instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 93
3.53k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BlockEntry::~BlockEntry()
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
BlockEntry::~BlockEntry()
| 174,456
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PrintMsg_Print_Params::Reset() {
page_size = gfx::Size();
content_size = gfx::Size();
printable_area = gfx::Rect();
margin_top = 0;
margin_left = 0;
dpi = 0;
scale_factor = 1.0f;
rasterize_pdf = false;
document_cookie = 0;
selection_only = false;
supports_alpha_blend = false;
preview_ui_id = -1;
preview_request_id = 0;
is_first_request = false;
print_scaling_option = blink::kWebPrintScalingOptionSourceSize;
print_to_pdf = false;
display_header_footer = false;
title = base::string16();
url = base::string16();
should_print_backgrounds = false;
printed_doc_type = printing::SkiaDocumentType::PDF;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <jzfeng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void PrintMsg_Print_Params::Reset() {
page_size = gfx::Size();
content_size = gfx::Size();
printable_area = gfx::Rect();
margin_top = 0;
margin_left = 0;
dpi = 0;
scale_factor = 1.0f;
rasterize_pdf = false;
document_cookie = 0;
selection_only = false;
supports_alpha_blend = false;
preview_ui_id = -1;
preview_request_id = 0;
is_first_request = false;
print_scaling_option = blink::kWebPrintScalingOptionSourceSize;
print_to_pdf = false;
display_header_footer = false;
title = base::string16();
url = base::string16();
header_template = base::string16();
footer_template = base::string16();
should_print_backgrounds = false;
printed_doc_type = printing::SkiaDocumentType::PDF;
}
| 172,898
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void opl3_setup_voice(int dev, int voice, int chn)
{
struct channel_info *info =
&synth_devs[dev]->chn_info[chn];
opl3_set_instr(dev, voice, info->pgm_num);
devc->voc[voice].bender = 0;
devc->voc[voice].bender_range = info->bender_range;
devc->voc[voice].volume = info->controllers[CTL_MAIN_VOLUME];
devc->voc[voice].panning = (info->controllers[CTL_PAN] * 2) - 128;
}
Commit Message: sound/oss/opl3: validate voice and channel indexes
User-controllable indexes for voice and channel values may cause reading
and writing beyond the bounds of their respective arrays, leading to
potentially exploitable memory corruption. Validate these indexes.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void opl3_setup_voice(int dev, int voice, int chn)
{
struct channel_info *info;
if (voice < 0 || voice >= devc->nr_voice)
return;
if (chn < 0 || chn > 15)
return;
info = &synth_devs[dev]->chn_info[chn];
opl3_set_instr(dev, voice, info->pgm_num);
devc->voc[voice].bender = 0;
devc->voc[voice].bender_range = info->bender_range;
devc->voc[voice].volume = info->controllers[CTL_MAIN_VOLUME];
devc->voc[voice].panning = (info->controllers[CTL_PAN] * 2) - 128;
}
| 165,891
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: externalParEntProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
const char *next = s;
int tok;
tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
if (tok <= 0) {
if (! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer && tok != XML_TOK_INVALID) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_INVALID:
return XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL:
return XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR:
return XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR;
case XML_TOK_NONE: /* start == end */
default:
break;
}
}
/* This would cause the next stage, i.e. doProlog to be passed XML_TOK_BOM.
However, when parsing an external subset, doProlog will not accept a BOM
as valid, and report a syntax error, so we have to skip the BOM
*/
else if (tok == XML_TOK_BOM) {
s = next;
tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
}
parser->m_processor = prologProcessor;
return doProlog(parser, parser->m_encoding, s, end, tok, next, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer);
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
|
externalParEntProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
const char *next = s;
int tok;
tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
if (tok <= 0) {
if (! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer && tok != XML_TOK_INVALID) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_INVALID:
return XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL:
return XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR:
return XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR;
case XML_TOK_NONE: /* start == end */
default:
break;
}
}
/* This would cause the next stage, i.e. doProlog to be passed XML_TOK_BOM.
However, when parsing an external subset, doProlog will not accept a BOM
as valid, and report a syntax error, so we have to skip the BOM
*/
else if (tok == XML_TOK_BOM) {
s = next;
tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
}
parser->m_processor = prologProcessor;
return doProlog(parser, parser->m_encoding, s, end, tok, next, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer, XML_TRUE);
}
| 169,530
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: cc::FrameSinkId RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetFrameSinkId() {
return delegated_frame_host_ ? delegated_frame_host_->GetFrameSinkId()
: cc::FrameSinkId();
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
cc::FrameSinkId RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetFrameSinkId() {
return frame_sink_id_;
}
| 172,234
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void QuicTransportHost::Initialize(
IceTransportHost* ice_transport_host,
quic::Perspective perspective,
const std::vector<rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate>>& certificates) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(ice_transport_host);
DCHECK(!ice_transport_host_);
ice_transport_host_ = ice_transport_host;
P2PQuicTransportConfig config(
this, ice_transport_host->ConnectConsumer(this)->packet_transport(),
certificates);
config.is_server = (perspective == quic::Perspective::IS_SERVER);
quic_transport_ =
quic_transport_factory_->CreateQuicTransport(std::move(config));
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
void QuicTransportHost::Initialize(
IceTransportHost* ice_transport_host,
quic::Perspective perspective,
const std::vector<rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate>>& certificates) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(ice_transport_host);
DCHECK(!ice_transport_host_);
ice_transport_host_ = ice_transport_host;
// TODO(https://crbug.com/874296): Pass through values for read and write
// stream buffer sizes in the P2PQuicTransportConfig. Currently this is just
// set to the same size as the QUIC receive window size (24 MB).
uint32_t stream_buffer_size = 24 * 1024 * 1024;
P2PQuicTransportConfig config(
this, ice_transport_host->ConnectConsumer(this)->packet_transport(),
certificates, stream_buffer_size);
config.is_server = (perspective == quic::Perspective::IS_SERVER);
quic_transport_ =
quic_transport_factory_->CreateQuicTransport(std::move(config));
}
| 172,270
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool PluginInfoMessageFilter::Context::FindEnabledPlugin(
int render_view_id,
const GURL& url,
const GURL& top_origin_url,
const std::string& mime_type,
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status* status,
WebPluginInfo* plugin,
std::string* actual_mime_type,
scoped_ptr<PluginMetadata>* plugin_metadata) const {
bool allow_wildcard = true;
std::vector<WebPluginInfo> matching_plugins;
std::vector<std::string> mime_types;
PluginService::GetInstance()->GetPluginInfoArray(
url, mime_type, allow_wildcard, &matching_plugins, &mime_types);
if (matching_plugins.empty()) {
status->value = ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kNotFound;
return false;
}
content::PluginServiceFilter* filter =
PluginService::GetInstance()->GetFilter();
size_t i = 0;
for (; i < matching_plugins.size(); ++i) {
if (!filter || filter->IsPluginEnabled(render_process_id_,
render_view_id,
resource_context_,
url,
top_origin_url,
&matching_plugins[i])) {
break;
}
}
bool enabled = i < matching_plugins.size();
if (!enabled) {
i = 0;
status->value = ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kDisabled;
}
*plugin = matching_plugins[i];
*actual_mime_type = mime_types[i];
if (plugin_metadata)
*plugin_metadata = PluginFinder::GetInstance()->GetPluginMetadata(*plugin);
return enabled;
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
|
bool PluginInfoMessageFilter::Context::FindEnabledPlugin(
int render_view_id,
const GURL& url,
const GURL& top_origin_url,
const std::string& mime_type,
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status* status,
WebPluginInfo* plugin,
std::string* actual_mime_type,
scoped_ptr<PluginMetadata>* plugin_metadata) const {
bool allow_wildcard = true;
std::vector<WebPluginInfo> matching_plugins;
std::vector<std::string> mime_types;
PluginService::GetInstance()->GetPluginInfoArray(
url, mime_type, allow_wildcard, &matching_plugins, &mime_types);
if (matching_plugins.empty()) {
status->value = ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kNotFound;
return false;
}
content::PluginServiceFilter* filter =
PluginService::GetInstance()->GetFilter();
size_t i = 0;
for (; i < matching_plugins.size(); ++i) {
if (!filter || filter->IsPluginAvailable(render_process_id_,
render_view_id,
resource_context_,
url,
top_origin_url,
&matching_plugins[i])) {
break;
}
}
bool enabled = i < matching_plugins.size();
if (!enabled) {
i = 0;
status->value = ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kDisabled;
}
*plugin = matching_plugins[i];
*actual_mime_type = mime_types[i];
if (plugin_metadata)
*plugin_metadata = PluginFinder::GetInstance()->GetPluginMetadata(*plugin);
return enabled;
}
| 171,471
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BrowserPolicyConnector::DeviceStopAutoRetry() {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (device_cloud_policy_subsystem_.get())
device_cloud_policy_subsystem_->StopAutoRetry();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void BrowserPolicyConnector::DeviceStopAutoRetry() {
void BrowserPolicyConnector::ResetDevicePolicy() {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (device_cloud_policy_subsystem_.get())
device_cloud_policy_subsystem_->Reset();
#endif
}
| 170,279
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static ssize_t k90_show_current_profile(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
int ret;
struct usb_interface *usbif = to_usb_interface(dev->parent);
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbif);
int current_profile;
char data[8];
ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usbdev, 0),
K90_REQUEST_STATUS,
USB_DIR_IN | USB_TYPE_VENDOR |
USB_RECIP_DEVICE, 0, 0, data, 8,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_warn(dev, "Failed to get K90 initial state (error %d).\n",
ret);
return -EIO;
}
current_profile = data[7];
if (current_profile < 1 || current_profile > 3) {
dev_warn(dev, "Read invalid current profile: %02hhx.\n",
data[7]);
return -EIO;
}
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", current_profile);
}
Commit Message: HID: corsair: fix DMA buffers on stack
Not all platforms support DMA to the stack, and specifically since v4.9
this is no longer supported on x86 with VMAP_STACK either.
Note that the macro-mode buffer was larger than necessary.
Fixes: 6f78193ee9ea ("HID: corsair: Add Corsair Vengeance K90 driver")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static ssize_t k90_show_current_profile(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
int ret;
struct usb_interface *usbif = to_usb_interface(dev->parent);
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbif);
int current_profile;
char *data;
data = kmalloc(8, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usbdev, 0),
K90_REQUEST_STATUS,
USB_DIR_IN | USB_TYPE_VENDOR |
USB_RECIP_DEVICE, 0, 0, data, 8,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_warn(dev, "Failed to get K90 initial state (error %d).\n",
ret);
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
current_profile = data[7];
if (current_profile < 1 || current_profile > 3) {
dev_warn(dev, "Read invalid current profile: %02hhx.\n",
data[7]);
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
ret = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", current_profile);
out:
kfree(data);
return ret;
}
| 168,394
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static unsigned short get_ushort(const unsigned char *data)
{
unsigned short val = *(const unsigned short *)data;
#ifdef OPJ_BIG_ENDIAN
val = ((val & 0xffU) << 8) | (val >> 8);
#endif
return val;
}
Commit Message: tgatoimage(): avoid excessive memory allocation attempt, and fixes unaligned load (#995)
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
static unsigned short get_ushort(const unsigned char *data)
/* Returns a ushort from a little-endian serialized value */
static unsigned short get_tga_ushort(const unsigned char *data)
{
return data[0] | (data[1] << 8);
}
| 167,780
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_primary_language )
{
get_icu_value_src_php( LOC_LANG_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_primary_language )
PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_primary_language )
{
get_icu_value_src_php( LOC_LANG_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
| 167,184
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: exsltStrPaddingFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int number, str_len = 0;
xmlChar *str = NULL, *ret = NULL, *tmp;
if ((nargs < 1) || (nargs > 2)) {
xmlXPathSetArityError(ctxt);
return;
}
if (nargs == 2) {
str = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
str_len = xmlUTF8Strlen(str);
}
if (str_len == 0) {
if (str != NULL) xmlFree(str);
str = xmlStrdup((const xmlChar *) " ");
str_len = 1;
}
number = (int) xmlXPathPopNumber(ctxt);
if (number <= 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString(ctxt);
xmlFree(str);
return;
}
while (number >= str_len) {
ret = xmlStrncat(ret, str, str_len);
number -= str_len;
}
tmp = xmlUTF8Strndup (str, number);
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, tmp);
if (tmp != NULL)
xmlFree (tmp);
xmlXPathReturnString(ctxt, ret);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree(str);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
exsltStrPaddingFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int number, str_len = 0, str_size = 0;
xmlChar *str = NULL, *ret = NULL;
if ((nargs < 1) || (nargs > 2)) {
xmlXPathSetArityError(ctxt);
return;
}
if (nargs == 2) {
str = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
str_len = xmlUTF8Strlen(str);
str_size = xmlStrlen(str);
}
if (str_len == 0) {
if (str != NULL) xmlFree(str);
str = xmlStrdup((const xmlChar *) " ");
str_len = 1;
str_size = 1;
}
number = (int) xmlXPathPopNumber(ctxt);
if (number <= 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString(ctxt);
xmlFree(str);
return;
}
while (number >= str_len) {
ret = xmlStrncat(ret, str, str_size);
number -= str_len;
}
if (number > 0) {
str_size = xmlUTF8Strsize(str, number);
ret = xmlStrncat(ret, str, str_size);
}
xmlXPathReturnString(ctxt, ret);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree(str);
}
| 173,296
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
return image_transform_png_set_expand_add(this, that, colour_type,
bit_depth);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_transform_png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8_add(image_transform *this,
const image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
#if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10700
return image_transform_png_set_expand_add(this, that, colour_type,
bit_depth);
#else
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
/* This should do nothing unless the color type is gray and the bit depth is
* less than 8:
*/
return colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY && bit_depth < 8;
#endif /* 1.7 or later */
}
| 173,630
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Track::GetContentEncodingByIndex(unsigned long idx) const {
const ptrdiff_t count =
content_encoding_entries_end_ - content_encoding_entries_;
assert(count >= 0);
if (idx >= static_cast<unsigned long>(count))
return NULL;
return content_encoding_entries_[idx];
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
Track::GetContentEncodingByIndex(unsigned long idx) const {
const ContentEncoding* Track::GetContentEncodingByIndex(
unsigned long idx) const {
const ptrdiff_t count =
content_encoding_entries_end_ - content_encoding_entries_;
assert(count >= 0);
if (idx >= static_cast<unsigned long>(count))
return NULL;
return content_encoding_entries_[idx];
}
| 174,296
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void LoginHtmlDialog::GetDialogSize(gfx::Size* size) const {
size->SetSize(width_, height_);
}
Commit Message: cros: The next 100 clang plugin errors.
BUG=none
TEST=none
TBR=dpolukhin
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7022008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85418 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void LoginHtmlDialog::GetDialogSize(gfx::Size* size) const {
bool LoginHtmlDialog::ShouldShowDialogTitle() const {
return true;
}
void LoginHtmlDialog::Observe(NotificationType type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
DCHECK(type.value == NotificationType::LOAD_COMPLETED_MAIN_FRAME);
if (bubble_frame_view_)
bubble_frame_view_->StopThrobber();
}
| 170,615
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void v9fs_device_unrealize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
{
g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
g_free(s->tag);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
|
void v9fs_device_unrealize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
{
g_free(s->tag);
g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
}
| 164,896
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void _xml_unparsedEntityDeclHandler(void *userData,
const XML_Char *entityName,
const XML_Char *base,
const XML_Char *systemId,
const XML_Char *publicId,
const XML_Char *notationName)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)userData;
if (parser && parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler) {
zval *retval, *args[6];
args[0] = _xml_resource_zval(parser->index);
args[1] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(entityName, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[2] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(base, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[3] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(systemId, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[4] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(publicId, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[5] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(notationName, 0, parser->target_encoding);
if ((retval = xml_call_handler(parser, parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler, parser->unparsedEntityDeclPtr, 6, args))) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void _xml_unparsedEntityDeclHandler(void *userData,
void _xml_unparsedEntityDeclHandler(void *userData,
const XML_Char *entityName,
const XML_Char *base,
const XML_Char *systemId,
const XML_Char *publicId,
const XML_Char *notationName)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)userData;
if (parser && parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler) {
zval *retval, *args[6];
args[0] = _xml_resource_zval(parser->index);
args[1] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(entityName, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[2] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(base, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[3] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(systemId, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[4] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(publicId, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[5] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(notationName, 0, parser->target_encoding);
if ((retval = xml_call_handler(parser, parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler, parser->unparsedEntityDeclPtr, 6, args))) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
}
| 165,043
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DataReductionProxyConfig::FetchWarmupProbeURL() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (!enabled_by_user_) {
RecordWarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent(
WarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent::kProxyNotEnabledByUser);
return;
}
if (!params::FetchWarmupProbeURLEnabled()) {
RecordWarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent(
WarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent::kWarmupURLFetchingDisabled);
return;
}
if (connection_type_ == network::mojom::ConnectionType::CONNECTION_NONE) {
RecordWarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent(
WarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent::kConnectionTypeNone);
return;
}
base::Optional<DataReductionProxyServer> warmup_proxy =
GetProxyConnectionToProbe();
if (!warmup_proxy)
return;
warmup_url_fetch_in_flight_secure_proxy_ = warmup_proxy->IsSecureProxy();
warmup_url_fetch_in_flight_core_proxy_ = warmup_proxy->IsCoreProxy();
size_t previous_attempt_counts = GetWarmupURLFetchAttemptCounts();
network_properties_manager_->OnWarmupFetchInitiated(
warmup_url_fetch_in_flight_secure_proxy_,
warmup_url_fetch_in_flight_core_proxy_);
RecordWarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent(WarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent::kFetchInitiated);
warmup_url_fetcher_->FetchWarmupURL(previous_attempt_counts,
warmup_proxy.value());
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void DataReductionProxyConfig::FetchWarmupProbeURL() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (params::IsIncludedInHoldbackFieldTrial())
return;
if (!enabled_by_user_) {
RecordWarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent(
WarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent::kProxyNotEnabledByUser);
return;
}
if (!params::FetchWarmupProbeURLEnabled()) {
RecordWarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent(
WarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent::kWarmupURLFetchingDisabled);
return;
}
if (connection_type_ == network::mojom::ConnectionType::CONNECTION_NONE) {
RecordWarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent(
WarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent::kConnectionTypeNone);
return;
}
base::Optional<DataReductionProxyServer> warmup_proxy =
GetProxyConnectionToProbe();
if (!warmup_proxy)
return;
warmup_url_fetch_in_flight_secure_proxy_ = warmup_proxy->IsSecureProxy();
warmup_url_fetch_in_flight_core_proxy_ = warmup_proxy->IsCoreProxy();
size_t previous_attempt_counts = GetWarmupURLFetchAttemptCounts();
network_properties_manager_->OnWarmupFetchInitiated(
warmup_url_fetch_in_flight_secure_proxy_,
warmup_url_fetch_in_flight_core_proxy_);
RecordWarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent(WarmupURLFetchAttemptEvent::kFetchInitiated);
warmup_url_fetcher_->FetchWarmupURL(previous_attempt_counts,
warmup_proxy.value());
}
| 172,415
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: char *enl_ipc_get(const char *msg_data)
{
static char *message = NULL;
static unsigned short len = 0;
char buff[13], *ret_msg = NULL;
register unsigned char i;
unsigned char blen;
if (msg_data == IPC_TIMEOUT) {
return(IPC_TIMEOUT);
}
for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
buff[i] = msg_data[i];
}
buff[12] = 0;
blen = strlen(buff);
if (message != NULL) {
len += blen;
message = (char *) erealloc(message, len + 1);
strcat(message, buff);
} else {
len = blen;
message = (char *) emalloc(len + 1);
strcpy(message, buff);
}
if (blen < 12) {
ret_msg = message;
message = NULL;
D(("Received complete reply: \"%s\"\n", ret_msg));
}
return(ret_msg);
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free/OOB-write while receiving IPC data
If a malicious client pretends to be the E17 window manager, it is
possible to trigger an out of boundary heap write while receiving an
IPC message.
The length of the already received message is stored in an unsigned
short, which overflows after receiving 64 KB of data. It's comparably
small amount of data and therefore achievable for an attacker.
When len overflows, realloc() will either be called with a small value
and therefore chars will be appended out of bounds, or len + 1 will be
exactly 0, in which case realloc() behaves like free(). This could be
abused for a later double-free attack as it's even possible to overwrite
the free information -- but this depends on the malloc implementation.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
char *enl_ipc_get(const char *msg_data)
{
static char *message = NULL;
static size_t len = 0;
char buff[13], *ret_msg = NULL;
register unsigned char i;
unsigned char blen;
if (msg_data == IPC_TIMEOUT) {
return(IPC_TIMEOUT);
}
for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
buff[i] = msg_data[i];
}
buff[12] = 0;
blen = strlen(buff);
if (message != NULL) {
len += blen;
message = (char *) erealloc(message, len + 1);
strcat(message, buff);
} else {
len = blen;
message = (char *) emalloc(len + 1);
strcpy(message, buff);
}
if (blen < 12) {
ret_msg = message;
message = NULL;
D(("Received complete reply: \"%s\"\n", ret_msg));
}
return(ret_msg);
}
| 168,244
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: png_set_PLTE(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr,
png_colorp palette, int num_palette)
{
png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", "PLTE");
if (png_ptr == NULL || info_ptr == NULL)
return;
if (num_palette < 0 || num_palette > PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH)
{
if (info_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
png_error(png_ptr, "Invalid palette length");
else
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Invalid palette length");
return;
}
}
/* It may not actually be necessary to set png_ptr->palette here;
* we do it for backward compatibility with the way the png_handle_tRNS
* function used to do the allocation.
*/
#ifdef PNG_FREE_ME_SUPPORTED
png_free_data(png_ptr, info_ptr, PNG_FREE_PLTE, 0);
#endif
/* Changed in libpng-1.2.1 to allocate PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH instead
* of num_palette entries, in case of an invalid PNG file that has
* too-large sample values.
*/
png_ptr->palette = (png_colorp)png_calloc(png_ptr,
PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH * png_sizeof(png_color));
png_memcpy(png_ptr->palette, palette, num_palette * png_sizeof(png_color));
info_ptr->palette = png_ptr->palette;
info_ptr->num_palette = png_ptr->num_palette = (png_uint_16)num_palette;
#ifdef PNG_FREE_ME_SUPPORTED
info_ptr->free_me |= PNG_FREE_PLTE;
#else
png_ptr->flags |= PNG_FLAG_FREE_PLTE;
#endif
info_ptr->valid |= PNG_INFO_PLTE;
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
png_set_PLTE(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr,
png_colorp palette, int num_palette)
{
png_uint_32 max_palette_length;
png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", "PLTE");
if (png_ptr == NULL || info_ptr == NULL)
return;
max_palette_length = (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE) ?
(1 << png_ptr->bit_depth) : PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH;
if (num_palette < 0 || num_palette > (int) max_palette_length)
{
if (info_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
png_error(png_ptr, "Invalid palette length");
else
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Invalid palette length");
return;
}
}
/* It may not actually be necessary to set png_ptr->palette here;
* we do it for backward compatibility with the way the png_handle_tRNS
* function used to do the allocation.
*/
#ifdef PNG_FREE_ME_SUPPORTED
png_free_data(png_ptr, info_ptr, PNG_FREE_PLTE, 0);
#endif
/* Changed in libpng-1.2.1 to allocate PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH instead
* of num_palette entries, in case of an invalid PNG file or incorrect
* call to png_set_PLTE() with too-large sample values.
*/
png_ptr->palette = (png_colorp)png_calloc(png_ptr,
PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH * png_sizeof(png_color));
png_memcpy(png_ptr->palette, palette, num_palette * png_sizeof(png_color));
info_ptr->palette = png_ptr->palette;
info_ptr->num_palette = png_ptr->num_palette = (png_uint_16)num_palette;
#ifdef PNG_FREE_ME_SUPPORTED
info_ptr->free_me |= PNG_FREE_PLTE;
#else
png_ptr->flags |= PNG_FLAG_FREE_PLTE;
#endif
info_ptr->valid |= PNG_INFO_PLTE;
}
| 172,183
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: xmlDocPtr soap_xmlParseFile(const char *filename TSRMLS_DC)
{
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt = NULL;
xmlDocPtr ret;
zend_bool old_allow_url_fopen;
/*
xmlInitParser();
*/
old_allow_url_fopen = PG(allow_url_fopen);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = 1;
ctxt = xmlCreateFileParserCtxt(filename);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = old_allow_url_fopen;
if (ctxt) {
ctxt->keepBlanks = 0;
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace = soap_ignorableWhitespace;
ctxt->sax->comment = soap_Comment;
ctxt->sax->warning = NULL;
/*ctxt->sax->fatalError = NULL;*/
xmlParseDocument(ctxt);
if (ctxt->wellFormed) {
ret = ctxt->myDoc;
if (ret->URL == NULL && ctxt->directory != NULL) {
ret->URL = xmlCharStrdup(ctxt->directory);
}
} else {
ret = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
} else {
ret = NULL;
}
/*
xmlCleanupParser();
*/
if (ret) {
cleanup_xml_node((xmlNodePtr)ret);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
xmlDocPtr soap_xmlParseFile(const char *filename TSRMLS_DC)
{
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt = NULL;
xmlDocPtr ret;
zend_bool old_allow_url_fopen;
/*
xmlInitParser();
*/
old_allow_url_fopen = PG(allow_url_fopen);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = 1;
ctxt = xmlCreateFileParserCtxt(filename);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = old_allow_url_fopen;
if (ctxt) {
ctxt->keepBlanks = 0;
ctxt->options -= XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD;
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace = soap_ignorableWhitespace;
ctxt->sax->comment = soap_Comment;
ctxt->sax->warning = NULL;
/*ctxt->sax->fatalError = NULL;*/
xmlParseDocument(ctxt);
if (ctxt->wellFormed) {
ret = ctxt->myDoc;
if (ret->URL == NULL && ctxt->directory != NULL) {
ret->URL = xmlCharStrdup(ctxt->directory);
}
} else {
ret = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
} else {
ret = NULL;
}
/*
xmlCleanupParser();
*/
if (ret) {
cleanup_xml_node((xmlNodePtr)ret);
}
return ret;
}
| 164,727
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateIntArray( int64_t *numbers, int count )
{
int i;
cJSON *n = 0, *p = 0, *a = cJSON_CreateArray();
for ( i = 0; a && i < count; ++i ) {
n = cJSON_CreateInt( numbers[i] );
if ( ! i )
a->child = n;
else
suffix_object( p, n );
p = n;
}
return a;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
cJSON *cJSON_CreateIntArray( int64_t *numbers, int count )
| 167,275
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(
const gfx::Rect& src_subrect,
const gfx::Size& dst_size,
const base::Callback<void(bool, const SkBitmap&)>& callback,
const SkColorType color_type) {
bool format_support = ((color_type == kRGB_565_SkColorType) ||
(color_type == kN32_SkColorType));
DCHECK(format_support);
if (!CanCopyToBitmap()) {
callback.Run(false, SkBitmap());
return;
}
const gfx::Size& dst_size_in_pixel =
client_->ConvertViewSizeToPixel(dst_size);
scoped_ptr<cc::CopyOutputRequest> request =
cc::CopyOutputRequest::CreateRequest(base::Bind(
&DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurfaceHasResult,
dst_size_in_pixel,
color_type,
callback));
gfx::Rect src_subrect_in_pixel =
ConvertRectToPixel(client_->CurrentDeviceScaleFactor(), src_subrect);
request->set_area(src_subrect_in_pixel);
client_->RequestCopyOfOutput(request.Pass());
}
Commit Message: repairs CopyFromCompositingSurface in HighDPI
This CL removes the DIP=>Pixel transform in
DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(), because said
transformation seems to be happening later in the copy logic
and is currently being applied twice.
BUG=397708
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/421293002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286414 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(
const gfx::Rect& src_subrect,
const gfx::Size& output_size,
const base::Callback<void(bool, const SkBitmap&)>& callback,
const SkColorType color_type) {
bool format_support = ((color_type == kRGB_565_SkColorType) ||
(color_type == kN32_SkColorType));
DCHECK(format_support);
if (!CanCopyToBitmap()) {
callback.Run(false, SkBitmap());
return;
}
scoped_ptr<cc::CopyOutputRequest> request =
cc::CopyOutputRequest::CreateRequest(base::Bind(
&DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurfaceHasResult,
output_size,
color_type,
callback));
request->set_area(src_subrect);
client_->RequestCopyOfOutput(request.Pass());
}
| 171,193
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void zend_throw_or_error(int fetch_type, zend_class_entry *exception_ce, const char *format, ...) /* {{{ */
{
va_list va;
char *message = NULL;
va_start(va, format);
zend_vspprintf(&message, 0, format, va);
if (fetch_type & ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_EXCEPTION) {
zend_throw_error(exception_ce, message);
} else {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "%s", message);
}
efree(message);
va_end(va);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Use format string
CWE ID: CWE-134
|
static void zend_throw_or_error(int fetch_type, zend_class_entry *exception_ce, const char *format, ...) /* {{{ */
{
va_list va;
char *message = NULL;
va_start(va, format);
zend_vspprintf(&message, 0, format, va);
if (fetch_type & ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_EXCEPTION) {
zend_throw_error(exception_ce, "%s", message);
} else {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "%s", message);
}
efree(message);
va_end(va);
}
/* }}} */
| 167,531
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void RemoveICCProfileFromResourceBlock(StringInfo *bim_profile)
{
register const unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*datum;
unsigned int
count,
long_sans;
unsigned short
id,
short_sans;
length=GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile);
if (length < 16)
return;
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(bim_profile);
for (p=datum; (p >= datum) && (p < (datum+length-16)); )
{
register unsigned char
*q;
q=(unsigned char *) p;
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) p,"8BIM",4) != 0)
break;
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&long_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&id);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&count);
if (id == 0x0000040f)
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,q+PSDQuantum(count)+12,length-
(PSDQuantum(count)+12)-(q-datum));
SetStringInfoLength(bim_profile,length-(PSDQuantum(count)+12));
break;
}
p+=count;
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
p++;
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/148
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
static void RemoveICCProfileFromResourceBlock(StringInfo *bim_profile)
{
register const unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*datum;
unsigned int
count,
long_sans;
unsigned short
id,
short_sans;
length=GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile);
if (length < 16)
return;
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(bim_profile);
for (p=datum; (p >= datum) && (p < (datum+length-16)); )
{
register unsigned char
*q;
q=(unsigned char *) p;
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) p,"8BIM",4) != 0)
break;
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&long_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&id);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&count);
if (id == 0x0000040f)
{
if ((q+PSDQuantum(count)+12) < (datum+length-16))
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,q+PSDQuantum(count)+12,length-
(PSDQuantum(count)+12)-(q-datum));
SetStringInfoLength(bim_profile,length-(PSDQuantum(count)+12));
}
break;
}
p+=count;
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
p++;
}
}
| 168,789
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: _PUBLIC_ codepoint_t next_codepoint_handle_ext(
struct smb_iconv_handle *ic,
const char *str, charset_t src_charset,
size_t *bytes_consumed)
{
/* it cannot occupy more than 4 bytes in UTF16 format */
smb_iconv_t descriptor;
size_t ilen_orig;
size_t ilen;
size_t olen;
char *outbuf;
if ((str[0] & 0x80) == 0) {
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return (codepoint_t)str[0];
}
/*
* we assume that no multi-byte character can take more than 5 bytes.
* we assume that no multi-byte character can take more than 5 bytes.
* This is OK as we only support codepoints up to 1M (U+100000)
*/
ilen_orig = strnlen(str, 5);
ilen = ilen_orig;
descriptor = get_conv_handle(ic, src_charset, CH_UTF16);
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return INVALID_CODEPOINT;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
_PUBLIC_ codepoint_t next_codepoint_handle_ext(
struct smb_iconv_handle *ic,
const char *str, size_t len,
charset_t src_charset,
size_t *bytes_consumed)
{
/* it cannot occupy more than 4 bytes in UTF16 format */
smb_iconv_t descriptor;
size_t ilen_orig;
size_t ilen;
size_t olen;
char *outbuf;
if ((str[0] & 0x80) == 0) {
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return (codepoint_t)str[0];
}
/*
* we assume that no multi-byte character can take more than 5 bytes.
* we assume that no multi-byte character can take more than 5 bytes.
* This is OK as we only support codepoints up to 1M (U+100000)
*/
ilen_orig = MIN(len, 5);
ilen = ilen_orig;
descriptor = get_conv_handle(ic, src_charset, CH_UTF16);
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return INVALID_CODEPOINT;
}
| 164,670
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WriteFromUrlOperation::Download(const base::Closure& continuation) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::FILE);
if (IsCancelled()) {
return;
}
download_continuation_ = continuation;
SetStage(image_writer_api::STAGE_DOWNLOAD);
url_fetcher_ = net::URLFetcher::Create(url_, net::URLFetcher::GET, this);
url_fetcher_->SetRequestContext(request_context_);
url_fetcher_->SaveResponseToFileAtPath(
image_path_, BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::FILE));
AddCleanUpFunction(
base::Bind(&WriteFromUrlOperation::DestroyUrlFetcher, this));
url_fetcher_->Start();
}
Commit Message: Network traffic annotation added to extensions::image_writer::WriteFromUrlOperation.
Network traffic annotation is added to network request of extensions::image_writer::WriteFromUrlOperation.
BUG=656607
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2691963002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#451456}
CWE ID:
|
void WriteFromUrlOperation::Download(const base::Closure& continuation) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::FILE);
if (IsCancelled()) {
return;
}
download_continuation_ = continuation;
SetStage(image_writer_api::STAGE_DOWNLOAD);
// Create traffic annotation tag.
net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag traffic_annotation =
net::DefineNetworkTrafficAnnotation("cros_recovery_image_download", R"(
semantics {
sender: "Chrome OS Recovery Utility"
description:
"The Google Chrome OS recovery utility downloads the recovery "
"image from Google Download Server."
trigger:
"User uses the Chrome OS Recovery Utility app/extension, selects "
"a Chrome OS recovery image, and clicks the Create button to write "
"the image to a USB or SD card."
data:
"URL of the image file to be downloaded. No other data or user "
"identifier is sent."
destination: GOOGLE_OWNED_SERVICE
}
policy {
cookies_allowed: true
cookies_store: "user"
setting:
"This feature cannot be disabled by settings, it can only be used "
"by whitelisted apps/extension."
policy_exception_justification:
"Not implemented, considered not useful."
})");
url_fetcher_ = net::URLFetcher::Create(url_, net::URLFetcher::GET, this,
traffic_annotation);
url_fetcher_->SetRequestContext(request_context_);
url_fetcher_->SaveResponseToFileAtPath(
image_path_, BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::FILE));
AddCleanUpFunction(
base::Bind(&WriteFromUrlOperation::DestroyUrlFetcher, this));
url_fetcher_->Start();
}
| 171,962
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int enable(void) {
LOG_INFO("%s", __func__);
if (!interface_ready())
return BT_STATUS_NOT_READY;
stack_manager_get_interface()->start_up_stack_async();
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int enable(void) {
static int enable(bool start_restricted) {
LOG_INFO(LOG_TAG, "%s: start restricted = %d", __func__, start_restricted);
restricted_mode = start_restricted;
if (!interface_ready())
return BT_STATUS_NOT_READY;
stack_manager_get_interface()->start_up_stack_async();
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
| 173,551
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool GesturePoint::IsInSecondClickTimeWindow() const {
double duration = last_touch_time_ - last_tap_time_;
return duration < kMaximumSecondsBetweenDoubleClick;
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool GesturePoint::IsInSecondClickTimeWindow() const {
double duration = last_touch_time_ - last_tap_time_;
return duration < GestureConfiguration::max_seconds_between_double_click();
}
| 171,043
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
/* The general expand case depends on what the colour type is: */
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
else if (that->bit_depth < 8) /* grayscale */
that->sample_depth = that->bit_depth = 8;
if (that->have_tRNS)
image_pixel_add_alpha(that, &display->this);
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_transform_png_set_expand_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_expand_mod(const image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
const transform_display *display)
{
/* The general expand case depends on what the colour type is: */
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
else if (that->bit_depth < 8) /* grayscale */
that->sample_depth = that->bit_depth = 8;
if (that->have_tRNS)
image_pixel_add_alpha(that, &display->this, 0/*!for background*/);
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
| 173,633
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void XMLHttpRequest::didFailRedirectCheck()
{
networkError();
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void XMLHttpRequest::didFailRedirectCheck()
{
handleNetworkError();
}
| 171,166
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int64 GetReceivedListPrefValue(size_t index) {
return ListPrefInt64Value(*received_update_, index);
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
int64 GetReceivedListPrefValue(size_t index) {
return received_.GetListPrefValue(index);
}
| 171,324
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int cuse_channel_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct fuse_dev *fud = file->private_data;
struct cuse_conn *cc = fc_to_cc(fud->fc);
int rc;
/* remove from the conntbl, no more access from this point on */
mutex_lock(&cuse_lock);
list_del_init(&cc->list);
mutex_unlock(&cuse_lock);
/* remove device */
if (cc->dev)
device_unregister(cc->dev);
if (cc->cdev) {
unregister_chrdev_region(cc->cdev->dev, 1);
cdev_del(cc->cdev);
}
rc = fuse_dev_release(inode, file); /* puts the base reference */
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cuse: fix memory leak
The problem is that fuse_dev_alloc() acquires an extra reference to cc.fc,
and the original ref count is never dropped.
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: cc080e9e9be1 ("fuse: introduce per-instance fuse_dev structure")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static int cuse_channel_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct fuse_dev *fud = file->private_data;
struct cuse_conn *cc = fc_to_cc(fud->fc);
int rc;
/* remove from the conntbl, no more access from this point on */
mutex_lock(&cuse_lock);
list_del_init(&cc->list);
mutex_unlock(&cuse_lock);
/* remove device */
if (cc->dev)
device_unregister(cc->dev);
if (cc->cdev) {
unregister_chrdev_region(cc->cdev->dev, 1);
cdev_del(cc->cdev);
}
/* Base reference is now owned by "fud" */
fuse_conn_put(&cc->fc);
rc = fuse_dev_release(inode, file); /* puts the base reference */
return rc;
}
| 167,573
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void* sspi_SecureHandleGetLowerPointer(SecHandle* handle)
{
void* pointer;
if (!handle)
return NULL;
pointer = (void*) ~((size_t) handle->dwLower);
return pointer;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
void* sspi_SecureHandleGetLowerPointer(SecHandle* handle)
{
void* pointer;
if (!handle || !SecIsValidHandle(handle))
return NULL;
pointer = (void*) ~((size_t) handle->dwLower);
return pointer;
}
| 167,604
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long long mkvparser::GetUIntLength(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long& len)
{
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
long long total, available;
int status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
assert(status >= 0);
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
len = 1;
if (pos >= available)
return pos; //too few bytes available
//// TODO(vigneshv): This function assumes that unsigned values never have their
//// high bit set.
unsigned char b;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
assert(status == 0);
if (b == 0) //we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m))
{
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
return 0; //success
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
long long mkvparser::GetUIntLength(
long long mkvparser::GetUIntLength(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long& len) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
long long total, available;
int status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
assert(status >= 0);
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
len = 1;
if (pos >= available)
return pos; // too few bytes available
unsigned char b;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
assert(status == 0);
if (b == 0) // we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m)) {
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
return 0; // success
}
//// TODO(vigneshv): This function assumes that unsigned values never have their
//// high bit set.
long long mkvparser::UnserializeUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
if ((size <= 0) || (size > 8))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long long result = 0;
for (long long i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
unsigned char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
| 174,377
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: download::DownloadItemImpl* DownloadManagerImpl::CreateActiveItem(
uint32_t id,
const download::DownloadCreateInfo& info) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(!base::ContainsKey(downloads_, id));
download::DownloadItemImpl* download =
item_factory_->CreateActiveItem(this, id, info);
downloads_[id] = base::WrapUnique(download);
downloads_by_guid_[download->GetGuid()] = download;
DownloadItemUtils::AttachInfo(
download, GetBrowserContext(),
WebContentsImpl::FromRenderFrameHostID(info.render_process_id,
info.render_frame_id));
return download;
}
Commit Message: Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
download::DownloadItemImpl* DownloadManagerImpl::CreateActiveItem(
uint32_t id,
const download::DownloadCreateInfo& info) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (base::ContainsKey(downloads_, id))
return nullptr;
download::DownloadItemImpl* download =
item_factory_->CreateActiveItem(this, id, info);
downloads_[id] = base::WrapUnique(download);
downloads_by_guid_[download->GetGuid()] = download;
DownloadItemUtils::AttachInfo(
download, GetBrowserContext(),
WebContentsImpl::FromRenderFrameHostID(info.render_process_id,
info.render_frame_id));
return download;
}
| 172,965
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
{
if (user_pwd == NULL)
return;
BN_free(user_pwd->s);
BN_clear_free(user_pwd->v);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->id);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->info);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
{
if (user_pwd == NULL)
return;
BN_free(user_pwd->s);
BN_clear_free(user_pwd->v);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->id);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->info);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd);
}
| 165,249
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int usb_cypress_load_firmware(struct usb_device *udev, const struct firmware *fw, int type)
{
struct hexline *hx;
u8 reset;
int ret,pos=0;
hx = kmalloc(sizeof(*hx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hx)
return -ENOMEM;
/* stop the CPU */
reset = 1;
if ((ret = usb_cypress_writemem(udev,cypress[type].cpu_cs_register,&reset,1)) != 1)
err("could not stop the USB controller CPU.");
while ((ret = dvb_usb_get_hexline(fw, hx, &pos)) > 0) {
deb_fw("writing to address 0x%04x (buffer: 0x%02x %02x)\n", hx->addr, hx->len, hx->chk);
ret = usb_cypress_writemem(udev, hx->addr, hx->data, hx->len);
if (ret != hx->len) {
err("error while transferring firmware (transferred size: %d, block size: %d)",
ret, hx->len);
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
if (ret < 0) {
err("firmware download failed at %d with %d",pos,ret);
kfree(hx);
return ret;
}
if (ret == 0) {
/* restart the CPU */
reset = 0;
if (ret || usb_cypress_writemem(udev,cypress[type].cpu_cs_register,&reset,1) != 1) {
err("could not restart the USB controller CPU.");
ret = -EINVAL;
}
} else
ret = -EIO;
kfree(hx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: [media] dvb-usb-firmware: don't do DMA on stack
The buffer allocation for the firmware data was changed in
commit 43fab9793c1f ("[media] dvb-usb: don't use stack for firmware load")
but the same applies for the reset value.
Fixes: 43fab9793c1f ("[media] dvb-usb: don't use stack for firmware load")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
int usb_cypress_load_firmware(struct usb_device *udev, const struct firmware *fw, int type)
{
struct hexline *hx;
u8 *buf;
int ret, pos = 0;
u16 cpu_cs_register = cypress[type].cpu_cs_register;
buf = kmalloc(sizeof(*hx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
hx = (struct hexline *)buf;
/* stop the CPU */
buf[0] = 1;
if (usb_cypress_writemem(udev, cpu_cs_register, buf, 1) != 1)
err("could not stop the USB controller CPU.");
while ((ret = dvb_usb_get_hexline(fw, hx, &pos)) > 0) {
deb_fw("writing to address 0x%04x (buffer: 0x%02x %02x)\n", hx->addr, hx->len, hx->chk);
ret = usb_cypress_writemem(udev, hx->addr, hx->data, hx->len);
if (ret != hx->len) {
err("error while transferring firmware (transferred size: %d, block size: %d)",
ret, hx->len);
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
if (ret < 0) {
err("firmware download failed at %d with %d",pos,ret);
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
if (ret == 0) {
/* restart the CPU */
buf[0] = 0;
if (usb_cypress_writemem(udev, cpu_cs_register, buf, 1) != 1) {
err("could not restart the USB controller CPU.");
ret = -EINVAL;
}
} else
ret = -EIO;
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
| 168,230
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static X509_ALGOR *rsa_mgf1_decode(X509_ALGOR *alg)
{
const unsigned char *p;
int plen;
if (alg == NULL)
return NULL;
if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1)
return NULL;
if (alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
return NULL;
p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
return d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
|
static X509_ALGOR *rsa_mgf1_decode(X509_ALGOR *alg)
{
const unsigned char *p;
int plen;
if (alg == NULL || alg->parameter == NULL)
return NULL;
if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1)
return NULL;
if (alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
return NULL;
p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
return d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
}
| 164,720
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void LoadingStatsCollector::RecordPreconnectStats(
std::unique_ptr<PreconnectStats> stats) {
const GURL& main_frame_url = stats->url;
auto it = preconnect_stats_.find(main_frame_url);
if (it != preconnect_stats_.end()) {
ReportPreconnectAccuracy(*it->second,
std::map<GURL, OriginRequestSummary>());
preconnect_stats_.erase(it);
}
preconnect_stats_.emplace(main_frame_url, std::move(stats));
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
void LoadingStatsCollector::RecordPreconnectStats(
std::unique_ptr<PreconnectStats> stats) {
const GURL& main_frame_url = stats->url;
auto it = preconnect_stats_.find(main_frame_url);
if (it != preconnect_stats_.end()) {
ReportPreconnectAccuracy(*it->second, {});
preconnect_stats_.erase(it);
}
preconnect_stats_.emplace(main_frame_url, std::move(stats));
}
| 172,371
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SProcXFixesQueryVersion(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesQueryVersionReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->majorVersion);
return (*ProcXFixesVector[stuff->xfixesReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
SProcXFixesQueryVersion(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesQueryVersionReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXFixesQueryVersionReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->majorVersion);
return (*ProcXFixesVector[stuff->xfixesReqType]) (client);
}
| 165,444
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void LauncherView::ButtonPressed(views::Button* sender,
const views::Event& event) {
if (dragging_)
return;
if (sender == overflow_button_)
ShowOverflowMenu();
if (!delegate_)
return;
int view_index = view_model_->GetIndexOfView(sender);
if (view_index == -1)
return;
switch (model_->items()[view_index].type) {
case TYPE_TABBED:
case TYPE_APP_PANEL:
case TYPE_APP_SHORTCUT:
case TYPE_PLATFORM_APP:
delegate_->ItemClicked(model_->items()[view_index], event.flags());
break;
case TYPE_APP_LIST:
Shell::GetInstance()->ToggleAppList();
break;
case TYPE_BROWSER_SHORTCUT:
if (event.flags() & ui::EF_CONTROL_DOWN)
delegate_->CreateNewWindow();
else
delegate_->CreateNewTab();
break;
}
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void LauncherView::ButtonPressed(views::Button* sender,
const views::Event& event) {
if (dragging_)
return;
if (sender == overflow_button_) {
ShowOverflowBubble();
return;
}
if (!delegate_)
return;
int view_index = view_model_->GetIndexOfView(sender);
if (view_index == -1)
return;
switch (model_->items()[view_index].type) {
case TYPE_TABBED:
case TYPE_APP_PANEL:
case TYPE_APP_SHORTCUT:
case TYPE_PLATFORM_APP:
delegate_->ItemClicked(model_->items()[view_index], event.flags());
break;
case TYPE_APP_LIST:
Shell::GetInstance()->ToggleAppList();
break;
case TYPE_BROWSER_SHORTCUT:
if (event.flags() & ui::EF_CONTROL_DOWN)
delegate_->CreateNewWindow();
else
delegate_->CreateNewTab();
break;
}
}
| 170,887
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<WebContents> CreateWebContents() {
std::unique_ptr<WebContents> web_contents = CreateTestWebContents();
content::WebContentsTester::For(web_contents.get())
->NavigateAndCommit(GURL("https://www.example.com"));
return web_contents;
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
|
std::unique_ptr<WebContents> CreateWebContents() {
std::unique_ptr<WebContents> web_contents = CreateTestWebContents();
ResourceCoordinatorTabHelper::CreateForWebContents(web_contents.get());
content::WebContentsTester::For(web_contents.get())
->NavigateAndCommit(GURL("https://www.example.com"));
base::RepeatingClosure run_loop_cb = base::BindRepeating(
&base::TestMockTimeTaskRunner::RunUntilIdle, task_runner_);
testing::WaitForLocalDBEntryToBeInitialized(web_contents.get(),
run_loop_cb);
testing::ExpireLocalDBObservationWindows(web_contents.get());
return web_contents;
}
| 172,230
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: pkinit_eku_authorize(krb5_context context, krb5_certauth_moddata moddata,
const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_len,
krb5_const_principal princ, const void *opts,
const struct _krb5_db_entry_new *db_entry,
char ***authinds_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
int valid_eku;
const struct certauth_req_opts *req_opts = opts;
*authinds_out = NULL;
/* Verify the client EKU. */
ret = verify_client_eku(context, req_opts->plgctx, req_opts->reqctx,
&valid_eku);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!valid_eku) {
TRACE_PKINIT_SERVER_EKU_REJECT(context);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_INCONSISTENT_KEY_PURPOSE;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix certauth built-in module returns
The PKINIT certauth eku module should never authoritatively authorize
a certificate, because an extended key usage does not establish a
relationship between the certificate and any specific user; it only
establishes that the certificate was created for PKINIT client
authentication. Therefore, pkinit_eku_authorize() should return
KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE on success, not 0.
The certauth san module should pass if it does not find any SANs of
the types it can match against; the presence of other types of SANs
should not cause it to explicitly deny a certificate. Check for an
empty result from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() in verify_client_san(),
instead of returning ENOENT from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() when
there are no SANs at all.
ticket: 8561
CWE ID: CWE-287
|
pkinit_eku_authorize(krb5_context context, krb5_certauth_moddata moddata,
const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_len,
krb5_const_principal princ, const void *opts,
const struct _krb5_db_entry_new *db_entry,
char ***authinds_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
int valid_eku;
const struct certauth_req_opts *req_opts = opts;
*authinds_out = NULL;
/* Verify the client EKU. */
ret = verify_client_eku(context, req_opts->plgctx, req_opts->reqctx,
&valid_eku);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!valid_eku) {
TRACE_PKINIT_SERVER_EKU_REJECT(context);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_INCONSISTENT_KEY_PURPOSE;
}
return KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE;
}
| 170,174
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int cac_get_serial_nr_from_CUID(sc_card_t* card, sc_serial_number_t* serial)
{
cac_private_data_t * priv = CAC_DATA(card);
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL);
if (card->serialnr.len) {
*serial = card->serialnr;
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_SUCCESS);
}
if (priv->cac_id_len) {
serial->len = MIN(priv->cac_id_len, SC_MAX_SERIALNR);
memcpy(serial->value, priv->cac_id, priv->cac_id_len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_SUCCESS);
}
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
|
static int cac_get_serial_nr_from_CUID(sc_card_t* card, sc_serial_number_t* serial)
{
cac_private_data_t * priv = CAC_DATA(card);
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL);
if (card->serialnr.len) {
*serial = card->serialnr;
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_SUCCESS);
}
if (priv->cac_id_len) {
serial->len = MIN(priv->cac_id_len, SC_MAX_SERIALNR);
memcpy(serial->value, priv->cac_id, serial->len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_SUCCESS);
}
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND);
}
| 169,071
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const Cluster* Segment::GetFirst() const
{
if ((m_clusters == NULL) || (m_clusterCount <= 0))
return &m_eos;
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[0];
assert(pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
const Cluster* Segment::GetFirst() const
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[0];
assert(pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
| 174,322
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: _TIFFmalloc(tmsize_t s)
{
return (malloc((size_t) s));
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
CWE ID: CWE-369
|
_TIFFmalloc(tmsize_t s)
{
if (s == 0)
return ((void *) NULL);
return (malloc((size_t) s));
}
| 169,459
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static char *print_value( cJSON *item, int depth, int fmt )
{
char *out = 0;
if ( ! item )
return 0;
switch ( ( item->type ) & 255 ) {
case cJSON_NULL: out = cJSON_strdup( "null" ); break;
case cJSON_False: out = cJSON_strdup( "false" ); break;
case cJSON_True: out = cJSON_strdup( "true" ); break;
case cJSON_Number: out = print_number( item ); break;
case cJSON_String: out = print_string( item ); break;
case cJSON_Array: out = print_array( item, depth, fmt ); break;
case cJSON_Object: out = print_object( item, depth, fmt ); break;
}
return out;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static char *print_value( cJSON *item, int depth, int fmt )
static char *print_value(cJSON *item,int depth,int fmt,printbuffer *p)
{
char *out=0;
if (!item) return 0;
if (p)
{
switch ((item->type)&255)
{
case cJSON_NULL: {out=ensure(p,5); if (out) strcpy(out,"null"); break;}
case cJSON_False: {out=ensure(p,6); if (out) strcpy(out,"false"); break;}
case cJSON_True: {out=ensure(p,5); if (out) strcpy(out,"true"); break;}
case cJSON_Number: out=print_number(item,p);break;
case cJSON_String: out=print_string(item,p);break;
case cJSON_Array: out=print_array(item,depth,fmt,p);break;
case cJSON_Object: out=print_object(item,depth,fmt,p);break;
}
}
else
{
switch ((item->type)&255)
{
case cJSON_NULL: out=cJSON_strdup("null"); break;
case cJSON_False: out=cJSON_strdup("false");break;
case cJSON_True: out=cJSON_strdup("true"); break;
case cJSON_Number: out=print_number(item,0);break;
case cJSON_String: out=print_string(item,0);break;
case cJSON_Array: out=print_array(item,depth,fmt,0);break;
case cJSON_Object: out=print_object(item,depth,fmt,0);break;
}
}
return out;
}
| 167,311
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
size_t i;
if (minor_status == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*minor_status = 0;
if (desired_object == GSS_C_NO_OID)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ;
if (data_set == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*data_set = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (!ctx->established)
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops)/
sizeof(krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[0]); i++) {
if (g_OID_prefix_equal(desired_object, &krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[i].oid)) {
return (*krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[i].func)(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
data_set);
}
}
*minor_status = EINVAL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
|
krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
size_t i;
if (minor_status == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*minor_status = 0;
if (desired_object == GSS_C_NO_OID)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ;
if (data_set == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*data_set = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established)
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops)/
sizeof(krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[0]); i++) {
if (g_OID_prefix_equal(desired_object, &krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[i].oid)) {
return (*krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[i].func)(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
data_set);
}
}
*minor_status = EINVAL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
}
| 166,815
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::ClearState() {
characteristic_id_to_notify_session_.clear();
pending_primary_services_requests_.clear();
descriptor_id_to_characteristic_id_.clear();
characteristic_id_to_service_id_.clear();
service_id_to_device_address_.clear();
connected_devices_.reset(
new FrameConnectedBluetoothDevices(render_frame_host_));
device_chooser_controller_.reset();
BluetoothAdapterFactoryWrapper::Get().ReleaseAdapter(this);
}
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <msw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::ClearState() {
// Releasing the adapter will drop references to callbacks that have not yet
// been executed. The binding must be closed first so that this is allowed.
binding_.Close();
characteristic_id_to_notify_session_.clear();
pending_primary_services_requests_.clear();
descriptor_id_to_characteristic_id_.clear();
characteristic_id_to_service_id_.clear();
service_id_to_device_address_.clear();
connected_devices_.reset(
new FrameConnectedBluetoothDevices(render_frame_host_));
device_chooser_controller_.reset();
BluetoothAdapterFactoryWrapper::Get().ReleaseAdapter(this);
}
| 173,204
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void init_once(void *foo)
{
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = (struct ext4_inode_info *) foo;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_orphan);
init_rwsem(&ei->xattr_sem);
init_rwsem(&ei->i_data_sem);
inode_init_once(&ei->vfs_inode);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
static void init_once(void *foo)
{
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = (struct ext4_inode_info *) foo;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_orphan);
init_rwsem(&ei->xattr_sem);
init_rwsem(&ei->i_data_sem);
init_rwsem(&ei->i_mmap_sem);
inode_init_once(&ei->vfs_inode);
}
| 167,492
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int decode_getacl(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct rpc_rqst *req,
size_t *acl_len)
{
__be32 *savep;
uint32_t attrlen,
bitmap[3] = {0};
struct kvec *iov = req->rq_rcv_buf.head;
int status;
*acl_len = 0;
if ((status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_GETATTR)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_attr_bitmap(xdr, bitmap)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_attr_length(xdr, &attrlen, &savep)) != 0)
goto out;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_ACL - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_ACL)) {
size_t hdrlen;
u32 recvd;
/* We ignore &savep and don't do consistency checks on
* the attr length. Let userspace figure it out.... */
hdrlen = (u8 *)xdr->p - (u8 *)iov->iov_base;
recvd = req->rq_rcv_buf.len - hdrlen;
if (attrlen > recvd) {
dprintk("NFS: server cheating in getattr"
" acl reply: attrlen %u > recvd %u\n",
attrlen, recvd);
return -EINVAL;
}
xdr_read_pages(xdr, attrlen);
*acl_len = attrlen;
} else
status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
static int decode_getacl(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct rpc_rqst *req,
struct nfs_getaclres *res)
{
__be32 *savep, *bm_p;
uint32_t attrlen,
bitmap[3] = {0};
struct kvec *iov = req->rq_rcv_buf.head;
int status;
res->acl_len = 0;
if ((status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_GETATTR)) != 0)
goto out;
bm_p = xdr->p;
if ((status = decode_attr_bitmap(xdr, bitmap)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_attr_length(xdr, &attrlen, &savep)) != 0)
goto out;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_ACL - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_ACL)) {
size_t hdrlen;
u32 recvd;
/* The bitmap (xdr len + bitmaps) and the attr xdr len words
* are stored with the acl data to handle the problem of
* variable length bitmaps.*/
xdr->p = bm_p;
res->acl_data_offset = be32_to_cpup(bm_p) + 2;
res->acl_data_offset <<= 2;
/* We ignore &savep and don't do consistency checks on
* the attr length. Let userspace figure it out.... */
hdrlen = (u8 *)xdr->p - (u8 *)iov->iov_base;
attrlen += res->acl_data_offset;
recvd = req->rq_rcv_buf.len - hdrlen;
if (attrlen > recvd) {
if (res->acl_flags & NFS4_ACL_LEN_REQUEST) {
/* getxattr interface called with a NULL buf */
res->acl_len = attrlen;
goto out;
}
dprintk("NFS: acl reply: attrlen %u > recvd %u\n",
attrlen, recvd);
return -EINVAL;
}
xdr_read_pages(xdr, attrlen);
res->acl_len = attrlen;
} else
status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
out:
return status;
}
| 165,719
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: cJSON *cJSON_GetArrayItem( cJSON *array, int item )
{
cJSON *c = array->child;
while ( c && item > 0 ) {
--item;
c = c->next;
}
return c;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
cJSON *cJSON_GetArrayItem( cJSON *array, int item )
| 167,286
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, getBasename)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char *suffix = 0, *fname;
int slen = 0;
size_t flen;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|s", &suffix, &slen) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
php_basename(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, strlen(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name), suffix, slen, &fname, &flen TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(fname, flen, 0);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, getBasename)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char *suffix = 0, *fname;
int slen = 0;
size_t flen;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|s", &suffix, &slen) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
php_basename(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, strlen(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name), suffix, slen, &fname, &flen TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(fname, flen, 0);
}
| 167,034
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int string_check(char *buf, const char *buf2)
{
if(strcmp(buf, buf2)) {
/* they shouldn't differ */
printf("sprintf failed:\nwe '%s'\nsystem: '%s'\n",
buf, buf2);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: printf: fix floating point buffer overflow issues
... and add a bunch of floating point printf tests
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int string_check(char *buf, const char *buf2)
static int _string_check(int linenumber, char *buf, const char *buf2)
{
if(strcmp(buf, buf2)) {
/* they shouldn't differ */
printf("sprintf line %d failed:\nwe '%s'\nsystem: '%s'\n",
linenumber, buf, buf2);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 169,437
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: l2tp_proxy_auth_id_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr) & L2TP_PROXY_AUTH_ID_MASK));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
l2tp_proxy_auth_id_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
l2tp_proxy_auth_id_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
if (length < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr) & L2TP_PROXY_AUTH_ID_MASK));
}
| 167,899
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: double VideoTrack::GetFrameRate() const
{
return m_rate;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
double VideoTrack::GetFrameRate() const
| 174,326
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline void uipc_wakeup_locked(void)
{
char sig_on = 1;
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC SEND WAKE UP");
send(uipc_main.signal_fds[1], &sig_on, sizeof(sig_on), 0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
static inline void uipc_wakeup_locked(void)
{
char sig_on = 1;
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC SEND WAKE UP");
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(uipc_main.signal_fds[1], &sig_on, sizeof(sig_on), 0));
}
| 173,499
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int cxusb_ctrl_msg(struct dvb_usb_device *d,
u8 cmd, u8 *wbuf, int wlen, u8 *rbuf, int rlen)
{
struct cxusb_state *st = d->priv;
int ret, wo;
if (1 + wlen > MAX_XFER_SIZE) {
warn("i2c wr: len=%d is too big!\n", wlen);
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
wo = (rbuf == NULL || rlen == 0); /* write-only */
mutex_lock(&d->data_mutex);
st->data[0] = cmd;
memcpy(&st->data[1], wbuf, wlen);
if (wo)
ret = dvb_usb_generic_write(d, st->data, 1 + wlen);
else
ret = dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, st->data, 1 + wlen,
rbuf, rlen, 0);
mutex_unlock(&d->data_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int cxusb_ctrl_msg(struct dvb_usb_device *d,
u8 cmd, u8 *wbuf, int wlen, u8 *rbuf, int rlen)
{
struct cxusb_state *st = d->priv;
int ret;
if (1 + wlen > MAX_XFER_SIZE) {
warn("i2c wr: len=%d is too big!\n", wlen);
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
if (rlen > MAX_XFER_SIZE) {
warn("i2c rd: len=%d is too big!\n", rlen);
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
mutex_lock(&d->data_mutex);
st->data[0] = cmd;
memcpy(&st->data[1], wbuf, wlen);
ret = dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, st->data, 1 + wlen, st->data, rlen, 0);
if (!ret && rbuf && rlen)
memcpy(rbuf, st->data, rlen);
mutex_unlock(&d->data_mutex);
return ret;
}
| 168,223
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long ContentEncoding::ParseContentEncAESSettingsEntry(
long long start, long long size, IMkvReader* pReader,
ContentEncAESSettings* aes) {
assert(pReader);
assert(aes);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x7E8) {
aes->cipher_mode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (aes->cipher_mode != 1)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
long ContentEncoding::ParseContentEncAESSettingsEntry(
long long start, long long size, IMkvReader* pReader,
ContentEncAESSettings* aes) {
assert(pReader);
assert(aes);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x7E8) {
aes->cipher_mode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (aes->cipher_mode != 1)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
return 0;
}
| 173,849
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void impeg2d_peek_next_start_code(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush_to_byte_boundary(ps_stream);
while ((impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_PREFIX_LEN) != START_CODE_PREFIX)
&& (ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_offset <= ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_max_offset))
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,8);
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
void impeg2d_peek_next_start_code(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush_to_byte_boundary(ps_stream);
while ((impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_PREFIX_LEN) != START_CODE_PREFIX)
&& (ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_offset < ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_max_offset))
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,8);
}
return;
}
| 173,951
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetTouchpadLibrary(
TouchpadLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->touchpad_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetTouchpadLibrary(
| 170,648
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: OmniboxPopupViewGtk::~OmniboxPopupViewGtk() {
model_.reset();
g_object_unref(layout_);
gtk_widget_destroy(window_);
for (ImageMap::iterator it = images_.begin(); it != images_.end(); ++it)
delete it->second;
}
Commit Message: GTK: Stop listening to gtk signals in the omnibox before destroying the model.
BUG=123530
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10103012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132498 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
OmniboxPopupViewGtk::~OmniboxPopupViewGtk() {
// Stop listening to our signals before we destroy the model. I suspect that
// we can race window destruction, otherwise.
signal_registrar_.reset();
model_.reset();
g_object_unref(layout_);
gtk_widget_destroy(window_);
for (ImageMap::iterator it = images_.begin(); it != images_.end(); ++it)
delete it->second;
}
| 171,049
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ResetScreenHandler::UpdateStatusChanged(
const UpdateEngineClient::Status& status) {
if (status.status == UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_ERROR) {
base::DictionaryValue params;
params.SetInteger("uiState", kErrorUIStateRollback);
ShowScreen(OobeUI::kScreenErrorMessage, ¶ms);
} else if (status.status ==
UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_UPDATED_NEED_REBOOT) {
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetPowerManagerClient()->RequestRestart();
}
}
Commit Message: Rollback option put behind the flag.
BUG=368860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/267393011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269753 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void ResetScreenHandler::UpdateStatusChanged(
const UpdateEngineClient::Status& status) {
VLOG(1) << "Update status change to " << status.status;
if (status.status == UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_ERROR) {
base::DictionaryValue params;
params.SetInteger("uiState", kErrorUIStateRollback);
ShowScreen(OobeUI::kScreenErrorMessage, ¶ms);
} else if (status.status ==
UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_UPDATED_NEED_REBOOT) {
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetPowerManagerClient()->RequestRestart();
}
}
| 171,182
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: juniper_atm1_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
int llc_hdrlen;
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ATM1;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
if (l2info.cookie[0] == 0x80) { /* OAM cell ? */
oam_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, ATM_OAM_NOHEC);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xfefe03 || /* NLPID encaps ? */
EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xaaaa03) { /* SNAP encaps ? */
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
if (llc_hdrlen > 0)
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (p[0] == 0x03) { /* Cisco style NLPID encaps ? */
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1, l2info.caplen - 1);
/* FIXME check if frame was recognized */
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* last try - vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
return l2info.header_len;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
juniper_atm1_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
int llc_hdrlen;
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ATM1;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
if (l2info.cookie[0] == 0x80) { /* OAM cell ? */
oam_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, ATM_OAM_NOHEC);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xfefe03 || /* NLPID encaps ? */
EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xaaaa03) { /* SNAP encaps ? */
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
if (llc_hdrlen > 0)
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (p[0] == 0x03) { /* Cisco style NLPID encaps ? */
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1);
/* FIXME check if frame was recognized */
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* last try - vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
return l2info.header_len;
}
| 167,948
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: AccessibilityOrientation AXNodeObject::orientation() const {
const AtomicString& ariaOrientation =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kOrientation);
AccessibilityOrientation orientation = AccessibilityOrientationUndefined;
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaOrientation, "horizontal"))
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationHorizontal;
else if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaOrientation, "vertical"))
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationVertical;
switch (roleValue()) {
case ComboBoxRole:
case ListBoxRole:
case MenuRole:
case ScrollBarRole:
case TreeRole:
if (orientation == AccessibilityOrientationUndefined)
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationVertical;
return orientation;
case MenuBarRole:
case SliderRole:
case SplitterRole:
case TabListRole:
case ToolbarRole:
if (orientation == AccessibilityOrientationUndefined)
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationHorizontal;
return orientation;
case RadioGroupRole:
case TreeGridRole:
case TableRole:
return orientation;
default:
return AXObject::orientation();
}
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
AccessibilityOrientation AXNodeObject::orientation() const {
const AtomicString& ariaOrientation =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kOrientation);
AccessibilityOrientation orientation = AccessibilityOrientationUndefined;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(ariaOrientation, "horizontal"))
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationHorizontal;
else if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(ariaOrientation, "vertical"))
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationVertical;
switch (roleValue()) {
case ComboBoxRole:
case ListBoxRole:
case MenuRole:
case ScrollBarRole:
case TreeRole:
if (orientation == AccessibilityOrientationUndefined)
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationVertical;
return orientation;
case MenuBarRole:
case SliderRole:
case SplitterRole:
case TabListRole:
case ToolbarRole:
if (orientation == AccessibilityOrientationUndefined)
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationHorizontal;
return orientation;
case RadioGroupRole:
case TreeGridRole:
case TableRole:
return orientation;
default:
return AXObject::orientation();
}
}
| 171,920
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: wb_prep(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pkt_prep *prep, u_int len)
{
int n;
const struct pgstate *ps;
const u_char *ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-prep:"));
if (len < sizeof(*prep)) {
return (-1);
}
n = EXTRACT_32BITS(&prep->pp_n);
ps = (const struct pgstate *)(prep + 1);
while (--n >= 0 && ND_TTEST(*ps)) {
const struct id_off *io, *ie;
char c = '<';
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u/%s:%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ps->slot),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ps->page.p_sid),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ps->page.p_uid)));
io = (const struct id_off *)(ps + 1);
for (ie = io + ps->nid; io < ie && ND_TTEST(*io); ++io) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s:%u", c, ipaddr_string(ndo, &io->id),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&io->off)));
c = ',';
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ">"));
ps = (const struct pgstate *)io;
}
return ((const u_char *)ps <= ep? 0 : -1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13014/White Board: Do more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, print a truncation error if the packets are
truncated, rather than just, in effect, ignoring the result of the
routines that print particular packet types.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
wb_prep(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pkt_prep *prep, u_int len)
{
int n;
const struct pgstate *ps;
const u_char *ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-prep:"));
if (len < sizeof(*prep) || !ND_TTEST(*prep))
return (-1);
n = EXTRACT_32BITS(&prep->pp_n);
ps = (const struct pgstate *)(prep + 1);
while (--n >= 0 && ND_TTEST(*ps)) {
const struct id_off *io, *ie;
char c = '<';
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u/%s:%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ps->slot),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ps->page.p_sid),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ps->page.p_uid)));
io = (const struct id_off *)(ps + 1);
for (ie = io + ps->nid; io < ie && ND_TTEST(*io); ++io) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s:%u", c, ipaddr_string(ndo, &io->id),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&io->off)));
c = ',';
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ">"));
ps = (const struct pgstate *)io;
}
return ((const u_char *)ps <= ep? 0 : -1);
}
| 167,878
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ExtensionViewGuest::NavigateGuest(const std::string& src,
bool force_navigation) {
GURL url = extension_url_.Resolve(src);
bool url_not_allowed = (url != GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL)) &&
(url.GetOrigin() != extension_url_.GetOrigin());
if (!url.is_valid() || url_not_allowed)
return NavigateGuest(url::kAboutBlankURL, true /* force_navigation */);
if (!force_navigation && (url_ == url))
return false;
web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost()->FilterURL(false, &url);
web_contents()->GetController().LoadURL(url, content::Referrer(),
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_TOPLEVEL,
std::string());
url_ = url;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
bool ExtensionViewGuest::NavigateGuest(const std::string& src,
bool force_navigation) {
GURL url = extension_url_.Resolve(src);
bool url_not_allowed = url != GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL) &&
!url::IsSameOriginWith(url, extension_url_);
if (!url.is_valid() || url_not_allowed)
return NavigateGuest(url::kAboutBlankURL, true /* force_navigation */);
if (!force_navigation && (url_ == url))
return false;
web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost()->FilterURL(false, &url);
web_contents()->GetController().LoadURL(url, content::Referrer(),
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_TOPLEVEL,
std::string());
url_ = url;
return true;
}
| 172,284
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool PermissionsData::CanRunOnPage(const Extension* extension,
const GURL& document_url,
const GURL& top_frame_url,
int tab_id,
int process_id,
const URLPatternSet& permitted_url_patterns,
std::string* error) const {
if (g_policy_delegate &&
!g_policy_delegate->CanExecuteScriptOnPage(
extension, document_url, top_frame_url, tab_id, process_id, error)) {
return false;
}
bool can_execute_everywhere = CanExecuteScriptEverywhere(extension);
if (!can_execute_everywhere &&
!ExtensionsClient::Get()->IsScriptableURL(document_url, error)) {
return false;
}
if (!base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kExtensionsOnChromeURLs)) {
if (document_url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme) &&
!can_execute_everywhere) {
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kCannotAccessChromeUrl;
return false;
}
}
if (top_frame_url.SchemeIs(kExtensionScheme) &&
top_frame_url.GetOrigin() !=
Extension::GetBaseURLFromExtensionId(extension->id()).GetOrigin() &&
!can_execute_everywhere) {
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kCannotAccessExtensionUrl;
return false;
}
if (HasTabSpecificPermissionToExecuteScript(tab_id, top_frame_url))
return true;
bool can_access = permitted_url_patterns.MatchesURL(document_url);
if (!can_access && error) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(manifest_errors::kCannotAccessPage,
document_url.spec());
}
return can_access;
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
bool PermissionsData::CanRunOnPage(const Extension* extension,
const GURL& document_url,
const GURL& top_frame_url,
int tab_id,
int process_id,
const URLPatternSet& permitted_url_patterns,
std::string* error) const {
if (g_policy_delegate &&
!g_policy_delegate->CanExecuteScriptOnPage(
extension, document_url, top_frame_url, tab_id, process_id, error)) {
return false;
}
if (IsRestrictedUrl(document_url, top_frame_url, extension, error))
return false;
if (HasTabSpecificPermissionToExecuteScript(tab_id, top_frame_url))
return true;
bool can_access = permitted_url_patterns.MatchesURL(document_url);
if (!can_access && error) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(manifest_errors::kCannotAccessPage,
document_url.spec());
}
return can_access;
}
| 171,655
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void UserSelectionScreen::FillUserDictionary(
user_manager::User* user,
bool is_owner,
bool is_signin_to_add,
proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType auth_type,
const std::vector<std::string>* public_session_recommended_locales,
base::DictionaryValue* user_dict) {
const bool is_public_session =
user->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_PUBLIC_ACCOUNT;
const bool is_legacy_supervised_user =
user->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_SUPERVISED;
const bool is_child_user = user->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_CHILD;
user_dict->SetString(kKeyUsername, user->GetAccountId().Serialize());
user_dict->SetString(kKeyEmailAddress, user->display_email());
user_dict->SetString(kKeyDisplayName, user->GetDisplayName());
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyPublicAccount, is_public_session);
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyLegacySupervisedUser, is_legacy_supervised_user);
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyChildUser, is_child_user);
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyDesktopUser, false);
user_dict->SetInteger(kKeyInitialAuthType, static_cast<int>(auth_type));
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeySignedIn, user->is_logged_in());
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyIsOwner, is_owner);
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyIsActiveDirectory, user->IsActiveDirectoryUser());
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyAllowFingerprint, AllowFingerprintForUser(user));
FillMultiProfileUserPrefs(user, user_dict, is_signin_to_add);
if (is_public_session) {
AddPublicSessionDetailsToUserDictionaryEntry(
user_dict, public_session_recommended_locales);
}
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
|
void UserSelectionScreen::FillUserDictionary(
const user_manager::User* user,
bool is_owner,
bool is_signin_to_add,
proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType auth_type,
const std::vector<std::string>* public_session_recommended_locales,
base::DictionaryValue* user_dict) {
const bool is_public_session =
user->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_PUBLIC_ACCOUNT;
const bool is_legacy_supervised_user =
user->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_SUPERVISED;
const bool is_child_user = user->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_CHILD;
user_dict->SetString(kKeyUsername, user->GetAccountId().Serialize());
user_dict->SetString(kKeyEmailAddress, user->display_email());
user_dict->SetString(kKeyDisplayName, user->GetDisplayName());
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyPublicAccount, is_public_session);
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyLegacySupervisedUser, is_legacy_supervised_user);
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyChildUser, is_child_user);
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyDesktopUser, false);
user_dict->SetInteger(kKeyInitialAuthType, static_cast<int>(auth_type));
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeySignedIn, user->is_logged_in());
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyIsOwner, is_owner);
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyIsActiveDirectory, user->IsActiveDirectoryUser());
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyAllowFingerprint, AllowFingerprintForUser(user));
FillMultiProfileUserPrefs(user, user_dict, is_signin_to_add);
if (is_public_session) {
AddPublicSessionDetailsToUserDictionaryEntry(
user_dict, public_session_recommended_locales);
}
}
| 172,200
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: EntrySync* WorkerGlobalScopeFileSystem::webkitResolveLocalFileSystemSyncURL(WorkerGlobalScope& worker, const String& url, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
KURL completedURL = worker.completeURL(url);
ExecutionContext* secureContext = worker.executionContext();
if (!secureContext->securityOrigin()->canAccessFileSystem() || !secureContext->securityOrigin()->canRequest(completedURL)) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError(FileError::securityErrorMessage);
return 0;
}
if (!completedURL.isValid()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(EncodingError, "the URL '" + url + "' is invalid.");
return 0;
}
RefPtr<EntrySyncCallbackHelper> resolveURLHelper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
OwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks = ResolveURICallbacks::create(resolveURLHelper->successCallback(), resolveURLHelper->errorCallback(), &worker);
callbacks->setShouldBlockUntilCompletion(true);
LocalFileSystem::from(worker)->resolveURL(&worker, completedURL, callbacks.release());
return resolveURLHelper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
EntrySync* WorkerGlobalScopeFileSystem::webkitResolveLocalFileSystemSyncURL(WorkerGlobalScope& worker, const String& url, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
KURL completedURL = worker.completeURL(url);
ExecutionContext* secureContext = worker.executionContext();
if (!secureContext->securityOrigin()->canAccessFileSystem() || !secureContext->securityOrigin()->canRequest(completedURL)) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError(FileError::securityErrorMessage);
return 0;
}
if (!completedURL.isValid()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(EncodingError, "the URL '" + url + "' is invalid.");
return 0;
}
EntrySyncCallbackHelper* resolveURLHelper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
OwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks = ResolveURICallbacks::create(resolveURLHelper->successCallback(), resolveURLHelper->errorCallback(), &worker);
callbacks->setShouldBlockUntilCompletion(true);
LocalFileSystem::from(worker)->resolveURL(&worker, completedURL, callbacks.release());
return resolveURLHelper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
| 171,433
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Blob::Blob(PassOwnPtr<BlobData> blobData, long long size)
: m_type(blobData->contentType())
, m_size(size)
{
ASSERT(blobData);
ScriptWrappable::init(this);
m_internalURL = BlobURL::createInternalURL();
ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(m_internalURL, blobData);
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
|
Blob::Blob(PassOwnPtr<BlobData> blobData, long long size)
: m_type(blobData->contentType())
, m_size(size)
{
ASSERT(blobData);
ScriptWrappable::init(this);
m_internalURL = BlobURL::createInternalURL();
BlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(m_internalURL, blobData);
}
| 170,675
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: file_add_mapi_attrs (File* file, MAPI_Attr** attrs)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; attrs[i]; i++)
{
MAPI_Attr* a = attrs[i];
if (a->num_values)
{
switch (a->name)
{
case MAPI_ATTACH_LONG_FILENAME:
if (file->name) XFREE(file->name);
file->name = strdup( (char*)a->values[0].data.buf );
break;
case MAPI_ATTACH_DATA_OBJ:
file->len = a->values[0].len;
if (file->data) XFREE (file->data);
file->data = CHECKED_XMALLOC (unsigned char, file->len);
memmove (file->data, a->values[0].data.buf, file->len);
break;
case MAPI_ATTACH_MIME_TAG:
if (file->mime_type) XFREE (file->mime_type);
file->mime_type = CHECKED_XMALLOC (char, a->values[0].len);
memmove (file->mime_type, a->values[0].data.buf, a->values[0].len);
break;
case MAPI_ATTACH_CONTENT_ID:
if (file->content_id) XFREE(file->content_id);
file->content_id = CHECKED_XMALLOC (char, a->values[0].len);
memmove (file->content_id, a->values[0].data.buf, a->values[0].len);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Check types to avoid invalid reads/writes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
file_add_mapi_attrs (File* file, MAPI_Attr** attrs)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; attrs[i]; i++)
{
MAPI_Attr* a = attrs[i];
if (a->num_values)
{
switch (a->name)
{
case MAPI_ATTACH_LONG_FILENAME:
assert(a->type == szMAPI_STRING);
if (file->name) XFREE(file->name);
file->name = strdup( (char*)a->values[0].data.buf );
break;
case MAPI_ATTACH_DATA_OBJ:
assert((a->type == szMAPI_BINARY) || (a->type == szMAPI_OBJECT));
file->len = a->values[0].len;
if (file->data) XFREE (file->data);
file->data = CHECKED_XMALLOC (unsigned char, file->len);
memmove (file->data, a->values[0].data.buf, file->len);
break;
case MAPI_ATTACH_MIME_TAG:
assert(a->type == szMAPI_STRING);
if (file->mime_type) XFREE (file->mime_type);
file->mime_type = CHECKED_XMALLOC (char, a->values[0].len);
memmove (file->mime_type, a->values[0].data.buf, a->values[0].len);
break;
case MAPI_ATTACH_CONTENT_ID:
assert(a->type == szMAPI_STRING);
if (file->content_id) XFREE(file->content_id);
file->content_id = CHECKED_XMALLOC (char, a->values[0].len);
memmove (file->content_id, a->values[0].data.buf, a->values[0].len);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
}
| 168,351
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void __exit ipgre_fini(void)
{
rtnl_link_unregister(&ipgre_tap_ops);
rtnl_link_unregister(&ipgre_link_ops);
unregister_pernet_device(&ipgre_net_ops);
if (inet_del_protocol(&ipgre_protocol, IPPROTO_GRE) < 0)
printk(KERN_INFO "ipgre close: can't remove protocol\n");
}
Commit Message: gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
|
static void __exit ipgre_fini(void)
{
rtnl_link_unregister(&ipgre_tap_ops);
rtnl_link_unregister(&ipgre_link_ops);
if (inet_del_protocol(&ipgre_protocol, IPPROTO_GRE) < 0)
printk(KERN_INFO "ipgre close: can't remove protocol\n");
unregister_pernet_device(&ipgre_net_ops);
}
| 165,883
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool DebuggerFunction::InitTabContents() {
Value* debuggee;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->Get(0, &debuggee));
DictionaryValue* dict = static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(debuggee);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(dict->GetInteger(keys::kTabIdKey, &tab_id_));
contents_ = NULL;
TabContentsWrapper* wrapper = NULL;
bool result = ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabById(
tab_id_, profile(), include_incognito(), NULL, NULL, &wrapper, NULL);
if (!result || !wrapper) {
error_ = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kNoTabError,
base::IntToString(tab_id_));
return false;
}
contents_ = wrapper->web_contents();
if (ChromeWebUIControllerFactory::GetInstance()->HasWebUIScheme(
contents_->GetURL())) {
error_ = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kAttachToWebUIError,
contents_->GetURL().scheme());
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
bool DebuggerFunction::InitTabContents() {
Value* debuggee;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->Get(0, &debuggee));
DictionaryValue* dict = static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(debuggee);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(dict->GetInteger(keys::kTabIdKey, &tab_id_));
contents_ = NULL;
TabContentsWrapper* wrapper = NULL;
bool result = ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabById(
tab_id_, profile(), include_incognito(), NULL, NULL, &wrapper, NULL);
if (!result || !wrapper) {
error_ = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kNoTabError,
base::IntToString(tab_id_));
return false;
}
contents_ = wrapper->web_contents();
if (content::GetContentClient()->HasWebUIScheme(
contents_->GetURL())) {
error_ = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kAttachToWebUIError,
contents_->GetURL().scheme());
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 171,006
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool CheckClientDownloadRequest::ShouldUploadForMalwareScan(
DownloadCheckResultReason reason) {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kDeepScanningOfDownloads))
return false;
if (reason != DownloadCheckResultReason::REASON_DOWNLOAD_SAFE &&
reason != DownloadCheckResultReason::REASON_DOWNLOAD_UNCOMMON &&
reason != DownloadCheckResultReason::REASON_VERDICT_UNKNOWN)
return false;
content::BrowserContext* browser_context =
content::DownloadItemUtils::GetBrowserContext(item_);
if (!browser_context)
return false;
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context);
if (!profile)
return false;
int send_files_for_malware_check = profile->GetPrefs()->GetInteger(
prefs::kSafeBrowsingSendFilesForMalwareCheck);
if (send_files_for_malware_check !=
SendFilesForMalwareCheckValues::SEND_DOWNLOADS &&
send_files_for_malware_check !=
SendFilesForMalwareCheckValues::SEND_UPLOADS_AND_DOWNLOADS)
return false;
return !policy::BrowserDMTokenStorage::Get()->RetrieveDMToken().empty();
}
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool CheckClientDownloadRequest::ShouldUploadForMalwareScan(
DownloadCheckResultReason reason) {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kDeepScanningOfDownloads))
return false;
if (reason != DownloadCheckResultReason::REASON_DOWNLOAD_SAFE &&
reason != DownloadCheckResultReason::REASON_DOWNLOAD_UNCOMMON &&
reason != DownloadCheckResultReason::REASON_VERDICT_UNKNOWN)
return false;
content::BrowserContext* browser_context =
content::DownloadItemUtils::GetBrowserContext(item_);
if (!browser_context)
return false;
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context);
if (!profile)
return false;
int send_files_for_malware_check = profile->GetPrefs()->GetInteger(
prefs::kSafeBrowsingSendFilesForMalwareCheck);
if (send_files_for_malware_check !=
SendFilesForMalwareCheckValues::SEND_DOWNLOADS &&
send_files_for_malware_check !=
SendFilesForMalwareCheckValues::SEND_UPLOADS_AND_DOWNLOADS)
return false;
// If there's no valid DM token, the upload will fail, so we can skip
// uploading now.
return BrowserDMTokenStorage::Get()->RetrieveBrowserDMToken().is_valid();
}
| 172,357
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PrintViewManager::OnShowScriptedPrintPreview(content::RenderFrameHost* rfh,
bool source_is_modifiable) {
DCHECK(print_preview_rfh_);
if (rfh != print_preview_rfh_)
return;
PrintPreviewDialogController* dialog_controller =
PrintPreviewDialogController::GetInstance();
if (!dialog_controller) {
PrintPreviewDone();
return;
}
dialog_controller->PrintPreview(web_contents());
PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview_Params params;
params.is_modifiable = source_is_modifiable;
PrintPreviewUI::SetInitialParams(
dialog_controller->GetPrintPreviewForContents(web_contents()), params);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void PrintViewManager::OnShowScriptedPrintPreview(content::RenderFrameHost* rfh,
bool source_is_modifiable) {
DCHECK(print_preview_rfh_);
if (rfh != print_preview_rfh_)
return;
PrintPreviewDialogController* dialog_controller =
PrintPreviewDialogController::GetInstance();
if (!dialog_controller) {
PrintPreviewDone();
return;
}
// Running a dialog causes an exit to webpage-initiated fullscreen.
// http://crbug.com/728276
if (web_contents()->IsFullscreenForCurrentTab())
web_contents()->ExitFullscreen(true);
dialog_controller->PrintPreview(web_contents());
PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview_Params params;
params.is_modifiable = source_is_modifiable;
PrintPreviewUI::SetInitialParams(
dialog_controller->GetPrintPreviewForContents(web_contents()), params);
}
| 172,314
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool mkvparser::Match(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos, unsigned long id_,
unsigned char*& buf, size_t& buflen) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
long long total, available;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
assert(status >= 0);
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
if (status < 0)
return false;
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
if ((unsigned long)id != id_)
return false;
pos += len; // consume id
const long long size_ = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size_ >= 0);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
pos += len; // consume length of size of payload
assert((pos + size_) <= available);
const long buflen_ = static_cast<long>(size_);
buf = new (std::nothrow) unsigned char[buflen_];
assert(buf); // TODO
status = pReader->Read(pos, buflen_, buf);
assert(status == 0); // TODO
buflen = buflen_;
pos += size_; // consume size of payload
return true;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool mkvparser::Match(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos, unsigned long id_,
bool Match(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos, unsigned long expected_id,
unsigned char*& buf, size_t& buflen) {
if (!pReader || pos < 0)
return false;
long long total = 0;
long long available = 0;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
if (status < 0 || (total >= 0 && available > total))
return false;
long len = 0;
const long long id = ReadID(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0 || (available - pos) > len)
return false;
if (static_cast<unsigned long>(id) != expected_id)
return false;
pos += len; // consume id
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0 || len <= 0 || len > 8 || (available - pos) > len)
return false;
unsigned long long rollover_check =
static_cast<unsigned long long>(pos) + len;
if (rollover_check > LONG_LONG_MAX)
return false;
pos += len; // consume length of size of payload
rollover_check = static_cast<unsigned long long>(pos) + size;
if (rollover_check > LONG_LONG_MAX)
return false;
if ((pos + size) > available)
return false;
if (size >= LONG_MAX)
return false;
const long buflen_ = static_cast<long>(size);
buf = SafeArrayAlloc<unsigned char>(1, buflen_);
if (!buf)
return false;
status = pReader->Read(pos, buflen_, buf);
if (status != 0)
return false;
buflen = buflen_;
pos += size; // consume size of payload
return true;
}
| 173,833
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int sysMapFile(const char* fn, MemMapping* pMap)
{
memset(pMap, 0, sizeof(*pMap));
if (fn && fn[0] == '@') {
FILE* mapf = fopen(fn+1, "r");
if (mapf == NULL) {
LOGV("Unable to open '%s': %s\n", fn+1, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (sysMapBlockFile(mapf, pMap) != 0) {
LOGW("Map of '%s' failed\n", fn);
return -1;
}
fclose(mapf);
} else {
int fd = open(fn, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd < 0) {
LOGE("Unable to open '%s': %s\n", fn, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (sysMapFD(fd, pMap) != 0) {
LOGE("Map of '%s' failed\n", fn);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
close(fd);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflows in recovery procedure.
Bug: 26960931
Change-Id: Ieae45caccfb4728fcf514f0d920976585d8e6caf
(cherry picked from commit 4f2df162c6ab4a71ca86e4b38735b681729c353b)
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
int sysMapFile(const char* fn, MemMapping* pMap)
{
memset(pMap, 0, sizeof(*pMap));
if (fn && fn[0] == '@') {
FILE* mapf = fopen(fn+1, "r");
if (mapf == NULL) {
LOGV("Unable to open '%s': %s\n", fn+1, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (sysMapBlockFile(mapf, pMap) != 0) {
LOGW("Map of '%s' failed\n", fn);
fclose(mapf);
return -1;
}
fclose(mapf);
} else {
int fd = open(fn, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd < 0) {
LOGE("Unable to open '%s': %s\n", fn, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (sysMapFD(fd, pMap) != 0) {
LOGE("Map of '%s' failed\n", fn);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
close(fd);
}
return 0;
}
| 173,905
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int parse_arguments(int *argc_p, const char ***argv_p)
{
static poptContext pc;
char *ref = lp_refuse_options(module_id);
const char *arg, **argv = *argv_p;
int argc = *argc_p;
int opt;
if (ref && *ref)
set_refuse_options(ref);
set_refuse_options("log-file*");
#ifdef ICONV_OPTION
if (!*lp_charset(module_id))
set_refuse_options("iconv");
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
|
int parse_arguments(int *argc_p, const char ***argv_p)
{
static poptContext pc;
char *ref = lp_refuse_options(module_id);
const char *arg, **argv = *argv_p;
int argc = *argc_p;
int opt;
int orig_protect_args = protect_args;
if (ref && *ref)
set_refuse_options(ref);
set_refuse_options("log-file*");
#ifdef ICONV_OPTION
if (!*lp_charset(module_id))
set_refuse_options("iconv");
#endif
}
| 165,134
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: std::string ProcessRawBytesWithSeparators(const unsigned char* data,
size_t data_length,
char hex_separator,
char line_separator) {
static const char kHexChars[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
std::string ret;
size_t kMin = 0U;
ret.reserve(std::max(kMin, data_length * 3 - 1));
for (size_t i = 0; i < data_length; ++i) {
unsigned char b = data[i];
ret.push_back(kHexChars[(b >> 4) & 0xf]);
ret.push_back(kHexChars[b & 0xf]);
if (i + 1 < data_length) {
if ((i + 1) % 16 == 0)
ret.push_back(line_separator);
else
ret.push_back(hex_separator);
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: return early from ProcessRawBytesWithSeperators() when data length is 0
BUG=109717
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9169028
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@117241 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
std::string ProcessRawBytesWithSeparators(const unsigned char* data,
size_t data_length,
char hex_separator,
char line_separator) {
static const char kHexChars[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
std::string ret;
size_t kMin = 0U;
if (!data_length)
return "";
ret.reserve(std::max(kMin, data_length * 3 - 1));
for (size_t i = 0; i < data_length; ++i) {
unsigned char b = data[i];
ret.push_back(kHexChars[(b >> 4) & 0xf]);
ret.push_back(kHexChars[b & 0xf]);
if (i + 1 < data_length) {
if ((i + 1) % 16 == 0)
ret.push_back(line_separator);
else
ret.push_back(hex_separator);
}
}
return ret;
}
| 170,975
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int main()
{
gdImagePtr im;
char *buffer;
size_t size;
size = read_test_file(&buffer, "heap_overflow.tga");
im = gdImageCreateFromTgaPtr(size, (void *) buffer);
gdTestAssert(im == NULL);
free(buffer);
return gdNumFailures();
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB reads of the TGA decompression buffer
It is possible to craft TGA files which will overflow the decompression
buffer, but not the image's bitmap. Therefore we also have to check for
potential decompression buffer overflows.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org;
a modified case exposing an off-by-one error of the first patch had been
provided by Konrad Beckmann.
This commit is an amendment to commit fb0e0cce, so we use CVE-2016-6906
as well.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
int main()
{
check_file("heap_overflow_1.tga");
check_file("heap_overflow_2.tga");
return gdNumFailures();
}
static void check_file(char *basename)
{
gdImagePtr im;
char *buffer;
size_t size;
size = read_test_file(&buffer, basename);
im = gdImageCreateFromTgaPtr(size, (void *) buffer);
gdTestAssert(im == NULL);
free(buffer);
}
| 170,121
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static unsigned int variance_ref(const uint8_t *ref, const uint8_t *src,
int l2w, int l2h, unsigned int *sse_ptr) {
int se = 0;
unsigned int sse = 0;
const int w = 1 << l2w, h = 1 << l2h;
for (int y = 0; y < h; y++) {
for (int x = 0; x < w; x++) {
int diff = ref[w * y + x] - src[w * y + x];
se += diff;
sse += diff * diff;
}
//// Truncate high bit depth results by downshifting (with rounding) by:
//// 2 * (bit_depth - 8) for sse
//// (bit_depth - 8) for se
}
*sse_ptr = sse;
return sse - (((int64_t) se * se) >> (l2w + l2h));
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static unsigned int variance_ref(const uint8_t *ref, const uint8_t *src,
//// Truncate high bit depth results by downshifting (with rounding) by:
//// 2 * (bit_depth - 8) for sse
//// (bit_depth - 8) for se
static void RoundHighBitDepth(int bit_depth, int64_t *se, uint64_t *sse) {
switch (bit_depth) {
case VPX_BITS_12:
*sse = (*sse + 128) >> 8;
*se = (*se + 8) >> 4;
break;
case VPX_BITS_10:
*sse = (*sse + 8) >> 4;
*se = (*se + 2) >> 2;
break;
case VPX_BITS_8:
default:
break;
}
}
| 174,596
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
krb5_kdc_req *request,
const krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc,
const krb5_db_entry *server,
krb5_const_principal server_princ,
krb5_const_principal proxy_princ,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code errcode;
/*
* Constrained delegation is mutually exclusive with renew/forward/etc.
* We can assert from this check that the header ticket was a TGT, as
* that is validated previously in validate_tgs_request().
*/
if (request->kdc_options & (NON_TGT_OPTION | KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
}
/* Ensure that evidence ticket server matches TGT client */
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context,
server->princ, /* after canon */
server_princ)) {
return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
}
if (!isflagset(t2enc->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE)) {
*status = "EVIDENCE_TKT_NOT_FORWARDABLE";
return KRB5_TKT_NOT_FORWARDABLE;
}
/* Backend policy check */
errcode = check_allowed_to_delegate_to(kdc_context,
t2enc->client,
server,
proxy_princ);
if (errcode) {
*status = "NOT_ALLOWED_TO_DELEGATE";
return errcode;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Prevent KDC unset status assertion failures
Assign status values if S4U2Self padata fails to decode, if an
S4U2Proxy request uses invalid KDC options, or if an S4U2Proxy request
uses an evidence ticket which does not match the canonicalized request
server principal name. Reported by Samuel Cabrero.
If a status value is not assigned during KDC processing, default to
"UNKNOWN_REASON" rather than failing an assertion. This change will
prevent future denial of service bugs due to similar mistakes, and
will allow us to omit assigning status values for unlikely errors such
as small memory allocation failures.
CVE-2017-11368:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause an
assertion failure in krb5kdc by sending an invalid S4U2Self or
S4U2Proxy request.
CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 8599 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-617
|
kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
krb5_kdc_req *request,
const krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc,
const krb5_db_entry *server,
krb5_const_principal server_princ,
krb5_const_principal proxy_princ,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code errcode;
/*
* Constrained delegation is mutually exclusive with renew/forward/etc.
* We can assert from this check that the header ticket was a TGT, as
* that is validated previously in validate_tgs_request().
*/
if (request->kdc_options & (NON_TGT_OPTION | KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2PROXY_OPTIONS";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
}
/* Ensure that evidence ticket server matches TGT client */
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context,
server->princ, /* after canon */
server_princ)) {
*status = "EVIDENCE_TICKET_MISMATCH";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
}
if (!isflagset(t2enc->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE)) {
*status = "EVIDENCE_TKT_NOT_FORWARDABLE";
return KRB5_TKT_NOT_FORWARDABLE;
}
/* Backend policy check */
errcode = check_allowed_to_delegate_to(kdc_context,
t2enc->client,
server,
proxy_princ);
if (errcode) {
*status = "NOT_ALLOWED_TO_DELEGATE";
return errcode;
}
return 0;
}
| 168,042
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: UpdateLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetUpdateLibrary() {
return update_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
UpdateLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetUpdateLibrary() {
| 170,634
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const CuePoint* Cues::GetFirst() const
{
if (m_cue_points == NULL)
return NULL;
if (m_count == 0)
return NULL;
#if 0
LoadCuePoint(); //init cues
const size_t count = m_count + m_preload_count;
if (count == 0) //weird
return NULL;
#endif
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
CuePoint* const pCP = pp[0];
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
return pCP;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
const CuePoint* Cues::GetFirst() const
if (m_count == 0)
return NULL;
#if 0
LoadCuePoint(); //init cues
const size_t count = m_count + m_preload_count;
if (count == 0) //weird
return NULL;
#endif
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
CuePoint* const pCP = pp[0];
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
return pCP;
}
| 174,321
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void exit_io_context(void)
{
struct io_context *ioc;
task_lock(current);
ioc = current->io_context;
current->io_context = NULL;
task_unlock(current);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ioc->nr_tasks)) {
if (ioc->aic && ioc->aic->exit)
ioc->aic->exit(ioc->aic);
cfq_exit(ioc);
put_io_context(ioc);
}
}
Commit Message: block: Fix io_context leak after clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, copy_io() increments both ioc->refcount and ioc->nr_tasks.
However exit_io_context() only decrements ioc->refcount if ioc->nr_tasks
reaches 0.
Always call put_io_context() in exit_io_context().
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void exit_io_context(void)
{
struct io_context *ioc;
task_lock(current);
ioc = current->io_context;
current->io_context = NULL;
task_unlock(current);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ioc->nr_tasks)) {
if (ioc->aic && ioc->aic->exit)
ioc->aic->exit(ioc->aic);
cfq_exit(ioc);
}
put_io_context(ioc);
}
| 165,648
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void copy_asoundrc(void) {
char *src = RUN_ASOUNDRC_FILE ;
char *dest;
if (asprintf(&dest, "%s/.asoundrc", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
if (is_link(dest)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s is a symbolic link\n", dest);
exit(1);
}
pid_t child = fork();
if (child < 0)
errExit("fork");
if (child == 0) {
drop_privs(0);
int rv = copy_file(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
if (rv)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot transfer .asoundrc in private home directory\n");
else {
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
}
_exit(0);
}
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
unlink(src);
}
Commit Message: replace copy_file with copy_file_as_user
CWE ID: CWE-269
|
static void copy_asoundrc(void) {
char *src = RUN_ASOUNDRC_FILE ;
char *dest;
if (asprintf(&dest, "%s/.asoundrc", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
if (is_link(dest)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s is a symbolic link\n", dest);
exit(1);
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
unlink(src);
}
| 170,091
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: asocket* find_local_socket(unsigned local_id, unsigned peer_id) {
asocket* s;
asocket* result = NULL;
adb_mutex_lock(&socket_list_lock);
for (s = local_socket_list.next; s != &local_socket_list; s = s->next) {
if (s->id != local_id) {
continue;
}
if (peer_id == 0 || (s->peer && s->peer->id == peer_id)) {
result = s;
}
break;
}
adb_mutex_unlock(&socket_list_lock);
return result;
}
Commit Message: adb: switch the socket list mutex to a recursive_mutex.
sockets.cpp was branching on whether a socket close function was
local_socket_close in order to avoid a potential deadlock if the socket
list lock was held while closing a peer socket.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I5e56f17fa54275284787f0f1dc150d1960256ab3
(cherry picked from commit 9b587dec6d0a57c8fe1083c1c543fbeb163d65fa)
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
asocket* find_local_socket(unsigned local_id, unsigned peer_id) {
asocket* s;
asocket* result = NULL;
std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> lock(local_socket_list_lock);
for (s = local_socket_list.next; s != &local_socket_list; s = s->next) {
if (s->id != local_id) {
continue;
}
if (peer_id == 0 || (s->peer && s->peer->id == peer_id)) {
result = s;
}
break;
}
return result;
}
| 174,151
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int tight_fill_palette(VncState *vs, int x, int y,
size_t count, uint32_t *bg, uint32_t *fg,
VncPalette **palette)
{
int max;
max = count / tight_conf[vs->tight.compression].idx_max_colors_divisor;
if (max < 2 &&
count >= tight_conf[vs->tight.compression].mono_min_rect_size) {
max = 2;
}
if (max >= 256) {
max = 256;
}
switch(vs->clientds.pf.bytes_per_pixel) {
case 4:
return tight_fill_palette32(vs, x, y, max, count, bg, fg, palette);
case 2:
return tight_fill_palette16(vs, x, y, max, count, bg, fg, palette);
default:
max = 2;
return tight_fill_palette8(vs, x, y, max, count, bg, fg, palette);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static int tight_fill_palette(VncState *vs, int x, int y,
size_t count, uint32_t *bg, uint32_t *fg,
VncPalette **palette)
{
int max;
max = count / tight_conf[vs->tight.compression].idx_max_colors_divisor;
if (max < 2 &&
count >= tight_conf[vs->tight.compression].mono_min_rect_size) {
max = 2;
}
if (max >= 256) {
max = 256;
}
switch (vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel) {
case 4:
return tight_fill_palette32(vs, x, y, max, count, bg, fg, palette);
case 2:
return tight_fill_palette16(vs, x, y, max, count, bg, fg, palette);
default:
max = 2;
return tight_fill_palette8(vs, x, y, max, count, bg, fg, palette);
}
return 0;
}
| 165,466
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetCryptohomeLibrary(
CryptohomeLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->crypto_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetCryptohomeLibrary(
| 170,637
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Segment::~Segment() {
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** i = m_clusters;
Cluster** j = m_clusters + count;
while (i != j) {
Cluster* const p = *i++;
assert(p);
delete p;
}
delete[] m_clusters;
delete m_pTracks;
delete m_pInfo;
delete m_pCues;
delete m_pChapters;
delete m_pSeekHead;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
Segment::~Segment() {
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** i = m_clusters;
Cluster** j = m_clusters + count;
while (i != j) {
Cluster* const p = *i++;
delete p;
}
delete[] m_clusters;
delete m_pTracks;
delete m_pInfo;
delete m_pCues;
delete m_pChapters;
delete m_pTags;
delete m_pSeekHead;
}
| 173,870
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a)
{
BN_ULONG t1,t2;
BN_ULONG c1,c2,c3;
c1=0;
c2=0;
c3=0;
sqr_add_c(a,0,c1,c2,c3);
r[0]=c1;
c1=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,1,0,c2,c3,c1);
r[1]=c2;
c2=0;
sqr_add_c(a,1,c3,c1,c2);
sqr_add_c2(a,2,0,c3,c1,c2);
r[2]=c3;
c3=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,3,0,c1,c2,c3);
sqr_add_c2(a,2,1,c1,c2,c3);
r[3]=c1;
c1=0;
sqr_add_c(a,2,c2,c3,c1);
sqr_add_c2(a,3,1,c2,c3,c1);
r[4]=c2;
c2=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,3,2,c3,c1,c2);
r[5]=c3;
c3=0;
sqr_add_c(a,3,c1,c2,c3);
r[6]=c1;
r[7]=c2;
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2014-3570 (with minor bn_asm.c revamp).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
|
void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a)
{
BN_ULONG c1,c2,c3;
c1=0;
c2=0;
c3=0;
sqr_add_c(a,0,c1,c2,c3);
r[0]=c1;
c1=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,1,0,c2,c3,c1);
r[1]=c2;
c2=0;
sqr_add_c(a,1,c3,c1,c2);
sqr_add_c2(a,2,0,c3,c1,c2);
r[2]=c3;
c3=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,3,0,c1,c2,c3);
sqr_add_c2(a,2,1,c1,c2,c3);
r[3]=c1;
c1=0;
sqr_add_c(a,2,c2,c3,c1);
sqr_add_c2(a,3,1,c2,c3,c1);
r[4]=c2;
c2=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,3,2,c3,c1,c2);
r[5]=c3;
c3=0;
sqr_add_c(a,3,c1,c2,c3);
r[6]=c1;
r[7]=c2;
}
| 166,830
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8ValueConverterImpl::ToV8Array(
v8::Isolate* isolate,
v8::Local<v8::Object> creation_context,
const base::ListValue* val) const {
v8::Local<v8::Array> result(v8::Array::New(isolate, val->GetSize()));
for (size_t i = 0; i < val->GetSize(); ++i) {
const base::Value* child = NULL;
CHECK(val->Get(i, &child));
v8::Local<v8::Value> child_v8 =
ToV8ValueImpl(isolate, creation_context, child);
CHECK(!child_v8.IsEmpty());
v8::TryCatch try_catch(isolate);
result->Set(static_cast<uint32_t>(i), child_v8);
if (try_catch.HasCaught())
LOG(ERROR) << "Setter for index " << i << " threw an exception.";
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
CWE ID:
|
v8::Local<v8::Value> V8ValueConverterImpl::ToV8Array(
v8::Isolate* isolate,
v8::Local<v8::Object> creation_context,
const base::ListValue* val) const {
v8::Local<v8::Array> result(v8::Array::New(isolate, val->GetSize()));
// TODO(robwu): Callers should pass in the context.
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = isolate->GetCurrentContext();
for (size_t i = 0; i < val->GetSize(); ++i) {
const base::Value* child = NULL;
CHECK(val->Get(i, &child));
v8::Local<v8::Value> child_v8 =
ToV8ValueImpl(isolate, creation_context, child);
CHECK(!child_v8.IsEmpty());
v8::Maybe<bool> maybe =
result->CreateDataProperty(context, static_cast<uint32_t>(i), child_v8);
if (!maybe.IsJust() || !maybe.FromJust())
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set value at index " << i;
}
return result;
}
| 173,283
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int ret;
struct lxc_lock *lock;
lock = lxc_newlock(NULL, NULL);
if (!lock) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: failed to get unnamed lock\n", __LINE__);
exit(1);
}
ret = lxclock(lock, 0);
if (ret) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: failed to take unnamed lock (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
exit(1);
}
ret = lxcunlock(lock);
if (ret) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: failed to put unnamed lock (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
exit(1);
}
lxc_putlock(lock);
lock = lxc_newlock("/var/lib/lxc", mycontainername);
if (!lock) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: failed to get lock\n", __LINE__);
exit(1);
}
struct stat sb;
char *pathname = RUNTIME_PATH "/lock/lxc/var/lib/lxc/";
ret = stat(pathname, &sb);
if (ret != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: filename %s not created\n", __LINE__,
pathname);
exit(1);
}
lxc_putlock(lock);
test_two_locks();
fprintf(stderr, "all tests passed\n");
exit(ret);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1331: lxclock: use /run/lxc/lock rather than /run/lock/lxc
This prevents an unprivileged user to use LXC to create arbitrary file
on the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
|
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int ret;
struct lxc_lock *lock;
lock = lxc_newlock(NULL, NULL);
if (!lock) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: failed to get unnamed lock\n", __LINE__);
exit(1);
}
ret = lxclock(lock, 0);
if (ret) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: failed to take unnamed lock (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
exit(1);
}
ret = lxcunlock(lock);
if (ret) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: failed to put unnamed lock (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
exit(1);
}
lxc_putlock(lock);
lock = lxc_newlock("/var/lib/lxc", mycontainername);
if (!lock) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: failed to get lock\n", __LINE__);
exit(1);
}
struct stat sb;
char *pathname = RUNTIME_PATH "/lxc/lock/var/lib/lxc/";
ret = stat(pathname, &sb);
if (ret != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: filename %s not created\n", __LINE__,
pathname);
exit(1);
}
lxc_putlock(lock);
test_two_locks();
fprintf(stderr, "all tests passed\n");
exit(ret);
}
| 166,726
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: local unsigned long crc32_big(crc, buf, len)
unsigned long crc;
const unsigned char FAR *buf;
unsigned len;
{
register z_crc_t c;
register const z_crc_t FAR *buf4;
c = ZSWAP32((z_crc_t)crc);
c = ~c;
while (len && ((ptrdiff_t)buf & 3)) {
c = crc_table[4][(c >> 24) ^ *buf++] ^ (c << 8);
len--;
}
buf4 = (const z_crc_t FAR *)(const void FAR *)buf;
buf4--;
while (len >= 32) {
DOBIG32;
len -= 32;
}
while (len >= 4) {
DOBIG4;
len -= 4;
}
buf4++;
buf = (const unsigned char FAR *)buf4;
if (len) do {
c = crc_table[4][(c >> 24) ^ *buf++] ^ (c << 8);
} while (--len);
c = ~c;
return (unsigned long)(ZSWAP32(c));
}
Commit Message: Avoid pre-decrement of pointer in big-endian CRC calculation.
There was a small optimization for PowerPCs to pre-increment a
pointer when accessing a word, instead of post-incrementing. This
required prefacing the loop with a decrement of the pointer,
possibly pointing before the object passed. This is not compliant
with the C standard, for which decrementing a pointer before its
allocated memory is undefined. When tested on a modern PowerPC
with a modern compiler, the optimization no longer has any effect.
Due to all that, and per the recommendation of a security audit of
the zlib code by Trail of Bits and TrustInSoft, in support of the
Mozilla Foundation, this "optimization" was removed, in order to
avoid the possibility of undefined behavior.
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
local unsigned long crc32_big(crc, buf, len)
unsigned long crc;
const unsigned char FAR *buf;
unsigned len;
{
register z_crc_t c;
register const z_crc_t FAR *buf4;
c = ZSWAP32((z_crc_t)crc);
c = ~c;
while (len && ((ptrdiff_t)buf & 3)) {
c = crc_table[4][(c >> 24) ^ *buf++] ^ (c << 8);
len--;
}
buf4 = (const z_crc_t FAR *)(const void FAR *)buf;
while (len >= 32) {
DOBIG32;
len -= 32;
}
while (len >= 4) {
DOBIG4;
len -= 4;
}
buf = (const unsigned char FAR *)buf4;
if (len) do {
c = crc_table[4][(c >> 24) ^ *buf++] ^ (c << 8);
} while (--len);
c = ~c;
return (unsigned long)(ZSWAP32(c));
}
| 168,672
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static cJSON *get_object_item(const cJSON * const object, const char * const name, const cJSON_bool case_sensitive)
{
cJSON *current_element = NULL;
if ((object == NULL) || (name == NULL))
{
return NULL;
}
current_element = object->child;
if (case_sensitive)
{
while ((current_element != NULL) && (strcmp(name, current_element->string) != 0))
{
current_element = current_element->next;
}
}
else
{
while ((current_element != NULL) && (case_insensitive_strcmp((const unsigned char*)name, (const unsigned char*)(current_element->string)) != 0))
{
current_element = current_element->next;
}
}
return current_element;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
CWE ID: CWE-754
|
static cJSON *get_object_item(const cJSON * const object, const char * const name, const cJSON_bool case_sensitive)
{
cJSON *current_element = NULL;
if ((object == NULL) || (name == NULL))
{
return NULL;
}
current_element = object->child;
if (case_sensitive)
{
while ((current_element != NULL) && (current_element->string != NULL) && (strcmp(name, current_element->string) != 0))
{
current_element = current_element->next;
}
}
else
{
while ((current_element != NULL) && (case_insensitive_strcmp((const unsigned char*)name, (const unsigned char*)(current_element->string)) != 0))
{
current_element = current_element->next;
}
}
if ((current_element == NULL) || (current_element->string == NULL)) {
return NULL;
}
return current_element;
}
| 169,480
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AudioOutputDevice::OnStateChanged(AudioOutputIPCDelegate::State state) {
DCHECK(message_loop()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!stream_id_)
return;
if (state == AudioOutputIPCDelegate::kError) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "AudioOutputDevice::OnStateChanged(kError)";
base::AutoLock auto_lock_(audio_thread_lock_);
if (audio_thread_.get() && !audio_thread_->IsStopped())
callback_->OnRenderError();
}
}
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
void AudioOutputDevice::OnStateChanged(AudioOutputIPCDelegate::State state) {
DCHECK(message_loop()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!stream_id_)
return;
if (state == AudioOutputIPCDelegate::kError) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "AudioOutputDevice::OnStateChanged(kError)";
if (!audio_thread_.IsStopped())
callback_->OnRenderError();
}
}
| 170,704
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void cJSON_DeleteItemFromObject( cJSON *object, const char *string )
{
cJSON_Delete( cJSON_DetachItemFromObject( object, string ) );
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void cJSON_DeleteItemFromObject( cJSON *object, const char *string )
| 167,283
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, key)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_FILENAME)) {
RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);
} else {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, key)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_FILENAME)) {
RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);
} else {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
}
}
| 167,035
|
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