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Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: IOHandler::IOHandler(DevToolsIOContext* io_context) : DevToolsDomainHandler(IO::Metainfo::domainName), io_context_(io_context), process_host_(nullptr), weak_factory_(this) {} Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost upon closure of DevTools front-end. Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694 Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657 Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} CWE ID: CWE-20
IOHandler::IOHandler(DevToolsIOContext* io_context) : DevToolsDomainHandler(IO::Metainfo::domainName), io_context_(io_context), browser_context_(nullptr), storage_partition_(nullptr), weak_factory_(this) {}
172,749
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: InputImeEventRouter* GetInputImeEventRouter(Profile* profile) { if (!profile) return nullptr; return extensions::InputImeEventRouterFactory::GetInstance()->GetRouter( profile->GetOriginalProfile()); } Commit Message: Fix the regression caused by http://crrev.com/c/1288350. Bug: 900124,856135 Change-Id: Ie11ad406bd1ea383dc2a83cc8661076309154865 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1317010 Reviewed-by: Lan Wei <azurewei@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Shu Chen <shuchen@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605282} CWE ID: CWE-416
InputImeEventRouter* GetInputImeEventRouter(Profile* profile) { if (!profile) return nullptr; return extensions::InputImeEventRouterFactory::GetInstance()->GetRouter( profile); }
172,646
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: name_len(netdissect_options *ndo, const unsigned char *s, const unsigned char *maxbuf) { const unsigned char *s0 = s; unsigned char c; if (s >= maxbuf) return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */ ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1); c = *s; if ((c & 0xC0) == 0xC0) return(2); while (*s) { if (s >= maxbuf) return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */ ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1); s += (*s) + 1; } return(PTR_DIFF(s, s0) + 1); trunc: return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */ } Commit Message: CVE-2017-12893/SMB/CIFS: Add a bounds check in name_len(). After we advance the pointer by the length value in the buffer, make sure it points to something in the captured data. This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki. Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). CWE ID: CWE-125
name_len(netdissect_options *ndo, const unsigned char *s, const unsigned char *maxbuf) { const unsigned char *s0 = s; unsigned char c; if (s >= maxbuf) return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */ ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1); c = *s; if ((c & 0xC0) == 0xC0) return(2); while (*s) { if (s >= maxbuf) return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */ ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1); s += (*s) + 1; ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1); } return(PTR_DIFF(s, s0) + 1); trunc: return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */ }
167,961
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static void rose_loopback_timer(unsigned long param) { struct sk_buff *skb; struct net_device *dev; rose_address *dest; struct sock *sk; unsigned short frametype; unsigned int lci_i, lci_o; while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&loopback_queue)) != NULL) { lci_i = ((skb->data[0] << 8) & 0xF00) + ((skb->data[1] << 0) & 0x0FF); frametype = skb->data[2]; dest = (rose_address *)(skb->data + 4); lci_o = ROSE_DEFAULT_MAXVC + 1 - lci_i; skb_reset_transport_header(skb); sk = rose_find_socket(lci_o, rose_loopback_neigh); if (sk) { if (rose_process_rx_frame(sk, skb) == 0) kfree_skb(skb); continue; } if (frametype == ROSE_CALL_REQUEST) { if ((dev = rose_dev_get(dest)) != NULL) { if (rose_rx_call_request(skb, dev, rose_loopback_neigh, lci_o) == 0) kfree_skb(skb); } else { kfree_skb(skb); } } else { kfree_skb(skb); } } } Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths. Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or assuming its value. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CWE ID: CWE-20
static void rose_loopback_timer(unsigned long param) { struct sk_buff *skb; struct net_device *dev; rose_address *dest; struct sock *sk; unsigned short frametype; unsigned int lci_i, lci_o; while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&loopback_queue)) != NULL) { if (skb->len < ROSE_MIN_LEN) { kfree_skb(skb); continue; } lci_i = ((skb->data[0] << 8) & 0xF00) + ((skb->data[1] << 0) & 0x0FF); frametype = skb->data[2]; if (frametype == ROSE_CALL_REQUEST && (skb->len <= ROSE_CALL_REQ_FACILITIES_OFF || skb->data[ROSE_CALL_REQ_ADDR_LEN_OFF] != ROSE_CALL_REQ_ADDR_LEN_VAL)) { kfree_skb(skb); continue; } dest = (rose_address *)(skb->data + ROSE_CALL_REQ_DEST_ADDR_OFF); lci_o = ROSE_DEFAULT_MAXVC + 1 - lci_i; skb_reset_transport_header(skb); sk = rose_find_socket(lci_o, rose_loopback_neigh); if (sk) { if (rose_process_rx_frame(sk, skb) == 0) kfree_skb(skb); continue; } if (frametype == ROSE_CALL_REQUEST) { if ((dev = rose_dev_get(dest)) != NULL) { if (rose_rx_call_request(skb, dev, rose_loopback_neigh, lci_o) == 0) kfree_skb(skb); } else { kfree_skb(skb); } } else { kfree_skb(skb); } } }
165,670
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static int _snd_timer_stop(struct snd_timer_instance * timeri, int keep_flag, int event) { struct snd_timer *timer; unsigned long flags; if (snd_BUG_ON(!timeri)) return -ENXIO; if (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_SLAVE) { if (!keep_flag) { spin_lock_irqsave(&slave_active_lock, flags); timeri->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&slave_active_lock, flags); } goto __end; } timer = timeri->timer; if (!timer) return -EINVAL; spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags); list_del_init(&timeri->ack_list); list_del_init(&timeri->active_list); if ((timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING) && !(--timer->running)) { timer->hw.stop(timer); if (timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_RESCHED) { timer->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_RESCHED; snd_timer_reschedule(timer, 0); if (timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE) { timer->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE; timer->hw.start(timer); } } } if (!keep_flag) timeri->flags &= ~(SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING | SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_START); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timer->lock, flags); __end: if (event != SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION) snd_timer_notify1(timeri, event); return 0; } Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Harden slave timer list handling A slave timer instance might be still accessible in a racy way while operating the master instance as it lacks of locking. Since the master operation is mostly protected with timer->lock, we should cope with it while changing the slave instance, too. Also, some linked lists (active_list and ack_list) of slave instances aren't unlinked immediately at stopping or closing, and this may lead to unexpected accesses. This patch tries to address these issues. It adds spin lock of timer->lock (either from master or slave, which is equivalent) in a few places. For avoiding a deadlock, we ensure that the global slave_active_lock is always locked at first before each timer lock. Also, ack and active_list of slave instances are properly unlinked at snd_timer_stop() and snd_timer_close(). Last but not least, remove the superfluous call of _snd_timer_stop() at removing slave links. This is a noop, and calling it may confuse readers wrt locking. Further cleanup will follow in a later patch. Actually we've got reports of use-after-free by syzkaller fuzzer, and this hopefully fixes these issues. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> CWE ID: CWE-20
static int _snd_timer_stop(struct snd_timer_instance * timeri, int keep_flag, int event) { struct snd_timer *timer; unsigned long flags; if (snd_BUG_ON(!timeri)) return -ENXIO; if (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_SLAVE) { if (!keep_flag) { spin_lock_irqsave(&slave_active_lock, flags); timeri->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING; list_del_init(&timeri->ack_list); list_del_init(&timeri->active_list); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&slave_active_lock, flags); } goto __end; } timer = timeri->timer; if (!timer) return -EINVAL; spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags); list_del_init(&timeri->ack_list); list_del_init(&timeri->active_list); if ((timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING) && !(--timer->running)) { timer->hw.stop(timer); if (timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_RESCHED) { timer->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_RESCHED; snd_timer_reschedule(timer, 0); if (timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE) { timer->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE; timer->hw.start(timer); } } } if (!keep_flag) timeri->flags &= ~(SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING | SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_START); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timer->lock, flags); __end: if (event != SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION) snd_timer_notify1(timeri, event); return 0; }
167,400
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: WandExport MagickBooleanType MogrifyImageList(ImageInfo *image_info, const int argc,const char **argv,Image **images,ExceptionInfo *exception) { ChannelType channel; const char *option; ImageInfo *mogrify_info; MagickStatusType status; QuantizeInfo *quantize_info; register ssize_t i; ssize_t count, index; /* Apply options to the image list. */ assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL); assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature); assert(images != (Image **) NULL); assert((*images)->previous == (Image *) NULL); assert((*images)->signature == MagickCoreSignature); if ((*images)->debug != MagickFalse) (void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s", (*images)->filename); if ((argc <= 0) || (*argv == (char *) NULL)) return(MagickTrue); mogrify_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info); quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(mogrify_info); channel=mogrify_info->channel; status=MagickTrue; for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) argc; i++) { if (*images == (Image *) NULL) break; option=argv[i]; if (IsCommandOption(option) == MagickFalse) continue; count=ParseCommandOption(MagickCommandOptions,MagickFalse,option); count=MagickMax(count,0L); if ((i+count) >= (ssize_t) argc) break; status=MogrifyImageInfo(mogrify_info,(int) count+1,argv+i,exception); switch (*(option+1)) { case 'a': { if (LocaleCompare("affinity",option+1) == 0) { (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); if (*option == '+') { (void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL); InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception); break; } i++; break; } if (LocaleCompare("append",option+1) == 0) { Image *append_image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); append_image=AppendImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception); if (append_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=append_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("average",option+1) == 0) { Image *average_image; /* Average an image sequence (deprecated). */ (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); average_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MeanEvaluateOperator, exception); if (average_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=average_image; break; } break; } case 'c': { if (LocaleCompare("channel",option+1) == 0) { if (*option == '+') { channel=DefaultChannels; break; } channel=(ChannelType) ParseChannelOption(argv[i+1]); break; } if (LocaleCompare("clut",option+1) == 0) { Image *clut_image, *image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); clut_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); if (clut_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } (void) ClutImageChannel(image,channel,clut_image); clut_image=DestroyImage(clut_image); InheritException(exception,&image->exception); *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("coalesce",option+1) == 0) { Image *coalesce_image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); coalesce_image=CoalesceImages(*images,exception); if (coalesce_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=coalesce_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("combine",option+1) == 0) { Image *combine_image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); combine_image=CombineImages(*images,channel,exception); if (combine_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=combine_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("compare",option+1) == 0) { const char *option; double distortion; Image *difference_image, *image, *reconstruct_image; MetricType metric; /* Mathematically and visually annotate the difference between an image and its reconstruction. */ (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); reconstruct_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); if (reconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } metric=UndefinedMetric; option=GetImageOption(image_info,"metric"); if (option != (const char *) NULL) metric=(MetricType) ParseCommandOption(MagickMetricOptions, MagickFalse,option); difference_image=CompareImageChannels(image,reconstruct_image, channel,metric,&distortion,exception); if (difference_image == (Image *) NULL) break; reconstruct_image=DestroyImage(reconstruct_image); image=DestroyImage(image); if (*images != (Image *) NULL) *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=difference_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("complex",option+1) == 0) { ComplexOperator op; Image *complex_images; (void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images); op=(ComplexOperator) ParseCommandOption(MagickComplexOptions, MagickFalse,argv[i+1]); complex_images=ComplexImages(*images,op,exception); if (complex_images == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=complex_images; break; } if (LocaleCompare("composite",option+1) == 0) { Image *mask_image, *composite_image, *image; RectangleInfo geometry; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); composite_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); if (composite_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } (void) TransformImage(&composite_image,(char *) NULL, composite_image->geometry); SetGeometry(composite_image,&geometry); (void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(composite_image->geometry,&geometry); GravityAdjustGeometry(image->columns,image->rows,image->gravity, &geometry); mask_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); if (mask_image != (Image *) NULL) { if ((image->compose == DisplaceCompositeOp) || (image->compose == DistortCompositeOp)) { /* Merge Y displacement into X displacement image. */ (void) CompositeImage(composite_image,CopyGreenCompositeOp, mask_image,0,0); mask_image=DestroyImage(mask_image); } else { /* Set a blending mask for the composition. */ if (image->mask != (Image *) NULL) image->mask=DestroyImage(image->mask); image->mask=mask_image; (void) NegateImage(image->mask,MagickFalse); } } (void) CompositeImageChannel(image,channel,image->compose, composite_image,geometry.x,geometry.y); if (mask_image != (Image *) NULL) { image->mask=DestroyImage(image->mask); mask_image=image->mask; } composite_image=DestroyImage(composite_image); InheritException(exception,&image->exception); *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("copy",option+1) == 0) { Image *source_image; OffsetInfo offset; RectangleInfo geometry; /* Copy image pixels. */ (void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images); (void) ParsePageGeometry(*images,argv[i+2],&geometry,exception); offset.x=geometry.x; offset.y=geometry.y; source_image=(*images); if (source_image->next != (Image *) NULL) source_image=source_image->next; (void) ParsePageGeometry(source_image,argv[i+1],&geometry, exception); status=CopyImagePixels(*images,source_image,&geometry,&offset, exception); break; } break; } case 'd': { if (LocaleCompare("deconstruct",option+1) == 0) { Image *deconstruct_image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); deconstruct_image=DeconstructImages(*images,exception); if (deconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=deconstruct_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("delete",option+1) == 0) { if (*option == '+') DeleteImages(images,"-1",exception); else DeleteImages(images,argv[i+1],exception); break; } if (LocaleCompare("dither",option+1) == 0) { if (*option == '+') { quantize_info->dither=MagickFalse; break; } quantize_info->dither=MagickTrue; quantize_info->dither_method=(DitherMethod) ParseCommandOption( MagickDitherOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]); break; } if (LocaleCompare("duplicate",option+1) == 0) { Image *duplicate_images; if (*option == '+') duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,1,"-1",exception); else { const char *p; size_t number_duplicates; number_duplicates=(size_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]); p=strchr(argv[i+1],','); if (p == (const char *) NULL) duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates, "-1",exception); else duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,p, exception); } AppendImageToList(images, duplicate_images); (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); break; } break; } case 'e': { if (LocaleCompare("evaluate-sequence",option+1) == 0) { Image *evaluate_image; MagickEvaluateOperator op; (void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images); op=(MagickEvaluateOperator) ParseCommandOption( MagickEvaluateOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]); evaluate_image=EvaluateImages(*images,op,exception); if (evaluate_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=evaluate_image; break; } break; } case 'f': { if (LocaleCompare("fft",option+1) == 0) { Image *fourier_image; /* Implements the discrete Fourier transform (DFT). */ (void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images); fourier_image=ForwardFourierTransformImage(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception); if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL) break; *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=fourier_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("flatten",option+1) == 0) { Image *flatten_image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); flatten_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,FlattenLayer,exception); if (flatten_image == (Image *) NULL) break; *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=flatten_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("fx",option+1) == 0) { Image *fx_image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); fx_image=FxImageChannel(*images,channel,argv[i+1],exception); if (fx_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=fx_image; break; } break; } case 'h': { if (LocaleCompare("hald-clut",option+1) == 0) { Image *hald_image, *image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); hald_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); if (hald_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } (void) HaldClutImageChannel(image,channel,hald_image); hald_image=DestroyImage(hald_image); InheritException(exception,&image->exception); if (*images != (Image *) NULL) *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=image; break; } break; } case 'i': { if (LocaleCompare("ift",option+1) == 0) { Image *fourier_image, *magnitude_image, *phase_image; /* Implements the inverse fourier discrete Fourier transform (DFT). */ (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); magnitude_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); phase_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); if (phase_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } fourier_image=InverseFourierTransformImage(magnitude_image, phase_image,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception); if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL) break; if (*images != (Image *) NULL) *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=fourier_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("insert",option+1) == 0) { Image *p, *q; index=0; if (*option != '+') index=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]); p=RemoveLastImageFromList(images); if (p == (Image *) NULL) { (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(), OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]); status=MagickFalse; break; } q=p; if (index == 0) PrependImageToList(images,q); else if (index == (ssize_t) GetImageListLength(*images)) AppendImageToList(images,q); else { q=GetImageFromList(*images,index-1); if (q == (Image *) NULL) { p=DestroyImage(p); (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(), OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]); status=MagickFalse; break; } InsertImageInList(&q,p); } *images=GetFirstImageInList(q); break; } break; } case 'l': { if (LocaleCompare("layers",option+1) == 0) { Image *layers; ImageLayerMethod method; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); layers=(Image *) NULL; method=(ImageLayerMethod) ParseCommandOption(MagickLayerOptions, MagickFalse,argv[i+1]); switch (method) { case CoalesceLayer: { layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception); break; } case CompareAnyLayer: case CompareClearLayer: case CompareOverlayLayer: default: { layers=CompareImageLayers(*images,method,exception); break; } case MergeLayer: case FlattenLayer: case MosaicLayer: case TrimBoundsLayer: { layers=MergeImageLayers(*images,method,exception); break; } case DisposeLayer: { layers=DisposeImages(*images,exception); break; } case OptimizeImageLayer: { layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception); break; } case OptimizePlusLayer: { layers=OptimizePlusImageLayers(*images,exception); break; } case OptimizeTransLayer: { OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception); break; } case RemoveDupsLayer: { RemoveDuplicateLayers(images,exception); break; } case RemoveZeroLayer: { RemoveZeroDelayLayers(images,exception); break; } case OptimizeLayer: { /* General Purpose, GIF Animation Optimizer. */ layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception); if (layers == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } InheritException(exception,&layers->exception); *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=layers; layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception); if (layers == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } InheritException(exception,&layers->exception); *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=layers; layers=(Image *) NULL; OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception); InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception); (void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL); break; } case CompositeLayer: { CompositeOperator compose; Image *source; RectangleInfo geometry; /* Split image sequence at the first 'NULL:' image. */ source=(*images); while (source != (Image *) NULL) { source=GetNextImageInList(source); if ((source != (Image *) NULL) && (LocaleCompare(source->magick,"NULL") == 0)) break; } if (source != (Image *) NULL) { if ((GetPreviousImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL) || (GetNextImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL)) source=(Image *) NULL; else { /* Separate the two lists, junk the null: image. */ source=SplitImageList(source->previous); DeleteImageFromList(&source); } } if (source == (Image *) NULL) { (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(), OptionError,"MissingNullSeparator","layers Composite"); status=MagickFalse; break; } /* Adjust offset with gravity and virtual canvas. */ SetGeometry(*images,&geometry); (void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry((*images)->geometry,&geometry); geometry.width=source->page.width != 0 ? source->page.width : source->columns; geometry.height=source->page.height != 0 ? source->page.height : source->rows; GravityAdjustGeometry((*images)->page.width != 0 ? (*images)->page.width : (*images)->columns, (*images)->page.height != 0 ? (*images)->page.height : (*images)->rows,(*images)->gravity,&geometry); compose=OverCompositeOp; option=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose"); if (option != (const char *) NULL) compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption( MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,option); CompositeLayers(*images,compose,source,geometry.x,geometry.y, exception); source=DestroyImageList(source); break; } } if (layers == (Image *) NULL) break; InheritException(exception,&layers->exception); *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=layers; break; } break; } case 'm': { if (LocaleCompare("map",option+1) == 0) { (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); if (*option == '+') { (void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL); InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception); break; } i++; break; } if (LocaleCompare("maximum",option+1) == 0) { Image *maximum_image; /* Maximum image sequence (deprecated). */ (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); maximum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MaxEvaluateOperator,exception); if (maximum_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=maximum_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("minimum",option+1) == 0) { Image *minimum_image; /* Minimum image sequence (deprecated). */ (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); minimum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MinEvaluateOperator,exception); if (minimum_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=minimum_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("morph",option+1) == 0) { Image *morph_image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); morph_image=MorphImages(*images,StringToUnsignedLong(argv[i+1]), exception); if (morph_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=morph_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("mosaic",option+1) == 0) { Image *mosaic_image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); mosaic_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,MosaicLayer,exception); if (mosaic_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=mosaic_image; break; } break; } case 'p': { if (LocaleCompare("poly",option+1) == 0) { char *args, token[MaxTextExtent]; const char *p; double *arguments; Image *polynomial_image; register ssize_t x; size_t number_arguments; /* Polynomial image. */ (void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images); args=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1]); InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception); if (args == (char *) NULL) break; p=(char *) args; for (x=0; *p != '\0'; x++) { GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token); if (*token == ',') GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token); } number_arguments=(size_t) x; arguments=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_arguments, sizeof(*arguments)); if (arguments == (double *) NULL) ThrowWandFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError, "MemoryAllocationFailed",(*images)->filename); (void) memset(arguments,0,number_arguments* sizeof(*arguments)); p=(char *) args; for (x=0; (x < (ssize_t) number_arguments) && (*p != '\0'); x++) { GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token); if (*token == ',') GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token); arguments[x]=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL); } args=DestroyString(args); polynomial_image=PolynomialImageChannel(*images,channel, number_arguments >> 1,arguments,exception); arguments=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments); if (polynomial_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=polynomial_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("print",option+1) == 0) { char *string; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); string=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1]); if (string == (char *) NULL) break; InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception); (void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%s",string); string=DestroyString(string); } if (LocaleCompare("process",option+1) == 0) { char **arguments; int j, number_arguments; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); arguments=StringToArgv(argv[i+1],&number_arguments); if (arguments == (char **) NULL) break; if ((argc > 1) && (strchr(arguments[1],'=') != (char *) NULL)) { char breaker, quote, *token; const char *arguments; int next, status; size_t length; TokenInfo *token_info; /* Support old style syntax, filter="-option arg". */ length=strlen(argv[i+1]); token=(char *) NULL; if (~length >= (MaxTextExtent-1)) token=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MaxTextExtent, sizeof(*token)); if (token == (char *) NULL) break; next=0; arguments=argv[i+1]; token_info=AcquireTokenInfo(); status=Tokenizer(token_info,0,token,length,arguments,"","=", "\"",'\0',&breaker,&next,&quote); token_info=DestroyTokenInfo(token_info); if (status == 0) { const char *argv; argv=(&(arguments[next])); (void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(token,&(*images),1,&argv, exception); } token=DestroyString(token); break; } (void) SubstituteString(&arguments[1],"-",""); (void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(arguments[1],&(*images), number_arguments-2,(const char **) arguments+2,exception); for (j=0; j < number_arguments; j++) arguments[j]=DestroyString(arguments[j]); arguments=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments); break; } break; } case 'r': { if (LocaleCompare("reverse",option+1) == 0) { ReverseImageList(images); InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception); break; } break; } case 's': { if (LocaleCompare("smush",option+1) == 0) { Image *smush_image; ssize_t offset; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); offset=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]); smush_image=SmushImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,offset,exception); if (smush_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=smush_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("swap",option+1) == 0) { Image *p, *q, *u, *v; ssize_t swap_index; index=(-1); swap_index=(-2); if (*option != '+') { GeometryInfo geometry_info; MagickStatusType flags; swap_index=(-1); flags=ParseGeometry(argv[i+1],&geometry_info); index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.rho; if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0) swap_index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.sigma; } p=GetImageFromList(*images,index); q=GetImageFromList(*images,swap_index); if ((p == (Image *) NULL) || (q == (Image *) NULL)) { (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(), OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",(*images)->filename); status=MagickFalse; break; } if (p == q) break; u=CloneImage(p,0,0,MagickTrue,exception); if (u == (Image *) NULL) break; v=CloneImage(q,0,0,MagickTrue,exception); if (v == (Image *) NULL) { u=DestroyImage(u); break; } ReplaceImageInList(&p,v); ReplaceImageInList(&q,u); *images=GetFirstImageInList(q); break; } break; } case 'w': { if (LocaleCompare("write",option+1) == 0) { char key[MaxTextExtent]; Image *write_images; ImageInfo *write_info; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); (void) FormatLocaleString(key,MaxTextExtent,"cache:%s",argv[i+1]); (void) DeleteImageRegistry(key); write_images=(*images); if (*option == '+') write_images=CloneImageList(*images,exception); write_info=CloneImageInfo(mogrify_info); status&=WriteImages(write_info,write_images,argv[i+1],exception); write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info); if (*option == '+') write_images=DestroyImageList(write_images); break; } break; } default: break; } i+=count; } quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info); mogrify_info=DestroyImageInfo(mogrify_info); status&=MogrifyImageInfo(image_info,argc,argv,exception); return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse); } Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1623 CWE ID: CWE-399
WandExport MagickBooleanType MogrifyImageList(ImageInfo *image_info, const int argc,const char **argv,Image **images,ExceptionInfo *exception) { ChannelType channel; const char *option; ImageInfo *mogrify_info; MagickStatusType status; QuantizeInfo *quantize_info; register ssize_t i; ssize_t count, index; /* Apply options to the image list. */ assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL); assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature); assert(images != (Image **) NULL); assert((*images)->previous == (Image *) NULL); assert((*images)->signature == MagickCoreSignature); if ((*images)->debug != MagickFalse) (void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s", (*images)->filename); if ((argc <= 0) || (*argv == (char *) NULL)) return(MagickTrue); mogrify_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info); quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(mogrify_info); channel=mogrify_info->channel; status=MagickTrue; for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) argc; i++) { if (*images == (Image *) NULL) break; option=argv[i]; if (IsCommandOption(option) == MagickFalse) continue; count=ParseCommandOption(MagickCommandOptions,MagickFalse,option); count=MagickMax(count,0L); if ((i+count) >= (ssize_t) argc) break; status=MogrifyImageInfo(mogrify_info,(int) count+1,argv+i,exception); switch (*(option+1)) { case 'a': { if (LocaleCompare("affinity",option+1) == 0) { (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); if (*option == '+') { (void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL); InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception); break; } i++; break; } if (LocaleCompare("append",option+1) == 0) { Image *append_image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); append_image=AppendImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception); if (append_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=append_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("average",option+1) == 0) { Image *average_image; /* Average an image sequence (deprecated). */ (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); average_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MeanEvaluateOperator, exception); if (average_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=average_image; break; } break; } case 'c': { if (LocaleCompare("channel",option+1) == 0) { if (*option == '+') { channel=DefaultChannels; break; } channel=(ChannelType) ParseChannelOption(argv[i+1]); break; } if (LocaleCompare("clut",option+1) == 0) { Image *clut_image, *image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); clut_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); if (clut_image == (Image *) NULL) { (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(), OptionError,"ImageSequenceRequired","`%s'",option); image=DestroyImage(image); status=MagickFalse; break; } (void) ClutImageChannel(image,channel,clut_image); clut_image=DestroyImage(clut_image); InheritException(exception,&image->exception); *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("coalesce",option+1) == 0) { Image *coalesce_image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); coalesce_image=CoalesceImages(*images,exception); if (coalesce_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=coalesce_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("combine",option+1) == 0) { Image *combine_image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); combine_image=CombineImages(*images,channel,exception); if (combine_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=combine_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("compare",option+1) == 0) { double distortion; Image *difference_image, *image, *reconstruct_image; MetricType metric; /* Mathematically and visually annotate the difference between an image and its reconstruction. */ (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); reconstruct_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); if (reconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL) { (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(), OptionError,"ImageSequenceRequired","`%s'",option); image=DestroyImage(image); status=MagickFalse; break; } metric=UndefinedMetric; option=GetImageOption(image_info,"metric"); if (option != (const char *) NULL) metric=(MetricType) ParseCommandOption(MagickMetricOptions, MagickFalse,option); difference_image=CompareImageChannels(image,reconstruct_image, channel,metric,&distortion,exception); if (difference_image == (Image *) NULL) break; reconstruct_image=DestroyImage(reconstruct_image); image=DestroyImage(image); if (*images != (Image *) NULL) *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=difference_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("complex",option+1) == 0) { ComplexOperator op; Image *complex_images; (void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images); op=(ComplexOperator) ParseCommandOption(MagickComplexOptions, MagickFalse,argv[i+1]); complex_images=ComplexImages(*images,op,exception); if (complex_images == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=complex_images; break; } if (LocaleCompare("composite",option+1) == 0) { Image *mask_image, *composite_image, *image; RectangleInfo geometry; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); composite_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); if (composite_image == (Image *) NULL) { (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(), OptionError,"ImageSequenceRequired","`%s'",option); image=DestroyImage(image); status=MagickFalse; break; } (void) TransformImage(&composite_image,(char *) NULL, composite_image->geometry); SetGeometry(composite_image,&geometry); (void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(composite_image->geometry,&geometry); GravityAdjustGeometry(image->columns,image->rows,image->gravity, &geometry); mask_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); if (mask_image != (Image *) NULL) { if ((image->compose == DisplaceCompositeOp) || (image->compose == DistortCompositeOp)) { /* Merge Y displacement into X displacement image. */ (void) CompositeImage(composite_image,CopyGreenCompositeOp, mask_image,0,0); mask_image=DestroyImage(mask_image); } else { /* Set a blending mask for the composition. */ if (image->mask != (Image *) NULL) image->mask=DestroyImage(image->mask); image->mask=mask_image; (void) NegateImage(image->mask,MagickFalse); } } (void) CompositeImageChannel(image,channel,image->compose, composite_image,geometry.x,geometry.y); if (mask_image != (Image *) NULL) { image->mask=DestroyImage(image->mask); mask_image=image->mask; } composite_image=DestroyImage(composite_image); InheritException(exception,&image->exception); *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("copy",option+1) == 0) { Image *source_image; OffsetInfo offset; RectangleInfo geometry; /* Copy image pixels. */ (void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images); (void) ParsePageGeometry(*images,argv[i+2],&geometry,exception); offset.x=geometry.x; offset.y=geometry.y; source_image=(*images); if (source_image->next != (Image *) NULL) source_image=source_image->next; (void) ParsePageGeometry(source_image,argv[i+1],&geometry, exception); status=CopyImagePixels(*images,source_image,&geometry,&offset, exception); break; } break; } case 'd': { if (LocaleCompare("deconstruct",option+1) == 0) { Image *deconstruct_image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); deconstruct_image=DeconstructImages(*images,exception); if (deconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=deconstruct_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("delete",option+1) == 0) { if (*option == '+') DeleteImages(images,"-1",exception); else DeleteImages(images,argv[i+1],exception); break; } if (LocaleCompare("dither",option+1) == 0) { if (*option == '+') { quantize_info->dither=MagickFalse; break; } quantize_info->dither=MagickTrue; quantize_info->dither_method=(DitherMethod) ParseCommandOption( MagickDitherOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]); break; } if (LocaleCompare("duplicate",option+1) == 0) { Image *duplicate_images; if (*option == '+') duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,1,"-1",exception); else { const char *p; size_t number_duplicates; number_duplicates=(size_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]); p=strchr(argv[i+1],','); if (p == (const char *) NULL) duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates, "-1",exception); else duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,p, exception); } AppendImageToList(images, duplicate_images); (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); break; } break; } case 'e': { if (LocaleCompare("evaluate-sequence",option+1) == 0) { Image *evaluate_image; MagickEvaluateOperator op; (void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images); op=(MagickEvaluateOperator) ParseCommandOption( MagickEvaluateOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]); evaluate_image=EvaluateImages(*images,op,exception); if (evaluate_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=evaluate_image; break; } break; } case 'f': { if (LocaleCompare("fft",option+1) == 0) { Image *fourier_image; /* Implements the discrete Fourier transform (DFT). */ (void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images); fourier_image=ForwardFourierTransformImage(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception); if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL) break; *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=fourier_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("flatten",option+1) == 0) { Image *flatten_image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); flatten_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,FlattenLayer,exception); if (flatten_image == (Image *) NULL) break; *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=flatten_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("fx",option+1) == 0) { Image *fx_image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); fx_image=FxImageChannel(*images,channel,argv[i+1],exception); if (fx_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=fx_image; break; } break; } case 'h': { if (LocaleCompare("hald-clut",option+1) == 0) { Image *hald_image, *image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); hald_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); if (hald_image == (Image *) NULL) { (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(), OptionError,"ImageSequenceRequired","`%s'",option); image=DestroyImage(image); status=MagickFalse; break; } (void) HaldClutImageChannel(image,channel,hald_image); hald_image=DestroyImage(hald_image); InheritException(exception,&image->exception); if (*images != (Image *) NULL) *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=image; break; } break; } case 'i': { if (LocaleCompare("ift",option+1) == 0) { Image *fourier_image, *magnitude_image, *phase_image; /* Implements the inverse fourier discrete Fourier transform (DFT). */ (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); magnitude_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); phase_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images); if (phase_image == (Image *) NULL) { (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(), OptionError,"ImageSequenceRequired","`%s'",option); magnitude_image=DestroyImage(magnitude_image); status=MagickFalse; break; } fourier_image=InverseFourierTransformImage(magnitude_image, phase_image,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception); magnitude_image=DestroyImage(magnitude_image); phase_image=DestroyImage(phase_image); if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL) break; if (*images != (Image *) NULL) *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=fourier_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("insert",option+1) == 0) { Image *p, *q; index=0; if (*option != '+') index=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]); p=RemoveLastImageFromList(images); if (p == (Image *) NULL) { (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(), OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]); status=MagickFalse; break; } q=p; if (index == 0) PrependImageToList(images,q); else if (index == (ssize_t) GetImageListLength(*images)) AppendImageToList(images,q); else { q=GetImageFromList(*images,index-1); if (q == (Image *) NULL) { p=DestroyImage(p); (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(), OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]); status=MagickFalse; break; } InsertImageInList(&q,p); } *images=GetFirstImageInList(q); break; } break; } case 'l': { if (LocaleCompare("layers",option+1) == 0) { Image *layers; ImageLayerMethod method; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); layers=(Image *) NULL; method=(ImageLayerMethod) ParseCommandOption(MagickLayerOptions, MagickFalse,argv[i+1]); switch (method) { case CoalesceLayer: { layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception); break; } case CompareAnyLayer: case CompareClearLayer: case CompareOverlayLayer: default: { layers=CompareImageLayers(*images,method,exception); break; } case MergeLayer: case FlattenLayer: case MosaicLayer: case TrimBoundsLayer: { layers=MergeImageLayers(*images,method,exception); break; } case DisposeLayer: { layers=DisposeImages(*images,exception); break; } case OptimizeImageLayer: { layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception); break; } case OptimizePlusLayer: { layers=OptimizePlusImageLayers(*images,exception); break; } case OptimizeTransLayer: { OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception); break; } case RemoveDupsLayer: { RemoveDuplicateLayers(images,exception); break; } case RemoveZeroLayer: { RemoveZeroDelayLayers(images,exception); break; } case OptimizeLayer: { /* General Purpose, GIF Animation Optimizer. */ layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception); if (layers == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } InheritException(exception,&layers->exception); *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=layers; layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception); if (layers == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } InheritException(exception,&layers->exception); *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=layers; layers=(Image *) NULL; OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception); InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception); (void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL); break; } case CompositeLayer: { CompositeOperator compose; Image *source; RectangleInfo geometry; /* Split image sequence at the first 'NULL:' image. */ source=(*images); while (source != (Image *) NULL) { source=GetNextImageInList(source); if ((source != (Image *) NULL) && (LocaleCompare(source->magick,"NULL") == 0)) break; } if (source != (Image *) NULL) { if ((GetPreviousImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL) || (GetNextImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL)) source=(Image *) NULL; else { /* Separate the two lists, junk the null: image. */ source=SplitImageList(source->previous); DeleteImageFromList(&source); } } if (source == (Image *) NULL) { (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(), OptionError,"MissingNullSeparator","layers Composite"); status=MagickFalse; break; } /* Adjust offset with gravity and virtual canvas. */ SetGeometry(*images,&geometry); (void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry((*images)->geometry,&geometry); geometry.width=source->page.width != 0 ? source->page.width : source->columns; geometry.height=source->page.height != 0 ? source->page.height : source->rows; GravityAdjustGeometry((*images)->page.width != 0 ? (*images)->page.width : (*images)->columns, (*images)->page.height != 0 ? (*images)->page.height : (*images)->rows,(*images)->gravity,&geometry); compose=OverCompositeOp; option=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose"); if (option != (const char *) NULL) compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption( MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,option); CompositeLayers(*images,compose,source,geometry.x,geometry.y, exception); source=DestroyImageList(source); break; } } if (layers == (Image *) NULL) break; InheritException(exception,&layers->exception); *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=layers; break; } break; } case 'm': { if (LocaleCompare("map",option+1) == 0) { (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); if (*option == '+') { (void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL); InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception); break; } i++; break; } if (LocaleCompare("maximum",option+1) == 0) { Image *maximum_image; /* Maximum image sequence (deprecated). */ (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); maximum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MaxEvaluateOperator,exception); if (maximum_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=maximum_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("minimum",option+1) == 0) { Image *minimum_image; /* Minimum image sequence (deprecated). */ (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); minimum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MinEvaluateOperator,exception); if (minimum_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=minimum_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("morph",option+1) == 0) { Image *morph_image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); morph_image=MorphImages(*images,StringToUnsignedLong(argv[i+1]), exception); if (morph_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=morph_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("mosaic",option+1) == 0) { Image *mosaic_image; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); mosaic_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,MosaicLayer,exception); if (mosaic_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=mosaic_image; break; } break; } case 'p': { if (LocaleCompare("poly",option+1) == 0) { char *args, token[MaxTextExtent]; const char *p; double *arguments; Image *polynomial_image; register ssize_t x; size_t number_arguments; /* Polynomial image. */ (void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images); args=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1]); InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception); if (args == (char *) NULL) break; p=(char *) args; for (x=0; *p != '\0'; x++) { GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token); if (*token == ',') GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token); } number_arguments=(size_t) x; arguments=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_arguments, sizeof(*arguments)); if (arguments == (double *) NULL) ThrowWandFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError, "MemoryAllocationFailed",(*images)->filename); (void) memset(arguments,0,number_arguments* sizeof(*arguments)); p=(char *) args; for (x=0; (x < (ssize_t) number_arguments) && (*p != '\0'); x++) { GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token); if (*token == ',') GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token); arguments[x]=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL); } args=DestroyString(args); polynomial_image=PolynomialImageChannel(*images,channel, number_arguments >> 1,arguments,exception); arguments=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments); if (polynomial_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=polynomial_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("print",option+1) == 0) { char *string; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); string=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1]); if (string == (char *) NULL) break; InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception); (void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%s",string); string=DestroyString(string); } if (LocaleCompare("process",option+1) == 0) { char **arguments; int j, number_arguments; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); arguments=StringToArgv(argv[i+1],&number_arguments); if (arguments == (char **) NULL) break; if ((argc > 1) && (strchr(arguments[1],'=') != (char *) NULL)) { char breaker, quote, *token; const char *arguments; int next, status; size_t length; TokenInfo *token_info; /* Support old style syntax, filter="-option arg". */ length=strlen(argv[i+1]); token=(char *) NULL; if (~length >= (MaxTextExtent-1)) token=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MaxTextExtent, sizeof(*token)); if (token == (char *) NULL) break; next=0; arguments=argv[i+1]; token_info=AcquireTokenInfo(); status=Tokenizer(token_info,0,token,length,arguments,"","=", "\"",'\0',&breaker,&next,&quote); token_info=DestroyTokenInfo(token_info); if (status == 0) { const char *argv; argv=(&(arguments[next])); (void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(token,&(*images),1,&argv, exception); } token=DestroyString(token); break; } (void) SubstituteString(&arguments[1],"-",""); (void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(arguments[1],&(*images), number_arguments-2,(const char **) arguments+2,exception); for (j=0; j < number_arguments; j++) arguments[j]=DestroyString(arguments[j]); arguments=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments); break; } break; } case 'r': { if (LocaleCompare("reverse",option+1) == 0) { ReverseImageList(images); InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception); break; } break; } case 's': { if (LocaleCompare("smush",option+1) == 0) { Image *smush_image; ssize_t offset; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); offset=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]); smush_image=SmushImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,offset,exception); if (smush_image == (Image *) NULL) { status=MagickFalse; break; } *images=DestroyImageList(*images); *images=smush_image; break; } if (LocaleCompare("swap",option+1) == 0) { Image *p, *q, *u, *v; ssize_t swap_index; index=(-1); swap_index=(-2); if (*option != '+') { GeometryInfo geometry_info; MagickStatusType flags; swap_index=(-1); flags=ParseGeometry(argv[i+1],&geometry_info); index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.rho; if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0) swap_index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.sigma; } p=GetImageFromList(*images,index); q=GetImageFromList(*images,swap_index); if ((p == (Image *) NULL) || (q == (Image *) NULL)) { (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(), OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",(*images)->filename); status=MagickFalse; break; } if (p == q) break; u=CloneImage(p,0,0,MagickTrue,exception); if (u == (Image *) NULL) break; v=CloneImage(q,0,0,MagickTrue,exception); if (v == (Image *) NULL) { u=DestroyImage(u); break; } ReplaceImageInList(&p,v); ReplaceImageInList(&q,u); *images=GetFirstImageInList(q); break; } break; } case 'w': { if (LocaleCompare("write",option+1) == 0) { char key[MaxTextExtent]; Image *write_images; ImageInfo *write_info; (void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images); (void) FormatLocaleString(key,MaxTextExtent,"cache:%s",argv[i+1]); (void) DeleteImageRegistry(key); write_images=(*images); if (*option == '+') write_images=CloneImageList(*images,exception); write_info=CloneImageInfo(mogrify_info); status&=WriteImages(write_info,write_images,argv[i+1],exception); write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info); if (*option == '+') write_images=DestroyImageList(write_images); break; } break; } default: break; } i+=count; } quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info); mogrify_info=DestroyImageInfo(mogrify_info); status&=MogrifyImageInfo(image_info,argc,argv,exception); return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse); }
169,591
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: unsigned int munlock_vma_page(struct page *page) { unsigned int nr_pages; struct zone *zone = page_zone(page); BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page)); /* * Serialize with any parallel __split_huge_page_refcount() which * might otherwise copy PageMlocked to part of the tail pages before * we clear it in the head page. It also stabilizes hpage_nr_pages(). */ spin_lock_irq(&zone->lru_lock); nr_pages = hpage_nr_pages(page); if (!TestClearPageMlocked(page)) goto unlock_out; __mod_zone_page_state(zone, NR_MLOCK, -nr_pages); if (__munlock_isolate_lru_page(page, true)) { spin_unlock_irq(&zone->lru_lock); __munlock_isolated_page(page); goto out; } __munlock_isolation_failed(page); unlock_out: spin_unlock_irq(&zone->lru_lock); out: return nr_pages - 1; } Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked). The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration, which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that effect. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page != check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable memory design. Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com> Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> CWE ID: CWE-264
unsigned int munlock_vma_page(struct page *page) { unsigned int nr_pages; struct zone *zone = page_zone(page); /* For try_to_munlock() and to serialize with page migration */ BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page)); /* * Serialize with any parallel __split_huge_page_refcount() which * might otherwise copy PageMlocked to part of the tail pages before * we clear it in the head page. It also stabilizes hpage_nr_pages(). */ spin_lock_irq(&zone->lru_lock); nr_pages = hpage_nr_pages(page); if (!TestClearPageMlocked(page)) goto unlock_out; __mod_zone_page_state(zone, NR_MLOCK, -nr_pages); if (__munlock_isolate_lru_page(page, true)) { spin_unlock_irq(&zone->lru_lock); __munlock_isolated_page(page); goto out; } __munlock_isolation_failed(page); unlock_out: spin_unlock_irq(&zone->lru_lock); out: return nr_pages - 1; }
166,386
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: authentic_process_fci(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_file *file, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) { struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx; size_t taglen; int rv; unsigned ii; const unsigned char *tag = NULL; unsigned char ops_DF[8] = { SC_AC_OP_CREATE, SC_AC_OP_DELETE, SC_AC_OP_CRYPTO, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }; unsigned char ops_EF[8] = { SC_AC_OP_READ, SC_AC_OP_DELETE, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE, SC_AC_OP_RESIZE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }; LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx); tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(card->ctx, buf, buflen, 0x6F, &taglen); if (tag != NULL) { sc_log(ctx, " FCP length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", taglen); buf = tag; buflen = taglen; } tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(card->ctx, buf, buflen, 0x62, &taglen); if (tag != NULL) { sc_log(ctx, " FCP length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", taglen); buf = tag; buflen = taglen; } rv = iso_ops->process_fci(card, file, buf, buflen); LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "ISO parse FCI failed"); if (!file->sec_attr_len) { sc_log_hex(ctx, "ACLs not found in data", buf, buflen); sc_log(ctx, "Path:%s; Type:%X; PathType:%X", sc_print_path(&file->path), file->type, file->path.type); if (file->path.type == SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME || file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF) { file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF; } else { LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, "ACLs tag missing"); } } sc_log_hex(ctx, "ACL data", file->sec_attr, file->sec_attr_len); for (ii = 0; ii < file->sec_attr_len / 2; ii++) { unsigned char op = file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF ? ops_DF[ii] : ops_EF[ii]; unsigned char acl = *(file->sec_attr + ii*2); unsigned char cred_id = *(file->sec_attr + ii*2 + 1); unsigned sc = acl * 0x100 + cred_id; sc_log(ctx, "ACL(%i) op 0x%X, acl %X:%X", ii, op, acl, cred_id); if (op == 0xFF) ; else if (!acl && !cred_id) sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NONE, 0); else if (acl == 0xFF) sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NEVER, 0); else if (acl & AUTHENTIC_AC_SM_MASK) sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_SCB, sc); else if (cred_id) sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_CHV, cred_id); else sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NEVER, 0); } LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, 0); } Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH for reporting and suggesting security fixes. CWE ID: CWE-125
authentic_process_fci(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_file *file, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) { struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx; size_t taglen; int rv; unsigned ii; const unsigned char *tag = NULL; unsigned char ops_DF[8] = { SC_AC_OP_CREATE, SC_AC_OP_DELETE, SC_AC_OP_CRYPTO, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }; unsigned char ops_EF[8] = { SC_AC_OP_READ, SC_AC_OP_DELETE, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE, SC_AC_OP_RESIZE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }; LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx); tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(card->ctx, buf, buflen, 0x6F, &taglen); if (tag != NULL) { sc_log(ctx, " FCP length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", taglen); buf = tag; buflen = taglen; } tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(card->ctx, buf, buflen, 0x62, &taglen); if (tag != NULL) { sc_log(ctx, " FCP length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", taglen); buf = tag; buflen = taglen; } rv = iso_ops->process_fci(card, file, buf, buflen); LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "ISO parse FCI failed"); if (!file->sec_attr_len) { sc_log_hex(ctx, "ACLs not found in data", buf, buflen); sc_log(ctx, "Path:%s; Type:%X; PathType:%X", sc_print_path(&file->path), file->type, file->path.type); if (file->path.type == SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME || file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF) { file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF; } else { LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, "ACLs tag missing"); } } sc_log_hex(ctx, "ACL data", file->sec_attr, file->sec_attr_len); for (ii = 0; ii < file->sec_attr_len / 2 && ii < sizeof ops_DF; ii++) { unsigned char op = file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF ? ops_DF[ii] : ops_EF[ii]; unsigned char acl = *(file->sec_attr + ii*2); unsigned char cred_id = *(file->sec_attr + ii*2 + 1); unsigned sc = acl * 0x100 + cred_id; sc_log(ctx, "ACL(%i) op 0x%X, acl %X:%X", ii, op, acl, cred_id); if (op == 0xFF) ; else if (!acl && !cred_id) sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NONE, 0); else if (acl == 0xFF) sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NEVER, 0); else if (acl & AUTHENTIC_AC_SM_MASK) sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_SCB, sc); else if (cred_id) sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_CHV, cred_id); else sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NEVER, 0); } LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, 0); }
169,048
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: bool WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin(PluginView* plugin, const Platform::TouchEvent& event) { if (!event.neverHadMultiTouch()) return false; if (event.isDoubleTap() || event.isTouchHold() || event.m_type == Platform::TouchEvent::TouchCancel) { NPTouchEvent npTouchEvent; if (event.isDoubleTap()) npTouchEvent.type = TOUCH_EVENT_DOUBLETAP; else if (event.isTouchHold()) npTouchEvent.type = TOUCH_EVENT_TOUCHHOLD; else if (event.m_type == Platform::TouchEvent::TouchCancel) npTouchEvent.type = TOUCH_EVENT_CANCEL; npTouchEvent.points = 0; npTouchEvent.size = event.m_points.size(); if (npTouchEvent.size) { npTouchEvent.points = new NPTouchPoint[npTouchEvent.size]; for (int i = 0; i < npTouchEvent.size; i++) { npTouchEvent.points[i].touchId = event.m_points[i].m_id; npTouchEvent.points[i].clientX = event.m_points[i].m_screenPos.x(); npTouchEvent.points[i].clientY = event.m_points[i].m_screenPos.y(); npTouchEvent.points[i].screenX = event.m_points[i].m_screenPos.x(); npTouchEvent.points[i].screenY = event.m_points[i].m_screenPos.y(); npTouchEvent.points[i].pageX = event.m_points[i].m_pos.x(); npTouchEvent.points[i].pageY = event.m_points[i].m_pos.y(); } } NPEvent npEvent; npEvent.type = NP_TouchEvent; npEvent.data = &npTouchEvent; plugin->dispatchFullScreenNPEvent(npEvent); delete[] npTouchEvent.points; return true; } dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin(plugin, event.m_points[0]); return true; } Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143 RIM PR 171941 Reviewed by Rob Buis. Internally reviewed by George Staikos. Source/WebCore: TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members. No change in behavior, no new tests. * platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp: (WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint): Source/WebKit/blackberry: TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception is when passing events to a full screen plugin. Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members. * Api/WebPage.cpp: (BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent): (BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent): (BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin): (BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin): * WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp: (BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint): * WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h: (InputHandler): * WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp: (BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers): (BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint): * WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h: (TouchEventHandler): Tools: Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members. * DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp: (addTouchPointCallback): (updateTouchPointCallback): (touchEndCallback): (releaseTouchPointCallback): (sendTouchEvent): git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 CWE ID:
bool WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin(PluginView* plugin, const Platform::TouchEvent& event) { if (!event.neverHadMultiTouch()) return false; if (event.isDoubleTap() || event.isTouchHold() || event.m_type == Platform::TouchEvent::TouchCancel) { NPTouchEvent npTouchEvent; if (event.isDoubleTap()) npTouchEvent.type = TOUCH_EVENT_DOUBLETAP; else if (event.isTouchHold()) npTouchEvent.type = TOUCH_EVENT_TOUCHHOLD; else if (event.m_type == Platform::TouchEvent::TouchCancel) npTouchEvent.type = TOUCH_EVENT_CANCEL; npTouchEvent.points = 0; npTouchEvent.size = event.m_points.size(); if (npTouchEvent.size) { npTouchEvent.points = new NPTouchPoint[npTouchEvent.size]; for (int i = 0; i < npTouchEvent.size; i++) { npTouchEvent.points[i].touchId = event.m_points[i].id(); npTouchEvent.points[i].clientX = event.m_points[i].screenPosition().x(); npTouchEvent.points[i].clientY = event.m_points[i].screenPosition().y(); npTouchEvent.points[i].screenX = event.m_points[i].screenPosition().x(); npTouchEvent.points[i].screenY = event.m_points[i].screenPosition().y(); npTouchEvent.points[i].pageX = event.m_points[i].pixelViewportPosition().x(); npTouchEvent.points[i].pageY = event.m_points[i].pixelViewportPosition().y(); } } NPEvent npEvent; npEvent.type = NP_TouchEvent; npEvent.data = &npTouchEvent; plugin->dispatchFullScreenNPEvent(npEvent); delete[] npTouchEvent.points; return true; } dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin(plugin, event.m_points[0]); return true; }
170,764
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: const ClipPaintPropertyNode* c0() { return ClipPaintPropertyNode::Root(); } Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted" This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7. Reason for revert: Retry in M69. Original change's description: > Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted" > > This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123. > > Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz > > Original change's description: > > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted > > > > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties > > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode). > > Others just use raw pointers or references. > > > > Bug: 833496 > > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2 > > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101 > > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org> > > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626} > > TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org > > Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: 833496,837932,837943 > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292 > Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653} TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org # Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago. Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943 Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992 Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491 Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} CWE ID:
const ClipPaintPropertyNode* c0() {
171,821
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::prepareForAdaptivePlayback( OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL enable, OMX_U32 maxFrameWidth, OMX_U32 maxFrameHeight) { Mutex::Autolock autolock(mLock); CLOG_CONFIG(prepareForAdaptivePlayback, "%s:%u en=%d max=%ux%u", portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, maxFrameWidth, maxFrameHeight); OMX_INDEXTYPE index; OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>( "OMX.google.android.index.prepareForAdaptivePlayback"); OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index); if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) { CLOG_ERROR_IF(enable, getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name); return StatusFromOMXError(err); } PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams params; InitOMXParams(&params); params.nPortIndex = portIndex; params.bEnable = enable; params.nMaxFrameWidth = maxFrameWidth; params.nMaxFrameHeight = maxFrameHeight; err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, &params); CLOG_IF_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d max=%ux%u", name, index, portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, maxFrameWidth, maxFrameHeight); return StatusFromOMXError(err); } Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing - Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance. - Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly share with clients. - Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface after first sendCommand. - Disallow store-meta for input cross process. - Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX). - Fix checking for input surface. Bug: 29422020 Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e (cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8) CWE ID: CWE-200
status_t OMXNodeInstance::prepareForAdaptivePlayback( OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL enable, OMX_U32 maxFrameWidth, OMX_U32 maxFrameHeight) { Mutex::Autolock autolock(mLock); if (mSailed) { android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422020"); return INVALID_OPERATION; } CLOG_CONFIG(prepareForAdaptivePlayback, "%s:%u en=%d max=%ux%u", portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, maxFrameWidth, maxFrameHeight); OMX_INDEXTYPE index; OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>( "OMX.google.android.index.prepareForAdaptivePlayback"); OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index); if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) { CLOG_ERROR_IF(enable, getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name); return StatusFromOMXError(err); } PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams params; InitOMXParams(&params); params.nPortIndex = portIndex; params.bEnable = enable; params.nMaxFrameWidth = maxFrameWidth; params.nMaxFrameHeight = maxFrameHeight; err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, &params); CLOG_IF_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d max=%ux%u", name, index, portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, maxFrameWidth, maxFrameHeight); return StatusFromOMXError(err); }
174,136
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: AXObjectInclusion AXLayoutObject::defaultObjectInclusion( IgnoredReasons* ignoredReasons) const { if (!m_layoutObject) { if (ignoredReasons) ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXNotRendered)); return IgnoreObject; } if (m_layoutObject->style()->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible) { if (equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "false")) return DefaultBehavior; if (ignoredReasons) ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXNotVisible)); return IgnoreObject; } return AXObject::defaultObjectInclusion(ignoredReasons); } Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility BUG=627682 Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007 Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} CWE ID: CWE-254
AXObjectInclusion AXLayoutObject::defaultObjectInclusion( IgnoredReasons* ignoredReasons) const { if (!m_layoutObject) { if (ignoredReasons) ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXNotRendered)); return IgnoreObject; } if (m_layoutObject->style()->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible) { if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "false")) return DefaultBehavior; if (ignoredReasons) ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXNotVisible)); return IgnoreObject; } return AXObject::defaultObjectInclusion(ignoredReasons); }
171,903
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static int packet_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sk_buff *skb; int copied, err; struct sockaddr_ll *sll; int vnet_hdr_len = 0; err = -EINVAL; if (flags & ~(MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_TRUNC|MSG_CMSG_COMPAT|MSG_ERRQUEUE)) goto out; #if 0 /* What error should we return now? EUNATTACH? */ if (pkt_sk(sk)->ifindex < 0) return -ENODEV; #endif if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE) { err = sock_recv_errqueue(sk, msg, len, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_TX_TIMESTAMP); goto out; } /* * Call the generic datagram receiver. This handles all sorts * of horrible races and re-entrancy so we can forget about it * in the protocol layers. * * Now it will return ENETDOWN, if device have just gone down, * but then it will block. */ skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err); /* * An error occurred so return it. Because skb_recv_datagram() * handles the blocking we don't see and worry about blocking * retries. */ if (skb == NULL) goto out; if (pkt_sk(sk)->has_vnet_hdr) { struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr = { 0 }; err = -EINVAL; vnet_hdr_len = sizeof(vnet_hdr); if (len < vnet_hdr_len) goto out_free; len -= vnet_hdr_len; if (skb_is_gso(skb)) { struct skb_shared_info *sinfo = skb_shinfo(skb); /* This is a hint as to how much should be linear. */ vnet_hdr.hdr_len = skb_headlen(skb); vnet_hdr.gso_size = sinfo->gso_size; if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV4) vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4; else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV6) vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6; else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP) vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP; else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FCOE) goto out_free; else BUG(); if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN) vnet_hdr.gso_type |= VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN; } else vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE; if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) { vnet_hdr.flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM; vnet_hdr.csum_start = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb); vnet_hdr.csum_offset = skb->csum_offset; } else if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY) { vnet_hdr.flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID; } /* else everything is zero */ err = memcpy_toiovec(msg->msg_iov, (void *)&vnet_hdr, vnet_hdr_len); if (err < 0) goto out_free; } /* * If the address length field is there to be filled in, we fill * it in now. */ sll = &PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->sa.ll; if (sock->type == SOCK_PACKET) msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_pkt); else msg->msg_namelen = sll->sll_halen + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_addr); /* * You lose any data beyond the buffer you gave. If it worries a * user program they can ask the device for its MTU anyway. */ copied = skb->len; if (copied > len) { copied = len; msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; } err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied); if (err) goto out_free; sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb); if (msg->msg_name) memcpy(msg->msg_name, &PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->sa, msg->msg_namelen); if (pkt_sk(sk)->auxdata) { struct tpacket_auxdata aux; aux.tp_status = TP_STATUS_USER; if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) aux.tp_status |= TP_STATUS_CSUMNOTREADY; aux.tp_len = PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->origlen; aux.tp_snaplen = skb->len; aux.tp_mac = 0; aux.tp_net = skb_network_offset(skb); if (vlan_tx_tag_present(skb)) { aux.tp_vlan_tci = vlan_tx_tag_get(skb); aux.tp_status |= TP_STATUS_VLAN_VALID; } else { aux.tp_vlan_tci = 0; } aux.tp_padding = 0; put_cmsg(msg, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_AUXDATA, sizeof(aux), &aux); } /* * Free or return the buffer as appropriate. Again this * hides all the races and re-entrancy issues from us. */ err = vnet_hdr_len + ((flags&MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len : copied); out_free: skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); out: return err; } Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) to return msg_name to the user. This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak uninitialized memory. Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets msg_name to NULL. Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David Miller. Changes since RFC: Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of verify_iovec. With this change in place I could remove " if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0) msg->msg_name = NULL ". This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL. Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change comments to netdev style. Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CWE ID: CWE-20
static int packet_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sk_buff *skb; int copied, err; int vnet_hdr_len = 0; err = -EINVAL; if (flags & ~(MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_TRUNC|MSG_CMSG_COMPAT|MSG_ERRQUEUE)) goto out; #if 0 /* What error should we return now? EUNATTACH? */ if (pkt_sk(sk)->ifindex < 0) return -ENODEV; #endif if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE) { err = sock_recv_errqueue(sk, msg, len, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_TX_TIMESTAMP); goto out; } /* * Call the generic datagram receiver. This handles all sorts * of horrible races and re-entrancy so we can forget about it * in the protocol layers. * * Now it will return ENETDOWN, if device have just gone down, * but then it will block. */ skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err); /* * An error occurred so return it. Because skb_recv_datagram() * handles the blocking we don't see and worry about blocking * retries. */ if (skb == NULL) goto out; if (pkt_sk(sk)->has_vnet_hdr) { struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr = { 0 }; err = -EINVAL; vnet_hdr_len = sizeof(vnet_hdr); if (len < vnet_hdr_len) goto out_free; len -= vnet_hdr_len; if (skb_is_gso(skb)) { struct skb_shared_info *sinfo = skb_shinfo(skb); /* This is a hint as to how much should be linear. */ vnet_hdr.hdr_len = skb_headlen(skb); vnet_hdr.gso_size = sinfo->gso_size; if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV4) vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4; else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV6) vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6; else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP) vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP; else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FCOE) goto out_free; else BUG(); if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN) vnet_hdr.gso_type |= VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN; } else vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE; if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) { vnet_hdr.flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM; vnet_hdr.csum_start = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb); vnet_hdr.csum_offset = skb->csum_offset; } else if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY) { vnet_hdr.flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID; } /* else everything is zero */ err = memcpy_toiovec(msg->msg_iov, (void *)&vnet_hdr, vnet_hdr_len); if (err < 0) goto out_free; } /* You lose any data beyond the buffer you gave. If it worries * a user program they can ask the device for its MTU * anyway. */ copied = skb->len; if (copied > len) { copied = len; msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; } err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied); if (err) goto out_free; sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb); if (msg->msg_name) { /* If the address length field is there to be filled * in, we fill it in now. */ if (sock->type == SOCK_PACKET) { msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_pkt); } else { struct sockaddr_ll *sll = &PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->sa.ll; msg->msg_namelen = sll->sll_halen + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_addr); } memcpy(msg->msg_name, &PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->sa, msg->msg_namelen); } if (pkt_sk(sk)->auxdata) { struct tpacket_auxdata aux; aux.tp_status = TP_STATUS_USER; if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) aux.tp_status |= TP_STATUS_CSUMNOTREADY; aux.tp_len = PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->origlen; aux.tp_snaplen = skb->len; aux.tp_mac = 0; aux.tp_net = skb_network_offset(skb); if (vlan_tx_tag_present(skb)) { aux.tp_vlan_tci = vlan_tx_tag_get(skb); aux.tp_status |= TP_STATUS_VLAN_VALID; } else { aux.tp_vlan_tci = 0; } aux.tp_padding = 0; put_cmsg(msg, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_AUXDATA, sizeof(aux), &aux); } /* * Free or return the buffer as appropriate. Again this * hides all the races and re-entrancy issues from us. */ err = vnet_hdr_len + ((flags&MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len : copied); out_free: skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); out: return err; }
166,511
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: icmp6_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length, const u_char *bp2, int fragmented) { const struct icmp6_hdr *dp; const struct ip6_hdr *ip; const struct ip6_hdr *oip; const struct udphdr *ouh; int dport; const u_char *ep; u_int prot; dp = (const struct icmp6_hdr *)bp; ip = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp2; oip = (const struct ip6_hdr *)(dp + 1); /* 'ep' points to the end of available data. */ ep = ndo->ndo_snapend; ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_cksum); if (ndo->ndo_vflag && !fragmented) { uint16_t sum, udp_sum; if (ND_TTEST2(bp[0], length)) { udp_sum = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_cksum); sum = icmp6_cksum(ndo, ip, dp, length); if (sum != 0) ND_PRINT((ndo,"[bad icmp6 cksum 0x%04x -> 0x%04x!] ", udp_sum, in_cksum_shouldbe(udp_sum, sum))); else ND_PRINT((ndo,"[icmp6 sum ok] ")); } } ND_PRINT((ndo,"ICMP6, %s", tok2str(icmp6_type_values,"unknown icmp6 type (%u)",dp->icmp6_type))); /* display cosmetics: print the packet length for printer that use the vflag now */ if (ndo->ndo_vflag && (dp->icmp6_type == ND_ROUTER_SOLICIT || dp->icmp6_type == ND_ROUTER_ADVERT || dp->icmp6_type == ND_NEIGHBOR_ADVERT || dp->icmp6_type == ND_NEIGHBOR_SOLICIT || dp->icmp6_type == ND_REDIRECT || dp->icmp6_type == ICMP6_HADISCOV_REPLY || dp->icmp6_type == ICMP6_MOBILEPREFIX_ADVERT )) ND_PRINT((ndo,", length %u", length)); switch (dp->icmp6_type) { case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH: ND_TCHECK(oip->ip6_dst); ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s", tok2str(icmp6_dst_unreach_code_values,"unknown unreach code (%u)",dp->icmp6_code))); switch (dp->icmp6_code) { case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_NOROUTE: /* fall through */ case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_ADMIN: case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_ADDR: ND_PRINT((ndo," %s",ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst))); break; case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_BEYONDSCOPE: ND_PRINT((ndo," %s, source address %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst), ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_src))); break; case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_NOPORT: if ((ouh = get_upperlayer(ndo, (const u_char *)oip, &prot)) == NULL) goto trunc; dport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ouh->uh_dport); switch (prot) { case IPPROTO_TCP: ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s tcp port %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst), tcpport_string(ndo, dport))); break; case IPPROTO_UDP: ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s udp port %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst), udpport_string(ndo, dport))); break; default: ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s protocol %d port %d unreachable", ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst), oip->ip6_nxt, dport)); break; } break; default: if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) { print_unknown_data(ndo, bp,"\n\t",length); return; } break; } break; case ICMP6_PACKET_TOO_BIG: ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_mtu); ND_PRINT((ndo,", mtu %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp6_mtu))); break; case ICMP6_TIME_EXCEEDED: ND_TCHECK(oip->ip6_dst); switch (dp->icmp6_code) { case ICMP6_TIME_EXCEED_TRANSIT: ND_PRINT((ndo," for %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst))); break; case ICMP6_TIME_EXCEED_REASSEMBLY: ND_PRINT((ndo," (reassembly)")); break; default: ND_PRINT((ndo,", unknown code (%u)", dp->icmp6_code)); break; } break; case ICMP6_PARAM_PROB: ND_TCHECK(oip->ip6_dst); switch (dp->icmp6_code) { case ICMP6_PARAMPROB_HEADER: ND_PRINT((ndo,", erroneous - octet %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp6_pptr))); break; case ICMP6_PARAMPROB_NEXTHEADER: ND_PRINT((ndo,", next header - octet %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp6_pptr))); break; case ICMP6_PARAMPROB_OPTION: ND_PRINT((ndo,", option - octet %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp6_pptr))); break; default: ND_PRINT((ndo,", code-#%d", dp->icmp6_code)); break; } break; case ICMP6_ECHO_REQUEST: case ICMP6_ECHO_REPLY: ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_seq); ND_PRINT((ndo,", seq %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_seq))); break; case ICMP6_MEMBERSHIP_QUERY: if (length == MLD_MINLEN) { mld6_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp); } else if (length >= MLDV2_MINLEN) { ND_PRINT((ndo," v2")); mldv2_query_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp, length); } else { ND_PRINT((ndo," unknown-version (len %u) ", length)); } break; case ICMP6_MEMBERSHIP_REPORT: mld6_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp); break; case ICMP6_MEMBERSHIP_REDUCTION: mld6_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp); break; case ND_ROUTER_SOLICIT: #define RTSOLLEN 8 if (ndo->ndo_vflag) { icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + RTSOLLEN, length - RTSOLLEN); } break; case ND_ROUTER_ADVERT: #define RTADVLEN 16 if (ndo->ndo_vflag) { const struct nd_router_advert *p; p = (const struct nd_router_advert *)dp; ND_TCHECK(p->nd_ra_retransmit); ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n\thop limit %u, Flags [%s]" \ ", pref %s, router lifetime %us, reachable time %ums, retrans timer %ums", (u_int)p->nd_ra_curhoplimit, bittok2str(icmp6_opt_ra_flag_values,"none",(p->nd_ra_flags_reserved)), get_rtpref(p->nd_ra_flags_reserved), EXTRACT_16BITS(&p->nd_ra_router_lifetime), EXTRACT_32BITS(&p->nd_ra_reachable), EXTRACT_32BITS(&p->nd_ra_retransmit))); icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + RTADVLEN, length - RTADVLEN); } break; case ND_NEIGHBOR_SOLICIT: { const struct nd_neighbor_solicit *p; p = (const struct nd_neighbor_solicit *)dp; ND_TCHECK(p->nd_ns_target); ND_PRINT((ndo,", who has %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &p->nd_ns_target))); if (ndo->ndo_vflag) { #define NDSOLLEN 24 icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + NDSOLLEN, length - NDSOLLEN); } } break; case ND_NEIGHBOR_ADVERT: { const struct nd_neighbor_advert *p; p = (const struct nd_neighbor_advert *)dp; ND_TCHECK(p->nd_na_target); ND_PRINT((ndo,", tgt is %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &p->nd_na_target))); if (ndo->ndo_vflag) { ND_PRINT((ndo,", Flags [%s]", bittok2str(icmp6_nd_na_flag_values, "none", EXTRACT_32BITS(&p->nd_na_flags_reserved)))); #define NDADVLEN 24 icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + NDADVLEN, length - NDADVLEN); #undef NDADVLEN } } break; case ND_REDIRECT: #define RDR(i) ((const struct nd_redirect *)(i)) ND_TCHECK(RDR(dp)->nd_rd_dst); ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &RDR(dp)->nd_rd_dst))); ND_TCHECK(RDR(dp)->nd_rd_target); ND_PRINT((ndo," to %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &RDR(dp)->nd_rd_target))); #define REDIRECTLEN 40 if (ndo->ndo_vflag) { icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + REDIRECTLEN, length - REDIRECTLEN); } break; #undef REDIRECTLEN #undef RDR case ICMP6_ROUTER_RENUMBERING: icmp6_rrenum_print(ndo, bp, ep); break; case ICMP6_NI_QUERY: case ICMP6_NI_REPLY: icmp6_nodeinfo_print(ndo, length, bp, ep); break; case IND_SOLICIT: case IND_ADVERT: break; case ICMP6_V2_MEMBERSHIP_REPORT: mldv2_report_print(ndo, (const u_char *) dp, length); break; case ICMP6_MOBILEPREFIX_SOLICIT: /* fall through */ case ICMP6_HADISCOV_REQUEST: ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_data16[0]); ND_PRINT((ndo,", id 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_data16[0]))); break; case ICMP6_HADISCOV_REPLY: if (ndo->ndo_vflag) { const struct in6_addr *in6; const u_char *cp; ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_data16[0]); ND_PRINT((ndo,", id 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_data16[0]))); cp = (const u_char *)dp + length; in6 = (const struct in6_addr *)(dp + 1); for (; (const u_char *)in6 < cp; in6++) { ND_TCHECK(*in6); ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, in6))); } } break; case ICMP6_MOBILEPREFIX_ADVERT: if (ndo->ndo_vflag) { ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_data16[0]); ND_PRINT((ndo,", id 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_data16[0]))); ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_data16[1]); if (dp->icmp6_data16[1] & 0xc0) ND_PRINT((ndo," ")); if (dp->icmp6_data16[1] & 0x80) ND_PRINT((ndo,"M")); if (dp->icmp6_data16[1] & 0x40) ND_PRINT((ndo,"O")); #define MPADVLEN 8 icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + MPADVLEN, length - MPADVLEN); } break; case ND_RPL_MESSAGE: /* plus 4, because struct icmp6_hdr contains 4 bytes of icmp payload */ rpl_print(ndo, dp, &dp->icmp6_data8[0], length-sizeof(struct icmp6_hdr)+4); break; default: ND_PRINT((ndo,", length %u", length)); if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) print_unknown_data(ndo, bp,"\n\t", length); return; } if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) ND_PRINT((ndo,", length %u", length)); return; trunc: ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|icmp6]")); } Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check Moreover: Add and use *_tstr[] strings. Update four tests outputs accordingly. Fix a space. Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture file for the test. CWE ID: CWE-125
icmp6_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length, const u_char *bp2, int fragmented) { const struct icmp6_hdr *dp; const struct ip6_hdr *ip; const struct ip6_hdr *oip; const struct udphdr *ouh; int dport; const u_char *ep; u_int prot; dp = (const struct icmp6_hdr *)bp; ip = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp2; oip = (const struct ip6_hdr *)(dp + 1); /* 'ep' points to the end of available data. */ ep = ndo->ndo_snapend; ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_cksum); if (ndo->ndo_vflag && !fragmented) { uint16_t sum, udp_sum; if (ND_TTEST2(bp[0], length)) { udp_sum = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_cksum); sum = icmp6_cksum(ndo, ip, dp, length); if (sum != 0) ND_PRINT((ndo,"[bad icmp6 cksum 0x%04x -> 0x%04x!] ", udp_sum, in_cksum_shouldbe(udp_sum, sum))); else ND_PRINT((ndo,"[icmp6 sum ok] ")); } } ND_PRINT((ndo,"ICMP6, %s", tok2str(icmp6_type_values,"unknown icmp6 type (%u)",dp->icmp6_type))); /* display cosmetics: print the packet length for printer that use the vflag now */ if (ndo->ndo_vflag && (dp->icmp6_type == ND_ROUTER_SOLICIT || dp->icmp6_type == ND_ROUTER_ADVERT || dp->icmp6_type == ND_NEIGHBOR_ADVERT || dp->icmp6_type == ND_NEIGHBOR_SOLICIT || dp->icmp6_type == ND_REDIRECT || dp->icmp6_type == ICMP6_HADISCOV_REPLY || dp->icmp6_type == ICMP6_MOBILEPREFIX_ADVERT )) ND_PRINT((ndo,", length %u", length)); switch (dp->icmp6_type) { case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH: ND_TCHECK(oip->ip6_dst); ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s", tok2str(icmp6_dst_unreach_code_values,"unknown unreach code (%u)",dp->icmp6_code))); switch (dp->icmp6_code) { case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_NOROUTE: /* fall through */ case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_ADMIN: case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_ADDR: ND_PRINT((ndo," %s",ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst))); break; case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_BEYONDSCOPE: ND_PRINT((ndo," %s, source address %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst), ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_src))); break; case ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_NOPORT: if ((ouh = get_upperlayer(ndo, (const u_char *)oip, &prot)) == NULL) goto trunc; dport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ouh->uh_dport); switch (prot) { case IPPROTO_TCP: ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s tcp port %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst), tcpport_string(ndo, dport))); break; case IPPROTO_UDP: ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s udp port %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst), udpport_string(ndo, dport))); break; default: ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s protocol %d port %d unreachable", ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst), oip->ip6_nxt, dport)); break; } break; default: if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) { print_unknown_data(ndo, bp,"\n\t",length); return; } break; } break; case ICMP6_PACKET_TOO_BIG: ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_mtu); ND_PRINT((ndo,", mtu %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp6_mtu))); break; case ICMP6_TIME_EXCEEDED: ND_TCHECK(oip->ip6_dst); switch (dp->icmp6_code) { case ICMP6_TIME_EXCEED_TRANSIT: ND_PRINT((ndo," for %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &oip->ip6_dst))); break; case ICMP6_TIME_EXCEED_REASSEMBLY: ND_PRINT((ndo," (reassembly)")); break; default: ND_PRINT((ndo,", unknown code (%u)", dp->icmp6_code)); break; } break; case ICMP6_PARAM_PROB: ND_TCHECK(oip->ip6_dst); switch (dp->icmp6_code) { case ICMP6_PARAMPROB_HEADER: ND_PRINT((ndo,", erroneous - octet %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp6_pptr))); break; case ICMP6_PARAMPROB_NEXTHEADER: ND_PRINT((ndo,", next header - octet %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp6_pptr))); break; case ICMP6_PARAMPROB_OPTION: ND_PRINT((ndo,", option - octet %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp6_pptr))); break; default: ND_PRINT((ndo,", code-#%d", dp->icmp6_code)); break; } break; case ICMP6_ECHO_REQUEST: case ICMP6_ECHO_REPLY: ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_seq); ND_PRINT((ndo,", seq %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_seq))); break; case ICMP6_MEMBERSHIP_QUERY: if (length == MLD_MINLEN) { mld6_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp); } else if (length >= MLDV2_MINLEN) { ND_PRINT((ndo," v2")); mldv2_query_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp, length); } else { ND_PRINT((ndo," unknown-version (len %u) ", length)); } break; case ICMP6_MEMBERSHIP_REPORT: mld6_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp); break; case ICMP6_MEMBERSHIP_REDUCTION: mld6_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp); break; case ND_ROUTER_SOLICIT: #define RTSOLLEN 8 if (ndo->ndo_vflag) { icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + RTSOLLEN, length - RTSOLLEN); } break; case ND_ROUTER_ADVERT: #define RTADVLEN 16 if (ndo->ndo_vflag) { const struct nd_router_advert *p; p = (const struct nd_router_advert *)dp; ND_TCHECK(p->nd_ra_retransmit); ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n\thop limit %u, Flags [%s]" \ ", pref %s, router lifetime %us, reachable time %ums, retrans timer %ums", (u_int)p->nd_ra_curhoplimit, bittok2str(icmp6_opt_ra_flag_values,"none",(p->nd_ra_flags_reserved)), get_rtpref(p->nd_ra_flags_reserved), EXTRACT_16BITS(&p->nd_ra_router_lifetime), EXTRACT_32BITS(&p->nd_ra_reachable), EXTRACT_32BITS(&p->nd_ra_retransmit))); icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + RTADVLEN, length - RTADVLEN); } break; case ND_NEIGHBOR_SOLICIT: { const struct nd_neighbor_solicit *p; p = (const struct nd_neighbor_solicit *)dp; ND_TCHECK(p->nd_ns_target); ND_PRINT((ndo,", who has %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &p->nd_ns_target))); if (ndo->ndo_vflag) { #define NDSOLLEN 24 icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + NDSOLLEN, length - NDSOLLEN); } } break; case ND_NEIGHBOR_ADVERT: { const struct nd_neighbor_advert *p; p = (const struct nd_neighbor_advert *)dp; ND_TCHECK(p->nd_na_target); ND_PRINT((ndo,", tgt is %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &p->nd_na_target))); if (ndo->ndo_vflag) { ND_PRINT((ndo,", Flags [%s]", bittok2str(icmp6_nd_na_flag_values, "none", EXTRACT_32BITS(&p->nd_na_flags_reserved)))); #define NDADVLEN 24 icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + NDADVLEN, length - NDADVLEN); #undef NDADVLEN } } break; case ND_REDIRECT: #define RDR(i) ((const struct nd_redirect *)(i)) ND_TCHECK(RDR(dp)->nd_rd_dst); ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &RDR(dp)->nd_rd_dst))); ND_TCHECK(RDR(dp)->nd_rd_target); ND_PRINT((ndo," to %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &RDR(dp)->nd_rd_target))); #define REDIRECTLEN 40 if (ndo->ndo_vflag) { icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + REDIRECTLEN, length - REDIRECTLEN); } break; #undef REDIRECTLEN #undef RDR case ICMP6_ROUTER_RENUMBERING: icmp6_rrenum_print(ndo, bp, ep); break; case ICMP6_NI_QUERY: case ICMP6_NI_REPLY: icmp6_nodeinfo_print(ndo, length, bp, ep); break; case IND_SOLICIT: case IND_ADVERT: break; case ICMP6_V2_MEMBERSHIP_REPORT: mldv2_report_print(ndo, (const u_char *) dp, length); break; case ICMP6_MOBILEPREFIX_SOLICIT: /* fall through */ case ICMP6_HADISCOV_REQUEST: ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_data16[0]); ND_PRINT((ndo,", id 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_data16[0]))); break; case ICMP6_HADISCOV_REPLY: if (ndo->ndo_vflag) { const struct in6_addr *in6; const u_char *cp; ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_data16[0]); ND_PRINT((ndo,", id 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_data16[0]))); cp = (const u_char *)dp + length; in6 = (const struct in6_addr *)(dp + 1); for (; (const u_char *)in6 < cp; in6++) { ND_TCHECK(*in6); ND_PRINT((ndo,", %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, in6))); } } break; case ICMP6_MOBILEPREFIX_ADVERT: if (ndo->ndo_vflag) { ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_data16[0]); ND_PRINT((ndo,", id 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp6_data16[0]))); ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp6_data16[1]); if (dp->icmp6_data16[1] & 0xc0) ND_PRINT((ndo," ")); if (dp->icmp6_data16[1] & 0x80) ND_PRINT((ndo,"M")); if (dp->icmp6_data16[1] & 0x40) ND_PRINT((ndo,"O")); #define MPADVLEN 8 icmp6_opt_print(ndo, (const u_char *)dp + MPADVLEN, length - MPADVLEN); } break; case ND_RPL_MESSAGE: /* plus 4, because struct icmp6_hdr contains 4 bytes of icmp payload */ rpl_print(ndo, dp, &dp->icmp6_data8[0], length-sizeof(struct icmp6_hdr)+4); break; default: ND_PRINT((ndo,", length %u", length)); if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) print_unknown_data(ndo, bp,"\n\t", length); return; } if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) ND_PRINT((ndo,", length %u", length)); return; trunc: ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", icmp6_tstr)); }
169,824
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter( OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) { switch (index) { case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat: { OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params; if (formatParams->nPortIndex > kMaxPortIndex) { return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex; } if (formatParams->nIndex != 0) { return OMX_ErrorNoMore; } if (formatParams->nPortIndex == kInputPortIndex) { formatParams->eCompressionFormat = mCodingType; formatParams->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused; formatParams->xFramerate = 0; } else { CHECK_EQ(formatParams->nPortIndex, 1u); formatParams->eCompressionFormat = OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused; formatParams->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar; formatParams->xFramerate = 0; } return OMX_ErrorNone; } case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported: { OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *profileLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *) params; if (profileLevel->nPortIndex != kInputPortIndex) { ALOGE("Invalid port index: %" PRIu32, profileLevel->nPortIndex); return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex; } if (profileLevel->nProfileIndex >= mNumProfileLevels) { return OMX_ErrorNoMore; } profileLevel->eProfile = mProfileLevels[profileLevel->nProfileIndex].mProfile; profileLevel->eLevel = mProfileLevels[profileLevel->nProfileIndex].mLevel; return OMX_ErrorNone; } default: return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params); } } Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access Bug: 27207275 Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d CWE ID: CWE-119
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter( OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) { switch (index) { case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat: { OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params; if (!isValidOMXParam(formatParams)) { return OMX_ErrorBadParameter; } if (formatParams->nPortIndex > kMaxPortIndex) { return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex; } if (formatParams->nIndex != 0) { return OMX_ErrorNoMore; } if (formatParams->nPortIndex == kInputPortIndex) { formatParams->eCompressionFormat = mCodingType; formatParams->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused; formatParams->xFramerate = 0; } else { CHECK_EQ(formatParams->nPortIndex, 1u); formatParams->eCompressionFormat = OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused; formatParams->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar; formatParams->xFramerate = 0; } return OMX_ErrorNone; } case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported: { OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *profileLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *) params; if (!isValidOMXParam(profileLevel)) { return OMX_ErrorBadParameter; } if (profileLevel->nPortIndex != kInputPortIndex) { ALOGE("Invalid port index: %" PRIu32, profileLevel->nPortIndex); return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex; } if (profileLevel->nProfileIndex >= mNumProfileLevels) { return OMX_ErrorNoMore; } profileLevel->eProfile = mProfileLevels[profileLevel->nProfileIndex].mProfile; profileLevel->eLevel = mProfileLevels[profileLevel->nProfileIndex].mLevel; return OMX_ErrorNone; } default: return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params); } }
174,225
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: void MediaInterfaceProxy::ConnectToService() { DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__; DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread()); DCHECK(!interface_factory_ptr_); service_manager::mojom::InterfaceProviderPtr interfaces; auto provider = base::MakeUnique<media::MediaInterfaceProvider>( mojo::MakeRequest(&interfaces)); #if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MOJO_CDM) net::URLRequestContextGetter* context_getter = BrowserContext::GetDefaultStoragePartition( render_frame_host_->GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext()) ->GetURLRequestContext(); provider->registry()->AddInterface(base::Bind( &ProvisionFetcherImpl::Create, base::RetainedRef(context_getter))); #endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MOJO_CDM) GetContentClient()->browser()->ExposeInterfacesToMediaService( provider->registry(), render_frame_host_); media_registries_.push_back(std::move(provider)); media::mojom::MediaServicePtr media_service; service_manager::Connector* connector = ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess()->GetConnector(); connector->BindInterface(media::mojom::kMediaServiceName, &media_service); media_service->CreateInterfaceFactory(MakeRequest(&interface_factory_ptr_), std::move(interfaces)); interface_factory_ptr_.set_connection_error_handler(base::Bind( &MediaInterfaceProxy::OnConnectionError, base::Unretained(this))); } Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the utility process. This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm" service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". BUG=664364 TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working. Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172 Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947} CWE ID: CWE-119
void MediaInterfaceProxy::ConnectToService() { void MediaInterfaceProxy::OnCdmServiceConnectionError() { DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__; DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread()); cdm_interface_factory_ptr_.reset(); } service_manager::mojom::InterfaceProviderPtr MediaInterfaceProxy::GetFrameServices() { service_manager::mojom::InterfaceProviderPtr interfaces; auto provider = base::MakeUnique<media::MediaInterfaceProvider>( mojo::MakeRequest(&interfaces)); #if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MOJO_CDM) net::URLRequestContextGetter* context_getter = BrowserContext::GetDefaultStoragePartition( render_frame_host_->GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext()) ->GetURLRequestContext(); provider->registry()->AddInterface(base::Bind( &ProvisionFetcherImpl::Create, base::RetainedRef(context_getter))); #endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MOJO_CDM) GetContentClient()->browser()->ExposeInterfacesToMediaService( provider->registry(), render_frame_host_); media_registries_.push_back(std::move(provider)); return interfaces; } void MediaInterfaceProxy::ConnectToMediaService() { DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__; media::mojom::MediaServicePtr media_service; // TODO(slan): Use the BrowserContext Connector instead. See crbug.com/638950. service_manager::Connector* connector = ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess()->GetConnector(); connector->BindInterface(media::mojom::kMediaServiceName, &media_service); media_service->CreateInterfaceFactory(MakeRequest(&interface_factory_ptr_), GetFrameServices()); interface_factory_ptr_.set_connection_error_handler( base::Bind(&MediaInterfaceProxy::OnMediaServiceConnectionError, base::Unretained(this))); } void MediaInterfaceProxy::ConnectToCdmService() { DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__; media::mojom::MediaServicePtr media_service; // TODO(slan): Use the BrowserContext Connector instead. See crbug.com/638950. service_manager::Connector* connector = ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess()->GetConnector(); connector->BindInterface(media::mojom::kCdmServiceName, &media_service); media_service->CreateInterfaceFactory( MakeRequest(&cdm_interface_factory_ptr_), GetFrameServices()); cdm_interface_factory_ptr_.set_connection_error_handler( base::Bind(&MediaInterfaceProxy::OnCdmServiceConnectionError, base::Unretained(this))); }
171,935
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: void SetDelegateOnIO(content::ResourceDispatcherHostDelegate* new_delegate) { content::ResourceDispatcherHost::Get()->SetDelegate(new_delegate); } Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service. The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to better match production, which removes the dependency on net/. Also: -make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present -add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having to modify each callsite to google_util Bug: 881976 Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142 Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652} CWE ID:
void SetDelegateOnIO(content::ResourceDispatcherHostDelegate* new_delegate) {
172,581
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: void FileAPIMessageFilter::OnCreateSnapshotFile( int request_id, const GURL& blob_url, const GURL& path) { DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO)); FileSystemURL url(path); base::Callback<void(const FilePath&)> register_file_callback = base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::RegisterFileAsBlob, this, blob_url, url.path()); FileSystemOperation* operation = GetNewOperation(url, request_id); if (!operation) return; operation->CreateSnapshotFile( url, base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::DidCreateSnapshot, this, request_id, register_file_callback)); } Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile(). BUG=162114 TEST=manual Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-264
void FileAPIMessageFilter::OnCreateSnapshotFile( int request_id, const GURL& blob_url, const GURL& path) { DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO)); FileSystemURL url(path); base::Callback<void(const FilePath&)> register_file_callback = base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::RegisterFileAsBlob, this, blob_url, url); // Make sure if this file can be read by the renderer as this is // called when the renderer is about to create a new File object // (for reading the file). base::PlatformFileError error; if (!HasPermissionsForFile(url, kReadFilePermissions, &error)) { Send(new FileSystemMsg_DidFail(request_id, error)); return; } FileSystemOperation* operation = GetNewOperation(url, request_id); if (!operation) return; operation->CreateSnapshotFile( url, base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::DidCreateSnapshot, this, request_id, register_file_callback)); }
171,586
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: xmlParseElementContentDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *name, xmlElementContentPtr *result) { xmlElementContentPtr tree = NULL; int inputid = ctxt->input->id; int res; *result = NULL; if (RAW != '(') { xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ELEMCONTENT_NOT_STARTED, "xmlParseElementContentDecl : %s '(' expected\n", name); return(-1); } NEXT; GROW; SKIP_BLANKS; if (CMP7(CUR_PTR, '#', 'P', 'C', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A')) { tree = xmlParseElementMixedContentDecl(ctxt, inputid); res = XML_ELEMENT_TYPE_MIXED; } else { tree = xmlParseElementChildrenContentDeclPriv(ctxt, inputid, 1); res = XML_ELEMENT_TYPE_ELEMENT; } SKIP_BLANKS; *result = tree; return(res); } Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream BUG=229019 TBR=cpu Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-119
xmlParseElementContentDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *name, xmlElementContentPtr *result) { xmlElementContentPtr tree = NULL; int inputid = ctxt->input->id; int res; *result = NULL; if (RAW != '(') { xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ELEMCONTENT_NOT_STARTED, "xmlParseElementContentDecl : %s '(' expected\n", name); return(-1); } NEXT; GROW; if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) return(-1); SKIP_BLANKS; if (CMP7(CUR_PTR, '#', 'P', 'C', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A')) { tree = xmlParseElementMixedContentDecl(ctxt, inputid); res = XML_ELEMENT_TYPE_MIXED; } else { tree = xmlParseElementChildrenContentDeclPriv(ctxt, inputid, 1); res = XML_ELEMENT_TYPE_ELEMENT; } SKIP_BLANKS; *result = tree; return(res); }
171,285
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::set_config(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp, OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE configIndex, OMX_IN OMX_PTR configData) { (void) hComp; if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) { DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get Config in Invalid State"); return OMX_ErrorInvalidState; } OMX_ERRORTYPE ret = OMX_ErrorNone; OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_NALSIZE *pNal; DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Config Called"); if (configIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexVendorVideoExtraData) { OMX_VENDOR_EXTRADATATYPE *config = (OMX_VENDOR_EXTRADATATYPE *) configData; DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Index OMX_IndexVendorVideoExtraData called"); if (!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.avc") || !strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mvc")) { DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Index OMX_IndexVendorVideoExtraData AVC"); OMX_U32 extra_size; nal_length = (config->pData[4] & 0x03) + 1; extra_size = 0; if (nal_length > 2) { /* Presently we assume that only one SPS and one PPS in AvC1 Atom */ extra_size = (nal_length - 2) * 2; } OMX_U8 *pSrcBuf = (OMX_U8 *) (&config->pData[6]); OMX_U8 *pDestBuf; m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex; m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize - 6 - 1 + extra_size; m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8 *) malloc(m_vendor_config.nDataSize); OMX_U32 len; OMX_U8 index = 0; pDestBuf = m_vendor_config.pData; DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Rxd SPS+PPS nPortIndex[%u] len[%u] data[%p]", (unsigned int)m_vendor_config.nPortIndex, (unsigned int)m_vendor_config.nDataSize, m_vendor_config.pData); while (index < 2) { uint8 *psize; len = *pSrcBuf; len = len << 8; len |= *(pSrcBuf + 1); psize = (uint8 *) & len; memcpy(pDestBuf + nal_length, pSrcBuf + 2,len); for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nal_length; i++) { pDestBuf[i] = psize[nal_length - 1 - i]; } pDestBuf += len + nal_length; pSrcBuf += len + 2; index++; pSrcBuf++; // skip picture param set len = 0; } } else if (!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg4") || !strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg2")) { m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex; m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize; m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8 *) malloc((config->nDataSize)); memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData, config->pData,config->nDataSize); } else if (!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.vc1")) { if (m_vendor_config.pData) { free(m_vendor_config.pData); m_vendor_config.pData = NULL; m_vendor_config.nDataSize = 0; } if (((*((OMX_U32 *) config->pData)) & VC1_SP_MP_START_CODE_MASK) == VC1_SP_MP_START_CODE) { DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - VC1 simple/main profile"); m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex; m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize; m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8 *) malloc(config->nDataSize); memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData, config->pData, config->nDataSize); m_vc1_profile = VC1_SP_MP_RCV; } else if (*((OMX_U32 *) config->pData) == VC1_AP_SEQ_START_CODE) { DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - VC1 Advance profile"); m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex; m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize; m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8 *) malloc((config->nDataSize)); memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData, config->pData, config->nDataSize); m_vc1_profile = VC1_AP; } else if ((config->nDataSize == VC1_STRUCT_C_LEN)) { DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - VC1 Simple/Main profile struct C only"); m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex; m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize; m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8*)malloc(config->nDataSize); memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData,config->pData,config->nDataSize); m_vc1_profile = VC1_SP_MP_RCV; } else { DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - Error: Unknown VC1 profile"); } } return ret; } else if (configIndex == OMX_IndexConfigVideoNalSize) { struct v4l2_control temp; temp.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STREAM_FORMAT; pNal = reinterpret_cast < OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_NALSIZE * >(configData); switch (pNal->nNaluBytes) { case 0: temp.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NAL_FORMAT_STARTCODES; break; case 2: temp.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NAL_FORMAT_TWO_BYTE_LENGTH; break; case 4: temp.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NAL_FORMAT_FOUR_BYTE_LENGTH; break; default: return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting; } if (!arbitrary_bytes) { /* In arbitrary bytes mode, the assembler strips out nal size and replaces * with start code, so only need to notify driver in frame by frame mode */ if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &temp)) { DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STREAM_FORMAT"); return OMX_ErrorHardware; } } nal_length = pNal->nNaluBytes; m_frame_parser.init_nal_length(nal_length); DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_IndexConfigVideoNalSize called with Size %d", nal_length); return ret; } else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_IndexVendorVideoFrameRate) { OMX_VENDOR_VIDEOFRAMERATE *config = (OMX_VENDOR_VIDEOFRAMERATE *) configData; DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Index OMX_IndexVendorVideoFrameRate %u", (unsigned int)config->nFps); if (config->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX) { if (config->bEnabled) { if ((config->nFps >> 16) > 0) { DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_config: frame rate set by omx client : %u", (unsigned int)config->nFps >> 16); Q16ToFraction(config->nFps, drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator, drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator); if (!drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator) { DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Numerator is zero setting to 30"); drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator = 30; } if (drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator) { drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator = (int) drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator / drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator; } drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator = 1; frm_int = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator * 1e6 / drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator; struct v4l2_outputparm oparm; /*XXX: we're providing timing info as seconds per frame rather than frames * per second.*/ oparm.timeperframe.numerator = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator; oparm.timeperframe.denominator = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator; struct v4l2_streamparm sparm; sparm.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE; sparm.parm.output = oparm; if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_PARM, &sparm)) { DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Unable to convey fps info to driver, \ performance might be affected"); ret = OMX_ErrorHardware; } client_set_fps = true; } else { DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Frame rate not supported."); ret = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting; } } else { DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_config: Disabled client's frame rate"); client_set_fps = false; } } else { DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(" Set_config: Bad Port idx %d", (int)config->nPortIndex); ret = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex; } return ret; } else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_QcomIndexConfigPerfLevel) { OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL *perf = (OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL *)configData; struct v4l2_control control; DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set perf level: %d", perf->ePerfLevel); control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_SET_PERF_LEVEL; switch (perf->ePerfLevel) { case OMX_QCOM_PerfLevelNominal: control.value = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_PERF_LEVEL_NOMINAL; break; case OMX_QCOM_PerfLevelTurbo: control.value = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_PERF_LEVEL_TURBO; break; default: ret = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting; break; } if (ret == OMX_ErrorNone) { ret = (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control) < 0) ? OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting : OMX_ErrorNone; } return ret; } else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_IndexConfigPriority) { OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *priority = (OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *)configData; DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set_config: priority %d", priority->nU32); struct v4l2_control control; control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_PRIORITY; if (priority->nU32 == 0) control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_PRIORITY_REALTIME_ENABLE; else control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_PRIORITY_REALTIME_DISABLE; if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) { DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set Priority"); ret = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting; } return ret; } else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_IndexConfigOperatingRate) { OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *rate = (OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *)configData; DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set_config: operating-rate %u fps", rate->nU32 >> 16); struct v4l2_control control; control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OPERATING_RATE; control.value = rate->nU32; if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) { ret = errno == -EBUSY ? OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources : OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting; DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set operating rate %u fps (%s)", rate->nU32 >> 16, errno == -EBUSY ? "HW Overload" : strerror(errno)); } return ret; } return OMX_ErrorNotImplemented; } Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vidc: validate omx param/config data Check the sanity of config/param strcuture objects passed to get/set _ config()/parameter() methods. Bug: 27533317 Security Vulnerability in MediaServer omx_vdec::get_config() Can lead to arbitrary write Change-Id: I6c3243afe12055ab94f1a1ecf758c10e88231809 Conflicts: mm-core/inc/OMX_QCOMExtns.h mm-video-v4l2/vidc/vdec/src/omx_vdec_msm8974.cpp mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_base.cpp mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_encoder.cpp CWE ID: CWE-20
OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::set_config(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp, OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE configIndex, OMX_IN OMX_PTR configData) { (void) hComp; if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) { DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get Config in Invalid State"); return OMX_ErrorInvalidState; } OMX_ERRORTYPE ret = OMX_ErrorNone; OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_NALSIZE *pNal; DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Config Called"); if (configIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexVendorVideoExtraData) { OMX_VENDOR_EXTRADATATYPE *config = (OMX_VENDOR_EXTRADATATYPE *) configData; DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Index OMX_IndexVendorVideoExtraData called"); if (!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.avc") || !strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mvc")) { DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Index OMX_IndexVendorVideoExtraData AVC"); OMX_U32 extra_size; nal_length = (config->pData[4] & 0x03) + 1; extra_size = 0; if (nal_length > 2) { /* Presently we assume that only one SPS and one PPS in AvC1 Atom */ extra_size = (nal_length - 2) * 2; } OMX_U8 *pSrcBuf = (OMX_U8 *) (&config->pData[6]); OMX_U8 *pDestBuf; m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex; m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize - 6 - 1 + extra_size; m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8 *) malloc(m_vendor_config.nDataSize); OMX_U32 len; OMX_U8 index = 0; pDestBuf = m_vendor_config.pData; DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Rxd SPS+PPS nPortIndex[%u] len[%u] data[%p]", (unsigned int)m_vendor_config.nPortIndex, (unsigned int)m_vendor_config.nDataSize, m_vendor_config.pData); while (index < 2) { uint8 *psize; len = *pSrcBuf; len = len << 8; len |= *(pSrcBuf + 1); psize = (uint8 *) & len; memcpy(pDestBuf + nal_length, pSrcBuf + 2,len); for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nal_length; i++) { pDestBuf[i] = psize[nal_length - 1 - i]; } pDestBuf += len + nal_length; pSrcBuf += len + 2; index++; pSrcBuf++; // skip picture param set len = 0; } } else if (!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg4") || !strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg2")) { m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex; m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize; m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8 *) malloc((config->nDataSize)); memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData, config->pData,config->nDataSize); } else if (!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.vc1")) { if (m_vendor_config.pData) { free(m_vendor_config.pData); m_vendor_config.pData = NULL; m_vendor_config.nDataSize = 0; } if (((*((OMX_U32 *) config->pData)) & VC1_SP_MP_START_CODE_MASK) == VC1_SP_MP_START_CODE) { DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - VC1 simple/main profile"); m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex; m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize; m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8 *) malloc(config->nDataSize); memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData, config->pData, config->nDataSize); m_vc1_profile = VC1_SP_MP_RCV; } else if (*((OMX_U32 *) config->pData) == VC1_AP_SEQ_START_CODE) { DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - VC1 Advance profile"); m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex; m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize; m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8 *) malloc((config->nDataSize)); memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData, config->pData, config->nDataSize); m_vc1_profile = VC1_AP; } else if ((config->nDataSize == VC1_STRUCT_C_LEN)) { DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - VC1 Simple/Main profile struct C only"); m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex; m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize; m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8*)malloc(config->nDataSize); memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData,config->pData,config->nDataSize); m_vc1_profile = VC1_SP_MP_RCV; } else { DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - Error: Unknown VC1 profile"); } } return ret; } else if (configIndex == OMX_IndexConfigVideoNalSize) { struct v4l2_control temp; temp.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STREAM_FORMAT; VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(configData, OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_NALSIZE); pNal = reinterpret_cast < OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_NALSIZE * >(configData); switch (pNal->nNaluBytes) { case 0: temp.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NAL_FORMAT_STARTCODES; break; case 2: temp.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NAL_FORMAT_TWO_BYTE_LENGTH; break; case 4: temp.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NAL_FORMAT_FOUR_BYTE_LENGTH; break; default: return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting; } if (!arbitrary_bytes) { /* In arbitrary bytes mode, the assembler strips out nal size and replaces * with start code, so only need to notify driver in frame by frame mode */ if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &temp)) { DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STREAM_FORMAT"); return OMX_ErrorHardware; } } nal_length = pNal->nNaluBytes; m_frame_parser.init_nal_length(nal_length); DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_IndexConfigVideoNalSize called with Size %d", nal_length); return ret; } else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_IndexVendorVideoFrameRate) { OMX_VENDOR_VIDEOFRAMERATE *config = (OMX_VENDOR_VIDEOFRAMERATE *) configData; DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Index OMX_IndexVendorVideoFrameRate %u", (unsigned int)config->nFps); if (config->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX) { if (config->bEnabled) { if ((config->nFps >> 16) > 0) { DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_config: frame rate set by omx client : %u", (unsigned int)config->nFps >> 16); Q16ToFraction(config->nFps, drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator, drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator); if (!drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator) { DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Numerator is zero setting to 30"); drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator = 30; } if (drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator) { drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator = (int) drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator / drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator; } drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator = 1; frm_int = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator * 1e6 / drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator; struct v4l2_outputparm oparm; /*XXX: we're providing timing info as seconds per frame rather than frames * per second.*/ oparm.timeperframe.numerator = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator; oparm.timeperframe.denominator = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator; struct v4l2_streamparm sparm; sparm.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE; sparm.parm.output = oparm; if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_PARM, &sparm)) { DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Unable to convey fps info to driver, \ performance might be affected"); ret = OMX_ErrorHardware; } client_set_fps = true; } else { DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Frame rate not supported."); ret = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting; } } else { DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_config: Disabled client's frame rate"); client_set_fps = false; } } else { DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(" Set_config: Bad Port idx %d", (int)config->nPortIndex); ret = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex; } return ret; } else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_QcomIndexConfigPerfLevel) { OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL *perf = (OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL *)configData; struct v4l2_control control; DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set perf level: %d", perf->ePerfLevel); control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_SET_PERF_LEVEL; switch (perf->ePerfLevel) { case OMX_QCOM_PerfLevelNominal: control.value = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_PERF_LEVEL_NOMINAL; break; case OMX_QCOM_PerfLevelTurbo: control.value = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_PERF_LEVEL_TURBO; break; default: ret = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting; break; } if (ret == OMX_ErrorNone) { ret = (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control) < 0) ? OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting : OMX_ErrorNone; } return ret; } else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_IndexConfigPriority) { OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *priority = (OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *)configData; DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set_config: priority %d", priority->nU32); struct v4l2_control control; control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_PRIORITY; if (priority->nU32 == 0) control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_PRIORITY_REALTIME_ENABLE; else control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_PRIORITY_REALTIME_DISABLE; if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) { DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set Priority"); ret = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting; } return ret; } else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_IndexConfigOperatingRate) { OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *rate = (OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *)configData; DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set_config: operating-rate %u fps", rate->nU32 >> 16); struct v4l2_control control; control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OPERATING_RATE; control.value = rate->nU32; if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) { ret = errno == -EBUSY ? OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources : OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting; DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set operating rate %u fps (%s)", rate->nU32 >> 16, errno == -EBUSY ? "HW Overload" : strerror(errno)); } return ret; } return OMX_ErrorNotImplemented; }
173,790
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static Image *ReadGIFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception) { #define BitSet(byte,bit) (((byte) & (bit)) == (bit)) #define LSBFirstOrder(x,y) (((y) << 8) | (x)) Image *image, *meta_image; int number_extensionss=0; MagickBooleanType status; RectangleInfo page; register ssize_t i; register unsigned char *p; size_t delay, dispose, duration, global_colors, image_count, iterations, one; ssize_t count, opacity; unsigned char background, c, flag, *global_colormap, buffer[257]; /* Open image file. */ assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL); assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature); if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse) (void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s", image_info->filename); assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL); assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature); image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception); status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception); if (status == MagickFalse) { image=DestroyImageList(image); return((Image *) NULL); } /* Determine if this a GIF file. */ count=ReadBlob(image,6,buffer); if ((count != 6) || ((LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"GIF87",5) != 0) && (LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"GIF89",5) != 0))) ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader"); page.width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); page.height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); flag=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image); background=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image); c=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image); /* reserved */ one=1; global_colors=one << (((size_t) flag & 0x07)+1); global_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) MagickMax(global_colors,256),3UL*sizeof(*global_colormap)); if (global_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL) ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed"); if (BitSet((int) flag,0x80) != 0) { count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) (3*global_colors),global_colormap); if (count != (ssize_t) (3*global_colors)) { global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory( global_colormap); ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile"); } } delay=0; dispose=0; duration=0; iterations=1; opacity=(-1); image_count=0; meta_image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception); /* metadata container */ for ( ; ; ) { count=ReadBlob(image,1,&c); if (count != 1) break; if (c == (unsigned char) ';') break; /* terminator */ if (c == (unsigned char) '!') { /* GIF Extension block. */ count=ReadBlob(image,1,&c); if (count != 1) { global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory( global_colormap); meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, "UnableToReadExtensionBlock"); } switch (c) { case 0xf9: { /* Read graphics control extension. */ while (ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer) != 0) ; dispose=(size_t) (buffer[0] >> 2); delay=(size_t) ((buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[1]); if ((ssize_t) (buffer[0] & 0x01) == 0x01) opacity=(ssize_t) buffer[3]; break; } case 0xfe: { char *comments; size_t length; /* Read comment extension. */ comments=AcquireString((char *) NULL); for (length=0; ; length+=count) { count=(ssize_t) ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer); if (count == 0) break; buffer[count]='\0'; (void) ConcatenateString(&comments,(const char *) buffer); } (void) SetImageProperty(meta_image,"comment",comments,exception); comments=DestroyString(comments); break; } case 0xff: { MagickBooleanType loop; /* Read Netscape Loop extension. */ loop=MagickFalse; if (ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer) != 0) loop=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"NETSCAPE2.0",11) == 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse; if (loop != MagickFalse) { while (ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer) != 0) iterations=(size_t) ((buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[1]); break; } else { char name[MagickPathExtent]; int block_length, info_length, reserved_length; MagickBooleanType i8bim, icc, iptc, magick; StringInfo *profile; unsigned char *info; /* Store GIF application extension as a generic profile. */ icc=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"ICCRGBG1012",11) == 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse; magick=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"ImageMagick",11) == 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse; i8bim=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"MGK8BIM0000",11) == 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse; iptc=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"MGKIPTC0000",11) == 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse; number_extensionss++; (void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(), " Reading GIF application extension"); info=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(255UL, sizeof(*info)); if (info == (unsigned char *) NULL) { meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError, "MemoryAllocationFailed"); } reserved_length=255; for (info_length=0; ; ) { block_length=(int) ReadBlobBlock(image,&info[info_length]); if (block_length == 0) break; info_length+=block_length; if (info_length > (reserved_length-255)) { reserved_length+=4096; info=(unsigned char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(info,(size_t) reserved_length,sizeof(*info)); if (info == (unsigned char *) NULL) { meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError, "MemoryAllocationFailed"); } } } profile=BlobToStringInfo(info,(size_t) info_length); if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL) { meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError, "MemoryAllocationFailed"); } if (i8bim != MagickFalse) (void) CopyMagickString(name,"8bim",sizeof(name)); else if (icc != MagickFalse) (void) CopyMagickString(name,"icc",sizeof(name)); else if (iptc != MagickFalse) (void) CopyMagickString(name,"iptc",sizeof(name)); else if (magick != MagickFalse) { (void) CopyMagickString(name,"magick",sizeof(name)); meta_image->gamma=StringToDouble((char *) info+6, (char **) NULL); } else (void) FormatLocaleString(name,sizeof(name),"gif:%.11s", buffer); info=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info); if (magick == MagickFalse) (void) SetImageProfile(meta_image,name,profile,exception); profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile); (void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(), " profile name=%s",name); } break; } default: { while (ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer) != 0) ; break; } } } if (c != (unsigned char) ',') continue; if (image_count != 0) { /* Allocate next image structure. */ AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception); if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL) { image=DestroyImageList(image); global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory( global_colormap); return((Image *) NULL); } image=SyncNextImageInList(image); } image_count++; /* Read image attributes. */ meta_image->scene=image->scene; (void) CloneImageProperties(image,meta_image); DestroyImageProperties(meta_image); (void) CloneImageProfiles(image,meta_image); DestroyImageProfiles(meta_image); image->storage_class=PseudoClass; image->compression=LZWCompression; page.x=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image); page.y=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image); image->columns=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); image->rows=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); image->depth=8; flag=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image); image->interlace=BitSet((int) flag,0x40) != 0 ? GIFInterlace : NoInterlace; image->colors=BitSet((int) flag,0x80) == 0 ? global_colors : one << ((size_t) (flag & 0x07)+1); if (opacity >= (ssize_t) image->colors) opacity=(-1); image->page.width=page.width; image->page.height=page.height; image->page.y=page.y; image->page.x=page.x; image->delay=delay; image->ticks_per_second=100; image->dispose=(DisposeType) dispose; image->iterations=iterations; image->alpha_trait=opacity >= 0 ? BlendPixelTrait : UndefinedPixelTrait; delay=0; dispose=0; if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0)) { global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory( global_colormap); meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize"); } /* Inititialize colormap. */ if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse) { global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory( global_colormap); meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed"); } if (BitSet((int) flag,0x80) == 0) { /* Use global colormap. */ p=global_colormap; for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++) { image->colormap[i].red=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++); image->colormap[i].green=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++); image->colormap[i].blue=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++); if (i == opacity) { image->colormap[i].alpha=(double) TransparentAlpha; image->transparent_color=image->colormap[opacity]; } } image->background_color=image->colormap[MagickMin((ssize_t) background, (ssize_t) image->colors-1)]; } else { unsigned char *colormap; /* Read local colormap. */ colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,3* sizeof(*colormap)); if (colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL) { global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory( global_colormap); meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed"); } count=ReadBlob(image,(3*image->colors)*sizeof(*colormap),colormap); if (count != (ssize_t) (3*image->colors)) { global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory( global_colormap); colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap); meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, "InsufficientImageDataInFile"); } p=colormap; for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++) { image->colormap[i].red=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++); image->colormap[i].green=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++); image->colormap[i].blue=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++); if (i == opacity) image->colormap[i].alpha=(double) TransparentAlpha; } colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap); } if (image->gamma == 1.0) { for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++) if (IsPixelInfoGray(image->colormap+i) == MagickFalse) break; (void) SetImageColorspace(image,i == (ssize_t) image->colors ? GRAYColorspace : RGBColorspace,exception); } if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0)) if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1)) break; status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception); if (status == MagickFalse) return(DestroyImageList(image)); /* Decode image. */ if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse) status=PingGIFImage(image,exception); else status=DecodeImage(image,opacity,exception); if ((image_info->ping == MagickFalse) && (status == MagickFalse)) { global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory( global_colormap); meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage"); } duration+=image->delay*image->iterations; if (image_info->number_scenes != 0) if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1)) break; opacity=(-1); status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) image->scene- 1,image->scene); if (status == MagickFalse) break; } image->duration=duration; meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(global_colormap); if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0)) ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize"); (void) CloseBlob(image); return(GetFirstImageInList(image)); } Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/592 CWE ID: CWE-200
static Image *ReadGIFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception) { #define BitSet(byte,bit) (((byte) & (bit)) == (bit)) #define LSBFirstOrder(x,y) (((y) << 8) | (x)) Image *image, *meta_image; int number_extensionss=0; MagickBooleanType status; RectangleInfo page; register ssize_t i; register unsigned char *p; size_t delay, dispose, duration, global_colors, image_count, iterations, one; ssize_t count, opacity; unsigned char background, c, flag, *global_colormap, buffer[257]; /* Open image file. */ assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL); assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature); if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse) (void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s", image_info->filename); assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL); assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature); image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception); status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception); if (status == MagickFalse) { image=DestroyImageList(image); return((Image *) NULL); } /* Determine if this a GIF file. */ count=ReadBlob(image,6,buffer); if ((count != 6) || ((LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"GIF87",5) != 0) && (LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"GIF89",5) != 0))) ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader"); page.width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); page.height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); flag=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image); background=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image); c=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image); /* reserved */ one=1; global_colors=one << (((size_t) flag & 0x07)+1); global_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) MagickMax(global_colors,256),3UL*sizeof(*global_colormap)); if (global_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL) ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed"); (void) ResetMagickMemory(global_colormap,0,3*MagickMax(global_colors,256)* sizeof(*global_colormap)); if (BitSet((int) flag,0x80) != 0) { count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) (3*global_colors),global_colormap); if (count != (ssize_t) (3*global_colors)) { global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory( global_colormap); ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile"); } } delay=0; dispose=0; duration=0; iterations=1; opacity=(-1); image_count=0; meta_image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception); /* metadata container */ for ( ; ; ) { count=ReadBlob(image,1,&c); if (count != 1) break; if (c == (unsigned char) ';') break; /* terminator */ if (c == (unsigned char) '!') { /* GIF Extension block. */ count=ReadBlob(image,1,&c); if (count != 1) { global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory( global_colormap); meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, "UnableToReadExtensionBlock"); } switch (c) { case 0xf9: { /* Read graphics control extension. */ while (ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer) != 0) ; dispose=(size_t) (buffer[0] >> 2); delay=(size_t) ((buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[1]); if ((ssize_t) (buffer[0] & 0x01) == 0x01) opacity=(ssize_t) buffer[3]; break; } case 0xfe: { char *comments; size_t length; /* Read comment extension. */ comments=AcquireString((char *) NULL); for (length=0; ; length+=count) { count=(ssize_t) ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer); if (count == 0) break; buffer[count]='\0'; (void) ConcatenateString(&comments,(const char *) buffer); } (void) SetImageProperty(meta_image,"comment",comments,exception); comments=DestroyString(comments); break; } case 0xff: { MagickBooleanType loop; /* Read Netscape Loop extension. */ loop=MagickFalse; if (ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer) != 0) loop=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"NETSCAPE2.0",11) == 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse; if (loop != MagickFalse) { while (ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer) != 0) iterations=(size_t) ((buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[1]); break; } else { char name[MagickPathExtent]; int block_length, info_length, reserved_length; MagickBooleanType i8bim, icc, iptc, magick; StringInfo *profile; unsigned char *info; /* Store GIF application extension as a generic profile. */ icc=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"ICCRGBG1012",11) == 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse; magick=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"ImageMagick",11) == 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse; i8bim=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"MGK8BIM0000",11) == 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse; iptc=LocaleNCompare((char *) buffer,"MGKIPTC0000",11) == 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse; number_extensionss++; (void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(), " Reading GIF application extension"); info=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(255UL, sizeof(*info)); if (info == (unsigned char *) NULL) { meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError, "MemoryAllocationFailed"); } reserved_length=255; for (info_length=0; ; ) { block_length=(int) ReadBlobBlock(image,&info[info_length]); if (block_length == 0) break; info_length+=block_length; if (info_length > (reserved_length-255)) { reserved_length+=4096; info=(unsigned char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(info,(size_t) reserved_length,sizeof(*info)); if (info == (unsigned char *) NULL) { meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError, "MemoryAllocationFailed"); } } } profile=BlobToStringInfo(info,(size_t) info_length); if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL) { meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError, "MemoryAllocationFailed"); } if (i8bim != MagickFalse) (void) CopyMagickString(name,"8bim",sizeof(name)); else if (icc != MagickFalse) (void) CopyMagickString(name,"icc",sizeof(name)); else if (iptc != MagickFalse) (void) CopyMagickString(name,"iptc",sizeof(name)); else if (magick != MagickFalse) { (void) CopyMagickString(name,"magick",sizeof(name)); meta_image->gamma=StringToDouble((char *) info+6, (char **) NULL); } else (void) FormatLocaleString(name,sizeof(name),"gif:%.11s", buffer); info=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info); if (magick == MagickFalse) (void) SetImageProfile(meta_image,name,profile,exception); profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile); (void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(), " profile name=%s",name); } break; } default: { while (ReadBlobBlock(image,buffer) != 0) ; break; } } } if (c != (unsigned char) ',') continue; if (image_count != 0) { /* Allocate next image structure. */ AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception); if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL) { image=DestroyImageList(image); global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory( global_colormap); return((Image *) NULL); } image=SyncNextImageInList(image); } image_count++; /* Read image attributes. */ meta_image->scene=image->scene; (void) CloneImageProperties(image,meta_image); DestroyImageProperties(meta_image); (void) CloneImageProfiles(image,meta_image); DestroyImageProfiles(meta_image); image->storage_class=PseudoClass; image->compression=LZWCompression; page.x=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image); page.y=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image); image->columns=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); image->rows=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); image->depth=8; flag=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image); image->interlace=BitSet((int) flag,0x40) != 0 ? GIFInterlace : NoInterlace; image->colors=BitSet((int) flag,0x80) == 0 ? global_colors : one << ((size_t) (flag & 0x07)+1); if (opacity >= (ssize_t) image->colors) opacity=(-1); image->page.width=page.width; image->page.height=page.height; image->page.y=page.y; image->page.x=page.x; image->delay=delay; image->ticks_per_second=100; image->dispose=(DisposeType) dispose; image->iterations=iterations; image->alpha_trait=opacity >= 0 ? BlendPixelTrait : UndefinedPixelTrait; delay=0; dispose=0; if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0)) { global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory( global_colormap); meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize"); } /* Inititialize colormap. */ if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse) { global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory( global_colormap); meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed"); } if (BitSet((int) flag,0x80) == 0) { /* Use global colormap. */ p=global_colormap; for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++) { image->colormap[i].red=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++); image->colormap[i].green=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++); image->colormap[i].blue=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++); if (i == opacity) { image->colormap[i].alpha=(double) TransparentAlpha; image->transparent_color=image->colormap[opacity]; } } image->background_color=image->colormap[MagickMin((ssize_t) background, (ssize_t) image->colors-1)]; } else { unsigned char *colormap; /* Read local colormap. */ colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,3* sizeof(*colormap)); if (colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL) { global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory( global_colormap); meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed"); } count=ReadBlob(image,(3*image->colors)*sizeof(*colormap),colormap); if (count != (ssize_t) (3*image->colors)) { global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory( global_colormap); colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap); meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, "InsufficientImageDataInFile"); } p=colormap; for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++) { image->colormap[i].red=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++); image->colormap[i].green=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++); image->colormap[i].blue=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++); if (i == opacity) image->colormap[i].alpha=(double) TransparentAlpha; } colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap); } if (image->gamma == 1.0) { for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++) if (IsPixelInfoGray(image->colormap+i) == MagickFalse) break; (void) SetImageColorspace(image,i == (ssize_t) image->colors ? GRAYColorspace : RGBColorspace,exception); } if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0)) if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1)) break; status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception); if (status == MagickFalse) return(DestroyImageList(image)); /* Decode image. */ if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse) status=PingGIFImage(image,exception); else status=DecodeImage(image,opacity,exception); if ((image_info->ping == MagickFalse) && (status == MagickFalse)) { global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory( global_colormap); meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage"); } duration+=image->delay*image->iterations; if (image_info->number_scenes != 0) if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1)) break; opacity=(-1); status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) image->scene- 1,image->scene); if (status == MagickFalse) break; } image->duration=duration; meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image); global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(global_colormap); if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0)) ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize"); (void) CloseBlob(image); return(GetFirstImageInList(image)); }
167,725
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static uint32_t select_lease_time(struct dhcp_packet *packet) { uint32_t lease_time_sec = server_config.max_lease_sec; uint8_t *lease_time_opt = udhcp_get_option(packet, DHCP_LEASE_TIME); if (lease_time_opt) { move_from_unaligned32(lease_time_sec, lease_time_opt); lease_time_sec = ntohl(lease_time_sec); if (lease_time_sec > server_config.max_lease_sec) lease_time_sec = server_config.max_lease_sec; if (lease_time_sec < server_config.min_lease_sec) lease_time_sec = server_config.min_lease_sec; } return lease_time_sec; } Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-125
static uint32_t select_lease_time(struct dhcp_packet *packet) { uint32_t lease_time_sec = server_config.max_lease_sec; uint8_t *lease_time_opt = udhcp_get_option32(packet, DHCP_LEASE_TIME); if (lease_time_opt) { move_from_unaligned32(lease_time_sec, lease_time_opt); lease_time_sec = ntohl(lease_time_sec); if (lease_time_sec > server_config.max_lease_sec) lease_time_sec = server_config.max_lease_sec; if (lease_time_sec < server_config.min_lease_sec) lease_time_sec = server_config.min_lease_sec; } return lease_time_sec; }
165,225
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: xfs_attr_shortform_to_leaf( struct xfs_da_args *args, struct xfs_buf **leaf_bp) { xfs_inode_t *dp; xfs_attr_shortform_t *sf; xfs_attr_sf_entry_t *sfe; xfs_da_args_t nargs; char *tmpbuffer; int error, i, size; xfs_dablk_t blkno; struct xfs_buf *bp; xfs_ifork_t *ifp; trace_xfs_attr_sf_to_leaf(args); dp = args->dp; ifp = dp->i_afp; sf = (xfs_attr_shortform_t *)ifp->if_u1.if_data; size = be16_to_cpu(sf->hdr.totsize); tmpbuffer = kmem_alloc(size, KM_SLEEP); ASSERT(tmpbuffer != NULL); memcpy(tmpbuffer, ifp->if_u1.if_data, size); sf = (xfs_attr_shortform_t *)tmpbuffer; xfs_idata_realloc(dp, -size, XFS_ATTR_FORK); xfs_bmap_local_to_extents_empty(dp, XFS_ATTR_FORK); bp = NULL; error = xfs_da_grow_inode(args, &blkno); if (error) { /* * If we hit an IO error middle of the transaction inside * grow_inode(), we may have inconsistent data. Bail out. */ if (error == -EIO) goto out; xfs_idata_realloc(dp, size, XFS_ATTR_FORK); /* try to put */ memcpy(ifp->if_u1.if_data, tmpbuffer, size); /* it back */ goto out; } ASSERT(blkno == 0); error = xfs_attr3_leaf_create(args, blkno, &bp); if (error) { error = xfs_da_shrink_inode(args, 0, bp); bp = NULL; if (error) goto out; xfs_idata_realloc(dp, size, XFS_ATTR_FORK); /* try to put */ memcpy(ifp->if_u1.if_data, tmpbuffer, size); /* it back */ goto out; } memset((char *)&nargs, 0, sizeof(nargs)); nargs.dp = dp; nargs.geo = args->geo; nargs.firstblock = args->firstblock; nargs.dfops = args->dfops; nargs.total = args->total; nargs.whichfork = XFS_ATTR_FORK; nargs.trans = args->trans; nargs.op_flags = XFS_DA_OP_OKNOENT; sfe = &sf->list[0]; for (i = 0; i < sf->hdr.count; i++) { nargs.name = sfe->nameval; nargs.namelen = sfe->namelen; nargs.value = &sfe->nameval[nargs.namelen]; nargs.valuelen = sfe->valuelen; nargs.hashval = xfs_da_hashname(sfe->nameval, sfe->namelen); nargs.flags = XFS_ATTR_NSP_ONDISK_TO_ARGS(sfe->flags); error = xfs_attr3_leaf_lookup_int(bp, &nargs); /* set a->index */ ASSERT(error == -ENOATTR); error = xfs_attr3_leaf_add(bp, &nargs); ASSERT(error != -ENOSPC); if (error) goto out; sfe = XFS_ATTR_SF_NEXTENTRY(sfe); } error = 0; *leaf_bp = bp; out: kmem_free(tmpbuffer); return error; } Commit Message: xfs: don't call xfs_da_shrink_inode with NULL bp xfs_attr3_leaf_create may have errored out before instantiating a buffer, for example if the blkno is out of range. In that case there is no work to do to remove it, and in fact xfs_da_shrink_inode will lead to an oops if we try. This also seems to fix a flaw where the original error from xfs_attr3_leaf_create gets overwritten in the cleanup case, and it removes a pointless assignment to bp which isn't used after this. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199969 Reported-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu> Tested-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> CWE ID: CWE-476
xfs_attr_shortform_to_leaf( struct xfs_da_args *args, struct xfs_buf **leaf_bp) { xfs_inode_t *dp; xfs_attr_shortform_t *sf; xfs_attr_sf_entry_t *sfe; xfs_da_args_t nargs; char *tmpbuffer; int error, i, size; xfs_dablk_t blkno; struct xfs_buf *bp; xfs_ifork_t *ifp; trace_xfs_attr_sf_to_leaf(args); dp = args->dp; ifp = dp->i_afp; sf = (xfs_attr_shortform_t *)ifp->if_u1.if_data; size = be16_to_cpu(sf->hdr.totsize); tmpbuffer = kmem_alloc(size, KM_SLEEP); ASSERT(tmpbuffer != NULL); memcpy(tmpbuffer, ifp->if_u1.if_data, size); sf = (xfs_attr_shortform_t *)tmpbuffer; xfs_idata_realloc(dp, -size, XFS_ATTR_FORK); xfs_bmap_local_to_extents_empty(dp, XFS_ATTR_FORK); bp = NULL; error = xfs_da_grow_inode(args, &blkno); if (error) { /* * If we hit an IO error middle of the transaction inside * grow_inode(), we may have inconsistent data. Bail out. */ if (error == -EIO) goto out; xfs_idata_realloc(dp, size, XFS_ATTR_FORK); /* try to put */ memcpy(ifp->if_u1.if_data, tmpbuffer, size); /* it back */ goto out; } ASSERT(blkno == 0); error = xfs_attr3_leaf_create(args, blkno, &bp); if (error) { /* xfs_attr3_leaf_create may not have instantiated a block */ if (bp && (xfs_da_shrink_inode(args, 0, bp) != 0)) goto out; xfs_idata_realloc(dp, size, XFS_ATTR_FORK); /* try to put */ memcpy(ifp->if_u1.if_data, tmpbuffer, size); /* it back */ goto out; } memset((char *)&nargs, 0, sizeof(nargs)); nargs.dp = dp; nargs.geo = args->geo; nargs.firstblock = args->firstblock; nargs.dfops = args->dfops; nargs.total = args->total; nargs.whichfork = XFS_ATTR_FORK; nargs.trans = args->trans; nargs.op_flags = XFS_DA_OP_OKNOENT; sfe = &sf->list[0]; for (i = 0; i < sf->hdr.count; i++) { nargs.name = sfe->nameval; nargs.namelen = sfe->namelen; nargs.value = &sfe->nameval[nargs.namelen]; nargs.valuelen = sfe->valuelen; nargs.hashval = xfs_da_hashname(sfe->nameval, sfe->namelen); nargs.flags = XFS_ATTR_NSP_ONDISK_TO_ARGS(sfe->flags); error = xfs_attr3_leaf_lookup_int(bp, &nargs); /* set a->index */ ASSERT(error == -ENOATTR); error = xfs_attr3_leaf_add(bp, &nargs); ASSERT(error != -ENOSPC); if (error) goto out; sfe = XFS_ATTR_SF_NEXTENTRY(sfe); } error = 0; *leaf_bp = bp; out: kmem_free(tmpbuffer); return error; }
169,164
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) { const struct tcphdr *th; const struct ipv6hdr *hdr; bool refcounted; struct sock *sk; int ret; struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev); if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST) goto discard_it; /* * Count it even if it's bad. */ __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INSEGS); if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct tcphdr))) goto discard_it; th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data; if (unlikely(th->doff < sizeof(struct tcphdr)/4)) goto bad_packet; if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, th->doff*4)) goto discard_it; if (skb_checksum_init(skb, IPPROTO_TCP, ip6_compute_pseudo)) goto csum_error; th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data; hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb); lookup: sk = __inet6_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), th->source, th->dest, inet6_iif(skb), &refcounted); if (!sk) goto no_tcp_socket; process: if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) goto do_time_wait; if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) { struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk); struct sock *nsk; sk = req->rsk_listener; tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th); if (tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb)) { sk_drops_add(sk, skb); reqsk_put(req); goto discard_it; } if (unlikely(sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)) { inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put(sk, req); goto lookup; } sock_hold(sk); refcounted = true; nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false); if (!nsk) { reqsk_put(req); goto discard_and_relse; } if (nsk == sk) { reqsk_put(req); tcp_v6_restore_cb(skb); } else if (tcp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb)) { tcp_v6_send_reset(nsk, skb); goto discard_and_relse; } else { sock_put(sk); return 0; } } if (hdr->hop_limit < inet6_sk(sk)->min_hopcount) { __NET_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_TCPMINTTLDROP); goto discard_and_relse; } if (!xfrm6_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) goto discard_and_relse; tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th); if (tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb)) goto discard_and_relse; if (sk_filter(sk, skb)) goto discard_and_relse; skb->dev = NULL; if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) { ret = tcp_v6_do_rcv(sk, skb); goto put_and_return; } sk_incoming_cpu_update(sk); bh_lock_sock_nested(sk); tcp_segs_in(tcp_sk(sk), skb); ret = 0; if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk)) { if (!tcp_prequeue(sk, skb)) ret = tcp_v6_do_rcv(sk, skb); } else if (tcp_add_backlog(sk, skb)) { goto discard_and_relse; } bh_unlock_sock(sk); put_and_return: if (refcounted) sock_put(sk); return ret ? -1 : 0; no_tcp_socket: if (!xfrm6_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) goto discard_it; tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th); if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) { csum_error: __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_CSUMERRORS); bad_packet: __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INERRS); } else { tcp_v6_send_reset(NULL, skb); } discard_it: kfree_skb(skb); return 0; discard_and_relse: sk_drops_add(sk, skb); if (refcounted) sock_put(sk); goto discard_it; do_time_wait: if (!xfrm6_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) { inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk)); goto discard_it; } tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th); if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) { inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk)); goto csum_error; } switch (tcp_timewait_state_process(inet_twsk(sk), skb, th)) { case TCP_TW_SYN: { struct sock *sk2; sk2 = inet6_lookup_listener(dev_net(skb->dev), &tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, th->source, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr, ntohs(th->dest), tcp_v6_iif(skb)); if (sk2) { struct inet_timewait_sock *tw = inet_twsk(sk); inet_twsk_deschedule_put(tw); sk = sk2; tcp_v6_restore_cb(skb); refcounted = false; goto process; } /* Fall through to ACK */ } case TCP_TW_ACK: tcp_v6_timewait_ack(sk, skb); break; case TCP_TW_RST: tcp_v6_restore_cb(skb); tcp_v6_send_reset(sk, skb); inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk)); goto discard_it; case TCP_TW_SUCCESS: ; } goto discard_it; } Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter() With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack, crashing in tcp_collapse() Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb, but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen. It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior. We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed. Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com> Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CWE ID: CWE-284
static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) { const struct tcphdr *th; const struct ipv6hdr *hdr; bool refcounted; struct sock *sk; int ret; struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev); if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST) goto discard_it; /* * Count it even if it's bad. */ __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INSEGS); if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct tcphdr))) goto discard_it; th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data; if (unlikely(th->doff < sizeof(struct tcphdr)/4)) goto bad_packet; if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, th->doff*4)) goto discard_it; if (skb_checksum_init(skb, IPPROTO_TCP, ip6_compute_pseudo)) goto csum_error; th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data; hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb); lookup: sk = __inet6_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), th->source, th->dest, inet6_iif(skb), &refcounted); if (!sk) goto no_tcp_socket; process: if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) goto do_time_wait; if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) { struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk); struct sock *nsk; sk = req->rsk_listener; tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th); if (tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb)) { sk_drops_add(sk, skb); reqsk_put(req); goto discard_it; } if (unlikely(sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)) { inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put(sk, req); goto lookup; } sock_hold(sk); refcounted = true; nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false); if (!nsk) { reqsk_put(req); goto discard_and_relse; } if (nsk == sk) { reqsk_put(req); tcp_v6_restore_cb(skb); } else if (tcp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb)) { tcp_v6_send_reset(nsk, skb); goto discard_and_relse; } else { sock_put(sk); return 0; } } if (hdr->hop_limit < inet6_sk(sk)->min_hopcount) { __NET_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_TCPMINTTLDROP); goto discard_and_relse; } if (!xfrm6_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) goto discard_and_relse; tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th); if (tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb)) goto discard_and_relse; if (tcp_filter(sk, skb)) goto discard_and_relse; th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data; hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb); skb->dev = NULL; if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) { ret = tcp_v6_do_rcv(sk, skb); goto put_and_return; } sk_incoming_cpu_update(sk); bh_lock_sock_nested(sk); tcp_segs_in(tcp_sk(sk), skb); ret = 0; if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk)) { if (!tcp_prequeue(sk, skb)) ret = tcp_v6_do_rcv(sk, skb); } else if (tcp_add_backlog(sk, skb)) { goto discard_and_relse; } bh_unlock_sock(sk); put_and_return: if (refcounted) sock_put(sk); return ret ? -1 : 0; no_tcp_socket: if (!xfrm6_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) goto discard_it; tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th); if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) { csum_error: __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_CSUMERRORS); bad_packet: __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INERRS); } else { tcp_v6_send_reset(NULL, skb); } discard_it: kfree_skb(skb); return 0; discard_and_relse: sk_drops_add(sk, skb); if (refcounted) sock_put(sk); goto discard_it; do_time_wait: if (!xfrm6_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) { inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk)); goto discard_it; } tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th); if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) { inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk)); goto csum_error; } switch (tcp_timewait_state_process(inet_twsk(sk), skb, th)) { case TCP_TW_SYN: { struct sock *sk2; sk2 = inet6_lookup_listener(dev_net(skb->dev), &tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, th->source, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr, ntohs(th->dest), tcp_v6_iif(skb)); if (sk2) { struct inet_timewait_sock *tw = inet_twsk(sk); inet_twsk_deschedule_put(tw); sk = sk2; tcp_v6_restore_cb(skb); refcounted = false; goto process; } /* Fall through to ACK */ } case TCP_TW_ACK: tcp_v6_timewait_ack(sk, skb); break; case TCP_TW_RST: tcp_v6_restore_cb(skb); tcp_v6_send_reset(sk, skb); inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk)); goto discard_it; case TCP_TW_SUCCESS: ; } goto discard_it; }
166,915
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: void ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument::OnPaymentAppInvoked( mojom::PaymentHandlerResponsePtr response) { DCHECK(delegate_); if (delegate_ != nullptr) { delegate_->OnInstrumentDetailsReady(response->method_name, response->stringified_details); delegate_ = nullptr; } } Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app. Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the |response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the |response_helper_| would be used after free. This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed. After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction failed" and does not use memory after it was freed. Bug: 956597 Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682 Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995} CWE ID: CWE-416
void ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument::OnPaymentAppInvoked( mojom::PaymentHandlerResponsePtr response) { if (delegate_ != nullptr) { delegate_->OnInstrumentDetailsReady(response->method_name, response->stringified_details); delegate_ = nullptr; } }
172,964
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, next) { spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC); if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) { return; } spl_filesystem_file_free_line(intern TSRMLS_CC); if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_AHEAD)) { spl_filesystem_file_read_line(getThis(), intern, 1 TSRMLS_CC); } intern->u.file.current_line_num++; } /* }}} */ /* {{{ proto void SplFileObject::setFlags(int flags) Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int CWE ID: CWE-190
SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, next) { spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC); if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) { return; } spl_filesystem_file_free_line(intern TSRMLS_CC); if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_AHEAD)) { spl_filesystem_file_read_line(getThis(), intern, 1 TSRMLS_CC); } intern->u.file.current_line_num++; } /* }}} */ /* {{{ proto void SplFileObject::setFlags(int flags)
167,057
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: WebRunnerBrowserContext::~WebRunnerBrowserContext() { if (resource_context_) { content::BrowserThread::DeleteSoon(content::BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE, std::move(resource_context_)); } } Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service. Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser functionality. * Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner. * Add some simple navigation tests. * Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls. * Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic. * Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor. * Use FIDL events for navigation state changes. * Bug fixes: ** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(), so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown. ** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case) ** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents observer being registered. Bug: 871594 Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539 Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155} CWE ID: CWE-264
WebRunnerBrowserContext::~WebRunnerBrowserContext() { NotifyWillBeDestroyed(this); if (resource_context_) { content::BrowserThread::DeleteSoon(content::BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE, std::move(resource_context_)); } ShutdownStoragePartitions(); }
172,156
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static void show_object(struct object *object, struct strbuf *path, const char *last, void *data) { struct bitmap *base = data; int bitmap_pos; bitmap_pos = bitmap_position(object->oid.hash); if (bitmap_pos < 0) { char *name = path_name(path, last); bitmap_pos = ext_index_add_object(object, name); free(name); } bitmap_set(base, bitmap_pos); } Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and "c". Callbacks which want the full value then call path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the length, without creating a new copy. So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can also notice that no callback actually cares about the broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to the strbuf. This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks would not bother to format the final path component. But in practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> CWE ID: CWE-119
static void show_object(struct object *object, struct strbuf *path, static void show_object(struct object *object, const char *name, void *data) { struct bitmap *base = data; int bitmap_pos; bitmap_pos = bitmap_position(object->oid.hash); if (bitmap_pos < 0) bitmap_pos = ext_index_add_object(object, name); bitmap_set(base, bitmap_pos); }
167,422
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: struct bio *bio_map_user_iov(struct request_queue *q, const struct iov_iter *iter, gfp_t gfp_mask) { int j; int nr_pages = 0; struct page **pages; struct bio *bio; int cur_page = 0; int ret, offset; struct iov_iter i; struct iovec iov; iov_for_each(iov, i, *iter) { unsigned long uaddr = (unsigned long) iov.iov_base; unsigned long len = iov.iov_len; unsigned long end = (uaddr + len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT; unsigned long start = uaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT; /* * Overflow, abort */ if (end < start) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); nr_pages += end - start; /* * buffer must be aligned to at least logical block size for now */ if (uaddr & queue_dma_alignment(q)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } if (!nr_pages) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); bio = bio_kmalloc(gfp_mask, nr_pages); if (!bio) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); ret = -ENOMEM; pages = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(struct page *), gfp_mask); if (!pages) goto out; iov_for_each(iov, i, *iter) { unsigned long uaddr = (unsigned long) iov.iov_base; unsigned long len = iov.iov_len; unsigned long end = (uaddr + len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT; unsigned long start = uaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT; const int local_nr_pages = end - start; const int page_limit = cur_page + local_nr_pages; ret = get_user_pages_fast(uaddr, local_nr_pages, (iter->type & WRITE) != WRITE, &pages[cur_page]); if (ret < local_nr_pages) { ret = -EFAULT; goto out_unmap; } offset = offset_in_page(uaddr); for (j = cur_page; j < page_limit; j++) { unsigned int bytes = PAGE_SIZE - offset; unsigned short prev_bi_vcnt = bio->bi_vcnt; if (len <= 0) break; if (bytes > len) bytes = len; /* * sorry... */ if (bio_add_pc_page(q, bio, pages[j], bytes, offset) < bytes) break; /* * check if vector was merged with previous * drop page reference if needed */ if (bio->bi_vcnt == prev_bi_vcnt) put_page(pages[j]); len -= bytes; offset = 0; } cur_page = j; /* * release the pages we didn't map into the bio, if any */ while (j < page_limit) put_page(pages[j++]); } kfree(pages); bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_USER_MAPPED); /* * subtle -- if bio_map_user_iov() ended up bouncing a bio, * it would normally disappear when its bi_end_io is run. * however, we need it for the unmap, so grab an extra * reference to it */ bio_get(bio); return bio; out_unmap: for (j = 0; j < nr_pages; j++) { if (!pages[j]) break; put_page(pages[j]); } out: kfree(pages); bio_put(bio); return ERR_PTR(ret); } Commit Message: more bio_map_user_iov() leak fixes we need to take care of failure exit as well - pages already in bio should be dropped by analogue of bio_unmap_pages(), since their refcounts had been bumped only once per reference in bio. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> CWE ID: CWE-772
struct bio *bio_map_user_iov(struct request_queue *q, const struct iov_iter *iter, gfp_t gfp_mask) { int j; int nr_pages = 0; struct page **pages; struct bio *bio; int cur_page = 0; int ret, offset; struct iov_iter i; struct iovec iov; struct bio_vec *bvec; iov_for_each(iov, i, *iter) { unsigned long uaddr = (unsigned long) iov.iov_base; unsigned long len = iov.iov_len; unsigned long end = (uaddr + len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT; unsigned long start = uaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT; /* * Overflow, abort */ if (end < start) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); nr_pages += end - start; /* * buffer must be aligned to at least logical block size for now */ if (uaddr & queue_dma_alignment(q)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } if (!nr_pages) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); bio = bio_kmalloc(gfp_mask, nr_pages); if (!bio) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); ret = -ENOMEM; pages = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(struct page *), gfp_mask); if (!pages) goto out; iov_for_each(iov, i, *iter) { unsigned long uaddr = (unsigned long) iov.iov_base; unsigned long len = iov.iov_len; unsigned long end = (uaddr + len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT; unsigned long start = uaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT; const int local_nr_pages = end - start; const int page_limit = cur_page + local_nr_pages; ret = get_user_pages_fast(uaddr, local_nr_pages, (iter->type & WRITE) != WRITE, &pages[cur_page]); if (unlikely(ret < local_nr_pages)) { for (j = cur_page; j < page_limit; j++) { if (!pages[j]) break; put_page(pages[j]); } ret = -EFAULT; goto out_unmap; } offset = offset_in_page(uaddr); for (j = cur_page; j < page_limit; j++) { unsigned int bytes = PAGE_SIZE - offset; unsigned short prev_bi_vcnt = bio->bi_vcnt; if (len <= 0) break; if (bytes > len) bytes = len; /* * sorry... */ if (bio_add_pc_page(q, bio, pages[j], bytes, offset) < bytes) break; /* * check if vector was merged with previous * drop page reference if needed */ if (bio->bi_vcnt == prev_bi_vcnt) put_page(pages[j]); len -= bytes; offset = 0; } cur_page = j; /* * release the pages we didn't map into the bio, if any */ while (j < page_limit) put_page(pages[j++]); } kfree(pages); bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_USER_MAPPED); /* * subtle -- if bio_map_user_iov() ended up bouncing a bio, * it would normally disappear when its bi_end_io is run. * however, we need it for the unmap, so grab an extra * reference to it */ bio_get(bio); return bio; out_unmap: bio_for_each_segment_all(bvec, bio, j) { put_page(bvec->bv_page); } out: kfree(pages); bio_put(bio); return ERR_PTR(ret); }
170,037
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: int Chapters::Edition::GetAtomCount() const { return m_atoms_count; } Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing failures with certain Opus WebM files. Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream. But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style clean ups was done upstream. Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 CWE ID: CWE-119
int Chapters::Edition::GetAtomCount() const long long Chapters::Atom::GetStopTime(const Chapters* pChapters) const { return GetTime(pChapters, m_stop_timecode); }
174,282
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: ProcRenderAddGlyphs (ClientPtr client) { GlyphSetPtr glyphSet; REQUEST(xRenderAddGlyphsReq); GlyphNewRec glyphsLocal[NLOCALGLYPH]; GlyphNewPtr glyphsBase, glyphs, glyph_new; int remain, nglyphs; CARD32 *gids; xGlyphInfo *gi; CARD8 *bits; unsigned int size; int err; int i, screen; PicturePtr pSrc = NULL, pDst = NULL; PixmapPtr pSrcPix = NULL, pDstPix = NULL; CARD32 component_alpha; REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderAddGlyphsReq); err = dixLookupResourceByType((pointer *)&glyphSet, stuff->glyphset, GlyphSetType, client, DixAddAccess); if (err != Success) { client->errorValue = stuff->glyphset; return err; } err = BadAlloc; nglyphs = stuff->nglyphs; if (nglyphs > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(GlyphNewRec)) return BadAlloc; component_alpha = NeedsComponent (glyphSet->format->format); if (nglyphs <= NLOCALGLYPH) { memset (glyphsLocal, 0, sizeof (glyphsLocal)); glyphsBase = glyphsLocal; } else { glyphsBase = (GlyphNewPtr)calloc(nglyphs, sizeof (GlyphNewRec)); if (!glyphsBase) return BadAlloc; } remain = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof (xRenderAddGlyphsReq); glyphs = glyphsBase; gids = (CARD32 *) (stuff + 1); gi = (xGlyphInfo *) (gids + nglyphs); bits = (CARD8 *) (gi + nglyphs); remain -= (sizeof (CARD32) + sizeof (xGlyphInfo)) * nglyphs; for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++) { size_t padded_width; size = gi[i].height * padded_width; if (remain < size) break; err = HashGlyph (&gi[i], bits, size, glyph_new->sha1); if (err) goto bail; glyph_new->glyph = FindGlyphByHash (glyph_new->sha1, glyphSet->fdepth); if (glyph_new->glyph && glyph_new->glyph != DeletedGlyph) { glyph_new->found = TRUE; } else { GlyphPtr glyph; glyph_new->found = FALSE; glyph_new->glyph = glyph = AllocateGlyph (&gi[i], glyphSet->fdepth); if (! glyph) { err = BadAlloc; goto bail; } for (screen = 0; screen < screenInfo.numScreens; screen++) { int width = gi[i].width; int height = gi[i].height; int depth = glyphSet->format->depth; ScreenPtr pScreen; int error; /* Skip work if it's invisibly small anyway */ if (!width || !height) break; pScreen = screenInfo.screens[screen]; pSrcPix = GetScratchPixmapHeader (pScreen, width, height, depth, depth, -1, bits); if (! pSrcPix) { err = BadAlloc; goto bail; } pSrc = CreatePicture (0, &pSrcPix->drawable, glyphSet->format, 0, NULL, serverClient, &error); if (! pSrc) { err = BadAlloc; goto bail; } pDstPix = (pScreen->CreatePixmap) (pScreen, width, height, depth, CREATE_PIXMAP_USAGE_GLYPH_PICTURE); if (!pDstPix) { err = BadAlloc; goto bail; } GlyphPicture (glyph)[screen] = pDst = CreatePicture (0, &pDstPix->drawable, glyphSet->format, CPComponentAlpha, &component_alpha, serverClient, &error); /* The picture takes a reference to the pixmap, so we drop ours. */ (pScreen->DestroyPixmap) (pDstPix); pDstPix = NULL; if (! pDst) { err = BadAlloc; goto bail; } CompositePicture (PictOpSrc, pSrc, None, pDst, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, width, height); FreePicture ((pointer) pSrc, 0); pSrc = NULL; FreeScratchPixmapHeader (pSrcPix); pSrcPix = NULL; } memcpy (glyph_new->glyph->sha1, glyph_new->sha1, 20); } glyph_new->id = gids[i]; if (size & 3) size += 4 - (size & 3); bits += size; remain -= size; } if (remain || i < nglyphs) { err = BadLength; goto bail; } if (!ResizeGlyphSet (glyphSet, nglyphs)) { err = BadAlloc; goto bail; } for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++) AddGlyph (glyphSet, glyphs[i].glyph, glyphs[i].id); if (glyphsBase != glyphsLocal) free(glyphsBase); return Success; bail: if (pSrc) FreePicture ((pointer) pSrc, 0); if (pSrcPix) FreeScratchPixmapHeader (pSrcPix); for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++) if (glyphs[i].glyph && ! glyphs[i].found) free(glyphs[i].glyph); if (glyphsBase != glyphsLocal) free(glyphsBase); return err; } Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-20
ProcRenderAddGlyphs (ClientPtr client) { GlyphSetPtr glyphSet; REQUEST(xRenderAddGlyphsReq); GlyphNewRec glyphsLocal[NLOCALGLYPH]; GlyphNewPtr glyphsBase, glyphs, glyph_new; int remain, nglyphs; CARD32 *gids; xGlyphInfo *gi; CARD8 *bits; unsigned int size; int err; int i, screen; PicturePtr pSrc = NULL, pDst = NULL; PixmapPtr pSrcPix = NULL, pDstPix = NULL; CARD32 component_alpha; REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderAddGlyphsReq); err = dixLookupResourceByType((pointer *)&glyphSet, stuff->glyphset, GlyphSetType, client, DixAddAccess); if (err != Success) { client->errorValue = stuff->glyphset; return err; } err = BadAlloc; nglyphs = stuff->nglyphs; if (nglyphs > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(GlyphNewRec)) return BadAlloc; component_alpha = NeedsComponent (glyphSet->format->format); if (nglyphs <= NLOCALGLYPH) { memset (glyphsLocal, 0, sizeof (glyphsLocal)); glyphsBase = glyphsLocal; } else { glyphsBase = (GlyphNewPtr)calloc(nglyphs, sizeof (GlyphNewRec)); if (!glyphsBase) return BadAlloc; } remain = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof (xRenderAddGlyphsReq); glyphs = glyphsBase; gids = (CARD32 *) (stuff + 1); gi = (xGlyphInfo *) (gids + nglyphs); bits = (CARD8 *) (gi + nglyphs); remain -= (sizeof (CARD32) + sizeof (xGlyphInfo)) * nglyphs; /* protect against bad nglyphs */ if (gi < stuff || gi > ((CARD32 *)stuff + client->req_len) || bits < stuff || bits > ((CARD32 *)stuff + client->req_len)) { err = BadLength; goto bail; } for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++) { size_t padded_width; size = gi[i].height * padded_width; if (remain < size) break; err = HashGlyph (&gi[i], bits, size, glyph_new->sha1); if (err) goto bail; glyph_new->glyph = FindGlyphByHash (glyph_new->sha1, glyphSet->fdepth); if (glyph_new->glyph && glyph_new->glyph != DeletedGlyph) { glyph_new->found = TRUE; } else { GlyphPtr glyph; glyph_new->found = FALSE; glyph_new->glyph = glyph = AllocateGlyph (&gi[i], glyphSet->fdepth); if (! glyph) { err = BadAlloc; goto bail; } for (screen = 0; screen < screenInfo.numScreens; screen++) { int width = gi[i].width; int height = gi[i].height; int depth = glyphSet->format->depth; ScreenPtr pScreen; int error; /* Skip work if it's invisibly small anyway */ if (!width || !height) break; pScreen = screenInfo.screens[screen]; pSrcPix = GetScratchPixmapHeader (pScreen, width, height, depth, depth, -1, bits); if (! pSrcPix) { err = BadAlloc; goto bail; } pSrc = CreatePicture (0, &pSrcPix->drawable, glyphSet->format, 0, NULL, serverClient, &error); if (! pSrc) { err = BadAlloc; goto bail; } pDstPix = (pScreen->CreatePixmap) (pScreen, width, height, depth, CREATE_PIXMAP_USAGE_GLYPH_PICTURE); if (!pDstPix) { err = BadAlloc; goto bail; } GlyphPicture (glyph)[screen] = pDst = CreatePicture (0, &pDstPix->drawable, glyphSet->format, CPComponentAlpha, &component_alpha, serverClient, &error); /* The picture takes a reference to the pixmap, so we drop ours. */ (pScreen->DestroyPixmap) (pDstPix); pDstPix = NULL; if (! pDst) { err = BadAlloc; goto bail; } CompositePicture (PictOpSrc, pSrc, None, pDst, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, width, height); FreePicture ((pointer) pSrc, 0); pSrc = NULL; FreeScratchPixmapHeader (pSrcPix); pSrcPix = NULL; } memcpy (glyph_new->glyph->sha1, glyph_new->sha1, 20); } glyph_new->id = gids[i]; if (size & 3) size += 4 - (size & 3); bits += size; remain -= size; } if (remain || i < nglyphs) { err = BadLength; goto bail; } if (!ResizeGlyphSet (glyphSet, nglyphs)) { err = BadAlloc; goto bail; } for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++) AddGlyph (glyphSet, glyphs[i].glyph, glyphs[i].id); if (glyphsBase != glyphsLocal) free(glyphsBase); return Success; bail: if (pSrc) FreePicture ((pointer) pSrc, 0); if (pSrcPix) FreeScratchPixmapHeader (pSrcPix); for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++) if (glyphs[i].glyph && ! glyphs[i].found) free(glyphs[i].glyph); if (glyphsBase != glyphsLocal) free(glyphsBase); return err; }
165,268
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: pop_decoder_state (DECODER_STATE ds) { if (!ds->idx) { fprintf (stderr, "ERROR: decoder stack underflow!\n"); abort (); } ds->cur = ds->stack[--ds->idx]; } Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-20
pop_decoder_state (DECODER_STATE ds) { if (!ds->idx) { fprintf (stderr, "ksba: ber-decoder: stack underflow!\n"); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); } ds->cur = ds->stack[--ds->idx]; return 0; }
165,051
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: void NetworkHandler::ClearBrowserCache( std::unique_ptr<ClearBrowserCacheCallback> callback) { if (!process_) { callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError()); return; } content::BrowsingDataRemover* remover = content::BrowserContext::GetBrowsingDataRemover( process_->GetBrowserContext()); remover->RemoveAndReply( base::Time(), base::Time::Max(), content::BrowsingDataRemover::DATA_TYPE_CACHE, content::BrowsingDataRemover::ORIGIN_TYPE_UNPROTECTED_WEB, new DevtoolsClearCacheObserver(remover, std::move(callback))); } Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost upon closure of DevTools front-end. Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694 Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657 Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} CWE ID: CWE-20
void NetworkHandler::ClearBrowserCache( std::unique_ptr<ClearBrowserCacheCallback> callback) { if (!browser_context_) { callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError()); return; } content::BrowsingDataRemover* remover = content::BrowserContext::GetBrowsingDataRemover(browser_context_); remover->RemoveAndReply( base::Time(), base::Time::Max(), content::BrowsingDataRemover::DATA_TYPE_CACHE, content::BrowsingDataRemover::ORIGIN_TYPE_UNPROTECTED_WEB, new DevtoolsClearCacheObserver(remover, std::move(callback))); }
172,752
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: WebGLRenderingContextBase::WebGLRenderingContextBase( CanvasRenderingContextHost* host, scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner, std::unique_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DProvider> context_provider, bool using_gpu_compositing, const CanvasContextCreationAttributesCore& requested_attributes, Platform::ContextType context_type) : CanvasRenderingContext(host, requested_attributes), context_group_(MakeGarbageCollected<WebGLContextGroup>()), dispatch_context_lost_event_timer_( task_runner, this, &WebGLRenderingContextBase::DispatchContextLostEvent), restore_timer_(task_runner, this, &WebGLRenderingContextBase::MaybeRestoreContext), task_runner_(task_runner), num_gl_errors_to_console_allowed_(kMaxGLErrorsAllowedToConsole), context_type_(context_type) { DCHECK(context_provider); xr_compatible_ = requested_attributes.xr_compatible; context_group_->AddContext(this); max_viewport_dims_[0] = max_viewport_dims_[1] = 0; context_provider->ContextGL()->GetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VIEWPORT_DIMS, max_viewport_dims_); InitializeWebGLContextLimits(context_provider.get()); scoped_refptr<DrawingBuffer> buffer; buffer = CreateDrawingBuffer(std::move(context_provider), using_gpu_compositing); if (!buffer) { context_lost_mode_ = kSyntheticLostContext; return; } drawing_buffer_ = std::move(buffer); GetDrawingBuffer()->Bind(GL_FRAMEBUFFER); SetupFlags(); String disabled_webgl_extensions(GetDrawingBuffer() ->ContextProvider() ->GetGpuFeatureInfo() .disabled_webgl_extensions.c_str()); Vector<String> disabled_extension_list; disabled_webgl_extensions.Split(' ', disabled_extension_list); for (const auto& entry : disabled_extension_list) { disabled_extensions_.insert(entry); } #define ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(set, values) \ for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(values); ++i) { \ set.insert(values[i]); \ } ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_internal_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2); ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_internal_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2); ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_internal_formats_copy_tex_image_, kSupportedFormatsES2); ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2); ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2); ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_types_, kSupportedTypesES2); ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_types_, kSupportedTypesES2); } Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread. Bug: 881152, 957001 Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630 Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568} CWE ID: CWE-416
WebGLRenderingContextBase::WebGLRenderingContextBase( CanvasRenderingContextHost* host, scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner, std::unique_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DProvider> context_provider, bool using_gpu_compositing, const CanvasContextCreationAttributesCore& requested_attributes, Platform::ContextType context_type) : CanvasRenderingContext(host, requested_attributes), context_group_(MakeGarbageCollected<WebGLContextGroup>()), dispatch_context_lost_event_timer_( task_runner, this, &WebGLRenderingContextBase::DispatchContextLostEvent), restore_timer_(task_runner, this, &WebGLRenderingContextBase::MaybeRestoreContext), task_runner_(task_runner), num_gl_errors_to_console_allowed_(kMaxGLErrorsAllowedToConsole), context_type_(context_type), program_completion_queries_( base::MRUCache<WebGLProgram*, GLuint>::NO_AUTO_EVICT) { DCHECK(context_provider); xr_compatible_ = requested_attributes.xr_compatible; context_group_->AddContext(this); max_viewport_dims_[0] = max_viewport_dims_[1] = 0; context_provider->ContextGL()->GetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VIEWPORT_DIMS, max_viewport_dims_); InitializeWebGLContextLimits(context_provider.get()); scoped_refptr<DrawingBuffer> buffer; buffer = CreateDrawingBuffer(std::move(context_provider), using_gpu_compositing); if (!buffer) { context_lost_mode_ = kSyntheticLostContext; return; } drawing_buffer_ = std::move(buffer); GetDrawingBuffer()->Bind(GL_FRAMEBUFFER); SetupFlags(); String disabled_webgl_extensions(GetDrawingBuffer() ->ContextProvider() ->GetGpuFeatureInfo() .disabled_webgl_extensions.c_str()); Vector<String> disabled_extension_list; disabled_webgl_extensions.Split(' ', disabled_extension_list); for (const auto& entry : disabled_extension_list) { disabled_extensions_.insert(entry); } #define ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(set, values) \ for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(values); ++i) { \ set.insert(values[i]); \ } ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_internal_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2); ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_internal_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2); ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_internal_formats_copy_tex_image_, kSupportedFormatsES2); ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2); ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2); ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_types_, kSupportedTypesES2); ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_types_, kSupportedTypesES2); }
172,535
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: void ExternalProtocolHandler::LaunchUrlWithDelegate( const GURL& url, int render_process_host_id, int render_view_routing_id, ui::PageTransition page_transition, bool has_user_gesture, Delegate* delegate) { DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI); std::string escaped_url_string = net::EscapeExternalHandlerValue(url.spec()); GURL escaped_url(escaped_url_string); content::WebContents* web_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID( render_process_host_id, render_view_routing_id); Profile* profile = nullptr; if (web_contents) // Maybe NULL during testing. profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext()); BlockState block_state = GetBlockStateWithDelegate(escaped_url.scheme(), delegate, profile); if (block_state == BLOCK) { if (delegate) delegate->BlockRequest(); return; } g_accept_requests = false; shell_integration::DefaultWebClientWorkerCallback callback = base::Bind( &OnDefaultProtocolClientWorkerFinished, url, render_process_host_id, render_view_routing_id, block_state == UNKNOWN, page_transition, has_user_gesture, delegate); CreateShellWorker(callback, escaped_url.scheme(), delegate) ->StartCheckIsDefault(); } Commit Message: Reland "Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL." This is a reland of 2401e58572884b3561e4348d64f11ac74667ef02 Original change's description: > Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL. > > Fixes bug introduced in r102449. > > Bug: 785809 > Change-Id: I9e6dd1031dd7e7b8d378b138ab151daefdc0c6dc > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/778747 > Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518848} Bug: 785809 Change-Id: Ib8954584004ff5681654398db76d48cdf4437df7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/788551 Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519203} CWE ID: CWE-20
void ExternalProtocolHandler::LaunchUrlWithDelegate( const GURL& url, int render_process_host_id, int render_view_routing_id, ui::PageTransition page_transition, bool has_user_gesture, Delegate* delegate) { DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI); // TODO(mgiuca): This essentially amounts to "remove illegal characters from // the URL", something that probably should be done by the GURL constructor // itself. The GURL constructor does do it in some cases (e.g., mailto) but // not in general. https://crbug.com/788244. std::string escaped_url_string = net::EscapeExternalHandlerValue(url.spec()); GURL escaped_url(escaped_url_string); content::WebContents* web_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID( render_process_host_id, render_view_routing_id); Profile* profile = nullptr; if (web_contents) // Maybe NULL during testing. profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext()); BlockState block_state = GetBlockStateWithDelegate(escaped_url.scheme(), delegate, profile); if (block_state == BLOCK) { if (delegate) delegate->BlockRequest(); return; } g_accept_requests = false; shell_integration::DefaultWebClientWorkerCallback callback = base::Bind( &OnDefaultProtocolClientWorkerFinished, escaped_url, render_process_host_id, render_view_routing_id, block_state == UNKNOWN, page_transition, has_user_gesture, delegate); CreateShellWorker(callback, escaped_url.scheme(), delegate) ->StartCheckIsDefault(); }
172,687
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: INT_PTR CALLBACK NewVersionCallback(HWND hDlg, UINT message, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam) { char cmdline[] = APPLICATION_NAME " -w 150"; static char* filepath = NULL; static int download_status = 0; LONG i; HWND hNotes; STARTUPINFOA si; PROCESS_INFORMATION pi; HFONT hyperlink_font = NULL; EXT_DECL(dl_ext, NULL, __VA_GROUP__("*.exe"), __VA_GROUP__(lmprintf(MSG_037))); switch (message) { case WM_INITDIALOG: apply_localization(IDD_NEW_VERSION, hDlg); download_status = 0; SetTitleBarIcon(hDlg); CenterDialog(hDlg); update_original_proc = (WNDPROC)SetWindowLongPtr(hDlg, GWLP_WNDPROC, (LONG_PTR)update_subclass_callback); hNotes = GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_RELEASE_NOTES); SendMessage(hNotes, EM_AUTOURLDETECT, 1, 0); SendMessageA(hNotes, EM_SETTEXTEX, (WPARAM)&friggin_microsoft_unicode_amateurs, (LPARAM)update.release_notes); SendMessage(hNotes, EM_SETSEL, -1, -1); SendMessage(hNotes, EM_SETEVENTMASK, 0, ENM_LINK); SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_YOUR_VERSION), lmprintf(MSG_018, rufus_version[0], rufus_version[1], rufus_version[2])); SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_LATEST_VERSION), lmprintf(MSG_019, update.version[0], update.version[1], update.version[2])); SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD_URL), update.download_url); SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_PROGRESS), PBM_SETRANGE, 0, (MAX_PROGRESS<<16) & 0xFFFF0000); if (update.download_url == NULL) EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), FALSE); break; case WM_CTLCOLORSTATIC: if ((HWND)lParam != GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_WEBSITE)) return FALSE; SetBkMode((HDC)wParam, TRANSPARENT); CreateStaticFont((HDC)wParam, &hyperlink_font); SelectObject((HDC)wParam, hyperlink_font); SetTextColor((HDC)wParam, RGB(0,0,125)); // DARK_BLUE return (INT_PTR)CreateSolidBrush(GetSysColor(COLOR_BTNFACE)); case WM_COMMAND: switch (LOWORD(wParam)) { case IDCLOSE: case IDCANCEL: if (download_status != 1) { reset_localization(IDD_NEW_VERSION); safe_free(filepath); EndDialog(hDlg, LOWORD(wParam)); } return (INT_PTR)TRUE; case IDC_WEBSITE: ShellExecuteA(hDlg, "open", RUFUS_URL, NULL, NULL, SW_SHOWNORMAL); break; case IDC_DOWNLOAD: // Also doubles as abort and launch function switch(download_status) { case 1: // Abort FormatStatus = ERROR_SEVERITY_ERROR|FAC(FACILITY_STORAGE)|ERROR_CANCELLED; download_status = 0; break; case 2: // Launch newer version and close this one Sleep(1000); // Add a delay on account of antivirus scanners if (ValidateSignature(hDlg, filepath) != NO_ERROR) break; memset(&si, 0, sizeof(si)); memset(&pi, 0, sizeof(pi)); si.cb = sizeof(si); if (!CreateProcessU(filepath, cmdline, NULL, NULL, FALSE, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi)) { PrintInfo(0, MSG_214); uprintf("Failed to launch new application: %s\n", WindowsErrorString()); } else { PrintInfo(0, MSG_213); PostMessage(hDlg, WM_COMMAND, (WPARAM)IDCLOSE, 0); PostMessage(hMainDialog, WM_CLOSE, 0, 0); } break; default: // Download if (update.download_url == NULL) { uprintf("Could not get download URL\n"); break; } for (i=(int)strlen(update.download_url); (i>0)&&(update.download_url[i]!='/'); i--); dl_ext.filename = &update.download_url[i+1]; filepath = FileDialog(TRUE, app_dir, &dl_ext, OFN_NOCHANGEDIR); if (filepath == NULL) { uprintf("Could not get save path\n"); break; } SendMessage(hDlg, WM_NEXTDLGCTL, (WPARAM)GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), TRUE); DownloadFileThreaded(update.download_url, filepath, hDlg); break; } return (INT_PTR)TRUE; } break; case UM_PROGRESS_INIT: EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDCANCEL), FALSE); SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), lmprintf(MSG_038)); FormatStatus = 0; download_status = 1; return (INT_PTR)TRUE; case UM_PROGRESS_EXIT: EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDCANCEL), TRUE); if (wParam) { SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), lmprintf(MSG_039)); download_status = 2; } else { SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), lmprintf(MSG_040)); download_status = 0; } return (INT_PTR)TRUE; } return (INT_PTR)FALSE; } Commit Message: [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 * This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit, by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to bypass the intended signature verification checks. * It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it, is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP. * It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately, before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability. * Closes #1009 * Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately. CWE ID: CWE-494
INT_PTR CALLBACK NewVersionCallback(HWND hDlg, UINT message, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam) { char cmdline[] = APPLICATION_NAME " -w 150"; static char* filepath = NULL; static int download_status = 0; LONG i; HWND hNotes; STARTUPINFOA si; PROCESS_INFORMATION pi; HFONT hyperlink_font = NULL; EXT_DECL(dl_ext, NULL, __VA_GROUP__("*.exe"), __VA_GROUP__(lmprintf(MSG_037))); switch (message) { case WM_INITDIALOG: apply_localization(IDD_NEW_VERSION, hDlg); download_status = 0; SetTitleBarIcon(hDlg); CenterDialog(hDlg); update_original_proc = (WNDPROC)SetWindowLongPtr(hDlg, GWLP_WNDPROC, (LONG_PTR)update_subclass_callback); hNotes = GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_RELEASE_NOTES); SendMessage(hNotes, EM_AUTOURLDETECT, 1, 0); SendMessageA(hNotes, EM_SETTEXTEX, (WPARAM)&friggin_microsoft_unicode_amateurs, (LPARAM)update.release_notes); SendMessage(hNotes, EM_SETSEL, -1, -1); SendMessage(hNotes, EM_SETEVENTMASK, 0, ENM_LINK); SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_YOUR_VERSION), lmprintf(MSG_018, rufus_version[0], rufus_version[1], rufus_version[2])); SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_LATEST_VERSION), lmprintf(MSG_019, update.version[0], update.version[1], update.version[2])); SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD_URL), update.download_url); SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_PROGRESS), PBM_SETRANGE, 0, (MAX_PROGRESS<<16) & 0xFFFF0000); if (update.download_url == NULL) EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), FALSE); break; case WM_CTLCOLORSTATIC: if ((HWND)lParam != GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_WEBSITE)) return FALSE; SetBkMode((HDC)wParam, TRANSPARENT); CreateStaticFont((HDC)wParam, &hyperlink_font); SelectObject((HDC)wParam, hyperlink_font); SetTextColor((HDC)wParam, RGB(0,0,125)); // DARK_BLUE return (INT_PTR)CreateSolidBrush(GetSysColor(COLOR_BTNFACE)); case WM_COMMAND: switch (LOWORD(wParam)) { case IDCLOSE: case IDCANCEL: if (download_status != 1) { reset_localization(IDD_NEW_VERSION); safe_free(filepath); EndDialog(hDlg, LOWORD(wParam)); } return (INT_PTR)TRUE; case IDC_WEBSITE: ShellExecuteA(hDlg, "open", RUFUS_URL, NULL, NULL, SW_SHOWNORMAL); break; case IDC_DOWNLOAD: // Also doubles as abort and launch function switch(download_status) { case 1: // Abort FormatStatus = ERROR_SEVERITY_ERROR|FAC(FACILITY_STORAGE)|ERROR_CANCELLED; download_status = 0; break; case 2: // Launch newer version and close this one Sleep(1000); // Add a delay on account of antivirus scanners if (ValidateSignature(hDlg, filepath) != NO_ERROR) { // Unconditionally delete the download and disable the "Launch" control _unlinkU(filepath); EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), FALSE); break; } memset(&si, 0, sizeof(si)); memset(&pi, 0, sizeof(pi)); si.cb = sizeof(si); if (!CreateProcessU(filepath, cmdline, NULL, NULL, FALSE, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi)) { PrintInfo(0, MSG_214); uprintf("Failed to launch new application: %s\n", WindowsErrorString()); } else { PrintInfo(0, MSG_213); PostMessage(hDlg, WM_COMMAND, (WPARAM)IDCLOSE, 0); PostMessage(hMainDialog, WM_CLOSE, 0, 0); } break; default: // Download if (update.download_url == NULL) { uprintf("Could not get download URL\n"); break; } for (i=(int)strlen(update.download_url); (i>0)&&(update.download_url[i]!='/'); i--); dl_ext.filename = &update.download_url[i+1]; filepath = FileDialog(TRUE, app_dir, &dl_ext, OFN_NOCHANGEDIR); if (filepath == NULL) { uprintf("Could not get save path\n"); break; } SendMessage(hDlg, WM_NEXTDLGCTL, (WPARAM)GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), TRUE); DownloadFileThreaded(update.download_url, filepath, hDlg); break; } return (INT_PTR)TRUE; } break; case UM_PROGRESS_INIT: EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDCANCEL), FALSE); SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), lmprintf(MSG_038)); FormatStatus = 0; download_status = 1; return (INT_PTR)TRUE; case UM_PROGRESS_EXIT: EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDCANCEL), TRUE); if (wParam) { SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), lmprintf(MSG_039)); download_status = 2; } else { SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), lmprintf(MSG_040)); download_status = 0; } return (INT_PTR)TRUE; } return (INT_PTR)FALSE; }
167,817
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static int misaligned_fpu_store(struct pt_regs *regs, __u32 opcode, int displacement_not_indexed, int width_shift, int do_paired_load) { /* Return -1 for a fault, 0 for OK */ int error; int srcreg; __u64 address; error = generate_and_check_address(regs, opcode, displacement_not_indexed, width_shift, &address); if (error < 0) { return error; } perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address); srcreg = (opcode >> 4) & 0x3f; if (user_mode(regs)) { __u64 buffer; /* Initialise these to NaNs. */ __u32 buflo=0xffffffffUL, bufhi=0xffffffffUL; if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, (unsigned long) address, 1UL<<width_shift)) { return -1; } /* 'current' may be the current owner of the FPU state, so context switch the registers into memory so they can be indexed by register number. */ if (last_task_used_math == current) { enable_fpu(); save_fpu(current); disable_fpu(); last_task_used_math = NULL; regs->sr |= SR_FD; } switch (width_shift) { case 2: buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg]; break; case 3: if (do_paired_load) { buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg]; bufhi = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg+1]; } else { #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN) bufhi = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg]; buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg+1]; #else buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg]; bufhi = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg+1]; #endif } break; default: printk("Unexpected width_shift %d in misaligned_fpu_store, PC=%08lx\n", width_shift, (unsigned long) regs->pc); break; } *(__u32*) &buffer = buflo; *(1 + (__u32*) &buffer) = bufhi; if (__copy_user((void *)(int)address, &buffer, (1 << width_shift)) > 0) { return -1; /* fault */ } return 0; } else { die ("Misaligned FPU load inside kernel", regs, 0); return -1; } } Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the resulting interrupt do the wakeup. For the various event classes: - hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from the PMI-tail (ARM etc.) - tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context. - software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot perform wakeups, and hence need 0. As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented). The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a bunch of conditionals in fast paths. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com> Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> CWE ID: CWE-399
static int misaligned_fpu_store(struct pt_regs *regs, __u32 opcode, int displacement_not_indexed, int width_shift, int do_paired_load) { /* Return -1 for a fault, 0 for OK */ int error; int srcreg; __u64 address; error = generate_and_check_address(regs, opcode, displacement_not_indexed, width_shift, &address); if (error < 0) { return error; } perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, regs, address); srcreg = (opcode >> 4) & 0x3f; if (user_mode(regs)) { __u64 buffer; /* Initialise these to NaNs. */ __u32 buflo=0xffffffffUL, bufhi=0xffffffffUL; if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, (unsigned long) address, 1UL<<width_shift)) { return -1; } /* 'current' may be the current owner of the FPU state, so context switch the registers into memory so they can be indexed by register number. */ if (last_task_used_math == current) { enable_fpu(); save_fpu(current); disable_fpu(); last_task_used_math = NULL; regs->sr |= SR_FD; } switch (width_shift) { case 2: buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg]; break; case 3: if (do_paired_load) { buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg]; bufhi = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg+1]; } else { #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN) bufhi = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg]; buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg+1]; #else buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg]; bufhi = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg+1]; #endif } break; default: printk("Unexpected width_shift %d in misaligned_fpu_store, PC=%08lx\n", width_shift, (unsigned long) regs->pc); break; } *(__u32*) &buffer = buflo; *(1 + (__u32*) &buffer) = bufhi; if (__copy_user((void *)(int)address, &buffer, (1 << width_shift)) > 0) { return -1; /* fault */ } return 0; } else { die ("Misaligned FPU load inside kernel", regs, 0); return -1; } }
165,798
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: entry_guard_obeys_restriction(const entry_guard_t *guard, const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst) { tor_assert(guard); if (! rst) return 1; // No restriction? No problem. return tor_memneq(guard->identity, rst->exclude_id, DIGEST_LEN); } Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions. When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during code review. This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t for it. Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006 and CVE-2017-0377. CWE ID: CWE-200
entry_guard_obeys_restriction(const entry_guard_t *guard, const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst) { tor_assert(guard); if (! rst) return 1; // No restriction? No problem. // Only one kind of restriction exists right now: excluding an exit // ID and all of its family. const node_t *node = node_get_by_id((const char*)rst->exclude_id); if (node && guard_in_node_family(guard, node)) return 0; return tor_memneq(guard->identity, rst->exclude_id, DIGEST_LEN); }
168,450
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static int pptp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr, int sockaddr_len) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sockaddr_pppox *sp = (struct sockaddr_pppox *) uservaddr; struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk); struct pptp_opt *opt = &po->proto.pptp; int error = 0; lock_sock(sk); opt->src_addr = sp->sa_addr.pptp; if (add_chan(po)) error = -EBUSY; release_sock(sk); return error; } Commit Message: pptp: verify sockaddr_len in pptp_bind() and pptp_connect() Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CWE ID: CWE-200
static int pptp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr, int sockaddr_len) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sockaddr_pppox *sp = (struct sockaddr_pppox *) uservaddr; struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk); struct pptp_opt *opt = &po->proto.pptp; int error = 0; if (sockaddr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_pppox)) return -EINVAL; lock_sock(sk); opt->src_addr = sp->sa_addr.pptp; if (add_chan(po)) error = -EBUSY; release_sock(sk); return error; }
166,560
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static void InsertRow(unsigned char *p,ssize_t y,Image *image, int bpp) { ExceptionInfo *exception; int bit; ssize_t x; register PixelPacket *q; IndexPacket index; register IndexPacket *indexes; exception=(&image->exception); switch (bpp) { case 1: /* Convert bitmap scanline. */ { q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception); if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL) break; indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image); for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8) { for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++) { index=((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); q++; } p++; } if ((image->columns % 8) != 0) { for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (image->columns % 8); bit++) { index=((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); q++; } p++; } if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception)) break; break; } case 2: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */ { q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception); if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL) break; indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image); for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2) { index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 6) & 0x3); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); q++; index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x3); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); q++; index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 2) & 0x3); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); q++; index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p) & 0x3); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); p++; q++; } if ((image->columns % 4) != 0) { index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 6) & 0x3); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); q++; if ((image->columns % 4) >= 1) { index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x3); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); q++; if ((image->columns % 4) >= 2) { index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 2) & 0x3); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); q++; } } p++; } if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse) break; break; } case 4: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */ { q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception); if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL) break; indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image); for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2) { index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); q++; index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p) & 0x0f); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); p++; q++; } if ((image->columns % 2) != 0) { index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); p++; q++; } if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse) break; break; } case 8: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */ { q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception); if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL) break; indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image); for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++) { index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); p++; q++; } if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse) break; } break; case 24: /* Convert DirectColor scanline. */ q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception); if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL) break; for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++) { SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++)); SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++)); SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++)); q++; } if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception)) break; break; } } Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/102 CWE ID: CWE-787
static void InsertRow(unsigned char *p,ssize_t y,Image *image, int bpp) { ExceptionInfo *exception; int bit; ssize_t x; register PixelPacket *q; IndexPacket index; register IndexPacket *indexes; exception=(&image->exception); switch (bpp) { case 1: /* Convert bitmap scanline. */ { q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception); if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL) break; indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image); for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8) { for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++) { index=((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); q++; } p++; } if ((image->columns % 8) != 0) { for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (image->columns % 8); bit++) { index=((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); q++; } p++; } if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception)) break; break; } case 2: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */ { q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception); if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL) break; indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image); for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=4) { index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 6) & 0x3); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); q++; index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x3); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); q++; index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 2) & 0x3); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); q++; index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p) & 0x3); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); p++; q++; } if ((image->columns % 4) != 0) { index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 6) & 0x3); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); q++; if ((image->columns % 4) >= 1) { index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x3); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); q++; if ((image->columns % 4) >= 2) { index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 2) & 0x3); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); q++; } } p++; } if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse) break; break; } case 4: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */ { q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception); if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL) break; indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image); for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2) { index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); q++; index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p) & 0x0f); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); p++; q++; } if ((image->columns % 2) != 0) { index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); p++; q++; } if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse) break; break; } case 8: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */ { q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception); if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL) break; indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image); for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++) { index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p); SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index); SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index); p++; q++; } if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse) break; } break; case 24: /* Convert DirectColor scanline. */ q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception); if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL) break; for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++) { SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++)); SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++)); SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++)); q++; } if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception)) break; break; } }
168,803
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: lspci_process(STREAM s) { unsigned int pkglen; static char *rest = NULL; char *buf; pkglen = s->end - s->p; /* str_handle_lines requires null terminated strings */ buf = xmalloc(pkglen + 1); STRNCPY(buf, (char *) s->p, pkglen + 1); str_handle_lines(buf, &rest, lspci_process_line, NULL); xfree(buf); } Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used. All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin. * Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes * Refactor of process_bitmap_updates * Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch * Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794 * Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795 * Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797 * Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175 * Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175 * Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176 * Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176 * Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791 * Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792 * Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793 * Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796 * Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798 * Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799 * Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800 * Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174 * Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177 * Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178 * Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179 * Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180 * Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181 * Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182 CWE ID: CWE-119
lspci_process(STREAM s) { unsigned int pkglen; static char *rest = NULL; char *buf; struct stream packet = *s; if (!s_check(s)) { rdp_protocol_error("lspci_process(), stream is in unstable state", &packet); } pkglen = s->end - s->p; /* str_handle_lines requires null terminated strings */ buf = xmalloc(pkglen + 1); STRNCPY(buf, (char *) s->p, pkglen + 1); str_handle_lines(buf, &rest, lspci_process_line, NULL); xfree(buf); }
169,798
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(ptrace, long, request, long, pid, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, data) { struct task_struct *child; long ret; if (request == PTRACE_TRACEME) { ret = ptrace_traceme(); if (!ret) arch_ptrace_attach(current); goto out; } child = ptrace_get_task_struct(pid); if (IS_ERR(child)) { ret = PTR_ERR(child); goto out; } if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH || request == PTRACE_SEIZE) { ret = ptrace_attach(child, request, addr, data); /* * Some architectures need to do book-keeping after * a ptrace attach. */ if (!ret) arch_ptrace_attach(child); goto out_put_task_struct; } ret = ptrace_check_attach(child, request == PTRACE_KILL || request == PTRACE_INTERRUPT); if (ret < 0) goto out_put_task_struct; ret = arch_ptrace(child, request, addr, data); out_put_task_struct: put_task_struct(child); out: return ret; } Commit Message: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee does SAVE_REST again. set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the logic. As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace() call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths. Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before access_process_vm(). While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state(). Reported-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com> Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> CWE ID: CWE-362
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(ptrace, long, request, long, pid, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, data) { struct task_struct *child; long ret; if (request == PTRACE_TRACEME) { ret = ptrace_traceme(); if (!ret) arch_ptrace_attach(current); goto out; } child = ptrace_get_task_struct(pid); if (IS_ERR(child)) { ret = PTR_ERR(child); goto out; } if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH || request == PTRACE_SEIZE) { ret = ptrace_attach(child, request, addr, data); /* * Some architectures need to do book-keeping after * a ptrace attach. */ if (!ret) arch_ptrace_attach(child); goto out_put_task_struct; } ret = ptrace_check_attach(child, request == PTRACE_KILL || request == PTRACE_INTERRUPT); if (ret < 0) goto out_put_task_struct; ret = arch_ptrace(child, request, addr, data); if (ret || request != PTRACE_DETACH) ptrace_unfreeze_traced(child); out_put_task_struct: put_task_struct(child); out: return ret; }
166,136
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static ssize_t read_mem(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { phys_addr_t p = *ppos; ssize_t read, sz; void *ptr; if (p != *ppos) return 0; if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count)) return -EFAULT; read = 0; #ifdef __ARCH_HAS_NO_PAGE_ZERO_MAPPED /* we don't have page 0 mapped on sparc and m68k.. */ if (p < PAGE_SIZE) { sz = size_inside_page(p, count); if (sz > 0) { if (clear_user(buf, sz)) return -EFAULT; buf += sz; p += sz; count -= sz; read += sz; } } #endif while (count > 0) { unsigned long remaining; sz = size_inside_page(p, count); if (!range_is_allowed(p >> PAGE_SHIFT, count)) return -EPERM; /* * On ia64 if a page has been mapped somewhere as uncached, then * it must also be accessed uncached by the kernel or data * corruption may occur. */ ptr = xlate_dev_mem_ptr(p); if (!ptr) return -EFAULT; remaining = copy_to_user(buf, ptr, sz); unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(p, ptr); if (remaining) return -EFAULT; buf += sz; p += sz; count -= sz; read += sz; } *ppos += read; return read; } Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy: usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes) This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel. Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com> Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> CWE ID: CWE-732
static ssize_t read_mem(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { phys_addr_t p = *ppos; ssize_t read, sz; void *ptr; if (p != *ppos) return 0; if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count)) return -EFAULT; read = 0; #ifdef __ARCH_HAS_NO_PAGE_ZERO_MAPPED /* we don't have page 0 mapped on sparc and m68k.. */ if (p < PAGE_SIZE) { sz = size_inside_page(p, count); if (sz > 0) { if (clear_user(buf, sz)) return -EFAULT; buf += sz; p += sz; count -= sz; read += sz; } } #endif while (count > 0) { unsigned long remaining; int allowed; sz = size_inside_page(p, count); allowed = page_is_allowed(p >> PAGE_SHIFT); if (!allowed) return -EPERM; if (allowed == 2) { /* Show zeros for restricted memory. */ remaining = clear_user(buf, sz); } else { /* * On ia64 if a page has been mapped somewhere as * uncached, then it must also be accessed uncached * by the kernel or data corruption may occur. */ ptr = xlate_dev_mem_ptr(p); if (!ptr) return -EFAULT; remaining = copy_to_user(buf, ptr, sz); unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(p, ptr); } if (remaining) return -EFAULT; buf += sz; p += sz; count -= sz; read += sz; } *ppos += read; return read; }
168,242
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static double pcerr(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth) { /* Percentage error permitted in the linear values. Note that the specified * value is a percentage but this routine returns a simple number. */ if (pm->assume_16_bit_calculations || (pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16) return pm->maxpc16 * .01; else return pm->maxpc8 * .01; } Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20 BUG:23265085 Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833 (cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82) CWE ID:
static double pcerr(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth) static double pcerr(const png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth) { /* Percentage error permitted in the linear values. Note that the specified * value is a percentage but this routine returns a simple number. */ if (pm->assume_16_bit_calculations || (pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16) return pm->maxpc16 * .01; else return pm->maxpc8 * .01; }
173,677
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: void read_sequence_header(decoder_info_t *decoder_info, stream_t *stream) { decoder_info->width = get_flc(16, stream); decoder_info->height = get_flc(16, stream); decoder_info->log2_sb_size = get_flc(3, stream); decoder_info->pb_split = get_flc(1, stream); decoder_info->tb_split_enable = get_flc(1, stream); decoder_info->max_num_ref = get_flc(2, stream) + 1; decoder_info->interp_ref = get_flc(2, stream); decoder_info->max_delta_qp = get_flc(1, stream); decoder_info->deblocking = get_flc(1, stream); decoder_info->clpf = get_flc(1, stream); decoder_info->use_block_contexts = get_flc(1, stream); decoder_info->bipred = get_flc(2, stream); decoder_info->qmtx = get_flc(1, stream); if (decoder_info->qmtx) { decoder_info->qmtx_offset = get_flc(6, stream) - 32; } decoder_info->subsample = get_flc(2, stream); decoder_info->subsample = // 0: 400 1: 420 2: 422 3: 444 (decoder_info->subsample & 1) * 20 + (decoder_info->subsample & 2) * 22 + ((decoder_info->subsample & 3) == 3) * 2 + 400; decoder_info->num_reorder_pics = get_flc(4, stream); if (decoder_info->subsample != 400) { decoder_info->cfl_intra = get_flc(1, stream); decoder_info->cfl_inter = get_flc(1, stream); } decoder_info->bitdepth = get_flc(1, stream) ? 10 : 8; if (decoder_info->bitdepth == 10) decoder_info->bitdepth += 2 * get_flc(1, stream); decoder_info->input_bitdepth = get_flc(1, stream) ? 10 : 8; if (decoder_info->input_bitdepth == 10) decoder_info->input_bitdepth += 2 * get_flc(1, stream); } Commit Message: Fix possible stack overflows in decoder for illegal bit streams Fixes CVE-2018-0429 A vulnerability in the Thor decoder (available at: https://github.com/cisco/thor) could allow an authenticated, local attacker to cause segmentation faults and stack overflows when using a non-conformant Thor bitstream as input. The vulnerability is due to lack of input validation when parsing the bitstream. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a stack overflow and potentially inject and execute arbitrary code. CWE ID: CWE-119
void read_sequence_header(decoder_info_t *decoder_info, stream_t *stream) { decoder_info->width = get_flc(16, stream); decoder_info->height = get_flc(16, stream); decoder_info->log2_sb_size = get_flc(3, stream); decoder_info->log2_sb_size = clip(decoder_info->log2_sb_size, log2i(MIN_BLOCK_SIZE), log2i(MAX_SB_SIZE)); decoder_info->pb_split = get_flc(1, stream); decoder_info->tb_split_enable = get_flc(1, stream); decoder_info->max_num_ref = get_flc(2, stream) + 1; decoder_info->interp_ref = get_flc(2, stream); decoder_info->max_delta_qp = get_flc(1, stream); decoder_info->deblocking = get_flc(1, stream); decoder_info->clpf = get_flc(1, stream); decoder_info->use_block_contexts = get_flc(1, stream); decoder_info->bipred = get_flc(2, stream); decoder_info->qmtx = get_flc(1, stream); if (decoder_info->qmtx) { decoder_info->qmtx_offset = get_flc(6, stream) - 32; } decoder_info->subsample = get_flc(2, stream); decoder_info->subsample = // 0: 400 1: 420 2: 422 3: 444 (decoder_info->subsample & 1) * 20 + (decoder_info->subsample & 2) * 22 + ((decoder_info->subsample & 3) == 3) * 2 + 400; decoder_info->num_reorder_pics = get_flc(4, stream); if (decoder_info->subsample != 400) { decoder_info->cfl_intra = get_flc(1, stream); decoder_info->cfl_inter = get_flc(1, stream); } decoder_info->bitdepth = get_flc(1, stream) ? 10 : 8; if (decoder_info->bitdepth == 10) decoder_info->bitdepth += 2 * get_flc(1, stream); decoder_info->input_bitdepth = get_flc(1, stream) ? 10 : 8; if (decoder_info->input_bitdepth == 10) decoder_info->input_bitdepth += 2 * get_flc(1, stream); }
169,367
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: int bt_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags) { int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT; struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sk_buff *skb; size_t copied; int err; BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p len %zu", sock, sk, len); if (flags & (MSG_OOB)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err); if (!skb) { if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) return 0; return err; } msg->msg_namelen = 0; copied = skb->len; if (len < copied) { msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; copied = len; } skb_reset_transport_header(skb); err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied); if (err == 0) sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb); skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); return err ? : copied; } Commit Message: Bluetooth: fix possible info leak in bt_sock_recvmsg() In case the socket is already shutting down, bt_sock_recvmsg() returns with 0 without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix this by moving the msg_namelen assignment in front of the shutdown test. Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org> Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CWE ID: CWE-200
int bt_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags) { int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT; struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sk_buff *skb; size_t copied; int err; BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p len %zu", sock, sk, len); if (flags & (MSG_OOB)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; msg->msg_namelen = 0; skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err); if (!skb) { if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) return 0; return err; } copied = skb->len; if (len < copied) { msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; copied = len; } skb_reset_transport_header(skb); err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied); if (err == 0) sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb); skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); return err ? : copied; }
166,043
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: void GpuDataManager::UpdateGpuInfo(const GPUInfo& gpu_info) { { base::AutoLock auto_lock(gpu_info_lock_); if (!gpu_info_.Merge(gpu_info)) return; RunGpuInfoUpdateCallbacks(); content::GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(gpu_info_); } UpdateGpuFeatureFlags(); } Commit Message: Fix a lock re-entry bug in GpuDataManager::UpdateGpuInfo. The issue is that the registered callbacks could request GPUInfo, so they could re-enter the lock. Therefore, we should release the lock before we run through callbacks. BUG=84805 TEST=the issue in 84805 is gone. Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7054063 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87898 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-399
void GpuDataManager::UpdateGpuInfo(const GPUInfo& gpu_info) { { base::AutoLock auto_lock(gpu_info_lock_); if (!gpu_info_.Merge(gpu_info)) return; } RunGpuInfoUpdateCallbacks(); { base::AutoLock auto_lock(gpu_info_lock_); content::GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(gpu_info_); } UpdateGpuFeatureFlags(); }
170,410
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: bool InputWindowInfo::isTrustedOverlay() const { return layoutParamsType == TYPE_INPUT_METHOD || layoutParamsType == TYPE_INPUT_METHOD_DIALOG || layoutParamsType == TYPE_MAGNIFICATION_OVERLAY || layoutParamsType == TYPE_SECURE_SYSTEM_OVERLAY; } Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows. Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to only be set when the point at which the window was touched is obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs, introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is being even partially overlapped. We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications. Bug: 26677796 Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47 CWE ID: CWE-264
bool InputWindowInfo::isTrustedOverlay() const { return layoutParamsType == TYPE_INPUT_METHOD || layoutParamsType == TYPE_INPUT_METHOD_DIALOG || layoutParamsType == TYPE_MAGNIFICATION_OVERLAY || layoutParamsType == TYPE_STATUS_BAR || layoutParamsType == TYPE_NAVIGATION_BAR || layoutParamsType == TYPE_SECURE_SYSTEM_OVERLAY; }
174,170
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: bool ResourceTracker::UnrefResource(PP_Resource res) { DLOG_IF(ERROR, !CheckIdType(res, PP_ID_TYPE_RESOURCE)) << res << " is not a PP_Resource."; ResourceMap::iterator i = live_resources_.find(res); if (i != live_resources_.end()) { if (!--i->second.second) { Resource* to_release = i->second.first; PP_Instance instance = to_release->instance()->pp_instance(); to_release->LastPluginRefWasDeleted(false); instance_map_[instance]->resources.erase(res); live_resources_.erase(i); } return true; } else { return false; } } Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed, BUG=85808 Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-399
bool ResourceTracker::UnrefResource(PP_Resource res) { DLOG_IF(ERROR, !CheckIdType(res, PP_ID_TYPE_RESOURCE)) << res << " is not a PP_Resource."; ResourceMap::iterator i = live_resources_.find(res); if (i != live_resources_.end()) { if (!--i->second.second) { Resource* to_release = i->second.first; PP_Instance instance = to_release->instance()->pp_instance(); to_release->LastPluginRefWasDeleted(); instance_map_[instance]->ref_resources.erase(res); live_resources_.erase(i); } return true; } else { return false; } }
170,419
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: test_size(png_modifier* PNG_CONST pm, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type, int bdlo, int PNG_CONST bdhi) { /* Run the tests on each combination. * * NOTE: on my 32 bit x86 each of the following blocks takes * a total of 3.5 seconds if done across every combo of bit depth * width and height. This is a waste of time in practice, hence the * hinc and winc stuff: */ static PNG_CONST png_byte hinc[] = {1, 3, 11, 1, 5}; static PNG_CONST png_byte winc[] = {1, 9, 5, 7, 1}; for (; bdlo <= bdhi; ++bdlo) { png_uint_32 h, w; for (h=1; h<=16; h+=hinc[bdlo]) for (w=1; w<=16; w+=winc[bdlo]) { /* First test all the 'size' images against the sequential * reader using libpng to deinterlace (where required.) This * validates the write side of libpng. There are four possibilities * to validate. */ standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/, PNG_INTERLACE_NONE, w, h, 0), 0/*do_interlace*/, pm->use_update_info); if (fail(pm)) return 0; standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/, PNG_INTERLACE_NONE, w, h, 1), 0/*do_interlace*/, pm->use_update_info); if (fail(pm)) return 0; # ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/, PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7, w, h, 0), 0/*do_interlace*/, pm->use_update_info); if (fail(pm)) return 0; standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/, PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7, w, h, 1), 0/*do_interlace*/, pm->use_update_info); if (fail(pm)) return 0; # endif /* Now validate the interlaced read side - do_interlace true, * in the progressive case this does actually make a difference * to the code used in the non-interlaced case too. */ standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/, PNG_INTERLACE_NONE, w, h, 0), 1/*do_interlace*/, pm->use_update_info); if (fail(pm)) return 0; # ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/, PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7, w, h, 0), 1/*do_interlace*/, pm->use_update_info); if (fail(pm)) return 0; # endif } } return 1; /* keep going */ } Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20 BUG:23265085 Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833 (cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82) CWE ID:
test_size(png_modifier* PNG_CONST pm, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type, test_size(png_modifier* const pm, png_byte const colour_type, int bdlo, int const bdhi) { /* Run the tests on each combination. * * NOTE: on my 32 bit x86 each of the following blocks takes * a total of 3.5 seconds if done across every combo of bit depth * width and height. This is a waste of time in practice, hence the * hinc and winc stuff: */ static const png_byte hinc[] = {1, 3, 11, 1, 5}; static const png_byte winc[] = {1, 9, 5, 7, 1}; const int save_bdlo = bdlo; for (; bdlo <= bdhi; ++bdlo) { png_uint_32 h, w; for (h=1; h<=16; h+=hinc[bdlo]) for (w=1; w<=16; w+=winc[bdlo]) { /* First test all the 'size' images against the sequential * reader using libpng to deinterlace (where required.) This * validates the write side of libpng. There are four possibilities * to validate. */ standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/, PNG_INTERLACE_NONE, w, h, 0), 0/*do_interlace*/, pm->use_update_info); if (fail(pm)) return 0; standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/, PNG_INTERLACE_NONE, w, h, 1), 0/*do_interlace*/, pm->use_update_info); if (fail(pm)) return 0; /* Now validate the interlaced read side - do_interlace true, * in the progressive case this does actually make a difference * to the code used in the non-interlaced case too. */ standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/, PNG_INTERLACE_NONE, w, h, 0), 1/*do_interlace*/, pm->use_update_info); if (fail(pm)) return 0; # if CAN_WRITE_INTERLACE /* Validate the pngvalid code itself: */ standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/, PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7, w, h, 1), 1/*do_interlace*/, pm->use_update_info); if (fail(pm)) return 0; # endif } } /* Now do the tests of libpng interlace handling, after we have made sure * that the pngvalid version works: */ for (bdlo = save_bdlo; bdlo <= bdhi; ++bdlo) { png_uint_32 h, w; for (h=1; h<=16; h+=hinc[bdlo]) for (w=1; w<=16; w+=winc[bdlo]) { # ifdef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED /* Test with pngvalid generated interlaced images first; we have * already verify these are ok (unless pngvalid has self-consistent * read/write errors, which is unlikely), so this detects errors in the * read side first: */ # if CAN_WRITE_INTERLACE standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/, PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7, w, h, 1), 0/*do_interlace*/, pm->use_update_info); if (fail(pm)) return 0; # endif # endif /* READ_INTERLACING */ # ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED /* Test the libpng write side against the pngvalid read side: */ standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/, PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7, w, h, 0), 1/*do_interlace*/, pm->use_update_info); if (fail(pm)) return 0; # endif # ifdef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED # ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED /* Test both together: */ standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/, PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7, w, h, 0), 0/*do_interlace*/, pm->use_update_info); if (fail(pm)) return 0; # endif # endif /* READ_INTERLACING */ } } return 1; /* keep going */ }
173,709
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: void close_connection(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn) { conn->state = H2O_HTTP2_CONN_STATE_IS_CLOSING; if (conn->_write.buf_in_flight != NULL || h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)) { /* there is a pending write, let on_write_complete actually close the connection */ } else { close_connection_now(conn); } } Commit Message: h2: use after free on premature connection close #920 lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free `conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`. We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore. Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham. CWE ID:
void close_connection(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn) int close_connection(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn) { conn->state = H2O_HTTP2_CONN_STATE_IS_CLOSING; if (conn->_write.buf_in_flight != NULL || h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)) { /* there is a pending write, let on_write_complete actually close the connection */ } else { close_connection_now(conn); return -1; } return 0; }
167,225
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sctp_chunk *asconf) { sctp_addiphdr_t *hdr; union sctp_addr_param *addr_param; sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_param; struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack; __be16 err_code; int length = 0; int chunk_len; __u32 serial; int all_param_pass = 1; chunk_len = ntohs(asconf->chunk_hdr->length) - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t); hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)asconf->skb->data; serial = ntohl(hdr->serial); /* Skip the addiphdr and store a pointer to address parameter. */ length = sizeof(sctp_addiphdr_t); addr_param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf->skb->data + length); chunk_len -= length; /* Skip the address parameter and store a pointer to the first * asconf parameter. */ length = ntohs(addr_param->p.length); asconf_param = (void *)addr_param + length; chunk_len -= length; /* create an ASCONF_ACK chunk. * Based on the definitions of parameters, we know that the size of * ASCONF_ACK parameters are less than or equal to the fourfold of ASCONF * parameters. */ asconf_ack = sctp_make_asconf_ack(asoc, serial, chunk_len * 4); if (!asconf_ack) goto done; /* Process the TLVs contained within the ASCONF chunk. */ while (chunk_len > 0) { err_code = sctp_process_asconf_param(asoc, asconf, asconf_param); /* ADDIP 4.1 A7) * If an error response is received for a TLV parameter, * all TLVs with no response before the failed TLV are * considered successful if not reported. All TLVs after * the failed response are considered unsuccessful unless * a specific success indication is present for the parameter. */ if (SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR != err_code) all_param_pass = 0; if (!all_param_pass) sctp_add_asconf_response(asconf_ack, asconf_param->crr_id, err_code, asconf_param); /* ADDIP 4.3 D11) When an endpoint receiving an ASCONF to add * an IP address sends an 'Out of Resource' in its response, it * MUST also fail any subsequent add or delete requests bundled * in the ASCONF. */ if (SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW == err_code) goto done; /* Move to the next ASCONF param. */ length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; chunk_len -= length; } done: asoc->peer.addip_serial++; /* If we are sending a new ASCONF_ACK hold a reference to it in assoc * after freeing the reference to old asconf ack if any. */ if (asconf_ack) { sctp_chunk_hold(asconf_ack); list_add_tail(&asconf_ack->transmitted_list, &asoc->asconf_ack_list); } return asconf_ack; } Commit Message: net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CWE ID: CWE-399
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sctp_chunk *asconf) { sctp_addip_chunk_t *addip = (sctp_addip_chunk_t *) asconf->chunk_hdr; bool all_param_pass = true; union sctp_params param; sctp_addiphdr_t *hdr; union sctp_addr_param *addr_param; sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_param; struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack; __be16 err_code; int length = 0; int chunk_len; __u32 serial; chunk_len = ntohs(asconf->chunk_hdr->length) - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t); hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)asconf->skb->data; serial = ntohl(hdr->serial); /* Skip the addiphdr and store a pointer to address parameter. */ length = sizeof(sctp_addiphdr_t); addr_param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf->skb->data + length); chunk_len -= length; /* Skip the address parameter and store a pointer to the first * asconf parameter. */ length = ntohs(addr_param->p.length); asconf_param = (void *)addr_param + length; chunk_len -= length; /* create an ASCONF_ACK chunk. * Based on the definitions of parameters, we know that the size of * ASCONF_ACK parameters are less than or equal to the fourfold of ASCONF * parameters. */ asconf_ack = sctp_make_asconf_ack(asoc, serial, chunk_len * 4); if (!asconf_ack) goto done; /* Process the TLVs contained within the ASCONF chunk. */ sctp_walk_params(param, addip, addip_hdr.params) { /* Skip preceeding address parameters. */ if (param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS || param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS) continue; err_code = sctp_process_asconf_param(asoc, asconf, param.addip); /* ADDIP 4.1 A7) * If an error response is received for a TLV parameter, * all TLVs with no response before the failed TLV are * considered successful if not reported. All TLVs after * the failed response are considered unsuccessful unless * a specific success indication is present for the parameter. */ if (err_code != SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR) all_param_pass = false; if (!all_param_pass) sctp_add_asconf_response(asconf_ack, param.addip->crr_id, err_code, param.addip); /* ADDIP 4.3 D11) When an endpoint receiving an ASCONF to add * an IP address sends an 'Out of Resource' in its response, it * MUST also fail any subsequent add or delete requests bundled * in the ASCONF. */ if (err_code == SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW) goto done; } done: asoc->peer.addip_serial++; /* If we are sending a new ASCONF_ACK hold a reference to it in assoc * after freeing the reference to old asconf ack if any. */ if (asconf_ack) { sctp_chunk_hold(asconf_ack); list_add_tail(&asconf_ack->transmitted_list, &asoc->asconf_ack_list); } return asconf_ack; }
166,333
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: hstoreArrayToPairs(ArrayType *a, int *npairs) { Datum *key_datums; bool *key_nulls; int key_count; Pairs *key_pairs; int bufsiz; int i, j; deconstruct_array(a, TEXTOID, -1, false, 'i', &key_datums, &key_nulls, &key_count); if (key_count == 0) { *npairs = 0; return NULL; } key_pairs = palloc(sizeof(Pairs) * key_count); for (i = 0, j = 0; i < key_count; i++) { if (!key_nulls[i]) { key_pairs[j].key = VARDATA(key_datums[i]); key_pairs[j].keylen = VARSIZE(key_datums[i]) - VARHDRSZ; key_pairs[j].val = NULL; key_pairs[j].vallen = 0; key_pairs[j].needfree = 0; key_pairs[j].isnull = 1; j++; } } *npairs = hstoreUniquePairs(key_pairs, j, &bufsiz); return key_pairs; } Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns. Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter. Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow in related functions. Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0. Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane. Security: CVE-2014-0064 CWE ID: CWE-189
hstoreArrayToPairs(ArrayType *a, int *npairs) { Datum *key_datums; bool *key_nulls; int key_count; Pairs *key_pairs; int bufsiz; int i, j; deconstruct_array(a, TEXTOID, -1, false, 'i', &key_datums, &key_nulls, &key_count); if (key_count == 0) { *npairs = 0; return NULL; } /* * A text array uses at least eight bytes per element, so any overflow in * "key_count * sizeof(Pairs)" is small enough for palloc() to catch. * However, credible improvements to the array format could invalidate * that assumption. Therefore, use an explicit check rather than relying * on palloc() to complain. */ if (key_count > MaxAllocSize / sizeof(Pairs)) ereport(ERROR, (errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED), errmsg("number of pairs (%d) exceeds the maximum allowed (%d)", key_count, (int) (MaxAllocSize / sizeof(Pairs))))); key_pairs = palloc(sizeof(Pairs) * key_count); for (i = 0, j = 0; i < key_count; i++) { if (!key_nulls[i]) { key_pairs[j].key = VARDATA(key_datums[i]); key_pairs[j].keylen = VARSIZE(key_datums[i]) - VARHDRSZ; key_pairs[j].val = NULL; key_pairs[j].vallen = 0; key_pairs[j].needfree = 0; key_pairs[j].isnull = 1; j++; } } *npairs = hstoreUniquePairs(key_pairs, j, &bufsiz); return key_pairs; }
166,400
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: BOOLEAN UIPC_Send(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id, UINT16 msg_evt, UINT8 *p_buf, UINT16 msglen) { UNUSED(msg_evt); BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("UIPC_Send : ch_id:%d %d bytes", ch_id, msglen); UIPC_LOCK(); if (write(uipc_main.ch[ch_id].fd, p_buf, msglen) < 0) { BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("failed to write (%s)", strerror(errno)); } UIPC_UNLOCK(); return FALSE; } Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process Bug: 28885210 Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360 Conflicts: btif/co/bta_hh_co.c btif/src/btif_core.c Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670) - Directly into mnc-mr2-release CWE ID: CWE-284
BOOLEAN UIPC_Send(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id, UINT16 msg_evt, UINT8 *p_buf, UINT16 msglen) { UNUSED(msg_evt); BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("UIPC_Send : ch_id:%d %d bytes", ch_id, msglen); UIPC_LOCK(); if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(write(uipc_main.ch[ch_id].fd, p_buf, msglen)) < 0) { BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("failed to write (%s)", strerror(errno)); } UIPC_UNLOCK(); return FALSE; }
173,494
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static ssize_t lbs_debugfs_write(struct file *f, const char __user *buf, size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos) { int r, i; char *pdata; char *p; char *p0; char *p1; char *p2; struct debug_data *d = f->private_data; pdata = kmalloc(cnt, GFP_KERNEL); if (pdata == NULL) return 0; if (copy_from_user(pdata, buf, cnt)) { lbs_deb_debugfs("Copy from user failed\n"); kfree(pdata); return 0; } p0 = pdata; for (i = 0; i < num_of_items; i++) { do { p = strstr(p0, d[i].name); if (p == NULL) break; p1 = strchr(p, '\n'); if (p1 == NULL) break; p0 = p1++; p2 = strchr(p, '='); if (!p2) break; p2++; r = simple_strtoul(p2, NULL, 0); if (d[i].size == 1) *((u8 *) d[i].addr) = (u8) r; else if (d[i].size == 2) *((u16 *) d[i].addr) = (u16) r; else if (d[i].size == 4) *((u32 *) d[i].addr) = (u32) r; else if (d[i].size == 8) *((u64 *) d[i].addr) = (u64) r; break; } while (1); } kfree(pdata); return (ssize_t)cnt; } Commit Message: libertas: potential oops in debugfs If we do a zero size allocation then it will oops. Also we can't be sure the user passes us a NUL terminated string so I've added a terminator. This code can only be triggered by root. Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de> Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by: Dan Williams <dcbw@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> CWE ID: CWE-189
static ssize_t lbs_debugfs_write(struct file *f, const char __user *buf, size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos) { int r, i; char *pdata; char *p; char *p0; char *p1; char *p2; struct debug_data *d = f->private_data; if (cnt == 0) return 0; pdata = kmalloc(cnt + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (pdata == NULL) return 0; if (copy_from_user(pdata, buf, cnt)) { lbs_deb_debugfs("Copy from user failed\n"); kfree(pdata); return 0; } pdata[cnt] = '\0'; p0 = pdata; for (i = 0; i < num_of_items; i++) { do { p = strstr(p0, d[i].name); if (p == NULL) break; p1 = strchr(p, '\n'); if (p1 == NULL) break; p0 = p1++; p2 = strchr(p, '='); if (!p2) break; p2++; r = simple_strtoul(p2, NULL, 0); if (d[i].size == 1) *((u8 *) d[i].addr) = (u8) r; else if (d[i].size == 2) *((u16 *) d[i].addr) = (u16) r; else if (d[i].size == 4) *((u32 *) d[i].addr) = (u32) r; else if (d[i].size == 8) *((u64 *) d[i].addr) = (u64) r; break; } while (1); } kfree(pdata); return (ssize_t)cnt; }
165,942
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: StateBase* writeFileList(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value, StateBase* next) { FileList* fileList = V8FileList::toNative(value.As<v8::Object>()); if (!fileList) return 0; unsigned length = fileList->length(); Vector<int> blobIndices; for (unsigned i = 0; i < length; ++i) { int blobIndex = -1; const File* file = fileList->item(i); if (file->hasBeenClosed()) return handleError(DataCloneError, "A File object has been closed, and could therefore not be cloned.", next); m_blobDataHandles.add(file->uuid(), file->blobDataHandle()); if (appendFileInfo(file, &blobIndex)) { ASSERT(!i || blobIndex > 0); ASSERT(blobIndex >= 0); blobIndices.append(blobIndex); } } if (!blobIndices.isEmpty()) m_writer.writeFileListIndex(blobIndices); else m_writer.writeFileList(*fileList); return 0; } Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings BUG=390928 R=dcarney@chromium.org Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 CWE ID:
StateBase* writeFileList(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value, StateBase* next) { FileList* fileList = V8FileList::toNative(value.As<v8::Object>()); if (!fileList) return 0; unsigned length = fileList->length(); Vector<int> blobIndices; for (unsigned i = 0; i < length; ++i) { int blobIndex = -1; const File* file = fileList->item(i); if (file->hasBeenClosed()) return handleError(DataCloneError, "A File object has been closed, and could therefore not be cloned.", next); m_blobDataHandles.set(file->uuid(), file->blobDataHandle()); if (appendFileInfo(file, &blobIndex)) { ASSERT(!i || blobIndex > 0); ASSERT(blobIndex >= 0); blobIndices.append(blobIndex); } } if (!blobIndices.isEmpty()) m_writer.writeFileListIndex(blobIndices); else m_writer.writeFileList(*fileList); return 0; }
171,652
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: _handle_carbons(xmpp_stanza_t *const stanza) { xmpp_stanza_t *carbons = xmpp_stanza_get_child_by_ns(stanza, STANZA_NS_CARBONS); if (!carbons) { return FALSE; } const char *name = xmpp_stanza_get_name(carbons); if (!name) { log_error("Unable to retrieve stanza name for Carbon"); return TRUE; } if (g_strcmp0(name, "private") == 0) { log_info("Carbon received with private element."); return FALSE; } if ((g_strcmp0(name, "received") != 0) && (g_strcmp0(name, "sent") != 0)) { log_warning("Carbon received with unrecognised stanza name: %s", name); return TRUE; } xmpp_stanza_t *forwarded = xmpp_stanza_get_child_by_ns(carbons, STANZA_NS_FORWARD); if (!forwarded) { log_warning("Carbon received with no forwarded element"); return TRUE; } xmpp_stanza_t *message = xmpp_stanza_get_child_by_name(forwarded, STANZA_NAME_MESSAGE); if (!message) { log_warning("Carbon received with no message element"); return TRUE; } char *message_txt = xmpp_message_get_body(message); if (!message_txt) { log_warning("Carbon received with no message."); return TRUE; } const gchar *to = xmpp_stanza_get_to(message); const gchar *from = xmpp_stanza_get_from(message); if (!to) to = from; Jid *jid_from = jid_create(from); Jid *jid_to = jid_create(to); Jid *my_jid = jid_create(connection_get_fulljid()); char *enc_message = NULL; xmpp_stanza_t *x = xmpp_stanza_get_child_by_ns(message, STANZA_NS_ENCRYPTED); if (x) { enc_message = xmpp_stanza_get_text(x); } if (g_strcmp0(my_jid->barejid, jid_to->barejid) == 0) { sv_ev_incoming_carbon(jid_from->barejid, jid_from->resourcepart, message_txt, enc_message); } else { sv_ev_outgoing_carbon(jid_to->barejid, message_txt, enc_message); } xmpp_ctx_t *ctx = connection_get_ctx(); xmpp_free(ctx, message_txt); xmpp_free(ctx, enc_message); jid_destroy(jid_from); jid_destroy(jid_to); jid_destroy(my_jid); return TRUE; } Commit Message: Add carbons from check CWE ID: CWE-346
_handle_carbons(xmpp_stanza_t *const stanza) { xmpp_stanza_t *carbons = xmpp_stanza_get_child_by_ns(stanza, STANZA_NS_CARBONS); if (!carbons) { return FALSE; } const char *name = xmpp_stanza_get_name(carbons); if (!name) { log_error("Unable to retrieve stanza name for Carbon"); return TRUE; } if (g_strcmp0(name, "private") == 0) { log_info("Carbon received with private element."); return FALSE; } if ((g_strcmp0(name, "received") != 0) && (g_strcmp0(name, "sent") != 0)) { log_warning("Carbon received with unrecognised stanza name: %s", name); return TRUE; } xmpp_stanza_t *forwarded = xmpp_stanza_get_child_by_ns(carbons, STANZA_NS_FORWARD); if (!forwarded) { log_warning("Carbon received with no forwarded element"); return TRUE; } xmpp_stanza_t *message = xmpp_stanza_get_child_by_name(forwarded, STANZA_NAME_MESSAGE); if (!message) { log_warning("Carbon received with no message element"); return TRUE; } char *message_txt = xmpp_message_get_body(message); if (!message_txt) { log_warning("Carbon received with no message."); return TRUE; } Jid *my_jid = jid_create(connection_get_fulljid()); const char *const stanza_from = xmpp_stanza_get_from(stanza); Jid *msg_jid = jid_create(stanza_from); if (g_strcmp0(my_jid->barejid, msg_jid->barejid) != 0) { log_warning("Invalid carbon received, from: %s", stanza_from); return TRUE; } const gchar *to = xmpp_stanza_get_to(message); const gchar *from = xmpp_stanza_get_from(message); if (!to) to = from; Jid *jid_from = jid_create(from); Jid *jid_to = jid_create(to); char *enc_message = NULL; xmpp_stanza_t *x = xmpp_stanza_get_child_by_ns(message, STANZA_NS_ENCRYPTED); if (x) { enc_message = xmpp_stanza_get_text(x); } if (g_strcmp0(my_jid->barejid, jid_to->barejid) == 0) { sv_ev_incoming_carbon(jid_from->barejid, jid_from->resourcepart, message_txt, enc_message); } else { sv_ev_outgoing_carbon(jid_to->barejid, message_txt, enc_message); } xmpp_ctx_t *ctx = connection_get_ctx(); xmpp_free(ctx, message_txt); xmpp_free(ctx, enc_message); jid_destroy(jid_from); jid_destroy(jid_to); jid_destroy(my_jid); return TRUE; }
168,382
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static int add_push_report_sideband_pkt(git_push *push, git_pkt_data *data_pkt, git_buf *data_pkt_buf) { git_pkt *pkt; const char *line, *line_end = NULL; size_t line_len; int error; int reading_from_buf = data_pkt_buf->size > 0; if (reading_from_buf) { /* We had an existing partial packet, so add the new * packet to the buffer and parse the whole thing */ git_buf_put(data_pkt_buf, data_pkt->data, data_pkt->len); line = data_pkt_buf->ptr; line_len = data_pkt_buf->size; } else { line = data_pkt->data; line_len = data_pkt->len; } while (line_len > 0) { error = git_pkt_parse_line(&pkt, line, &line_end, line_len); if (error == GIT_EBUFS) { /* Buffer the data when the inner packet is split * across multiple sideband packets */ if (!reading_from_buf) git_buf_put(data_pkt_buf, line, line_len); error = 0; goto done; } else if (error < 0) goto done; /* Advance in the buffer */ line_len -= (line_end - line); line = line_end; /* When a valid packet with no content has been * read, git_pkt_parse_line does not report an * error, but the pkt pointer has not been set. * Handle this by skipping over empty packets. */ if (pkt == NULL) continue; error = add_push_report_pkt(push, pkt); git_pkt_free(pkt); if (error < 0 && error != GIT_ITEROVER) goto done; } error = 0; done: if (reading_from_buf) git_buf_consume(data_pkt_buf, line_end); return error; } Commit Message: smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting in a `NULL` pointer dereference. Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right thing to do. CWE ID: CWE-476
static int add_push_report_sideband_pkt(git_push *push, git_pkt_data *data_pkt, git_buf *data_pkt_buf) { git_pkt *pkt; const char *line, *line_end = NULL; size_t line_len; int error; int reading_from_buf = data_pkt_buf->size > 0; if (reading_from_buf) { /* We had an existing partial packet, so add the new * packet to the buffer and parse the whole thing */ git_buf_put(data_pkt_buf, data_pkt->data, data_pkt->len); line = data_pkt_buf->ptr; line_len = data_pkt_buf->size; } else { line = data_pkt->data; line_len = data_pkt->len; } while (line_len > 0) { error = git_pkt_parse_line(&pkt, line, &line_end, line_len); if (error == GIT_EBUFS) { /* Buffer the data when the inner packet is split * across multiple sideband packets */ if (!reading_from_buf) git_buf_put(data_pkt_buf, line, line_len); error = 0; goto done; } else if (error < 0) goto done; /* Advance in the buffer */ line_len -= (line_end - line); line = line_end; error = add_push_report_pkt(push, pkt); git_pkt_free(pkt); if (error < 0 && error != GIT_ITEROVER) goto done; } error = 0; done: if (reading_from_buf) git_buf_consume(data_pkt_buf, line_end); return error; }
168,528
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback(const v8::Arguments& args) { INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg"); if (args.Length() < 1) return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError(); TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder()); EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, nonOpt, toInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))); if (args.Length() <= 1) { imp->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg(nonOpt); return v8::Handle<v8::Value>(); } EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, opt, toInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined))); imp->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg(nonOpt, opt); return v8::Handle<v8::Value>(); } Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError() https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983 Reviewed by Adam Barth. The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings. This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError(). No tests. No change in behavior. * bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm: (GenerateArgumentsCountCheck): (GenerateEventConstructorCallback): * bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp: (WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback): * bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp: (WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback): (WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback): * bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp: (WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback): * bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp: (WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback): * bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp: (WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback): (WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback): * bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp: (WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback): (WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback): * bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp: (WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback): * bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp: (WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback): * bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp: (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback): (WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback): (WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback): * bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp: (WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback): (WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback): * bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp: (WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback): * bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp: (WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError): * bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h: (V8Proxy): * bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp: (WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback): * bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp: (WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback): (WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback): (WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback): (WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback): * bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp: (WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback): (WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback): * bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp: (WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback): * bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp: (WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback): * bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp: (WebCore::getObjectParameter): (WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback): (WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback): (WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback): (WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback): (WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback): (WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback): (WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback): (WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf): (WebCore::uniformHelperi): (WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper): * bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp: (WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback): (WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback): * bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp: (WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback): (WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback): * bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp: (WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback): git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 CWE ID:
static v8::Handle<v8::Value> methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback(const v8::Arguments& args) { INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg"); if (args.Length() < 1) return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError(args.GetIsolate()); TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder()); EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, nonOpt, toInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))); if (args.Length() <= 1) { imp->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg(nonOpt); return v8::Handle<v8::Value>(); } EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, opt, toInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined))); imp->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg(nonOpt, opt); return v8::Handle<v8::Value>(); }
171,090
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: int handle_unaligned_access(insn_size_t instruction, struct pt_regs *regs, struct mem_access *ma, int expected, unsigned long address) { u_int rm; int ret, index; /* * XXX: We can't handle mixed 16/32-bit instructions yet */ if (instruction_size(instruction) != 2) return -EINVAL; index = (instruction>>8)&15; /* 0x0F00 */ rm = regs->regs[index]; /* * Log the unexpected fixups, and then pass them on to perf. * * We intentionally don't report the expected cases to perf as * otherwise the trapped I/O case will skew the results too much * to be useful. */ if (!expected) { unaligned_fixups_notify(current, instruction, regs); perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address); } ret = -EFAULT; switch (instruction&0xF000) { case 0x0000: if (instruction==0x000B) { /* rts */ ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma); if (ret==0) regs->pc = regs->pr; } else if ((instruction&0x00FF)==0x0023) { /* braf @Rm */ ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma); if (ret==0) regs->pc += rm + 4; } else if ((instruction&0x00FF)==0x0003) { /* bsrf @Rm */ ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma); if (ret==0) { regs->pr = regs->pc + 4; regs->pc += rm + 4; } } else { /* mov.[bwl] to/from memory via r0+rn */ goto simple; } break; case 0x1000: /* mov.l Rm,@(disp,Rn) */ goto simple; case 0x2000: /* mov.[bwl] to memory, possibly with pre-decrement */ goto simple; case 0x4000: if ((instruction&0x00FF)==0x002B) { /* jmp @Rm */ ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma); if (ret==0) regs->pc = rm; } else if ((instruction&0x00FF)==0x000B) { /* jsr @Rm */ ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma); if (ret==0) { regs->pr = regs->pc + 4; regs->pc = rm; } } else { /* mov.[bwl] to/from memory via r0+rn */ goto simple; } break; case 0x5000: /* mov.l @(disp,Rm),Rn */ goto simple; case 0x6000: /* mov.[bwl] from memory, possibly with post-increment */ goto simple; case 0x8000: /* bf lab, bf/s lab, bt lab, bt/s lab */ switch (instruction&0x0F00) { case 0x0100: /* mov.w R0,@(disp,Rm) */ goto simple; case 0x0500: /* mov.w @(disp,Rm),R0 */ goto simple; case 0x0B00: /* bf lab - no delayslot*/ break; case 0x0F00: /* bf/s lab */ ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma); if (ret==0) { #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_SH4) || defined(CONFIG_SH7705_CACHE_32KB) if ((regs->sr & 0x00000001) != 0) regs->pc += 4; /* next after slot */ else #endif regs->pc += SH_PC_8BIT_OFFSET(instruction); } break; case 0x0900: /* bt lab - no delayslot */ break; case 0x0D00: /* bt/s lab */ ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma); if (ret==0) { #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_SH4) || defined(CONFIG_SH7705_CACHE_32KB) if ((regs->sr & 0x00000001) == 0) regs->pc += 4; /* next after slot */ else #endif regs->pc += SH_PC_8BIT_OFFSET(instruction); } break; } break; case 0xA000: /* bra label */ ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma); if (ret==0) regs->pc += SH_PC_12BIT_OFFSET(instruction); break; case 0xB000: /* bsr label */ ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma); if (ret==0) { regs->pr = regs->pc + 4; regs->pc += SH_PC_12BIT_OFFSET(instruction); } break; } return ret; /* handle non-delay-slot instruction */ simple: ret = handle_unaligned_ins(instruction, regs, ma); if (ret==0) regs->pc += instruction_size(instruction); return ret; } Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the resulting interrupt do the wakeup. For the various event classes: - hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from the PMI-tail (ARM etc.) - tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context. - software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot perform wakeups, and hence need 0. As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented). The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a bunch of conditionals in fast paths. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com> Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> CWE ID: CWE-399
int handle_unaligned_access(insn_size_t instruction, struct pt_regs *regs, struct mem_access *ma, int expected, unsigned long address) { u_int rm; int ret, index; /* * XXX: We can't handle mixed 16/32-bit instructions yet */ if (instruction_size(instruction) != 2) return -EINVAL; index = (instruction>>8)&15; /* 0x0F00 */ rm = regs->regs[index]; /* * Log the unexpected fixups, and then pass them on to perf. * * We intentionally don't report the expected cases to perf as * otherwise the trapped I/O case will skew the results too much * to be useful. */ if (!expected) { unaligned_fixups_notify(current, instruction, regs); perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, regs, address); } ret = -EFAULT; switch (instruction&0xF000) { case 0x0000: if (instruction==0x000B) { /* rts */ ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma); if (ret==0) regs->pc = regs->pr; } else if ((instruction&0x00FF)==0x0023) { /* braf @Rm */ ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma); if (ret==0) regs->pc += rm + 4; } else if ((instruction&0x00FF)==0x0003) { /* bsrf @Rm */ ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma); if (ret==0) { regs->pr = regs->pc + 4; regs->pc += rm + 4; } } else { /* mov.[bwl] to/from memory via r0+rn */ goto simple; } break; case 0x1000: /* mov.l Rm,@(disp,Rn) */ goto simple; case 0x2000: /* mov.[bwl] to memory, possibly with pre-decrement */ goto simple; case 0x4000: if ((instruction&0x00FF)==0x002B) { /* jmp @Rm */ ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma); if (ret==0) regs->pc = rm; } else if ((instruction&0x00FF)==0x000B) { /* jsr @Rm */ ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma); if (ret==0) { regs->pr = regs->pc + 4; regs->pc = rm; } } else { /* mov.[bwl] to/from memory via r0+rn */ goto simple; } break; case 0x5000: /* mov.l @(disp,Rm),Rn */ goto simple; case 0x6000: /* mov.[bwl] from memory, possibly with post-increment */ goto simple; case 0x8000: /* bf lab, bf/s lab, bt lab, bt/s lab */ switch (instruction&0x0F00) { case 0x0100: /* mov.w R0,@(disp,Rm) */ goto simple; case 0x0500: /* mov.w @(disp,Rm),R0 */ goto simple; case 0x0B00: /* bf lab - no delayslot*/ break; case 0x0F00: /* bf/s lab */ ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma); if (ret==0) { #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_SH4) || defined(CONFIG_SH7705_CACHE_32KB) if ((regs->sr & 0x00000001) != 0) regs->pc += 4; /* next after slot */ else #endif regs->pc += SH_PC_8BIT_OFFSET(instruction); } break; case 0x0900: /* bt lab - no delayslot */ break; case 0x0D00: /* bt/s lab */ ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma); if (ret==0) { #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_SH4) || defined(CONFIG_SH7705_CACHE_32KB) if ((regs->sr & 0x00000001) == 0) regs->pc += 4; /* next after slot */ else #endif regs->pc += SH_PC_8BIT_OFFSET(instruction); } break; } break; case 0xA000: /* bra label */ ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma); if (ret==0) regs->pc += SH_PC_12BIT_OFFSET(instruction); break; case 0xB000: /* bsr label */ ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma); if (ret==0) { regs->pr = regs->pc + 4; regs->pc += SH_PC_12BIT_OFFSET(instruction); } break; } return ret; /* handle non-delay-slot instruction */ simple: ret = handle_unaligned_ins(instruction, regs, ma); if (ret==0) regs->pc += instruction_size(instruction); return ret; }
165,796
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: ScreenLockLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetScreenLockLibrary() { return screen_lock_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_); } Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros. This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros function definitions and comments. BUG=none TEST=built it Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-189
ScreenLockLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetScreenLockLibrary() {
170,629
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: validate_group(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event *sibling, *leader = event->group_leader; struct pmu_hw_events fake_pmu; DECLARE_BITMAP(fake_used_mask, ARMPMU_MAX_HWEVENTS); /* * Initialise the fake PMU. We only need to populate the * used_mask for the purposes of validation. */ memset(fake_used_mask, 0, sizeof(fake_used_mask)); fake_pmu.used_mask = fake_used_mask; if (!validate_event(&fake_pmu, leader)) return -EINVAL; list_for_each_entry(sibling, &leader->sibling_list, group_entry) { if (!validate_event(&fake_pmu, sibling)) return -EINVAL; } if (!validate_event(&fake_pmu, event)) return -EINVAL; return 0; } Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a different HW PMU. The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage. This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with a CCI PMU present: Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL) CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249 Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT) task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 PC is at 0x0 LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8 pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145 sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0 [< (null)>] (null) [<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc [<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70 [<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c [<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358 [<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c Code: bad PC value Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know that we are dealing with an arm pmu event. Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> CWE ID: CWE-264
validate_group(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event *sibling, *leader = event->group_leader; struct pmu_hw_events fake_pmu; DECLARE_BITMAP(fake_used_mask, ARMPMU_MAX_HWEVENTS); /* * Initialise the fake PMU. We only need to populate the * used_mask for the purposes of validation. */ memset(fake_used_mask, 0, sizeof(fake_used_mask)); fake_pmu.used_mask = fake_used_mask; if (!validate_event(event->pmu, &fake_pmu, leader)) return -EINVAL; list_for_each_entry(sibling, &leader->sibling_list, group_entry) { if (!validate_event(event->pmu, &fake_pmu, sibling)) return -EINVAL; } if (!validate_event(event->pmu, &fake_pmu, event)) return -EINVAL; return 0; }
167,468
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: R_API void r_anal_bb_free(RAnalBlock *bb) { if (!bb) { return; } r_anal_cond_free (bb->cond); R_FREE (bb->fingerprint); r_anal_diff_free (bb->diff); bb->diff = NULL; R_FREE (bb->op_bytes); r_anal_switch_op_free (bb->switch_op); bb->switch_op = NULL; bb->fingerprint = NULL; bb->cond = NULL; R_FREE (bb->label); R_FREE (bb->op_pos); R_FREE (bb->parent_reg_arena); if (bb->prev) { if (bb->prev->jumpbb == bb) { bb->prev->jumpbb = NULL; } if (bb->prev->failbb == bb) { bb->prev->failbb = NULL; } bb->prev = NULL; } if (bb->jumpbb) { bb->jumpbb->prev = NULL; bb->jumpbb = NULL; } if (bb->failbb) { bb->failbb->prev = NULL; bb->failbb = NULL; } R_FREE (bb); } Commit Message: Fix #10293 - Use-after-free in r_anal_bb_free() CWE ID: CWE-416
R_API void r_anal_bb_free(RAnalBlock *bb) { if (!bb) { return; } r_anal_cond_free (bb->cond); R_FREE (bb->fingerprint); r_anal_diff_free (bb->diff); bb->diff = NULL; R_FREE (bb->op_bytes); r_anal_switch_op_free (bb->switch_op); bb->switch_op = NULL; bb->fingerprint = NULL; bb->cond = NULL; R_FREE (bb->label); R_FREE (bb->op_pos); R_FREE (bb->parent_reg_arena); if (bb->prev) { if (bb->prev->jumpbb == bb) { bb->prev->jumpbb = NULL; } if (bb->prev->failbb == bb) { bb->prev->failbb = NULL; } bb->prev = NULL; } if (bb->jumpbb) { bb->jumpbb->prev = NULL; bb->jumpbb = NULL; } if (bb->failbb) { bb->failbb->prev = NULL; bb->failbb = NULL; } if (bb->next) { // avoid double free bb->next->prev = NULL; } R_FREE (bb); // double free }
169,199
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: u32 h264bsdInit(storage_t *pStorage, u32 noOutputReordering) { /* Variables */ u32 size; /* Code */ ASSERT(pStorage); h264bsdInitStorage(pStorage); /* allocate mbLayer to be next multiple of 64 to enable use of * specific NEON optimized "memset" for clearing the structure */ size = (sizeof(macroblockLayer_t) + 63) & ~0x3F; pStorage->mbLayer = (macroblockLayer_t*)H264SwDecMalloc(size); if (!pStorage->mbLayer) return HANTRO_NOK; if (noOutputReordering) pStorage->noReordering = HANTRO_TRUE; return HANTRO_OK; } Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size. Bug: 27855419 Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd CWE ID: CWE-119
u32 h264bsdInit(storage_t *pStorage, u32 noOutputReordering) { /* Variables */ u32 size; /* Code */ ASSERT(pStorage); h264bsdInitStorage(pStorage); /* allocate mbLayer to be next multiple of 64 to enable use of * specific NEON optimized "memset" for clearing the structure */ size = (sizeof(macroblockLayer_t) + 63) & ~0x3F; pStorage->mbLayer = (macroblockLayer_t*)H264SwDecMalloc(size, 1); if (!pStorage->mbLayer) return HANTRO_NOK; if (noOutputReordering) pStorage->noReordering = HANTRO_TRUE; return HANTRO_OK; }
173,876
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: gplotCreate(const char *rootname, l_int32 outformat, const char *title, const char *xlabel, const char *ylabel) { char *newroot; char buf[L_BUF_SIZE]; l_int32 badchar; GPLOT *gplot; PROCNAME("gplotCreate"); if (!rootname) return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("rootname not defined", procName, NULL); if (outformat != GPLOT_PNG && outformat != GPLOT_PS && outformat != GPLOT_EPS && outformat != GPLOT_LATEX) return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("outformat invalid", procName, NULL); stringCheckForChars(rootname, "`;&|><\"?*", &badchar); if (badchar) /* danger of command injection */ return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("invalid rootname", procName, NULL); if ((gplot = (GPLOT *)LEPT_CALLOC(1, sizeof(GPLOT))) == NULL) return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("gplot not made", procName, NULL); gplot->cmddata = sarrayCreate(0); gplot->datanames = sarrayCreate(0); gplot->plotdata = sarrayCreate(0); gplot->plottitles = sarrayCreate(0); gplot->plotstyles = numaCreate(0); /* Save title, labels, rootname, outformat, cmdname, outname */ newroot = genPathname(rootname, NULL); gplot->rootname = newroot; gplot->outformat = outformat; snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "%s.cmd", rootname); gplot->cmdname = stringNew(buf); if (outformat == GPLOT_PNG) snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "%s.png", newroot); else if (outformat == GPLOT_PS) snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "%s.ps", newroot); else if (outformat == GPLOT_EPS) snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "%s.eps", newroot); else if (outformat == GPLOT_LATEX) snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "%s.tex", newroot); gplot->outname = stringNew(buf); if (title) gplot->title = stringNew(title); if (xlabel) gplot->xlabel = stringNew(xlabel); if (ylabel) gplot->ylabel = stringNew(ylabel); return gplot; } Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3. * Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with possible buffer overflow. * There were also a few similar situations with sscanf(). CWE ID: CWE-119
gplotCreate(const char *rootname, l_int32 outformat, const char *title, const char *xlabel, const char *ylabel) { char *newroot; char buf[L_BUFSIZE]; l_int32 badchar; GPLOT *gplot; PROCNAME("gplotCreate"); if (!rootname) return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("rootname not defined", procName, NULL); if (outformat != GPLOT_PNG && outformat != GPLOT_PS && outformat != GPLOT_EPS && outformat != GPLOT_LATEX) return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("outformat invalid", procName, NULL); stringCheckForChars(rootname, "`;&|><\"?*", &badchar); if (badchar) /* danger of command injection */ return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("invalid rootname", procName, NULL); if ((gplot = (GPLOT *)LEPT_CALLOC(1, sizeof(GPLOT))) == NULL) return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("gplot not made", procName, NULL); gplot->cmddata = sarrayCreate(0); gplot->datanames = sarrayCreate(0); gplot->plotdata = sarrayCreate(0); gplot->plottitles = sarrayCreate(0); gplot->plotstyles = numaCreate(0); /* Save title, labels, rootname, outformat, cmdname, outname */ newroot = genPathname(rootname, NULL); gplot->rootname = newroot; gplot->outformat = outformat; snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "%s.cmd", rootname); gplot->cmdname = stringNew(buf); if (outformat == GPLOT_PNG) snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "%s.png", newroot); else if (outformat == GPLOT_PS) snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "%s.ps", newroot); else if (outformat == GPLOT_EPS) snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "%s.eps", newroot); else if (outformat == GPLOT_LATEX) snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "%s.tex", newroot); gplot->outname = stringNew(buf); if (title) gplot->title = stringNew(title); if (xlabel) gplot->xlabel = stringNew(xlabel); if (ylabel) gplot->ylabel = stringNew(ylabel); return gplot; }
169,324
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i, fd, swapped, pkthdrlen, ret, optct, backwards, caplentoobig; struct pcap_file_header pcap_fh; struct pcap_pkthdr pcap_ph; struct pcap_sf_patched_pkthdr pcap_patched_ph; /* Kuznetzov */ char buf[10000]; struct stat statinfo; uint64_t pktcnt; uint32_t readword; int32_t last_sec, last_usec, caplen; optct = optionProcess(&tcpcapinfoOptions, argc, argv); argc -= optct; argv += optct; #ifdef DEBUG if (HAVE_OPT(DBUG)) debug = OPT_VALUE_DBUG; #endif for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { dbgx(1, "processing: %s\n", argv[i]); if ((fd = open(argv[i], O_RDONLY)) < 0) errx(-1, "Error opening file %s: %s", argv[i], strerror(errno)); if (fstat(fd, &statinfo) < 0) errx(-1, "Error getting file stat info %s: %s", argv[i], strerror(errno)); printf("file size = %"PRIu64" bytes\n", (uint64_t)statinfo.st_size); if ((ret = read(fd, &buf, sizeof(pcap_fh))) != sizeof(pcap_fh)) errx(-1, "File too small. Unable to read pcap_file_header from %s", argv[i]); dbgx(3, "Read %d bytes for file header", ret); swapped = 0; memcpy(&pcap_fh, &buf, sizeof(pcap_fh)); pkthdrlen = 16; /* pcap_pkthdr isn't the actual on-disk format for 64bit systems! */ switch (pcap_fh.magic) { case TCPDUMP_MAGIC: printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (tcpdump) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_not_swapped); break; case SWAPLONG(TCPDUMP_MAGIC): printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (tcpdump/swapped) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_swapped); swapped = 1; break; case KUZNETZOV_TCPDUMP_MAGIC: pkthdrlen = sizeof(pcap_patched_ph); printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (Kuznetzov) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_not_swapped); break; case SWAPLONG(KUZNETZOV_TCPDUMP_MAGIC): pkthdrlen = sizeof(pcap_patched_ph); printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (Kuznetzov/swapped) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_swapped); swapped = 1; break; case FMESQUITA_TCPDUMP_MAGIC: printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (Fmesquita) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_not_swapped); break; case SWAPLONG(FMESQUITA_TCPDUMP_MAGIC): printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (Fmesquita) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_swapped); swapped = 1; break; case NAVTEL_TCPDUMP_MAGIC: printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (Navtel) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_not_swapped); break; case SWAPLONG(NAVTEL_TCPDUMP_MAGIC): printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (Navtel/swapped) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_swapped); swapped = 1; break; case NSEC_TCPDUMP_MAGIC: printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (Nsec) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_not_swapped); break; case SWAPLONG(NSEC_TCPDUMP_MAGIC): printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (Nsec/swapped) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_swapped); swapped = 1; break; default: printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (unknown)\n", pcap_fh.magic); } if (swapped == 1) { pcap_fh.version_major = SWAPSHORT(pcap_fh.version_major); pcap_fh.version_minor = SWAPSHORT(pcap_fh.version_minor); pcap_fh.thiszone = SWAPLONG(pcap_fh.thiszone); pcap_fh.sigfigs = SWAPLONG(pcap_fh.sigfigs); pcap_fh.snaplen = SWAPLONG(pcap_fh.snaplen); pcap_fh.linktype = SWAPLONG(pcap_fh.linktype); } printf("version = %hu.%hu\n", pcap_fh.version_major, pcap_fh.version_minor); printf("thiszone = 0x%08"PRIx32"\n", pcap_fh.thiszone); printf("sigfigs = 0x%08"PRIx32"\n", pcap_fh.sigfigs); printf("snaplen = %"PRIu32"\n", pcap_fh.snaplen); printf("linktype = 0x%08"PRIx32"\n", pcap_fh.linktype); if (pcap_fh.version_major != 2 && pcap_fh.version_minor != 4) { printf("Sorry, we only support file format version 2.4\n"); close(fd); continue; } dbgx(5, "Packet header len: %d", pkthdrlen); if (pkthdrlen == 24) { printf("Packet\tOrigLen\t\tCaplen\t\tTimestamp\t\tIndex\tProto\tPktType\tPktCsum\tNote\n"); } else { printf("Packet\tOrigLen\t\tCaplen\t\tTimestamp\tCsum\tNote\n"); } pktcnt = 0; last_sec = 0; last_usec = 0; while ((ret = read(fd, &buf, pkthdrlen)) == pkthdrlen) { pktcnt ++; backwards = 0; caplentoobig = 0; dbgx(3, "Read %d bytes for packet %"PRIu64" header", ret, pktcnt); memset(&pcap_ph, 0, sizeof(pcap_ph)); /* see what packet header we're using */ if (pkthdrlen == sizeof(pcap_patched_ph)) { memcpy(&pcap_patched_ph, &buf, sizeof(pcap_patched_ph)); if (swapped == 1) { dbg(3, "Swapping packet header bytes..."); pcap_patched_ph.caplen = SWAPLONG(pcap_patched_ph.caplen); pcap_patched_ph.len = SWAPLONG(pcap_patched_ph.len); pcap_patched_ph.ts.tv_sec = SWAPLONG(pcap_patched_ph.ts.tv_sec); pcap_patched_ph.ts.tv_usec = SWAPLONG(pcap_patched_ph.ts.tv_usec); pcap_patched_ph.index = SWAPLONG(pcap_patched_ph.index); pcap_patched_ph.protocol = SWAPSHORT(pcap_patched_ph.protocol); } printf("%"PRIu64"\t%4"PRIu32"\t\t%4"PRIu32"\t\t%" PRIx32".%"PRIx32"\t\t%4"PRIu32"\t%4hu\t%4hhu", pktcnt, pcap_patched_ph.len, pcap_patched_ph.caplen, pcap_patched_ph.ts.tv_sec, pcap_patched_ph.ts.tv_usec, pcap_patched_ph.index, pcap_patched_ph.protocol, pcap_patched_ph.pkt_type); if (pcap_fh.snaplen < pcap_patched_ph.caplen) { caplentoobig = 1; } caplen = pcap_patched_ph.caplen; } else { /* manually map on-disk bytes to our memory structure */ memcpy(&readword, buf, 4); pcap_ph.ts.tv_sec = readword; memcpy(&readword, &buf[4], 4); pcap_ph.ts.tv_usec = readword; memcpy(&pcap_ph.caplen, &buf[8], 4); memcpy(&pcap_ph.len, &buf[12], 4); if (swapped == 1) { dbg(3, "Swapping packet header bytes..."); pcap_ph.caplen = SWAPLONG(pcap_ph.caplen); pcap_ph.len = SWAPLONG(pcap_ph.len); pcap_ph.ts.tv_sec = SWAPLONG(pcap_ph.ts.tv_sec); pcap_ph.ts.tv_usec = SWAPLONG(pcap_ph.ts.tv_usec); } printf("%"PRIu64"\t%4"PRIu32"\t\t%4"PRIu32"\t\t%" PRIx32".%"PRIx32, pktcnt, pcap_ph.len, pcap_ph.caplen, (unsigned int)pcap_ph.ts.tv_sec, (unsigned int)pcap_ph.ts.tv_usec); if (pcap_fh.snaplen < pcap_ph.caplen) { caplentoobig = 1; } caplen = pcap_ph.caplen; } /* check to make sure timestamps don't go backwards */ if (last_sec > 0 && last_usec > 0) { if ((pcap_ph.ts.tv_sec == last_sec) ? (pcap_ph.ts.tv_usec < last_usec) : (pcap_ph.ts.tv_sec < last_sec)) { backwards = 1; } } if (pkthdrlen == sizeof(pcap_patched_ph)) { last_sec = pcap_patched_ph.ts.tv_sec; last_usec = pcap_patched_ph.ts.tv_usec; } else { last_sec = pcap_ph.ts.tv_sec; last_usec = pcap_ph.ts.tv_usec; } /* read the frame */ if ((ret = read(fd, &buf, caplen)) != caplen) { if (ret < 0) { printf("Error reading file: %s: %s\n", argv[i], strerror(errno)); } else { printf("File truncated! Unable to jump to next packet.\n"); } close(fd); continue; } /* print the frame checksum */ printf("\t%x\t", do_checksum_math((u_int16_t *)buf, caplen)); /* print the Note */ if (! backwards && ! caplentoobig) { printf("OK\n"); } else if (backwards && ! caplentoobig) { printf("BAD_TS\n"); } else if (caplentoobig && ! backwards) { printf("TOOBIG\n"); } else if (backwards && caplentoobig) { printf("BAD_TS|TOOBIG"); } } } exit(0); } Commit Message: #278 fail if capture has a packet that is too large (#286) * #278 fail if capture has a packet that is too large * Update CHANGELOG CWE ID: CWE-119
main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i, fd, swapped, pkthdrlen, ret, optct, backwards, caplentoobig; struct pcap_file_header pcap_fh; struct pcap_pkthdr pcap_ph; struct pcap_sf_patched_pkthdr pcap_patched_ph; /* Kuznetzov */ char buf[10000]; struct stat statinfo; uint64_t pktcnt; uint32_t readword; int32_t last_sec, last_usec, caplen; optct = optionProcess(&tcpcapinfoOptions, argc, argv); argc -= optct; argv += optct; #ifdef DEBUG if (HAVE_OPT(DBUG)) debug = OPT_VALUE_DBUG; #endif for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { dbgx(1, "processing: %s\n", argv[i]); if ((fd = open(argv[i], O_RDONLY)) < 0) errx(-1, "Error opening file %s: %s", argv[i], strerror(errno)); if (fstat(fd, &statinfo) < 0) errx(-1, "Error getting file stat info %s: %s", argv[i], strerror(errno)); printf("file size = %"PRIu64" bytes\n", (uint64_t)statinfo.st_size); if ((ret = read(fd, &buf, sizeof(pcap_fh))) != sizeof(pcap_fh)) errx(-1, "File too small. Unable to read pcap_file_header from %s", argv[i]); dbgx(3, "Read %d bytes for file header", ret); swapped = 0; memcpy(&pcap_fh, &buf, sizeof(pcap_fh)); pkthdrlen = 16; /* pcap_pkthdr isn't the actual on-disk format for 64bit systems! */ switch (pcap_fh.magic) { case TCPDUMP_MAGIC: printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (tcpdump) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_not_swapped); break; case SWAPLONG(TCPDUMP_MAGIC): printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (tcpdump/swapped) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_swapped); swapped = 1; break; case KUZNETZOV_TCPDUMP_MAGIC: pkthdrlen = sizeof(pcap_patched_ph); printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (Kuznetzov) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_not_swapped); break; case SWAPLONG(KUZNETZOV_TCPDUMP_MAGIC): pkthdrlen = sizeof(pcap_patched_ph); printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (Kuznetzov/swapped) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_swapped); swapped = 1; break; case FMESQUITA_TCPDUMP_MAGIC: printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (Fmesquita) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_not_swapped); break; case SWAPLONG(FMESQUITA_TCPDUMP_MAGIC): printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (Fmesquita) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_swapped); swapped = 1; break; case NAVTEL_TCPDUMP_MAGIC: printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (Navtel) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_not_swapped); break; case SWAPLONG(NAVTEL_TCPDUMP_MAGIC): printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (Navtel/swapped) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_swapped); swapped = 1; break; case NSEC_TCPDUMP_MAGIC: printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (Nsec) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_not_swapped); break; case SWAPLONG(NSEC_TCPDUMP_MAGIC): printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (Nsec/swapped) (%s)\n", pcap_fh.magic, is_swapped); swapped = 1; break; default: printf("magic = 0x%08"PRIx32" (unknown)\n", pcap_fh.magic); } if (swapped == 1) { pcap_fh.version_major = SWAPSHORT(pcap_fh.version_major); pcap_fh.version_minor = SWAPSHORT(pcap_fh.version_minor); pcap_fh.thiszone = SWAPLONG(pcap_fh.thiszone); pcap_fh.sigfigs = SWAPLONG(pcap_fh.sigfigs); pcap_fh.snaplen = SWAPLONG(pcap_fh.snaplen); pcap_fh.linktype = SWAPLONG(pcap_fh.linktype); } printf("version = %hu.%hu\n", pcap_fh.version_major, pcap_fh.version_minor); printf("thiszone = 0x%08"PRIx32"\n", pcap_fh.thiszone); printf("sigfigs = 0x%08"PRIx32"\n", pcap_fh.sigfigs); printf("snaplen = %"PRIu32"\n", pcap_fh.snaplen); printf("linktype = 0x%08"PRIx32"\n", pcap_fh.linktype); if (pcap_fh.version_major != 2 && pcap_fh.version_minor != 4) { printf("Sorry, we only support file format version 2.4\n"); close(fd); continue; } dbgx(5, "Packet header len: %d", pkthdrlen); if (pkthdrlen == 24) { printf("Packet\tOrigLen\t\tCaplen\t\tTimestamp\t\tIndex\tProto\tPktType\tPktCsum\tNote\n"); } else { printf("Packet\tOrigLen\t\tCaplen\t\tTimestamp\tCsum\tNote\n"); } pktcnt = 0; last_sec = 0; last_usec = 0; while ((ret = read(fd, &buf, pkthdrlen)) == pkthdrlen) { pktcnt ++; backwards = 0; caplentoobig = 0; dbgx(3, "Read %d bytes for packet %"PRIu64" header", ret, pktcnt); memset(&pcap_ph, 0, sizeof(pcap_ph)); /* see what packet header we're using */ if (pkthdrlen == sizeof(pcap_patched_ph)) { memcpy(&pcap_patched_ph, &buf, sizeof(pcap_patched_ph)); if (swapped == 1) { dbg(3, "Swapping packet header bytes..."); pcap_patched_ph.caplen = SWAPLONG(pcap_patched_ph.caplen); pcap_patched_ph.len = SWAPLONG(pcap_patched_ph.len); pcap_patched_ph.ts.tv_sec = SWAPLONG(pcap_patched_ph.ts.tv_sec); pcap_patched_ph.ts.tv_usec = SWAPLONG(pcap_patched_ph.ts.tv_usec); pcap_patched_ph.index = SWAPLONG(pcap_patched_ph.index); pcap_patched_ph.protocol = SWAPSHORT(pcap_patched_ph.protocol); } printf("%"PRIu64"\t%4"PRIu32"\t\t%4"PRIu32"\t\t%" PRIx32".%"PRIx32"\t\t%4"PRIu32"\t%4hu\t%4hhu", pktcnt, pcap_patched_ph.len, pcap_patched_ph.caplen, pcap_patched_ph.ts.tv_sec, pcap_patched_ph.ts.tv_usec, pcap_patched_ph.index, pcap_patched_ph.protocol, pcap_patched_ph.pkt_type); if (pcap_fh.snaplen < pcap_patched_ph.caplen) { caplentoobig = 1; } caplen = pcap_patched_ph.caplen; } else { /* manually map on-disk bytes to our memory structure */ memcpy(&readword, buf, 4); pcap_ph.ts.tv_sec = readword; memcpy(&readword, &buf[4], 4); pcap_ph.ts.tv_usec = readword; memcpy(&pcap_ph.caplen, &buf[8], 4); memcpy(&pcap_ph.len, &buf[12], 4); if (swapped == 1) { dbg(3, "Swapping packet header bytes..."); pcap_ph.caplen = SWAPLONG(pcap_ph.caplen); pcap_ph.len = SWAPLONG(pcap_ph.len); pcap_ph.ts.tv_sec = SWAPLONG(pcap_ph.ts.tv_sec); pcap_ph.ts.tv_usec = SWAPLONG(pcap_ph.ts.tv_usec); } printf("%"PRIu64"\t%4"PRIu32"\t\t%4"PRIu32"\t\t%" PRIx32".%"PRIx32, pktcnt, pcap_ph.len, pcap_ph.caplen, (unsigned int)pcap_ph.ts.tv_sec, (unsigned int)pcap_ph.ts.tv_usec); if (pcap_fh.snaplen < pcap_ph.caplen) { caplentoobig = 1; } caplen = pcap_ph.caplen; } if (caplentoobig) { printf("\n\nCapture file appears to be damaged or corrupt.\n" "Contains packet of size %u, bigger than snap length %u\n", caplen, pcap_fh.snaplen); close(fd); break; } /* check to make sure timestamps don't go backwards */ if (last_sec > 0 && last_usec > 0) { if ((pcap_ph.ts.tv_sec == last_sec) ? (pcap_ph.ts.tv_usec < last_usec) : (pcap_ph.ts.tv_sec < last_sec)) { backwards = 1; } } if (pkthdrlen == sizeof(pcap_patched_ph)) { last_sec = pcap_patched_ph.ts.tv_sec; last_usec = pcap_patched_ph.ts.tv_usec; } else { last_sec = pcap_ph.ts.tv_sec; last_usec = pcap_ph.ts.tv_usec; } /* read the frame */ if ((ret = read(fd, &buf, caplen)) != caplen) { if (ret < 0) { printf("Error reading file: %s: %s\n", argv[i], strerror(errno)); } else { printf("File truncated! Unable to jump to next packet.\n"); } close(fd); break; } /* print the frame checksum */ printf("\t%x\t", do_checksum_math((u_int16_t *)buf, caplen)); /* print the Note */ if (! backwards && ! caplentoobig) { printf("OK\n"); } else if (backwards && ! caplentoobig) { printf("BAD_TS\n"); } else if (caplentoobig && ! backwards) { printf("TOOBIG\n"); } else if (backwards && caplentoobig) { printf("BAD_TS|TOOBIG"); } } } exit(0); }
168,339
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: DrawingBuffer::DrawingBuffer( std::unique_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DProvider> context_provider, std::unique_ptr<Extensions3DUtil> extensions_util, Client* client, bool discard_framebuffer_supported, bool want_alpha_channel, bool premultiplied_alpha, PreserveDrawingBuffer preserve, WebGLVersion web_gl_version, bool want_depth, bool want_stencil, ChromiumImageUsage chromium_image_usage, const CanvasColorParams& color_params) : client_(client), preserve_drawing_buffer_(preserve), web_gl_version_(web_gl_version), context_provider_(WTF::WrapUnique(new WebGraphicsContext3DProviderWrapper( std::move(context_provider)))), gl_(this->ContextProvider()->ContextGL()), extensions_util_(std::move(extensions_util)), discard_framebuffer_supported_(discard_framebuffer_supported), want_alpha_channel_(want_alpha_channel), premultiplied_alpha_(premultiplied_alpha), software_rendering_(this->ContextProvider()->IsSoftwareRendering()), want_depth_(want_depth), want_stencil_(want_stencil), color_space_(color_params.GetGfxColorSpace()), chromium_image_usage_(chromium_image_usage) { TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("test_gpu", "DrawingBufferCreation", TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_GLOBAL); } Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later. BUG=740603 TEST=new conformance test R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840 Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518} CWE ID: CWE-119
DrawingBuffer::DrawingBuffer( std::unique_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DProvider> context_provider, std::unique_ptr<Extensions3DUtil> extensions_util, Client* client, bool discard_framebuffer_supported, bool want_alpha_channel, bool premultiplied_alpha, PreserveDrawingBuffer preserve, WebGLVersion webgl_version, bool want_depth, bool want_stencil, ChromiumImageUsage chromium_image_usage, const CanvasColorParams& color_params) : client_(client), preserve_drawing_buffer_(preserve), webgl_version_(webgl_version), context_provider_(WTF::WrapUnique(new WebGraphicsContext3DProviderWrapper( std::move(context_provider)))), gl_(this->ContextProvider()->ContextGL()), extensions_util_(std::move(extensions_util)), discard_framebuffer_supported_(discard_framebuffer_supported), want_alpha_channel_(want_alpha_channel), premultiplied_alpha_(premultiplied_alpha), software_rendering_(this->ContextProvider()->IsSoftwareRendering()), want_depth_(want_depth), want_stencil_(want_stencil), color_space_(color_params.GetGfxColorSpace()), chromium_image_usage_(chromium_image_usage) { TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("test_gpu", "DrawingBufferCreation", TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_GLOBAL); }
172,291
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: void ParamTraits<GURL>::Write(Message* m, const GURL& p) { DCHECK(p.possibly_invalid_spec().length() <= content::kMaxURLChars); m->WriteString(p.possibly_invalid_spec()); } Commit Message: Beware of print-read inconsistency when serializing GURLs. BUG=165622 Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11576038 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173583 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-264
void ParamTraits<GURL>::Write(Message* m, const GURL& p) { DCHECK(p.possibly_invalid_spec().length() <= content::kMaxURLChars); // Beware of print-parse inconsistency which would change an invalid // URL into a valid one. Ideally, the message would contain this flag // so that the read side could make the check, but performing it here // avoids changing the on-the-wire representation of such a fundamental // type as GURL. See https://crbug.com/166486 for additional work in // this area. if (!p.is_valid()) { GURL reconstructed_url(p.possibly_invalid_spec()); if (reconstructed_url.is_valid()) { DLOG(WARNING) << "GURL string " << p.possibly_invalid_spec() << " (marked invalid) but parsed as valid."; m->WriteString(std::string()); return; } } m->WriteString(p.possibly_invalid_spec()); }
171,503
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static int compile_search(struct Context *ctx, const struct Pattern *pat, struct Buffer *buf) { if (do_search(pat, 0) == 0) return 0; if (pat->not) mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "NOT "); if (pat->child) { int clauses; clauses = do_search(pat->child, 1); if (clauses > 0) { const struct Pattern *clause = pat->child; mutt_buffer_addch(buf, '('); while (clauses) { if (do_search(clause, 0)) { if (pat->op == MUTT_OR && clauses > 1) mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "OR "); clauses--; if (compile_search(ctx, clause, buf) < 0) return -1; if (clauses) mutt_buffer_addch(buf, ' '); } clause = clause->next; } mutt_buffer_addch(buf, ')'); } } else { char term[STRING]; char *delim = NULL; switch (pat->op) { case MUTT_HEADER: mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "HEADER "); /* extract header name */ delim = strchr(pat->p.str, ':'); if (!delim) { mutt_error(_("Header search without header name: %s"), pat->p.str); return -1; } *delim = '\0'; imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str); mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term); mutt_buffer_addch(buf, ' '); /* and field */ *delim = ':'; delim++; SKIPWS(delim); imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), delim); mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term); break; case MUTT_BODY: mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "BODY "); imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str); mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term); break; case MUTT_WHOLE_MSG: mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "TEXT "); imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str); mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term); break; case MUTT_SERVERSEARCH: { struct ImapData *idata = ctx->data; if (!mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, X_GM_EXT1)) { mutt_error(_("Server-side custom search not supported: %s"), pat->p.str); return -1; } } mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "X-GM-RAW "); imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str); mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term); break; } } return 0; } Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us> CWE ID: CWE-77
static int compile_search(struct Context *ctx, const struct Pattern *pat, struct Buffer *buf) { if (do_search(pat, 0) == 0) return 0; if (pat->not) mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "NOT "); if (pat->child) { int clauses; clauses = do_search(pat->child, 1); if (clauses > 0) { const struct Pattern *clause = pat->child; mutt_buffer_addch(buf, '('); while (clauses) { if (do_search(clause, 0)) { if (pat->op == MUTT_OR && clauses > 1) mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "OR "); clauses--; if (compile_search(ctx, clause, buf) < 0) return -1; if (clauses) mutt_buffer_addch(buf, ' '); } clause = clause->next; } mutt_buffer_addch(buf, ')'); } } else { char term[STRING]; char *delim = NULL; switch (pat->op) { case MUTT_HEADER: mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "HEADER "); /* extract header name */ delim = strchr(pat->p.str, ':'); if (!delim) { mutt_error(_("Header search without header name: %s"), pat->p.str); return -1; } *delim = '\0'; imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str, false); mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term); mutt_buffer_addch(buf, ' '); /* and field */ *delim = ':'; delim++; SKIPWS(delim); imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), delim, false); mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term); break; case MUTT_BODY: mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "BODY "); imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str, false); mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term); break; case MUTT_WHOLE_MSG: mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "TEXT "); imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str, false); mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term); break; case MUTT_SERVERSEARCH: { struct ImapData *idata = ctx->data; if (!mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, X_GM_EXT1)) { mutt_error(_("Server-side custom search not supported: %s"), pat->p.str); return -1; } } mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "X-GM-RAW "); imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str, false); mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term); break; } } return 0; }
169,135
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: getword(f, word, newlinep, filename) FILE *f; char *word; int *newlinep; char *filename; { int c, len, escape; int quoted, comment; int value, digit, got, n; #define isoctal(c) ((c) >= '0' && (c) < '8') *newlinep = 0; len = 0; escape = 0; comment = 0; quoted = 0; /* * First skip white-space and comments. */ for (;;) { c = getc(f); if (c == EOF) break; /* * A newline means the end of a comment; backslash-newline * is ignored. Note that we cannot have escape && comment. */ if (c == '\n') { if (!escape) { *newlinep = 1; comment = 0; } else escape = 0; continue; } /* * Ignore characters other than newline in a comment. */ if (comment) continue; /* * If this character is escaped, we have a word start. */ if (escape) break; /* * If this is the escape character, look at the next character. */ if (c == '\\') { escape = 1; continue; } /* * If this is the start of a comment, ignore the rest of the line. */ if (c == '#') { comment = 1; continue; } /* * A non-whitespace character is the start of a word. */ if (!isspace(c)) break; } /* * Process characters until the end of the word. */ while (c != EOF) { if (escape) { /* * This character is escaped: backslash-newline is ignored, * various other characters indicate particular values * as for C backslash-escapes. */ escape = 0; if (c == '\n') { c = getc(f); continue; } got = 0; switch (c) { case 'a': value = '\a'; break; case 'b': value = '\b'; break; case 'f': value = '\f'; break; case 'n': value = '\n'; break; case 'r': value = '\r'; break; case 's': value = ' '; break; case 't': value = '\t'; break; default: if (isoctal(c)) { /* * \ddd octal sequence */ value = 0; for (n = 0; n < 3 && isoctal(c); ++n) { value = (value << 3) + (c & 07); c = getc(f); } got = 1; break; } if (c == 'x') { /* * \x<hex_string> sequence */ value = 0; c = getc(f); for (n = 0; n < 2 && isxdigit(c); ++n) { digit = toupper(c) - '0'; if (digit > 10) digit += '0' + 10 - 'A'; value = (value << 4) + digit; c = getc (f); } got = 1; break; } /* * Otherwise the character stands for itself. */ value = c; break; } /* * Store the resulting character for the escape sequence. */ if (len < MAXWORDLEN-1) word[len] = value; ++len; if (!got) c = getc(f); continue; } /* * Backslash starts a new escape sequence. */ if (c == '\\') { escape = 1; c = getc(f); continue; } /* * Not escaped: check for the start or end of a quoted * section and see if we've reached the end of the word. */ if (quoted) { if (c == quoted) { quoted = 0; c = getc(f); continue; } } else if (c == '"' || c == '\'') { quoted = c; c = getc(f); continue; } else if (isspace(c) || c == '#') { ungetc (c, f); break; } /* * An ordinary character: store it in the word and get another. */ if (len < MAXWORDLEN-1) word[len] = c; ++len; c = getc(f); } /* * End of the word: check for errors. */ if (c == EOF) { if (ferror(f)) { if (errno == 0) errno = EIO; option_error("Error reading %s: %m", filename); die(1); } /* * If len is zero, then we didn't find a word before the * end of the file. */ if (len == 0) return 0; if (quoted) option_error("warning: quoted word runs to end of file (%.20s...)", filename, word); } /* * Warn if the word was too long, and append a terminating null. */ if (len >= MAXWORDLEN) { option_error("warning: word in file %s too long (%.20s...)", filename, word); len = MAXWORDLEN - 1; } word[len] = 0; return 1; #undef isoctal } Commit Message: pppd: Eliminate potential integer overflow in option parsing When we are reading in a word from an options file, we maintain a count of the length we have seen so far in 'len', which is an int. When len exceeds MAXWORDLEN - 1 (i.e. 1023) we cease storing characters in the buffer but we continue to increment len. Since len is an int, it will wrap around to -2147483648 after it reaches 2147483647. At that point our test of (len < MAXWORDLEN-1) will succeed and we will start writing characters to memory again. This may enable an attacker to overwrite the heap and thereby corrupt security-relevant variables. For this reason it has been assigned a CVE identifier, CVE-2014-3158. This fixes the bug by ceasing to increment len once it reaches MAXWORDLEN. Reported-by: Lee Campbell <leecam@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> CWE ID: CWE-119
getword(f, word, newlinep, filename) FILE *f; char *word; int *newlinep; char *filename; { int c, len, escape; int quoted, comment; int value, digit, got, n; #define isoctal(c) ((c) >= '0' && (c) < '8') *newlinep = 0; len = 0; escape = 0; comment = 0; quoted = 0; /* * First skip white-space and comments. */ for (;;) { c = getc(f); if (c == EOF) break; /* * A newline means the end of a comment; backslash-newline * is ignored. Note that we cannot have escape && comment. */ if (c == '\n') { if (!escape) { *newlinep = 1; comment = 0; } else escape = 0; continue; } /* * Ignore characters other than newline in a comment. */ if (comment) continue; /* * If this character is escaped, we have a word start. */ if (escape) break; /* * If this is the escape character, look at the next character. */ if (c == '\\') { escape = 1; continue; } /* * If this is the start of a comment, ignore the rest of the line. */ if (c == '#') { comment = 1; continue; } /* * A non-whitespace character is the start of a word. */ if (!isspace(c)) break; } /* * Process characters until the end of the word. */ while (c != EOF) { if (escape) { /* * This character is escaped: backslash-newline is ignored, * various other characters indicate particular values * as for C backslash-escapes. */ escape = 0; if (c == '\n') { c = getc(f); continue; } got = 0; switch (c) { case 'a': value = '\a'; break; case 'b': value = '\b'; break; case 'f': value = '\f'; break; case 'n': value = '\n'; break; case 'r': value = '\r'; break; case 's': value = ' '; break; case 't': value = '\t'; break; default: if (isoctal(c)) { /* * \ddd octal sequence */ value = 0; for (n = 0; n < 3 && isoctal(c); ++n) { value = (value << 3) + (c & 07); c = getc(f); } got = 1; break; } if (c == 'x') { /* * \x<hex_string> sequence */ value = 0; c = getc(f); for (n = 0; n < 2 && isxdigit(c); ++n) { digit = toupper(c) - '0'; if (digit > 10) digit += '0' + 10 - 'A'; value = (value << 4) + digit; c = getc (f); } got = 1; break; } /* * Otherwise the character stands for itself. */ value = c; break; } /* * Store the resulting character for the escape sequence. */ if (len < MAXWORDLEN) { word[len] = value; ++len; } if (!got) c = getc(f); continue; } /* * Backslash starts a new escape sequence. */ if (c == '\\') { escape = 1; c = getc(f); continue; } /* * Not escaped: check for the start or end of a quoted * section and see if we've reached the end of the word. */ if (quoted) { if (c == quoted) { quoted = 0; c = getc(f); continue; } } else if (c == '"' || c == '\'') { quoted = c; c = getc(f); continue; } else if (isspace(c) || c == '#') { ungetc (c, f); break; } /* * An ordinary character: store it in the word and get another. */ if (len < MAXWORDLEN) { word[len] = c; ++len; } c = getc(f); } /* * End of the word: check for errors. */ if (c == EOF) { if (ferror(f)) { if (errno == 0) errno = EIO; option_error("Error reading %s: %m", filename); die(1); } /* * If len is zero, then we didn't find a word before the * end of the file. */ if (len == 0) return 0; if (quoted) option_error("warning: quoted word runs to end of file (%.20s...)", filename, word); } /* * Warn if the word was too long, and append a terminating null. */ if (len >= MAXWORDLEN) { option_error("warning: word in file %s too long (%.20s...)", filename, word); len = MAXWORDLEN - 1; } word[len] = 0; return 1; #undef isoctal }
166,380
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username) { int i; SRP_user_pwd *user; unsigned char digv[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned char digs[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; EVP_MD_CTX ctxt; if (vb == NULL) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_user_pwd_num(vb->users_pwd); i++) { user = sk_SRP_user_pwd_value(vb->users_pwd, i); if (strcmp(user->id, username) == 0) return user; } if ((vb->seed_key == NULL) || (vb->default_g == NULL) || (vb->default_N == NULL)) return NULL; if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, N))) goto err; N_bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL); if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, g))) goto err; g_bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL); defgNid = "*"; } else { SRP_gN *gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(g, NULL); if (gN == NULL) goto err; N_bn = gN->N; g_bn = gN->g; defgNid = gN->id; } Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-399
SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username) static SRP_user_pwd *find_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username) { int i; SRP_user_pwd *user; if (vb == NULL) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_user_pwd_num(vb->users_pwd); i++) { user = sk_SRP_user_pwd_value(vb->users_pwd, i); if (strcmp(user->id, username) == 0) return user; } return NULL; } /* * This method ignores the configured seed and fails for an unknown user. * Ownership of the returned pointer is not released to the caller. * In other words, caller must not free the result. */ SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username) { return find_user(vb, username); } /* * Ownership of the returned pointer is released to the caller. * In other words, caller must free the result once done. */ SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username) { SRP_user_pwd *user; unsigned char digv[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned char digs[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; EVP_MD_CTX ctxt; if (vb == NULL) return NULL; if ((user = find_user(vb, username)) != NULL) return srp_user_pwd_dup(user); if ((vb->seed_key == NULL) || (vb->default_g == NULL) || (vb->default_N == NULL)) return NULL; if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, N))) goto err; N_bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL); if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, g))) goto err; g_bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL); defgNid = "*"; } else { SRP_gN *gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(g, NULL); if (gN == NULL) goto err; N_bn = gN->N; g_bn = gN->g; defgNid = gN->id; }
165,248
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: virtual void SetUp() { svc_.encoding_mode = INTER_LAYER_PREDICTION_IP; svc_.log_level = SVC_LOG_DEBUG; svc_.log_print = 0; codec_iface_ = vpx_codec_vp9_cx(); const vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_enc_config_default(codec_iface_, &codec_enc_, 0); EXPECT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res); codec_enc_.g_w = kWidth; codec_enc_.g_h = kHeight; codec_enc_.g_timebase.num = 1; codec_enc_.g_timebase.den = 60; codec_enc_.kf_min_dist = 100; codec_enc_.kf_max_dist = 100; vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t dec_cfg = {0}; VP9CodecFactory codec_factory; decoder_ = codec_factory.CreateDecoder(dec_cfg, 0); } Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478 DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06 BUG=23452792 Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec CWE ID: CWE-119
virtual void SetUp() { svc_.log_level = SVC_LOG_DEBUG; svc_.log_print = 0; codec_iface_ = vpx_codec_vp9_cx(); const vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_enc_config_default(codec_iface_, &codec_enc_, 0); EXPECT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res); codec_enc_.g_w = kWidth; codec_enc_.g_h = kHeight; codec_enc_.g_timebase.num = 1; codec_enc_.g_timebase.den = 60; codec_enc_.kf_min_dist = 100; codec_enc_.kf_max_dist = 100; vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t dec_cfg = vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t(); VP9CodecFactory codec_factory; decoder_ = codec_factory.CreateDecoder(dec_cfg, 0); tile_columns_ = 0; tile_rows_ = 0; }
174,580
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: email_close(FILE *mailer) { char *temp; mode_t prev_umask; priv_state priv; char *customSig; if ( mailer == NULL ) { return; } /* Want the letter to come from "condor" if possible */ priv = set_condor_priv(); customSig = NULL; if ((customSig = param("EMAIL_SIGNATURE")) != NULL) { fprintf( mailer, "\n\n"); fprintf( mailer, customSig); fprintf( mailer, "\n"); free(customSig); } else { /* Put a signature on the bottom of the email */ fprintf( mailer, "\n\n-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=\n" ); fprintf( mailer, "Questions about this message or Condor in general?\n" ); /* See if there's an address users should use for help */ temp = param( "CONDOR_SUPPORT_EMAIL" ); if( ! temp ) { temp = param( "CONDOR_ADMIN" ); } if( temp ) { fprintf( mailer, "Email address of the local Condor administrator: " "%s\n", temp ); free( temp ); } fprintf( mailer, "The Official Condor Homepage is " "http://www.cs.wisc.edu/condor\n" ); } fflush(mailer); /* there are some oddities with how pclose can close a file. In some arches, pclose will create temp files for locking and they need to be of the correct perms in order to be deleted. So the umask is set to something useable for the close operation. -pete 9/11/99 */ prev_umask = umask(022); /* ** we fclose() on UNIX, pclose on win32 */ #if defined(WIN32) if (EMAIL_FINAL_COMMAND == NULL) { my_pclose( mailer ); } else { char *email_filename = NULL; /* Should this be a pclose??? -Erik 9/21/00 */ fclose( mailer ); dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"Sending email via system(%s)\n", EMAIL_FINAL_COMMAND); system(EMAIL_FINAL_COMMAND); if ( (email_filename=strrchr(EMAIL_FINAL_COMMAND,'<')) ) { email_filename++; /* go past the "<" */ email_filename++; /* go past the space after the < */ if ( unlink(email_filename) == -1 ) { dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"email_close: cannot unlink temp file %s\n", email_filename); } } free(EMAIL_FINAL_COMMAND); EMAIL_FINAL_COMMAND = NULL; } #else (void)fclose( mailer ); #endif umask(prev_umask); /* Set priv state back */ set_priv(priv); } Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-134
email_close(FILE *mailer) { char *temp; mode_t prev_umask; priv_state priv; char *customSig; if ( mailer == NULL ) { return; } /* Want the letter to come from "condor" if possible */ priv = set_condor_priv(); customSig = NULL; if ((customSig = param("EMAIL_SIGNATURE")) != NULL) { fprintf( mailer, "\n\n"); fprintf( mailer, "%s", customSig); fprintf( mailer, "\n"); free(customSig); } else { /* Put a signature on the bottom of the email */ fprintf( mailer, "\n\n-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=\n" ); fprintf( mailer, "Questions about this message or Condor in general?\n" ); /* See if there's an address users should use for help */ temp = param( "CONDOR_SUPPORT_EMAIL" ); if( ! temp ) { temp = param( "CONDOR_ADMIN" ); } if( temp ) { fprintf( mailer, "Email address of the local Condor administrator: " "%s\n", temp ); free( temp ); } fprintf( mailer, "The Official Condor Homepage is " "http://www.cs.wisc.edu/condor\n" ); } fflush(mailer); /* there are some oddities with how pclose can close a file. In some arches, pclose will create temp files for locking and they need to be of the correct perms in order to be deleted. So the umask is set to something useable for the close operation. -pete 9/11/99 */ prev_umask = umask(022); /* ** we fclose() on UNIX, pclose on win32 */ #if defined(WIN32) if (EMAIL_FINAL_COMMAND == NULL) { my_pclose( mailer ); } else { char *email_filename = NULL; /* Should this be a pclose??? -Erik 9/21/00 */ fclose( mailer ); dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"Sending email via system(%s)\n", EMAIL_FINAL_COMMAND); system(EMAIL_FINAL_COMMAND); if ( (email_filename=strrchr(EMAIL_FINAL_COMMAND,'<')) ) { email_filename++; /* go past the "<" */ email_filename++; /* go past the space after the < */ if ( unlink(email_filename) == -1 ) { dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"email_close: cannot unlink temp file %s\n", email_filename); } } free(EMAIL_FINAL_COMMAND); EMAIL_FINAL_COMMAND = NULL; } #else (void)fclose( mailer ); #endif umask(prev_umask); /* Set priv state back */ set_priv(priv); }
165,384
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: header_put_marker (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x) { if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 4) { psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ; psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ; psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ; psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ; } ; } /* header_put_marker */ Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by `SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority of files and too small for some others. Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as necessary up to a maximum of 100k. CWE ID: CWE-119
header_put_marker (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x) { psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = x ; psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 8) ; psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 16) ; psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 24) ; } /* header_put_marker */
170,060
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static void php_mb_regex_free_cache(php_mb_regex_t **pre) { onig_free(*pre); } Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free CWE ID: CWE-415
static void php_mb_regex_free_cache(php_mb_regex_t **pre) static void php_mb_regex_free_cache(php_mb_regex_t **pre) { onig_free(*pre); }
167,122
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: virtual InputMethodDescriptors* GetActiveInputMethods() { return GetInputMethodDescriptorsForTesting(); } Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary. BUG=chromium-os:16238 TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before. Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-399
virtual InputMethodDescriptors* GetActiveInputMethods() { virtual input_method::InputMethodDescriptors* GetActiveInputMethods() { return GetInputMethodDescriptorsForTesting(); }
170,487
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: daemon_AuthUserPwd(char *username, char *password, char *errbuf) { #ifdef _WIN32 /* * Warning: the user which launches the process must have the * SE_TCB_NAME right. * This corresponds to have the "Act as part of the Operating System" * turned on (administrative tools, local security settings, local * policies, user right assignment) * However, it seems to me that if you run it as a service, this * right should be provided by default. * * XXX - hopefully, this returns errors such as ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE, * which merely indicates that the user name or password is * incorrect, not whether it's the user name or the password * that's incorrect, so a client that's trying to brute-force * accounts doesn't know whether it's the user name or the * password that's incorrect, so it doesn't know whether to * stop trying to log in with a given user name and move on * to another user name. */ HANDLE Token; if (LogonUser(username, ".", password, LOGON32_LOGON_NETWORK, LOGON32_PROVIDER_DEFAULT, &Token) == 0) { pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_win32_err(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, GetLastError(), "LogonUser() failed"); return -1; } if (ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(Token) == 0) { pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_win32_err(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, GetLastError(), "ImpersonateLoggedOnUser() failed"); CloseHandle(Token); return -1; } CloseHandle(Token); return 0; #else /* * See * * http://www.unixpapa.com/incnote/passwd.html * * We use the Solaris/Linux shadow password authentication if * we have getspnam(), otherwise we just do traditional * authentication, which, on some platforms, might work, even * with shadow passwords, if we're running as root. Traditional * authenticaion won't work if we're not running as root, as * I think these days all UN*Xes either won't return the password * at all with getpwnam() or will only do so if you're root. * * XXX - perhaps what we *should* be using is PAM, if we have * it. That might hide all the details of username/password * authentication, whether it's done with a visible-to-root- * only password database or some other authentication mechanism, * behind its API. */ struct passwd *user; char *user_password; #ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM struct spwd *usersp; #endif char *crypt_password; if ((user = getpwnam(username)) == NULL) { pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed: user name or password incorrect"); return -1; } #ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM if ((usersp = getspnam(username)) == NULL) { pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed: user name or password incorrect"); return -1; } user_password = usersp->sp_pwdp; #else /* * XXX - what about other platforms? * The unixpapa.com page claims this Just Works on *BSD if you're * running as root - it's from 2000, so it doesn't indicate whether * macOS (which didn't come out until 2001, under the name Mac OS * X) behaves like the *BSDs or not, and might also work on AIX. * HP-UX does something else. * * Again, hopefully PAM hides all that. */ user_password = user->pw_passwd; #endif crypt_password = crypt(password, user_password); if (crypt_password == NULL) { pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed"); return -1; } if (strcmp(user_password, crypt_password) != 0) { pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed: user name or password incorrect"); return -1; } if (setuid(user->pw_uid)) { pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, errno, "setuid"); return -1; } /* if (setgid(user->pw_gid)) { pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, errno, "setgid"); return -1; } */ return 0; #endif } Commit Message: On UN*X, don't tell the client why authentication failed. "no such user" tells the client that the user ID isn't valid and, therefore, that it needn't bother trying to do password cracking for that user ID; just saying that the authentication failed dosn't give them that hint. This resolves the third problem in Include Security issue F11: [libpcap] Remote Packet Capture Daemon Multiple Authentication Improvements. The Windows LogonUser() API returns ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE for both cases, so the Windows code doesn't have this issue. Just return the same "Authentication failed" message on Windows to the user. For various authentication failures *other* than "no such user" and "password not valid", log a message, as there's a problem that may need debugging. We don't need to tell the end user what the problem is, as they may not bother reporting it and, even if they do, they may not give the full error message. CWE ID: CWE-345
daemon_AuthUserPwd(char *username, char *password, char *errbuf) { #ifdef _WIN32 /* * Warning: the user which launches the process must have the * SE_TCB_NAME right. * This corresponds to have the "Act as part of the Operating System" * turned on (administrative tools, local security settings, local * policies, user right assignment) * However, it seems to me that if you run it as a service, this * right should be provided by default. * * XXX - hopefully, this returns errors such as ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE, * which merely indicates that the user name or password is * incorrect, not whether it's the user name or the password * that's incorrect, so a client that's trying to brute-force * accounts doesn't know whether it's the user name or the * password that's incorrect, so it doesn't know whether to * stop trying to log in with a given user name and move on * to another user name. */ DWORD error; HANDLE Token; char errmsgbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for errors to log if (LogonUser(username, ".", password, LOGON32_LOGON_NETWORK, LOGON32_PROVIDER_DEFAULT, &Token) == 0) { pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed"); error = GetLastError(); if (error != ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE) { // Some error other than an authentication error; // log it. pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_win32_err(errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, error, "LogonUser() failed"); rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "%s", errmsgbuf); } return -1; } if (ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(Token) == 0) { pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed"); pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_win32_err(errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, GetLastError(), "ImpersonateLoggedOnUser() failed"); rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "%s", errmsgbuf); CloseHandle(Token); return -1; } CloseHandle(Token); return 0; #else /* * See * * http://www.unixpapa.com/incnote/passwd.html * * We use the Solaris/Linux shadow password authentication if * we have getspnam(), otherwise we just do traditional * authentication, which, on some platforms, might work, even * with shadow passwords, if we're running as root. Traditional * authenticaion won't work if we're not running as root, as * I think these days all UN*Xes either won't return the password * at all with getpwnam() or will only do so if you're root. * * XXX - perhaps what we *should* be using is PAM, if we have * it. That might hide all the details of username/password * authentication, whether it's done with a visible-to-root- * only password database or some other authentication mechanism, * behind its API. */ int error; struct passwd *user; char *user_password; #ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM struct spwd *usersp; #endif char *crypt_password; if ((user = getpwnam(username)) == NULL) { pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed"); return -1; } #ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM if ((usersp = getspnam(username)) == NULL) { pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed"); return -1; } user_password = usersp->sp_pwdp; #else /* * XXX - what about other platforms? * The unixpapa.com page claims this Just Works on *BSD if you're * running as root - it's from 2000, so it doesn't indicate whether * macOS (which didn't come out until 2001, under the name Mac OS * X) behaves like the *BSDs or not, and might also work on AIX. * HP-UX does something else. * * Again, hopefully PAM hides all that. */ user_password = user->pw_passwd; #endif // // The Single UNIX Specification says that if crypt() fails it // sets errno, but some implementatons that haven't been run // through the SUS test suite might not do so. // errno = 0; crypt_password = crypt(password, user_password); if (crypt_password == NULL) { error = errno; pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed"); if (error == 0) { // It didn't set errno. rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "crypt() failed"); } else { rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "crypt() failed: %s", strerror(error)); } return -1; } if (strcmp(user_password, crypt_password) != 0) { pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed"); return -1; } if (setuid(user->pw_uid)) { error = errno; pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, error, "setuid"); rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "setuid() failed: %s", strerror(error)); return -1; } /* if (setgid(user->pw_gid)) { error = errno; pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, errno, "setgid"); rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "setgid() failed: %s", strerror(error)); return -1; } */ return 0; #endif }
169,542
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: Plugin::Plugin(PP_Instance pp_instance) : pp::InstancePrivate(pp_instance), scriptable_plugin_(NULL), argc_(-1), argn_(NULL), argv_(NULL), main_subprocess_("main subprocess", NULL, NULL), nacl_ready_state_(UNSENT), nexe_error_reported_(false), wrapper_factory_(NULL), last_error_string_(""), ppapi_proxy_(NULL), enable_dev_interfaces_(false), init_time_(0), ready_time_(0), nexe_size_(0), time_of_last_progress_event_(0), using_ipc_proxy_(false) { PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::Plugin (this=%p, pp_instance=%" NACL_PRId32")\n", static_cast<void*>(this), pp_instance)); callback_factory_.Initialize(this); nexe_downloader_.Initialize(this); } Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer. BUG=116317 TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy. Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016 TBR=bbudge@chromium.org Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-399
Plugin::Plugin(PP_Instance pp_instance) : pp::InstancePrivate(pp_instance), scriptable_plugin_(NULL), argc_(-1), argn_(NULL), argv_(NULL), main_subprocess_("main subprocess", NULL, NULL), nacl_ready_state_(UNSENT), nexe_error_reported_(false), wrapper_factory_(NULL), last_error_string_(""), ppapi_proxy_(NULL), enable_dev_interfaces_(false), init_time_(0), ready_time_(0), nexe_size_(0), time_of_last_progress_event_(0) { PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::Plugin (this=%p, pp_instance=%" NACL_PRId32")\n", static_cast<void*>(this), pp_instance)); callback_factory_.Initialize(this); nexe_downloader_.Initialize(this); }
170,744
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: void bandwidth_pid(pid_t pid, const char *command, const char *dev, int down, int up) { EUID_ASSERT(); EUID_ROOT(); char *comm = pid_proc_comm(pid); EUID_USER(); if (!comm) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot find sandbox\n"); exit(1); } if (strcmp(comm, "firejail") != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot find sandbox\n"); exit(1); } free(comm); char *name; if (asprintf(&name, "/run/firejail/network/%d-netmap", pid) == -1) errExit("asprintf"); struct stat s; if (stat(name, &s) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: the sandbox doesn't use a new network namespace\n"); exit(1); } pid_t child; if (find_child(pid, &child) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot join the network namespace\n"); exit(1); } EUID_ROOT(); if (join_namespace(child, "net")) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot join the network namespace\n"); exit(1); } if (strcmp(command, "set") == 0) bandwidth_set(pid, dev, down, up); else if (strcmp(command, "clear") == 0) bandwidth_remove(pid, dev); char *devname = NULL; if (dev) { char *fname; if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/%d-netmap", RUN_FIREJAIL_NETWORK_DIR, (int) pid) == -1) errExit("asprintf"); FILE *fp = fopen(fname, "r"); if (!fp) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot read network map file %s\n", fname); exit(1); } char buf[1024]; int len = strlen(dev); while (fgets(buf, 1024, fp)) { char *ptr = strchr(buf, '\n'); if (ptr) *ptr = '\0'; if (*buf == '\0') break; if (strncmp(buf, dev, len) == 0 && buf[len] == ':') { devname = strdup(buf + len + 1); if (!devname) errExit("strdup"); if (if_nametoindex(devname) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot find network device %s\n", devname); exit(1); } break; } } free(fname); fclose(fp); } char *cmd = NULL; if (devname) { if (strcmp(command, "set") == 0) { if (asprintf(&cmd, "%s/firejail/fshaper.sh --%s %s %d %d", LIBDIR, command, devname, down, up) == -1) errExit("asprintf"); } else { if (asprintf(&cmd, "%s/firejail/fshaper.sh --%s %s", LIBDIR, command, devname) == -1) errExit("asprintf"); } } else { if (asprintf(&cmd, "%s/firejail/fshaper.sh --%s", LIBDIR, command) == -1) errExit("asprintf"); } assert(cmd); environ = NULL; if (setreuid(0, 0)) errExit("setreuid"); if (setregid(0, 0)) errExit("setregid"); if (!cfg.shell) cfg.shell = guess_shell(); if (!cfg.shell) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: no POSIX shell found, please use --shell command line option\n"); exit(1); } char *arg[4]; arg[0] = cfg.shell; arg[1] = "-c"; arg[2] = cmd; arg[3] = NULL; clearenv(); execvp(arg[0], arg); errExit("execvp"); } Commit Message: security fix CWE ID: CWE-269
void bandwidth_pid(pid_t pid, const char *command, const char *dev, int down, int up) { EUID_ASSERT(); EUID_ROOT(); char *comm = pid_proc_comm(pid); EUID_USER(); if (!comm) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot find sandbox\n"); exit(1); } if (strcmp(comm, "firejail") != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot find sandbox\n"); exit(1); } free(comm); char *name; if (asprintf(&name, "/run/firejail/network/%d-netmap", pid) == -1) errExit("asprintf"); struct stat s; if (stat(name, &s) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: the sandbox doesn't use a new network namespace\n"); exit(1); } pid_t child; if (find_child(pid, &child) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot join the network namespace\n"); exit(1); } EUID_ROOT(); if (join_namespace(child, "net")) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot join the network namespace\n"); exit(1); } if (strcmp(command, "set") == 0) bandwidth_set(pid, dev, down, up); else if (strcmp(command, "clear") == 0) bandwidth_remove(pid, dev); char *devname = NULL; if (dev) { char *fname; if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/%d-netmap", RUN_FIREJAIL_NETWORK_DIR, (int) pid) == -1) errExit("asprintf"); FILE *fp = fopen(fname, "r"); if (!fp) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot read network map file %s\n", fname); exit(1); } char buf[1024]; int len = strlen(dev); while (fgets(buf, 1024, fp)) { char *ptr = strchr(buf, '\n'); if (ptr) *ptr = '\0'; if (*buf == '\0') break; if (strncmp(buf, dev, len) == 0 && buf[len] == ':') { devname = strdup(buf + len + 1); if (!devname) errExit("strdup"); if (if_nametoindex(devname) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot find network device %s\n", devname); exit(1); } break; } } free(fname); fclose(fp); } char *cmd = NULL; if (devname) { if (strcmp(command, "set") == 0) { if (asprintf(&cmd, "%s/firejail/fshaper.sh --%s %s %d %d", LIBDIR, command, devname, down, up) == -1) errExit("asprintf"); } else { if (asprintf(&cmd, "%s/firejail/fshaper.sh --%s %s", LIBDIR, command, devname) == -1) errExit("asprintf"); } } else { if (asprintf(&cmd, "%s/firejail/fshaper.sh --%s", LIBDIR, command) == -1) errExit("asprintf"); } assert(cmd); environ = NULL; if (setreuid(0, 0)) errExit("setreuid"); if (setregid(0, 0)) errExit("setregid"); char *arg[4]; arg[0] = "/bin/sh"; arg[1] = "-c"; arg[2] = cmd; arg[3] = NULL; clearenv(); execvp(arg[0], arg); errExit("execvp"); }
168,418
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: DefragDoSturgesNovakTest(int policy, u_char *expected, size_t expected_len) { int i; int ret = 0; DefragInit(); /* * Build the packets. */ int id = 1; Packet *packets[17]; memset(packets, 0x00, sizeof(packets)); /* * Original fragments. */ /* A*24 at 0. */ packets[0] = BuildTestPacket(id, 0, 1, 'A', 24); /* B*15 at 32. */ packets[1] = BuildTestPacket(id, 32 >> 3, 1, 'B', 16); /* C*24 at 48. */ packets[2] = BuildTestPacket(id, 48 >> 3, 1, 'C', 24); /* D*8 at 80. */ packets[3] = BuildTestPacket(id, 80 >> 3, 1, 'D', 8); /* E*16 at 104. */ packets[4] = BuildTestPacket(id, 104 >> 3, 1, 'E', 16); /* F*24 at 120. */ packets[5] = BuildTestPacket(id, 120 >> 3, 1, 'F', 24); /* G*16 at 144. */ packets[6] = BuildTestPacket(id, 144 >> 3, 1, 'G', 16); /* H*16 at 160. */ packets[7] = BuildTestPacket(id, 160 >> 3, 1, 'H', 16); /* I*8 at 176. */ packets[8] = BuildTestPacket(id, 176 >> 3, 1, 'I', 8); /* * Overlapping subsequent fragments. */ /* J*32 at 8. */ packets[9] = BuildTestPacket(id, 8 >> 3, 1, 'J', 32); /* K*24 at 48. */ packets[10] = BuildTestPacket(id, 48 >> 3, 1, 'K', 24); /* L*24 at 72. */ packets[11] = BuildTestPacket(id, 72 >> 3, 1, 'L', 24); /* M*24 at 96. */ packets[12] = BuildTestPacket(id, 96 >> 3, 1, 'M', 24); /* N*8 at 128. */ packets[13] = BuildTestPacket(id, 128 >> 3, 1, 'N', 8); /* O*8 at 152. */ packets[14] = BuildTestPacket(id, 152 >> 3, 1, 'O', 8); /* P*8 at 160. */ packets[15] = BuildTestPacket(id, 160 >> 3, 1, 'P', 8); /* Q*16 at 176. */ packets[16] = BuildTestPacket(id, 176 >> 3, 0, 'Q', 16); default_policy = policy; /* Send all but the last. */ for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) { Packet *tp = Defrag(NULL, NULL, packets[i], NULL); if (tp != NULL) { SCFree(tp); goto end; } if (ENGINE_ISSET_EVENT(packets[i], IPV4_FRAG_OVERLAP)) { goto end; } } int overlap = 0; for (; i < 16; i++) { Packet *tp = Defrag(NULL, NULL, packets[i], NULL); if (tp != NULL) { SCFree(tp); goto end; } if (ENGINE_ISSET_EVENT(packets[i], IPV4_FRAG_OVERLAP)) { overlap++; } } if (!overlap) { goto end; } /* And now the last one. */ Packet *reassembled = Defrag(NULL, NULL, packets[16], NULL); if (reassembled == NULL) { goto end; } if (IPV4_GET_HLEN(reassembled) != 20) { goto end; } if (IPV4_GET_IPLEN(reassembled) != 20 + 192) { goto end; } if (memcmp(GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled) + 20, expected, expected_len) != 0) { goto end; } SCFree(reassembled); /* Make sure all frags were returned back to the pool. */ if (defrag_context->frag_pool->outstanding != 0) { goto end; } ret = 1; end: for (i = 0; i < 17; i++) { SCFree(packets[i]); } DefragDestroy(); return ret; } Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled by the destination host. CWE ID: CWE-358
DefragDoSturgesNovakTest(int policy, u_char *expected, size_t expected_len) { int i; int ret = 0; DefragInit(); /* * Build the packets. */ int id = 1; Packet *packets[17]; memset(packets, 0x00, sizeof(packets)); /* * Original fragments. */ /* A*24 at 0. */ packets[0] = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 0, 1, 'A', 24); /* B*15 at 32. */ packets[1] = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 32 >> 3, 1, 'B', 16); /* C*24 at 48. */ packets[2] = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 48 >> 3, 1, 'C', 24); /* D*8 at 80. */ packets[3] = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 80 >> 3, 1, 'D', 8); /* E*16 at 104. */ packets[4] = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 104 >> 3, 1, 'E', 16); /* F*24 at 120. */ packets[5] = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 120 >> 3, 1, 'F', 24); /* G*16 at 144. */ packets[6] = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 144 >> 3, 1, 'G', 16); /* H*16 at 160. */ packets[7] = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 160 >> 3, 1, 'H', 16); /* I*8 at 176. */ packets[8] = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 176 >> 3, 1, 'I', 8); /* * Overlapping subsequent fragments. */ /* J*32 at 8. */ packets[9] = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 8 >> 3, 1, 'J', 32); /* K*24 at 48. */ packets[10] = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 48 >> 3, 1, 'K', 24); /* L*24 at 72. */ packets[11] = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 72 >> 3, 1, 'L', 24); /* M*24 at 96. */ packets[12] = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 96 >> 3, 1, 'M', 24); /* N*8 at 128. */ packets[13] = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 128 >> 3, 1, 'N', 8); /* O*8 at 152. */ packets[14] = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 152 >> 3, 1, 'O', 8); /* P*8 at 160. */ packets[15] = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 160 >> 3, 1, 'P', 8); /* Q*16 at 176. */ packets[16] = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 176 >> 3, 0, 'Q', 16); default_policy = policy; /* Send all but the last. */ for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) { Packet *tp = Defrag(NULL, NULL, packets[i], NULL); if (tp != NULL) { SCFree(tp); goto end; } if (ENGINE_ISSET_EVENT(packets[i], IPV4_FRAG_OVERLAP)) { goto end; } } int overlap = 0; for (; i < 16; i++) { Packet *tp = Defrag(NULL, NULL, packets[i], NULL); if (tp != NULL) { SCFree(tp); goto end; } if (ENGINE_ISSET_EVENT(packets[i], IPV4_FRAG_OVERLAP)) { overlap++; } } if (!overlap) { goto end; } /* And now the last one. */ Packet *reassembled = Defrag(NULL, NULL, packets[16], NULL); if (reassembled == NULL) { goto end; } if (IPV4_GET_HLEN(reassembled) != 20) { goto end; } if (IPV4_GET_IPLEN(reassembled) != 20 + 192) { goto end; } if (memcmp(GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled) + 20, expected, expected_len) != 0) { goto end; } SCFree(reassembled); /* Make sure all frags were returned back to the pool. */ if (defrag_context->frag_pool->outstanding != 0) { goto end; } ret = 1; end: for (i = 0; i < 17; i++) { SCFree(packets[i]); } DefragDestroy(); return ret; }
168,295
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: void http_end_txn_clean_session(struct session *s) { int prev_status = s->txn.status; /* FIXME: We need a more portable way of releasing a backend's and a * server's connections. We need a safer way to reinitialize buffer * flags. We also need a more accurate method for computing per-request * data. */ /* unless we're doing keep-alive, we want to quickly close the connection * to the server. */ if (((s->txn.flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_KAL) || !si_conn_ready(s->req->cons)) { s->req->cons->flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER | SI_FL_NOHALF; si_shutr(s->req->cons); si_shutw(s->req->cons); } if (s->flags & SN_BE_ASSIGNED) { s->be->beconn--; if (unlikely(s->srv_conn)) sess_change_server(s, NULL); } s->logs.t_close = tv_ms_elapsed(&s->logs.tv_accept, &now); session_process_counters(s); if (s->txn.status) { int n; n = s->txn.status / 100; if (n < 1 || n > 5) n = 0; if (s->fe->mode == PR_MODE_HTTP) { s->fe->fe_counters.p.http.rsp[n]++; if (s->comp_algo && (s->flags & SN_COMP_READY)) s->fe->fe_counters.p.http.comp_rsp++; } if ((s->flags & SN_BE_ASSIGNED) && (s->be->mode == PR_MODE_HTTP)) { s->be->be_counters.p.http.rsp[n]++; s->be->be_counters.p.http.cum_req++; if (s->comp_algo && (s->flags & SN_COMP_READY)) s->be->be_counters.p.http.comp_rsp++; } } /* don't count other requests' data */ s->logs.bytes_in -= s->req->buf->i; s->logs.bytes_out -= s->rep->buf->i; /* let's do a final log if we need it */ if (!LIST_ISEMPTY(&s->fe->logformat) && s->logs.logwait && !(s->flags & SN_MONITOR) && (!(s->fe->options & PR_O_NULLNOLOG) || s->req->total)) { s->do_log(s); } /* stop tracking content-based counters */ session_stop_content_counters(s); session_update_time_stats(s); s->logs.accept_date = date; /* user-visible date for logging */ s->logs.tv_accept = now; /* corrected date for internal use */ tv_zero(&s->logs.tv_request); s->logs.t_queue = -1; s->logs.t_connect = -1; s->logs.t_data = -1; s->logs.t_close = 0; s->logs.prx_queue_size = 0; /* we get the number of pending conns before us */ s->logs.srv_queue_size = 0; /* we will get this number soon */ s->logs.bytes_in = s->req->total = s->req->buf->i; s->logs.bytes_out = s->rep->total = s->rep->buf->i; if (s->pend_pos) pendconn_free(s->pend_pos); if (objt_server(s->target)) { if (s->flags & SN_CURR_SESS) { s->flags &= ~SN_CURR_SESS; objt_server(s->target)->cur_sess--; } if (may_dequeue_tasks(objt_server(s->target), s->be)) process_srv_queue(objt_server(s->target)); } s->target = NULL; /* only release our endpoint if we don't intend to reuse the * connection. */ if (((s->txn.flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_KAL) || !si_conn_ready(s->req->cons)) { si_release_endpoint(s->req->cons); } s->req->cons->state = s->req->cons->prev_state = SI_ST_INI; s->req->cons->err_type = SI_ET_NONE; s->req->cons->conn_retries = 0; /* used for logging too */ s->req->cons->exp = TICK_ETERNITY; s->req->cons->flags &= SI_FL_DONT_WAKE; /* we're in the context of process_session */ s->req->flags &= ~(CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW|CF_AUTO_CONNECT|CF_WRITE_ERROR|CF_STREAMER|CF_STREAMER_FAST|CF_NEVER_WAIT|CF_WAKE_CONNECT); s->rep->flags &= ~(CF_SHUTR|CF_SHUTR_NOW|CF_READ_ATTACHED|CF_READ_ERROR|CF_READ_NOEXP|CF_STREAMER|CF_STREAMER_FAST|CF_WRITE_PARTIAL|CF_NEVER_WAIT); s->flags &= ~(SN_DIRECT|SN_ASSIGNED|SN_ADDR_SET|SN_BE_ASSIGNED|SN_FORCE_PRST|SN_IGNORE_PRST); s->flags &= ~(SN_CURR_SESS|SN_REDIRECTABLE|SN_SRV_REUSED); s->txn.meth = 0; http_reset_txn(s); s->txn.flags |= TX_NOT_FIRST | TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ; if (prev_status == 401 || prev_status == 407) { /* In HTTP keep-alive mode, if we receive a 401, we still have * a chance of being able to send the visitor again to the same * server over the same connection. This is required by some * broken protocols such as NTLM, and anyway whenever there is * an opportunity for sending the challenge to the proper place, * it's better to do it (at least it helps with debugging). */ s->txn.flags |= TX_PREFER_LAST; } if (s->fe->options2 & PR_O2_INDEPSTR) s->req->cons->flags |= SI_FL_INDEP_STR; if (s->fe->options2 & PR_O2_NODELAY) { s->req->flags |= CF_NEVER_WAIT; s->rep->flags |= CF_NEVER_WAIT; } /* if the request buffer is not empty, it means we're * about to process another request, so send pending * data with MSG_MORE to merge TCP packets when possible. * Just don't do this if the buffer is close to be full, * because the request will wait for it to flush a little * bit before proceeding. */ if (s->req->buf->i) { if (s->rep->buf->o && !buffer_full(s->rep->buf, global.tune.maxrewrite) && bi_end(s->rep->buf) <= s->rep->buf->data + s->rep->buf->size - global.tune.maxrewrite) s->rep->flags |= CF_EXPECT_MORE; } /* we're removing the analysers, we MUST re-enable events detection */ channel_auto_read(s->req); channel_auto_close(s->req); channel_auto_read(s->rep); channel_auto_close(s->rep); /* we're in keep-alive with an idle connection, monitor it */ si_idle_conn(s->req->cons); s->req->analysers = s->listener->analysers; s->rep->analysers = 0; } Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-189
void http_end_txn_clean_session(struct session *s) { int prev_status = s->txn.status; /* FIXME: We need a more portable way of releasing a backend's and a * server's connections. We need a safer way to reinitialize buffer * flags. We also need a more accurate method for computing per-request * data. */ /* unless we're doing keep-alive, we want to quickly close the connection * to the server. */ if (((s->txn.flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_KAL) || !si_conn_ready(s->req->cons)) { s->req->cons->flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER | SI_FL_NOHALF; si_shutr(s->req->cons); si_shutw(s->req->cons); } if (s->flags & SN_BE_ASSIGNED) { s->be->beconn--; if (unlikely(s->srv_conn)) sess_change_server(s, NULL); } s->logs.t_close = tv_ms_elapsed(&s->logs.tv_accept, &now); session_process_counters(s); if (s->txn.status) { int n; n = s->txn.status / 100; if (n < 1 || n > 5) n = 0; if (s->fe->mode == PR_MODE_HTTP) { s->fe->fe_counters.p.http.rsp[n]++; if (s->comp_algo && (s->flags & SN_COMP_READY)) s->fe->fe_counters.p.http.comp_rsp++; } if ((s->flags & SN_BE_ASSIGNED) && (s->be->mode == PR_MODE_HTTP)) { s->be->be_counters.p.http.rsp[n]++; s->be->be_counters.p.http.cum_req++; if (s->comp_algo && (s->flags & SN_COMP_READY)) s->be->be_counters.p.http.comp_rsp++; } } /* don't count other requests' data */ s->logs.bytes_in -= s->req->buf->i; s->logs.bytes_out -= s->rep->buf->i; /* let's do a final log if we need it */ if (!LIST_ISEMPTY(&s->fe->logformat) && s->logs.logwait && !(s->flags & SN_MONITOR) && (!(s->fe->options & PR_O_NULLNOLOG) || s->req->total)) { s->do_log(s); } /* stop tracking content-based counters */ session_stop_content_counters(s); session_update_time_stats(s); s->logs.accept_date = date; /* user-visible date for logging */ s->logs.tv_accept = now; /* corrected date for internal use */ tv_zero(&s->logs.tv_request); s->logs.t_queue = -1; s->logs.t_connect = -1; s->logs.t_data = -1; s->logs.t_close = 0; s->logs.prx_queue_size = 0; /* we get the number of pending conns before us */ s->logs.srv_queue_size = 0; /* we will get this number soon */ s->logs.bytes_in = s->req->total = s->req->buf->i; s->logs.bytes_out = s->rep->total = s->rep->buf->i; if (s->pend_pos) pendconn_free(s->pend_pos); if (objt_server(s->target)) { if (s->flags & SN_CURR_SESS) { s->flags &= ~SN_CURR_SESS; objt_server(s->target)->cur_sess--; } if (may_dequeue_tasks(objt_server(s->target), s->be)) process_srv_queue(objt_server(s->target)); } s->target = NULL; /* only release our endpoint if we don't intend to reuse the * connection. */ if (((s->txn.flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_KAL) || !si_conn_ready(s->req->cons)) { si_release_endpoint(s->req->cons); } s->req->cons->state = s->req->cons->prev_state = SI_ST_INI; s->req->cons->err_type = SI_ET_NONE; s->req->cons->conn_retries = 0; /* used for logging too */ s->req->cons->exp = TICK_ETERNITY; s->req->cons->flags &= SI_FL_DONT_WAKE; /* we're in the context of process_session */ s->req->flags &= ~(CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW|CF_AUTO_CONNECT|CF_WRITE_ERROR|CF_STREAMER|CF_STREAMER_FAST|CF_NEVER_WAIT|CF_WAKE_CONNECT|CF_WROTE_DATA); s->rep->flags &= ~(CF_SHUTR|CF_SHUTR_NOW|CF_READ_ATTACHED|CF_READ_ERROR|CF_READ_NOEXP|CF_STREAMER|CF_STREAMER_FAST|CF_WRITE_PARTIAL|CF_NEVER_WAIT|CF_WROTE_DATA); s->flags &= ~(SN_DIRECT|SN_ASSIGNED|SN_ADDR_SET|SN_BE_ASSIGNED|SN_FORCE_PRST|SN_IGNORE_PRST); s->flags &= ~(SN_CURR_SESS|SN_REDIRECTABLE|SN_SRV_REUSED); s->txn.meth = 0; http_reset_txn(s); s->txn.flags |= TX_NOT_FIRST | TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ; if (prev_status == 401 || prev_status == 407) { /* In HTTP keep-alive mode, if we receive a 401, we still have * a chance of being able to send the visitor again to the same * server over the same connection. This is required by some * broken protocols such as NTLM, and anyway whenever there is * an opportunity for sending the challenge to the proper place, * it's better to do it (at least it helps with debugging). */ s->txn.flags |= TX_PREFER_LAST; } if (s->fe->options2 & PR_O2_INDEPSTR) s->req->cons->flags |= SI_FL_INDEP_STR; if (s->fe->options2 & PR_O2_NODELAY) { s->req->flags |= CF_NEVER_WAIT; s->rep->flags |= CF_NEVER_WAIT; } /* if the request buffer is not empty, it means we're * about to process another request, so send pending * data with MSG_MORE to merge TCP packets when possible. * Just don't do this if the buffer is close to be full, * because the request will wait for it to flush a little * bit before proceeding. */ if (s->req->buf->i) { if (s->rep->buf->o && !buffer_full(s->rep->buf, global.tune.maxrewrite) && bi_end(s->rep->buf) <= s->rep->buf->data + s->rep->buf->size - global.tune.maxrewrite) s->rep->flags |= CF_EXPECT_MORE; } /* we're removing the analysers, we MUST re-enable events detection */ channel_auto_read(s->req); channel_auto_close(s->req); channel_auto_read(s->rep); channel_auto_close(s->rep); /* we're in keep-alive with an idle connection, monitor it */ si_idle_conn(s->req->cons); s->req->analysers = s->listener->analysers; s->rep->analysers = 0; }
164,989
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: void BrowserViewRenderer::SetTotalRootLayerScrollOffset( gfx::Vector2dF scroll_offset_dip) { if (scroll_offset_dip_ == scroll_offset_dip) return; scroll_offset_dip_ = scroll_offset_dip; gfx::Vector2d max_offset = max_scroll_offset(); gfx::Vector2d scroll_offset; if (max_scroll_offset_dip_.x()) { scroll_offset.set_x((scroll_offset_dip.x() * max_offset.x()) / max_scroll_offset_dip_.x()); } if (max_scroll_offset_dip_.y()) { scroll_offset.set_y((scroll_offset_dip.y() * max_offset.y()) / max_scroll_offset_dip_.y()); } DCHECK_LE(0, scroll_offset.x()); DCHECK_LE(0, scroll_offset.y()); DCHECK_LE(scroll_offset.x(), max_offset.x()); DCHECK_LE(scroll_offset.y(), max_offset.y()); client_->ScrollContainerViewTo(scroll_offset); } Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref See bug for reasoning BUG=159273 Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006 Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653} CWE ID: CWE-399
void BrowserViewRenderer::SetTotalRootLayerScrollOffset( const gfx::Vector2dF& scroll_offset_dip) { if (scroll_offset_dip_ == scroll_offset_dip) return; scroll_offset_dip_ = scroll_offset_dip; gfx::Vector2d max_offset = max_scroll_offset(); gfx::Vector2d scroll_offset; if (max_scroll_offset_dip_.x()) { scroll_offset.set_x((scroll_offset_dip.x() * max_offset.x()) / max_scroll_offset_dip_.x()); } if (max_scroll_offset_dip_.y()) { scroll_offset.set_y((scroll_offset_dip.y() * max_offset.y()) / max_scroll_offset_dip_.y()); } DCHECK_LE(0, scroll_offset.x()); DCHECK_LE(0, scroll_offset.y()); DCHECK_LE(scroll_offset.x(), max_offset.x()); DCHECK_LE(scroll_offset.y(), max_offset.y()); client_->ScrollContainerViewTo(scroll_offset); }
171,615
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: bool GDataCache::CreateCacheDirectories( const std::vector<FilePath>& paths_to_create) { bool success = true; for (size_t i = 0; i < paths_to_create.size(); ++i) { if (file_util::DirectoryExists(paths_to_create[i])) continue; if (!file_util::CreateDirectory(paths_to_create[i])) { success = false; PLOG(ERROR) << "Error creating directory " << paths_to_create[i].value(); } else { DVLOG(1) << "Created directory " << paths_to_create[i].value(); } } return success; } Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind: http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance. Besides, it's good to be defensive. BUG=134862 TEST=added unit tests Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020 TBR=satorux@chromium.org git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-119
bool GDataCache::CreateCacheDirectories(
170,861
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: PowerLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetPowerLibrary() { return power_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_); } Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros. This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros function definitions and comments. BUG=none TEST=built it Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-189
PowerLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetPowerLibrary() {
170,628
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static void become_daemon(const char *pidfile) { #ifndef _WIN32 pid_t pid, sid; pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } if (pid > 0) { exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } if (pidfile) { if (!ga_open_pidfile(pidfile)) { g_critical("failed to create pidfile"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } } umask(0); sid = setsid(); if (sid < 0) { goto fail; } if ((chdir("/")) < 0) { goto fail; } reopen_fd_to_null(STDIN_FILENO); reopen_fd_to_null(STDOUT_FILENO); reopen_fd_to_null(STDERR_FILENO); return; fail: if (pidfile) { unlink(pidfile); } g_critical("failed to daemonize"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); #endif } Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-264
static void become_daemon(const char *pidfile) { #ifndef _WIN32 pid_t pid, sid; pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } if (pid > 0) { exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } if (pidfile) { if (!ga_open_pidfile(pidfile)) { g_critical("failed to create pidfile"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } } umask(S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO); sid = setsid(); if (sid < 0) { goto fail; } if ((chdir("/")) < 0) { goto fail; } reopen_fd_to_null(STDIN_FILENO); reopen_fd_to_null(STDOUT_FILENO); reopen_fd_to_null(STDERR_FILENO); return; fail: if (pidfile) { unlink(pidfile); } g_critical("failed to daemonize"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); #endif }
164,724
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static int pvc_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sockaddr, int *sockaddr_len, int peer) { struct sockaddr_atmpvc *addr; struct atm_vcc *vcc = ATM_SD(sock); if (!vcc->dev || !test_bit(ATM_VF_ADDR, &vcc->flags)) return -ENOTCONN; *sockaddr_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_atmpvc); addr = (struct sockaddr_atmpvc *)sockaddr; addr->sap_family = AF_ATMPVC; addr->sap_addr.itf = vcc->dev->number; addr->sap_addr.vpi = vcc->vpi; addr->sap_addr.vci = vcc->vci; return 0; } Commit Message: atm: fix info leak via getsockname() The ATM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct sockaddr_atmpvc inserted for alignment. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CWE ID: CWE-200
static int pvc_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sockaddr, int *sockaddr_len, int peer) { struct sockaddr_atmpvc *addr; struct atm_vcc *vcc = ATM_SD(sock); if (!vcc->dev || !test_bit(ATM_VF_ADDR, &vcc->flags)) return -ENOTCONN; *sockaddr_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_atmpvc); addr = (struct sockaddr_atmpvc *)sockaddr; memset(addr, 0, sizeof(*addr)); addr->sap_family = AF_ATMPVC; addr->sap_addr.itf = vcc->dev->number; addr->sap_addr.vpi = vcc->vpi; addr->sap_addr.vci = vcc->vci; return 0; }
169,896
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: const BlockEntry* Segment::GetBlock(const CuePoint& cp, const CuePoint::TrackPosition& tp) { Cluster** const ii = m_clusters; Cluster** i = ii; const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount; Cluster** const jj = ii + count; Cluster** j = jj; while (i < j) { Cluster** const k = i + (j - i) / 2; assert(k < jj); Cluster* const pCluster = *k; assert(pCluster); const long long pos = pCluster->GetPosition(); assert(pos >= 0); if (pos < tp.m_pos) i = k + 1; else if (pos > tp.m_pos) j = k; else return pCluster->GetEntry(cp, tp); } assert(i == j); Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(this, -1, tp.m_pos); //, -1); assert(pCluster); const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_clusters; PreloadCluster(pCluster, idx); assert(m_clusters); assert(m_clusterPreloadCount > 0); assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster); return pCluster->GetEntry(cp, tp); } Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream. Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b BUG=23167726 Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207 (cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a) CWE ID: CWE-20
const BlockEntry* Segment::GetBlock(const CuePoint& cp, const CuePoint::TrackPosition& tp) { Cluster** const ii = m_clusters; Cluster** i = ii; const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount; Cluster** const jj = ii + count; Cluster** j = jj; while (i < j) { Cluster** const k = i + (j - i) / 2; assert(k < jj); Cluster* const pCluster = *k; assert(pCluster); const long long pos = pCluster->GetPosition(); assert(pos >= 0); if (pos < tp.m_pos) i = k + 1; else if (pos > tp.m_pos) j = k; else return pCluster->GetEntry(cp, tp); } assert(i == j); Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(this, -1, tp.m_pos); //, -1); if (pCluster == NULL) return NULL; const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_clusters; if (!PreloadCluster(pCluster, idx)) { delete pCluster; return NULL; } assert(m_clusters); assert(m_clusterPreloadCount > 0); assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster); return pCluster->GetEntry(cp, tp); }
173,814
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static int local_name_to_path(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path, const char *name, V9fsPath *target) { if (dir_path) { v9fs_path_sprintf(target, "%s/%s", dir_path->data, name); } else { v9fs_path_sprintf(target, "%s", name); } return 0; } Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-732
static int local_name_to_path(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path, const char *name, V9fsPath *target) { if (dir_path) { v9fs_path_sprintf(target, "%s/%s", dir_path->data, name); } else if (strcmp(name, "/")) { v9fs_path_sprintf(target, "%s", name); } else { /* We want the path of the export root to be relative, otherwise * "*at()" syscalls would treat it as "/" in the host. */ v9fs_path_sprintf(target, "%s", "."); } return 0; }
165,457
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: static Sdb *store_versioninfo_gnu_verneed(ELFOBJ *bin, Elf_(Shdr) *shdr, int sz) { ut8 *end, *need = NULL; const char *section_name = ""; Elf_(Shdr) *link_shdr = NULL; const char *link_section_name = ""; Sdb *sdb_vernaux = NULL; Sdb *sdb_version = NULL; Sdb *sdb = NULL; int i, cnt; if (!bin || !bin->dynstr) { return NULL; } if (shdr->sh_link > bin->ehdr.e_shnum) { return NULL; } if (shdr->sh_size < 1) { return NULL; } sdb = sdb_new0 (); if (!sdb) { return NULL; } link_shdr = &bin->shdr[shdr->sh_link]; if (bin->shstrtab && shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) { section_name = &bin->shstrtab[shdr->sh_name]; } if (bin->shstrtab && link_shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) { link_section_name = &bin->shstrtab[link_shdr->sh_name]; } if (!(need = (ut8*) calloc (R_MAX (1, shdr->sh_size), sizeof (ut8)))) { bprintf ("Warning: Cannot allocate memory for Elf_(Verneed)\n"); goto beach; } end = need + shdr->sh_size; sdb_set (sdb, "section_name", section_name, 0); sdb_num_set (sdb, "num_entries", shdr->sh_info, 0); sdb_num_set (sdb, "addr", shdr->sh_addr, 0); sdb_num_set (sdb, "offset", shdr->sh_offset, 0); sdb_num_set (sdb, "link", shdr->sh_link, 0); sdb_set (sdb, "link_section_name", link_section_name, 0); if (shdr->sh_offset > bin->size || shdr->sh_offset + shdr->sh_size > bin->size) { goto beach; } if (shdr->sh_offset + shdr->sh_size < shdr->sh_size) { goto beach; } i = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, shdr->sh_offset, need, shdr->sh_size); if (i < 0) goto beach; for (i = 0, cnt = 0; cnt < shdr->sh_info; ++cnt) { int j, isum; ut8 *vstart = need + i; Elf_(Verneed) vvn = {0}; if (vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verneed)) > end) { goto beach; } Elf_(Verneed) *entry = &vvn; char key[32] = {0}; sdb_version = sdb_new0 (); if (!sdb_version) { goto beach; } j = 0; vvn.vn_version = READ16 (vstart, j) vvn.vn_cnt = READ16 (vstart, j) vvn.vn_file = READ32 (vstart, j) vvn.vn_aux = READ32 (vstart, j) vvn.vn_next = READ32 (vstart, j) sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "vn_version", entry->vn_version, 0); sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "idx", i, 0); if (entry->vn_file > bin->dynstr_size) { goto beach; } { char *s = r_str_ndup (&bin->dynstr[entry->vn_file], 16); sdb_set (sdb_version, "file_name", s, 0); free (s); } sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "cnt", entry->vn_cnt, 0); st32 vnaux = entry->vn_aux; if (vnaux < 1) { goto beach; } vstart += vnaux; for (j = 0, isum = i + entry->vn_aux; j < entry->vn_cnt && vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Vernaux)) <= end; ++j) { int k; Elf_(Vernaux) * aux = NULL; Elf_(Vernaux) vaux = {0}; sdb_vernaux = sdb_new0 (); if (!sdb_vernaux) { goto beach; } aux = (Elf_(Vernaux)*)&vaux; k = 0; vaux.vna_hash = READ32 (vstart, k) vaux.vna_flags = READ16 (vstart, k) vaux.vna_other = READ16 (vstart, k) vaux.vna_name = READ32 (vstart, k) vaux.vna_next = READ32 (vstart, k) if (aux->vna_name > bin->dynstr_size) { goto beach; } sdb_num_set (sdb_vernaux, "idx", isum, 0); if (aux->vna_name > 0 && aux->vna_name + 8 < bin->dynstr_size) { char name [16]; strncpy (name, &bin->dynstr[aux->vna_name], sizeof (name)-1); name[sizeof(name)-1] = 0; sdb_set (sdb_vernaux, "name", name, 0); } sdb_set (sdb_vernaux, "flags", get_ver_flags (aux->vna_flags), 0); sdb_num_set (sdb_vernaux, "version", aux->vna_other, 0); isum += aux->vna_next; vstart += aux->vna_next; snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "vernaux%d", j); sdb_ns_set (sdb_version, key, sdb_vernaux); } if ((int)entry->vn_next < 0) { bprintf ("Invalid vn_next\n"); break; } i += entry->vn_next; snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "version%d", cnt ); sdb_ns_set (sdb, key, sdb_version); if (!entry->vn_next) { break; } } free (need); return sdb; beach: free (need); sdb_free (sdb_vernaux); sdb_free (sdb_version); sdb_free (sdb); return NULL; } Commit Message: Fixed crash in elf.c with 32bit r2 when shdr->sh_size > max size_t CWE ID: CWE-119
static Sdb *store_versioninfo_gnu_verneed(ELFOBJ *bin, Elf_(Shdr) *shdr, int sz) { ut8 *end, *need = NULL; const char *section_name = ""; Elf_(Shdr) *link_shdr = NULL; const char *link_section_name = ""; Sdb *sdb_vernaux = NULL; Sdb *sdb_version = NULL; Sdb *sdb = NULL; int i, cnt; if (!bin || !bin->dynstr) { return NULL; } if (shdr->sh_link > bin->ehdr.e_shnum) { return NULL; } if (shdr->sh_size < 1 || shdr->sh_size > SIZE_MAX) { return NULL; } sdb = sdb_new0 (); if (!sdb) { return NULL; } link_shdr = &bin->shdr[shdr->sh_link]; if (bin->shstrtab && shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) { section_name = &bin->shstrtab[shdr->sh_name]; } if (bin->shstrtab && link_shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) { link_section_name = &bin->shstrtab[link_shdr->sh_name]; } if (!(need = (ut8*) calloc (R_MAX (1, shdr->sh_size), sizeof (ut8)))) { bprintf ("Warning: Cannot allocate memory for Elf_(Verneed)\n"); goto beach; } end = need + shdr->sh_size; sdb_set (sdb, "section_name", section_name, 0); sdb_num_set (sdb, "num_entries", shdr->sh_info, 0); sdb_num_set (sdb, "addr", shdr->sh_addr, 0); sdb_num_set (sdb, "offset", shdr->sh_offset, 0); sdb_num_set (sdb, "link", shdr->sh_link, 0); sdb_set (sdb, "link_section_name", link_section_name, 0); if (shdr->sh_offset > bin->size || shdr->sh_offset + shdr->sh_size > bin->size) { goto beach; } if (shdr->sh_offset + shdr->sh_size < shdr->sh_size) { goto beach; } i = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, shdr->sh_offset, need, shdr->sh_size); if (i < 0) goto beach; for (i = 0, cnt = 0; cnt < shdr->sh_info; ++cnt) { int j, isum; ut8 *vstart = need + i; Elf_(Verneed) vvn = {0}; if (vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verneed)) > end) { goto beach; } Elf_(Verneed) *entry = &vvn; char key[32] = {0}; sdb_version = sdb_new0 (); if (!sdb_version) { goto beach; } j = 0; vvn.vn_version = READ16 (vstart, j) vvn.vn_cnt = READ16 (vstart, j) vvn.vn_file = READ32 (vstart, j) vvn.vn_aux = READ32 (vstart, j) vvn.vn_next = READ32 (vstart, j) sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "vn_version", entry->vn_version, 0); sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "idx", i, 0); if (entry->vn_file > bin->dynstr_size) { goto beach; } { char *s = r_str_ndup (&bin->dynstr[entry->vn_file], 16); sdb_set (sdb_version, "file_name", s, 0); free (s); } sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "cnt", entry->vn_cnt, 0); st32 vnaux = entry->vn_aux; if (vnaux < 1) { goto beach; } vstart += vnaux; for (j = 0, isum = i + entry->vn_aux; j < entry->vn_cnt && vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Vernaux)) <= end; ++j) { int k; Elf_(Vernaux) * aux = NULL; Elf_(Vernaux) vaux = {0}; sdb_vernaux = sdb_new0 (); if (!sdb_vernaux) { goto beach; } aux = (Elf_(Vernaux)*)&vaux; k = 0; vaux.vna_hash = READ32 (vstart, k) vaux.vna_flags = READ16 (vstart, k) vaux.vna_other = READ16 (vstart, k) vaux.vna_name = READ32 (vstart, k) vaux.vna_next = READ32 (vstart, k) if (aux->vna_name > bin->dynstr_size) { goto beach; } sdb_num_set (sdb_vernaux, "idx", isum, 0); if (aux->vna_name > 0 && aux->vna_name + 8 < bin->dynstr_size) { char name [16]; strncpy (name, &bin->dynstr[aux->vna_name], sizeof (name)-1); name[sizeof(name)-1] = 0; sdb_set (sdb_vernaux, "name", name, 0); } sdb_set (sdb_vernaux, "flags", get_ver_flags (aux->vna_flags), 0); sdb_num_set (sdb_vernaux, "version", aux->vna_other, 0); isum += aux->vna_next; vstart += aux->vna_next; snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "vernaux%d", j); sdb_ns_set (sdb_version, key, sdb_vernaux); } if ((int)entry->vn_next < 0) { bprintf ("Invalid vn_next\n"); break; } i += entry->vn_next; snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "version%d", cnt ); sdb_ns_set (sdb, key, sdb_version); if (!entry->vn_next) { break; } } free (need); return sdb; beach: free (need); sdb_free (sdb_vernaux); sdb_free (sdb_version); sdb_free (sdb); return NULL; }
167,690
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction(ExecState* exec) { JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue(); if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestActiveDOMObject::s_info)) return throwVMTypeError(exec); JSTestActiveDOMObject* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestActiveDOMObject*>(asObject(thisValue)); ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestActiveDOMObject::s_info); if (!castedThis->allowsAccessFrom(exec)) return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined()); TestActiveDOMObject* impl = static_cast<TestActiveDOMObject*>(castedThis->impl()); if (exec->argumentCount() < 1) return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments")); Node* nextChild(toNode(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))); if (exec->hadException()) return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined()); impl->excitingFunction(nextChild); return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined()); } Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError() https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102 Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen. In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there. This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec) and uses it in JSC bindings. c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097. Source/JavaScriptCore: * runtime/Error.cpp: (JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError): (JSC): * runtime/Error.h: (JSC): Source/WebCore: Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl * bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above. (GenerateArgumentsCountCheck): * bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto. (WebCore::getDataViewMember): (WebCore::setDataViewMember): * bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp: (WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection): * bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp: (WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile): (WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory): * bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp: (WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker): * bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp: (WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver): (WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe): * bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp: (WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker): * bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests. (WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo): * bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp: (WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction): (WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage): * bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp: (WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction): * bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp: (WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem): (WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener): (WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener): (WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent): * bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp: (WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface): (WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2): * bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp: (WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod): * bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp: (WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor): * bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp: (WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7): (WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2): (WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11): (WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5): (WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction): * bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp: (WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface): (WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList): git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 CWE ID: CWE-20
EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction(ExecState* exec) { JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue(); if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestActiveDOMObject::s_info)) return throwVMTypeError(exec); JSTestActiveDOMObject* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestActiveDOMObject*>(asObject(thisValue)); ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestActiveDOMObject::s_info); if (!castedThis->allowsAccessFrom(exec)) return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined()); TestActiveDOMObject* impl = static_cast<TestActiveDOMObject*>(castedThis->impl()); if (exec->argumentCount() < 1) return throwVMError(exec, createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)); Node* nextChild(toNode(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))); if (exec->hadException()) return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined()); impl->excitingFunction(nextChild); return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined()); }
170,567
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: pim_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *bp, register u_int len, const u_char *bp2) { register const u_char *ep; register const struct pim *pim = (const struct pim *)bp; ep = (const u_char *)ndo->ndo_snapend; if (bp >= ep) return; #ifdef notyet /* currently we see only version and type */ ND_TCHECK(pim->pim_rsv); #endif switch (PIM_VER(pim->pim_typever)) { case 2: if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) { ND_PRINT((ndo, "PIMv%u, %s, length %u", PIM_VER(pim->pim_typever), tok2str(pimv2_type_values,"Unknown Type",PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever)), len)); return; } else { ND_PRINT((ndo, "PIMv%u, length %u\n\t%s", PIM_VER(pim->pim_typever), len, tok2str(pimv2_type_values,"Unknown Type",PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever)))); pimv2_print(ndo, bp, len, bp2); } break; default: ND_PRINT((ndo, "PIMv%u, length %u", PIM_VER(pim->pim_typever), len)); break; } return; } Commit Message: CVE-2017-13030/PIM: Redo bounds checks and add length checks. Use ND_TCHECK macros to do bounds checking, and add length checks before the bounds checks. Add a bounds check that the review process found was missing. This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry, SecT/TU Berlin. Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture. Update one test output file to reflect the changes. CWE ID: CWE-125
pim_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *bp, register u_int len, const u_char *bp2) { register const struct pim *pim = (const struct pim *)bp; #ifdef notyet /* currently we see only version and type */ ND_TCHECK(pim->pim_rsv); #endif ND_TCHECK(pim->pim_typever); switch (PIM_VER(pim->pim_typever)) { case 2: if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) { ND_PRINT((ndo, "PIMv%u, %s, length %u", PIM_VER(pim->pim_typever), tok2str(pimv2_type_values,"Unknown Type",PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever)), len)); return; } else { ND_PRINT((ndo, "PIMv%u, length %u\n\t%s", PIM_VER(pim->pim_typever), len, tok2str(pimv2_type_values,"Unknown Type",PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever)))); pimv2_print(ndo, bp, len, bp2); } break; default: ND_PRINT((ndo, "PIMv%u, length %u", PIM_VER(pim->pim_typever), len)); break; } return; trunc: ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|pim]")); return; }
167,854
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: WindowOpenDisposition BrowserView::GetDispositionForPopupBounds( const gfx::Rect& bounds) { return WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_POPUP; } Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen. It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.) This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton of override code put in just to support this. BUG=858929, 868416 TEST=as in bugs Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455 Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755} CWE ID: CWE-20
WindowOpenDisposition BrowserView::GetDispositionForPopupBounds(
173,207
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: void BlobURLRequestJob::CountSize() { error_ = false; pending_get_file_info_count_ = 0; total_size_ = 0; item_length_list_.resize(blob_data_->items().size()); for (size_t i = 0; i < blob_data_->items().size(); ++i) { const BlobData::Item& item = blob_data_->items().at(i); if (IsFileType(item.type())) { ++pending_get_file_info_count_; GetFileStreamReader(i)->GetLength( base::Bind(&BlobURLRequestJob::DidGetFileItemLength, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), i)); continue; } int64 item_length = static_cast<int64>(item.length()); item_length_list_[i] = item_length; total_size_ += item_length; } if (pending_get_file_info_count_ == 0) DidCountSize(net::OK); } Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob. BUG=169685 Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-189
void BlobURLRequestJob::CountSize() { error_ = false; pending_get_file_info_count_ = 0; total_size_ = 0; item_length_list_.resize(blob_data_->items().size()); for (size_t i = 0; i < blob_data_->items().size(); ++i) { const BlobData::Item& item = blob_data_->items().at(i); if (IsFileType(item.type())) { ++pending_get_file_info_count_; GetFileStreamReader(i)->GetLength( base::Bind(&BlobURLRequestJob::DidGetFileItemLength, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), i)); continue; } if (!AddItemLength(i, item.length())) return; } if (pending_get_file_info_count_ == 0) DidCountSize(net::OK); }
171,398
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: smtp_log_to_file(smtp_t *smtp) { FILE *fp = fopen("/tmp/smtp-alert.log", "a"); time_t now; struct tm tm; char time_buf[25]; int time_buf_len; time(&now); localtime_r(&now, &tm); time_buf_len = strftime(time_buf, sizeof time_buf, "%a %b %e %X %Y", &tm); fprintf(fp, "%s: %s -> %s\n" "%*sSubject: %s\n" "%*sBody: %s\n\n", time_buf, global_data->email_from, smtp->email_to, time_buf_len - 7, "", smtp->subject, time_buf_len - 7, "", smtp->body); fclose(fp); free_smtp_all(smtp); } Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd, writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus) would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten. This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening a file for writing. This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case, instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to /tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via /home/fred/keepalived.data. There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility, since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening for writing would create a race condition. Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk> CWE ID: CWE-59
smtp_log_to_file(smtp_t *smtp) { FILE *fp = fopen_safe("/tmp/smtp-alert.log", "a"); time_t now; struct tm tm; char time_buf[25]; int time_buf_len; time(&now); localtime_r(&now, &tm); time_buf_len = strftime(time_buf, sizeof time_buf, "%a %b %e %X %Y", &tm); fprintf(fp, "%s: %s -> %s\n" "%*sSubject: %s\n" "%*sBody: %s\n\n", time_buf, global_data->email_from, smtp->email_to, time_buf_len - 7, "", smtp->subject, time_buf_len - 7, "", smtp->body); fclose(fp); free_smtp_all(smtp); }
168,987
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: int attribute_align_arg avcodec_open2(AVCodecContext *avctx, const AVCodec *codec, AVDictionary **options) { int ret = 0; int codec_init_ok = 0; AVDictionary *tmp = NULL; const AVPixFmtDescriptor *pixdesc; if (avcodec_is_open(avctx)) return 0; if ((!codec && !avctx->codec)) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "No codec provided to avcodec_open2()\n"); return AVERROR(EINVAL); } if ((codec && avctx->codec && codec != avctx->codec)) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "This AVCodecContext was allocated for %s, " "but %s passed to avcodec_open2()\n", avctx->codec->name, codec->name); return AVERROR(EINVAL); } if (!codec) codec = avctx->codec; if (avctx->extradata_size < 0 || avctx->extradata_size >= FF_MAX_EXTRADATA_SIZE) return AVERROR(EINVAL); if (options) av_dict_copy(&tmp, *options, 0); ff_lock_avcodec(avctx, codec); avctx->internal = av_mallocz(sizeof(*avctx->internal)); if (!avctx->internal) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto end; } avctx->internal->pool = av_mallocz(sizeof(*avctx->internal->pool)); if (!avctx->internal->pool) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto free_and_end; } avctx->internal->to_free = av_frame_alloc(); if (!avctx->internal->to_free) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto free_and_end; } avctx->internal->compat_decode_frame = av_frame_alloc(); if (!avctx->internal->compat_decode_frame) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto free_and_end; } avctx->internal->buffer_frame = av_frame_alloc(); if (!avctx->internal->buffer_frame) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto free_and_end; } avctx->internal->buffer_pkt = av_packet_alloc(); if (!avctx->internal->buffer_pkt) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto free_and_end; } avctx->internal->ds.in_pkt = av_packet_alloc(); if (!avctx->internal->ds.in_pkt) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto free_and_end; } avctx->internal->last_pkt_props = av_packet_alloc(); if (!avctx->internal->last_pkt_props) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto free_and_end; } avctx->internal->skip_samples_multiplier = 1; if (codec->priv_data_size > 0) { if (!avctx->priv_data) { avctx->priv_data = av_mallocz(codec->priv_data_size); if (!avctx->priv_data) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto end; } if (codec->priv_class) { *(const AVClass **)avctx->priv_data = codec->priv_class; av_opt_set_defaults(avctx->priv_data); } } if (codec->priv_class && (ret = av_opt_set_dict(avctx->priv_data, &tmp)) < 0) goto free_and_end; } else { avctx->priv_data = NULL; } if ((ret = av_opt_set_dict(avctx, &tmp)) < 0) goto free_and_end; if (avctx->codec_whitelist && av_match_list(codec->name, avctx->codec_whitelist, ',') <= 0) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Codec (%s) not on whitelist \'%s\'\n", codec->name, avctx->codec_whitelist); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } if (!(avctx->coded_width && avctx->coded_height && avctx->width && avctx->height && (avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264 || avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VP6F || avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_DXV))) { if (avctx->coded_width && avctx->coded_height) ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, avctx->coded_width, avctx->coded_height); else if (avctx->width && avctx->height) ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, avctx->width, avctx->height); if (ret < 0) goto free_and_end; } if ((avctx->coded_width || avctx->coded_height || avctx->width || avctx->height) && ( av_image_check_size2(avctx->coded_width, avctx->coded_height, avctx->max_pixels, AV_PIX_FMT_NONE, 0, avctx) < 0 || av_image_check_size2(avctx->width, avctx->height, avctx->max_pixels, AV_PIX_FMT_NONE, 0, avctx) < 0)) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Ignoring invalid width/height values\n"); ff_set_dimensions(avctx, 0, 0); } if (avctx->width > 0 && avctx->height > 0) { if (av_image_check_sar(avctx->width, avctx->height, avctx->sample_aspect_ratio) < 0) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "ignoring invalid SAR: %u/%u\n", avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.num, avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.den); avctx->sample_aspect_ratio = (AVRational){ 0, 1 }; } } /* if the decoder init function was already called previously, * free the already allocated subtitle_header before overwriting it */ if (av_codec_is_decoder(codec)) av_freep(&avctx->subtitle_header); if (avctx->channels > FF_SANE_NB_CHANNELS) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Too many channels: %d\n", avctx->channels); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } avctx->codec = codec; if ((avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_UNKNOWN || avctx->codec_type == codec->type) && avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_NONE) { avctx->codec_type = codec->type; avctx->codec_id = codec->id; } if (avctx->codec_id != codec->id || (avctx->codec_type != codec->type && avctx->codec_type != AVMEDIA_TYPE_ATTACHMENT)) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Codec type or id mismatches\n"); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } avctx->frame_number = 0; avctx->codec_descriptor = avcodec_descriptor_get(avctx->codec_id); if ((avctx->codec->capabilities & AV_CODEC_CAP_EXPERIMENTAL) && avctx->strict_std_compliance > FF_COMPLIANCE_EXPERIMENTAL) { const char *codec_string = av_codec_is_encoder(codec) ? "encoder" : "decoder"; AVCodec *codec2; av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "The %s '%s' is experimental but experimental codecs are not enabled, " "add '-strict %d' if you want to use it.\n", codec_string, codec->name, FF_COMPLIANCE_EXPERIMENTAL); codec2 = av_codec_is_encoder(codec) ? avcodec_find_encoder(codec->id) : avcodec_find_decoder(codec->id); if (!(codec2->capabilities & AV_CODEC_CAP_EXPERIMENTAL)) av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Alternatively use the non experimental %s '%s'.\n", codec_string, codec2->name); ret = AVERROR_EXPERIMENTAL; goto free_and_end; } if (avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO && (!avctx->time_base.num || !avctx->time_base.den)) { avctx->time_base.num = 1; avctx->time_base.den = avctx->sample_rate; } if (!HAVE_THREADS) av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: not compiled with thread support, using thread emulation\n"); if (CONFIG_FRAME_THREAD_ENCODER && av_codec_is_encoder(avctx->codec)) { ff_unlock_avcodec(codec); //we will instantiate a few encoders thus kick the counter to prevent false detection of a problem ret = ff_frame_thread_encoder_init(avctx, options ? *options : NULL); ff_lock_avcodec(avctx, codec); if (ret < 0) goto free_and_end; } if (av_codec_is_decoder(avctx->codec)) { ret = ff_decode_bsfs_init(avctx); if (ret < 0) goto free_and_end; } if (HAVE_THREADS && !(avctx->internal->frame_thread_encoder && (avctx->active_thread_type&FF_THREAD_FRAME))) { ret = ff_thread_init(avctx); if (ret < 0) { goto free_and_end; } } if (!HAVE_THREADS && !(codec->capabilities & AV_CODEC_CAP_AUTO_THREADS)) avctx->thread_count = 1; if (avctx->codec->max_lowres < avctx->lowres || avctx->lowres < 0) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "The maximum value for lowres supported by the decoder is %d\n", avctx->codec->max_lowres); avctx->lowres = avctx->codec->max_lowres; } if (av_codec_is_encoder(avctx->codec)) { int i; #if FF_API_CODED_FRAME FF_DISABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS avctx->coded_frame = av_frame_alloc(); if (!avctx->coded_frame) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto free_and_end; } FF_ENABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS #endif if (avctx->time_base.num <= 0 || avctx->time_base.den <= 0) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "The encoder timebase is not set.\n"); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } if (avctx->codec->sample_fmts) { for (i = 0; avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i] != AV_SAMPLE_FMT_NONE; i++) { if (avctx->sample_fmt == avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i]) break; if (avctx->channels == 1 && av_get_planar_sample_fmt(avctx->sample_fmt) == av_get_planar_sample_fmt(avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i])) { avctx->sample_fmt = avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i]; break; } } if (avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i] == AV_SAMPLE_FMT_NONE) { char buf[128]; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", avctx->sample_fmt); av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified sample format %s is invalid or not supported\n", (char *)av_x_if_null(av_get_sample_fmt_name(avctx->sample_fmt), buf)); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } } if (avctx->codec->pix_fmts) { for (i = 0; avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] != AV_PIX_FMT_NONE; i++) if (avctx->pix_fmt == avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i]) break; if (avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_NONE && !((avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MJPEG || avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_LJPEG) && avctx->strict_std_compliance <= FF_COMPLIANCE_UNOFFICIAL)) { char buf[128]; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", avctx->pix_fmt); av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified pixel format %s is invalid or not supported\n", (char *)av_x_if_null(av_get_pix_fmt_name(avctx->pix_fmt), buf)); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } if (avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ420P || avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ411P || avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ422P || avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ440P || avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ444P) avctx->color_range = AVCOL_RANGE_JPEG; } if (avctx->codec->supported_samplerates) { for (i = 0; avctx->codec->supported_samplerates[i] != 0; i++) if (avctx->sample_rate == avctx->codec->supported_samplerates[i]) break; if (avctx->codec->supported_samplerates[i] == 0) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified sample rate %d is not supported\n", avctx->sample_rate); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } } if (avctx->sample_rate < 0) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified sample rate %d is not supported\n", avctx->sample_rate); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } if (avctx->codec->channel_layouts) { if (!avctx->channel_layout) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Channel layout not specified\n"); } else { for (i = 0; avctx->codec->channel_layouts[i] != 0; i++) if (avctx->channel_layout == avctx->codec->channel_layouts[i]) break; if (avctx->codec->channel_layouts[i] == 0) { char buf[512]; av_get_channel_layout_string(buf, sizeof(buf), -1, avctx->channel_layout); av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified channel layout '%s' is not supported\n", buf); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } } } if (avctx->channel_layout && avctx->channels) { int channels = av_get_channel_layout_nb_channels(avctx->channel_layout); if (channels != avctx->channels) { char buf[512]; av_get_channel_layout_string(buf, sizeof(buf), -1, avctx->channel_layout); av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Channel layout '%s' with %d channels does not match number of specified channels %d\n", buf, channels, avctx->channels); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } } else if (avctx->channel_layout) { avctx->channels = av_get_channel_layout_nb_channels(avctx->channel_layout); } if (avctx->channels < 0) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified number of channels %d is not supported\n", avctx->channels); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } if(avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO) { pixdesc = av_pix_fmt_desc_get(avctx->pix_fmt); if ( avctx->bits_per_raw_sample < 0 || (avctx->bits_per_raw_sample > 8 && pixdesc->comp[0].depth <= 8)) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Specified bit depth %d not possible with the specified pixel formats depth %d\n", avctx->bits_per_raw_sample, pixdesc->comp[0].depth); avctx->bits_per_raw_sample = pixdesc->comp[0].depth; } if (avctx->width <= 0 || avctx->height <= 0) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "dimensions not set\n"); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } } if ( (avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO || avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO) && avctx->bit_rate>0 && avctx->bit_rate<1000) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Bitrate %"PRId64" is extremely low, maybe you mean %"PRId64"k\n", avctx->bit_rate, avctx->bit_rate); } if (!avctx->rc_initial_buffer_occupancy) avctx->rc_initial_buffer_occupancy = avctx->rc_buffer_size * 3LL / 4; if (avctx->ticks_per_frame && avctx->time_base.num && avctx->ticks_per_frame > INT_MAX / avctx->time_base.num) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "ticks_per_frame %d too large for the timebase %d/%d.", avctx->ticks_per_frame, avctx->time_base.num, avctx->time_base.den); goto free_and_end; } if (avctx->hw_frames_ctx) { AVHWFramesContext *frames_ctx = (AVHWFramesContext*)avctx->hw_frames_ctx->data; if (frames_ctx->format != avctx->pix_fmt) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Mismatching AVCodecContext.pix_fmt and AVHWFramesContext.format\n"); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } if (avctx->sw_pix_fmt != AV_PIX_FMT_NONE && avctx->sw_pix_fmt != frames_ctx->sw_format) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Mismatching AVCodecContext.sw_pix_fmt (%s) " "and AVHWFramesContext.sw_format (%s)\n", av_get_pix_fmt_name(avctx->sw_pix_fmt), av_get_pix_fmt_name(frames_ctx->sw_format)); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } avctx->sw_pix_fmt = frames_ctx->sw_format; } } avctx->pts_correction_num_faulty_pts = avctx->pts_correction_num_faulty_dts = 0; avctx->pts_correction_last_pts = avctx->pts_correction_last_dts = INT64_MIN; if ( !CONFIG_GRAY && avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_GRAY && avctx->codec_descriptor->type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO) av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "gray decoding requested but not enabled at configuration time\n"); if ( avctx->codec->init && (!(avctx->active_thread_type&FF_THREAD_FRAME) || avctx->internal->frame_thread_encoder)) { ret = avctx->codec->init(avctx); if (ret < 0) { goto free_and_end; } codec_init_ok = 1; } ret=0; if (av_codec_is_decoder(avctx->codec)) { if (!avctx->bit_rate) avctx->bit_rate = get_bit_rate(avctx); /* validate channel layout from the decoder */ if (avctx->channel_layout) { int channels = av_get_channel_layout_nb_channels(avctx->channel_layout); if (!avctx->channels) avctx->channels = channels; else if (channels != avctx->channels) { char buf[512]; av_get_channel_layout_string(buf, sizeof(buf), -1, avctx->channel_layout); av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Channel layout '%s' with %d channels does not match specified number of channels %d: " "ignoring specified channel layout\n", buf, channels, avctx->channels); avctx->channel_layout = 0; } } if (avctx->channels && avctx->channels < 0 || avctx->channels > FF_SANE_NB_CHANNELS) { ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } if (avctx->bits_per_coded_sample < 0) { ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } if (avctx->sub_charenc) { if (avctx->codec_type != AVMEDIA_TYPE_SUBTITLE) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Character encoding is only " "supported with subtitles codecs\n"); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } else if (avctx->codec_descriptor->props & AV_CODEC_PROP_BITMAP_SUB) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Codec '%s' is bitmap-based, " "subtitles character encoding will be ignored\n", avctx->codec_descriptor->name); avctx->sub_charenc_mode = FF_SUB_CHARENC_MODE_DO_NOTHING; } else { /* input character encoding is set for a text based subtitle * codec at this point */ if (avctx->sub_charenc_mode == FF_SUB_CHARENC_MODE_AUTOMATIC) avctx->sub_charenc_mode = FF_SUB_CHARENC_MODE_PRE_DECODER; if (avctx->sub_charenc_mode == FF_SUB_CHARENC_MODE_PRE_DECODER) { #if CONFIG_ICONV iconv_t cd = iconv_open("UTF-8", avctx->sub_charenc); if (cd == (iconv_t)-1) { ret = AVERROR(errno); av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to open iconv context " "with input character encoding \"%s\"\n", avctx->sub_charenc); goto free_and_end; } iconv_close(cd); #else av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Character encoding subtitles " "conversion needs a libavcodec built with iconv support " "for this codec\n"); ret = AVERROR(ENOSYS); goto free_and_end; #endif } } } #if FF_API_AVCTX_TIMEBASE if (avctx->framerate.num > 0 && avctx->framerate.den > 0) avctx->time_base = av_inv_q(av_mul_q(avctx->framerate, (AVRational){avctx->ticks_per_frame, 1})); #endif } if (codec->priv_data_size > 0 && avctx->priv_data && codec->priv_class) { av_assert0(*(const AVClass **)avctx->priv_data == codec->priv_class); } end: ff_unlock_avcodec(codec); if (options) { av_dict_free(options); *options = tmp; } return ret; free_and_end: if (avctx->codec && (codec_init_ok || (avctx->codec->caps_internal & FF_CODEC_CAP_INIT_CLEANUP))) avctx->codec->close(avctx); if (codec->priv_class && codec->priv_data_size) av_opt_free(avctx->priv_data); av_opt_free(avctx); #if FF_API_CODED_FRAME FF_DISABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS av_frame_free(&avctx->coded_frame); FF_ENABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS #endif av_dict_free(&tmp); av_freep(&avctx->priv_data); if (avctx->internal) { av_frame_free(&avctx->internal->to_free); av_frame_free(&avctx->internal->compat_decode_frame); av_frame_free(&avctx->internal->buffer_frame); av_packet_free(&avctx->internal->buffer_pkt); av_packet_free(&avctx->internal->last_pkt_props); av_packet_free(&avctx->internal->ds.in_pkt); ff_decode_bsfs_uninit(avctx); av_freep(&avctx->internal->pool); } av_freep(&avctx->internal); avctx->codec = NULL; goto end; } Commit Message: avcodec/utils: Check close before calling it Fixes: NULL pointer dereference Fixes: 15733/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_IDF_fuzzer-5658616977162240 Reviewed-by: Paul B Mahol <onemda@gmail.com> Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc> CWE ID:
int attribute_align_arg avcodec_open2(AVCodecContext *avctx, const AVCodec *codec, AVDictionary **options) { int ret = 0; int codec_init_ok = 0; AVDictionary *tmp = NULL; const AVPixFmtDescriptor *pixdesc; if (avcodec_is_open(avctx)) return 0; if ((!codec && !avctx->codec)) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "No codec provided to avcodec_open2()\n"); return AVERROR(EINVAL); } if ((codec && avctx->codec && codec != avctx->codec)) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "This AVCodecContext was allocated for %s, " "but %s passed to avcodec_open2()\n", avctx->codec->name, codec->name); return AVERROR(EINVAL); } if (!codec) codec = avctx->codec; if (avctx->extradata_size < 0 || avctx->extradata_size >= FF_MAX_EXTRADATA_SIZE) return AVERROR(EINVAL); if (options) av_dict_copy(&tmp, *options, 0); ff_lock_avcodec(avctx, codec); avctx->internal = av_mallocz(sizeof(*avctx->internal)); if (!avctx->internal) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto end; } avctx->internal->pool = av_mallocz(sizeof(*avctx->internal->pool)); if (!avctx->internal->pool) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto free_and_end; } avctx->internal->to_free = av_frame_alloc(); if (!avctx->internal->to_free) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto free_and_end; } avctx->internal->compat_decode_frame = av_frame_alloc(); if (!avctx->internal->compat_decode_frame) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto free_and_end; } avctx->internal->buffer_frame = av_frame_alloc(); if (!avctx->internal->buffer_frame) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto free_and_end; } avctx->internal->buffer_pkt = av_packet_alloc(); if (!avctx->internal->buffer_pkt) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto free_and_end; } avctx->internal->ds.in_pkt = av_packet_alloc(); if (!avctx->internal->ds.in_pkt) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto free_and_end; } avctx->internal->last_pkt_props = av_packet_alloc(); if (!avctx->internal->last_pkt_props) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto free_and_end; } avctx->internal->skip_samples_multiplier = 1; if (codec->priv_data_size > 0) { if (!avctx->priv_data) { avctx->priv_data = av_mallocz(codec->priv_data_size); if (!avctx->priv_data) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto end; } if (codec->priv_class) { *(const AVClass **)avctx->priv_data = codec->priv_class; av_opt_set_defaults(avctx->priv_data); } } if (codec->priv_class && (ret = av_opt_set_dict(avctx->priv_data, &tmp)) < 0) goto free_and_end; } else { avctx->priv_data = NULL; } if ((ret = av_opt_set_dict(avctx, &tmp)) < 0) goto free_and_end; if (avctx->codec_whitelist && av_match_list(codec->name, avctx->codec_whitelist, ',') <= 0) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Codec (%s) not on whitelist \'%s\'\n", codec->name, avctx->codec_whitelist); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } if (!(avctx->coded_width && avctx->coded_height && avctx->width && avctx->height && (avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264 || avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VP6F || avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_DXV))) { if (avctx->coded_width && avctx->coded_height) ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, avctx->coded_width, avctx->coded_height); else if (avctx->width && avctx->height) ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, avctx->width, avctx->height); if (ret < 0) goto free_and_end; } if ((avctx->coded_width || avctx->coded_height || avctx->width || avctx->height) && ( av_image_check_size2(avctx->coded_width, avctx->coded_height, avctx->max_pixels, AV_PIX_FMT_NONE, 0, avctx) < 0 || av_image_check_size2(avctx->width, avctx->height, avctx->max_pixels, AV_PIX_FMT_NONE, 0, avctx) < 0)) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Ignoring invalid width/height values\n"); ff_set_dimensions(avctx, 0, 0); } if (avctx->width > 0 && avctx->height > 0) { if (av_image_check_sar(avctx->width, avctx->height, avctx->sample_aspect_ratio) < 0) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "ignoring invalid SAR: %u/%u\n", avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.num, avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.den); avctx->sample_aspect_ratio = (AVRational){ 0, 1 }; } } /* if the decoder init function was already called previously, * free the already allocated subtitle_header before overwriting it */ if (av_codec_is_decoder(codec)) av_freep(&avctx->subtitle_header); if (avctx->channels > FF_SANE_NB_CHANNELS) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Too many channels: %d\n", avctx->channels); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } avctx->codec = codec; if ((avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_UNKNOWN || avctx->codec_type == codec->type) && avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_NONE) { avctx->codec_type = codec->type; avctx->codec_id = codec->id; } if (avctx->codec_id != codec->id || (avctx->codec_type != codec->type && avctx->codec_type != AVMEDIA_TYPE_ATTACHMENT)) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Codec type or id mismatches\n"); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } avctx->frame_number = 0; avctx->codec_descriptor = avcodec_descriptor_get(avctx->codec_id); if ((avctx->codec->capabilities & AV_CODEC_CAP_EXPERIMENTAL) && avctx->strict_std_compliance > FF_COMPLIANCE_EXPERIMENTAL) { const char *codec_string = av_codec_is_encoder(codec) ? "encoder" : "decoder"; AVCodec *codec2; av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "The %s '%s' is experimental but experimental codecs are not enabled, " "add '-strict %d' if you want to use it.\n", codec_string, codec->name, FF_COMPLIANCE_EXPERIMENTAL); codec2 = av_codec_is_encoder(codec) ? avcodec_find_encoder(codec->id) : avcodec_find_decoder(codec->id); if (!(codec2->capabilities & AV_CODEC_CAP_EXPERIMENTAL)) av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Alternatively use the non experimental %s '%s'.\n", codec_string, codec2->name); ret = AVERROR_EXPERIMENTAL; goto free_and_end; } if (avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO && (!avctx->time_base.num || !avctx->time_base.den)) { avctx->time_base.num = 1; avctx->time_base.den = avctx->sample_rate; } if (!HAVE_THREADS) av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: not compiled with thread support, using thread emulation\n"); if (CONFIG_FRAME_THREAD_ENCODER && av_codec_is_encoder(avctx->codec)) { ff_unlock_avcodec(codec); //we will instantiate a few encoders thus kick the counter to prevent false detection of a problem ret = ff_frame_thread_encoder_init(avctx, options ? *options : NULL); ff_lock_avcodec(avctx, codec); if (ret < 0) goto free_and_end; } if (av_codec_is_decoder(avctx->codec)) { ret = ff_decode_bsfs_init(avctx); if (ret < 0) goto free_and_end; } if (HAVE_THREADS && !(avctx->internal->frame_thread_encoder && (avctx->active_thread_type&FF_THREAD_FRAME))) { ret = ff_thread_init(avctx); if (ret < 0) { goto free_and_end; } } if (!HAVE_THREADS && !(codec->capabilities & AV_CODEC_CAP_AUTO_THREADS)) avctx->thread_count = 1; if (avctx->codec->max_lowres < avctx->lowres || avctx->lowres < 0) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "The maximum value for lowres supported by the decoder is %d\n", avctx->codec->max_lowres); avctx->lowres = avctx->codec->max_lowres; } if (av_codec_is_encoder(avctx->codec)) { int i; #if FF_API_CODED_FRAME FF_DISABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS avctx->coded_frame = av_frame_alloc(); if (!avctx->coded_frame) { ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM); goto free_and_end; } FF_ENABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS #endif if (avctx->time_base.num <= 0 || avctx->time_base.den <= 0) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "The encoder timebase is not set.\n"); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } if (avctx->codec->sample_fmts) { for (i = 0; avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i] != AV_SAMPLE_FMT_NONE; i++) { if (avctx->sample_fmt == avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i]) break; if (avctx->channels == 1 && av_get_planar_sample_fmt(avctx->sample_fmt) == av_get_planar_sample_fmt(avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i])) { avctx->sample_fmt = avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i]; break; } } if (avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i] == AV_SAMPLE_FMT_NONE) { char buf[128]; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", avctx->sample_fmt); av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified sample format %s is invalid or not supported\n", (char *)av_x_if_null(av_get_sample_fmt_name(avctx->sample_fmt), buf)); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } } if (avctx->codec->pix_fmts) { for (i = 0; avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] != AV_PIX_FMT_NONE; i++) if (avctx->pix_fmt == avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i]) break; if (avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_NONE && !((avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MJPEG || avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_LJPEG) && avctx->strict_std_compliance <= FF_COMPLIANCE_UNOFFICIAL)) { char buf[128]; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", avctx->pix_fmt); av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified pixel format %s is invalid or not supported\n", (char *)av_x_if_null(av_get_pix_fmt_name(avctx->pix_fmt), buf)); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } if (avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ420P || avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ411P || avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ422P || avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ440P || avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ444P) avctx->color_range = AVCOL_RANGE_JPEG; } if (avctx->codec->supported_samplerates) { for (i = 0; avctx->codec->supported_samplerates[i] != 0; i++) if (avctx->sample_rate == avctx->codec->supported_samplerates[i]) break; if (avctx->codec->supported_samplerates[i] == 0) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified sample rate %d is not supported\n", avctx->sample_rate); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } } if (avctx->sample_rate < 0) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified sample rate %d is not supported\n", avctx->sample_rate); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } if (avctx->codec->channel_layouts) { if (!avctx->channel_layout) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Channel layout not specified\n"); } else { for (i = 0; avctx->codec->channel_layouts[i] != 0; i++) if (avctx->channel_layout == avctx->codec->channel_layouts[i]) break; if (avctx->codec->channel_layouts[i] == 0) { char buf[512]; av_get_channel_layout_string(buf, sizeof(buf), -1, avctx->channel_layout); av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified channel layout '%s' is not supported\n", buf); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } } } if (avctx->channel_layout && avctx->channels) { int channels = av_get_channel_layout_nb_channels(avctx->channel_layout); if (channels != avctx->channels) { char buf[512]; av_get_channel_layout_string(buf, sizeof(buf), -1, avctx->channel_layout); av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Channel layout '%s' with %d channels does not match number of specified channels %d\n", buf, channels, avctx->channels); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } } else if (avctx->channel_layout) { avctx->channels = av_get_channel_layout_nb_channels(avctx->channel_layout); } if (avctx->channels < 0) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified number of channels %d is not supported\n", avctx->channels); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } if(avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO) { pixdesc = av_pix_fmt_desc_get(avctx->pix_fmt); if ( avctx->bits_per_raw_sample < 0 || (avctx->bits_per_raw_sample > 8 && pixdesc->comp[0].depth <= 8)) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Specified bit depth %d not possible with the specified pixel formats depth %d\n", avctx->bits_per_raw_sample, pixdesc->comp[0].depth); avctx->bits_per_raw_sample = pixdesc->comp[0].depth; } if (avctx->width <= 0 || avctx->height <= 0) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "dimensions not set\n"); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } } if ( (avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO || avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO) && avctx->bit_rate>0 && avctx->bit_rate<1000) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Bitrate %"PRId64" is extremely low, maybe you mean %"PRId64"k\n", avctx->bit_rate, avctx->bit_rate); } if (!avctx->rc_initial_buffer_occupancy) avctx->rc_initial_buffer_occupancy = avctx->rc_buffer_size * 3LL / 4; if (avctx->ticks_per_frame && avctx->time_base.num && avctx->ticks_per_frame > INT_MAX / avctx->time_base.num) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "ticks_per_frame %d too large for the timebase %d/%d.", avctx->ticks_per_frame, avctx->time_base.num, avctx->time_base.den); goto free_and_end; } if (avctx->hw_frames_ctx) { AVHWFramesContext *frames_ctx = (AVHWFramesContext*)avctx->hw_frames_ctx->data; if (frames_ctx->format != avctx->pix_fmt) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Mismatching AVCodecContext.pix_fmt and AVHWFramesContext.format\n"); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } if (avctx->sw_pix_fmt != AV_PIX_FMT_NONE && avctx->sw_pix_fmt != frames_ctx->sw_format) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Mismatching AVCodecContext.sw_pix_fmt (%s) " "and AVHWFramesContext.sw_format (%s)\n", av_get_pix_fmt_name(avctx->sw_pix_fmt), av_get_pix_fmt_name(frames_ctx->sw_format)); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } avctx->sw_pix_fmt = frames_ctx->sw_format; } } avctx->pts_correction_num_faulty_pts = avctx->pts_correction_num_faulty_dts = 0; avctx->pts_correction_last_pts = avctx->pts_correction_last_dts = INT64_MIN; if ( !CONFIG_GRAY && avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_GRAY && avctx->codec_descriptor->type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO) av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "gray decoding requested but not enabled at configuration time\n"); if ( avctx->codec->init && (!(avctx->active_thread_type&FF_THREAD_FRAME) || avctx->internal->frame_thread_encoder)) { ret = avctx->codec->init(avctx); if (ret < 0) { goto free_and_end; } codec_init_ok = 1; } ret=0; if (av_codec_is_decoder(avctx->codec)) { if (!avctx->bit_rate) avctx->bit_rate = get_bit_rate(avctx); /* validate channel layout from the decoder */ if (avctx->channel_layout) { int channels = av_get_channel_layout_nb_channels(avctx->channel_layout); if (!avctx->channels) avctx->channels = channels; else if (channels != avctx->channels) { char buf[512]; av_get_channel_layout_string(buf, sizeof(buf), -1, avctx->channel_layout); av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Channel layout '%s' with %d channels does not match specified number of channels %d: " "ignoring specified channel layout\n", buf, channels, avctx->channels); avctx->channel_layout = 0; } } if (avctx->channels && avctx->channels < 0 || avctx->channels > FF_SANE_NB_CHANNELS) { ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } if (avctx->bits_per_coded_sample < 0) { ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } if (avctx->sub_charenc) { if (avctx->codec_type != AVMEDIA_TYPE_SUBTITLE) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Character encoding is only " "supported with subtitles codecs\n"); ret = AVERROR(EINVAL); goto free_and_end; } else if (avctx->codec_descriptor->props & AV_CODEC_PROP_BITMAP_SUB) { av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Codec '%s' is bitmap-based, " "subtitles character encoding will be ignored\n", avctx->codec_descriptor->name); avctx->sub_charenc_mode = FF_SUB_CHARENC_MODE_DO_NOTHING; } else { /* input character encoding is set for a text based subtitle * codec at this point */ if (avctx->sub_charenc_mode == FF_SUB_CHARENC_MODE_AUTOMATIC) avctx->sub_charenc_mode = FF_SUB_CHARENC_MODE_PRE_DECODER; if (avctx->sub_charenc_mode == FF_SUB_CHARENC_MODE_PRE_DECODER) { #if CONFIG_ICONV iconv_t cd = iconv_open("UTF-8", avctx->sub_charenc); if (cd == (iconv_t)-1) { ret = AVERROR(errno); av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to open iconv context " "with input character encoding \"%s\"\n", avctx->sub_charenc); goto free_and_end; } iconv_close(cd); #else av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Character encoding subtitles " "conversion needs a libavcodec built with iconv support " "for this codec\n"); ret = AVERROR(ENOSYS); goto free_and_end; #endif } } } #if FF_API_AVCTX_TIMEBASE if (avctx->framerate.num > 0 && avctx->framerate.den > 0) avctx->time_base = av_inv_q(av_mul_q(avctx->framerate, (AVRational){avctx->ticks_per_frame, 1})); #endif } if (codec->priv_data_size > 0 && avctx->priv_data && codec->priv_class) { av_assert0(*(const AVClass **)avctx->priv_data == codec->priv_class); } end: ff_unlock_avcodec(codec); if (options) { av_dict_free(options); *options = tmp; } return ret; free_and_end: if (avctx->codec && avctx->codec->close && (codec_init_ok || (avctx->codec->caps_internal & FF_CODEC_CAP_INIT_CLEANUP))) avctx->codec->close(avctx); if (codec->priv_class && codec->priv_data_size) av_opt_free(avctx->priv_data); av_opt_free(avctx); #if FF_API_CODED_FRAME FF_DISABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS av_frame_free(&avctx->coded_frame); FF_ENABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS #endif av_dict_free(&tmp); av_freep(&avctx->priv_data); if (avctx->internal) { av_frame_free(&avctx->internal->to_free); av_frame_free(&avctx->internal->compat_decode_frame); av_frame_free(&avctx->internal->buffer_frame); av_packet_free(&avctx->internal->buffer_pkt); av_packet_free(&avctx->internal->last_pkt_props); av_packet_free(&avctx->internal->ds.in_pkt); ff_decode_bsfs_uninit(avctx); av_freep(&avctx->internal->pool); } av_freep(&avctx->internal); avctx->codec = NULL; goto end; }
169,489
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: GDataDirectoryService::GDataDirectoryService() : blocking_task_runner_(NULL), serialized_size_(0), largest_changestamp_(0), origin_(UNINITIALIZED), weak_ptr_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)) { root_.reset(new GDataDirectory(NULL, this)); if (!util::IsDriveV2ApiEnabled()) InitializeRootEntry(kGDataRootDirectoryResourceId); } Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor. * Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry. * Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry. * Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere. * Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected. BUG=141494 TEST=unit tests. Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-399
GDataDirectoryService::GDataDirectoryService() : blocking_task_runner_(NULL), serialized_size_(0), largest_changestamp_(0), origin_(UNINITIALIZED), weak_ptr_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)) { root_.reset(CreateGDataDirectory()); if (!util::IsDriveV2ApiEnabled()) InitializeRootEntry(kGDataRootDirectoryResourceId); }
171,490
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: long Cluster::Parse(long long& pos, long& len) const { long status = Load(pos, len); if (status < 0) return status; assert(m_pos >= m_element_start); assert(m_timecode >= 0); const long long cluster_stop = (m_element_size < 0) ? -1 : m_element_start + m_element_size; if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (m_pos >= cluster_stop)) return 1; // nothing else to do IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader; long long total, avail; status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail); if (status < 0) // error return status; assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total)); pos = m_pos; for (;;) { if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop)) break; if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total)) { if (m_element_size < 0) m_element_size = pos - m_element_start; break; } if ((pos + 1) > avail) { len = 1; return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; } long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len); if (result < 0) // error return static_cast<long>(result); if (result > 0) // weird return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop)) return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; if ((pos + len) > avail) return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len); if (id < 0) // error return static_cast<long>(id); if (id == 0) // weird return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; if ((id == 0x0F43B675) || (id == 0x0C53BB6B)) { // Cluster or Cues ID if (m_element_size < 0) m_element_size = pos - m_element_start; break; } pos += len; // consume ID field if ((pos + 1) > avail) { len = 1; return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; } result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len); if (result < 0) // error return static_cast<long>(result); if (result > 0) // weird return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop)) return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; if ((pos + len) > avail) return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len); if (size < 0) // error return static_cast<long>(size); const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1; if (size == unknown_size) return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; pos += len; // consume size field if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos > cluster_stop)) return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; if (size == 0) // weird continue; const long long block_stop = pos + size; if (cluster_stop >= 0) { if (block_stop > cluster_stop) { if ((id == 0x20) || (id == 0x23)) return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; pos = cluster_stop; break; } } else if ((total >= 0) && (block_stop > total)) { m_element_size = total - m_element_start; pos = total; break; } else if (block_stop > avail) { len = static_cast<long>(size); return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; } Cluster* const this_ = const_cast<Cluster*>(this); if (id == 0x20) // BlockGroup return this_->ParseBlockGroup(size, pos, len); if (id == 0x23) // SimpleBlock return this_->ParseSimpleBlock(size, pos, len); pos += size; // consume payload assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (pos <= cluster_stop)); } assert(m_element_size > 0); m_pos = pos; assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= cluster_stop)); if (m_entries_count > 0) { const long idx = m_entries_count - 1; const BlockEntry* const pLast = m_entries[idx]; assert(pLast); const Block* const pBlock = pLast->GetBlock(); assert(pBlock); const long long start = pBlock->m_start; if ((total >= 0) && (start > total)) return -1; // defend against trucated stream const long long size = pBlock->m_size; const long long stop = start + size; assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (stop <= cluster_stop)); if ((total >= 0) && (stop > total)) return -1; // defend against trucated stream } return 1; // no more entries } Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream. Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b BUG=23167726 Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207 (cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a) CWE ID: CWE-20
long Cluster::Parse(long long& pos, long& len) const { long status = Load(pos, len); if (status < 0) return status; assert(m_pos >= m_element_start); assert(m_timecode >= 0); const long long cluster_stop = (m_element_size < 0) ? -1 : m_element_start + m_element_size; if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (m_pos >= cluster_stop)) return 1; // nothing else to do IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader; long long total, avail; status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail); if (status < 0) // error return status; assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total)); pos = m_pos; for (;;) { if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop)) break; if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total)) { if (m_element_size < 0) m_element_size = pos - m_element_start; break; } if ((pos + 1) > avail) { len = 1; return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; } long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len); if (result < 0) // error return static_cast<long>(result); if (result > 0) // weird return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop)) return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; if ((pos + len) > avail) return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len); if (id < 0) // error return static_cast<long>(id); if (id == 0) // weird return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; if ((id == 0x0F43B675) || (id == 0x0C53BB6B)) { // Cluster or Cues ID if (m_element_size < 0) m_element_size = pos - m_element_start; break; } pos += len; // consume ID field if ((pos + 1) > avail) { len = 1; return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; } result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len); if (result < 0) // error return static_cast<long>(result); if (result > 0) // weird return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop)) return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; if ((pos + len) > avail) return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len); if (size < 0) // error return static_cast<long>(size); const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1; if (size == unknown_size) return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; pos += len; // consume size field if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos > cluster_stop)) return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; if (size == 0) // weird continue; const long long block_stop = pos + size; if (cluster_stop >= 0) { if (block_stop > cluster_stop) { if ((id == 0x20) || (id == 0x23)) return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; pos = cluster_stop; break; } } else if ((total >= 0) && (block_stop > total)) { m_element_size = total - m_element_start; pos = total; break; } else if (block_stop > avail) { len = static_cast<long>(size); return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; } Cluster* const this_ = const_cast<Cluster*>(this); if (id == 0x20) // BlockGroup return this_->ParseBlockGroup(size, pos, len); if (id == 0x23) // SimpleBlock return this_->ParseSimpleBlock(size, pos, len); pos += size; // consume payload if (cluster_stop >= 0 && pos > cluster_stop) return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; } assert(m_element_size > 0); m_pos = pos; if (cluster_stop >= 0 && m_pos > cluster_stop) return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; if (m_entries_count > 0) { const long idx = m_entries_count - 1; const BlockEntry* const pLast = m_entries[idx]; assert(pLast); const Block* const pBlock = pLast->GetBlock(); assert(pBlock); const long long start = pBlock->m_start; if ((total >= 0) && (start > total)) return -1; // defend against trucated stream const long long size = pBlock->m_size; const long long stop = start + size; assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (stop <= cluster_stop)); if ((total >= 0) && (stop > total)) return -1; // defend against trucated stream } return 1; // no more entries }
173,846
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: find_alternate_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_principal princ, krb5_db_entry **server_ptr, const char **status) { krb5_error_code retval; krb5_principal *plist = NULL, *pl2; krb5_data tmp; krb5_db_entry *server = NULL; *server_ptr = NULL; assert(is_cross_tgs_principal(princ)); if ((retval = krb5_walk_realm_tree(kdc_context, krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, princ), krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, princ, 1), &plist, KRB5_REALM_BRANCH_CHAR))) { goto cleanup; } /* move to the end */ for (pl2 = plist; *pl2; pl2++); /* the first entry in this array is for krbtgt/local@local, so we ignore it */ while (--pl2 > plist) { tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2); krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server)); retval = db_get_svc_princ(kdc_context, *pl2, 0, &server, status); krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp); if (retval == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY) continue; else if (retval) goto cleanup; log_tgs_alt_tgt(kdc_context, server->princ); *server_ptr = server; server = NULL; goto cleanup; } cleanup: if (retval != 0) *status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER"; krb5_free_realm_tree(kdc_context, plist); krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server); return retval; } Commit Message: KDC null deref due to referrals [CVE-2013-1417] An authenticated remote client can cause a KDC to crash by making a valid TGS-REQ to a KDC serving a realm with a single-component name. The process_tgs_req() function dereferences a null pointer because an unusual failure condition causes a helper function to return success. While attempting to provide cross-realm referrals for host-based service principals, the find_referral_tgs() function could return a TGS principal for a zero-length realm name (indicating that the hostname in the service principal has no known realm associated with it). Subsequently, the find_alternate_tgs() function would attempt to construct a path to this empty-string realm, and return success along with a null pointer in its output parameter. This happens because krb5_walk_realm_tree() returns a list of length one when it attempts to construct a transit path between a single-component realm and the empty-string realm. This list causes a loop in find_alternate_tgs() to iterate over zero elements, resulting in the unexpected output of a null pointer, which process_tgs_req() proceeds to dereference because there is no error condition. Add an error condition to find_referral_tgs() when krb5_get_host_realm() returns an empty realm name. Also add an error condition to find_alternate_tgs() to handle the length-one output from krb5_walk_realm_tree(). The vulnerable configuration is not likely to arise in practice. (Realm names that have a single component are likely to be test realms.) Releases prior to krb5-1.11 are not vulnerable. Thanks to Sol Jerome for reporting this problem. CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:O/RC:C (cherry picked from commit 3c7f1c21ffaaf6c90f1045f0f5440303c766acc0) ticket: 7668 version_fixed: 1.11.4 status: resolved CWE ID: CWE-20
find_alternate_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_principal princ, krb5_db_entry **server_ptr, const char **status) { krb5_error_code retval; krb5_principal *plist = NULL, *pl2; krb5_data tmp; krb5_db_entry *server = NULL; *server_ptr = NULL; assert(is_cross_tgs_principal(princ)); if ((retval = krb5_walk_realm_tree(kdc_context, krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, princ), krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, princ, 1), &plist, KRB5_REALM_BRANCH_CHAR))) { goto cleanup; } /* move to the end */ for (pl2 = plist; *pl2; pl2++); /* the first entry in this array is for krbtgt/local@local, so we ignore it */ while (--pl2 > plist) { tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2); krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server)); retval = db_get_svc_princ(kdc_context, *pl2, 0, &server, status); krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp); if (retval == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY) continue; else if (retval) goto cleanup; log_tgs_alt_tgt(kdc_context, server->princ); *server_ptr = server; server = NULL; goto cleanup; } cleanup: if (retval == 0 && server_ptr == NULL) retval = KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY; if (retval != 0) *status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER"; krb5_free_realm_tree(kdc_context, plist); krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server); return retval; }
166,130
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, valid) { spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC); if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) { return; } if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_AHEAD)) { RETURN_BOOL(intern->u.file.current_line || intern->u.file.current_zval); } else { RETVAL_BOOL(!php_stream_eof(intern->u.file.stream)); } } /* }}} */ /* {{{ proto string SplFileObject::fgets() Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int CWE ID: CWE-190
SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, valid) { spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC); if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) { return; } if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_AHEAD)) { RETURN_BOOL(intern->u.file.current_line || intern->u.file.current_zval); } else { RETVAL_BOOL(!php_stream_eof(intern->u.file.stream)); } } /* }}} */ /* {{{ proto string SplFileObject::fgets()
167,053
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
Code: int ip_options_get(struct net *net, struct ip_options **optp, unsigned char *data, int optlen) { struct ip_options *opt = ip_options_get_alloc(optlen); if (!opt) return -ENOMEM; if (optlen) memcpy(opt->__data, data, optlen); return ip_options_get_finish(net, optp, opt, optlen); } Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options), without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt. Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us. Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt). Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying. We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new ip_options_rcu structure. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CWE ID: CWE-362
int ip_options_get(struct net *net, struct ip_options **optp, int ip_options_get(struct net *net, struct ip_options_rcu **optp, unsigned char *data, int optlen) { struct ip_options_rcu *opt = ip_options_get_alloc(optlen); if (!opt) return -ENOMEM; if (optlen) memcpy(opt->opt.__data, data, optlen); return ip_options_get_finish(net, optp, opt, optlen); }
165,558