instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.3k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: METHODDEF(JDIMENSION)
get_word_gray_row(j_compress_ptr cinfo, cjpeg_source_ptr sinfo)
/* This version is for reading raw-word-format PGM files with any maxval */
{
ppm_source_ptr source = (ppm_source_ptr)sinfo;
register JSAMPROW ptr;
register U_CHAR *bufferptr;
register JSAMPLE *rescale = source->rescale;
JDIMENSION col;
unsigned int maxval = source->maxval;
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, source->iobuffer, source->buffer_width))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
ptr = source->pub.buffer[0];
bufferptr = source->iobuffer;
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
register unsigned int temp;
temp = UCH(*bufferptr++) << 8;
temp |= UCH(*bufferptr++);
if (temp > maxval)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE);
*ptr++ = rescale[temp];
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: cjpeg: Fix OOB read caused by malformed 8-bit BMP
... in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the
number of palette entries.
Fix partly borrowed from jpeg-9c. This commit also adopts Guido's
JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE enum value in lieu of our project-specific
JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE enum value.
Fixes #258
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
METHODDEF(JDIMENSION)
get_word_gray_row(j_compress_ptr cinfo, cjpeg_source_ptr sinfo)
/* This version is for reading raw-word-format PGM files with any maxval */
{
ppm_source_ptr source = (ppm_source_ptr)sinfo;
register JSAMPROW ptr;
register U_CHAR *bufferptr;
register JSAMPLE *rescale = source->rescale;
JDIMENSION col;
unsigned int maxval = source->maxval;
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, source->iobuffer, source->buffer_width))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
ptr = source->pub.buffer[0];
bufferptr = source->iobuffer;
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
register unsigned int temp;
temp = UCH(*bufferptr++) << 8;
temp |= UCH(*bufferptr++);
if (temp > maxval)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE);
*ptr++ = rescale[temp];
}
return 1;
}
| 169,838
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: poppler_page_prepare_output_dev (PopplerPage *page,
double scale,
int rotation,
gboolean transparent,
OutputDevData *output_dev_data)
{
CairoOutputDev *output_dev;
cairo_surface_t *surface;
double width, height;
int cairo_width, cairo_height, cairo_rowstride, rotate;
unsigned char *cairo_data;
rotate = rotation + page->page->getRotate ();
if (rotate == 90 || rotate == 270) {
height = page->page->getCropWidth ();
width = page->page->getCropHeight ();
} else {
width = page->page->getCropWidth ();
height = page->page->getCropHeight ();
}
cairo_width = (int) ceil(width * scale);
cairo_height = (int) ceil(height * scale);
output_dev = page->document->output_dev;
cairo_rowstride = cairo_width * 4;
cairo_data = (guchar *) gmalloc (cairo_height * cairo_rowstride);
if (transparent)
memset (cairo_data, 0x00, cairo_height * cairo_rowstride);
else
memset (cairo_data, 0xff, cairo_height * cairo_rowstride);
surface = cairo_image_surface_create_for_data(cairo_data,
CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32,
cairo_width, cairo_height,
cairo_rowstride);
output_dev_data->cairo_data = cairo_data;
output_dev_data->surface = surface;
output_dev_data->cairo = cairo_create (surface);
output_dev->setCairo (output_dev_data->cairo);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
poppler_page_prepare_output_dev (PopplerPage *page,
double scale,
int rotation,
gboolean transparent,
OutputDevData *output_dev_data)
{
CairoOutputDev *output_dev;
cairo_surface_t *surface;
double width, height;
int cairo_width, cairo_height, cairo_rowstride, rotate;
unsigned char *cairo_data;
rotate = rotation + page->page->getRotate ();
if (rotate == 90 || rotate == 270) {
height = page->page->getCropWidth ();
width = page->page->getCropHeight ();
} else {
width = page->page->getCropWidth ();
height = page->page->getCropHeight ();
}
cairo_width = (int) ceil(width * scale);
cairo_height = (int) ceil(height * scale);
output_dev = page->document->output_dev;
cairo_rowstride = cairo_width * 4;
cairo_data = (guchar *) gmallocn (cairo_height, cairo_rowstride);
if (transparent)
memset (cairo_data, 0x00, cairo_height * cairo_rowstride);
else
memset (cairo_data, 0xff, cairo_height * cairo_rowstride);
surface = cairo_image_surface_create_for_data(cairo_data,
CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32,
cairo_width, cairo_height,
cairo_rowstride);
output_dev_data->cairo_data = cairo_data;
output_dev_data->surface = surface;
output_dev_data->cairo = cairo_create (surface);
output_dev->setCairo (output_dev_data->cairo);
}
| 164,617
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline int btif_hl_select_wakeup(void){
char sig_on = btif_hl_signal_select_wakeup;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_wakeup");
return send(signal_fds[1], &sig_on, sizeof(sig_on), 0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
static inline int btif_hl_select_wakeup(void){
char sig_on = btif_hl_signal_select_wakeup;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_wakeup");
return TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(signal_fds[1], &sig_on, sizeof(sig_on), 0));
}
| 173,444
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long long BlockGroup::GetPrevTimeCode() const
{
return m_prev;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
long long BlockGroup::GetPrevTimeCode() const
| 174,351
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
{
match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
{
match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
match_data->cmp = asymmetric_key_cmp;
return 0;
}
| 168,437
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ExtensionTtsController::IsSpeaking() const {
return current_utterance_ != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool ExtensionTtsController::IsSpeaking() const {
| 170,382
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SoftAVC::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
if (mEOSStatus == OUTPUT_FRAMES_FLUSHED) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(kInputPortIndex);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
if (mHeadersDecoded) {
drainAllOutputBuffers(false /* eos */);
}
H264SwDecRet ret = H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY;
bool portWillReset = false;
while ((mEOSStatus != INPUT_DATA_AVAILABLE || !inQueue.empty())
&& outQueue.size() == kNumOutputBuffers) {
if (mEOSStatus == INPUT_EOS_SEEN) {
drainAllOutputBuffers(true /* eos */);
return;
}
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
++mPicId;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = new OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE;
memset(header, 0, sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE));
header->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
header->nFlags = inHeader->nFlags;
if (header->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mEOSStatus = INPUT_EOS_SEEN;
}
mPicToHeaderMap.add(mPicId, header);
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
H264SwDecInput inPicture;
H264SwDecOutput outPicture;
memset(&inPicture, 0, sizeof(inPicture));
inPicture.dataLen = inHeader->nFilledLen;
inPicture.pStream = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
inPicture.picId = mPicId;
inPicture.intraConcealmentMethod = 1;
H264SwDecPicture decodedPicture;
while (inPicture.dataLen > 0) {
ret = H264SwDecDecode(mHandle, &inPicture, &outPicture);
if (ret == H264SWDEC_HDRS_RDY_BUFF_NOT_EMPTY ||
ret == H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY_BUFF_NOT_EMPTY) {
inPicture.dataLen -= (u32)(outPicture.pStrmCurrPos - inPicture.pStream);
inPicture.pStream = outPicture.pStrmCurrPos;
if (ret == H264SWDEC_HDRS_RDY_BUFF_NOT_EMPTY) {
mHeadersDecoded = true;
H264SwDecInfo decoderInfo;
CHECK(H264SwDecGetInfo(mHandle, &decoderInfo) == H264SWDEC_OK);
SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::CropSettingsMode cropSettingsMode =
handleCropParams(decoderInfo);
handlePortSettingsChange(
&portWillReset, decoderInfo.picWidth, decoderInfo.picHeight,
cropSettingsMode);
}
} else {
if (portWillReset) {
if (H264SwDecNextPicture(mHandle, &decodedPicture, 0)
== H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY) {
saveFirstOutputBuffer(
decodedPicture.picId,
(uint8_t *)decodedPicture.pOutputPicture);
}
}
inPicture.dataLen = 0;
if (ret < 0) {
ALOGE("Decoder failed: %d", ret);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined,
ERROR_MALFORMED, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
}
}
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
if (portWillReset) {
return;
}
if (mFirstPicture && !outQueue.empty()) {
drainOneOutputBuffer(mFirstPictureId, mFirstPicture);
delete[] mFirstPicture;
mFirstPicture = NULL;
mFirstPictureId = -1;
}
drainAllOutputBuffers(false /* eos */);
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (h263|h264)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I0fd599b3da431425d89236ffdd9df423c11947c0
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void SoftAVC::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
if (mEOSStatus == OUTPUT_FRAMES_FLUSHED) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(kInputPortIndex);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
if (mHeadersDecoded) {
drainAllOutputBuffers(false /* eos */);
}
H264SwDecRet ret = H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY;
bool portWillReset = false;
while ((mEOSStatus != INPUT_DATA_AVAILABLE || !inQueue.empty())
&& outQueue.size() == kNumOutputBuffers) {
if (mEOSStatus == INPUT_EOS_SEEN) {
drainAllOutputBuffers(true /* eos */);
return;
}
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
++mPicId;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = new OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE;
memset(header, 0, sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE));
header->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
header->nFlags = inHeader->nFlags;
if (header->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mEOSStatus = INPUT_EOS_SEEN;
}
mPicToHeaderMap.add(mPicId, header);
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
H264SwDecInput inPicture;
H264SwDecOutput outPicture;
memset(&inPicture, 0, sizeof(inPicture));
inPicture.dataLen = inHeader->nFilledLen;
inPicture.pStream = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
inPicture.picId = mPicId;
inPicture.intraConcealmentMethod = 1;
H264SwDecPicture decodedPicture;
while (inPicture.dataLen > 0) {
ret = H264SwDecDecode(mHandle, &inPicture, &outPicture);
if (ret == H264SWDEC_HDRS_RDY_BUFF_NOT_EMPTY ||
ret == H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY_BUFF_NOT_EMPTY) {
inPicture.dataLen -= (u32)(outPicture.pStrmCurrPos - inPicture.pStream);
inPicture.pStream = outPicture.pStrmCurrPos;
if (ret == H264SWDEC_HDRS_RDY_BUFF_NOT_EMPTY) {
mHeadersDecoded = true;
H264SwDecInfo decoderInfo;
CHECK(H264SwDecGetInfo(mHandle, &decoderInfo) == H264SWDEC_OK);
SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::CropSettingsMode cropSettingsMode =
handleCropParams(decoderInfo);
handlePortSettingsChange(
&portWillReset, decoderInfo.picWidth, decoderInfo.picHeight,
cropSettingsMode);
}
} else {
if (portWillReset) {
if (H264SwDecNextPicture(mHandle, &decodedPicture, 0)
== H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY) {
saveFirstOutputBuffer(
decodedPicture.picId,
(uint8_t *)decodedPicture.pOutputPicture);
}
}
inPicture.dataLen = 0;
if (ret < 0) {
ALOGE("Decoder failed: %d", ret);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined,
ERROR_MALFORMED, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
}
}
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
if (portWillReset) {
return;
}
if (mFirstPicture && !outQueue.empty()) {
if (!drainOneOutputBuffer(mFirstPictureId, mFirstPicture)) {
ALOGE("Drain failed");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
delete[] mFirstPicture;
mFirstPicture = NULL;
mFirstPictureId = -1;
}
drainAllOutputBuffers(false /* eos */);
}
}
| 174,178
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int sdp_parse_fmtp_config_h264(AVFormatContext *s,
AVStream *stream,
PayloadContext *h264_data,
const char *attr, const char *value)
{
AVCodecParameters *par = stream->codecpar;
if (!strcmp(attr, "packetization-mode")) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "RTP Packetization Mode: %d\n", atoi(value));
h264_data->packetization_mode = atoi(value);
/*
* Packetization Mode:
* 0 or not present: Single NAL mode (Only nals from 1-23 are allowed)
* 1: Non-interleaved Mode: 1-23, 24 (STAP-A), 28 (FU-A) are allowed.
* 2: Interleaved Mode: 25 (STAP-B), 26 (MTAP16), 27 (MTAP24), 28 (FU-A),
* and 29 (FU-B) are allowed.
*/
if (h264_data->packetization_mode > 1)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Interleaved RTP mode is not supported yet.\n");
} else if (!strcmp(attr, "profile-level-id")) {
if (strlen(value) == 6)
parse_profile_level_id(s, h264_data, value);
} else if (!strcmp(attr, "sprop-parameter-sets")) {
int ret;
if (value[strlen(value) - 1] == ',') {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Missing PPS in sprop-parameter-sets, ignoring\n");
return 0;
}
par->extradata_size = 0;
av_freep(&par->extradata);
ret = ff_h264_parse_sprop_parameter_sets(s, &par->extradata,
&par->extradata_size, value);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Extradata set to %p (size: %d)\n",
par->extradata, par->extradata_size);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/rtpdec_h264: Fix heap-buffer-overflow
Fixes: rtp_sdp/poc.sdp
Found-by: Bingchang <l.bing.chang.bc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int sdp_parse_fmtp_config_h264(AVFormatContext *s,
AVStream *stream,
PayloadContext *h264_data,
const char *attr, const char *value)
{
AVCodecParameters *par = stream->codecpar;
if (!strcmp(attr, "packetization-mode")) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "RTP Packetization Mode: %d\n", atoi(value));
h264_data->packetization_mode = atoi(value);
/*
* Packetization Mode:
* 0 or not present: Single NAL mode (Only nals from 1-23 are allowed)
* 1: Non-interleaved Mode: 1-23, 24 (STAP-A), 28 (FU-A) are allowed.
* 2: Interleaved Mode: 25 (STAP-B), 26 (MTAP16), 27 (MTAP24), 28 (FU-A),
* and 29 (FU-B) are allowed.
*/
if (h264_data->packetization_mode > 1)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Interleaved RTP mode is not supported yet.\n");
} else if (!strcmp(attr, "profile-level-id")) {
if (strlen(value) == 6)
parse_profile_level_id(s, h264_data, value);
} else if (!strcmp(attr, "sprop-parameter-sets")) {
int ret;
if (*value == 0 || value[strlen(value) - 1] == ',') {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Missing PPS in sprop-parameter-sets, ignoring\n");
return 0;
}
par->extradata_size = 0;
av_freep(&par->extradata);
ret = ff_h264_parse_sprop_parameter_sets(s, &par->extradata,
&par->extradata_size, value);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Extradata set to %p (size: %d)\n",
par->extradata, par->extradata_size);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
| 167,744
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: AudioSource::AudioSource(
audio_source_t inputSource, const String16 &opPackageName,
uint32_t sampleRate, uint32_t channelCount, uint32_t outSampleRate)
: mStarted(false),
mSampleRate(sampleRate),
mOutSampleRate(outSampleRate > 0 ? outSampleRate : sampleRate),
mPrevSampleTimeUs(0),
mFirstSampleTimeUs(-1ll),
mNumFramesReceived(0),
mNumClientOwnedBuffers(0) {
ALOGV("sampleRate: %u, outSampleRate: %u, channelCount: %u",
sampleRate, outSampleRate, channelCount);
CHECK(channelCount == 1 || channelCount == 2);
CHECK(sampleRate > 0);
size_t minFrameCount;
status_t status = AudioRecord::getMinFrameCount(&minFrameCount,
sampleRate,
AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT,
audio_channel_in_mask_from_count(channelCount));
if (status == OK) {
uint32_t frameCount = kMaxBufferSize / sizeof(int16_t) / channelCount;
size_t bufCount = 2;
while ((bufCount * frameCount) < minFrameCount) {
bufCount++;
}
mRecord = new AudioRecord(
inputSource, sampleRate, AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT,
audio_channel_in_mask_from_count(channelCount),
opPackageName,
(size_t) (bufCount * frameCount),
AudioRecordCallbackFunction,
this,
frameCount /*notificationFrames*/);
mInitCheck = mRecord->initCheck();
if (mInitCheck != OK) {
mRecord.clear();
}
} else {
mInitCheck = status;
}
}
Commit Message: AudioSource: initialize variables
to prevent info leak
Bug: 27855172
Change-Id: I3d33e0a9cc5cf8a758d7b0794590b09c43a24561
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
AudioSource::AudioSource(
audio_source_t inputSource, const String16 &opPackageName,
uint32_t sampleRate, uint32_t channelCount, uint32_t outSampleRate)
: mStarted(false),
mSampleRate(sampleRate),
mOutSampleRate(outSampleRate > 0 ? outSampleRate : sampleRate),
mTrackMaxAmplitude(false),
mStartTimeUs(0),
mMaxAmplitude(0),
mPrevSampleTimeUs(0),
mFirstSampleTimeUs(-1ll),
mInitialReadTimeUs(0),
mNumFramesReceived(0),
mNumClientOwnedBuffers(0) {
ALOGV("sampleRate: %u, outSampleRate: %u, channelCount: %u",
sampleRate, outSampleRate, channelCount);
CHECK(channelCount == 1 || channelCount == 2);
CHECK(sampleRate > 0);
size_t minFrameCount;
status_t status = AudioRecord::getMinFrameCount(&minFrameCount,
sampleRate,
AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT,
audio_channel_in_mask_from_count(channelCount));
if (status == OK) {
uint32_t frameCount = kMaxBufferSize / sizeof(int16_t) / channelCount;
size_t bufCount = 2;
while ((bufCount * frameCount) < minFrameCount) {
bufCount++;
}
mRecord = new AudioRecord(
inputSource, sampleRate, AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT,
audio_channel_in_mask_from_count(channelCount),
opPackageName,
(size_t) (bufCount * frameCount),
AudioRecordCallbackFunction,
this,
frameCount /*notificationFrames*/);
mInitCheck = mRecord->initCheck();
if (mInitCheck != OK) {
mRecord.clear();
}
} else {
mInitCheck = status;
}
}
| 173,770
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Chapters::Atom::Init()
{
m_string_uid = NULL;
m_uid = 0;
m_start_timecode = -1;
m_stop_timecode = -1;
m_displays = NULL;
m_displays_size = 0;
m_displays_count = 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void Chapters::Atom::Init()
| 174,387
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void FrameLoader::ReplaceDocumentWhileExecutingJavaScriptURL(
const String& source,
Document* owner_document) {
Document* document = frame_->GetDocument();
if (!document_loader_ ||
document->PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() != Document::kNoDismissal)
return;
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kReplaceDocumentViaJavaScriptURL);
const KURL& url = document->Url();
WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy global_object_reuse_policy =
frame_->ShouldReuseDefaultView(url)
? WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kUseExisting
: WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kCreateNew;
StopAllLoaders();
SubframeLoadingDisabler disabler(document);
frame_->DetachChildren();
if (!frame_->IsAttached() || document != frame_->GetDocument())
return;
frame_->GetDocument()->Shutdown();
Client()->TransitionToCommittedForNewPage();
document_loader_->ReplaceDocumentWhileExecutingJavaScriptURL(
url, owner_document, global_object_reuse_policy, source);
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285
|
void FrameLoader::ReplaceDocumentWhileExecutingJavaScriptURL(
const String& source,
Document* owner_document) {
Document* document = frame_->GetDocument();
if (!document_loader_ ||
document->PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() != Document::kNoDismissal)
return;
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kReplaceDocumentViaJavaScriptURL);
const KURL& url = document->Url();
// The document CSP is the correct one as it is used for CSP checks
// done previously before getting here:
// HTMLFormElement::ScheduleFormSubmission
// HTMLFrameElementBase::OpenURL
WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy global_object_reuse_policy =
frame_->ShouldReuseDefaultView(url, document->GetContentSecurityPolicy())
? WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kUseExisting
: WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kCreateNew;
StopAllLoaders();
SubframeLoadingDisabler disabler(document);
frame_->DetachChildren();
if (!frame_->IsAttached() || document != frame_->GetDocument())
return;
frame_->GetDocument()->Shutdown();
Client()->TransitionToCommittedForNewPage();
document_loader_->ReplaceDocumentWhileExecutingJavaScriptURL(
url, owner_document, global_object_reuse_policy, source);
}
| 173,198
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PrintViewManager::OnShowScriptedPrintPreview(content::RenderFrameHost* rfh,
bool source_is_modifiable) {
DCHECK(print_preview_rfh_);
if (rfh != print_preview_rfh_)
return;
PrintPreviewDialogController* dialog_controller =
PrintPreviewDialogController::GetInstance();
if (!dialog_controller) {
PrintPreviewDone();
return;
}
dialog_controller->PrintPreview(web_contents());
PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview_Params params;
params.is_modifiable = source_is_modifiable;
PrintPreviewUI::SetInitialParams(
dialog_controller->GetPrintPreviewForContents(web_contents()), params);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void PrintViewManager::OnShowScriptedPrintPreview(content::RenderFrameHost* rfh,
bool source_is_modifiable) {
DCHECK(print_preview_rfh_);
if (rfh != print_preview_rfh_)
return;
PrintPreviewDialogController* dialog_controller =
PrintPreviewDialogController::GetInstance();
if (!dialog_controller) {
PrintPreviewDone();
return;
}
// Running a dialog causes an exit to webpage-initiated fullscreen.
// http://crbug.com/728276
if (web_contents()->IsFullscreenForCurrentTab())
web_contents()->ExitFullscreen(true);
dialog_controller->PrintPreview(web_contents());
PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview_Params params;
params.is_modifiable = source_is_modifiable;
PrintPreviewUI::SetInitialParams(
dialog_controller->GetPrintPreviewForContents(web_contents()), params);
}
| 172,314
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void UpdatePolicyForEvent(const WebInputEvent* input_event,
NavigationPolicy* policy) {
if (!input_event)
return;
unsigned short button_number = 0;
if (input_event->GetType() == WebInputEvent::kMouseUp) {
const WebMouseEvent* mouse_event =
static_cast<const WebMouseEvent*>(input_event);
switch (mouse_event->button) {
case WebMouseEvent::Button::kLeft:
button_number = 0;
break;
case WebMouseEvent::Button::kMiddle:
button_number = 1;
break;
case WebMouseEvent::Button::kRight:
button_number = 2;
break;
default:
return;
}
} else if ((WebInputEvent::IsKeyboardEventType(input_event->GetType()) &&
static_cast<const WebKeyboardEvent*>(input_event)
->windows_key_code == VKEY_RETURN) ||
WebInputEvent::IsGestureEventType(input_event->GetType())) {
button_number = 0;
} else {
return;
}
bool ctrl = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kControlKey;
bool shift = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kShiftKey;
bool alt = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kAltKey;
bool meta = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kMetaKey;
NavigationPolicy user_policy = *policy;
NavigationPolicyFromMouseEvent(button_number, ctrl, shift, alt, meta,
&user_policy);
if (user_policy == kNavigationPolicyDownload &&
*policy != kNavigationPolicyIgnore)
return;
if (user_policy == kNavigationPolicyNewWindow &&
*policy == kNavigationPolicyNewPopup)
return;
*policy = user_policy;
}
Commit Message: Only allow downloading in response to real keyboard modifiers
BUG=848531
Change-Id: I97554c8d312243b55647f1376945aee32dbd95bf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1082216
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564051}
CWE ID:
|
void UpdatePolicyForEvent(const WebInputEvent* input_event,
NavigationPolicy* policy) {
if (!input_event)
return;
unsigned short button_number = 0;
if (input_event->GetType() == WebInputEvent::kMouseUp) {
const WebMouseEvent* mouse_event =
static_cast<const WebMouseEvent*>(input_event);
switch (mouse_event->button) {
case WebMouseEvent::Button::kLeft:
button_number = 0;
break;
case WebMouseEvent::Button::kMiddle:
button_number = 1;
break;
case WebMouseEvent::Button::kRight:
button_number = 2;
break;
default:
return;
}
} else if ((WebInputEvent::IsKeyboardEventType(input_event->GetType()) &&
static_cast<const WebKeyboardEvent*>(input_event)
->windows_key_code == VKEY_RETURN) ||
WebInputEvent::IsGestureEventType(input_event->GetType())) {
button_number = 0;
} else {
return;
}
bool ctrl = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kControlKey;
bool shift = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kShiftKey;
bool alt = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kAltKey;
bool meta = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kMetaKey;
NavigationPolicy user_policy = *policy;
NavigationPolicyFromMouseEvent(button_number, ctrl, shift, alt, meta,
&user_policy);
if (user_policy == kNavigationPolicyNewWindow &&
*policy == kNavigationPolicyNewPopup)
return;
*policy = user_policy;
}
| 173,194
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SSLManager::OnSSLCertificateError(
base::WeakPtr<SSLErrorHandler::Delegate> delegate,
const content::GlobalRequestID& id,
const ResourceType::Type resource_type,
const GURL& url,
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
const net::SSLInfo& ssl_info,
bool fatal) {
DCHECK(delegate);
DVLOG(1) << "OnSSLCertificateError() cert_error: "
<< net::MapCertStatusToNetError(ssl_info.cert_status)
<< " id: " << id.child_id << "," << id.request_id
<< " resource_type: " << resource_type
<< " url: " << url.spec()
<< " render_process_id: " << render_process_id
<< " render_view_id: " << render_view_id
<< " cert_status: " << std::hex << ssl_info.cert_status;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SSLCertErrorHandler::Dispatch,
new SSLCertErrorHandler(delegate,
id,
resource_type,
url,
render_process_id,
render_view_id,
ssl_info,
fatal)));
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void SSLManager::OnSSLCertificateError(
const base::WeakPtr<SSLErrorHandler::Delegate>& delegate,
const content::GlobalRequestID& id,
const ResourceType::Type resource_type,
const GURL& url,
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
const net::SSLInfo& ssl_info,
bool fatal) {
DCHECK(delegate);
DVLOG(1) << "OnSSLCertificateError() cert_error: "
<< net::MapCertStatusToNetError(ssl_info.cert_status)
<< " id: " << id.child_id << "," << id.request_id
<< " resource_type: " << resource_type
<< " url: " << url.spec()
<< " render_process_id: " << render_process_id
<< " render_view_id: " << render_view_id
<< " cert_status: " << std::hex << ssl_info.cert_status;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SSLCertErrorHandler::Dispatch,
new SSLCertErrorHandler(delegate,
id,
resource_type,
url,
render_process_id,
render_view_id,
ssl_info,
fatal)));
}
| 170,996
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void detect_allow_debuggers(int argc, char **argv) {
int i;
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
if (strcmp(argv[i], "--allow-debuggers") == 0) {
arg_allow_debuggers = 1;
break;
}
if (strcmp(argv[i], "--") == 0)
break;
if (strncmp(argv[i], "--", 2) != 0)
break;
}
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID:
|
static void detect_allow_debuggers(int argc, char **argv) {
int i;
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
if (strcmp(argv[i], "--allow-debuggers") == 0) {
// check kernel version
struct utsname u;
int rv = uname(&u);
if (rv != 0)
errExit("uname");
int major;
int minor;
if (2 != sscanf(u.release, "%d.%d", &major, &minor)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot extract Linux kernel version: %s\n", u.version);
exit(1);
}
if (major < 4 || (major == 4 && minor < 8)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: --allow-debuggers is disabled on Linux kernels prior to 4.8. "
"A bug in ptrace call allows a full bypass of the seccomp filter. "
"Your current kernel version is %d.%d.\n", major, minor);
exit(1);
}
arg_allow_debuggers = 1;
break;
}
if (strcmp(argv[i], "--") == 0)
break;
if (strncmp(argv[i], "--", 2) != 0)
break;
}
}
| 168,419
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int jp2_cmap_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_cmap_t *cmap = &box->data.cmap;
jp2_cmapent_t *ent;
unsigned int i;
cmap->numchans = (box->datalen) / 4;
if (!(cmap->ents = jas_alloc2(cmap->numchans, sizeof(jp2_cmapent_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < cmap->numchans; ++i) {
ent = &cmap->ents[i];
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &ent->cmptno) ||
jp2_getuint8(in, &ent->map) ||
jp2_getuint8(in, &ent->pcol)) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
static int jp2_cmap_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_cmap_t *cmap = &box->data.cmap;
jp2_cmapent_t *ent;
unsigned int i;
cmap->ents = 0;
cmap->numchans = (box->datalen) / 4;
if (!(cmap->ents = jas_alloc2(cmap->numchans, sizeof(jp2_cmapent_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < cmap->numchans; ++i) {
ent = &cmap->ents[i];
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &ent->cmptno) ||
jp2_getuint8(in, &ent->map) ||
jp2_getuint8(in, &ent->pcol)) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 168,322
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool Chapters::ExpandEditionsArray()
{
if (m_editions_size > m_editions_count)
return true; // nothing else to do
const int size = (m_editions_size == 0) ? 1 : 2 * m_editions_size;
Edition* const editions = new (std::nothrow) Edition[size];
if (editions == NULL)
return false;
for (int idx = 0; idx < m_editions_count; ++idx)
{
m_editions[idx].ShallowCopy(editions[idx]);
}
delete[] m_editions;
m_editions = editions;
m_editions_size = size;
return true;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool Chapters::ExpandEditionsArray()
Edition& e = m_editions[m_editions_count++];
e.Init();
return e.Parse(m_pSegment->m_pReader, pos, size);
}
Chapters::Edition::Edition() {}
Chapters::Edition::~Edition() {}
int Chapters::Edition::GetAtomCount() const { return m_atoms_count; }
const Chapters::Atom* Chapters::Edition::GetAtom(int index) const {
if (index < 0)
return NULL;
if (index >= m_atoms_count)
return NULL;
return m_atoms + index;
}
void Chapters::Edition::Init() {
m_atoms = NULL;
m_atoms_size = 0;
m_atoms_count = 0;
}
void Chapters::Edition::ShallowCopy(Edition& rhs) const {
rhs.m_atoms = m_atoms;
rhs.m_atoms_size = m_atoms_size;
rhs.m_atoms_count = m_atoms_count;
}
void Chapters::Edition::Clear() {
while (m_atoms_count > 0) {
Atom& a = m_atoms[--m_atoms_count];
a.Clear();
}
delete[] m_atoms;
m_atoms = NULL;
m_atoms_size = 0;
}
long Chapters::Edition::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x36) { // Atom ID
status = ParseAtom(pReader, pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
| 174,276
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int Track::Info::CopyStr(char* Info::*str, Info& dst_) const {
if (str == static_cast<char * Info::*>(NULL))
return -1;
char*& dst = dst_.*str;
if (dst) // should be NULL already
return -1;
const char* const src = this->*str;
if (src == NULL)
return 0;
const size_t len = strlen(src);
dst = new (std::nothrow) char[len + 1];
if (dst == NULL)
return -1;
strcpy(dst, src);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
int Track::Info::CopyStr(char* Info::*str, Info& dst_) const {
if (str == static_cast<char * Info::*>(NULL))
return -1;
char*& dst = dst_.*str;
if (dst) // should be NULL already
return -1;
const char* const src = this->*str;
if (src == NULL)
return 0;
const size_t len = strlen(src);
dst = SafeArrayAlloc<char>(1, len + 1);
if (dst == NULL)
return -1;
strcpy(dst, src);
return 0;
}
| 173,803
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_seq_ext_data(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
UWORD32 u4_start_code;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
e_error = (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T) IVD_ERROR_NONE;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
while( (u4_start_code == EXTENSION_START_CODE ||
u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE) &&
(IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE == e_error)
{
if(u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE)
{
impeg2d_dec_user_data(ps_dec);
}
else
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,EXT_ID_LEN);
switch(u4_start_code)
{
case SEQ_DISPLAY_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_seq_disp_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case SEQ_SCALABLE_EXT_ID:
e_error = IMPEG2D_SCALABILITIY_NOT_SUPPORTED;
break;
default:
/* In case its a reserved extension code */
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,EXT_ID_LEN);
impeg2d_peek_next_start_code(ps_dec);
break;
}
}
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
}
return e_error;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_seq_ext_data(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
UWORD32 u4_start_code;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
e_error = (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T) IVD_ERROR_NONE;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
while( (u4_start_code == EXTENSION_START_CODE ||
u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE) &&
(IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE == e_error &&
(ps_stream->u4_offset < ps_stream->u4_max_offset))
{
if(u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE)
{
impeg2d_dec_user_data(ps_dec);
}
else
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,EXT_ID_LEN);
switch(u4_start_code)
{
case SEQ_DISPLAY_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_seq_disp_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case SEQ_SCALABLE_EXT_ID:
e_error = IMPEG2D_SCALABILITIY_NOT_SUPPORTED;
break;
default:
/* In case its a reserved extension code */
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,EXT_ID_LEN);
impeg2d_peek_next_start_code(ps_dec);
break;
}
}
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
}
return e_error;
}
| 173,946
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long Chapters::Atom::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x00) { // Display ID
status = ParseDisplay(pReader, pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
} else if (id == 0x1654) { // StringUID ID
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_string_uid);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
} else if (id == 0x33C4) { // UID ID
long long val;
status = UnserializeInt(pReader, pos, size, val);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
m_uid = static_cast<unsigned long long>(val);
} else if (id == 0x11) { // TimeStart ID
const long long val = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (val < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(val);
m_start_timecode = val;
} else if (id == 0x12) { // TimeEnd ID
const long long val = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (val < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(val);
m_stop_timecode = val;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
long Chapters::Atom::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x00) { // Display ID
status = ParseDisplay(pReader, pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
} else if (id == 0x1654) { // StringUID ID
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_string_uid);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
} else if (id == 0x33C4) { // UID ID
long long val;
status = UnserializeInt(pReader, pos, size, val);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
m_uid = static_cast<unsigned long long>(val);
} else if (id == 0x11) { // TimeStart ID
const long long val = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (val < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(val);
m_start_timecode = val;
} else if (id == 0x12) { // TimeEnd ID
const long long val = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (val < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(val);
m_stop_timecode = val;
}
pos += size;
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
| 173,840
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: psh_glyph_find_strong_points( PSH_Glyph glyph,
FT_Int dimension )
{
/* a point is `strong' if it is located on a stem edge and */
/* has an `in' or `out' tangent parallel to the hint's direction */
PSH_Hint_Table table = &glyph->hint_tables[dimension];
PS_Mask mask = table->hint_masks->masks;
FT_UInt num_masks = table->hint_masks->num_masks;
FT_UInt first = 0;
FT_Int major_dir = dimension == 0 ? PSH_DIR_VERTICAL
: PSH_DIR_HORIZONTAL;
PSH_Dimension dim = &glyph->globals->dimension[dimension];
FT_Fixed scale = dim->scale_mult;
FT_Int threshold;
threshold = (FT_Int)FT_DivFix( PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD, scale );
if ( threshold > PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD_MAXIMUM )
threshold = PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD_MAXIMUM;
/* process secondary hints to `selected' points */
/* process secondary hints to `selected' points */
if ( num_masks > 1 && glyph->num_points > 0 )
{
first = mask->end_point;
mask++;
for ( ; num_masks > 1; num_masks--, mask++ )
{
next = mask->end_point;
FT_Int count;
next = mask->end_point;
count = next - first;
if ( count > 0 )
{
threshold, major_dir );
}
first = next;
}
}
/* process primary hints for all points */
if ( num_masks == 1 )
{
FT_UInt count = glyph->num_points;
PSH_Point point = glyph->points;
psh_hint_table_activate_mask( table, table->hint_masks->masks );
psh_hint_table_find_strong_points( table, point, count,
threshold, major_dir );
}
/* now, certain points may have been attached to a hint and */
/* not marked as strong; update their flags then */
{
FT_UInt count = glyph->num_points;
PSH_Point point = glyph->points;
for ( ; count > 0; count--, point++ )
if ( point->hint && !psh_point_is_strong( point ) )
psh_point_set_strong( point );
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
psh_glyph_find_strong_points( PSH_Glyph glyph,
FT_Int dimension )
{
/* a point is `strong' if it is located on a stem edge and */
/* has an `in' or `out' tangent parallel to the hint's direction */
PSH_Hint_Table table = &glyph->hint_tables[dimension];
PS_Mask mask = table->hint_masks->masks;
FT_UInt num_masks = table->hint_masks->num_masks;
FT_UInt first = 0;
FT_Int major_dir = dimension == 0 ? PSH_DIR_VERTICAL
: PSH_DIR_HORIZONTAL;
PSH_Dimension dim = &glyph->globals->dimension[dimension];
FT_Fixed scale = dim->scale_mult;
FT_Int threshold;
threshold = (FT_Int)FT_DivFix( PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD, scale );
if ( threshold > PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD_MAXIMUM )
threshold = PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD_MAXIMUM;
/* process secondary hints to `selected' points */
/* process secondary hints to `selected' points */
if ( num_masks > 1 && glyph->num_points > 0 )
{
/* the `endchar' op can reduce the number of points */
first = mask->end_point > glyph->num_points
? glyph->num_points
: mask->end_point;
mask++;
for ( ; num_masks > 1; num_masks--, mask++ )
{
next = mask->end_point;
FT_Int count;
next = mask->end_point > glyph->num_points
? glyph->num_points
: mask->end_point;
count = next - first;
if ( count > 0 )
{
threshold, major_dir );
}
first = next;
}
}
/* process primary hints for all points */
if ( num_masks == 1 )
{
FT_UInt count = glyph->num_points;
PSH_Point point = glyph->points;
psh_hint_table_activate_mask( table, table->hint_masks->masks );
psh_hint_table_find_strong_points( table, point, count,
threshold, major_dir );
}
/* now, certain points may have been attached to a hint and */
/* not marked as strong; update their flags then */
{
FT_UInt count = glyph->num_points;
PSH_Point point = glyph->points;
for ( ; count > 0; count--, point++ )
if ( point->hint && !psh_point_is_strong( point ) )
psh_point_set_strong( point );
}
}
| 165,007
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void nsc_rle_decompress_data(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
{
UINT16 i;
BYTE* rle;
UINT32 planeSize;
UINT32 originalSize;
rle = context->Planes;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
originalSize = context->OrgByteCount[i];
planeSize = context->PlaneByteCount[i];
if (planeSize == 0)
FillMemory(context->priv->PlaneBuffers[i], originalSize, 0xFF);
else if (planeSize < originalSize)
nsc_rle_decode(rle, context->priv->PlaneBuffers[i], originalSize);
else
CopyMemory(context->priv->PlaneBuffers[i], rle, originalSize);
rle += planeSize;
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
static void nsc_rle_decompress_data(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
static BOOL nsc_rle_decompress_data(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
{
UINT16 i;
BYTE* rle;
UINT32 planeSize;
UINT32 originalSize;
if (!context)
return FALSE;
rle = context->Planes;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
originalSize = context->OrgByteCount[i];
planeSize = context->PlaneByteCount[i];
if (planeSize == 0)
{
if (context->priv->PlaneBuffersLength < originalSize)
return FALSE;
FillMemory(context->priv->PlaneBuffers[i], originalSize, 0xFF);
}
else if (planeSize < originalSize)
{
if (!nsc_rle_decode(rle, context->priv->PlaneBuffers[i], context->priv->PlaneBuffersLength,
originalSize))
return FALSE;
}
else
{
if (context->priv->PlaneBuffersLength < originalSize)
return FALSE;
CopyMemory(context->priv->PlaneBuffers[i], rle, originalSize);
}
rle += planeSize;
}
return TRUE;
}
| 169,285
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: read_packet(int fd, gss_buffer_t buf, int timeout, int first)
{
int ret;
static uint32_t len = 0;
static char len_buf[4];
static int len_buf_pos = 0;
static char * tmpbuf = 0;
static int tmpbuf_pos = 0;
if (first) {
len_buf_pos = 0;
return -2;
}
if (len_buf_pos < 4) {
ret = timed_read(fd, &len_buf[len_buf_pos], 4 - len_buf_pos,
timeout);
if (ret == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
return -2;
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("%s", strerror(errno)));
return -1;
}
if (ret == 0) { /* EOF */
/* Failure to read ANY length just means we're done */
if (len_buf_pos == 0)
return 0;
/*
* Otherwise, we got EOF mid-length, and that's
* a protocol error.
*/
LOG(LOG_INFO, ("EOF reading packet len"));
return -1;
}
len_buf_pos += ret;
}
/* Not done reading the length? */
if (len_buf_pos != 4)
return -2;
/* We have the complete length */
len = ntohl(*(uint32_t *)len_buf);
/*
* We make sure recvd length is reasonable, allowing for some
* slop in enc overhead, beyond the actual maximum number of
* bytes of decrypted payload.
*/
if (len > GSTD_MAXPACKETCONTENTS + 512) {
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("ridiculous length, %ld", len));
return -1;
}
if (!tmpbuf) {
if ((tmpbuf = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
LOG(LOG_CRIT, ("malloc failure, %ld bytes", len));
return -1;
}
}
ret = timed_read(fd, tmpbuf + tmpbuf_pos, len - tmpbuf_pos, timeout);
if (ret == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
return -2;
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("%s", strerror(errno)));
return -1;
}
if (ret == 0) {
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("EOF while reading packet (len=%d)", len));
return -1;
}
tmpbuf_pos += ret;
if (tmpbuf_pos == len) {
buf->length = len;
buf->value = tmpbuf;
len = len_buf_pos = tmpbuf_pos = 0;
tmpbuf = NULL;
LOG(LOG_DEBUG, ("read packet of length %d", buf->length));
return 1;
}
return -2;
}
Commit Message: knc: fix a couple of memory leaks.
One of these can be remotely triggered during the authentication
phase which leads to a remote DoS possibility.
Pointed out by: Imre Rad <radimre83@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400
|
read_packet(int fd, gss_buffer_t buf, int timeout, int first)
{
int ret;
static uint32_t len = 0;
static char len_buf[4];
static int len_buf_pos = 0;
static char * tmpbuf = 0;
static int tmpbuf_pos = 0;
if (first) {
len_buf_pos = 0;
return -2;
}
if (len_buf_pos < 4) {
ret = timed_read(fd, &len_buf[len_buf_pos], 4 - len_buf_pos,
timeout);
if (ret == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
return -2;
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("%s", strerror(errno)));
goto bail;
}
if (ret == 0) { /* EOF */
/* Failure to read ANY length just means we're done */
if (len_buf_pos == 0)
return 0;
/*
* Otherwise, we got EOF mid-length, and that's
* a protocol error.
*/
LOG(LOG_INFO, ("EOF reading packet len"));
goto bail;
}
len_buf_pos += ret;
}
/* Not done reading the length? */
if (len_buf_pos != 4)
return -2;
/* We have the complete length */
len = ntohl(*(uint32_t *)len_buf);
/*
* We make sure recvd length is reasonable, allowing for some
* slop in enc overhead, beyond the actual maximum number of
* bytes of decrypted payload.
*/
if (len > GSTD_MAXPACKETCONTENTS + 512) {
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("ridiculous length, %ld", len));
goto bail;
}
if (!tmpbuf) {
if ((tmpbuf = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
LOG(LOG_CRIT, ("malloc failure, %ld bytes", len));
goto bail;
}
}
ret = timed_read(fd, tmpbuf + tmpbuf_pos, len - tmpbuf_pos, timeout);
if (ret == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
return -2;
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("%s", strerror(errno)));
goto bail;
}
if (ret == 0) {
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("EOF while reading packet (len=%d)", len));
goto bail;
}
tmpbuf_pos += ret;
if (tmpbuf_pos == len) {
buf->length = len;
buf->value = tmpbuf;
len = len_buf_pos = tmpbuf_pos = 0;
tmpbuf = NULL;
LOG(LOG_DEBUG, ("read packet of length %d", buf->length));
return 1;
}
return -2;
bail:
free(tmpbuf);
tmpbuf = NULL;
return -1;
}
| 169,433
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Utterance::~Utterance() {
DCHECK_EQ(completion_task_, static_cast<Task *>(NULL));
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
Utterance::~Utterance() {
| 170,397
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int sock_send_fd(int sock_fd, const uint8_t* buf, int len, int send_fd)
{
ssize_t ret;
struct msghdr msg;
unsigned char *buffer = (unsigned char *)buf;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
char msgbuf[CMSG_SPACE(1)];
asrt(send_fd != -1);
if(sock_fd == -1 || send_fd == -1)
return -1;
msg.msg_control = msgbuf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof msgbuf;
cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof send_fd);
memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), &send_fd, sizeof send_fd);
int ret_len = len;
while (len > 0) {
struct iovec iv;
memset(&iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
iv.iov_base = buffer;
iv.iov_len = len;
msg.msg_iov = &iv;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
do {
ret = sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, MSG_NOSIGNAL);
} while (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR);
if (ret < 0) {
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("fd:%d, send_fd:%d, sendmsg ret:%d, errno:%d, %s",
sock_fd, send_fd, (int)ret, errno, strerror(errno));
ret_len = -1;
break;
}
buffer += ret;
len -= ret;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("close fd:%d after sent", send_fd);
close(send_fd);
return ret_len;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
int sock_send_fd(int sock_fd, const uint8_t* buf, int len, int send_fd)
{
ssize_t ret;
struct msghdr msg;
unsigned char *buffer = (unsigned char *)buf;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
char msgbuf[CMSG_SPACE(1)];
asrt(send_fd != -1);
if(sock_fd == -1 || send_fd == -1)
return -1;
msg.msg_control = msgbuf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof msgbuf;
cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof send_fd);
memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), &send_fd, sizeof send_fd);
int ret_len = len;
while (len > 0) {
struct iovec iv;
memset(&iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
iv.iov_base = buffer;
iv.iov_len = len;
msg.msg_iov = &iv;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
do {
ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, MSG_NOSIGNAL));
} while (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR);
if (ret < 0) {
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("fd:%d, send_fd:%d, sendmsg ret:%d, errno:%d, %s",
sock_fd, send_fd, (int)ret, errno, strerror(errno));
ret_len = -1;
break;
}
buffer += ret;
len -= ret;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("close fd:%d after sent", send_fd);
close(send_fd);
return ret_len;
}
| 173,470
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static __u8 *ch_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
if (*rsize >= 17 && rdesc[11] == 0x3c && rdesc[12] == 0x02) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up Cherry Cymotion report descriptor\n");
rdesc[11] = rdesc[16] = 0xff;
rdesc[12] = rdesc[17] = 0x03;
}
return rdesc;
}
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static __u8 *ch_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
if (*rsize >= 18 && rdesc[11] == 0x3c && rdesc[12] == 0x02) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up Cherry Cymotion report descriptor\n");
rdesc[11] = rdesc[16] = 0xff;
rdesc[12] = rdesc[17] = 0x03;
}
return rdesc;
}
| 166,370
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: svc_set_num_threads(struct svc_serv *serv, struct svc_pool *pool, int nrservs)
{
struct svc_rqst *rqstp;
struct task_struct *task;
struct svc_pool *chosen_pool;
int error = 0;
unsigned int state = serv->sv_nrthreads-1;
int node;
if (pool == NULL) {
/* The -1 assumes caller has done a svc_get() */
nrservs -= (serv->sv_nrthreads-1);
} else {
spin_lock_bh(&pool->sp_lock);
nrservs -= pool->sp_nrthreads;
spin_unlock_bh(&pool->sp_lock);
}
/* create new threads */
while (nrservs > 0) {
nrservs--;
chosen_pool = choose_pool(serv, pool, &state);
node = svc_pool_map_get_node(chosen_pool->sp_id);
rqstp = svc_prepare_thread(serv, chosen_pool, node);
if (IS_ERR(rqstp)) {
error = PTR_ERR(rqstp);
break;
}
__module_get(serv->sv_ops->svo_module);
task = kthread_create_on_node(serv->sv_ops->svo_function, rqstp,
node, "%s", serv->sv_name);
if (IS_ERR(task)) {
error = PTR_ERR(task);
module_put(serv->sv_ops->svo_module);
svc_exit_thread(rqstp);
break;
}
rqstp->rq_task = task;
if (serv->sv_nrpools > 1)
svc_pool_map_set_cpumask(task, chosen_pool->sp_id);
svc_sock_update_bufs(serv);
wake_up_process(task);
}
/* destroy old threads */
while (nrservs < 0 &&
(task = choose_victim(serv, pool, &state)) != NULL) {
send_sig(SIGINT, task, 1);
nrservs++;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
|
svc_set_num_threads(struct svc_serv *serv, struct svc_pool *pool, int nrservs)
/* create new threads */
static int
svc_start_kthreads(struct svc_serv *serv, struct svc_pool *pool, int nrservs)
{
struct svc_rqst *rqstp;
struct task_struct *task;
struct svc_pool *chosen_pool;
unsigned int state = serv->sv_nrthreads-1;
int node;
do {
nrservs--;
chosen_pool = choose_pool(serv, pool, &state);
node = svc_pool_map_get_node(chosen_pool->sp_id);
rqstp = svc_prepare_thread(serv, chosen_pool, node);
if (IS_ERR(rqstp))
return PTR_ERR(rqstp);
__module_get(serv->sv_ops->svo_module);
task = kthread_create_on_node(serv->sv_ops->svo_function, rqstp,
node, "%s", serv->sv_name);
if (IS_ERR(task)) {
module_put(serv->sv_ops->svo_module);
svc_exit_thread(rqstp);
return PTR_ERR(task);
}
rqstp->rq_task = task;
if (serv->sv_nrpools > 1)
svc_pool_map_set_cpumask(task, chosen_pool->sp_id);
svc_sock_update_bufs(serv);
wake_up_process(task);
} while (nrservs > 0);
return 0;
}
/* destroy old threads */
static int
svc_signal_kthreads(struct svc_serv *serv, struct svc_pool *pool, int nrservs)
{
struct task_struct *task;
unsigned int state = serv->sv_nrthreads-1;
/* destroy old threads */
do {
task = choose_victim(serv, pool, &state);
if (task == NULL)
break;
send_sig(SIGINT, task, 1);
nrservs++;
} while (nrservs < 0);
return 0;
}
/*
* Create or destroy enough new threads to make the number
* of threads the given number. If `pool' is non-NULL, applies
* only to threads in that pool, otherwise round-robins between
* all pools. Caller must ensure that mutual exclusion between this and
* server startup or shutdown.
*
* Destroying threads relies on the service threads filling in
* rqstp->rq_task, which only the nfs ones do. Assumes the serv
* has been created using svc_create_pooled().
*
* Based on code that used to be in nfsd_svc() but tweaked
* to be pool-aware.
*/
int
svc_set_num_threads(struct svc_serv *serv, struct svc_pool *pool, int nrservs)
{
if (pool == NULL) {
/* The -1 assumes caller has done a svc_get() */
nrservs -= (serv->sv_nrthreads-1);
} else {
spin_lock_bh(&pool->sp_lock);
nrservs -= pool->sp_nrthreads;
spin_unlock_bh(&pool->sp_lock);
}
if (nrservs > 0)
return svc_start_kthreads(serv, pool, nrservs);
if (nrservs < 0)
return svc_signal_kthreads(serv, pool, nrservs);
return 0;
}
| 168,155
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::appendFrom(const Parcel *parcel, size_t offset, size_t len)
{
const sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
status_t err;
const uint8_t *data = parcel->mData;
const binder_size_t *objects = parcel->mObjects;
size_t size = parcel->mObjectsSize;
int startPos = mDataPos;
int firstIndex = -1, lastIndex = -2;
if (len == 0) {
return NO_ERROR;
}
if ((offset > parcel->mDataSize)
|| (len > parcel->mDataSize)
|| (offset + len > parcel->mDataSize)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
for (int i = 0; i < (int) size; i++) {
size_t off = objects[i];
if ((off >= offset) && (off < offset + len)) {
if (firstIndex == -1) {
firstIndex = i;
}
lastIndex = i;
}
}
int numObjects = lastIndex - firstIndex + 1;
if ((mDataSize+len) > mDataCapacity) {
err = growData(len);
if (err != NO_ERROR) {
return err;
}
}
memcpy(mData + mDataPos, data + offset, len);
mDataPos += len;
mDataSize += len;
err = NO_ERROR;
if (numObjects > 0) {
if (mObjectsCapacity < mObjectsSize + numObjects) {
int newSize = ((mObjectsSize + numObjects)*3)/2;
binder_size_t *objects =
(binder_size_t*)realloc(mObjects, newSize*sizeof(binder_size_t));
if (objects == (binder_size_t*)0) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
mObjects = objects;
mObjectsCapacity = newSize;
}
int idx = mObjectsSize;
for (int i = firstIndex; i <= lastIndex; i++) {
size_t off = objects[i] - offset + startPos;
mObjects[idx++] = off;
mObjectsSize++;
flat_binder_object* flat
= reinterpret_cast<flat_binder_object*>(mData + off);
acquire_object(proc, *flat, this);
if (flat->type == BINDER_TYPE_FD) {
flat->handle = dup(flat->handle);
flat->cookie = 1;
mHasFds = mFdsKnown = true;
if (!mAllowFds) {
err = FDS_NOT_ALLOWED;
}
}
}
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
status_t Parcel::appendFrom(const Parcel *parcel, size_t offset, size_t len)
{
const sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
status_t err;
const uint8_t *data = parcel->mData;
const binder_size_t *objects = parcel->mObjects;
size_t size = parcel->mObjectsSize;
int startPos = mDataPos;
int firstIndex = -1, lastIndex = -2;
if (len == 0) {
return NO_ERROR;
}
if ((offset > parcel->mDataSize)
|| (len > parcel->mDataSize)
|| (offset + len > parcel->mDataSize)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
for (int i = 0; i < (int) size; i++) {
size_t off = objects[i];
if ((off >= offset) && (off + sizeof(flat_binder_object) <= offset + len)) {
if (firstIndex == -1) {
firstIndex = i;
}
lastIndex = i;
}
}
int numObjects = lastIndex - firstIndex + 1;
if ((mDataSize+len) > mDataCapacity) {
err = growData(len);
if (err != NO_ERROR) {
return err;
}
}
memcpy(mData + mDataPos, data + offset, len);
mDataPos += len;
mDataSize += len;
err = NO_ERROR;
if (numObjects > 0) {
if (mObjectsCapacity < mObjectsSize + numObjects) {
int newSize = ((mObjectsSize + numObjects)*3)/2;
binder_size_t *objects =
(binder_size_t*)realloc(mObjects, newSize*sizeof(binder_size_t));
if (objects == (binder_size_t*)0) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
mObjects = objects;
mObjectsCapacity = newSize;
}
int idx = mObjectsSize;
for (int i = firstIndex; i <= lastIndex; i++) {
size_t off = objects[i] - offset + startPos;
mObjects[idx++] = off;
mObjectsSize++;
flat_binder_object* flat
= reinterpret_cast<flat_binder_object*>(mData + off);
acquire_object(proc, *flat, this);
if (flat->type == BINDER_TYPE_FD) {
flat->handle = dup(flat->handle);
flat->cookie = 1;
mHasFds = mFdsKnown = true;
if (!mAllowFds) {
err = FDS_NOT_ALLOWED;
}
}
}
}
return err;
}
| 173,342
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: png_handle_iCCP(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
/* Note: this does not properly handle chunks that are > 64K under DOS */
{
png_byte compression_type;
png_bytep pC;
png_charp profile;
png_uint_32 skip = 0;
png_uint_32 profile_size, profile_length;
png_size_t slength, prefix_length, data_length;
png_debug(1, "in png_handle_iCCP");
if (!(png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IHDR))
png_error(png_ptr, "Missing IHDR before iCCP");
else if (png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IDAT)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Invalid iCCP after IDAT");
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
return;
}
else if (png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_PLTE)
/* Should be an error, but we can cope with it */
png_warning(png_ptr, "Out of place iCCP chunk");
if (info_ptr != NULL && (info_ptr->valid & PNG_INFO_iCCP))
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Duplicate iCCP chunk");
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
return;
}
#ifdef PNG_MAX_MALLOC_64K
if (length > (png_uint_32)65535L)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "iCCP chunk too large to fit in memory");
skip = length - (png_uint_32)65535L;
length = (png_uint_32)65535L;
}
#endif
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = (png_charp)png_malloc(png_ptr, length + 1);
slength = (png_size_t)length;
png_crc_read(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_ptr->chunkdata, slength);
if (png_crc_finish(png_ptr, skip))
{
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
return;
}
png_ptr->chunkdata[slength] = 0x00;
for (profile = png_ptr->chunkdata; *profile; profile++)
/* Empty loop to find end of name */ ;
++profile;
/* There should be at least one zero (the compression type byte)
* following the separator, and we should be on it
*/
if ( profile >= png_ptr->chunkdata + slength - 1)
{
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
png_warning(png_ptr, "Malformed iCCP chunk");
return;
}
/* Compression_type should always be zero */
compression_type = *profile++;
if (compression_type)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Ignoring nonzero compression type in iCCP chunk");
compression_type = 0x00; /* Reset it to zero (libpng-1.0.6 through 1.0.8
wrote nonzero) */
}
prefix_length = profile - png_ptr->chunkdata;
png_decompress_chunk(png_ptr, compression_type,
slength, prefix_length, &data_length);
profile_length = data_length - prefix_length;
if ( prefix_length > data_length || profile_length < 4)
{
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
png_warning(png_ptr, "Profile size field missing from iCCP chunk");
return;
}
/* Check the profile_size recorded in the first 32 bits of the ICC profile */
pC = (png_bytep)(png_ptr->chunkdata + prefix_length);
profile_size = ((*(pC ))<<24) |
((*(pC + 1))<<16) |
((*(pC + 2))<< 8) |
((*(pC + 3)) );
if (profile_size < profile_length)
profile_length = profile_size;
if (profile_size > profile_length)
{
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
png_warning(png_ptr, "Ignoring truncated iCCP profile.");
return;
}
png_set_iCCP(png_ptr, info_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata,
compression_type, png_ptr->chunkdata + prefix_length, profile_length);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
png_handle_iCCP(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
/* Note: this does not properly handle chunks that are > 64K under DOS */
{
png_byte compression_type;
png_bytep pC;
png_charp profile;
png_uint_32 skip = 0;
png_uint_32 profile_size, profile_length;
png_size_t slength, prefix_length, data_length;
png_debug(1, "in png_handle_iCCP");
if (!(png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IHDR))
png_error(png_ptr, "Missing IHDR before iCCP");
else if (png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IDAT)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Invalid iCCP after IDAT");
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
return;
}
else if (png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_PLTE)
/* Should be an error, but we can cope with it */
png_warning(png_ptr, "Out of place iCCP chunk");
if (info_ptr != NULL && (info_ptr->valid & PNG_INFO_iCCP))
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Duplicate iCCP chunk");
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
return;
}
#ifdef PNG_MAX_MALLOC_64K
if (length > (png_uint_32)65535L)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "iCCP chunk too large to fit in memory");
skip = length - (png_uint_32)65535L;
length = (png_uint_32)65535L;
}
#endif
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = (png_charp)png_malloc(png_ptr, length + 1);
slength = (png_size_t)length;
png_crc_read(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_ptr->chunkdata, slength);
if (png_crc_finish(png_ptr, skip))
{
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
return;
}
png_ptr->chunkdata[slength] = 0x00;
for (profile = png_ptr->chunkdata; *profile; profile++)
/* Empty loop to find end of name */ ;
++profile;
/* There should be at least one zero (the compression type byte)
* following the separator, and we should be on it
*/
if ( profile >= png_ptr->chunkdata + slength - 1)
{
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
png_warning(png_ptr, "Malformed iCCP chunk");
return;
}
/* Compression_type should always be zero */
compression_type = *profile++;
if (compression_type)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Ignoring nonzero compression type in iCCP chunk");
compression_type = 0x00; /* Reset it to zero (libpng-1.0.6 through 1.0.8
wrote nonzero) */
}
prefix_length = profile - png_ptr->chunkdata;
png_decompress_chunk(png_ptr, compression_type,
slength, prefix_length, &data_length);
profile_length = data_length - prefix_length;
if ( prefix_length > data_length || profile_length < 4)
{
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
png_warning(png_ptr, "Profile size field missing from iCCP chunk");
return;
}
/* Check the profile_size recorded in the first 32 bits of the ICC profile */
pC = (png_bytep)(png_ptr->chunkdata + prefix_length);
profile_size = ((png_uint_32) (*(pC )<<24)) |
((png_uint_32) (*(pC + 1)<<16)) |
((png_uint_32) (*(pC + 2)<< 8)) |
((png_uint_32) (*(pC + 3) ));
if (profile_size < profile_length)
profile_length = profile_size;
if (profile_size > profile_length)
{
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
png_warning(png_ptr, "Ignoring truncated iCCP profile.");
return;
}
png_set_iCCP(png_ptr, info_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata,
compression_type, png_ptr->chunkdata + prefix_length, profile_length);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
}
| 172,178
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: lmp_print_data_link_subobjs(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *obj_tptr,
int total_subobj_len, int offset)
{
int hexdump = FALSE;
int subobj_type, subobj_len;
union { /* int to float conversion buffer */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
while (total_subobj_len > 0 && hexdump == FALSE ) {
subobj_type = EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset);
subobj_len = EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Subobject, Type: %s (%u), Length: %u",
tok2str(lmp_data_link_subobj,
"Unknown",
subobj_type),
subobj_type,
subobj_len));
if (subobj_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (too short)"));
break;
}
if ((subobj_len % 4) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (not a multiple of 4)"));
break;
}
if (total_subobj_len < subobj_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (goes past the end of the object)"));
break;
}
switch(subobj_type) {
case INT_SWITCHING_TYPE_SUBOBJ:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Switching Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(gmpls_switch_cap_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 2)),
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 2)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Encoding Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(gmpls_encoding_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 3)),
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 3)));
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 4);
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Min Reservable Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Max Reservable Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case WAVELENGTH_SUBOBJ:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Wavelength: %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)));
break;
default:
/* Any Unknown Subobject ==> Exit loop */
hexdump=TRUE;
break;
}
total_subobj_len-=subobj_len;
offset+=subobj_len;
}
return (hexdump);
trunc:
return -1;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) LMP: Add some missing bounds checks
In lmp_print_data_link_subobjs(), these problems were identified
through code review.
Moreover:
Add and use tstr[].
Update two tests outputs accordingly.
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
lmp_print_data_link_subobjs(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *obj_tptr,
int total_subobj_len, int offset)
{
int hexdump = FALSE;
int subobj_type, subobj_len;
union { /* int to float conversion buffer */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
while (total_subobj_len > 0 && hexdump == FALSE ) {
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(obj_tptr + offset);
subobj_type = EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset);
subobj_len = EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Subobject, Type: %s (%u), Length: %u",
tok2str(lmp_data_link_subobj,
"Unknown",
subobj_type),
subobj_type,
subobj_len));
if (subobj_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (too short)"));
break;
}
if ((subobj_len % 4) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (not a multiple of 4)"));
break;
}
if (total_subobj_len < subobj_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (goes past the end of the object)"));
break;
}
switch(subobj_type) {
case INT_SWITCHING_TYPE_SUBOBJ:
ND_TCHECK_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Switching Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(gmpls_switch_cap_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 2)),
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 2)));
ND_TCHECK_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 3);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Encoding Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(gmpls_encoding_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 3)),
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 3)));
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 4);
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Min Reservable Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 8);
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Max Reservable Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case WAVELENGTH_SUBOBJ:
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Wavelength: %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)));
break;
default:
/* Any Unknown Subobject ==> Exit loop */
hexdump=TRUE;
break;
}
total_subobj_len-=subobj_len;
offset+=subobj_len;
}
return (hexdump);
trunc:
return -1;
}
| 169,538
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int db_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct kvm_run *kvm_run = svm->vcpu.run;
if (!(svm->vcpu.guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)) &&
!svm->nmi_singlestep) {
kvm_queue_exception(&svm->vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
if (svm->nmi_singlestep) {
svm->nmi_singlestep = false;
if (!(svm->vcpu.guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP))
svm->vmcb->save.rflags &=
~(X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);
update_db_bp_intercept(&svm->vcpu);
}
if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)) {
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
kvm_run->debug.arch.pc =
svm->vmcb->save.cs.base + svm->vmcb->save.rip;
kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = DB_VECTOR;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB
This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).
VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static int db_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct kvm_run *kvm_run = svm->vcpu.run;
if (!(svm->vcpu.guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)) &&
!svm->nmi_singlestep) {
kvm_queue_exception(&svm->vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
if (svm->nmi_singlestep) {
svm->nmi_singlestep = false;
if (!(svm->vcpu.guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP))
svm->vmcb->save.rflags &=
~(X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);
}
if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)) {
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
kvm_run->debug.arch.pc =
svm->vmcb->save.cs.base + svm->vmcb->save.rip;
kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = DB_VECTOR;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
| 166,568
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RunFwdTxfm(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride) {
fwd_txfm_(in, out, stride);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void RunFwdTxfm(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride) {
void RunFwdTxfm(const int16_t *in, tran_low_t *out, int stride) {
fwd_txfm_(in, out, stride);
}
| 174,549
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: build_config(char *prefix, struct server *server)
{
char *path = NULL;
int path_size = strlen(prefix) + strlen(server->port) + 20;
path = ss_malloc(path_size);
snprintf(path, path_size, "%s/.shadowsocks_%s.conf", prefix, server->port);
FILE *f = fopen(path, "w+");
if (f == NULL) {
if (verbose) {
LOGE("unable to open config file");
}
ss_free(path);
return;
}
fprintf(f, "{\n");
fprintf(f, "\"server_port\":%d,\n", atoi(server->port));
fprintf(f, "\"password\":\"%s\"", server->password);
if (server->fast_open[0]) fprintf(f, ",\n\"fast_open\": %s", server->fast_open);
if (server->mode) fprintf(f, ",\n\"mode\":\"%s\"", server->mode);
if (server->method) fprintf(f, ",\n\"method\":\"%s\"", server->method);
if (server->plugin) fprintf(f, ",\n\"plugin\":\"%s\"", server->plugin);
if (server->plugin_opts) fprintf(f, ",\n\"plugin_opts\":\"%s\"", server->plugin_opts);
fprintf(f, "\n}\n");
fclose(f);
ss_free(path);
}
Commit Message: Fix #1734
CWE ID: CWE-78
|
build_config(char *prefix, struct server *server)
build_config(char *prefix, struct manager_ctx *manager, struct server *server)
{
char *path = NULL;
int path_size = strlen(prefix) + strlen(server->port) + 20;
path = ss_malloc(path_size);
snprintf(path, path_size, "%s/.shadowsocks_%s.conf", prefix, server->port);
FILE *f = fopen(path, "w+");
if (f == NULL) {
if (verbose) {
LOGE("unable to open config file");
}
ss_free(path);
return;
}
fprintf(f, "{\n");
fprintf(f, "\"server_port\":%d,\n", atoi(server->port));
fprintf(f, "\"password\":\"%s\"", server->password);
if (server->method)
fprintf(f, ",\n\"method\":\"%s\"", server->method);
else if (manager->method)
fprintf(f, ",\n\"method\":\"%s\"", manager->method);
if (server->fast_open[0])
fprintf(f, ",\n\"fast_open\": %s", server->fast_open);
if (server->mode)
fprintf(f, ",\n\"mode\":\"%s\"", server->mode);
if (server->plugin)
fprintf(f, ",\n\"plugin\":\"%s\"", server->plugin);
if (server->plugin_opts)
fprintf(f, ",\n\"plugin_opts\":\"%s\"", server->plugin_opts);
fprintf(f, "\n}\n");
fclose(f);
ss_free(path);
}
| 167,713
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: char *curl_easy_escape(CURL *handle, const char *string, int inlength)
{
size_t alloc = (inlength?(size_t)inlength:strlen(string))+1;
char *ns;
char *testing_ptr = NULL;
unsigned char in; /* we need to treat the characters unsigned */
size_t newlen = alloc;
int strindex=0;
size_t length;
CURLcode res;
ns = malloc(alloc);
if(!ns)
return NULL;
length = alloc-1;
while(length--) {
in = *string;
if(Curl_isunreserved(in))
/* just copy this */
ns[strindex++]=in;
else {
/* encode it */
newlen += 2; /* the size grows with two, since this'll become a %XX */
if(newlen > alloc) {
alloc *= 2;
testing_ptr = realloc(ns, alloc);
if(!testing_ptr) {
free( ns );
return NULL;
}
else {
ns = testing_ptr;
}
}
res = Curl_convert_to_network(handle, &in, 1);
if(res) {
/* Curl_convert_to_network calls failf if unsuccessful */
free(ns);
return NULL;
}
snprintf(&ns[strindex], 4, "%%%02X", in);
strindex+=3;
}
string++;
}
ns[strindex]=0; /* terminate it */
return ns;
}
Commit Message: URL sanitize: reject URLs containing bad data
Protocols (IMAP, POP3 and SMTP) that use the path part of a URL in a
decoded manner now use the new Curl_urldecode() function to reject URLs
with embedded control codes (anything that is or decodes to a byte value
less than 32).
URLs containing such codes could easily otherwise be used to do harm and
allow users to do unintended actions with otherwise innocent tools and
applications. Like for example using a URL like
pop3://pop3.example.com/1%0d%0aDELE%201 when the app wants a URL to get
a mail and instead this would delete one.
This flaw is considered a security vulnerability: CVE-2012-0036
Security advisory at: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20120124.html
Reported by: Dan Fandrich
CWE ID: CWE-89
|
char *curl_easy_escape(CURL *handle, const char *string, int inlength)
{
size_t alloc = (inlength?(size_t)inlength:strlen(string))+1;
char *ns;
char *testing_ptr = NULL;
unsigned char in; /* we need to treat the characters unsigned */
size_t newlen = alloc;
size_t strindex=0;
size_t length;
CURLcode res;
ns = malloc(alloc);
if(!ns)
return NULL;
length = alloc-1;
while(length--) {
in = *string;
if(Curl_isunreserved(in))
/* just copy this */
ns[strindex++]=in;
else {
/* encode it */
newlen += 2; /* the size grows with two, since this'll become a %XX */
if(newlen > alloc) {
alloc *= 2;
testing_ptr = realloc(ns, alloc);
if(!testing_ptr) {
free( ns );
return NULL;
}
else {
ns = testing_ptr;
}
}
res = Curl_convert_to_network(handle, &in, 1);
if(res) {
/* Curl_convert_to_network calls failf if unsuccessful */
free(ns);
return NULL;
}
snprintf(&ns[strindex], 4, "%%%02X", in);
strindex+=3;
}
string++;
}
ns[strindex]=0; /* terminate it */
return ns;
}
| 165,664
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DateTimeChooserImpl::writeDocument(SharedBuffer* data)
{
String stepString = String::number(m_parameters.step);
String stepBaseString = String::number(m_parameters.stepBase, 11, WTF::TruncateTrailingZeros);
IntRect anchorRectInScreen = m_chromeClient->rootViewToScreen(m_parameters.anchorRectInRootView);
String todayLabelString;
String otherDateLabelString;
if (m_parameters.type == InputTypeNames::month) {
todayLabelString = locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::ThisMonthButtonLabel);
otherDateLabelString = locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::OtherMonthLabel);
} else if (m_parameters.type == InputTypeNames::week) {
todayLabelString = locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::ThisWeekButtonLabel);
otherDateLabelString = locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::OtherWeekLabel);
} else {
todayLabelString = locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::CalendarToday);
otherDateLabelString = locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::OtherDateLabel);
}
addString("<!DOCTYPE html><head><meta charset='UTF-8'><style>\n", data);
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("pickerCommon.css"));
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("pickerButton.css"));
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("suggestionPicker.css"));
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("calendarPicker.css"));
addString("</style></head><body><div id=main>Loading...</div><script>\n"
"window.dialogArguments = {\n", data);
addProperty("anchorRectInScreen", anchorRectInScreen, data);
addProperty("min", valueToDateTimeString(m_parameters.minimum, m_parameters.type), data);
addProperty("max", valueToDateTimeString(m_parameters.maximum, m_parameters.type), data);
addProperty("step", stepString, data);
addProperty("stepBase", stepBaseString, data);
addProperty("required", m_parameters.required, data);
addProperty("currentValue", valueToDateTimeString(m_parameters.doubleValue, m_parameters.type), data);
addProperty("locale", m_parameters.locale.string(), data);
addProperty("todayLabel", todayLabelString, data);
addProperty("clearLabel", locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::CalendarClear), data);
addProperty("weekLabel", locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::WeekNumberLabel), data);
addProperty("weekStartDay", m_locale->firstDayOfWeek(), data);
addProperty("shortMonthLabels", m_locale->shortMonthLabels(), data);
addProperty("dayLabels", m_locale->weekDayShortLabels(), data);
addProperty("isLocaleRTL", m_locale->isRTL(), data);
addProperty("isRTL", m_parameters.isAnchorElementRTL, data);
addProperty("mode", m_parameters.type.string(), data);
if (m_parameters.suggestions.size()) {
Vector<String> suggestionValues;
Vector<String> localizedSuggestionValues;
Vector<String> suggestionLabels;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < m_parameters.suggestions.size(); i++) {
suggestionValues.append(valueToDateTimeString(m_parameters.suggestions[i].value, m_parameters.type));
localizedSuggestionValues.append(m_parameters.suggestions[i].localizedValue);
suggestionLabels.append(m_parameters.suggestions[i].label);
}
addProperty("suggestionValues", suggestionValues, data);
addProperty("localizedSuggestionValues", localizedSuggestionValues, data);
addProperty("suggestionLabels", suggestionLabels, data);
addProperty("inputWidth", static_cast<unsigned>(m_parameters.anchorRectInRootView.width()), data);
addProperty("showOtherDateEntry", RenderTheme::theme().supportsCalendarPicker(m_parameters.type), data);
addProperty("otherDateLabel", otherDateLabelString, data);
addProperty("suggestionHighlightColor", RenderTheme::theme().activeListBoxSelectionBackgroundColor().serialized(), data);
addProperty("suggestionHighlightTextColor", RenderTheme::theme().activeListBoxSelectionForegroundColor().serialized(), data);
}
addString("}\n", data);
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("pickerCommon.js"));
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("suggestionPicker.js"));
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("calendarPicker.js"));
addString("</script></body>\n", data);
}
Commit Message: AX: Calendar Picker: Add AX labels to MonthPopupButton and CalendarNavigationButtons.
This CL adds no new tests. Will add tests after a Chromium change for
string resource.
BUG=123896
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/552163002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@181617 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-22
|
void DateTimeChooserImpl::writeDocument(SharedBuffer* data)
{
String stepString = String::number(m_parameters.step);
String stepBaseString = String::number(m_parameters.stepBase, 11, WTF::TruncateTrailingZeros);
IntRect anchorRectInScreen = m_chromeClient->rootViewToScreen(m_parameters.anchorRectInRootView);
String todayLabelString;
String otherDateLabelString;
if (m_parameters.type == InputTypeNames::month) {
todayLabelString = locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::ThisMonthButtonLabel);
otherDateLabelString = locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::OtherMonthLabel);
} else if (m_parameters.type == InputTypeNames::week) {
todayLabelString = locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::ThisWeekButtonLabel);
otherDateLabelString = locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::OtherWeekLabel);
} else {
todayLabelString = locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::CalendarToday);
otherDateLabelString = locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::OtherDateLabel);
}
addString("<!DOCTYPE html><head><meta charset='UTF-8'><style>\n", data);
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("pickerCommon.css"));
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("pickerButton.css"));
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("suggestionPicker.css"));
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("calendarPicker.css"));
addString("</style></head><body><div id=main>Loading...</div><script>\n"
"window.dialogArguments = {\n", data);
addProperty("anchorRectInScreen", anchorRectInScreen, data);
addProperty("min", valueToDateTimeString(m_parameters.minimum, m_parameters.type), data);
addProperty("max", valueToDateTimeString(m_parameters.maximum, m_parameters.type), data);
addProperty("step", stepString, data);
addProperty("stepBase", stepBaseString, data);
addProperty("required", m_parameters.required, data);
addProperty("currentValue", valueToDateTimeString(m_parameters.doubleValue, m_parameters.type), data);
addProperty("locale", m_parameters.locale.string(), data);
addProperty("todayLabel", todayLabelString, data);
addProperty("clearLabel", locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::CalendarClear), data);
addProperty("weekLabel", locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::WeekNumberLabel), data);
addProperty("axShowMonthSelector", locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::AXCalendarShowMonthSelector), data);
addProperty("axShowNextMonth", locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::AXCalendarShowNextMonth), data);
addProperty("axShowPreviousMonth", locale().queryString(WebLocalizedString::AXCalendarShowPreviousMonth), data);
addProperty("weekStartDay", m_locale->firstDayOfWeek(), data);
addProperty("shortMonthLabels", m_locale->shortMonthLabels(), data);
addProperty("dayLabels", m_locale->weekDayShortLabels(), data);
addProperty("isLocaleRTL", m_locale->isRTL(), data);
addProperty("isRTL", m_parameters.isAnchorElementRTL, data);
addProperty("mode", m_parameters.type.string(), data);
if (m_parameters.suggestions.size()) {
Vector<String> suggestionValues;
Vector<String> localizedSuggestionValues;
Vector<String> suggestionLabels;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < m_parameters.suggestions.size(); i++) {
suggestionValues.append(valueToDateTimeString(m_parameters.suggestions[i].value, m_parameters.type));
localizedSuggestionValues.append(m_parameters.suggestions[i].localizedValue);
suggestionLabels.append(m_parameters.suggestions[i].label);
}
addProperty("suggestionValues", suggestionValues, data);
addProperty("localizedSuggestionValues", localizedSuggestionValues, data);
addProperty("suggestionLabels", suggestionLabels, data);
addProperty("inputWidth", static_cast<unsigned>(m_parameters.anchorRectInRootView.width()), data);
addProperty("showOtherDateEntry", RenderTheme::theme().supportsCalendarPicker(m_parameters.type), data);
addProperty("otherDateLabel", otherDateLabelString, data);
addProperty("suggestionHighlightColor", RenderTheme::theme().activeListBoxSelectionBackgroundColor().serialized(), data);
addProperty("suggestionHighlightTextColor", RenderTheme::theme().activeListBoxSelectionForegroundColor().serialized(), data);
}
addString("}\n", data);
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("pickerCommon.js"));
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("suggestionPicker.js"));
data->append(Platform::current()->loadResource("calendarPicker.js"));
addString("</script></body>\n", data);
}
| 171,196
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: WM_SYMBOL midi *WildMidi_OpenBuffer(uint8_t *midibuffer, uint32_t size) {
uint8_t mus_hdr[] = { 'M', 'U', 'S', 0x1A };
uint8_t xmi_hdr[] = { 'F', 'O', 'R', 'M' };
midi * ret = NULL;
if (!WM_Initialized) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_INIT, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (midibuffer == NULL) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_INVALID_ARG, "(NULL midi data buffer)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (size > WM_MAXFILESIZE) {
/* don't bother loading suspiciously long files */
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_LONGFIL, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (memcmp(midibuffer,"HMIMIDIP", 8) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewHmp(midibuffer, size);
} else if (memcmp(midibuffer, "HMI-MIDISONG061595", 18) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewHmi(midibuffer, size);
} else if (memcmp(midibuffer, mus_hdr, 4) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewMus(midibuffer, size);
} else if (memcmp(midibuffer, xmi_hdr, 4) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewXmi(midibuffer, size);
} else {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewMidi(midibuffer, size);
}
if (ret) {
if (add_handle(ret) != 0) {
WildMidi_Close(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
}
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: wildmidi_lib.c (WildMidi_Open, WildMidi_OpenBuffer): refuse to proceed if less then 18 bytes of input
Fixes bug #178.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
WM_SYMBOL midi *WildMidi_OpenBuffer(uint8_t *midibuffer, uint32_t size) {
uint8_t mus_hdr[] = { 'M', 'U', 'S', 0x1A };
uint8_t xmi_hdr[] = { 'F', 'O', 'R', 'M' };
midi * ret = NULL;
if (!WM_Initialized) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_INIT, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (midibuffer == NULL) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_INVALID_ARG, "(NULL midi data buffer)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (size > WM_MAXFILESIZE) {
/* don't bother loading suspiciously long files */
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_LONGFIL, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (size < 18) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(too short)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (memcmp(midibuffer,"HMIMIDIP", 8) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewHmp(midibuffer, size);
} else if (memcmp(midibuffer, "HMI-MIDISONG061595", 18) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewHmi(midibuffer, size);
} else if (memcmp(midibuffer, mus_hdr, 4) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewMus(midibuffer, size);
} else if (memcmp(midibuffer, xmi_hdr, 4) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewXmi(midibuffer, size);
} else {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewMidi(midibuffer, size);
}
if (ret) {
if (add_handle(ret) != 0) {
WildMidi_Close(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
}
return (ret);
}
| 169,370
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const SegmentInfo* Segment::GetInfo() const
{
return m_pInfo;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
const SegmentInfo* Segment::GetInfo() const
Chapters::~Chapters() {
while (m_editions_count > 0) {
Edition& e = m_editions[--m_editions_count];
e.Clear();
}
}
| 174,330
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: krb5_gss_context_time(minor_status, context_handle, time_rec)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
OM_uint32 *time_rec;
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_deltat lifetime;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
if ((code = krb5_timeofday(ctx->k5_context, &now))) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, ctx->k5_context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if ((lifetime = ctx->krb_times.endtime - now) <= 0) {
*time_rec = 0;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED);
} else {
*time_rec = lifetime;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
|
krb5_gss_context_time(minor_status, context_handle, time_rec)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
OM_uint32 *time_rec;
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_deltat lifetime;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
if ((code = krb5_timeofday(ctx->k5_context, &now))) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, ctx->k5_context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if ((lifetime = ctx->krb_times.endtime - now) <= 0) {
*time_rec = 0;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED);
} else {
*time_rec = lifetime;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
}
| 166,813
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetBurnLibrary(
BurnLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->burn_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetBurnLibrary(
| 170,636
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void ldap_encode_response(struct asn1_data *data, struct ldap_Result *result)
{
asn1_write_enumerated(data, result->resultcode);
asn1_write_OctetString(data, result->dn,
(result->dn) ? strlen(result->dn) : 0);
asn1_write_OctetString(data, result->errormessage,
(result->errormessage) ?
strlen(result->errormessage) : 0);
if (result->referral) {
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(3));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, result->referral,
strlen(result->referral));
asn1_pop_tag(data);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void ldap_encode_response(struct asn1_data *data, struct ldap_Result *result)
static bool ldap_encode_response(struct asn1_data *data, struct ldap_Result *result)
{
if (!asn1_write_enumerated(data, result->resultcode)) return false;
if (!asn1_write_OctetString(data, result->dn,
(result->dn) ? strlen(result->dn) : 0)) return false;
if (!asn1_write_OctetString(data, result->errormessage,
(result->errormessage) ?
strlen(result->errormessage) : 0)) return false;
if (result->referral) {
if (!asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(3))) return false;
if (!asn1_write_OctetString(data, result->referral,
strlen(result->referral))) return false;
if (!asn1_pop_tag(data)) return false;
}
return true;
}
| 164,593
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void LauncherView::ButtonPressed(views::Button* sender,
const views::Event& event) {
if (dragging_)
return;
if (sender == overflow_button_)
ShowOverflowMenu();
if (!delegate_)
return;
int view_index = view_model_->GetIndexOfView(sender);
if (view_index == -1)
return;
switch (model_->items()[view_index].type) {
case TYPE_TABBED:
case TYPE_APP_PANEL:
case TYPE_APP_SHORTCUT:
case TYPE_PLATFORM_APP:
delegate_->ItemClicked(model_->items()[view_index], event.flags());
break;
case TYPE_APP_LIST:
Shell::GetInstance()->ToggleAppList();
break;
case TYPE_BROWSER_SHORTCUT:
if (event.flags() & ui::EF_CONTROL_DOWN)
delegate_->CreateNewWindow();
else
delegate_->CreateNewTab();
break;
}
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void LauncherView::ButtonPressed(views::Button* sender,
const views::Event& event) {
if (dragging_)
return;
if (sender == overflow_button_) {
ShowOverflowBubble();
return;
}
if (!delegate_)
return;
int view_index = view_model_->GetIndexOfView(sender);
if (view_index == -1)
return;
switch (model_->items()[view_index].type) {
case TYPE_TABBED:
case TYPE_APP_PANEL:
case TYPE_APP_SHORTCUT:
case TYPE_PLATFORM_APP:
delegate_->ItemClicked(model_->items()[view_index], event.flags());
break;
case TYPE_APP_LIST:
Shell::GetInstance()->ToggleAppList();
break;
case TYPE_BROWSER_SHORTCUT:
if (event.flags() & ui::EF_CONTROL_DOWN)
delegate_->CreateNewWindow();
else
delegate_->CreateNewTab();
break;
}
}
| 170,887
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BrowserEventRouter::TabPinnedStateChanged(WebContents* contents,
int index) {
TabStripModel* tab_strip = NULL;
int tab_index;
if (ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabStripModel(contents, &tab_strip, &tab_index)) {
DictionaryValue* changed_properties = new DictionaryValue();
changed_properties->SetBoolean(tab_keys::kPinnedKey,
tab_strip->IsTabPinned(tab_index));
DispatchTabUpdatedEvent(contents, changed_properties);
}
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void BrowserEventRouter::TabPinnedStateChanged(WebContents* contents,
int index) {
TabStripModel* tab_strip = NULL;
int tab_index;
if (ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabStripModel(contents, &tab_strip, &tab_index)) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> changed_properties(new DictionaryValue());
changed_properties->SetBoolean(tab_keys::kPinnedKey,
tab_strip->IsTabPinned(tab_index));
DispatchTabUpdatedEvent(contents, changed_properties.Pass());
}
}
| 171,451
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CoordinatorImpl::RequestGlobalMemoryDump(
MemoryDumpType dump_type,
MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail level_of_detail,
const std::vector<std::string>& allocator_dump_names,
const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpCallback& callback) {
auto adapter = [](const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpCallback& callback,
bool success, uint64_t,
mojom::GlobalMemoryDumpPtr global_memory_dump) {
callback.Run(success, std::move(global_memory_dump));
};
QueuedRequest::Args args(dump_type, level_of_detail, allocator_dump_names,
false /* add_to_trace */, base::kNullProcessId);
RequestGlobalMemoryDumpInternal(args, base::BindRepeating(adapter, callback));
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269
|
void CoordinatorImpl::RequestGlobalMemoryDump(
MemoryDumpType dump_type,
MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail level_of_detail,
const std::vector<std::string>& allocator_dump_names,
const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpCallback& callback) {
// Don't allow arbitary processes to obtain VM regions. Only the heap profiler
// is allowed to obtain them using the special method on the different
// interface.
if (level_of_detail ==
MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail::VM_REGIONS_ONLY_FOR_HEAP_PROFILER) {
bindings_.ReportBadMessage(
"Requested global memory dump using level of detail reserved for the "
"heap profiler.");
return;
}
auto adapter = [](const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpCallback& callback,
bool success, uint64_t,
mojom::GlobalMemoryDumpPtr global_memory_dump) {
callback.Run(success, std::move(global_memory_dump));
};
QueuedRequest::Args args(dump_type, level_of_detail, allocator_dump_names,
false /* add_to_trace */, base::kNullProcessId);
RequestGlobalMemoryDumpInternal(args, base::BindRepeating(adapter, callback));
}
| 172,915
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int spl_filesystem_file_read_csv(spl_filesystem_object *intern, char delimiter, char enclosure, char escape, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
int ret = SUCCESS;
do {
ret = spl_filesystem_file_read(intern, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
} while (ret == SUCCESS && !intern->u.file.current_line_len && SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_SKIP_EMPTY));
if (ret == SUCCESS) {
size_t buf_len = intern->u.file.current_line_len;
char *buf = estrndup(intern->u.file.current_line, buf_len);
if (intern->u.file.current_zval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&intern->u.file.current_zval);
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(intern->u.file.current_zval);
php_fgetcsv(intern->u.file.stream, delimiter, enclosure, escape, buf_len, buf, intern->u.file.current_zval TSRMLS_CC);
if (return_value) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(return_value) != IS_NULL) {
zval_dtor(return_value);
ZVAL_NULL(return_value);
}
ZVAL_ZVAL(return_value, intern->u.file.current_zval, 1, 0);
}
}
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static int spl_filesystem_file_read_csv(spl_filesystem_object *intern, char delimiter, char enclosure, char escape, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
int ret = SUCCESS;
do {
ret = spl_filesystem_file_read(intern, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
} while (ret == SUCCESS && !intern->u.file.current_line_len && SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_SKIP_EMPTY));
if (ret == SUCCESS) {
size_t buf_len = intern->u.file.current_line_len;
char *buf = estrndup(intern->u.file.current_line, buf_len);
if (intern->u.file.current_zval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&intern->u.file.current_zval);
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(intern->u.file.current_zval);
php_fgetcsv(intern->u.file.stream, delimiter, enclosure, escape, buf_len, buf, intern->u.file.current_zval TSRMLS_CC);
if (return_value) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(return_value) != IS_NULL) {
zval_dtor(return_value);
ZVAL_NULL(return_value);
}
ZVAL_ZVAL(return_value, intern->u.file.current_zval, 1, 0);
}
}
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
| 167,077
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void get_icu_value_src_php( char* tag_name, INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS)
{
const char* loc_name = NULL;
int loc_name_len = 0;
char* tag_value = NULL;
char* empty_result = "";
int result = 0;
char* msg = NULL;
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&loc_name ,&loc_name_len ) == FAILURE) {
spprintf(&msg , 0, "locale_get_%s : unable to parse input params", tag_name );
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, msg , 1 TSRMLS_CC );
efree(msg);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(loc_name_len == 0) {
loc_name = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
/* Call ICU get */
tag_value = get_icu_value_internal( loc_name , tag_name , &result ,0);
/* No value found */
if( result == -1 ) {
if( tag_value){
efree( tag_value);
}
RETURN_STRING( empty_result , TRUE);
}
/* value found */
if( tag_value){
RETURN_STRING( tag_value , FALSE);
}
/* Error encountered while fetching the value */
if( result ==0) {
spprintf(&msg , 0, "locale_get_%s : unable to get locale %s", tag_name , tag_name );
intl_error_set( NULL, status, msg , 1 TSRMLS_CC );
efree(msg);
RETURN_NULL();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static void get_icu_value_src_php( char* tag_name, INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS)
static void get_icu_value_src_php( char* tag_name, INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS)
{
const char* loc_name = NULL;
int loc_name_len = 0;
char* tag_value = NULL;
char* empty_result = "";
int result = 0;
char* msg = NULL;
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&loc_name ,&loc_name_len ) == FAILURE) {
spprintf(&msg , 0, "locale_get_%s : unable to parse input params", tag_name );
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, msg , 1 TSRMLS_CC );
efree(msg);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(loc_name_len == 0) {
loc_name = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
/* Call ICU get */
tag_value = get_icu_value_internal( loc_name , tag_name , &result ,0);
/* No value found */
if( result == -1 ) {
if( tag_value){
efree( tag_value);
}
RETURN_STRING( empty_result , TRUE);
}
/* value found */
if( tag_value){
RETURN_STRING( tag_value , FALSE);
}
/* Error encountered while fetching the value */
if( result ==0) {
spprintf(&msg , 0, "locale_get_%s : unable to get locale %s", tag_name , tag_name );
intl_error_set( NULL, status, msg , 1 TSRMLS_CC );
efree(msg);
RETURN_NULL();
}
}
| 167,206
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int dv_extract_audio_info(DVDemuxContext* c, uint8_t* frame)
{
const uint8_t* as_pack;
int freq, stype, smpls, quant, i, ach;
as_pack = dv_extract_pack(frame, dv_audio_source);
if (!as_pack || !c->sys) { /* No audio ? */
c->ach = 0;
return 0;
}
smpls = as_pack[1] & 0x3f; /* samples in this frame - min. samples */
freq = (as_pack[4] >> 3) & 0x07; /* 0 - 48kHz, 1 - 44,1kHz, 2 - 32kHz */
stype = (as_pack[3] & 0x1f); /* 0 - 2CH, 2 - 4CH, 3 - 8CH */
quant = as_pack[4] & 0x07; /* 0 - 16bit linear, 1 - 12bit nonlinear */
/* note: ach counts PAIRS of channels (i.e. stereo channels) */
ach = ((int[4]){ 1, 0, 2, 4})[stype];
if (ach == 1 && quant && freq == 2)
if (!c->ast[i])
break;
avpriv_set_pts_info(c->ast[i], 64, 1, 30000);
c->ast[i]->codec->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO;
c->ast[i]->codec->codec_id = CODEC_ID_PCM_S16LE;
av_init_packet(&c->audio_pkt[i]);
c->audio_pkt[i].size = 0;
c->audio_pkt[i].data = c->audio_buf[i];
c->audio_pkt[i].stream_index = c->ast[i]->index;
c->audio_pkt[i].flags |= AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int dv_extract_audio_info(DVDemuxContext* c, uint8_t* frame)
{
const uint8_t* as_pack;
int freq, stype, smpls, quant, i, ach;
as_pack = dv_extract_pack(frame, dv_audio_source);
if (!as_pack || !c->sys) { /* No audio ? */
c->ach = 0;
return 0;
}
smpls = as_pack[1] & 0x3f; /* samples in this frame - min. samples */
freq = (as_pack[4] >> 3) & 0x07; /* 0 - 48kHz, 1 - 44,1kHz, 2 - 32kHz */
stype = (as_pack[3] & 0x1f); /* 0 - 2CH, 2 - 4CH, 3 - 8CH */
quant = as_pack[4] & 0x07; /* 0 - 16bit linear, 1 - 12bit nonlinear */
if (stype > 3) {
av_log(c->fctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "stype %d is invalid\n", stype);
c->ach = 0;
return 0;
}
/* note: ach counts PAIRS of channels (i.e. stereo channels) */
ach = ((int[4]){ 1, 0, 2, 4})[stype];
if (ach == 1 && quant && freq == 2)
if (!c->ast[i])
break;
avpriv_set_pts_info(c->ast[i], 64, 1, 30000);
c->ast[i]->codec->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO;
c->ast[i]->codec->codec_id = CODEC_ID_PCM_S16LE;
av_init_packet(&c->audio_pkt[i]);
c->audio_pkt[i].size = 0;
c->audio_pkt[i].data = c->audio_buf[i];
c->audio_pkt[i].stream_index = c->ast[i]->index;
c->audio_pkt[i].flags |= AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY;
}
| 165,243
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_trace)
{
char *z_filename, *mode = "w";
int z_filename_len, mode_len;
zval *pgsql_link = NULL;
int id = -1, argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
PGconn *pgsql;
FILE *fp = NULL;
php_stream *stream;
id = PGG(default_link);
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "s|sr", &z_filename, &z_filename_len, &mode, &mode_len, &pgsql_link) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (argc < 3) {
CHECK_DEFAULT_LINK(id);
}
if (pgsql_link == NULL && id == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper(z_filename, mode, REPORT_ERRORS, NULL);
if (!stream) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (FAILURE == php_stream_cast(stream, PHP_STREAM_AS_STDIO, (void**)&fp, REPORT_ERRORS)) {
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_stream_auto_cleanup(stream);
PQtrace(pgsql, fp);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
PHP_FUNCTION(pg_trace)
{
char *z_filename, *mode = "w";
int z_filename_len, mode_len;
zval *pgsql_link = NULL;
int id = -1, argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
PGconn *pgsql;
FILE *fp = NULL;
php_stream *stream;
id = PGG(default_link);
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "p|sr", &z_filename, &z_filename_len, &mode, &mode_len, &pgsql_link) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (argc < 3) {
CHECK_DEFAULT_LINK(id);
}
if (pgsql_link == NULL && id == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper(z_filename, mode, REPORT_ERRORS, NULL);
if (!stream) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (FAILURE == php_stream_cast(stream, PHP_STREAM_AS_STDIO, (void**)&fp, REPORT_ERRORS)) {
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_stream_auto_cleanup(stream);
PQtrace(pgsql, fp);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
| 165,314
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(
const gfx::Rect& src_subrect,
const gfx::Size& dst_size,
const base::Callback<void(bool, const SkBitmap&)>& callback,
const SkColorType color_type) {
bool format_support = ((color_type == kRGB_565_SkColorType) ||
(color_type == kN32_SkColorType));
DCHECK(format_support);
if (!CanCopyToBitmap()) {
callback.Run(false, SkBitmap());
return;
}
const gfx::Size& dst_size_in_pixel =
client_->ConvertViewSizeToPixel(dst_size);
scoped_ptr<cc::CopyOutputRequest> request =
cc::CopyOutputRequest::CreateRequest(base::Bind(
&DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurfaceHasResult,
dst_size_in_pixel,
color_type,
callback));
gfx::Rect src_subrect_in_pixel =
ConvertRectToPixel(client_->CurrentDeviceScaleFactor(), src_subrect);
request->set_area(src_subrect_in_pixel);
client_->RequestCopyOfOutput(request.Pass());
}
Commit Message: repairs CopyFromCompositingSurface in HighDPI
This CL removes the DIP=>Pixel transform in
DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(), because said
transformation seems to be happening later in the copy logic
and is currently being applied twice.
BUG=397708
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/421293002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286414 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(
const gfx::Rect& src_subrect,
const gfx::Size& output_size,
const base::Callback<void(bool, const SkBitmap&)>& callback,
const SkColorType color_type) {
bool format_support = ((color_type == kRGB_565_SkColorType) ||
(color_type == kN32_SkColorType));
DCHECK(format_support);
if (!CanCopyToBitmap()) {
callback.Run(false, SkBitmap());
return;
}
scoped_ptr<cc::CopyOutputRequest> request =
cc::CopyOutputRequest::CreateRequest(base::Bind(
&DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurfaceHasResult,
output_size,
color_type,
callback));
request->set_area(src_subrect);
client_->RequestCopyOfOutput(request.Pass());
}
| 171,193
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: xmlParseEndTag2(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *prefix,
const xmlChar *URI, int line, int nsNr, int tlen) {
const xmlChar *name;
GROW;
if ((RAW != '<') || (NXT(1) != '/')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LTSLASH_REQUIRED, NULL);
return;
}
SKIP(2);
if ((tlen > 0) && (xmlStrncmp(ctxt->input->cur, ctxt->name, tlen) == 0)) {
if (ctxt->input->cur[tlen] == '>') {
ctxt->input->cur += tlen + 1;
goto done;
}
ctxt->input->cur += tlen;
name = (xmlChar*)1;
} else {
if (prefix == NULL)
name = xmlParseNameAndCompare(ctxt, ctxt->name);
else
name = xmlParseQNameAndCompare(ctxt, ctxt->name, prefix);
}
/*
* We should definitely be at the ending "S? '>'" part
*/
GROW;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((!IS_BYTE_CHAR(RAW)) || (RAW != '>')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_GT_REQUIRED, NULL);
} else
NEXT1;
/*
* [ WFC: Element Type Match ]
* The Name in an element's end-tag must match the element type in the
* start-tag.
*
*/
if (name != (xmlChar*)1) {
if (name == NULL) name = BAD_CAST "unparseable";
if ((line == 0) && (ctxt->node != NULL))
line = ctxt->node->line;
xmlFatalErrMsgStrIntStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_TAG_NAME_MISMATCH,
"Opening and ending tag mismatch: %s line %d and %s\n",
ctxt->name, line, name);
}
/*
* SAX: End of Tag
*/
done:
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->endElementNs != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElementNs(ctxt->userData, ctxt->name, prefix, URI);
spacePop(ctxt);
if (nsNr != 0)
nsPop(ctxt, nsNr);
return;
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
xmlParseEndTag2(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *prefix,
const xmlChar *URI, int line, int nsNr, int tlen) {
const xmlChar *name;
GROW;
if ((RAW != '<') || (NXT(1) != '/')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LTSLASH_REQUIRED, NULL);
return;
}
SKIP(2);
if ((tlen > 0) && (xmlStrncmp(ctxt->input->cur, ctxt->name, tlen) == 0)) {
if (ctxt->input->cur[tlen] == '>') {
ctxt->input->cur += tlen + 1;
goto done;
}
ctxt->input->cur += tlen;
name = (xmlChar*)1;
} else {
if (prefix == NULL)
name = xmlParseNameAndCompare(ctxt, ctxt->name);
else
name = xmlParseQNameAndCompare(ctxt, ctxt->name, prefix);
}
/*
* We should definitely be at the ending "S? '>'" part
*/
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((!IS_BYTE_CHAR(RAW)) || (RAW != '>')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_GT_REQUIRED, NULL);
} else
NEXT1;
/*
* [ WFC: Element Type Match ]
* The Name in an element's end-tag must match the element type in the
* start-tag.
*
*/
if (name != (xmlChar*)1) {
if (name == NULL) name = BAD_CAST "unparseable";
if ((line == 0) && (ctxt->node != NULL))
line = ctxt->node->line;
xmlFatalErrMsgStrIntStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_TAG_NAME_MISMATCH,
"Opening and ending tag mismatch: %s line %d and %s\n",
ctxt->name, line, name);
}
/*
* SAX: End of Tag
*/
done:
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->endElementNs != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElementNs(ctxt->userData, ctxt->name, prefix, URI);
spacePop(ctxt);
if (nsNr != 0)
nsPop(ctxt, nsNr);
return;
}
| 171,287
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int UDPSocketWin::InternalConnect(const IPEndPoint& address) {
DCHECK(!is_connected());
DCHECK(!remote_address_.get());
int addr_family = address.GetSockAddrFamily();
int rv = CreateSocket(addr_family);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
if (bind_type_ == DatagramSocket::RANDOM_BIND) {
size_t addr_size =
addr_family == AF_INET ? kIPv4AddressSize : kIPv6AddressSize;
IPAddressNumber addr_any(addr_size);
rv = RandomBind(addr_any);
}
if (rv < 0) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Net.UdpSocketRandomBindErrorCode", rv);
Close();
return rv;
}
SockaddrStorage storage;
if (!address.ToSockAddr(storage.addr, &storage.addr_len))
return ERR_ADDRESS_INVALID;
rv = connect(socket_, storage.addr, storage.addr_len);
if (rv < 0) {
int result = MapSystemError(WSAGetLastError());
Close();
return result;
}
remote_address_.reset(new IPEndPoint(address));
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
int UDPSocketWin::InternalConnect(const IPEndPoint& address) {
DCHECK(!is_connected());
DCHECK(!remote_address_.get());
int addr_family = address.GetSockAddrFamily();
int rv = CreateSocket(addr_family);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
if (bind_type_ == DatagramSocket::RANDOM_BIND) {
size_t addr_size =
addr_family == AF_INET ? kIPv4AddressSize : kIPv6AddressSize;
IPAddressNumber addr_any(addr_size);
rv = RandomBind(addr_any);
}
if (rv < 0) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Net.UdpSocketRandomBindErrorCode", -rv);
Close();
return rv;
}
SockaddrStorage storage;
if (!address.ToSockAddr(storage.addr, &storage.addr_len))
return ERR_ADDRESS_INVALID;
rv = connect(socket_, storage.addr, storage.addr_len);
if (rv < 0) {
int result = MapSystemError(WSAGetLastError());
Close();
return result;
}
remote_address_.reset(new IPEndPoint(address));
return rv;
}
| 171,318
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: MediaStreamImpl::~MediaStreamImpl() {
DCHECK(!peer_connection_handler_);
if (dependency_factory_.get())
dependency_factory_->ReleasePeerConnectionFactory();
if (network_manager_) {
if (chrome_worker_thread_.IsRunning()) {
chrome_worker_thread_.message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(
&MediaStreamImpl::DeleteIpcNetworkManager,
base::Unretained(this)));
} else {
NOTREACHED() << "Worker thread not running.";
}
}
}
Commit Message: Explicitly stopping thread in MediaStreamImpl dtor to avoid any racing issues.
This may solve the below bugs.
BUG=112408,111202
TEST=content_unittests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9307058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120222 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
MediaStreamImpl::~MediaStreamImpl() {
DCHECK(!peer_connection_handler_);
if (dependency_factory_.get())
dependency_factory_->ReleasePeerConnectionFactory();
if (network_manager_) {
if (chrome_worker_thread_.IsRunning()) {
chrome_worker_thread_.message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(
&MediaStreamImpl::DeleteIpcNetworkManager,
base::Unretained(this)));
// Stopping the thread will wait until all tasks have been
// processed before returning. We wait for the above task to finish before
// letting the destructor continue to avoid any potential race issues.
chrome_worker_thread_.Stop();
} else {
NOTREACHED() << "Worker thread not running.";
}
}
}
| 170,957
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: nf_ct_frag6_reasm(struct nf_ct_frag6_queue *fq, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct sk_buff *fp, *op, *head = fq->q.fragments;
int payload_len;
fq_kill(fq);
WARN_ON(head == NULL);
WARN_ON(NFCT_FRAG6_CB(head)->offset != 0);
/* Unfragmented part is taken from the first segment. */
payload_len = ((head->data - skb_network_header(head)) -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + fq->q.len -
sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
if (payload_len > IPV6_MAXPLEN) {
pr_debug("payload len is too large.\n");
goto out_oversize;
}
/* Head of list must not be cloned. */
if (skb_cloned(head) && pskb_expand_head(head, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)) {
pr_debug("skb is cloned but can't expand head");
goto out_oom;
}
/* If the first fragment is fragmented itself, we split
* it to two chunks: the first with data and paged part
* and the second, holding only fragments. */
if (skb_has_frags(head)) {
struct sk_buff *clone;
int i, plen = 0;
if ((clone = alloc_skb(0, GFP_ATOMIC)) == NULL) {
pr_debug("Can't alloc skb\n");
goto out_oom;
}
clone->next = head->next;
head->next = clone;
skb_shinfo(clone)->frag_list = skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list;
skb_frag_list_init(head);
for (i=0; i<skb_shinfo(head)->nr_frags; i++)
plen += skb_shinfo(head)->frags[i].size;
clone->len = clone->data_len = head->data_len - plen;
head->data_len -= clone->len;
head->len -= clone->len;
clone->csum = 0;
clone->ip_summed = head->ip_summed;
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(clone)->orig = NULL;
atomic_add(clone->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
}
/* We have to remove fragment header from datagram and to relocate
* header in order to calculate ICV correctly. */
skb_network_header(head)[fq->nhoffset] = skb_transport_header(head)[0];
memmove(head->head + sizeof(struct frag_hdr), head->head,
(head->data - head->head) - sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
head->mac_header += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
head->network_header += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list = head->next;
skb_reset_transport_header(head);
skb_push(head, head->data - skb_network_header(head));
atomic_sub(head->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
for (fp=head->next; fp; fp = fp->next) {
head->data_len += fp->len;
head->len += fp->len;
if (head->ip_summed != fp->ip_summed)
head->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
else if (head->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)
head->csum = csum_add(head->csum, fp->csum);
head->truesize += fp->truesize;
atomic_sub(fp->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
}
head->next = NULL;
head->dev = dev;
head->tstamp = fq->q.stamp;
ipv6_hdr(head)->payload_len = htons(payload_len);
/* Yes, and fold redundant checksum back. 8) */
if (head->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)
head->csum = csum_partial(skb_network_header(head),
skb_network_header_len(head),
head->csum);
fq->q.fragments = NULL;
/* all original skbs are linked into the NFCT_FRAG6_CB(head).orig */
fp = skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list;
if (NFCT_FRAG6_CB(fp)->orig == NULL)
/* at above code, head skb is divided into two skbs. */
fp = fp->next;
op = NFCT_FRAG6_CB(head)->orig;
for (; fp; fp = fp->next) {
struct sk_buff *orig = NFCT_FRAG6_CB(fp)->orig;
op->next = orig;
op = orig;
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(fp)->orig = NULL;
}
return head;
out_oversize:
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_DEBUG "nf_ct_frag6_reasm: payload len = %d\n", payload_len);
goto out_fail;
out_oom:
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_DEBUG "nf_ct_frag6_reasm: no memory for reassembly\n");
out_fail:
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_conntrack_reasm: properly handle packets fragmented into a single fragment
When an ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG message is received with a MTU below 1280,
all further packets include a fragment header.
Unlike regular defragmentation, conntrack also needs to "reassemble"
those fragments in order to obtain a packet without the fragment
header for connection tracking. Currently nf_conntrack_reasm checks
whether a fragment has either IP6_MF set or an offset != 0, which
makes it ignore those fragments.
Remove the invalid check and make reassembly handle fragment queues
containing only a single fragment.
Reported-and-tested-by: Ulrich Weber <uweber@astaro.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID:
|
nf_ct_frag6_reasm(struct nf_ct_frag6_queue *fq, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct sk_buff *fp, *op, *head = fq->q.fragments;
int payload_len;
fq_kill(fq);
WARN_ON(head == NULL);
WARN_ON(NFCT_FRAG6_CB(head)->offset != 0);
/* Unfragmented part is taken from the first segment. */
payload_len = ((head->data - skb_network_header(head)) -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + fq->q.len -
sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
if (payload_len > IPV6_MAXPLEN) {
pr_debug("payload len is too large.\n");
goto out_oversize;
}
/* Head of list must not be cloned. */
if (skb_cloned(head) && pskb_expand_head(head, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)) {
pr_debug("skb is cloned but can't expand head");
goto out_oom;
}
/* If the first fragment is fragmented itself, we split
* it to two chunks: the first with data and paged part
* and the second, holding only fragments. */
if (skb_has_frags(head)) {
struct sk_buff *clone;
int i, plen = 0;
if ((clone = alloc_skb(0, GFP_ATOMIC)) == NULL) {
pr_debug("Can't alloc skb\n");
goto out_oom;
}
clone->next = head->next;
head->next = clone;
skb_shinfo(clone)->frag_list = skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list;
skb_frag_list_init(head);
for (i=0; i<skb_shinfo(head)->nr_frags; i++)
plen += skb_shinfo(head)->frags[i].size;
clone->len = clone->data_len = head->data_len - plen;
head->data_len -= clone->len;
head->len -= clone->len;
clone->csum = 0;
clone->ip_summed = head->ip_summed;
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(clone)->orig = NULL;
atomic_add(clone->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
}
/* We have to remove fragment header from datagram and to relocate
* header in order to calculate ICV correctly. */
skb_network_header(head)[fq->nhoffset] = skb_transport_header(head)[0];
memmove(head->head + sizeof(struct frag_hdr), head->head,
(head->data - head->head) - sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
head->mac_header += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
head->network_header += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list = head->next;
skb_reset_transport_header(head);
skb_push(head, head->data - skb_network_header(head));
atomic_sub(head->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
for (fp=head->next; fp; fp = fp->next) {
head->data_len += fp->len;
head->len += fp->len;
if (head->ip_summed != fp->ip_summed)
head->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
else if (head->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)
head->csum = csum_add(head->csum, fp->csum);
head->truesize += fp->truesize;
atomic_sub(fp->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
}
head->next = NULL;
head->dev = dev;
head->tstamp = fq->q.stamp;
ipv6_hdr(head)->payload_len = htons(payload_len);
/* Yes, and fold redundant checksum back. 8) */
if (head->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)
head->csum = csum_partial(skb_network_header(head),
skb_network_header_len(head),
head->csum);
fq->q.fragments = NULL;
/* all original skbs are linked into the NFCT_FRAG6_CB(head).orig */
fp = skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list;
if (fp && NFCT_FRAG6_CB(fp)->orig == NULL)
/* at above code, head skb is divided into two skbs. */
fp = fp->next;
op = NFCT_FRAG6_CB(head)->orig;
for (; fp; fp = fp->next) {
struct sk_buff *orig = NFCT_FRAG6_CB(fp)->orig;
op->next = orig;
op = orig;
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(fp)->orig = NULL;
}
return head;
out_oversize:
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_DEBUG "nf_ct_frag6_reasm: payload len = %d\n", payload_len);
goto out_fail;
out_oom:
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_DEBUG "nf_ct_frag6_reasm: no memory for reassembly\n");
out_fail:
return NULL;
}
| 165,591
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long long mkvparser::ReadUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long& len) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
int status;
len = 1;
unsigned char b;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0) // error or underflow
return status;
if (status > 0) // interpreted as "underflow"
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if (b == 0) // we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m)) {
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
long long result = b & (~m);
++pos;
for (int i = 1; i < len; ++i) {
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0) {
len = 1;
return status;
}
if (status > 0) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
long long mkvparser::ReadUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long& len) {
long long ReadUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long& len) {
if (!pReader || pos < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
len = 1;
unsigned char b;
int status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0) // error or underflow
return status;
if (status > 0) // interpreted as "underflow"
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if (b == 0) // we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m)) {
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
long long result = b & (~m);
++pos;
for (int i = 1; i < len; ++i) {
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0) {
len = 1;
return status;
}
if (status > 0) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
| 173,862
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AddMainWebResources(content::WebUIDataSource* html_source) {
html_source->AddResourcePath("media_router.js", IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_JS);
html_source->AddResourcePath("media_router_common.css",
IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_COMMON_CSS);
html_source->AddResourcePath("media_router.css",
IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_CSS);
html_source->AddResourcePath("media_router_data.js",
IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_DATA_JS);
html_source->AddResourcePath("media_router_ui_interface.js",
IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_UI_INTERFACE_JS);
html_source->AddResourcePath("polymer_config.js",
IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_POLYMER_CONFIG_JS);
}
Commit Message: One polymer_config.js to rule them all.
R=michaelpg@chromium.org,fukino@chromium.org,mfoltz@chromium.org
BUG=425626
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1224783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#337882}
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void AddMainWebResources(content::WebUIDataSource* html_source) {
html_source->AddResourcePath("media_router.js", IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_JS);
html_source->AddResourcePath("media_router_common.css",
IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_COMMON_CSS);
html_source->AddResourcePath("media_router.css",
IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_CSS);
html_source->AddResourcePath("media_router_data.js",
IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_DATA_JS);
html_source->AddResourcePath("media_router_ui_interface.js",
IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_UI_INTERFACE_JS);
}
| 171,708
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: png_write_destroy(png_structp png_ptr)
{
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
jmp_buf tmp_jmp; /* Save jump buffer */
#endif
png_error_ptr error_fn;
png_error_ptr warning_fn;
png_voidp error_ptr;
#ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
png_free_ptr free_fn;
#endif
png_debug(1, "in png_write_destroy");
/* Free any memory zlib uses */
deflateEnd(&png_ptr->zstream);
/* Free our memory. png_free checks NULL for us. */
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->zbuf);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->row_buf);
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->prev_row);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->sub_row);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->up_row);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->avg_row);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->paeth_row);
#endif
#ifdef PNG_TIME_RFC1123_SUPPORTED
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->time_buffer);
#endif
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_WEIGHTED_FILTER_SUPPORTED
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->prev_filters);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->filter_weights);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->inv_filter_weights);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->filter_costs);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->inv_filter_costs);
#endif
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
/* Reset structure */
png_memcpy(tmp_jmp, png_ptr->jmpbuf, png_sizeof(jmp_buf));
#endif
error_fn = png_ptr->error_fn;
warning_fn = png_ptr->warning_fn;
error_ptr = png_ptr->error_ptr;
#ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
free_fn = png_ptr->free_fn;
#endif
png_memset(png_ptr, 0, png_sizeof(png_struct));
png_ptr->error_fn = error_fn;
png_ptr->warning_fn = warning_fn;
png_ptr->error_ptr = error_ptr;
#ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->free_fn = free_fn;
#endif
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
png_memcpy(png_ptr->jmpbuf, tmp_jmp, png_sizeof(jmp_buf));
#endif
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
png_write_destroy(png_structp png_ptr)
{
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
jmp_buf tmp_jmp; /* Save jump buffer */
#endif
png_error_ptr error_fn;
png_error_ptr warning_fn;
png_voidp error_ptr;
#ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
png_free_ptr free_fn;
#endif
png_debug(1, "in png_write_destroy");
/* Free any memory zlib uses */
deflateEnd(&png_ptr->zstream);
/* Free our memory. png_free checks NULL for us. */
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->zbuf);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->row_buf);
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->prev_row);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->sub_row);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->up_row);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->avg_row);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->paeth_row);
#endif
#ifdef PNG_TIME_RFC1123_SUPPORTED
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->time_buffer);
#endif
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
/* Reset structure */
png_memcpy(tmp_jmp, png_ptr->jmpbuf, png_sizeof(jmp_buf));
#endif
error_fn = png_ptr->error_fn;
warning_fn = png_ptr->warning_fn;
error_ptr = png_ptr->error_ptr;
#ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
free_fn = png_ptr->free_fn;
#endif
png_memset(png_ptr, 0, png_sizeof(png_struct));
png_ptr->error_fn = error_fn;
png_ptr->warning_fn = warning_fn;
png_ptr->error_ptr = error_ptr;
#ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->free_fn = free_fn;
#endif
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
png_memcpy(png_ptr->jmpbuf, tmp_jmp, png_sizeof(jmp_buf));
#endif
}
| 172,189
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: dissect_rpcap_packet (tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *top_tree,
proto_tree *parent_tree, gint offset, proto_item *top_item)
{
proto_tree *tree;
proto_item *ti;
nstime_t ts;
tvbuff_t *new_tvb;
guint caplen, len, frame_no;
gint reported_length_remaining;
ti = proto_tree_add_item (parent_tree, hf_packet, tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA);
tree = proto_item_add_subtree (ti, ett_packet);
ts.secs = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset);
ts.nsecs = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset + 4) * 1000;
proto_tree_add_time(tree, hf_timestamp, tvb, offset, 8, &ts);
offset += 8;
caplen = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset);
ti = proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_caplen, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
len = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_len, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
frame_no = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_npkt, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
proto_item_append_text (ti, ", Frame %u", frame_no);
proto_item_append_text (top_item, " Frame %u", frame_no);
/*
* reported_length_remaining should not be -1, as offset is at
* most right past the end of the available data in the packet.
*/
reported_length_remaining = tvb_reported_length_remaining (tvb, offset);
if (caplen > (guint)reported_length_remaining) {
expert_add_info(pinfo, ti, &ei_caplen_too_big);
return;
}
new_tvb = tvb_new_subset (tvb, offset, caplen, len);
if (decode_content && linktype != WTAP_ENCAP_UNKNOWN) {
dissector_try_uint(wtap_encap_dissector_table, linktype, new_tvb, pinfo, top_tree);
if (!info_added) {
/* Only indicate when not added before */
/* Indicate RPCAP in the protocol column */
col_prepend_fence_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "R|");
/* Indicate RPCAP in the info column */
col_prepend_fence_fstr (pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Remote | ");
info_added = TRUE;
register_frame_end_routine(pinfo, rpcap_frame_end);
}
} else {
if (linktype == WTAP_ENCAP_UNKNOWN) {
proto_item_append_text (ti, ", Unknown link-layer type");
}
call_dissector (data_handle, new_tvb, pinfo, top_tree);
}
}
Commit Message: The WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET dissector needs to be passed a struct eth_phdr.
We now require that. Make it so.
Bug: 12440
Change-Id: Iffee520976b013800699bde3c6092a3e86be0d76
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15424
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
dissect_rpcap_packet (tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *top_tree,
proto_tree *parent_tree, gint offset, proto_item *top_item)
{
proto_tree *tree;
proto_item *ti;
nstime_t ts;
tvbuff_t *new_tvb;
guint caplen, len, frame_no;
gint reported_length_remaining;
struct eth_phdr eth;
void *phdr;
ti = proto_tree_add_item (parent_tree, hf_packet, tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA);
tree = proto_item_add_subtree (ti, ett_packet);
ts.secs = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset);
ts.nsecs = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset + 4) * 1000;
proto_tree_add_time(tree, hf_timestamp, tvb, offset, 8, &ts);
offset += 8;
caplen = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset);
ti = proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_caplen, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
len = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_len, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
frame_no = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_npkt, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
proto_item_append_text (ti, ", Frame %u", frame_no);
proto_item_append_text (top_item, " Frame %u", frame_no);
/*
* reported_length_remaining should not be -1, as offset is at
* most right past the end of the available data in the packet.
*/
reported_length_remaining = tvb_reported_length_remaining (tvb, offset);
if (caplen > (guint)reported_length_remaining) {
expert_add_info(pinfo, ti, &ei_caplen_too_big);
return;
}
new_tvb = tvb_new_subset (tvb, offset, caplen, len);
if (decode_content && linktype != WTAP_ENCAP_UNKNOWN) {
switch (linktype) {
case WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET:
eth.fcs_len = -1; /* Unknown whether we have an FCS */
phdr = ð
break;
default:
phdr = NULL;
break;
}
dissector_try_uint_new(wtap_encap_dissector_table, linktype, new_tvb, pinfo, top_tree, TRUE, phdr);
if (!info_added) {
/* Only indicate when not added before */
/* Indicate RPCAP in the protocol column */
col_prepend_fence_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "R|");
/* Indicate RPCAP in the info column */
col_prepend_fence_fstr (pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Remote | ");
info_added = TRUE;
register_frame_end_routine(pinfo, rpcap_frame_end);
}
} else {
if (linktype == WTAP_ENCAP_UNKNOWN) {
proto_item_append_text (ti, ", Unknown link-layer type");
}
call_dissector (data_handle, new_tvb, pinfo, top_tree);
}
}
| 167,145
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: nfs4_xdr_dec_getacl(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs_getaclres *res)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
status = decode_compound_hdr(xdr, &hdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_sequence(xdr, &res->seq_res, rqstp);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_putfh(xdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_getacl(xdr, rqstp, &res->acl_len);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
nfs4_xdr_dec_getacl(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs_getaclres *res)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
status = decode_compound_hdr(xdr, &hdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_sequence(xdr, &res->seq_res, rqstp);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_putfh(xdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_getacl(xdr, rqstp, res);
out:
return status;
}
| 165,720
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PrintPreviewUI::PrintPreviewUI(content::WebUI* web_ui)
: ConstrainedWebDialogUI(web_ui),
initial_preview_start_time_(base::TimeTicks::Now()),
handler_(NULL),
source_is_modifiable_(true),
tab_closed_(false) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromWebUI(web_ui);
ChromeURLDataManager::AddDataSource(profile, new PrintPreviewDataSource());
handler_ = new PrintPreviewHandler();
web_ui->AddMessageHandler(handler_);
preview_ui_addr_str_ = GetPrintPreviewUIAddress();
g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Set(preview_ui_addr_str_, -1);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
PrintPreviewUI::PrintPreviewUI(content::WebUI* web_ui)
: ConstrainedWebDialogUI(web_ui),
initial_preview_start_time_(base::TimeTicks::Now()),
id_(g_print_preview_ui_id_map.Get().Add(this)),
handler_(NULL),
source_is_modifiable_(true),
tab_closed_(false) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromWebUI(web_ui);
ChromeURLDataManager::AddDataSource(profile, new PrintPreviewDataSource());
handler_ = new PrintPreviewHandler();
web_ui->AddMessageHandler(handler_);
g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Set(id_, -1);
}
| 170,841
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static bool check_client_passwd(PgSocket *client, const char *passwd)
{
char md5[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
const char *correct;
PgUser *user = client->auth_user;
/* disallow empty passwords */
if (!*passwd || !*user->passwd)
return false;
switch (cf_auth_type) {
case AUTH_PLAIN:
return strcmp(user->passwd, passwd) == 0;
case AUTH_CRYPT:
correct = crypt(user->passwd, (char *)client->tmp_login_salt);
return correct && strcmp(correct, passwd) == 0;
case AUTH_MD5:
if (strlen(passwd) != MD5_PASSWD_LEN)
return false;
if (!isMD5(user->passwd))
pg_md5_encrypt(user->passwd, user->name, strlen(user->name), user->passwd);
pg_md5_encrypt(user->passwd + 3, (char *)client->tmp_login_salt, 4, md5);
return strcmp(md5, passwd) == 0;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Check if auth_user is set.
Fixes a crash if password packet appears before startup packet (#42).
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
static bool check_client_passwd(PgSocket *client, const char *passwd)
{
char md5[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
const char *correct;
PgUser *user = client->auth_user;
/* auth_user may be missing */
if (!user) {
slog_error(client, "Password packet before auth packet?");
return false;
}
/* disallow empty passwords */
if (!*passwd || !*user->passwd)
return false;
switch (cf_auth_type) {
case AUTH_PLAIN:
return strcmp(user->passwd, passwd) == 0;
case AUTH_CRYPT:
correct = crypt(user->passwd, (char *)client->tmp_login_salt);
return correct && strcmp(correct, passwd) == 0;
case AUTH_MD5:
if (strlen(passwd) != MD5_PASSWD_LEN)
return false;
if (!isMD5(user->passwd))
pg_md5_encrypt(user->passwd, user->name, strlen(user->name), user->passwd);
pg_md5_encrypt(user->passwd + 3, (char *)client->tmp_login_salt, 4, md5);
return strcmp(md5, passwd) == 0;
}
return false;
}
| 170,132
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ResetScreenHandler::UpdateStatusChanged(
const UpdateEngineClient::Status& status) {
if (status.status == UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_ERROR) {
base::DictionaryValue params;
params.SetInteger("uiState", kErrorUIStateRollback);
ShowScreen(OobeUI::kScreenErrorMessage, ¶ms);
} else if (status.status ==
UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_UPDATED_NEED_REBOOT) {
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetPowerManagerClient()->RequestRestart();
}
}
Commit Message: Rollback option put behind the flag.
BUG=368860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/267393011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269753 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void ResetScreenHandler::UpdateStatusChanged(
const UpdateEngineClient::Status& status) {
VLOG(1) << "Update status change to " << status.status;
if (status.status == UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_ERROR) {
base::DictionaryValue params;
params.SetInteger("uiState", kErrorUIStateRollback);
ShowScreen(OobeUI::kScreenErrorMessage, ¶ms);
} else if (status.status ==
UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_UPDATED_NEED_REBOOT) {
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetPowerManagerClient()->RequestRestart();
}
}
| 171,182
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool GesturePoint::IsOverMinFlickSpeed() {
return velocity_calculator_.VelocitySquared() > kMinFlickSpeedSquared;
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool GesturePoint::IsOverMinFlickSpeed() {
return velocity_calculator_.VelocitySquared() >
GestureConfiguration::min_flick_speed_squared();
}
| 171,045
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: usage(int iExitCode)
{
char word[32];
sprintf( word, getJobActionString(mode) );
fprintf( stderr, "Usage: %s [options] [constraints]\n", MyName );
fprintf( stderr, " where [options] is zero or more of:\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -help Display this message and exit\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -version Display version information and exit\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -name schedd_name Connect to the given schedd\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -pool hostname Use the given central manager to find daemons\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -addr <ip:port> Connect directly to the given \"sinful string\"\n" );
if( mode == JA_REMOVE_JOBS || mode == JA_REMOVE_X_JOBS ) {
fprintf( stderr, " -reason reason Use the given RemoveReason\n");
} else if( mode == JA_RELEASE_JOBS ) {
fprintf( stderr, " -reason reason Use the given ReleaseReason\n");
} else if( mode == JA_HOLD_JOBS ) {
fprintf( stderr, " -reason reason Use the given HoldReason\n");
fprintf( stderr, " -subcode number Set HoldReasonSubCode\n");
}
if( mode == JA_REMOVE_JOBS || mode == JA_REMOVE_X_JOBS ) {
fprintf( stderr,
" -forcex Force the immediate local removal of jobs in the X state\n"
" (only affects jobs already being removed)\n" );
}
if( mode == JA_VACATE_JOBS || mode == JA_VACATE_FAST_JOBS ) {
fprintf( stderr,
" -fast Use a fast vacate (hardkill)\n" );
}
fprintf( stderr, " and where [constraints] is one of:\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " cluster.proc %s the given job\n", word );
fprintf( stderr, " cluster %s the given cluster of jobs\n", word );
fprintf( stderr, " user %s all jobs owned by user\n", word );
fprintf( stderr, " -constraint expr %s all jobs matching the boolean expression\n", word );
fprintf( stderr, " -all %s all jobs "
"(cannot be used with other constraints)\n", word );
exit( iExitCode );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
|
usage(int iExitCode)
{
char word[32];
sprintf( word, "%s", getJobActionString(mode) );
fprintf( stderr, "Usage: %s [options] [constraints]\n", MyName );
fprintf( stderr, " where [options] is zero or more of:\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -help Display this message and exit\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -version Display version information and exit\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -name schedd_name Connect to the given schedd\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -pool hostname Use the given central manager to find daemons\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -addr <ip:port> Connect directly to the given \"sinful string\"\n" );
if( mode == JA_REMOVE_JOBS || mode == JA_REMOVE_X_JOBS ) {
fprintf( stderr, " -reason reason Use the given RemoveReason\n");
} else if( mode == JA_RELEASE_JOBS ) {
fprintf( stderr, " -reason reason Use the given ReleaseReason\n");
} else if( mode == JA_HOLD_JOBS ) {
fprintf( stderr, " -reason reason Use the given HoldReason\n");
fprintf( stderr, " -subcode number Set HoldReasonSubCode\n");
}
if( mode == JA_REMOVE_JOBS || mode == JA_REMOVE_X_JOBS ) {
fprintf( stderr,
" -forcex Force the immediate local removal of jobs in the X state\n"
" (only affects jobs already being removed)\n" );
}
if( mode == JA_VACATE_JOBS || mode == JA_VACATE_FAST_JOBS ) {
fprintf( stderr,
" -fast Use a fast vacate (hardkill)\n" );
}
fprintf( stderr, " and where [constraints] is one of:\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " cluster.proc %s the given job\n", word );
fprintf( stderr, " cluster %s the given cluster of jobs\n", word );
fprintf( stderr, " user %s all jobs owned by user\n", word );
fprintf( stderr, " -constraint expr %s all jobs matching the boolean expression\n", word );
fprintf( stderr, " -all %s all jobs "
"(cannot be used with other constraints)\n", word );
exit( iExitCode );
}
| 165,375
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItems(
bool canceled,
const std::vector<int>& selected_indices) {
if (!external_popup_menu_)
return;
blink::WebScopedUserGesture gesture(frame_);
external_popup_menu_->DidSelectItems(canceled, selected_indices);
external_popup_menu_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItems(
bool canceled,
const std::vector<int>& selected_indices) {
if (!external_popup_menu_)
return;
blink::WebScopedUserGesture gesture(frame_);
// We need to reset |external_popup_menu_| before calling DidSelectItems(),
// which might delete |this|.
// See ExternalPopupMenuRemoveTest.RemoveFrameOnChange
std::unique_ptr<ExternalPopupMenu> popup;
popup.swap(external_popup_menu_);
popup->DidSelectItems(canceled, selected_indices);
}
| 173,073
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool AppCacheBackendImpl::SelectCache(
int host_id,
const GURL& document_url,
const int64 cache_document_was_loaded_from,
const GURL& manifest_url) {
AppCacheHost* host = GetHost(host_id);
if (!host || host->was_select_cache_called())
return false;
host->SelectCache(document_url, cache_document_was_loaded_from,
manifest_url);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID:
|
bool AppCacheBackendImpl::SelectCache(
int host_id,
const GURL& document_url,
const int64 cache_document_was_loaded_from,
const GURL& manifest_url) {
AppCacheHost* host = GetHost(host_id);
if (!host)
return false;
return host->SelectCache(document_url, cache_document_was_loaded_from,
manifest_url);
}
| 171,736
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int http_connect(http_subtransport *t)
{
int error;
char *proxy_url;
if (t->connected &&
http_should_keep_alive(&t->parser) &&
t->parse_finished)
return 0;
if (t->io) {
git_stream_close(t->io);
git_stream_free(t->io);
t->io = NULL;
t->connected = 0;
}
if (t->connection_data.use_ssl) {
error = git_tls_stream_new(&t->io, t->connection_data.host, t->connection_data.port);
} else {
#ifdef GIT_CURL
error = git_curl_stream_new(&t->io, t->connection_data.host, t->connection_data.port);
#else
error = git_socket_stream_new(&t->io, t->connection_data.host, t->connection_data.port);
#endif
}
if (error < 0)
return error;
GITERR_CHECK_VERSION(t->io, GIT_STREAM_VERSION, "git_stream");
if (git_stream_supports_proxy(t->io) &&
!git_remote__get_http_proxy(t->owner->owner, !!t->connection_data.use_ssl, &proxy_url)) {
error = git_stream_set_proxy(t->io, proxy_url);
git__free(proxy_url);
if (error < 0)
return error;
}
error = git_stream_connect(t->io);
#if defined(GIT_OPENSSL) || defined(GIT_SECURE_TRANSPORT) || defined(GIT_CURL)
if ((!error || error == GIT_ECERTIFICATE) && t->owner->certificate_check_cb != NULL &&
git_stream_is_encrypted(t->io)) {
git_cert *cert;
int is_valid;
if ((error = git_stream_certificate(&cert, t->io)) < 0)
return error;
giterr_clear();
is_valid = error != GIT_ECERTIFICATE;
error = t->owner->certificate_check_cb(cert, is_valid, t->connection_data.host, t->owner->message_cb_payload);
if (error < 0) {
if (!giterr_last())
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "user cancelled certificate check");
return error;
}
}
#endif
if (error < 0)
return error;
t->connected = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: http: check certificate validity before clobbering the error variable
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
static int http_connect(http_subtransport *t)
{
int error;
char *proxy_url;
if (t->connected &&
http_should_keep_alive(&t->parser) &&
t->parse_finished)
return 0;
if (t->io) {
git_stream_close(t->io);
git_stream_free(t->io);
t->io = NULL;
t->connected = 0;
}
if (t->connection_data.use_ssl) {
error = git_tls_stream_new(&t->io, t->connection_data.host, t->connection_data.port);
} else {
#ifdef GIT_CURL
error = git_curl_stream_new(&t->io, t->connection_data.host, t->connection_data.port);
#else
error = git_socket_stream_new(&t->io, t->connection_data.host, t->connection_data.port);
#endif
}
if (error < 0)
return error;
GITERR_CHECK_VERSION(t->io, GIT_STREAM_VERSION, "git_stream");
if (git_stream_supports_proxy(t->io) &&
!git_remote__get_http_proxy(t->owner->owner, !!t->connection_data.use_ssl, &proxy_url)) {
error = git_stream_set_proxy(t->io, proxy_url);
git__free(proxy_url);
if (error < 0)
return error;
}
error = git_stream_connect(t->io);
#if defined(GIT_OPENSSL) || defined(GIT_SECURE_TRANSPORT) || defined(GIT_CURL)
if ((!error || error == GIT_ECERTIFICATE) && t->owner->certificate_check_cb != NULL &&
git_stream_is_encrypted(t->io)) {
git_cert *cert;
int is_valid = (error == GIT_OK);
if ((error = git_stream_certificate(&cert, t->io)) < 0)
return error;
giterr_clear();
error = t->owner->certificate_check_cb(cert, is_valid, t->connection_data.host, t->owner->message_cb_payload);
if (error < 0) {
if (!giterr_last())
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "user cancelled certificate check");
return error;
}
}
#endif
if (error < 0)
return error;
t->connected = 1;
return 0;
}
| 170,109
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline void constructBidiRunsForSegment(InlineBidiResolver& topResolver, BidiRunList<BidiRun>& bidiRuns, const InlineIterator& endOfRuns, VisualDirectionOverride override, bool previousLineBrokeCleanly)
{
ASSERT(&topResolver.runs() == &bidiRuns);
ASSERT(topResolver.position() != endOfRuns);
RenderObject* currentRoot = topResolver.position().root();
topResolver.createBidiRunsForLine(endOfRuns, override, previousLineBrokeCleanly);
while (!topResolver.isolatedRuns().isEmpty()) {
BidiRun* isolatedRun = topResolver.isolatedRuns().last();
topResolver.isolatedRuns().removeLast();
RenderObject* startObj = isolatedRun->object();
RenderInline* isolatedInline = toRenderInline(containingIsolate(startObj, currentRoot));
InlineBidiResolver isolatedResolver;
EUnicodeBidi unicodeBidi = isolatedInline->style()->unicodeBidi();
TextDirection direction = isolatedInline->style()->direction();
if (unicodeBidi == Plaintext)
direction = determinePlaintextDirectionality(isolatedInline, startObj);
else {
ASSERT(unicodeBidi == Isolate || unicodeBidi == IsolateOverride);
direction = isolatedInline->style()->direction();
}
isolatedResolver.setStatus(statusWithDirection(direction, isOverride(unicodeBidi)));
setupResolverToResumeInIsolate(isolatedResolver, isolatedInline, startObj);
InlineIterator iter = InlineIterator(isolatedInline, startObj, isolatedRun->m_start);
isolatedResolver.setPositionIgnoringNestedIsolates(iter);
isolatedResolver.createBidiRunsForLine(endOfRuns, NoVisualOverride, previousLineBrokeCleanly);
if (isolatedResolver.runs().runCount())
bidiRuns.replaceRunWithRuns(isolatedRun, isolatedResolver.runs());
if (!isolatedResolver.isolatedRuns().isEmpty()) {
topResolver.isolatedRuns().append(isolatedResolver.isolatedRuns());
isolatedResolver.isolatedRuns().clear();
currentRoot = isolatedInline;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static inline void constructBidiRunsForSegment(InlineBidiResolver& topResolver, BidiRunList<BidiRun>& bidiRuns, const InlineIterator& endOfRuns, VisualDirectionOverride override, bool previousLineBrokeCleanly)
{
ASSERT(&topResolver.runs() == &bidiRuns);
ASSERT(topResolver.position() != endOfRuns);
RenderObject* currentRoot = topResolver.position().root();
topResolver.createBidiRunsForLine(endOfRuns, override, previousLineBrokeCleanly);
while (!topResolver.isolatedRuns().isEmpty()) {
BidiRun* isolatedRun = topResolver.isolatedRuns().last();
topResolver.isolatedRuns().removeLast();
RenderObject* startObj = isolatedRun->object();
RenderInline* isolatedInline = toRenderInline(highestContainingIsolateWithinRoot(startObj, currentRoot));
ASSERT(isolatedInline);
InlineBidiResolver isolatedResolver;
EUnicodeBidi unicodeBidi = isolatedInline->style()->unicodeBidi();
TextDirection direction = isolatedInline->style()->direction();
if (unicodeBidi == Plaintext)
direction = determinePlaintextDirectionality(isolatedInline, startObj);
else {
ASSERT(unicodeBidi == Isolate || unicodeBidi == IsolateOverride);
direction = isolatedInline->style()->direction();
}
isolatedResolver.setStatus(statusWithDirection(direction, isOverride(unicodeBidi)));
setupResolverToResumeInIsolate(isolatedResolver, isolatedInline, startObj);
InlineIterator iter = InlineIterator(isolatedInline, startObj, isolatedRun->m_start);
isolatedResolver.setPositionIgnoringNestedIsolates(iter);
isolatedResolver.createBidiRunsForLine(endOfRuns, NoVisualOverride, previousLineBrokeCleanly);
if (isolatedResolver.runs().runCount())
bidiRuns.replaceRunWithRuns(isolatedRun, isolatedResolver.runs());
if (!isolatedResolver.isolatedRuns().isEmpty()) {
topResolver.isolatedRuns().append(isolatedResolver.isolatedRuns());
isolatedResolver.isolatedRuns().clear();
currentRoot = isolatedInline;
}
}
}
| 171,180
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CloudPolicyController::StopAutoRetry() {
scheduler_->CancelDelayedWork();
backend_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void CloudPolicyController::StopAutoRetry() {
void CloudPolicyController::Reset() {
SetState(STATE_TOKEN_UNAVAILABLE);
}
| 170,282
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void calcstepsizes(uint_fast16_t refstepsize, int numrlvls,
uint_fast16_t *stepsizes)
{
int bandno;
int numbands;
uint_fast16_t expn;
uint_fast16_t mant;
expn = JPC_QCX_GETEXPN(refstepsize);
mant = JPC_QCX_GETMANT(refstepsize);
numbands = 3 * numrlvls - 2;
for (bandno = 0; bandno < numbands; ++bandno) {
////jas_eprintf("DEBUG %d %d %d %d %d\n", bandno, expn, numrlvls, bandno, ((numrlvls - 1) - (numrlvls - 1 - ((bandno > 0) ? ((bandno + 2) / 3) : (0)))));
stepsizes[bandno] = JPC_QCX_MANT(mant) | JPC_QCX_EXPN(expn +
(numrlvls - 1) - (numrlvls - 1 - ((bandno > 0) ? ((bandno + 2) / 3) : (0))));
}
}
Commit Message: Changed the JPC bitstream code to more gracefully handle a request
for a larger sized integer than what can be handled (i.e., return
with an error instead of failing an assert).
CWE ID:
|
static void calcstepsizes(uint_fast16_t refstepsize, int numrlvls,
uint_fast16_t *stepsizes)
{
int bandno;
int numbands;
uint_fast16_t expn;
uint_fast16_t mant;
expn = JPC_QCX_GETEXPN(refstepsize);
mant = JPC_QCX_GETMANT(refstepsize);
numbands = 3 * numrlvls - 2;
for (bandno = 0; bandno < numbands; ++bandno) {
////jas_eprintf("DEBUG %d %d %d %d %d\n", bandno, expn, numrlvls, bandno, ((numrlvls - 1) - (numrlvls - 1 - ((bandno > 0) ? ((bandno + 2) / 3) : (0)))));
stepsizes[bandno] = JPC_QCX_MANT(mant) | JPC_QCX_EXPN(expn +
(numrlvls - 1) - (numrlvls - 1 - ((bandno > 0) ? ((bandno + 2) / 3) : (0))));
}
}
| 168,735
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CheckSADs() {
unsigned int reference_sad, exp_sad[4];
SADs(exp_sad);
for (int block = 0; block < 4; block++) {
reference_sad = ReferenceSAD(UINT_MAX, block);
EXPECT_EQ(exp_sad[block], reference_sad) << "block " << block;
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void CheckSADs() {
unsigned int reference_sad, exp_sad[4];
SADs(exp_sad);
for (int block = 0; block < 4; ++block) {
reference_sad = ReferenceSAD(block);
EXPECT_EQ(reference_sad, exp_sad[block]) << "block " << block;
}
}
| 174,569
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void tokenadd(struct jv_parser* p, char c) {
assert(p->tokenpos <= p->tokenlen);
if (p->tokenpos == p->tokenlen) {
p->tokenlen = p->tokenlen*2 + 256;
p->tokenbuf = jv_mem_realloc(p->tokenbuf, p->tokenlen);
}
assert(p->tokenpos < p->tokenlen);
p->tokenbuf[p->tokenpos++] = c;
}
Commit Message: Heap buffer overflow in tokenadd() (fix #105)
This was an off-by one: the NUL terminator byte was not allocated on
resize. This was triggered by JSON-encoded numbers longer than 256
bytes.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void tokenadd(struct jv_parser* p, char c) {
assert(p->tokenpos <= p->tokenlen);
if (p->tokenpos >= (p->tokenlen - 1)) {
p->tokenlen = p->tokenlen*2 + 256;
p->tokenbuf = jv_mem_realloc(p->tokenbuf, p->tokenlen);
}
assert(p->tokenpos < p->tokenlen);
p->tokenbuf[p->tokenpos++] = c;
}
| 167,477
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static opj_bool pi_next_cprl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
pi->first = 0;
}
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
int resno;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < int_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
/* To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift */
if (rpx >= 31 || ((comp->dx << rpx) >> rpx) != comp->dx ||
rpy >= 31 || ((comp->dy << rpy) >> rpy) != comp->dy) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: [MJ2] Avoid index out of bounds access to pi->include[]
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static opj_bool pi_next_cprl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
pi->first = 0;
}
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
int resno;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < int_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
/* To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift */
if (rpx >= 31 || ((comp->dx << rpx) >> rpx) != comp->dx ||
rpy >= 31 || ((comp->dy << rpy) >> rpy) != comp->dy) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
/* Avoids index out of bounds access with include*/
if (index >= pi->include_size) {
opj_pi_emit_error(pi, "Invalid access to pi->include");
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
| 169,767
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(set_mempolicy, int, mode, compat_ulong_t __user *, nmask,
compat_ulong_t, maxnode)
{
long err = 0;
unsigned long __user *nm = NULL;
unsigned long nr_bits, alloc_size;
DECLARE_BITMAP(bm, MAX_NUMNODES);
nr_bits = min_t(unsigned long, maxnode-1, MAX_NUMNODES);
alloc_size = ALIGN(nr_bits, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
if (nmask) {
err = compat_get_bitmap(bm, nmask, nr_bits);
nm = compat_alloc_user_space(alloc_size);
err |= copy_to_user(nm, bm, alloc_size);
}
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
return sys_set_mempolicy(mode, nm, nr_bits+1);
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-388
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(set_mempolicy, int, mode, compat_ulong_t __user *, nmask,
compat_ulong_t, maxnode)
{
unsigned long __user *nm = NULL;
unsigned long nr_bits, alloc_size;
DECLARE_BITMAP(bm, MAX_NUMNODES);
nr_bits = min_t(unsigned long, maxnode-1, MAX_NUMNODES);
alloc_size = ALIGN(nr_bits, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
if (nmask) {
if (compat_get_bitmap(bm, nmask, nr_bits))
return -EFAULT;
nm = compat_alloc_user_space(alloc_size);
if (copy_to_user(nm, bm, alloc_size))
return -EFAULT;
}
return sys_set_mempolicy(mode, nm, nr_bits+1);
}
| 168,257
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: base::MessageLoopProxy* ProxyChannelDelegate::GetIPCMessageLoop() {
return RenderThread::Get()->GetIOMessageLoopProxy().get();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
base::MessageLoopProxy* ProxyChannelDelegate::GetIPCMessageLoop() {
| 170,733
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: zend_op_array *compile_string(zval *source_string, char *filename TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_lex_state original_lex_state;
zend_op_array *op_array = (zend_op_array *) emalloc(sizeof(zend_op_array));
zend_op_array *original_active_op_array = CG(active_op_array);
zend_op_array *retval;
zval tmp;
int compiler_result;
zend_bool original_in_compilation = CG(in_compilation);
if (source_string->value.str.len==0) {
efree(op_array);
return NULL;
}
CG(in_compilation) = 1;
tmp = *source_string;
zval_copy_ctor(&tmp);
convert_to_string(&tmp);
source_string = &tmp;
zend_save_lexical_state(&original_lex_state TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_prepare_string_for_scanning(source_string, filename TSRMLS_CC)==FAILURE) {
efree(op_array);
retval = NULL;
} else {
zend_bool orig_interactive = CG(interactive);
CG(interactive) = 0;
init_op_array(op_array, ZEND_EVAL_CODE, INITIAL_OP_ARRAY_SIZE TSRMLS_CC);
CG(interactive) = orig_interactive;
CG(active_op_array) = op_array;
zend_stack_push(&CG(context_stack), (void *) &CG(context), sizeof(CG(context)));
zend_init_compiler_context(TSRMLS_C);
BEGIN(ST_IN_SCRIPTING);
compiler_result = zendparse(TSRMLS_C);
if (SCNG(script_filtered)) {
efree(SCNG(script_filtered));
SCNG(script_filtered) = NULL;
}
if (compiler_result==1) {
CG(active_op_array) = original_active_op_array;
CG(unclean_shutdown)=1;
destroy_op_array(op_array TSRMLS_CC);
efree(op_array);
retval = NULL;
} else {
zend_do_return(NULL, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
CG(active_op_array) = original_active_op_array;
pass_two(op_array TSRMLS_CC);
zend_release_labels(0 TSRMLS_CC);
retval = op_array;
}
}
zend_restore_lexical_state(&original_lex_state TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(&tmp);
CG(in_compilation) = original_in_compilation;
return retval;
}
Commit Message: fix bug #64660 - yyparse can return 2, not only 1
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
zend_op_array *compile_string(zval *source_string, char *filename TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_lex_state original_lex_state;
zend_op_array *op_array = (zend_op_array *) emalloc(sizeof(zend_op_array));
zend_op_array *original_active_op_array = CG(active_op_array);
zend_op_array *retval;
zval tmp;
int compiler_result;
zend_bool original_in_compilation = CG(in_compilation);
if (source_string->value.str.len==0) {
efree(op_array);
return NULL;
}
CG(in_compilation) = 1;
tmp = *source_string;
zval_copy_ctor(&tmp);
convert_to_string(&tmp);
source_string = &tmp;
zend_save_lexical_state(&original_lex_state TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_prepare_string_for_scanning(source_string, filename TSRMLS_CC)==FAILURE) {
efree(op_array);
retval = NULL;
} else {
zend_bool orig_interactive = CG(interactive);
CG(interactive) = 0;
init_op_array(op_array, ZEND_EVAL_CODE, INITIAL_OP_ARRAY_SIZE TSRMLS_CC);
CG(interactive) = orig_interactive;
CG(active_op_array) = op_array;
zend_stack_push(&CG(context_stack), (void *) &CG(context), sizeof(CG(context)));
zend_init_compiler_context(TSRMLS_C);
BEGIN(ST_IN_SCRIPTING);
compiler_result = zendparse(TSRMLS_C);
if (SCNG(script_filtered)) {
efree(SCNG(script_filtered));
SCNG(script_filtered) = NULL;
}
if (compiler_result != 0) {
CG(active_op_array) = original_active_op_array;
CG(unclean_shutdown)=1;
destroy_op_array(op_array TSRMLS_CC);
efree(op_array);
retval = NULL;
} else {
zend_do_return(NULL, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
CG(active_op_array) = original_active_op_array;
pass_two(op_array TSRMLS_CC);
zend_release_labels(0 TSRMLS_CC);
retval = op_array;
}
}
zend_restore_lexical_state(&original_lex_state TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(&tmp);
CG(in_compilation) = original_in_compilation;
return retval;
}
| 166,024
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintForPrintPreview(
const base::DictionaryValue& job_settings) {
if (prep_frame_view_)
return;
if (!render_view()->GetWebView())
return;
blink::WebFrame* main_frame = render_view()->GetWebView()->mainFrame();
if (!main_frame)
return;
blink::WebDocument document = main_frame->document();
blink::WebElement pdf_element = document.getElementById("pdf-viewer");
if (pdf_element.isNull()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
blink::WebLocalFrame* plugin_frame = pdf_element.document().frame();
blink::WebElement plugin_element = pdf_element;
if (pdf_element.hasHTMLTagName("iframe")) {
plugin_frame = blink::WebLocalFrame::fromFrameOwnerElement(pdf_element);
plugin_element = delegate_->GetPdfElement(plugin_frame);
if (plugin_element.isNull()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
}
base::AutoReset<bool> set_printing_flag(&print_for_preview_, true);
if (!UpdatePrintSettings(plugin_frame, plugin_element, job_settings)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "UpdatePrintSettings failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
return;
}
PrintMsg_Print_Params& print_params = print_pages_params_->params;
print_params.printable_area = gfx::Rect(print_params.page_size);
if (!RenderPagesForPrint(plugin_frame, plugin_element)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenderPagesForPrint failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
}
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID:
|
void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintForPrintPreview(
const base::DictionaryValue& job_settings) {
CHECK_LE(ipc_nesting_level_, 1);
if (prep_frame_view_)
return;
if (!render_view()->GetWebView())
return;
blink::WebFrame* main_frame = render_view()->GetWebView()->mainFrame();
if (!main_frame)
return;
blink::WebDocument document = main_frame->document();
blink::WebElement pdf_element = document.getElementById("pdf-viewer");
if (pdf_element.isNull()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
blink::WebLocalFrame* plugin_frame = pdf_element.document().frame();
blink::WebElement plugin_element = pdf_element;
if (pdf_element.hasHTMLTagName("iframe")) {
plugin_frame = blink::WebLocalFrame::fromFrameOwnerElement(pdf_element);
plugin_element = delegate_->GetPdfElement(plugin_frame);
if (plugin_element.isNull()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
}
base::AutoReset<bool> set_printing_flag(&print_for_preview_, true);
if (!UpdatePrintSettings(plugin_frame, plugin_element, job_settings)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "UpdatePrintSettings failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
return;
}
PrintMsg_Print_Params& print_params = print_pages_params_->params;
print_params.printable_area = gfx::Rect(print_params.page_size);
if (!RenderPagesForPrint(plugin_frame, plugin_element)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenderPagesForPrint failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
}
}
| 171,873
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void ikev2_parent_inR1outI2_continue(struct pluto_crypto_req_cont *pcrc,
struct pluto_crypto_req *r,
err_t ugh)
{
struct dh_continuation *dh = (struct dh_continuation *)pcrc;
struct msg_digest *md = dh->md;
struct state *const st = md->st;
stf_status e;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("ikev2 parent inR1outI2: calculating g^{xy}, sending I2"));
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"%s: Request was disconnected from state",
__FUNCTION__);
if (dh->md)
release_md(dh->md);
return;
}
/* XXX should check out ugh */
passert(ugh == NULL);
passert(cur_state == NULL);
passert(st != NULL);
passert(st->st_suspended_md == dh->md);
set_suspended(st, NULL); /* no longer connected or suspended */
set_cur_state(st);
st->st_calculating = FALSE;
e = ikev2_parent_inR1outI2_tail(pcrc, r);
if (dh->md != NULL) {
complete_v2_state_transition(&dh->md, e);
if (dh->md)
release_md(dh->md);
}
reset_globals();
passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static void ikev2_parent_inR1outI2_continue(struct pluto_crypto_req_cont *pcrc,
struct pluto_crypto_req *r,
err_t ugh)
{
struct dh_continuation *dh = (struct dh_continuation *)pcrc;
struct msg_digest *md = dh->md;
struct state *const st = md->st;
stf_status e;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("ikev2 parent inR1outI2: calculating g^{xy}, sending I2"));
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"%s: Request was disconnected from state",
__FUNCTION__);
if (dh->md)
release_md(dh->md);
return;
}
/* XXX should check out ugh */
passert(ugh == NULL);
passert(cur_state == NULL);
passert(st != NULL);
passert(st->st_suspended_md == dh->md);
set_suspended(st, NULL); /* no longer connected or suspended */
set_cur_state(st);
st->st_calculating = FALSE;
e = ikev2_parent_inR1outI2_tail(pcrc, r);
if (dh->md != NULL) {
complete_v2_state_transition(&dh->md, e);
if (dh->md)
release_md(dh->md);
}
reset_globals();
}
| 166,472
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ElementsUploadDataStreamTest::FileChangedHelper(
const base::FilePath& file_path,
const base::Time& time,
bool error_expected) {
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<UploadElementReader>> element_readers;
element_readers.push_back(base::MakeUnique<UploadFileElementReader>(
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get().get(), file_path, 1, 2, time));
TestCompletionCallback init_callback;
std::unique_ptr<UploadDataStream> stream(
new ElementsUploadDataStream(std::move(element_readers), 0));
ASSERT_THAT(stream->Init(init_callback.callback(), NetLogWithSource()),
IsError(ERR_IO_PENDING));
int error_code = init_callback.WaitForResult();
if (error_expected)
ASSERT_THAT(error_code, IsError(ERR_UPLOAD_FILE_CHANGED));
else
ASSERT_THAT(error_code, IsOk());
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311
|
void ElementsUploadDataStreamTest::FileChangedHelper(
const base::FilePath& file_path,
const base::Time& time,
bool error_expected) {
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<UploadElementReader>> element_readers;
element_readers.push_back(std::make_unique<UploadFileElementReader>(
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get().get(), file_path, 1, 2, time));
TestCompletionCallback init_callback;
std::unique_ptr<UploadDataStream> stream(
new ElementsUploadDataStream(std::move(element_readers), 0));
ASSERT_THAT(stream->Init(init_callback.callback(), NetLogWithSource()),
IsError(ERR_IO_PENDING));
int error_code = init_callback.WaitForResult();
if (error_expected)
ASSERT_THAT(error_code, IsError(ERR_UPLOAD_FILE_CHANGED));
else
ASSERT_THAT(error_code, IsOk());
}
| 173,261
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
const int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
mComponentRole,
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > kMaxPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex == kInputPortIndex) {
if (formatParams->eCompressionFormat != mCodingType
|| formatParams->eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
if (formatParams->eCompressionFormat != OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused
|| formatParams->eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case kPrepareForAdaptivePlaybackIndex:
{
const PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams* adaptivePlaybackParams =
(const PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams *)params;
mIsAdaptive = adaptivePlaybackParams->bEnable;
if (mIsAdaptive) {
mAdaptiveMaxWidth = adaptivePlaybackParams->nMaxFrameWidth;
mAdaptiveMaxHeight = adaptivePlaybackParams->nMaxFrameHeight;
mWidth = mAdaptiveMaxWidth;
mHeight = mAdaptiveMaxHeight;
} else {
mAdaptiveMaxWidth = 0;
mAdaptiveMaxHeight = 0;
}
updatePortDefinitions(true /* updateCrop */, true /* updateInputSize */);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *newParams =
(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *)params;
OMX_VIDEO_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *video_def = &newParams->format.video;
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *def = &editPortInfo(newParams->nPortIndex)->mDef;
uint32_t oldWidth = def->format.video.nFrameWidth;
uint32_t oldHeight = def->format.video.nFrameHeight;
uint32_t newWidth = video_def->nFrameWidth;
uint32_t newHeight = video_def->nFrameHeight;
if (newWidth != oldWidth || newHeight != oldHeight) {
bool outputPort = (newParams->nPortIndex == kOutputPortIndex);
if (outputPort) {
mWidth = newWidth;
mHeight = newHeight;
updatePortDefinitions(true /* updateCrop */, true /* updateInputSize */);
newParams->nBufferSize = def->nBufferSize;
} else {
def->format.video.nFrameWidth = newWidth;
def->format.video.nFrameHeight = newHeight;
}
}
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
const int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(roleParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
mComponentRole,
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(formatParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > kMaxPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex == kInputPortIndex) {
if (formatParams->eCompressionFormat != mCodingType
|| formatParams->eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
if (formatParams->eCompressionFormat != OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused
|| formatParams->eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case kPrepareForAdaptivePlaybackIndex:
{
const PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams* adaptivePlaybackParams =
(const PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(adaptivePlaybackParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
mIsAdaptive = adaptivePlaybackParams->bEnable;
if (mIsAdaptive) {
mAdaptiveMaxWidth = adaptivePlaybackParams->nMaxFrameWidth;
mAdaptiveMaxHeight = adaptivePlaybackParams->nMaxFrameHeight;
mWidth = mAdaptiveMaxWidth;
mHeight = mAdaptiveMaxHeight;
} else {
mAdaptiveMaxWidth = 0;
mAdaptiveMaxHeight = 0;
}
updatePortDefinitions(true /* updateCrop */, true /* updateInputSize */);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *newParams =
(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(newParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
OMX_VIDEO_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *video_def = &newParams->format.video;
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *def = &editPortInfo(newParams->nPortIndex)->mDef;
uint32_t oldWidth = def->format.video.nFrameWidth;
uint32_t oldHeight = def->format.video.nFrameHeight;
uint32_t newWidth = video_def->nFrameWidth;
uint32_t newHeight = video_def->nFrameHeight;
if (newWidth != oldWidth || newHeight != oldHeight) {
bool outputPort = (newParams->nPortIndex == kOutputPortIndex);
if (outputPort) {
mWidth = newWidth;
mHeight = newHeight;
updatePortDefinitions(true /* updateCrop */, true /* updateInputSize */);
newParams->nBufferSize = def->nBufferSize;
} else {
def->format.video.nFrameWidth = newWidth;
def->format.video.nFrameHeight = newHeight;
}
}
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,226
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void UserSelectionScreen::OnBeforeUserRemoved(const AccountId& account_id) {
for (user_manager::UserList::iterator it = users_.begin(); it != users_.end();
++it) {
if ((*it)->GetAccountId() == account_id) {
users_.erase(it);
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
|
void UserSelectionScreen::OnBeforeUserRemoved(const AccountId& account_id) {
for (auto it = users_.cbegin(); it != users_.cend(); ++it) {
if ((*it)->GetAccountId() == account_id) {
users_.erase(it);
break;
}
}
}
| 172,202
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: vmnc_handle_wmvi_rectangle (GstVMncDec * dec, struct RfbRectangle *rect,
const guint8 * data, int len, gboolean decode)
{
GstVideoFormat format;
gint bpp, tc;
guint32 redmask, greenmask, bluemask;
guint32 endianness, dataendianness;
GstVideoCodecState *state;
/* A WMVi rectangle has a 16byte payload */
if (len < 16) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Bad WMVi rect: too short");
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA;
}
/* We only compare 13 bytes; ignoring the 3 padding bytes at the end */
if (dec->have_format && memcmp (data, dec->format.descriptor, 13) == 0) {
/* Nothing changed, so just exit */
return 16;
}
/* Store the whole block for simple comparison later */
memcpy (dec->format.descriptor, data, 16);
if (rect->x != 0 || rect->y != 0) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (dec, "Bad WMVi rect: wrong coordinates");
return ERROR_INVALID;
}
bpp = data[0];
dec->format.depth = data[1];
dec->format.big_endian = data[2];
dataendianness = data[2] ? G_BIG_ENDIAN : G_LITTLE_ENDIAN;
tc = data[3];
if (bpp != 8 && bpp != 16 && bpp != 32) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (dec, "Bad bpp value: %d", bpp);
return ERROR_INVALID;
}
if (!tc) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (dec, "Paletted video not supported");
return ERROR_INVALID;
}
dec->format.bytes_per_pixel = bpp / 8;
dec->format.width = rect->width;
dec->format.height = rect->height;
redmask = (guint32) (RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 4)) << data[10];
greenmask = (guint32) (RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 6)) << data[11];
bluemask = (guint32) (RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 8)) << data[12];
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Red: mask %d, shift %d",
RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 4), data[10]);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Green: mask %d, shift %d",
RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 6), data[11]);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Blue: mask %d, shift %d",
RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 8), data[12]);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "BPP: %d. endianness: %s", bpp,
data[2] ? "big" : "little");
/* GStreamer's RGB caps are a bit weird. */
if (bpp == 8) {
endianness = G_BYTE_ORDER; /* Doesn't matter */
} else if (bpp == 16) {
/* We require host-endian. */
endianness = G_BYTE_ORDER;
} else { /* bpp == 32 */
/* We require big endian */
endianness = G_BIG_ENDIAN;
if (endianness != dataendianness) {
redmask = GUINT32_SWAP_LE_BE (redmask);
greenmask = GUINT32_SWAP_LE_BE (greenmask);
bluemask = GUINT32_SWAP_LE_BE (bluemask);
}
}
format = gst_video_format_from_masks (dec->format.depth, bpp, endianness,
redmask, greenmask, bluemask, 0);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "From depth: %d bpp: %u endianess: %s redmask: %X "
"greenmask: %X bluemask: %X got format %s",
dec->format.depth, bpp, endianness == G_BIG_ENDIAN ? "BE" : "LE",
GUINT32_FROM_BE (redmask), GUINT32_FROM_BE (greenmask),
GUINT32_FROM_BE (bluemask),
format == GST_VIDEO_FORMAT_UNKNOWN ? "UNKOWN" :
gst_video_format_to_string (format));
if (format == GST_VIDEO_FORMAT_UNKNOWN) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (dec, "Video format unknown to GStreamer");
return ERROR_INVALID;
}
dec->have_format = TRUE;
if (!decode) {
GST_LOG_OBJECT (dec, "Parsing, not setting caps");
return 16;
}
state = gst_video_decoder_set_output_state (GST_VIDEO_DECODER (dec), format,
rect->width, rect->height, dec->input_state);
gst_video_codec_state_unref (state);
g_free (dec->imagedata);
dec->imagedata = g_malloc (dec->format.width * dec->format.height *
dec->format.bytes_per_pixel);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Allocated image data at %p", dec->imagedata);
dec->format.stride = dec->format.width * dec->format.bytes_per_pixel;
return 16;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
vmnc_handle_wmvi_rectangle (GstVMncDec * dec, struct RfbRectangle *rect,
const guint8 * data, int len, gboolean decode)
{
GstVideoFormat format;
gint bpp, tc;
guint32 redmask, greenmask, bluemask;
guint32 endianness, dataendianness;
GstVideoCodecState *state;
/* A WMVi rectangle has a 16byte payload */
if (len < 16) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Bad WMVi rect: too short");
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA;
}
/* We only compare 13 bytes; ignoring the 3 padding bytes at the end */
if (dec->have_format && memcmp (data, dec->format.descriptor, 13) == 0) {
/* Nothing changed, so just exit */
return 16;
}
/* Store the whole block for simple comparison later */
memcpy (dec->format.descriptor, data, 16);
if (rect->x != 0 || rect->y != 0) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (dec, "Bad WMVi rect: wrong coordinates");
return ERROR_INVALID;
}
bpp = data[0];
dec->format.depth = data[1];
dec->format.big_endian = data[2];
dataendianness = data[2] ? G_BIG_ENDIAN : G_LITTLE_ENDIAN;
tc = data[3];
if (bpp != 8 && bpp != 16 && bpp != 32) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (dec, "Bad bpp value: %d", bpp);
return ERROR_INVALID;
}
if (!tc) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (dec, "Paletted video not supported");
return ERROR_INVALID;
}
dec->format.bytes_per_pixel = bpp / 8;
dec->format.width = rect->width;
dec->format.height = rect->height;
redmask = (guint32) (RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 4)) << data[10];
greenmask = (guint32) (RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 6)) << data[11];
bluemask = (guint32) (RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 8)) << data[12];
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Red: mask %d, shift %d",
RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 4), data[10]);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Green: mask %d, shift %d",
RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 6), data[11]);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Blue: mask %d, shift %d",
RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 8), data[12]);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "BPP: %d. endianness: %s", bpp,
data[2] ? "big" : "little");
/* GStreamer's RGB caps are a bit weird. */
if (bpp == 8) {
endianness = G_BYTE_ORDER; /* Doesn't matter */
} else if (bpp == 16) {
/* We require host-endian. */
endianness = G_BYTE_ORDER;
} else { /* bpp == 32 */
/* We require big endian */
endianness = G_BIG_ENDIAN;
if (endianness != dataendianness) {
redmask = GUINT32_SWAP_LE_BE (redmask);
greenmask = GUINT32_SWAP_LE_BE (greenmask);
bluemask = GUINT32_SWAP_LE_BE (bluemask);
}
}
format = gst_video_format_from_masks (dec->format.depth, bpp, endianness,
redmask, greenmask, bluemask, 0);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "From depth: %d bpp: %u endianess: %s redmask: %X "
"greenmask: %X bluemask: %X got format %s",
dec->format.depth, bpp, endianness == G_BIG_ENDIAN ? "BE" : "LE",
GUINT32_FROM_BE (redmask), GUINT32_FROM_BE (greenmask),
GUINT32_FROM_BE (bluemask),
format == GST_VIDEO_FORMAT_UNKNOWN ? "UNKOWN" :
gst_video_format_to_string (format));
if (format == GST_VIDEO_FORMAT_UNKNOWN) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (dec, "Video format unknown to GStreamer");
return ERROR_INVALID;
}
dec->have_format = TRUE;
if (!decode) {
GST_LOG_OBJECT (dec, "Parsing, not setting caps");
return 16;
}
state = gst_video_decoder_set_output_state (GST_VIDEO_DECODER (dec), format,
rect->width, rect->height, dec->input_state);
gst_video_codec_state_unref (state);
g_free (dec->imagedata);
dec->imagedata = g_malloc0 (dec->format.width * dec->format.height *
dec->format.bytes_per_pixel);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Allocated image data at %p", dec->imagedata);
dec->format.stride = dec->format.width * dec->format.bytes_per_pixel;
return 16;
}
| 165,252
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long Chapters::Display::Parse(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long long size)
{
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x05) // ChapterString ID
{
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_string);
if (status)
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x037C) // ChapterLanguage ID
{
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_language);
if (status)
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x037E) // ChapterCountry ID
{
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_country);
if (status)
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
long Chapters::Display::Parse(
| 174,403
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: mrb_class_real(struct RClass* cl)
{
if (cl == 0)
return NULL;
while ((cl->tt == MRB_TT_SCLASS) || (cl->tt == MRB_TT_ICLASS)) {
cl = cl->super;
}
return cl;
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
mrb_class_real(struct RClass* cl)
{
if (cl == 0) return NULL;
while ((cl->tt == MRB_TT_SCLASS) || (cl->tt == MRB_TT_ICLASS)) {
cl = cl->super;
if (cl == 0) return NULL;
}
return cl;
}
| 169,200
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: mp_dss_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *opt, u_int opt_len, u_char flags)
{
const struct mp_dss *mdss = (const struct mp_dss *) opt;
if ((opt_len != mp_dss_len(mdss, 1) &&
opt_len != mp_dss_len(mdss, 0)) || flags & TH_SYN)
return 0;
if (mdss->flags & MP_DSS_F)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fin"));
opt += 4;
if (mdss->flags & MP_DSS_A) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ack "));
if (mdss->flags & MP_DSS_a) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%" PRIu64, EXTRACT_64BITS(opt)));
opt += 8;
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(opt)));
opt += 4;
}
}
if (mdss->flags & MP_DSS_M) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq "));
if (mdss->flags & MP_DSS_m) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%" PRIu64, EXTRACT_64BITS(opt)));
opt += 8;
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(opt)));
opt += 4;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " subseq %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(opt)));
opt += 4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " len %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(opt)));
opt += 2;
if (opt_len == mp_dss_len(mdss, 1))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " csum 0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(opt)));
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13040/MPTCP: Clean up printing DSS suboption.
Do the length checking inline; that means we print stuff up to the point
at which we run out of option data.
First check to make sure we have at least 4 bytes of option, so we have
flags to check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kim Gwan Yeong.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
mp_dss_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *opt, u_int opt_len, u_char flags)
{
const struct mp_dss *mdss = (const struct mp_dss *) opt;
/* We need the flags, at a minimum. */
if (opt_len < 4)
return 0;
if (flags & TH_SYN)
return 0;
if (mdss->flags & MP_DSS_F)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fin"));
opt += 4;
opt_len -= 4;
if (mdss->flags & MP_DSS_A) {
/* Ack present */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ack "));
/*
* If the a flag is set, we have an 8-byte ack; if it's
* clear, we have a 4-byte ack.
*/
if (mdss->flags & MP_DSS_a) {
if (opt_len < 8)
return 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%" PRIu64, EXTRACT_64BITS(opt)));
opt += 8;
opt_len -= 8;
} else {
if (opt_len < 4)
return 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(opt)));
opt += 4;
opt_len -= 4;
}
}
if (mdss->flags & MP_DSS_M) {
/*
* Data Sequence Number (DSN), Subflow Sequence Number (SSN),
* Data-Level Length present, and Checksum possibly present.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq "));
/*
* If the m flag is set, we have an 8-byte NDS; if it's clear,
* we have a 4-byte DSN.
*/
if (mdss->flags & MP_DSS_m) {
if (opt_len < 8)
return 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%" PRIu64, EXTRACT_64BITS(opt)));
opt += 8;
opt_len -= 8;
} else {
if (opt_len < 4)
return 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(opt)));
opt += 4;
opt_len -= 4;
}
if (opt_len < 4)
return 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " subseq %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(opt)));
opt += 4;
opt_len -= 4;
if (opt_len < 2)
return 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " len %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(opt)));
opt += 2;
opt_len -= 2;
/*
* The Checksum is present only if negotiated.
* If there are at least 2 bytes left, process the next 2
* bytes as the Checksum.
*/
if (opt_len >= 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " csum 0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(opt)));
opt_len -= 2;
}
}
if (opt_len != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
| 167,837
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ChromeOSSetImeConfig(InputMethodStatusConnection* connection,
const char* section,
const char* config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
DCHECK(section);
DCHECK(config_name);
g_return_val_if_fail(connection, FALSE);
return connection->SetImeConfig(section, config_name, value);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool ChromeOSSetImeConfig(InputMethodStatusConnection* connection,
| 170,526
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void MostVisitedSitesBridge::JavaObserver::OnIconMadeAvailable(
const GURL& site_url) {
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
Java_MostVisitedURLsObserver_onIconMadeAvailable(
env, observer_, ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, site_url.spec()));
}
Commit Message: Rename MostVisitedSites.MostVisitedURLsObserver to Observer.
BUG=677672
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2697543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#449958}
CWE ID: CWE-17
|
void MostVisitedSitesBridge::JavaObserver::OnIconMadeAvailable(
const GURL& site_url) {
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
Java_Observer_onIconMadeAvailable(
env, observer_, ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, site_url.spec()));
}
| 172,034
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagetruecolortopalette)
{
zval *IM;
zend_bool dither;
long ncolors;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rbl", &IM, &dither, &ncolors) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
if (ncolors <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Number of colors has to be greater than zero");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
gdImageTrueColorToPalette(im, dither, ncolors);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug#72697 - select_colors write out-of-bounds
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
PHP_FUNCTION(imagetruecolortopalette)
{
zval *IM;
zend_bool dither;
long ncolors;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rbl", &IM, &dither, &ncolors) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
if (ncolors <= 0 || ncolors > INT_MAX) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Number of colors has to be greater than zero and no more than %d", INT_MAX);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
gdImageTrueColorToPalette(im, dither, (int)ncolors);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
| 166,953
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: mojom::AppPtr AppControllerImpl::CreateAppPtr(const apps::AppUpdate& update) {
auto app = chromeos::kiosk_next_home::mojom::App::New();
app->app_id = update.AppId();
app->type = update.AppType();
app->display_name = update.Name();
app->readiness = update.Readiness();
if (app->type == apps::mojom::AppType::kArc) {
app->android_package_name = MaybeGetAndroidPackageName(app->app_id);
}
return app;
}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
mojom::AppPtr AppControllerImpl::CreateAppPtr(const apps::AppUpdate& update) {
mojom::AppPtr AppControllerService::CreateAppPtr(
const apps::AppUpdate& update) {
auto app = chromeos::kiosk_next_home::mojom::App::New();
app->app_id = update.AppId();
app->type = update.AppType();
app->display_name = update.Name();
app->readiness = update.Readiness();
if (app->type == apps::mojom::AppType::kArc) {
app->android_package_name = MaybeGetAndroidPackageName(app->app_id);
}
return app;
}
| 172,081
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE6(sendto, int, fd, void __user *, buff, size_t, len,
unsigned int, flags, struct sockaddr __user *, addr,
int, addr_len)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int err;
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
int fput_needed;
if (len > INT_MAX)
len = INT_MAX;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
goto out;
iov.iov_base = buff;
iov.iov_len = len;
msg.msg_name = NULL;
iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, &iov, 1, len);
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
if (addr) {
err = move_addr_to_kernel(addr, addr_len, &address);
if (err < 0)
goto out_put;
msg.msg_name = (struct sockaddr *)&address;
msg.msg_namelen = addr_len;
}
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
msg.msg_flags = flags;
err = sock_sendmsg(sock, &msg, len);
out_put:
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: validate the range we feed to iov_iter_init() in sys_sendto/sys_recvfrom
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE6(sendto, int, fd, void __user *, buff, size_t, len,
unsigned int, flags, struct sockaddr __user *, addr,
int, addr_len)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int err;
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
int fput_needed;
if (len > INT_MAX)
len = INT_MAX;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buff, len)))
return -EFAULT;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
goto out;
iov.iov_base = buff;
iov.iov_len = len;
msg.msg_name = NULL;
iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, &iov, 1, len);
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
if (addr) {
err = move_addr_to_kernel(addr, addr_len, &address);
if (err < 0)
goto out_put;
msg.msg_name = (struct sockaddr *)&address;
msg.msg_namelen = addr_len;
}
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
msg.msg_flags = flags;
err = sock_sendmsg(sock, &msg, len);
out_put:
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
return err;
}
| 167,570
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ConfirmInfoBar::ConfirmInfoBar(std::unique_ptr<ConfirmInfoBarDelegate> delegate)
: InfoBarView(std::move(delegate)) {
auto* delegate_ptr = GetDelegate();
label_ = CreateLabel(delegate_ptr->GetMessageText());
AddChildView(label_);
const auto buttons = delegate_ptr->GetButtons();
if (buttons & ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_OK) {
ok_button_ = CreateButton(ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_OK);
ok_button_->SetProminent(true);
if (delegate_ptr->OKButtonTriggersUACPrompt()) {
elevation_icon_setter_.reset(new ElevationIconSetter(
ok_button_,
base::BindOnce(&ConfirmInfoBar::Layout, base::Unretained(this))));
}
}
if (buttons & ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_CANCEL) {
cancel_button_ = CreateButton(ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_CANCEL);
if (buttons == ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_CANCEL)
cancel_button_->SetProminent(true);
}
link_ = CreateLink(delegate_ptr->GetLinkText(), this);
AddChildView(link_);
}
Commit Message: Allow to specify elide behavior for confrim infobar message
Used in "<extension name> is debugging this browser" infobar.
Bug: 823194
Change-Id: Iff6627097c020cccca8f7cc3e21a803a41fd8f2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1048064
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557245}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
ConfirmInfoBar::ConfirmInfoBar(std::unique_ptr<ConfirmInfoBarDelegate> delegate)
: InfoBarView(std::move(delegate)) {
auto* delegate_ptr = GetDelegate();
label_ = CreateLabel(delegate_ptr->GetMessageText());
label_->SetElideBehavior(delegate_ptr->GetMessageElideBehavior());
AddChildView(label_);
const auto buttons = delegate_ptr->GetButtons();
if (buttons & ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_OK) {
ok_button_ = CreateButton(ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_OK);
ok_button_->SetProminent(true);
if (delegate_ptr->OKButtonTriggersUACPrompt()) {
elevation_icon_setter_.reset(new ElevationIconSetter(
ok_button_,
base::BindOnce(&ConfirmInfoBar::Layout, base::Unretained(this))));
}
}
if (buttons & ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_CANCEL) {
cancel_button_ = CreateButton(ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_CANCEL);
if (buttons == ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_CANCEL)
cancel_button_->SetProminent(true);
}
link_ = CreateLink(delegate_ptr->GetLinkText(), this);
AddChildView(link_);
}
| 173,165
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: xsltResolveSASCallback(xsltAttrElemPtr values, xsltStylesheetPtr style,
const xmlChar *name, const xmlChar *ns,
ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED const xmlChar *ignored) {
xsltAttrElemPtr tmp;
xsltAttrElemPtr refs;
tmp = values;
while (tmp != NULL) {
if (tmp->set != NULL) {
/*
* Check against cycles !
*/
if ((xmlStrEqual(name, tmp->set)) && (xmlStrEqual(ns, tmp->ns))) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"xsl:attribute-set : use-attribute-sets recursion detected on %s\n",
name);
} else {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_ATTRIBUTES
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Importing attribute list %s\n", tmp->set);
#endif
refs = xsltGetSAS(style, tmp->set, tmp->ns);
if (refs == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"xsl:attribute-set : use-attribute-sets %s reference missing %s\n",
name, tmp->set);
} else {
/*
* recurse first for cleanup
*/
xsltResolveSASCallback(refs, style, name, ns, NULL);
/*
* Then merge
*/
xsltMergeAttrElemList(style, values, refs);
/*
* Then suppress the reference
*/
tmp->set = NULL;
tmp->ns = NULL;
}
}
}
tmp = tmp->next;
}
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
xsltResolveSASCallback(xsltAttrElemPtr values, xsltStylesheetPtr style,
xsltResolveSASCallbackInt(xsltAttrElemPtr values, xsltStylesheetPtr style,
const xmlChar *name, const xmlChar *ns,
int depth) {
xsltAttrElemPtr tmp;
xsltAttrElemPtr refs;
tmp = values;
if ((name == NULL) || (name[0] == 0))
return;
if (depth > 100) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"xsl:attribute-set : use-attribute-sets recursion detected on %s\n",
name);
return;
}
while (tmp != NULL) {
if (tmp->set != NULL) {
/*
* Check against cycles !
*/
if ((xmlStrEqual(name, tmp->set)) && (xmlStrEqual(ns, tmp->ns))) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"xsl:attribute-set : use-attribute-sets recursion detected on %s\n",
name);
} else {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_ATTRIBUTES
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Importing attribute list %s\n", tmp->set);
#endif
refs = xsltGetSAS(style, tmp->set, tmp->ns);
if (refs == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"xsl:attribute-set : use-attribute-sets %s reference missing %s\n",
name, tmp->set);
} else {
/*
* recurse first for cleanup
*/
xsltResolveSASCallbackInt(refs, style, name, ns, depth + 1);
/*
* Then merge
*/
xsltMergeAttrElemList(style, values, refs);
/*
* Then suppress the reference
*/
tmp->set = NULL;
tmp->ns = NULL;
}
}
}
tmp = tmp->next;
}
}
| 173,299
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SMB2_tcon(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, const char *tree,
struct cifs_tcon *tcon, const struct nls_table *cp)
{
struct smb2_tree_connect_req *req;
struct smb2_tree_connect_rsp *rsp = NULL;
struct kvec iov[2];
int rc = 0;
int resp_buftype;
int unc_path_len;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server;
__le16 *unc_path = NULL;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "TCON\n");
if ((ses->server) && tree)
server = ses->server;
else
return -EIO;
if (tcon && tcon->bad_network_name)
return -ENOENT;
unc_path = kmalloc(MAX_SHARENAME_LENGTH * 2, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unc_path == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
unc_path_len = cifs_strtoUTF16(unc_path, tree, strlen(tree), cp) + 1;
unc_path_len *= 2;
if (unc_path_len < 2) {
kfree(unc_path);
return -EINVAL;
}
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_TREE_CONNECT, tcon, (void **) &req);
if (rc) {
kfree(unc_path);
return rc;
}
if (tcon == NULL) {
/* since no tcon, smb2_init can not do this, so do here */
req->hdr.SessionId = ses->Suid;
/* if (ses->server->sec_mode & SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED)
req->hdr.Flags |= SMB2_FLAGS_SIGNED; */
}
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field and 1 for pad */
iov[0].iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4 - 1;
/* Testing shows that buffer offset must be at location of Buffer[0] */
req->PathOffset = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct smb2_tree_connect_req)
- 1 /* pad */ - 4 /* do not count rfc1001 len field */);
req->PathLength = cpu_to_le16(unc_path_len - 2);
iov[1].iov_base = unc_path;
iov[1].iov_len = unc_path_len;
inc_rfc1001_len(req, unc_path_len - 1 /* pad */);
rc = SendReceive2(xid, ses, iov, 2, &resp_buftype, 0);
rsp = (struct smb2_tree_connect_rsp *)iov[0].iov_base;
if (rc != 0) {
if (tcon) {
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_TREE_CONNECT_HE);
tcon->need_reconnect = true;
}
goto tcon_error_exit;
}
if (tcon == NULL) {
ses->ipc_tid = rsp->hdr.TreeId;
goto tcon_exit;
}
if (rsp->ShareType & SMB2_SHARE_TYPE_DISK)
cifs_dbg(FYI, "connection to disk share\n");
else if (rsp->ShareType & SMB2_SHARE_TYPE_PIPE) {
tcon->ipc = true;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "connection to pipe share\n");
} else if (rsp->ShareType & SMB2_SHARE_TYPE_PRINT) {
tcon->print = true;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "connection to printer\n");
} else {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "unknown share type %d\n", rsp->ShareType);
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto tcon_error_exit;
}
tcon->share_flags = le32_to_cpu(rsp->ShareFlags);
tcon->capabilities = rsp->Capabilities; /* we keep caps little endian */
tcon->maximal_access = le32_to_cpu(rsp->MaximalAccess);
tcon->tidStatus = CifsGood;
tcon->need_reconnect = false;
tcon->tid = rsp->hdr.TreeId;
strlcpy(tcon->treeName, tree, sizeof(tcon->treeName));
if ((rsp->Capabilities & SMB2_SHARE_CAP_DFS) &&
((tcon->share_flags & SHI1005_FLAGS_DFS) == 0))
cifs_dbg(VFS, "DFS capability contradicts DFS flag\n");
init_copy_chunk_defaults(tcon);
if (tcon->ses->server->ops->validate_negotiate)
rc = tcon->ses->server->ops->validate_negotiate(xid, tcon);
tcon_exit:
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp);
kfree(unc_path);
return rc;
tcon_error_exit:
if (rsp->hdr.Status == STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "BAD_NETWORK_NAME: %s\n", tree);
tcon->bad_network_name = true;
}
goto tcon_exit;
}
Commit Message: [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
SMB2_tcon(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, const char *tree,
struct cifs_tcon *tcon, const struct nls_table *cp)
{
struct smb2_tree_connect_req *req;
struct smb2_tree_connect_rsp *rsp = NULL;
struct kvec iov[2];
int rc = 0;
int resp_buftype;
int unc_path_len;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server;
__le16 *unc_path = NULL;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "TCON\n");
if ((ses->server) && tree)
server = ses->server;
else
return -EIO;
if (tcon && tcon->bad_network_name)
return -ENOENT;
unc_path = kmalloc(MAX_SHARENAME_LENGTH * 2, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unc_path == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
unc_path_len = cifs_strtoUTF16(unc_path, tree, strlen(tree), cp) + 1;
unc_path_len *= 2;
if (unc_path_len < 2) {
kfree(unc_path);
return -EINVAL;
}
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_TREE_CONNECT, tcon, (void **) &req);
if (rc) {
kfree(unc_path);
return rc;
}
if (tcon == NULL) {
/* since no tcon, smb2_init can not do this, so do here */
req->hdr.SessionId = ses->Suid;
/* if (ses->server->sec_mode & SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED)
req->hdr.Flags |= SMB2_FLAGS_SIGNED; */
}
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field and 1 for pad */
iov[0].iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4 - 1;
/* Testing shows that buffer offset must be at location of Buffer[0] */
req->PathOffset = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct smb2_tree_connect_req)
- 1 /* pad */ - 4 /* do not count rfc1001 len field */);
req->PathLength = cpu_to_le16(unc_path_len - 2);
iov[1].iov_base = unc_path;
iov[1].iov_len = unc_path_len;
inc_rfc1001_len(req, unc_path_len - 1 /* pad */);
rc = SendReceive2(xid, ses, iov, 2, &resp_buftype, 0);
rsp = (struct smb2_tree_connect_rsp *)iov[0].iov_base;
if (rc != 0) {
if (tcon) {
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_TREE_CONNECT_HE);
tcon->need_reconnect = true;
}
goto tcon_error_exit;
}
if (tcon == NULL) {
ses->ipc_tid = rsp->hdr.TreeId;
goto tcon_exit;
}
if (rsp->ShareType & SMB2_SHARE_TYPE_DISK)
cifs_dbg(FYI, "connection to disk share\n");
else if (rsp->ShareType & SMB2_SHARE_TYPE_PIPE) {
tcon->ipc = true;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "connection to pipe share\n");
} else if (rsp->ShareType & SMB2_SHARE_TYPE_PRINT) {
tcon->print = true;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "connection to printer\n");
} else {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "unknown share type %d\n", rsp->ShareType);
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto tcon_error_exit;
}
tcon->share_flags = le32_to_cpu(rsp->ShareFlags);
tcon->capabilities = rsp->Capabilities; /* we keep caps little endian */
tcon->maximal_access = le32_to_cpu(rsp->MaximalAccess);
tcon->tidStatus = CifsGood;
tcon->need_reconnect = false;
tcon->tid = rsp->hdr.TreeId;
strlcpy(tcon->treeName, tree, sizeof(tcon->treeName));
if ((rsp->Capabilities & SMB2_SHARE_CAP_DFS) &&
((tcon->share_flags & SHI1005_FLAGS_DFS) == 0))
cifs_dbg(VFS, "DFS capability contradicts DFS flag\n");
init_copy_chunk_defaults(tcon);
if (tcon->ses->server->ops->validate_negotiate)
rc = tcon->ses->server->ops->validate_negotiate(xid, tcon);
tcon_exit:
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp);
kfree(unc_path);
return rc;
tcon_error_exit:
if (rsp->hdr.Status == STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "BAD_NETWORK_NAME: %s\n", tree);
if (tcon)
tcon->bad_network_name = true;
}
goto tcon_exit;
}
| 166,261
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int er_supported(ERContext *s)
{
if(s->avctx->hwaccel && s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_slice ||
!s->cur_pic.f ||
s->cur_pic.field_picture ||
s->avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO
)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Remove use of FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO as indicator of studio profile
The profile field is changed by code inside and outside the decoder,
its not a reliable indicator of the internal codec state.
Maintaining it consistency with studio_profile is messy.
Its easier to just avoid it and use only studio_profile
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_9.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-617
|
static int er_supported(ERContext *s)
{
if(s->avctx->hwaccel && s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_slice ||
!s->cur_pic.f ||
s->cur_pic.field_picture
)
return 0;
return 1;
}
| 169,154
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAMR::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (mMode == MODE_NARROW) {
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.amrnb",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
} else {
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.amrwb",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAmr:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *aacParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAMR::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(roleParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (mMode == MODE_NARROW) {
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.amrnb",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
} else {
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.amrwb",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAmr:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *aacParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(aacParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,193
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: fst_get_iface(struct fst_card_info *card, struct fst_port_info *port,
struct ifreq *ifr)
{
sync_serial_settings sync;
int i;
/* First check what line type is set, we'll default to reporting X.21
* if nothing is set as IF_IFACE_SYNC_SERIAL implies it can't be
* changed
*/
switch (port->hwif) {
case E1:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_E1;
break;
case T1:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_T1;
break;
case V35:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_V35;
break;
case V24:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_V24;
break;
case X21D:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_X21D;
break;
case X21:
default:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_X21;
break;
}
if (ifr->ifr_settings.size == 0) {
return 0; /* only type requested */
}
if (ifr->ifr_settings.size < sizeof (sync)) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
i = port->index;
sync.clock_rate = FST_RDL(card, portConfig[i].lineSpeed);
/* Lucky card and linux use same encoding here */
sync.clock_type = FST_RDB(card, portConfig[i].internalClock) ==
INTCLK ? CLOCK_INT : CLOCK_EXT;
sync.loopback = 0;
if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.sync, &sync, sizeof (sync))) {
return -EFAULT;
}
ifr->ifr_settings.size = sizeof (sync);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
fst_get_iface(struct fst_card_info *card, struct fst_port_info *port,
struct ifreq *ifr)
{
sync_serial_settings sync;
int i;
/* First check what line type is set, we'll default to reporting X.21
* if nothing is set as IF_IFACE_SYNC_SERIAL implies it can't be
* changed
*/
switch (port->hwif) {
case E1:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_E1;
break;
case T1:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_T1;
break;
case V35:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_V35;
break;
case V24:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_V24;
break;
case X21D:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_X21D;
break;
case X21:
default:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_X21;
break;
}
if (ifr->ifr_settings.size == 0) {
return 0; /* only type requested */
}
if (ifr->ifr_settings.size < sizeof (sync)) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
i = port->index;
memset(&sync, 0, sizeof(sync));
sync.clock_rate = FST_RDL(card, portConfig[i].lineSpeed);
/* Lucky card and linux use same encoding here */
sync.clock_type = FST_RDB(card, portConfig[i].internalClock) ==
INTCLK ? CLOCK_INT : CLOCK_EXT;
sync.loopback = 0;
if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.sync, &sync, sizeof (sync))) {
return -EFAULT;
}
ifr->ifr_settings.size = sizeof (sync);
return 0;
}
| 166,439
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: gplotGenCommandFile(GPLOT *gplot)
{
char buf[L_BUF_SIZE];
char *cmdstr, *plottitle, *dataname;
l_int32 i, plotstyle, nplots;
FILE *fp;
PROCNAME("gplotGenCommandFile");
if (!gplot)
return ERROR_INT("gplot not defined", procName, 1);
/* Remove any previous command data */
sarrayClear(gplot->cmddata);
/* Generate command data instructions */
if (gplot->title) { /* set title */
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set title '%s'", gplot->title);
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
if (gplot->xlabel) { /* set xlabel */
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set xlabel '%s'", gplot->xlabel);
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
if (gplot->ylabel) { /* set ylabel */
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set ylabel '%s'", gplot->ylabel);
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
/* Set terminal type and output */
if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_PNG) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set terminal png; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
} else if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_PS) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set terminal postscript; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
} else if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_EPS) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE,
"set terminal postscript eps; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
} else if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_LATEX) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set terminal latex; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
}
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
if (gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_X ||
gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_X_Y) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set logscale x");
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
if (gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_Y ||
gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_X_Y) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set logscale y");
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
nplots = sarrayGetCount(gplot->datanames);
for (i = 0; i < nplots; i++) {
plottitle = sarrayGetString(gplot->plottitles, i, L_NOCOPY);
dataname = sarrayGetString(gplot->datanames, i, L_NOCOPY);
numaGetIValue(gplot->plotstyles, i, &plotstyle);
if (nplots == 1) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "plot '%s' title '%s' %s",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
} else {
if (i == 0)
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "plot '%s' title '%s' %s, \\",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
else if (i < nplots - 1)
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, " '%s' title '%s' %s, \\",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
else
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, " '%s' title '%s' %s",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
}
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
/* Write command data to file */
cmdstr = sarrayToString(gplot->cmddata, 1);
if ((fp = fopenWriteStream(gplot->cmdname, "w")) == NULL) {
LEPT_FREE(cmdstr);
return ERROR_INT("cmd stream not opened", procName, 1);
}
fwrite(cmdstr, 1, strlen(cmdstr), fp);
fclose(fp);
LEPT_FREE(cmdstr);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
gplotGenCommandFile(GPLOT *gplot)
{
char buf[L_BUFSIZE];
char *cmdstr, *plottitle, *dataname;
l_int32 i, plotstyle, nplots;
FILE *fp;
PROCNAME("gplotGenCommandFile");
if (!gplot)
return ERROR_INT("gplot not defined", procName, 1);
/* Remove any previous command data */
sarrayClear(gplot->cmddata);
/* Generate command data instructions */
if (gplot->title) { /* set title */
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "set title '%s'", gplot->title);
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
if (gplot->xlabel) { /* set xlabel */
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "set xlabel '%s'", gplot->xlabel);
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
if (gplot->ylabel) { /* set ylabel */
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "set ylabel '%s'", gplot->ylabel);
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
/* Set terminal type and output */
if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_PNG) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "set terminal png; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
} else if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_PS) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "set terminal postscript; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
} else if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_EPS) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE,
"set terminal postscript eps; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
} else if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_LATEX) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "set terminal latex; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
}
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
if (gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_X ||
gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_X_Y) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "set logscale x");
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
if (gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_Y ||
gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_X_Y) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "set logscale y");
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
nplots = sarrayGetCount(gplot->datanames);
for (i = 0; i < nplots; i++) {
plottitle = sarrayGetString(gplot->plottitles, i, L_NOCOPY);
dataname = sarrayGetString(gplot->datanames, i, L_NOCOPY);
numaGetIValue(gplot->plotstyles, i, &plotstyle);
if (nplots == 1) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "plot '%s' title '%s' %s",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
} else {
if (i == 0)
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "plot '%s' title '%s' %s, \\",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
else if (i < nplots - 1)
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, " '%s' title '%s' %s, \\",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
else
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, " '%s' title '%s' %s",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
}
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
/* Write command data to file */
cmdstr = sarrayToString(gplot->cmddata, 1);
if ((fp = fopenWriteStream(gplot->cmdname, "w")) == NULL) {
LEPT_FREE(cmdstr);
return ERROR_INT("cmd stream not opened", procName, 1);
}
fwrite(cmdstr, 1, strlen(cmdstr), fp);
fclose(fp);
LEPT_FREE(cmdstr);
return 0;
}
| 169,325
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void IndexedDBTransaction::Abort(const IndexedDBDatabaseError& error) {
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBTransaction::Abort", "txn.id", id());
DCHECK(!processing_event_queue_);
if (state_ == FINISHED)
return;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebCore.IndexedDB.TransactionAbortReason",
ExceptionCodeToUmaEnum(error.code()),
UmaIDBExceptionExclusiveMaxValue);
timeout_timer_.Stop();
state_ = FINISHED;
should_process_queue_ = false;
if (backing_store_transaction_begun_)
transaction_->Rollback();
while (!abort_task_stack_.empty())
abort_task_stack_.pop().Run();
preemptive_task_queue_.clear();
pending_preemptive_events_ = 0;
task_queue_.clear();
CloseOpenCursors();
transaction_->Reset();
database_->transaction_coordinator().DidFinishTransaction(this);
#ifndef NDEBUG
DCHECK(!database_->transaction_coordinator().IsActive(this));
#endif
if (callbacks_.get())
callbacks_->OnAbort(*this, error);
database_->TransactionFinished(this, false);
connection_->RemoveTransaction(id_);
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID:
|
void IndexedDBTransaction::Abort(const IndexedDBDatabaseError& error) {
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBTransaction::Abort", "txn.id", id());
DCHECK(!processing_event_queue_);
if (state_ == FINISHED)
return;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebCore.IndexedDB.TransactionAbortReason",
ExceptionCodeToUmaEnum(error.code()),
UmaIDBExceptionExclusiveMaxValue);
timeout_timer_.Stop();
state_ = FINISHED;
should_process_queue_ = false;
if (backing_store_transaction_begun_)
transaction_->Rollback();
while (!abort_task_stack_.empty())
abort_task_stack_.pop().Run();
preemptive_task_queue_.clear();
pending_preemptive_events_ = 0;
task_queue_.clear();
CloseOpenCursors();
transaction_->Reset();
database_->transaction_coordinator().DidFinishTransaction(this);
#ifndef NDEBUG
DCHECK(!database_->transaction_coordinator().IsActive(this));
#endif
if (callbacks_.get())
callbacks_->OnAbort(*this, error);
database_->TransactionFinished(this, false);
// Note: During force-close situations, the connection can be destroyed during
// the |IndexedDBDatabase::TransactionFinished| call
if (connection_)
connection_->RemoveTransaction(id_);
}
| 173,219
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: fix_transited_encoding(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
krb5_boolean check_policy,
const TransitedEncoding *tr,
EncTicketPart *et,
const char *client_realm,
const char *server_realm,
const char *tgt_realm)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
char **realms, **tmp;
unsigned int num_realms;
size_t i;
switch (tr->tr_type) {
case DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS:
break;
case 0:
/*
* Allow empty content of type 0 because that is was Microsoft
* generates in their TGT.
*/
if (tr->contents.length == 0)
break;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Transited type 0 with non empty content");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
default:
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Unknown transited type: %u", tr->tr_type);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
}
ret = krb5_domain_x500_decode(context,
tr->contents,
&realms,
&num_realms,
client_realm,
server_realm);
if(ret){
krb5_warn(context, ret,
"Decoding transited encoding");
return ret;
}
if(strcmp(client_realm, tgt_realm) && strcmp(server_realm, tgt_realm)) {
/* not us, so add the previous realm to transited set */
if (num_realms + 1 > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*realms)) {
ret = ERANGE;
goto free_realms;
}
tmp = realloc(realms, (num_realms + 1) * sizeof(*realms));
if(tmp == NULL){
ret = ENOMEM;
goto free_realms;
}
realms = tmp;
realms[num_realms] = strdup(tgt_realm);
if(realms[num_realms] == NULL){
ret = ENOMEM;
goto free_realms;
}
num_realms++;
}
if(num_realms == 0) {
if(strcmp(client_realm, server_realm))
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"cross-realm %s -> %s", client_realm, server_realm);
} else {
size_t l = 0;
char *rs;
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
l += strlen(realms[i]) + 2;
rs = malloc(l);
if(rs != NULL) {
*rs = '\0';
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++) {
if(i > 0)
strlcat(rs, ", ", l);
strlcat(rs, realms[i], l);
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"cross-realm %s -> %s via [%s]",
client_realm, server_realm, rs);
free(rs);
}
}
if(check_policy) {
ret = krb5_check_transited(context, client_realm,
server_realm,
realms, num_realms, NULL);
if(ret) {
krb5_warn(context, ret, "cross-realm %s -> %s",
client_realm, server_realm);
goto free_realms;
}
et->flags.transited_policy_checked = 1;
}
et->transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
ret = krb5_domain_x500_encode(realms, num_realms, &et->transited.contents);
if(ret)
krb5_warn(context, ret, "Encoding transited encoding");
free_realms:
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
free(realms[i]);
free(realms);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix transit path validation CVE-2017-6594
Commit f469fc6 (2010-10-02) inadvertently caused the previous hop realm
to not be added to the transit path of issued tickets. This may, in
some cases, enable bypass of capath policy in Heimdal versions 1.5
through 7.2.
Note, this may break sites that rely on the bug. With the bug some
incomplete [capaths] worked, that should not have. These may now break
authentication in some cross-realm configurations.
CWE ID: CWE-295
|
fix_transited_encoding(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
krb5_boolean check_policy,
const TransitedEncoding *tr,
EncTicketPart *et,
const char *client_realm,
const char *server_realm,
const char *tgt_realm)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
char **realms, **tmp;
unsigned int num_realms;
size_t i;
switch (tr->tr_type) {
case DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS:
break;
case 0:
/*
* Allow empty content of type 0 because that is was Microsoft
* generates in their TGT.
*/
if (tr->contents.length == 0)
break;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Transited type 0 with non empty content");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
default:
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Unknown transited type: %u", tr->tr_type);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
}
ret = krb5_domain_x500_decode(context,
tr->contents,
&realms,
&num_realms,
client_realm,
server_realm);
if(ret){
krb5_warn(context, ret,
"Decoding transited encoding");
return ret;
}
/*
* If the realm of the presented tgt is neither the client nor the server
* realm, it is a transit realm and must be added to transited set.
*/
if(strcmp(client_realm, tgt_realm) && strcmp(server_realm, tgt_realm)) {
if (num_realms + 1 > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*realms)) {
ret = ERANGE;
goto free_realms;
}
tmp = realloc(realms, (num_realms + 1) * sizeof(*realms));
if(tmp == NULL){
ret = ENOMEM;
goto free_realms;
}
realms = tmp;
realms[num_realms] = strdup(tgt_realm);
if(realms[num_realms] == NULL){
ret = ENOMEM;
goto free_realms;
}
num_realms++;
}
if(num_realms == 0) {
if(strcmp(client_realm, server_realm))
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"cross-realm %s -> %s", client_realm, server_realm);
} else {
size_t l = 0;
char *rs;
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
l += strlen(realms[i]) + 2;
rs = malloc(l);
if(rs != NULL) {
*rs = '\0';
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++) {
if(i > 0)
strlcat(rs, ", ", l);
strlcat(rs, realms[i], l);
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"cross-realm %s -> %s via [%s]",
client_realm, server_realm, rs);
free(rs);
}
}
if(check_policy) {
ret = krb5_check_transited(context, client_realm,
server_realm,
realms, num_realms, NULL);
if(ret) {
krb5_warn(context, ret, "cross-realm %s -> %s",
client_realm, server_realm);
goto free_realms;
}
et->flags.transited_policy_checked = 1;
}
et->transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
ret = krb5_domain_x500_encode(realms, num_realms, &et->transited.contents);
if(ret)
krb5_warn(context, ret, "Encoding transited encoding");
free_realms:
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
free(realms[i]);
free(realms);
return ret;
}
| 168,325
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: QuicConnectionHelperTest()
: framer_(QuicDecrypter::Create(kNULL), QuicEncrypter::Create(kNULL)),
creator_(guid_, &framer_),
net_log_(BoundNetLog()),
scheduler_(new MockScheduler()),
socket_(&empty_data_, net_log_.net_log()),
runner_(new TestTaskRunner(&clock_)),
helper_(new TestConnectionHelper(runner_.get(), &clock_, &socket_)),
connection_(guid_, IPEndPoint(), helper_),
frame1_(1, false, 0, data1) {
connection_.set_visitor(&visitor_);
connection_.SetScheduler(scheduler_);
}
Commit Message: Fix uninitialized access in QuicConnectionHelperTest
BUG=159928
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11360153
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@166708 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
QuicConnectionHelperTest()
: guid_(0),
framer_(QuicDecrypter::Create(kNULL), QuicEncrypter::Create(kNULL)),
creator_(guid_, &framer_),
net_log_(BoundNetLog()),
scheduler_(new MockScheduler()),
socket_(&empty_data_, net_log_.net_log()),
runner_(new TestTaskRunner(&clock_)),
helper_(new TestConnectionHelper(runner_.get(), &clock_, &socket_)),
connection_(guid_, IPEndPoint(), helper_),
frame1_(1, false, 0, data1) {
connection_.set_visitor(&visitor_);
connection_.SetScheduler(scheduler_);
}
| 171,411
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::didBlurFromControl()
{
RefPtr<HTMLInputElement> protector(element());
element()->setFocus(false);
}
Commit Message: Fix reentrance of BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree.
destroyShadowSubtree could dispatch 'blur' event unexpectedly because
element()->focused() had incorrect information. We make sure it has
correct information by checking if the UA shadow root contains the
focused element.
BUG=257353
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19067004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154086 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::didBlurFromControl()
{
if (containsFocusedShadowElement())
return;
RefPtr<HTMLInputElement> protector(element());
element()->setFocus(false);
}
| 171,211
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: jas_matrix_t *jas_matrix_create(int numrows, int numcols)
{
jas_matrix_t *matrix;
int i;
if (!(matrix = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_matrix_t)))) {
return 0;
}
matrix->flags_ = 0;
matrix->numrows_ = numrows;
matrix->numcols_ = numcols;
matrix->rows_ = 0;
matrix->maxrows_ = numrows;
matrix->data_ = 0;
matrix->datasize_ = numrows * numcols;
if (matrix->maxrows_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->rows_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->maxrows_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t *)))) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
return 0;
}
}
if (matrix->datasize_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->data_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->datasize_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t)))) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
return 0;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < numrows; ++i) {
matrix->rows_[i] = &matrix->data_[i * matrix->numcols_];
}
for (i = 0; i < matrix->datasize_; ++i) {
matrix->data_[i] = 0;
}
matrix->xstart_ = 0;
matrix->ystart_ = 0;
matrix->xend_ = matrix->numcols_;
matrix->yend_ = matrix->numrows_;
return matrix;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a problem with a null pointer dereference in the BMP decoder.
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
jas_matrix_t *jas_matrix_create(int numrows, int numcols)
{
jas_matrix_t *matrix;
int i;
if (numrows < 0 || numcols < 0) {
return 0;
}
if (!(matrix = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_matrix_t)))) {
return 0;
}
matrix->flags_ = 0;
matrix->numrows_ = numrows;
matrix->numcols_ = numcols;
matrix->rows_ = 0;
matrix->maxrows_ = numrows;
matrix->data_ = 0;
matrix->datasize_ = numrows * numcols;
if (matrix->maxrows_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->rows_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->maxrows_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t *)))) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
return 0;
}
}
if (matrix->datasize_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->data_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->datasize_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t)))) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
return 0;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < numrows; ++i) {
matrix->rows_[i] = &matrix->data_[i * matrix->numcols_];
}
for (i = 0; i < matrix->datasize_; ++i) {
matrix->data_[i] = 0;
}
matrix->xstart_ = 0;
matrix->ystart_ = 0;
matrix->xend_ = matrix->numcols_;
matrix->yend_ = matrix->numrows_;
return matrix;
}
| 168,755
|
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