instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 93
3.53k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BaseRenderingContext2D::ClearResolvedFilters() {
for (auto& state : state_stack_)
state->ClearResolvedFilter();
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void BaseRenderingContext2D::ClearResolvedFilters() {
void BaseRenderingContext2D::SetOriginTaintedByContent() {
SetOriginTainted();
origin_tainted_by_content_ = true;
for (auto& state : state_stack_)
state->ClearResolvedFilter();
}
| 172,905
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void ext2_put_super (struct super_block * sb)
{
int db_count;
int i;
struct ext2_sb_info *sbi = EXT2_SB(sb);
dquot_disable(sb, -1, DQUOT_USAGE_ENABLED | DQUOT_LIMITS_ENABLED);
ext2_xattr_put_super(sb);
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) {
struct ext2_super_block *es = sbi->s_es;
spin_lock(&sbi->s_lock);
es->s_state = cpu_to_le16(sbi->s_mount_state);
spin_unlock(&sbi->s_lock);
ext2_sync_super(sb, es, 1);
}
db_count = sbi->s_gdb_count;
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++)
if (sbi->s_group_desc[i])
brelse (sbi->s_group_desc[i]);
kfree(sbi->s_group_desc);
kfree(sbi->s_debts);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirs_counter);
brelse (sbi->s_sbh);
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
kfree(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
kfree(sbi);
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19
|
static void ext2_put_super (struct super_block * sb)
{
int db_count;
int i;
struct ext2_sb_info *sbi = EXT2_SB(sb);
dquot_disable(sb, -1, DQUOT_USAGE_ENABLED | DQUOT_LIMITS_ENABLED);
if (sbi->s_mb_cache) {
ext2_xattr_destroy_cache(sbi->s_mb_cache);
sbi->s_mb_cache = NULL;
}
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) {
struct ext2_super_block *es = sbi->s_es;
spin_lock(&sbi->s_lock);
es->s_state = cpu_to_le16(sbi->s_mount_state);
spin_unlock(&sbi->s_lock);
ext2_sync_super(sb, es, 1);
}
db_count = sbi->s_gdb_count;
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++)
if (sbi->s_group_desc[i])
brelse (sbi->s_group_desc[i]);
kfree(sbi->s_group_desc);
kfree(sbi->s_debts);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirs_counter);
brelse (sbi->s_sbh);
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
kfree(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
kfree(sbi);
}
| 169,974
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
" [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
" ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
exit(1);
}
Commit Message: add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load (via
ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@
CWE ID: CWE-426
|
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
" [-P pkcs11_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
" ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
exit(1);
}
| 168,665
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static zval *_xml_xmlchar_zval(const XML_Char *s, int len, const XML_Char *encoding)
{
zval *ret;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ret);
if (s == NULL) {
ZVAL_FALSE(ret);
return ret;
}
if (len == 0) {
len = _xml_xmlcharlen(s);
}
Z_TYPE_P(ret) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRVAL_P(ret) = xml_utf8_decode(s, len, &Z_STRLEN_P(ret), encoding);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static zval *_xml_xmlchar_zval(const XML_Char *s, int len, const XML_Char *encoding)
{
zval *ret;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ret);
if (s == NULL) {
ZVAL_FALSE(ret);
return ret;
}
if (len == 0) {
len = _xml_xmlcharlen(s);
}
Z_TYPE_P(ret) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRVAL_P(ret) = xml_utf8_decode(s, len, &Z_STRLEN_P(ret), encoding);
return ret;
}
| 165,044
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: nfs3svc_decode_readdirplusargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_readdirargs *args)
{
int len;
u32 max_blocksize = svc_max_payload(rqstp);
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &args->cookie);
args->verf = p; p += 2;
args->dircount = ntohl(*p++);
args->count = ntohl(*p++);
len = args->count = min(args->count, max_blocksize);
while (len > 0) {
struct page *p = *(rqstp->rq_next_page++);
if (!args->buffer)
args->buffer = page_address(p);
len -= PAGE_SIZE;
}
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
|
nfs3svc_decode_readdirplusargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_readdirargs *args)
{
int len;
u32 max_blocksize = svc_max_payload(rqstp);
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &args->cookie);
args->verf = p; p += 2;
args->dircount = ntohl(*p++);
args->count = ntohl(*p++);
if (!xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p))
return 0;
len = args->count = min(args->count, max_blocksize);
while (len > 0) {
struct page *p = *(rqstp->rq_next_page++);
if (!args->buffer)
args->buffer = page_address(p);
len -= PAGE_SIZE;
}
return 1;
}
| 168,142
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int append_camera_metadata(camera_metadata_t *dst,
const camera_metadata_t *src) {
if (dst == NULL || src == NULL ) return ERROR;
if (dst->entry_capacity < src->entry_count + dst->entry_count) return ERROR;
if (dst->data_capacity < src->data_count + dst->data_count) return ERROR;
memcpy(get_entries(dst) + dst->entry_count, get_entries(src),
sizeof(camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t[src->entry_count]));
memcpy(get_data(dst) + dst->data_count, get_data(src),
sizeof(uint8_t[src->data_count]));
if (dst->data_count != 0) {
camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t *entry = get_entries(dst) + dst->entry_count;
for (size_t i = 0; i < src->entry_count; i++, entry++) {
if ( calculate_camera_metadata_entry_data_size(entry->type,
entry->count) > 0 ) {
entry->data.offset += dst->data_count;
}
}
}
if (dst->entry_count == 0) {
dst->flags |= src->flags & FLAG_SORTED;
} else if (src->entry_count != 0) {
dst->flags &= ~FLAG_SORTED;
} else {
}
dst->entry_count += src->entry_count;
dst->data_count += src->data_count;
assert(validate_camera_metadata_structure(dst, NULL) == OK);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera metadata: Check for inconsistent data count
Resolve merge conflict for nyc-release
Also check for overflow of data/entry count on append.
Bug: 30591838
Change-Id: Ibf4c3c6e236cdb28234f3125055d95ef0a2416a2
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
int append_camera_metadata(camera_metadata_t *dst,
const camera_metadata_t *src) {
if (dst == NULL || src == NULL ) return ERROR;
// Check for overflow
if (src->entry_count + dst->entry_count < src->entry_count) return ERROR;
if (src->data_count + dst->data_count < src->data_count) return ERROR;
// Check for space
if (dst->entry_capacity < src->entry_count + dst->entry_count) return ERROR;
if (dst->data_capacity < src->data_count + dst->data_count) return ERROR;
memcpy(get_entries(dst) + dst->entry_count, get_entries(src),
sizeof(camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t[src->entry_count]));
memcpy(get_data(dst) + dst->data_count, get_data(src),
sizeof(uint8_t[src->data_count]));
if (dst->data_count != 0) {
camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t *entry = get_entries(dst) + dst->entry_count;
for (size_t i = 0; i < src->entry_count; i++, entry++) {
if ( calculate_camera_metadata_entry_data_size(entry->type,
entry->count) > 0 ) {
entry->data.offset += dst->data_count;
}
}
}
if (dst->entry_count == 0) {
dst->flags |= src->flags & FLAG_SORTED;
} else if (src->entry_count != 0) {
dst->flags &= ~FLAG_SORTED;
} else {
}
dst->entry_count += src->entry_count;
dst->data_count += src->data_count;
assert(validate_camera_metadata_structure(dst, NULL) == OK);
return OK;
}
| 173,396
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: png_get_uint_31(png_structp png_ptr, png_bytep buf)
{
#ifdef PNG_READ_BIG_ENDIAN_SUPPORTED
png_uint_32 i = png_get_uint_32(buf);
#else
/* Avoid an extra function call by inlining the result. */
png_uint_32 i = ((png_uint_32)(*buf) << 24) +
((png_uint_32)(*(buf + 1)) << 16) +
((png_uint_32)(*(buf + 2)) << 8) +
(png_uint_32)(*(buf + 3));
#endif
if (i > PNG_UINT_31_MAX)
png_error(png_ptr, "PNG unsigned integer out of range.");
return (i);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
png_get_uint_31(png_structp png_ptr, png_bytep buf)
{
#ifdef PNG_READ_BIG_ENDIAN_SUPPORTED
png_uint_32 i = png_get_uint_32(buf);
#else
/* Avoid an extra function call by inlining the result. */
png_uint_32 i = ((png_uint_32)((*(buf )) & 0xff) << 24) +
((png_uint_32)((*(buf + 1)) & 0xff) << 16) +
((png_uint_32)((*(buf + 2)) & 0xff) << 8) +
((png_uint_32)((*(buf + 3)) & 0xff) );
#endif
if (i > PNG_UINT_31_MAX)
png_error(png_ptr, "PNG unsigned integer out of range.");
return (i);
}
| 172,175
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static bool getCoverageFormat12(vector<uint32_t>& coverage, const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
const size_t kNGroupsOffset = 12;
const size_t kFirstGroupOffset = 16;
const size_t kGroupSize = 12;
const size_t kStartCharCodeOffset = 0;
const size_t kEndCharCodeOffset = 4;
const size_t kMaxNGroups = 0xfffffff0 / kGroupSize; // protection against overflow
if (kFirstGroupOffset > size) {
return false;
}
uint32_t nGroups = readU32(data, kNGroupsOffset);
if (nGroups >= kMaxNGroups || kFirstGroupOffset + nGroups * kGroupSize > size) {
return false;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < nGroups; i++) {
uint32_t groupOffset = kFirstGroupOffset + i * kGroupSize;
uint32_t start = readU32(data, groupOffset + kStartCharCodeOffset);
uint32_t end = readU32(data, groupOffset + kEndCharCodeOffset);
addRange(coverage, start, end + 1); // file is inclusive, vector is exclusive
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reject fonts with invalid ranges in cmap
A corrupt or malicious font may have a negative size in its cmap
range, which in turn could lead to memory corruption. This patch
detects the case and rejects the font, and also includes an assertion
in the sparse bit set implementation if we missed any such case.
External issue:
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=192618
Bug: 26413177
Change-Id: Icc0c80e4ef389abba0964495b89aa0fae3e9f4b2
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static bool getCoverageFormat12(vector<uint32_t>& coverage, const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
const size_t kNGroupsOffset = 12;
const size_t kFirstGroupOffset = 16;
const size_t kGroupSize = 12;
const size_t kStartCharCodeOffset = 0;
const size_t kEndCharCodeOffset = 4;
const size_t kMaxNGroups = 0xfffffff0 / kGroupSize; // protection against overflow
if (kFirstGroupOffset > size) {
return false;
}
uint32_t nGroups = readU32(data, kNGroupsOffset);
if (nGroups >= kMaxNGroups || kFirstGroupOffset + nGroups * kGroupSize > size) {
return false;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < nGroups; i++) {
uint32_t groupOffset = kFirstGroupOffset + i * kGroupSize;
uint32_t start = readU32(data, groupOffset + kStartCharCodeOffset);
uint32_t end = readU32(data, groupOffset + kEndCharCodeOffset);
if (end < start) {
// invalid group range: size must be positive
return false;
}
addRange(coverage, start, end + 1); // file is inclusive, vector is exclusive
}
return true;
}
| 174,234
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SProcXFixesCreatePointerBarrier(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq);
int i;
int i;
CARD16 *in_devices = (CARD16 *) &stuff[1];
swaps(&stuff->length);
swaps(&stuff->num_devices);
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq, pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices));
swaps(&stuff->x1);
swaps(&stuff->y1);
swaps(&stuff->x2);
swaps(&stuff->y2);
swapl(&stuff->directions);
for (i = 0; i < stuff->num_devices; i++) {
swaps(in_devices + i);
}
return ProcXFixesVector[stuff->xfixesReqType] (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
SProcXFixesCreatePointerBarrier(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq);
int i;
int i;
CARD16 *in_devices = (CARD16 *) &stuff[1];
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swaps(&stuff->num_devices);
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq, pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices));
swaps(&stuff->x1);
swaps(&stuff->y1);
swaps(&stuff->x2);
swaps(&stuff->y2);
swapl(&stuff->directions);
for (i = 0; i < stuff->num_devices; i++) {
swaps(in_devices + i);
}
return ProcXFixesVector[stuff->xfixesReqType] (client);
}
| 165,440
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual ~InputMethodLibraryImpl() {
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
virtual ~InputMethodLibraryImpl() {
ibus_controller_->RemoveObserver(this);
}
| 170,516
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: IW_IMPL(unsigned int) iw_get_ui32be(const iw_byte *b)
{
return (b[0]<<24) | (b[1]<<16) | (b[2]<<8) | b[3];
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682
|
IW_IMPL(unsigned int) iw_get_ui32be(const iw_byte *b)
{
return ((unsigned int)b[0]<<24) | ((unsigned int)b[1]<<16) |
((unsigned int)b[2]<<8) | (unsigned int)b[3];
}
| 168,199
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void UpdateContentLengthPrefs(
int received_content_length, int original_content_length,
bool with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled, bool via_data_reduction_proxy,
PrefService* prefs) {
int64 total_received = prefs->GetInt64(prefs::kHttpReceivedContentLength);
int64 total_original = prefs->GetInt64(prefs::kHttpOriginalContentLength);
total_received += received_content_length;
total_original += original_content_length;
prefs->SetInt64(prefs::kHttpReceivedContentLength, total_received);
prefs->SetInt64(prefs::kHttpOriginalContentLength, total_original);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
UpdateContentLengthPrefsForDataReductionProxy(
received_content_length,
original_content_length,
with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled,
via_data_reduction_proxy,
base::Time::Now(),
prefs);
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void UpdateContentLengthPrefs(
int received_content_length,
int original_content_length,
bool with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled,
DataReductionRequestType data_reduction_type,
PrefService* prefs) {
int64 total_received = prefs->GetInt64(prefs::kHttpReceivedContentLength);
int64 total_original = prefs->GetInt64(prefs::kHttpOriginalContentLength);
total_received += received_content_length;
total_original += original_content_length;
prefs->SetInt64(prefs::kHttpReceivedContentLength, total_received);
prefs->SetInt64(prefs::kHttpOriginalContentLength, total_original);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
UpdateContentLengthPrefsForDataReductionProxy(
received_content_length,
original_content_length,
with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled,
data_reduction_type,
base::Time::Now(),
prefs);
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
}
| 171,327
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Track::Info::Clear()
{
delete[] nameAsUTF8;
nameAsUTF8 = NULL;
delete[] language;
language = NULL;
delete[] codecId;
codecId = NULL;
delete[] codecPrivate;
codecPrivate = NULL;
codecPrivateSize = 0;
delete[] codecNameAsUTF8;
codecNameAsUTF8 = NULL;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void Track::Info::Clear()
if (dst) // should be NULL already
return -1;
const char* const src = this->*str;
| 174,247
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ext2_xattr_cache_insert(struct buffer_head *bh)
{
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_hash);
struct mb_cache_entry *ce;
int error;
ce = mb_cache_entry_alloc(ext2_xattr_cache, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ce)
return -ENOMEM;
error = mb_cache_entry_insert(ce, bh->b_bdev, bh->b_blocknr, hash);
if (error) {
mb_cache_entry_free(ce);
if (error == -EBUSY) {
ea_bdebug(bh, "already in cache (%d cache entries)",
atomic_read(&ext2_xattr_cache->c_entry_count));
error = 0;
}
} else {
ea_bdebug(bh, "inserting [%x] (%d cache entries)", (int)hash,
atomic_read(&ext2_xattr_cache->c_entry_count));
mb_cache_entry_release(ce);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19
|
ext2_xattr_cache_insert(struct buffer_head *bh)
ext2_xattr_cache_insert(struct mb2_cache *cache, struct buffer_head *bh)
{
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_hash);
int error;
error = mb2_cache_entry_create(cache, GFP_NOFS, hash, bh->b_blocknr);
if (error) {
if (error == -EBUSY) {
ea_bdebug(bh, "already in cache (%d cache entries)",
atomic_read(&ext2_xattr_cache->c_entry_count));
error = 0;
}
} else
ea_bdebug(bh, "inserting [%x]", (int)hash);
return error;
}
| 169,978
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static char *escape_pathname(const char *inp)
{
const unsigned char *s;
char *escaped, *d;
if (!inp) {
return NULL;
}
escaped = malloc (4 * strlen(inp) + 1);
if (!escaped) {
perror("malloc");
return NULL;
}
for (d = escaped, s = (const unsigned char *)inp; *s; s++) {
if (needs_escape (*s)) {
snprintf (d, 5, "\\x%02x", *s);
d += strlen (d);
} else {
*d++ = *s;
}
}
*d++ = '\0';
return escaped;
}
Commit Message: misc oom and possible memory leak fix
CWE ID:
|
static char *escape_pathname(const char *inp)
{
const unsigned char *s;
char *escaped, *d;
if (!inp) {
return NULL;
}
escaped = malloc (4 * strlen(inp) + 1);
if (!escaped) {
perror("malloc");
return NULL;
}
for (d = escaped, s = (const unsigned char *)inp; *s; s++) {
if (needs_escape (*s)) {
snprintf (d, 5, "\\x%02x", *s);
d += strlen (d);
} else {
*d++ = *s;
}
}
*d++ = '\0';
return escaped;
}
| 169,757
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void SetUp() {
FakeDBusThreadManager* fake_dbus_thread_manager = new FakeDBusThreadManager;
fake_bluetooth_profile_manager_client_ =
new FakeBluetoothProfileManagerClient;
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothProfileManagerClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothProfileManagerClient>(
fake_bluetooth_profile_manager_client_));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothAdapterClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothAdapterClient>(new FakeBluetoothAdapterClient));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothDeviceClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothDeviceClient>(new FakeBluetoothDeviceClient));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothInputClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothInputClient>(new FakeBluetoothInputClient));
DBusThreadManager::InitializeForTesting(fake_dbus_thread_manager);
device::BluetoothAdapterFactory::GetAdapter(
base::Bind(&BluetoothProfileChromeOSTest::AdapterCallback,
base::Unretained(this)));
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_.get() != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsInitialized());
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsPresent());
adapter_->SetPowered(
true,
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing),
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing));
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsPowered());
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
virtual void SetUp() {
FakeDBusThreadManager* fake_dbus_thread_manager = new FakeDBusThreadManager;
fake_bluetooth_profile_manager_client_ =
new FakeBluetoothProfileManagerClient;
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothProfileManagerClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothProfileManagerClient>(
fake_bluetooth_profile_manager_client_));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothAgentManagerClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothAgentManagerClient>(
new FakeBluetoothAgentManagerClient));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothAdapterClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothAdapterClient>(new FakeBluetoothAdapterClient));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothDeviceClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothDeviceClient>(new FakeBluetoothDeviceClient));
fake_dbus_thread_manager->SetBluetoothInputClient(
scoped_ptr<BluetoothInputClient>(new FakeBluetoothInputClient));
DBusThreadManager::InitializeForTesting(fake_dbus_thread_manager);
device::BluetoothAdapterFactory::GetAdapter(
base::Bind(&BluetoothProfileChromeOSTest::AdapterCallback,
base::Unretained(this)));
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_.get() != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsInitialized());
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsPresent());
adapter_->SetPowered(
true,
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing),
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing));
ASSERT_TRUE(adapter_->IsPowered());
}
| 171,242
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void copyMultiCh8(short *dst, const int *const *src, unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
for (unsigned c = 0; c < nChannels; ++c) {
*dst++ = src[c][i] << 8;
}
}
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void copyMultiCh8(short *dst, const int *const *src, unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
static void copyMultiCh8(short *dst, const int * src[FLACParser::kMaxChannels], unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
for (unsigned c = 0; c < nChannels; ++c) {
*dst++ = src[c][i] << 8;
}
}
}
| 174,020
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool InitSkBitmapFromData(SkBitmap* bitmap,
const char* pixels,
size_t pixels_size) const {
if (!bitmap->tryAllocPixels(
SkImageInfo::Make(width, height, color_type, alpha_type)))
return false;
if (pixels_size != bitmap->computeByteSize())
return false;
memcpy(bitmap->getPixels(), pixels, pixels_size);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Update IPC ParamTraits for SkBitmap to follow best practices.
Using memcpy() to serialize a POD struct is highly discouraged. Just use
the standard IPC param traits macros for doing it.
Bug: 779428
Change-Id: I48f52c1f5c245ba274d595829ed92e8b3cb41334
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/899649
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534562}
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
bool InitSkBitmapFromData(SkBitmap* bitmap,
bool ParamTraits<SkImageInfo>::Read(const base::Pickle* m,
base::PickleIterator* iter,
SkImageInfo* r) {
SkColorType color_type;
SkAlphaType alpha_type;
uint32_t width;
uint32_t height;
if (!ReadParam(m, iter, &color_type) || !ReadParam(m, iter, &alpha_type) ||
!ReadParam(m, iter, &width) || !ReadParam(m, iter, &height)) {
return false;
}
| 172,892
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int off, int size)
{
bool strict = env->strict_alignment;
const char *pointer_desc = "";
switch (reg->type) {
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
/* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits
* right in front, treat it the very same way.
*/
return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict);
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
pointer_desc = "value ";
break;
case PTR_TO_CTX:
pointer_desc = "context ";
break;
case PTR_TO_STACK:
pointer_desc = "stack ";
break;
default:
break;
}
return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size,
strict);
}
Commit Message: bpf: force strict alignment checks for stack pointers
Force strict alignment checks for stack pointers because the tracking of
stack spills relies on it; unaligned stack accesses can lead to corruption
of spilled registers, which is exploitable.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int off, int size)
{
bool strict = env->strict_alignment;
const char *pointer_desc = "";
switch (reg->type) {
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
/* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits
* right in front, treat it the very same way.
*/
return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict);
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
pointer_desc = "value ";
break;
case PTR_TO_CTX:
pointer_desc = "context ";
break;
case PTR_TO_STACK:
pointer_desc = "stack ";
/* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write()
* and check_stack_read() relies on stack accesses being
* aligned.
*/
strict = true;
break;
default:
break;
}
return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size,
strict);
}
| 167,641
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: char *strstr(char *s1, char *s2)
{ /* from libiberty */
char *p;
int len = strlen(s2);
if (*s2 == '\0') /* everything matches empty string */
return s1;
for (p = s1; (p = strchr(p, *s2)) != NULL; p = strchr(p + 1, *s2)) {
if (strncmp(p, s2, len) == 0)
return (p);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: misc oom and possible memory leak fix
CWE ID:
|
char *strstr(char *s1, char *s2)
{ /* from libiberty */
char *p;
int len = strlen(s2);
if (*s2 == '\0') /* everything matches empty string */
return s1;
for (p = s1; (p = strchr(p, *s2)) != NULL; p++) {
if (strncmp(p, s2, len) == 0)
return (p);
}
return NULL;
}
| 169,755
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Chapters::Atom::Atom()
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
Chapters::Atom::Atom()
long long SegmentInfo::GetDuration() const {
if (m_duration < 0)
return -1;
assert(m_timecodeScale >= 1);
const double dd = double(m_duration) * double(m_timecodeScale);
const long long d = static_cast<long long>(dd);
return d;
}
| 174,238
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int send_solid_rect(VncState *vs)
{
size_t bytes;
tight_pack24(vs, vs->tight.tight.buffer, 1, &vs->tight.tight.offset);
bytes = 3;
} else {
bytes = vs->clientds.pf.bytes_per_pixel;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static int send_solid_rect(VncState *vs)
{
size_t bytes;
tight_pack24(vs, vs->tight.tight.buffer, 1, &vs->tight.tight.offset);
bytes = 3;
} else {
bytes = vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel;
}
| 165,462
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn,
struct nlattr *rp)
{
struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *up;
int ulen;
if (!replay_esn || !rp)
return 0;
up = nla_data(rp);
ulen = xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up);
if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
return -EINVAL;
if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size harder
Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to
wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN
structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported
by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same.
CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
|
static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn,
struct nlattr *rp)
{
struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *up;
int ulen;
if (!replay_esn || !rp)
return 0;
up = nla_data(rp);
ulen = xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up);
/* Check the overall length and the internal bitmap length to avoid
* potential overflow. */
if (nla_len(rp) < ulen ||
xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen ||
replay_esn->bmp_len != up->bmp_len)
return -EINVAL;
if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
| 168,292
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::OnJobNotification(DWORD message,
DWORD pid) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
switch (message) {
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_ACTIVE_PROCESS_ZERO:
CHECK(SetEvent(process_exit_event_));
break;
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_NEW_PROCESS:
worker_process_.Set(OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid));
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::OnJobNotification(DWORD message,
DWORD pid) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
switch (message) {
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_ACTIVE_PROCESS_ZERO:
CHECK(SetEvent(process_exit_event_));
break;
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_NEW_PROCESS:
worker_process_.Set(OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid));
break;
}
}
| 171,561
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static ssize_t nfs4_proc_get_acl(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
int ret;
if (!nfs4_server_supports_acls(server))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ret = nfs_revalidate_inode(server, inode);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (NFS_I(inode)->cache_validity & NFS_INO_INVALID_ACL)
nfs_zap_acl_cache(inode);
ret = nfs4_read_cached_acl(inode, buf, buflen);
if (ret != -ENOENT)
return ret;
return nfs4_get_acl_uncached(inode, buf, buflen);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
static ssize_t nfs4_proc_get_acl(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
int ret;
if (!nfs4_server_supports_acls(server))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ret = nfs_revalidate_inode(server, inode);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (NFS_I(inode)->cache_validity & NFS_INO_INVALID_ACL)
nfs_zap_acl_cache(inode);
ret = nfs4_read_cached_acl(inode, buf, buflen);
if (ret != -ENOENT)
/* -ENOENT is returned if there is no ACL or if there is an ACL
* but no cached acl data, just the acl length */
return ret;
return nfs4_get_acl_uncached(inode, buf, buflen);
}
| 165,718
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int dispatch_discard_io(struct xen_blkif *blkif,
struct blkif_request *req)
{
int err = 0;
int status = BLKIF_RSP_OKAY;
struct block_device *bdev = blkif->vbd.bdev;
unsigned long secure;
blkif->st_ds_req++;
xen_blkif_get(blkif);
secure = (blkif->vbd.discard_secure &&
(req->u.discard.flag & BLKIF_DISCARD_SECURE)) ?
BLKDEV_DISCARD_SECURE : 0;
err = blkdev_issue_discard(bdev, req->u.discard.sector_number,
req->u.discard.nr_sectors,
GFP_KERNEL, secure);
if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
pr_debug(DRV_PFX "discard op failed, not supported\n");
status = BLKIF_RSP_EOPNOTSUPP;
} else if (err)
status = BLKIF_RSP_ERROR;
make_response(blkif, req->u.discard.id, req->operation, status);
xen_blkif_put(blkif);
return err;
}
Commit Message: xen/blkback: Check device permissions before allowing OP_DISCARD
We need to make sure that the device is not RO or that
the request is not past the number of sectors we want to
issue the DISCARD operation for.
This fixes CVE-2013-2140.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
[v1: Made it pr_warn instead of pr_debug]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int dispatch_discard_io(struct xen_blkif *blkif,
struct blkif_request *req)
{
int err = 0;
int status = BLKIF_RSP_OKAY;
struct block_device *bdev = blkif->vbd.bdev;
unsigned long secure;
struct phys_req preq;
preq.sector_number = req->u.discard.sector_number;
preq.nr_sects = req->u.discard.nr_sectors;
err = xen_vbd_translate(&preq, blkif, WRITE);
if (err) {
pr_warn(DRV_PFX "access denied: DISCARD [%llu->%llu] on dev=%04x\n",
preq.sector_number,
preq.sector_number + preq.nr_sects, blkif->vbd.pdevice);
goto fail_response;
}
blkif->st_ds_req++;
xen_blkif_get(blkif);
secure = (blkif->vbd.discard_secure &&
(req->u.discard.flag & BLKIF_DISCARD_SECURE)) ?
BLKDEV_DISCARD_SECURE : 0;
err = blkdev_issue_discard(bdev, req->u.discard.sector_number,
req->u.discard.nr_sectors,
GFP_KERNEL, secure);
fail_response:
if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
pr_debug(DRV_PFX "discard op failed, not supported\n");
status = BLKIF_RSP_EOPNOTSUPP;
} else if (err)
status = BLKIF_RSP_ERROR;
make_response(blkif, req->u.discard.id, req->operation, status);
xen_blkif_put(blkif);
return err;
}
| 166,083
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int verify_vc_kbmode(int fd) {
int curr_mode;
/*
* Make sure we only adjust consoles in K_XLATE or K_UNICODE mode.
* Otherwise we would (likely) interfere with X11's processing of the
* key events.
*
* http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2013-February/008573.html
*/
if (ioctl(fd, KDGKBMODE, &curr_mode) < 0)
return -errno;
return IN_SET(curr_mode, K_XLATE, K_UNICODE) ? 0 : -EBUSY;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255
|
static int verify_vc_kbmode(int fd) {
| 169,781
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: mcid_char_imp(fz_context *ctx, pdf_filter_processor *p, tag_record *tr, int uni, int remove)
{
if (tr->mcid_obj == NULL)
/* No object, or already deleted */
return;
if (remove)
{
/* Remove the expanded abbreviation, if there is one. */
pdf_dict_del(ctx, tr->mcid_obj, PDF_NAME(E));
/* Remove the structure title, if there is one. */
pdf_dict_del(ctx, tr->mcid_obj, PDF_NAME(T));
}
/* Edit the Alt string */
walk_string(ctx, uni, remove, &tr->alt);
/* Edit the ActualText string */
walk_string(ctx, uni, remove, &tr->actualtext);
/* If we're removing a character, and either of the strings
* haven't matched up to what we were expecting, then just
* delete the whole string. */
else if (tr->alt.pos >= 0 || tr->actualtext.pos >= 0)
{
/* The strings are making sense so far */
remove = 0;
/* The strings are making sense so far */
remove = 0;
}
if (remove)
{
/* Anything else we have to err on the side of caution and
if (tr->alt.pos == -1)
pdf_dict_del(ctx, tr->mcid_obj, PDF_NAME(Alt));
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, tr->mcid_obj);
tr->mcid_obj = NULL;
fz_free(ctx, tr->alt.utf8);
tr->alt.utf8 = NULL;
fz_free(ctx, tr->actualtext.utf8);
tr->actualtext.utf8 = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
mcid_char_imp(fz_context *ctx, pdf_filter_processor *p, tag_record *tr, int uni, int remove)
{
if (tr->mcid_obj == NULL)
/* No object, or already deleted */
return;
if (remove)
{
/* Remove the expanded abbreviation, if there is one. */
pdf_dict_del(ctx, tr->mcid_obj, PDF_NAME(E));
/* Remove the structure title, if there is one. */
pdf_dict_del(ctx, tr->mcid_obj, PDF_NAME(T));
}
/* Edit the Alt string */
walk_string(ctx, uni, remove, &tr->alt);
/* Edit the ActualText string */
walk_string(ctx, uni, remove, &tr->actualtext);
/* If we're removing a character, and either of the strings
* haven't matched up to what we were expecting, then just
* delete the whole string. */
else if (tr->alt.pos >= 0 || tr->actualtext.pos >= 0)
{
/* The strings are making sense so far */
remove = 0;
/* The strings are making sense so far */
remove = 0;
}
if (remove)
{
/* Anything else we have to err on the side of caution and
if (tr->alt.pos == -1)
pdf_dict_del(ctx, tr->mcid_obj, PDF_NAME(Alt));
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, tr->mcid_obj);
tr->mcid_obj = NULL;
fz_free(ctx, tr->alt.utf8);
tr->alt.utf8 = NULL;
fz_free(ctx, tr->actualtext.utf8);
tr->actualtext.utf8 = NULL;
}
}
| 164,659
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Utterance::Utterance(Profile* profile,
const std::string& text,
DictionaryValue* options,
Task* completion_task)
: profile_(profile),
id_(next_utterance_id_++),
text_(text),
rate_(-1.0),
pitch_(-1.0),
volume_(-1.0),
can_enqueue_(false),
completion_task_(completion_task) {
if (!options) {
options_.reset(new DictionaryValue());
return;
}
options_.reset(options->DeepCopy());
if (options->HasKey(util::kVoiceNameKey))
options->GetString(util::kVoiceNameKey, &voice_name_);
if (options->HasKey(util::kLocaleKey))
options->GetString(util::kLocaleKey, &locale_);
if (options->HasKey(util::kGenderKey))
options->GetString(util::kGenderKey, &gender_);
if (options->GetDouble(util::kRateKey, &rate_)) {
if (!base::IsFinite(rate_) || rate_ < 0.0 || rate_ > 1.0)
rate_ = -1.0;
}
if (options->GetDouble(util::kPitchKey, &pitch_)) {
if (!base::IsFinite(pitch_) || pitch_ < 0.0 || pitch_ > 1.0)
pitch_ = -1.0;
}
if (options->GetDouble(util::kVolumeKey, &volume_)) {
if (!base::IsFinite(volume_) || volume_ < 0.0 || volume_ > 1.0)
volume_ = -1.0;
}
if (options->HasKey(util::kEnqueueKey))
options->GetBoolean(util::kEnqueueKey, &can_enqueue_);
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
Utterance::Utterance(Profile* profile,
bool ExtensionTtsSpeakFunction::RunImpl() {
std::string text;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetString(0, &text));
if (text.size() > 32768) {
error_ = constants::kErrorUtteranceTooLong;
return false;
}
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> options;
if (args_->GetSize() >= 2) {
DictionaryValue* temp_options = NULL;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetDictionary(1, &temp_options));
options.reset(temp_options->DeepCopy());
}
std::string voice_name;
if (options->HasKey(constants::kVoiceNameKey)) {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(
options->GetString(constants::kVoiceNameKey, &voice_name));
}
std::string lang;
if (options->HasKey(constants::kLangKey))
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(options->GetString(constants::kLangKey, &lang));
if (!lang.empty() && !l10n_util::IsValidLocaleSyntax(lang)) {
error_ = constants::kErrorInvalidLang;
return false;
}
| 170,392
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static unsigned char *AcquireCompactPixels(const Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
packet_size=image->depth > 8UL ? 2UL : 1UL;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((9*
image->columns)+1,packet_size*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",
image->filename);
}
return(compact_pixels);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/350
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
static unsigned char *AcquireCompactPixels(const Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
packet_size=image->depth > 8UL ? 2UL : 1UL;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((9*
image->columns)+1,packet_size*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
}
return(compact_pixels);
}
| 168,403
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: feed_table_block_tag(struct table *tbl,
char *line, struct table_mode *mode, int indent, int cmd)
{
int offset;
if (mode->indent_level <= 0 && indent == -1)
return;
if (mode->indent_level >= CHAR_MAX && indent == 1)
return;
setwidth(tbl, mode);
feed_table_inline_tag(tbl, line, mode, -1);
clearcontentssize(tbl, mode);
if (indent == 1) {
mode->indent_level++;
if (mode->indent_level <= MAX_INDENT_LEVEL)
tbl->indent += INDENT_INCR;
}
else if (indent == -1) {
mode->indent_level--;
if (mode->indent_level < MAX_INDENT_LEVEL)
tbl->indent -= INDENT_INCR;
}
offset = tbl->indent;
if (cmd == HTML_DT) {
if (mode->indent_level > 0 && mode->indent_level <= MAX_INDENT_LEVEL)
offset -= INDENT_INCR;
}
if (tbl->indent > 0) {
check_minimum0(tbl, 0);
addcontentssize(tbl, offset);
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835
|
feed_table_block_tag(struct table *tbl,
char *line, struct table_mode *mode, int indent, int cmd)
{
int offset;
if (mode->indent_level <= 0 && indent == -1)
return;
if (mode->indent_level >= CHAR_MAX && indent == 1)
return;
setwidth(tbl, mode);
feed_table_inline_tag(tbl, line, mode, -1);
clearcontentssize(tbl, mode);
if (indent == 1) {
mode->indent_level++;
if (mode->indent_level <= MAX_INDENT_LEVEL)
tbl->indent += INDENT_INCR;
}
else if (indent == -1) {
mode->indent_level--;
if (mode->indent_level < MAX_INDENT_LEVEL)
tbl->indent -= INDENT_INCR;
}
if (tbl->indent < 0)
tbl->indent = 0;
offset = tbl->indent;
if (cmd == HTML_DT) {
if (mode->indent_level > 0 && mode->indent_level <= MAX_INDENT_LEVEL)
offset -= INDENT_INCR;
if (offset < 0)
offset = 0;
}
if (tbl->indent > 0) {
check_minimum0(tbl, 0);
addcontentssize(tbl, offset);
}
}
| 169,348
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: DefragRegisterTests(void)
{
#ifdef UNITTESTS
UtRegisterTest("DefragInOrderSimpleTest", DefragInOrderSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragReverseSimpleTest", DefragReverseSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest", DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest", DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest",
DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest",
DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest", DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakLastTest", DefragSturgesNovakLastTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragIPv4NoDataTest", DefragIPv4NoDataTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragIPv4TooLargeTest", DefragIPv4TooLargeTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest", IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragReverseSimpleTest", IPV6DefragReverseSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLastTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLastTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragVlanTest", DefragVlanTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragVlanQinQTest", DefragVlanQinQTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTrackerReuseTest", DefragTrackerReuseTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTimeoutTest", DefragTimeoutTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragMfIpv4Test", DefragMfIpv4Test);
UtRegisterTest("DefragMfIpv6Test", DefragMfIpv6Test);
#endif /* UNITTESTS */
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358
|
DefragRegisterTests(void)
{
#ifdef UNITTESTS
UtRegisterTest("DefragInOrderSimpleTest", DefragInOrderSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragReverseSimpleTest", DefragReverseSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest", DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest", DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest",
DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest",
DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest", DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakLastTest", DefragSturgesNovakLastTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragIPv4NoDataTest", DefragIPv4NoDataTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragIPv4TooLargeTest", DefragIPv4TooLargeTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest", IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragReverseSimpleTest", IPV6DefragReverseSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLastTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLastTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragVlanTest", DefragVlanTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragVlanQinQTest", DefragVlanQinQTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTrackerReuseTest", DefragTrackerReuseTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTimeoutTest", DefragTimeoutTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragMfIpv4Test", DefragMfIpv4Test);
UtRegisterTest("DefragMfIpv6Test", DefragMfIpv6Test);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTestBadProto", DefragTestBadProto);
#endif /* UNITTESTS */
}
| 168,301
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline int ip_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff_head *queue,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
int transhdrlen, int maxfraglen, unsigned int flags)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
/* There is support for UDP fragmentation offload by network
* device, so create one single skb packet containing complete
* udp datagram
*/
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(queue)) == NULL) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
hh_len + fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + 20,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
if (skb == NULL)
return err;
/* reserve space for Hardware header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
/* create space for UDP/IP header */
skb_put(skb, fragheaderlen + transhdrlen);
/* initialize network header pointer */
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
/* initialize protocol header pointer */
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + fragheaderlen;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
skb->csum = 0;
/* specify the length of each IP datagram fragment */
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = maxfraglen - fragheaderlen;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
__skb_queue_tail(queue, skb);
}
return skb_append_datato_frags(sk, skb, getfrag, from,
(length - transhdrlen));
}
Commit Message: ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well
Now, if user application does:
sendto len<mtu flag MSG_MORE
sendto len>mtu flag 0
The skb is not treated as fragmented one because it is not initialized
that way. So move the initialization to fix this.
introduced by:
commit e89e9cf539a28df7d0eb1d0a545368e9920b34ac "[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach"
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
static inline int ip_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff_head *queue,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
int transhdrlen, int maxfraglen, unsigned int flags)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
/* There is support for UDP fragmentation offload by network
* device, so create one single skb packet containing complete
* udp datagram
*/
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(queue)) == NULL) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
hh_len + fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + 20,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
if (skb == NULL)
return err;
/* reserve space for Hardware header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
/* create space for UDP/IP header */
skb_put(skb, fragheaderlen + transhdrlen);
/* initialize network header pointer */
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
/* initialize protocol header pointer */
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + fragheaderlen;
skb->csum = 0;
__skb_queue_tail(queue, skb);
} else if (skb_is_gso(skb)) {
goto append;
}
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
/* specify the length of each IP datagram fragment */
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = maxfraglen - fragheaderlen;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
append:
return skb_append_datato_frags(sk, skb, getfrag, from,
(length - transhdrlen));
}
| 165,986
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: INLINE void impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(void* pv_ctxt, UWORD32 u4_no_of_bits)
{
stream_t *ps_stream = (stream_t *)pv_ctxt;
FLUSH_BITS(ps_stream->u4_offset,ps_stream->u4_buf,ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt,u4_no_of_bits,ps_stream->pu4_buf_aligned)
return;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
INLINE void impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(void* pv_ctxt, UWORD32 u4_no_of_bits)
{
stream_t *ps_stream = (stream_t *)pv_ctxt;
if (ps_stream->u4_offset < ps_stream->u4_max_offset)
{
FLUSH_BITS(ps_stream->u4_offset,ps_stream->u4_buf,ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt,u4_no_of_bits,ps_stream->pu4_buf_aligned)
}
return;
}
| 173,941
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: download::DownloadInterruptReason DownloadManagerImpl::BeginDownloadRequest(
std::unique_ptr<net::URLRequest> url_request,
ResourceContext* resource_context,
download::DownloadUrlParameters* params) {
if (ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get()->is_shutdown())
return download::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_USER_SHUTDOWN;
ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get()->InitializeURLRequest(
url_request.get(),
Referrer(params->referrer(),
Referrer::NetReferrerPolicyToBlinkReferrerPolicy(
params->referrer_policy())),
true, // download.
params->render_process_host_id(), params->render_view_host_routing_id(),
params->render_frame_host_routing_id(), PREVIEWS_OFF, resource_context);
url_request->set_first_party_url_policy(
net::URLRequest::UPDATE_FIRST_PARTY_URL_ON_REDIRECT);
const GURL& url = url_request->original_url();
const net::URLRequestContext* request_context = url_request->context();
if (!request_context->job_factory()->IsHandledProtocol(url.scheme())) {
DVLOG(1) << "Download request for unsupported protocol: "
<< url.possibly_invalid_spec();
return download::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NETWORK_INVALID_REQUEST;
}
std::unique_ptr<ResourceHandler> handler(
DownloadResourceHandler::CreateForNewRequest(
url_request.get(), params->request_origin(),
params->download_source(), params->follow_cross_origin_redirects()));
ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get()->BeginURLRequest(
std::move(url_request), std::move(handler), true, // download
params->content_initiated(), params->do_not_prompt_for_login(),
resource_context);
return download::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NONE;
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
download::DownloadInterruptReason DownloadManagerImpl::BeginDownloadRequest(
std::unique_ptr<net::URLRequest> url_request,
ResourceContext* resource_context,
download::DownloadUrlParameters* params) {
if (ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get()->is_shutdown())
return download::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_USER_SHUTDOWN;
ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get()->InitializeURLRequest(
url_request.get(),
Referrer(params->referrer(),
Referrer::NetReferrerPolicyToBlinkReferrerPolicy(
params->referrer_policy())),
true, // download.
params->render_process_host_id(), params->render_view_host_routing_id(),
params->render_frame_host_routing_id(), params->frame_tree_node_id(),
PREVIEWS_OFF, resource_context);
url_request->set_first_party_url_policy(
net::URLRequest::UPDATE_FIRST_PARTY_URL_ON_REDIRECT);
const GURL& url = url_request->original_url();
const net::URLRequestContext* request_context = url_request->context();
if (!request_context->job_factory()->IsHandledProtocol(url.scheme())) {
DVLOG(1) << "Download request for unsupported protocol: "
<< url.possibly_invalid_spec();
return download::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NETWORK_INVALID_REQUEST;
}
std::unique_ptr<ResourceHandler> handler(
DownloadResourceHandler::CreateForNewRequest(
url_request.get(), params->request_origin(),
params->download_source(), params->follow_cross_origin_redirects()));
ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get()->BeginURLRequest(
std::move(url_request), std::move(handler), true, // download
params->content_initiated(), params->do_not_prompt_for_login(),
resource_context);
return download::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NONE;
}
| 173,021
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: RenderWidgetHostImpl* WebContentsImpl::GetRenderWidgetHostWithPageFocus() {
WebContentsImpl* focused_web_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (focused_web_contents->ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
return static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
focused_web_contents->GetRenderManager()
->interstitial_page()
->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
return focused_web_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
RenderWidgetHostImpl* WebContentsImpl::GetRenderWidgetHostWithPageFocus() {
WebContentsImpl* focused_web_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (focused_web_contents->ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
return static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
focused_web_contents->interstitial_page_->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
return focused_web_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
| 172,330
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Huff_offsetTransmit (huff_t *huff, int ch, byte *fout, int *offset) {
bloc = *offset;
send(huff->loc[ch], NULL, fout);
*offset = bloc;
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void Huff_offsetTransmit (huff_t *huff, int ch, byte *fout, int *offset) {
void Huff_offsetTransmit (huff_t *huff, int ch, byte *fout, int *offset, int maxoffset) {
bloc = *offset;
send(huff->loc[ch], NULL, fout, maxoffset);
*offset = bloc;
}
| 167,995
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SelectionInDOMTree ConvertToSelectionInDOMTree(
const SelectionInFlatTree& selection_in_flat_tree) {
return SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SetAffinity(selection_in_flat_tree.Affinity())
.SetBaseAndExtent(ToPositionInDOMTree(selection_in_flat_tree.Base()),
ToPositionInDOMTree(selection_in_flat_tree.Extent()))
.SetIsDirectional(selection_in_flat_tree.IsDirectional())
.SetIsHandleVisible(selection_in_flat_tree.IsHandleVisible())
.Build();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
SelectionInDOMTree ConvertToSelectionInDOMTree(
const SelectionInFlatTree& selection_in_flat_tree) {
return SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SetAffinity(selection_in_flat_tree.Affinity())
.SetBaseAndExtent(ToPositionInDOMTree(selection_in_flat_tree.Base()),
ToPositionInDOMTree(selection_in_flat_tree.Extent()))
.SetIsDirectional(selection_in_flat_tree.IsDirectional())
.Build();
}
| 171,762
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool DataReductionProxySettings::IsDataReductionProxyEnabled() const {
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService) &&
!params::IsEnabledWithNetworkService()) {
return false;
}
return IsDataSaverEnabledByUser();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool DataReductionProxySettings::IsDataReductionProxyEnabled() const {
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService) &&
!params::IsEnabledWithNetworkService()) {
return false;
}
return IsDataSaverEnabledByUser(GetOriginalProfilePrefs());
}
| 172,554
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const char* Track::GetNameAsUTF8() const
{
return m_info.nameAsUTF8;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
const char* Track::GetNameAsUTF8() const
| 174,343
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DecoderTest::RunLoop(CompressedVideoSource *video) {
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t dec_cfg = {0};
Decoder* const decoder = codec_->CreateDecoder(dec_cfg, 0);
ASSERT_TRUE(decoder != NULL);
for (video->Begin(); video->cxdata(); video->Next()) {
PreDecodeFrameHook(*video, decoder);
vpx_codec_err_t res_dec = decoder->DecodeFrame(video->cxdata(),
video->frame_size());
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res_dec) << decoder->DecodeError();
DxDataIterator dec_iter = decoder->GetDxData();
const vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
while ((img = dec_iter.Next()))
DecompressedFrameHook(*img, video->frame_number());
}
delete decoder;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void DecoderTest::RunLoop(CompressedVideoSource *video) {
bool Decoder::IsVP8() const {
const char *codec_name = GetDecoderName();
return strncmp(kVP8Name, codec_name, sizeof(kVP8Name) - 1) == 0;
}
void DecoderTest::HandlePeekResult(Decoder *const decoder,
CompressedVideoSource *video,
const vpx_codec_err_t res_peek) {
const bool is_vp8 = decoder->IsVP8();
if (is_vp8) {
/* Vp8's implementation of PeekStream returns an error if the frame you
* pass it is not a keyframe, so we only expect VPX_CODEC_OK on the first
* frame, which must be a keyframe. */
if (video->frame_number() == 0)
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res_peek) << "Peek return failed: "
<< vpx_codec_err_to_string(res_peek);
} else {
/* The Vp9 implementation of PeekStream returns an error only if the
* data passed to it isn't a valid Vp9 chunk. */
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res_peek) << "Peek return failed: "
<< vpx_codec_err_to_string(res_peek);
}
}
void DecoderTest::RunLoop(CompressedVideoSource *video,
const vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t &dec_cfg) {
Decoder* const decoder = codec_->CreateDecoder(dec_cfg, flags_, 0);
ASSERT_TRUE(decoder != NULL);
bool end_of_file = false;
for (video->Begin(); !::testing::Test::HasFailure() && !end_of_file;
video->Next()) {
PreDecodeFrameHook(*video, decoder);
vpx_codec_stream_info_t stream_info;
stream_info.sz = sizeof(stream_info);
if (video->cxdata() != NULL) {
const vpx_codec_err_t res_peek = decoder->PeekStream(video->cxdata(),
video->frame_size(),
&stream_info);
HandlePeekResult(decoder, video, res_peek);
ASSERT_FALSE(::testing::Test::HasFailure());
vpx_codec_err_t res_dec = decoder->DecodeFrame(video->cxdata(),
video->frame_size());
if (!HandleDecodeResult(res_dec, *video, decoder))
break;
} else {
// Signal end of the file to the decoder.
const vpx_codec_err_t res_dec = decoder->DecodeFrame(NULL, 0);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res_dec) << decoder->DecodeError();
end_of_file = true;
}
DxDataIterator dec_iter = decoder->GetDxData();
const vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
while ((img = dec_iter.Next()))
DecompressedFrameHook(*img, video->frame_number());
}
delete decoder;
}
| 174,535
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_server_method());
#endif
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
|
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_server_method());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
#endif
if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
| 165,158
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static struct nfs4_opendata *nfs4_open_recoverdata_alloc(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct nfs4_state *state)
{
struct nfs4_opendata *opendata;
opendata = nfs4_opendata_alloc(&ctx->path, state->owner, 0, NULL);
if (opendata == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
opendata->state = state;
atomic_inc(&state->count);
return opendata;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
|
static struct nfs4_opendata *nfs4_open_recoverdata_alloc(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct nfs4_state *state)
{
struct nfs4_opendata *opendata;
opendata = nfs4_opendata_alloc(&ctx->path, state->owner, 0, 0, NULL);
if (opendata == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
opendata->state = state;
atomic_inc(&state->count);
return opendata;
}
| 165,697
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnDidPreviewPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage_Params& params) {
DCHECK(params.page_number >= printing::FIRST_PAGE_INDEX);
print_preview_pages_remaining_--;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnDidPreviewPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage_Params& params) {
DCHECK_GE(params.page_number, printing::FIRST_PAGE_INDEX);
print_preview_pages_remaining_--;
}
| 170,849
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BlockEntry::Kind BlockGroup::GetKind() const
{
return kBlockGroup;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
BlockEntry::Kind BlockGroup::GetKind() const
| 174,333
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WebViewTestClient::DidFocus() {
test_runner()->SetFocus(web_view_test_proxy_base_->web_view(), true);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
|
void WebViewTestClient::DidFocus() {
void WebViewTestClient::DidFocus(blink::WebLocalFrame* calling_frame) {
test_runner()->SetFocus(web_view_test_proxy_base_->web_view(), true);
}
| 172,721
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline int add_post_vars(zval *arr, post_var_data_t *vars, zend_bool eof TSRMLS_DC)
{
uint64_t max_vars = PG(max_input_vars);
vars->ptr = vars->str.c;
vars->end = vars->str.c + vars->str.len;
while (add_post_var(arr, vars, eof TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (++vars->cnt > max_vars) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,
"Input variables exceeded %" PRIu64 ". "
"To increase the limit change max_input_vars in php.ini.",
max_vars);
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (!eof) {
memmove(vars->str.c, vars->ptr, vars->str.len = vars->end - vars->ptr);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73807
CWE ID: CWE-400
|
static inline int add_post_vars(zval *arr, post_var_data_t *vars, zend_bool eof TSRMLS_DC)
{
uint64_t max_vars = PG(max_input_vars);
vars->ptr = vars->str.c;
vars->end = vars->str.c + vars->str.len;
while (add_post_var(arr, vars, eof TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (++vars->cnt > max_vars) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,
"Input variables exceeded %" PRIu64 ". "
"To increase the limit change max_input_vars in php.ini.",
max_vars);
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (!eof && vars->str.c != vars->ptr) {
memmove(vars->str.c, vars->ptr, vars->str.len = vars->end - vars->ptr);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
| 168,055
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SpdyWriteQueue::RemovePendingWritesForStreamsAfter(
SpdyStreamId last_good_stream_id) {
CHECK(!removing_writes_);
removing_writes_ = true;
for (int i = MINIMUM_PRIORITY; i <= MAXIMUM_PRIORITY; ++i) {
std::deque<PendingWrite>* queue = &queue_[i];
std::deque<PendingWrite>::iterator out_it = queue->begin();
for (std::deque<PendingWrite>::const_iterator it = queue->begin();
it != queue->end(); ++it) {
if (it->stream.get() && (it->stream->stream_id() > last_good_stream_id ||
it->stream->stream_id() == 0)) {
delete it->frame_producer;
} else {
*out_it = *it;
++out_it;
}
}
queue->erase(out_it, queue->end());
}
removing_writes_ = false;
}
Commit Message: These can post callbacks which re-enter into SpdyWriteQueue.
BUG=369539
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/265933007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268730 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void SpdyWriteQueue::RemovePendingWritesForStreamsAfter(
SpdyStreamId last_good_stream_id) {
CHECK(!removing_writes_);
removing_writes_ = true;
std::vector<SpdyBufferProducer*> erased_buffer_producers;
for (int i = MINIMUM_PRIORITY; i <= MAXIMUM_PRIORITY; ++i) {
std::deque<PendingWrite>* queue = &queue_[i];
std::deque<PendingWrite>::iterator out_it = queue->begin();
for (std::deque<PendingWrite>::const_iterator it = queue->begin();
it != queue->end(); ++it) {
if (it->stream.get() && (it->stream->stream_id() > last_good_stream_id ||
it->stream->stream_id() == 0)) {
erased_buffer_producers.push_back(it->frame_producer);
} else {
*out_it = *it;
++out_it;
}
}
queue->erase(out_it, queue->end());
}
removing_writes_ = false;
STLDeleteElements(&erased_buffer_producers); // Invokes callbacks.
}
| 171,675
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool PPB_ImageData_Impl::Init(PP_ImageDataFormat format,
int width, int height,
bool init_to_zero) {
if (!IsImageDataFormatSupported(format))
return false; // Only support this one format for now.
if (width <= 0 || height <= 0)
return false;
if (static_cast<int64>(width) * static_cast<int64>(height) * 4 >=
std::numeric_limits<int32>::max())
return false; // Prevent overflow of signed 32-bit ints.
format_ = format;
width_ = width;
height_ = height;
return backend_->Init(this, format, width, height, init_to_zero);
}
Commit Message: Security fix: integer overflow on checking image size
Test is left in another CL (codereview.chromiu,.org/11274036) to avoid conflict there. Hope it's fine.
BUG=160926
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11410081
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167882 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
bool PPB_ImageData_Impl::Init(PP_ImageDataFormat format,
int width, int height,
bool init_to_zero) {
if (!IsImageDataFormatSupported(format))
return false; // Only support this one format for now.
if (width <= 0 || height <= 0)
return false;
if (static_cast<int64>(width) * static_cast<int64>(height) >=
std::numeric_limits<int32>::max() / 4)
return false; // Prevent overflow of signed 32-bit ints.
format_ = format;
width_ = width;
height_ = height;
return backend_->Init(this, format, width, height, init_to_zero);
}
| 170,672
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: struct dst_entry *inet6_csk_route_req(const struct sock *sk,
struct flowi6 *fl6,
const struct request_sock *req,
u8 proto)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
const struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *final_p, final;
struct dst_entry *dst;
memset(fl6, 0, sizeof(*fl6));
fl6->flowi6_proto = proto;
fl6->daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, np->opt, &final);
fl6->saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
fl6->flowi6_oif = ireq->ir_iif;
fl6->flowi6_mark = ireq->ir_mark;
fl6->fl6_dport = ireq->ir_rmt_port;
fl6->fl6_sport = htons(ireq->ir_num);
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi6_to_flowi(fl6));
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst))
return NULL;
return dst;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
struct dst_entry *inet6_csk_route_req(const struct sock *sk,
struct flowi6 *fl6,
const struct request_sock *req,
u8 proto)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
const struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *final_p, final;
struct dst_entry *dst;
memset(fl6, 0, sizeof(*fl6));
fl6->flowi6_proto = proto;
fl6->daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
rcu_read_lock();
final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
rcu_read_unlock();
fl6->saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
fl6->flowi6_oif = ireq->ir_iif;
fl6->flowi6_mark = ireq->ir_mark;
fl6->fl6_dport = ireq->ir_rmt_port;
fl6->fl6_sport = htons(ireq->ir_num);
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi6_to_flowi(fl6));
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst))
return NULL;
return dst;
}
| 167,332
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int jp2_bpcc_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_bpcc_t *bpcc = &box->data.bpcc;
unsigned int i;
bpcc->numcmpts = box->datalen;
if (!(bpcc->bpcs = jas_alloc2(bpcc->numcmpts, sizeof(uint_fast8_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < bpcc->numcmpts; ++i) {
if (jp2_getuint8(in, &bpcc->bpcs[i])) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
static int jp2_bpcc_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_bpcc_t *bpcc = &box->data.bpcc;
unsigned int i;
bpcc->bpcs = 0;
bpcc->numcmpts = box->datalen;
if (!(bpcc->bpcs = jas_alloc2(bpcc->numcmpts, sizeof(uint_fast8_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < bpcc->numcmpts; ++i) {
if (jp2_getuint8(in, &bpcc->bpcs[i])) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 168,320
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission(Event* event)
{
Frame* frame = document().frame();
if (m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission || !frame)
return m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission;
m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission = true;
m_shouldSubmit = false;
if (!validateInteractively(event)) {
m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission = false;
return false;
}
StringPairVector controlNamesAndValues;
getTextFieldValues(controlNamesAndValues);
RefPtr<FormState> formState = FormState::create(this, controlNamesAndValues, &document(), NotSubmittedByJavaScript);
frame->loader()->client()->dispatchWillSendSubmitEvent(formState.release());
if (dispatchEvent(Event::createCancelableBubble(eventNames().submitEvent)))
m_shouldSubmit = true;
m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission = false;
if (m_shouldSubmit)
submit(event, true, true, NotSubmittedByJavaScript);
return m_shouldSubmit;
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash in HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission.
BUG=297478
TEST=automated with ASAN.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24910003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158428 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission(Event* event)
{
RefPtr<HTMLFormElement> protector(this);
Frame* frame = document().frame();
if (m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission || !frame)
return m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission;
m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission = true;
m_shouldSubmit = false;
if (!validateInteractively(event)) {
m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission = false;
return false;
}
StringPairVector controlNamesAndValues;
getTextFieldValues(controlNamesAndValues);
RefPtr<FormState> formState = FormState::create(this, controlNamesAndValues, &document(), NotSubmittedByJavaScript);
frame->loader()->client()->dispatchWillSendSubmitEvent(formState.release());
if (dispatchEvent(Event::createCancelableBubble(eventNames().submitEvent)))
m_shouldSubmit = true;
m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission = false;
if (m_shouldSubmit)
submit(event, true, true, NotSubmittedByJavaScript);
return m_shouldSubmit;
}
| 171,171
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BrowserEventRouter::TabPinnedStateChanged(WebContents* contents,
int index) {
TabStripModel* tab_strip = NULL;
int tab_index;
if (ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabStripModel(contents, &tab_strip, &tab_index)) {
DictionaryValue* changed_properties = new DictionaryValue();
changed_properties->SetBoolean(tab_keys::kPinnedKey,
tab_strip->IsTabPinned(tab_index));
DispatchTabUpdatedEvent(contents, changed_properties);
}
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void BrowserEventRouter::TabPinnedStateChanged(WebContents* contents,
int index) {
TabStripModel* tab_strip = NULL;
int tab_index;
if (ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabStripModel(contents, &tab_strip, &tab_index)) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> changed_properties(new DictionaryValue());
changed_properties->SetBoolean(tab_keys::kPinnedKey,
tab_strip->IsTabPinned(tab_index));
DispatchTabUpdatedEvent(contents, changed_properties.Pass());
}
}
| 171,451
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: OMX::buffer_id OMXNodeInstance::makeBufferID(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *bufferHeader) {
return (OMX::buffer_id)bufferHeader;
}
Commit Message: IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
OMX::buffer_id OMXNodeInstance::makeBufferID(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *bufferHeader) {
| 173,360
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool GesturePoint::IsInClickTimeWindow() const {
double duration = last_touch_time_ - first_touch_time_;
return duration >= kMinimumTouchDownDurationInSecondsForClick &&
duration < kMaximumTouchDownDurationInSecondsForClick;
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool GesturePoint::IsInClickTimeWindow() const {
double duration = last_touch_time_ - first_touch_time_;
return duration >=
GestureConfiguration::min_touch_down_duration_in_seconds_for_click() &&
duration <
GestureConfiguration::max_touch_down_duration_in_seconds_for_click();
}
| 171,042
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ProcXResQueryResourceBytes (ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
int rc;
ConstructResourceBytesCtx ctx;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq,
stuff->numSpecs * sizeof(ctx.specs[0]));
(void*) ((char*) stuff +
sz_xXResQueryResourceBytesReq))) {
return BadAlloc;
}
rc = ConstructResourceBytes(stuff->client, &ctx);
if (rc == Success) {
xXResQueryResourceBytesReply rep = {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = bytes_to_int32(ctx.resultBytes),
.numSizes = ctx.numSizes
};
if (client->swapped) {
swaps (&rep.sequenceNumber);
swapl (&rep.length);
swapl (&rep.numSizes);
SwapXResQueryResourceBytes(&ctx.response);
}
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(rep), &rep);
WriteFragmentsToClient(client, &ctx.response);
}
DestroyConstructResourceBytesCtx(&ctx);
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
ProcXResQueryResourceBytes (ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
int rc;
ConstructResourceBytesCtx ctx;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
if (stuff->numSpecs > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(ctx.specs[0]))
return BadLength;
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq,
stuff->numSpecs * sizeof(ctx.specs[0]));
(void*) ((char*) stuff +
sz_xXResQueryResourceBytesReq))) {
return BadAlloc;
}
rc = ConstructResourceBytes(stuff->client, &ctx);
if (rc == Success) {
xXResQueryResourceBytesReply rep = {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = bytes_to_int32(ctx.resultBytes),
.numSizes = ctx.numSizes
};
if (client->swapped) {
swaps (&rep.sequenceNumber);
swapl (&rep.length);
swapl (&rep.numSizes);
SwapXResQueryResourceBytes(&ctx.response);
}
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(rep), &rep);
WriteFragmentsToClient(client, &ctx.response);
}
DestroyConstructResourceBytesCtx(&ctx);
return rc;
}
| 165,434
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void SetUp() {
UUT_ = GET_PARAM(2);
/* Set up guard blocks for an inner block centered in the outer block */
for (int i = 0; i < kOutputBufferSize; ++i) {
if (IsIndexInBorder(i))
output_[i] = 255;
else
output_[i] = 0;
}
::libvpx_test::ACMRandom prng;
for (int i = 0; i < kInputBufferSize; ++i)
input_[i] = prng.Rand8Extremes();
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
virtual void SetUp() {
UUT_ = GET_PARAM(2);
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
if (UUT_->use_highbd_ != 0)
mask_ = (1 << UUT_->use_highbd_) - 1;
else
mask_ = 255;
#endif
/* Set up guard blocks for an inner block centered in the outer block */
for (int i = 0; i < kOutputBufferSize; ++i) {
if (IsIndexInBorder(i))
output_[i] = 255;
else
output_[i] = 0;
}
::libvpx_test::ACMRandom prng;
for (int i = 0; i < kInputBufferSize; ++i) {
if (i & 1) {
input_[i] = 255;
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
input16_[i] = mask_;
#endif
} else {
input_[i] = prng.Rand8Extremes();
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
input16_[i] = prng.Rand16() & mask_;
#endif
}
}
}
| 174,505
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool NaClProcessHost::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& msg) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(NaClProcessHost, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(NaClProcessMsg_QueryKnownToValidate,
OnQueryKnownToValidate)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(NaClProcessMsg_SetKnownToValidate,
OnSetKnownToValidate)
#if defined(OS_WIN)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(NaClProcessMsg_AttachDebugExceptionHandler,
OnAttachDebugExceptionHandler)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(NaClProcessHostMsg_PpapiChannelCreated,
OnPpapiChannelCreated)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool NaClProcessHost::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& msg) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(NaClProcessHost, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(NaClProcessMsg_QueryKnownToValidate,
OnQueryKnownToValidate)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(NaClProcessMsg_SetKnownToValidate,
OnSetKnownToValidate)
#if defined(OS_WIN)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(NaClProcessMsg_AttachDebugExceptionHandler,
OnAttachDebugExceptionHandler)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
| 170,725
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: LosslessTestLarge()
: EncoderTest(GET_PARAM(0)),
psnr_(kMaxPsnr),
nframes_(0),
encoding_mode_(GET_PARAM(1)) {
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
LosslessTestLarge()
LosslessTest()
: EncoderTest(GET_PARAM(0)),
psnr_(kMaxPsnr),
nframes_(0),
encoding_mode_(GET_PARAM(1)) {
}
| 174,597
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int ext4_dax_pmd_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
pmd_t *pmd, unsigned int flags)
{
int result;
handle_t *handle = NULL;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
bool write = flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
if (write) {
sb_start_pagefault(sb);
file_update_time(vma->vm_file);
handle = ext4_journal_start_sb(sb, EXT4_HT_WRITE_PAGE,
ext4_chunk_trans_blocks(inode,
PMD_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE));
}
if (IS_ERR(handle))
result = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
else
result = __dax_pmd_fault(vma, addr, pmd, flags,
ext4_get_block_dax, ext4_end_io_unwritten);
if (write) {
if (!IS_ERR(handle))
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
sb_end_pagefault(sb);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
static int ext4_dax_pmd_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
pmd_t *pmd, unsigned int flags)
{
int result;
handle_t *handle = NULL;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
bool write = flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
if (write) {
sb_start_pagefault(sb);
file_update_time(vma->vm_file);
down_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
handle = ext4_journal_start_sb(sb, EXT4_HT_WRITE_PAGE,
ext4_chunk_trans_blocks(inode,
PMD_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE));
} else
down_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
if (IS_ERR(handle))
result = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
else
result = __dax_pmd_fault(vma, addr, pmd, flags,
ext4_get_block_dax, ext4_end_io_unwritten);
if (write) {
if (!IS_ERR(handle))
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
up_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
sb_end_pagefault(sb);
} else
up_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
return result;
}
| 167,488
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: t42_parse_font_matrix( T42_Face face,
T42_Loader loader )
{
T42_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Matrix* matrix = &face->type1.font_matrix;
FT_Vector* offset = &face->type1.font_offset;
FT_Face root = (FT_Face)&face->root;
FT_Fixed temp[6];
FT_Fixed temp_scale;
(void)T1_ToFixedArray( parser, 6, temp, 3 );
temp_scale = FT_ABS( temp[3] );
/* Set Units per EM based on FontMatrix values. We set the value to */
/* 1000 / temp_scale, because temp_scale was already multiplied by */
/* 1000 (in t1_tofixed, from psobjs.c). */
matrix->xx = temp[0];
matrix->yx = temp[1];
matrix->xy = temp[2];
matrix->yy = temp[3];
/* note that the offsets must be expressed in integer font units */
offset->x = temp[4] >> 16;
offset->y = temp[5] >> 16;
temp[2] = FT_DivFix( temp[2], temp_scale );
temp[4] = FT_DivFix( temp[4], temp_scale );
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = 0x10000L;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
t42_parse_font_matrix( T42_Face face,
T42_Loader loader )
{
T42_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Matrix* matrix = &face->type1.font_matrix;
FT_Vector* offset = &face->type1.font_offset;
FT_Face root = (FT_Face)&face->root;
FT_Fixed temp[6];
FT_Fixed temp_scale;
FT_Int result;
result = T1_ToFixedArray( parser, 6, temp, 3 );
if ( result < 6 )
{
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
temp_scale = FT_ABS( temp[3] );
if ( temp_scale == 0 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_parse_font_matrix: invalid font matrix\n" ));
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
/* Set Units per EM based on FontMatrix values. We set the value to */
/* 1000 / temp_scale, because temp_scale was already multiplied by */
/* 1000 (in t1_tofixed, from psobjs.c). */
matrix->xx = temp[0];
matrix->yx = temp[1];
matrix->xy = temp[2];
matrix->yy = temp[3];
/* note that the offsets must be expressed in integer font units */
offset->x = temp[4] >> 16;
offset->y = temp[5] >> 16;
temp[2] = FT_DivFix( temp[2], temp_scale );
temp[4] = FT_DivFix( temp[4], temp_scale );
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = temp[3] < 0 ? -0x10000L : 0x10000L;
}
| 165,343
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void fz_init_cached_color_converter(fz_context *ctx, fz_color_converter *cc, fz_colorspace *is, fz_colorspace *ds, fz_colorspace *ss, const fz_color_params *params)
{
int n = ss->n;
fz_cached_color_converter *cached = fz_malloc_struct(ctx, fz_cached_color_converter);
cc->opaque = cached;
cc->convert = fz_cached_color_convert;
cc->ds = ds ? ds : fz_device_gray(ctx);
cc->ss = ss;
cc->is = is;
fz_try(ctx)
{
fz_find_color_converter(ctx, &cached->base, is, cc->ds, ss, params);
cached->hash = fz_new_hash_table(ctx, 256, n * sizeof(float), -1, fz_free);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_drop_color_converter(ctx, &cached->base);
fz_drop_hash_table(ctx, cached->hash);
fz_free(ctx, cached);
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void fz_init_cached_color_converter(fz_context *ctx, fz_color_converter *cc, fz_colorspace *is, fz_colorspace *ds, fz_colorspace *ss, const fz_color_params *params)
{
int n = ss->n;
fz_cached_color_converter *cached = fz_malloc_struct(ctx, fz_cached_color_converter);
cc->opaque = cached;
cc->convert = fz_cached_color_convert;
cc->ds = ds ? ds : fz_device_gray(ctx);
cc->ss = ss;
cc->is = is;
fz_try(ctx)
{
fz_find_color_converter(ctx, &cached->base, is, cc->ds, ss, params);
cached->hash = fz_new_hash_table(ctx, 256, n * sizeof(float), -1, fz_free);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_drop_color_converter(ctx, &cached->base);
fz_drop_hash_table(ctx, cached->hash);
fz_free(ctx, cached);
cc->opaque = NULL;
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
}
| 164,576
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool GestureSequence::PinchUpdate(const TouchEvent& event,
const GesturePoint& point, Gestures* gestures) {
DCHECK(state_ == GS_PINCH);
float distance = points_[0].Distance(points_[1]);
if (abs(distance - pinch_distance_current_) < kMinimumPinchUpdateDistance) {
if (!points_[0].DidScroll(event, kMinimumDistanceForPinchScroll) ||
!points_[1].DidScroll(event, kMinimumDistanceForPinchScroll))
return false;
gfx::Point center = points_[0].last_touch_position().Middle(
points_[1].last_touch_position());
AppendScrollGestureUpdate(point, center, gestures);
} else {
AppendPinchGestureUpdate(points_[0], points_[1],
distance / pinch_distance_current_, gestures);
pinch_distance_current_ = distance;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool GestureSequence::PinchUpdate(const TouchEvent& event,
const GesturePoint& point, Gestures* gestures) {
DCHECK(state_ == GS_PINCH);
float distance = points_[0].Distance(points_[1]);
if (abs(distance - pinch_distance_current_) <
GestureConfiguration::minimum_pinch_update_distance_in_pixels()) {
if (!points_[0].DidScroll(event,
GestureConfiguration::minimum_distance_for_pinch_scroll_in_pixels()) ||
!points_[1].DidScroll(event,
GestureConfiguration::minimum_distance_for_pinch_scroll_in_pixels()))
return false;
gfx::Point center = points_[0].last_touch_position().Middle(
points_[1].last_touch_position());
AppendScrollGestureUpdate(point, center, gestures);
} else {
AppendPinchGestureUpdate(points_[0], points_[1],
distance / pinch_distance_current_, gestures);
pinch_distance_current_ = distance;
}
return true;
}
| 171,047
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, getMaxLineLen)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG((long)intern->u.file.max_line_len);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool SplFileObject::hasChildren()
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, getMaxLineLen)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG((long)intern->u.file.max_line_len);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool SplFileObject::hasChildren()
| 167,059
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static Element* siblingWithAriaRole(String role, Node* node) {
Node* parent = node->parentNode();
if (!parent)
return 0;
for (Element* sibling = ElementTraversal::firstChild(*parent); sibling;
sibling = ElementTraversal::nextSibling(*sibling)) {
const AtomicString& siblingAriaRole =
AccessibleNode::getProperty(sibling, AOMStringProperty::kRole);
if (equalIgnoringCase(siblingAriaRole, role))
return sibling;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
static Element* siblingWithAriaRole(String role, Node* node) {
Node* parent = node->parentNode();
if (!parent)
return 0;
for (Element* sibling = ElementTraversal::firstChild(*parent); sibling;
sibling = ElementTraversal::nextSibling(*sibling)) {
const AtomicString& siblingAriaRole =
AccessibleNode::getProperty(sibling, AOMStringProperty::kRole);
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(siblingAriaRole, role))
return sibling;
}
return 0;
}
| 171,921
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::WasShown(const ui::LatencyInfo& latency_info) {
if (!is_hidden_)
return;
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer_host", "RenderWidgetHostImpl::WasShown");
is_hidden_ = false;
if (new_content_rendering_timeout_ &&
new_content_rendering_timeout_->IsRunning()) {
new_content_rendering_timeout_->Stop();
ClearDisplayedGraphics();
}
SendScreenRects();
RestartHangMonitorTimeoutIfNecessary();
bool needs_repainting = true;
needs_repainting_on_restore_ = false;
Send(new ViewMsg_WasShown(routing_id_, needs_repainting, latency_info));
process_->WidgetRestored();
bool is_visible = true;
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
Source<RenderWidgetHost>(this),
Details<bool>(&is_visible));
WasResized();
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID:
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::WasShown(const ui::LatencyInfo& latency_info) {
if (!is_hidden_)
return;
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer_host", "RenderWidgetHostImpl::WasShown");
is_hidden_ = false;
ForceFirstFrameAfterNavigationTimeout();
SendScreenRects();
RestartHangMonitorTimeoutIfNecessary();
bool needs_repainting = true;
needs_repainting_on_restore_ = false;
Send(new ViewMsg_WasShown(routing_id_, needs_repainting, latency_info));
process_->WidgetRestored();
bool is_visible = true;
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
Source<RenderWidgetHost>(this),
Details<bool>(&is_visible));
WasResized();
}
| 173,226
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void __detach_mounts(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct mountpoint *mp;
struct mount *mnt;
namespace_lock();
mp = lookup_mountpoint(dentry);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mp))
goto out_unlock;
lock_mount_hash();
while (!hlist_empty(&mp->m_list)) {
mnt = hlist_entry(mp->m_list.first, struct mount, mnt_mp_list);
if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_UMOUNT) {
struct mount *p, *tmp;
list_for_each_entry_safe(p, tmp, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) {
hlist_add_head(&p->mnt_umount.s_list, &unmounted);
umount_mnt(p);
}
}
else umount_tree(mnt, 0);
}
unlock_mount_hash();
put_mountpoint(mp);
out_unlock:
namespace_unlock();
}
Commit Message: mnt: Update detach_mounts to leave mounts connected
Now that it is possible to lazily unmount an entire mount tree and
leave the individual mounts connected to each other add a new flag
UMOUNT_CONNECTED to umount_tree to force this behavior and use
this flag in detach_mounts.
This closes a bug where the deletion of a file or directory could
trigger an unmount and reveal data under a mount point.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void __detach_mounts(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct mountpoint *mp;
struct mount *mnt;
namespace_lock();
mp = lookup_mountpoint(dentry);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mp))
goto out_unlock;
lock_mount_hash();
while (!hlist_empty(&mp->m_list)) {
mnt = hlist_entry(mp->m_list.first, struct mount, mnt_mp_list);
if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_UMOUNT) {
struct mount *p, *tmp;
list_for_each_entry_safe(p, tmp, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) {
hlist_add_head(&p->mnt_umount.s_list, &unmounted);
umount_mnt(p);
}
}
else umount_tree(mnt, UMOUNT_CONNECTED);
}
unlock_mount_hash();
put_mountpoint(mp);
out_unlock:
namespace_unlock();
}
| 167,564
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PluginInfoMessageFilter::PluginsLoaded(
const GetPluginInfo_Params& params,
IPC::Message* reply_msg,
const std::vector<WebPluginInfo>& plugins) {
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Output output;
scoped_ptr<PluginMetadata> plugin_metadata;
if (context_.FindEnabledPlugin(params.render_view_id, params.url,
params.top_origin_url, params.mime_type,
&output.status, &output.plugin,
&output.actual_mime_type,
&plugin_metadata)) {
context_.DecidePluginStatus(params, output.plugin, plugin_metadata.get(),
&output.status);
}
if (plugin_metadata) {
output.group_identifier = plugin_metadata->identifier();
output.group_name = plugin_metadata->name();
}
context_.GrantAccess(output.status, output.plugin.path);
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg, output);
Send(reply_msg);
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
|
void PluginInfoMessageFilter::PluginsLoaded(
const GetPluginInfo_Params& params,
IPC::Message* reply_msg,
const std::vector<WebPluginInfo>& plugins) {
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Output output;
scoped_ptr<PluginMetadata> plugin_metadata;
if (context_.FindEnabledPlugin(params.render_view_id, params.url,
params.top_origin_url, params.mime_type,
&output.status, &output.plugin,
&output.actual_mime_type,
&plugin_metadata)) {
context_.DecidePluginStatus(params, output.plugin, plugin_metadata.get(),
&output.status);
}
if (plugin_metadata) {
output.group_identifier = plugin_metadata->identifier();
output.group_name = plugin_metadata->name();
}
context_.MaybeGrantAccess(output.status, output.plugin.path);
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg, output);
Send(reply_msg);
}
| 171,473
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, current)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
} else if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_object_create_type(0, intern, SPL_FS_INFO, NULL, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
RETURN_ZVAL(getThis(), 1, 0);
/*RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);*/
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, current)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
} else if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_object_create_type(0, intern, SPL_FS_INFO, NULL, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
RETURN_ZVAL(getThis(), 1, 0);
/*RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);*/
}
}
| 167,036
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Set(const std::string& addr, int value) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
map_[addr] = value;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void Set(const std::string& addr, int value) {
// Sets the |value| for |preview_id|.
void Set(int32 preview_id, int value) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
map_[preview_id] = value;
}
| 170,842
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void XMLHttpRequest::abortError()
{
genericError();
if (!m_uploadComplete) {
m_uploadComplete = true;
if (m_upload && m_uploadEventsAllowed)
m_upload->dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().abortEvent));
}
m_progressEventThrottle.dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().abortEvent));
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void XMLHttpRequest::abortError()
void XMLHttpRequest::handleDidCancel()
{
m_exceptionCode = AbortError;
handleDidFailGeneric();
if (!m_async) {
m_state = DONE;
return;
}
changeState(DONE);
dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(eventNames().abortEvent);
}
| 171,164
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool GesturePoint::IsInsideManhattanSquare(const TouchEvent& event) const {
int manhattanDistance = abs(event.x() - first_touch_position_.x()) +
abs(event.y() - first_touch_position_.y());
return manhattanDistance < kMaximumTouchMoveInPixelsForClick;
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool GesturePoint::IsInsideManhattanSquare(const TouchEvent& event) const {
int manhattanDistance = abs(event.x() - first_touch_position_.x()) +
abs(event.y() - first_touch_position_.y());
return manhattanDistance <
GestureConfiguration::max_touch_move_in_pixels_for_click();
}
| 171,044
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int Block::GetFrameCount() const
{
return m_frame_count;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
int Block::GetFrameCount() const
| 174,325
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool xmp_init()
{
RESET_ERROR;
try {
bool result = SXMPFiles::Initialize(kXMPFiles_IgnoreLocalText);
SXMPMeta::SetDefaultErrorCallback(&_xmp_error_callback, nullptr, 1);
return result;
SXMPMeta::SetDefaultErrorCallback(&_xmp_error_callback, nullptr, 1);
return result;
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
}
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
bool xmp_init()
{
RESET_ERROR;
try {
// XMP SDK 5.1.2 needs this because it has been stripped off local
// text conversion the one that was done in Exempi with libiconv.
bool result = SXMPFiles::Initialize(kXMPFiles_IgnoreLocalText);
SXMPMeta::SetDefaultErrorCallback(&_xmp_error_callback, nullptr, 1);
return result;
SXMPMeta::SetDefaultErrorCallback(&_xmp_error_callback, nullptr, 1);
return result;
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
}
return false;
}
| 165,368
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int http_buf_read(URLContext *h, uint8_t *buf, int size)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
int len;
/* read bytes from input buffer first */
len = s->buf_end - s->buf_ptr;
if (len > 0) {
if (len > size)
len = size;
memcpy(buf, s->buf_ptr, len);
s->buf_ptr += len;
} else {
int64_t target_end = s->end_off ? s->end_off : s->filesize;
if ((!s->willclose || s->chunksize < 0) &&
target_end >= 0 && s->off >= target_end)
return AVERROR_EOF;
len = ffurl_read(s->hd, buf, size);
if (!len && (!s->willclose || s->chunksize < 0) &&
target_end >= 0 && s->off < target_end) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Stream ends prematurely at %"PRId64", should be %"PRId64"\n",
s->off, target_end
);
return AVERROR(EIO);
}
}
if (len > 0) {
s->off += len;
if (s->chunksize > 0)
s->chunksize -= len;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int http_buf_read(URLContext *h, uint8_t *buf, int size)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
int len;
/* read bytes from input buffer first */
len = s->buf_end - s->buf_ptr;
if (len > 0) {
if (len > size)
len = size;
memcpy(buf, s->buf_ptr, len);
s->buf_ptr += len;
} else {
uint64_t target_end = s->end_off ? s->end_off : s->filesize;
if ((!s->willclose || s->chunksize == UINT64_MAX) && s->off >= target_end)
return AVERROR_EOF;
len = ffurl_read(s->hd, buf, size);
if (!len && (!s->willclose || s->chunksize == UINT64_MAX) && s->off < target_end) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Stream ends prematurely at %"PRIu64", should be %"PRIu64"\n",
s->off, target_end
);
return AVERROR(EIO);
}
}
if (len > 0) {
s->off += len;
if (s->chunksize > 0)
s->chunksize -= len;
}
return len;
}
| 168,496
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert,
BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
{
int r;
BIO *cont;
if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA);
return 0;
}
if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
return 0;
if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1;
else
cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0;
if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out)
return 1;
if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert))
r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
do_free_upto(cont, dcont);
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311
|
int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert,
BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
{
int r;
BIO *cont;
if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA);
return 0;
}
if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
return 0;
if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1;
else
cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0;
if (!cert)
cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->havenocert = 1;
else
cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->havenocert = 0;
if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out)
return 1;
if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert))
r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
do_free_upto(cont, dcont);
return r;
}
| 165,138
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: TabGroupData::TabGroupData() {
static int next_placeholder_title_number = 1;
title_ = base::ASCIIToUTF16(
"Group " + base::NumberToString(next_placeholder_title_number));
++next_placeholder_title_number;
static SkRandom rand;
stroke_color_ = rand.nextU() | 0xff000000;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
TabGroupData::TabGroupData() {
static int next_placeholder_title_number = 1;
title_ = base::ASCIIToUTF16(
"Group " + base::NumberToString(next_placeholder_title_number));
++next_placeholder_title_number;
static SkRandom rand;
color_ = rand.nextU() | 0xff000000;
}
| 172,517
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void cJSON_Delete( cJSON *c )
{
cJSON *next;
while ( c ) {
next = c->next;
if ( ! ( c->type & cJSON_IsReference ) && c->child )
cJSON_Delete( c->child );
if ( ! ( c->type & cJSON_IsReference ) && c->valuestring )
cJSON_free( c->valuestring );
if ( c->string )
cJSON_free( c->string );
cJSON_free( c );
c = next;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void cJSON_Delete( cJSON *c )
void cJSON_Delete(cJSON *c)
{
cJSON *next;
while (c)
{
next=c->next;
if (!(c->type&cJSON_IsReference) && c->child) cJSON_Delete(c->child);
if (!(c->type&cJSON_IsReference) && c->valuestring) cJSON_free(c->valuestring);
if (!(c->type&cJSON_StringIsConst) && c->string) cJSON_free(c->string);
cJSON_free(c);
c=next;
}
}
| 167,281
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ping_unhash(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_sock *isk = inet_sk(sk);
pr_debug("ping_unhash(isk=%p,isk->num=%u)\n", isk, isk->inet_num);
if (sk_hashed(sk)) {
write_lock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
hlist_nulls_del(&sk->sk_nulls_node);
sock_put(sk);
isk->inet_num = 0;
isk->inet_sport = 0;
sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, -1);
write_unlock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
}
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Missing sk_nulls_node_init() in ping_unhash().
If we don't do that, then the poison value is left in the ->pprev
backlink.
This can cause crashes if we do a disconnect, followed by a connect().
Tested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Wen Xu <hotdog3645@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
|
void ping_unhash(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_sock *isk = inet_sk(sk);
pr_debug("ping_unhash(isk=%p,isk->num=%u)\n", isk, isk->inet_num);
if (sk_hashed(sk)) {
write_lock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
hlist_nulls_del(&sk->sk_nulls_node);
sk_nulls_node_init(&sk->sk_nulls_node);
sock_put(sk);
isk->inet_num = 0;
isk->inet_sport = 0;
sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, -1);
write_unlock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
}
}
| 166,623
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int mxf_read_primer_pack(void *arg, AVIOContext *pb, int tag, int size, UID uid, int64_t klv_offset)
{
MXFContext *mxf = arg;
int item_num = avio_rb32(pb);
int item_len = avio_rb32(pb);
if (item_len != 18) {
avpriv_request_sample(pb, "Primer pack item length %d", item_len);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if (item_num > 65536) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "item_num %d is too large\n", item_num);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (mxf->local_tags)
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Multiple primer packs\n");
av_free(mxf->local_tags);
mxf->local_tags_count = 0;
mxf->local_tags = av_calloc(item_num, item_len);
if (!mxf->local_tags)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
mxf->local_tags_count = item_num;
avio_read(pb, mxf->local_tags, item_num*item_len);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix Sign error in mxf_read_primer_pack()
Fixes: 20170829B.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int mxf_read_primer_pack(void *arg, AVIOContext *pb, int tag, int size, UID uid, int64_t klv_offset)
{
MXFContext *mxf = arg;
int item_num = avio_rb32(pb);
int item_len = avio_rb32(pb);
if (item_len != 18) {
avpriv_request_sample(pb, "Primer pack item length %d", item_len);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if (item_num > 65536 || item_num < 0) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "item_num %d is too large\n", item_num);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (mxf->local_tags)
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Multiple primer packs\n");
av_free(mxf->local_tags);
mxf->local_tags_count = 0;
mxf->local_tags = av_calloc(item_num, item_len);
if (!mxf->local_tags)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
mxf->local_tags_count = item_num;
avio_read(pb, mxf->local_tags, item_num*item_len);
return 0;
}
| 167,766
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: LookupModMask(struct xkb_context *ctx, const void *priv, xkb_atom_t field,
enum expr_value_type type, xkb_mod_mask_t *val_rtrn)
{
const char *str;
xkb_mod_index_t ndx;
const LookupModMaskPriv *arg = priv;
const struct xkb_mod_set *mods = arg->mods;
enum mod_type mod_type = arg->mod_type;
if (type != EXPR_TYPE_INT)
return false;
str = xkb_atom_text(ctx, field);
if (istreq(str, "all")) {
*val_rtrn = MOD_REAL_MASK_ALL;
return true;
}
if (istreq(str, "none")) {
*val_rtrn = 0;
return true;
}
ndx = XkbModNameToIndex(mods, field, mod_type);
if (ndx == XKB_MOD_INVALID)
return false;
*val_rtrn = (1u << ndx);
return true;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: Don't explode on invalid virtual modifiers
testcase: 'virtualModifiers=LevelThreC'
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
LookupModMask(struct xkb_context *ctx, const void *priv, xkb_atom_t field,
enum expr_value_type type, xkb_mod_mask_t *val_rtrn)
{
const char *str;
xkb_mod_index_t ndx;
const LookupModMaskPriv *arg = priv;
const struct xkb_mod_set *mods = arg->mods;
enum mod_type mod_type = arg->mod_type;
if (type != EXPR_TYPE_INT)
return false;
str = xkb_atom_text(ctx, field);
if (!str)
return false;
if (istreq(str, "all")) {
*val_rtrn = MOD_REAL_MASK_ALL;
return true;
}
if (istreq(str, "none")) {
*val_rtrn = 0;
return true;
}
ndx = XkbModNameToIndex(mods, field, mod_type);
if (ndx == XKB_MOD_INVALID)
return false;
*val_rtrn = (1u << ndx);
return true;
}
| 169,089
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int digi_startup(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct digi_serial *serial_priv;
int ret;
serial_priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*serial_priv), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!serial_priv)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num = serial->type->num_ports;
serial_priv->ds_oob_port = serial->port[serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num];
ret = digi_port_init(serial_priv->ds_oob_port,
serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num);
if (ret) {
kfree(serial_priv);
return ret;
}
usb_set_serial_data(serial, serial_priv);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: digi_acceleport: do sanity checking for the number of ports
The driver can be crashed with devices that expose crafted descriptors
with too few endpoints.
See: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/61
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
[johan: fix OOB endpoint check and add error messages ]
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
|
static int digi_startup(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct device *dev = &serial->interface->dev;
struct digi_serial *serial_priv;
int ret;
int i;
/* check whether the device has the expected number of endpoints */
if (serial->num_port_pointers < serial->type->num_ports + 1) {
dev_err(dev, "OOB endpoints missing\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
for (i = 0; i < serial->type->num_ports + 1 ; i++) {
if (!serial->port[i]->read_urb) {
dev_err(dev, "bulk-in endpoint missing\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
if (!serial->port[i]->write_urb) {
dev_err(dev, "bulk-out endpoint missing\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
}
serial_priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*serial_priv), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!serial_priv)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num = serial->type->num_ports;
serial_priv->ds_oob_port = serial->port[serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num];
ret = digi_port_init(serial_priv->ds_oob_port,
serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num);
if (ret) {
kfree(serial_priv);
return ret;
}
usb_set_serial_data(serial, serial_priv);
return 0;
}
| 167,357
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long long Cluster::GetTime() const
{
const long long tc = GetTimeCode();
if (tc < 0)
return tc;
const SegmentInfo* const pInfo = m_pSegment->GetInfo();
assert(pInfo);
const long long scale = pInfo->GetTimeCodeScale();
assert(scale >= 1);
const long long t = m_timecode * scale;
return t;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
long long Cluster::GetTime() const
| 174,362
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void RemoveObserver(Observer* observer) {
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
virtual void RemoveObserver(Observer* observer) {
virtual void RemoveObserver(InputMethodLibrary::Observer* observer) {
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
| 170,503
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: unsigned long long Track::GetCodecDelay() const
{
return m_info.codecDelay;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
unsigned long long Track::GetCodecDelay() const
| 174,292
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static boolean str_fill_input_buffer(j_decompress_ptr cinfo)
{
int c;
struct str_src_mgr * src = (struct str_src_mgr *)cinfo->src;
if (src->abort) return FALSE;
if (src->index == 0) {
c = 0xFF;
src->index++;
src->index++;
}
else if (src->index == 1) {
c = 0xD8;
src->index++;
}
else c = src->str->getChar();
if (c != EOF)
{
src->buffer = c;
src->pub.next_input_byte = &src->buffer;
src->pub.bytes_in_buffer = 1;
return TRUE;
}
else return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static boolean str_fill_input_buffer(j_decompress_ptr cinfo)
{
int c;
struct str_src_mgr * src = (struct str_src_mgr *)cinfo->src;
if (src->index == 0) {
c = 0xFF;
src->index++;
src->index++;
}
else if (src->index == 1) {
c = 0xD8;
src->index++;
}
else c = src->str->getChar();
if (c != EOF)
{
src->buffer = c;
src->pub.next_input_byte = &src->buffer;
src->pub.bytes_in_buffer = 1;
return TRUE;
}
else return FALSE;
}
| 165,395
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int jp2_cmap_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_cmap_t *cmap = &box->data.cmap;
jp2_cmapent_t *ent;
unsigned int i;
cmap->numchans = (box->datalen) / 4;
if (!(cmap->ents = jas_alloc2(cmap->numchans, sizeof(jp2_cmapent_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < cmap->numchans; ++i) {
ent = &cmap->ents[i];
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &ent->cmptno) ||
jp2_getuint8(in, &ent->map) ||
jp2_getuint8(in, &ent->pcol)) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
static int jp2_cmap_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_cmap_t *cmap = &box->data.cmap;
jp2_cmapent_t *ent;
unsigned int i;
cmap->ents = 0;
cmap->numchans = (box->datalen) / 4;
if (!(cmap->ents = jas_alloc2(cmap->numchans, sizeof(jp2_cmapent_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < cmap->numchans; ++i) {
ent = &cmap->ents[i];
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &ent->cmptno) ||
jp2_getuint8(in, &ent->map) ||
jp2_getuint8(in, &ent->pcol)) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 168,322
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: INLINE void impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(void* pv_ctxt, UWORD32 u4_no_of_bits)
{
stream_t *ps_stream = (stream_t *)pv_ctxt;
if (ps_stream->u4_offset < ps_stream->u4_max_offset)
{
FLUSH_BITS(ps_stream->u4_offset,ps_stream->u4_buf,ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt,u4_no_of_bits,ps_stream->pu4_buf_aligned)
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Fixed out of bound read in flush_bits
Bug: 28168413
Change-Id: I3db5432a08daf665e160c0dab2d1928a576418b4
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
INLINE void impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(void* pv_ctxt, UWORD32 u4_no_of_bits)
{
stream_t *ps_stream = (stream_t *)pv_ctxt;
if ((ps_stream->u4_offset + 64) < ps_stream->u4_max_offset)
{
FLUSH_BITS(ps_stream->u4_offset,ps_stream->u4_buf,ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt,u4_no_of_bits,ps_stream->pu4_buf_aligned)
}
else
{
UWORD32 u4_temp;
if (((ps_stream->u4_offset & 0x1f) + u4_no_of_bits) >= 32)
{
ps_stream->u4_buf = ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt;
ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt = 0;
}
ps_stream->u4_offset += u4_no_of_bits;
}
return;
}
| 173,549
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void mpeg4_encode_gop_header(MpegEncContext *s)
{
int hours, minutes, seconds;
int64_t time;
put_bits(&s->pb, 16, 0);
put_bits(&s->pb, 16, GOP_STARTCODE);
time = s->current_picture_ptr->f->pts;
if (s->reordered_input_picture[1])
time = FFMIN(time, s->reordered_input_picture[1]->f->pts);
time = time * s->avctx->time_base.num;
s->last_time_base = FFUDIV(time, s->avctx->time_base.den);
seconds = FFUDIV(time, s->avctx->time_base.den);
minutes = FFUDIV(seconds, 60); seconds = FFUMOD(seconds, 60);
hours = FFUDIV(minutes, 60); minutes = FFUMOD(minutes, 60);
hours = FFUMOD(hours , 24);
put_bits(&s->pb, 5, hours);
put_bits(&s->pb, 6, minutes);
put_bits(&s->pb, 1, 1);
put_bits(&s->pb, 6, seconds);
put_bits(&s->pb, 1, !!(s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_CLOSED_GOP));
put_bits(&s->pb, 1, 0); // broken link == NO
ff_mpeg4_stuffing(&s->pb);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videoenc: Use 64 bit for times in mpeg4_encode_gop_header()
Fixes truncation
Fixes Assertion n <= 31 && value < (1U << n) failed at libavcodec/put_bits.h:169
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_2.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static void mpeg4_encode_gop_header(MpegEncContext *s)
{
int64_t hours, minutes, seconds;
int64_t time;
put_bits(&s->pb, 16, 0);
put_bits(&s->pb, 16, GOP_STARTCODE);
time = s->current_picture_ptr->f->pts;
if (s->reordered_input_picture[1])
time = FFMIN(time, s->reordered_input_picture[1]->f->pts);
time = time * s->avctx->time_base.num;
s->last_time_base = FFUDIV(time, s->avctx->time_base.den);
seconds = FFUDIV(time, s->avctx->time_base.den);
minutes = FFUDIV(seconds, 60); seconds = FFUMOD(seconds, 60);
hours = FFUDIV(minutes, 60); minutes = FFUMOD(minutes, 60);
hours = FFUMOD(hours , 24);
put_bits(&s->pb, 5, hours);
put_bits(&s->pb, 6, minutes);
put_bits(&s->pb, 1, 1);
put_bits(&s->pb, 6, seconds);
put_bits(&s->pb, 1, !!(s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_CLOSED_GOP));
put_bits(&s->pb, 1, 0); // broken link == NO
ff_mpeg4_stuffing(&s->pb);
}
| 169,192
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: nfs4_callback_svc(void *vrqstp)
{
int err;
struct svc_rqst *rqstp = vrqstp;
set_freezable();
while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
/*
* Listen for a request on the socket
*/
err = svc_recv(rqstp, MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT);
if (err == -EAGAIN || err == -EINTR)
continue;
svc_process(rqstp);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
|
nfs4_callback_svc(void *vrqstp)
{
int err;
struct svc_rqst *rqstp = vrqstp;
set_freezable();
while (!kthread_freezable_should_stop(NULL)) {
if (signal_pending(current))
flush_signals(current);
/*
* Listen for a request on the socket
*/
err = svc_recv(rqstp, MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT);
if (err == -EAGAIN || err == -EINTR)
continue;
svc_process(rqstp);
}
svc_exit_thread(rqstp);
module_put_and_exit(0);
return 0;
}
| 168,138
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int proc_connectinfo(struct usb_dev_state *ps, void __user *arg)
{
struct usbdevfs_connectinfo ci = {
.devnum = ps->dev->devnum,
.slow = ps->dev->speed == USB_SPEED_LOW
};
if (copy_to_user(arg, &ci, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
static int proc_connectinfo(struct usb_dev_state *ps, void __user *arg)
{
struct usbdevfs_connectinfo ci;
memset(&ci, 0, sizeof(ci));
ci.devnum = ps->dev->devnum;
ci.slow = ps->dev->speed == USB_SPEED_LOW;
if (copy_to_user(arg, &ci, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
| 167,259
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static M_bool M_fs_check_overwrite_allowed(const char *p1, const char *p2, M_uint32 mode)
{
M_fs_info_t *info = NULL;
char *pold = NULL;
char *pnew = NULL;
M_fs_type_t type;
M_bool ret = M_TRUE;
if (mode & M_FS_FILE_MODE_OVERWRITE)
return M_TRUE;
/* If we're not overwriting we need to verify existance.
*
* For files we need to check if the file name exists in the
* directory it's being copied to.
*
* For directories we need to check if the directory name
* exists in the directory it's being copied to.
*/
if (M_fs_info(&info, p1, M_FS_PATH_INFO_FLAGS_BASIC) != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS)
return M_FALSE;
type = M_fs_info_get_type(info);
M_fs_info_destroy(info);
if (type != M_FS_TYPE_DIR) {
/* File exists at path. */
if (M_fs_perms_can_access(p2, M_FS_PERMS_MODE_NONE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
ret = M_FALSE;
goto done;
}
}
/* Is dir */
pold = M_fs_path_basename(p1, M_FS_SYSTEM_AUTO);
pnew = M_fs_path_join(p2, pnew, M_FS_SYSTEM_AUTO);
if (M_fs_perms_can_access(pnew, M_FS_PERMS_MODE_NONE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
ret = M_FALSE;
goto done;
}
done:
M_free(pnew);
M_free(pold);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
CWE ID: CWE-732
|
static M_bool M_fs_check_overwrite_allowed(const char *p1, const char *p2, M_uint32 mode)
{
M_fs_info_t *info = NULL;
char *pold = NULL;
char *pnew = NULL;
M_fs_type_t type;
M_bool ret = M_TRUE;
if (mode & M_FS_FILE_MODE_OVERWRITE)
return M_TRUE;
/* If we're not overwriting we need to verify existance.
*
* For files we need to check if the file name exists in the
* directory it's being copied to.
*
* For directories we need to check if the directory name
* exists in the directory it's being copied to.
*/
if (M_fs_info(&info, p1, M_FS_PATH_INFO_FLAGS_BASIC) != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS)
return M_FALSE;
type = M_fs_info_get_type(info);
M_fs_info_destroy(info);
if (type != M_FS_TYPE_DIR) {
/* File exists at path. */
if (M_fs_perms_can_access(p2, M_FS_PERMS_MODE_NONE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
ret = M_FALSE;
goto done;
}
}
/* Is dir */
pold = M_fs_path_basename(p1, M_FS_SYSTEM_AUTO);
pnew = M_fs_path_join(p2, pnew, M_FS_SYSTEM_AUTO);
if (M_fs_perms_can_access(pnew, M_FS_PERMS_MODE_NONE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
ret = M_FALSE;
goto done;
}
done:
M_free(pnew);
M_free(pold);
return ret;
}
| 169,140
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void *jas_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
{
void *result;
JAS_DBGLOG(101, ("jas_realloc called with %x,%zu\n", ptr, size));
result = realloc(ptr, size);
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("jas_realloc(%p, %zu) -> %p\n", ptr, size, result));
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem.
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
void *jas_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
{
void *result;
JAS_DBGLOG(101, ("jas_realloc(%x, %zu)\n", ptr, size));
result = realloc(ptr, size);
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("jas_realloc(%p, %zu) -> %p\n", ptr, size, result));
return result;
}
| 168,475
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void xhci_kick_ep(XHCIState *xhci, unsigned int slotid,
unsigned int epid, unsigned int streamid)
{
XHCIEPContext *epctx;
assert(slotid >= 1 && slotid <= xhci->numslots);
assert(epid >= 1 && epid <= 31);
if (!xhci->slots[slotid-1].enabled) {
DPRINTF("xhci: xhci_kick_ep for disabled slot %d\n", slotid);
return;
}
epctx = xhci->slots[slotid-1].eps[epid-1];
if (!epctx) {
DPRINTF("xhci: xhci_kick_ep for disabled endpoint %d,%d\n",
epid, slotid);
return;
return;
}
xhci_kick_epctx(epctx, streamid);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
|
static void xhci_kick_ep(XHCIState *xhci, unsigned int slotid,
unsigned int epid, unsigned int streamid)
{
XHCIEPContext *epctx;
assert(slotid >= 1 && slotid <= xhci->numslots);
assert(epid >= 1 && epid <= 31);
if (!xhci->slots[slotid-1].enabled) {
DPRINTF("xhci: xhci_kick_ep for disabled slot %d\n", slotid);
return;
}
epctx = xhci->slots[slotid-1].eps[epid-1];
if (!epctx) {
DPRINTF("xhci: xhci_kick_ep for disabled endpoint %d,%d\n",
epid, slotid);
return;
return;
}
if (epctx->kick_active) {
return;
}
xhci_kick_epctx(epctx, streamid);
}
| 164,795
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: tight_detect_smooth_image(VncState *vs, int w, int h)
{
unsigned int errors;
int compression = vs->tight.compression;
int quality = vs->tight.quality;
if (!vs->vd->lossy) {
return 0;
}
if (ds_get_bytes_per_pixel(vs->ds) == 1 ||
vs->clientds.pf.bytes_per_pixel == 1 ||
w < VNC_TIGHT_DETECT_MIN_WIDTH || h < VNC_TIGHT_DETECT_MIN_HEIGHT) {
return 0;
}
if (vs->tight.quality != (uint8_t)-1) {
if (w * h < VNC_TIGHT_JPEG_MIN_RECT_SIZE) {
return 0;
}
} else {
if (w * h < tight_conf[compression].gradient_min_rect_size) {
return 0;
}
}
if (vs->clientds.pf.bytes_per_pixel == 4) {
if (vs->tight.pixel24) {
errors = tight_detect_smooth_image24(vs, w, h);
if (vs->tight.quality != (uint8_t)-1) {
return (errors < tight_conf[quality].jpeg_threshold24);
}
return (errors < tight_conf[compression].gradient_threshold24);
} else {
errors = tight_detect_smooth_image32(vs, w, h);
}
} else {
errors = tight_detect_smooth_image16(vs, w, h);
}
if (quality != -1) {
return (errors < tight_conf[quality].jpeg_threshold);
}
return (errors < tight_conf[compression].gradient_threshold);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
tight_detect_smooth_image(VncState *vs, int w, int h)
{
unsigned int errors;
int compression = vs->tight.compression;
int quality = vs->tight.quality;
if (!vs->vd->lossy) {
return 0;
}
if (ds_get_bytes_per_pixel(vs->ds) == 1 ||
vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel == 1 ||
w < VNC_TIGHT_DETECT_MIN_WIDTH || h < VNC_TIGHT_DETECT_MIN_HEIGHT) {
return 0;
}
if (vs->tight.quality != (uint8_t)-1) {
if (w * h < VNC_TIGHT_JPEG_MIN_RECT_SIZE) {
return 0;
}
} else {
if (w * h < tight_conf[compression].gradient_min_rect_size) {
return 0;
}
}
if (vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel == 4) {
if (vs->tight.pixel24) {
errors = tight_detect_smooth_image24(vs, w, h);
if (vs->tight.quality != (uint8_t)-1) {
return (errors < tight_conf[quality].jpeg_threshold24);
}
return (errors < tight_conf[compression].gradient_threshold24);
} else {
errors = tight_detect_smooth_image32(vs, w, h);
}
} else {
errors = tight_detect_smooth_image16(vs, w, h);
}
if (quality != -1) {
return (errors < tight_conf[quality].jpeg_threshold);
}
return (errors < tight_conf[compression].gradient_threshold);
}
| 165,464
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: pvscsi_convert_sglist(PVSCSIRequest *r)
{
int chunk_size;
uint64_t data_length = r->req.dataLen;
PVSCSISGState sg = r->sg;
while (data_length) {
while (!sg.resid) {
pvscsi_get_next_sg_elem(&sg);
trace_pvscsi_convert_sglist(r->req.context, r->sg.dataAddr,
r->sg.resid);
}
assert(data_length > 0);
chunk_size = MIN((unsigned) data_length, sg.resid);
if (chunk_size) {
qemu_sglist_add(&r->sgl, sg.dataAddr, chunk_size);
}
sg.dataAddr += chunk_size;
data_length -= chunk_size;
sg.resid -= chunk_size;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
pvscsi_convert_sglist(PVSCSIRequest *r)
{
uint32_t chunk_size, elmcnt = 0;
uint64_t data_length = r->req.dataLen;
PVSCSISGState sg = r->sg;
while (data_length && elmcnt < PVSCSI_MAX_SG_ELEM) {
while (!sg.resid && elmcnt++ < PVSCSI_MAX_SG_ELEM) {
pvscsi_get_next_sg_elem(&sg);
trace_pvscsi_convert_sglist(r->req.context, r->sg.dataAddr,
r->sg.resid);
}
chunk_size = MIN(data_length, sg.resid);
if (chunk_size) {
qemu_sglist_add(&r->sgl, sg.dataAddr, chunk_size);
}
sg.dataAddr += chunk_size;
data_length -= chunk_size;
sg.resid -= chunk_size;
}
}
| 164,936
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void smp_proc_id_info(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->tk, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN); /* reuse TK for IRK */
smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void smp_proc_id_info(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) {
tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
smp_int_data.status = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111937065");
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
return;
}
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->tk, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN); /* reuse TK for IRK */
smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL);
}
| 174,075
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int au1100fb_fb_mmap(struct fb_info *fbi, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct au1100fb_device *fbdev;
unsigned int len;
unsigned long start=0, off;
fbdev = to_au1100fb_device(fbi);
if (vma->vm_pgoff > (~0UL >> PAGE_SHIFT)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
start = fbdev->fb_phys & PAGE_MASK;
len = PAGE_ALIGN((start & ~PAGE_MASK) + fbdev->fb_len);
off = vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
if ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start + off) > len) {
return -EINVAL;
}
off += start;
vma->vm_pgoff = off >> PAGE_SHIFT;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
pgprot_val(vma->vm_page_prot) |= (6 << 9); //CCA=6
if (io_remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start, off >> PAGE_SHIFT,
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start,
vma->vm_page_prot)) {
return -EAGAIN;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
int au1100fb_fb_mmap(struct fb_info *fbi, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct au1100fb_device *fbdev;
fbdev = to_au1100fb_device(fbi);
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
pgprot_val(vma->vm_page_prot) |= (6 << 9); //CCA=6
return vm_iomap_memory(vma, fbdev->fb_phys, fbdev->fb_len);
}
| 165,935
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
#if ARCH_X86 || ARCH_X86_64
const int simd_caps = x86_simd_caps();
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_MMX))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":MMX/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE2))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE2/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE3))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE3/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSSE3))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSSE3/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE4_1))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE4_1/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_AVX))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":AVX/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_AVX2))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":AVX2/*");
#endif
#if !CONFIG_SHARED
#if CONFIG_VP8
vp8_rtcd();
#endif
#if CONFIG_VP9
vp9_rtcd();
#endif
#endif
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
#if ARCH_X86 || ARCH_X86_64
const int simd_caps = x86_simd_caps();
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_MMX))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":MMX.*:MMX/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE.*:SSE/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE2))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE2.*:SSE2/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE3))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE3.*:SSE3/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSSE3))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSSE3.*:SSSE3/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE4_1))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE4_1.*:SSE4_1/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_AVX))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":AVX.*:AVX/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_AVX2))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":AVX2.*:AVX2/*");
#endif
#if !CONFIG_SHARED
#if CONFIG_VP8
vp8_rtcd();
#endif // CONFIG_VP8
#if CONFIG_VP9
vp9_rtcd();
#endif // CONFIG_VP9
vpx_dsp_rtcd();
vpx_scale_rtcd();
#endif // !CONFIG_SHARED
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
}
| 174,583
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int cdc_ncm_bind(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf)
{
int ret;
/* MBIM backwards compatible function? */
if (cdc_ncm_select_altsetting(intf) != CDC_NCM_COMM_ALTSETTING_NCM)
return -ENODEV;
/* The NCM data altsetting is fixed, so we hard-coded it.
* Additionally, generic NCM devices are assumed to accept arbitrarily
* placed NDP.
*/
ret = cdc_ncm_bind_common(dev, intf, CDC_NCM_DATA_ALTSETTING_NCM, 0);
/*
* We should get an event when network connection is "connected" or
* "disconnected". Set network connection in "disconnected" state
* (carrier is OFF) during attach, so the IP network stack does not
* start IPv6 negotiation and more.
*/
usbnet_link_change(dev, 0, 0);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
|
static int cdc_ncm_bind(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf)
{
/* MBIM backwards compatible function? */
if (cdc_ncm_select_altsetting(intf) != CDC_NCM_COMM_ALTSETTING_NCM)
return -ENODEV;
/* The NCM data altsetting is fixed, so we hard-coded it.
* Additionally, generic NCM devices are assumed to accept arbitrarily
* placed NDP.
*/
return cdc_ncm_bind_common(dev, intf, CDC_NCM_DATA_ALTSETTING_NCM, 0);
}
| 167,323
|
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