instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.3k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: UINT32 UIPC_Read(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id, UINT16 *p_msg_evt, UINT8 *p_buf, UINT32 len)
{
int n;
int n_read = 0;
int fd = uipc_main.ch[ch_id].fd;
struct pollfd pfd;
UNUSED(p_msg_evt);
if (ch_id >= UIPC_CH_NUM)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("UIPC_Read : invalid ch id %d", ch_id);
return 0;
}
if (fd == UIPC_DISCONNECTED)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("UIPC_Read : channel %d closed", ch_id);
return 0;
}
while (n_read < (int)len)
{
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN|POLLHUP;
/* make sure there is data prior to attempting read to avoid blocking
a read for more than poll timeout */
if (poll(&pfd, 1, uipc_main.ch[ch_id].read_poll_tmo_ms) == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("poll timeout (%d ms)", uipc_main.ch[ch_id].read_poll_tmo_ms);
break;
}
if (pfd.revents & (POLLHUP|POLLNVAL) )
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("poll : channel detached remotely");
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return 0;
}
n = recv(fd, p_buf+n_read, len-n_read, 0);
if (n == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC_Read : channel detached remotely");
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return 0;
}
if (n < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC_Read : read failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
n_read+=n;
}
return n_read;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
UINT32 UIPC_Read(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id, UINT16 *p_msg_evt, UINT8 *p_buf, UINT32 len)
{
int n;
int n_read = 0;
int fd = uipc_main.ch[ch_id].fd;
struct pollfd pfd;
UNUSED(p_msg_evt);
if (ch_id >= UIPC_CH_NUM)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("UIPC_Read : invalid ch id %d", ch_id);
return 0;
}
if (fd == UIPC_DISCONNECTED)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("UIPC_Read : channel %d closed", ch_id);
return 0;
}
while (n_read < (int)len)
{
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN|POLLHUP;
/* make sure there is data prior to attempting read to avoid blocking
a read for more than poll timeout */
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(poll(&pfd, 1, uipc_main.ch[ch_id].read_poll_tmo_ms)) == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("poll timeout (%d ms)", uipc_main.ch[ch_id].read_poll_tmo_ms);
break;
}
if (pfd.revents & (POLLHUP|POLLNVAL) )
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("poll : channel detached remotely");
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return 0;
}
n = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(recv(fd, p_buf+n_read, len-n_read, 0));
if (n == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC_Read : channel detached remotely");
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return 0;
}
if (n < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC_Read : read failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
n_read+=n;
}
return n_read;
}
| 173,493
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void TransportTexture::OnTexturesCreated(std::vector<int> textures) {
bool ret = decoder_->MakeCurrent();
if (!ret) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to switch context";
return;
}
output_textures_->clear();
for (size_t i = 0; i < textures.size(); ++i) {
uint32 gl_texture = 0;
ret = decoder_->GetServiceTextureId(textures[i], &gl_texture);
DCHECK(ret) << "Cannot translate client texture ID to service ID";
output_textures_->push_back(gl_texture);
texture_map_.insert(std::make_pair(gl_texture, textures[i]));
}
create_task_->Run();
create_task_.reset();
output_textures_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void TransportTexture::OnTexturesCreated(std::vector<int> textures) {
void TransportTexture::OnTexturesCreated(const std::vector<int>& textures) {
bool ret = decoder_->MakeCurrent();
if (!ret) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to switch context";
return;
}
output_textures_->clear();
for (size_t i = 0; i < textures.size(); ++i) {
uint32 gl_texture = 0;
ret = decoder_->GetServiceTextureId(textures[i], &gl_texture);
DCHECK(ret) << "Cannot translate client texture ID to service ID";
output_textures_->push_back(gl_texture);
texture_map_.insert(std::make_pair(gl_texture, textures[i]));
}
create_task_->Run();
create_task_.reset();
output_textures_ = NULL;
}
| 170,313
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline long object_common1(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, zend_class_entry *ce)
{
long elements;
elements = parse_iv2((*p) + 2, p);
(*p) += 2;
if (ce->serialize == NULL) {
object_init_ex(*rval, ce);
} else {
/* If this class implements Serializable, it should not land here but in object_custom(). The passed string
obviously doesn't descend from the regular serializer. */
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Erroneous data format for unserializing '%s'", ce->name);
return 0;
}
return elements;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73825 - Heap out of bounds read on unserialize in finish_nested_data()
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static inline long object_common1(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, zend_class_entry *ce)
{
long elements;
if( *p >= max - 2) {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Bad unserialize data");
return -1;
}
elements = parse_iv2((*p) + 2, p);
(*p) += 2;
if (ce->serialize == NULL) {
object_init_ex(*rval, ce);
} else {
/* If this class implements Serializable, it should not land here but in object_custom(). The passed string
obviously doesn't descend from the regular serializer. */
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Erroneous data format for unserializing '%s'", ce->name);
return -1;
}
return elements;
}
| 168,514
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: wiki_handle_rest_call(HttpRequest *req,
HttpResponse *res,
char *func)
{
if (func != NULL && *func != '\0')
{
if (!strcmp(func, "page/get"))
{
char *page = http_request_param_get(req, "page");
if (page == NULL)
page = http_request_get_query_string(req);
if (page && (access(page, R_OK) == 0))
{
http_response_printf(res, "%s", file_read(page));
http_response_send(res);
return;
}
}
else if (!strcmp(func, "page/set"))
{
char *wikitext = NULL, *page = NULL;
if( ( (wikitext = http_request_param_get(req, "text")) != NULL)
&& ( (page = http_request_param_get(req, "page")) != NULL))
{
file_write(page, wikitext);
http_response_printf(res, "success");
http_response_send(res);
return;
}
}
else if (!strcmp(func, "page/delete"))
{
char *page = http_request_param_get(req, "page");
if (page == NULL)
page = http_request_get_query_string(req);
if (page && (unlink(page) > 0))
{
http_response_printf(res, "success");
http_response_send(res);
return;
}
}
else if (!strcmp(func, "page/exists"))
{
char *page = http_request_param_get(req, "page");
if (page == NULL)
page = http_request_get_query_string(req);
if (page && (access(page, R_OK) == 0))
{
http_response_printf(res, "success");
http_response_send(res);
return;
}
}
else if (!strcmp(func, "pages") || !strcmp(func, "search"))
{
WikiPageList **pages = NULL;
int n_pages, i;
char *expr = http_request_param_get(req, "expr");
if (expr == NULL)
expr = http_request_get_query_string(req);
pages = wiki_get_pages(&n_pages, expr);
if (pages)
{
for (i=0; i<n_pages; i++)
{
struct tm *pTm;
char datebuf[64];
pTm = localtime(&pages[i]->mtime);
strftime(datebuf, sizeof(datebuf), "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M", pTm);
http_response_printf(res, "%s\t%s\n", pages[i]->name, datebuf);
}
http_response_send(res);
return;
}
}
}
http_response_set_status(res, 500, "Error");
http_response_printf(res, "<html><body>Failed</body></html>\n");
http_response_send(res);
return;
}
Commit Message: page_name_is_good function
CWE ID: CWE-22
|
wiki_handle_rest_call(HttpRequest *req,
HttpResponse *res,
char *func)
{
if (func != NULL && *func != '\0')
{
if (!strcmp(func, "page/get"))
{
char *page = http_request_param_get(req, "page");
if (page == NULL)
page = http_request_get_query_string(req);
if (page && page_name_is_good(page) && (access(page, R_OK) == 0))
{
http_response_printf(res, "%s", file_read(page));
http_response_send(res);
return;
}
}
else if (!strcmp(func, "page/set"))
{
char *wikitext = NULL, *page = NULL;
if( ( (wikitext = http_request_param_get(req, "text")) != NULL)
&& ( (page = http_request_param_get(req, "page")) != NULL))
{
if (page_name_is_good(page))
{
file_write(page, wikitext);
http_response_printf(res, "success");
http_response_send(res);
return;
}
}
}
else if (!strcmp(func, "page/delete"))
{
char *page = http_request_param_get(req, "page");
if (page == NULL)
page = http_request_get_query_string(req);
if (page && page_name_is_good(page) && (unlink(page) > 0))
{
http_response_printf(res, "success");
http_response_send(res);
return;
}
}
else if (!strcmp(func, "page/exists"))
{
char *page = http_request_param_get(req, "page");
if (page == NULL)
page = http_request_get_query_string(req);
if (page && page_name_is_good(page) && (access(page, R_OK) == 0))
{
http_response_printf(res, "success");
http_response_send(res);
return;
}
}
else if (!strcmp(func, "pages") || !strcmp(func, "search"))
{
WikiPageList **pages = NULL;
int n_pages, i;
char *expr = http_request_param_get(req, "expr");
if (expr == NULL)
expr = http_request_get_query_string(req);
pages = wiki_get_pages(&n_pages, expr);
if (pages)
{
for (i=0; i<n_pages; i++)
{
struct tm *pTm;
char datebuf[64];
pTm = localtime(&pages[i]->mtime);
strftime(datebuf, sizeof(datebuf), "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M", pTm);
http_response_printf(res, "%s\t%s\n", pages[i]->name, datebuf);
}
http_response_send(res);
return;
}
}
}
http_response_set_status(res, 500, "Error");
http_response_printf(res, "<html><body>Failed</body></html>\n");
http_response_send(res);
return;
}
| 167,595
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void FrameLoader::Load(const FrameLoadRequest& passed_request,
FrameLoadType frame_load_type,
HistoryItem* history_item,
HistoryLoadType history_load_type) {
DCHECK(frame_->GetDocument());
if (IsBackForwardLoadType(frame_load_type) && !frame_->IsNavigationAllowed())
return;
if (in_stop_all_loaders_)
return;
FrameLoadRequest request(passed_request);
request.GetResourceRequest().SetHasUserGesture(
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation(frame_));
if (!PrepareRequestForThisFrame(request))
return;
Frame* target_frame = request.Form()
? nullptr
: frame_->FindFrameForNavigation(
AtomicString(request.FrameName()), *frame_,
request.GetResourceRequest().Url());
NavigationPolicy policy = NavigationPolicyForRequest(request);
if (target_frame && target_frame != frame_ &&
ShouldNavigateTargetFrame(policy)) {
if (target_frame->IsLocalFrame() &&
!ToLocalFrame(target_frame)->IsNavigationAllowed()) {
return;
}
bool was_in_same_page = target_frame->GetPage() == frame_->GetPage();
request.SetFrameName("_self");
target_frame->Navigate(request);
Page* page = target_frame->GetPage();
if (!was_in_same_page && page)
page->GetChromeClient().Focus();
return;
}
SetReferrerForFrameRequest(request);
if (!target_frame && !request.FrameName().IsEmpty()) {
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyDownload) {
Client()->DownloadURL(request.GetResourceRequest(), String());
return; // Navigation/download will be handled by the client.
} else if (ShouldNavigateTargetFrame(policy)) {
request.GetResourceRequest().SetFrameType(
network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kAuxiliary);
CreateWindowForRequest(request, *frame_, policy);
return; // Navigation will be handled by the new frame/window.
}
}
if (!frame_->IsNavigationAllowed())
return;
const KURL& url = request.GetResourceRequest().Url();
FrameLoadType new_load_type = (frame_load_type == kFrameLoadTypeStandard)
? DetermineFrameLoadType(request)
: frame_load_type;
bool same_document_history_navigation =
IsBackForwardLoadType(new_load_type) &&
history_load_type == kHistorySameDocumentLoad;
bool same_document_navigation =
policy == kNavigationPolicyCurrentTab &&
ShouldPerformFragmentNavigation(request.Form(),
request.GetResourceRequest().HttpMethod(),
new_load_type, url);
if (same_document_history_navigation || same_document_navigation) {
DCHECK(history_item || !same_document_history_navigation);
scoped_refptr<SerializedScriptValue> state_object =
same_document_history_navigation ? history_item->StateObject()
: nullptr;
if (!same_document_history_navigation) {
document_loader_->SetNavigationType(DetermineNavigationType(
new_load_type, false, request.TriggeringEvent()));
if (ShouldTreatURLAsSameAsCurrent(url))
new_load_type = kFrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem;
}
LoadInSameDocument(url, state_object, new_load_type, history_item,
request.ClientRedirect(), request.OriginDocument());
return;
}
if (request.GetResourceRequest().IsSameDocumentNavigation())
return;
StartLoad(request, new_load_type, policy, history_item);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
|
void FrameLoader::Load(const FrameLoadRequest& passed_request,
FrameLoadType frame_load_type,
HistoryItem* history_item,
HistoryLoadType history_load_type) {
DCHECK(frame_->GetDocument());
if (IsBackForwardLoadType(frame_load_type) && !frame_->IsNavigationAllowed())
return;
if (in_stop_all_loaders_)
return;
FrameLoadRequest request(passed_request);
request.GetResourceRequest().SetHasUserGesture(
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation(frame_));
if (!PrepareRequestForThisFrame(request))
return;
Frame* target_frame = request.Form()
? nullptr
: frame_->FindFrameForNavigation(
AtomicString(request.FrameName()), *frame_,
request.GetResourceRequest().Url());
NavigationPolicy policy = NavigationPolicyForRequest(request);
if (target_frame && target_frame != frame_ &&
ShouldNavigateTargetFrame(policy)) {
if (target_frame->IsLocalFrame() &&
!ToLocalFrame(target_frame)->IsNavigationAllowed()) {
return;
}
bool was_in_same_page = target_frame->GetPage() == frame_->GetPage();
request.SetFrameName("_self");
target_frame->Navigate(request);
Page* page = target_frame->GetPage();
if (!was_in_same_page && page)
page->GetChromeClient().Focus(nullptr);
return;
}
SetReferrerForFrameRequest(request);
if (!target_frame && !request.FrameName().IsEmpty()) {
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyDownload) {
Client()->DownloadURL(request.GetResourceRequest(), String());
return; // Navigation/download will be handled by the client.
} else if (ShouldNavigateTargetFrame(policy)) {
request.GetResourceRequest().SetFrameType(
network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kAuxiliary);
CreateWindowForRequest(request, *frame_, policy);
return; // Navigation will be handled by the new frame/window.
}
}
if (!frame_->IsNavigationAllowed())
return;
const KURL& url = request.GetResourceRequest().Url();
FrameLoadType new_load_type = (frame_load_type == kFrameLoadTypeStandard)
? DetermineFrameLoadType(request)
: frame_load_type;
bool same_document_history_navigation =
IsBackForwardLoadType(new_load_type) &&
history_load_type == kHistorySameDocumentLoad;
bool same_document_navigation =
policy == kNavigationPolicyCurrentTab &&
ShouldPerformFragmentNavigation(request.Form(),
request.GetResourceRequest().HttpMethod(),
new_load_type, url);
if (same_document_history_navigation || same_document_navigation) {
DCHECK(history_item || !same_document_history_navigation);
scoped_refptr<SerializedScriptValue> state_object =
same_document_history_navigation ? history_item->StateObject()
: nullptr;
if (!same_document_history_navigation) {
document_loader_->SetNavigationType(DetermineNavigationType(
new_load_type, false, request.TriggeringEvent()));
if (ShouldTreatURLAsSameAsCurrent(url))
new_load_type = kFrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem;
}
LoadInSameDocument(url, state_object, new_load_type, history_item,
request.ClientRedirect(), request.OriginDocument());
return;
}
if (request.GetResourceRequest().IsSameDocumentNavigation())
return;
StartLoad(request, new_load_type, policy, history_item);
}
| 172,723
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: char *auth_server(int f_in, int f_out, int module, const char *host,
const char *addr, const char *leader)
{
char *users = lp_auth_users(module);
char challenge[MAX_DIGEST_LEN*2];
char line[BIGPATHBUFLEN];
char **auth_uid_groups = NULL;
int auth_uid_groups_cnt = -1;
const char *err = NULL;
int group_match = -1;
char *tok, *pass;
char opt_ch = '\0';
/* if no auth list then allow anyone in! */
if (!users || !*users)
if (!users || !*users)
return "";
gen_challenge(addr, challenge);
io_printf(f_out, "%s%s\n", leader, challenge);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-354
|
char *auth_server(int f_in, int f_out, int module, const char *host,
const char *addr, const char *leader)
{
char *users = lp_auth_users(module);
char challenge[MAX_DIGEST_LEN*2];
char line[BIGPATHBUFLEN];
char **auth_uid_groups = NULL;
int auth_uid_groups_cnt = -1;
const char *err = NULL;
int group_match = -1;
char *tok, *pass;
char opt_ch = '\0';
/* if no auth list then allow anyone in! */
if (!users || !*users)
if (!users || !*users)
return "";
if (protocol_version < 21) { /* Don't allow a weak checksum for the password. */
rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: protocol version is too old!\n");
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
gen_challenge(addr, challenge);
io_printf(f_out, "%s%s\n", leader, challenge);
return NULL;
}
| 164,641
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(xml_set_object)
{
xml_parser *parser;
zval *pind, *mythis;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ro", &pind, &mythis) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(parser,xml_parser *, &pind, -1, "XML Parser", le_xml_parser);
/* please leave this commented - or ask thies@thieso.net before doing it (again) */
if (parser->object) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->object);
}
/* please leave this commented - or ask thies@thieso.net before doing it (again) */
/* #ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval_add_ref(&parser->object);
#endif */
ALLOC_ZVAL(parser->object);
MAKE_COPY_ZVAL(&mythis, parser->object);
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
PHP_FUNCTION(xml_set_object)
{
xml_parser *parser;
zval *pind, *mythis;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ro", &pind, &mythis) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(parser,xml_parser *, &pind, -1, "XML Parser", le_xml_parser);
/* please leave this commented - or ask thies@thieso.net before doing it (again) */
if (parser->object) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->object);
}
/* please leave this commented - or ask thies@thieso.net before doing it (again) */
/* #ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval_add_ref(&parser->object);
#endif */
ALLOC_ZVAL(parser->object);
MAKE_COPY_ZVAL(&mythis, parser->object);
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
| 165,036
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
OM_uint32 minor, major;
gss_ctx_id_t context;
gss_union_ctx_id_desc uctx;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec kgctx;
krb5_key k1, k2;
krb5_keyblock kb1, kb2;
gss_buffer_desc in, out;
unsigned char k1buf[32], k2buf[32], outbuf[44];
size_t i;
/*
* Fake up just enough of a krb5 GSS context to make gss_pseudo_random
* work, with chosen subkeys and acceptor subkeys. If we implement
* gss_import_lucid_sec_context, we can rewrite this to use public
* interfaces and stop using private headers and internal knowledge of the
* implementation.
*/
context = (gss_ctx_id_t)&uctx;
uctx.mech_type = &mech_krb5;
uctx.internal_ctx_id = (gss_ctx_id_t)&kgctx;
kgctx.k5_context = NULL;
kgctx.have_acceptor_subkey = 1;
kb1.contents = k1buf;
kb2.contents = k2buf;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); i++) {
/* Set up the keys for this test. */
kb1.enctype = tests[i].enctype;
kb1.length = fromhex(tests[i].key1, k1buf);
check_k5err(NULL, "create_key", krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb1, &k1));
kgctx.subkey = k1;
kb2.enctype = tests[i].enctype;
kb2.length = fromhex(tests[i].key2, k2buf);
check_k5err(NULL, "create_key", krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb2, &k2));
kgctx.acceptor_subkey = k2;
/* Generate a PRF value with the subkey and an empty input, and compare
* it to the first expected output. */
in.length = 0;
in.value = NULL;
major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL, &in,
44, &out);
check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
(void)fromhex(tests[i].out1, outbuf);
assert(out.length == 44 && memcmp(out.value, outbuf, 44) == 0);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
/* Generate a PRF value with the acceptor subkey and the 61-byte input
* string, and compare it to the second expected output. */
in.length = strlen(inputstr);
in.value = (char *)inputstr;
major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL, &in, 44,
&out);
check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
(void)fromhex(tests[i].out2, outbuf);
assert(out.length == 44 && memcmp(out.value, outbuf, 44) == 0);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
/* Also check that generating zero bytes of output works. */
major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL, &in, 0,
&out);
check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
assert(out.length == 0);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, k1);
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, k2);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
|
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
OM_uint32 minor, major;
gss_ctx_id_t context;
gss_union_ctx_id_desc uctx;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec kgctx;
krb5_key k1, k2;
krb5_keyblock kb1, kb2;
gss_buffer_desc in, out;
unsigned char k1buf[32], k2buf[32], outbuf[44];
size_t i;
/*
* Fake up just enough of a krb5 GSS context to make gss_pseudo_random
* work, with chosen subkeys and acceptor subkeys. If we implement
* gss_import_lucid_sec_context, we can rewrite this to use public
* interfaces and stop using private headers and internal knowledge of the
* implementation.
*/
context = (gss_ctx_id_t)&uctx;
uctx.mech_type = &mech_krb5;
uctx.internal_ctx_id = (gss_ctx_id_t)&kgctx;
kgctx.k5_context = NULL;
kgctx.established = 1;
kgctx.have_acceptor_subkey = 1;
kb1.contents = k1buf;
kb2.contents = k2buf;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); i++) {
/* Set up the keys for this test. */
kb1.enctype = tests[i].enctype;
kb1.length = fromhex(tests[i].key1, k1buf);
check_k5err(NULL, "create_key", krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb1, &k1));
kgctx.subkey = k1;
kb2.enctype = tests[i].enctype;
kb2.length = fromhex(tests[i].key2, k2buf);
check_k5err(NULL, "create_key", krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb2, &k2));
kgctx.acceptor_subkey = k2;
/* Generate a PRF value with the subkey and an empty input, and compare
* it to the first expected output. */
in.length = 0;
in.value = NULL;
major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL, &in,
44, &out);
check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
(void)fromhex(tests[i].out1, outbuf);
assert(out.length == 44 && memcmp(out.value, outbuf, 44) == 0);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
/* Generate a PRF value with the acceptor subkey and the 61-byte input
* string, and compare it to the second expected output. */
in.length = strlen(inputstr);
in.value = (char *)inputstr;
major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL, &in, 44,
&out);
check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
(void)fromhex(tests[i].out2, outbuf);
assert(out.length == 44 && memcmp(out.value, outbuf, 44) == 0);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
/* Also check that generating zero bytes of output works. */
major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL, &in, 0,
&out);
check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
assert(out.length == 0);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, k1);
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, k2);
}
return 0;
}
| 166,825
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void nlmclnt_unlock_callback(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nlm_rqst *req = data;
u32 status = ntohl(req->a_res.status);
if (RPC_ASSASSINATED(task))
goto die;
if (task->tk_status < 0) {
dprintk("lockd: unlock failed (err = %d)\n", -task->tk_status);
goto retry_rebind;
}
if (status == NLM_LCK_DENIED_GRACE_PERIOD) {
rpc_delay(task, NLMCLNT_GRACE_WAIT);
goto retry_unlock;
}
if (status != NLM_LCK_GRANTED)
printk(KERN_WARNING "lockd: unexpected unlock status: %d\n", status);
die:
return;
retry_rebind:
nlm_rebind_host(req->a_host);
retry_unlock:
rpc_restart_call(task);
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void nlmclnt_unlock_callback(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nlm_rqst *req = data;
u32 status = ntohl(req->a_res.status);
if (RPC_ASSASSINATED(task))
goto die;
if (task->tk_status < 0) {
dprintk("lockd: unlock failed (err = %d)\n", -task->tk_status);
switch (task->tk_status) {
case -EACCES:
case -EIO:
goto die;
default:
goto retry_rebind;
}
}
if (status == NLM_LCK_DENIED_GRACE_PERIOD) {
rpc_delay(task, NLMCLNT_GRACE_WAIT);
goto retry_unlock;
}
if (status != NLM_LCK_GRANTED)
printk(KERN_WARNING "lockd: unexpected unlock status: %d\n", status);
die:
return;
retry_rebind:
nlm_rebind_host(req->a_host);
retry_unlock:
rpc_restart_call(task);
}
| 166,221
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
break;
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
/* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
st->use_timer = 0;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
* retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
*/
st->use_timer = 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
#endif
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
*/
st->use_timer = 0;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
* already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
* but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
*/
st->use_timer = 0;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_OK:
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
default:
/* No pre work to be done */
break;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
break;
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
/* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
st->use_timer = 0;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
* retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
*/
st->use_timer = 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
#endif
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
*/
st->use_timer = 0;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
* already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
* but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
*/
st->use_timer = 0;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_OK:
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
default:
/* No pre work to be done */
break;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
| 165,199
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
unsigned int efi_map_offset, unsigned int efi_map_sz,
unsigned int efi_setup_data_offset)
{
struct efi_info *current_ei = &boot_params.efi_info;
struct efi_info *ei = ¶ms->efi_info;
if (!current_ei->efi_memmap_size)
return 0;
/*
* If 1:1 mapping is not enabled, second kernel can not setup EFI
* and use EFI run time services. User space will have to pass
* acpi_rsdp=<addr> on kernel command line to make second kernel boot
* without efi.
*/
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
return 0;
ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature;
ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab;
ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;
ei->efi_memdesc_version = current_ei->efi_memdesc_version;
ei->efi_memdesc_size = efi_get_runtime_map_desc_size();
setup_efi_info_memmap(params, params_load_addr, efi_map_offset,
efi_map_sz);
prepare_add_efi_setup_data(params, params_load_addr,
efi_setup_data_offset);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kexec/uefi: copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy
kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided
by secure boot. Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag
in original kernel.
secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the
stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot.
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
unsigned int efi_map_offset, unsigned int efi_map_sz,
unsigned int efi_setup_data_offset)
{
struct efi_info *current_ei = &boot_params.efi_info;
struct efi_info *ei = ¶ms->efi_info;
if (!current_ei->efi_memmap_size)
return 0;
/*
* If 1:1 mapping is not enabled, second kernel can not setup EFI
* and use EFI run time services. User space will have to pass
* acpi_rsdp=<addr> on kernel command line to make second kernel boot
* without efi.
*/
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
return 0;
params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot;
ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature;
ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab;
ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;
ei->efi_memdesc_version = current_ei->efi_memdesc_version;
ei->efi_memdesc_size = efi_get_runtime_map_desc_size();
setup_efi_info_memmap(params, params_load_addr, efi_map_offset,
efi_map_sz);
prepare_add_efi_setup_data(params, params_load_addr,
efi_setup_data_offset);
return 0;
}
| 168,868
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnDidPreviewPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage_Params& params) {
DCHECK(params.page_number >= printing::FIRST_PAGE_INDEX);
print_preview_pages_remaining_--;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnDidPreviewPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage_Params& params) {
DCHECK_GE(params.page_number, printing::FIRST_PAGE_INDEX);
print_preview_pages_remaining_--;
}
| 170,849
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int store_xauthority(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: invalid .Xauthority file\n");
return 0;
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269
|
static int store_xauthority(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE;
// create an empty file as root, and change ownership to user
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: invalid .Xauthority file\n");
return 0;
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
| 168,373
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long ZEXPORT inflateMark(strm)
z_streamp strm;
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
if (strm == Z_NULL || strm->state == Z_NULL) return -1L << 16;
state = (struct inflate_state FAR *)strm->state;
return ((long)(state->back) << 16) +
(state->mode == COPY ? state->length :
(state->mode == MATCH ? state->was - state->length : 0));
}
Commit Message: Avoid shifts of negative values inflateMark().
The C standard says that bit shifts of negative integers is
undefined. This casts to unsigned values to assure a known
result.
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
long ZEXPORT inflateMark(strm)
z_streamp strm;
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
if (strm == Z_NULL || strm->state == Z_NULL)
return (long)(((unsigned long)0 - 1) << 16);
state = (struct inflate_state FAR *)strm->state;
return (long)(((unsigned long)((long)state->back)) << 16) +
(state->mode == COPY ? state->length :
(state->mode == MATCH ? state->was - state->length : 0));
}
| 168,673
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void smp_proc_id_info(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->tk, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN); /* reuse TK for IRK */
smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void smp_proc_id_info(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) {
tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
smp_int_data.status = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111937065");
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
return;
}
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->tk, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN); /* reuse TK for IRK */
smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL);
}
| 174,075
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int do_devinfo_ioctl(struct comedi_device *dev,
struct comedi_devinfo __user *arg,
struct file *file)
{
struct comedi_devinfo devinfo;
const unsigned minor = iminor(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
struct comedi_device_file_info *dev_file_info =
comedi_get_device_file_info(minor);
struct comedi_subdevice *read_subdev =
comedi_get_read_subdevice(dev_file_info);
struct comedi_subdevice *write_subdev =
comedi_get_write_subdevice(dev_file_info);
memset(&devinfo, 0, sizeof(devinfo));
/* fill devinfo structure */
devinfo.version_code = COMEDI_VERSION_CODE;
devinfo.n_subdevs = dev->n_subdevices;
memcpy(devinfo.driver_name, dev->driver->driver_name, COMEDI_NAMELEN);
memcpy(devinfo.board_name, dev->board_name, COMEDI_NAMELEN);
if (read_subdev)
devinfo.read_subdevice = read_subdev - dev->subdevices;
else
devinfo.read_subdevice = -1;
if (write_subdev)
devinfo.write_subdevice = write_subdev - dev->subdevices;
else
devinfo.write_subdevice = -1;
if (copy_to_user(arg, &devinfo, sizeof(struct comedi_devinfo)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: staging: comedi: fix infoleak to userspace
driver_name and board_name are pointers to strings, not buffers of size
COMEDI_NAMELEN. Copying COMEDI_NAMELEN bytes of a string containing
less than COMEDI_NAMELEN-1 bytes would leak some unrelated bytes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
static int do_devinfo_ioctl(struct comedi_device *dev,
struct comedi_devinfo __user *arg,
struct file *file)
{
struct comedi_devinfo devinfo;
const unsigned minor = iminor(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
struct comedi_device_file_info *dev_file_info =
comedi_get_device_file_info(minor);
struct comedi_subdevice *read_subdev =
comedi_get_read_subdevice(dev_file_info);
struct comedi_subdevice *write_subdev =
comedi_get_write_subdevice(dev_file_info);
memset(&devinfo, 0, sizeof(devinfo));
/* fill devinfo structure */
devinfo.version_code = COMEDI_VERSION_CODE;
devinfo.n_subdevs = dev->n_subdevices;
strlcpy(devinfo.driver_name, dev->driver->driver_name, COMEDI_NAMELEN);
strlcpy(devinfo.board_name, dev->board_name, COMEDI_NAMELEN);
if (read_subdev)
devinfo.read_subdevice = read_subdev - dev->subdevices;
else
devinfo.read_subdevice = -1;
if (write_subdev)
devinfo.write_subdevice = write_subdev - dev->subdevices;
else
devinfo.write_subdevice = -1;
if (copy_to_user(arg, &devinfo, sizeof(struct comedi_devinfo)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
| 166,557
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: gs_main_init1(gs_main_instance * minst)
{
if (minst->init_done < 1) {
gs_dual_memory_t idmem;
int code =
ialloc_init(&idmem, minst->heap,
minst->memory_clump_size, gs_have_level2());
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = gs_lib_init1((gs_memory_t *)idmem.space_system);
if (code < 0)
return code;
alloc_save_init(&idmem);
{
gs_memory_t *mem = (gs_memory_t *)idmem.space_system;
name_table *nt = names_init(minst->name_table_size,
idmem.space_system);
if (nt == 0)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
mem->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table = nt;
code = gs_register_struct_root(mem, NULL,
(void **)&mem->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table,
"the_gs_name_table");
"the_gs_name_table");
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
code = obj_init(&minst->i_ctx_p, &idmem); /* requires name_init */
if (code < 0)
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = i_iodev_init(minst->i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
return code;
minst->init_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
gs_main_init1(gs_main_instance * minst)
{
if (minst->init_done < 1) {
gs_dual_memory_t idmem;
int code =
ialloc_init(&idmem, minst->heap,
minst->memory_clump_size, gs_have_level2());
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = gs_lib_init1((gs_memory_t *)idmem.space_system);
if (code < 0)
return code;
alloc_save_init(&idmem);
{
gs_memory_t *mem = (gs_memory_t *)idmem.space_system;
name_table *nt = names_init(minst->name_table_size,
idmem.space_system);
if (nt == 0)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
mem->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table = nt;
code = gs_register_struct_root(mem, NULL,
(void **)&mem->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table,
"the_gs_name_table");
"the_gs_name_table");
if (code < 0)
return code;
mem->gs_lib_ctx->client_check_file_permission = z_check_file_permissions;
}
code = obj_init(&minst->i_ctx_p, &idmem); /* requires name_init */
if (code < 0)
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = i_iodev_init(minst->i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
return code;
minst->init_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 165,267
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, __construct)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zend_bool use_include_path = 0;
char *p1, *p2;
char *tmp_path;
int tmp_path_len;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
intern->u.file.open_mode_len = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p|sbr!",
&intern->file_name, &intern->file_name_len,
&intern->u.file.open_mode, &intern->u.file.open_mode_len,
&use_include_path, &intern->u.file.zcontext) == FAILURE) {
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
intern->file_name = NULL;
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
if (intern->u.file.open_mode == NULL) {
intern->u.file.open_mode = "r";
intern->u.file.open_mode_len = 1;
}
if (spl_filesystem_file_open(intern, use_include_path, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
tmp_path_len = strlen(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path);
if (tmp_path_len > 1 && IS_SLASH_AT(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path, tmp_path_len-1)) {
tmp_path_len--;
}
tmp_path = estrndup(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path, tmp_path_len);
p1 = strrchr(tmp_path, '/');
#if defined(PHP_WIN32) || defined(NETWARE)
p2 = strrchr(tmp_path, '\\');
#else
p2 = 0;
#endif
if (p1 || p2) {
intern->_path_len = (p1 > p2 ? p1 : p2) - tmp_path;
} else {
intern->_path_len = 0;
}
efree(tmp_path);
intern->_path = estrndup(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path, intern->_path_len);
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplTempFileObject::__construct([int max_memory])
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, __construct)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zend_bool use_include_path = 0;
char *p1, *p2;
char *tmp_path;
int tmp_path_len;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
intern->u.file.open_mode_len = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p|sbr!",
&intern->file_name, &intern->file_name_len,
&intern->u.file.open_mode, &intern->u.file.open_mode_len,
&use_include_path, &intern->u.file.zcontext) == FAILURE) {
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
intern->file_name = NULL;
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
if (intern->u.file.open_mode == NULL) {
intern->u.file.open_mode = "r";
intern->u.file.open_mode_len = 1;
}
if (spl_filesystem_file_open(intern, use_include_path, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
tmp_path_len = strlen(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path);
if (tmp_path_len > 1 && IS_SLASH_AT(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path, tmp_path_len-1)) {
tmp_path_len--;
}
tmp_path = estrndup(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path, tmp_path_len);
p1 = strrchr(tmp_path, '/');
#if defined(PHP_WIN32) || defined(NETWARE)
p2 = strrchr(tmp_path, '\\');
#else
p2 = 0;
#endif
if (p1 || p2) {
intern->_path_len = (p1 > p2 ? p1 : p2) - tmp_path;
} else {
intern->_path_len = 0;
}
efree(tmp_path);
intern->_path = estrndup(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path, intern->_path_len);
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplTempFileObject::__construct([int max_memory])
| 167,049
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: socket_t *socket_accept(const socket_t *socket) {
assert(socket != NULL);
int fd = accept(socket->fd, NULL, NULL);
if (fd == INVALID_FD) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to accept socket: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
socket_t *ret = (socket_t *)osi_calloc(sizeof(socket_t));
if (!ret) {
close(fd);
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to allocate memory for socket.", __func__);
return NULL;
}
ret->fd = fd;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
socket_t *socket_accept(const socket_t *socket) {
assert(socket != NULL);
int fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(accept(socket->fd, NULL, NULL));
if (fd == INVALID_FD) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to accept socket: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
socket_t *ret = (socket_t *)osi_calloc(sizeof(socket_t));
if (!ret) {
close(fd);
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to allocate memory for socket.", __func__);
return NULL;
}
ret->fd = fd;
return ret;
}
| 173,484
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int send_solid_rect(VncState *vs)
{
size_t bytes;
tight_pack24(vs, vs->tight.tight.buffer, 1, &vs->tight.tight.offset);
bytes = 3;
} else {
bytes = vs->clientds.pf.bytes_per_pixel;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static int send_solid_rect(VncState *vs)
{
size_t bytes;
tight_pack24(vs, vs->tight.tight.buffer, 1, &vs->tight.tight.offset);
bytes = 3;
} else {
bytes = vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel;
}
| 165,462
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void set_scl(int state)
{
qrio_set_opendrain_gpio(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SCL1, state);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
void set_scl(int state)
| 169,632
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: HistogramBase* SparseHistogram::FactoryGet(const std::string& name,
int32_t flags) {
HistogramBase* histogram = StatisticsRecorder::FindHistogram(name);
if (!histogram) {
PersistentMemoryAllocator::Reference histogram_ref = 0;
std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> tentative_histogram;
PersistentHistogramAllocator* allocator = GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get();
if (allocator) {
tentative_histogram = allocator->AllocateHistogram(
SPARSE_HISTOGRAM, name, 0, 0, nullptr, flags, &histogram_ref);
}
if (!tentative_histogram) {
DCHECK(!histogram_ref); // Should never have been set.
DCHECK(!allocator); // Shouldn't have failed.
flags &= ~HistogramBase::kIsPersistent;
tentative_histogram.reset(new SparseHistogram(name));
tentative_histogram->SetFlags(flags);
}
const void* tentative_histogram_ptr = tentative_histogram.get();
histogram = StatisticsRecorder::RegisterOrDeleteDuplicate(
tentative_histogram.release());
if (histogram_ref) {
allocator->FinalizeHistogram(histogram_ref,
histogram == tentative_histogram_ptr);
}
ReportHistogramActivity(*histogram, HISTOGRAM_CREATED);
} else {
ReportHistogramActivity(*histogram, HISTOGRAM_LOOKUP);
}
DCHECK_EQ(SPARSE_HISTOGRAM, histogram->GetHistogramType());
return histogram;
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
HistogramBase* SparseHistogram::FactoryGet(const std::string& name,
int32_t flags) {
HistogramBase* histogram = StatisticsRecorder::FindHistogram(name);
if (!histogram) {
PersistentMemoryAllocator::Reference histogram_ref = 0;
std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> tentative_histogram;
PersistentHistogramAllocator* allocator = GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get();
if (allocator) {
tentative_histogram = allocator->AllocateHistogram(
SPARSE_HISTOGRAM, name, 0, 0, nullptr, flags, &histogram_ref);
}
if (!tentative_histogram) {
DCHECK(!histogram_ref); // Should never have been set.
DCHECK(!allocator); // Shouldn't have failed.
flags &= ~HistogramBase::kIsPersistent;
tentative_histogram.reset(new SparseHistogram(name));
tentative_histogram->SetFlags(flags);
}
const void* tentative_histogram_ptr = tentative_histogram.get();
histogram = StatisticsRecorder::RegisterOrDeleteDuplicate(
tentative_histogram.release());
if (histogram_ref) {
allocator->FinalizeHistogram(histogram_ref,
histogram == tentative_histogram_ptr);
}
ReportHistogramActivity(*histogram, HISTOGRAM_CREATED);
} else {
ReportHistogramActivity(*histogram, HISTOGRAM_LOOKUP);
}
CHECK_EQ(SPARSE_HISTOGRAM, histogram->GetHistogramType());
return histogram;
}
| 172,494
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void MaybeRestoreIBusConfig() {
if (!ibus_) {
return;
}
MaybeDestroyIBusConfig();
if (!ibus_config_) {
GDBusConnection* ibus_connection = ibus_bus_get_connection(ibus_);
if (!ibus_connection) {
LOG(INFO) << "Couldn't create an ibus config object since "
<< "IBus connection is not ready.";
return;
}
const gboolean disconnected
= g_dbus_connection_is_closed(ibus_connection);
if (disconnected) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't create an ibus config object since "
<< "IBus connection is closed.";
return;
}
ibus_config_ = ibus_config_new(ibus_connection,
NULL /* do not cancel the operation */,
NULL /* do not get error information */);
if (!ibus_config_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "ibus_config_new() failed. ibus-memconf is not ready?";
return;
}
g_object_ref(ibus_config_);
LOG(INFO) << "ibus_config_ is ready.";
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void MaybeRestoreIBusConfig() {
if (!ibus_) {
return;
}
MaybeDestroyIBusConfig();
if (!ibus_config_) {
GDBusConnection* ibus_connection = ibus_bus_get_connection(ibus_);
if (!ibus_connection) {
VLOG(1) << "Couldn't create an ibus config object since "
<< "IBus connection is not ready.";
return;
}
const gboolean disconnected
= g_dbus_connection_is_closed(ibus_connection);
if (disconnected) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't create an ibus config object since "
<< "IBus connection is closed.";
return;
}
ibus_config_ = ibus_config_new(ibus_connection,
NULL /* do not cancel the operation */,
NULL /* do not get error information */);
if (!ibus_config_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "ibus_config_new() failed. ibus-memconf is not ready?";
return;
}
g_object_ref(ibus_config_);
VLOG(1) << "ibus_config_ is ready.";
}
}
| 170,543
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void FoFiType1::parse() {
char *line, *line1, *p, *p2;
char buf[256];
char c;
int n, code, i, j;
char *tokptr;
for (i = 1, line = (char *)file;
i <= 100 && line && (!name || !encoding);
++i) {
if (!name && !strncmp(line, "/FontName", 9)) {
strncpy(buf, line, 255);
buf[255] = '\0';
if ((p = strchr(buf+9, '/')) &&
(p = strtok_r(p+1, " \t\n\r", &tokptr))) {
name = copyString(p);
}
line = getNextLine(line);
} else if (!encoding &&
!strncmp(line, "/Encoding StandardEncoding def", 30)) {
encoding = fofiType1StandardEncoding;
} else if (!encoding &&
!strncmp(line, "/Encoding 256 array", 19)) {
encoding = (char **)gmallocn(256, sizeof(char *));
for (j = 0; j < 256; ++j) {
encoding[j] = NULL;
}
for (j = 0, line = getNextLine(line);
j < 300 && line && (line1 = getNextLine(line));
++j, line = line1) {
if ((n = line1 - line) > 255) {
error(-1, "FoFiType1::parse a line has more than 255 characters, we don't support this");
n = 255;
}
strncpy(buf, line, n);
buf[n] = '\0';
for (p = buf; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
if (!strncmp(p, "dup", 3)) {
for (p += 3; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
for (p2 = p; *p2 >= '0' && *p2 <= '9'; ++p2) ;
if (*p2) {
c = *p2; // store it so we can recover it after atoi
*p2 = '\0'; // terminate p so atoi works
code = atoi(p);
*p2 = c;
if (code == 8 && *p2 == '#') {
code = 0;
for (++p2; *p2 >= '0' && *p2 <= '7'; ++p2) {
code = code * 8 + (*p2 - '0');
code = code * 8 + (*p2 - '0');
}
}
if (code < 256) {
for (p = p2; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
if (*p == '/') {
++p;
c = *p2; // store it so we can recover it after copyString
*p2 = '\0'; // terminate p so copyString works
encoding[code] = copyString(p);
*p2 = c;
p = p2;
for (; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p); // eat spaces between string and put
if (!strncmp(p, "put", 3)) {
for (p += 3; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t' || *p == '\n' || *p == '\r'; ++p);
if (*p)
{
line1 = &line[p - buf];
}
} else {
error(-1, "FoFiType1::parse no put after dup");
}
}
}
}
} else {
if (strtok_r(buf, " \t", &tokptr) &&
(p = strtok_r(NULL, " \t\n\r", &tokptr)) && !strcmp(p, "def")) {
break;
}
}
}
} else {
line = getNextLine(line);
}
}
parsed = gTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void FoFiType1::parse() {
char *line, *line1, *p, *p2;
char buf[256];
char c;
int n, code, i, j;
char *tokptr;
for (i = 1, line = (char *)file;
i <= 100 && line && (!name || !encoding);
++i) {
if (!name && !strncmp(line, "/FontName", 9)) {
strncpy(buf, line, 255);
buf[255] = '\0';
if ((p = strchr(buf+9, '/')) &&
(p = strtok_r(p+1, " \t\n\r", &tokptr))) {
name = copyString(p);
}
line = getNextLine(line);
} else if (!encoding &&
!strncmp(line, "/Encoding StandardEncoding def", 30)) {
encoding = fofiType1StandardEncoding;
} else if (!encoding &&
!strncmp(line, "/Encoding 256 array", 19)) {
encoding = (char **)gmallocn(256, sizeof(char *));
for (j = 0; j < 256; ++j) {
encoding[j] = NULL;
}
for (j = 0, line = getNextLine(line);
j < 300 && line && (line1 = getNextLine(line));
++j, line = line1) {
if ((n = line1 - line) > 255) {
error(-1, "FoFiType1::parse a line has more than 255 characters, we don't support this");
n = 255;
}
strncpy(buf, line, n);
buf[n] = '\0';
for (p = buf; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
if (!strncmp(p, "dup", 3)) {
for (p += 3; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
for (p2 = p; *p2 >= '0' && *p2 <= '9'; ++p2) ;
if (*p2) {
c = *p2; // store it so we can recover it after atoi
*p2 = '\0'; // terminate p so atoi works
code = atoi(p);
*p2 = c;
if (code == 8 && *p2 == '#') {
code = 0;
for (++p2; *p2 >= '0' && *p2 <= '7'; ++p2) {
code = code * 8 + (*p2 - '0');
code = code * 8 + (*p2 - '0');
}
}
if (likely(code < 256 && code >= 0)) {
for (p = p2; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
if (*p == '/') {
++p;
c = *p2; // store it so we can recover it after copyString
*p2 = '\0'; // terminate p so copyString works
encoding[code] = copyString(p);
*p2 = c;
p = p2;
for (; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p); // eat spaces between string and put
if (!strncmp(p, "put", 3)) {
for (p += 3; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t' || *p == '\n' || *p == '\r'; ++p);
if (*p)
{
line1 = &line[p - buf];
}
} else {
error(-1, "FoFiType1::parse no put after dup");
}
}
}
}
} else {
if (strtok_r(buf, " \t", &tokptr) &&
(p = strtok_r(NULL, " \t\n\r", &tokptr)) && !strcmp(p, "def")) {
break;
}
}
}
} else {
line = getNextLine(line);
}
}
parsed = gTrue;
}
| 164,903
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RunAccuracyCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
uint32_t max_error = 0;
int64_t total_error = 0;
const int count_test_block = 10000;
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_input_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_temp_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, kNumCoeffs);
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8();
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8();
test_input_block[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block,
test_temp_block, pitch_));
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, dst, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
const uint32_t diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const uint32_t error = diff * diff;
if (max_error < error)
max_error = error;
total_error += error;
}
}
EXPECT_GE(1u, max_error)
<< "Error: 16x16 FHT/IHT has an individual round trip error > 1";
EXPECT_GE(count_test_block , total_error)
<< "Error: 16x16 FHT/IHT has average round trip error > 1 per block";
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void RunAccuracyCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
uint32_t max_error = 0;
int64_t total_error = 0;
const int count_test_block = 10000;
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, int16_t, test_input_block[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, test_temp_block[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint8_t, dst[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint8_t, src[kNumCoeffs]);
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint16_t, dst16[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, uint16_t, src16[kNumCoeffs]);
#endif
// Initialize a test block with input range [-mask_, mask_].
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
if (bit_depth_ == VPX_BITS_8) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8();
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8();
test_input_block[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
src16[j] = rnd.Rand16() & mask_;
dst16[j] = rnd.Rand16() & mask_;
test_input_block[j] = src16[j] - dst16[j];
#endif
}
}
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block,
test_temp_block, pitch_));
if (bit_depth_ == VPX_BITS_8) {
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, dst, pitch_));
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, CONVERT_TO_BYTEPTR(dst16), pitch_));
#endif
}
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
const uint32_t diff =
bit_depth_ == VPX_BITS_8 ? dst[j] - src[j] : dst16[j] - src16[j];
#else
const uint32_t diff = dst[j] - src[j];
#endif
const uint32_t error = diff * diff;
if (max_error < error)
max_error = error;
total_error += error;
}
}
EXPECT_GE(1u << 2 * (bit_depth_ - 8), max_error)
<< "Error: 16x16 FHT/IHT has an individual round trip error > 1";
EXPECT_GE(count_test_block << 2 * (bit_depth_ - 8), total_error)
<< "Error: 16x16 FHT/IHT has average round trip error > 1 per block";
}
| 174,519
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: file_tryelf(struct magic_set *ms, int fd, const unsigned char *buf,
size_t nbytes)
{
union {
int32_t l;
char c[sizeof (int32_t)];
} u;
int clazz;
int swap;
struct stat st;
off_t fsize;
int flags = 0;
Elf32_Ehdr elf32hdr;
Elf64_Ehdr elf64hdr;
uint16_t type;
if (ms->flags & (MAGIC_MIME|MAGIC_APPLE))
return 0;
/*
* ELF executables have multiple section headers in arbitrary
* file locations and thus file(1) cannot determine it from easily.
* Instead we traverse thru all section headers until a symbol table
* one is found or else the binary is stripped.
* Return immediately if it's not ELF (so we avoid pipe2file unless needed).
*/
if (buf[EI_MAG0] != ELFMAG0
|| (buf[EI_MAG1] != ELFMAG1 && buf[EI_MAG1] != OLFMAG1)
|| buf[EI_MAG2] != ELFMAG2 || buf[EI_MAG3] != ELFMAG3)
return 0;
/*
* If we cannot seek, it must be a pipe, socket or fifo.
*/
if((lseek(fd, (off_t)0, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) && (errno == ESPIPE))
fd = file_pipe2file(ms, fd, buf, nbytes);
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
fsize = st.st_size;
clazz = buf[EI_CLASS];
switch (clazz) {
case ELFCLASS32:
#undef elf_getu
#define elf_getu(a, b) elf_getu32(a, b)
#undef elfhdr
#define elfhdr elf32hdr
#include "elfclass.h"
case ELFCLASS64:
#undef elf_getu
#define elf_getu(a, b) elf_getu64(a, b)
#undef elfhdr
#define elfhdr elf64hdr
#include "elfclass.h"
default:
if (file_printf(ms, ", unknown class %d", clazz) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: - limit the number of program and section header number of sections to be
processed to avoid excessive processing time.
- if a bad note is found, return 0 to stop processing immediately.
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
file_tryelf(struct magic_set *ms, int fd, const unsigned char *buf,
size_t nbytes)
{
union {
int32_t l;
char c[sizeof (int32_t)];
} u;
int clazz;
int swap;
struct stat st;
off_t fsize;
int flags = 0;
Elf32_Ehdr elf32hdr;
Elf64_Ehdr elf64hdr;
uint16_t type, phnum, shnum;
if (ms->flags & (MAGIC_MIME|MAGIC_APPLE))
return 0;
/*
* ELF executables have multiple section headers in arbitrary
* file locations and thus file(1) cannot determine it from easily.
* Instead we traverse thru all section headers until a symbol table
* one is found or else the binary is stripped.
* Return immediately if it's not ELF (so we avoid pipe2file unless needed).
*/
if (buf[EI_MAG0] != ELFMAG0
|| (buf[EI_MAG1] != ELFMAG1 && buf[EI_MAG1] != OLFMAG1)
|| buf[EI_MAG2] != ELFMAG2 || buf[EI_MAG3] != ELFMAG3)
return 0;
/*
* If we cannot seek, it must be a pipe, socket or fifo.
*/
if((lseek(fd, (off_t)0, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) && (errno == ESPIPE))
fd = file_pipe2file(ms, fd, buf, nbytes);
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
fsize = st.st_size;
clazz = buf[EI_CLASS];
switch (clazz) {
case ELFCLASS32:
#undef elf_getu
#define elf_getu(a, b) elf_getu32(a, b)
#undef elfhdr
#define elfhdr elf32hdr
#include "elfclass.h"
case ELFCLASS64:
#undef elf_getu
#define elf_getu(a, b) elf_getu64(a, b)
#undef elfhdr
#define elfhdr elf64hdr
#include "elfclass.h"
default:
if (file_printf(ms, ", unknown class %d", clazz) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
| 169,904
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ssize_t utf16_to_utf8_length(const char16_t *src, size_t src_len)
{
if (src == NULL || src_len == 0) {
return -1;
}
size_t ret = 0;
const char16_t* const end = src + src_len;
while (src < end) {
if ((*src & 0xFC00) == 0xD800 && (src + 1) < end
&& (*++src & 0xFC00) == 0xDC00) {
ret += 4;
src++;
} else {
ret += utf32_codepoint_utf8_length((char32_t) *src++);
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
ssize_t utf16_to_utf8_length(const char16_t *src, size_t src_len)
{
if (src == NULL || src_len == 0) {
return -1;
}
size_t ret = 0;
const char16_t* const end = src + src_len;
while (src < end) {
if ((*src & 0xFC00) == 0xD800 && (src + 1) < end
&& (*(src + 1) & 0xFC00) == 0xDC00) {
ret += 4;
src += 2;
} else {
ret += utf32_codepoint_utf8_length((char32_t) *src++);
}
}
return ret;
}
| 173,420
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BluetoothOptionsHandler::GenerateFakeDeviceList() {
GenerateFakeDiscoveredDevice(
"Fake Wireless Keyboard",
"01-02-03-04-05-06",
"input-keyboard",
true,
true);
GenerateFakeDiscoveredDevice(
"Fake Wireless Mouse",
"02-03-04-05-06-01",
"input-mouse",
true,
false);
GenerateFakeDiscoveredDevice(
"Fake Wireless Headset",
"03-04-05-06-01-02",
"headset",
false,
false);
GenerateFakePairing(
"Fake Connecting Keyboard",
"04-05-06-01-02-03",
"input-keyboard",
"bluetoothRemotePasskey");
GenerateFakePairing(
"Fake Connecting Phone",
"05-06-01-02-03-04",
"phone",
"bluetoothConfirmPasskey");
GenerateFakePairing(
"Fake Connecting Headset",
"06-01-02-03-04-05",
"headset",
"bluetoothEnterPasskey");
web_ui_->CallJavascriptFunction(
"options.SystemOptions.notifyBluetoothSearchComplete");
}
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void BluetoothOptionsHandler::GenerateFakeDeviceList() {
GenerateFakeDevice(
"Fake Wireless Keyboard",
"01-02-03-04-05-06",
"input-keyboard",
true,
true,
"");
GenerateFakeDevice(
"Fake Wireless Mouse",
"02-03-04-05-06-01",
"input-mouse",
true,
false,
"");
GenerateFakeDevice(
"Fake Wireless Headset",
"03-04-05-06-01-02",
"headset",
false,
false,
"");
GenerateFakeDevice(
"Fake Connecting Keyboard",
"04-05-06-01-02-03",
"input-keyboard",
false,
false,
"bluetoothRemotePasskey");
GenerateFakeDevice(
"Fake Connecting Phone",
"05-06-01-02-03-04",
"phone",
false,
false,
"bluetoothConfirmPasskey");
GenerateFakeDevice(
"Fake Connecting Headset",
"06-01-02-03-04-05",
"headset",
false,
false,
"bluetoothEnterPasskey");
web_ui_->CallJavascriptFunction(
"options.SystemOptions.notifyBluetoothSearchComplete");
}
| 170,968
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int needs_empty_write(sector_t block, struct inode *inode)
{
int error;
struct buffer_head bh_map = { .b_state = 0, .b_blocknr = 0 };
bh_map.b_size = 1 << inode->i_blkbits;
error = gfs2_block_map(inode, block, &bh_map, 0);
if (unlikely(error))
return error;
return !buffer_mapped(&bh_map);
}
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int needs_empty_write(sector_t block, struct inode *inode)
| 166,214
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ImageTransportClientTexture(
WebKit::WebGraphicsContext3D* host_context,
const gfx::Size& size,
float device_scale_factor,
uint64 surface_id)
: ui::Texture(true, size, device_scale_factor),
host_context_(host_context),
texture_id_(surface_id) {
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
ImageTransportClientTexture(
| 171,362
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const Cluster* Segment::FindCluster(long long time_ns) const
{
if ((m_clusters == NULL) || (m_clusterCount <= 0))
return &m_eos;
{
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[0];
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index == 0);
if (time_ns <= pCluster->GetTime())
return pCluster;
}
long i = 0;
long j = m_clusterCount;
while (i < j)
{
const long k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < m_clusterCount);
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[k];
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index == k);
const long long t = pCluster->GetTime();
if (t <= time_ns)
i = k + 1;
else
j = k;
assert(i <= j);
}
assert(i == j);
assert(i > 0);
assert(i <= m_clusterCount);
const long k = i - 1;
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[k];
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index == k);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
return pCluster;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
const Cluster* Segment::FindCluster(long long time_ns) const
{
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[0];
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index == 0);
if (time_ns <= pCluster->GetTime())
return pCluster;
}
// Binary search of cluster array
long i = 0;
long j = m_clusterCount;
while (i < j) {
// INVARIANT:
//[0, i) <= time_ns
//[i, j) ?
//[j, m_clusterCount) > time_ns
const long k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < m_clusterCount);
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[k];
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index == k);
const long long t = pCluster->GetTime();
if (t <= time_ns)
i = k + 1;
else
j = k;
assert(i <= j);
}
assert(i == j);
assert(i > 0);
assert(i <= m_clusterCount);
const long k = i - 1;
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[k];
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index == k);
assert(pCluster->GetTime() <= time_ns);
return pCluster;
}
| 174,279
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: CoordinatorImpl::CoordinatorImpl(service_manager::Connector* connector)
: next_dump_id_(0),
client_process_timeout_(base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(15)) {
process_map_ = std::make_unique<ProcessMap>(connector);
DCHECK(!g_coordinator_impl);
g_coordinator_impl = this;
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpManager::GetInstance()->set_tracing_process_id(
mojom::kServiceTracingProcessId);
tracing_observer_ = std::make_unique<TracingObserver>(
base::trace_event::TraceLog::GetInstance(), nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
CoordinatorImpl::CoordinatorImpl(service_manager::Connector* connector)
: next_dump_id_(0),
client_process_timeout_(base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(15)),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
process_map_ = std::make_unique<ProcessMap>(connector);
DCHECK(!g_coordinator_impl);
g_coordinator_impl = this;
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpManager::GetInstance()->set_tracing_process_id(
mojom::kServiceTracingProcessId);
tracing_observer_ = std::make_unique<TracingObserver>(
base::trace_event::TraceLog::GetInstance(), nullptr);
}
| 173,211
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SocketStream::SocketStream(const GURL& url, Delegate* delegate)
: delegate_(delegate),
url_(url),
max_pending_send_allowed_(kMaxPendingSendAllowed),
next_state_(STATE_NONE),
factory_(ClientSocketFactory::GetDefaultFactory()),
proxy_mode_(kDirectConnection),
proxy_url_(url),
pac_request_(NULL),
privacy_mode_(kPrivacyModeDisabled),
io_callback_(base::Bind(&SocketStream::OnIOCompleted,
base::Unretained(this))),
read_buf_(NULL),
current_write_buf_(NULL),
waiting_for_write_completion_(false),
closing_(false),
server_closed_(false),
metrics_(new SocketStreamMetrics(url)) {
DCHECK(base::MessageLoop::current())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must exist";
DCHECK_EQ(base::MessageLoop::TYPE_IO, base::MessageLoop::current()->type())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must be TYPE_IO";
DCHECK(delegate_);
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
SocketStream::SocketStream(const GURL& url, Delegate* delegate)
: delegate_(delegate),
url_(url),
max_pending_send_allowed_(kMaxPendingSendAllowed),
context_(NULL),
next_state_(STATE_NONE),
factory_(ClientSocketFactory::GetDefaultFactory()),
proxy_mode_(kDirectConnection),
proxy_url_(url),
pac_request_(NULL),
privacy_mode_(kPrivacyModeDisabled),
io_callback_(base::Bind(&SocketStream::OnIOCompleted,
base::Unretained(this))),
read_buf_(NULL),
current_write_buf_(NULL),
waiting_for_write_completion_(false),
closing_(false),
server_closed_(false),
metrics_(new SocketStreamMetrics(url)) {
DCHECK(base::MessageLoop::current())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must exist";
DCHECK_EQ(base::MessageLoop::TYPE_IO, base::MessageLoop::current()->type())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must be TYPE_IO";
DCHECK(delegate_);
}
| 171,256
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const Cluster* Segment::FindOrPreloadCluster(long long requested_pos) {
if (requested_pos < 0)
return 0;
Cluster** const ii = m_clusters;
Cluster** i = ii;
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** const jj = ii + count;
Cluster** j = jj;
while (i < j) {
Cluster** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
Cluster* const pCluster = *k;
assert(pCluster);
const long long pos = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(pos >= 0);
if (pos < requested_pos)
i = k + 1;
else if (pos > requested_pos)
j = k;
else
return pCluster;
}
assert(i == j);
Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(this, -1, requested_pos);
assert(pCluster);
const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_clusters;
PreloadCluster(pCluster, idx);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(m_clusterPreloadCount > 0);
assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
const Cluster* Segment::FindOrPreloadCluster(long long requested_pos) {
if (requested_pos < 0)
return 0;
Cluster** const ii = m_clusters;
Cluster** i = ii;
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** const jj = ii + count;
Cluster** j = jj;
while (i < j) {
Cluster** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
Cluster* const pCluster = *k;
assert(pCluster);
const long long pos = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(pos >= 0);
if (pos < requested_pos)
i = k + 1;
else if (pos > requested_pos)
j = k;
else
return pCluster;
}
assert(i == j);
Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(this, -1, requested_pos);
if (pCluster == NULL)
return NULL;
const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_clusters;
if (!PreloadCluster(pCluster, idx)) {
delete pCluster;
return NULL;
}
assert(m_clusters);
assert(m_clusterPreloadCount > 0);
assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
| 173,812
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static Maybe<bool> IncludesValueImpl(Isolate* isolate,
Handle<JSObject> object,
Handle<Object> value,
uint32_t start_from, uint32_t length) {
DCHECK(JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *object));
Handle<Map> original_map = handle(object->map(), isolate);
Handle<FixedArray> parameter_map(FixedArray::cast(object->elements()),
isolate);
bool search_for_hole = value->IsUndefined(isolate);
for (uint32_t k = start_from; k < length; ++k) {
uint32_t entry = GetEntryForIndexImpl(isolate, *object, *parameter_map, k,
ALL_PROPERTIES);
if (entry == kMaxUInt32) {
if (search_for_hole) return Just(true);
continue;
}
Handle<Object> element_k =
Subclass::GetImpl(isolate, *parameter_map, entry);
if (element_k->IsAccessorPair()) {
LookupIterator it(isolate, object, k, LookupIterator::OWN);
DCHECK(it.IsFound());
DCHECK_EQ(it.state(), LookupIterator::ACCESSOR);
ASSIGN_RETURN_ON_EXCEPTION_VALUE(isolate, element_k,
Object::GetPropertyWithAccessor(&it),
Nothing<bool>());
if (value->SameValueZero(*element_k)) return Just(true);
if (object->map() != *original_map) {
return IncludesValueSlowPath(isolate, object, value, k + 1, length);
}
} else if (value->SameValueZero(*element_k)) {
return Just(true);
}
}
return Just(false);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
|
static Maybe<bool> IncludesValueImpl(Isolate* isolate,
Handle<JSObject> object,
Handle<Object> value,
uint32_t start_from, uint32_t length) {
DCHECK(JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *object));
Handle<Map> original_map(object->map(), isolate);
Handle<FixedArray> parameter_map(FixedArray::cast(object->elements()),
isolate);
bool search_for_hole = value->IsUndefined(isolate);
for (uint32_t k = start_from; k < length; ++k) {
DCHECK_EQ(object->map(), *original_map);
uint32_t entry = GetEntryForIndexImpl(isolate, *object, *parameter_map, k,
ALL_PROPERTIES);
if (entry == kMaxUInt32) {
if (search_for_hole) return Just(true);
continue;
}
Handle<Object> element_k =
Subclass::GetImpl(isolate, *parameter_map, entry);
if (element_k->IsAccessorPair()) {
LookupIterator it(isolate, object, k, LookupIterator::OWN);
DCHECK(it.IsFound());
DCHECK_EQ(it.state(), LookupIterator::ACCESSOR);
ASSIGN_RETURN_ON_EXCEPTION_VALUE(isolate, element_k,
Object::GetPropertyWithAccessor(&it),
Nothing<bool>());
if (value->SameValueZero(*element_k)) return Just(true);
if (object->map() != *original_map) {
return IncludesValueSlowPath(isolate, object, value, k + 1, length);
}
} else if (value->SameValueZero(*element_k)) {
return Just(true);
}
}
return Just(false);
}
| 174,097
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void queue_delete(struct snd_seq_queue *q)
{
/* stop and release the timer */
snd_seq_timer_stop(q->timer);
snd_seq_timer_close(q);
/* wait until access free */
snd_use_lock_sync(&q->use_lock);
/* release resources... */
snd_seq_prioq_delete(&q->tickq);
snd_seq_prioq_delete(&q->timeq);
snd_seq_timer_delete(&q->timer);
kfree(q);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix race at timer setup and close
ALSA sequencer code has an open race between the timer setup ioctl and
the close of the client. This was triggered by syzkaller fuzzer, and
a use-after-free was caught there as a result.
This patch papers over it by adding a proper queue->timer_mutex lock
around the timer-related calls in the relevant code path.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
static void queue_delete(struct snd_seq_queue *q)
{
/* stop and release the timer */
mutex_lock(&q->timer_mutex);
snd_seq_timer_stop(q->timer);
snd_seq_timer_close(q);
mutex_unlock(&q->timer_mutex);
/* wait until access free */
snd_use_lock_sync(&q->use_lock);
/* release resources... */
snd_seq_prioq_delete(&q->tickq);
snd_seq_prioq_delete(&q->timeq);
snd_seq_timer_delete(&q->timer);
kfree(q);
}
| 167,409
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void UpdatePropertyCallback(IBusPanelService* panel,
IBusProperty* ibus_prop,
gpointer user_data) {
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->UpdateProperty(ibus_prop);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void UpdatePropertyCallback(IBusPanelService* panel,
void UpdateProperty(IBusPanelService* panel, IBusProperty* ibus_prop) {
VLOG(1) << "UpdateProperty";
DCHECK(ibus_prop);
// You can call
// LOG(INFO) << "\n" << PrintProp(ibus_prop, 0);
// here to dump |ibus_prop|.
ImePropertyList prop_list; // our representation.
if (!FlattenProperty(ibus_prop, &prop_list)) {
// Don't update the UI on errors.
LOG(ERROR) << "Malformed properties are detected";
return;
}
// Notify the change.
if (!prop_list.empty()) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_,
OnUpdateImeProperty(prop_list));
}
}
| 170,551
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CrosMock::SetSpeechSynthesisLibraryExpectations() {
InSequence s;
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, StopSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, Speak(_))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, IsSpeaking())
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(Return(true));
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, StopSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, Speak(_))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, IsSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.WillOnce(Return(false))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void CrosMock::SetSpeechSynthesisLibraryExpectations() {
InSequence s;
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, StopSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, SetSpeakProperties(_))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, Speak(_))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, IsSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, StopSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, SetSpeakProperties(_))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, Speak(_))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, IsSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.WillOnce(Return(false))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
}
| 170,372
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void TearDown() {
delete[] src_;
delete[] ref_;
libvpx_test::ClearSystemState();
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
virtual void TearDown() {
if (!use_high_bit_depth_) {
vpx_free(src_);
delete[] ref_;
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
vpx_free(CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(src_));
delete[] CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(ref_);
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
libvpx_test::ClearSystemState();
}
| 174,591
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int omninet_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial;
struct usb_serial_port *wport;
wport = serial->port[1];
tty_port_tty_set(&wport->port, tty);
return usb_serial_generic_open(tty, port);
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: omninet: fix reference leaks at open
This driver needlessly took another reference to the tty on open, a
reference which was then never released on close. This lead to not just
a leak of the tty, but also a driver reference leak that prevented the
driver from being unloaded after a port had once been opened.
Fixes: 4a90f09b20f4 ("tty: usb-serial krefs")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.28
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-404
|
static int omninet_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
return usb_serial_generic_open(tty, port);
}
| 168,188
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int MDC2_Update(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
size_t i, j;
i = c->num;
if (i != 0) {
if (i + len < MDC2_BLOCK) {
/* partial block */
memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, len);
c->num += (int)len;
return 1;
} else {
/* filled one */
j = MDC2_BLOCK - i;
memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, j);
len -= j;
in += j;
c->num = 0;
mdc2_body(c, &(c->data[0]), MDC2_BLOCK);
}
}
i = len & ~((size_t)MDC2_BLOCK - 1);
if (i > 0)
mdc2_body(c, in, i);
j = len - i;
if (j > 0) {
memcpy(&(c->data[0]), &(in[i]), j);
c->num = (int)j;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
int MDC2_Update(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
size_t i, j;
i = c->num;
if (i != 0) {
if (len < MDC2_BLOCK - i) {
/* partial block */
memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, len);
c->num += (int)len;
return 1;
} else {
/* filled one */
j = MDC2_BLOCK - i;
memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, j);
len -= j;
in += j;
c->num = 0;
mdc2_body(c, &(c->data[0]), MDC2_BLOCK);
}
}
i = len & ~((size_t)MDC2_BLOCK - 1);
if (i > 0)
mdc2_body(c, in, i);
j = len - i;
if (j > 0) {
memcpy(&(c->data[0]), &(in[i]), j);
c->num = (int)j;
}
return 1;
}
| 164,965
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: vpx_codec_err_t Decoder::DecodeFrame(const uint8_t *cxdata, size_t size) {
vpx_codec_err_t res_dec;
InitOnce();
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
res_dec = vpx_codec_decode(&decoder_,
cxdata, static_cast<unsigned int>(size),
NULL, 0));
return res_dec;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
vpx_codec_err_t Decoder::DecodeFrame(const uint8_t *cxdata, size_t size) {
return DecodeFrame(cxdata, size, NULL);
}
vpx_codec_err_t Decoder::DecodeFrame(const uint8_t *cxdata, size_t size,
void *user_priv) {
vpx_codec_err_t res_dec;
InitOnce();
API_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
res_dec = vpx_codec_decode(&decoder_,
cxdata, static_cast<unsigned int>(size),
user_priv, 0));
return res_dec;
}
| 174,534
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void btif_av_event_deep_copy(uint16_t event, char* p_dest, char* p_src) {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
tBTA_AV* av_src = (tBTA_AV*)p_src;
tBTA_AV* av_dest = (tBTA_AV*)p_dest;
maybe_non_aligned_memcpy(av_dest, av_src, sizeof(*av_src));
switch (event) {
case BTA_AV_META_MSG_EVT:
if (av_src->meta_msg.p_data && av_src->meta_msg.len) {
av_dest->meta_msg.p_data = (uint8_t*)osi_calloc(av_src->meta_msg.len);
memcpy(av_dest->meta_msg.p_data, av_src->meta_msg.p_data,
av_src->meta_msg.len);
}
if (av_src->meta_msg.p_msg) {
av_dest->meta_msg.p_msg = (tAVRC_MSG*)osi_calloc(sizeof(tAVRC_MSG));
memcpy(av_dest->meta_msg.p_msg, av_src->meta_msg.p_msg,
sizeof(tAVRC_MSG));
tAVRC_MSG* p_msg_src = av_src->meta_msg.p_msg;
tAVRC_MSG* p_msg_dest = av_dest->meta_msg.p_msg;
if ((p_msg_src->hdr.opcode == AVRC_OP_VENDOR) &&
(p_msg_src->vendor.p_vendor_data && p_msg_src->vendor.vendor_len)) {
p_msg_dest->vendor.p_vendor_data =
(uint8_t*)osi_calloc(p_msg_src->vendor.vendor_len);
memcpy(p_msg_dest->vendor.p_vendor_data,
p_msg_src->vendor.p_vendor_data, p_msg_src->vendor.vendor_len);
}
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE AVRC: Copy browse.p_browse_data in btif_av_event_deep_copy
p_msg_src->browse.p_browse_data is not copied, but used after the
original pointer is freed
Bug: 109699112
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1d014eb9a8911da6913173a9b11218bf1c89e16e
(cherry picked from commit 1d9a58768e6573899c7e80c2b3f52e22f2d8f58b)
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void btif_av_event_deep_copy(uint16_t event, char* p_dest, char* p_src) {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
tBTA_AV* av_src = (tBTA_AV*)p_src;
tBTA_AV* av_dest = (tBTA_AV*)p_dest;
maybe_non_aligned_memcpy(av_dest, av_src, sizeof(*av_src));
switch (event) {
case BTA_AV_META_MSG_EVT:
if (av_src->meta_msg.p_data && av_src->meta_msg.len) {
av_dest->meta_msg.p_data = (uint8_t*)osi_calloc(av_src->meta_msg.len);
memcpy(av_dest->meta_msg.p_data, av_src->meta_msg.p_data,
av_src->meta_msg.len);
}
if (av_src->meta_msg.p_msg) {
av_dest->meta_msg.p_msg = (tAVRC_MSG*)osi_calloc(sizeof(tAVRC_MSG));
memcpy(av_dest->meta_msg.p_msg, av_src->meta_msg.p_msg,
sizeof(tAVRC_MSG));
tAVRC_MSG* p_msg_src = av_src->meta_msg.p_msg;
tAVRC_MSG* p_msg_dest = av_dest->meta_msg.p_msg;
if ((p_msg_src->hdr.opcode == AVRC_OP_VENDOR) &&
(p_msg_src->vendor.p_vendor_data && p_msg_src->vendor.vendor_len)) {
p_msg_dest->vendor.p_vendor_data =
(uint8_t*)osi_calloc(p_msg_src->vendor.vendor_len);
memcpy(p_msg_dest->vendor.p_vendor_data,
p_msg_src->vendor.p_vendor_data, p_msg_src->vendor.vendor_len);
}
if ((p_msg_src->hdr.opcode == AVRC_OP_BROWSE) &&
p_msg_src->browse.p_browse_data && p_msg_src->browse.browse_len) {
p_msg_dest->browse.p_browse_data =
(uint8_t*)osi_calloc(p_msg_src->browse.browse_len);
memcpy(p_msg_dest->browse.p_browse_data,
p_msg_src->browse.p_browse_data, p_msg_src->browse.browse_len);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "109699112");
}
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
| 174,100
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int nbd_negotiate_read(QIOChannel *ioc, void *buffer, size_t size)
{
ssize_t ret;
guint watch;
assert(qemu_in_coroutine());
/* Negotiation are always in main loop. */
watch = qio_channel_add_watch(ioc,
G_IO_IN,
nbd_negotiate_continue,
qemu_coroutine_self(),
NULL);
ret = nbd_read(ioc, buffer, size, NULL);
g_source_remove(watch);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int nbd_negotiate_read(QIOChannel *ioc, void *buffer, size_t size)
| 165,454
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: iasecc_get_serialnr(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_serial_number *serial)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct sc_iin *iin = &card->serialnr.iin;
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned char rbuf[0xC0];
size_t ii, offs;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
if (card->serialnr.len)
goto end;
memset(&card->serialnr, 0, sizeof(card->serialnr));
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xB0, 0x80 | IASECC_SFI_EF_SN, 0);
apdu.le = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Get 'serial number' data failed");
if (rbuf[0] != ISO7812_PAN_SN_TAG)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED, "serial number parse error");
iin->mii = (rbuf[2] >> 4) & 0x0F;
iin->country = 0;
for (ii=5; ii<8; ii++) {
iin->country *= 10;
iin->country += (rbuf[ii/2] >> ((ii & 0x01) ? 0 : 4)) & 0x0F;
}
iin->issuer_id = 0;
for (ii=8; ii<10; ii++) {
iin->issuer_id *= 10;
iin->issuer_id += (rbuf[ii/2] >> (ii & 0x01 ? 0 : 4)) & 0x0F;
}
offs = rbuf[1] > 8 ? rbuf[1] - 8 : 0;
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_SAGEM) {
/* 5A 0A 92 50 00 20 10 10 25 00 01 3F */
/* 00 02 01 01 02 50 00 13 */
for (ii=0; ii < rbuf[1] - offs; ii++)
*(card->serialnr.value + ii) = ((rbuf[ii + offs + 1] & 0x0F) << 4)
+ ((rbuf[ii + offs + 2] & 0xF0) >> 4) ;
card->serialnr.len = ii;
}
else {
for (ii=0; ii < rbuf[1] - offs; ii++)
*(card->serialnr.value + ii) = rbuf[ii + offs + 2];
card->serialnr.len = ii;
}
do {
char txt[0x200];
for (ii=0;ii<card->serialnr.len;ii++)
sprintf(txt + ii*2, "%02X", *(card->serialnr.value + ii));
sc_log(ctx, "serial number '%s'; mii %i; country %i; issuer_id %li", txt, iin->mii, iin->country, iin->issuer_id);
} while(0);
end:
if (serial)
memcpy(serial, &card->serialnr, sizeof(*serial));
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
iasecc_get_serialnr(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_serial_number *serial)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct sc_iin *iin = &card->serialnr.iin;
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned char rbuf[0xC0];
size_t ii, offs;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
if (card->serialnr.len)
goto end;
memset(&card->serialnr, 0, sizeof(card->serialnr));
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xB0, 0x80 | IASECC_SFI_EF_SN, 0);
apdu.le = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Get 'serial number' data failed");
if (rbuf[0] != ISO7812_PAN_SN_TAG)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED, "serial number parse error");
iin->mii = (rbuf[2] >> 4) & 0x0F;
iin->country = 0;
for (ii=5; ii<8; ii++) {
iin->country *= 10;
iin->country += (rbuf[ii/2] >> ((ii & 0x01) ? 0 : 4)) & 0x0F;
}
iin->issuer_id = 0;
for (ii=8; ii<10; ii++) {
iin->issuer_id *= 10;
iin->issuer_id += (rbuf[ii/2] >> (ii & 0x01 ? 0 : 4)) & 0x0F;
}
offs = rbuf[1] > 8 ? rbuf[1] - 8 : 0;
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_SAGEM) {
/* 5A 0A 92 50 00 20 10 10 25 00 01 3F */
/* 00 02 01 01 02 50 00 13 */
for (ii=0; (ii < rbuf[1] - offs) && (ii + offs + 2 < sizeof(rbuf)); ii++)
*(card->serialnr.value + ii) = ((rbuf[ii + offs + 1] & 0x0F) << 4)
+ ((rbuf[ii + offs + 2] & 0xF0) >> 4) ;
card->serialnr.len = ii;
}
else {
for (ii=0; ii < rbuf[1] - offs; ii++)
*(card->serialnr.value + ii) = rbuf[ii + offs + 2];
card->serialnr.len = ii;
}
do {
char txt[0x200];
for (ii=0;ii<card->serialnr.len;ii++)
sprintf(txt + ii*2, "%02X", *(card->serialnr.value + ii));
sc_log(ctx, "serial number '%s'; mii %i; country %i; issuer_id %li", txt, iin->mii, iin->country, iin->issuer_id);
} while(0);
end:
if (serial)
memcpy(serial, &card->serialnr, sizeof(*serial));
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
| 169,057
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void inet6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
/* Release rx options */
skb = xchg(&np->pktoptions, NULL);
if (skb)
kfree_skb(skb);
skb = xchg(&np->rxpmtu, NULL);
if (skb)
kfree_skb(skb);
/* Free flowlabels */
fl6_free_socklist(sk);
/* Free tx options */
opt = xchg(&np->opt, NULL);
if (opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void inet6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
/* Release rx options */
skb = xchg(&np->pktoptions, NULL);
if (skb)
kfree_skb(skb);
skb = xchg(&np->rxpmtu, NULL);
if (skb)
kfree_skb(skb);
/* Free flowlabels */
fl6_free_socklist(sk);
/* Free tx options */
opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&np->opt, NULL);
if (opt) {
atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
txopt_put(opt);
}
}
| 167,327
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int mwifiex_update_vs_ie(const u8 *ies, int ies_len,
struct mwifiex_ie **ie_ptr, u16 mask,
unsigned int oui, u8 oui_type)
{
struct ieee_types_header *vs_ie;
struct mwifiex_ie *ie = *ie_ptr;
const u8 *vendor_ie;
vendor_ie = cfg80211_find_vendor_ie(oui, oui_type, ies, ies_len);
if (vendor_ie) {
if (!*ie_ptr) {
*ie_ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!*ie_ptr)
return -ENOMEM;
ie = *ie_ptr;
}
vs_ie = (struct ieee_types_header *)vendor_ie;
memcpy(ie->ie_buffer + le16_to_cpu(ie->ie_length),
vs_ie, vs_ie->len + 2);
le16_unaligned_add_cpu(&ie->ie_length, vs_ie->len + 2);
ie->mgmt_subtype_mask = cpu_to_le16(mask);
ie->ie_index = cpu_to_le16(MWIFIEX_AUTO_IDX_MASK);
}
*ie_ptr = ie;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mwifiex: Fix three heap overflow at parsing element in cfg80211_ap_settings
mwifiex_update_vs_ie(),mwifiex_set_uap_rates() and
mwifiex_set_wmm_params() call memcpy() without checking
the destination size.Since the source is given from
user-space, this may trigger a heap buffer overflow.
Fix them by putting the length check before performing memcpy().
This fix addresses CVE-2019-14814,CVE-2019-14815,CVE-2019-14816.
Signed-off-by: Wen Huang <huangwenabc@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <gbhat@marvell.comg>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-120
|
static int mwifiex_update_vs_ie(const u8 *ies, int ies_len,
struct mwifiex_ie **ie_ptr, u16 mask,
unsigned int oui, u8 oui_type)
{
struct ieee_types_header *vs_ie;
struct mwifiex_ie *ie = *ie_ptr;
const u8 *vendor_ie;
vendor_ie = cfg80211_find_vendor_ie(oui, oui_type, ies, ies_len);
if (vendor_ie) {
if (!*ie_ptr) {
*ie_ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!*ie_ptr)
return -ENOMEM;
ie = *ie_ptr;
}
vs_ie = (struct ieee_types_header *)vendor_ie;
if (le16_to_cpu(ie->ie_length) + vs_ie->len + 2 >
IEEE_MAX_IE_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(ie->ie_buffer + le16_to_cpu(ie->ie_length),
vs_ie, vs_ie->len + 2);
le16_unaligned_add_cpu(&ie->ie_length, vs_ie->len + 2);
ie->mgmt_subtype_mask = cpu_to_le16(mask);
ie->ie_index = cpu_to_le16(MWIFIEX_AUTO_IDX_MASK);
}
*ie_ptr = ie;
return 0;
}
| 169,575
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: jp2_box_t *jp2_box_get(jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
uint_fast32_t len;
uint_fast64_t extlen;
bool dataflag;
box = 0;
tmpstream = 0;
if (!(box = jas_malloc(sizeof(jp2_box_t)))) {
goto error;
}
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
if (jp2_getuint32(in, &len) || jp2_getuint32(in, &box->type)) {
goto error;
}
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
box->info = boxinfo;
box->ops = &boxinfo->ops;
box->len = len;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, (
"preliminary processing of JP2 box: type=%c%s%c (0x%08x); length=%d\n",
'"', boxinfo->name, '"', box->type, box->len
));
if (box->len == 1) {
if (jp2_getuint64(in, &extlen)) {
goto error;
}
if (extlen > 0xffffffffUL) {
jas_eprintf("warning: cannot handle large 64-bit box length\n");
extlen = 0xffffffffUL;
}
box->len = extlen;
box->datalen = extlen - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(true);
} else {
box->datalen = box->len - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false);
}
if (box->len != 0 && box->len < 8) {
goto error;
}
dataflag = !(box->info->flags & (JP2_BOX_SUPER | JP2_BOX_NODATA));
if (dataflag) {
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(tmpstream, in, box->datalen)) {
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
jas_eprintf("cannot copy box data\n");
goto error;
}
jas_stream_rewind(tmpstream);
if (box->ops->getdata) {
if ((*box->ops->getdata)(box, tmpstream)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot parse box data\n");
goto error;
}
}
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jp2_box_dump(box, stderr);
}
return box;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (tmpstream) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed another problem with incorrect cleanup of JP2 box data upon error.
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
jp2_box_t *jp2_box_get(jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
uint_fast32_t len;
uint_fast64_t extlen;
bool dataflag;
box = 0;
tmpstream = 0;
if (!(box = jas_malloc(sizeof(jp2_box_t)))) {
goto error;
}
// Mark the box data as never having been constructed
// so that we will not errantly attempt to destroy it later.
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
if (jp2_getuint32(in, &len) || jp2_getuint32(in, &box->type)) {
goto error;
}
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
box->info = boxinfo;
box->len = len;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, (
"preliminary processing of JP2 box: type=%c%s%c (0x%08x); length=%d\n",
'"', boxinfo->name, '"', box->type, box->len
));
if (box->len == 1) {
if (jp2_getuint64(in, &extlen)) {
goto error;
}
if (extlen > 0xffffffffUL) {
jas_eprintf("warning: cannot handle large 64-bit box length\n");
extlen = 0xffffffffUL;
}
box->len = extlen;
box->datalen = extlen - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(true);
} else {
box->datalen = box->len - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false);
}
if (box->len != 0 && box->len < 8) {
goto error;
}
dataflag = !(box->info->flags & (JP2_BOX_SUPER | JP2_BOX_NODATA));
if (dataflag) {
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(tmpstream, in, box->datalen)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot copy box data\n");
goto error;
}
jas_stream_rewind(tmpstream);
// From here onwards, the box data will need to be destroyed.
// So, initialize the box operations.
box->ops = &boxinfo->ops;
if (box->ops->getdata) {
if ((*box->ops->getdata)(box, tmpstream)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot parse box data\n");
goto error;
}
}
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jp2_box_dump(box, stderr);
}
return box;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (tmpstream) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return 0;
}
| 168,473
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void UnloadController::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
TabDetachedImpl(contents);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void UnloadController::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
void UnloadController::TabDetachedAt(content::WebContents* contents,
int index) {
TabDetachedImpl(contents);
}
| 171,519
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: INLINE void impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(void* pv_ctxt, UWORD32 u4_no_of_bits)
{
stream_t *ps_stream = (stream_t *)pv_ctxt;
FLUSH_BITS(ps_stream->u4_offset,ps_stream->u4_buf,ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt,u4_no_of_bits,ps_stream->pu4_buf_aligned)
return;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
INLINE void impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(void* pv_ctxt, UWORD32 u4_no_of_bits)
{
stream_t *ps_stream = (stream_t *)pv_ctxt;
if (ps_stream->u4_offset < ps_stream->u4_max_offset)
{
FLUSH_BITS(ps_stream->u4_offset,ps_stream->u4_buf,ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt,u4_no_of_bits,ps_stream->pu4_buf_aligned)
}
return;
}
| 173,941
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ff_h264_free_tables(H264Context *h, int free_rbsp)
{
int i;
H264Context *hx;
av_freep(&h->intra4x4_pred_mode);
av_freep(&h->chroma_pred_mode_table);
av_freep(&h->cbp_table);
av_freep(&h->mvd_table[0]);
av_freep(&h->mvd_table[1]);
av_freep(&h->direct_table);
av_freep(&h->non_zero_count);
av_freep(&h->slice_table_base);
h->slice_table = NULL;
av_freep(&h->list_counts);
av_freep(&h->mb2b_xy);
av_freep(&h->mb2br_xy);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->qscale_table_pool);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->mb_type_pool);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->motion_val_pool);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->ref_index_pool);
if (free_rbsp && h->DPB) {
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++)
ff_h264_unref_picture(h, &h->DPB[i]);
av_freep(&h->DPB);
} else if (h->DPB) {
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++)
h->DPB[i].needs_realloc = 1;
}
h->cur_pic_ptr = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_THREADS; i++) {
hx = h->thread_context[i];
if (!hx)
continue;
av_freep(&hx->top_borders[1]);
av_freep(&hx->top_borders[0]);
av_freep(&hx->bipred_scratchpad);
av_freep(&hx->edge_emu_buffer);
av_freep(&hx->dc_val_base);
av_freep(&hx->er.mb_index2xy);
av_freep(&hx->er.error_status_table);
av_freep(&hx->er.er_temp_buffer);
av_freep(&hx->er.mbintra_table);
av_freep(&hx->er.mbskip_table);
if (free_rbsp) {
av_freep(&hx->rbsp_buffer[1]);
av_freep(&hx->rbsp_buffer[0]);
hx->rbsp_buffer_size[0] = 0;
hx->rbsp_buffer_size[1] = 0;
}
if (i)
av_freep(&h->thread_context[i]);
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: Clear delayed_pic on deallocation
Fixes use of freed memory
Fixes: case5_av_frame_copy_props.mp4
Found-by: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@coredump.cx>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID:
|
void ff_h264_free_tables(H264Context *h, int free_rbsp)
{
int i;
H264Context *hx;
av_freep(&h->intra4x4_pred_mode);
av_freep(&h->chroma_pred_mode_table);
av_freep(&h->cbp_table);
av_freep(&h->mvd_table[0]);
av_freep(&h->mvd_table[1]);
av_freep(&h->direct_table);
av_freep(&h->non_zero_count);
av_freep(&h->slice_table_base);
h->slice_table = NULL;
av_freep(&h->list_counts);
av_freep(&h->mb2b_xy);
av_freep(&h->mb2br_xy);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->qscale_table_pool);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->mb_type_pool);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->motion_val_pool);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->ref_index_pool);
if (free_rbsp && h->DPB) {
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++)
ff_h264_unref_picture(h, &h->DPB[i]);
memset(h->delayed_pic, 0, sizeof(h->delayed_pic));
av_freep(&h->DPB);
} else if (h->DPB) {
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++)
h->DPB[i].needs_realloc = 1;
}
h->cur_pic_ptr = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_THREADS; i++) {
hx = h->thread_context[i];
if (!hx)
continue;
av_freep(&hx->top_borders[1]);
av_freep(&hx->top_borders[0]);
av_freep(&hx->bipred_scratchpad);
av_freep(&hx->edge_emu_buffer);
av_freep(&hx->dc_val_base);
av_freep(&hx->er.mb_index2xy);
av_freep(&hx->er.error_status_table);
av_freep(&hx->er.er_temp_buffer);
av_freep(&hx->er.mbintra_table);
av_freep(&hx->er.mbskip_table);
if (free_rbsp) {
av_freep(&hx->rbsp_buffer[1]);
av_freep(&hx->rbsp_buffer[0]);
hx->rbsp_buffer_size[0] = 0;
hx->rbsp_buffer_size[1] = 0;
}
if (i)
av_freep(&h->thread_context[i]);
}
}
| 166,624
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigateToNewPage(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
bool is_in_page,
bool replace_entry,
NavigationHandleImpl* handle) {
std::unique_ptr<NavigationEntryImpl> new_entry;
bool update_virtual_url = false;
if (is_in_page && GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry = new FrameNavigationEntry(
params.frame_unique_name, params.item_sequence_number,
params.document_sequence_number, rfh->GetSiteInstance(), nullptr,
params.url, params.referrer, params.method, params.post_id);
new_entry = GetLastCommittedEntry()->CloneAndReplace(
frame_entry, true, rfh->frame_tree_node(),
delegate_->GetFrameTree()->root());
CHECK(frame_entry->HasOneRef());
update_virtual_url = new_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url();
}
if (!new_entry &&
PendingEntryMatchesHandle(handle) && pending_entry_index_ == -1 &&
(!pending_entry_->site_instance() ||
pending_entry_->site_instance() == rfh->GetSiteInstance())) {
new_entry = pending_entry_->Clone();
update_virtual_url = new_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url();
new_entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
if (!new_entry) {
new_entry = base::WrapUnique(new NavigationEntryImpl);
GURL url = params.url;
bool needs_update = false;
BrowserURLHandlerImpl::GetInstance()->RewriteURLIfNecessary(
&url, browser_context_, &needs_update);
new_entry->set_update_virtual_url_with_url(needs_update);
update_virtual_url = needs_update;
new_entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
new_entry->set_page_type(params.url_is_unreachable ? PAGE_TYPE_ERROR
: PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
new_entry->SetURL(params.url);
if (update_virtual_url)
UpdateVirtualURLToURL(new_entry.get(), params.url);
new_entry->SetReferrer(params.referrer);
new_entry->SetTransitionType(params.transition);
new_entry->set_site_instance(
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(rfh->GetSiteInstance()));
new_entry->SetOriginalRequestURL(params.original_request_url);
new_entry->SetIsOverridingUserAgent(params.is_overriding_user_agent);
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry =
new_entry->GetFrameEntry(rfh->frame_tree_node());
frame_entry->set_frame_unique_name(params.frame_unique_name);
frame_entry->set_item_sequence_number(params.item_sequence_number);
frame_entry->set_document_sequence_number(params.document_sequence_number);
frame_entry->set_method(params.method);
frame_entry->set_post_id(params.post_id);
if (is_in_page && GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
new_entry->SetTitle(GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetTitle());
new_entry->GetFavicon() = GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetFavicon();
}
DCHECK(!params.history_list_was_cleared || !replace_entry);
if (params.history_list_was_cleared) {
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
entries_.clear();
last_committed_entry_index_ = -1;
}
InsertOrReplaceEntry(std::move(new_entry), replace_entry);
}
Commit Message: Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigateToNewPage(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
bool is_in_page,
bool replace_entry,
NavigationHandleImpl* handle) {
std::unique_ptr<NavigationEntryImpl> new_entry;
bool update_virtual_url = false;
if (is_in_page && GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry = new FrameNavigationEntry(
params.frame_unique_name, params.item_sequence_number,
params.document_sequence_number, rfh->GetSiteInstance(), nullptr,
params.url, params.referrer, params.method, params.post_id);
new_entry = GetLastCommittedEntry()->CloneAndReplace(
frame_entry, true, rfh->frame_tree_node(),
delegate_->GetFrameTree()->root());
CHECK(frame_entry->HasOneRef());
update_virtual_url = new_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url();
MaybeDumpCopiedNonSameOriginEntry("New page navigation", params, is_in_page,
GetLastCommittedEntry());
}
if (!new_entry &&
PendingEntryMatchesHandle(handle) && pending_entry_index_ == -1 &&
(!pending_entry_->site_instance() ||
pending_entry_->site_instance() == rfh->GetSiteInstance())) {
new_entry = pending_entry_->Clone();
update_virtual_url = new_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url();
new_entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
if (!new_entry) {
new_entry = base::WrapUnique(new NavigationEntryImpl);
GURL url = params.url;
bool needs_update = false;
BrowserURLHandlerImpl::GetInstance()->RewriteURLIfNecessary(
&url, browser_context_, &needs_update);
new_entry->set_update_virtual_url_with_url(needs_update);
update_virtual_url = needs_update;
new_entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
new_entry->set_page_type(params.url_is_unreachable ? PAGE_TYPE_ERROR
: PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
new_entry->SetURL(params.url);
if (update_virtual_url)
UpdateVirtualURLToURL(new_entry.get(), params.url);
new_entry->SetReferrer(params.referrer);
new_entry->SetTransitionType(params.transition);
new_entry->set_site_instance(
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(rfh->GetSiteInstance()));
new_entry->SetOriginalRequestURL(params.original_request_url);
new_entry->SetIsOverridingUserAgent(params.is_overriding_user_agent);
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry =
new_entry->GetFrameEntry(rfh->frame_tree_node());
frame_entry->set_frame_unique_name(params.frame_unique_name);
frame_entry->set_item_sequence_number(params.item_sequence_number);
frame_entry->set_document_sequence_number(params.document_sequence_number);
frame_entry->set_method(params.method);
frame_entry->set_post_id(params.post_id);
if (is_in_page && GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
new_entry->SetTitle(GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetTitle());
new_entry->GetFavicon() = GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetFavicon();
}
DCHECK(!params.history_list_was_cleared || !replace_entry);
if (params.history_list_was_cleared) {
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
entries_.clear();
last_committed_entry_index_ = -1;
}
InsertOrReplaceEntry(std::move(new_entry), replace_entry);
}
| 172,411
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: file_check_mem(struct magic_set *ms, unsigned int level)
{
size_t len;
if (level >= ms->c.len) {
len = (ms->c.len += 20) * sizeof(*ms->c.li);
ms->c.li = CAST(struct level_info *, (ms->c.li == NULL) ?
malloc(len) :
realloc(ms->c.li, len));
if (ms->c.li == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, len);
return -1;
}
}
ms->c.li[level].got_match = 0;
#ifdef ENABLE_CONDITIONALS
ms->c.li[level].last_match = 0;
ms->c.li[level].last_cond = COND_NONE;
#endif /* ENABLE_CONDITIONALS */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: PR/454: Fix memory corruption when the continuation level jumps by more than
20 in a single step.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
file_check_mem(struct magic_set *ms, unsigned int level)
{
size_t len;
if (level >= ms->c.len) {
len = (ms->c.len = 20 + level) * sizeof(*ms->c.li);
ms->c.li = CAST(struct level_info *, (ms->c.li == NULL) ?
malloc(len) :
realloc(ms->c.li, len));
if (ms->c.li == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, len);
return -1;
}
}
ms->c.li[level].got_match = 0;
#ifdef ENABLE_CONDITIONALS
ms->c.li[level].last_match = 0;
ms->c.li[level].last_cond = COND_NONE;
#endif /* ENABLE_CONDITIONALS */
return 0;
}
| 167,475
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: print_pixel(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_const_bytep row,
png_uint_32 x)
{
PNG_CONST unsigned int bit_depth = png_get_bit_depth(png_ptr, info_ptr);
switch (png_get_color_type(png_ptr, info_ptr))
{
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY:
printf("GRAY %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 1));
return;
/* The palette case is slightly more difficult - the palette and, if
* present, the tRNS ('transparency', though the values are really
* opacity) data must be read to give the full picture:
*/
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE:
{
PNG_CONST unsigned int index = component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 1);
png_colorp palette = NULL;
int num_palette = 0;
if ((png_get_PLTE(png_ptr, info_ptr, &palette, &num_palette) &
PNG_INFO_PLTE) && num_palette > 0 && palette != NULL)
{
png_bytep trans_alpha = NULL;
int num_trans = 0;
if ((png_get_tRNS(png_ptr, info_ptr, &trans_alpha, &num_trans,
NULL) & PNG_INFO_tRNS) && num_trans > 0 &&
trans_alpha != NULL)
printf("INDEXED %u = %d %d %d %d\n", index,
palette[index].red, palette[index].green,
palette[index].blue,
index < num_trans ? trans_alpha[index] : 255);
else /* no transparency */
printf("INDEXED %u = %d %d %d\n", index,
palette[index].red, palette[index].green,
palette[index].blue);
}
else
printf("INDEXED %u = invalid index\n", index);
}
return;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB:
printf("RGB %u %u %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 3),
component(row, x, 1, bit_depth, 3),
component(row, x, 2, bit_depth, 3));
return;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA:
printf("GRAY+ALPHA %u %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 2),
component(row, x, 1, bit_depth, 2));
return;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA:
printf("RGBA %u %u %u %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 4),
component(row, x, 1, bit_depth, 4),
component(row, x, 2, bit_depth, 4),
component(row, x, 3, bit_depth, 4));
return;
default:
png_error(png_ptr, "pngpixel: invalid color type");
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
print_pixel(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_const_bytep row,
png_uint_32 x)
{
PNG_CONST unsigned int bit_depth = png_get_bit_depth(png_ptr, info_ptr);
switch (png_get_color_type(png_ptr, info_ptr))
{
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY:
printf("GRAY %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 1));
return;
/* The palette case is slightly more difficult - the palette and, if
* present, the tRNS ('transparency', though the values are really
* opacity) data must be read to give the full picture:
*/
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE:
{
PNG_CONST int index = component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 1);
png_colorp palette = NULL;
int num_palette = 0;
if ((png_get_PLTE(png_ptr, info_ptr, &palette, &num_palette) &
PNG_INFO_PLTE) && num_palette > 0 && palette != NULL)
{
png_bytep trans_alpha = NULL;
int num_trans = 0;
if ((png_get_tRNS(png_ptr, info_ptr, &trans_alpha, &num_trans,
NULL) & PNG_INFO_tRNS) && num_trans > 0 &&
trans_alpha != NULL)
printf("INDEXED %u = %d %d %d %d\n", index,
palette[index].red, palette[index].green,
palette[index].blue,
index < num_trans ? trans_alpha[index] : 255);
else /* no transparency */
printf("INDEXED %u = %d %d %d\n", index,
palette[index].red, palette[index].green,
palette[index].blue);
}
else
printf("INDEXED %u = invalid index\n", index);
}
return;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB:
printf("RGB %u %u %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 3),
component(row, x, 1, bit_depth, 3),
component(row, x, 2, bit_depth, 3));
return;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA:
printf("GRAY+ALPHA %u %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 2),
component(row, x, 1, bit_depth, 2));
return;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA:
printf("RGBA %u %u %u %u\n", component(row, x, 0, bit_depth, 4),
component(row, x, 1, bit_depth, 4),
component(row, x, 2, bit_depth, 4),
component(row, x, 3, bit_depth, 4));
return;
default:
png_error(png_ptr, "pngpixel: invalid color type");
}
}
| 173,566
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: on_register_handler(TCMUService1HandlerManager1 *interface,
GDBusMethodInvocation *invocation,
gchar *subtype,
gchar *cfg_desc,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct tcmur_handler *handler;
struct dbus_info *info;
char *bus_name;
bus_name = g_strdup_printf("org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.%s",
subtype);
handler = g_new0(struct tcmur_handler, 1);
handler->subtype = g_strdup(subtype);
handler->cfg_desc = g_strdup(cfg_desc);
handler->open = dbus_handler_open;
handler->close = dbus_handler_close;
handler->handle_cmd = dbus_handler_handle_cmd;
info = g_new0(struct dbus_info, 1);
info->register_invocation = invocation;
info->watcher_id = g_bus_watch_name(G_BUS_TYPE_SYSTEM,
bus_name,
G_BUS_NAME_WATCHER_FLAGS_NONE,
on_handler_appeared,
on_handler_vanished,
handler,
NULL);
g_free(bus_name);
handler->opaque = info;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: only allow dynamic UnregisterHandler for external handlers, thereby fixing DoS
Trying to unregister an internal handler ended up in a SEGFAULT, because
the tcmur_handler->opaque was NULL. Way to reproduce:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:qcow
we use a newly introduced boolean in struct tcmur_handler for keeping
track of external handlers. As suggested by mikechristie adjusting the
public data structure is acceptable.
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
on_register_handler(TCMUService1HandlerManager1 *interface,
GDBusMethodInvocation *invocation,
gchar *subtype,
gchar *cfg_desc,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct tcmur_handler *handler;
struct dbus_info *info;
char *bus_name;
bus_name = g_strdup_printf("org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.%s",
subtype);
handler = g_new0(struct tcmur_handler, 1);
handler->subtype = g_strdup(subtype);
handler->cfg_desc = g_strdup(cfg_desc);
handler->open = dbus_handler_open;
handler->close = dbus_handler_close;
handler->handle_cmd = dbus_handler_handle_cmd;
info = g_new0(struct dbus_info, 1);
handler->opaque = info;
handler->_is_dbus_handler = 1;
info->register_invocation = invocation;
info->watcher_id = g_bus_watch_name(G_BUS_TYPE_SYSTEM,
bus_name,
G_BUS_NAME_WATCHER_FLAGS_NONE,
on_handler_appeared,
on_handler_vanished,
handler,
NULL);
g_free(bus_name);
handler->opaque = info;
return TRUE;
}
| 167,633
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: mldv2_report_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int len)
{
const struct icmp6_hdr *icp = (const struct icmp6_hdr *) bp;
u_int group, nsrcs, ngroups;
u_int i, j;
/* Minimum len is 8 */
if (len < 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," [invalid len %d]", len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(icp->icmp6_data16[1]);
ngroups = EXTRACT_16BITS(&icp->icmp6_data16[1]);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %d group record(s)", ngroups));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 0) {
/* Print the group records */
group = 8;
for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
/* type(1) + auxlen(1) + numsrc(2) + grp(16) */
if (len < group + 20) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," [invalid number of groups]"));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[group + 4], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo," [gaddr %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[group + 4])));
ND_PRINT((ndo," %s", tok2str(mldv2report2str, " [v2-report-#%d]",
bp[group])));
nsrcs = (bp[group + 2] << 8) + bp[group + 3];
/* Check the number of sources and print them */
if (len < group + 20 + (nsrcs * sizeof(struct in6_addr))) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," [invalid number of sources %d]", nsrcs));
return;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %d source(s)", nsrcs));
else {
/* Print the sources */
ND_PRINT((ndo," {"));
for (j = 0; j < nsrcs; j++) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[group + 20 + j * sizeof(struct in6_addr)],
sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo," %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[group + 20 + j * sizeof(struct in6_addr)])));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," }"));
}
/* Next group record */
group += 20 + nsrcs * sizeof(struct in6_addr);
ND_PRINT((ndo,"]"));
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|icmp6]"));
return;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check
Moreover:
Add and use *_tstr[] strings.
Update four tests outputs accordingly.
Fix a space.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
mldv2_report_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int len)
{
const struct icmp6_hdr *icp = (const struct icmp6_hdr *) bp;
u_int group, nsrcs, ngroups;
u_int i, j;
/* Minimum len is 8 */
if (len < 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," [invalid len %d]", len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(icp->icmp6_data16[1]);
ngroups = EXTRACT_16BITS(&icp->icmp6_data16[1]);
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %d group record(s)", ngroups));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 0) {
/* Print the group records */
group = 8;
for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
/* type(1) + auxlen(1) + numsrc(2) + grp(16) */
if (len < group + 20) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," [invalid number of groups]"));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[group + 4], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo," [gaddr %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[group + 4])));
ND_PRINT((ndo," %s", tok2str(mldv2report2str, " [v2-report-#%d]",
bp[group])));
nsrcs = (bp[group + 2] << 8) + bp[group + 3];
/* Check the number of sources and print them */
if (len < group + 20 + (nsrcs * sizeof(struct in6_addr))) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," [invalid number of sources %d]", nsrcs));
return;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %d source(s)", nsrcs));
else {
/* Print the sources */
ND_PRINT((ndo," {"));
for (j = 0; j < nsrcs; j++) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[group + 20 + j * sizeof(struct in6_addr)],
sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo," %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[group + 20 + j * sizeof(struct in6_addr)])));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," }"));
}
/* Next group record */
group += 20 + nsrcs * sizeof(struct in6_addr);
ND_PRINT((ndo,"]"));
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", mldv2_tstr));
return;
}
| 169,827
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ikev2_ke_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct ikev2_ke ke;
const struct ikev2_ke *k;
k = (const struct ikev2_ke *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&ke, ext, sizeof(ke));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), ke.h.critical);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%u group=%s", ntohs(ke.h.len) - 8,
STR_OR_ID(ntohs(ke.ke_group), dh_p_map)));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 8 < ntohs(ke.h.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(k + 1), ntohs(ke.h.len) - 8))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(ke.h.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
ikev2_ke_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct ikev2_ke ke;
const struct ikev2_ke *k;
k = (const struct ikev2_ke *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*k);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&ke, ext, sizeof(ke));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), ke.h.critical);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%u group=%s", ntohs(ke.h.len) - 8,
STR_OR_ID(ntohs(ke.ke_group), dh_p_map)));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 8 < ntohs(ke.h.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(k + 1), ntohs(ke.h.len) - 8))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(ke.h.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,799
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static char* cJSON_strdup( const char* str )
{
size_t len;
char* copy;
len = strlen( str ) + 1;
if ( ! ( copy = (char*) cJSON_malloc( len ) ) )
return 0;
memcpy( copy, str, len );
return copy;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static char* cJSON_strdup( const char* str )
void cJSON_InitHooks(cJSON_Hooks* hooks)
{
if (!hooks) { /* Reset hooks */
cJSON_malloc = malloc;
cJSON_free = free;
return;
}
cJSON_malloc = (hooks->malloc_fn)?hooks->malloc_fn:malloc;
cJSON_free = (hooks->free_fn)?hooks->free_fn:free;
}
| 167,298
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long Segment::ParseNext(
const Cluster* pCurr,
const Cluster*& pResult,
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
assert(pCurr);
assert(!pCurr->EOS());
assert(m_clusters);
pResult = 0;
if (pCurr->m_index >= 0) //loaded (not merely preloaded)
{
assert(m_clusters[pCurr->m_index] == pCurr);
const long next_idx = pCurr->m_index + 1;
if (next_idx < m_clusterCount)
{
pResult = m_clusters[next_idx];
return 0; //success
}
const long result = LoadCluster(pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error or underflow
return result;
if (result > 0) //no more clusters
{
return 1;
}
pResult = GetLast();
return 0; //success
}
assert(m_pos > 0);
long long total, avail;
long status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
pos = pCurr->m_element_start;
if (pCurr->m_element_size >= 0)
pos += pCurr->m_element_size;
else
{
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (id != 0x0F43B675) //weird: not Cluster ID
return -1;
pos += len; //consume ID
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume size field
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size) //TODO: should never happen
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: resolve this
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += size; //consume payload (that is, the current cluster)
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
}
for (;;)
{
const long status = DoParseNext(pResult, pos, len);
if (status <= 1)
return status;
}
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
long Segment::ParseNext(
long long pos = pCurr->m_element_start;
assert(m_size >= 0); // TODO
const long long stop = m_start + m_size; // end of segment
{
long len;
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(result == 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop); // TODO
if (result != 0)
return NULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(id == 0x0F43B675); // Cluster ID
if (id != 0x0F43B675)
return NULL;
pos += len; // consume ID
// Read Size
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(result == 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop); // TODO
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(size > 0); // TODO
// assert((pCurr->m_size <= 0) || (pCurr->m_size == size));
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
assert((pos + size) <= stop); // TODO
// Pos now points to start of payload
pos += size; // consume payload
}
long long off_next = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(result == 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop); // TODO
if (result != 0)
return NULL;
const long long idpos = pos; // pos of next (potential) cluster
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
assert(id > 0); // TODO
pos += len; // consume ID
// Read Size
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(result == 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop); // TODO
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0); // TODO
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
assert((pos + size) <= stop); // TODO
// Pos now points to start of payload
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x0F43B675) { // Cluster ID
const long long off_next_ = idpos - m_start;
long long pos_;
long len_;
const long status = Cluster::HasBlockEntries(this, off_next_, pos_, len_);
assert(status >= 0);
if (status > 0) {
off_next = off_next_;
break;
}
}
pos += size; // consume payload
}
if (off_next <= 0)
return 0;
Cluster** const ii = m_clusters + m_clusterCount;
Cluster** i = ii;
Cluster** const jj = ii + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** j = jj;
while (i < j) {
// INVARIANT:
//[0, i) < pos_next
//[i, j) ?
//[j, jj) > pos_next
Cluster** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
Cluster* const pNext = *k;
assert(pNext);
assert(pNext->m_index < 0);
// const long long pos_ = pNext->m_pos;
// assert(pos_);
// pos = pos_ * ((pos_ < 0) ? -1 : 1);
pos = pNext->GetPosition();
if (pos < off_next)
i = k + 1;
else if (pos > off_next)
j = k;
else
return pNext;
}
assert(i == j);
Cluster* const pNext = Cluster::Create(this, -1, off_next);
assert(pNext);
const ptrdiff_t idx_next = i - m_clusters; // insertion position
PreloadCluster(pNext, idx_next);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(idx_next < m_clusterSize);
assert(m_clusters[idx_next] == pNext);
return pNext;
}
| 174,428
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri = ri->d.ktri;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = ktri->pkey;
unsigned char *ek = NULL;
size_t eklen;
int ret = 0;
CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY);
return 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311
|
static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri = ri->d.ktri;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = ktri->pkey;
unsigned char *ek = NULL;
size_t eklen;
int ret = 0;
size_t fixlen = 0;
CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY);
return 0;
return 0;
}
| 165,137
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ShellWindowFrameView::Layout() {
gfx::Size close_size = close_button_->GetPreferredSize();
int closeButtonOffsetY =
(kCaptionHeight - close_size.height()) / 2;
int closeButtonOffsetX = closeButtonOffsetY;
close_button_->SetBounds(
width() - closeButtonOffsetX - close_size.width(),
closeButtonOffsetY,
close_size.width(),
close_size.height());
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79
|
void ShellWindowFrameView::Layout() {
if (is_frameless_)
return;
gfx::Size close_size = close_button_->GetPreferredSize();
int closeButtonOffsetY =
(kCaptionHeight - close_size.height()) / 2;
int closeButtonOffsetX = closeButtonOffsetY;
close_button_->SetBounds(
width() - closeButtonOffsetX - close_size.width(),
closeButtonOffsetY,
close_size.width(),
close_size.height());
}
| 170,716
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int cx24116_send_diseqc_msg(struct dvb_frontend *fe,
struct dvb_diseqc_master_cmd *d)
{
struct cx24116_state *state = fe->demodulator_priv;
int i, ret;
/* Dump DiSEqC message */
if (debug) {
printk(KERN_INFO "cx24116: %s(", __func__);
for (i = 0 ; i < d->msg_len ;) {
printk(KERN_INFO "0x%02x", d->msg[i]);
if (++i < d->msg_len)
printk(KERN_INFO ", ");
}
printk(") toneburst=%d\n", toneburst);
}
/* Validate length */
if (d->msg_len > (CX24116_ARGLEN - CX24116_DISEQC_MSGOFS))
return -EINVAL;
/* DiSEqC message */
for (i = 0; i < d->msg_len; i++)
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGOFS + i] = d->msg[i];
/* DiSEqC message length */
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN] = d->msg_len;
/* Command length */
state->dsec_cmd.len = CX24116_DISEQC_MSGOFS +
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN];
/* DiSEqC toneburst */
if (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_MESGCACHE)
/* Message is cached */
return 0;
else if (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONEOFF)
/* Message is sent without burst */
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST] = 0;
else if (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONECACHE) {
/*
* Message is sent with derived else cached burst
*
* WRITE PORT GROUP COMMAND 38
*
* 0/A/A: E0 10 38 F0..F3
* 1/B/B: E0 10 38 F4..F7
* 2/C/A: E0 10 38 F8..FB
* 3/D/B: E0 10 38 FC..FF
*
* databyte[3]= 8421:8421
* ABCD:WXYZ
* CLR :SET
*
* WX= PORT SELECT 0..3 (X=TONEBURST)
* Y = VOLTAGE (0=13V, 1=18V)
* Z = BAND (0=LOW, 1=HIGH(22K))
*/
if (d->msg_len >= 4 && d->msg[2] == 0x38)
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST] =
((d->msg[3] & 4) >> 2);
if (debug)
dprintk("%s burst=%d\n", __func__,
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST]);
}
/* Wait for LNB ready */
ret = cx24116_wait_for_lnb(fe);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
/* Wait for voltage/min repeat delay */
msleep(100);
/* Command */
ret = cx24116_cmd_execute(fe, &state->dsec_cmd);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
/*
* Wait for send
*
* Eutelsat spec:
* >15ms delay + (XXX determine if FW does this, see set_tone)
* 13.5ms per byte +
* >15ms delay +
* 12.5ms burst +
* >15ms delay (XXX determine if FW does this, see set_tone)
*/
msleep((state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN] << 4) +
((toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONEOFF) ? 30 : 60));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] cx24116: fix a buffer overflow when checking userspace params
The maximum size for a DiSEqC command is 6, according to the
userspace API. However, the code allows to write up much more values:
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c:983 cx24116_send_diseqc_msg() error: buffer overflow 'd->msg' 6 <= 23
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int cx24116_send_diseqc_msg(struct dvb_frontend *fe,
struct dvb_diseqc_master_cmd *d)
{
struct cx24116_state *state = fe->demodulator_priv;
int i, ret;
/* Validate length */
if (d->msg_len > sizeof(d->msg))
return -EINVAL;
/* Dump DiSEqC message */
if (debug) {
printk(KERN_INFO "cx24116: %s(", __func__);
for (i = 0 ; i < d->msg_len ;) {
printk(KERN_INFO "0x%02x", d->msg[i]);
if (++i < d->msg_len)
printk(KERN_INFO ", ");
}
printk(") toneburst=%d\n", toneburst);
}
/* DiSEqC message */
for (i = 0; i < d->msg_len; i++)
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGOFS + i] = d->msg[i];
/* DiSEqC message length */
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN] = d->msg_len;
/* Command length */
state->dsec_cmd.len = CX24116_DISEQC_MSGOFS +
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN];
/* DiSEqC toneburst */
if (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_MESGCACHE)
/* Message is cached */
return 0;
else if (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONEOFF)
/* Message is sent without burst */
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST] = 0;
else if (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONECACHE) {
/*
* Message is sent with derived else cached burst
*
* WRITE PORT GROUP COMMAND 38
*
* 0/A/A: E0 10 38 F0..F3
* 1/B/B: E0 10 38 F4..F7
* 2/C/A: E0 10 38 F8..FB
* 3/D/B: E0 10 38 FC..FF
*
* databyte[3]= 8421:8421
* ABCD:WXYZ
* CLR :SET
*
* WX= PORT SELECT 0..3 (X=TONEBURST)
* Y = VOLTAGE (0=13V, 1=18V)
* Z = BAND (0=LOW, 1=HIGH(22K))
*/
if (d->msg_len >= 4 && d->msg[2] == 0x38)
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST] =
((d->msg[3] & 4) >> 2);
if (debug)
dprintk("%s burst=%d\n", __func__,
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST]);
}
/* Wait for LNB ready */
ret = cx24116_wait_for_lnb(fe);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
/* Wait for voltage/min repeat delay */
msleep(100);
/* Command */
ret = cx24116_cmd_execute(fe, &state->dsec_cmd);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
/*
* Wait for send
*
* Eutelsat spec:
* >15ms delay + (XXX determine if FW does this, see set_tone)
* 13.5ms per byte +
* >15ms delay +
* 12.5ms burst +
* >15ms delay (XXX determine if FW does this, see set_tone)
*/
msleep((state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN] << 4) +
((toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONEOFF) ? 30 : 60));
return 0;
}
| 169,867
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void markPointer(Visitor* visitor, HeapObjectHeader* header) {
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
const GCInfo* gcInfo = ThreadHeap::gcInfo(header->gcInfoIndex());
if (gcInfo->hasVTable() && !vTableInitialized(header->payload())) {
visitor->markHeaderNoTracing(header);
ASSERT(isUninitializedMemory(header->payload(), header->payloadSize()));
} else {
visitor->markHeader(header, gcInfo->m_trace);
}
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void markPointer(Visitor* visitor, HeapObjectHeader* header) {
header->checkHeader();
const GCInfo* gcInfo = ThreadHeap::gcInfo(header->gcInfoIndex());
if (gcInfo->hasVTable() && !vTableInitialized(header->payload())) {
visitor->markHeaderNoTracing(header);
ASSERT(isUninitializedMemory(header->payload(), header->payloadSize()));
} else {
visitor->markHeader(header, gcInfo->m_trace);
}
}
| 172,712
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool Cues::Find(long long time_ns, const Track* pTrack, const CuePoint*& pCP,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition*& pTP) const {
assert(time_ns >= 0);
assert(pTrack);
#if 0
LoadCuePoint(); //establish invariant
assert(m_cue_points);
assert(m_count > 0);
CuePoint** const ii = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** i = ii;
CuePoint** const jj = ii + m_count + m_preload_count;
CuePoint** j = jj;
pCP = *i;
assert(pCP);
if (time_ns <= pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment))
{
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
while (i < j)
{
CuePoint** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
CuePoint* const pCP = *k;
assert(pCP);
pCP->Load(pReader);
const long long t = pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment);
if (t <= time_ns)
i = k + 1;
else
j = k;
assert(i <= j);
}
assert(i == j);
assert(i <= jj);
assert(i > ii);
pCP = *--i;
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment) <= time_ns);
#else
if (m_cue_points == NULL)
return false;
if (m_count == 0)
return false;
CuePoint** const ii = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** i = ii;
CuePoint** const jj = ii + m_count;
CuePoint** j = jj;
pCP = *i;
assert(pCP);
if (time_ns <= pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment)) {
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
while (i < j) {
CuePoint** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
CuePoint* const pCP = *k;
assert(pCP);
const long long t = pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment);
if (t <= time_ns)
i = k + 1;
else
j = k;
assert(i <= j);
}
assert(i == j);
assert(i <= jj);
assert(i > ii);
pCP = *--i;
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment) <= time_ns);
#endif
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool Cues::Find(long long time_ns, const Track* pTrack, const CuePoint*& pCP,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition*& pTP) const {
if (time_ns < 0 || pTrack == NULL || m_cue_points == NULL || m_count == 0)
return false;
CuePoint** const ii = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** i = ii;
CuePoint** const jj = ii + m_count;
CuePoint** j = jj;
pCP = *i;
if (pCP == NULL)
return false;
if (time_ns <= pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment)) {
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
while (i < j) {
CuePoint** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
if (k >= jj)
return false;
CuePoint* const pCP = *k;
if (pCP == NULL)
return false;
const long long t = pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment);
if (t <= time_ns)
i = k + 1;
else
j = k;
if (i > j)
return false;
}
if (i != j || i > jj || i <= ii)
return false;
pCP = *--i;
if (pCP == NULL || pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment) > time_ns)
return false;
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
| 173,811
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: cmsPipeline* DefaultICCintents(cmsContext ContextID,
cmsUInt32Number nProfiles,
cmsUInt32Number TheIntents[],
cmsHPROFILE hProfiles[],
cmsBool BPC[],
cmsFloat64Number AdaptationStates[],
cmsUInt32Number dwFlags)
{
cmsPipeline* Lut = NULL;
cmsPipeline* Result;
cmsHPROFILE hProfile;
cmsMAT3 m;
cmsVEC3 off;
cmsColorSpaceSignature ColorSpaceIn, ColorSpaceOut, CurrentColorSpace;
cmsProfileClassSignature ClassSig;
cmsUInt32Number i, Intent;
if (nProfiles == 0) return NULL;
Result = cmsPipelineAlloc(ContextID, 0, 0);
if (Result == NULL) return NULL;
CurrentColorSpace = cmsGetColorSpace(hProfiles[0]);
for (i=0; i < nProfiles; i++) {
cmsBool lIsDeviceLink, lIsInput;
hProfile = hProfiles[i];
ClassSig = cmsGetDeviceClass(hProfile);
lIsDeviceLink = (ClassSig == cmsSigLinkClass || ClassSig == cmsSigAbstractClass );
if ((i == 0) && !lIsDeviceLink) {
lIsInput = TRUE;
}
else {
lIsInput = (CurrentColorSpace != cmsSigXYZData) &&
(CurrentColorSpace != cmsSigLabData);
}
Intent = TheIntents[i];
if (lIsInput || lIsDeviceLink) {
ColorSpaceIn = cmsGetColorSpace(hProfile);
ColorSpaceOut = cmsGetPCS(hProfile);
}
else {
ColorSpaceIn = cmsGetPCS(hProfile);
ColorSpaceOut = cmsGetColorSpace(hProfile);
}
if (!ColorSpaceIsCompatible(ColorSpaceIn, CurrentColorSpace)) {
cmsSignalError(ContextID, cmsERROR_COLORSPACE_CHECK, "ColorSpace mismatch");
goto Error;
}
if (lIsDeviceLink || ((ClassSig == cmsSigNamedColorClass) && (nProfiles == 1))) {
Lut = _cmsReadDevicelinkLUT(hProfile, Intent);
if (Lut == NULL) goto Error;
if (ClassSig == cmsSigAbstractClass && i > 0) {
if (!ComputeConversion(i, hProfiles, Intent, BPC[i], AdaptationStates[i], &m, &off)) goto Error;
}
else {
_cmsMAT3identity(&m);
_cmsVEC3init(&off, 0, 0, 0);
}
if (!AddConversion(Result, CurrentColorSpace, ColorSpaceIn, &m, &off)) goto Error;
}
else {
if (lIsInput) {
Lut = _cmsReadInputLUT(hProfile, Intent);
if (Lut == NULL) goto Error;
}
else {
Lut = _cmsReadOutputLUT(hProfile, Intent);
if (Lut == NULL) goto Error;
if (!ComputeConversion(i, hProfiles, Intent, BPC[i], AdaptationStates[i], &m, &off)) goto Error;
if (!AddConversion(Result, CurrentColorSpace, ColorSpaceIn, &m, &off)) goto Error;
}
}
if (!cmsPipelineCat(Result, Lut))
goto Error;
cmsPipelineFree(Lut);
CurrentColorSpace = ColorSpaceOut;
}
return Result;
Error:
cmsPipelineFree(Lut);
if (Result != NULL) cmsPipelineFree(Result);
return NULL;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(dwFlags);
}
Commit Message: Fix a double free on error recovering
CWE ID:
|
cmsPipeline* DefaultICCintents(cmsContext ContextID,
cmsUInt32Number nProfiles,
cmsUInt32Number TheIntents[],
cmsHPROFILE hProfiles[],
cmsBool BPC[],
cmsFloat64Number AdaptationStates[],
cmsUInt32Number dwFlags)
{
cmsPipeline* Lut = NULL;
cmsPipeline* Result;
cmsHPROFILE hProfile;
cmsMAT3 m;
cmsVEC3 off;
cmsColorSpaceSignature ColorSpaceIn, ColorSpaceOut, CurrentColorSpace;
cmsProfileClassSignature ClassSig;
cmsUInt32Number i, Intent;
if (nProfiles == 0) return NULL;
Result = cmsPipelineAlloc(ContextID, 0, 0);
if (Result == NULL) return NULL;
CurrentColorSpace = cmsGetColorSpace(hProfiles[0]);
for (i=0; i < nProfiles; i++) {
cmsBool lIsDeviceLink, lIsInput;
hProfile = hProfiles[i];
ClassSig = cmsGetDeviceClass(hProfile);
lIsDeviceLink = (ClassSig == cmsSigLinkClass || ClassSig == cmsSigAbstractClass );
if ((i == 0) && !lIsDeviceLink) {
lIsInput = TRUE;
}
else {
lIsInput = (CurrentColorSpace != cmsSigXYZData) &&
(CurrentColorSpace != cmsSigLabData);
}
Intent = TheIntents[i];
if (lIsInput || lIsDeviceLink) {
ColorSpaceIn = cmsGetColorSpace(hProfile);
ColorSpaceOut = cmsGetPCS(hProfile);
}
else {
ColorSpaceIn = cmsGetPCS(hProfile);
ColorSpaceOut = cmsGetColorSpace(hProfile);
}
if (!ColorSpaceIsCompatible(ColorSpaceIn, CurrentColorSpace)) {
cmsSignalError(ContextID, cmsERROR_COLORSPACE_CHECK, "ColorSpace mismatch");
goto Error;
}
if (lIsDeviceLink || ((ClassSig == cmsSigNamedColorClass) && (nProfiles == 1))) {
Lut = _cmsReadDevicelinkLUT(hProfile, Intent);
if (Lut == NULL) goto Error;
if (ClassSig == cmsSigAbstractClass && i > 0) {
if (!ComputeConversion(i, hProfiles, Intent, BPC[i], AdaptationStates[i], &m, &off)) goto Error;
}
else {
_cmsMAT3identity(&m);
_cmsVEC3init(&off, 0, 0, 0);
}
if (!AddConversion(Result, CurrentColorSpace, ColorSpaceIn, &m, &off)) goto Error;
}
else {
if (lIsInput) {
Lut = _cmsReadInputLUT(hProfile, Intent);
if (Lut == NULL) goto Error;
}
else {
Lut = _cmsReadOutputLUT(hProfile, Intent);
if (Lut == NULL) goto Error;
if (!ComputeConversion(i, hProfiles, Intent, BPC[i], AdaptationStates[i], &m, &off)) goto Error;
if (!AddConversion(Result, CurrentColorSpace, ColorSpaceIn, &m, &off)) goto Error;
}
}
if (!cmsPipelineCat(Result, Lut))
goto Error;
cmsPipelineFree(Lut);
Lut = NULL;
CurrentColorSpace = ColorSpaceOut;
}
return Result;
Error:
if (Lut != NULL) cmsPipelineFree(Lut);
if (Result != NULL) cmsPipelineFree(Result);
return NULL;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(dwFlags);
}
| 167,592
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ScriptValue WebGLRenderingContextBase::getProgramParameter(
ScriptState* script_state,
WebGLProgram* program,
GLenum pname) {
if (!ValidateWebGLProgramOrShader("getProgramParamter", program)) {
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
GLint value = 0;
switch (pname) {
case GL_DELETE_STATUS:
return WebGLAny(script_state, program->MarkedForDeletion());
case GL_VALIDATE_STATUS:
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program), pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<bool>(value));
case GL_LINK_STATUS:
return WebGLAny(script_state, program->LinkStatus(this));
case GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR:
if (!ExtensionEnabled(kKHRParallelShaderCompileName)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getProgramParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
return WebGLAny(script_state, program->CompletionStatus(this));
case GL_ACTIVE_UNIFORM_BLOCKS:
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_VARYINGS:
if (!IsWebGL2OrHigher()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getProgramParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
FALLTHROUGH;
case GL_ATTACHED_SHADERS:
case GL_ACTIVE_ATTRIBUTES:
case GL_ACTIVE_UNIFORMS:
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program), pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, value);
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER_MODE:
if (!IsWebGL2OrHigher()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getProgramParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program), pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<unsigned>(value));
case GL_ACTIVE_ATOMIC_COUNTER_BUFFERS:
if (context_type_ == Platform::kWebGL2ComputeContextType) {
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program), pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<unsigned>(value));
}
FALLTHROUGH;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getProgramParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
ScriptValue WebGLRenderingContextBase::getProgramParameter(
ScriptState* script_state,
WebGLProgram* program,
GLenum pname) {
if (!ValidateWebGLProgramOrShader("getProgramParamter", program)) {
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
GLint value = 0;
switch (pname) {
case GL_DELETE_STATUS:
return WebGLAny(script_state, program->MarkedForDeletion());
case GL_VALIDATE_STATUS:
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program), pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<bool>(value));
case GL_LINK_STATUS:
return WebGLAny(script_state, program->LinkStatus(this));
case GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR:
if (!ExtensionEnabled(kKHRParallelShaderCompileName)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getProgramParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
bool completed;
if (checkProgramCompletionQueryAvailable(program, &completed)) {
return WebGLAny(script_state, completed);
}
return WebGLAny(script_state, program->CompletionStatus(this));
case GL_ACTIVE_UNIFORM_BLOCKS:
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_VARYINGS:
if (!IsWebGL2OrHigher()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getProgramParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
FALLTHROUGH;
case GL_ATTACHED_SHADERS:
case GL_ACTIVE_ATTRIBUTES:
case GL_ACTIVE_UNIFORMS:
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program), pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, value);
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER_MODE:
if (!IsWebGL2OrHigher()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getProgramParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program), pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<unsigned>(value));
case GL_ACTIVE_ATOMIC_COUNTER_BUFFERS:
if (context_type_ == Platform::kWebGL2ComputeContextType) {
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program), pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<unsigned>(value));
}
FALLTHROUGH;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getProgramParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
}
| 172,536
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompleted(int host_id,
int route_id,
int surface_id,
bool alive,
base::TimeTicks timebase,
base::TimeDelta interval) {
AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompletedForGPU(host_id, route_id,
alive, true /* presented */);
AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompletedForRenderer(surface_id, timebase,
interval);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompleted(int host_id,
int route_id,
int surface_id,
uint64 surface_handle,
bool alive,
base::TimeTicks timebase,
base::TimeDelta interval) {
AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompletedForGPU(host_id, route_id,
alive, surface_handle);
AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompletedForRenderer(surface_id, timebase,
interval);
}
| 171,353
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::ResetFeaturePolicy() {
RenderFrameHostImpl* parent_frame_host = GetParent();
const FeaturePolicy* parent_policy =
parent_frame_host ? parent_frame_host->get_feature_policy() : nullptr;
ParsedFeaturePolicyHeader container_policy =
frame_tree_node()->effective_container_policy();
feature_policy_ = FeaturePolicy::CreateFromParentPolicy(
parent_policy, container_policy, last_committed_origin_);
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
void RenderFrameHostImpl::ResetFeaturePolicy() {
RenderFrameHostImpl* parent_frame_host = GetParent();
const FeaturePolicy* parent_policy =
parent_frame_host ? parent_frame_host->feature_policy() : nullptr;
ParsedFeaturePolicyHeader container_policy =
frame_tree_node()->effective_container_policy();
feature_policy_ = FeaturePolicy::CreateFromParentPolicy(
parent_policy, container_policy, last_committed_origin_);
}
| 171,964
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: JNI_EXPORT jint JNI_OnLoad(JavaVM* vm, void* reserved) {
base::android::InitVM(vm);
if (!content::android::OnJNIOnLoadInit())
return -1;
content::SetContentMainDelegate(new content::ShellMainDelegate());
return JNI_VERSION_1_4;
}
Commit Message: Fix content_shell with network service enabled not loading pages.
This regressed in my earlier cl r528763.
This is a reland of r547221.
Bug: 833612
Change-Id: I4c2649414d42773f2530e1abe5912a04fcd0ed9b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1064702
Reviewed-by: Jay Civelli <jcivelli@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560011}
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
JNI_EXPORT jint JNI_OnLoad(JavaVM* vm, void* reserved) {
base::android::InitVM(vm);
if (!content::android::OnJNIOnLoadInit())
return -1;
content::SetContentMainDelegate(new content::ShellMainDelegate(true));
return JNI_VERSION_1_4;
}
| 172,119
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int ext4_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
loff_t pos, unsigned len, unsigned flags,
struct page **pagep, void **fsdata)
{
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
int ret, needed_blocks;
handle_t *handle;
int retries = 0;
struct page *page;
pgoff_t index;
unsigned from, to;
trace_ext4_write_begin(inode, pos, len, flags);
/*
* Reserve one block more for addition to orphan list in case
* we allocate blocks but write fails for some reason
*/
needed_blocks = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode) + 1;
index = pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
from = pos & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
to = from + len;
retry:
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, needed_blocks);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto out;
}
/* We cannot recurse into the filesystem as the transaction is already
* started */
flags |= AOP_FLAG_NOFS;
page = grab_cache_page_write_begin(mapping, index, flags);
if (!page) {
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
*pagep = page;
ret = block_write_begin(file, mapping, pos, len, flags, pagep, fsdata,
ext4_get_block);
if (!ret && ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
ret = walk_page_buffers(handle, page_buffers(page),
from, to, NULL, do_journal_get_write_access);
}
if (ret) {
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
/*
* block_write_begin may have instantiated a few blocks
* outside i_size. Trim these off again. Don't need
* i_size_read because we hold i_mutex.
*
* Add inode to orphan list in case we crash before
* truncate finishes
*/
if (pos + len > inode->i_size && ext4_can_truncate(inode))
ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (pos + len > inode->i_size) {
ext4_truncate_failed_write(inode);
/*
* If truncate failed early the inode might
* still be on the orphan list; we need to
* make sure the inode is removed from the
* orphan list in that case.
*/
if (inode->i_nlink)
ext4_orphan_del(NULL, inode);
}
}
if (ret == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries))
goto retry;
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
|
static int ext4_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
loff_t pos, unsigned len, unsigned flags,
struct page **pagep, void **fsdata)
{
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
int ret, needed_blocks;
handle_t *handle;
int retries = 0;
struct page *page;
pgoff_t index;
unsigned from, to;
trace_ext4_write_begin(inode, pos, len, flags);
/*
* Reserve one block more for addition to orphan list in case
* we allocate blocks but write fails for some reason
*/
needed_blocks = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode) + 1;
index = pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
from = pos & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
to = from + len;
retry:
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, needed_blocks);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto out;
}
/* We cannot recurse into the filesystem as the transaction is already
* started */
flags |= AOP_FLAG_NOFS;
page = grab_cache_page_write_begin(mapping, index, flags);
if (!page) {
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
*pagep = page;
if (ext4_should_dioread_nolock(inode))
ret = block_write_begin(file, mapping, pos, len, flags, pagep,
fsdata, ext4_get_block_write);
else
ret = block_write_begin(file, mapping, pos, len, flags, pagep,
fsdata, ext4_get_block);
if (!ret && ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
ret = walk_page_buffers(handle, page_buffers(page),
from, to, NULL, do_journal_get_write_access);
}
if (ret) {
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
/*
* block_write_begin may have instantiated a few blocks
* outside i_size. Trim these off again. Don't need
* i_size_read because we hold i_mutex.
*
* Add inode to orphan list in case we crash before
* truncate finishes
*/
if (pos + len > inode->i_size && ext4_can_truncate(inode))
ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (pos + len > inode->i_size) {
ext4_truncate_failed_write(inode);
/*
* If truncate failed early the inode might
* still be on the orphan list; we need to
* make sure the inode is removed from the
* orphan list in that case.
*/
if (inode->i_nlink)
ext4_orphan_del(NULL, inode);
}
}
if (ret == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries))
goto retry;
out:
return ret;
}
| 167,548
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SProcXIBarrierReleasePointer(ClientPtr client)
{
xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo *info;
REQUEST(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq);
int i;
swaps(&stuff->length);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq);
swapl(&stuff->num_barriers);
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq, stuff->num_barriers * sizeof(xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo));
info = (xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo*) &stuff[1];
swapl(&info->barrier);
swapl(&info->eventid);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
SProcXIBarrierReleasePointer(ClientPtr client)
{
xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo *info;
REQUEST(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq);
int i;
swaps(&stuff->length);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq);
swapl(&stuff->num_barriers);
if (stuff->num_barriers > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo))
return BadLength;
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq, stuff->num_barriers * sizeof(xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo));
info = (xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo*) &stuff[1];
swapl(&info->barrier);
swapl(&info->eventid);
}
| 165,445
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: php_stream *php_stream_zip_open(char *filename, char *path, char *mode STREAMS_DC TSRMLS_DC)
{
struct zip_file *zf = NULL;
int err = 0;
php_stream *stream = NULL;
struct php_zip_stream_data_t *self;
struct zip *stream_za;
if (strncmp(mode,"r", strlen("r")) != 0) {
return NULL;
}
if (filename) {
if (ZIP_OPENBASEDIR_CHECKPATH(filename)) {
return NULL;
}
/* duplicate to make the stream za independent (esp. for MSHUTDOWN) */
stream_za = zip_open(filename, ZIP_CREATE, &err);
if (!stream_za) {
return NULL;
}
zf = zip_fopen(stream_za, path, 0);
if (zf) {
self = emalloc(sizeof(*self));
self->za = stream_za;
self->zf = zf;
self->stream = NULL;
self->cursor = 0;
stream = php_stream_alloc(&php_stream_zipio_ops, self, NULL, mode);
stream->orig_path = estrdup(path);
} else {
zip_close(stream_za);
}
}
if (!stream) {
return NULL;
} else {
return stream;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
php_stream *php_stream_zip_open(char *filename, char *path, char *mode STREAMS_DC TSRMLS_DC)
{
struct zip_file *zf = NULL;
int err = 0;
php_stream *stream = NULL;
struct php_zip_stream_data_t *self;
struct zip *stream_za;
if (strncmp(mode,"r", strlen("r")) != 0) {
return NULL;
}
if (filename) {
if (ZIP_OPENBASEDIR_CHECKPATH(filename)) {
return NULL;
}
/* duplicate to make the stream za independent (esp. for MSHUTDOWN) */
stream_za = zip_open(filename, ZIP_CREATE, &err);
if (!stream_za) {
return NULL;
}
zf = zip_fopen(stream_za, path, 0);
if (zf) {
self = emalloc(sizeof(*self));
self->za = stream_za;
self->zf = zf;
self->stream = NULL;
self->cursor = 0;
stream = php_stream_alloc(&php_stream_zipio_ops, self, NULL, mode);
stream->orig_path = estrdup(path);
} else {
zip_close(stream_za);
}
}
if (!stream) {
return NULL;
} else {
return stream;
}
}
| 164,968
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintPreview(const base::DictionaryValue& settings) {
print_preview_context_.OnPrintPreview();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("PrintPreview.PreviewEvent",
PREVIEW_EVENT_REQUESTED, PREVIEW_EVENT_MAX);
if (!print_preview_context_.source_frame()) {
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PREVIEW);
return;
}
if (!UpdatePrintSettings(print_preview_context_.source_frame(),
print_preview_context_.source_node(), settings)) {
if (print_preview_context_.last_error() != PREVIEW_ERROR_BAD_SETTING) {
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewInvalidPrinterSettings(
routing_id(), print_pages_params_
? print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie
: 0));
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = false; // Already sent.
}
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PREVIEW);
return;
}
if (print_pages_params_->params.is_first_request &&
!print_preview_context_.IsModifiable()) {
PrintHostMsg_SetOptionsFromDocument_Params options;
if (SetOptionsFromPdfDocument(&options))
Send(new PrintHostMsg_SetOptionsFromDocument(routing_id(), options));
}
is_print_ready_metafile_sent_ = false;
print_pages_params_->params.supports_alpha_blend = true;
bool generate_draft_pages = false;
if (!settings.GetBoolean(kSettingGenerateDraftData, &generate_draft_pages)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
print_preview_context_.set_generate_draft_pages(generate_draft_pages);
PrepareFrameForPreviewDocument();
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID:
|
void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintPreview(const base::DictionaryValue& settings) {
CHECK_LE(ipc_nesting_level_, 1);
print_preview_context_.OnPrintPreview();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("PrintPreview.PreviewEvent",
PREVIEW_EVENT_REQUESTED, PREVIEW_EVENT_MAX);
if (!print_preview_context_.source_frame()) {
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PREVIEW);
return;
}
if (!UpdatePrintSettings(print_preview_context_.source_frame(),
print_preview_context_.source_node(), settings)) {
if (print_preview_context_.last_error() != PREVIEW_ERROR_BAD_SETTING) {
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewInvalidPrinterSettings(
routing_id(), print_pages_params_
? print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie
: 0));
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = false; // Already sent.
}
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PREVIEW);
return;
}
if (print_pages_params_->params.is_first_request &&
!print_preview_context_.IsModifiable()) {
PrintHostMsg_SetOptionsFromDocument_Params options;
if (SetOptionsFromPdfDocument(&options))
Send(new PrintHostMsg_SetOptionsFromDocument(routing_id(), options));
}
is_print_ready_metafile_sent_ = false;
print_pages_params_->params.supports_alpha_blend = true;
bool generate_draft_pages = false;
if (!settings.GetBoolean(kSettingGenerateDraftData, &generate_draft_pages)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
print_preview_context_.set_generate_draft_pages(generate_draft_pages);
PrepareFrameForPreviewDocument();
}
| 171,876
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int vorbis_finish_frame(stb_vorbis *f, int len, int left, int right)
{
int prev,i,j;
if (f->previous_length) {
int i,j, n = f->previous_length;
float *w = get_window(f, n);
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i) {
for (j=0; j < n; ++j)
f->channel_buffers[i][left+j] =
f->channel_buffers[i][left+j]*w[ j] +
f->previous_window[i][ j]*w[n-1-j];
}
}
prev = f->previous_length;
f->previous_length = len - right;
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i)
for (j=0; right+j < len; ++j)
f->previous_window[i][j] = f->channel_buffers[i][right+j];
if (!prev)
return 0;
if (len < right) right = len;
f->samples_output += right-left;
return right - left;
}
Commit Message: Fix seven bugs discovered and fixed by ForAllSecure:
CVE-2019-13217: heap buffer overflow in start_decoder()
CVE-2019-13218: stack buffer overflow in compute_codewords()
CVE-2019-13219: uninitialized memory in vorbis_decode_packet_rest()
CVE-2019-13220: out-of-range read in draw_line()
CVE-2019-13221: issue with large 1D codebooks in lookup1_values()
CVE-2019-13222: unchecked NULL returned by get_window()
CVE-2019-13223: division by zero in predict_point()
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int vorbis_finish_frame(stb_vorbis *f, int len, int left, int right)
{
int prev,i,j;
if (f->previous_length) {
int i,j, n = f->previous_length;
float *w = get_window(f, n);
if (w == NULL) return 0;
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i) {
for (j=0; j < n; ++j)
f->channel_buffers[i][left+j] =
f->channel_buffers[i][left+j]*w[ j] +
f->previous_window[i][ j]*w[n-1-j];
}
}
prev = f->previous_length;
f->previous_length = len - right;
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i)
for (j=0; right+j < len; ++j)
f->previous_window[i][j] = f->channel_buffers[i][right+j];
if (!prev)
return 0;
if (len < right) right = len;
f->samples_output += right-left;
return right - left;
}
| 169,618
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnRegisterAgentError(
const ConnectErrorCallback& error_callback,
const std::string& error_name,
const std::string& error_message) {
if (--num_connecting_calls_ == 0)
adapter_->NotifyDeviceChanged(this);
DCHECK(num_connecting_calls_ >= 0);
LOG(WARNING) << object_path_.value() << ": Failed to register agent: "
<< error_name << ": " << error_message;
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": " << num_connecting_calls_
<< " still in progress";
UnregisterAgent();
ConnectErrorCode error_code = ERROR_UNKNOWN;
if (error_name == bluetooth_agent_manager::kErrorAlreadyExists)
error_code = ERROR_INPROGRESS;
RecordPairingResult(error_code);
error_callback.Run(error_code);
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnRegisterAgentError(
| 171,230
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CtcpHandler::handleAction(CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m) {
Q_UNUSED(ctcptype)
emit displayMsg(Message::Action, typeByTarget(target), target, param, prefix);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void CtcpHandler::handleAction(CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m) {
void CtcpHandler::handleAction(CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m, QString &/*reply*/) {
Q_UNUSED(ctcptype)
emit displayMsg(Message::Action, typeByTarget(target), target, param, prefix);
}
| 164,877
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void fanout_release(struct sock *sk)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct packet_fanout *f;
f = po->fanout;
if (!f)
return;
mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex);
po->fanout = NULL;
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&f->sk_ref)) {
list_del(&f->list);
dev_remove_pack(&f->prot_hook);
fanout_release_data(f);
kfree(f);
}
mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex);
if (po->rollover)
kfree_rcu(po->rollover, rcu);
}
Commit Message: packet: fix races in fanout_add()
Multiple threads can call fanout_add() at the same time.
We need to grab fanout_mutex earlier to avoid races that could
lead to one thread freeing po->rollover that was set by another thread.
Do the same in fanout_release(), for peace of mind, and to help us
finding lockdep issues earlier.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Fixes: 0648ab70afe6 ("packet: rollover prepare: per-socket state")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
static void fanout_release(struct sock *sk)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct packet_fanout *f;
mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex);
f = po->fanout;
if (f) {
po->fanout = NULL;
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&f->sk_ref)) {
list_del(&f->list);
dev_remove_pack(&f->prot_hook);
fanout_release_data(f);
kfree(f);
}
if (po->rollover)
kfree_rcu(po->rollover, rcu);
}
mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex);
}
| 168,347
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::FlipVertically(
uint8* framebuffer,
unsigned int width,
unsigned int height) {
uint8* scanline = scanline_.get();
if (!scanline)
return;
unsigned int row_bytes = width * 4;
unsigned int count = height / 2;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
uint8* row_a = framebuffer + i * row_bytes;
uint8* row_b = framebuffer + (height - i - 1) * row_bytes;
memcpy(scanline, row_b, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_b, row_a, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_a, scanline, row_bytes);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix mismanagement in handling of temporary scanline for vertical flip.
BUG=116637
TEST=manual test from bug report with ASAN
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9617038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125301 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::FlipVertically(
uint8* framebuffer,
unsigned int width,
unsigned int height) {
if (width == 0)
return;
scanline_.resize(width * 4);
uint8* scanline = &scanline_[0];
unsigned int row_bytes = width * 4;
unsigned int count = height / 2;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
uint8* row_a = framebuffer + i * row_bytes;
uint8* row_b = framebuffer + (height - i - 1) * row_bytes;
memcpy(scanline, row_b, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_b, row_a, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_a, scanline, row_bytes);
}
}
| 171,063
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: aiff_read_chanmap (SF_PRIVATE * psf, unsigned dword)
{ const AIFF_CAF_CHANNEL_MAP * map_info ;
unsigned channel_bitmap, channel_decriptions, bytesread ;
int layout_tag ;
bytesread = psf_binheader_readf (psf, "444", &layout_tag, &channel_bitmap, &channel_decriptions) ;
if ((map_info = aiff_caf_of_channel_layout_tag (layout_tag)) == NULL)
return 0 ;
psf_log_printf (psf, " Tag : %x\n", layout_tag) ;
if (map_info)
psf_log_printf (psf, " Layout : %s\n", map_info->name) ;
if (bytesread < dword)
psf_binheader_readf (psf, "j", dword - bytesread) ;
if (map_info->channel_map != NULL)
{ size_t chanmap_size = psf->sf.channels * sizeof (psf->channel_map [0]) ;
free (psf->channel_map) ;
if ((psf->channel_map = malloc (chanmap_size)) == NULL)
return SFE_MALLOC_FAILED ;
memcpy (psf->channel_map, map_info->channel_map, chanmap_size) ;
} ;
return 0 ;
} /* aiff_read_chanmap */
Commit Message: src/aiff.c: Fix a buffer read overflow
Secunia Advisory SA76717.
Found by: Laurent Delosieres, Secunia Research at Flexera Software
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
aiff_read_chanmap (SF_PRIVATE * psf, unsigned dword)
{ const AIFF_CAF_CHANNEL_MAP * map_info ;
unsigned channel_bitmap, channel_decriptions, bytesread ;
int layout_tag ;
bytesread = psf_binheader_readf (psf, "444", &layout_tag, &channel_bitmap, &channel_decriptions) ;
if ((map_info = aiff_caf_of_channel_layout_tag (layout_tag)) == NULL)
return 0 ;
psf_log_printf (psf, " Tag : %x\n", layout_tag) ;
if (map_info)
psf_log_printf (psf, " Layout : %s\n", map_info->name) ;
if (bytesread < dword)
psf_binheader_readf (psf, "j", dword - bytesread) ;
if (map_info->channel_map != NULL)
{ size_t chanmap_size = SF_MIN (psf->sf.channels, layout_tag & 0xffff) * sizeof (psf->channel_map [0]) ;
free (psf->channel_map) ;
if ((psf->channel_map = malloc (chanmap_size)) == NULL)
return SFE_MALLOC_FAILED ;
memcpy (psf->channel_map, map_info->channel_map, chanmap_size) ;
} ;
return 0 ;
} /* aiff_read_chanmap */
| 168,312
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: store_current_palette(png_store *ps, int *npalette)
{
/* This is an internal error (the call has been made outside a read
* operation.)
*/
if (ps->current == NULL)
store_log(ps, ps->pread, "no current stream for palette", 1);
/* The result may be null if there is no palette. */
*npalette = ps->current->npalette;
return ps->current->palette;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
store_current_palette(png_store *ps, int *npalette)
{
/* This is an internal error (the call has been made outside a read
* operation.)
*/
if (ps->current == NULL)
{
store_log(ps, ps->pread, "no current stream for palette", 1);
return NULL;
}
/* The result may be null if there is no palette. */
*npalette = ps->current->npalette;
return ps->current->palette;
}
| 173,703
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void usage_exit() {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <codec> <width> <height> <infile> <outfile>\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void usage_exit() {
void usage_exit(void) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <codec> <width> <height> <infile> <outfile>\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
| 174,486
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::AcceptAuthRequest(
ResourceLoader* loader,
net::AuthChallengeInfo* auth_info) {
if (delegate_ && !delegate_->AcceptAuthRequest(loader->request(), auth_info))
return false;
if (!auth_info->is_proxy) {
HttpAuthResourceType resource_type =
HttpAuthResourceTypeOf(loader->request());
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.HttpAuthResource",
resource_type,
HTTP_AUTH_RESOURCE_LAST);
if (resource_type == HTTP_AUTH_RESOURCE_BLOCKED_CROSS)
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert cross-origin auth prompt blocking.
BUG=174129
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12183030
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181113 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
bool ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::AcceptAuthRequest(
ResourceLoader* loader,
net::AuthChallengeInfo* auth_info) {
if (delegate_ && !delegate_->AcceptAuthRequest(loader->request(), auth_info))
return false;
if (!auth_info->is_proxy) {
HttpAuthResourceType resource_type =
HttpAuthResourceTypeOf(loader->request());
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.HttpAuthResource",
resource_type,
HTTP_AUTH_RESOURCE_LAST);
// TODO(tsepez): Return false on HTTP_AUTH_RESOURCE_BLOCKED_CROSS.
// The code once did this, but was changed due to http://crbug.com/174129.
// http://crbug.com/174179 has been filed to track this issue.
}
return true;
}
| 171,439
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void RemoveICCProfileFromResourceBlock(StringInfo *bim_profile)
{
register const unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*datum;
unsigned int
count,
long_sans;
unsigned short
id,
short_sans;
length=GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile);
if (length < 16)
return;
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(bim_profile);
for (p=datum; (p >= datum) && (p < (datum+length-16)); )
{
register unsigned char
*q;
q=(unsigned char *) p;
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) p,"8BIM",4) != 0)
break;
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&long_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&id);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&count);
if (id == 0x0000040f)
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,q+PSDQuantum(count)+12,length-
(PSDQuantum(count)+12)-(q-datum));
SetStringInfoLength(bim_profile,length-(PSDQuantum(count)+12));
break;
}
p+=count;
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
p++;
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/148
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
static void RemoveICCProfileFromResourceBlock(StringInfo *bim_profile)
{
register const unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*datum;
unsigned int
count,
long_sans;
unsigned short
id,
short_sans;
length=GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile);
if (length < 16)
return;
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(bim_profile);
for (p=datum; (p >= datum) && (p < (datum+length-16)); )
{
register unsigned char
*q;
q=(unsigned char *) p;
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) p,"8BIM",4) != 0)
break;
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&long_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&id);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&count);
if (id == 0x0000040f)
{
if ((q+PSDQuantum(count)+12) < (datum+length-16))
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,q+PSDQuantum(count)+12,length-
(PSDQuantum(count)+12)-(q-datum));
SetStringInfoLength(bim_profile,length-(PSDQuantum(count)+12));
}
break;
}
p+=count;
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
p++;
}
}
| 168,789
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: atol8(const char *p, size_t char_cnt)
{
int64_t l;
int digit;
l = 0;
while (char_cnt-- > 0) {
if (*p >= '0' && *p <= '7')
digit = *p - '0';
else
break;
p++;
l <<= 3;
l |= digit;
}
return (l);
}
Commit Message: Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
atol8(const char *p, size_t char_cnt)
{
int64_t l;
int digit;
if (char_cnt == 0)
return (0);
l = 0;
while (char_cnt-- > 0) {
if (*p >= '0' && *p <= '7')
digit = *p - '0';
else
break;
p++;
l <<= 3;
l |= digit;
}
return (l);
}
| 167,768
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int cms_copy_content(BIO *out, BIO *in, unsigned int flags)
{
unsigned char buf[4096];
int r = 0, i;
BIO *tmpout = NULL;
if (out == NULL)
tmpout = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
else if (flags & CMS_TEXT)
{
tmpout = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
BIO_set_mem_eof_return(tmpout, 0);
}
else
tmpout = out;
if(!tmpout)
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Read all content through chain to process digest, decrypt etc */
for (;;)
{
i=BIO_read(in,buf,sizeof(buf));
if (i <= 0)
{
if (BIO_method_type(in) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER)
{
if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(in))
goto err;
}
if (i < 0)
goto err;
break;
}
if (tmpout && (BIO_write(tmpout, buf, i) != i))
goto err;
}
if(flags & CMS_TEXT)
{
if(!SMIME_text(tmpout, out))
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT,CMS_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
r = 1;
err:
if (tmpout && (tmpout != out))
BIO_free(tmpout);
return r;
}
Commit Message: Canonicalise input in CMS_verify.
If content is detached and not binary mode translate the input to
CRLF format. Before this change the input was verified verbatim
which lead to a discrepancy between sign and verify.
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static int cms_copy_content(BIO *out, BIO *in, unsigned int flags)
static BIO *cms_get_text_bio(BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
{
BIO *rbio;
if (out == NULL)
rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
else if (flags & CMS_TEXT)
{
rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
BIO_set_mem_eof_return(rbio, 0);
}
else
rbio = out;
return rbio;
}
static int cms_copy_content(BIO *out, BIO *in, unsigned int flags)
{
unsigned char buf[4096];
int r = 0, i;
BIO *tmpout;
tmpout = cms_get_text_bio(out, flags);
if(!tmpout)
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Read all content through chain to process digest, decrypt etc */
for (;;)
{
i=BIO_read(in,buf,sizeof(buf));
if (i <= 0)
{
if (BIO_method_type(in) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER)
{
if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(in))
goto err;
}
if (i < 0)
goto err;
break;
}
if (tmpout && (BIO_write(tmpout, buf, i) != i))
goto err;
}
if(flags & CMS_TEXT)
{
if(!SMIME_text(tmpout, out))
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT,CMS_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
r = 1;
err:
if (tmpout && (tmpout != out))
BIO_free(tmpout);
return r;
}
| 166,689
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bmexec_trans (kwset_t kwset, char const *text, size_t size)
{
unsigned char const *d1;
char const *ep, *sp, *tp;
int d;
int len = kwset->mind;
char const *trans = kwset->trans;
if (len == 0)
return 0;
if (len > size)
return -1;
if (len == 1)
{
tp = memchr_kwset (text, size, kwset);
return tp ? tp - text : -1;
}
d1 = kwset->delta;
sp = kwset->target + len;
tp = text + len;
char gc1 = kwset->gc1;
char gc2 = kwset->gc2;
/* Significance of 12: 1 (initial offset) + 10 (skip loop) + 1 (md2). */
if (size > 12 * len)
/* 11 is not a bug, the initial offset happens only once. */
for (ep = text + size - 11 * len; tp <= ep; )
{
char const *tp0 = tp;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
if (d != 0)
{
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
if (d != 0)
{
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
if (d != 0)
{
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
/* As a heuristic, prefer memchr to seeking by
delta1 when the latter doesn't advance much. */
int advance_heuristic = 16 * sizeof (long);
if (advance_heuristic <= tp - tp0)
goto big_advance;
tp--;
tp = memchr_kwset (tp, text + size - tp, kwset);
if (! tp)
return -1;
tp++;
}
}
}
big_advance:;
}
/* Now we have only a few characters left to search. We
carefully avoid ever producing an out-of-bounds pointer. */
ep = text + size;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])];
while (d <= ep - tp)
{
d = d1[U((tp += d)[-1])];
if (d != 0)
continue;
if (bm_delta2_search (&tp, ep, sp, len, trans, gc1, gc2, NULL, kwset))
return tp - text;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bmexec_trans (kwset_t kwset, char const *text, size_t size)
{
unsigned char const *d1;
char const *ep, *sp, *tp;
int d;
int len = kwset->mind;
char const *trans = kwset->trans;
if (len == 0)
return 0;
if (len > size)
return -1;
if (len == 1)
{
tp = memchr_kwset (text, size, kwset);
return tp ? tp - text : -1;
}
d1 = kwset->delta;
sp = kwset->target + len;
tp = text + len;
char gc1 = kwset->gc1;
char gc2 = kwset->gc2;
/* Significance of 12: 1 (initial offset) + 10 (skip loop) + 1 (md2). */
if (size > 12 * len)
/* 11 is not a bug, the initial offset happens only once. */
for (ep = text + size - 11 * len; tp <= ep; )
{
char const *tp0 = tp;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
if (d != 0)
{
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
if (d != 0)
{
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
if (d != 0)
{
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])], tp += d;
/* As a heuristic, prefer memchr to seeking by
delta1 when the latter doesn't advance much. */
int advance_heuristic = 16 * sizeof (long);
if (advance_heuristic <= tp - tp0)
goto big_advance;
tp--;
tp = memchr_kwset (tp, text + size - tp, kwset);
if (! tp)
return -1;
tp++;
if (ep <= tp)
break;
}
}
}
big_advance:;
}
/* Now we have only a few characters left to search. We
carefully avoid ever producing an out-of-bounds pointer. */
ep = text + size;
d = d1[U(tp[-1])];
while (d <= ep - tp)
{
d = d1[U((tp += d)[-1])];
if (d != 0)
continue;
if (bm_delta2_search (&tp, ep, sp, len, trans, gc1, gc2, NULL, kwset))
return tp - text;
}
return -1;
}
| 164,771
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void buffer_slow_realign(struct buffer *buf)
{
/* two possible cases :
* - the buffer is in one contiguous block, we move it in-place
* - the buffer is in two blocks, we move it via the swap_buffer
*/
if (buf->i) {
int block1 = buf->i;
int block2 = 0;
if (buf->p + buf->i > buf->data + buf->size) {
/* non-contiguous block */
block1 = buf->data + buf->size - buf->p;
block2 = buf->p + buf->i - (buf->data + buf->size);
}
if (block2)
memcpy(swap_buffer, buf->data, block2);
memmove(buf->data, buf->p, block1);
if (block2)
memcpy(buf->data + block1, swap_buffer, block2);
}
buf->p = buf->data;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void buffer_slow_realign(struct buffer *buf)
{
int block1 = buf->o;
int block2 = 0;
/* process output data in two steps to cover wrapping */
if (block1 > buf->p - buf->data) {
block2 = buf->p - buf->data;
block1 -= block2;
}
memcpy(swap_buffer + buf->size - buf->o, bo_ptr(buf), block1);
memcpy(swap_buffer + buf->size - block2, buf->data, block2);
/* process input data in two steps to cover wrapping */
block1 = buf->i;
block2 = 0;
if (block1 > buf->data + buf->size - buf->p) {
block1 = buf->data + buf->size - buf->p;
block2 = buf->i - block1;
}
memcpy(swap_buffer, bi_ptr(buf), block1);
memcpy(swap_buffer + block1, buf->data, block2);
/* reinject changes into the buffer */
memcpy(buf->data, swap_buffer, buf->i);
memcpy(buf->data + buf->size - buf->o, swap_buffer + buf->size - buf->o, buf->o);
buf->p = buf->data;
}
| 164,714
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: AutocompleteMatch HistoryQuickProvider::QuickMatchToACMatch(
const ScoredHistoryMatch& history_match,
int score) {
const history::URLRow& info = history_match.url_info;
AutocompleteMatch match(this, score, !!info.visit_count(),
history_match.url_matches.empty() ?
AutocompleteMatch::HISTORY_URL : AutocompleteMatch::HISTORY_TITLE);
match.destination_url = info.url();
DCHECK(match.destination_url.is_valid());
std::vector<size_t> offsets =
OffsetsFromTermMatches(history_match.url_matches);
const net::FormatUrlTypes format_types = net::kFormatUrlOmitAll &
~(!history_match.match_in_scheme ? 0 : net::kFormatUrlOmitHTTP);
match.fill_into_edit =
AutocompleteInput::FormattedStringWithEquivalentMeaning(info.url(),
net::FormatUrlWithOffsets(info.url(), languages_, format_types,
net::UnescapeRule::SPACES, NULL, NULL, &offsets));
history::TermMatches new_matches =
ReplaceOffsetsInTermMatches(history_match.url_matches, offsets);
match.contents = net::FormatUrl(info.url(), languages_, format_types,
net::UnescapeRule::SPACES, NULL, NULL, NULL);
match.contents_class =
SpansFromTermMatch(new_matches, match.contents.length(), true);
if (!history_match.can_inline) {
match.inline_autocomplete_offset = string16::npos;
} else {
DCHECK(!new_matches.empty());
match.inline_autocomplete_offset = new_matches[0].offset +
new_matches[0].length;
if (match.inline_autocomplete_offset > match.fill_into_edit.length())
match.inline_autocomplete_offset = match.fill_into_edit.length();
}
match.description = info.title();
match.description_class = SpansFromTermMatch(
history_match.title_matches, match.description.length(), false);
return match;
}
Commit Message: Fix icon returned for HQP matches; the two icons were reversed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9695022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126296 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
AutocompleteMatch HistoryQuickProvider::QuickMatchToACMatch(
const ScoredHistoryMatch& history_match,
int score) {
const history::URLRow& info = history_match.url_info;
AutocompleteMatch match(this, score, !!info.visit_count(),
history_match.url_matches.empty() ?
AutocompleteMatch::HISTORY_TITLE : AutocompleteMatch::HISTORY_URL);
match.destination_url = info.url();
DCHECK(match.destination_url.is_valid());
std::vector<size_t> offsets =
OffsetsFromTermMatches(history_match.url_matches);
const net::FormatUrlTypes format_types = net::kFormatUrlOmitAll &
~(!history_match.match_in_scheme ? 0 : net::kFormatUrlOmitHTTP);
match.fill_into_edit =
AutocompleteInput::FormattedStringWithEquivalentMeaning(info.url(),
net::FormatUrlWithOffsets(info.url(), languages_, format_types,
net::UnescapeRule::SPACES, NULL, NULL, &offsets));
history::TermMatches new_matches =
ReplaceOffsetsInTermMatches(history_match.url_matches, offsets);
match.contents = net::FormatUrl(info.url(), languages_, format_types,
net::UnescapeRule::SPACES, NULL, NULL, NULL);
match.contents_class =
SpansFromTermMatch(new_matches, match.contents.length(), true);
if (!history_match.can_inline) {
match.inline_autocomplete_offset = string16::npos;
} else {
DCHECK(!new_matches.empty());
match.inline_autocomplete_offset = new_matches[0].offset +
new_matches[0].length;
if (match.inline_autocomplete_offset > match.fill_into_edit.length())
match.inline_autocomplete_offset = match.fill_into_edit.length();
}
match.description = info.title();
match.description_class = SpansFromTermMatch(
history_match.title_matches, match.description.length(), false);
return match;
}
| 170,999
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static av_cold int vqa_decode_init(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
VqaContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int i, j, codebook_index, ret;
s->avctx = avctx;
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8;
/* make sure the extradata made it */
if (s->avctx->extradata_size != VQA_HEADER_SIZE) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "expected extradata size of %d\n", VQA_HEADER_SIZE);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
/* load up the VQA parameters from the header */
s->vqa_version = s->avctx->extradata[0];
switch (s->vqa_version) {
case 1:
case 2:
break;
case 3:
avpriv_report_missing_feature(avctx, "VQA Version %d", s->vqa_version);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
default:
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "VQA Version %i", s->vqa_version);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
s->width = AV_RL16(&s->avctx->extradata[6]);
s->height = AV_RL16(&s->avctx->extradata[8]);
if ((ret = av_image_check_size(s->width, s->height, 0, avctx)) < 0) {
s->width= s->height= 0;
return ret;
}
s->vector_width = s->avctx->extradata[10];
s->vector_height = s->avctx->extradata[11];
s->partial_count = s->partial_countdown = s->avctx->extradata[13];
/* the vector dimensions have to meet very stringent requirements */
if ((s->vector_width != 4) ||
((s->vector_height != 2) && (s->vector_height != 4))) {
/* return without further initialization */
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (s->width % s->vector_width || s->height % s->vector_height) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Image size not multiple of block size\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* allocate codebooks */
s->codebook_size = MAX_CODEBOOK_SIZE;
s->codebook = av_malloc(s->codebook_size);
if (!s->codebook)
goto fail;
s->next_codebook_buffer = av_malloc(s->codebook_size);
if (!s->next_codebook_buffer)
goto fail;
/* allocate decode buffer */
s->decode_buffer_size = (s->width / s->vector_width) *
(s->height / s->vector_height) * 2;
s->decode_buffer = av_mallocz(s->decode_buffer_size);
if (!s->decode_buffer)
goto fail;
/* initialize the solid-color vectors */
if (s->vector_height == 4) {
codebook_index = 0xFF00 * 16;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
s->codebook[codebook_index++] = i;
} else {
codebook_index = 0xF00 * 8;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
s->codebook[codebook_index++] = i;
}
s->next_codebook_buffer_index = 0;
return 0;
fail:
av_freep(&s->codebook);
av_freep(&s->next_codebook_buffer);
av_freep(&s->decode_buffer);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/vqavideo: Set video size
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 15919/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_VQA_fuzzer-5657368257363968
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID:
|
static av_cold int vqa_decode_init(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
VqaContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int i, j, codebook_index, ret;
s->avctx = avctx;
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8;
/* make sure the extradata made it */
if (s->avctx->extradata_size != VQA_HEADER_SIZE) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "expected extradata size of %d\n", VQA_HEADER_SIZE);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
/* load up the VQA parameters from the header */
s->vqa_version = s->avctx->extradata[0];
switch (s->vqa_version) {
case 1:
case 2:
break;
case 3:
avpriv_report_missing_feature(avctx, "VQA Version %d", s->vqa_version);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
default:
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "VQA Version %i", s->vqa_version);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
s->width = AV_RL16(&s->avctx->extradata[6]);
s->height = AV_RL16(&s->avctx->extradata[8]);
if ((ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, s->width, s->height)) < 0) {
s->width= s->height= 0;
return ret;
}
s->vector_width = s->avctx->extradata[10];
s->vector_height = s->avctx->extradata[11];
s->partial_count = s->partial_countdown = s->avctx->extradata[13];
/* the vector dimensions have to meet very stringent requirements */
if ((s->vector_width != 4) ||
((s->vector_height != 2) && (s->vector_height != 4))) {
/* return without further initialization */
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (s->width % s->vector_width || s->height % s->vector_height) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Image size not multiple of block size\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* allocate codebooks */
s->codebook_size = MAX_CODEBOOK_SIZE;
s->codebook = av_malloc(s->codebook_size);
if (!s->codebook)
goto fail;
s->next_codebook_buffer = av_malloc(s->codebook_size);
if (!s->next_codebook_buffer)
goto fail;
/* allocate decode buffer */
s->decode_buffer_size = (s->width / s->vector_width) *
(s->height / s->vector_height) * 2;
s->decode_buffer = av_mallocz(s->decode_buffer_size);
if (!s->decode_buffer)
goto fail;
/* initialize the solid-color vectors */
if (s->vector_height == 4) {
codebook_index = 0xFF00 * 16;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
s->codebook[codebook_index++] = i;
} else {
codebook_index = 0xF00 * 8;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
s->codebook[codebook_index++] = i;
}
s->next_codebook_buffer_index = 0;
return 0;
fail:
av_freep(&s->codebook);
av_freep(&s->next_codebook_buffer);
av_freep(&s->decode_buffer);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
| 169,486
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::ClearState() {
characteristic_id_to_notify_session_.clear();
pending_primary_services_requests_.clear();
descriptor_id_to_characteristic_id_.clear();
characteristic_id_to_service_id_.clear();
service_id_to_device_address_.clear();
connected_devices_.reset(
new FrameConnectedBluetoothDevices(render_frame_host_));
device_chooser_controller_.reset();
BluetoothAdapterFactoryWrapper::Get().ReleaseAdapter(this);
}
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <msw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::ClearState() {
// Releasing the adapter will drop references to callbacks that have not yet
// been executed. The binding must be closed first so that this is allowed.
binding_.Close();
characteristic_id_to_notify_session_.clear();
pending_primary_services_requests_.clear();
descriptor_id_to_characteristic_id_.clear();
characteristic_id_to_service_id_.clear();
service_id_to_device_address_.clear();
connected_devices_.reset(
new FrameConnectedBluetoothDevices(render_frame_host_));
device_chooser_controller_.reset();
BluetoothAdapterFactoryWrapper::Get().ReleaseAdapter(this);
}
| 173,204
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void iriap_getvaluebyclass_indication(struct iriap_cb *self,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ias_object *obj;
struct ias_attrib *attrib;
int name_len;
int attr_len;
char name[IAS_MAX_CLASSNAME + 1]; /* 60 bytes */
char attr[IAS_MAX_ATTRIBNAME + 1]; /* 60 bytes */
__u8 *fp;
int n;
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "%s()\n", __func__);
IRDA_ASSERT(self != NULL, return;);
IRDA_ASSERT(self->magic == IAS_MAGIC, return;);
IRDA_ASSERT(skb != NULL, return;);
fp = skb->data;
n = 1;
name_len = fp[n++];
memcpy(name, fp+n, name_len); n+=name_len;
name[name_len] = '\0';
attr_len = fp[n++];
memcpy(attr, fp+n, attr_len); n+=attr_len;
attr[attr_len] = '\0';
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "LM-IAS: Looking up %s: %s\n", name, attr);
obj = irias_find_object(name);
if (obj == NULL) {
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "LM-IAS: Object %s not found\n", name);
iriap_getvaluebyclass_response(self, 0x1235, IAS_CLASS_UNKNOWN,
&irias_missing);
return;
}
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "LM-IAS: found %s, id=%d\n", obj->name, obj->id);
attrib = irias_find_attrib(obj, attr);
if (attrib == NULL) {
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "LM-IAS: Attribute %s not found\n", attr);
iriap_getvaluebyclass_response(self, obj->id,
IAS_ATTRIB_UNKNOWN,
&irias_missing);
return;
}
/* We have a match; send the value. */
iriap_getvaluebyclass_response(self, obj->id, IAS_SUCCESS,
attrib->value);
}
Commit Message: irda: validate peer name and attribute lengths
Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer
than the destination array sizes. Validate lengths to prevent stack
buffer overflows.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void iriap_getvaluebyclass_indication(struct iriap_cb *self,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ias_object *obj;
struct ias_attrib *attrib;
int name_len;
int attr_len;
char name[IAS_MAX_CLASSNAME + 1]; /* 60 bytes */
char attr[IAS_MAX_ATTRIBNAME + 1]; /* 60 bytes */
__u8 *fp;
int n;
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "%s()\n", __func__);
IRDA_ASSERT(self != NULL, return;);
IRDA_ASSERT(self->magic == IAS_MAGIC, return;);
IRDA_ASSERT(skb != NULL, return;);
fp = skb->data;
n = 1;
name_len = fp[n++];
IRDA_ASSERT(name_len < IAS_MAX_CLASSNAME + 1, return;);
memcpy(name, fp+n, name_len); n+=name_len;
name[name_len] = '\0';
attr_len = fp[n++];
IRDA_ASSERT(attr_len < IAS_MAX_ATTRIBNAME + 1, return;);
memcpy(attr, fp+n, attr_len); n+=attr_len;
attr[attr_len] = '\0';
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "LM-IAS: Looking up %s: %s\n", name, attr);
obj = irias_find_object(name);
if (obj == NULL) {
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "LM-IAS: Object %s not found\n", name);
iriap_getvaluebyclass_response(self, 0x1235, IAS_CLASS_UNKNOWN,
&irias_missing);
return;
}
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "LM-IAS: found %s, id=%d\n", obj->name, obj->id);
attrib = irias_find_attrib(obj, attr);
if (attrib == NULL) {
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "LM-IAS: Attribute %s not found\n", attr);
iriap_getvaluebyclass_response(self, obj->id,
IAS_ATTRIB_UNKNOWN,
&irias_missing);
return;
}
/* We have a match; send the value. */
iriap_getvaluebyclass_response(self, obj->id, IAS_SUCCESS,
attrib->value);
}
| 166,233
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void vp8_decoder_remove_threads(VP8D_COMP *pbi)
{
/* shutdown MB Decoding thread; */
if (pbi->b_multithreaded_rd)
{
int i;
pbi->b_multithreaded_rd = 0;
/* allow all threads to exit */
for (i = 0; i < pbi->allocated_decoding_thread_count; i++)
{
sem_post(&pbi->h_event_start_decoding[i]);
pthread_join(pbi->h_decoding_thread[i], NULL);
}
for (i = 0; i < pbi->allocated_decoding_thread_count; i++)
{
sem_destroy(&pbi->h_event_start_decoding[i]);
}
sem_destroy(&pbi->h_event_end_decoding);
vpx_free(pbi->h_decoding_thread);
pbi->h_decoding_thread = NULL;
vpx_free(pbi->h_event_start_decoding);
pbi->h_event_start_decoding = NULL;
vpx_free(pbi->mb_row_di);
pbi->mb_row_di = NULL ;
vpx_free(pbi->de_thread_data);
pbi->de_thread_data = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: vp8:fix threading issues
1 - stops de allocating before threads are closed.
2 - limits threads to mb_rows when mb_rows < partitions
BUG=webm:851
Bug: 30436808
Change-Id: Ie017818ed28103ca9d26d57087f31361b642e09b
(cherry picked from commit 70cca742efa20617c70c3209aa614a70f282f90e)
CWE ID:
|
void vp8_decoder_remove_threads(VP8D_COMP *pbi)
void vp8_decoder_remove_threads(VP8D_COMP *pbi) {
/* shutdown MB Decoding thread; */
if (pbi->b_multithreaded_rd) {
int i;
pbi->b_multithreaded_rd = 0;
/* allow all threads to exit */
for (i = 0; i < pbi->allocated_decoding_thread_count; ++i) {
sem_post(&pbi->h_event_start_decoding[i]);
pthread_join(pbi->h_decoding_thread[i], NULL);
}
for (i = 0; i < pbi->allocated_decoding_thread_count; ++i) {
sem_destroy(&pbi->h_event_start_decoding[i]);
}
sem_destroy(&pbi->h_event_end_decoding);
vpx_free(pbi->h_decoding_thread);
pbi->h_decoding_thread = NULL;
vpx_free(pbi->h_event_start_decoding);
pbi->h_event_start_decoding = NULL;
vpx_free(pbi->mb_row_di);
pbi->mb_row_di = NULL;
vpx_free(pbi->de_thread_data);
pbi->de_thread_data = NULL;
vp8mt_de_alloc_temp_buffers(pbi, pbi->common.mb_rows);
}
}
| 174,067
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: WorkerProcessLauncherTest::WorkerProcessLauncherTest()
: message_loop_(MessageLoop::TYPE_IO) {
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
WorkerProcessLauncherTest::WorkerProcessLauncherTest()
: message_loop_(MessageLoop::TYPE_IO),
client_pid_(GetCurrentProcessId()),
permanent_error_(false) {
}
| 171,553
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::RenderViewCreated(
content::RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
ReloadIfTerminated(render_view_host);
ExtensionWebContentsObserver::RenderViewCreated(render_view_host);
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::RenderViewCreated(
content::RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
ReloadIfTerminated(render_view_host);
ExtensionWebContentsObserver::RenderViewCreated(render_view_host);
const Extension* extension = GetExtension(render_view_host);
if (!extension)
return;
int process_id = render_view_host->GetProcess()->GetID();
auto policy = content::ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::GetInstance();
// Components of chrome that are implemented as extensions or platform apps
// are allowed to use chrome://resources/ URLs.
if ((extension->is_extension() || extension->is_platform_app()) &&
Manifest::IsComponentLocation(extension->location())) {
policy->GrantOrigin(process_id,
url::Origin(GURL(content::kChromeUIResourcesURL)));
}
// Extensions, legacy packaged apps, and component platform apps are allowed
// to use chrome://favicon/ and chrome://extension-icon/ URLs. Hosted apps are
// not allowed because they are served via web servers (and are generally
// never given access to Chrome APIs).
if (extension->is_extension() ||
extension->is_legacy_packaged_app() ||
(extension->is_platform_app() &&
Manifest::IsComponentLocation(extension->location()))) {
policy->GrantOrigin(process_id,
url::Origin(GURL(chrome::kChromeUIFaviconURL)));
policy->GrantOrigin(process_id,
url::Origin(GURL(chrome::kChromeUIExtensionIconURL)));
}
}
| 171,773
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: new_msg_register_event (u_int32_t seqnum, struct lsa_filter_type *filter)
{
u_char buf[OSPF_API_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
struct msg_register_event *emsg;
int len;
emsg = (struct msg_register_event *) buf;
len = sizeof (struct msg_register_event) +
filter->num_areas * sizeof (struct in_addr);
emsg->filter.typemask = htons (filter->typemask);
emsg->filter.origin = filter->origin;
emsg->filter.num_areas = filter->num_areas;
return msg_new (MSG_REGISTER_EVENT, emsg, seqnum, len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
new_msg_register_event (u_int32_t seqnum, struct lsa_filter_type *filter)
{
u_char buf[OSPF_API_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
struct msg_register_event *emsg;
int len;
emsg = (struct msg_register_event *) buf;
len = sizeof (struct msg_register_event) +
filter->num_areas * sizeof (struct in_addr);
emsg->filter.typemask = htons (filter->typemask);
emsg->filter.origin = filter->origin;
emsg->filter.num_areas = filter->num_areas;
if (len > sizeof (buf))
len = sizeof(buf);
/* API broken - missing memcpy to fill data */
return msg_new (MSG_REGISTER_EVENT, emsg, seqnum, len);
}
| 164,716
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ConnectionInfoPopupAndroid::ConnectionInfoPopupAndroid(
JNIEnv* env,
jobject java_website_settings_pop,
WebContents* web_contents) {
content::NavigationEntry* nav_entry =
web_contents->GetController().GetVisibleEntry();
if (nav_entry == NULL)
return;
popup_jobject_.Reset(env, java_website_settings_pop);
presenter_.reset(new WebsiteSettings(
this,
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext()),
TabSpecificContentSettings::FromWebContents(web_contents),
InfoBarService::FromWebContents(web_contents),
nav_entry->GetURL(),
nav_entry->GetSSL(),
content::CertStore::GetInstance()));
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
CWE ID:
|
ConnectionInfoPopupAndroid::ConnectionInfoPopupAndroid(
JNIEnv* env,
jobject java_website_settings_pop,
WebContents* web_contents) {
content::NavigationEntry* nav_entry =
web_contents->GetController().GetVisibleEntry();
if (nav_entry == NULL)
return;
popup_jobject_.Reset(env, java_website_settings_pop);
presenter_.reset(new WebsiteSettings(
this,
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext()),
TabSpecificContentSettings::FromWebContents(web_contents),
web_contents,
nav_entry->GetURL(),
nav_entry->GetSSL(),
content::CertStore::GetInstance()));
}
| 171,777
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int http_read_header(URLContext *h, int *new_location)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
char line[MAX_URL_SIZE];
int err = 0;
s->chunksize = -1;
for (;;) {
if ((err = http_get_line(s, line, sizeof(line))) < 0)
return err;
av_log(h, AV_LOG_TRACE, "header='%s'\n", line);
err = process_line(h, line, s->line_count, new_location);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (err == 0)
break;
s->line_count++;
}
if (s->seekable == -1 && s->is_mediagateway && s->filesize == 2000000000)
h->is_streamed = 1; /* we can in fact _not_ seek */
cookie_string(s->cookie_dict, &s->cookies);
av_dict_free(&s->cookie_dict);
return err;
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int http_read_header(URLContext *h, int *new_location)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
char line[MAX_URL_SIZE];
int err = 0;
s->chunksize = UINT64_MAX;
for (;;) {
if ((err = http_get_line(s, line, sizeof(line))) < 0)
return err;
av_log(h, AV_LOG_TRACE, "header='%s'\n", line);
err = process_line(h, line, s->line_count, new_location);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (err == 0)
break;
s->line_count++;
}
if (s->seekable == -1 && s->is_mediagateway && s->filesize == 2000000000)
h->is_streamed = 1; /* we can in fact _not_ seek */
cookie_string(s->cookie_dict, &s->cookies);
av_dict_free(&s->cookie_dict);
return err;
}
| 168,500
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SyncBackendHost::Initialize(
SyncFrontend* frontend,
const GURL& sync_service_url,
const syncable::ModelTypeSet& types,
net::URLRequestContextGetter* baseline_context_getter,
const SyncCredentials& credentials,
bool delete_sync_data_folder) {
if (!core_thread_.Start())
return;
frontend_ = frontend;
DCHECK(frontend);
registrar_.workers[GROUP_DB] = new DatabaseModelWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_UI] = new UIModelWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_PASSIVE] = new ModelSafeWorker();
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableSyncTypedUrls) || types.count(syncable::TYPED_URLS)) {
registrar_.workers[GROUP_HISTORY] =
new HistoryModelWorker(
profile_->GetHistoryService(Profile::IMPLICIT_ACCESS));
}
for (syncable::ModelTypeSet::const_iterator it = types.begin();
it != types.end(); ++it) {
registrar_.routing_info[(*it)] = GROUP_PASSIVE;
}
PasswordStore* password_store =
profile_->GetPasswordStore(Profile::IMPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (password_store) {
registrar_.workers[GROUP_PASSWORD] =
new PasswordModelWorker(password_store);
} else {
LOG_IF(WARNING, types.count(syncable::PASSWORDS) > 0) << "Password store "
<< "not initialized, cannot sync passwords";
registrar_.routing_info.erase(syncable::PASSWORDS);
}
registrar_.routing_info[syncable::NIGORI] = GROUP_PASSIVE;
core_->CreateSyncNotifier(baseline_context_getter);
InitCore(Core::DoInitializeOptions(
sync_service_url,
MakeHttpBridgeFactory(baseline_context_getter),
credentials,
delete_sync_data_folder,
RestoreEncryptionBootstrapToken(),
false));
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void SyncBackendHost::Initialize(
SyncFrontend* frontend,
const GURL& sync_service_url,
const syncable::ModelTypeSet& types,
net::URLRequestContextGetter* baseline_context_getter,
const SyncCredentials& credentials,
bool delete_sync_data_folder) {
if (!core_thread_.Start())
return;
frontend_ = frontend;
DCHECK(frontend);
registrar_.workers[GROUP_DB] = new DatabaseModelWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_UI] = new UIModelWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_PASSIVE] = new ModelSafeWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_HISTORY] = new HistoryModelWorker(
profile_->GetHistoryService(Profile::IMPLICIT_ACCESS));
for (syncable::ModelTypeSet::const_iterator it = types.begin();
it != types.end(); ++it) {
registrar_.routing_info[(*it)] = GROUP_PASSIVE;
}
PasswordStore* password_store =
profile_->GetPasswordStore(Profile::IMPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (password_store) {
registrar_.workers[GROUP_PASSWORD] =
new PasswordModelWorker(password_store);
} else {
LOG_IF(WARNING, types.count(syncable::PASSWORDS) > 0) << "Password store "
<< "not initialized, cannot sync passwords";
registrar_.routing_info.erase(syncable::PASSWORDS);
}
registrar_.routing_info[syncable::NIGORI] = GROUP_PASSIVE;
core_->CreateSyncNotifier(baseline_context_getter);
InitCore(Core::DoInitializeOptions(
sync_service_url,
MakeHttpBridgeFactory(baseline_context_getter),
credentials,
delete_sync_data_folder,
RestoreEncryptionBootstrapToken(),
false));
}
| 170,614
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int nfs_readlink_reply(unsigned char *pkt, unsigned len)
{
uint32_t *data;
char *path;
int rlen;
int ret;
ret = rpc_check_reply(pkt, 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
data = (uint32_t *)(pkt + sizeof(struct rpc_reply));
data++;
rlen = ntohl(net_read_uint32(data)); /* new path length */
data++;
path = (char *)data;
} else {
memcpy(nfs_path, path, rlen);
nfs_path[rlen] = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int nfs_readlink_reply(unsigned char *pkt, unsigned len)
{
uint32_t *data;
char *path;
unsigned int rlen;
int ret;
ret = rpc_check_reply(pkt, 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
data = (uint32_t *)(pkt + sizeof(struct rpc_reply));
data++;
rlen = ntohl(net_read_uint32(data)); /* new path length */
rlen = max_t(unsigned int, rlen,
len - sizeof(struct rpc_reply) - sizeof(uint32_t));
data++;
path = (char *)data;
} else {
memcpy(nfs_path, path, rlen);
nfs_path[rlen] = 0;
}
| 164,625
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int tipc_nl_compat_link_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX + 1];
struct tipc_link_info link_info;
int err;
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK])
return -EINVAL;
err = nla_parse_nested(link, TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX, attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK],
NULL);
if (err)
return err;
link_info.dest = nla_get_flag(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_DEST]);
link_info.up = htonl(nla_get_flag(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_UP]));
strcpy(link_info.str, nla_data(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME]));
return tipc_add_tlv(msg->rep, TIPC_TLV_LINK_INFO,
&link_info, sizeof(link_info));
}
Commit Message: tipc: fix an infoleak in tipc_nl_compat_link_dump
link_info.str is a char array of size 60. Memory after the NULL
byte is not initialized. Sending the whole object out can cause
a leak.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
static int tipc_nl_compat_link_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX + 1];
struct tipc_link_info link_info;
int err;
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK])
return -EINVAL;
err = nla_parse_nested(link, TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX, attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK],
NULL);
if (err)
return err;
link_info.dest = nla_get_flag(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_DEST]);
link_info.up = htonl(nla_get_flag(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_UP]));
nla_strlcpy(link_info.str, nla_data(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME]),
TIPC_MAX_LINK_NAME);
return tipc_add_tlv(msg->rep, TIPC_TLV_LINK_INFO,
&link_info, sizeof(link_info));
}
| 167,162
|
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