instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.3k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void php_snmp_error(zval *object, const char *docref, int type, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
php_snmp_object *snmp_object = NULL;
if (object) {
snmp_object = Z_SNMP_P(object);
if (type == PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR) {
memset(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, 0, sizeof(snmp_object->snmp_errstr));
} else {
va_start(args, format);
vsnprintf(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, sizeof(snmp_object->snmp_errstr) - 1, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
snmp_object->snmp_errno = type;
}
if (type == PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR) {
return;
}
if (object && (snmp_object->exceptions_enabled & type)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(php_snmp_exception_ce, type, snmp_object->snmp_errstr);
} else {
va_start(args, format);
php_verror(docref, "", E_WARNING, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static void php_snmp_error(zval *object, const char *docref, int type, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
php_snmp_object *snmp_object = NULL;
if (object) {
snmp_object = Z_SNMP_P(object);
if (type == PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR) {
memset(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, 0, sizeof(snmp_object->snmp_errstr));
} else {
va_start(args, format);
vsnprintf(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, sizeof(snmp_object->snmp_errstr) - 1, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
snmp_object->snmp_errno = type;
}
if (type == PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR) {
return;
}
if (object && (snmp_object->exceptions_enabled & type)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(php_snmp_exception_ce, type, "%s", snmp_object->snmp_errstr);
} else {
va_start(args, format);
php_verror(docref, "", E_WARNING, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
}
| 165,074
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: }static inline void WriteResourceLong(unsigned char *p,
const unsigned int quantum)
{
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
}static inline void WriteResourceLong(unsigned char *p,
}
static inline void WriteResourceLong(unsigned char *p,
const unsigned int quantum)
{
| 169,950
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool GetURLRowForAutocompleteMatch(Profile* profile,
const AutocompleteMatch& match,
history::URLRow* url_row) {
DCHECK(url_row);
HistoryService* history_service =
profile->GetHistoryService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (!history_service)
return false;
history::URLDatabase* url_db = history_service->InMemoryDatabase();
return url_db && (url_db->GetRowForURL(match.destination_url, url_row) != 0);
}
Commit Message: Removing dead code from NetworkActionPredictor.
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358062
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121926 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool GetURLRowForAutocompleteMatch(Profile* profile,
| 170,958
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission(Event* event)
{
Frame* frame = document().frame();
if (m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission || !frame)
return m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission;
m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission = true;
m_shouldSubmit = false;
if (!validateInteractively(event)) {
m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission = false;
return false;
}
StringPairVector controlNamesAndValues;
getTextFieldValues(controlNamesAndValues);
RefPtr<FormState> formState = FormState::create(this, controlNamesAndValues, &document(), NotSubmittedByJavaScript);
frame->loader()->client()->dispatchWillSendSubmitEvent(formState.release());
if (dispatchEvent(Event::createCancelableBubble(eventNames().submitEvent)))
m_shouldSubmit = true;
m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission = false;
if (m_shouldSubmit)
submit(event, true, true, NotSubmittedByJavaScript);
return m_shouldSubmit;
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash in HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission.
BUG=297478
TEST=automated with ASAN.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24910003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158428 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission(Event* event)
{
RefPtr<HTMLFormElement> protector(this);
Frame* frame = document().frame();
if (m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission || !frame)
return m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission;
m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission = true;
m_shouldSubmit = false;
if (!validateInteractively(event)) {
m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission = false;
return false;
}
StringPairVector controlNamesAndValues;
getTextFieldValues(controlNamesAndValues);
RefPtr<FormState> formState = FormState::create(this, controlNamesAndValues, &document(), NotSubmittedByJavaScript);
frame->loader()->client()->dispatchWillSendSubmitEvent(formState.release());
if (dispatchEvent(Event::createCancelableBubble(eventNames().submitEvent)))
m_shouldSubmit = true;
m_isSubmittingOrPreparingForSubmission = false;
if (m_shouldSubmit)
submit(event, true, true, NotSubmittedByJavaScript);
return m_shouldSubmit;
}
| 171,171
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: RefCountedMemory* ChromeWebUIControllerFactory::GetFaviconResourceBytes(
const GURL& page_url) const {
if (page_url.host() == extension_misc::kBookmarkManagerId)
return BookmarksUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme)) {
NOTREACHED();
return NULL;
}
if (!HasWebUIScheme(page_url))
return NULL;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIConflictsHost)
return ConflictsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
#endif
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUICrashesHost)
return CrashesUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIHistoryHost)
return HistoryUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIFlagsHost)
return FlagsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUISessionsHost)
return SessionsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIFlashHost)
return FlashUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIDownloadsHost)
return DownloadsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUISettingsHost)
return OptionsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUISettingsFrameHost)
return options2::OptionsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
#endif
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIPluginsHost)
return PluginsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
RefCountedMemory* ChromeWebUIControllerFactory::GetFaviconResourceBytes(
const GURL& page_url) const {
if (page_url.host() == extension_misc::kBookmarkManagerId)
return BookmarksUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme)) {
NOTREACHED();
return NULL;
}
if (!content::GetContentClient()->HasWebUIScheme(page_url))
return NULL;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIConflictsHost)
return ConflictsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
#endif
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUICrashesHost)
return CrashesUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIHistoryHost)
return HistoryUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIFlagsHost)
return FlagsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUISessionsHost)
return SessionsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIFlashHost)
return FlashUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIDownloadsHost)
return DownloadsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUISettingsHost)
return OptionsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUISettingsFrameHost)
return options2::OptionsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
#endif
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIPluginsHost)
return PluginsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
return NULL;
}
| 171,007
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *sdec;
const unsigned char *p;
int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
if (eticklen < 48)
return 2;
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hctx == NULL)
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hctx == NULL)
return -2;
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
ret = -2;
goto err;
}
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
ctx, hctx, 0);
if (rv < 0)
goto err;
if (rv == 0) {
ret = 2;
goto err;
}
if (rv == 2)
renew_ticket = 1;
} else {
/* Check key name matches */
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
ret = 2;
goto err;
}
if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
0) {
goto err;
}
}
/*
* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
* checks on ticket.
if (mlen < 0) {
goto err;
}
eticklen -= mlen;
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return 2;
}
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return -1;
}
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return 2;
}
slen += mlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
p = sdec;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
if (sess) {
/*
* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
* that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
* structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
* standard.
*/
if (sesslen)
memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
*psess = sess;
if (renew_ticket)
return 4;
else
return 3;
}
ERR_clear_error();
/*
* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
*/
return 2;
err:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *sdec;
const unsigned char *p;
int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hctx == NULL)
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hctx == NULL)
return -2;
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
ret = -2;
goto err;
}
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
ctx, hctx, 0);
if (rv < 0)
goto err;
if (rv == 0) {
ret = 2;
goto err;
}
if (rv == 2)
renew_ticket = 1;
} else {
/* Check key name matches */
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
ret = 2;
goto err;
}
if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
0) {
goto err;
}
}
/*
* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
* checks on ticket.
if (mlen < 0) {
goto err;
}
/* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
if (eticklen <=
TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
ret = 2;
goto err;
}
eticklen -= mlen;
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return 2;
}
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return -1;
}
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return 2;
}
slen += mlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
p = sdec;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
if (sess) {
/*
* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
* that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
* structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
* standard.
*/
if (sesslen)
memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
*psess = sess;
if (renew_ticket)
return 4;
else
return 3;
}
ERR_clear_error();
/*
* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
*/
return 2;
err:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
return ret;
}
| 164,966
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: zend_object_iterator *spl_filesystem_tree_get_iterator(zend_class_entry *ce, zval *object, int by_ref TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator;
spl_filesystem_object *dir_object;
if (by_ref) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "An iterator cannot be used with foreach by reference");
}
dir_object = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
iterator = spl_filesystem_object_to_iterator(dir_object);
/* initialize iterator if wasn't gotten before */
if (iterator->intern.data == NULL) {
iterator->intern.data = object;
iterator->intern.funcs = &spl_filesystem_tree_it_funcs;
}
zval_add_ref(&object);
return (zend_object_iterator*)iterator;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
zend_object_iterator *spl_filesystem_tree_get_iterator(zend_class_entry *ce, zval *object, int by_ref TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator;
spl_filesystem_object *dir_object;
if (by_ref) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "An iterator cannot be used with foreach by reference");
}
dir_object = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
iterator = spl_filesystem_object_to_iterator(dir_object);
/* initialize iterator if wasn't gotten before */
if (iterator->intern.data == NULL) {
iterator->intern.data = object;
iterator->intern.funcs = &spl_filesystem_tree_it_funcs;
}
zval_add_ref(&object);
return (zend_object_iterator*)iterator;
}
| 167,086
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: donote(struct magic_set *ms, void *vbuf, size_t offset, size_t size,
int clazz, int swap, size_t align, int *flags, uint16_t *notecount)
{
Elf32_Nhdr nh32;
Elf64_Nhdr nh64;
size_t noff, doff;
uint32_t namesz, descsz;
unsigned char *nbuf = CAST(unsigned char *, vbuf);
if (*notecount == 0)
return 0;
--*notecount;
if (xnh_sizeof + offset > size) {
/*
* We're out of note headers.
*/
return xnh_sizeof + offset;
}
(void)memcpy(xnh_addr, &nbuf[offset], xnh_sizeof);
offset += xnh_sizeof;
namesz = xnh_namesz;
descsz = xnh_descsz;
if ((namesz == 0) && (descsz == 0)) {
/*
* We're out of note headers.
*/
return (offset >= size) ? offset : size;
}
if (namesz & 0x80000000) {
(void)file_printf(ms, ", bad note name size 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)namesz);
return 0;
}
if (descsz & 0x80000000) {
(void)file_printf(ms, ", bad note description size 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)descsz);
return 0;
}
noff = offset;
doff = ELF_ALIGN(offset + namesz);
if (offset + namesz > size) {
/*
* We're past the end of the buffer.
*/
return doff;
}
offset = ELF_ALIGN(doff + descsz);
if (doff + descsz > size) {
/*
* We're past the end of the buffer.
*/
return (offset >= size) ? offset : size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_OS_NOTE) == 0) {
if (do_os_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_BUILD_ID) == 0) {
if (do_bid_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_PAX) == 0) {
if (do_pax_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE) == 0) {
if (do_core_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags, size, clazz))
return size;
}
if (namesz == 7 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD") == 0) {
switch (xnh_type) {
case NT_NETBSD_VERSION:
return size;
case NT_NETBSD_MARCH:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_MARCH)
return size;
if (file_printf(ms, ", compiled for: %.*s", (int)descsz,
(const char *)&nbuf[doff]) == -1)
return size;
break;
case NT_NETBSD_CMODEL:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_CMODEL)
return size;
if (file_printf(ms, ", compiler model: %.*s",
(int)descsz, (const char *)&nbuf[doff]) == -1)
return size;
break;
default:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_UNKNOWN)
return size;
if (file_printf(ms, ", note=%u", xnh_type) == -1)
return size;
break;
}
return size;
}
return offset;
}
Commit Message: Limit string printing to 100 chars, and add flags I forgot in the previous
commit.
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
donote(struct magic_set *ms, void *vbuf, size_t offset, size_t size,
int clazz, int swap, size_t align, int *flags, uint16_t *notecount)
{
Elf32_Nhdr nh32;
Elf64_Nhdr nh64;
size_t noff, doff;
uint32_t namesz, descsz;
unsigned char *nbuf = CAST(unsigned char *, vbuf);
if (*notecount == 0)
return 0;
--*notecount;
if (xnh_sizeof + offset > size) {
/*
* We're out of note headers.
*/
return xnh_sizeof + offset;
}
(void)memcpy(xnh_addr, &nbuf[offset], xnh_sizeof);
offset += xnh_sizeof;
namesz = xnh_namesz;
descsz = xnh_descsz;
if ((namesz == 0) && (descsz == 0)) {
/*
* We're out of note headers.
*/
return (offset >= size) ? offset : size;
}
if (namesz & 0x80000000) {
(void)file_printf(ms, ", bad note name size 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)namesz);
return 0;
}
if (descsz & 0x80000000) {
(void)file_printf(ms, ", bad note description size 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)descsz);
return 0;
}
noff = offset;
doff = ELF_ALIGN(offset + namesz);
if (offset + namesz > size) {
/*
* We're past the end of the buffer.
*/
return doff;
}
offset = ELF_ALIGN(doff + descsz);
if (doff + descsz > size) {
/*
* We're past the end of the buffer.
*/
return (offset >= size) ? offset : size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_OS_NOTE) == 0) {
if (do_os_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_BUILD_ID) == 0) {
if (do_bid_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_PAX) == 0) {
if (do_pax_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE) == 0) {
if (do_core_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags, size, clazz))
return size;
}
if (namesz == 7 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD") == 0) {
if (descsz > 100)
descsz = 100;
switch (xnh_type) {
case NT_NETBSD_VERSION:
return size;
case NT_NETBSD_MARCH:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_MARCH)
return size;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_MARCH;
if (file_printf(ms, ", compiled for: %.*s",
(int)descsz, (const char *)&nbuf[doff]) == -1)
return size;
break;
case NT_NETBSD_CMODEL:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_CMODEL)
return size;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_CMODEL;
if (file_printf(ms, ", compiler model: %.*s",
(int)descsz, (const char *)&nbuf[doff]) == -1)
return size;
break;
default:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_UNKNOWN)
return size;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_UNKNOWN;
if (file_printf(ms, ", note=%u", xnh_type) == -1)
return size;
break;
}
return size;
}
return offset;
}
| 166,772
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
WORK_STATE ret;
ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
return ret;
}
#endif
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
* in case there are any unexpected retransmits
*/
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf = NULL;
}
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num = 0;
if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
/* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
s->renegotiate = 0;
s->new_session = 0;
if (s->server) {
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
} else {
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
if (s->hit)
s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
}
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* done with handshaking */
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
WORK_STATE ret;
ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
return ret;
}
#endif
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
* in case there are any unexpected retransmits
*/
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf = NULL;
}
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num = 0;
if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
/* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
s->renegotiate = 0;
s->new_session = 0;
if (s->server) {
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
} else {
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
if (s->hit)
s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
}
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* done with handshaking */
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
}
}
}
| 165,198
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline int ip6_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
int transhdrlen, int mtu,unsigned int flags,
struct rt6_info *rt)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
/* There is support for UDP large send offload by network
* device, so create one single skb packet containing complete
* udp datagram
*/
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL) {
struct frag_hdr fhdr;
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
hh_len + fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + 20,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
if (skb == NULL)
return err;
/* reserve space for Hardware header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
/* create space for UDP/IP header */
skb_put(skb,fragheaderlen + transhdrlen);
/* initialize network header pointer */
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
/* initialize protocol header pointer */
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + fragheaderlen;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
skb->csum = 0;
/* Specify the length of each IPv6 datagram fragment.
* It has to be a multiple of 8.
*/
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = (mtu - fragheaderlen -
sizeof(struct frag_hdr)) & ~7;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
ipv6_select_ident(&fhdr, rt);
skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id = fhdr.identification;
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
}
return skb_append_datato_frags(sk, skb, getfrag, from,
(length - transhdrlen));
}
Commit Message: ip6_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well
Now, if user application does:
sendto len<mtu flag MSG_MORE
sendto len>mtu flag 0
The skb is not treated as fragmented one because it is not initialized
that way. So move the initialization to fix this.
introduced by:
commit e89e9cf539a28df7d0eb1d0a545368e9920b34ac "[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach"
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
static inline int ip6_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
int transhdrlen, int mtu,unsigned int flags,
struct rt6_info *rt)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct frag_hdr fhdr;
int err;
/* There is support for UDP large send offload by network
* device, so create one single skb packet containing complete
* udp datagram
*/
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
hh_len + fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + 20,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
if (skb == NULL)
return err;
/* reserve space for Hardware header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
/* create space for UDP/IP header */
skb_put(skb,fragheaderlen + transhdrlen);
/* initialize network header pointer */
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
/* initialize protocol header pointer */
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + fragheaderlen;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
skb->csum = 0;
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
} else if (skb_is_gso(skb)) {
goto append;
}
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
/* Specify the length of each IPv6 datagram fragment.
* It has to be a multiple of 8.
*/
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = (mtu - fragheaderlen -
sizeof(struct frag_hdr)) & ~7;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
ipv6_select_ident(&fhdr, rt);
skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id = fhdr.identification;
append:
return skb_append_datato_frags(sk, skb, getfrag, from,
(length - transhdrlen));
}
| 169,893
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: DrawingBuffer::ScopedStateRestorer::~ScopedStateRestorer() {
DCHECK_EQ(drawing_buffer_->state_restorer_, this);
drawing_buffer_->state_restorer_ = previous_state_restorer_;
Client* client = drawing_buffer_->client_;
if (!client)
return;
if (clear_state_dirty_) {
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreScissorTest();
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreMaskAndClearValues();
}
if (pixel_pack_alignment_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestorePixelPackAlignment();
if (texture_binding_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreTexture2DBinding();
if (renderbuffer_binding_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreRenderbufferBinding();
if (framebuffer_binding_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreFramebufferBinding();
if (pixel_unpack_buffer_binding_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestorePixelUnpackBufferBinding();
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
DrawingBuffer::ScopedStateRestorer::~ScopedStateRestorer() {
DCHECK_EQ(drawing_buffer_->state_restorer_, this);
drawing_buffer_->state_restorer_ = previous_state_restorer_;
Client* client = drawing_buffer_->client_;
if (!client)
return;
if (clear_state_dirty_) {
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreScissorTest();
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreMaskAndClearValues();
}
if (pixel_pack_parameters_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestorePixelPackParameters();
if (texture_binding_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreTexture2DBinding();
if (renderbuffer_binding_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreRenderbufferBinding();
if (framebuffer_binding_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreFramebufferBinding();
if (pixel_unpack_buffer_binding_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestorePixelUnpackBufferBinding();
if (pixel_pack_buffer_binding_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestorePixelPackBufferBinding();
}
| 172,296
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int jpc_pi_nextrpcl(register jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
int rlvlno;
jpc_pirlvl_t *pirlvl;
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int prchind;
int prcvind;
int *prclyrno;
int compno;
jpc_picomp_t *picomp;
int xstep;
int ystep;
uint_fast32_t r;
uint_fast32_t rpx;
uint_fast32_t rpy;
uint_fast32_t trx0;
uint_fast32_t try0;
pchg = pi->pchg;
if (!pi->prgvolfirst) {
goto skip;
} else {
pi->xstep = 0;
pi->ystep = 0;
for (compno = 0, picomp = pi->picomps; compno < pi->numcomps;
++compno, ++picomp) {
for (rlvlno = 0, pirlvl = picomp->pirlvls; rlvlno <
picomp->numrlvls; ++rlvlno, ++pirlvl) {
if (pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + pi->picomp->numrlvls >
JAS_UINTFAST32_NUMBITS - 2 ||
pirlvl->prcheightexpn + pi->picomp->numrlvls >
JAS_UINTFAST32_NUMBITS - 2) {
return -1;
}
xstep = picomp->hsamp * (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) <<
(pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1));
ystep = picomp->vsamp * (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) <<
(pirlvl->prcheightexpn + picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1));
pi->xstep = (!pi->xstep) ? xstep : JAS_MIN(pi->xstep, xstep);
pi->ystep = (!pi->ystep) ? ystep : JAS_MIN(pi->ystep, ystep);
}
}
pi->prgvolfirst = 0;
}
for (pi->rlvlno = pchg->rlvlnostart; pi->rlvlno < pchg->rlvlnoend &&
pi->rlvlno < pi->maxrlvls; ++pi->rlvlno) {
for (pi->y = pi->ystart; pi->y < pi->yend; pi->y +=
pi->ystep - (pi->y % pi->ystep)) {
for (pi->x = pi->xstart; pi->x < pi->xend; pi->x +=
pi->xstep - (pi->x % pi->xstep)) {
for (pi->compno = pchg->compnostart,
pi->picomp = &pi->picomps[pi->compno];
pi->compno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->compnoend) && pi->compno <
pi->numcomps; ++pi->compno, ++pi->picomp) {
if (pi->rlvlno >= pi->picomp->numrlvls) {
continue;
}
pi->pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[pi->rlvlno];
if (pi->pirlvl->numprcs == 0) {
continue;
}
r = pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1 - pi->rlvlno;
rpx = r + pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rpy = r + pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn;
trx0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->xstart, pi->picomp->hsamp << r);
try0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->ystart, pi->picomp->vsamp << r);
if (((pi->x == pi->xstart &&
((trx0 << r) % (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << rpx)))
|| !(pi->x % (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << rpx))) &&
((pi->y == pi->ystart &&
((try0 << r) % (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << rpy)))
|| !(pi->y % (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << rpy)))) {
prchind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->x,
pi->picomp->hsamp << r), pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn) -
JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(trx0, pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn);
prcvind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->y,
pi->picomp->vsamp << r), pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn) -
JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(try0, pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn);
pi->prcno = prcvind * pi->pirlvl->numhprcs + prchind;
assert(pi->prcno < pi->pirlvl->numprcs);
for (pi->lyrno = 0; pi->lyrno <
pi->numlyrs && pi->lyrno < JAS_CAST(int,
pchg->lyrnoend); ++pi->lyrno) {
prclyrno = &pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos[pi->prcno];
if (pi->lyrno >= *prclyrno) {
++(*prclyrno);
return 0;
}
skip:
;
}
}
}
}
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug in the packet iterator code.
Added a new regression test case.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static int jpc_pi_nextrpcl(register jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
int rlvlno;
jpc_pirlvl_t *pirlvl;
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int prchind;
int prcvind;
int *prclyrno;
int compno;
jpc_picomp_t *picomp;
int xstep;
int ystep;
uint_fast32_t r;
uint_fast32_t rpx;
uint_fast32_t rpy;
uint_fast32_t trx0;
uint_fast32_t try0;
pchg = pi->pchg;
if (!pi->prgvolfirst) {
goto skip;
} else {
pi->xstep = 0;
pi->ystep = 0;
for (compno = 0, picomp = pi->picomps; compno < pi->numcomps;
++compno, ++picomp) {
for (rlvlno = 0, pirlvl = picomp->pirlvls; rlvlno <
picomp->numrlvls; ++rlvlno, ++pirlvl) {
if (pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + picomp->numrlvls >
JAS_UINTFAST32_NUMBITS - 2 ||
pirlvl->prcheightexpn + picomp->numrlvls >
JAS_UINTFAST32_NUMBITS - 2) {
return -1;
}
xstep = picomp->hsamp * (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) <<
(pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1));
ystep = picomp->vsamp * (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) <<
(pirlvl->prcheightexpn + picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1));
pi->xstep = (!pi->xstep) ? xstep : JAS_MIN(pi->xstep, xstep);
pi->ystep = (!pi->ystep) ? ystep : JAS_MIN(pi->ystep, ystep);
}
}
pi->prgvolfirst = 0;
}
for (pi->rlvlno = pchg->rlvlnostart; pi->rlvlno < pchg->rlvlnoend &&
pi->rlvlno < pi->maxrlvls; ++pi->rlvlno) {
for (pi->y = pi->ystart; pi->y < pi->yend; pi->y +=
pi->ystep - (pi->y % pi->ystep)) {
for (pi->x = pi->xstart; pi->x < pi->xend; pi->x +=
pi->xstep - (pi->x % pi->xstep)) {
for (pi->compno = pchg->compnostart,
pi->picomp = &pi->picomps[pi->compno];
pi->compno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->compnoend) && pi->compno <
pi->numcomps; ++pi->compno, ++pi->picomp) {
if (pi->rlvlno >= pi->picomp->numrlvls) {
continue;
}
pi->pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[pi->rlvlno];
if (pi->pirlvl->numprcs == 0) {
continue;
}
r = pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1 - pi->rlvlno;
rpx = r + pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rpy = r + pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn;
trx0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->xstart, pi->picomp->hsamp << r);
try0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->ystart, pi->picomp->vsamp << r);
if (((pi->x == pi->xstart &&
((trx0 << r) % (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << rpx)))
|| !(pi->x % (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << rpx))) &&
((pi->y == pi->ystart &&
((try0 << r) % (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << rpy)))
|| !(pi->y % (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << rpy)))) {
prchind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->x,
pi->picomp->hsamp << r), pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn) -
JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(trx0, pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn);
prcvind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->y,
pi->picomp->vsamp << r), pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn) -
JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(try0, pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn);
pi->prcno = prcvind * pi->pirlvl->numhprcs + prchind;
assert(pi->prcno < pi->pirlvl->numprcs);
for (pi->lyrno = 0; pi->lyrno <
pi->numlyrs && pi->lyrno < JAS_CAST(int,
pchg->lyrnoend); ++pi->lyrno) {
prclyrno = &pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos[pi->prcno];
if (pi->lyrno >= *prclyrno) {
++(*prclyrno);
return 0;
}
skip:
;
}
}
}
}
}
}
return 1;
}
| 170,178
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: pipe_iov_copy_from_user(void *to, struct iovec *iov, unsigned long len,
int atomic)
{
unsigned long copy;
while (len > 0) {
while (!iov->iov_len)
iov++;
copy = min_t(unsigned long, len, iov->iov_len);
if (atomic) {
if (__copy_from_user_inatomic(to, iov->iov_base, copy))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (copy_from_user(to, iov->iov_base, copy))
return -EFAULT;
}
to += copy;
len -= copy;
iov->iov_base += copy;
iov->iov_len -= copy;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
|
pipe_iov_copy_from_user(void *to, struct iovec *iov, unsigned long len,
| 166,686
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl::clear_error() {
error_ = std::string();
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl::clear_error() {
| 170,393
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void EncoderTest::InitializeConfig() {
const vpx_codec_err_t res = codec_->DefaultEncoderConfig(&cfg_, 0);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void EncoderTest::InitializeConfig() {
const vpx_codec_err_t res = codec_->DefaultEncoderConfig(&cfg_, 0);
dec_cfg_ = vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t();
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
}
| 174,538
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline void AllocatePixelCachePixels(CacheInfo *cache_info)
{
cache_info->mapped=MagickFalse;
cache_info->pixels=(PixelPacket *) MagickAssumeAligned(
AcquireAlignedMemory(1,(size_t) cache_info->length));
if (cache_info->pixels == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
cache_info->mapped=MagickTrue;
cache_info->pixels=(PixelPacket *) MapBlob(-1,IOMode,0,(size_t)
cache_info->length);
}
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static inline void AllocatePixelCachePixels(CacheInfo *cache_info)
| 168,787
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int __init ip6_tunnel_init(void)
{
int err;
if (xfrm6_tunnel_register(&ip4ip6_handler, AF_INET)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ip6_tunnel init: can't register ip4ip6\n");
err = -EAGAIN;
goto out;
}
if (xfrm6_tunnel_register(&ip6ip6_handler, AF_INET6)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ip6_tunnel init: can't register ip6ip6\n");
err = -EAGAIN;
goto unreg_ip4ip6;
}
err = register_pernet_device(&ip6_tnl_net_ops);
if (err < 0)
goto err_pernet;
return 0;
err_pernet:
xfrm6_tunnel_deregister(&ip6ip6_handler, AF_INET6);
unreg_ip4ip6:
xfrm6_tunnel_deregister(&ip4ip6_handler, AF_INET);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
static int __init ip6_tunnel_init(void)
{
int err;
err = register_pernet_device(&ip6_tnl_net_ops);
if (err < 0)
goto out_pernet;
err = xfrm6_tunnel_register(&ip4ip6_handler, AF_INET);
if (err < 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ip6_tunnel init: can't register ip4ip6\n");
goto out_ip4ip6;
}
err = xfrm6_tunnel_register(&ip6ip6_handler, AF_INET6);
if (err < 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ip6_tunnel init: can't register ip6ip6\n");
goto out_ip6ip6;
}
return 0;
out_ip6ip6:
xfrm6_tunnel_deregister(&ip4ip6_handler, AF_INET);
out_ip4ip6:
unregister_pernet_device(&ip6_tnl_net_ops);
out_pernet:
return err;
}
| 165,877
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PP_Resource ResourceTracker::AddResource(Resource* resource) {
if (last_resource_id_ ==
(std::numeric_limits<PP_Resource>::max() >> kPPIdTypeBits))
return 0;
PP_Resource new_id = MakeTypedId(++last_resource_id_, PP_ID_TYPE_RESOURCE);
live_resources_.insert(std::make_pair(new_id, std::make_pair(resource, 1)));
PP_Instance pp_instance = resource->instance()->pp_instance();
DCHECK(instance_map_.find(pp_instance) != instance_map_.end());
instance_map_[pp_instance]->resources.insert(new_id);
return new_id;
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
PP_Resource ResourceTracker::AddResource(Resource* resource) {
if (last_resource_id_ ==
(std::numeric_limits<PP_Resource>::max() >> kPPIdTypeBits))
return 0;
PP_Resource new_id = MakeTypedId(++last_resource_id_, PP_ID_TYPE_RESOURCE);
live_resources_.insert(std::make_pair(new_id, std::make_pair(resource, 1)));
PP_Instance pp_instance = resource->instance()->pp_instance();
DCHECK(instance_map_.find(pp_instance) != instance_map_.end());
instance_map_[pp_instance]->ref_resources.insert(new_id);
return new_id;
}
| 170,416
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ThreadHeap::TakeSnapshot(SnapshotType type) {
DCHECK(thread_state_->InAtomicMarkingPause());
ThreadState::GCSnapshotInfo info(GCInfoTable::GcInfoIndex() + 1);
String thread_dump_name =
String::Format("blink_gc/thread_%lu",
static_cast<unsigned long>(thread_state_->ThreadId()));
const String heaps_dump_name = thread_dump_name + "/heaps";
const String classes_dump_name = thread_dump_name + "/classes";
int number_of_heaps_reported = 0;
#define SNAPSHOT_HEAP(ArenaType) \
{ \
number_of_heaps_reported++; \
switch (type) { \
case SnapshotType::kHeapSnapshot: \
arenas_[BlinkGC::k##ArenaType##ArenaIndex]->TakeSnapshot( \
heaps_dump_name + "/" #ArenaType, info); \
break; \
case SnapshotType::kFreelistSnapshot: \
arenas_[BlinkGC::k##ArenaType##ArenaIndex]->TakeFreelistSnapshot( \
heaps_dump_name + "/" #ArenaType); \
break; \
default: \
NOTREACHED(); \
} \
}
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(NormalPage1);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(NormalPage2);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(NormalPage3);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(NormalPage4);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(EagerSweep);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(Vector1);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(Vector2);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(Vector3);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(Vector4);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(InlineVector);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(HashTable);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(LargeObject);
FOR_EACH_TYPED_ARENA(SNAPSHOT_HEAP);
DCHECK_EQ(number_of_heaps_reported, BlinkGC::kNumberOfArenas);
#undef SNAPSHOT_HEAP
if (type == SnapshotType::kFreelistSnapshot)
return;
size_t total_live_count = 0;
size_t total_dead_count = 0;
size_t total_live_size = 0;
size_t total_dead_size = 0;
for (size_t gc_info_index = 1; gc_info_index <= GCInfoTable::GcInfoIndex();
++gc_info_index) {
total_live_count += info.live_count[gc_info_index];
total_dead_count += info.dead_count[gc_info_index];
total_live_size += info.live_size[gc_info_index];
total_dead_size += info.dead_size[gc_info_index];
}
base::trace_event::MemoryAllocatorDump* thread_dump =
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::Instance()
->CreateMemoryAllocatorDumpForCurrentGC(thread_dump_name);
thread_dump->AddScalar("live_count", "objects", total_live_count);
thread_dump->AddScalar("dead_count", "objects", total_dead_count);
thread_dump->AddScalar("live_size", "bytes", total_live_size);
thread_dump->AddScalar("dead_size", "bytes", total_dead_size);
base::trace_event::MemoryAllocatorDump* heaps_dump =
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::Instance()
->CreateMemoryAllocatorDumpForCurrentGC(heaps_dump_name);
base::trace_event::MemoryAllocatorDump* classes_dump =
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::Instance()
->CreateMemoryAllocatorDumpForCurrentGC(classes_dump_name);
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::Instance()
->CurrentProcessMemoryDump()
->AddOwnershipEdge(classes_dump->guid(), heaps_dump->guid());
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
void ThreadHeap::TakeSnapshot(SnapshotType type) {
DCHECK(thread_state_->InAtomicMarkingPause());
ThreadState::GCSnapshotInfo info(GCInfoTable::Get().GcInfoIndex() + 1);
String thread_dump_name =
String::Format("blink_gc/thread_%lu",
static_cast<unsigned long>(thread_state_->ThreadId()));
const String heaps_dump_name = thread_dump_name + "/heaps";
const String classes_dump_name = thread_dump_name + "/classes";
int number_of_heaps_reported = 0;
#define SNAPSHOT_HEAP(ArenaType) \
{ \
number_of_heaps_reported++; \
switch (type) { \
case SnapshotType::kHeapSnapshot: \
arenas_[BlinkGC::k##ArenaType##ArenaIndex]->TakeSnapshot( \
heaps_dump_name + "/" #ArenaType, info); \
break; \
case SnapshotType::kFreelistSnapshot: \
arenas_[BlinkGC::k##ArenaType##ArenaIndex]->TakeFreelistSnapshot( \
heaps_dump_name + "/" #ArenaType); \
break; \
default: \
NOTREACHED(); \
} \
}
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(NormalPage1);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(NormalPage2);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(NormalPage3);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(NormalPage4);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(EagerSweep);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(Vector1);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(Vector2);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(Vector3);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(Vector4);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(InlineVector);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(HashTable);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(LargeObject);
FOR_EACH_TYPED_ARENA(SNAPSHOT_HEAP);
DCHECK_EQ(number_of_heaps_reported, BlinkGC::kNumberOfArenas);
#undef SNAPSHOT_HEAP
if (type == SnapshotType::kFreelistSnapshot)
return;
size_t total_live_count = 0;
size_t total_dead_count = 0;
size_t total_live_size = 0;
size_t total_dead_size = 0;
for (size_t gc_info_index = 1;
gc_info_index <= GCInfoTable::Get().GcInfoIndex(); ++gc_info_index) {
total_live_count += info.live_count[gc_info_index];
total_dead_count += info.dead_count[gc_info_index];
total_live_size += info.live_size[gc_info_index];
total_dead_size += info.dead_size[gc_info_index];
}
base::trace_event::MemoryAllocatorDump* thread_dump =
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::Instance()
->CreateMemoryAllocatorDumpForCurrentGC(thread_dump_name);
thread_dump->AddScalar("live_count", "objects", total_live_count);
thread_dump->AddScalar("dead_count", "objects", total_dead_count);
thread_dump->AddScalar("live_size", "bytes", total_live_size);
thread_dump->AddScalar("dead_size", "bytes", total_dead_size);
base::trace_event::MemoryAllocatorDump* heaps_dump =
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::Instance()
->CreateMemoryAllocatorDumpForCurrentGC(heaps_dump_name);
base::trace_event::MemoryAllocatorDump* classes_dump =
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::Instance()
->CreateMemoryAllocatorDumpForCurrentGC(classes_dump_name);
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::Instance()
->CurrentProcessMemoryDump()
->AddOwnershipEdge(classes_dump->guid(), heaps_dump->guid());
}
| 173,137
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ID3::Iterator::getstring(String8 *id, bool otherdata) const {
id->setTo("");
const uint8_t *frameData = mFrameData;
if (frameData == NULL) {
return;
}
uint8_t encoding = *frameData;
if (mParent.mVersion == ID3_V1 || mParent.mVersion == ID3_V1_1) {
if (mOffset == 126 || mOffset == 127) {
char tmp[16];
sprintf(tmp, "%d", (int)*frameData);
id->setTo(tmp);
return;
}
id->setTo((const char*)frameData, mFrameSize);
return;
}
if (mFrameSize < getHeaderLength() + 1) {
return;
}
size_t n = mFrameSize - getHeaderLength() - 1;
if (otherdata) {
frameData += 4;
int32_t i = n - 4;
while(--i >= 0 && *++frameData != 0) ;
int skipped = (frameData - mFrameData);
if (skipped >= (int)n) {
return;
}
n -= skipped;
}
if (encoding == 0x00) {
id->setTo((const char*)frameData + 1, n);
} else if (encoding == 0x03) {
id->setTo((const char *)(frameData + 1), n);
} else if (encoding == 0x02) {
int len = n / 2;
const char16_t *framedata = (const char16_t *) (frameData + 1);
char16_t *framedatacopy = NULL;
#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
framedatacopy = new char16_t[len];
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
framedatacopy[i] = bswap_16(framedata[i]);
}
framedata = framedatacopy;
#endif
id->setTo(framedata, len);
if (framedatacopy != NULL) {
delete[] framedatacopy;
}
} else if (encoding == 0x01) {
int len = n / 2;
const char16_t *framedata = (const char16_t *) (frameData + 1);
char16_t *framedatacopy = NULL;
if (*framedata == 0xfffe) {
framedatacopy = new char16_t[len];
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
framedatacopy[i] = bswap_16(framedata[i]);
}
framedata = framedatacopy;
}
if (*framedata == 0xfeff) {
framedata++;
len--;
}
bool eightBit = true;
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (framedata[i] > 0xff) {
eightBit = false;
break;
}
}
if (eightBit) {
char *frame8 = new char[len];
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
frame8[i] = framedata[i];
}
id->setTo(frame8, len);
delete [] frame8;
} else {
id->setTo(framedata, len);
}
if (framedatacopy != NULL) {
delete[] framedatacopy;
}
}
}
Commit Message: better validation lengths of strings in ID3 tags
Validate lengths on strings in ID3 tags, particularly around 0.
Also added code to handle cases when we can't get memory for
copies of strings we want to extract from these tags.
Affects L/M/N/master, same patch for all of them.
Bug: 30744884
Change-Id: I2675a817a39f0927ec1f7e9f9c09f2e61020311e
Test: play mp3 file which caused a <0 length.
(cherry picked from commit d23c01546c4f82840a01a380def76ab6cae5d43f)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void ID3::Iterator::getstring(String8 *id, bool otherdata) const {
id->setTo("");
const uint8_t *frameData = mFrameData;
if (frameData == NULL) {
return;
}
uint8_t encoding = *frameData;
if (mParent.mVersion == ID3_V1 || mParent.mVersion == ID3_V1_1) {
if (mOffset == 126 || mOffset == 127) {
char tmp[16];
sprintf(tmp, "%d", (int)*frameData);
id->setTo(tmp);
return;
}
id->setTo((const char*)frameData, mFrameSize);
return;
}
if (mFrameSize < getHeaderLength() + 1) {
return;
}
size_t n = mFrameSize - getHeaderLength() - 1;
if (otherdata) {
frameData += 4;
int32_t i = n - 4;
while(--i >= 0 && *++frameData != 0) ;
int skipped = (frameData - mFrameData);
if (skipped >= (int)n) {
return;
}
n -= skipped;
}
if (n <= 0) {
return;
}
if (encoding == 0x00) {
id->setTo((const char*)frameData + 1, n);
} else if (encoding == 0x03) {
id->setTo((const char *)(frameData + 1), n);
} else if (encoding == 0x02) {
int len = n / 2;
const char16_t *framedata = (const char16_t *) (frameData + 1);
char16_t *framedatacopy = NULL;
#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
if (len > 0) {
framedatacopy = new (std::nothrow) char16_t[len];
if (framedatacopy == NULL) {
return;
}
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
framedatacopy[i] = bswap_16(framedata[i]);
}
framedata = framedatacopy;
}
#endif
id->setTo(framedata, len);
if (framedatacopy != NULL) {
delete[] framedatacopy;
}
} else if (encoding == 0x01) {
int len = n / 2;
const char16_t *framedata = (const char16_t *) (frameData + 1);
char16_t *framedatacopy = NULL;
if (*framedata == 0xfffe) {
// endianness marker != host endianness, convert & skip
if (len <= 1) {
return; // nothing after the marker
}
framedatacopy = new (std::nothrow) char16_t[len];
if (framedatacopy == NULL) {
return;
}
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
framedatacopy[i] = bswap_16(framedata[i]);
}
framedata = framedatacopy;
// and skip over the marker
framedata++;
len--;
} else if (*framedata == 0xfeff) {
// endianness marker == host endianness, skip it
if (len <= 1) {
return; // nothing after the marker
}
framedata++;
len--;
}
bool eightBit = true;
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (framedata[i] > 0xff) {
eightBit = false;
break;
}
}
if (eightBit) {
char *frame8 = new (std::nothrow) char[len];
if (frame8 != NULL) {
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
frame8[i] = framedata[i];
}
id->setTo(frame8, len);
delete [] frame8;
} else {
id->setTo(framedata, len);
}
} else {
id->setTo(framedata, len);
}
if (framedatacopy != NULL) {
delete[] framedatacopy;
}
}
}
| 173,393
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BnCrypto::readVector(const Parcel &data, Vector<uint8_t> &vector) const {
uint32_t size = data.readInt32();
vector.insertAt((size_t)0, size);
data.read(vector.editArray(), size);
}
Commit Message: Fix information disclosure in mediadrmserver
Test:POC provided in bug
Bug:79218474
Change-Id: Iba12c07a5e615f8ed234b01ac53e3559ba9ac12e
(cherry picked from commit c1bf68a8d1321d7cdf7da6933f0b89b171d251c6)
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void BnCrypto::readVector(const Parcel &data, Vector<uint8_t> &vector) const {
uint32_t size = data.readInt32();
if (vector.insertAt((size_t)0, size) < 0) {
vector.clear();
}
if (data.read(vector.editArray(), size) != NO_ERROR) {
vector.clear();
android_errorWriteWithInfoLog(0x534e4554, "62872384", -1, NULL, 0);
}
}
| 174,083
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool AXLayoutObject::isSelected() const {
if (!getLayoutObject() || !getNode())
return false;
const AtomicString& ariaSelected = getAttribute(aria_selectedAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaSelected, "true"))
return true;
AXObject* focusedObject = axObjectCache().focusedObject();
if (ariaRoleAttribute() == ListBoxOptionRole && focusedObject &&
focusedObject->activeDescendant() == this) {
return true;
}
if (isTabItem() && isTabItemSelected())
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
bool AXLayoutObject::isSelected() const {
if (!getLayoutObject() || !getNode())
return false;
const AtomicString& ariaSelected = getAttribute(aria_selectedAttr);
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(ariaSelected, "true"))
return true;
AXObject* focusedObject = axObjectCache().focusedObject();
if (ariaRoleAttribute() == ListBoxOptionRole && focusedObject &&
focusedObject->activeDescendant() == this) {
return true;
}
if (isTabItem() && isTabItemSelected())
return true;
return false;
}
| 171,905
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void TopSitesImpl::SetTopSites(const MostVisitedURLList& new_top_sites,
const CallLocation location) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
MostVisitedURLList top_sites(new_top_sites);
size_t num_forced_urls = MergeCachedForcedURLs(&top_sites);
AddPrepopulatedPages(&top_sites, num_forced_urls);
TopSitesDelta delta;
DiffMostVisited(cache_->top_sites(), top_sites, &delta);
TopSitesBackend::RecordHistogram record_or_not =
TopSitesBackend::RECORD_HISTOGRAM_NO;
if (location == CALL_LOCATION_FROM_ON_GOT_MOST_VISITED_THUMBNAILS &&
!histogram_recorded_) {
size_t delta_size =
delta.deleted.size() + delta.added.size() + delta.moved.size();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_100("History.FirstSetTopSitesDeltaSize", delta_size);
record_or_not = TopSitesBackend::RECORD_HISTOGRAM_YES;
histogram_recorded_ = true;
}
bool should_notify_observers = false;
if (!delta.deleted.empty() || !delta.added.empty() || !delta.moved.empty()) {
backend_->UpdateTopSites(delta, record_or_not);
should_notify_observers = true;
}
if (!should_notify_observers)
should_notify_observers = DoTitlesDiffer(cache_->top_sites(), top_sites);
cache_->SetTopSites(top_sites);
if (!temp_images_.empty()) {
for (const MostVisitedURL& mv : top_sites) {
const GURL& canonical_url = cache_->GetCanonicalURL(mv.url);
for (TempImages::iterator it = temp_images_.begin();
it != temp_images_.end(); ++it) {
if (canonical_url == cache_->GetCanonicalURL(it->first)) {
bool success = SetPageThumbnailEncoded(
mv.url, it->second.thumbnail.get(), it->second.thumbnail_score);
if (success) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Thumbnails.AddedToTopSites",
THUMBNAIL_PROMOTED_TEMP_TO_REGULAR,
THUMBNAIL_EVENT_COUNT);
}
temp_images_.erase(it);
break;
}
}
}
}
if (top_sites.size() - num_forced_urls >= kNonForcedTopSitesNumber)
temp_images_.clear();
ResetThreadSafeCache();
ResetThreadSafeImageCache();
if (should_notify_observers) {
if (location == CALL_LOCATION_FROM_FORCED_URLS)
NotifyTopSitesChanged(TopSitesObserver::ChangeReason::FORCED_URL);
else
NotifyTopSitesChanged(TopSitesObserver::ChangeReason::MOST_VISITED);
}
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void TopSitesImpl::SetTopSites(const MostVisitedURLList& new_top_sites,
const CallLocation location) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
MostVisitedURLList top_sites(new_top_sites);
size_t num_forced_urls = MergeCachedForcedURLs(&top_sites);
AddPrepopulatedPages(&top_sites, num_forced_urls);
TopSitesDelta delta;
DiffMostVisited(cache_->top_sites(), top_sites, &delta);
TopSitesBackend::RecordHistogram record_or_not =
TopSitesBackend::RECORD_HISTOGRAM_NO;
if (location == CALL_LOCATION_FROM_ON_GOT_MOST_VISITED_THUMBNAILS &&
!histogram_recorded_) {
size_t delta_size =
delta.deleted.size() + delta.added.size() + delta.moved.size();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_100("History.FirstSetTopSitesDeltaSize", delta_size);
record_or_not = TopSitesBackend::RECORD_HISTOGRAM_YES;
histogram_recorded_ = true;
}
bool should_notify_observers = false;
if (!delta.deleted.empty() || !delta.added.empty() || !delta.moved.empty()) {
backend_->UpdateTopSites(delta, record_or_not);
should_notify_observers = true;
}
if (!should_notify_observers)
should_notify_observers = DoTitlesDiffer(cache_->top_sites(), top_sites);
cache_->SetTopSites(top_sites);
cache_->ClearUnreferencedThumbnails();
if (!temp_images_.empty()) {
for (const MostVisitedURL& mv : top_sites) {
const GURL& canonical_url = cache_->GetCanonicalURL(mv.url);
for (TempImages::iterator it = temp_images_.begin();
it != temp_images_.end(); ++it) {
if (canonical_url == cache_->GetCanonicalURL(it->first)) {
bool success = SetPageThumbnailEncoded(
mv.url, it->second.thumbnail.get(), it->second.thumbnail_score);
if (success) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Thumbnails.AddedToTopSites",
THUMBNAIL_PROMOTED_TEMP_TO_REGULAR,
THUMBNAIL_EVENT_COUNT);
}
temp_images_.erase(it);
break;
}
}
}
}
if (top_sites.size() - num_forced_urls >= kNonForcedTopSitesNumber)
temp_images_.clear();
ResetThreadSafeCache();
ResetThreadSafeImageCache();
if (should_notify_observers) {
if (location == CALL_LOCATION_FROM_FORCED_URLS)
NotifyTopSitesChanged(TopSitesObserver::ChangeReason::FORCED_URL);
else
NotifyTopSitesChanged(TopSitesObserver::ChangeReason::MOST_VISITED);
}
}
| 172,694
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void buf_to_pages(const void *buf, size_t buflen,
struct page **pages, unsigned int *pgbase)
{
const void *p = buf;
*pgbase = offset_in_page(buf);
p -= *pgbase;
while (p < buf + buflen) {
*(pages++) = virt_to_page(p);
p += PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
}
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
static void buf_to_pages(const void *buf, size_t buflen,
| 165,717
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long long Block::GetTrackNumber() const
{
return m_track;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
long long Block::GetTrackNumber() const
bool Block::IsKey() const {
return ((m_flags & static_cast<unsigned char>(1 << 7)) != 0);
}
| 174,372
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int nfs4_do_close(struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state, int wait)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata;
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp = state->owner;
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_CLOSE],
.rpc_cred = state->owner->so_cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = server->client,
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs4_close_ops,
.workqueue = nfsiod_workqueue,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
int status = -ENOMEM;
calldata = kmalloc(sizeof(*calldata), GFP_KERNEL);
if (calldata == NULL)
goto out;
calldata->inode = state->inode;
calldata->state = state;
calldata->arg.fh = NFS_FH(state->inode);
calldata->arg.stateid = &state->open_stateid;
/* Serialization for the sequence id */
calldata->arg.seqid = nfs_alloc_seqid(&state->owner->so_seqid);
if (calldata->arg.seqid == NULL)
goto out_free_calldata;
calldata->arg.open_flags = 0;
calldata->arg.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask;
calldata->res.fattr = &calldata->fattr;
calldata->res.seqid = calldata->arg.seqid;
calldata->res.server = server;
calldata->path.mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
calldata->path.dentry = dget(path->dentry);
msg.rpc_argp = &calldata->arg,
msg.rpc_resp = &calldata->res,
task_setup_data.callback_data = calldata;
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
status = 0;
if (wait)
status = rpc_wait_for_completion_task(task);
rpc_put_task(task);
return status;
out_free_calldata:
kfree(calldata);
out:
nfs4_put_open_state(state);
nfs4_put_state_owner(sp);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
|
int nfs4_do_close(struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state, int wait)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata;
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp = state->owner;
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_CLOSE],
.rpc_cred = state->owner->so_cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = server->client,
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs4_close_ops,
.workqueue = nfsiod_workqueue,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
int status = -ENOMEM;
calldata = kmalloc(sizeof(*calldata), GFP_KERNEL);
if (calldata == NULL)
goto out;
calldata->inode = state->inode;
calldata->state = state;
calldata->arg.fh = NFS_FH(state->inode);
calldata->arg.stateid = &state->open_stateid;
/* Serialization for the sequence id */
calldata->arg.seqid = nfs_alloc_seqid(&state->owner->so_seqid);
if (calldata->arg.seqid == NULL)
goto out_free_calldata;
calldata->arg.fmode = 0;
calldata->arg.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask;
calldata->res.fattr = &calldata->fattr;
calldata->res.seqid = calldata->arg.seqid;
calldata->res.server = server;
calldata->path.mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
calldata->path.dentry = dget(path->dentry);
msg.rpc_argp = &calldata->arg,
msg.rpc_resp = &calldata->res,
task_setup_data.callback_data = calldata;
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
status = 0;
if (wait)
status = rpc_wait_for_completion_task(task);
rpc_put_task(task);
return status;
out_free_calldata:
kfree(calldata);
out:
nfs4_put_open_state(state);
nfs4_put_state_owner(sp);
return status;
}
| 165,691
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static char *print_object( cJSON *item, int depth, int fmt )
{
char **entries = 0, **names = 0;
char *out = 0, *ptr, *ret, *str;
int len = 7, i = 0, j;
cJSON *child = item->child;
int numentries = 0, fail = 0;
/* Count the number of entries. */
while ( child ) {
++numentries;
child = child->next;
}
/* Allocate space for the names and the objects. */
if ( ! ( entries = (char**) cJSON_malloc( numentries * sizeof(char*) ) ) )
return 0;
if ( ! ( names = (char**) cJSON_malloc( numentries * sizeof(char*) ) ) ) {
cJSON_free( entries );
return 0;
}
memset( entries, 0, sizeof(char*) * numentries );
memset( names, 0, sizeof(char*) * numentries );
/* Collect all the results into our arrays. */
child = item->child;
++depth;
if ( fmt )
len += depth;
while ( child ) {
names[i] = str = print_string_ptr( child->string );
entries[i++] = ret = print_value( child, depth, fmt );
if ( str && ret )
len += strlen( ret ) + strlen( str ) + 2 + ( fmt ? 2 + depth : 0 );
else
fail = 1;
child = child->next;
}
/* Try to allocate the output string. */
if ( ! fail ) {
out = (char*) cJSON_malloc( len );
if ( ! out )
fail = 1;
}
/* Handle failure. */
if ( fail ) {
for ( i = 0; i < numentries; ++i ) {
if ( names[i] )
cJSON_free( names[i] );
if ( entries[i] )
cJSON_free( entries[i] );
}
cJSON_free( names );
cJSON_free( entries );
return 0;
}
/* Compose the output. */
*out = '{';
ptr = out + 1;
if ( fmt )
*ptr++ = '\n';
*ptr = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < numentries; ++i ) {
if ( fmt )
for ( j = 0; j < depth; ++j )
*ptr++ = '\t';
strcpy( ptr, names[i] );
ptr += strlen( names[i] );
*ptr++ = ':';
if ( fmt )
*ptr++ = '\t';
strcpy( ptr, entries[i] );
ptr += strlen( entries[i] );
if ( i != numentries - 1 )
*ptr++ = ',';
if ( fmt )
*ptr++ = '\n';
*ptr = 0;
cJSON_free( names[i] );
cJSON_free( entries[i] );
}
cJSON_free( names );
cJSON_free( entries );
if ( fmt )
for ( i = 0; i < depth - 1; ++i )
*ptr++ = '\t';
*ptr++ = '}';
*ptr++ = 0;
return out;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static char *print_object( cJSON *item, int depth, int fmt )
static char *print_object(cJSON *item,int depth,int fmt,printbuffer *p)
{
char **entries=0,**names=0;
char *out=0,*ptr,*ret,*str;int len=7,i=0,j;
cJSON *child=item->child;
int numentries=0,fail=0;
size_t tmplen=0;
/* Count the number of entries. */
while (child) numentries++,child=child->next;
/* Explicitly handle empty object case */
if (!numentries)
{
if (p) out=ensure(p,fmt?depth+4:3);
else out=(char*)cJSON_malloc(fmt?depth+4:3);
if (!out) return 0;
ptr=out;*ptr++='{';
if (fmt) {*ptr++='\n';for (i=0;i<depth;i++) *ptr++='\t';}
*ptr++='}';*ptr++=0;
return out;
}
if (p)
{
/* Compose the output: */
i=p->offset;
len=fmt?2:1; ptr=ensure(p,len+1); if (!ptr) return 0;
*ptr++='{'; if (fmt) *ptr++='\n'; *ptr=0; p->offset+=len;
child=item->child;depth++;
while (child)
{
if (fmt)
{
ptr=ensure(p,depth); if (!ptr) return 0;
for (j=0;j<depth;j++) *ptr++='\t';
p->offset+=depth;
}
print_string_ptr(child->string,p);
p->offset=update(p);
len=fmt?2:1;
ptr=ensure(p,len); if (!ptr) return 0;
*ptr++=':';if (fmt) *ptr++='\t';
p->offset+=len;
print_value(child,depth,fmt,p);
p->offset=update(p);
len=(fmt?1:0)+(child->next?1:0);
ptr=ensure(p,len+1); if (!ptr) return 0;
if (child->next) *ptr++=',';
if (fmt) *ptr++='\n';*ptr=0;
p->offset+=len;
child=child->next;
}
ptr=ensure(p,fmt?(depth+1):2); if (!ptr) return 0;
if (fmt) for (i=0;i<depth-1;i++) *ptr++='\t';
*ptr++='}';*ptr=0;
out=(p->buffer)+i;
}
else
{
/* Allocate space for the names and the objects */
entries=(char**)cJSON_malloc(numentries*sizeof(char*));
if (!entries) return 0;
names=(char**)cJSON_malloc(numentries*sizeof(char*));
if (!names) {cJSON_free(entries);return 0;}
memset(entries,0,sizeof(char*)*numentries);
memset(names,0,sizeof(char*)*numentries);
/* Collect all the results into our arrays: */
child=item->child;depth++;if (fmt) len+=depth;
while (child && !fail)
{
names[i]=str=print_string_ptr(child->string,0);
entries[i++]=ret=print_value(child,depth,fmt,0);
if (str && ret) len+=strlen(ret)+strlen(str)+2+(fmt?2+depth:0); else fail=1;
child=child->next;
}
/* Try to allocate the output string */
if (!fail) out=(char*)cJSON_malloc(len);
if (!out) fail=1;
/* Handle failure */
if (fail)
{
for (i=0;i<numentries;i++) {if (names[i]) cJSON_free(names[i]);if (entries[i]) cJSON_free(entries[i]);}
cJSON_free(names);cJSON_free(entries);
return 0;
}
/* Compose the output: */
*out='{';ptr=out+1;if (fmt)*ptr++='\n';*ptr=0;
for (i=0;i<numentries;i++)
{
if (fmt) for (j=0;j<depth;j++) *ptr++='\t';
tmplen=strlen(names[i]);memcpy(ptr,names[i],tmplen);ptr+=tmplen;
*ptr++=':';if (fmt) *ptr++='\t';
strcpy(ptr,entries[i]);ptr+=strlen(entries[i]);
if (i!=numentries-1) *ptr++=',';
if (fmt) *ptr++='\n';*ptr=0;
cJSON_free(names[i]);cJSON_free(entries[i]);
}
cJSON_free(names);cJSON_free(entries);
if (fmt) for (i=0;i<depth-1;i++) *ptr++='\t';
*ptr++='}';*ptr++=0;
}
return out;
}
| 167,308
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static ssize_t wdm_read
(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
int rv, cntr;
int i = 0;
struct wdm_device *desc = file->private_data;
rv = mutex_lock_interruptible(&desc->rlock); /*concurrent reads */
if (rv < 0)
return -ERESTARTSYS;
cntr = ACCESS_ONCE(desc->length);
if (cntr == 0) {
desc->read = 0;
retry:
if (test_bit(WDM_DISCONNECTING, &desc->flags)) {
rv = -ENODEV;
goto err;
}
i++;
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
if (!test_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags)) {
rv = cntr ? cntr : -EAGAIN;
goto err;
}
rv = 0;
} else {
rv = wait_event_interruptible(desc->wait,
test_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags));
}
/* may have happened while we slept */
if (test_bit(WDM_DISCONNECTING, &desc->flags)) {
rv = -ENODEV;
goto err;
}
if (test_bit(WDM_RESETTING, &desc->flags)) {
rv = -EIO;
goto err;
}
usb_mark_last_busy(interface_to_usbdev(desc->intf));
if (rv < 0) {
rv = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto err;
}
spin_lock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
if (desc->rerr) { /* read completed, error happened */
desc->rerr = 0;
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
rv = -EIO;
goto err;
}
/*
* recheck whether we've lost the race
* against the completion handler
*/
if (!test_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags)) { /* lost race */
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
goto retry;
}
if (!desc->reslength) { /* zero length read */
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev, "%s: zero length - clearing WDM_READ\n", __func__);
clear_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags);
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
goto retry;
}
cntr = desc->length;
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
}
if (cntr > count)
cntr = count;
rv = copy_to_user(buffer, desc->ubuf, cntr);
if (rv > 0) {
rv = -EFAULT;
goto err;
}
spin_lock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
for (i = 0; i < desc->length - cntr; i++)
desc->ubuf[i] = desc->ubuf[i + cntr];
desc->length -= cntr;
/* in case we had outstanding data */
if (!desc->length)
clear_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags);
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
rv = cntr;
err:
mutex_unlock(&desc->rlock);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static ssize_t wdm_read
(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
int rv, cntr;
int i = 0;
struct wdm_device *desc = file->private_data;
rv = mutex_lock_interruptible(&desc->rlock); /*concurrent reads */
if (rv < 0)
return -ERESTARTSYS;
cntr = ACCESS_ONCE(desc->length);
if (cntr == 0) {
desc->read = 0;
retry:
if (test_bit(WDM_DISCONNECTING, &desc->flags)) {
rv = -ENODEV;
goto err;
}
if (test_bit(WDM_OVERFLOW, &desc->flags)) {
clear_bit(WDM_OVERFLOW, &desc->flags);
rv = -ENOBUFS;
goto err;
}
i++;
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
if (!test_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags)) {
rv = cntr ? cntr : -EAGAIN;
goto err;
}
rv = 0;
} else {
rv = wait_event_interruptible(desc->wait,
test_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags));
}
/* may have happened while we slept */
if (test_bit(WDM_DISCONNECTING, &desc->flags)) {
rv = -ENODEV;
goto err;
}
if (test_bit(WDM_RESETTING, &desc->flags)) {
rv = -EIO;
goto err;
}
usb_mark_last_busy(interface_to_usbdev(desc->intf));
if (rv < 0) {
rv = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto err;
}
spin_lock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
if (desc->rerr) { /* read completed, error happened */
desc->rerr = 0;
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
rv = -EIO;
goto err;
}
/*
* recheck whether we've lost the race
* against the completion handler
*/
if (!test_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags)) { /* lost race */
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
goto retry;
}
if (!desc->reslength) { /* zero length read */
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev, "%s: zero length - clearing WDM_READ\n", __func__);
clear_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags);
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
goto retry;
}
cntr = desc->length;
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
}
if (cntr > count)
cntr = count;
rv = copy_to_user(buffer, desc->ubuf, cntr);
if (rv > 0) {
rv = -EFAULT;
goto err;
}
spin_lock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
for (i = 0; i < desc->length - cntr; i++)
desc->ubuf[i] = desc->ubuf[i + cntr];
desc->length -= cntr;
/* in case we had outstanding data */
if (!desc->length)
clear_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags);
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
rv = cntr;
err:
mutex_unlock(&desc->rlock);
return rv;
}
| 166,105
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: cdf_unpack_summary_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
cdf_summary_info_header_t *ssi, cdf_property_info_t **info, size_t *count)
{
size_t i, maxcount;
const cdf_summary_info_header_t *si =
CAST(const cdf_summary_info_header_t *, sst->sst_tab);
const cdf_section_declaration_t *sd =
CAST(const cdf_section_declaration_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)sst->sst_tab + CDF_SECTION_DECLARATION_OFFSET));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, si, sizeof(*si), __LINE__) == -1 ||
cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, sd, sizeof(*sd), __LINE__) == -1)
return -1;
ssi->si_byte_order = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_byte_order);
ssi->si_os_version = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_os_version);
ssi->si_os = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_os);
ssi->si_class = si->si_class;
cdf_swap_class(&ssi->si_class);
ssi->si_count = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_count);
*count = 0;
maxcount = 0;
*info = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < CDF_TOLE4(si->si_count); i++) {
if (i >= CDF_LOOP_LIMIT) {
DPRINTF(("Unpack summary info loop limit"));
errno = EFTYPE;
return -1;
}
if (cdf_read_property_info(sst, h, CDF_TOLE4(sd->sd_offset),
info, count, &maxcount) == -1) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Remove loop that kept reading the same offset (Jan Kaluza)
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
cdf_unpack_summary_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
cdf_summary_info_header_t *ssi, cdf_property_info_t **info, size_t *count)
{
size_t maxcount;
const cdf_summary_info_header_t *si =
CAST(const cdf_summary_info_header_t *, sst->sst_tab);
const cdf_section_declaration_t *sd =
CAST(const cdf_section_declaration_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)sst->sst_tab + CDF_SECTION_DECLARATION_OFFSET));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, si, sizeof(*si), __LINE__) == -1 ||
cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, sd, sizeof(*sd), __LINE__) == -1)
return -1;
ssi->si_byte_order = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_byte_order);
ssi->si_os_version = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_os_version);
ssi->si_os = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_os);
ssi->si_class = si->si_class;
cdf_swap_class(&ssi->si_class);
ssi->si_count = CDF_TOLE4(si->si_count);
*count = 0;
maxcount = 0;
*info = NULL;
if (cdf_read_property_info(sst, h, CDF_TOLE4(sd->sd_offset), info,
count, &maxcount) == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
| 166,443
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void uv__process_child_init(const uv_process_options_t* options,
int stdio_count,
int (*pipes)[2],
int error_fd) {
int close_fd;
int use_fd;
int fd;
if (options->flags & UV_PROCESS_DETACHED)
setsid();
for (fd = 0; fd < stdio_count; fd++) {
close_fd = pipes[fd][0];
use_fd = pipes[fd][1];
if (use_fd < 0) {
if (fd >= 3)
continue;
else {
/* redirect stdin, stdout and stderr to /dev/null even if UV_IGNORE is
* set
*/
use_fd = open("/dev/null", fd == 0 ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR);
close_fd = use_fd;
if (use_fd == -1) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("failed to open stdio");
_exit(127);
}
}
}
if (fd == use_fd)
uv__cloexec(use_fd, 0);
else
dup2(use_fd, fd);
if (fd <= 2)
uv__nonblock(fd, 0);
if (close_fd != -1)
uv__close(close_fd);
}
for (fd = 0; fd < stdio_count; fd++) {
use_fd = pipes[fd][1];
if (use_fd >= 0 && fd != use_fd)
close(use_fd);
}
if (options->cwd != NULL && chdir(options->cwd)) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("chdir()");
_exit(127);
}
if ((options->flags & UV_PROCESS_SETGID) && setgid(options->gid)) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("setgid()");
_exit(127);
}
if ((options->flags & UV_PROCESS_SETUID) && setuid(options->uid)) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("setuid()");
_exit(127);
}
if (options->env != NULL) {
environ = options->env;
}
execvp(options->file, options->args);
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("execvp()");
_exit(127);
}
Commit Message: unix: call setgoups before calling setuid/setgid
Partial fix for #1093
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
static void uv__process_child_init(const uv_process_options_t* options,
int stdio_count,
int (*pipes)[2],
int error_fd) {
int close_fd;
int use_fd;
int fd;
if (options->flags & UV_PROCESS_DETACHED)
setsid();
for (fd = 0; fd < stdio_count; fd++) {
close_fd = pipes[fd][0];
use_fd = pipes[fd][1];
if (use_fd < 0) {
if (fd >= 3)
continue;
else {
/* redirect stdin, stdout and stderr to /dev/null even if UV_IGNORE is
* set
*/
use_fd = open("/dev/null", fd == 0 ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR);
close_fd = use_fd;
if (use_fd == -1) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("failed to open stdio");
_exit(127);
}
}
}
if (fd == use_fd)
uv__cloexec(use_fd, 0);
else
dup2(use_fd, fd);
if (fd <= 2)
uv__nonblock(fd, 0);
if (close_fd != -1)
uv__close(close_fd);
}
for (fd = 0; fd < stdio_count; fd++) {
use_fd = pipes[fd][1];
if (use_fd >= 0 && fd != use_fd)
close(use_fd);
}
if (options->cwd != NULL && chdir(options->cwd)) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("chdir()");
_exit(127);
}
if (options->flags & (UV_PROCESS_SETUID | UV_PROCESS_SETGID)) {
/* When dropping privileges from root, the `setgroups` call will
* remove any extraneous groups. If we don't call this, then
* even though our uid has dropped, we may still have groups
* that enable us to do super-user things. This will fail if we
* aren't root, so don't bother checking the return value, this
* is just done as an optimistic privilege dropping function.
*/
SAVE_ERRNO(setgroups(0, NULL));
}
if ((options->flags & UV_PROCESS_SETGID) && setgid(options->gid)) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("setgid()");
_exit(127);
}
if ((options->flags & UV_PROCESS_SETUID) && setuid(options->uid)) {
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("setuid()");
_exit(127);
}
if (options->env != NULL) {
environ = options->env;
}
execvp(options->file, options->args);
uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno);
perror("execvp()");
_exit(127);
}
| 166,728
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static apr_status_t parse_chunk_size(http_ctx_t *ctx, const char *buffer,
apr_size_t len, int linelimit)
{
apr_size_t i = 0;
while (i < len) {
char c = buffer[i];
ap_xlate_proto_from_ascii(&c, 1);
/* handle CRLF after the chunk */
if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_END) {
if (c == LF) {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK;
}
i++;
continue;
}
/* handle start of the chunk */
if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK) {
if (!apr_isxdigit(c)) {
/*
* Detect invalid character at beginning. This also works for empty
* chunk size lines.
*/
return APR_EGENERAL;
}
else {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_PART;
}
ctx->remaining = 0;
ctx->chunkbits = sizeof(long) * 8;
ctx->chunk_used = 0;
}
/* handle a chunk part, or a chunk extension */
/*
* In theory, we are supposed to expect CRLF only, but our
* test suite sends LF only. Tolerate a missing CR.
*/
if (c == ';' || c == CR) {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_EXT;
}
else if (c == LF) {
if (ctx->remaining) {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_DATA;
}
else {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_TRAILER;
}
}
else if (ctx->state != BODY_CHUNK_EXT) {
int xvalue = 0;
/* ignore leading zeros */
if (!ctx->remaining && c == '0') {
i++;
continue;
}
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
xvalue = c - '0';
}
else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
xvalue = c - 'A' + 0xa;
}
else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
xvalue = c - 'a' + 0xa;
}
else {
/* bogus character */
return APR_EGENERAL;
}
ctx->remaining = (ctx->remaining << 4) | xvalue;
ctx->chunkbits -= 4;
if (ctx->chunkbits <= 0 || ctx->remaining < 0) {
/* overflow */
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
}
i++;
}
/* sanity check */
ctx->chunk_used += len;
if (ctx->chunk_used < 0 || ctx->chunk_used > linelimit) {
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Limit accepted chunk-size to 2^63-1 and be strict about chunk-ext
authorized characters.
Submitted by: Yann Ylavic
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684513 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static apr_status_t parse_chunk_size(http_ctx_t *ctx, const char *buffer,
apr_size_t len, int linelimit)
{
apr_size_t i = 0;
while (i < len) {
char c = buffer[i];
ap_xlate_proto_from_ascii(&c, 1);
/* handle CRLF after the chunk */
if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_END
|| ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_END_LF) {
if (c == LF) {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK;
}
else if (c == CR && ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_END) {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_END_LF;
}
else {
/*
* LF expected.
*/
return APR_EINVAL;
}
i++;
continue;
}
/* handle start of the chunk */
if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK) {
if (!apr_isxdigit(c)) {
/*
* Detect invalid character at beginning. This also works for
* empty chunk size lines.
*/
return APR_EINVAL;
}
else {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_PART;
}
ctx->remaining = 0;
ctx->chunkbits = sizeof(apr_off_t) * 8;
ctx->chunk_used = 0;
}
if (c == LF) {
if (ctx->remaining) {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_DATA;
}
else {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_TRAILER;
}
}
else if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_LF) {
/*
* LF expected.
*/
return APR_EINVAL;
}
else if (c == CR) {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_LF;
}
else if (c == ';') {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_EXT;
}
else if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_EXT) {
/*
* Control chars (but tabs) are invalid.
*/
if (c != '\t' && apr_iscntrl(c)) {
return APR_EINVAL;
}
}
else if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_PART) {
int xvalue;
/* ignore leading zeros */
if (!ctx->remaining && c == '0') {
i++;
continue;
}
ctx->chunkbits -= 4;
if (ctx->chunkbits < 0) {
/* overflow */
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
xvalue = c - '0';
}
else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
xvalue = c - 'A' + 0xa;
}
else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
xvalue = c - 'a' + 0xa;
}
else {
/* bogus character */
return APR_EINVAL;
}
ctx->remaining = (ctx->remaining << 4) | xvalue;
if (ctx->remaining < 0) {
/* overflow */
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
}
else {
/* Should not happen */
return APR_EGENERAL;
}
i++;
}
/* sanity check */
ctx->chunk_used += len;
if (ctx->chunk_used < 0 || ctx->chunk_used > linelimit) {
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
| 166,634
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void LocalFileSystem::deleteFileSystemInternal(
PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> context,
FileSystemType type,
PassRefPtr<CallbackWrapper> callbacks)
{
if (!fileSystem()) {
fileSystemNotAvailable(context, callbacks);
return;
}
KURL storagePartition = KURL(KURL(), context->securityOrigin()->toString());
fileSystem()->deleteFileSystem(storagePartition, static_cast<WebFileSystemType>(type), callbacks->release());
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void LocalFileSystem::deleteFileSystemInternal(
PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> context,
FileSystemType type,
CallbackWrapper* callbacks)
{
if (!fileSystem()) {
fileSystemNotAvailable(context, callbacks);
return;
}
KURL storagePartition = KURL(KURL(), context->securityOrigin()->toString());
fileSystem()->deleteFileSystem(storagePartition, static_cast<WebFileSystemType>(type), callbacks->release());
}
| 171,425
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CoordinatorImpl::RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPid(
base::ProcessId pid,
const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPidCallback& callback) {
if (pid == base::kNullProcessId) {
callback.Run(false, nullptr);
return;
}
auto adapter = [](const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPidCallback& callback,
bool success, uint64_t,
mojom::GlobalMemoryDumpPtr global_memory_dump) {
callback.Run(success, std::move(global_memory_dump));
};
QueuedRequest::Args args(
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpType::SUMMARY_ONLY,
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail::BACKGROUND, {},
false /* addToTrace */, pid);
RequestGlobalMemoryDumpInternal(args, base::BindRepeating(adapter, callback));
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269
|
void CoordinatorImpl::RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPid(
base::ProcessId pid,
const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPidCallback& callback) {
if (pid == base::kNullProcessId) {
callback.Run(false, nullptr);
return;
}
auto adapter = [](const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPidCallback& callback,
bool success, uint64_t,
mojom::GlobalMemoryDumpPtr global_memory_dump) {
callback.Run(success, std::move(global_memory_dump));
};
QueuedRequest::Args args(
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpType::SUMMARY_ONLY,
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail::BACKGROUND, {},
false /* add_to_trace */, pid);
RequestGlobalMemoryDumpInternal(args, base::BindRepeating(adapter, callback));
}
| 172,917
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static float *get_window(vorb *f, int len)
{
len <<= 1;
if (len == f->blocksize_0) return f->window[0];
if (len == f->blocksize_1) return f->window[1];
assert(0);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix seven bugs discovered and fixed by ForAllSecure:
CVE-2019-13217: heap buffer overflow in start_decoder()
CVE-2019-13218: stack buffer overflow in compute_codewords()
CVE-2019-13219: uninitialized memory in vorbis_decode_packet_rest()
CVE-2019-13220: out-of-range read in draw_line()
CVE-2019-13221: issue with large 1D codebooks in lookup1_values()
CVE-2019-13222: unchecked NULL returned by get_window()
CVE-2019-13223: division by zero in predict_point()
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static float *get_window(vorb *f, int len)
{
len <<= 1;
if (len == f->blocksize_0) return f->window[0];
if (len == f->blocksize_1) return f->window[1];
return NULL;
}
| 169,615
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static zend_always_inline int process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, HashTable *ht, zend_long elements, int objprops)
{
while (elements-- > 0) {
zval key, *data, d, *old_data;
zend_ulong idx;
ZVAL_UNDEF(&key);
if (!php_var_unserialize_internal(&key, p, max, NULL, classes)) {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
data = NULL;
ZVAL_UNDEF(&d);
if (!objprops) {
if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_LONG) {
idx = Z_LVAL(key);
numeric_key:
if (UNEXPECTED((old_data = zend_hash_index_find(ht, idx)) != NULL)) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
data = zend_hash_index_update(ht, idx, &d);
} else {
data = zend_hash_index_add_new(ht, idx, &d);
}
} else if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_STRING) {
if (UNEXPECTED(ZEND_HANDLE_NUMERIC(Z_STR(key), idx))) {
goto numeric_key;
}
if (UNEXPECTED((old_data = zend_hash_find(ht, Z_STR(key))) != NULL)) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
data = zend_hash_update(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
} else {
data = zend_hash_add_new(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
}
} else {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
} else {
if (EXPECTED(Z_TYPE(key) == IS_STRING)) {
string_key:
if ((old_data = zend_hash_find(ht, Z_STR(key))) != NULL) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(old_data) == IS_INDIRECT) {
old_data = Z_INDIRECT_P(old_data);
}
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
data = zend_hash_update_ind(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
} else {
data = zend_hash_add_new(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
}
} else if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_LONG) {
/* object properties should include no integers */
convert_to_string(&key);
goto string_key;
} else {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
}
if (!php_var_unserialize_internal(data, p, max, var_hash, classes)) {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
if (UNEXPECTED(Z_ISUNDEF_P(data))) {
if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_LONG) {
zend_hash_index_del(ht, Z_LVAL(key));
} else {
zend_hash_del_ind(ht, Z_STR(key));
}
} else {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, data);
}
zval_dtor(&key);
if (elements && *(*p-1) != ';' && *(*p-1) != '}') {
(*p)--;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #74103 and bug #75054
Directly fail unserialization when trying to acquire an r/R
reference to an UNDEF HT slot. Previously this left an UNDEF and
later deleted the index/key from the HT.
What actually caused the issue here is a combination of two
factors: First, the key deletion was performed using the hash API,
rather than the symtable API, such that the element was not actually
removed if it used an integral string key. Second, a subsequent
deletion operation, while collecting trailing UNDEF ranges, would
mark the element as available for reuse (leaving a corrupted HT
state with nNumOfElemnts > nNumUsed).
Fix this by failing early and dropping the deletion code.
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
static zend_always_inline int process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, HashTable *ht, zend_long elements, int objprops)
{
while (elements-- > 0) {
zval key, *data, d, *old_data;
zend_ulong idx;
ZVAL_UNDEF(&key);
if (!php_var_unserialize_internal(&key, p, max, NULL, classes)) {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
data = NULL;
ZVAL_UNDEF(&d);
if (!objprops) {
if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_LONG) {
idx = Z_LVAL(key);
numeric_key:
if (UNEXPECTED((old_data = zend_hash_index_find(ht, idx)) != NULL)) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
data = zend_hash_index_update(ht, idx, &d);
} else {
data = zend_hash_index_add_new(ht, idx, &d);
}
} else if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_STRING) {
if (UNEXPECTED(ZEND_HANDLE_NUMERIC(Z_STR(key), idx))) {
goto numeric_key;
}
if (UNEXPECTED((old_data = zend_hash_find(ht, Z_STR(key))) != NULL)) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
data = zend_hash_update(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
} else {
data = zend_hash_add_new(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
}
} else {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
} else {
if (EXPECTED(Z_TYPE(key) == IS_STRING)) {
string_key:
if ((old_data = zend_hash_find(ht, Z_STR(key))) != NULL) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(old_data) == IS_INDIRECT) {
old_data = Z_INDIRECT_P(old_data);
}
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
data = zend_hash_update_ind(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
} else {
data = zend_hash_add_new(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
}
} else if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_LONG) {
/* object properties should include no integers */
convert_to_string(&key);
goto string_key;
} else {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
}
if (!php_var_unserialize_internal(data, p, max, var_hash, classes)) {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
var_push_dtor(var_hash, data);
zval_dtor(&key);
if (elements && *(*p-1) != ';' && *(*p-1) != '}') {
(*p)--;
return 0;
}
}
| 167,934
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: xps_true_callback_glyph_name(gs_font *pfont, gs_glyph glyph, gs_const_string *pstr)
{
/* This function is copied verbatim from plfont.c */
int table_length;
int table_offset;
ulong format;
uint numGlyphs;
uint glyph_name_index;
const byte *postp; /* post table pointer */
/* guess if the font type is not truetype */
if ( pfont->FontType != ft_TrueType )
{
pstr->size = strlen((char*)pstr->data);
return 0;
}
else
{
return gs_throw1(-1, "glyph index %lu out of range", (ulong)glyph);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
xps_true_callback_glyph_name(gs_font *pfont, gs_glyph glyph, gs_const_string *pstr)
{
/* This function is copied verbatim from plfont.c */
int table_length;
int table_offset;
ulong format;
int numGlyphs;
uint glyph_name_index;
const byte *postp; /* post table pointer */
if (glyph >= GS_MIN_GLYPH_INDEX) {
glyph -= GS_MIN_GLYPH_INDEX;
}
/* guess if the font type is not truetype */
if ( pfont->FontType != ft_TrueType )
{
pstr->size = strlen((char*)pstr->data);
return 0;
}
else
{
return gs_throw1(-1, "glyph index %lu out of range", (ulong)glyph);
}
}
| 164,784
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: kg_unseal(minor_status, context_handle, input_token_buffer,
message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state, toktype)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer;
gss_buffer_t message_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_qop_t *qop_state;
int toktype;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
unsigned char *ptr;
unsigned int bodysize;
int err;
int toktype2;
int vfyflags = 0;
OM_uint32 ret;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
/* parse the token, leave the data in message_buffer, setting conf_state */
/* verify the header */
ptr = (unsigned char *) input_token_buffer->value;
err = g_verify_token_header(ctx->mech_used,
&bodysize, &ptr, -1,
input_token_buffer->length,
vfyflags);
if (err) {
*minor_status = err;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (bodysize < 2) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
toktype2 = load_16_be(ptr);
ptr += 2;
bodysize -= 2;
switch (toktype2) {
case KG2_TOK_MIC_MSG:
case KG2_TOK_WRAP_MSG:
case KG2_TOK_DEL_CTX:
ret = gss_krb5int_unseal_token_v3(&ctx->k5_context, minor_status, ctx,
ptr, bodysize, message_buffer,
conf_state, qop_state, toktype);
break;
case KG_TOK_MIC_MSG:
case KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG:
case KG_TOK_DEL_CTX:
ret = kg_unseal_v1(ctx->k5_context, minor_status, ctx, ptr, bodysize,
message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state,
toktype);
break;
default:
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
break;
}
if (ret != 0)
save_error_info (*minor_status, ctx->k5_context);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
|
kg_unseal(minor_status, context_handle, input_token_buffer,
message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state, toktype)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer;
gss_buffer_t message_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_qop_t *qop_state;
int toktype;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
unsigned char *ptr;
unsigned int bodysize;
int err;
int toktype2;
int vfyflags = 0;
OM_uint32 ret;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
/* parse the token, leave the data in message_buffer, setting conf_state */
/* verify the header */
ptr = (unsigned char *) input_token_buffer->value;
err = g_verify_token_header(ctx->mech_used,
&bodysize, &ptr, -1,
input_token_buffer->length,
vfyflags);
if (err) {
*minor_status = err;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (bodysize < 2) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
toktype2 = load_16_be(ptr);
ptr += 2;
bodysize -= 2;
switch (toktype2) {
case KG2_TOK_MIC_MSG:
case KG2_TOK_WRAP_MSG:
case KG2_TOK_DEL_CTX:
ret = gss_krb5int_unseal_token_v3(&ctx->k5_context, minor_status, ctx,
ptr, bodysize, message_buffer,
conf_state, qop_state, toktype);
break;
case KG_TOK_MIC_MSG:
case KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG:
case KG_TOK_DEL_CTX:
ret = kg_unseal_v1(ctx->k5_context, minor_status, ctx, ptr, bodysize,
message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state,
toktype);
break;
default:
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
break;
}
if (ret != 0)
save_error_info (*minor_status, ctx->k5_context);
return ret;
}
| 166,819
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: char **XListExtensions(
register Display *dpy,
int *nextensions) /* RETURN */
{
xListExtensionsReply rep;
char **list = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (ListExtensions, req);
if (! _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nExtensions) {
list = Xmalloc (rep.nExtensions * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length > 0 && rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((!list) || (!ch)) {
Xfree(list);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + rlen;
length = *ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nExtensions; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
list[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
length = *ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else
list[i] = NULL;
}
}
*nextensions = count;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (list);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
char **XListExtensions(
register Display *dpy,
int *nextensions) /* RETURN */
{
xListExtensionsReply rep;
char **list = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (ListExtensions, req);
if (! _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nExtensions) {
list = Xmalloc (rep.nExtensions * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length > 0 && rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((!list) || (!ch)) {
Xfree(list);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + rlen;
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nExtensions; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
list[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else
list[i] = NULL;
}
}
*nextensions = count;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (list);
}
| 164,746
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API unsigned int ModPlug_SampleName(ModPlugFile* file, unsigned int qual, char* buff)
{
const char* str;
unsigned int retval;
size_t tmpretval;
if(!file) return 0;
str = openmpt_module_get_sample_name(file->mod,qual-1);
if(!str){
if(buff){
*buff = '\0';
}
return 0;
}
tmpretval = strlen(str);
if(tmpretval>=INT_MAX){
tmpretval = INT_MAX-1;
}
retval = (int)tmpretval;
if(buff){
memcpy(buff,str,retval+1);
buff[retval] = '\0';
}
openmpt_free_string(str);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: [Fix] libmodplug: C API: Limit the length of strings copied to the output buffer of ModPlug_InstrumentName() and ModPlug_SampleName() to 32 bytes (including terminating null) as is done by original libmodplug. This avoids potential buffer overflows in software relying on this limit instead of querying the required buffer size beforehand. libopenmpt can return strings longer than 32 bytes here beacuse the internal limit of 32 bytes applies to strings encoded in arbitrary character encodings but the API returns them converted to UTF-8, which can be longer. (reported by Antonio Morales Maldonado of Semmle Security Research Team)
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@12127 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-120
|
LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API unsigned int ModPlug_SampleName(ModPlugFile* file, unsigned int qual, char* buff)
{
const char* str;
char buf[32];
if(!file) return 0;
str = openmpt_module_get_sample_name(file->mod,qual-1);
memset(buf,0,32);
if(str){
strncpy(buf,str,31);
openmpt_free_string(str);
}
if(buff){
strncpy(buff,buf,32);
}
return (unsigned int)strlen(buf);
}
| 169,501
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bt_status_t btif_dm_pin_reply( const bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr, uint8_t accept,
uint8_t pin_len, bt_pin_code_t *pin_code)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s: accept=%d", __FUNCTION__, accept);
if (pin_code == NULL)
return BT_STATUS_FAIL;
#if (defined(BLE_INCLUDED) && (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE))
if (pairing_cb.is_le_only)
{
int i;
UINT32 passkey = 0;
int multi[] = {100000, 10000, 1000, 100, 10,1};
BD_ADDR remote_bd_addr;
bdcpy(remote_bd_addr, bd_addr->address);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
{
passkey += (multi[i] * (pin_code->pin[i] - '0'));
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_dm_pin_reply: passkey: %d", passkey);
BTA_DmBlePasskeyReply(remote_bd_addr, accept, passkey);
}
else
{
BTA_DmPinReply( (UINT8 *)bd_addr->address, accept, pin_len, pin_code->pin);
if (accept)
pairing_cb.pin_code_len = pin_len;
}
#else
BTA_DmPinReply( (UINT8 *)bd_addr->address, accept, pin_len, pin_code->pin);
if (accept)
pairing_cb.pin_code_len = pin_len;
#endif
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Check size of pin before replying
If a malicious client set a pin that was too long it would overflow
the pin code memory.
Bug: 27411268
Change-Id: I9197ac6fdaa92a4799dacb6364e04671a39450cc
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bt_status_t btif_dm_pin_reply( const bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr, uint8_t accept,
uint8_t pin_len, bt_pin_code_t *pin_code)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s: accept=%d", __FUNCTION__, accept);
if (pin_code == NULL || pin_len > PIN_CODE_LEN)
return BT_STATUS_FAIL;
#if (defined(BLE_INCLUDED) && (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE))
if (pairing_cb.is_le_only)
{
int i;
UINT32 passkey = 0;
int multi[] = {100000, 10000, 1000, 100, 10,1};
BD_ADDR remote_bd_addr;
bdcpy(remote_bd_addr, bd_addr->address);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
{
passkey += (multi[i] * (pin_code->pin[i] - '0'));
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_dm_pin_reply: passkey: %d", passkey);
BTA_DmBlePasskeyReply(remote_bd_addr, accept, passkey);
}
else
{
BTA_DmPinReply( (UINT8 *)bd_addr->address, accept, pin_len, pin_code->pin);
if (accept)
pairing_cb.pin_code_len = pin_len;
}
#else
BTA_DmPinReply( (UINT8 *)bd_addr->address, accept, pin_len, pin_code->pin);
if (accept)
pairing_cb.pin_code_len = pin_len;
#endif
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
| 173,886
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool DataReductionProxyConfig::IsFetchInFlight() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return warmup_url_fetcher_->IsFetchInFlight();
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
bool DataReductionProxyConfig::IsFetchInFlight() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (!warmup_url_fetcher_)
return false;
return warmup_url_fetcher_->IsFetchInFlight();
}
| 172,417
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: nvmet_fc_find_target_queue(struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport,
u64 connection_id)
{
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc *assoc;
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_queue *queue;
u64 association_id = nvmet_fc_getassociationid(connection_id);
u16 qid = nvmet_fc_getqueueid(connection_id);
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tgtport->lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(assoc, &tgtport->assoc_list, a_list) {
if (association_id == assoc->association_id) {
queue = assoc->queues[qid];
if (queue &&
(!atomic_read(&queue->connected) ||
!nvmet_fc_tgt_q_get(queue)))
queue = NULL;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tgtport->lock, flags);
return queue;
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tgtport->lock, flags);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
nvmet_fc_find_target_queue(struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport,
u64 connection_id)
{
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc *assoc;
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_queue *queue;
u64 association_id = nvmet_fc_getassociationid(connection_id);
u16 qid = nvmet_fc_getqueueid(connection_id);
unsigned long flags;
if (qid > NVMET_NR_QUEUES)
return NULL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tgtport->lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(assoc, &tgtport->assoc_list, a_list) {
if (association_id == assoc->association_id) {
queue = assoc->queues[qid];
if (queue &&
(!atomic_read(&queue->connected) ||
!nvmet_fc_tgt_q_get(queue)))
queue = NULL;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tgtport->lock, flags);
return queue;
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tgtport->lock, flags);
return NULL;
}
| 169,859
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_palette_to_rgb_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_transform_png_set_palette_to_rgb_add(image_transform *this,
const image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE;
}
| 173,638
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ikev2_gen_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), e.critical);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
ikev2_gen_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), e.critical);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
/* Print the entire payload in hex */
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,798
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: internalEntityProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
ENTITY *entity;
const char *textStart, *textEnd;
const char *next;
enum XML_Error result;
OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY *openEntity = parser->m_openInternalEntities;
if (! openEntity)
return XML_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_STATE;
entity = openEntity->entity;
textStart = ((char *)entity->textPtr) + entity->processed;
textEnd = (char *)(entity->textPtr + entity->textLen);
/* Set a safe default value in case 'next' does not get set */
next = textStart;
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (entity->is_param) {
int tok
= XmlPrologTok(parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd, &next);
result = doProlog(parser, parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd,
tok, next, &next, XML_FALSE);
} else
#endif /* XML_DTD */
result = doContent(parser, openEntity->startTagLevel,
parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd, &next,
XML_FALSE);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
else if (textEnd != next
&& parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED) {
entity->processed = (int)(next - (char *)entity->textPtr);
return result;
} else {
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = openEntity->next;
/* put openEntity back in list of free instances */
openEntity->next = parser->m_freeInternalEntities;
parser->m_freeInternalEntities = openEntity;
}
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (entity->is_param) {
int tok;
parser->m_processor = prologProcessor;
tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
return doProlog(parser, parser->m_encoding, s, end, tok, next, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer);
} else
#endif /* XML_DTD */
{
parser->m_processor = contentProcessor;
/* see externalEntityContentProcessor vs contentProcessor */
return doContent(parser, parser->m_parentParser ? 1 : 0, parser->m_encoding,
s, end, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer);
}
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
|
internalEntityProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
ENTITY *entity;
const char *textStart, *textEnd;
const char *next;
enum XML_Error result;
OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY *openEntity = parser->m_openInternalEntities;
if (! openEntity)
return XML_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_STATE;
entity = openEntity->entity;
textStart = ((char *)entity->textPtr) + entity->processed;
textEnd = (char *)(entity->textPtr + entity->textLen);
/* Set a safe default value in case 'next' does not get set */
next = textStart;
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (entity->is_param) {
int tok
= XmlPrologTok(parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd, &next);
result = doProlog(parser, parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd,
tok, next, &next, XML_FALSE, XML_TRUE);
} else
#endif /* XML_DTD */
result = doContent(parser, openEntity->startTagLevel,
parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd, &next,
XML_FALSE);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
else if (textEnd != next
&& parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED) {
entity->processed = (int)(next - (char *)entity->textPtr);
return result;
} else {
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = openEntity->next;
/* put openEntity back in list of free instances */
openEntity->next = parser->m_freeInternalEntities;
parser->m_freeInternalEntities = openEntity;
}
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (entity->is_param) {
int tok;
parser->m_processor = prologProcessor;
tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
return doProlog(parser, parser->m_encoding, s, end, tok, next, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer, XML_TRUE);
} else
#endif /* XML_DTD */
{
parser->m_processor = contentProcessor;
/* see externalEntityContentProcessor vs contentProcessor */
return doContent(parser, parser->m_parentParser ? 1 : 0, parser->m_encoding,
s, end, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer);
}
}
| 169,531
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool extractPages (const char *srcFileName, const char *destFileName) {
char pathName[4096];
GooString *gfileName = new GooString (srcFileName);
PDFDoc *doc = new PDFDoc (gfileName, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!doc->isOk()) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "Could not extract page(s) from damaged file ('{0:s}')", srcFileName);
return false;
}
if (firstPage == 0 && lastPage == 0) {
firstPage = 1;
lastPage = doc->getNumPages();
}
if (lastPage == 0)
lastPage = doc->getNumPages();
if (firstPage == 0)
if (firstPage == 0)
firstPage = 1;
if (firstPage != lastPage && strstr(destFileName, "%d") == NULL) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "'{0:s}' must contain '%%d' if more than one page should be extracted", destFileName);
return false;
}
for (int pageNo = firstPage; pageNo <= lastPage; pageNo++) {
snprintf (pathName, sizeof (pathName) - 1, destFileName, pageNo);
GooString *gpageName = new GooString (pathName);
{
printUsage ("pdfseparate", "<PDF-sourcefile> <PDF-pattern-destfile>",
argDesc);
}
if (printVersion || printHelp)
exitCode = 0;
goto err0;
}
globalParams = new GlobalParams();
ok = extractPages (argv[1], argv[2]);
if (ok) {
exitCode = 0;
}
delete globalParams;
err0:
return exitCode;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool extractPages (const char *srcFileName, const char *destFileName) {
char pathName[4096];
GooString *gfileName = new GooString (srcFileName);
PDFDoc *doc = new PDFDoc (gfileName, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!doc->isOk()) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "Could not extract page(s) from damaged file ('{0:s}')", srcFileName);
return false;
}
if (firstPage == 0 && lastPage == 0) {
firstPage = 1;
lastPage = doc->getNumPages();
}
if (lastPage == 0)
lastPage = doc->getNumPages();
if (firstPage == 0)
if (firstPage == 0)
firstPage = 1;
if (firstPage != lastPage && strstr(destFileName, "%d") == NULL) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "'{0:s}' must contain '%d' if more than one page should be extracted", destFileName);
return false;
}
// destFileName can have multiple %% and one %d
// We use auxDestFileName to replace all the valid % appearances
// by 'A' (random char that is not %), if at the end of replacing
// any of the valid appearances there is still any % around, the
// pattern is wrong
char *auxDestFileName = strdup(destFileName);
// %% can appear as many times as you want
char *p = strstr(auxDestFileName, "%%");
while (p != NULL) {
*p = 'A';
*(p + 1) = 'A';
p = strstr(p, "%%");
}
// %d can appear only one time
p = strstr(auxDestFileName, "%d");
if (p != NULL) {
*p = 'A';
}
// at this point any other % is wrong
p = strstr(auxDestFileName, "%");
if (p != NULL) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "'{0:s}' can only contain one '%d' pattern", destFileName);
free(auxDestFileName);
return false;
}
free(auxDestFileName);
for (int pageNo = firstPage; pageNo <= lastPage; pageNo++) {
snprintf (pathName, sizeof (pathName) - 1, destFileName, pageNo);
GooString *gpageName = new GooString (pathName);
{
printUsage ("pdfseparate", "<PDF-sourcefile> <PDF-pattern-destfile>",
argDesc);
}
if (printVersion || printHelp)
exitCode = 0;
goto err0;
}
globalParams = new GlobalParams();
ok = extractPages (argv[1], argv[2]);
if (ok) {
exitCode = 0;
}
delete globalParams;
err0:
return exitCode;
}
| 164,653
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: std::string TestFlashMessageLoop::TestRunWithoutQuit() {
message_loop_ = new pp::flash::MessageLoop(instance_);
pp::CompletionCallback callback = callback_factory_.NewCallback(
&TestFlashMessageLoop::DestroyMessageLoopResourceTask);
pp::Module::Get()->core()->CallOnMainThread(0, callback);
int32_t result = message_loop_->Run();
if (message_loop_) {
delete message_loop_;
message_loop_ = NULL;
ASSERT_TRUE(false);
}
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_ABORTED, result);
PASS();
}
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
std::string TestFlashMessageLoop::TestRunWithoutQuit() {
message_loop_ = new pp::flash::MessageLoop(instance_);
pp::CompletionCallback callback = callback_factory_.NewCallback(
&TestFlashMessageLoop::DestroyMessageLoopResourceTask);
pp::Module::Get()->core()->CallOnMainThread(0, callback);
int32_t result = message_loop_->Run();
if (message_loop_) {
delete message_loop_;
message_loop_ = nullptr;
ASSERT_TRUE(false);
}
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_ABORTED, result);
PASS();
}
| 172,128
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int rfcomm_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct bt_security sec;
int len, err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (level == SOL_RFCOMM)
return rfcomm_sock_getsockopt_old(sock, optname, optval, optlen);
if (level != SOL_BLUETOOTH)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case BT_SECURITY:
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
sec.level = rfcomm_pi(sk)->sec_level;
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(sec));
if (copy_to_user(optval, (char *) &sec, len))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case BT_DEFER_SETUP:
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND && sk->sk_state != BT_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (put_user(test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags),
(u32 __user *) optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in getsockopt(BT_SECURITY)
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the key_size member of struct
bt_security before copying it to userland -- that for leaking one
byte kernel stack. Initialize key_size with 0 to avoid the info
leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
static int rfcomm_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct bt_security sec;
int len, err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (level == SOL_RFCOMM)
return rfcomm_sock_getsockopt_old(sock, optname, optval, optlen);
if (level != SOL_BLUETOOTH)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case BT_SECURITY:
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
sec.level = rfcomm_pi(sk)->sec_level;
sec.key_size = 0;
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(sec));
if (copy_to_user(optval, (char *) &sec, len))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case BT_DEFER_SETUP:
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND && sk->sk_state != BT_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (put_user(test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags),
(u32 __user *) optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
| 169,897
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr(PVSCSIRingInfo *mgr)
{
uint32_t ready_ptr = RS_GET_FIELD(mgr, reqProdIdx);
if (ready_ptr != mgr->consumed_ptr) {
uint32_t next_ready_ptr =
mgr->consumed_ptr++ & mgr->txr_len_mask;
uint32_t next_ready_page =
return mgr->req_ring_pages_pa[next_ready_page] +
inpage_idx * sizeof(PVSCSIRingReqDesc);
} else {
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr(PVSCSIRingInfo *mgr)
{
uint32_t ready_ptr = RS_GET_FIELD(mgr, reqProdIdx);
uint32_t ring_size = PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_PAGES_REQ_RING
* PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_REQ_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
if (ready_ptr != mgr->consumed_ptr
&& ready_ptr - mgr->consumed_ptr < ring_size) {
uint32_t next_ready_ptr =
mgr->consumed_ptr++ & mgr->txr_len_mask;
uint32_t next_ready_page =
return mgr->req_ring_pages_pa[next_ready_page] +
inpage_idx * sizeof(PVSCSIRingReqDesc);
} else {
return 0;
}
}
| 164,929
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void btu_exec_tap_fd_read(void *p_param) {
struct pollfd ufd;
int fd = (int)p_param;
if (fd == INVALID_FD || fd != btpan_cb.tap_fd)
return;
for (int i = 0; i < PAN_POOL_MAX && btif_is_enabled() && btpan_cb.flow; i++) {
BT_HDR *buffer = (BT_HDR *)GKI_getpoolbuf(PAN_POOL_ID);
if (!buffer) {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s unable to allocate buffer for packet.", __func__);
break;
}
buffer->offset = PAN_MINIMUM_OFFSET;
buffer->len = GKI_get_buf_size(buffer) - sizeof(BT_HDR) - buffer->offset;
UINT8 *packet = (UINT8 *)buffer + sizeof(BT_HDR) + buffer->offset;
if (!btpan_cb.congest_packet_size) {
ssize_t ret = read(fd, btpan_cb.congest_packet, sizeof(btpan_cb.congest_packet));
switch (ret) {
case -1:
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s unable to read from driver: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
GKI_freebuf(buffer);
btsock_thread_add_fd(pan_pth, fd, 0, SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD, 0);
return;
case 0:
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s end of file reached.", __func__);
GKI_freebuf(buffer);
btsock_thread_add_fd(pan_pth, fd, 0, SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD, 0);
return;
default:
btpan_cb.congest_packet_size = ret;
break;
}
}
memcpy(packet, btpan_cb.congest_packet, MIN(btpan_cb.congest_packet_size, buffer->len));
buffer->len = MIN(btpan_cb.congest_packet_size, buffer->len);
if (buffer->len > sizeof(tETH_HDR) && should_forward((tETH_HDR *)packet)) {
tETH_HDR hdr;
memcpy(&hdr, packet, sizeof(tETH_HDR));
buffer->len -= sizeof(tETH_HDR);
buffer->offset += sizeof(tETH_HDR);
if (forward_bnep(&hdr, buffer) != FORWARD_CONGEST)
btpan_cb.congest_packet_size = 0;
} else {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s dropping packet of length %d", __func__, buffer->len);
btpan_cb.congest_packet_size = 0;
GKI_freebuf(buffer);
}
ufd.fd = fd;
ufd.events = POLLIN;
ufd.revents = 0;
if (poll(&ufd, 1, 0) <= 0 || IS_EXCEPTION(ufd.revents))
break;
}
btsock_thread_add_fd(pan_pth, fd, 0, SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD, 0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
static void btu_exec_tap_fd_read(void *p_param) {
struct pollfd ufd;
int fd = (int)p_param;
if (fd == INVALID_FD || fd != btpan_cb.tap_fd)
return;
for (int i = 0; i < PAN_POOL_MAX && btif_is_enabled() && btpan_cb.flow; i++) {
BT_HDR *buffer = (BT_HDR *)GKI_getpoolbuf(PAN_POOL_ID);
if (!buffer) {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s unable to allocate buffer for packet.", __func__);
break;
}
buffer->offset = PAN_MINIMUM_OFFSET;
buffer->len = GKI_get_buf_size(buffer) - sizeof(BT_HDR) - buffer->offset;
UINT8 *packet = (UINT8 *)buffer + sizeof(BT_HDR) + buffer->offset;
if (!btpan_cb.congest_packet_size) {
ssize_t ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(fd, btpan_cb.congest_packet, sizeof(btpan_cb.congest_packet)));
switch (ret) {
case -1:
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s unable to read from driver: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
GKI_freebuf(buffer);
btsock_thread_add_fd(pan_pth, fd, 0, SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD, 0);
return;
case 0:
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s end of file reached.", __func__);
GKI_freebuf(buffer);
btsock_thread_add_fd(pan_pth, fd, 0, SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD, 0);
return;
default:
btpan_cb.congest_packet_size = ret;
break;
}
}
memcpy(packet, btpan_cb.congest_packet, MIN(btpan_cb.congest_packet_size, buffer->len));
buffer->len = MIN(btpan_cb.congest_packet_size, buffer->len);
if (buffer->len > sizeof(tETH_HDR) && should_forward((tETH_HDR *)packet)) {
tETH_HDR hdr;
memcpy(&hdr, packet, sizeof(tETH_HDR));
buffer->len -= sizeof(tETH_HDR);
buffer->offset += sizeof(tETH_HDR);
if (forward_bnep(&hdr, buffer) != FORWARD_CONGEST)
btpan_cb.congest_packet_size = 0;
} else {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s dropping packet of length %d", __func__, buffer->len);
btpan_cb.congest_packet_size = 0;
GKI_freebuf(buffer);
}
ufd.fd = fd;
ufd.events = POLLIN;
ufd.revents = 0;
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(poll(&ufd, 1, 0)) <= 0 || IS_EXCEPTION(ufd.revents))
break;
}
btsock_thread_add_fd(pan_pth, fd, 0, SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD, 0);
}
| 173,447
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int dnxhd_find_frame_end(DNXHDParserContext *dctx,
const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
ParseContext *pc = &dctx->pc;
uint64_t state = pc->state64;
int pic_found = pc->frame_start_found;
int i = 0;
if (!pic_found) {
for (i = 0; i < buf_size; i++) {
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (ff_dnxhd_check_header_prefix(state & 0xffffffffff00LL) != 0) {
i++;
pic_found = 1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (pic_found && !dctx->remaining) {
if (!buf_size) /* EOF considered as end of frame */
return 0;
for (; i < buf_size; i++) {
dctx->cur_byte++;
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (dctx->cur_byte == 24) {
dctx->h = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 26) {
dctx->w = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 42) {
int cid = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF;
if (cid <= 0)
continue;
dctx->remaining = avpriv_dnxhd_get_frame_size(cid);
if (dctx->remaining <= 0) {
dctx->remaining = dnxhd_get_hr_frame_size(cid, dctx->w, dctx->h);
if (dctx->remaining <= 0)
return dctx->remaining;
}
if (buf_size - i + 47 >= dctx->remaining) {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
} else {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
}
}
}
} else if (pic_found) {
if (dctx->remaining > buf_size) {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
} else {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
}
}
pc->frame_start_found = pic_found;
pc->state64 = state;
return END_NOT_FOUND;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dnxhd_parser: Do not return invalid value from dnxhd_find_frame_end() on error
Fixes: Null pointer dereference
Fixes: CVE-2017-9608
Found-by: Yihan Lian
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 611b35627488a8d0763e75c25ee0875c5b7987dd)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
static int dnxhd_find_frame_end(DNXHDParserContext *dctx,
const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
ParseContext *pc = &dctx->pc;
uint64_t state = pc->state64;
int pic_found = pc->frame_start_found;
int i = 0;
if (!pic_found) {
for (i = 0; i < buf_size; i++) {
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (ff_dnxhd_check_header_prefix(state & 0xffffffffff00LL) != 0) {
i++;
pic_found = 1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (pic_found && !dctx->remaining) {
if (!buf_size) /* EOF considered as end of frame */
return 0;
for (; i < buf_size; i++) {
dctx->cur_byte++;
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (dctx->cur_byte == 24) {
dctx->h = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 26) {
dctx->w = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 42) {
int cid = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF;
int remaining;
if (cid <= 0)
continue;
remaining = avpriv_dnxhd_get_frame_size(cid);
if (remaining <= 0) {
remaining = dnxhd_get_hr_frame_size(cid, dctx->w, dctx->h);
if (remaining <= 0)
continue;
}
dctx->remaining = remaining;
if (buf_size - i + 47 >= dctx->remaining) {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
} else {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
}
}
}
} else if (pic_found) {
if (dctx->remaining > buf_size) {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
} else {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
}
}
pc->frame_start_found = pic_found;
pc->state64 = state;
return END_NOT_FOUND;
}
| 170,046
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool AwMainDelegate::BasicStartupComplete(int* exit_code) {
content::SetContentClient(&content_client_);
content::RegisterMediaUrlInterceptor(new AwMediaUrlInterceptor());
BrowserViewRenderer::CalculateTileMemoryPolicy();
ui::GestureConfiguration::GetInstance()
->set_fling_touchscreen_tap_suppression_enabled(false);
base::CommandLine* cl = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
cl->AppendSwitch(cc::switches::kEnableBeginFrameScheduling);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableOverscrollEdgeEffect);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePullToRefreshEffect);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSharedWorkers);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableFileSystem);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableNotifications);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableWebRtcHWDecoding);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableAcceleratedVideoDecode);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableThreadedTextureMailboxes);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableScreenOrientationLock);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSpeechAPI);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePermissionsAPI);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableAggressiveDOMStorageFlushing);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePresentationAPI);
if (cl->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType).empty()) {
#ifdef __LP64__
const char kNativesFileName[] = "assets/natives_blob_64.bin";
const char kSnapshotFileName[] = "assets/snapshot_blob_64.bin";
#else
const char kNativesFileName[] = "assets/natives_blob_32.bin";
const char kSnapshotFileName[] = "assets/snapshot_blob_32.bin";
#endif // __LP64__
CHECK(base::android::RegisterApkAssetWithGlobalDescriptors(
kV8NativesDataDescriptor, kNativesFileName));
CHECK(base::android::RegisterApkAssetWithGlobalDescriptors(
kV8SnapshotDataDescriptor, kSnapshotFileName));
}
if (cl->HasSwitch(switches::kWebViewSanboxedRenderer)) {
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kInProcessGPU);
cl->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kRendererProcessLimit, "1");
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [Android WebView] Fix a couple of typos
Fix a couple of typos in variable names/commentary introduced in:
https://codereview.chromium.org/1315633003/
No functional effect.
BUG=156062
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1331943002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#348175}
CWE ID:
|
bool AwMainDelegate::BasicStartupComplete(int* exit_code) {
content::SetContentClient(&content_client_);
content::RegisterMediaUrlInterceptor(new AwMediaUrlInterceptor());
BrowserViewRenderer::CalculateTileMemoryPolicy();
ui::GestureConfiguration::GetInstance()
->set_fling_touchscreen_tap_suppression_enabled(false);
base::CommandLine* cl = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
cl->AppendSwitch(cc::switches::kEnableBeginFrameScheduling);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableOverscrollEdgeEffect);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePullToRefreshEffect);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSharedWorkers);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableFileSystem);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableNotifications);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableWebRtcHWDecoding);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableAcceleratedVideoDecode);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableThreadedTextureMailboxes);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableScreenOrientationLock);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSpeechAPI);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePermissionsAPI);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableAggressiveDOMStorageFlushing);
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePresentationAPI);
if (cl->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType).empty()) {
#ifdef __LP64__
const char kNativesFileName[] = "assets/natives_blob_64.bin";
const char kSnapshotFileName[] = "assets/snapshot_blob_64.bin";
#else
const char kNativesFileName[] = "assets/natives_blob_32.bin";
const char kSnapshotFileName[] = "assets/snapshot_blob_32.bin";
#endif // __LP64__
CHECK(base::android::RegisterApkAssetWithGlobalDescriptors(
kV8NativesDataDescriptor, kNativesFileName));
CHECK(base::android::RegisterApkAssetWithGlobalDescriptors(
kV8SnapshotDataDescriptor, kSnapshotFileName));
}
if (cl->HasSwitch(switches::kWebViewSandboxedRenderer)) {
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kInProcessGPU);
cl->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kRendererProcessLimit, "1");
}
return false;
}
| 171,710
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: explicit RemoveDownloadsTester(TestingProfile* testing_profile)
: download_manager_(new content::MockDownloadManager()),
chrome_download_manager_delegate_(testing_profile) {
content::BrowserContext::SetDownloadManagerForTesting(
testing_profile, base::WrapUnique(download_manager_));
EXPECT_EQ(download_manager_,
content::BrowserContext::GetDownloadManager(testing_profile));
EXPECT_CALL(*download_manager_, GetDelegate())
.WillOnce(Return(&chrome_download_manager_delegate_));
EXPECT_CALL(*download_manager_, Shutdown());
}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
explicit RemoveDownloadsTester(TestingProfile* testing_profile)
: download_manager_(new content::MockDownloadManager()) {
content::BrowserContext::SetDownloadManagerForTesting(
testing_profile, base::WrapUnique(download_manager_));
std::unique_ptr<ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate> delegate =
std::make_unique<ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate>(testing_profile);
chrome_download_manager_delegate_ = delegate.get();
service_ =
DownloadCoreServiceFactory::GetForBrowserContext(testing_profile);
service_->SetDownloadManagerDelegateForTesting(std::move(delegate));
EXPECT_CALL(*download_manager_, GetBrowserContext())
.WillRepeatedly(Return(testing_profile));
EXPECT_CALL(*download_manager_, Shutdown());
}
| 173,167
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long do_rt_tgsigqueueinfo(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig, siginfo_t *info)
{
/* This is only valid for single tasks */
if (pid <= 0 || tgid <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
Nor can they impersonate a kill(), which adds source info. */
if (info->si_code >= 0)
return -EPERM;
info->si_signo = sig;
return do_send_specific(tgid, pid, sig, info);
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
|
long do_rt_tgsigqueueinfo(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig, siginfo_t *info)
{
/* This is only valid for single tasks */
if (pid <= 0 || tgid <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
* Nor can they impersonate a kill()/tgkill(), which adds source info.
*/
if (info->si_code != SI_QUEUE) {
/* We used to allow any < 0 si_code */
WARN_ON_ONCE(info->si_code < 0);
return -EPERM;
}
info->si_signo = sig;
return do_send_specific(tgid, pid, sig, info);
}
| 166,232
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ZSTD_buildCTable(void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
FSE_CTable* nextCTable, U32 FSELog, symbolEncodingType_e type,
U32* count, U32 max,
const BYTE* codeTable, size_t nbSeq,
const S16* defaultNorm, U32 defaultNormLog, U32 defaultMax,
const FSE_CTable* prevCTable, size_t prevCTableSize,
void* workspace, size_t workspaceSize)
{
BYTE* op = (BYTE*)dst;
const BYTE* const oend = op + dstCapacity;
switch (type) {
case set_rle:
*op = codeTable[0];
CHECK_F(FSE_buildCTable_rle(nextCTable, (BYTE)max));
return 1;
case set_repeat:
memcpy(nextCTable, prevCTable, prevCTableSize);
return 0;
case set_basic:
CHECK_F(FSE_buildCTable_wksp(nextCTable, defaultNorm, defaultMax, defaultNormLog, workspace, workspaceSize)); /* note : could be pre-calculated */
return 0;
case set_compressed: {
S16 norm[MaxSeq + 1];
size_t nbSeq_1 = nbSeq;
const U32 tableLog = FSE_optimalTableLog(FSELog, nbSeq, max);
if (count[codeTable[nbSeq-1]] > 1) {
count[codeTable[nbSeq-1]]--;
nbSeq_1--;
}
assert(nbSeq_1 > 1);
CHECK_F(FSE_normalizeCount(norm, tableLog, count, nbSeq_1, max));
{ size_t const NCountSize = FSE_writeNCount(op, oend - op, norm, max, tableLog); /* overflow protected */
if (FSE_isError(NCountSize)) return NCountSize;
CHECK_F(FSE_buildCTable_wksp(nextCTable, norm, max, tableLog, workspace, workspaceSize));
return NCountSize;
}
}
default: return assert(0), ERROR(GENERIC);
}
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
ZSTD_buildCTable(void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
FSE_CTable* nextCTable, U32 FSELog, symbolEncodingType_e type,
U32* count, U32 max,
const BYTE* codeTable, size_t nbSeq,
const S16* defaultNorm, U32 defaultNormLog, U32 defaultMax,
const FSE_CTable* prevCTable, size_t prevCTableSize,
void* workspace, size_t workspaceSize)
{
BYTE* op = (BYTE*)dst;
const BYTE* const oend = op + dstCapacity;
DEBUGLOG(6, "ZSTD_buildCTable (dstCapacity=%u)", (unsigned)dstCapacity);
switch (type) {
case set_rle:
CHECK_F(FSE_buildCTable_rle(nextCTable, (BYTE)max));
if (dstCapacity==0) return ERROR(dstSize_tooSmall);
*op = codeTable[0];
return 1;
case set_repeat:
memcpy(nextCTable, prevCTable, prevCTableSize);
return 0;
case set_basic:
CHECK_F(FSE_buildCTable_wksp(nextCTable, defaultNorm, defaultMax, defaultNormLog, workspace, workspaceSize)); /* note : could be pre-calculated */
return 0;
case set_compressed: {
S16 norm[MaxSeq + 1];
size_t nbSeq_1 = nbSeq;
const U32 tableLog = FSE_optimalTableLog(FSELog, nbSeq, max);
if (count[codeTable[nbSeq-1]] > 1) {
count[codeTable[nbSeq-1]]--;
nbSeq_1--;
}
assert(nbSeq_1 > 1);
CHECK_F(FSE_normalizeCount(norm, tableLog, count, nbSeq_1, max));
{ size_t const NCountSize = FSE_writeNCount(op, oend - op, norm, max, tableLog); /* overflow protected */
if (FSE_isError(NCountSize)) return NCountSize;
CHECK_F(FSE_buildCTable_wksp(nextCTable, norm, max, tableLog, workspace, workspaceSize));
return NCountSize;
}
}
default: return assert(0), ERROR(GENERIC);
}
}
| 169,671
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHPAPI PHP_FUNCTION(fread)
{
zval *arg1;
long len;
php_stream *stream;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rl", &arg1, &len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PHP_STREAM_TO_ZVAL(stream, &arg1);
if (len <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Length parameter must be greater than 0");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value) = emalloc(len + 1);
Z_STRLEN_P(return_value) = php_stream_read(stream, Z_STRVAL_P(return_value), len);
/* needed because recv/read/gzread doesnt put a null at the end*/
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value)[Z_STRLEN_P(return_value)] = 0;
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_STRING;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
PHPAPI PHP_FUNCTION(fread)
{
zval *arg1;
long len;
php_stream *stream;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rl", &arg1, &len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PHP_STREAM_TO_ZVAL(stream, &arg1);
if (len <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Length parameter must be greater than 0");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (len > INT_MAX) {
/* string length is int in 5.x so we can not read more than int */
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Length parameter must be no more than %d", INT_MAX);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value) = emalloc(len + 1);
Z_STRLEN_P(return_value) = php_stream_read(stream, Z_STRVAL_P(return_value), len);
/* needed because recv/read/gzread doesnt put a null at the end*/
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value)[Z_STRLEN_P(return_value)] = 0;
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_STRING;
}
| 167,167
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RunTestsInFile(const std::string& filename,
const std::string& pdf_filename) {
extensions::ResultCatcher catcher;
GURL url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("/pdf/" + pdf_filename));
ASSERT_TRUE(LoadPdf(url));
content::WebContents* contents =
browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
content::BrowserPluginGuestManager* guest_manager =
contents->GetBrowserContext()->GetGuestManager();
content::WebContents* guest_contents =
guest_manager->GetFullPageGuest(contents);
ASSERT_TRUE(guest_contents);
base::FilePath test_data_dir;
PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_TEST_DATA, &test_data_dir);
test_data_dir = test_data_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("pdf"));
base::FilePath test_util_path = test_data_dir.AppendASCII("test_util.js");
std::string test_util_js;
ASSERT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(test_util_path, &test_util_js));
base::FilePath test_file_path = test_data_dir.AppendASCII(filename);
std::string test_js;
ASSERT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(test_file_path, &test_js));
test_util_js.append(test_js);
ASSERT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScript(guest_contents, test_util_js));
if (!catcher.GetNextResult())
FAIL() << catcher.message();
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void RunTestsInFile(const std::string& filename,
const std::string& pdf_filename) {
extensions::ResultCatcher catcher;
GURL url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("/pdf/" + pdf_filename));
content::WebContents* guest_contents = LoadPdfGetGuestContents(url);
ASSERT_TRUE(guest_contents);
base::FilePath test_data_dir;
PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_TEST_DATA, &test_data_dir);
test_data_dir = test_data_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("pdf"));
base::FilePath test_util_path = test_data_dir.AppendASCII("test_util.js");
std::string test_util_js;
ASSERT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(test_util_path, &test_util_js));
base::FilePath test_file_path = test_data_dir.AppendASCII(filename);
std::string test_js;
ASSERT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(test_file_path, &test_js));
test_util_js.append(test_js);
ASSERT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScript(guest_contents, test_util_js));
if (!catcher.GetNextResult())
FAIL() << catcher.message();
}
| 171,774
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: OMXNodeInstance::OMXNodeInstance(
OMX *owner, const sp<IOMXObserver> &observer, const char *name)
: mOwner(owner),
mNodeID(0),
mHandle(NULL),
mObserver(observer),
mDying(false),
mBufferIDCount(0)
{
mName = ADebug::GetDebugName(name);
DEBUG = ADebug::GetDebugLevelFromProperty(name, "debug.stagefright.omx-debug");
ALOGV("debug level for %s is %d", name, DEBUG);
DEBUG_BUMP = DEBUG;
mNumPortBuffers[0] = 0;
mNumPortBuffers[1] = 0;
mDebugLevelBumpPendingBuffers[0] = 0;
mDebugLevelBumpPendingBuffers[1] = 0;
mMetadataType[0] = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
mMetadataType[1] = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
mSecureBufferType[0] = kSecureBufferTypeUnknown;
mSecureBufferType[1] = kSecureBufferTypeUnknown;
mIsSecure = AString(name).endsWith(".secure");
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
OMXNodeInstance::OMXNodeInstance(
OMX *owner, const sp<IOMXObserver> &observer, const char *name)
: mOwner(owner),
mNodeID(0),
mHandle(NULL),
mObserver(observer),
mDying(false),
mSailed(false),
mQueriedProhibitedExtensions(false),
mBufferIDCount(0)
{
mName = ADebug::GetDebugName(name);
DEBUG = ADebug::GetDebugLevelFromProperty(name, "debug.stagefright.omx-debug");
ALOGV("debug level for %s is %d", name, DEBUG);
DEBUG_BUMP = DEBUG;
mNumPortBuffers[0] = 0;
mNumPortBuffers[1] = 0;
mDebugLevelBumpPendingBuffers[0] = 0;
mDebugLevelBumpPendingBuffers[1] = 0;
mMetadataType[0] = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
mMetadataType[1] = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
mSecureBufferType[0] = kSecureBufferTypeUnknown;
mSecureBufferType[1] = kSecureBufferTypeUnknown;
mIsSecure = AString(name).endsWith(".secure");
}
| 174,129
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Chapters::Edition::~Edition()
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
Chapters::Edition::~Edition()
Chapters::Atom::~Atom() {}
unsigned long long Chapters::Atom::GetUID() const { return m_uid; }
const char* Chapters::Atom::GetStringUID() const { return m_string_uid; }
long long Chapters::Atom::GetStartTimecode() const { return m_start_timecode; }
long long Chapters::Atom::GetStopTimecode() const { return m_stop_timecode; }
long long Chapters::Atom::GetStartTime(const Chapters* pChapters) const {
return GetTime(pChapters, m_start_timecode);
}
| 174,466
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void mkvparser::GetVersion(int& major, int& minor, int& build, int& revision)
{
major = 1;
minor = 0;
build = 0;
revision = 27;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void mkvparser::GetVersion(int& major, int& minor, int& build, int& revision)
| 174,379
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void MaintainContentLengthPrefsForDateChange(
base::ListValue* original_update,
base::ListValue* received_update,
int days_since_last_update) {
if (days_since_last_update == -1) {
days_since_last_update = 0;
} else if (days_since_last_update < -1) {
original_update->Clear();
received_update->Clear();
days_since_last_update = kNumDaysInHistory;
//// DailyContentLengthUpdate maintains a data saving pref. The pref is a list
//// of |kNumDaysInHistory| elements of daily total content lengths for the past
//// |kNumDaysInHistory| days.
}
DCHECK_GE(days_since_last_update, 0);
for (int i = 0;
i < days_since_last_update && i < static_cast<int>(kNumDaysInHistory);
++i) {
original_update->AppendString(base::Int64ToString(0));
received_update->AppendString(base::Int64ToString(0));
}
MaintainContentLengthPrefsWindow(original_update, kNumDaysInHistory);
MaintainContentLengthPrefsWindow(received_update, kNumDaysInHistory);
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void MaintainContentLengthPrefsForDateChange(
//// DailyContentLengthUpdate maintains a data saving pref. The pref is a list
//// of |kNumDaysInHistory| elements of daily total content lengths for the past
//// |kNumDaysInHistory| days.
class DailyContentLengthUpdate {
public:
DailyContentLengthUpdate(
const char* pref,
PrefService* pref_service)
: update_(pref_service, pref) {
}
void UpdateForDataChange(int days_since_last_update) {
// New empty lists may have been created. Maintain the invariant that
// there should be exactly |kNumDaysInHistory| days in the histories.
MaintainContentLengthPrefsWindow(update_.Get(), kNumDaysInHistory);
if (days_since_last_update) {
MaintainContentLengthPrefForDateChange(days_since_last_update);
}
}
| 171,325
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long long AudioTrack::GetBitDepth() const
{
return m_bitDepth;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
long long AudioTrack::GetBitDepth() const
| 174,283
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int __ext4_journal_stop(const char *where, unsigned int line, handle_t *handle)
{
struct super_block *sb;
int err;
int rc;
if (!ext4_handle_valid(handle)) {
ext4_put_nojournal(handle);
return 0;
}
if (!handle->h_transaction) {
err = jbd2_journal_stop(handle);
return handle->h_err ? handle->h_err : err;
}
sb = handle->h_transaction->t_journal->j_private;
err = handle->h_err;
rc = jbd2_journal_stop(handle);
if (!err)
err = rc;
if (err)
__ext4_std_error(sb, where, line, err);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix potential use after free in __ext4_journal_stop
There is a use-after-free possibility in __ext4_journal_stop() in the
case that we free the handle in the first jbd2_journal_stop() because
we're referencing handle->h_err afterwards. This was introduced in
9705acd63b125dee8b15c705216d7186daea4625 and it is wrong. Fix it by
storing the handle->h_err value beforehand and avoid referencing
potentially freed handle.
Fixes: 9705acd63b125dee8b15c705216d7186daea4625
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
int __ext4_journal_stop(const char *where, unsigned int line, handle_t *handle)
{
struct super_block *sb;
int err;
int rc;
if (!ext4_handle_valid(handle)) {
ext4_put_nojournal(handle);
return 0;
}
err = handle->h_err;
if (!handle->h_transaction) {
rc = jbd2_journal_stop(handle);
return err ? err : rc;
}
sb = handle->h_transaction->t_journal->j_private;
rc = jbd2_journal_stop(handle);
if (!err)
err = rc;
if (err)
__ext4_std_error(sb, where, line, err);
return err;
}
| 167,465
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int nfs_readlink_req(struct nfs_priv *npriv, struct nfs_fh *fh,
char **target)
{
uint32_t data[1024];
uint32_t *p;
uint32_t len;
struct packet *nfs_packet;
/*
* struct READLINK3args {
* nfs_fh3 symlink;
* };
*
* struct READLINK3resok {
* post_op_attr symlink_attributes;
* nfspath3 data;
* };
*
* struct READLINK3resfail {
* post_op_attr symlink_attributes;
* }
*
* union READLINK3res switch (nfsstat3 status) {
* case NFS3_OK:
* READLINK3resok resok;
* default:
* READLINK3resfail resfail;
* };
*/
p = &(data[0]);
p = rpc_add_credentials(p);
p = nfs_add_fh3(p, fh);
len = p - &(data[0]);
nfs_packet = rpc_req(npriv, PROG_NFS, NFSPROC3_READLINK, data, len);
if (IS_ERR(nfs_packet))
return PTR_ERR(nfs_packet);
p = (void *)nfs_packet->data + sizeof(struct rpc_reply) + 4;
p = nfs_read_post_op_attr(p, NULL);
len = ntoh32(net_read_uint32(p)); /* new path length */
p++;
*target = xzalloc(len + 1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int nfs_readlink_req(struct nfs_priv *npriv, struct nfs_fh *fh,
char **target)
{
uint32_t data[1024];
uint32_t *p;
uint32_t len;
struct packet *nfs_packet;
/*
* struct READLINK3args {
* nfs_fh3 symlink;
* };
*
* struct READLINK3resok {
* post_op_attr symlink_attributes;
* nfspath3 data;
* };
*
* struct READLINK3resfail {
* post_op_attr symlink_attributes;
* }
*
* union READLINK3res switch (nfsstat3 status) {
* case NFS3_OK:
* READLINK3resok resok;
* default:
* READLINK3resfail resfail;
* };
*/
p = &(data[0]);
p = rpc_add_credentials(p);
p = nfs_add_fh3(p, fh);
len = p - &(data[0]);
nfs_packet = rpc_req(npriv, PROG_NFS, NFSPROC3_READLINK, data, len);
if (IS_ERR(nfs_packet))
return PTR_ERR(nfs_packet);
p = (void *)nfs_packet->data + sizeof(struct rpc_reply) + 4;
p = nfs_read_post_op_attr(p, NULL);
len = ntoh32(net_read_uint32(p)); /* new path length */
len = max_t(unsigned int, len,
nfs_packet->len - sizeof(struct rpc_reply) - sizeof(uint32_t));
p++;
*target = xzalloc(len + 1);
return 0;
}
| 164,624
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: wb_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const void *hdr, register u_int len)
{
register const struct pkt_hdr *ph;
ph = (const struct pkt_hdr *)hdr;
if (len < sizeof(*ph) || !ND_TTEST(*ph)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
len -= sizeof(*ph);
if (ph->ph_flags)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "*"));
switch (ph->ph_type) {
case PT_KILL:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-kill"));
return;
case PT_ID:
if (wb_id(ndo, (const struct pkt_id *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
break;
case PT_RREQ:
if (wb_rreq(ndo, (const struct pkt_rreq *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
break;
case PT_RREP:
if (wb_rrep(ndo, (const struct pkt_rrep *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
break;
case PT_DRAWOP:
if (wb_drawop(ndo, (const struct pkt_dop *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
break;
case PT_PREQ:
if (wb_preq(ndo, (const struct pkt_preq *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
break;
case PT_PREP:
if (wb_prep(ndo, (const struct pkt_prep *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-%d!", ph->ph_type));
return;
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13014/White Board: Do more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, print a truncation error if the packets are
truncated, rather than just, in effect, ignoring the result of the
routines that print particular packet types.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
wb_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const void *hdr, register u_int len)
{
register const struct pkt_hdr *ph;
ph = (const struct pkt_hdr *)hdr;
if (len < sizeof(*ph) || !ND_TTEST(*ph)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
len -= sizeof(*ph);
if (ph->ph_flags)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "*"));
switch (ph->ph_type) {
case PT_KILL:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-kill"));
return;
case PT_ID:
if (wb_id(ndo, (const struct pkt_id *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
break;
case PT_RREQ:
if (wb_rreq(ndo, (const struct pkt_rreq *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
break;
case PT_RREP:
if (wb_rrep(ndo, (const struct pkt_rrep *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
break;
case PT_DRAWOP:
if (wb_drawop(ndo, (const struct pkt_dop *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
break;
case PT_PREQ:
if (wb_preq(ndo, (const struct pkt_preq *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
break;
case PT_PREP:
if (wb_prep(ndo, (const struct pkt_prep *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-%d!", ph->ph_type));
return;
}
}
| 167,879
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: MediaRecorderHandler::~MediaRecorderHandler() {
DCHECK(main_render_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (client_)
client_->WriteData(
nullptr, 0u, true,
(TimeTicks::Now() - TimeTicks::UnixEpoch()).InMillisecondsF());
}
Commit Message: Check context is attached before creating MediaRecorder
Bug: 896736
Change-Id: I3ccfd2188fb15704af14c8af050e0a5667855d34
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324231
Commit-Queue: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606242}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
MediaRecorderHandler::~MediaRecorderHandler() {
DCHECK(main_render_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (client_) {
client_->WriteData(
nullptr, 0u, true,
(TimeTicks::Now() - TimeTicks::UnixEpoch()).InMillisecondsF());
}
}
| 172,604
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void usage()
{
fprintf (stderr, "PNG2PNM\n");
fprintf (stderr, " by Willem van Schaik, 1999\n");
#ifdef __TURBOC__
fprintf (stderr, " for Turbo-C and Borland-C compilers\n");
#else
fprintf (stderr, " for Linux (and Unix) compilers\n");
#endif
fprintf (stderr, "Usage: png2pnm [options] <file>.png [<file>.pnm]\n");
fprintf (stderr, " or: ... | png2pnm [options]\n");
fprintf (stderr, "Options:\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -r[aw] write pnm-file in binary format (P4/P5/P6) (default)\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -n[oraw] write pnm-file in ascii format (P1/P2/P3)\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -a[lpha] <file>.pgm write PNG alpha channel as pgm-file\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -h | -? print this help-information\n");
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
void usage()
{
fprintf (stderr, "PNG2PNM\n");
fprintf (stderr, " by Willem van Schaik, 1999\n");
#ifdef __TURBOC__
fprintf (stderr, " for Turbo-C and Borland-C compilers\n");
#else
fprintf (stderr, " for Linux (and Unix) compilers\n");
#endif
fprintf (stderr, "Usage: png2pnm [options] <file>.png [<file>.pnm]\n");
fprintf (stderr, " or: ... | png2pnm [options]\n");
fprintf (stderr, "Options:\n");
fprintf (stderr,
" -r[aw] write pnm-file in binary format (P4/P5/P6) (default)\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -n[oraw] write pnm-file in ascii format (P1/P2/P3)\n");
fprintf (stderr,
" -a[lpha] <file>.pgm write PNG alpha channel as pgm-file\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -h | -? print this help-information\n");
}
| 173,724
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: jbig2_sd_count_referred(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment)
{
int index;
Jbig2Segment *rsegment;
int n_dicts = 0;
for (index = 0; index < segment->referred_to_segment_count; index++) {
rsegment = jbig2_find_segment(ctx, segment->referred_to_segments[index]);
if (rsegment && ((rsegment->flags & 63) == 0) &&
rsegment->result && (((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->n_symbols > 0) && ((*((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->glyphs) != NULL))
n_dicts++;
}
return (n_dicts);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
jbig2_sd_count_referred(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment)
{
int index;
Jbig2Segment *rsegment;
uint32_t n_dicts = 0;
for (index = 0; index < segment->referred_to_segment_count; index++) {
rsegment = jbig2_find_segment(ctx, segment->referred_to_segments[index]);
if (rsegment && ((rsegment->flags & 63) == 0) &&
rsegment->result && (((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->n_symbols > 0) && ((*((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->glyphs) != NULL))
n_dicts++;
}
return (n_dicts);
}
| 165,500
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int get_exif_tag_dbl_value(struct iw_exif_state *e, unsigned int tag_pos,
double *pv)
{
unsigned int field_type;
unsigned int value_count;
unsigned int value_pos;
unsigned int numer, denom;
field_type = iw_get_ui16_e(&e->d[tag_pos+2],e->endian);
value_count = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[tag_pos+4],e->endian);
if(value_count!=1) return 0;
if(field_type!=5) return 0; // 5=Rational (two uint32's)
value_pos = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[tag_pos+8],e->endian);
if(value_pos > e->d_len-8) return 0;
numer = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[value_pos ],e->endian);
denom = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[value_pos+4],e->endian);
if(denom==0) return 0;
*pv = ((double)numer)/denom;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed invalid memory access bugs when decoding JPEG Exif data
Fixes issues #22, #23, #24, #25
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static int get_exif_tag_dbl_value(struct iw_exif_state *e, unsigned int tag_pos,
double *pv)
{
unsigned int field_type;
unsigned int value_count;
unsigned int value_pos;
unsigned int numer, denom;
field_type = get_exif_ui16(e, tag_pos+2);
value_count = get_exif_ui32(e, tag_pos+4);
if(value_count!=1) return 0;
if(field_type!=5) return 0; // 5=Rational (two uint32's)
value_pos = get_exif_ui32(e, tag_pos+8);
if(value_pos > e->d_len-8) return 0;
numer = get_exif_ui32(e, value_pos);
denom = get_exif_ui32(e, value_pos+4);
if(denom==0) return 0;
*pv = ((double)numer)/denom;
return 1;
}
| 168,113
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void command_timed_out(UNUSED_ATTR void *context) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&commands_pending_response_lock);
if (list_is_empty(commands_pending_response)) {
LOG_ERROR("%s with no commands pending response", __func__);
} else {
waiting_command_t *wait_entry = list_front(commands_pending_response);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&commands_pending_response_lock);
LOG_ERROR("%s hci layer timeout waiting for response to a command. opcode: 0x%x", __func__, wait_entry->opcode);
}
LOG_ERROR("%s restarting the bluetooth process.", __func__);
usleep(10000);
kill(getpid(), SIGKILL);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
static void command_timed_out(UNUSED_ATTR void *context) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&commands_pending_response_lock);
if (list_is_empty(commands_pending_response)) {
LOG_ERROR("%s with no commands pending response", __func__);
} else {
waiting_command_t *wait_entry = list_front(commands_pending_response);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&commands_pending_response_lock);
LOG_ERROR("%s hci layer timeout waiting for response to a command. opcode: 0x%x", __func__, wait_entry->opcode);
}
LOG_ERROR("%s restarting the bluetooth process.", __func__);
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(usleep(10000));
kill(getpid(), SIGKILL);
}
| 173,478
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ManifestUmaUtil::FetchFailed(FetchFailureReason reason) {
ManifestFetchResultType fetch_result_type = MANIFEST_FETCH_RESULT_TYPE_COUNT;
switch (reason) {
case FETCH_EMPTY_URL:
fetch_result_type = MANIFEST_FETCH_ERROR_EMPTY_URL;
break;
case FETCH_UNSPECIFIED_REASON:
fetch_result_type = MANIFEST_FETCH_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED;
break;
}
DCHECK_NE(fetch_result_type, MANIFEST_FETCH_RESULT_TYPE_COUNT);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(kUMANameFetchResult,
fetch_result_type,
MANIFEST_FETCH_RESULT_TYPE_COUNT);
}
Commit Message: Fail the web app manifest fetch if the document is sandboxed.
This ensures that sandboxed pages are regarded as non-PWAs, and that
other features in the browser process which trust the web manifest do
not receive the manifest at all if the document itself cannot access the
manifest.
BUG=771709
Change-Id: Ifd4d00c2fccff8cc0e5e8d2457bd55b992b0a8f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/866529
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531121}
CWE ID:
|
void ManifestUmaUtil::FetchFailed(FetchFailureReason reason) {
ManifestFetchResultType fetch_result_type = MANIFEST_FETCH_RESULT_TYPE_COUNT;
switch (reason) {
case FETCH_EMPTY_URL:
fetch_result_type = MANIFEST_FETCH_ERROR_EMPTY_URL;
break;
case FETCH_FROM_UNIQUE_ORIGIN:
fetch_result_type = MANIFEST_FETCH_ERROR_FROM_UNIQUE_ORIGIN;
break;
case FETCH_UNSPECIFIED_REASON:
fetch_result_type = MANIFEST_FETCH_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED;
break;
}
DCHECK_NE(fetch_result_type, MANIFEST_FETCH_RESULT_TYPE_COUNT);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(kUMANameFetchResult,
fetch_result_type,
MANIFEST_FETCH_RESULT_TYPE_COUNT);
}
| 172,922
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void on_read(h2o_socket_t *sock, int status)
{
h2o_http2_conn_t *conn = sock->data;
if (status != 0) {
h2o_socket_read_stop(conn->sock);
close_connection(conn);
return;
}
update_idle_timeout(conn);
parse_input(conn);
/* write immediately, if there is no write in flight and if pending write exists */
if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)) {
h2o_timeout_unlink(&conn->_write.timeout_entry);
do_emit_writereq(conn);
}
}
Commit Message: h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham.
CWE ID:
|
static void on_read(h2o_socket_t *sock, int status)
{
h2o_http2_conn_t *conn = sock->data;
if (status != 0) {
h2o_socket_read_stop(conn->sock);
close_connection(conn);
return;
}
update_idle_timeout(conn);
if (parse_input(conn) != 0)
return;
/* write immediately, if there is no write in flight and if pending write exists */
if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)) {
h2o_timeout_unlink(&conn->_write.timeout_entry);
do_emit_writereq(conn);
}
}
| 167,226
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: TabManagerTest() : scoped_set_tick_clock_for_testing_(&test_clock_) {
test_clock_.Advance(kShortDelay);
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
|
TabManagerTest() : scoped_set_tick_clock_for_testing_(&test_clock_) {
test_clock_.Advance(kShortDelay);
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(
features::kSiteCharacteristicsDatabase);
}
| 172,229
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: std::string print_valuetype(Value::ValueType e) {
switch (e) {
case Value::TYPE_NULL:
return "NULL ";
case Value::TYPE_BOOLEAN:
return "BOOL";
case Value::TYPE_INTEGER:
return "INT";
case Value::TYPE_DOUBLE:
return "DOUBLE";
case Value::TYPE_STRING:
return "STRING";
case Value::TYPE_BINARY:
return "BIN";
case Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY:
return "DICT";
case Value::TYPE_LIST:
return "LIST";
default:
return "ERROR";
}
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
std::string print_valuetype(Value::ValueType e) {
| 170,467
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int verify_vc_kbmode(int fd) {
int curr_mode;
/*
* Make sure we only adjust consoles in K_XLATE or K_UNICODE mode.
* Otherwise we would (likely) interfere with X11's processing of the
* key events.
*
* http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2013-February/008573.html
*/
if (ioctl(fd, KDGKBMODE, &curr_mode) < 0)
return -errno;
return IN_SET(curr_mode, K_XLATE, K_UNICODE) ? 0 : -EBUSY;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255
|
static int verify_vc_kbmode(int fd) {
| 169,781
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long ContentEncoding::ParseCompressionEntry(long long start, long long size,
IMkvReader* pReader,
ContentCompression* compression) {
assert(pReader);
assert(compression);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
bool valid = false;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x254) {
long long algo = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (algo < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
compression->algo = algo;
valid = true;
} else if (id == 0x255) {
if (size <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const size_t buflen = static_cast<size_t>(size);
typedef unsigned char* buf_t;
const buf_t buf = new (std::nothrow) unsigned char[buflen];
if (buf == NULL)
return -1;
const int read_status =
pReader->Read(pos, static_cast<long>(buflen), buf);
if (read_status) {
delete[] buf;
return status;
}
compression->settings = buf;
compression->settings_len = buflen;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (!valid)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
long ContentEncoding::ParseCompressionEntry(long long start, long long size,
IMkvReader* pReader,
ContentCompression* compression) {
assert(pReader);
assert(compression);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
bool valid = false;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x254) {
long long algo = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (algo < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
compression->algo = algo;
valid = true;
} else if (id == 0x255) {
if (size <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const size_t buflen = static_cast<size_t>(size);
unsigned char* buf = SafeArrayAlloc<unsigned char>(1, buflen);
if (buf == NULL)
return -1;
const int read_status =
pReader->Read(pos, static_cast<long>(buflen), buf);
if (read_status) {
delete[] buf;
return status;
}
compression->settings = buf;
compression->settings_len = buflen;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (!valid)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
| 173,848
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: MagickExport int LocaleLowercase(const int c)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(tolower_l(c,c_locale));
#endif
return(tolower(c));
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
MagickExport int LocaleLowercase(const int c)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(tolower_l((int) ((unsigned char) c),c_locale));
#endif
return(tolower((int) ((unsigned char) c)));
}
| 170,233
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void red_channel_pipes_add_type(RedChannel *channel, int pipe_item_type)
{
RingItem *link;
RING_FOREACH(link, &channel->clients) {
red_channel_client_pipe_add_type(
SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link),
pipe_item_type);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void red_channel_pipes_add_type(RedChannel *channel, int pipe_item_type)
{
RingItem *link, *next;
RING_FOREACH_SAFE(link, next, &channel->clients) {
red_channel_client_pipe_add_type(
SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link),
pipe_item_type);
}
}
| 164,664
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Huff_Compress(msg_t *mbuf, int offset) {
int i, ch, size;
byte seq[65536];
byte* buffer;
huff_t huff;
size = mbuf->cursize - offset;
buffer = mbuf->data+ + offset;
if (size<=0) {
return;
}
Com_Memset(&huff, 0, sizeof(huff_t));
huff.tree = huff.lhead = huff.loc[NYT] = &(huff.nodeList[huff.blocNode++]);
huff.tree->symbol = NYT;
huff.tree->weight = 0;
huff.lhead->next = huff.lhead->prev = NULL;
huff.tree->parent = huff.tree->left = huff.tree->right = NULL;
seq[0] = (size>>8);
seq[1] = size&0xff;
bloc = 16;
for (i=0; i<size; i++ ) {
ch = buffer[i];
Huff_transmit(&huff, ch, seq); /* Transmit symbol */
Huff_addRef(&huff, (byte)ch); /* Do update */
}
bloc += 8; // next byte
mbuf->cursize = (bloc>>3) + offset;
Com_Memcpy(mbuf->data+offset, seq, (bloc>>3));
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void Huff_Compress(msg_t *mbuf, int offset) {
int i, ch, size;
byte seq[65536];
byte* buffer;
huff_t huff;
size = mbuf->cursize - offset;
buffer = mbuf->data+ + offset;
if (size<=0) {
return;
}
Com_Memset(&huff, 0, sizeof(huff_t));
huff.tree = huff.lhead = huff.loc[NYT] = &(huff.nodeList[huff.blocNode++]);
huff.tree->symbol = NYT;
huff.tree->weight = 0;
huff.lhead->next = huff.lhead->prev = NULL;
huff.tree->parent = huff.tree->left = huff.tree->right = NULL;
seq[0] = (size>>8);
seq[1] = size&0xff;
bloc = 16;
for (i=0; i<size; i++ ) {
ch = buffer[i];
Huff_transmit(&huff, ch, seq, size<<3); /* Transmit symbol */
Huff_addRef(&huff, (byte)ch); /* Do update */
}
bloc += 8; // next byte
mbuf->cursize = (bloc>>3) + offset;
Com_Memcpy(mbuf->data+offset, seq, (bloc>>3));
}
| 167,993
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChooserController::PostErrorCallback(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult error) {
if (!base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(error_callback_, error))) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No TaskRunner.";
}
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void BluetoothDeviceChooserController::PostErrorCallback(
WebBluetoothResult error) {
if (!base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(error_callback_, error))) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No TaskRunner.";
}
}
| 172,445
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool_t xdr_nullstring(XDR *xdrs, char **objp)
{
u_int size;
if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_ENCODE) {
if (*objp == NULL)
size = 0;
else
size = strlen(*objp) + 1;
}
if (! xdr_u_int(xdrs, &size)) {
return FALSE;
}
switch (xdrs->x_op) {
case XDR_DECODE:
if (size == 0) {
*objp = NULL;
return TRUE;
} else if (*objp == NULL) {
*objp = (char *) mem_alloc(size);
if (*objp == NULL) {
errno = ENOMEM;
return FALSE;
}
}
return (xdr_opaque(xdrs, *objp, size));
case XDR_ENCODE:
if (size != 0)
return (xdr_opaque(xdrs, *objp, size));
return TRUE;
case XDR_FREE:
if (*objp != NULL)
mem_free(*objp, size);
*objp = NULL;
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Verify decoded kadmin C strings [CVE-2015-8629]
In xdr_nullstring(), check that the decoded string is terminated with
a zero byte and does not contain any internal zero bytes.
CVE-2015-8629:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to read beyond the end of allocated memory by sending a string
without a terminating zero byte. Information leakage may be possible
for an attacker with permission to modify the database.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8341 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool_t xdr_nullstring(XDR *xdrs, char **objp)
{
u_int size;
if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_ENCODE) {
if (*objp == NULL)
size = 0;
else
size = strlen(*objp) + 1;
}
if (! xdr_u_int(xdrs, &size)) {
return FALSE;
}
switch (xdrs->x_op) {
case XDR_DECODE:
if (size == 0) {
*objp = NULL;
return TRUE;
} else if (*objp == NULL) {
*objp = (char *) mem_alloc(size);
if (*objp == NULL) {
errno = ENOMEM;
return FALSE;
}
}
if (!xdr_opaque(xdrs, *objp, size))
return FALSE;
/* Check that the unmarshalled bytes are a C string. */
if ((*objp)[size - 1] != '\0')
return FALSE;
if (memchr(*objp, '\0', size - 1) != NULL)
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
case XDR_ENCODE:
if (size != 0)
return (xdr_opaque(xdrs, *objp, size));
return TRUE;
case XDR_FREE:
if (*objp != NULL)
mem_free(*objp, size);
*objp = NULL;
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
| 167,530
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SoftMPEG4Encoder::~SoftMPEG4Encoder() {
ALOGV("Destruct SoftMPEG4Encoder");
releaseEncoder();
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
CHECK(outQueue.empty());
CHECK(inQueue.empty());
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID:
|
SoftMPEG4Encoder::~SoftMPEG4Encoder() {
ALOGV("Destruct SoftMPEG4Encoder");
onReset();
releaseEncoder();
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
CHECK(outQueue.empty());
CHECK(inQueue.empty());
}
| 174,011
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteRGFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
int
bit;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
byte;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if((image->columns > 255L) || (image->rows > 255L))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"Dimensions must be less than 255x255");
/*
Write header (just the image dimensions)
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,image->columns & 0xff);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,image->rows & 0xff);
/*
Convert MIFF to bit pixels.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
x=0;
y=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte>>=1;
if (GetPixelLuma(image,p) < (QuantumRange/2.0))
byte|=0x80;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
/*
Write a bitmap byte to the image file.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,byte);
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p++;
}
if (bit != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,byte);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Fix abort when writing to rgf format
The rgf format (LEGO MINDSTORMS EV3 images) caused a software abort because
exception == NULL. When WriteRGFImage is called from WriteImage, it is only
passed two parameters, not three. So, removed the extra parameter and use
image->exception instead as in other coders.
CWE ID: CWE-19
|
static MagickBooleanType WriteRGFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
static MagickBooleanType WriteRGFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
int
bit;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
byte;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if((image->columns > 255L) || (image->rows > 255L))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"Dimensions must be less than 255x255");
/*
Write header (just the image dimensions)
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,image->columns & 0xff);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,image->rows & 0xff);
/*
Convert MIFF to bit pixels.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
x=0;
y=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte>>=1;
if (GetPixelLuma(image,p) < (QuantumRange/2.0))
byte|=0x80;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
/*
Write a bitmap byte to the image file.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,byte);
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p++;
}
if (bit != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,byte);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
| 168,786
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int simple_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int error;
if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) {
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
if (error < 0)
return 0;
if (error == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: clear S_ISGID when setting posix ACLs
This change was missed the tmpfs modification in In CVE-2016-7097
commit 073931017b49 ("posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting
file permissions")
It can test by xfstest generic/375, which failed to clear
setgid bit in the following test case on tmpfs:
touch $testfile
chown 100:100 $testfile
chmod 2755 $testfile
_runas -u 100 -g 101 -- setfacl -m u::rwx,g::rwx,o::rwx $testfile
Signed-off-by: Gu Zheng <guzheng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID:
|
int simple_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int error;
if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) {
error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode,
&inode->i_mode, &acl);
if (error)
return error;
}
inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return 0;
}
| 168,386
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool Init() {
DCHECK(!initialized_successfully_) << "Already initialized";
if (!CrosLibrary::Get()->EnsureLoaded())
return false;
input_method_status_connection_ = chromeos::MonitorInputMethodStatus(
this,
&InputMethodChangedHandler,
&RegisterPropertiesHandler,
&UpdatePropertyHandler,
&ConnectionChangeHandler);
if (!input_method_status_connection_)
return false;
initialized_successfully_ = true;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool Init() {
DCHECK(!initialized_successfully_) << "Already initialized";
ibus_controller_ = input_method::IBusController::Create();
// The observer should be added before Connect() so we can capture the
// initial connection change.
ibus_controller_->AddObserver(this);
ibus_controller_->Connect();
initialized_successfully_ = true;
return true;
}
| 170,494
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void __init files_init(unsigned long mempages)
{
unsigned long n;
filp_cachep = kmem_cache_create("filp", sizeof(struct file), 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
/*
* One file with associated inode and dcache is very roughly 1K.
* Per default don't use more than 10% of our memory for files.
*/
n = (mempages * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024)) / 10;
files_stat.max_files = max_t(unsigned long, n, NR_FILE);
files_defer_init();
lg_lock_init(&files_lglock, "files_lglock");
percpu_counter_init(&nr_files, 0);
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
|
void __init files_init(unsigned long mempages)
{
unsigned long n;
filp_cachep = kmem_cache_create("filp", sizeof(struct file), 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
/*
* One file with associated inode and dcache is very roughly 1K.
* Per default don't use more than 10% of our memory for files.
*/
n = (mempages * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024)) / 10;
files_stat.max_files = max_t(unsigned long, n, NR_FILE);
files_defer_init();
percpu_counter_init(&nr_files, 0);
}
| 166,800
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static v8::Local<v8::Value> compileAndRunPrivateScript(ScriptState* scriptState,
String scriptClassName,
const char* source,
size_t size) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = scriptState->isolate();
v8::TryCatch block(isolate);
String sourceString(source, size);
String fileName = scriptClassName + ".js";
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = scriptState->context();
v8::Local<v8::Object> global = context->Global();
v8::Local<v8::Value> privateScriptController =
global->Get(context, v8String(isolate, "privateScriptController"))
.ToLocalChecked();
RELEASE_ASSERT(privateScriptController->IsUndefined() ||
privateScriptController->IsObject());
if (privateScriptController->IsObject()) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> privateScriptControllerObject =
privateScriptController.As<v8::Object>();
v8::Local<v8::Value> importFunctionValue =
privateScriptControllerObject->Get(context, v8String(isolate, "import"))
.ToLocalChecked();
if (importFunctionValue->IsUndefined()) {
v8::Local<v8::Function> function;
if (!v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, importFunction)
->GetFunction(context)
.ToLocal(&function) ||
!v8CallBoolean(privateScriptControllerObject->Set(
context, v8String(isolate, "import"), function))) {
dumpV8Message(context, block.Message());
LOG(FATAL)
<< "Private script error: Setting import function failed. (Class "
"name = "
<< scriptClassName.utf8().data() << ")";
}
}
}
v8::Local<v8::Script> script;
if (!v8Call(V8ScriptRunner::compileScript(
v8String(isolate, sourceString), fileName, String(),
TextPosition::minimumPosition(), isolate, nullptr, nullptr,
nullptr, NotSharableCrossOrigin),
script, block)) {
dumpV8Message(context, block.Message());
LOG(FATAL) << "Private script error: Compile failed. (Class name = "
<< scriptClassName.utf8().data() << ")";
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> result;
if (!v8Call(V8ScriptRunner::runCompiledInternalScript(isolate, script),
result, block)) {
dumpV8Message(context, block.Message());
LOG(FATAL) << "Private script error: installClass() failed. (Class name = "
<< scriptClassName.utf8().data() << ")";
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Don't touch the prototype chain to get the private script controller.
Prior to this patch, private scripts attempted to get the
"privateScriptController" property off the global object without verifying if
the property actually exists on the global. If the property hasn't been set yet,
this operation could descend into the prototype chain and potentially return
a named property from the WindowProperties object, leading to release asserts
and general confusion.
BUG=668552
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2529163002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#434627}
CWE ID: CWE-79
|
static v8::Local<v8::Value> compileAndRunPrivateScript(ScriptState* scriptState,
String scriptClassName,
const char* source,
size_t size) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = scriptState->isolate();
v8::TryCatch block(isolate);
String sourceString(source, size);
String fileName = scriptClassName + ".js";
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = scriptState->context();
v8::Local<v8::Object> global = context->Global();
v8::Local<v8::String> key = v8String(isolate, "privateScriptController");
if (global->HasOwnProperty(context, key).ToChecked()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> privateScriptController =
global->Get(context, key).ToLocalChecked();
CHECK(privateScriptController->IsObject());
v8::Local<v8::Object> privateScriptControllerObject =
privateScriptController.As<v8::Object>();
v8::Local<v8::Value> importFunctionValue =
privateScriptControllerObject->Get(context, v8String(isolate, "import"))
.ToLocalChecked();
if (importFunctionValue->IsUndefined()) {
v8::Local<v8::Function> function;
if (!v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, importFunction)
->GetFunction(context)
.ToLocal(&function) ||
!v8CallBoolean(privateScriptControllerObject->Set(
context, v8String(isolate, "import"), function))) {
dumpV8Message(context, block.Message());
LOG(FATAL)
<< "Private script error: Setting import function failed. (Class "
"name = "
<< scriptClassName.utf8().data() << ")";
}
}
}
v8::Local<v8::Script> script;
if (!v8Call(V8ScriptRunner::compileScript(
v8String(isolate, sourceString), fileName, String(),
TextPosition::minimumPosition(), isolate, nullptr, nullptr,
nullptr, NotSharableCrossOrigin),
script, block)) {
dumpV8Message(context, block.Message());
LOG(FATAL) << "Private script error: Compile failed. (Class name = "
<< scriptClassName.utf8().data() << ")";
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> result;
if (!v8Call(V8ScriptRunner::runCompiledInternalScript(isolate, script),
result, block)) {
dumpV8Message(context, block.Message());
LOG(FATAL) << "Private script error: installClass() failed. (Class name = "
<< scriptClassName.utf8().data() << ")";
}
return result;
}
| 172,450
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: KeyedService* LogoServiceFactory::BuildServiceInstanceFor(
content::BrowserContext* context) const {
Profile* profile = static_cast<Profile*>(context);
DCHECK(!profile->IsOffTheRecord());
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
bool use_gray_background = !GetIsChromeHomeEnabled();
#else
bool use_gray_background = false;
#endif
return new LogoService(profile->GetPath().Append(kCachedLogoDirectory),
TemplateURLServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile),
base::MakeUnique<suggestions::ImageDecoderImpl>(),
profile->GetRequestContext(), use_gray_background);
}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
KeyedService* LogoServiceFactory::BuildServiceInstanceFor(
content::BrowserContext* context) const {
Profile* profile = static_cast<Profile*>(context);
DCHECK(!profile->IsOffTheRecord());
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
bool use_gray_background = !GetIsChromeHomeEnabled();
#else
bool use_gray_background = false;
#endif
return new LogoServiceImpl(profile->GetPath().Append(kCachedLogoDirectory),
TemplateURLServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile),
base::MakeUnique<suggestions::ImageDecoderImpl>(),
profile->GetRequestContext(), use_gray_background);
}
| 171,950
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void SetUp() {
vp9_worker_init(&worker_);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
virtual void SetUp() {
vpx_get_worker_interface()->init(&worker_);
}
| 174,599
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int64 GetReceivedListPrefValue(size_t index) {
return ListPrefInt64Value(*received_update_, index);
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
int64 GetReceivedListPrefValue(size_t index) {
return received_.GetListPrefValue(index);
}
| 171,324
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool BackingStoreGtk::CopyFromBackingStore(const gfx::Rect& rect,
skia::PlatformCanvas* output) {
base::TimeTicks begin_time = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (visual_depth_ < 24) {
return false;
}
const int width = std::min(size().width(), rect.width());
const int height = std::min(size().height(), rect.height());
XImage* image;
XShmSegmentInfo shminfo; // Used only when shared memory is enabled.
if (shared_memory_support_ != ui::SHARED_MEMORY_NONE) {
Visual* visual = static_cast<Visual*>(visual_);
memset(&shminfo, 0, sizeof(shminfo));
image = XShmCreateImage(display_, visual, 32,
ZPixmap, NULL, &shminfo, width, height);
if (!image) {
return false;
}
if (image->bytes_per_line == 0 || image->height == 0 ||
static_cast<size_t>(image->height) >
(std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max() / image->bytes_per_line)) {
XDestroyImage(image);
return false;
}
shminfo.shmid = shmget(IPC_PRIVATE, image->bytes_per_line * image->height,
IPC_CREAT|0666);
if (shminfo.shmid == -1) {
XDestroyImage(image);
return false;
}
void* mapped_memory = shmat(shminfo.shmid, NULL, SHM_RDONLY);
shmctl(shminfo.shmid, IPC_RMID, 0);
if (mapped_memory == (void*)-1) {
XDestroyImage(image);
return false;
}
shminfo.shmaddr = image->data = static_cast<char*>(mapped_memory);
if (!XShmAttach(display_, &shminfo) ||
!XShmGetImage(display_, pixmap_, image, rect.x(), rect.y(),
AllPlanes)) {
DestroySharedImage(display_, image, &shminfo);
return false;
}
} else {
image = XGetImage(display_, pixmap_,
rect.x(), rect.y(), width, height,
AllPlanes, ZPixmap);
}
if (!output->initialize(width, height, true) ||
image->bits_per_pixel != 32) {
if (shared_memory_support_ != ui::SHARED_MEMORY_NONE)
DestroySharedImage(display_, image, &shminfo);
else
XDestroyImage(image);
return false;
}
SkBitmap bitmap = skia::GetTopDevice(*output)->accessBitmap(true);
SkAutoLockPixels alp(bitmap);
for (int y = 0; y < height; y++) {
const uint32* src_row = reinterpret_cast<uint32*>(
&image->data[image->bytes_per_line * y]);
uint32* dest_row = bitmap.getAddr32(0, y);
for (int x = 0; x < width; ++x, ++dest_row) {
*dest_row = src_row[x] | 0xff000000;
}
}
if (shared_memory_support_ != ui::SHARED_MEMORY_NONE)
DestroySharedImage(display_, image, &shminfo);
else
XDestroyImage(image);
HISTOGRAM_TIMES("BackingStore.RetrievalFromX",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - begin_time);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
bool BackingStoreGtk::CopyFromBackingStore(const gfx::Rect& rect,
skia::PlatformCanvas* output) {
base::TimeTicks begin_time = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (visual_depth_ < 24) {
return false;
}
const int width = std::min(size().width(), rect.width());
const int height = std::min(size().height(), rect.height());
XImage* image;
XShmSegmentInfo shminfo; // Used only when shared memory is enabled.
if (shared_memory_support_ != ui::SHARED_MEMORY_NONE) {
Visual* visual = static_cast<Visual*>(visual_);
memset(&shminfo, 0, sizeof(shminfo));
image = XShmCreateImage(display_, visual, 32,
ZPixmap, NULL, &shminfo, width, height);
if (!image) {
return false;
}
if (image->bytes_per_line == 0 || image->height == 0 ||
static_cast<size_t>(image->height) >
(std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max() / image->bytes_per_line)) {
XDestroyImage(image);
return false;
}
shminfo.shmid = shmget(IPC_PRIVATE, image->bytes_per_line * image->height,
IPC_CREAT|0600);
if (shminfo.shmid == -1) {
XDestroyImage(image);
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to get shared memory segment. "
"Performance may be degraded.";
return false;
} else {
VLOG(1) << "Got shared memory segment " << shminfo.shmid;
}
void* mapped_memory = shmat(shminfo.shmid, NULL, SHM_RDONLY);
shmctl(shminfo.shmid, IPC_RMID, 0);
if (mapped_memory == (void*)-1) {
XDestroyImage(image);
return false;
}
shminfo.shmaddr = image->data = static_cast<char*>(mapped_memory);
if (!XShmAttach(display_, &shminfo) ||
!XShmGetImage(display_, pixmap_, image, rect.x(), rect.y(),
AllPlanes)) {
DestroySharedImage(display_, image, &shminfo);
LOG(WARNING) << "X failed to get shared memory segment. "
"Performance may be degraded.";
return false;
}
VLOG(1) << "Using X shared memory segment " << shminfo.shmid;
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << "Not using X shared memory.";
image = XGetImage(display_, pixmap_,
rect.x(), rect.y(), width, height,
AllPlanes, ZPixmap);
}
if (!output->initialize(width, height, true) ||
image->bits_per_pixel != 32) {
if (shared_memory_support_ != ui::SHARED_MEMORY_NONE)
DestroySharedImage(display_, image, &shminfo);
else
XDestroyImage(image);
return false;
}
SkBitmap bitmap = skia::GetTopDevice(*output)->accessBitmap(true);
SkAutoLockPixels alp(bitmap);
for (int y = 0; y < height; y++) {
const uint32* src_row = reinterpret_cast<uint32*>(
&image->data[image->bytes_per_line * y]);
uint32* dest_row = bitmap.getAddr32(0, y);
for (int x = 0; x < width; ++x, ++dest_row) {
*dest_row = src_row[x] | 0xff000000;
}
}
if (shared_memory_support_ != ui::SHARED_MEMORY_NONE)
DestroySharedImage(display_, image, &shminfo);
else
XDestroyImage(image);
HISTOGRAM_TIMES("BackingStore.RetrievalFromX",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - begin_time);
return true;
}
| 171,592
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static Frame* ReuseExistingWindow(LocalFrame& active_frame,
LocalFrame& lookup_frame,
const AtomicString& frame_name,
NavigationPolicy policy,
const KURL& destination_url) {
if (!frame_name.IsEmpty() && !EqualIgnoringASCIICase(frame_name, "_blank") &&
policy == kNavigationPolicyIgnore) {
if (Frame* frame = lookup_frame.FindFrameForNavigation(
frame_name, active_frame, destination_url)) {
if (!EqualIgnoringASCIICase(frame_name, "_self")) {
if (Page* page = frame->GetPage()) {
if (page == active_frame.GetPage())
page->GetFocusController().SetFocusedFrame(frame);
else
page->GetChromeClient().Focus();
}
}
return frame;
}
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
|
static Frame* ReuseExistingWindow(LocalFrame& active_frame,
LocalFrame& lookup_frame,
const AtomicString& frame_name,
NavigationPolicy policy,
const KURL& destination_url) {
if (!frame_name.IsEmpty() && !EqualIgnoringASCIICase(frame_name, "_blank") &&
policy == kNavigationPolicyIgnore) {
if (Frame* frame = lookup_frame.FindFrameForNavigation(
frame_name, active_frame, destination_url)) {
if (!EqualIgnoringASCIICase(frame_name, "_self")) {
if (Page* page = frame->GetPage()) {
if (page == active_frame.GetPage())
page->GetFocusController().SetFocusedFrame(frame);
else
page->GetChromeClient().Focus(&active_frame);
}
}
return frame;
}
}
return nullptr;
}
| 172,725
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void vrend_renderer_init_blit_ctx(struct vrend_blitter_ctx *blit_ctx)
{
struct virgl_gl_ctx_param ctx_params;
int i;
if (blit_ctx->initialised) {
vrend_clicbs->make_current(0, blit_ctx->gl_context);
return;
}
ctx_params.shared = true;
ctx_params.major_ver = VREND_GL_VER_MAJOR;
ctx_params.minor_ver = VREND_GL_VER_MINOR;
vrend_clicbs->make_current(0, blit_ctx->gl_context);
glGenVertexArrays(1, &blit_ctx->vaoid);
glGenFramebuffers(1, &blit_ctx->fb_id);
glGenBuffers(1, &blit_ctx->vbo_id);
blit_build_vs_passthrough(blit_ctx);
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
blit_ctx->vertices[i][0][3] = 1; /*v.w*/
glBindVertexArray(blit_ctx->vaoid);
glBindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, blit_ctx->vbo_id);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
|
static void vrend_renderer_init_blit_ctx(struct vrend_blitter_ctx *blit_ctx)
{
struct virgl_gl_ctx_param ctx_params;
int i;
if (blit_ctx->initialised) {
vrend_clicbs->make_current(0, blit_ctx->gl_context);
return;
}
blit_ctx->initialised = true;
ctx_params.shared = true;
ctx_params.major_ver = VREND_GL_VER_MAJOR;
ctx_params.minor_ver = VREND_GL_VER_MINOR;
vrend_clicbs->make_current(0, blit_ctx->gl_context);
glGenVertexArrays(1, &blit_ctx->vaoid);
glGenFramebuffers(1, &blit_ctx->fb_id);
glGenBuffers(1, &blit_ctx->vbo_id);
blit_build_vs_passthrough(blit_ctx);
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
blit_ctx->vertices[i][0][3] = 1; /*v.w*/
glBindVertexArray(blit_ctx->vaoid);
glBindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, blit_ctx->vbo_id);
}
| 164,955
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void xgroupCommand(client *c) {
const char *help[] = {
"CREATE <key> <groupname> <id or $> -- Create a new consumer group.",
"SETID <key> <groupname> <id or $> -- Set the current group ID.",
"DELGROUP <key> <groupname> -- Remove the specified group.",
"DELCONSUMER <key> <groupname> <consumer> -- Remove the specified conusmer.",
"HELP -- Prints this help.",
NULL
};
stream *s = NULL;
sds grpname = NULL;
streamCG *cg = NULL;
char *opt = c->argv[1]->ptr; /* Subcommand name. */
/* Lookup the key now, this is common for all the subcommands but HELP. */
if (c->argc >= 4) {
robj *o = lookupKeyWriteOrReply(c,c->argv[2],shared.nokeyerr);
if (o == NULL) return;
s = o->ptr;
grpname = c->argv[3]->ptr;
/* Certain subcommands require the group to exist. */
if ((cg = streamLookupCG(s,grpname)) == NULL &&
(!strcasecmp(opt,"SETID") ||
!strcasecmp(opt,"DELCONSUMER")))
{
addReplyErrorFormat(c, "-NOGROUP No such consumer group '%s' "
"for key name '%s'",
(char*)grpname, (char*)c->argv[2]->ptr);
return;
}
}
/* Dispatch the different subcommands. */
if (!strcasecmp(opt,"CREATE") && c->argc == 5) {
streamID id;
if (!strcmp(c->argv[4]->ptr,"$")) {
id = s->last_id;
} else if (streamParseIDOrReply(c,c->argv[4],&id,0) != C_OK) {
return;
}
streamCG *cg = streamCreateCG(s,grpname,sdslen(grpname),&id);
if (cg) {
addReply(c,shared.ok);
server.dirty++;
} else {
addReplySds(c,
sdsnew("-BUSYGROUP Consumer Group name already exists\r\n"));
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"SETID") && c->argc == 5) {
streamID id;
if (!strcmp(c->argv[4]->ptr,"$")) {
id = s->last_id;
} else if (streamParseIDOrReply(c,c->argv[4],&id,0) != C_OK) {
return;
}
cg->last_id = id;
addReply(c,shared.ok);
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"DESTROY") && c->argc == 4) {
if (cg) {
raxRemove(s->cgroups,(unsigned char*)grpname,sdslen(grpname),NULL);
streamFreeCG(cg);
addReply(c,shared.cone);
} else {
addReply(c,shared.czero);
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"DELCONSUMER") && c->argc == 5) {
/* Delete the consumer and returns the number of pending messages
* that were yet associated with such a consumer. */
long long pending = streamDelConsumer(cg,c->argv[4]->ptr);
addReplyLongLong(c,pending);
server.dirty++;
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"HELP")) {
addReplyHelp(c, help);
} else {
addReply(c,shared.syntaxerr);
}
}
Commit Message: Abort in XGROUP if the key is not a stream
CWE ID: CWE-704
|
void xgroupCommand(client *c) {
const char *help[] = {
"CREATE <key> <groupname> <id or $> -- Create a new consumer group.",
"SETID <key> <groupname> <id or $> -- Set the current group ID.",
"DELGROUP <key> <groupname> -- Remove the specified group.",
"DELCONSUMER <key> <groupname> <consumer> -- Remove the specified conusmer.",
"HELP -- Prints this help.",
NULL
};
stream *s = NULL;
sds grpname = NULL;
streamCG *cg = NULL;
char *opt = c->argv[1]->ptr; /* Subcommand name. */
/* Lookup the key now, this is common for all the subcommands but HELP. */
if (c->argc >= 4) {
robj *o = lookupKeyWriteOrReply(c,c->argv[2],shared.nokeyerr);
if (o == NULL || checkType(c,o,OBJ_STREAM)) return;
s = o->ptr;
grpname = c->argv[3]->ptr;
/* Certain subcommands require the group to exist. */
if ((cg = streamLookupCG(s,grpname)) == NULL &&
(!strcasecmp(opt,"SETID") ||
!strcasecmp(opt,"DELCONSUMER")))
{
addReplyErrorFormat(c, "-NOGROUP No such consumer group '%s' "
"for key name '%s'",
(char*)grpname, (char*)c->argv[2]->ptr);
return;
}
}
/* Dispatch the different subcommands. */
if (!strcasecmp(opt,"CREATE") && c->argc == 5) {
streamID id;
if (!strcmp(c->argv[4]->ptr,"$")) {
id = s->last_id;
} else if (streamParseIDOrReply(c,c->argv[4],&id,0) != C_OK) {
return;
}
streamCG *cg = streamCreateCG(s,grpname,sdslen(grpname),&id);
if (cg) {
addReply(c,shared.ok);
server.dirty++;
} else {
addReplySds(c,
sdsnew("-BUSYGROUP Consumer Group name already exists\r\n"));
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"SETID") && c->argc == 5) {
streamID id;
if (!strcmp(c->argv[4]->ptr,"$")) {
id = s->last_id;
} else if (streamParseIDOrReply(c,c->argv[4],&id,0) != C_OK) {
return;
}
cg->last_id = id;
addReply(c,shared.ok);
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"DESTROY") && c->argc == 4) {
if (cg) {
raxRemove(s->cgroups,(unsigned char*)grpname,sdslen(grpname),NULL);
streamFreeCG(cg);
addReply(c,shared.cone);
} else {
addReply(c,shared.czero);
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"DELCONSUMER") && c->argc == 5) {
/* Delete the consumer and returns the number of pending messages
* that were yet associated with such a consumer. */
long long pending = streamDelConsumer(cg,c->argv[4]->ptr);
addReplyLongLong(c,pending);
server.dirty++;
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"HELP")) {
addReplyHelp(c, help);
} else {
addReply(c,shared.syntaxerr);
}
}
| 169,193
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::functionLocation(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Function> function)
{
int scriptId = function->ScriptId();
if (scriptId == v8::UnboundScript::kNoScriptId)
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
int lineNumber = function->GetScriptLineNumber();
int columnNumber = function->GetScriptColumnNumber();
if (lineNumber == v8::Function::kLineOffsetNotFound || columnNumber == v8::Function::kLineOffsetNotFound)
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> location = v8::Object::New(m_isolate);
if (!location->Set(context, toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "scriptId"), toV8String(m_isolate, String16::fromInteger(scriptId))).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
if (!location->Set(context, toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "lineNumber"), v8::Integer::New(m_isolate, lineNumber)).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
if (!location->Set(context, toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "columnNumber"), v8::Integer::New(m_isolate, columnNumber)).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
if (!markAsInternal(context, location, V8InternalValueType::kLocation))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
return location;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79
|
v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::functionLocation(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Function> function)
{
int scriptId = function->ScriptId();
if (scriptId == v8::UnboundScript::kNoScriptId)
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
int lineNumber = function->GetScriptLineNumber();
int columnNumber = function->GetScriptColumnNumber();
if (lineNumber == v8::Function::kLineOffsetNotFound || columnNumber == v8::Function::kLineOffsetNotFound)
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> location = v8::Object::New(m_isolate);
if (!location->SetPrototype(context, v8::Null(m_isolate)).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
if (!location->Set(context, toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "scriptId"), toV8String(m_isolate, String16::fromInteger(scriptId))).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
if (!location->Set(context, toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "lineNumber"), v8::Integer::New(m_isolate, lineNumber)).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
if (!location->Set(context, toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "columnNumber"), v8::Integer::New(m_isolate, columnNumber)).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
if (!markAsInternal(context, location, V8InternalValueType::kLocation))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
return location;
}
| 172,065
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ut64 MACH0_(get_baddr)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
int i;
if (bin->hdr.filetype != MH_EXECUTE && bin->hdr.filetype != MH_DYLINKER)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsegs; ++i)
if (bin->segs[i].fileoff == 0 && bin->segs[i].filesize != 0)
return bin->segs[i].vmaddr;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
ut64 MACH0_(get_baddr)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
int i;
if (bin->hdr.filetype != MH_EXECUTE && bin->hdr.filetype != MH_DYLINKER) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsegs; ++i) {
if (bin->segs[i].fileoff == 0 && bin->segs[i].filesize != 0) {
return bin->segs[i].vmaddr;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 168,232
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int jpc_dec_process_siz(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_ms_t *ms)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
int compno;
int tileno;
jpc_dec_tile_t *tile;
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
int htileno;
int vtileno;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
dec->xstart = siz->xoff;
dec->ystart = siz->yoff;
dec->xend = siz->width;
dec->yend = siz->height;
dec->tilewidth = siz->tilewidth;
dec->tileheight = siz->tileheight;
dec->tilexoff = siz->tilexoff;
dec->tileyoff = siz->tileyoff;
dec->numcomps = siz->numcomps;
if (!(dec->cp = jpc_dec_cp_create(dec->numcomps))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(dec->cmpts = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_dec_cmpt_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno,
++cmpt) {
cmpt->prec = siz->comps[compno].prec;
cmpt->sgnd = siz->comps[compno].sgnd;
cmpt->hstep = siz->comps[compno].hsamp;
cmpt->vstep = siz->comps[compno].vsamp;
cmpt->width = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend, cmpt->hstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
cmpt->height = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend, cmpt->vstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
cmpt->hsubstep = 0;
cmpt->vsubstep = 0;
}
dec->image = 0;
dec->numhtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend - dec->tilexoff, dec->tilewidth);
dec->numvtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend - dec->tileyoff, dec->tileheight);
dec->numtiles = dec->numhtiles * dec->numvtiles;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("numtiles = %d; numhtiles = %d; numvtiles = %d;\n",
dec->numtiles, dec->numhtiles, dec->numvtiles));
if (!(dec->tiles = jas_alloc2(dec->numtiles, sizeof(jpc_dec_tile_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (tileno = 0, tile = dec->tiles; tileno < dec->numtiles; ++tileno,
++tile) {
htileno = tileno % dec->numhtiles;
vtileno = tileno / dec->numhtiles;
tile->realmode = 0;
tile->state = JPC_TILE_INIT;
tile->xstart = JAS_MAX(dec->tilexoff + htileno * dec->tilewidth,
dec->xstart);
tile->ystart = JAS_MAX(dec->tileyoff + vtileno * dec->tileheight,
dec->ystart);
tile->xend = JAS_MIN(dec->tilexoff + (htileno + 1) *
dec->tilewidth, dec->xend);
tile->yend = JAS_MIN(dec->tileyoff + (vtileno + 1) *
dec->tileheight, dec->yend);
tile->numparts = 0;
tile->partno = 0;
tile->pkthdrstream = 0;
tile->pkthdrstreampos = 0;
tile->pptstab = 0;
tile->cp = 0;
tile->pi = 0;
if (!(tile->tcomps = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps,
sizeof(jpc_dec_tcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts, tcomp = tile->tcomps;
compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++cmpt, ++tcomp) {
tcomp->rlvls = 0;
tcomp->numrlvls = 0;
tcomp->data = 0;
tcomp->xstart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->ystart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->xend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xend, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->yend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->yend, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->tsfb = 0;
}
}
dec->pkthdrstreams = 0;
/* We should expect to encounter other main header marker segments
or an SOT marker segment next. */
dec->state = JPC_MH;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed another integer overflow problem.
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static int jpc_dec_process_siz(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_ms_t *ms)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
int compno;
int tileno;
jpc_dec_tile_t *tile;
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
int htileno;
int vtileno;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
size_t size;
dec->xstart = siz->xoff;
dec->ystart = siz->yoff;
dec->xend = siz->width;
dec->yend = siz->height;
dec->tilewidth = siz->tilewidth;
dec->tileheight = siz->tileheight;
dec->tilexoff = siz->tilexoff;
dec->tileyoff = siz->tileyoff;
dec->numcomps = siz->numcomps;
if (!(dec->cp = jpc_dec_cp_create(dec->numcomps))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(dec->cmpts = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_dec_cmpt_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno,
++cmpt) {
cmpt->prec = siz->comps[compno].prec;
cmpt->sgnd = siz->comps[compno].sgnd;
cmpt->hstep = siz->comps[compno].hsamp;
cmpt->vstep = siz->comps[compno].vsamp;
cmpt->width = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend, cmpt->hstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
cmpt->height = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend, cmpt->vstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
cmpt->hsubstep = 0;
cmpt->vsubstep = 0;
}
dec->image = 0;
dec->numhtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend - dec->tilexoff, dec->tilewidth);
dec->numvtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend - dec->tileyoff, dec->tileheight);
if (!jas_safe_size_mul(dec->numhtiles, dec->numvtiles, &size)) {
return -1;
}
dec->numtiles = size;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("numtiles = %d; numhtiles = %d; numvtiles = %d;\n",
dec->numtiles, dec->numhtiles, dec->numvtiles));
if (!(dec->tiles = jas_alloc2(dec->numtiles, sizeof(jpc_dec_tile_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (tileno = 0, tile = dec->tiles; tileno < dec->numtiles; ++tileno,
++tile) {
htileno = tileno % dec->numhtiles;
vtileno = tileno / dec->numhtiles;
tile->realmode = 0;
tile->state = JPC_TILE_INIT;
tile->xstart = JAS_MAX(dec->tilexoff + htileno * dec->tilewidth,
dec->xstart);
tile->ystart = JAS_MAX(dec->tileyoff + vtileno * dec->tileheight,
dec->ystart);
tile->xend = JAS_MIN(dec->tilexoff + (htileno + 1) *
dec->tilewidth, dec->xend);
tile->yend = JAS_MIN(dec->tileyoff + (vtileno + 1) *
dec->tileheight, dec->yend);
tile->numparts = 0;
tile->partno = 0;
tile->pkthdrstream = 0;
tile->pkthdrstreampos = 0;
tile->pptstab = 0;
tile->cp = 0;
tile->pi = 0;
if (!(tile->tcomps = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps,
sizeof(jpc_dec_tcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts, tcomp = tile->tcomps;
compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++cmpt, ++tcomp) {
tcomp->rlvls = 0;
tcomp->numrlvls = 0;
tcomp->data = 0;
tcomp->xstart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->ystart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->xend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xend, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->yend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->yend, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->tsfb = 0;
}
}
dec->pkthdrstreams = 0;
/* We should expect to encounter other main header marker segments
or an SOT marker segment next. */
dec->state = JPC_MH;
return 0;
}
| 168,742
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ID3::removeUnsynchronizationV2_4(bool iTunesHack) {
size_t oldSize = mSize;
size_t offset = 0;
while (mSize >= 10 && offset <= mSize - 10) {
if (!memcmp(&mData[offset], "\0\0\0\0", 4)) {
break;
}
size_t dataSize;
if (iTunesHack) {
dataSize = U32_AT(&mData[offset + 4]);
} else if (!ParseSyncsafeInteger(&mData[offset + 4], &dataSize)) {
return false;
}
if (dataSize > mSize - 10 - offset) {
return false;
}
uint16_t flags = U16_AT(&mData[offset + 8]);
uint16_t prevFlags = flags;
if (flags & 1) {
if (mSize < 14 || mSize - 14 < offset || dataSize < 4) {
return false;
}
memmove(&mData[offset + 10], &mData[offset + 14], mSize - offset - 14);
mSize -= 4;
dataSize -= 4;
flags &= ~1;
}
if (flags & 2) {
size_t readOffset = offset + 11;
size_t writeOffset = offset + 11;
for (size_t i = 0; i + 1 < dataSize; ++i) {
if (mData[readOffset - 1] == 0xff
&& mData[readOffset] == 0x00) {
++readOffset;
--mSize;
--dataSize;
}
mData[writeOffset++] = mData[readOffset++];
}
memmove(&mData[writeOffset], &mData[readOffset], oldSize - readOffset);
flags &= ~2;
}
if (flags != prevFlags || iTunesHack) {
WriteSyncsafeInteger(&mData[offset + 4], dataSize);
mData[offset + 8] = flags >> 8;
mData[offset + 9] = flags & 0xff;
}
offset += 10 + dataSize;
}
memset(&mData[mSize], 0, oldSize - mSize);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access
Bug: 34618607
Change-Id: I84f0ef948414d0b2d54e8948b6c30b8ae4da2b36
(cherry picked from commit d1c19c57f66d91ea8033c8fa6510a8760a6e663b)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool ID3::removeUnsynchronizationV2_4(bool iTunesHack) {
size_t oldSize = mSize;
size_t offset = 0;
while (mSize >= 10 && offset <= mSize - 10) {
if (!memcmp(&mData[offset], "\0\0\0\0", 4)) {
break;
}
size_t dataSize;
if (iTunesHack) {
dataSize = U32_AT(&mData[offset + 4]);
} else if (!ParseSyncsafeInteger(&mData[offset + 4], &dataSize)) {
return false;
}
if (dataSize > mSize - 10 - offset) {
return false;
}
uint16_t flags = U16_AT(&mData[offset + 8]);
uint16_t prevFlags = flags;
if (flags & 1) {
if (mSize < 14 || mSize - 14 < offset || dataSize < 4) {
return false;
}
memmove(&mData[offset + 10], &mData[offset + 14], mSize - offset - 14);
mSize -= 4;
dataSize -= 4;
flags &= ~1;
}
if ((flags & 2) && (dataSize >= 2)) {
size_t readOffset = offset + 11;
size_t writeOffset = offset + 11;
for (size_t i = 0; i + 1 < dataSize; ++i) {
if (mData[readOffset - 1] == 0xff
&& mData[readOffset] == 0x00) {
++readOffset;
--mSize;
--dataSize;
}
mData[writeOffset++] = mData[readOffset++];
}
if (readOffset <= oldSize) {
memmove(&mData[writeOffset], &mData[readOffset], oldSize - readOffset);
} else {
ALOGE("b/34618607 (%zu %zu %zu %zu)", readOffset, writeOffset, oldSize, mSize);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "34618607");
}
}
flags &= ~2;
if (flags != prevFlags || iTunesHack) {
WriteSyncsafeInteger(&mData[offset + 4], dataSize);
mData[offset + 8] = flags >> 8;
mData[offset + 9] = flags & 0xff;
}
offset += 10 + dataSize;
}
memset(&mData[mSize], 0, oldSize - mSize);
return true;
}
| 174,031
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: _archive_write_data(struct archive *_a, const void *buff, size_t s)
{
struct archive_write *a = (struct archive_write *)_a;
archive_check_magic(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_WRITE_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_DATA, "archive_write_data");
archive_clear_error(&a->archive);
return ((a->format_write_data)(a, buff, s));
}
Commit Message: Limit write requests to at most INT_MAX.
This prevents a certain common programming error (passing -1 to write)
from leading to other problems deeper in the library.
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
_archive_write_data(struct archive *_a, const void *buff, size_t s)
{
struct archive_write *a = (struct archive_write *)_a;
const size_t max_write = INT_MAX;
archive_check_magic(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_WRITE_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_DATA, "archive_write_data");
/* In particular, this catches attempts to pass negative values. */
if (s > max_write)
s = max_write;
archive_clear_error(&a->archive);
return ((a->format_write_data)(a, buff, s));
}
| 166,176
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: status_t SampleTable::setSampleToChunkParams(
off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mSampleToChunkOffset >= 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mSampleToChunkOffset = data_offset;
if (data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mNumSampleToChunkOffsets = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if (data_size < 8 + mNumSampleToChunkOffsets * 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mSampleToChunkEntries =
new SampleToChunkEntry[mNumSampleToChunkOffsets];
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mNumSampleToChunkOffsets; ++i) {
uint8_t buffer[12];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
mSampleToChunkOffset + 8 + i * 12, buffer, sizeof(buffer))
!= (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
CHECK(U32_AT(buffer) >= 1); // chunk index is 1 based in the spec.
mSampleToChunkEntries[i].startChunk = U32_AT(buffer) - 1;
mSampleToChunkEntries[i].samplesPerChunk = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
mSampleToChunkEntries[i].chunkDesc = U32_AT(&buffer[8]);
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow during MP4 atom processing
A few sample table related FourCC values are handled by the
setSampleToChunkParams function. An integer overflow exists within this
function. Validate that mNumSampleToChunkOffets will not cause an integer
overflow.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit c24607c29c96f939aed9e33bfa702b1dd79da4b7)
Change-Id: I49086952451b09a234d8b82669251ab9f1ef58d9
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
status_t SampleTable::setSampleToChunkParams(
off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mSampleToChunkOffset >= 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mSampleToChunkOffset = data_offset;
if (data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mNumSampleToChunkOffsets = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if (data_size < 8 + mNumSampleToChunkOffsets * 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (SIZE_MAX / sizeof(SampleToChunkEntry) <= mNumSampleToChunkOffsets)
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
mSampleToChunkEntries =
new SampleToChunkEntry[mNumSampleToChunkOffsets];
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mNumSampleToChunkOffsets; ++i) {
uint8_t buffer[12];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
mSampleToChunkOffset + 8 + i * 12, buffer, sizeof(buffer))
!= (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
CHECK(U32_AT(buffer) >= 1); // chunk index is 1 based in the spec.
mSampleToChunkEntries[i].startChunk = U32_AT(buffer) - 1;
mSampleToChunkEntries[i].samplesPerChunk = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
mSampleToChunkEntries[i].chunkDesc = U32_AT(&buffer[8]);
}
return OK;
}
| 173,371
|
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