routines returning -1 when running past the end.
rt6_print(), ah_print(), and esp_print() return -1 if they run up
against the end of the packet while dissecting; if that happens, stop
dissecting, don't try to fetch the next header value, because 1) *it*
might be past the end of the packet and 2) we won't be using it in any
case, as we'll be exiting the loop.
Also, change mobility_print() to return -1 if it runs up against the
end of the packet, and stop dissecting if it does so.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
mobility_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const u_char *bp2 _U_)
{
const struct ip6_mobility *mh;
const u_char *ep;
unsigned mhlen, hlen;
uint8_t type;
mh = (const struct ip6_mobility *)bp;
/* 'ep' points to the end of available data. */
ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
if (!ND_TTEST(mh->ip6m_len)) {
/*
* There's not enough captured data to include the
* mobility header length.
*
* Our caller expects us to return the length, however,
* so return a value that will run to the end of the
* captured data.
*
* XXX - "ip6_print()" doesn't do anything with the
* returned length, however, as it breaks out of the
* header-processing loop.
*/
mhlen = ep - bp;
goto trunc;
}
mhlen = (mh->ip6m_len + 1) << 3;
/* XXX ip6m_cksum */
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_type);
type = mh->ip6m_type;
if (type <= IP6M_MAX && mhlen < ip6m_hdrlen[type]) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(header length %u is too small for type %u)", mhlen, type));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "mobility: %s", tok2str(ip6m_str, "type-#%u", type)));
switch (type) {
case IP6M_BINDING_REQUEST:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST_INIT:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nonce id=0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Keygen Token=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_UPDATE:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 1);
if (bp[hlen] & 0xf0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x40)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "H"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x20)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "L"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x10)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "K"));
/* Reserved (4bits) */
hlen += 1;
/* Reserved (8bits) */
hlen += 1;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ACK:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
if (mh->ip6m_data8[1] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " K"));
/* Reserved (7bits) */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen])));
hlen += 2;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ERROR:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
/* Reserved */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 16);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " homeaddr %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[hlen])));
hlen += 16;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " len=%u", mh->ip6m_len));
return(mhlen);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
if (mobility_opt_print(ndo, &bp[hlen], mhlen - hlen))
goto trunc;
return(mhlen);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(-1);
}
| 167,931
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
{
int ret;
sigset_t sigsaved;
/* Make sure they initialize the vcpu with KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT */
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.target < 0))
return -ENOEXEC;
ret = kvm_vcpu_first_run_init(vcpu);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (run->exit_reason == KVM_EXIT_MMIO) {
ret = kvm_handle_mmio_return(vcpu, vcpu->run);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (vcpu->sigset_active)
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &vcpu->sigset, &sigsaved);
ret = 1;
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN;
while (ret > 0) {
/*
* Check conditions before entering the guest
*/
cond_resched();
update_vttbr(vcpu->kvm);
if (vcpu->arch.pause)
vcpu_pause(vcpu);
kvm_vgic_flush_hwstate(vcpu);
kvm_timer_flush_hwstate(vcpu);
local_irq_disable();
/*
* Re-check atomic conditions
*/
if (signal_pending(current)) {
ret = -EINTR;
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTR;
}
if (ret <= 0 || need_new_vmid_gen(vcpu->kvm)) {
local_irq_enable();
kvm_timer_sync_hwstate(vcpu);
kvm_vgic_sync_hwstate(vcpu);
continue;
}
/**************************************************************
* Enter the guest
*/
trace_kvm_entry(*vcpu_pc(vcpu));
kvm_guest_enter();
vcpu->mode = IN_GUEST_MODE;
ret = kvm_call_hyp(__kvm_vcpu_run, vcpu);
vcpu->mode = OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE;
vcpu->arch.last_pcpu = smp_processor_id();
kvm_guest_exit();
trace_kvm_exit(*vcpu_pc(vcpu));
/*
* We may have taken a host interrupt in HYP mode (ie
* while executing the guest). This interrupt is still
* pending, as we haven't serviced it yet!
*
* We're now back in SVC mode, with interrupts
* disabled. Enabling the interrupts now will have
* the effect of taking the interrupt again, in SVC
* mode this time.
*/
local_irq_enable();
/*
* Back from guest
*************************************************************/
kvm_timer_sync_hwstate(vcpu);
kvm_vgic_sync_hwstate(vcpu);
ret = handle_exit(vcpu, run, ret);
}
if (vcpu->sigset_active)
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigsaved, NULL);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@cs.columbia.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
{
int ret;
sigset_t sigsaved;
if (unlikely(!kvm_vcpu_initialized(vcpu)))
return -ENOEXEC;
ret = kvm_vcpu_first_run_init(vcpu);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (run->exit_reason == KVM_EXIT_MMIO) {
ret = kvm_handle_mmio_return(vcpu, vcpu->run);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (vcpu->sigset_active)
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &vcpu->sigset, &sigsaved);
ret = 1;
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN;
while (ret > 0) {
/*
* Check conditions before entering the guest
*/
cond_resched();
update_vttbr(vcpu->kvm);
if (vcpu->arch.pause)
vcpu_pause(vcpu);
kvm_vgic_flush_hwstate(vcpu);
kvm_timer_flush_hwstate(vcpu);
local_irq_disable();
/*
* Re-check atomic conditions
*/
if (signal_pending(current)) {
ret = -EINTR;
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTR;
}
if (ret <= 0 || need_new_vmid_gen(vcpu->kvm)) {
local_irq_enable();
kvm_timer_sync_hwstate(vcpu);
kvm_vgic_sync_hwstate(vcpu);
continue;
}
/**************************************************************
* Enter the guest
*/
trace_kvm_entry(*vcpu_pc(vcpu));
kvm_guest_enter();
vcpu->mode = IN_GUEST_MODE;
ret = kvm_call_hyp(__kvm_vcpu_run, vcpu);
vcpu->mode = OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE;
vcpu->arch.last_pcpu = smp_processor_id();
kvm_guest_exit();
trace_kvm_exit(*vcpu_pc(vcpu));
/*
* We may have taken a host interrupt in HYP mode (ie
* while executing the guest). This interrupt is still
* pending, as we haven't serviced it yet!
*
* We're now back in SVC mode, with interrupts
* disabled. Enabling the interrupts now will have
* the effect of taking the interrupt again, in SVC
* mode this time.
*/
local_irq_enable();
/*
* Back from guest
*************************************************************/
kvm_timer_sync_hwstate(vcpu);
kvm_vgic_sync_hwstate(vcpu);
ret = handle_exit(vcpu, run, ret);
}
if (vcpu->sigset_active)
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigsaved, NULL);
return ret;
}
| 165,953
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void LinkChangeSerializerMarkupAccumulator::appendElement(StringBuilder& result, Element* element, Namespaces* namespaces)
{
if (element->hasTagName(HTMLNames::baseTag)) {
result.append("<!--");
} else if (element->hasTagName(HTMLNames::htmlTag)) {
result.append(String::format("\n<!-- saved from url=(%04d)%s -->\n",
static_cast<int>(m_document->url().string().utf8().length()),
m_document->url().string().utf8().data()));
}
SerializerMarkupAccumulator::appendElement(result, element, namespaces);
if (element->hasTagName(HTMLNames::baseTag)) {
result.appendLiteral("-->");
result.appendLiteral("<base href=\".\"");
if (!m_document->baseTarget().isEmpty()) {
result.appendLiteral(" target=\"");
result.append(m_document->baseTarget());
result.append('"');
}
if (m_document->isXHTMLDocument())
result.appendLiteral(" />");
else
result.appendLiteral(">");
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void LinkChangeSerializerMarkupAccumulator::appendElement(StringBuilder& result, Element* element, Namespaces* namespaces)
| 171,568
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int vorbis_finish_frame(stb_vorbis *f, int len, int left, int right)
{
int prev,i,j;
if (f->previous_length) {
int i,j, n = f->previous_length;
float *w = get_window(f, n);
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i) {
for (j=0; j < n; ++j)
f->channel_buffers[i][left+j] =
f->channel_buffers[i][left+j]*w[ j] +
f->previous_window[i][ j]*w[n-1-j];
}
}
prev = f->previous_length;
f->previous_length = len - right;
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i)
for (j=0; right+j < len; ++j)
f->previous_window[i][j] = f->channel_buffers[i][right+j];
if (!prev)
return 0;
if (len < right) right = len;
f->samples_output += right-left;
return right - left;
}
Commit Message: Fix seven bugs discovered and fixed by ForAllSecure:
CVE-2019-13217: heap buffer overflow in start_decoder()
CVE-2019-13218: stack buffer overflow in compute_codewords()
CVE-2019-13219: uninitialized memory in vorbis_decode_packet_rest()
CVE-2019-13220: out-of-range read in draw_line()
CVE-2019-13221: issue with large 1D codebooks in lookup1_values()
CVE-2019-13222: unchecked NULL returned by get_window()
CVE-2019-13223: division by zero in predict_point()
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int vorbis_finish_frame(stb_vorbis *f, int len, int left, int right)
{
int prev,i,j;
if (f->previous_length) {
int i,j, n = f->previous_length;
float *w = get_window(f, n);
if (w == NULL) return 0;
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i) {
for (j=0; j < n; ++j)
f->channel_buffers[i][left+j] =
f->channel_buffers[i][left+j]*w[ j] +
f->previous_window[i][ j]*w[n-1-j];
}
}
prev = f->previous_length;
f->previous_length = len - right;
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i)
for (j=0; right+j < len; ++j)
f->previous_window[i][j] = f->channel_buffers[i][right+j];
if (!prev)
return 0;
if (len < right) right = len;
f->samples_output += right-left;
return right - left;
}
| 169,618
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CtcpHandler::handleVersion(CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m) {
Q_UNUSED(target)
if(ctcptype == CtcpQuery) {
if(_ignoreListManager->ctcpMatch(prefix, network()->networkName(), "VERSION"))
return;
reply(nickFromMask(prefix), "VERSION", QString("Quassel IRC %1 (built on %2) -- http://www.quassel-irc.org")
.arg(Quassel::buildInfo().plainVersionString)
.arg(Quassel::buildInfo().buildDate));
emit displayMsg(Message::Server, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", tr("Received CTCP VERSION request by %1").arg(prefix));
} else {
str.append(tr(" with arguments: %1").arg(param));
emit displayMsg(Message::Error, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", str);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void CtcpHandler::handleVersion(CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m) {
void CtcpHandler::handleVersion(CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m, QString &reply) {
Q_UNUSED(target)
if(ctcptype == CtcpQuery) {
reply = QString("Quassel IRC %1 (built on %2) -- http://www.quassel-irc.org").arg(Quassel::buildInfo().plainVersionString).arg(Quassel::buildInfo().buildDate);
emit displayMsg(Message::Server, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", tr("Received CTCP VERSION request by %1").arg(prefix));
} else {
str.append(tr(" with arguments: %1").arg(param));
emit displayMsg(Message::Error, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", str);
}
}
| 164,880
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int rpmPackageFilesInstall(rpmts ts, rpmte te, rpmfiles files,
rpmpsm psm, char ** failedFile)
{
FD_t payload = rpmtePayload(te);
rpmfi fi = rpmfiNewArchiveReader(payload, files, RPMFI_ITER_READ_ARCHIVE);
rpmfs fs = rpmteGetFileStates(te);
rpmPlugins plugins = rpmtsPlugins(ts);
struct stat sb;
int saveerrno = errno;
int rc = 0;
int nodigest = (rpmtsFlags(ts) & RPMTRANS_FLAG_NOFILEDIGEST) ? 1 : 0;
int nofcaps = (rpmtsFlags(ts) & RPMTRANS_FLAG_NOCAPS) ? 1 : 0;
int firsthardlink = -1;
int skip;
rpmFileAction action;
char *tid = NULL;
const char *suffix;
char *fpath = NULL;
if (fi == NULL) {
rc = RPMERR_BAD_MAGIC;
goto exit;
}
/* transaction id used for temporary path suffix while installing */
rasprintf(&tid, ";%08x", (unsigned)rpmtsGetTid(ts));
/* Detect and create directories not explicitly in package. */
rc = fsmMkdirs(files, fs, plugins);
while (!rc) {
/* Read next payload header. */
rc = rpmfiNext(fi);
if (rc < 0) {
if (rc == RPMERR_ITER_END)
rc = 0;
break;
}
action = rpmfsGetAction(fs, rpmfiFX(fi));
skip = XFA_SKIPPING(action);
suffix = S_ISDIR(rpmfiFMode(fi)) ? NULL : tid;
if (action != FA_TOUCH) {
fpath = fsmFsPath(fi, suffix);
} else {
fpath = fsmFsPath(fi, "");
}
/* Remap file perms, owner, and group. */
rc = rpmfiStat(fi, 1, &sb);
fsmDebug(fpath, action, &sb);
/* Exit on error. */
if (rc)
break;
/* Run fsm file pre hook for all plugins */
rc = rpmpluginsCallFsmFilePre(plugins, fi, fpath,
sb.st_mode, action);
if (rc) {
skip = 1;
} else {
setFileState(fs, rpmfiFX(fi));
}
if (!skip) {
int setmeta = 1;
/* Directories replacing something need early backup */
if (!suffix) {
rc = fsmBackup(fi, action);
}
/* Assume file does't exist when tmp suffix is in use */
if (!suffix) {
rc = fsmVerify(fpath, fi);
} else {
rc = (action == FA_TOUCH) ? 0 : RPMERR_ENOENT;
}
if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) {
rc = fsmMkfile(fi, fpath, files, psm, nodigest,
&setmeta, &firsthardlink);
}
} else if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) {
mode_t mode = sb.st_mode;
mode &= ~07777;
mode |= 00700;
rc = fsmMkdir(fpath, mode);
}
} else if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) {
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) {
rc = fsmSymlink(rpmfiFLink(fi), fpath);
}
} else if (S_ISFIFO(sb.st_mode)) {
/* This mimics cpio S_ISSOCK() behavior but probably isn't right */
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) {
rc = fsmMkfifo(fpath, 0000);
}
} else if (S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode) ||
S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) ||
S_ISSOCK(sb.st_mode))
{
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) {
rc = fsmMknod(fpath, sb.st_mode, sb.st_rdev);
}
} else {
/* XXX Special case /dev/log, which shouldn't be packaged anyways */
if (!IS_DEV_LOG(fpath))
rc = RPMERR_UNKNOWN_FILETYPE;
}
/* Set permissions, timestamps etc for non-hardlink entries */
if (!rc && setmeta) {
rc = fsmSetmeta(fpath, fi, plugins, action, &sb, nofcaps);
}
} else if (firsthardlink >= 0 && rpmfiArchiveHasContent(fi)) {
/* we skip the hard linked file containing the content */
/* write the content to the first used instead */
char *fn = rpmfilesFN(files, firsthardlink);
rc = expandRegular(fi, fn, psm, nodigest, 0);
firsthardlink = -1;
free(fn);
}
if (rc) {
if (!skip) {
/* XXX only erase if temp fn w suffix is in use */
if (suffix && (action != FA_TOUCH)) {
(void) fsmRemove(fpath, sb.st_mode);
}
errno = saveerrno;
}
} else {
/* Notify on success. */
rpmpsmNotify(psm, RPMCALLBACK_INST_PROGRESS, rpmfiArchiveTell(fi));
if (!skip) {
/* Backup file if needed. Directories are handled earlier */
if (suffix)
rc = fsmBackup(fi, action);
if (!rc)
rc = fsmCommit(&fpath, fi, action, suffix);
}
}
if (rc)
*failedFile = xstrdup(fpath);
/* Run fsm file post hook for all plugins */
rpmpluginsCallFsmFilePost(plugins, fi, fpath,
sb.st_mode, action, rc);
fpath = _free(fpath);
}
rpmswAdd(rpmtsOp(ts, RPMTS_OP_UNCOMPRESS), fdOp(payload, FDSTAT_READ));
rpmswAdd(rpmtsOp(ts, RPMTS_OP_DIGEST), fdOp(payload, FDSTAT_DIGEST));
exit:
/* No need to bother with close errors on read */
rpmfiArchiveClose(fi);
rpmfiFree(fi);
Fclose(payload);
free(tid);
free(fpath);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Don't follow symlinks on file creation (CVE-2017-7501)
Open newly created files with O_EXCL to prevent symlink tricks.
When reopening hardlinks for writing the actual content, use append
mode instead. This is compatible with the write-only permissions but
is not destructive in case we got redirected to somebody elses file,
verify the target before actually writing anything.
As these are files with the temporary suffix, errors mean a local
user with sufficient privileges to break the installation of the package
anyway is trying to goof us on purpose, don't bother trying to mend it
(we couldn't fix the hardlink case anyhow) but just bail out.
Based on a patch by Florian Festi.
CWE ID: CWE-59
|
int rpmPackageFilesInstall(rpmts ts, rpmte te, rpmfiles files,
rpmpsm psm, char ** failedFile)
{
FD_t payload = rpmtePayload(te);
rpmfi fi = rpmfiNewArchiveReader(payload, files, RPMFI_ITER_READ_ARCHIVE);
rpmfs fs = rpmteGetFileStates(te);
rpmPlugins plugins = rpmtsPlugins(ts);
struct stat sb;
int saveerrno = errno;
int rc = 0;
int nodigest = (rpmtsFlags(ts) & RPMTRANS_FLAG_NOFILEDIGEST) ? 1 : 0;
int nofcaps = (rpmtsFlags(ts) & RPMTRANS_FLAG_NOCAPS) ? 1 : 0;
int firsthardlink = -1;
int skip;
rpmFileAction action;
char *tid = NULL;
const char *suffix;
char *fpath = NULL;
if (fi == NULL) {
rc = RPMERR_BAD_MAGIC;
goto exit;
}
/* transaction id used for temporary path suffix while installing */
rasprintf(&tid, ";%08x", (unsigned)rpmtsGetTid(ts));
/* Detect and create directories not explicitly in package. */
rc = fsmMkdirs(files, fs, plugins);
while (!rc) {
/* Read next payload header. */
rc = rpmfiNext(fi);
if (rc < 0) {
if (rc == RPMERR_ITER_END)
rc = 0;
break;
}
action = rpmfsGetAction(fs, rpmfiFX(fi));
skip = XFA_SKIPPING(action);
suffix = S_ISDIR(rpmfiFMode(fi)) ? NULL : tid;
if (action != FA_TOUCH) {
fpath = fsmFsPath(fi, suffix);
} else {
fpath = fsmFsPath(fi, "");
}
/* Remap file perms, owner, and group. */
rc = rpmfiStat(fi, 1, &sb);
fsmDebug(fpath, action, &sb);
/* Exit on error. */
if (rc)
break;
/* Run fsm file pre hook for all plugins */
rc = rpmpluginsCallFsmFilePre(plugins, fi, fpath,
sb.st_mode, action);
if (rc) {
skip = 1;
} else {
setFileState(fs, rpmfiFX(fi));
}
if (!skip) {
int setmeta = 1;
/* Directories replacing something need early backup */
if (!suffix) {
rc = fsmBackup(fi, action);
}
/* Assume file does't exist when tmp suffix is in use */
if (!suffix) {
rc = fsmVerify(fpath, fi);
} else {
rc = (action == FA_TOUCH) ? 0 : RPMERR_ENOENT;
}
if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) {
rc = fsmMkfile(fi, fpath, files, psm, nodigest,
&setmeta, &firsthardlink);
}
} else if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) {
mode_t mode = sb.st_mode;
mode &= ~07777;
mode |= 00700;
rc = fsmMkdir(fpath, mode);
}
} else if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) {
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) {
rc = fsmSymlink(rpmfiFLink(fi), fpath);
}
} else if (S_ISFIFO(sb.st_mode)) {
/* This mimics cpio S_ISSOCK() behavior but probably isn't right */
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) {
rc = fsmMkfifo(fpath, 0000);
}
} else if (S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode) ||
S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) ||
S_ISSOCK(sb.st_mode))
{
if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) {
rc = fsmMknod(fpath, sb.st_mode, sb.st_rdev);
}
} else {
/* XXX Special case /dev/log, which shouldn't be packaged anyways */
if (!IS_DEV_LOG(fpath))
rc = RPMERR_UNKNOWN_FILETYPE;
}
/* Set permissions, timestamps etc for non-hardlink entries */
if (!rc && setmeta) {
rc = fsmSetmeta(fpath, fi, plugins, action, &sb, nofcaps);
}
} else if (firsthardlink >= 0 && rpmfiArchiveHasContent(fi)) {
/* we skip the hard linked file containing the content */
/* write the content to the first used instead */
char *fn = rpmfilesFN(files, firsthardlink);
rc = expandRegular(fi, fn, psm, 0, nodigest, 0);
firsthardlink = -1;
free(fn);
}
if (rc) {
if (!skip) {
/* XXX only erase if temp fn w suffix is in use */
if (suffix && (action != FA_TOUCH)) {
(void) fsmRemove(fpath, sb.st_mode);
}
errno = saveerrno;
}
} else {
/* Notify on success. */
rpmpsmNotify(psm, RPMCALLBACK_INST_PROGRESS, rpmfiArchiveTell(fi));
if (!skip) {
/* Backup file if needed. Directories are handled earlier */
if (suffix)
rc = fsmBackup(fi, action);
if (!rc)
rc = fsmCommit(&fpath, fi, action, suffix);
}
}
if (rc)
*failedFile = xstrdup(fpath);
/* Run fsm file post hook for all plugins */
rpmpluginsCallFsmFilePost(plugins, fi, fpath,
sb.st_mode, action, rc);
fpath = _free(fpath);
}
rpmswAdd(rpmtsOp(ts, RPMTS_OP_UNCOMPRESS), fdOp(payload, FDSTAT_READ));
rpmswAdd(rpmtsOp(ts, RPMTS_OP_DIGEST), fdOp(payload, FDSTAT_DIGEST));
exit:
/* No need to bother with close errors on read */
rpmfiArchiveClose(fi);
rpmfiFree(fi);
Fclose(payload);
free(tid);
free(fpath);
return rc;
}
| 168,269
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::SetAsFocusedWebContentsIfNecessary() {
WebContentsImpl* old_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (old_contents == this)
return;
GetOutermostWebContents()->node_.SetFocusedWebContents(this);
if (!GuestMode::IsCrossProcessFrameGuest(this) && browser_plugin_guest_)
return;
if (old_contents)
old_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost()->SetPageFocus(false);
if (GetRenderManager()->GetProxyToOuterDelegate())
GetRenderManager()->GetProxyToOuterDelegate()->SetFocusedFrame();
if (ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page()->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost()
->SetPageFocus(true);
} else {
GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost()->SetPageFocus(true);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void WebContentsImpl::SetAsFocusedWebContentsIfNecessary() {
WebContentsImpl* old_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (old_contents == this)
return;
GetOutermostWebContents()->node_.SetFocusedWebContents(this);
if (!GuestMode::IsCrossProcessFrameGuest(this) && browser_plugin_guest_)
return;
if (old_contents)
old_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost()->SetPageFocus(false);
if (GetRenderManager()->GetProxyToOuterDelegate())
GetRenderManager()->GetProxyToOuterDelegate()->SetFocusedFrame();
if (ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(interstitial_page_->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost()
->SetPageFocus(true);
} else {
GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost()->SetPageFocus(true);
}
}
| 172,333
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int copy_to_user_tmpl(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct xfrm_user_tmpl vec[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
int i;
if (xp->xfrm_nr == 0)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < xp->xfrm_nr; i++) {
struct xfrm_user_tmpl *up = &vec[i];
struct xfrm_tmpl *kp = &xp->xfrm_vec[i];
memcpy(&up->id, &kp->id, sizeof(up->id));
up->family = kp->encap_family;
memcpy(&up->saddr, &kp->saddr, sizeof(up->saddr));
up->reqid = kp->reqid;
up->mode = kp->mode;
up->share = kp->share;
up->optional = kp->optional;
up->aalgos = kp->aalgos;
up->ealgos = kp->ealgos;
up->calgos = kp->calgos;
}
return nla_put(skb, XFRMA_TMPL,
sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr, vec);
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_tmpl()
The memory used for the template copy is a local stack variable. As
struct xfrm_user_tmpl contains multiple holes added by the compiler for
alignment, not initializing the memory will lead to leaking stack bytes
to userland. Add an explicit memset(0) to avoid the info leak.
Initial version of the patch by Brad Spengler.
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
static int copy_to_user_tmpl(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct xfrm_user_tmpl vec[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
int i;
if (xp->xfrm_nr == 0)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < xp->xfrm_nr; i++) {
struct xfrm_user_tmpl *up = &vec[i];
struct xfrm_tmpl *kp = &xp->xfrm_vec[i];
memset(up, 0, sizeof(*up));
memcpy(&up->id, &kp->id, sizeof(up->id));
up->family = kp->encap_family;
memcpy(&up->saddr, &kp->saddr, sizeof(up->saddr));
up->reqid = kp->reqid;
up->mode = kp->mode;
up->share = kp->share;
up->optional = kp->optional;
up->aalgos = kp->aalgos;
up->ealgos = kp->ealgos;
up->calgos = kp->calgos;
}
return nla_put(skb, XFRMA_TMPL,
sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr, vec);
}
| 169,901
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ikev1_attrmap_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, const u_char *ep,
const struct attrmap *map, size_t nmap)
{
int totlen;
uint32_t t, v;
if (p[0] & 0x80)
totlen = 4;
else
totlen = 4 + EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (ep < p + totlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|attr]"));
return ep + 1;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
t = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[0]) & 0x7fff;
if (map && t < nmap && map[t].type)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"type=%s ", map[t].type));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,"type=#%d ", t));
if (p[0] & 0x80) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"value="));
v = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (map && t < nmap && v < map[t].nvalue && map[t].value[v])
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s", map[t].value[v]));
else
rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[2], 2);
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"len=%d value=", EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2])));
rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[4], EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
return p + totlen;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13039/IKEv1: Do more bounds checking.
Have ikev1_attrmap_print() and ikev1_attr_print() do full bounds
checking, and return null on a bounds overflow. Have their callers
check for a null return.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
ikev1_attrmap_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, const u_char *ep2,
const struct attrmap *map, size_t nmap)
{
int totlen;
uint32_t t, v;
ND_TCHECK(p[0]);
if (p[0] & 0x80)
totlen = 4;
else {
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&p[2]);
totlen = 4 + EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
}
if (ep2 < p + totlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|attr]"));
return ep2 + 1;
}
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&p[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
t = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[0]) & 0x7fff;
if (map && t < nmap && map[t].type)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"type=%s ", map[t].type));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,"type=#%d ", t));
if (p[0] & 0x80) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"value="));
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&p[2]);
v = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (map && t < nmap && v < map[t].nvalue && map[t].value[v])
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s", map[t].value[v]));
else {
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[2], 2)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
goto trunc;
}
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"len=%d value=", totlen - 4));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[4], totlen - 4)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
goto trunc;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
return p + totlen;
trunc:
return NULL;
}
| 167,840
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void smp_proc_enc_info(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->ltk, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void smp_proc_enc_info(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) {
tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
smp_int_data.status = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111937065");
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
return;
}
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->ltk, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL);
}
| 174,074
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool IsSmartVirtualKeyboardEnabled() {
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
keyboard::switches::kEnableVirtualKeyboard)) {
return false;
}
return !base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
keyboard::switches::kDisableSmartVirtualKeyboard);
}
Commit Message: Move smart deploy to tristate.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1149383006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333058}
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool IsSmartVirtualKeyboardEnabled() {
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
keyboard::switches::kEnableVirtualKeyboard)) {
return false;
}
return keyboard::IsSmartDeployEnabled();
}
| 171,699
|
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