instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.3k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void __sock_recv_timestamp(struct msghdr *msg, struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int need_software_tstamp = sock_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP);
struct scm_timestamping tss;
int empty = 1;
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *shhwtstamps =
skb_hwtstamps(skb);
/* Race occurred between timestamp enabling and packet
receiving. Fill in the current time for now. */
if (need_software_tstamp && skb->tstamp == 0)
__net_timestamp(skb);
if (need_software_tstamp) {
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS)) {
struct timeval tv;
skb_get_timestamp(skb, &tv);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMP,
sizeof(tv), &tv);
} else {
struct timespec ts;
skb_get_timestampns(skb, &ts);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMPNS,
sizeof(ts), &ts);
}
}
memset(&tss, 0, sizeof(tss));
if ((sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_SOFTWARE) &&
ktime_to_timespec_cond(skb->tstamp, tss.ts + 0))
empty = 0;
if (shhwtstamps &&
(sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE) &&
ktime_to_timespec_cond(shhwtstamps->hwtstamp, tss.ts + 2))
empty = 0;
if (!empty) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET,
SCM_TIMESTAMPING, sizeof(tss), &tss);
if (skb_is_err_queue(skb) && skb->len &&
(sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS))
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS,
skb->len, skb->data);
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: mark skbs with SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS
SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS can be enabled and disabled
while packets are collected on the error queue.
So, checking SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS in sk->sk_tsflags
is not enough to safely assume that the skb contains
OPT_STATS data.
Add a bit in sock_exterr_skb to indicate whether the
skb contains opt_stats data.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
void __sock_recv_timestamp(struct msghdr *msg, struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int need_software_tstamp = sock_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP);
struct scm_timestamping tss;
int empty = 1;
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *shhwtstamps =
skb_hwtstamps(skb);
/* Race occurred between timestamp enabling and packet
receiving. Fill in the current time for now. */
if (need_software_tstamp && skb->tstamp == 0)
__net_timestamp(skb);
if (need_software_tstamp) {
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS)) {
struct timeval tv;
skb_get_timestamp(skb, &tv);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMP,
sizeof(tv), &tv);
} else {
struct timespec ts;
skb_get_timestampns(skb, &ts);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMPNS,
sizeof(ts), &ts);
}
}
memset(&tss, 0, sizeof(tss));
if ((sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_SOFTWARE) &&
ktime_to_timespec_cond(skb->tstamp, tss.ts + 0))
empty = 0;
if (shhwtstamps &&
(sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE) &&
ktime_to_timespec_cond(shhwtstamps->hwtstamp, tss.ts + 2))
empty = 0;
if (!empty) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET,
SCM_TIMESTAMPING, sizeof(tss), &tss);
if (skb_is_err_queue(skb) && skb->len &&
SKB_EXT_ERR(skb)->opt_stats)
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS,
skb->len, skb->data);
}
}
| 170,074
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: decnet_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *ap, register u_int length,
register u_int caplen)
{
register const union routehdr *rhp;
register int mflags;
int dst, src, hops;
u_int nsplen, pktlen;
const u_char *nspp;
if (length < sizeof(struct shorthdr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*ap, sizeof(short));
pktlen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(ap);
if (pktlen < sizeof(struct shorthdr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
if (pktlen > length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
length = pktlen;
rhp = (const union routehdr *)&(ap[sizeof(short)]);
ND_TCHECK(rhp->rh_short.sh_flags);
mflags = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_flags);
if (mflags & RMF_PAD) {
/* pad bytes of some sort in front of message */
u_int padlen = mflags & RMF_PADMASK;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[pad:%d] ", padlen));
if (length < padlen + 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(ap[sizeof(short)], padlen);
ap += padlen;
length -= padlen;
caplen -= padlen;
rhp = (const union routehdr *)&(ap[sizeof(short)]);
mflags = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_flags);
}
if (mflags & RMF_FVER) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "future-version-decnet"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(ap, min(length, caplen));
return;
}
/* is it a control message? */
if (mflags & RMF_CTLMSG) {
if (!print_decnet_ctlmsg(ndo, rhp, length, caplen))
goto trunc;
return;
}
switch (mflags & RMF_MASK) {
case RMF_LONG:
if (length < sizeof(struct longhdr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(rhp->rh_long);
dst =
EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(rhp->rh_long.lg_dst.dne_remote.dne_nodeaddr);
src =
EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(rhp->rh_long.lg_src.dne_remote.dne_nodeaddr);
hops = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(rhp->rh_long.lg_visits);
nspp = &(ap[sizeof(short) + sizeof(struct longhdr)]);
nsplen = length - sizeof(struct longhdr);
break;
case RMF_SHORT:
ND_TCHECK(rhp->rh_short);
dst = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_dst);
src = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_src);
hops = (EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_visits) & VIS_MASK)+1;
nspp = &(ap[sizeof(short) + sizeof(struct shorthdr)]);
nsplen = length - sizeof(struct shorthdr);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown message flags under mask"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)ap, min(length, caplen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s %d ",
dnaddr_string(ndo, src), dnaddr_string(ndo, dst), pktlen));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
if (mflags & RMF_RQR)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RQR "));
if (mflags & RMF_RTS)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RTS "));
if (mflags & RMF_IE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IE "));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%d hops ", hops));
}
if (!print_nsp(ndo, nspp, nsplen))
goto trunc;
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12899/DECnet: Fix bounds checking.
If we're skipping over padding before the *real* flags, check whether
the real flags are in the captured data before fetching it. This fixes
a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Note one place where we don't need to do bounds checking as it's already
been done.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
decnet_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *ap, register u_int length,
register u_int caplen)
{
register const union routehdr *rhp;
register int mflags;
int dst, src, hops;
u_int nsplen, pktlen;
const u_char *nspp;
if (length < sizeof(struct shorthdr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*ap, sizeof(short));
pktlen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(ap);
if (pktlen < sizeof(struct shorthdr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
if (pktlen > length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
length = pktlen;
rhp = (const union routehdr *)&(ap[sizeof(short)]);
ND_TCHECK(rhp->rh_short.sh_flags);
mflags = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_flags);
if (mflags & RMF_PAD) {
/* pad bytes of some sort in front of message */
u_int padlen = mflags & RMF_PADMASK;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[pad:%d] ", padlen));
if (length < padlen + 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(ap[sizeof(short)], padlen);
ap += padlen;
length -= padlen;
caplen -= padlen;
rhp = (const union routehdr *)&(ap[sizeof(short)]);
ND_TCHECK(rhp->rh_short.sh_flags);
mflags = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_flags);
}
if (mflags & RMF_FVER) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "future-version-decnet"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(ap, min(length, caplen));
return;
}
/* is it a control message? */
if (mflags & RMF_CTLMSG) {
if (!print_decnet_ctlmsg(ndo, rhp, length, caplen))
goto trunc;
return;
}
switch (mflags & RMF_MASK) {
case RMF_LONG:
if (length < sizeof(struct longhdr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(rhp->rh_long);
dst =
EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(rhp->rh_long.lg_dst.dne_remote.dne_nodeaddr);
src =
EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(rhp->rh_long.lg_src.dne_remote.dne_nodeaddr);
hops = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(rhp->rh_long.lg_visits);
nspp = &(ap[sizeof(short) + sizeof(struct longhdr)]);
nsplen = length - sizeof(struct longhdr);
break;
case RMF_SHORT:
ND_TCHECK(rhp->rh_short);
dst = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_dst);
src = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_src);
hops = (EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_visits) & VIS_MASK)+1;
nspp = &(ap[sizeof(short) + sizeof(struct shorthdr)]);
nsplen = length - sizeof(struct shorthdr);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown message flags under mask"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)ap, min(length, caplen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s %d ",
dnaddr_string(ndo, src), dnaddr_string(ndo, dst), pktlen));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
if (mflags & RMF_RQR)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RQR "));
if (mflags & RMF_RTS)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RTS "));
if (mflags & RMF_IE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IE "));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%d hops ", hops));
}
if (!print_nsp(ndo, nspp, nsplen))
goto trunc;
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
| 170,033
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void EntrySync::remove(ExceptionState& exceptionState) const
{
RefPtr<VoidSyncCallbackHelper> helper = VoidSyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->remove(this, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void EntrySync::remove(ExceptionState& exceptionState) const
{
VoidSyncCallbackHelper* helper = VoidSyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->remove(this, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
| 171,423
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int SpdyProxyClientSocket::DoReadReplyComplete(int result) {
if (result < 0)
return result;
if (response_.headers->GetParsedHttpVersion() < HttpVersion(1, 0))
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
net_log_.AddEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_HTTP_TRANSACTION_READ_TUNNEL_RESPONSE_HEADERS,
base::Bind(&HttpResponseHeaders::NetLogCallback, response_.headers));
switch (response_.headers->response_code()) {
case 200: // OK
next_state_ = STATE_OPEN;
return OK;
case 302: // Found / Moved Temporarily
if (SanitizeProxyRedirect(&response_, request_.url)) {
redirect_has_load_timing_info_ =
spdy_stream_->GetLoadTimingInfo(&redirect_load_timing_info_);
spdy_stream_->DetachDelegate();
next_state_ = STATE_DISCONNECTED;
return ERR_HTTPS_PROXY_TUNNEL_RESPONSE;
} else {
LogBlockedTunnelResponse();
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
case 407: // Proxy Authentication Required
next_state_ = STATE_OPEN;
return HandleProxyAuthChallenge(auth_.get(), &response_, net_log_);
default:
LogBlockedTunnelResponse();
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19
|
int SpdyProxyClientSocket::DoReadReplyComplete(int result) {
if (result < 0)
return result;
if (response_.headers->GetParsedHttpVersion() < HttpVersion(1, 0))
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
net_log_.AddEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_HTTP_TRANSACTION_READ_TUNNEL_RESPONSE_HEADERS,
base::Bind(&HttpResponseHeaders::NetLogCallback, response_.headers));
switch (response_.headers->response_code()) {
case 200: // OK
next_state_ = STATE_OPEN;
return OK;
case 302: // Found / Moved Temporarily
if (!SanitizeProxyRedirect(&response_)) {
LogBlockedTunnelResponse();
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
redirect_has_load_timing_info_ =
spdy_stream_->GetLoadTimingInfo(&redirect_load_timing_info_);
// Note that this triggers a RST_STREAM_CANCEL.
spdy_stream_->DetachDelegate();
next_state_ = STATE_DISCONNECTED;
return ERR_HTTPS_PROXY_TUNNEL_RESPONSE;
case 407: // Proxy Authentication Required
next_state_ = STATE_OPEN;
if (!SanitizeProxyAuth(&response_)) {
LogBlockedTunnelResponse();
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
return HandleProxyAuthChallenge(auth_.get(), &response_, net_log_);
default:
LogBlockedTunnelResponse();
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
}
| 172,041
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: _gnutls_server_name_recv_params (gnutls_session_t session,
const opaque * data, size_t _data_size)
{
int i;
const unsigned char *p;
uint16_t len, type;
ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
int server_names = 0;
if (session->security_parameters.entity == GNUTLS_SERVER)
{
DECR_LENGTH_RET (data_size, 2, 0);
len = _gnutls_read_uint16 (data);
if (len != data_size)
{
/* This is unexpected packet length, but
* just ignore it, for now.
*/
gnutls_assert ();
return 0;
}
p = data + 2;
/* Count all server_names in the packet. */
while (data_size > 0)
{
DECR_LENGTH_RET (data_size, 1, 0);
p++;
DECR_LEN (data_size, 2);
len = _gnutls_read_uint16 (p);
p += 2;
DECR_LENGTH_RET (data_size, len, 0);
server_names++;
p += len;
}
session->security_parameters.extensions.server_names_size =
if (server_names == 0)
return 0; /* no names found */
/* we cannot accept more server names.
*/
if (server_names > MAX_SERVER_NAME_EXTENSIONS)
server_names = MAX_SERVER_NAME_EXTENSIONS;
p = data + 2;
for (i = 0; i < server_names; i++)
server_names[i].name, p, len);
session->security_parameters.extensions.
server_names[i].name_length = len;
session->security_parameters.extensions.
server_names[i].type = GNUTLS_NAME_DNS;
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
_gnutls_server_name_recv_params (gnutls_session_t session,
const opaque * data, size_t _data_size)
{
int i;
const unsigned char *p;
uint16_t len, type;
ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
int server_names = 0;
if (session->security_parameters.entity == GNUTLS_SERVER)
{
DECR_LENGTH_RET (data_size, 2, 0);
len = _gnutls_read_uint16 (data);
if (len != data_size)
{
/* This is unexpected packet length, but
* just ignore it, for now.
*/
gnutls_assert ();
return 0;
}
p = data + 2;
/* Count all server_names in the packet. */
while (data_size > 0)
{
DECR_LENGTH_RET (data_size, 1, 0);
p++;
DECR_LEN (data_size, 2);
len = _gnutls_read_uint16 (p);
p += 2;
if (len > 0)
{
DECR_LENGTH_RET (data_size, len, 0);
server_names++;
p += len;
}
else
_gnutls_handshake_log
("HSK[%x]: Received zero size server name (under attack?)\n",
session);
}
/* we cannot accept more server names.
*/
if (server_names > MAX_SERVER_NAME_EXTENSIONS)
{
_gnutls_handshake_log
("HSK[%x]: Too many server names received (under attack?)\n",
session);
server_names = MAX_SERVER_NAME_EXTENSIONS;
}
session->security_parameters.extensions.server_names_size =
if (server_names == 0)
return 0; /* no names found */
p = data + 2;
for (i = 0; i < server_names; i++)
server_names[i].name, p, len);
session->security_parameters.extensions.
server_names[i].name_length = len;
session->security_parameters.extensions.
server_names[i].type = GNUTLS_NAME_DNS;
break;
}
}
| 165,145
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(
tCompletePhysicalAddress *pDataPages,
ULONG ulDataLength,
ULONG ulStartOffset,
ULONG flags,
LPCSTR caller)
{
IPHeader *pIpHeader = (IPHeader *) RtlOffsetToPointer(pDataPages[0].Virtual, ulStartOffset);
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = QualifyIpPacket(pIpHeader, ulDataLength);
if (res.ipStatus == ppresNotIP || res.ipCheckSum == ppresIPTooShort)
return res;
if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV4)
{
if (flags & pcrIpChecksum)
res = VerifyIpChecksum(&pIpHeader->v4, res, (flags & pcrFixIPChecksum) != 0);
if(res.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if (res.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if(flags & pcrTcpV4Checksum)
{
res = VerifyTcpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixTcpV4Checksum));
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (flags & pcrUdpV4Checksum)
{
res = VerifyUdpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixUdpV4Checksum));
}
}
}
}
else if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV6)
{
if(res.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if (res.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if(flags & pcrTcpV6Checksum)
{
res = VerifyTcpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixTcpV6Checksum));
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (flags & pcrUdpV6Checksum)
{
res = VerifyUdpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixUdpV6Checksum));
}
}
}
}
PrintOutParsingResult(res, 1, caller);
return res;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(
tCompletePhysicalAddress *pDataPages,
ULONG ulDataLength,
ULONG ulStartOffset,
ULONG flags,
BOOLEAN verifyLength,
LPCSTR caller)
{
IPHeader *pIpHeader = (IPHeader *) RtlOffsetToPointer(pDataPages[0].Virtual, ulStartOffset);
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = QualifyIpPacket(pIpHeader, ulDataLength, verifyLength);
if (res.ipStatus == ppresNotIP || res.ipCheckSum == ppresIPTooShort)
return res;
if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV4)
{
if (flags & pcrIpChecksum)
res = VerifyIpChecksum(&pIpHeader->v4, res, (flags & pcrFixIPChecksum) != 0);
if(res.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if (res.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if(flags & pcrTcpV4Checksum)
{
res = VerifyTcpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixTcpV4Checksum));
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (flags & pcrUdpV4Checksum)
{
res = VerifyUdpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixUdpV4Checksum));
}
}
}
}
else if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV6)
{
if(res.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if (res.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if(flags & pcrTcpV6Checksum)
{
res = VerifyTcpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixTcpV6Checksum));
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (flags & pcrUdpV6Checksum)
{
res = VerifyUdpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixUdpV6Checksum));
}
}
}
}
PrintOutParsingResult(res, 1, caller);
return res;
}
| 170,143
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool NaClProcessHost::SendStart() {
if (!enable_ipc_proxy_) {
if (!ReplyToRenderer(IPC::ChannelHandle()))
return false;
}
return StartNaClExecution();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool NaClProcessHost::SendStart() {
| 170,728
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: smb2_flush(smb_request_t *sr)
{
smb_ofile_t *of = NULL;
uint16_t StructSize;
uint16_t reserved1;
uint32_t reserved2;
smb2fid_t smb2fid;
uint32_t status;
int rc = 0;
/*
* SMB2 Flush request
*/
rc = smb_mbc_decodef(
&sr->smb_data, "wwlqq",
&StructSize, /* w */
&reserved1, /* w */
&reserved2, /* l */
&smb2fid.persistent, /* q */
&smb2fid.temporal); /* q */
if (rc)
return (SDRC_ERROR);
if (StructSize != 24)
return (SDRC_ERROR);
status = smb2sr_lookup_fid(sr, &smb2fid);
if (status) {
smb2sr_put_error(sr, status);
return (SDRC_SUCCESS);
}
of = sr->fid_ofile;
/*
* XXX - todo:
* Flush named pipe should drain writes.
*/
if ((of->f_node->flags & NODE_FLAGS_WRITE_THROUGH) == 0)
(void) smb_fsop_commit(sr, of->f_cr, of->f_node);
/*
* SMB2 Flush reply
*/
(void) smb_mbc_encodef(
&sr->reply, "wwl",
4, /* StructSize */ /* w */
0); /* reserved */ /* w */
return (SDRC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: 7483 SMB flush on pipe triggers NULL pointer dereference in module smbsrv
Reviewed by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Matt Barden <matt.barden@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Evan Layton <evan.layton@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
smb2_flush(smb_request_t *sr)
{
uint16_t StructSize;
uint16_t reserved1;
uint32_t reserved2;
smb2fid_t smb2fid;
uint32_t status;
int rc = 0;
/*
* SMB2 Flush request
*/
rc = smb_mbc_decodef(
&sr->smb_data, "wwlqq",
&StructSize, /* w */
&reserved1, /* w */
&reserved2, /* l */
&smb2fid.persistent, /* q */
&smb2fid.temporal); /* q */
if (rc)
return (SDRC_ERROR);
if (StructSize != 24)
return (SDRC_ERROR);
status = smb2sr_lookup_fid(sr, &smb2fid);
if (status) {
smb2sr_put_error(sr, status);
return (SDRC_SUCCESS);
}
smb_ofile_flush(sr, sr->fid_ofile);
/*
* SMB2 Flush reply
*/
(void) smb_mbc_encodef(
&sr->reply, "wwl",
4, /* StructSize */ /* w */
0); /* reserved */ /* w */
return (SDRC_SUCCESS);
}
| 168,825
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void VP8XChunk::width(XMP_Uns32 val)
{
PutLE24(&this->data[4], val - 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void VP8XChunk::width(XMP_Uns32 val)
{
PutLE24(&this->data[4], val > 0 ? val - 1 : 0);
}
| 165,366
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int genl_register_family(struct genl_family *family)
{
int err, i;
int start = GENL_START_ALLOC, end = GENL_MAX_ID;
err = genl_validate_ops(family);
if (err)
return err;
genl_lock_all();
if (genl_family_find_byname(family->name)) {
err = -EEXIST;
goto errout_locked;
}
/*
* Sadly, a few cases need to be special-cased
* due to them having previously abused the API
* and having used their family ID also as their
* multicast group ID, so we use reserved IDs
* for both to be sure we can do that mapping.
*/
if (family == &genl_ctrl) {
/* and this needs to be special for initial family lookups */
start = end = GENL_ID_CTRL;
} else if (strcmp(family->name, "pmcraid") == 0) {
start = end = GENL_ID_PMCRAID;
} else if (strcmp(family->name, "VFS_DQUOT") == 0) {
start = end = GENL_ID_VFS_DQUOT;
}
if (family->maxattr && !family->parallel_ops) {
family->attrbuf = kmalloc_array(family->maxattr + 1,
sizeof(struct nlattr *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (family->attrbuf == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto errout_locked;
}
} else
family->attrbuf = NULL;
family->id = idr_alloc(&genl_fam_idr, family,
start, end + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (family->id < 0) {
err = family->id;
goto errout_locked;
}
err = genl_validate_assign_mc_groups(family);
if (err)
goto errout_remove;
genl_unlock_all();
/* send all events */
genl_ctrl_event(CTRL_CMD_NEWFAMILY, family, NULL, 0);
for (i = 0; i < family->n_mcgrps; i++)
genl_ctrl_event(CTRL_CMD_NEWMCAST_GRP, family,
&family->mcgrps[i], family->mcgrp_offset + i);
return 0;
errout_remove:
idr_remove(&genl_fam_idr, family->id);
kfree(family->attrbuf);
errout_locked:
genl_unlock_all();
return err;
}
Commit Message: genetlink: Fix a memory leak on error path
In genl_register_family(), when idr_alloc() fails,
we forget to free the memory we possibly allocate for
family->attrbuf.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 2ae0f17df1cd ("genetlink: use idr to track families")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
int genl_register_family(struct genl_family *family)
{
int err, i;
int start = GENL_START_ALLOC, end = GENL_MAX_ID;
err = genl_validate_ops(family);
if (err)
return err;
genl_lock_all();
if (genl_family_find_byname(family->name)) {
err = -EEXIST;
goto errout_locked;
}
/*
* Sadly, a few cases need to be special-cased
* due to them having previously abused the API
* and having used their family ID also as their
* multicast group ID, so we use reserved IDs
* for both to be sure we can do that mapping.
*/
if (family == &genl_ctrl) {
/* and this needs to be special for initial family lookups */
start = end = GENL_ID_CTRL;
} else if (strcmp(family->name, "pmcraid") == 0) {
start = end = GENL_ID_PMCRAID;
} else if (strcmp(family->name, "VFS_DQUOT") == 0) {
start = end = GENL_ID_VFS_DQUOT;
}
if (family->maxattr && !family->parallel_ops) {
family->attrbuf = kmalloc_array(family->maxattr + 1,
sizeof(struct nlattr *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (family->attrbuf == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto errout_locked;
}
} else
family->attrbuf = NULL;
family->id = idr_alloc(&genl_fam_idr, family,
start, end + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (family->id < 0) {
err = family->id;
goto errout_free;
}
err = genl_validate_assign_mc_groups(family);
if (err)
goto errout_remove;
genl_unlock_all();
/* send all events */
genl_ctrl_event(CTRL_CMD_NEWFAMILY, family, NULL, 0);
for (i = 0; i < family->n_mcgrps; i++)
genl_ctrl_event(CTRL_CMD_NEWMCAST_GRP, family,
&family->mcgrps[i], family->mcgrp_offset + i);
return 0;
errout_remove:
idr_remove(&genl_fam_idr, family->id);
errout_free:
kfree(family->attrbuf);
errout_locked:
genl_unlock_all();
return err;
}
| 169,524
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void usage_exit() {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <codec> <width> <height> <infile> <outfile>\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void usage_exit() {
void usage_exit(void) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <codec> <width> <height> <infile> <outfile>\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
| 174,494
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int _gd2GetHeader(gdIOCtxPtr in, int *sx, int *sy, int *cs, int *vers, int *fmt, int *ncx, int *ncy, t_chunk_info ** chunkIdx)
{
int i;
int ch;
char id[5];
t_chunk_info *cidx;
int sidx;
int nc;
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Reading gd2 header info"));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
ch = gdGetC(in);
if (ch == EOF) {
goto fail1;
}
id[i] = ch;
}
id[4] = 0;
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Got file code: %s", id));
/* Equiv. of 'magick'. */
if (strcmp(id, GD2_ID) != 0) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Not a valid gd2 file"));
goto fail1;
}
/* Version */
if (gdGetWord(vers, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Version: %d", *vers));
if ((*vers != 1) && (*vers != 2)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Bad version: %d", *vers));
goto fail1;
}
/* Image Size */
if (!gdGetWord(sx, in)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Could not get x-size"));
goto fail1;
}
if (!gdGetWord(sy, in)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Could not get y-size"));
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Image is %dx%d", *sx, *sy));
/* Chunk Size (pixels, not bytes!) */
if (gdGetWord(cs, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("ChunkSize: %d", *cs));
if ((*cs < GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MIN) || (*cs > GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MAX)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Bad chunk size: %d", *cs));
goto fail1;
}
/* Data Format */
if (gdGetWord(fmt, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Format: %d", *fmt));
if ((*fmt != GD2_FMT_RAW) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_COMPRESSED) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_RAW) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_COMPRESSED)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Bad data format: %d", *fmt));
goto fail1;
}
/* # of chunks wide */
if (gdGetWord(ncx, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("%d Chunks Wide", *ncx));
/* # of chunks high */
if (gdGetWord(ncy, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("%d Chunks vertically", *ncy));
if (gd2_compressed(*fmt)) {
nc = (*ncx) * (*ncy);
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Reading %d chunk index entries", nc));
sidx = sizeof(t_chunk_info) * nc;
if (sidx <= 0) {
goto fail1;
}
cidx = gdCalloc(sidx, 1);
for (i = 0; i < nc; i++) {
if (gdGetInt(&cidx[i].offset, in) != 1) {
gdFree(cidx);
goto fail1;
}
if (gdGetInt(&cidx[i].size, in) != 1) {
gdFree(cidx);
goto fail1;
}
if (cidx[i].offset < 0 || cidx[i].size < 0) {
gdFree(cidx);
goto fail1;
}
}
*chunkIdx = cidx;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("gd2 header complete"));
return 1;
fail1:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #72339 Integer Overflow in _gd2GetHeader() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static int _gd2GetHeader(gdIOCtxPtr in, int *sx, int *sy, int *cs, int *vers, int *fmt, int *ncx, int *ncy, t_chunk_info ** chunkIdx)
{
int i;
int ch;
char id[5];
t_chunk_info *cidx;
int sidx;
int nc;
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Reading gd2 header info"));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
ch = gdGetC(in);
if (ch == EOF) {
goto fail1;
}
id[i] = ch;
}
id[4] = 0;
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Got file code: %s", id));
/* Equiv. of 'magick'. */
if (strcmp(id, GD2_ID) != 0) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Not a valid gd2 file"));
goto fail1;
}
/* Version */
if (gdGetWord(vers, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Version: %d", *vers));
if ((*vers != 1) && (*vers != 2)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Bad version: %d", *vers));
goto fail1;
}
/* Image Size */
if (!gdGetWord(sx, in)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Could not get x-size"));
goto fail1;
}
if (!gdGetWord(sy, in)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Could not get y-size"));
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Image is %dx%d", *sx, *sy));
/* Chunk Size (pixels, not bytes!) */
if (gdGetWord(cs, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("ChunkSize: %d", *cs));
if ((*cs < GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MIN) || (*cs > GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MAX)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Bad chunk size: %d", *cs));
goto fail1;
}
/* Data Format */
if (gdGetWord(fmt, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Format: %d", *fmt));
if ((*fmt != GD2_FMT_RAW) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_COMPRESSED) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_RAW) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_COMPRESSED)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Bad data format: %d", *fmt));
goto fail1;
}
/* # of chunks wide */
if (gdGetWord(ncx, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("%d Chunks Wide", *ncx));
/* # of chunks high */
if (gdGetWord(ncy, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("%d Chunks vertically", *ncy));
if (gd2_compressed(*fmt)) {
nc = (*ncx) * (*ncy);
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Reading %d chunk index entries", nc));
if (overflow2(sidx, nc)) {
goto fail1;
}
sidx = sizeof(t_chunk_info) * nc;
if (sidx <= 0) {
goto fail1;
}
cidx = gdCalloc(sidx, 1);
if (cidx == NULL) {
goto fail1;
}
for (i = 0; i < nc; i++) {
if (gdGetInt(&cidx[i].offset, in) != 1) {
gdFree(cidx);
goto fail1;
}
if (gdGetInt(&cidx[i].size, in) != 1) {
gdFree(cidx);
goto fail1;
}
if (cidx[i].offset < 0 || cidx[i].size < 0) {
gdFree(cidx);
goto fail1;
}
}
*chunkIdx = cidx;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("gd2 header complete"));
return 1;
fail1:
return 0;
}
| 167,131
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: fpDiff(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32 bps = tif->tif_dir.td_bitspersample / 8;
tmsize_t wc = cc / bps;
tmsize_t count;
uint8 *cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
uint8 *tmp = (uint8 *)_TIFFmalloc(cc);
assert((cc%(bps*stride))==0);
if (!tmp)
return;
_TIFFmemcpy(tmp, cp0, cc);
for (count = 0; count < wc; count++) {
uint32 byte;
for (byte = 0; byte < bps; byte++) {
#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
cp[byte * wc + count] = tmp[bps * count + byte];
#else
cp[(bps - byte - 1) * wc + count] =
tmp[bps * count + byte];
#endif
}
}
_TIFFfree(tmp);
cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
cp += cc - stride - 1;
for (count = cc; count > stride; count -= stride)
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] = (unsigned char)((cp[stride] - cp[0])&0xff); cp--)
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
fpDiff(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32 bps = tif->tif_dir.td_bitspersample / 8;
tmsize_t wc = cc / bps;
tmsize_t count;
uint8 *cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
uint8 *tmp = (uint8 *)_TIFFmalloc(cc);
if((cc%(bps*stride))!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "fpDiff",
"%s", "(cc%(bps*stride))!=0");
return 0;
}
if (!tmp)
return 0;
_TIFFmemcpy(tmp, cp0, cc);
for (count = 0; count < wc; count++) {
uint32 byte;
for (byte = 0; byte < bps; byte++) {
#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
cp[byte * wc + count] = tmp[bps * count + byte];
#else
cp[(bps - byte - 1) * wc + count] =
tmp[bps * count + byte];
#endif
}
}
_TIFFfree(tmp);
cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
cp += cc - stride - 1;
for (count = cc; count > stride; count -= stride)
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] = (unsigned char)((cp[stride] - cp[0])&0xff); cp--)
return 1;
}
| 166,881
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: string_modifier_check(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m)
{
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK) == 0)
return 0;
if (m->type != FILE_PSTRING && (m->str_flags & PSTRING_LEN) != 0) {
file_magwarn(ms,
"'/BHhLl' modifiers are only allowed for pascal strings\n");
return -1;
}
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16:
if (m->str_flags != 0) {
file_magwarn(ms,
"no modifiers allowed for 16-bit strings\n");
return -1;
}
break;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_PSTRING:
if ((m->str_flags & REGEX_OFFSET_START) != 0) {
file_magwarn(ms,
"'/%c' only allowed on regex and search\n",
CHAR_REGEX_OFFSET_START);
return -1;
}
break;
case FILE_SEARCH:
if (m->str_range == 0) {
file_magwarn(ms,
"missing range; defaulting to %d\n",
STRING_DEFAULT_RANGE);
m->str_range = STRING_DEFAULT_RANGE;
return -1;
}
break;
case FILE_REGEX:
if ((m->str_flags & STRING_COMPACT_WHITESPACE) != 0) {
file_magwarn(ms, "'/%c' not allowed on regex\n",
CHAR_COMPACT_WHITESPACE);
return -1;
}
if ((m->str_flags & STRING_COMPACT_OPTIONAL_WHITESPACE) != 0) {
file_magwarn(ms, "'/%c' not allowed on regex\n",
CHAR_COMPACT_OPTIONAL_WHITESPACE);
return -1;
}
break;
default:
file_magwarn(ms, "coding error: m->type=%d\n",
m->type);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: * Enforce limit of 8K on regex searches that have no limits
* Allow the l modifier for regex to mean line count. Default
to byte count. If line count is specified, assume a max
of 80 characters per line to limit the byte count.
* Don't allow conversions to be used for dates, allowing
the mask field to be used as an offset.
* Bump the version of the magic format so that regex changes
are visible.
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
string_modifier_check(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m)
{
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK) == 0)
return 0;
if ((m->type != FILE_REGEX || (m->str_flags & REGEX_LINE_COUNT) == 0) &&
(m->type != FILE_PSTRING && (m->str_flags & PSTRING_LEN) != 0)) {
file_magwarn(ms,
"'/BHhLl' modifiers are only allowed for pascal strings\n");
return -1;
}
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16:
if (m->str_flags != 0) {
file_magwarn(ms,
"no modifiers allowed for 16-bit strings\n");
return -1;
}
break;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_PSTRING:
if ((m->str_flags & REGEX_OFFSET_START) != 0) {
file_magwarn(ms,
"'/%c' only allowed on regex and search\n",
CHAR_REGEX_OFFSET_START);
return -1;
}
break;
case FILE_SEARCH:
if (m->str_range == 0) {
file_magwarn(ms,
"missing range; defaulting to %d\n",
STRING_DEFAULT_RANGE);
m->str_range = STRING_DEFAULT_RANGE;
return -1;
}
break;
case FILE_REGEX:
if ((m->str_flags & STRING_COMPACT_WHITESPACE) != 0) {
file_magwarn(ms, "'/%c' not allowed on regex\n",
CHAR_COMPACT_WHITESPACE);
return -1;
}
if ((m->str_flags & STRING_COMPACT_OPTIONAL_WHITESPACE) != 0) {
file_magwarn(ms, "'/%c' not allowed on regex\n",
CHAR_COMPACT_OPTIONAL_WHITESPACE);
return -1;
}
break;
default:
file_magwarn(ms, "coding error: m->type=%d\n",
m->type);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
| 166,356
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void dvb_usbv2_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
const char *name = d->name;
struct device dev = d->udev->dev;
dev_dbg(&d->udev->dev, "%s: bInterfaceNumber=%d\n", __func__,
intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber);
if (d->props->exit)
d->props->exit(d);
dvb_usbv2_exit(d);
dev_info(&dev, "%s: '%s' successfully deinitialized and disconnected\n",
KBUILD_MODNAME, name);
}
Commit Message: [media] dvb-usb-v2: avoid use-after-free
I ran into a stack frame size warning because of the on-stack copy of
the USB device structure:
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c: In function 'dvb_usbv2_disconnect':
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c:1029:1: error: the frame size of 1104 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]
Copying a device structure like this is wrong for a number of other reasons
too aside from the possible stack overflow. One of them is that the
dev_info() call will print the name of the device later, but AFAICT
we have only copied a pointer to the name earlier and the actual name
has been freed by the time it gets printed.
This removes the on-stack copy of the device and instead copies the
device name using kstrdup(). I'm ignoring the possible failure here
as both printk() and kfree() are able to deal with NULL pointers.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void dvb_usbv2_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
const char *devname = kstrdup(dev_name(&d->udev->dev), GFP_KERNEL);
const char *drvname = d->name;
dev_dbg(&d->udev->dev, "%s: bInterfaceNumber=%d\n", __func__,
intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber);
if (d->props->exit)
d->props->exit(d);
dvb_usbv2_exit(d);
pr_info("%s: '%s:%s' successfully deinitialized and disconnected\n",
KBUILD_MODNAME, drvname, devname);
kfree(devname);
}
| 168,222
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int udf_encode_fh(struct inode *inode, __u32 *fh, int *lenp,
struct inode *parent)
{
int len = *lenp;
struct kernel_lb_addr location = UDF_I(inode)->i_location;
struct fid *fid = (struct fid *)fh;
int type = FILEID_UDF_WITHOUT_PARENT;
if (parent && (len < 5)) {
*lenp = 5;
return 255;
} else if (len < 3) {
*lenp = 3;
return 255;
}
*lenp = 3;
fid->udf.block = location.logicalBlockNum;
fid->udf.partref = location.partitionReferenceNum;
fid->udf.generation = inode->i_generation;
if (parent) {
location = UDF_I(parent)->i_location;
fid->udf.parent_block = location.logicalBlockNum;
fid->udf.parent_partref = location.partitionReferenceNum;
fid->udf.parent_generation = inode->i_generation;
*lenp = 5;
type = FILEID_UDF_WITH_PARENT;
}
return type;
}
Commit Message: udf: avoid info leak on export
For type 0x51 the udf.parent_partref member in struct fid gets copied
uninitialized to userland. Fix this by initializing it to 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
static int udf_encode_fh(struct inode *inode, __u32 *fh, int *lenp,
struct inode *parent)
{
int len = *lenp;
struct kernel_lb_addr location = UDF_I(inode)->i_location;
struct fid *fid = (struct fid *)fh;
int type = FILEID_UDF_WITHOUT_PARENT;
if (parent && (len < 5)) {
*lenp = 5;
return 255;
} else if (len < 3) {
*lenp = 3;
return 255;
}
*lenp = 3;
fid->udf.block = location.logicalBlockNum;
fid->udf.partref = location.partitionReferenceNum;
fid->udf.parent_partref = 0;
fid->udf.generation = inode->i_generation;
if (parent) {
location = UDF_I(parent)->i_location;
fid->udf.parent_block = location.logicalBlockNum;
fid->udf.parent_partref = location.partitionReferenceNum;
fid->udf.parent_generation = inode->i_generation;
*lenp = 5;
type = FILEID_UDF_WITH_PARENT;
}
return type;
}
| 166,178
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Block::Block(long long start, long long size_, long long discard_padding) :
m_start(start),
m_size(size_),
m_track(0),
m_timecode(-1),
m_flags(0),
m_frames(NULL),
m_frame_count(-1),
m_discard_padding(discard_padding)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
Block::Block(long long start, long long size_, long long discard_padding) :
| 174,240
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int get_scl(void)
{
return qrio_get_gpio(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SCL1);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
int get_scl(void)
| 169,629
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ChromeOSChangeInputMethod(
InputMethodStatusConnection* connection, const char* name) {
DCHECK(name);
DLOG(INFO) << "ChangeInputMethod: " << name;
g_return_val_if_fail(connection, false);
return connection->ChangeInputMethod(name);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool ChromeOSChangeInputMethod(
| 170,521
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ContextualSearchDelegate::DecodeSearchTermFromJsonResponse(
const std::string& response,
std::string* search_term,
std::string* display_text,
std::string* alternate_term,
std::string* mid,
std::string* prevent_preload,
int* mention_start,
int* mention_end,
std::string* lang,
std::string* thumbnail_url,
std::string* caption) {
bool contains_xssi_escape =
base::StartsWith(response, kXssiEscape, base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE);
const std::string& proper_json =
contains_xssi_escape ? response.substr(sizeof(kXssiEscape) - 1)
: response;
JSONStringValueDeserializer deserializer(proper_json);
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> root =
deserializer.Deserialize(nullptr, nullptr);
const std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> dict =
base::DictionaryValue::From(std::move(root));
if (!dict)
return;
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchPreventPreload, prevent_preload);
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseSearchTermParam, search_term);
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseLanguageParam, lang);
if (!dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseDisplayTextParam,
display_text)) {
*display_text = *search_term;
}
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseMidParam, mid);
if (!field_trial_->IsDecodeMentionsDisabled()) {
base::ListValue* mentions_list = nullptr;
dict->GetList(kContextualSearchMentions, &mentions_list);
if (mentions_list && mentions_list->GetSize() >= 2)
ExtractMentionsStartEnd(*mentions_list, mention_start, mention_end);
}
std::string selected_text;
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseSelectedTextParam, &selected_text);
if (selected_text != *search_term) {
*alternate_term = selected_text;
} else {
std::string resolved_term;
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseResolvedTermParam, &resolved_term);
if (resolved_term != *search_term) {
*alternate_term = resolved_term;
}
}
if (field_trial_->IsNowOnTapBarIntegrationEnabled()) {
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchCaption, caption);
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchThumbnail, thumbnail_url);
}
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
|
void ContextualSearchDelegate::DecodeSearchTermFromJsonResponse(
const std::string& response,
std::string* search_term,
std::string* display_text,
std::string* alternate_term,
std::string* mid,
std::string* prevent_preload,
int* mention_start,
int* mention_end,
std::string* lang,
std::string* thumbnail_url,
std::string* caption) {
bool contains_xssi_escape =
base::StartsWith(response, kXssiEscape, base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE);
const std::string& proper_json =
contains_xssi_escape ? response.substr(sizeof(kXssiEscape) - 1)
: response;
JSONStringValueDeserializer deserializer(proper_json);
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> root =
deserializer.Deserialize(nullptr, nullptr);
const std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> dict =
base::DictionaryValue::From(std::move(root));
if (!dict)
return;
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchPreventPreload, prevent_preload);
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseSearchTermParam, search_term);
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseLanguageParam, lang);
if (!dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseDisplayTextParam,
display_text)) {
*display_text = *search_term;
}
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseMidParam, mid);
if (!field_trial_->IsDecodeMentionsDisabled()) {
base::ListValue* mentions_list = nullptr;
dict->GetList(kContextualSearchMentions, &mentions_list);
if (mentions_list && mentions_list->GetSize() >= 2)
ExtractMentionsStartEnd(*mentions_list, mention_start, mention_end);
}
std::string selected_text;
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseSelectedTextParam, &selected_text);
if (selected_text != *search_term) {
*alternate_term = selected_text;
} else {
std::string resolved_term;
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseResolvedTermParam, &resolved_term);
if (resolved_term != *search_term) {
*alternate_term = resolved_term;
}
}
if (field_trial_->IsContextualCardsBarIntegrationEnabled()) {
// Get the basic Bar data for Contextual Cards integration directly
// from the root.
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchCaption, caption);
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchThumbnail, thumbnail_url);
}
}
| 171,642
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void GraphicsContext::fillRoundedRect(const IntRect& rect, const IntSize& topLeft, const IntSize& topRight, const IntSize& bottomLeft, const IntSize& bottomRight, const Color& color, ColorSpace colorSpace)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
notImplemented();
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void GraphicsContext::fillRoundedRect(const IntRect& rect, const IntSize& topLeft, const IntSize& topRight, const IntSize& bottomLeft, const IntSize& bottomRight, const Color& color, ColorSpace colorSpace)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
#if USE(WXGC)
Path path;
path.addRoundedRect(rect, topLeft, topRight, bottomLeft, bottomRight);
m_data->context->SetBrush(wxBrush(color));
wxGraphicsContext* gc = m_data->context->GetGraphicsContext();
gc->FillPath(*path.platformPath());
#endif
}
| 170,426
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline void __file_sb_list_add(struct file *file, struct super_block *sb)
{
struct list_head *list;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
int cpu;
cpu = smp_processor_id();
file->f_sb_list_cpu = cpu;
list = per_cpu_ptr(sb->s_files, cpu);
#else
list = &sb->s_files;
#endif
list_add(&file->f_u.fu_list, list);
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
|
static inline void __file_sb_list_add(struct file *file, struct super_block *sb)
| 166,795
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static const char *parse_string( cJSON *item, const char *str )
{
const char *ptr = str + 1;
char *ptr2;
char *out;
int len = 0;
unsigned uc, uc2;
if ( *str != '\"' ) {
/* Not a string! */
ep = str;
return 0;
}
/* Skip escaped quotes. */
while ( *ptr != '\"' && *ptr && ++len )
if ( *ptr++ == '\\' )
ptr++;
if ( ! ( out = (char*) cJSON_malloc( len + 1 ) ) )
return 0;
ptr = str + 1;
ptr2 = out;
while ( *ptr != '\"' && *ptr ) {
if ( *ptr != '\\' )
*ptr2++ = *ptr++;
else {
ptr++;
switch ( *ptr ) {
case 'b': *ptr2++ ='\b'; break;
case 'f': *ptr2++ ='\f'; break;
case 'n': *ptr2++ ='\n'; break;
case 'r': *ptr2++ ='\r'; break;
case 't': *ptr2++ ='\t'; break;
case 'u':
/* Transcode utf16 to utf8. */
/* Get the unicode char. */
sscanf( ptr + 1,"%4x", &uc );
ptr += 4;
/* Check for invalid. */
if ( ( uc >= 0xDC00 && uc <= 0xDFFF ) || uc == 0 )
break;
/* UTF16 surrogate pairs. */
if ( uc >= 0xD800 && uc <= 0xDBFF ) {
if ( ptr[1] != '\\' || ptr[2] != 'u' )
/* Missing second-half of surrogate. */
break;
sscanf( ptr + 3, "%4x", &uc2 );
ptr += 6;
if ( uc2 < 0xDC00 || uc2 > 0xDFFF )
/* Invalid second-half of surrogate. */
break;
uc = 0x10000 | ( ( uc & 0x3FF ) << 10 ) | ( uc2 & 0x3FF );
}
len = 4;
if ( uc < 0x80 )
len = 1;
else if ( uc < 0x800 )
len = 2;
else if ( uc < 0x10000 )
len = 3;
ptr2 += len;
switch ( len ) {
case 4: *--ptr2 = ( ( uc | 0x80) & 0xBF ); uc >>= 6;
case 3: *--ptr2 = ( ( uc | 0x80) & 0xBF ); uc >>= 6;
case 2: *--ptr2 = ( ( uc | 0x80) & 0xBF ); uc >>= 6;
case 1: *--ptr2 = ( uc | firstByteMark[len] );
}
ptr2 += len;
break;
default: *ptr2++ = *ptr; break;
}
++ptr;
}
}
*ptr2 = 0;
if ( *ptr == '\"' )
++ptr;
item->valuestring = out;
item->type = cJSON_String;
return ptr;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static const char *parse_string( cJSON *item, const char *str )
static const char *parse_string(cJSON *item,const char *str,const char **ep)
{
const char *ptr=str+1,*end_ptr=str+1;char *ptr2;char *out;int len=0;unsigned uc,uc2;
if (*str!='\"') {*ep=str;return 0;} /* not a string! */
while (*end_ptr!='\"' && *end_ptr && ++len) if (*end_ptr++ == '\\') end_ptr++; /* Skip escaped quotes. */
out=(char*)cJSON_malloc(len+1); /* This is how long we need for the string, roughly. */
if (!out) return 0;
item->valuestring=out; /* assign here so out will be deleted during cJSON_Delete() later */
item->type=cJSON_String;
ptr=str+1;ptr2=out;
while (ptr < end_ptr)
{
if (*ptr!='\\') *ptr2++=*ptr++;
else
{
ptr++;
switch (*ptr)
{
case 'b': *ptr2++='\b'; break;
case 'f': *ptr2++='\f'; break;
case 'n': *ptr2++='\n'; break;
case 'r': *ptr2++='\r'; break;
case 't': *ptr2++='\t'; break;
case 'u': /* transcode utf16 to utf8. */
uc=parse_hex4(ptr+1);ptr+=4; /* get the unicode char. */
if (ptr >= end_ptr) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid */
if ((uc>=0xDC00 && uc<=0xDFFF) || uc==0) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* check for invalid. */
if (uc>=0xD800 && uc<=0xDBFF) /* UTF16 surrogate pairs. */
{
if (ptr+6 > end_ptr) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid */
if (ptr[1]!='\\' || ptr[2]!='u') {*ep=str;return 0;} /* missing second-half of surrogate. */
uc2=parse_hex4(ptr+3);ptr+=6;
if (uc2<0xDC00 || uc2>0xDFFF) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid second-half of surrogate. */
uc=0x10000 + (((uc&0x3FF)<<10) | (uc2&0x3FF));
}
len=4;if (uc<0x80) len=1;else if (uc<0x800) len=2;else if (uc<0x10000) len=3; ptr2+=len;
switch (len) {
case 4: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 3: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 2: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 1: *--ptr2 =(uc | firstByteMark[len]);
}
ptr2+=len;
break;
default: *ptr2++=*ptr; break;
}
ptr++;
}
}
*ptr2=0;
if (*ptr=='\"') ptr++;
return ptr;
}
| 167,304
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ChromeNetworkDelegate::AccumulateContentLength(
int64 received_content_length, int64 original_content_length,
bool via_data_reduction_proxy) {
DCHECK_GE(received_content_length, 0);
DCHECK_GE(original_content_length, 0);
StoreAccumulatedContentLength(received_content_length,
original_content_length,
via_data_reduction_proxy);
received_content_length_ += received_content_length;
original_content_length_ += original_content_length;
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void ChromeNetworkDelegate::AccumulateContentLength(
int64 received_content_length, int64 original_content_length,
chrome_browser_net::DataReductionRequestType data_reduction_type) {
DCHECK_GE(received_content_length, 0);
DCHECK_GE(original_content_length, 0);
StoreAccumulatedContentLength(received_content_length,
original_content_length,
data_reduction_type);
received_content_length_ += received_content_length;
original_content_length_ += original_content_length;
}
| 171,331
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
{
/* Allow mapping to your own filesystem ids */
if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1)) {
u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
if (uid_eq(uid, current_fsuid()))
return true;
}
else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
if (gid_eq(gid, current_fsgid()))
return true;
}
}
/* Allow anyone to set a mapping that doesn't require privilege */
if (!cap_valid(cap_setid))
return true;
/* Allow the specified ids if we have the appropriate capability
* (CAP_SETUID or CAP_SETGID) over the parent user namespace.
* And the opener of the id file also had the approprpiate capability.
*/
if (ns_capable(ns->parent, cap_setid) &&
file_ns_capable(file, ns->parent, cap_setid))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: userns: Check uid_map's opener's fsuid, not the current fsuid
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
{
/* Allow mapping to your own filesystem ids */
if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1)) {
u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid))
return true;
}
else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
if (gid_eq(gid, file->f_cred->fsgid))
return true;
}
}
/* Allow anyone to set a mapping that doesn't require privilege */
if (!cap_valid(cap_setid))
return true;
/* Allow the specified ids if we have the appropriate capability
* (CAP_SETUID or CAP_SETGID) over the parent user namespace.
* And the opener of the id file also had the approprpiate capability.
*/
if (ns_capable(ns->parent, cap_setid) &&
file_ns_capable(file, ns->parent, cap_setid))
return true;
return false;
}
| 169,895
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: fpDiff(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32 bps = tif->tif_dir.td_bitspersample / 8;
tmsize_t wc = cc / bps;
tmsize_t count;
uint8 *cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
uint8 *tmp = (uint8 *)_TIFFmalloc(cc);
if((cc%(bps*stride))!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "fpDiff",
"%s", "(cc%(bps*stride))!=0");
return 0;
}
if (!tmp)
return 0;
_TIFFmemcpy(tmp, cp0, cc);
for (count = 0; count < wc; count++) {
uint32 byte;
for (byte = 0; byte < bps; byte++) {
#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
cp[byte * wc + count] = tmp[bps * count + byte];
#else
cp[(bps - byte - 1) * wc + count] =
tmp[bps * count + byte];
#endif
}
}
_TIFFfree(tmp);
cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
cp += cc - stride - 1;
for (count = cc; count > stride; count -= stride)
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] = (unsigned char)((cp[stride] - cp[0])&0xff); cp--)
return 1;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predic.c: fix memory leaks in error code paths added in
previous commit (fix for MSVR 35105)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
fpDiff(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32 bps = tif->tif_dir.td_bitspersample / 8;
tmsize_t wc = cc / bps;
tmsize_t count;
uint8 *cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
uint8 *tmp;
if((cc%(bps*stride))!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "fpDiff",
"%s", "(cc%(bps*stride))!=0");
return 0;
}
tmp = (uint8 *)_TIFFmalloc(cc);
if (!tmp)
return 0;
_TIFFmemcpy(tmp, cp0, cc);
for (count = 0; count < wc; count++) {
uint32 byte;
for (byte = 0; byte < bps; byte++) {
#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
cp[byte * wc + count] = tmp[bps * count + byte];
#else
cp[(bps - byte - 1) * wc + count] =
tmp[bps * count + byte];
#endif
}
}
_TIFFfree(tmp);
cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
cp += cc - stride - 1;
for (count = cc; count > stride; count -= stride)
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] = (unsigned char)((cp[stride] - cp[0])&0xff); cp--)
return 1;
}
| 169,939
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void coroutine_fn v9fs_wstat(void *opaque)
{
int32_t fid;
int err = 0;
int16_t unused;
V9fsStat v9stat;
size_t offset = 7;
struct stat stbuf;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
v9fs_stat_init(&v9stat);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dwS", &fid, &unused, &v9stat);
goto out_nofid;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
static void coroutine_fn v9fs_wstat(void *opaque)
{
int32_t fid;
int err = 0;
int16_t unused;
V9fsStat v9stat;
size_t offset = 7;
struct stat stbuf;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
v9fs_stat_init(&v9stat);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dwS", &fid, &unused, &v9stat);
goto out_nofid;
}
| 164,633
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, key)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_FILENAME)) {
RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);
} else {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, key)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_FILENAME)) {
RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);
} else {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
}
}
| 167,035
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: unix_client_connect(hsm_com_client_hdl_t *hdl)
{
int fd, len;
struct sockaddr_un unix_addr;
if ((fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
{
return HSM_COM_ERROR;
}
memset(&unix_addr,0,sizeof(unix_addr));
unix_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if(strlen(hdl->c_path) >= sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path))
{
close(fd);
return HSM_COM_PATH_ERR;
}
snprintf(unix_addr.sun_path, sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path), "%s", hdl->c_path);
len = SUN_LEN(&unix_addr);
unlink(unix_addr.sun_path);
if(bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&unix_addr, len) < 0)
{
unlink(hdl->c_path);
close(fd);
return HSM_COM_BIND_ERR;
}
if(chmod(unix_addr.sun_path, S_IRWXU) < 0)
{
unlink(hdl->c_path);
close(fd);
return HSM_COM_CHMOD_ERR;
}
memset(&unix_addr,0,sizeof(unix_addr));
unix_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strncpy(unix_addr.sun_path, hdl->s_path, sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path));
unix_addr.sun_path[sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path)-1] = 0;
len = SUN_LEN(&unix_addr);
if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &unix_addr, len) < 0)
{
unlink(hdl->c_path);
close(fd);
return HSM_COM_CONX_ERR;
}
hdl->client_fd = fd;
hdl->client_state = HSM_COM_C_STATE_CT;
if(unix_sck_send_conn(hdl, 2) != HSM_COM_OK)
{
hdl->client_state = HSM_COM_C_STATE_IN;
return HSM_COM_SEND_ERR;
}
return HSM_COM_OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
unix_client_connect(hsm_com_client_hdl_t *hdl)
{
int fd, len;
struct sockaddr_un unix_addr;
hsm_com_errno_t res = HSM_COM_OK;
if ((fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
{
return HSM_COM_ERROR;
}
memset(&unix_addr,0,sizeof(unix_addr));
unix_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if(strlen(hdl->c_path) >= sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path))
{
res = HSM_COM_PATH_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
snprintf(unix_addr.sun_path, sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path), "%s", hdl->c_path);
len = SUN_LEN(&unix_addr);
unlink(unix_addr.sun_path);
if(bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&unix_addr, len) < 0)
{
res = HSM_COM_BIND_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if(chmod(unix_addr.sun_path, S_IRWXU) < 0)
{
res = HSM_COM_CHMOD_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
memset(&unix_addr,0,sizeof(unix_addr));
unix_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strncpy(unix_addr.sun_path, hdl->s_path, sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path));
unix_addr.sun_path[sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path)-1] = 0;
len = SUN_LEN(&unix_addr);
if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &unix_addr, len) < 0)
{
res = HSM_COM_CONX_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
hdl->client_fd = fd;
hdl->client_state = HSM_COM_C_STATE_CT;
if(unix_sck_send_conn(hdl, 2) != HSM_COM_OK)
{
hdl->client_state = HSM_COM_C_STATE_IN;
res = HSM_COM_SEND_ERR;
}
return res;
cleanup:
close(fd);
return res;
}
| 170,128
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ChromeContentUtilityClient::OnMessageReceived(
const IPC::Message& message) {
if (filter_messages_ && !ContainsKey(message_id_whitelist_, message.type()))
return false;
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(ChromeContentUtilityClient, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_DecodeImage, OnDecodeImage)
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_RobustJPEGDecodeImage,
OnRobustJPEGDecodeImage)
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_PatchFileBsdiff,
OnPatchFileBsdiff)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_PatchFileCourgette,
OnPatchFileCourgette)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_StartupPing, OnStartupPing)
#if defined(FULL_SAFE_BROWSING)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_AnalyzeZipFileForDownloadProtection,
OnAnalyzeZipFileForDownloadProtection)
#endif
#if defined(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_ParseMediaMetadata,
OnParseMediaMetadata)
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_CreateZipFile, OnCreateZipFile)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
for (Handlers::iterator it = handlers_.begin();
!handled && it != handlers_.end(); ++it) {
handled = (*it)->OnMessageReceived(message);
}
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID:
|
bool ChromeContentUtilityClient::OnMessageReceived(
const IPC::Message& message) {
if (filter_messages_ && !ContainsKey(message_id_whitelist_, message.type()))
return false;
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(ChromeContentUtilityClient, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_DecodeImage, OnDecodeImage)
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_RobustJPEGDecodeImage,
OnRobustJPEGDecodeImage)
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_PatchFileBsdiff,
OnPatchFileBsdiff)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_PatchFileCourgette,
OnPatchFileCourgette)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_StartupPing, OnStartupPing)
#if defined(FULL_SAFE_BROWSING)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_AnalyzeZipFileForDownloadProtection,
OnAnalyzeZipFileForDownloadProtection)
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_AnalyzeDmgFileForDownloadProtection,
OnAnalyzeDmgFileForDownloadProtection)
#endif
#endif
#if defined(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_ParseMediaMetadata,
OnParseMediaMetadata)
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeUtilityMsg_CreateZipFile, OnCreateZipFile)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
for (Handlers::iterator it = handlers_.begin();
!handled && it != handlers_.end(); ++it) {
handled = (*it)->OnMessageReceived(message);
}
return handled;
}
| 171,716
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void fpm_child_init(struct fpm_worker_pool_s *wp) /* {{{ */
{
fpm_globals.max_requests = wp->config->pm_max_requests;
if (0 > fpm_stdio_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_log_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_status_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_unix_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_signals_init_child() ||
0 > fpm_env_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_php_init_child(wp)) {
zlog(ZLOG_ERROR, "[pool %s] child failed to initialize", wp->config->name);
exit(FPM_EXIT_SOFTWARE);
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fixed bug #73342
Directly listen on socket, instead of duping it to STDIN and
listening on that.
CWE ID: CWE-400
|
static void fpm_child_init(struct fpm_worker_pool_s *wp) /* {{{ */
{
fpm_globals.max_requests = wp->config->pm_max_requests;
fpm_globals.listening_socket = dup(wp->listening_socket);
if (0 > fpm_stdio_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_log_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_status_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_unix_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_signals_init_child() ||
0 > fpm_env_init_child(wp) ||
0 > fpm_php_init_child(wp)) {
zlog(ZLOG_ERROR, "[pool %s] child failed to initialize", wp->config->name);
exit(FPM_EXIT_SOFTWARE);
}
}
/* }}} */
| 169,451
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void color_sycc_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
if(img->numcomps < 3)
{
img->color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_GRAY;
return;
}
if((img->comps[0].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[2].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[0].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dy == 2)
&& (img->comps[2].dy == 2))/* horizontal and vertical sub-sample */
{
sycc420_to_rgb(img);
}
else
if((img->comps[0].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[2].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[0].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[2].dy == 1))/* horizontal sub-sample only */
{
sycc422_to_rgb(img);
}
else
if((img->comps[0].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[2].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[0].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[2].dy == 1))/* no sub-sample */
{
sycc444_to_rgb(img);
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr,"%s:%d:color_sycc_to_rgb\n\tCAN NOT CONVERT\n", __FILE__,__LINE__);
return;
}
img->color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
}/* color_sycc_to_rgb() */
Commit Message: Fix Out-Of-Bounds Read in sycc42x_to_rgb function (#745)
42x Images with an odd x0/y0 lead to subsampled component starting at the
2nd column/line.
That is offset = comp->dx * comp->x0 - image->x0 = 1
Fix #726
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
void color_sycc_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
if(img->numcomps < 3)
{
img->color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_GRAY;
return;
}
if((img->comps[0].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[2].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[0].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dy == 2)
&& (img->comps[2].dy == 2))/* horizontal and vertical sub-sample */
{
sycc420_to_rgb(img);
}
else
if((img->comps[0].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[2].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[0].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[2].dy == 1))/* horizontal sub-sample only */
{
sycc422_to_rgb(img);
}
else
if((img->comps[0].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[2].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[0].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[2].dy == 1))/* no sub-sample */
{
sycc444_to_rgb(img);
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr,"%s:%d:color_sycc_to_rgb\n\tCAN NOT CONVERT\n", __FILE__,__LINE__);
return;
}
}/* color_sycc_to_rgb() */
| 168,838
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool_t auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(
OM_uint32 *major,
OM_uint32 *minor,
gss_ctx_id_t context,
uint32_t seq_num,
XDR *in_xdrs,
bool_t (*xdr_func)(),
caddr_t xdr_ptr)
{
gss_buffer_desc in_buf, out_buf;
XDR temp_xdrs;
uint32_t verf_seq_num;
int conf, qop;
unsigned int length;
PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: starting\n"));
*major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
*minor = 0; /* assumption */
in_buf.value = NULL;
out_buf.value = NULL;
if (! xdr_bytes(in_xdrs, (char **) &in_buf.value,
&length, (unsigned int) -1)) {
PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: deserializing encrypted data failed\n"));
temp_xdrs.x_op = XDR_FREE;
(void)xdr_bytes(&temp_xdrs, (char **) &in_buf.value, &length,
(unsigned int) -1);
return FALSE;
}
in_buf.length = length;
*major = gss_unseal(minor, context, &in_buf, &out_buf, &conf,
&qop);
free(in_buf.value);
if (*major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return FALSE;
PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: %llu bytes data, %llu bytes sealed\n",
(unsigned long long)out_buf.length,
(unsigned long long)in_buf.length));
xdrmem_create(&temp_xdrs, out_buf.value, out_buf.length, XDR_DECODE);
/* deserialize the sequence number */
if (! xdr_u_int32(&temp_xdrs, &verf_seq_num)) {
PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: deserializing verf_seq_num failed\n"));
gss_release_buffer(minor, &out_buf);
XDR_DESTROY(&temp_xdrs);
return FALSE;
}
if (verf_seq_num != seq_num) {
PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: seq %d specified, read %d\n",
seq_num, verf_seq_num));
gss_release_buffer(minor, &out_buf);
XDR_DESTROY(&temp_xdrs);
return FALSE;
}
PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: unwrap seq_num %d okay\n", verf_seq_num));
/* deserialize the arguments into xdr_ptr */
if (! (*xdr_func)(&temp_xdrs, xdr_ptr)) {
PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: deserializing arguments failed\n"));
gss_release_buffer(minor, &out_buf);
xdr_free(xdr_func, xdr_ptr);
XDR_DESTROY(&temp_xdrs);
return FALSE;
}
PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: succeeding\n\n"));
gss_release_buffer(minor, &out_buf);
XDR_DESTROY(&temp_xdrs);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
|
bool_t auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(
OM_uint32 *major,
OM_uint32 *minor,
gss_ctx_id_t context,
uint32_t seq_num,
XDR *in_xdrs,
bool_t (*xdr_func)(),
caddr_t xdr_ptr)
{
gss_buffer_desc in_buf, out_buf;
XDR temp_xdrs;
uint32_t verf_seq_num;
int conf, qop;
unsigned int length;
PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: starting\n"));
*major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
*minor = 0; /* assumption */
in_buf.value = NULL;
out_buf.value = NULL;
if (! xdr_bytes(in_xdrs, (char **) &in_buf.value,
&length, (unsigned int) -1)) {
PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: deserializing encrypted data failed\n"));
temp_xdrs.x_op = XDR_FREE;
(void)xdr_bytes(&temp_xdrs, (char **) &in_buf.value, &length,
(unsigned int) -1);
return FALSE;
}
in_buf.length = length;
*major = gss_unseal(minor, context, &in_buf, &out_buf, &conf,
&qop);
free(in_buf.value);
if (*major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return FALSE;
PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: %llu bytes data, %llu bytes sealed\n",
(unsigned long long)out_buf.length,
(unsigned long long)in_buf.length));
xdrmem_create(&temp_xdrs, out_buf.value, out_buf.length, XDR_DECODE);
/* deserialize the sequence number */
if (! xdr_u_int32(&temp_xdrs, &verf_seq_num)) {
PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: deserializing verf_seq_num failed\n"));
gss_release_buffer(minor, &out_buf);
XDR_DESTROY(&temp_xdrs);
return FALSE;
}
if (verf_seq_num != seq_num) {
PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: seq %d specified, read %d\n",
seq_num, verf_seq_num));
gss_release_buffer(minor, &out_buf);
XDR_DESTROY(&temp_xdrs);
return FALSE;
}
PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: unwrap seq_num %d okay\n", verf_seq_num));
/* deserialize the arguments into xdr_ptr */
if (! (*xdr_func)(&temp_xdrs, xdr_ptr)) {
PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: deserializing arguments failed\n"));
gss_release_buffer(minor, &out_buf);
XDR_DESTROY(&temp_xdrs);
return FALSE;
}
PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: succeeding\n\n"));
gss_release_buffer(minor, &out_buf);
XDR_DESTROY(&temp_xdrs);
return TRUE;
}
| 166,792
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
{
BN_ULONG t1,t2;
BN_ULONG c1,c2,c3;
c1=0;
c2=0;
c3=0;
mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
r[0]=c1;
c1=0;
mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
r[1]=c2;
c2=0;
mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
r[2]=c3;
c3=0;
mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
r[3]=c1;
c1=0;
mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
r[4]=c2;
c2=0;
mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
r[5]=c3;
c3=0;
mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
r[6]=c1;
r[7]=c2;
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2014-3570 (with minor bn_asm.c revamp).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
|
void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
{
BN_ULONG c1,c2,c3;
c1=0;
c2=0;
c3=0;
mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
r[0]=c1;
c1=0;
mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
r[1]=c2;
c2=0;
mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
r[2]=c3;
c3=0;
mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
r[3]=c1;
c1=0;
mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
r[4]=c2;
c2=0;
mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
r[5]=c3;
c3=0;
mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
r[6]=c1;
r[7]=c2;
}
| 166,828
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void _xml_startElementHandler(void *userData, const XML_Char *name, const XML_Char **attributes)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)userData;
const char **attrs = (const char **) attributes;
char *tag_name;
char *att, *val;
int val_len;
zval *retval, *args[3];
if (parser) {
parser->level++;
tag_name = _xml_decode_tag(parser, name);
if (parser->startElementHandler) {
args[0] = _xml_resource_zval(parser->index);
args[1] = _xml_string_zval(((char *) tag_name) + parser->toffset);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(args[2]);
array_init(args[2]);
while (attributes && *attributes) {
att = _xml_decode_tag(parser, attributes[0]);
val = xml_utf8_decode(attributes[1], strlen(attributes[1]), &val_len, parser->target_encoding);
add_assoc_stringl(args[2], att, val, val_len, 0);
attributes += 2;
efree(att);
}
if ((retval = xml_call_handler(parser, parser->startElementHandler, parser->startElementPtr, 3, args))) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (parser->data) {
if (parser->level <= XML_MAXLEVEL) {
zval *tag, *atr;
int atcnt = 0;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tag);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(atr);
array_init(tag);
array_init(atr);
_xml_add_to_info(parser,((char *) tag_name) + parser->toffset);
add_assoc_string(tag,"tag",((char *) tag_name) + parser->toffset,1); /* cast to avoid gcc-warning */
add_assoc_string(tag,"type","open",1);
add_assoc_long(tag,"level",parser->level);
parser->ltags[parser->level-1] = estrdup(tag_name);
parser->lastwasopen = 1;
attributes = (const XML_Char **) attrs;
while (attributes && *attributes) {
att = _xml_decode_tag(parser, attributes[0]);
val = xml_utf8_decode(attributes[1], strlen(attributes[1]), &val_len, parser->target_encoding);
add_assoc_stringl(atr,att,val,val_len,0);
atcnt++;
attributes += 2;
efree(att);
}
if (atcnt) {
zend_hash_add(Z_ARRVAL_P(tag),"attributes",sizeof("attributes"),&atr,sizeof(zval*),NULL);
} else {
zval_ptr_dtor(&atr);
}
zend_hash_next_index_insert(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->data),&tag,sizeof(zval*),(void *) &parser->ctag);
} else if (parser->level == (XML_MAXLEVEL + 1)) {
TSRMLS_FETCH();
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Maximum depth exceeded - Results truncated");
}
}
efree(tag_name);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void _xml_startElementHandler(void *userData, const XML_Char *name, const XML_Char **attributes)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)userData;
const char **attrs = (const char **) attributes;
char *tag_name;
char *att, *val;
int val_len;
zval *retval, *args[3];
if (parser) {
parser->level++;
tag_name = _xml_decode_tag(parser, name);
if (parser->startElementHandler) {
args[0] = _xml_resource_zval(parser->index);
args[1] = _xml_string_zval(((char *) tag_name) + parser->toffset);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(args[2]);
array_init(args[2]);
while (attributes && *attributes) {
att = _xml_decode_tag(parser, attributes[0]);
val = xml_utf8_decode(attributes[1], strlen(attributes[1]), &val_len, parser->target_encoding);
add_assoc_stringl(args[2], att, val, val_len, 0);
attributes += 2;
efree(att);
}
if ((retval = xml_call_handler(parser, parser->startElementHandler, parser->startElementPtr, 3, args))) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (parser->data) {
if (parser->level <= XML_MAXLEVEL) {
zval *tag, *atr;
int atcnt = 0;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tag);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(atr);
array_init(tag);
array_init(atr);
_xml_add_to_info(parser,((char *) tag_name) + parser->toffset);
add_assoc_string(tag,"tag",((char *) tag_name) + parser->toffset,1); /* cast to avoid gcc-warning */
add_assoc_string(tag,"type","open",1);
add_assoc_long(tag,"level",parser->level);
parser->ltags[parser->level-1] = estrdup(tag_name);
parser->lastwasopen = 1;
attributes = (const XML_Char **) attrs;
while (attributes && *attributes) {
att = _xml_decode_tag(parser, attributes[0]);
val = xml_utf8_decode(attributes[1], strlen(attributes[1]), &val_len, parser->target_encoding);
add_assoc_stringl(atr,att,val,val_len,0);
atcnt++;
attributes += 2;
efree(att);
}
if (atcnt) {
zend_hash_add(Z_ARRVAL_P(tag),"attributes",sizeof("attributes"),&atr,sizeof(zval*),NULL);
} else {
zval_ptr_dtor(&atr);
}
zend_hash_next_index_insert(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->data),&tag,sizeof(zval*),(void *) &parser->ctag);
} else if (parser->level == (XML_MAXLEVEL + 1)) {
TSRMLS_FETCH();
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Maximum depth exceeded - Results truncated");
}
}
efree(tag_name);
}
}
| 165,042
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void StorageHandler::GetUsageAndQuota(
const String& origin,
std::unique_ptr<GetUsageAndQuotaCallback> callback) {
if (!process_)
return callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
GURL origin_url(origin);
if (!origin_url.is_valid()) {
return callback->sendFailure(
Response::Error(origin + " is not a valid URL"));
}
storage::QuotaManager* manager =
process_->GetStoragePartition()->GetQuotaManager();
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&GetUsageAndQuotaOnIOThread, base::RetainedRef(manager),
origin_url, base::Passed(std::move(callback))));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void StorageHandler::GetUsageAndQuota(
const String& origin,
std::unique_ptr<GetUsageAndQuotaCallback> callback) {
if (!storage_partition_)
return callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
GURL origin_url(origin);
if (!origin_url.is_valid()) {
return callback->sendFailure(
Response::Error(origin + " is not a valid URL"));
}
storage::QuotaManager* manager = storage_partition_->GetQuotaManager();
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&GetUsageAndQuotaOnIOThread, base::RetainedRef(manager),
origin_url, base::Passed(std::move(callback))));
}
| 172,773
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int ping_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *isk = inet_sk(sk);
int family = sk->sk_family;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied, err;
pr_debug("ping_recvmsg(sk=%p,sk->num=%u)\n", isk, isk->inet_num);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE) {
if (family == AF_INET) {
return ip_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
return pingv6_ops.ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
#endif
}
}
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
/* Don't bother checking the checksum */
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto done;
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address and add cmsg data. */
if (family == AF_INET) {
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_port = 0 /* skb->h.uh->source */;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin);
if (isk->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6hdr *ip6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 =
(struct sockaddr_in6 *)msg->msg_name;
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6->sin6_port = 0;
sin6->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
if (np->sndflow)
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ip6);
sin6->sin6_scope_id = ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr,
IP6CB(skb)->iif);
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin6);
if (inet6_sk(sk)->rxopt.all)
pingv6_ops.ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
#endif
} else {
BUG();
}
err = copied;
done:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
pr_debug("ping_recvmsg -> %d\n", err);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ping: prevent NULL pointer dereference on write to msg_name
A plain read() on a socket does set msg->msg_name to NULL. So check for
NULL pointer first.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
|
int ping_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *isk = inet_sk(sk);
int family = sk->sk_family;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied, err;
pr_debug("ping_recvmsg(sk=%p,sk->num=%u)\n", isk, isk->inet_num);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE) {
if (family == AF_INET) {
return ip_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
return pingv6_ops.ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
#endif
}
}
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
/* Don't bother checking the checksum */
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto done;
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address and add cmsg data. */
if (family == AF_INET) {
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
if (sin) {
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_port = 0 /* skb->h.uh->source */;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin);
}
if (isk->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6hdr *ip6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 =
(struct sockaddr_in6 *)msg->msg_name;
if (sin6) {
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6->sin6_port = 0;
sin6->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
if (np->sndflow)
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ip6);
sin6->sin6_scope_id =
ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr,
IP6CB(skb)->iif);
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin6);
}
if (inet6_sk(sk)->rxopt.all)
pingv6_ops.ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
#endif
} else {
BUG();
}
err = copied;
done:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
pr_debug("ping_recvmsg -> %d\n", err);
return err;
}
| 165,937
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: normalize_color_encoding(color_encoding *encoding)
{
PNG_CONST double whiteY = encoding->red.Y + encoding->green.Y +
encoding->blue.Y;
if (whiteY != 1)
{
encoding->red.X /= whiteY;
encoding->red.Y /= whiteY;
encoding->red.Z /= whiteY;
encoding->green.X /= whiteY;
encoding->green.Y /= whiteY;
encoding->green.Z /= whiteY;
encoding->blue.X /= whiteY;
encoding->blue.Y /= whiteY;
encoding->blue.Z /= whiteY;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
normalize_color_encoding(color_encoding *encoding)
{
const double whiteY = encoding->red.Y + encoding->green.Y +
encoding->blue.Y;
if (whiteY != 1)
{
encoding->red.X /= whiteY;
encoding->red.Y /= whiteY;
encoding->red.Z /= whiteY;
encoding->green.X /= whiteY;
encoding->green.Y /= whiteY;
encoding->green.Z /= whiteY;
encoding->blue.X /= whiteY;
encoding->blue.Y /= whiteY;
encoding->blue.Z /= whiteY;
}
}
| 173,673
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ServiceWorkerContainer::registerServiceWorkerImpl(ExecutionContext* executionContext, const KURL& rawScriptURL, const KURL& scope, PassOwnPtr<RegistrationCallbacks> callbacks)
{
if (!m_provider) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeState, "Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The document is in an invalid state."));
return;
}
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> documentOrigin = executionContext->getSecurityOrigin();
String errorMessage;
if (!executionContext->isSecureContext(errorMessage)) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, errorMessage));
return;
}
KURL pageURL = KURL(KURL(), documentOrigin->toString());
if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsAllowingServiceWorkers(pageURL.protocol())) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The URL protocol of the current origin ('" + documentOrigin->toString() + "') is not supported.")));
return;
}
KURL scriptURL = rawScriptURL;
scriptURL.removeFragmentIdentifier();
if (!documentOrigin->canRequest(scriptURL)) {
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> scriptOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(scriptURL);
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The origin of the provided scriptURL ('" + scriptOrigin->toString() + "') does not match the current origin ('" + documentOrigin->toString() + "').")));
return;
}
if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsAllowingServiceWorkers(scriptURL.protocol())) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The URL protocol of the script ('" + scriptURL.getString() + "') is not supported.")));
return;
}
KURL patternURL = scope;
patternURL.removeFragmentIdentifier();
if (!documentOrigin->canRequest(patternURL)) {
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> patternOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(patternURL);
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The origin of the provided scope ('" + patternOrigin->toString() + "') does not match the current origin ('" + documentOrigin->toString() + "').")));
return;
}
if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsAllowingServiceWorkers(patternURL.protocol())) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The URL protocol of the scope ('" + patternURL.getString() + "') is not supported.")));
return;
}
WebString webErrorMessage;
if (!m_provider->validateScopeAndScriptURL(patternURL, scriptURL, &webErrorMessage)) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeType, WebString::fromUTF8("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: " + webErrorMessage.utf8())));
return;
}
m_provider->registerServiceWorker(patternURL, scriptURL, callbacks.leakPtr());
}
Commit Message: Check CSP before registering ServiceWorkers
Service Worker registrations should be subject to the same CSP checks as
other workers. The spec doesn't say this explicitly
(https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#directive-child-src-workers says "Worker or
SharedWorker constructors"), but it seems to be in the spirit of things,
and it matches Firefox's behavior.
BUG=579801
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1861253004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385775}
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
void ServiceWorkerContainer::registerServiceWorkerImpl(ExecutionContext* executionContext, const KURL& rawScriptURL, const KURL& scope, PassOwnPtr<RegistrationCallbacks> callbacks)
{
if (!m_provider) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeState, "Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The document is in an invalid state."));
return;
}
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> documentOrigin = executionContext->getSecurityOrigin();
String errorMessage;
if (!executionContext->isSecureContext(errorMessage)) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, errorMessage));
return;
}
KURL pageURL = KURL(KURL(), documentOrigin->toString());
if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsAllowingServiceWorkers(pageURL.protocol())) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The URL protocol of the current origin ('" + documentOrigin->toString() + "') is not supported.")));
return;
}
KURL scriptURL = rawScriptURL;
scriptURL.removeFragmentIdentifier();
if (!documentOrigin->canRequest(scriptURL)) {
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> scriptOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(scriptURL);
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The origin of the provided scriptURL ('" + scriptOrigin->toString() + "') does not match the current origin ('" + documentOrigin->toString() + "').")));
return;
}
if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsAllowingServiceWorkers(scriptURL.protocol())) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The URL protocol of the script ('" + scriptURL.getString() + "') is not supported.")));
return;
}
KURL patternURL = scope;
patternURL.removeFragmentIdentifier();
if (!documentOrigin->canRequest(patternURL)) {
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> patternOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(patternURL);
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The origin of the provided scope ('" + patternOrigin->toString() + "') does not match the current origin ('" + documentOrigin->toString() + "').")));
return;
}
if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsAllowingServiceWorkers(patternURL.protocol())) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The URL protocol of the scope ('" + patternURL.getString() + "') is not supported.")));
return;
}
WebString webErrorMessage;
if (!m_provider->validateScopeAndScriptURL(patternURL, scriptURL, &webErrorMessage)) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeType, WebString::fromUTF8("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: " + webErrorMessage.utf8())));
return;
}
ContentSecurityPolicy* csp = executionContext->contentSecurityPolicy();
if (csp) {
if (!csp->allowWorkerContextFromSource(scriptURL, ContentSecurityPolicy::DidNotRedirect, ContentSecurityPolicy::SendReport)) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The provided scriptURL ('" + scriptURL.getString() + "') violates the Content Security Policy.")));
return;
}
}
m_provider->registerServiceWorker(patternURL, scriptURL, callbacks.leakPtr());
}
| 173,285
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: print_trans(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *words, const u_char *data1, const u_char *buf, const u_char *maxbuf)
{
u_int bcc;
const char *f1, *f2, *f3, *f4;
const u_char *data, *param;
const u_char *w = words + 1;
int datalen, paramlen;
if (request) {
ND_TCHECK2(w[12 * 2], 2);
paramlen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 9 * 2);
param = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 10 * 2);
datalen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 11 * 2);
data = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 12 * 2);
f1 = "TotParamCnt=[d] \nTotDataCnt=[d] \nMaxParmCnt=[d] \nMaxDataCnt=[d]\nMaxSCnt=[d] \nTransFlags=[w] \nRes1=[w] \nRes2=[w] \nRes3=[w]\nParamCnt=[d] \nParamOff=[d] \nDataCnt=[d] \nDataOff=[d] \nSUCnt=[d]\n";
f2 = "|Name=[S]\n";
f3 = "|Param ";
f4 = "|Data ";
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(w[7 * 2], 2);
paramlen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 3 * 2);
param = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 4 * 2);
datalen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 6 * 2);
data = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 7 * 2);
f1 = "TotParamCnt=[d] \nTotDataCnt=[d] \nRes1=[d]\nParamCnt=[d] \nParamOff=[d] \nRes2=[d] \nDataCnt=[d] \nDataOff=[d] \nRes3=[d]\nLsetup=[d]\n";
f2 = "|Unknown ";
f3 = "|Param ";
f4 = "|Data ";
}
smb_fdata(ndo, words + 1, f1, min(words + 1 + 2 * words[0], maxbuf),
unicodestr);
ND_TCHECK2(*data1, 2);
bcc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(data1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "smb_bcc=%u\n", bcc));
if (bcc > 0) {
smb_fdata(ndo, data1 + 2, f2, maxbuf - (paramlen + datalen), unicodestr);
if (strcmp((const char *)(data1 + 2), "\\MAILSLOT\\BROWSE") == 0) {
print_browse(ndo, param, paramlen, data, datalen);
return;
}
if (strcmp((const char *)(data1 + 2), "\\PIPE\\LANMAN") == 0) {
print_ipc(ndo, param, paramlen, data, datalen);
return;
}
if (paramlen)
smb_fdata(ndo, param, f3, min(param + paramlen, maxbuf), unicodestr);
if (datalen)
smb_fdata(ndo, data, f4, min(data + datalen, maxbuf), unicodestr);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) SMB: Add two missing bounds checks
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
print_trans(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *words, const u_char *data1, const u_char *buf, const u_char *maxbuf)
{
u_int bcc;
const char *f1, *f2, *f3, *f4;
const u_char *data, *param;
const u_char *w = words + 1;
int datalen, paramlen;
if (request) {
ND_TCHECK2(w[12 * 2], 2);
paramlen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 9 * 2);
param = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 10 * 2);
datalen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 11 * 2);
data = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 12 * 2);
f1 = "TotParamCnt=[d] \nTotDataCnt=[d] \nMaxParmCnt=[d] \nMaxDataCnt=[d]\nMaxSCnt=[d] \nTransFlags=[w] \nRes1=[w] \nRes2=[w] \nRes3=[w]\nParamCnt=[d] \nParamOff=[d] \nDataCnt=[d] \nDataOff=[d] \nSUCnt=[d]\n";
f2 = "|Name=[S]\n";
f3 = "|Param ";
f4 = "|Data ";
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(w[7 * 2], 2);
paramlen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 3 * 2);
param = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 4 * 2);
datalen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 6 * 2);
data = buf + EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(w + 7 * 2);
f1 = "TotParamCnt=[d] \nTotDataCnt=[d] \nRes1=[d]\nParamCnt=[d] \nParamOff=[d] \nRes2=[d] \nDataCnt=[d] \nDataOff=[d] \nRes3=[d]\nLsetup=[d]\n";
f2 = "|Unknown ";
f3 = "|Param ";
f4 = "|Data ";
}
smb_fdata(ndo, words + 1, f1, min(words + 1 + 2 * words[0], maxbuf),
unicodestr);
ND_TCHECK2(*data1, 2);
bcc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(data1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "smb_bcc=%u\n", bcc));
if (bcc > 0) {
smb_fdata(ndo, data1 + 2, f2, maxbuf - (paramlen + datalen), unicodestr);
#define MAILSLOT_BROWSE_STR "\\MAILSLOT\\BROWSE"
ND_TCHECK2(*(data1 + 2), strlen(MAILSLOT_BROWSE_STR) + 1);
if (strcmp((const char *)(data1 + 2), MAILSLOT_BROWSE_STR) == 0) {
print_browse(ndo, param, paramlen, data, datalen);
return;
}
#undef MAILSLOT_BROWSE_STR
#define PIPE_LANMAN_STR "\\PIPE\\LANMAN"
ND_TCHECK2(*(data1 + 2), strlen(PIPE_LANMAN_STR) + 1);
if (strcmp((const char *)(data1 + 2), PIPE_LANMAN_STR) == 0) {
print_ipc(ndo, param, paramlen, data, datalen);
return;
}
#undef PIPE_LANMAN_STR
if (paramlen)
smb_fdata(ndo, param, f3, min(param + paramlen, maxbuf), unicodestr);
if (datalen)
smb_fdata(ndo, data, f4, min(data + datalen, maxbuf), unicodestr);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
| 169,815
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_open)
{
char *cipher, *cipher_dir;
char *mode, *mode_dir;
int cipher_len, cipher_dir_len;
int mode_len, mode_dir_len;
MCRYPT td;
php_mcrypt *pm;
if (zend_parse_parameters (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ssss",
&cipher, &cipher_len, &cipher_dir, &cipher_dir_len,
&mode, &mode_len, &mode_dir, &mode_dir_len)) {
return;
}
td = mcrypt_module_open (
cipher,
cipher_dir_len > 0 ? cipher_dir : MCG(algorithms_dir),
mode,
mode_dir_len > 0 ? mode_dir : MCG(modes_dir)
);
if (td == MCRYPT_FAILED) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not open encryption module");
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
pm = emalloc(sizeof(php_mcrypt));
pm->td = td;
pm->init = 0;
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, pm, le_mcrypt);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_open)
{
char *cipher, *cipher_dir;
char *mode, *mode_dir;
int cipher_len, cipher_dir_len;
int mode_len, mode_dir_len;
MCRYPT td;
php_mcrypt *pm;
if (zend_parse_parameters (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ssss",
&cipher, &cipher_len, &cipher_dir, &cipher_dir_len,
&mode, &mode_len, &mode_dir, &mode_dir_len)) {
return;
}
td = mcrypt_module_open (
cipher,
cipher_dir_len > 0 ? cipher_dir : MCG(algorithms_dir),
mode,
mode_dir_len > 0 ? mode_dir : MCG(modes_dir)
);
if (td == MCRYPT_FAILED) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not open encryption module");
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
pm = emalloc(sizeof(php_mcrypt));
pm->td = td;
pm->init = 0;
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, pm, le_mcrypt);
}
}
| 167,089
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: linkaddr_string(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *ep,
const unsigned int type, const unsigned int len)
{
register u_int i;
register char *cp;
register struct enamemem *tp;
if (len == 0)
return ("<empty>");
if (type == LINKADDR_ETHER && len == ETHER_ADDR_LEN)
return (etheraddr_string(ndo, ep));
if (type == LINKADDR_FRELAY)
return (q922_string(ndo, ep, len));
tp = lookup_bytestring(ndo, ep, len);
if (tp->e_name)
return (tp->e_name);
tp->e_name = cp = (char *)malloc(len*3);
if (tp->e_name == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "linkaddr_string: malloc");
*cp++ = hex[*ep >> 4];
*cp++ = hex[*ep++ & 0xf];
for (i = len-1; i > 0 ; --i) {
*cp++ = ':';
*cp++ = hex[*ep >> 4];
*cp++ = hex[*ep++ & 0xf];
}
*cp = '\0';
return (tp->e_name);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12894/In lookup_bytestring(), take the length of the byte string into account.
Otherwise, if, in our search of the hash table, we come across a byte
string that's shorter than the string we're looking for, we'll search
past the end of the string in the hash table.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
linkaddr_string(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *ep,
const unsigned int type, const unsigned int len)
{
register u_int i;
register char *cp;
register struct bsnamemem *tp;
if (len == 0)
return ("<empty>");
if (type == LINKADDR_ETHER && len == ETHER_ADDR_LEN)
return (etheraddr_string(ndo, ep));
if (type == LINKADDR_FRELAY)
return (q922_string(ndo, ep, len));
tp = lookup_bytestring(ndo, ep, len);
if (tp->bs_name)
return (tp->bs_name);
tp->bs_name = cp = (char *)malloc(len*3);
if (tp->bs_name == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "linkaddr_string: malloc");
*cp++ = hex[*ep >> 4];
*cp++ = hex[*ep++ & 0xf];
for (i = len-1; i > 0 ; --i) {
*cp++ = ':';
*cp++ = hex[*ep >> 4];
*cp++ = hex[*ep++ & 0xf];
}
*cp = '\0';
return (tp->bs_name);
}
| 167,959
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int insn_get_code_seg_params(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct desc_struct *desc;
short sel;
if (v8086_mode(regs))
/* Address and operand size are both 16-bit. */
return INSN_CODE_SEG_PARAMS(2, 2);
sel = get_segment_selector(regs, INAT_SEG_REG_CS);
if (sel < 0)
return sel;
desc = get_desc(sel);
if (!desc)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* The most significant byte of the Type field of the segment descriptor
* determines whether a segment contains data or code. If this is a data
* segment, return error.
*/
if (!(desc->type & BIT(3)))
return -EINVAL;
switch ((desc->l << 1) | desc->d) {
case 0: /*
* Legacy mode. CS.L=0, CS.D=0. Address and operand size are
* both 16-bit.
*/
return INSN_CODE_SEG_PARAMS(2, 2);
case 1: /*
* Legacy mode. CS.L=0, CS.D=1. Address and operand size are
* both 32-bit.
*/
return INSN_CODE_SEG_PARAMS(4, 4);
case 2: /*
* IA-32e 64-bit mode. CS.L=1, CS.D=0. Address size is 64-bit;
* operand size is 32-bit.
*/
return INSN_CODE_SEG_PARAMS(4, 8);
case 3: /* Invalid setting. CS.L=1, CS.D=1 */
/* fall through */
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: x86/insn-eval: Fix use-after-free access to LDT entry
get_desc() computes a pointer into the LDT while holding a lock that
protects the LDT from being freed, but then drops the lock and returns the
(now potentially dangling) pointer to its caller.
Fix it by giving the caller a copy of the LDT entry instead.
Fixes: 670f928ba09b ("x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment descriptor")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
int insn_get_code_seg_params(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct desc_struct desc;
short sel;
if (v8086_mode(regs))
/* Address and operand size are both 16-bit. */
return INSN_CODE_SEG_PARAMS(2, 2);
sel = get_segment_selector(regs, INAT_SEG_REG_CS);
if (sel < 0)
return sel;
if (!get_desc(&desc, sel))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* The most significant byte of the Type field of the segment descriptor
* determines whether a segment contains data or code. If this is a data
* segment, return error.
*/
if (!(desc.type & BIT(3)))
return -EINVAL;
switch ((desc.l << 1) | desc.d) {
case 0: /*
* Legacy mode. CS.L=0, CS.D=0. Address and operand size are
* both 16-bit.
*/
return INSN_CODE_SEG_PARAMS(2, 2);
case 1: /*
* Legacy mode. CS.L=0, CS.D=1. Address and operand size are
* both 32-bit.
*/
return INSN_CODE_SEG_PARAMS(4, 4);
case 2: /*
* IA-32e 64-bit mode. CS.L=1, CS.D=0. Address size is 64-bit;
* operand size is 32-bit.
*/
return INSN_CODE_SEG_PARAMS(4, 8);
case 3: /* Invalid setting. CS.L=1, CS.D=1 */
/* fall through */
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
| 169,609
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: GURL DecorateFrontendURL(const GURL& base_url) {
std::string frontend_url = base_url.spec();
std::string url_string(
frontend_url +
((frontend_url.find("?") == std::string::npos) ? "?" : "&") +
"dockSide=undocked"); // TODO(dgozman): remove this support in M38.
base::CommandLine* command_line = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableDevToolsExperiments))
url_string += "&experiments=true";
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDevToolsFlags)) {
std::string flags = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kDevToolsFlags);
flags = net::EscapeQueryParamValue(flags, false);
url_string += "&flags=" + flags;
}
#if defined(DEBUG_DEVTOOLS)
url_string += "&debugFrontend=true";
#endif // defined(DEBUG_DEVTOOLS)
return GURL(url_string);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Move sanitize url to devtools_ui.cc.
Compatibility script is not reliable enough.
BUG=653134
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2403633002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#425814}
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
GURL DecorateFrontendURL(const GURL& base_url) {
std::string frontend_url = base_url.spec();
std::string url_string(
frontend_url +
((frontend_url.find("?") == std::string::npos) ? "?" : "&") +
"dockSide=undocked"); // TODO(dgozman): remove this support in M38.
base::CommandLine* command_line = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableDevToolsExperiments))
url_string += "&experiments=true";
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDevToolsFlags)) {
url_string += "&" + command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kDevToolsFlags);
}
#if defined(DEBUG_DEVTOOLS)
url_string += "&debugFrontend=true";
#endif // defined(DEBUG_DEVTOOLS)
return GURL(url_string);
}
| 172,508
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: chrand_principal_2_svc(chrand_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static chrand_ret ret;
krb5_keyblock *k;
int nkeys;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_chrand_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_randkey_principal";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ)) {
ret.code = randkey_principal_wrapper_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
FALSE, 0, NULL, &k, &nkeys);
} else if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_CHANGEPW, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_randkey_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
&k, &nkeys);
} else {
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW;
}
if(ret.code == KADM5_OK) {
ret.keys = k;
ret.n_keys = nkeys;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
chrand_principal_2_svc(chrand_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static chrand_ret ret;
krb5_keyblock *k;
int nkeys;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_chrand_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_randkey_principal";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ)) {
ret.code = randkey_principal_wrapper_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
FALSE, 0, NULL, &k, &nkeys);
} else if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_CHANGEPW, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_randkey_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
&k, &nkeys);
} else {
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW;
}
if(ret.code == KADM5_OK) {
ret.keys = k;
ret.n_keys = nkeys;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,507
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ExtensionTtsSpeakCompletedFunction::RunImpl() {
int request_id;
std::string error_message;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetInteger(0, &request_id));
if (args_->GetSize() >= 2)
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetString(1, &error_message));
ExtensionTtsController::GetInstance()->OnSpeechFinished(
request_id, error_message);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool ExtensionTtsSpeakCompletedFunction::RunImpl() {
bool ExtensionTtsGetVoicesFunction::RunImpl() {
result_.reset(ExtensionTtsController::GetInstance()->GetVoices(profile()));
return true;
}
| 170,385
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ProcessControlLaunched() {
base::ScopedAllowBlockingForTesting allow_blocking;
base::ProcessId service_pid;
EXPECT_TRUE(GetServiceProcessData(NULL, &service_pid));
EXPECT_NE(static_cast<base::ProcessId>(0), service_pid);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
service_process_ =
base::Process::OpenWithAccess(service_pid,
SYNCHRONIZE | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION);
#else
service_process_ = base::Process::Open(service_pid);
#endif
EXPECT_TRUE(service_process_.IsValid());
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::RunLoop::QuitCurrentWhenIdleClosureDeprecated());
}
Commit Message: Migrate ServiceProcessControl tests off of QuitCurrent*Deprecated().
Bug: 844016
Change-Id: I9403b850456c8ee06cd2539f7cec9599302e81a0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1126576
Commit-Queue: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573131}
CWE ID: CWE-94
|
void ProcessControlLaunched() {
void ProcessControlLaunched(base::OnceClosure on_done) {
base::ScopedAllowBlockingForTesting allow_blocking;
base::ProcessId service_pid;
EXPECT_TRUE(GetServiceProcessData(NULL, &service_pid));
EXPECT_NE(static_cast<base::ProcessId>(0), service_pid);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
service_process_ =
base::Process::OpenWithAccess(service_pid,
SYNCHRONIZE | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION);
#else
service_process_ = base::Process::Open(service_pid);
#endif
EXPECT_TRUE(service_process_.IsValid());
std::move(on_done).Run();
}
| 172,053
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: CronTab::initRegexObject() {
if ( ! CronTab::regex.isInitialized() ) {
const char *errptr;
int erroffset;
MyString pattern( CRONTAB_PARAMETER_PATTERN ) ;
if ( ! CronTab::regex.compile( pattern, &errptr, &erroffset )) {
MyString error = "CronTab: Failed to compile Regex - ";
error += pattern;
EXCEPT( const_cast<char*>(error.Value()));
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
|
CronTab::initRegexObject() {
if ( ! CronTab::regex.isInitialized() ) {
const char *errptr;
int erroffset;
MyString pattern( CRONTAB_PARAMETER_PATTERN ) ;
if ( ! CronTab::regex.compile( pattern, &errptr, &erroffset )) {
MyString error = "CronTab: Failed to compile Regex - ";
error += pattern;
EXCEPT( "%s", const_cast<char*>(error.Value()) );
}
}
}
| 165,383
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: UserSelectionScreen::UpdateAndReturnUserListForMojo() {
std::vector<ash::mojom::LoginUserInfoPtr> user_info_list;
const AccountId owner = GetOwnerAccountId();
const bool is_signin_to_add = IsSigninToAdd();
users_to_send_ = PrepareUserListForSending(users_, owner, is_signin_to_add);
user_auth_type_map_.clear();
for (user_manager::UserList::const_iterator it = users_to_send_.begin();
it != users_to_send_.end(); ++it) {
const AccountId& account_id = (*it)->GetAccountId();
bool is_owner = owner == account_id;
const bool is_public_account =
((*it)->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_PUBLIC_ACCOUNT);
const proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType initial_auth_type =
is_public_account
? proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType::EXPAND_THEN_USER_CLICK
: (ShouldForceOnlineSignIn(*it)
? proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType::ONLINE_SIGN_IN
: proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType::OFFLINE_PASSWORD);
user_auth_type_map_[account_id] = initial_auth_type;
ash::mojom::LoginUserInfoPtr login_user_info =
ash::mojom::LoginUserInfo::New();
const std::vector<std::string>* public_session_recommended_locales =
public_session_recommended_locales_.find(account_id) ==
public_session_recommended_locales_.end()
? nullptr
: &public_session_recommended_locales_[account_id];
FillUserMojoStruct(*it, is_owner, is_signin_to_add, initial_auth_type,
public_session_recommended_locales,
login_user_info.get());
login_user_info->can_remove = CanRemoveUser(*it);
if (is_public_account && LoginScreenClient::HasInstance()) {
LoginScreenClient::Get()->RequestPublicSessionKeyboardLayouts(
account_id, login_user_info->public_account_info->default_locale);
}
user_info_list.push_back(std::move(login_user_info));
}
return user_info_list;
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
|
UserSelectionScreen::UpdateAndReturnUserListForMojo() {
std::vector<ash::mojom::LoginUserInfoPtr> user_info_list;
const AccountId owner = GetOwnerAccountId();
const bool is_signin_to_add = IsSigninToAdd();
users_to_send_ = PrepareUserListForSending(users_, owner, is_signin_to_add);
user_auth_type_map_.clear();
for (const user_manager::User* user : users_to_send_) {
const AccountId& account_id = user->GetAccountId();
bool is_owner = owner == account_id;
const bool is_public_account =
user->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_PUBLIC_ACCOUNT;
const proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType initial_auth_type =
is_public_account
? proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType::EXPAND_THEN_USER_CLICK
: (ShouldForceOnlineSignIn(user)
? proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType::ONLINE_SIGN_IN
: proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType::OFFLINE_PASSWORD);
user_auth_type_map_[account_id] = initial_auth_type;
ash::mojom::LoginUserInfoPtr user_info = ash::mojom::LoginUserInfo::New();
user_info->basic_user_info = ash::mojom::UserInfo::New();
user_info->basic_user_info->type = user->GetType();
user_info->basic_user_info->account_id = user->GetAccountId();
user_info->basic_user_info->display_name =
base::UTF16ToUTF8(user->GetDisplayName());
user_info->basic_user_info->display_email = user->display_email();
user_info->basic_user_info->avatar = BuildMojoUserAvatarForUser(user);
user_info->auth_type = initial_auth_type;
user_info->is_signed_in = user->is_logged_in();
user_info->is_device_owner = is_owner;
user_info->can_remove = CanRemoveUser(user);
user_info->allow_fingerprint_unlock = AllowFingerprintForUser(user);
// Fill multi-profile data.
if (!is_signin_to_add) {
user_info->is_multiprofile_allowed = true;
} else {
GetMultiProfilePolicy(user, &user_info->is_multiprofile_allowed,
&user_info->multiprofile_policy);
}
// Fill public session data.
if (user->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_PUBLIC_ACCOUNT) {
user_info->public_account_info = ash::mojom::PublicAccountInfo::New();
std::string domain;
if (GetEnterpriseDomain(&domain))
user_info->public_account_info->enterprise_domain = domain;
const std::vector<std::string>* public_session_recommended_locales =
public_session_recommended_locales_.find(account_id) ==
public_session_recommended_locales_.end()
? nullptr
: &public_session_recommended_locales_[account_id];
std::string selected_locale;
bool has_multiple_locales;
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> available_locales =
GetPublicSessionLocales(public_session_recommended_locales,
&selected_locale, &has_multiple_locales);
DCHECK(available_locales);
user_info->public_account_info->available_locales =
lock_screen_utils::FromListValueToLocaleItem(
std::move(available_locales));
user_info->public_account_info->default_locale = selected_locale;
user_info->public_account_info->show_advanced_view = has_multiple_locales;
}
user_info->can_remove = CanRemoveUser(user);
if (is_public_account && LoginScreenClient::HasInstance()) {
LoginScreenClient::Get()->RequestPublicSessionKeyboardLayouts(
account_id, user_info->public_account_info->default_locale);
}
user_info_list.push_back(std::move(user_info));
}
return user_info_list;
}
| 172,204
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: jp2_box_t *jp2_box_get(jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
uint_fast32_t len;
uint_fast64_t extlen;
bool dataflag;
box = 0;
tmpstream = 0;
if (!(box = jas_malloc(sizeof(jp2_box_t)))) {
goto error;
}
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
if (jp2_getuint32(in, &len) || jp2_getuint32(in, &box->type)) {
goto error;
}
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
box->info = boxinfo;
box->len = len;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, (
"preliminary processing of JP2 box: type=%c%s%c (0x%08x); length=%d\n",
'"', boxinfo->name, '"', box->type, box->len
));
if (box->len == 1) {
if (jp2_getuint64(in, &extlen)) {
goto error;
}
if (extlen > 0xffffffffUL) {
jas_eprintf("warning: cannot handle large 64-bit box length\n");
extlen = 0xffffffffUL;
}
box->len = extlen;
box->datalen = extlen - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(true);
} else {
box->datalen = box->len - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false);
}
if (box->len != 0 && box->len < 8) {
goto error;
}
dataflag = !(box->info->flags & (JP2_BOX_SUPER | JP2_BOX_NODATA));
if (dataflag) {
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(tmpstream, in, box->datalen)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot copy box data\n");
goto error;
}
jas_stream_rewind(tmpstream);
box->ops = &boxinfo->ops;
if (box->ops->getdata) {
if ((*box->ops->getdata)(box, tmpstream)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot parse box data\n");
goto error;
}
}
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jp2_box_dump(box, stderr);
}
return box;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (tmpstream) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
jp2_box_t *jp2_box_get(jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
uint_fast32_t len;
uint_fast64_t extlen;
bool dataflag;
box = 0;
tmpstream = 0;
if (!(box = jp2_box_create0())) {
goto error;
}
if (jp2_getuint32(in, &len) || jp2_getuint32(in, &box->type)) {
goto error;
}
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
box->info = boxinfo;
box->len = len;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, (
"preliminary processing of JP2 box: "
"type=%c%s%c (0x%08x); length=%"PRIuFAST32"\n",
'"', boxinfo->name, '"', box->type, box->len
));
if (box->len == 1) {
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("big length\n"));
if (jp2_getuint64(in, &extlen)) {
goto error;
}
if (extlen > 0xffffffffUL) {
jas_eprintf("warning: cannot handle large 64-bit box length\n");
extlen = 0xffffffffUL;
}
box->len = extlen;
box->datalen = extlen - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(true);
} else {
box->datalen = box->len - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false);
}
if (box->len != 0 && box->len < 8) {
goto error;
}
dataflag = !(box->info->flags & (JP2_BOX_SUPER | JP2_BOX_NODATA));
if (dataflag) {
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(tmpstream, in, box->datalen)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot copy box data\n");
goto error;
}
jas_stream_rewind(tmpstream);
box->ops = &boxinfo->ops;
if (box->ops->getdata) {
if ((*box->ops->getdata)(box, tmpstream)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot parse box data\n");
goto error;
}
}
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jp2_box_dump(box, stderr);
}
return box;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (tmpstream) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return 0;
}
| 168,318
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void handle_pxe_menu(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, struct pxe_menu *cfg)
{
void *choice;
struct menu *m;
int err;
#ifdef CONFIG_CMD_BMP
/* display BMP if available */
if (cfg->bmp) {
if (get_relfile(cmdtp, cfg->bmp, image_load_addr)) {
run_command("cls", 0);
bmp_display(image_load_addr,
BMP_ALIGN_CENTER, BMP_ALIGN_CENTER);
} else {
printf("Skipping background bmp %s for failure\n",
cfg->bmp);
}
}
#endif
m = pxe_menu_to_menu(cfg);
if (!m)
return;
err = menu_get_choice(m, &choice);
menu_destroy(m);
/*
* err == 1 means we got a choice back from menu_get_choice.
*
* err == -ENOENT if the menu was setup to select the default but no
* default was set. in that case, we should continue trying to boot
* labels that haven't been attempted yet.
*
* otherwise, the user interrupted or there was some other error and
* we give up.
*/
if (err == 1) {
err = label_boot(cmdtp, choice);
if (!err)
return;
} else if (err != -ENOENT) {
return;
}
boot_unattempted_labels(cmdtp, cfg);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
void handle_pxe_menu(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, struct pxe_menu *cfg)
{
void *choice;
struct menu *m;
int err;
#ifdef CONFIG_CMD_BMP
/* display BMP if available */
if (cfg->bmp) {
if (get_relfile(cmdtp, cfg->bmp, image_load_addr)) {
if (CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(CMD_CLS))
run_command("cls", 0);
bmp_display(image_load_addr,
BMP_ALIGN_CENTER, BMP_ALIGN_CENTER);
} else {
printf("Skipping background bmp %s for failure\n",
cfg->bmp);
}
}
#endif
m = pxe_menu_to_menu(cfg);
if (!m)
return;
err = menu_get_choice(m, &choice);
menu_destroy(m);
/*
* err == 1 means we got a choice back from menu_get_choice.
*
* err == -ENOENT if the menu was setup to select the default but no
* default was set. in that case, we should continue trying to boot
* labels that haven't been attempted yet.
*
* otherwise, the user interrupted or there was some other error and
* we give up.
*/
if (err == 1) {
err = label_boot(cmdtp, choice);
if (!err)
return;
} else if (err != -ENOENT) {
return;
}
boot_unattempted_labels(cmdtp, cfg);
}
| 169,637
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnReusePreviewData(int preview_request_id) {
base::StringValue ui_identifier(preview_ui_addr_str_);
base::FundamentalValue ui_preview_request_id(preview_request_id);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("reloadPreviewPages", ui_identifier,
ui_preview_request_id);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void PrintPreviewUI::OnReusePreviewData(int preview_request_id) {
base::FundamentalValue ui_identifier(id_);
base::FundamentalValue ui_preview_request_id(preview_request_id);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("reloadPreviewPages", ui_identifier,
ui_preview_request_id);
}
| 170,840
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoLinkProgram(GLuint program) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoLinkProgram");
SCOPED_UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMER("GPU.PassthroughDoLinkProgramTime");
api()->glLinkProgramFn(GetProgramServiceID(program, resources_));
ExitCommandProcessingEarly();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoLinkProgram(GLuint program) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoLinkProgram");
SCOPED_UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMER("GPU.PassthroughDoLinkProgramTime");
GLuint program_service_id = GetProgramServiceID(program, resources_);
api()->glLinkProgramFn(program_service_id);
ExitCommandProcessingEarly();
linking_program_service_id_ = program_service_id;
return error::kNoError;
}
| 172,534
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int cac_get_serial_nr_from_CUID(sc_card_t* card, sc_serial_number_t* serial)
{
cac_private_data_t * priv = CAC_DATA(card);
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL);
if (card->serialnr.len) {
*serial = card->serialnr;
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_SUCCESS);
}
if (priv->cac_id_len) {
serial->len = MIN(priv->cac_id_len, SC_MAX_SERIALNR);
memcpy(serial->value, priv->cac_id, priv->cac_id_len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_SUCCESS);
}
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
|
static int cac_get_serial_nr_from_CUID(sc_card_t* card, sc_serial_number_t* serial)
{
cac_private_data_t * priv = CAC_DATA(card);
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL);
if (card->serialnr.len) {
*serial = card->serialnr;
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_SUCCESS);
}
if (priv->cac_id_len) {
serial->len = MIN(priv->cac_id_len, SC_MAX_SERIALNR);
memcpy(serial->value, priv->cac_id, serial->len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_SUCCESS);
}
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND);
}
| 169,071
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static bool glfs_check_config(const char *cfgstring, char **reason)
{
char *path;
glfs_t *fs = NULL;
glfs_fd_t *gfd = NULL;
gluster_server *hosts = NULL; /* gluster server defination */
bool result = true;
path = strchr(cfgstring, '/');
if (!path) {
if (asprintf(reason, "No path found") == -1)
*reason = NULL;
result = false;
goto done;
}
path += 1; /* get past '/' */
fs = tcmu_create_glfs_object(path, &hosts);
if (!fs) {
tcmu_err("tcmu_create_glfs_object failed\n");
goto done;
}
gfd = glfs_open(fs, hosts->path, ALLOWED_BSOFLAGS);
if (!gfd) {
if (asprintf(reason, "glfs_open failed: %m") == -1)
*reason = NULL;
result = false;
goto unref;
}
if (glfs_access(fs, hosts->path, R_OK|W_OK) == -1) {
if (asprintf(reason, "glfs_access file not present, or not writable") == -1)
*reason = NULL;
result = false;
goto unref;
}
goto done;
unref:
gluster_cache_refresh(fs, path);
done:
if (gfd)
glfs_close(gfd);
gluster_free_server(&hosts);
return result;
}
Commit Message: glfs: discard glfs_check_config
Signed-off-by: Prasanna Kumar Kalever <prasanna.kalever@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static bool glfs_check_config(const char *cfgstring, char **reason)
| 167,635
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int toggle_utf8(const char *name, int fd, bool utf8) {
int r;
struct termios tc = {};
assert(name);
r = ioctl(fd, KDSKBMODE, utf8 ? K_UNICODE : K_XLATE);
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to %s UTF-8 kbdmode on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
r = loop_write(fd, utf8 ? "\033%G" : "\033%@", 3, false);
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to %s UTF-8 term processing on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
r = tcgetattr(fd, &tc);
if (r >= 0) {
SET_FLAG(tc.c_iflag, IUTF8, utf8);
r = tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, &tc);
}
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to %s iutf8 flag on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
log_debug("UTF-8 kbdmode %sd on %s", enable_disable(utf8), name);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255
|
static int toggle_utf8(const char *name, int fd, bool utf8) {
int r;
struct termios tc = {};
assert(name);
r = vt_verify_kbmode(fd);
if (r == -EBUSY) {
log_warning_errno(r, "Virtual console %s is not in K_XLATE or K_UNICODE: %m", name);
return 0;
} else if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to verify kbdmode on %s: %m", name);
r = ioctl(fd, KDSKBMODE, utf8 ? K_UNICODE : K_XLATE);
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to %s UTF-8 kbdmode on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
r = loop_write(fd, utf8 ? "\033%G" : "\033%@", 3, false);
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to %s UTF-8 term processing on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
r = tcgetattr(fd, &tc);
if (r >= 0) {
SET_FLAG(tc.c_iflag, IUTF8, utf8);
r = tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, &tc);
}
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to %s iutf8 flag on %s: %m", enable_disable(utf8), name);
log_debug("UTF-8 kbdmode %sd on %s", enable_disable(utf8), name);
return 0;
}
| 169,779
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Chapters::Display::Init()
{
m_string = NULL;
m_language = NULL;
m_country = NULL;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void Chapters::Display::Init()
| 174,388
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: _pyfribidi_log2vis (PyObject * self, PyObject * args, PyObject * kw)
{
PyObject *logical = NULL; /* input unicode or string object */
FriBidiParType base = FRIBIDI_TYPE_RTL; /* optional direction */
const char *encoding = "utf-8"; /* optional input string encoding */
int clean = 0; /* optional flag to clean the string */
int reordernsm = 1; /* optional flag to allow reordering of non spacing marks*/
static char *kwargs[] =
{ "logical", "base_direction", "encoding", "clean", "reordernsm", NULL };
if (!PyArg_ParseTupleAndKeywords (args, kw, "O|isii", kwargs,
&logical, &base, &encoding, &clean, &reordernsm))
return NULL;
/* Validate base */
if (!(base == FRIBIDI_TYPE_RTL ||
base == FRIBIDI_TYPE_LTR || base == FRIBIDI_TYPE_ON))
return PyErr_Format (PyExc_ValueError,
"invalid value %d: use either RTL, LTR or ON",
base);
/* Check object type and delegate to one of the log2vis functions */
if (PyUnicode_Check (logical))
return log2vis_unicode (logical, base, clean, reordernsm);
else if (PyString_Check (logical))
return log2vis_encoded_string (logical, encoding, base, clean, reordernsm);
else
return PyErr_Format (PyExc_TypeError,
"expected unicode or str, not %s",
logical->ob_type->tp_name);
}
Commit Message: refactor pyfribidi.c module
pyfribidi.c is now compiled as _pyfribidi. This module only handles
unicode internally and doesn't use the fribidi_utf8_to_unicode
function (which can't handle 4 byte utf-8 sequences). This fixes the
buffer overflow in issue #2.
The code is now also much simpler: pyfribidi.c is down from 280 to 130
lines of code.
We now ship a pure python pyfribidi that handles the case when
non-unicode strings are passed in.
We now also adapt the size of the output string if clean=True is
passed.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
_pyfribidi_log2vis (PyObject * self, PyObject * args, PyObject * kw)
unicode_log2vis (PyUnicodeObject* string,
FriBidiParType base_direction, int clean, int reordernsm)
{
int i;
int length = string->length;
FriBidiChar *logical = NULL; /* input fribidi unicode buffer */
FriBidiChar *visual = NULL; /* output fribidi unicode buffer */
FriBidiStrIndex new_len = 0; /* length of the UTF-8 buffer */
PyUnicodeObject *result = NULL;
/* Allocate fribidi unicode buffers
TODO - Don't copy strings if sizeof(FriBidiChar) == sizeof(Py_UNICODE)
*/
logical = PyMem_New (FriBidiChar, length + 1);
if (logical == NULL) {
PyErr_NoMemory();
goto cleanup;
}
visual = PyMem_New (FriBidiChar, length + 1);
if (visual == NULL) {
PyErr_NoMemory();
goto cleanup;
}
for (i=0; i<length; ++i) {
logical[i] = string->str[i];
}
/* Convert to unicode and order visually */
fribidi_set_reorder_nsm(reordernsm);
if (!fribidi_log2vis (logical, length, &base_direction, visual,
NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
PyErr_SetString (PyExc_RuntimeError,
"fribidi failed to order string");
goto cleanup;
}
/* Cleanup the string if requested */
if (clean) {
length = fribidi_remove_bidi_marks (visual, length, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
result = (PyUnicodeObject*) PyUnicode_FromUnicode(NULL, length);
if (result == NULL) {
goto cleanup;
}
for (i=0; i<length; ++i) {
result->str[i] = visual[i];
}
cleanup:
/* Delete unicode buffers */
PyMem_Del (logical);
PyMem_Del (visual);
return (PyObject *)result;
}
| 165,638
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: lrmd_remote_listen(gpointer data)
{
int csock = 0;
int flag = 0;
unsigned laddr = 0;
struct sockaddr addr;
gnutls_session_t *session = NULL;
crm_client_t *new_client = NULL;
static struct mainloop_fd_callbacks lrmd_remote_fd_cb = {
.dispatch = lrmd_remote_client_msg,
.destroy = lrmd_remote_client_destroy,
};
laddr = sizeof(addr);
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
getsockname(ssock, &addr, &laddr);
/* accept the connection */
if (addr.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
struct sockaddr_in6 sa;
char addr_str[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
laddr = sizeof(sa);
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
csock = accept(ssock, &sa, &laddr);
get_ip_str((struct sockaddr *)&sa, addr_str, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN);
crm_info("New remote connection from %s", addr_str);
} else {
struct sockaddr_in sa;
char addr_str[INET_ADDRSTRLEN];
laddr = sizeof(sa);
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
csock = accept(ssock, &sa, &laddr);
get_ip_str((struct sockaddr *)&sa, addr_str, INET_ADDRSTRLEN);
crm_info("New remote connection from %s", addr_str);
}
if (csock == -1) {
crm_err("accept socket failed");
return TRUE;
}
if ((flag = fcntl(csock, F_GETFL)) >= 0) {
if (fcntl(csock, F_SETFL, flag | O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
crm_err("fcntl() write failed");
close(csock);
return TRUE;
}
} else {
crm_err("fcntl() read failed");
close(csock);
return TRUE;
}
session = create_psk_tls_session(csock, GNUTLS_SERVER, psk_cred_s);
if (session == NULL) {
crm_err("TLS session creation failed");
close(csock);
return TRUE;
}
new_client = calloc(1, sizeof(crm_client_t));
new_client->remote = calloc(1, sizeof(crm_remote_t));
new_client->kind = CRM_CLIENT_TLS;
new_client->remote->tls_session = session;
new_client->id = crm_generate_uuid();
new_client->remote->auth_timeout =
g_timeout_add(LRMD_REMOTE_AUTH_TIMEOUT, lrmd_auth_timeout_cb, new_client);
crm_notice("LRMD client connection established. %p id: %s", new_client, new_client->id);
new_client->remote->source =
mainloop_add_fd("lrmd-remote-client", G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT, csock, new_client,
&lrmd_remote_fd_cb);
g_hash_table_insert(client_connections, new_client->id, new_client);
/* Alert other clients of the new connection */
notify_of_new_client(new_client);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix: remote: cl#5269 - Notify other clients of a new connection only if the handshake has completed (bsc#967388)
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
lrmd_remote_listen(gpointer data)
{
int csock = 0;
int flag = 0;
unsigned laddr = 0;
struct sockaddr addr;
gnutls_session_t *session = NULL;
crm_client_t *new_client = NULL;
static struct mainloop_fd_callbacks lrmd_remote_fd_cb = {
.dispatch = lrmd_remote_client_msg,
.destroy = lrmd_remote_client_destroy,
};
laddr = sizeof(addr);
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
getsockname(ssock, &addr, &laddr);
/* accept the connection */
if (addr.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
struct sockaddr_in6 sa;
char addr_str[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
laddr = sizeof(sa);
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
csock = accept(ssock, &sa, &laddr);
get_ip_str((struct sockaddr *)&sa, addr_str, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN);
crm_info("New remote connection from %s", addr_str);
} else {
struct sockaddr_in sa;
char addr_str[INET_ADDRSTRLEN];
laddr = sizeof(sa);
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
csock = accept(ssock, &sa, &laddr);
get_ip_str((struct sockaddr *)&sa, addr_str, INET_ADDRSTRLEN);
crm_info("New remote connection from %s", addr_str);
}
if (csock == -1) {
crm_err("accept socket failed");
return TRUE;
}
if ((flag = fcntl(csock, F_GETFL)) >= 0) {
if (fcntl(csock, F_SETFL, flag | O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
crm_err("fcntl() write failed");
close(csock);
return TRUE;
}
} else {
crm_err("fcntl() read failed");
close(csock);
return TRUE;
}
session = create_psk_tls_session(csock, GNUTLS_SERVER, psk_cred_s);
if (session == NULL) {
crm_err("TLS session creation failed");
close(csock);
return TRUE;
}
new_client = calloc(1, sizeof(crm_client_t));
new_client->remote = calloc(1, sizeof(crm_remote_t));
new_client->kind = CRM_CLIENT_TLS;
new_client->remote->tls_session = session;
new_client->id = crm_generate_uuid();
new_client->remote->auth_timeout =
g_timeout_add(LRMD_REMOTE_AUTH_TIMEOUT, lrmd_auth_timeout_cb, new_client);
crm_notice("LRMD client connection established. %p id: %s", new_client, new_client->id);
new_client->remote->source =
mainloop_add_fd("lrmd-remote-client", G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT, csock, new_client,
&lrmd_remote_fd_cb);
g_hash_table_insert(client_connections, new_client->id, new_client);
return TRUE;
}
| 168,785
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static ssize_t in_read(struct audio_stream_in *stream, void* buffer,
size_t bytes)
{
struct a2dp_stream_in *in = (struct a2dp_stream_in *)stream;
int read;
DEBUG("read %zu bytes, state: %d", bytes, in->common.state);
if (in->common.state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_SUSPENDED)
{
DEBUG("stream suspended");
return -1;
}
/* only allow autostarting if we are in stopped or standby */
if ((in->common.state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STOPPED) ||
(in->common.state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STANDBY))
{
pthread_mutex_lock(&in->common.lock);
if (start_audio_datapath(&in->common) < 0)
{
/* emulate time this write represents to avoid very fast write
failures during transition periods or remote suspend */
int us_delay = calc_audiotime(in->common.cfg, bytes);
DEBUG("emulate a2dp read delay (%d us)", us_delay);
usleep(us_delay);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&in->common.lock);
return -1;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&in->common.lock);
}
else if (in->common.state != AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STARTED)
{
ERROR("stream not in stopped or standby");
return -1;
}
read = skt_read(in->common.audio_fd, buffer, bytes);
if (read == -1)
{
skt_disconnect(in->common.audio_fd);
in->common.audio_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
in->common.state = AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STOPPED;
} else if (read == 0) {
DEBUG("read time out - return zeros");
memset(buffer, 0, bytes);
read = bytes;
}
DEBUG("read %d bytes out of %zu bytes", read, bytes);
return read;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
static ssize_t in_read(struct audio_stream_in *stream, void* buffer,
size_t bytes)
{
struct a2dp_stream_in *in = (struct a2dp_stream_in *)stream;
int read;
DEBUG("read %zu bytes, state: %d", bytes, in->common.state);
if (in->common.state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_SUSPENDED)
{
DEBUG("stream suspended");
return -1;
}
/* only allow autostarting if we are in stopped or standby */
if ((in->common.state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STOPPED) ||
(in->common.state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STANDBY))
{
pthread_mutex_lock(&in->common.lock);
if (start_audio_datapath(&in->common) < 0)
{
/* emulate time this write represents to avoid very fast write
failures during transition periods or remote suspend */
int us_delay = calc_audiotime(in->common.cfg, bytes);
DEBUG("emulate a2dp read delay (%d us)", us_delay);
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(usleep(us_delay));
pthread_mutex_unlock(&in->common.lock);
return -1;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&in->common.lock);
}
else if (in->common.state != AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STARTED)
{
ERROR("stream not in stopped or standby");
return -1;
}
read = skt_read(in->common.audio_fd, buffer, bytes);
if (read == -1)
{
skt_disconnect(in->common.audio_fd);
in->common.audio_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
in->common.state = AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STOPPED;
} else if (read == 0) {
DEBUG("read time out - return zeros");
memset(buffer, 0, bytes);
read = bytes;
}
DEBUG("read %d bytes out of %zu bytes", read, bytes);
return read;
}
| 173,426
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int read_part_of_packet(AVFormatContext *s, int64_t *pts,
int *len, int *strid, int read_packet) {
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
PVAContext *pvactx = s->priv_data;
int syncword, streamid, reserved, flags, length, pts_flag;
int64_t pva_pts = AV_NOPTS_VALUE, startpos;
int ret;
recover:
startpos = avio_tell(pb);
syncword = avio_rb16(pb);
streamid = avio_r8(pb);
avio_r8(pb); /* counter not used */
reserved = avio_r8(pb);
flags = avio_r8(pb);
length = avio_rb16(pb);
pts_flag = flags & 0x10;
if (syncword != PVA_MAGIC) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid syncword\n");
return AVERROR(EIO);
}
if (streamid != PVA_VIDEO_PAYLOAD && streamid != PVA_AUDIO_PAYLOAD) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid streamid\n");
return AVERROR(EIO);
}
if (reserved != 0x55) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "expected reserved byte to be 0x55\n");
}
if (length > PVA_MAX_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid payload length %u\n", length);
return AVERROR(EIO);
}
if (streamid == PVA_VIDEO_PAYLOAD && pts_flag) {
pva_pts = avio_rb32(pb);
length -= 4;
} else if (streamid == PVA_AUDIO_PAYLOAD) {
/* PVA Audio Packets either start with a signaled PES packet or
* are a continuation of the previous PES packet. New PES packets
* always start at the beginning of a PVA Packet, never somewhere in
* the middle. */
if (!pvactx->continue_pes) {
int pes_signal, pes_header_data_length, pes_packet_length,
pes_flags;
unsigned char pes_header_data[256];
pes_signal = avio_rb24(pb);
avio_r8(pb);
pes_packet_length = avio_rb16(pb);
pes_flags = avio_rb16(pb);
pes_header_data_length = avio_r8(pb);
if (pes_signal != 1 || pes_header_data_length == 0) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "expected non empty signaled PES packet, "
"trying to recover\n");
avio_skip(pb, length - 9);
if (!read_packet)
return AVERROR(EIO);
goto recover;
}
ret = avio_read(pb, pes_header_data, pes_header_data_length);
if (ret != pes_header_data_length)
return ret < 0 ? ret : AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
length -= 9 + pes_header_data_length;
pes_packet_length -= 3 + pes_header_data_length;
pvactx->continue_pes = pes_packet_length;
if (pes_flags & 0x80 && (pes_header_data[0] & 0xf0) == 0x20) {
if (pes_header_data_length < 5) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "header too short\n");
avio_skip(pb, length);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
pva_pts = ff_parse_pes_pts(pes_header_data);
}
}
pvactx->continue_pes -= length;
if (pvactx->continue_pes < 0) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "audio data corruption\n");
pvactx->continue_pes = 0;
}
}
if (pva_pts != AV_NOPTS_VALUE)
av_add_index_entry(s->streams[streamid-1], startpos, pva_pts, 0, 0, AVINDEX_KEYFRAME);
*pts = pva_pts;
*len = length;
*strid = streamid;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/pva: Check for EOF before retrying in read_part_of_packet()
Fixes: Infinite loop
Fixes: pva-4b1835dbc2027bf3c567005dcc78e85199240d06
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835
|
static int read_part_of_packet(AVFormatContext *s, int64_t *pts,
int *len, int *strid, int read_packet) {
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
PVAContext *pvactx = s->priv_data;
int syncword, streamid, reserved, flags, length, pts_flag;
int64_t pva_pts = AV_NOPTS_VALUE, startpos;
int ret;
recover:
startpos = avio_tell(pb);
syncword = avio_rb16(pb);
streamid = avio_r8(pb);
avio_r8(pb); /* counter not used */
reserved = avio_r8(pb);
flags = avio_r8(pb);
length = avio_rb16(pb);
pts_flag = flags & 0x10;
if (syncword != PVA_MAGIC) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid syncword\n");
return AVERROR(EIO);
}
if (streamid != PVA_VIDEO_PAYLOAD && streamid != PVA_AUDIO_PAYLOAD) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid streamid\n");
return AVERROR(EIO);
}
if (reserved != 0x55) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "expected reserved byte to be 0x55\n");
}
if (length > PVA_MAX_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid payload length %u\n", length);
return AVERROR(EIO);
}
if (streamid == PVA_VIDEO_PAYLOAD && pts_flag) {
pva_pts = avio_rb32(pb);
length -= 4;
} else if (streamid == PVA_AUDIO_PAYLOAD) {
/* PVA Audio Packets either start with a signaled PES packet or
* are a continuation of the previous PES packet. New PES packets
* always start at the beginning of a PVA Packet, never somewhere in
* the middle. */
if (!pvactx->continue_pes) {
int pes_signal, pes_header_data_length, pes_packet_length,
pes_flags;
unsigned char pes_header_data[256];
pes_signal = avio_rb24(pb);
avio_r8(pb);
pes_packet_length = avio_rb16(pb);
pes_flags = avio_rb16(pb);
pes_header_data_length = avio_r8(pb);
if (avio_feof(pb)) {
return AVERROR_EOF;
}
if (pes_signal != 1 || pes_header_data_length == 0) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "expected non empty signaled PES packet, "
"trying to recover\n");
avio_skip(pb, length - 9);
if (!read_packet)
return AVERROR(EIO);
goto recover;
}
ret = avio_read(pb, pes_header_data, pes_header_data_length);
if (ret != pes_header_data_length)
return ret < 0 ? ret : AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
length -= 9 + pes_header_data_length;
pes_packet_length -= 3 + pes_header_data_length;
pvactx->continue_pes = pes_packet_length;
if (pes_flags & 0x80 && (pes_header_data[0] & 0xf0) == 0x20) {
if (pes_header_data_length < 5) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "header too short\n");
avio_skip(pb, length);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
pva_pts = ff_parse_pes_pts(pes_header_data);
}
}
pvactx->continue_pes -= length;
if (pvactx->continue_pes < 0) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "audio data corruption\n");
pvactx->continue_pes = 0;
}
}
if (pva_pts != AV_NOPTS_VALUE)
av_add_index_entry(s->streams[streamid-1], startpos, pva_pts, 0, 0, AVINDEX_KEYFRAME);
*pts = pva_pts;
*len = length;
*strid = streamid;
return 0;
}
| 168,925
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
size_t count, loff_t *offset)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
long result = 0, unit;
int qhead;
int err = 0;
tu = file->private_data;
unit = tu->tread ? sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread) : sizeof(struct snd_timer_read);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
while ((long)count - result >= unit) {
while (!tu->qused) {
wait_queue_t wait;
if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) != 0 || result > 0) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto _error;
}
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
init_waitqueue_entry(&wait, current);
add_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
schedule();
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
remove_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
if (tu->disconnected) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto _error;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto _error;
}
}
qhead = tu->qhead++;
tu->qhead %= tu->queue_size;
tu->qused--;
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
if (tu->tread) {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->tqueue[qhead],
sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread)))
err = -EFAULT;
} else {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->queue[qhead],
sizeof(struct snd_timer_read)))
err = -EFAULT;
}
mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
if (err < 0)
goto _error;
result += unit;
buffer += unit;
}
_error:
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
return result > 0 ? result : err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix race between read and ioctl
The read from ALSA timer device, the function snd_timer_user_tread(),
may access to an uninitialized struct snd_timer_user fields when the
read is concurrently performed while the ioctl like
snd_timer_user_tselect() is invoked. We have already fixed the races
among ioctls via a mutex, but we seem to have forgotten the race
between read vs ioctl.
This patch simply applies (more exactly extends the already applied
range of) tu->ioctl_lock in snd_timer_user_tread() for closing the
race window.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
size_t count, loff_t *offset)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
long result = 0, unit;
int qhead;
int err = 0;
tu = file->private_data;
unit = tu->tread ? sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread) : sizeof(struct snd_timer_read);
mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
while ((long)count - result >= unit) {
while (!tu->qused) {
wait_queue_t wait;
if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) != 0 || result > 0) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto _error;
}
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
init_waitqueue_entry(&wait, current);
add_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
schedule();
mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
remove_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
if (tu->disconnected) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto _error;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto _error;
}
}
qhead = tu->qhead++;
tu->qhead %= tu->queue_size;
tu->qused--;
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
if (tu->tread) {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->tqueue[qhead],
sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread)))
err = -EFAULT;
} else {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->queue[qhead],
sizeof(struct snd_timer_read)))
err = -EFAULT;
}
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
if (err < 0)
goto _error;
result += unit;
buffer += unit;
}
_error:
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
return result > 0 ? result : err;
}
| 170,008
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void locationAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->location());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHref(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void locationAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
RefPtr<TestNode> imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->location());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHref(cppValue);
}
| 171,685
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void qrio_cpuwd_flag(bool flag)
{
u8 reason1;
void __iomem *qrio_base = (void *)CONFIG_SYS_QRIO_BASE;
reason1 = in_8(qrio_base + REASON1_OFF);
if (flag)
reason1 |= REASON1_CPUWD;
else
reason1 &= ~REASON1_CPUWD;
out_8(qrio_base + REASON1_OFF, reason1);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
void qrio_cpuwd_flag(bool flag)
{
u8 reason1;
void __iomem *qrio_base = (void *)CONFIG_SYS_QRIO_BASE;
reason1 = in_8(qrio_base + REASON1_OFF);
if (flag)
reason1 |= REASON1_CPUWD;
else
reason1 &= ~REASON1_CPUWD;
out_8(qrio_base + REASON1_OFF, reason1);
}
| 169,624
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void MaybeStartInputMethodDaemon(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
value.type == ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList &&
!value.string_list_value.empty()) {
if (ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(value) || defer_ime_startup_) {
return;
}
const bool just_started = StartInputMethodDaemon();
if (!just_started) {
return;
}
if (tentative_current_input_method_id_.empty()) {
tentative_current_input_method_id_ = current_input_method_.id;
}
if (std::find(value.string_list_value.begin(),
value.string_list_value.end(),
tentative_current_input_method_id_)
== value.string_list_value.end()) {
tentative_current_input_method_id_.clear();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void MaybeStartInputMethodDaemon(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const input_method::ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
value.type == input_method::ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList &&
!value.string_list_value.empty()) {
if (ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(value) || defer_ime_startup_) {
return;
}
const bool just_started = StartInputMethodDaemon();
if (!just_started) {
return;
}
if (tentative_current_input_method_id_.empty()) {
tentative_current_input_method_id_ = current_input_method_.id;
}
if (std::find(value.string_list_value.begin(),
value.string_list_value.end(),
tentative_current_input_method_id_)
== value.string_list_value.end()) {
tentative_current_input_method_id_.clear();
}
}
}
| 170,499
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void numtostr(js_State *J, const char *fmt, int w, double n)
{
char buf[32], *e;
sprintf(buf, fmt, w, n);
e = strchr(buf, 'e');
if (e) {
int exp = atoi(e+1);
sprintf(e, "e%+d", exp);
}
js_pushstring(J, buf);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700938: Fix stack overflow in numtostr as used by Number#toFixed().
32 is not enough to fit sprintf("%.20f", 1e20).
We need at least 43 bytes to fit that format.
Bump the static buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void numtostr(js_State *J, const char *fmt, int w, double n)
{
/* buf needs to fit printf("%.20f", 1e20) */
char buf[50], *e;
sprintf(buf, fmt, w, n);
e = strchr(buf, 'e');
if (e) {
int exp = atoi(e+1);
sprintf(e, "e%+d", exp);
}
js_pushstring(J, buf);
}
| 169,704
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: cpStripToTile(uint8* out, uint8* in,
uint32 rows, uint32 cols, int outskew, int inskew)
{
while (rows-- > 0) {
uint32 j = cols;
while (j-- > 0)
*out++ = *in++;
out += outskew;
in += inskew;
}
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix uint32 underflow/overflow that can cause heap-based
buffer overflow.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2610
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
cpStripToTile(uint8* out, uint8* in,
uint32 rows, uint32 cols, int outskew, int64 inskew)
{
while (rows-- > 0) {
uint32 j = cols;
while (j-- > 0)
*out++ = *in++;
out += outskew;
in += inskew;
}
}
| 168,533
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SProcXResQueryResourceBytes (ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
int c;
xXResResourceIdSpec *specs = (void*) ((char*) stuff + sizeof(*stuff));
int c;
xXResResourceIdSpec *specs = (void*) ((char*) stuff + sizeof(*stuff));
swapl(&stuff->numSpecs);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq,
stuff->numSpecs * sizeof(specs[0]));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
SProcXResQueryResourceBytes (ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
int c;
xXResResourceIdSpec *specs = (void*) ((char*) stuff + sizeof(*stuff));
int c;
xXResResourceIdSpec *specs = (void*) ((char*) stuff + sizeof(*stuff));
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq);
swapl(&stuff->numSpecs);
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXResQueryResourceBytesReq,
stuff->numSpecs * sizeof(specs[0]));
}
| 165,435
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateObject( void )
{
cJSON *item = cJSON_New_Item();
if ( item )
item->type = cJSON_Object;
return item;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
cJSON *cJSON_CreateObject( void )
| 167,277
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: NeXTDecode(TIFF* tif, uint8* buf, tmsize_t occ, uint16 s)
{
static const char module[] = "NeXTDecode";
unsigned char *bp, *op;
tmsize_t cc;
uint8* row;
tmsize_t scanline, n;
(void) s;
/*
* Each scanline is assumed to start off as all
* white (we assume a PhotometricInterpretation
* of ``min-is-black'').
*/
for (op = (unsigned char*) buf, cc = occ; cc-- > 0;)
*op++ = 0xff;
bp = (unsigned char *)tif->tif_rawcp;
cc = tif->tif_rawcc;
scanline = tif->tif_scanlinesize;
if (occ % scanline)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "Fractional scanlines cannot be read");
return (0);
}
for (row = buf; cc > 0 && occ > 0; occ -= scanline, row += scanline) {
n = *bp++, cc--;
switch (n) {
case LITERALROW:
/*
* The entire scanline is given as literal values.
*/
if (cc < scanline)
goto bad;
_TIFFmemcpy(row, bp, scanline);
bp += scanline;
cc -= scanline;
break;
case LITERALSPAN: {
tmsize_t off;
/*
* The scanline has a literal span that begins at some
* offset.
*/
if( cc < 4 )
goto bad;
off = (bp[0] * 256) + bp[1];
n = (bp[2] * 256) + bp[3];
if (cc < 4+n || off+n > scanline)
goto bad;
_TIFFmemcpy(row+off, bp+4, n);
bp += 4+n;
cc -= 4+n;
break;
}
default: {
uint32 npixels = 0, grey;
uint32 imagewidth = tif->tif_dir.td_imagewidth;
if( isTiled(tif) )
imagewidth = tif->tif_dir.td_tilewidth;
/*
* The scanline is composed of a sequence of constant
* color ``runs''. We shift into ``run mode'' and
* interpret bytes as codes of the form
* <color><npixels> until we've filled the scanline.
*/
op = row;
for (;;) {
grey = (uint32)((n>>6) & 0x3);
n &= 0x3f;
/*
* Ensure the run does not exceed the scanline
* bounds, potentially resulting in a security
* issue.
*/
while (n-- > 0 && npixels < imagewidth)
SETPIXEL(op, grey);
if (npixels >= imagewidth)
break;
if (cc == 0)
goto bad;
n = *bp++, cc--;
}
break;
}
}
}
tif->tif_rawcp = (uint8*) bp;
tif->tif_rawcc = cc;
return (1);
bad:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "Not enough data for scanline %ld",
(long) tif->tif_row);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_next.c: fix potential out-of-bound write in NeXTDecode()
triggered by http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/vulns/libtiff5.tif
(bugzilla #2508)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
NeXTDecode(TIFF* tif, uint8* buf, tmsize_t occ, uint16 s)
{
static const char module[] = "NeXTDecode";
unsigned char *bp, *op;
tmsize_t cc;
uint8* row;
tmsize_t scanline, n;
(void) s;
/*
* Each scanline is assumed to start off as all
* white (we assume a PhotometricInterpretation
* of ``min-is-black'').
*/
for (op = (unsigned char*) buf, cc = occ; cc-- > 0;)
*op++ = 0xff;
bp = (unsigned char *)tif->tif_rawcp;
cc = tif->tif_rawcc;
scanline = tif->tif_scanlinesize;
if (occ % scanline)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "Fractional scanlines cannot be read");
return (0);
}
for (row = buf; cc > 0 && occ > 0; occ -= scanline, row += scanline) {
n = *bp++, cc--;
switch (n) {
case LITERALROW:
/*
* The entire scanline is given as literal values.
*/
if (cc < scanline)
goto bad;
_TIFFmemcpy(row, bp, scanline);
bp += scanline;
cc -= scanline;
break;
case LITERALSPAN: {
tmsize_t off;
/*
* The scanline has a literal span that begins at some
* offset.
*/
if( cc < 4 )
goto bad;
off = (bp[0] * 256) + bp[1];
n = (bp[2] * 256) + bp[3];
if (cc < 4+n || off+n > scanline)
goto bad;
_TIFFmemcpy(row+off, bp+4, n);
bp += 4+n;
cc -= 4+n;
break;
}
default: {
uint32 npixels = 0, grey;
uint32 imagewidth = tif->tif_dir.td_imagewidth;
if( isTiled(tif) )
imagewidth = tif->tif_dir.td_tilewidth;
tmsize_t op_offset = 0;
/*
* The scanline is composed of a sequence of constant
* color ``runs''. We shift into ``run mode'' and
* interpret bytes as codes of the form
* <color><npixels> until we've filled the scanline.
*/
op = row;
for (;;) {
grey = (uint32)((n>>6) & 0x3);
n &= 0x3f;
/*
* Ensure the run does not exceed the scanline
* bounds, potentially resulting in a security
* issue.
*/
while (n-- > 0 && npixels < imagewidth && op_offset < scanline)
SETPIXEL(op, grey);
if (npixels >= imagewidth)
break;
if (op_offset >= scanline ) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "Invalid data for scanline %ld",
(long) tif->tif_row);
return (0);
}
if (cc == 0)
goto bad;
n = *bp++, cc--;
}
break;
}
}
}
tif->tif_rawcp = (uint8*) bp;
tif->tif_rawcc = cc;
return (1);
bad:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "Not enough data for scanline %ld",
(long) tif->tif_row);
return (0);
}
| 167,499
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mdecrypt_generic)
{
zval *mcryptind;
char *data;
int data_len;
php_mcrypt *pm;
char* data_s;
int block_size, data_size;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs", &mcryptind, &data, &data_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pm, php_mcrypt * , &mcryptind, -1, "MCrypt", le_mcrypt);
PHP_MCRYPT_INIT_CHECK
if (data_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "An empty string was passed");
RETURN_FALSE
}
/* Check blocksize */
if (mcrypt_enc_is_block_mode(pm->td) == 1) { /* It's a block algorithm */
block_size = mcrypt_enc_get_block_size(pm->td);
data_size = (((data_len - 1) / block_size) + 1) * block_size;
data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
} else { /* It's not a block algorithm */
data_size = data_len;
data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
}
mdecrypt_generic(pm->td, data_s, data_size);
RETVAL_STRINGL(data_s, data_size, 1);
efree(data_s);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
PHP_FUNCTION(mdecrypt_generic)
{
zval *mcryptind;
char *data;
int data_len;
php_mcrypt *pm;
char* data_s;
int block_size, data_size;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs", &mcryptind, &data, &data_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pm, php_mcrypt * , &mcryptind, -1, "MCrypt", le_mcrypt);
PHP_MCRYPT_INIT_CHECK
if (data_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "An empty string was passed");
RETURN_FALSE
}
/* Check blocksize */
if (mcrypt_enc_is_block_mode(pm->td) == 1) { /* It's a block algorithm */
block_size = mcrypt_enc_get_block_size(pm->td);
data_size = (((data_len - 1) / block_size) + 1) * block_size;
if (data_size <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Integer overflow in data size");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
} else { /* It's not a block algorithm */
data_size = data_len;
data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
}
mdecrypt_generic(pm->td, data_s, data_size);
RETVAL_STRINGL(data_s, data_size, 1);
efree(data_s);
}
| 167,092
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: atm_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
u_int length = h->len;
uint32_t llchdr;
u_int hdrlen = 0;
if (caplen < 1 || length < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (caplen);
}
/* Cisco Style NLPID ? */
if (*p == LLC_UI) {
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CNLPID "));
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1, caplen - 1);
return hdrlen;
}
/*
* Must have at least a DSAP, an SSAP, and the first byte of the
* control field.
*/
if (caplen < 3 || length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (caplen);
}
/*
* Extract the presumed LLC header into a variable, for quick
* testing.
* Then check for a header that's neither a header for a SNAP
* packet nor an RFC 2684 routed NLPID-formatted PDU nor
* an 802.2-but-no-SNAP IP packet.
*/
llchdr = EXTRACT_24BITS(p);
if (llchdr != LLC_UI_HDR(LLCSAP_SNAP) &&
llchdr != LLC_UI_HDR(LLCSAP_ISONS) &&
llchdr != LLC_UI_HDR(LLCSAP_IP)) {
/*
* XXX - assume 802.6 MAC header from Fore driver.
*
* Unfortunately, the above list doesn't check for
* all known SAPs, doesn't check for headers where
* the source and destination SAP aren't the same,
* and doesn't check for non-UI frames. It also
* runs the risk of an 802.6 MAC header that happens
* to begin with one of those values being
* incorrectly treated as an 802.2 header.
*
* So is that Fore driver still around? And, if so,
* is it still putting 802.6 MAC headers on ATM
* packets? If so, could it be changed to use a
* new DLT_IEEE802_6 value if we added it?
*/
if (caplen < 20 || length < 20) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (caplen);
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%08x%08x %08x%08x ",
EXTRACT_32BITS(p),
EXTRACT_32BITS(p+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(p+8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(p+12)));
p += 20;
length -= 20;
caplen -= 20;
hdrlen += 20;
}
hdrlen += atm_llc_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
return (hdrlen);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
atm_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
u_int length = h->len;
uint32_t llchdr;
u_int hdrlen = 0;
if (caplen < 1 || length < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (caplen);
}
/* Cisco Style NLPID ? */
if (*p == LLC_UI) {
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CNLPID "));
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
return hdrlen;
}
/*
* Must have at least a DSAP, an SSAP, and the first byte of the
* control field.
*/
if (caplen < 3 || length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (caplen);
}
/*
* Extract the presumed LLC header into a variable, for quick
* testing.
* Then check for a header that's neither a header for a SNAP
* packet nor an RFC 2684 routed NLPID-formatted PDU nor
* an 802.2-but-no-SNAP IP packet.
*/
llchdr = EXTRACT_24BITS(p);
if (llchdr != LLC_UI_HDR(LLCSAP_SNAP) &&
llchdr != LLC_UI_HDR(LLCSAP_ISONS) &&
llchdr != LLC_UI_HDR(LLCSAP_IP)) {
/*
* XXX - assume 802.6 MAC header from Fore driver.
*
* Unfortunately, the above list doesn't check for
* all known SAPs, doesn't check for headers where
* the source and destination SAP aren't the same,
* and doesn't check for non-UI frames. It also
* runs the risk of an 802.6 MAC header that happens
* to begin with one of those values being
* incorrectly treated as an 802.2 header.
*
* So is that Fore driver still around? And, if so,
* is it still putting 802.6 MAC headers on ATM
* packets? If so, could it be changed to use a
* new DLT_IEEE802_6 value if we added it?
*/
if (caplen < 20 || length < 20) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (caplen);
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%08x%08x %08x%08x ",
EXTRACT_32BITS(p),
EXTRACT_32BITS(p+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(p+8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(p+12)));
p += 20;
length -= 20;
caplen -= 20;
hdrlen += 20;
}
hdrlen += atm_llc_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
return (hdrlen);
}
| 167,942
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: l2tp_bearer_cap_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint32_t *ptr = (const uint32_t *)dat;
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_BEARER_CAP_ANALOG_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_BEARER_CAP_DIGITAL_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "D"));
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
l2tp_bearer_cap_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
l2tp_bearer_cap_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
const uint32_t *ptr = (const uint32_t *)dat;
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_BEARER_CAP_ANALOG_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_BEARER_CAP_DIGITAL_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "D"));
}
}
| 167,891
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void GpuDataManager::UpdateGpuInfo(const GPUInfo& gpu_info) {
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(gpu_info_lock_);
if (!gpu_info_.Merge(gpu_info))
return;
RunGpuInfoUpdateCallbacks();
content::GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(gpu_info_);
}
UpdateGpuFeatureFlags();
}
Commit Message: Fix a lock re-entry bug in GpuDataManager::UpdateGpuInfo.
The issue is that the registered callbacks could request GPUInfo, so they could re-enter the lock. Therefore, we should release the lock before we run through callbacks.
BUG=84805
TEST=the issue in 84805 is gone.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7054063
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87898 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void GpuDataManager::UpdateGpuInfo(const GPUInfo& gpu_info) {
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(gpu_info_lock_);
if (!gpu_info_.Merge(gpu_info))
return;
}
RunGpuInfoUpdateCallbacks();
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(gpu_info_lock_);
content::GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(gpu_info_);
}
UpdateGpuFeatureFlags();
}
| 170,410
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int spl_filesystem_file_read(spl_filesystem_object *intern, int silent TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char *buf;
size_t line_len = 0;
long line_add = (intern->u.file.current_line || intern->u.file.current_zval) ? 1 : 0;
spl_filesystem_file_free_line(intern TSRMLS_CC);
if (php_stream_eof(intern->u.file.stream)) {
if (!silent) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot read from file %s", intern->file_name);
}
return FAILURE;
}
if (intern->u.file.max_line_len > 0) {
buf = safe_emalloc((intern->u.file.max_line_len + 1), sizeof(char), 0);
if (php_stream_get_line(intern->u.file.stream, buf, intern->u.file.max_line_len + 1, &line_len) == NULL) {
efree(buf);
buf = NULL;
} else {
buf[line_len] = '\0';
}
} else {
buf = php_stream_get_line(intern->u.file.stream, NULL, 0, &line_len);
}
if (!buf) {
intern->u.file.current_line = estrdup("");
intern->u.file.current_line_len = 0;
} else {
if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_DROP_NEW_LINE)) {
line_len = strcspn(buf, "\r\n");
buf[line_len] = '\0';
}
intern->u.file.current_line = buf;
intern->u.file.current_line_len = line_len;
}
intern->u.file.current_line_num += line_add;
return SUCCESS;
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static int spl_filesystem_file_read(spl_filesystem_object *intern, int silent TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char *buf;
size_t line_len = 0;
long line_add = (intern->u.file.current_line || intern->u.file.current_zval) ? 1 : 0;
spl_filesystem_file_free_line(intern TSRMLS_CC);
if (php_stream_eof(intern->u.file.stream)) {
if (!silent) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot read from file %s", intern->file_name);
}
return FAILURE;
}
if (intern->u.file.max_line_len > 0) {
buf = safe_emalloc((intern->u.file.max_line_len + 1), sizeof(char), 0);
if (php_stream_get_line(intern->u.file.stream, buf, intern->u.file.max_line_len + 1, &line_len) == NULL) {
efree(buf);
buf = NULL;
} else {
buf[line_len] = '\0';
}
} else {
buf = php_stream_get_line(intern->u.file.stream, NULL, 0, &line_len);
}
if (!buf) {
intern->u.file.current_line = estrdup("");
intern->u.file.current_line_len = 0;
} else {
if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_DROP_NEW_LINE)) {
line_len = strcspn(buf, "\r\n");
buf[line_len] = '\0';
}
intern->u.file.current_line = buf;
intern->u.file.current_line_len = line_len;
}
intern->u.file.current_line_num += line_add;
return SUCCESS;
} /* }}} */
| 167,076
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: _gnutls_recv_handshake_header (gnutls_session_t session,
gnutls_handshake_description_t type,
gnutls_handshake_description_t * recv_type)
{
int ret;
uint32_t length32 = 0;
uint8_t *dataptr = NULL; /* for realloc */
size_t handshake_header_size = HANDSHAKE_HEADER_SIZE;
/* if we have data into the buffer then return them, do not read the next packet.
* In order to return we need a full TLS handshake header, or in case of a version 2
* packet, then we return the first byte.
*/
if (session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.header_size ==
handshake_header_size || (session->internals.v2_hello != 0
&& type == GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO
&& session->internals.
handshake_header_buffer.packet_length > 0))
{
*recv_type = session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.recv_type;
return session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.packet_length;
}
ret =
_gnutls_handshake_io_recv_int (session, GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE,
type, dataptr, SSL2_HEADERS);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
/* The case ret==0 is caught here.
*/
if (ret != SSL2_HEADERS)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH;
}
session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.header_size = SSL2_HEADERS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
_gnutls_recv_handshake_header (gnutls_session_t session,
gnutls_handshake_description_t type,
gnutls_handshake_description_t * recv_type)
{
int ret;
uint32_t length32 = 0;
uint8_t *dataptr = NULL; /* for realloc */
size_t handshake_header_size = HANDSHAKE_HEADER_SIZE;
/* if we have data into the buffer then return them, do not read the next packet.
* In order to return we need a full TLS handshake header, or in case of a version 2
* packet, then we return the first byte.
*/
if (session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.header_size ==
handshake_header_size || (session->internals.v2_hello != 0
&& type == GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO
&& session->internals.
handshake_header_buffer.packet_length > 0))
{
*recv_type = session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.recv_type;
if (*recv_type != type)
{
gnutls_assert ();
_gnutls_handshake_log
("HSK[%x]: Handshake type mismatch (under attack?)\n", session);
return GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE_PACKET;
}
return session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.packet_length;
}
ret =
_gnutls_handshake_io_recv_int (session, GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE,
type, dataptr, SSL2_HEADERS);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
/* The case ret==0 is caught here.
*/
if (ret != SSL2_HEADERS)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH;
}
session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.header_size = SSL2_HEADERS;
}
| 165,147
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool PPVarToNPVariant(PP_Var var, NPVariant* result) {
switch (var.type) {
case PP_VARTYPE_UNDEFINED:
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_NULL:
NULL_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_BOOL:
BOOLEAN_TO_NPVARIANT(var.value.as_bool, *result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_INT32:
INT32_TO_NPVARIANT(var.value.as_int, *result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_DOUBLE:
DOUBLE_TO_NPVARIANT(var.value.as_double, *result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_STRING: {
scoped_refptr<StringVar> string(StringVar::FromPPVar(var));
if (!string) {
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
return false;
}
const std::string& value = string->value();
STRINGN_TO_NPVARIANT(base::strdup(value.c_str()), value.size(), *result);
break;
}
case PP_VARTYPE_OBJECT: {
scoped_refptr<ObjectVar> object(ObjectVar::FromPPVar(var));
if (!object) {
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
return false;
}
OBJECT_TO_NPVARIANT(WebBindings::retainObject(object->np_object()),
*result);
break;
}
case PP_VARTYPE_ARRAY:
case PP_VARTYPE_DICTIONARY:
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
break;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix invalid read in ppapi code
BUG=77493
TEST=attached test
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6883059
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@82172 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool PPVarToNPVariant(PP_Var var, NPVariant* result) {
switch (var.type) {
case PP_VARTYPE_UNDEFINED:
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_NULL:
NULL_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_BOOL:
BOOLEAN_TO_NPVARIANT(var.value.as_bool, *result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_INT32:
INT32_TO_NPVARIANT(var.value.as_int, *result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_DOUBLE:
DOUBLE_TO_NPVARIANT(var.value.as_double, *result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_STRING: {
scoped_refptr<StringVar> string(StringVar::FromPPVar(var));
if (!string) {
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
return false;
}
const std::string& value = string->value();
char* c_string = static_cast<char*>(malloc(value.size()));
memcpy(c_string, value.data(), value.size());
STRINGN_TO_NPVARIANT(c_string, value.size(), *result);
break;
}
case PP_VARTYPE_OBJECT: {
scoped_refptr<ObjectVar> object(ObjectVar::FromPPVar(var));
if (!object) {
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
return false;
}
OBJECT_TO_NPVARIANT(WebBindings::retainObject(object->np_object()),
*result);
break;
}
case PP_VARTYPE_ARRAY:
case PP_VARTYPE_DICTIONARY:
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
break;
}
return true;
}
| 170,554
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void * gdImageGifPtr (gdImagePtr im, int *size)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx (2048, NULL);
gdImageGifCtx (im, out);
rv = gdDPExtractData (out, size);
out->gd_free (out);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
CWE ID: CWE-415
|
void * gdImageGifPtr (gdImagePtr im, int *size)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx (2048, NULL);
if (!_gdImageGifCtx(im, out)) {
rv = gdDPExtractData(out, size);
} else {
rv = NULL;
}
out->gd_free (out);
return rv;
}
| 169,734
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AppShortcutManager::Observe(int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
switch (type) {
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSIONS_READY: {
OnceOffCreateShortcuts();
break;
}
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_DEPRECATED: {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (!apps::IsAppShimsEnabled())
break;
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
const extensions::InstalledExtensionInfo* installed_info =
content::Details<const extensions::InstalledExtensionInfo>(details)
.ptr();
const Extension* extension = installed_info->extension;
if (installed_info->is_update) {
web_app::UpdateAllShortcuts(
base::UTF8ToUTF16(installed_info->old_name), profile_, extension);
} else if (ShouldCreateShortcutFor(profile_, extension)) {
CreateShortcutsInApplicationsMenu(profile_, extension);
}
break;
}
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_UNINSTALLED: {
const Extension* extension = content::Details<const Extension>(
details).ptr();
web_app::DeleteAllShortcuts(profile_, extension);
break;
}
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void AppShortcutManager::Observe(int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
switch (type) {
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSIONS_READY: {
OnceOffCreateShortcuts();
break;
}
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_DEPRECATED: {
const extensions::InstalledExtensionInfo* installed_info =
content::Details<const extensions::InstalledExtensionInfo>(details)
.ptr();
const Extension* extension = installed_info->extension;
if (installed_info->is_update) {
web_app::UpdateAllShortcuts(
base::UTF8ToUTF16(installed_info->old_name), profile_, extension);
} else if (ShouldCreateShortcutFor(profile_, extension)) {
CreateShortcutsInApplicationsMenu(profile_, extension);
}
break;
}
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_UNINSTALLED: {
const Extension* extension = content::Details<const Extension>(
details).ptr();
web_app::DeleteAllShortcuts(profile_, extension);
break;
}
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
| 171,145
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int jas_stream_write(jas_stream_t *stream, const void *buf, int cnt)
{
int n;
const char *bufptr;
bufptr = buf;
n = 0;
while (n < cnt) {
if (jas_stream_putc(stream, *bufptr) == EOF) {
return n;
}
++bufptr;
++n;
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior.
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
int jas_stream_write(jas_stream_t *stream, const void *buf, int cnt)
{
int n;
const char *bufptr;
if (cnt < 0) {
jas_deprecated("negative count for jas_stream_write");
}
bufptr = buf;
n = 0;
while (n < cnt) {
if (jas_stream_putc(stream, *bufptr) == EOF) {
return n;
}
++bufptr;
++n;
}
return n;
}
| 168,748
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline int mk_vhost_fdt_open(int id, unsigned int hash,
struct session_request *sr)
{
int i;
int fd;
struct vhost_fdt_hash_table *ht = NULL;
struct vhost_fdt_hash_chain *hc;
if (config->fdt == MK_FALSE) {
return open(sr->real_path.data, sr->file_info.flags_read_only);
}
ht = mk_vhost_fdt_table_lookup(id, sr->host_conf);
if (mk_unlikely(!ht)) {
return open(sr->real_path.data, sr->file_info.flags_read_only);
}
/* We got the hash table, now look around the chains array */
hc = mk_vhost_fdt_chain_lookup(hash, ht);
if (hc) {
/* Increment the readers and return the shared FD */
hc->readers++;
return hc->fd;
}
/*
* Get here means that no entry exists in the hash table for the
* requested file descriptor and hash, we must try to open the file
* and register the entry in the table.
*/
fd = open(sr->real_path.data, sr->file_info.flags_read_only);
if (fd == -1) {
return -1;
}
/* If chains are full, just return the new FD, bad luck... */
if (ht->av_slots <= 0) {
return fd;
}
/* Register the new entry in an available slot */
for (i = 0; i < VHOST_FDT_HASHTABLE_CHAINS; i++) {
hc = &ht->chain[i];
if (hc->fd == -1) {
hc->fd = fd;
hc->hash = hash;
hc->readers++;
ht->av_slots--;
sr->vhost_fdt_id = id;
sr->vhost_fdt_hash = hash;
return fd;
}
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Request: new request session flag to mark those files opened by FDT
This patch aims to fix a potential DDoS problem that can be caused
in the server quering repetitive non-existent resources.
When serving a static file, the core use Vhost FDT mechanism, but if
it sends a static error page it does a direct open(2). When closing
the resources for the same request it was just calling mk_vhost_close()
which did not clear properly the file descriptor.
This patch adds a new field on the struct session_request called 'fd_is_fdt',
which contains MK_TRUE or MK_FALSE depending of how fd_file was opened.
Thanks to Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com> for report and troubleshoot this
problem.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Silva <eduardo@monkey.io>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static inline int mk_vhost_fdt_open(int id, unsigned int hash,
struct session_request *sr)
{
int i;
int fd;
struct vhost_fdt_hash_table *ht = NULL;
struct vhost_fdt_hash_chain *hc;
if (config->fdt == MK_FALSE) {
return open(sr->real_path.data, sr->file_info.flags_read_only);
}
ht = mk_vhost_fdt_table_lookup(id, sr->host_conf);
if (mk_unlikely(!ht)) {
return open(sr->real_path.data, sr->file_info.flags_read_only);
}
/* We got the hash table, now look around the chains array */
hc = mk_vhost_fdt_chain_lookup(hash, ht);
if (hc) {
/* Increment the readers and return the shared FD */
hc->readers++;
return hc->fd;
}
/*
* Get here means that no entry exists in the hash table for the
* requested file descriptor and hash, we must try to open the file
* and register the entry in the table.
*/
fd = open(sr->real_path.data, sr->file_info.flags_read_only);
if (fd == -1) {
return -1;
}
/* If chains are full, just return the new FD, bad luck... */
if (ht->av_slots <= 0) {
return fd;
}
/* Register the new entry in an available slot */
for (i = 0; i < VHOST_FDT_HASHTABLE_CHAINS; i++) {
hc = &ht->chain[i];
if (hc->fd == -1) {
hc->fd = fd;
hc->hash = hash;
hc->readers++;
ht->av_slots--;
sr->vhost_fdt_id = id;
sr->vhost_fdt_hash = hash;
sr->fd_is_fdt = MK_TRUE;
return fd;
}
}
return -1;
}
| 166,279
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: char* problem_data_save(problem_data_t *pd)
{
load_abrt_conf();
struct dump_dir *dd = create_dump_dir_from_problem_data(pd, g_settings_dump_location);
char *problem_id = NULL;
if (dd)
{
problem_id = xstrdup(dd->dd_dirname);
dd_close(dd);
}
log_info("problem id: '%s'", problem_id);
return problem_id;
}
Commit Message: make the dump directories owned by root by default
It was discovered that the abrt event scripts create a user-readable
copy of a sosreport file in abrt problem directories, and include
excerpts of /var/log/messages selected by the user-controlled process
name, leading to an information disclosure.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Related: #1212868
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
char* problem_data_save(problem_data_t *pd)
{
load_abrt_conf();
struct dump_dir *dd = NULL;
if (g_settings_privatereports)
dd = create_dump_dir_from_problem_data_ext(pd, g_settings_dump_location, 0);
else
dd = create_dump_dir_from_problem_data(pd, g_settings_dump_location);
char *problem_id = NULL;
if (dd)
{
problem_id = xstrdup(dd->dd_dirname);
dd_close(dd);
}
log_info("problem id: '%s'", problem_id);
return problem_id;
}
| 170,151
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void TearDown() {
content::GetContentClient()->set_browser(old_browser_client_);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
virtual void TearDown() {
content::GetContentClient()->set_browser(old_browser_client_);
content::SetContentClient(old_client_);
}
| 171,012
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void VarianceTest<VarianceFunctionType>::OneQuarterTest() {
memset(src_, 255, block_size_);
const int half = block_size_ / 2;
memset(ref_, 255, half);
memset(ref_ + half, 0, half);
unsigned int sse;
unsigned int var;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var = variance_(src_, width_, ref_, width_, &sse));
const unsigned int expected = block_size_ * 255 * 255 / 4;
EXPECT_EQ(expected, var);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void VarianceTest<VarianceFunctionType>::OneQuarterTest() {
const int half = block_size_ / 2;
if (!use_high_bit_depth_) {
memset(src_, 255, block_size_);
memset(ref_, 255, half);
memset(ref_ + half, 0, half);
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
vpx_memset16(CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(src_), 255 << (bit_depth_ - 8),
block_size_);
vpx_memset16(CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(ref_), 255 << (bit_depth_ - 8), half);
vpx_memset16(CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(ref_) + half, 0, half);
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
unsigned int sse;
unsigned int var;
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var = variance_(src_, width_, ref_, width_, &sse));
const unsigned int expected = block_size_ * 255 * 255 / 4;
EXPECT_EQ(expected, var);
}
| 174,585
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PS_SERIALIZER_DECODE_FUNC(php) /* {{{ */
{
const char *p, *q;
char *name;
const char *endptr = val + vallen;
zval *current;
int namelen;
int has_value;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
p = val;
while (p < endptr) {
zval **tmp;
q = p;
while (*q != PS_DELIMITER) {
if (++q >= endptr) goto break_outer_loop;
}
if (p[0] == PS_UNDEF_MARKER) {
p++;
has_value = 0;
} else {
has_value = 1;
}
namelen = q - p;
name = estrndup(p, namelen);
q++;
if (zend_hash_find(&EG(symbol_table), name, namelen + 1, (void **) &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
if ((Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_ARRAY && Z_ARRVAL_PP(tmp) == &EG(symbol_table)) || *tmp == PS(http_session_vars)) {
goto skip;
}
}
if (has_value) {
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(current);
if (php_var_unserialize(¤t, (const unsigned char **) &q, (const unsigned char *) endptr, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
php_set_session_var(name, namelen, current, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
var_push_dtor_no_addref(&var_hash, ¤t);
efree(name);
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return FAILURE;
}
var_push_dtor_no_addref(&var_hash, ¤t);
}
PS_ADD_VARL(name, namelen);
skip:
efree(name);
p = q;
}
break_outer_loop:
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72681 - consume data even if we're not storing them
CWE ID: CWE-74
|
PS_SERIALIZER_DECODE_FUNC(php) /* {{{ */
{
const char *p, *q;
char *name;
const char *endptr = val + vallen;
zval *current;
int namelen;
int has_value;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
int skip = 0;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
p = val;
while (p < endptr) {
zval **tmp;
q = p;
skip = 0;
while (*q != PS_DELIMITER) {
if (++q >= endptr) goto break_outer_loop;
}
if (p[0] == PS_UNDEF_MARKER) {
p++;
has_value = 0;
} else {
has_value = 1;
}
namelen = q - p;
name = estrndup(p, namelen);
q++;
if (zend_hash_find(&EG(symbol_table), name, namelen + 1, (void **) &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
if ((Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_ARRAY && Z_ARRVAL_PP(tmp) == &EG(symbol_table)) || *tmp == PS(http_session_vars)) {
skip = 1;
}
}
if (has_value) {
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(current);
if (php_var_unserialize(¤t, (const unsigned char **) &q, (const unsigned char *) endptr, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (!skip) {
php_set_session_var(name, namelen, current, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC);
}
} else {
var_push_dtor_no_addref(&var_hash, ¤t);
efree(name);
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return FAILURE;
}
var_push_dtor_no_addref(&var_hash, ¤t);
}
if (!skip) {
PS_ADD_VARL(name, namelen);
}
skip:
efree(name);
p = q;
}
break_outer_loop:
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
| 166,959
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: deinterlace_row(png_bytep buffer, png_const_bytep row,
unsigned int pixel_size, png_uint_32 w, int pass)
{
/* The inverse of the above, 'row' is part of row 'y' of the output image,
* in 'buffer'. The image is 'w' wide and this is pass 'pass', distribute
* the pixels of row into buffer and return the number written (to allow
* this to be checked).
*/
png_uint_32 xin, xout, xstep;
xout = PNG_PASS_START_COL(pass);
xstep = 1U<<PNG_PASS_COL_SHIFT(pass);
for (xin=0; xout<w; xout+=xstep)
{
pixel_copy(buffer, xout, row, xin, pixel_size);
++xin;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
deinterlace_row(png_bytep buffer, png_const_bytep row,
| 173,607
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ResourceTracker::UnrefResource(PP_Resource res) {
DLOG_IF(ERROR, !CheckIdType(res, PP_ID_TYPE_RESOURCE))
<< res << " is not a PP_Resource.";
ResourceMap::iterator i = live_resources_.find(res);
if (i != live_resources_.end()) {
if (!--i->second.second) {
Resource* to_release = i->second.first;
PP_Instance instance = to_release->instance()->pp_instance();
to_release->LastPluginRefWasDeleted(false);
instance_map_[instance]->resources.erase(res);
live_resources_.erase(i);
}
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool ResourceTracker::UnrefResource(PP_Resource res) {
DLOG_IF(ERROR, !CheckIdType(res, PP_ID_TYPE_RESOURCE))
<< res << " is not a PP_Resource.";
ResourceMap::iterator i = live_resources_.find(res);
if (i != live_resources_.end()) {
if (!--i->second.second) {
Resource* to_release = i->second.first;
PP_Instance instance = to_release->instance()->pp_instance();
to_release->LastPluginRefWasDeleted();
instance_map_[instance]->ref_resources.erase(res);
live_resources_.erase(i);
}
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
}
| 170,419
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintInactiveTabBackground(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
const SkPath& clip) const {
bool has_custom_image;
int fill_id = tab_->controller()->GetBackgroundResourceId(&has_custom_image);
if (!has_custom_image)
fill_id = 0;
PaintTabBackground(canvas, false /* active */, fill_id, 0,
tab_->controller()->MaySetClip() ? &clip : nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void GM2TabStyle::PaintInactiveTabBackground(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
const SkPath& clip) const {
bool has_custom_image;
int fill_id = tab_->controller()->GetBackgroundResourceId(&has_custom_image);
if (!has_custom_image)
fill_id = 0;
PaintTabBackground(canvas, TAB_INACTIVE, fill_id, 0,
tab_->controller()->MaySetClip() ? &clip : nullptr);
}
| 172,523
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static char *pool_strdup(const char *s)
{
char *r = pool_alloc(strlen(s) + 1);
strcpy(r, s);
return r;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static char *pool_strdup(const char *s)
{
size_t len = strlen(s) + 1;
char *r = pool_alloc(len);
memcpy(r, s, len);
return r;
}
| 167,428
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: test_js (void) {
GString *result = g_string_new("");
/* simple javascript can be evaluated and returned */
parse_cmd_line("js ('x' + 345).toUpperCase()", result);
g_assert_cmpstr("X345", ==, result->str);
/* uzbl commands can be run from javascript */
uzbl.net.useragent = "Test useragent";
parse_cmd_line("js Uzbl.run('print @useragent').toUpperCase();", result);
g_assert_cmpstr("TEST USERAGENT", ==, result->str);
g_string_free(result, TRUE);
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
test_js (void) {
GString *result = g_string_new("");
/* simple javascript can be evaluated and returned */
parse_cmd_line("js ('x' + 345).toUpperCase()", result);
g_assert_cmpstr("X345", ==, result->str);
g_string_free(result, TRUE);
}
| 165,522
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: WebView* RenderViewImpl::createView(
WebFrame* creator,
const WebURLRequest& request,
const WebWindowFeatures& features,
const WebString& frame_name,
WebNavigationPolicy policy) {
if (shared_popup_counter_->data > kMaximumNumberOfUnacknowledgedPopups)
return NULL;
ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params params;
params.opener_id = routing_id_;
params.user_gesture = creator->isProcessingUserGesture();
params.window_container_type = WindowFeaturesToContainerType(features);
params.session_storage_namespace_id = session_storage_namespace_id_;
params.frame_name = frame_name;
params.opener_frame_id = creator->identifier();
params.opener_url = creator->document().url();
params.opener_security_origin =
creator->document().securityOrigin().toString().utf8();
params.opener_suppressed = creator->willSuppressOpenerInNewFrame();
params.disposition = NavigationPolicyToDisposition(policy);
if (!request.isNull())
params.target_url = request.url();
int32 routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
int32 surface_id = 0;
int64 cloned_session_storage_namespace_id;
RenderThread::Get()->Send(
new ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow(params,
&routing_id,
&surface_id,
&cloned_session_storage_namespace_id));
if (routing_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
return NULL;
creator->consumeUserGesture();
RenderViewImpl* view = RenderViewImpl::Create(
routing_id_,
renderer_preferences_,
webkit_preferences_,
shared_popup_counter_,
routing_id,
surface_id,
cloned_session_storage_namespace_id,
frame_name,
true,
false,
1,
screen_info_,
accessibility_mode_);
view->opened_by_user_gesture_ = params.user_gesture;
view->opener_suppressed_ = params.opener_suppressed;
view->alternate_error_page_url_ = alternate_error_page_url_;
return view->webview();
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
WebView* RenderViewImpl::createView(
WebFrame* creator,
const WebURLRequest& request,
const WebWindowFeatures& features,
const WebString& frame_name,
WebNavigationPolicy policy) {
if (shared_popup_counter_->data > kMaximumNumberOfUnacknowledgedPopups)
return NULL;
ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params params;
params.opener_id = routing_id_;
params.user_gesture = creator->isProcessingUserGesture();
params.window_container_type = WindowFeaturesToContainerType(features);
params.session_storage_namespace_id = session_storage_namespace_id_;
params.frame_name = frame_name;
params.opener_frame_id = creator->identifier();
params.opener_url = creator->document().url();
GURL security_url(creator->document().securityOrigin().toString().utf8());
if (!security_url.is_valid())
security_url = GURL();
params.opener_security_origin = security_url;
params.opener_suppressed = creator->willSuppressOpenerInNewFrame();
params.disposition = NavigationPolicyToDisposition(policy);
if (!request.isNull())
params.target_url = request.url();
int32 routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
int32 surface_id = 0;
int64 cloned_session_storage_namespace_id;
RenderThread::Get()->Send(
new ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow(params,
&routing_id,
&surface_id,
&cloned_session_storage_namespace_id));
if (routing_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
return NULL;
creator->consumeUserGesture();
RenderViewImpl* view = RenderViewImpl::Create(
routing_id_,
renderer_preferences_,
webkit_preferences_,
shared_popup_counter_,
routing_id,
surface_id,
cloned_session_storage_namespace_id,
frame_name,
true,
false,
1,
screen_info_,
accessibility_mode_);
view->opened_by_user_gesture_ = params.user_gesture;
view->opener_suppressed_ = params.opener_suppressed;
view->alternate_error_page_url_ = alternate_error_page_url_;
return view->webview();
}
| 171,499
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int b_unpack (lua_State *L) {
Header h;
const char *fmt = luaL_checkstring(L, 1);
size_t ld;
const char *data = luaL_checklstring(L, 2, &ld);
size_t pos = luaL_optinteger(L, 3, 1) - 1;
int n = 0; /* number of results */
defaultoptions(&h);
while (*fmt) {
int opt = *fmt++;
size_t size = optsize(L, opt, &fmt);
pos += gettoalign(pos, &h, opt, size);
luaL_argcheck(L, pos+size <= ld, 2, "data string too short");
/* stack space for item + next position */
luaL_checkstack(L, 2, "too many results");
switch (opt) {
case 'b': case 'B': case 'h': case 'H':
case 'l': case 'L': case 'T': case 'i': case 'I': { /* integer types */
int issigned = islower(opt);
lua_Number res = getinteger(data+pos, h.endian, issigned, size);
lua_pushnumber(L, res); n++;
break;
}
case 'x': {
break;
}
case 'f': {
float f;
memcpy(&f, data+pos, size);
correctbytes((char *)&f, sizeof(f), h.endian);
lua_pushnumber(L, f); n++;
break;
}
case 'd': {
double d;
memcpy(&d, data+pos, size);
correctbytes((char *)&d, sizeof(d), h.endian);
lua_pushnumber(L, d); n++;
break;
}
case 'c': {
if (size == 0) {
if (n == 0 || !lua_isnumber(L, -1))
luaL_error(L, "format 'c0' needs a previous size");
size = lua_tonumber(L, -1);
lua_pop(L, 1); n--;
luaL_argcheck(L, size <= ld && pos <= ld - size,
2, "data string too short");
}
lua_pushlstring(L, data+pos, size); n++;
break;
}
case 's': {
const char *e = (const char *)memchr(data+pos, '\0', ld - pos);
if (e == NULL)
luaL_error(L, "unfinished string in data");
size = (e - (data+pos)) + 1;
lua_pushlstring(L, data+pos, size - 1); n++;
break;
}
default: controloptions(L, opt, &fmt, &h);
}
pos += size;
}
lua_pushinteger(L, pos + 1); /* next position */
return n + 1;
}
Commit Message: Security: fix Lua struct package offset handling.
After the first fix to the struct package I found another similar
problem, which is fixed by this patch. It could be reproduced easily by
running the following script:
return struct.unpack('f', "xxxxxxxxxxxxx",-3)
The above will access bytes before the 'data' pointer.
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static int b_unpack (lua_State *L) {
Header h;
const char *fmt = luaL_checkstring(L, 1);
size_t ld;
const char *data = luaL_checklstring(L, 2, &ld);
size_t pos = luaL_optinteger(L, 3, 1);
luaL_argcheck(L, pos > 0, 3, "offset must be 1 or greater");
pos--; /* Lua indexes are 1-based, but here we want 0-based for C
* pointer math. */
int n = 0; /* number of results */
defaultoptions(&h);
while (*fmt) {
int opt = *fmt++;
size_t size = optsize(L, opt, &fmt);
pos += gettoalign(pos, &h, opt, size);
luaL_argcheck(L, size <= ld && pos <= ld - size,
2, "data string too short");
/* stack space for item + next position */
luaL_checkstack(L, 2, "too many results");
switch (opt) {
case 'b': case 'B': case 'h': case 'H':
case 'l': case 'L': case 'T': case 'i': case 'I': { /* integer types */
int issigned = islower(opt);
lua_Number res = getinteger(data+pos, h.endian, issigned, size);
lua_pushnumber(L, res); n++;
break;
}
case 'x': {
break;
}
case 'f': {
float f;
memcpy(&f, data+pos, size);
correctbytes((char *)&f, sizeof(f), h.endian);
lua_pushnumber(L, f); n++;
break;
}
case 'd': {
double d;
memcpy(&d, data+pos, size);
correctbytes((char *)&d, sizeof(d), h.endian);
lua_pushnumber(L, d); n++;
break;
}
case 'c': {
if (size == 0) {
if (n == 0 || !lua_isnumber(L, -1))
luaL_error(L, "format 'c0' needs a previous size");
size = lua_tonumber(L, -1);
lua_pop(L, 1); n--;
luaL_argcheck(L, size <= ld && pos <= ld - size,
2, "data string too short");
}
lua_pushlstring(L, data+pos, size); n++;
break;
}
case 's': {
const char *e = (const char *)memchr(data+pos, '\0', ld - pos);
if (e == NULL)
luaL_error(L, "unfinished string in data");
size = (e - (data+pos)) + 1;
lua_pushlstring(L, data+pos, size - 1); n++;
break;
}
default: controloptions(L, opt, &fmt, &h);
}
pos += size;
}
lua_pushinteger(L, pos + 1); /* next position */
return n + 1;
}
| 169,237
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: __ext4_set_acl(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, int type,
struct posix_acl *acl)
{
int name_index;
void *value = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
int error;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name_index = EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
if (error < 0)
return error;
else {
inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
if (error == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name_index = EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
value = ext4_acl_to_disk(acl, &size);
if (IS_ERR(value))
return (int)PTR_ERR(value);
}
error = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, name_index, "",
value, size, 0);
kfree(value);
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return error;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
|
__ext4_set_acl(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, int type,
struct posix_acl *acl)
{
int name_index;
void *value = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
int error;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name_index = EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
if (error)
return error;
inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name_index = EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
value = ext4_acl_to_disk(acl, &size);
if (IS_ERR(value))
return (int)PTR_ERR(value);
}
error = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, name_index, "",
value, size, 0);
kfree(value);
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return error;
}
| 166,970
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void close_all_sockets(atransport* t) {
asocket* s;
/* this is a little gross, but since s->close() *will* modify
** the list out from under you, your options are limited.
*/
adb_mutex_lock(&socket_list_lock);
restart:
for (s = local_socket_list.next; s != &local_socket_list; s = s->next) {
if (s->transport == t || (s->peer && s->peer->transport == t)) {
local_socket_close_locked(s);
goto restart;
}
}
adb_mutex_unlock(&socket_list_lock);
}
Commit Message: adb: switch the socket list mutex to a recursive_mutex.
sockets.cpp was branching on whether a socket close function was
local_socket_close in order to avoid a potential deadlock if the socket
list lock was held while closing a peer socket.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I5e56f17fa54275284787f0f1dc150d1960256ab3
(cherry picked from commit 9b587dec6d0a57c8fe1083c1c543fbeb163d65fa)
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void close_all_sockets(atransport* t) {
asocket* s;
/* this is a little gross, but since s->close() *will* modify
** the list out from under you, your options are limited.
*/
std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> lock(local_socket_list_lock);
restart:
for (s = local_socket_list.next; s != &local_socket_list; s = s->next) {
if (s->transport == t || (s->peer && s->peer->transport == t)) {
local_socket_close(s);
goto restart;
}
}
}
| 174,150
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void edge_bulk_in_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct edgeport_port *edge_port = urb->context;
struct device *dev = &edge_port->port->dev;
unsigned char *data = urb->transfer_buffer;
int retval = 0;
int port_number;
int status = urb->status;
switch (status) {
case 0:
/* success */
break;
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
/* this urb is terminated, clean up */
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - urb shutting down with status: %d\n", __func__, status);
return;
default:
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - nonzero read bulk status received: %d\n", __func__, status);
}
if (status == -EPIPE)
goto exit;
if (status) {
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - stopping read!\n", __func__);
return;
}
port_number = edge_port->port->port_number;
if (edge_port->lsr_event) {
edge_port->lsr_event = 0;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s ===== Port %u LSR Status = %02x, Data = %02x ======\n",
__func__, port_number, edge_port->lsr_mask, *data);
handle_new_lsr(edge_port, 1, edge_port->lsr_mask, *data);
/* Adjust buffer length/pointer */
--urb->actual_length;
++data;
}
if (urb->actual_length) {
usb_serial_debug_data(dev, __func__, urb->actual_length, data);
if (edge_port->close_pending)
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - close pending, dropping data on the floor\n",
__func__);
else
edge_tty_recv(edge_port->port, data,
urb->actual_length);
edge_port->port->icount.rx += urb->actual_length;
}
exit:
/* continue read unless stopped */
spin_lock(&edge_port->ep_lock);
if (edge_port->ep_read_urb_state == EDGE_READ_URB_RUNNING)
retval = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
else if (edge_port->ep_read_urb_state == EDGE_READ_URB_STOPPING)
edge_port->ep_read_urb_state = EDGE_READ_URB_STOPPED;
spin_unlock(&edge_port->ep_lock);
if (retval)
dev_err(dev, "%s - usb_submit_urb failed with result %d\n", __func__, retval);
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191
|
static void edge_bulk_in_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct edgeport_port *edge_port = urb->context;
struct device *dev = &edge_port->port->dev;
unsigned char *data = urb->transfer_buffer;
int retval = 0;
int port_number;
int status = urb->status;
switch (status) {
case 0:
/* success */
break;
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
/* this urb is terminated, clean up */
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - urb shutting down with status: %d\n", __func__, status);
return;
default:
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - nonzero read bulk status received: %d\n", __func__, status);
}
if (status == -EPIPE)
goto exit;
if (status) {
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - stopping read!\n", __func__);
return;
}
port_number = edge_port->port->port_number;
if (urb->actual_length > 0 && edge_port->lsr_event) {
edge_port->lsr_event = 0;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s ===== Port %u LSR Status = %02x, Data = %02x ======\n",
__func__, port_number, edge_port->lsr_mask, *data);
handle_new_lsr(edge_port, 1, edge_port->lsr_mask, *data);
/* Adjust buffer length/pointer */
--urb->actual_length;
++data;
}
if (urb->actual_length) {
usb_serial_debug_data(dev, __func__, urb->actual_length, data);
if (edge_port->close_pending)
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - close pending, dropping data on the floor\n",
__func__);
else
edge_tty_recv(edge_port->port, data,
urb->actual_length);
edge_port->port->icount.rx += urb->actual_length;
}
exit:
/* continue read unless stopped */
spin_lock(&edge_port->ep_lock);
if (edge_port->ep_read_urb_state == EDGE_READ_URB_RUNNING)
retval = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
else if (edge_port->ep_read_urb_state == EDGE_READ_URB_STOPPING)
edge_port->ep_read_urb_state = EDGE_READ_URB_STOPPED;
spin_unlock(&edge_port->ep_lock);
if (retval)
dev_err(dev, "%s - usb_submit_urb failed with result %d\n", __func__, retval);
}
| 168,189
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int cxusb_ctrl_msg(struct dvb_usb_device *d,
u8 cmd, u8 *wbuf, int wlen, u8 *rbuf, int rlen)
{
struct cxusb_state *st = d->priv;
int ret, wo;
if (1 + wlen > MAX_XFER_SIZE) {
warn("i2c wr: len=%d is too big!\n", wlen);
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
wo = (rbuf == NULL || rlen == 0); /* write-only */
mutex_lock(&d->data_mutex);
st->data[0] = cmd;
memcpy(&st->data[1], wbuf, wlen);
if (wo)
ret = dvb_usb_generic_write(d, st->data, 1 + wlen);
else
ret = dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, st->data, 1 + wlen,
rbuf, rlen, 0);
mutex_unlock(&d->data_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int cxusb_ctrl_msg(struct dvb_usb_device *d,
u8 cmd, u8 *wbuf, int wlen, u8 *rbuf, int rlen)
{
struct cxusb_state *st = d->priv;
int ret;
if (1 + wlen > MAX_XFER_SIZE) {
warn("i2c wr: len=%d is too big!\n", wlen);
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
if (rlen > MAX_XFER_SIZE) {
warn("i2c rd: len=%d is too big!\n", rlen);
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
mutex_lock(&d->data_mutex);
st->data[0] = cmd;
memcpy(&st->data[1], wbuf, wlen);
ret = dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, st->data, 1 + wlen, st->data, rlen, 0);
if (!ret && rbuf && rlen)
memcpy(rbuf, st->data, rlen);
mutex_unlock(&d->data_mutex);
return ret;
}
| 168,223
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::LoadBlobAsync(
Blob* blob) {
loader_->Start(blob->GetBlobDataHandle());
}
Commit Message: Fix UAP in ImageBitmapLoader/FileReaderLoader
FileReaderLoader stores its client as a raw pointer, so in cases like
ImageBitmapLoader where the FileReaderLoaderClient really is garbage
collected we have to make sure to destroy the FileReaderLoader when
the ExecutionContext that owns it is destroyed.
Bug: 913970
Change-Id: I40b02115367cf7bf5bbbbb8e9b57874d2510f861
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1374511
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616342}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::LoadBlobAsync(
void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::LoadBlobAsync(Blob* blob) {
loader_->Start(blob->GetBlobDataHandle());
}
| 173,068
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintBackgroundStroke(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
bool active,
SkColor stroke_color) const {
SkPath outer_path =
GetPath(TabStyle::PathType::kBorder, canvas->image_scale(), active);
gfx::ScopedCanvas scoped_canvas(canvas);
float scale = canvas->UndoDeviceScaleFactor();
cc::PaintFlags flags;
flags.setAntiAlias(true);
flags.setColor(stroke_color);
flags.setStyle(cc::PaintFlags::kStroke_Style);
flags.setStrokeWidth(GetStrokeThickness(active) * scale);
canvas->DrawPath(outer_path, flags);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void GM2TabStyle::PaintBackgroundStroke(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
TabState active_state,
SkColor stroke_color) const {
SkPath outer_path =
GetPath(TabStyle::PathType::kBorder, canvas->image_scale(),
active_state == TAB_ACTIVE);
gfx::ScopedCanvas scoped_canvas(canvas);
float scale = canvas->UndoDeviceScaleFactor();
cc::PaintFlags flags;
flags.setAntiAlias(true);
flags.setColor(stroke_color);
flags.setStyle(cc::PaintFlags::kStroke_Style);
flags.setStrokeWidth(GetStrokeThickness(active_state == TAB_ACTIVE) * scale);
canvas->DrawPath(outer_path, flags);
}
| 172,522
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ppp_hdlc(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, int length)
{
u_char *b, *s, *t, c;
int i, proto;
const void *se;
if (length <= 0)
return;
b = (uint8_t *)malloc(length);
if (b == NULL)
return;
/*
* Unescape all the data into a temporary, private, buffer.
* Do this so that we dont overwrite the original packet
* contents.
*/
for (s = (u_char *)p, t = b, i = length; i > 0; i--) {
c = *s++;
if (c == 0x7d) {
if (i > 1) {
i--;
c = *s++ ^ 0x20;
} else
continue;
}
*t++ = c;
}
se = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ndo->ndo_snapend = t;
length = t - b;
/* now lets guess about the payload codepoint format */
if (length < 1)
goto trunc;
proto = *b; /* start with a one-octet codepoint guess */
switch (proto) {
case PPP_IP:
ip_print(ndo, b + 1, length - 1);
goto cleanup;
case PPP_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, b + 1, length - 1);
goto cleanup;
default: /* no luck - try next guess */
break;
}
if (length < 2)
goto trunc;
proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(b); /* next guess - load two octets */
switch (proto) {
case (PPP_ADDRESS << 8 | PPP_CONTROL): /* looks like a PPP frame */
if (length < 4)
goto trunc;
proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(b+2); /* load the PPP proto-id */
handle_ppp(ndo, proto, b + 4, length - 4);
break;
default: /* last guess - proto must be a PPP proto-id */
handle_ppp(ndo, proto, b + 2, length - 2);
break;
}
cleanup:
ndo->ndo_snapend = se;
free(b);
return;
trunc:
ndo->ndo_snapend = se;
free(b);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ppp]"));
}
Commit Message: Do bounds checking when unescaping PPP.
Clean up a const issue while we're at it.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
ppp_hdlc(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, int length)
{
u_char *b, *t, c;
const u_char *s;
int i, proto;
const void *se;
if (length <= 0)
return;
b = (u_char *)malloc(length);
if (b == NULL)
return;
/*
* Unescape all the data into a temporary, private, buffer.
* Do this so that we dont overwrite the original packet
* contents.
*/
for (s = p, t = b, i = length; i > 0 && ND_TTEST(*s); i--) {
c = *s++;
if (c == 0x7d) {
if (i <= 1 || !ND_TTEST(*s))
break;
i--;
c = *s++ ^ 0x20;
}
*t++ = c;
}
se = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ndo->ndo_snapend = t;
length = t - b;
/* now lets guess about the payload codepoint format */
if (length < 1)
goto trunc;
proto = *b; /* start with a one-octet codepoint guess */
switch (proto) {
case PPP_IP:
ip_print(ndo, b + 1, length - 1);
goto cleanup;
case PPP_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, b + 1, length - 1);
goto cleanup;
default: /* no luck - try next guess */
break;
}
if (length < 2)
goto trunc;
proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(b); /* next guess - load two octets */
switch (proto) {
case (PPP_ADDRESS << 8 | PPP_CONTROL): /* looks like a PPP frame */
if (length < 4)
goto trunc;
proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(b+2); /* load the PPP proto-id */
handle_ppp(ndo, proto, b + 4, length - 4);
break;
default: /* last guess - proto must be a PPP proto-id */
handle_ppp(ndo, proto, b + 2, length - 2);
break;
}
cleanup:
ndo->ndo_snapend = se;
free(b);
return;
trunc:
ndo->ndo_snapend = se;
free(b);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ppp]"));
}
| 166,240
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int spl_array_has_dimension_ex(int check_inherited, zval *object, zval *offset, int check_empty TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
long index;
zval *rv, *value = NULL, **tmp;
if (check_inherited && intern->fptr_offset_has) {
zval *offset_tmp = offset;
SEPARATE_ARG_IF_REF(offset_tmp);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&object, Z_OBJCE_P(object), &intern->fptr_offset_has, "offsetExists", &rv, offset_tmp);
zval_ptr_dtor(&offset_tmp);
if (rv && zend_is_true(rv)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&rv);
if (check_empty != 1) {
return 1;
} else if (intern->fptr_offset_get) {
value = spl_array_read_dimension_ex(1, object, offset, BP_VAR_R TSRMLS_CC);
}
} else {
if (rv) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&rv);
}
return 0;
}
}
if (!value) {
HashTable *ht = spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
switch(Z_TYPE_P(offset)) {
case IS_STRING:
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(offset), Z_STRLEN_P(offset)+1, (void **) &tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (check_empty == 2) {
return 1;
}
} else {
return 0;
}
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
case IS_RESOURCE:
case IS_BOOL:
case IS_LONG:
if (offset->type == IS_DOUBLE) {
index = (long)Z_DVAL_P(offset);
} else {
index = Z_LVAL_P(offset);
}
if (zend_hash_index_find(ht, index, (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (check_empty == 2) {
return 1;
}
} else {
return 0;
}
break;
default:
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Illegal offset type");
return 0;
}
if (check_empty && check_inherited && intern->fptr_offset_get) {
value = spl_array_read_dimension_ex(1, object, offset, BP_VAR_R TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
value = *tmp;
}
}
return check_empty ? zend_is_true(value) : Z_TYPE_P(value) != IS_NULL;
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #73029 - Missing type check when unserializing SplArray
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int spl_array_has_dimension_ex(int check_inherited, zval *object, zval *offset, int check_empty TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
long index;
zval *rv, *value = NULL, **tmp;
if (check_inherited && intern->fptr_offset_has) {
zval *offset_tmp = offset;
SEPARATE_ARG_IF_REF(offset_tmp);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&object, Z_OBJCE_P(object), &intern->fptr_offset_has, "offsetExists", &rv, offset_tmp);
zval_ptr_dtor(&offset_tmp);
if (rv && zend_is_true(rv)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&rv);
if (check_empty != 1) {
return 1;
} else if (intern->fptr_offset_get) {
value = spl_array_read_dimension_ex(1, object, offset, BP_VAR_R TSRMLS_CC);
}
} else {
if (rv) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&rv);
}
return 0;
}
}
if (!value) {
HashTable *ht = spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
switch(Z_TYPE_P(offset)) {
case IS_STRING:
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(offset), Z_STRLEN_P(offset)+1, (void **) &tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (check_empty == 2) {
return 1;
}
} else {
return 0;
}
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
case IS_RESOURCE:
case IS_BOOL:
case IS_LONG:
if (offset->type == IS_DOUBLE) {
index = (long)Z_DVAL_P(offset);
} else {
index = Z_LVAL_P(offset);
}
if (zend_hash_index_find(ht, index, (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (check_empty == 2) {
return 1;
}
} else {
return 0;
}
break;
default:
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Illegal offset type");
return 0;
}
if (check_empty && check_inherited && intern->fptr_offset_get) {
value = spl_array_read_dimension_ex(1, object, offset, BP_VAR_R TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
value = *tmp;
}
}
return check_empty ? zend_is_true(value) : Z_TYPE_P(value) != IS_NULL;
} /* }}} */
| 166,932
|
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