acn int64 1.78M 2.31M | text stringlengths 37 20.6k | label class label 18
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2,008,766 | Narrative 1 - 'I was working ZZZ and North arrival. I had been on position for about 20 minutes and there was weather on the scope when I sat down. I was briefed that there had been some deviations but just light chop. And area of heavy precipitation which had been west of ZZZ1 eventually moved onto the final but aircraft were still taking the approach and landing. Eventually we got some LLWS alerts which I issued which in short time were followed by several go arounds and a microburst alert which I also issued as well as described the precipitation along the final. Aircraft X said he needed to discontinue the approach so I issued a 220 heading and 5000 feet since departure was getting a go-around in front of him and I couldn't turn him left or right due to airspace constraints. I yelled to departure and shipped him. In the mean time every other aircraft on final clogged up the frequency saying they also wouldn't take the approach. At some point Aircraft X said that he encountered almost unrecoverable conditions and had climbed to nearly 8000 feet.We need to have a much better plan of action when there is weather in the area. Our current method of giving the approach until aircraft refuse to take it while informing them of the weather will only result in this kind of situation in the future; which I find unacceptable. There was already a ground delay program in place when this happened; but there were no miles in trail out and I was oversaturated with aircraft. In the future I will will make a bigger point to not run aircraft through a final that is heavy precipitation even if outside they are below the layer and willing to take it. Also I think pilots need to be more vocal about saying what they see outside because often times we have no way of knowing what the weather is really like outside.' | 17weather |
2,109,432 | Narrative 1 - 'Wheelchair battery form and procedures reviewed and completed. Ramp Agent gave me the form; only knew they had to sign it. Did not know where battery was or if steps followed. Battery in back. When asked how big it was; did not know for sheet. We found passenger and confirmed battery info. Passenger removed USB drive with cord/metal that could have completed connection to terminals. Batteries stored in a computer bag with no other items/secured. Two batteries at 158.4; under the 160 limit. FAs notified. FO notified.' | 9humanfactors |
1,974,739 | Narrative 1 - 'The aircraft at some point in the past had a quick drain oil plug installed accessible via the nose gear well. This plug was safety wired to an angled piece of aluminum that was riveted to the drain plug cover plate that is secured to the airframe. These aftermarket STCed quick drains are made of aluminum. The aircraft recently came out of annual and had about 2.5 hours in service at the time of the event. During the annual all engine mounts were replaced. The oil was changed. And a visual inspection of the drain plug safety wire confirmed it was attached to the aluminum bracket in the nose gear portion of the airframe.Upon entering the pattern at ZZZ on a return flight from ZZZ1; it was observed that the engine oil pressure was at the lower limit at 30 PSI. After landing and while taxiing to the FBO it was observed that oil pressure dropped to 0 PSI. Engine temperature was normal and no anomalies were detected. Upon shutdown and exiting the aircraft engine oil was observed; of oil covering the entire undercarriage of the airframe from tip to tail. Oil dropped; puddled; and pooled under the aircraft. Upon further inspection it was discovered that the oil plug was missing. The hole in the aluminum bracket safety wire attachment point was worn through; negating the usefulness of the safety wire. The service shop at ZZZ replaced the plug with an original certificated plug and safety wired to the engine and NOT the airframe.It's believed that the failure of the drain plug to stay safely secured was caused by it being secured to the airframe; which with the engine running was able to vibrate its way loose. Further investigation revealed that it's a common practice to secure this aftermarket quick drain plug valve to the airframe because it extends through the access plate; making it convenient but not effective. In hindsight I'm glad we didn't drop the oil while climbing out over ZZZ2 in Day 0. Otherwise I might not have been able to write this. I hope this information is helpful and gets disseminated as soon as possible. I shared my experience with the service personnel that performed my annual. They had an A36 Bonanza in their shop also with the same drain plug secured to the airframe. Upon hearing about my experience they immediately removed the safety wire from the airframe and secured it to the engine.' | 9humanfactors |
1,904,026 | Narrative 1 - 'My FO deadheaded into ZZZ and was aware first hand that there was a problem with the rudder pedals noted by the inbound crew. The inbound crew wrote it up and maintenance did their checks and were unable to duplicate the problem. After talking with the maintenance guy and he was running down the list of items they checked; I asked if they checked for a brake possibly dragging. He said he didn't notice anything unusual on his initial walk around; but went and checked anyway just to make sure to which he found no abnormalities. With everything looked at that the mechanic and I could think of and he couldn't find any problems; I determined the airplane was OK to fly unless it gave me a problem during the control checks; taxi or takeoff. After pushback; engine start and during my control check; I noted a significant amount of pressure was required to actuate the rudders and the left rudder required more pressure to actuate than the right. I wanted to make sure I wasn't being prejudiced by expecting a problem and asked my FO to actuate the rudders and tell me what he felt without telling him what I felt. After he did; he told me that he felt the same thing I did. After that; I called Dispatch and told my Dispatcher what happened and we agreed we needed to return to the gate which we did. Once we were in the gate; I called my Dispatcher back and talked to maintenance about what we experienced. After we put the problem in the logbook; the mechanic turned the electric hydraulic pumps on to do his checks and said the rudder pressure felt normal to him. That seemed wildly unusual considering what we experienced; so I asked him if I could actuate the rudders to see for myself. To my surprise; the pressure required to actuate the rudder peddles was normal. I told the mechanic that what we experienced was significantly different with the engines running than what we experienced with just the electric pumps. After that; we were released and sent to the hotel. Maintenance said there was a leaking rudder ratio module that was causing the abnormal rudder pedal pressure. We should all be critical of any abnormality with the airplane and investigate the problem thoroughly. My FO was solid and objective in his evaluation of the situation and came to the same determination as I did. If he had come up with a different conclusion; I would have listened to what he had to say to make sure I didn't overlook any details.' | 0aircraft |
1,787,366 | Narrative 1 - 'Upon reaching clearance for ILS XX circle Runway XY at ZZZ from Approach; we were switched over to ZZZ Tower frequency. Established on the approach between the IAF and FAF; I keyed the mic to establish contact with Tower inbound. The entire avionics turned off completely; losing intercom; transponder; GPS/Nav/Comm 1; and Nav/Comm 2. ZZZ was currently under IFR due to 2SM visibility; but we were in visual conditions on the approach course. I broke off from the approach and turned to the south; since we were no longer receiving navigational guidance along the approach; and I had no communications to contact Tower or Approach. I knew the weather towards the south was looking clearer so the plan was to continue south towards ZZZ1 or ZZZ2. We troubleshot the avionics; checking circuit breakers and cycling the avionics switch to no avail. No indications of ammeter discharge or low voltage illuminated; and the turn coordinator was still operable as well as engine instruments; so I presumed that the failure was based solely on avionics and not complete electrical failure. We descended lower; maintaining VFR so that we could receive cell signal; and I contacted ZZZ Tower via cellphone; since they gave us instructors their phone number another time when they had an ATC/instructor meeting. I told them we were okay; and had complete avionics failure. I asked for the phone number for ZZZ1 Tower so I could communicate with them if I decided to continue south to ZZZ1. At that time; the visibility and clouds around ZZZ began to clear up and we could start to see towards ZZZ. I asked ZZZ Tower if the field was still IFR; and they replied that it just went VFR. We proceeded inbound toward ZZZ; maintaining VFR; and were able to receive landing and taxi clearances for our aircraft through the cell phone. The aircraft was repaired; with the problem being a short-circuited avionics switch.' | 0aircraft |
2,234,916 | Narrative 1 - 'During taxi-out to runway; number 4 brake temp increased and was well above other brake temp indicators. Thrust required for taxi was higher than normal. Requested tower to return to gate and was cleared to taxi down runway and exit taxiway 1. After turning onto taxiway; the aircraft came to stop and I was unable to move any further; even with high thrust setting. Advised tower we were unable to move. Maintenance met on taxiway. Technician advised number 4 brake locked due to residual hydraulic fluid in brake line number 4. Brake number 4 had been on MEL. Cause: I am not a mechanic but after talking with the technician; I believe the number 4 brake line was not bled properly when put on MEL.' | 0aircraft |
1,853,327 | Narrative 1 - 'While on ILS final to LAX Runway 25L at approximately 7 miles from Runway 25L and 2;000 feet AGL; LAX Tower cleared a B747 to take off in front of us on 25L. Both the Captain and I remarked that we were unhappy with the spacing and while it looked like the runway would be clear in time; we both remarked that we should be prepared to go-around. The Captain elected to fly slightly above the glide path to avoid turbulence; but at around 200 feet AGL we encountered moderate turbulence from the departing B747 lasting around 1-2 seconds. After exiting the turbulence I estimated we would touch down 2;000-2;500 feet down; and I said; 'We're going to be long.' The Captain made a smooth correction to glide path and a smooth touchdown probably around the 2;000 foot point. There were no GPWS warnings or 'long landing' warnings at any point. I don't know whether the Tower spacing between us and the B747 met standards; but I thought it was a poor decision to clear a B747 for takeoff in front of us with that spacing on the same runway.' | 14procedure |
1,856,351 | Narrative 1 - 'Flying over FAY I noted moderate turbulence and made report to FAY approach. In response they offered a lower altitude of 3;000 feet which I accepted. Subsequently turbulence became severe. Aircraft control became difficult. RDU approach told me to expect visual for 5R. In order to get to the runway ASAP I descended below MDA. A radio tower with a height of about 2;200 feet AGL was clearly visible and avoided. ATC instructed me to climb to 3;000 feet and turn 090. I climbed to about 3;400 feet. Stabilization of the aircraft was difficult due to severe turbulence. I eventually was vectored to successful landing. Of note there was a PIREP issued about an hour before by an aircraft 10 miles west of RDU reporting moderate turbulence. That aircraft is three times the weight of mine and supports the severity of turbulence I was experiencing.' | 17weather |
1,905,750 | Narrative 1 - 'While operating [FLIGHT NUMBER] [ROUTE]; crew noted a slight and unusual odor during the boarding process. Through air vents servicing the the cockpit; a smell resembling 'slightly burned popcorn' was noted. Consult with the flight attendants revealed no initial odor in the rear cabin; though a slight smell became apparent approximately 10 minutes from push back. A visual walk through of the cabin confirmed no active source; and nothing was noted in the forward cargo bay when inspected by the Captain. Crew conducted a Maintenance consult which resulted in improvement when the Packs were shut off. Maintenance suggested that the crew monitor the situation post engine start and note any changes after shutting down the APU. When asked by flight crew; Maintenance did not see a need to conduct an initial write up in the logbook if conditions improved and no further odor was present. Post engine start and after the APU had been shut down; the odor dissipated to nil during the taxi out. Prior to reaching the runway; zero odor was present in the aircraft as confirmed by all flight crew members. With this in mind; the unusual odor appeared to be gone with no signs of any aircraft malfunction. After applying takeoff thrust and reaching rotation speed; a very strong presence of the initial odor became apparent just after wheels up. The crew immediately and unanimously opted to return to the field without delay. No visible smoke or fumes were noted along with any EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) indications of malfunction. Soon thereafter; the odor again began to dissipate; however crew elected to return to the airport despite there being no more smell. With no visible indications of smoke; fire; fumes; or activation of a detection system; the crew did not declare an emergency at that time. ATC was however advised of the situation in addition to company; crew; and passengers. [FLIGHT NUMBER] returned to the field without incident. Upon landing; the smell did return once the APU was started prior to pulling into the gate. A fire department lieutenant was on scene and confirmed the presence of odor in the cockpit; resembling a slightly burnt smell. No other findings were noted and the aircraft was grounded and referred to Maintenance. No additions outside of event narrative.Crew should have performed an initial Maintenance write up despite consult with Maintenance and disappearance of odor. Additionally; consultation with the FODO (Flight Operations Duty Officer) would have been a prudent decision. I would also elect to declare an emergency in this situation.' | 0aircraft |
2,232,811 | Narrative 1 - 'I was simulating a XC flight to ZZZ1 and practicing a diversion to ZZZ and was approaching from the norther end of the air port; when gathering; time; fuel; distance; and getting weather for the airport myself and my instructor where scanning for traffic that was ahead of us which was noted on our ADS-B. Out of the corner of our eyes we saw a low wing air craft; unknown tail number; on our left flying right at us; my instructor swiftly pulled up on the controls to avoid the aircraft. Also we had our; NAV; Beacon; Strobes; Landing and taxi lights on during the duration of the flight. After we leveled off we both looked over at the aircraft that almost hit us and it made no change in course or altitude. After this event we did a touch and go landing at ZZZ and then did a left downwind departure towards ZZZ2 and did a normal full stop landing.' | 9humanfactors |
2,109,390 | Narrative 1 - 'Out of the north port we were given standard taxi instructions to XXL/[Taxiway] 1 ([Taxiways] 2-3-4-5-6). We turned on Taxiway 6 as normal. Once on Taxiway 6; it started to rain - heavily. I asked the First Officer (FO) to get wet" runway data for XXL/Taxiway 1. We were just short of Taxiway 1 on Taxiway 6; but hadn't received the uplink yet. Tower said to continue to Taxiway 7 short of Taxiway 8. We continued; and the FO started programming the FMC. Approaching Taxiway 7; I oversteered as I usually would for a 753 turn; but instantly I lost traction due to the sudden deluge of standing water. Instead of continuing the turn; and risking exiting the taxiway; I just gave up; and straightened up and continued down Taxiway 6 to 9. Once on Taxiway 9; I came back around on Taxiway 8. ATC was not happy that I missed my turn; which I knew I missed; but it wasn't like there was an opportunity to say so with the rapid taxi instructions to other airplanes. We apologized and then came back on Taxiway 8; turned on Taxiway 7; short of Taxiway 6. Then ATC got mad again because now our tail was blocking Taxiway 8. We said we were ready and had the wet data; and they said follow company to XXL/Taxiway 1. In all honesty; with all the sudden rain and water coming down the windows it was kinda hard to even see where Taxiway 7 was out the side window (no window wipers on the side). When I started the turn (753 you have to over shoot a bit) I realized I didn't have the grip to corner out a nice 90° turn. I figured it was safer to abort the turn - and get in trouble - then force a bad position and try to make the turn with the current conditions/position."' | 17weather |
1,839,362 | Narrative 1 - 'During normal cruise; red CAS message came on; LOW PRESS; along with automatic display of of EMER Descent checklist on DU4. Cabin Pressure differential was seen as abnormally low; cabin altitude indicated 17;000 ft.; did not match pilot perception. Oxygen masked were donned according to SOP and Checklists; Pilots requested lower with ATC; leaving FL430 for FL360. at FL360; the pilots were troubleshooting the problem; and switched from ADC [Air Data Computer] #1 to ADC#2. This prompted the cabin differential pressure to rise again to a normal level. Flight was continued at FL360 to destination with no further issues.' | 0aircraft |
2,205,943 | Narrative 1 - 'During our arrival into ZZZ we were talking to ZZZ center who let us know there was a cirrus jet arriving to the field before us landing runway XX which matched what our plan was as well. The winds were 240° at 10 kts with clear skies. At 25 miles out we had the field in sight and canceled our IFR clearance and went to XXX.X for traffic advisories. I was the pilot flying and the first officer was making all appropriate radio calls for our plan to fly over mid field and enter a left downwind. The cirrus jet landed and there was a Cessna following them in on a left base and a Comanche had just taken off all on runway XX. We had lots of separation between all traffic but we continued making the radio calls for left downwind; base and final. At the 500ft the first Officer called out stable" and I called out "landing." At 100ft I reduced the power to idle and just above the runway started to flair. The first Officer called out Go Around twice very quickly and on his second call I added go around power and executed the go around without touching down. Briefly looking up I saw a jet on the opposite end of the runway coming towards us with their spoilers up making me believe they had just landed. During the go around we flew over the jet that had landed by maybe 100-200ft. We continued the go around up to pattern altitude of 2100ft. We never received any alerts on TCAS or any other indication that there was another jet landing or in the vicinity of the airport. We entered a left downwind and that's when we heard aircraft X make a radio call saying "mic check; sorry I had swapped frequencies and didn't realize it." After flying the pattern and landing on runway XX we saw Aircraft XY holding short of the runway waiting to depart. When we were doing our shutdown checklist the pilot of Aircraft XY came over the radio and apologized for not making calls and again said he thought they were having radio issues. After shutdown I advised the passenger that we had to do a go around due to another aircraft on the runway and he was not upset or bothered that we did a go around."' | 9humanfactors |
2,195,845 | Narrative 1 - 'Prior to departure checked for traffic on final visually and ADS-B traffic on the MFD and no traffic was observed (distance ring on the MFD was set to 2.5 miles). While turning crosswind and climbing from ~800 ft to pattern altitude we noticed a traffic conflict appear on the G1000 and received a traffic audio traffic alert. The traffic was nearly the same altitude flying westbound through the DYB traffic pattern on the south side of the airport. I immediately took control of the plane and executed an evasive maneuver to the right to slow convergence of the aircraft and determined the best altitude was to climb. Once we no longer had a risk to flight safety we obtained the call sign from the G1000 and I re-entered the pattern and executed a landing. Prior to starting turn to crosswind there was no evidence of the traffic on the G1000 and with the plane behind us were unable to acquire visually. We did make calls before departure indicating runway and remaining in the pattern and made a call turning crosswind. Aircraft X started near Ladson and ended shortly after the NMAC. I didn't pick up again until the plane was SE of Atlanta. Why the plane was flying at pattern altitude directly through the DYB traffic pattern with no radio calls is unknown. They also did not appear to make any evasive maneuvers.' | 9humanfactors |
1,815,045 | Narrative 1 - 'We were cleared for takeoff on Runway XX in XXX and completed the before takeoff checklist. We lined up on the runway and I gave flight controls to the First Officer as it was his takeoff. He initiated the takeoff roll and all was normal. I called 80 knots and a few seconds later we noticed a large bird flying in front of the aircraft; flying at engine height from left to right in front of the aircraft. We presume that we were around 90-100 knots of airspeed. Upon the bird flying past the right side of the aircraft we heard a loud bang with a simultaneous shake/vibration. (Between seeing the bird and the noise/vibration was about 1-2 seconds) As this happened I called for the reject and applied braking and reverse thrust. We came to a stop on the runway and I advised the passengers to remain seated and the First Officer advised ATC. The engines were idling normally; (although the vibrations on the #2 engine were briefly amber) and our brake temperatures were below then amber range. We exited the runway at exit and stopped as CFR (requested by us) evaluated the exterior of the aircraft; we had shut down engine #2 prior to them approaching the engine. They reported some damage to the engine but no other visible damage to elsewhere on the aircraft. I elected to taxi to the gate and we parked at Gate XX without issue. I had briefed the passengers and FAs about the situation and everyone was kept informed. While parked; I was advised by the B-FA that in addition to a loud bang and vibration (presumably when we hit the bird); there was a bright orange/yellow flash on the right side of the aircraft at the same time as these noises/vibrations. Upon inspection of the aircraft at the gate it was obvious that a bird was ingested into the #2 engine as there was debris inside of and damage to the engine.' | 3ambiguous |
2,212,111 | Narrative 1 - 'During engine start the EICAS 'OVERHEAT ENG R' WITH CHECKLIST ICON appeared. The right EGT was slightly higher by only 20 degrees or so. The Overheat EICAS was coming on and off. First Officer (FO) began to run the checklist then the FIRE INDICATIONS on the right engine started (bell+lights). Engine was secured and fire handle pulled but light went out so no bottles were discharged. Crew called ramp on XXX.XXX to have the fire department come and inspect the right engine. I don't recall if the FO actually advised ATC at that time as I was helping the Captain deal with the checklists/actions. Over 10-15 minutes passed before any emergency vehicles showed up. Responders found nothing of concern so we hooked up to a tug and towed back into gate XX at XA:00. Gate agents were prompt arriving at the jetway and opening the cabin door. Passengers remained onboard while maintenance inspected the aircraft. Ultimately the flight cancelled but the cancellation determination took nearly 2 hours. Crew reviewed required reporting Items: Dispatch notified; chief pilot briefed; reports made.' | 0aircraft |
2,138,724 | Narrative 1 - 'We were flying at 9;500 feet MSL doing basic maneuvers when I noticed an aircraft at our altitude coming directly towards us. I had to evade him by rapidly descending 1;000 feet per minute and turning hard to the left but he did get within 100' of us. I called him on the radio but he wasn't on frequency. Looking at his track log he didn't avoid us at all and would've 100% had a midair had I not taken evasive actions.' | 9humanfactors |
2,114,174 | Narrative 1 - 'We were flying southbound from the LGC VOR at 3000 ft. We had been holding at 3000 at the LGC VOR. We made numerous radio calls of what we were doing. The other aircraft also made numerous radio calls that they were inbound for a left downwind for Runway 31 at LGC from 4500 feet. As we departed to the south on a heading of 180 they approached from our right at a higher altitude on the same heading. We had them in sight off our right wing at about 300 feet above and descending. We asked if they had us in sight and got no response. The aircraft then began to turn into us while descending. With a heading aimed directly at us; we took evasive action with full power in a steep climbing left turn to avoid the traffic. In the evasive action we successfully avoided the aircraft. Soon after the aircraft responded that they now had us in sight; but at this point the traffic was no factor with us over 500 feet above and headed in the opposite direction. We were able to avoid a worse situation by taking prompt action when we did not get response from the aircraft leading to a positive outcome.' | 9humanfactors |
1,899,595 | Narrative 1 - 'While working a busy combined session; an aircraft called looking to get his IFR release from a satellite airport. A position was split off due to volume and once the arrival push calmed down; I reached back out to the aircraft to accommodate him. Once the position was split off; the responsibility for the airport in question should've went with it. Being that it was fresh on my mind after hearing the aircraft while I was busy; I didn't immediately realize that it was no longer my responsibility so I proceeded with reading his clearance. doing so; I kind of fumbled through the phraseology due to lack of practice and also did not issue runway heading to avoid terrain. Shortly after I was relieved and upon giving the briefing; I failed to brief the IFR release I issued. I did my 2 minute overlap and left. Shortly after leaving I realized I forgot to mention something and went back in the room to tell him. By then; the aircraft had taken off and turned immediately into a higher MVA. I should practice my Phraseology and create a way to remind myself to remember to brief someone else in a timely manner' | 14procedure |
1,897,807 | Narrative 1 - 'As I rotated two geese hit the right nose of the aircraft. The AOA (Angle of Attack) [vane] sheared off causing erroneous airspeed and altitude info. We switched controls and Captain uneventfully landed over weight.' | 7environment-nonweatherrelated |
2,105,306 | Narrative 1 - 'On Day 0; I was acting pilot-in-command; and pilot flying; of a Challenger 350 from ZZZ to ZZZ1 on an IFR flight plan. At Approximately XA:45; while being vectored for the ILS RWY XX into ZZZ1; we were advised by TRACON to 'check attitude' and 'climb to 4000 feet.' We immediately complied with a climb from approximately 2250 feet to 4000 feet. We were then given vectors and lower altitudes and cleared for the ILS RWY XX approach in to ZZZ1. The remainder of the flight was without incident.After landing; we were given a request to contact the tower; which we complied with. The supervisor at the time; Person A; collected my personal information and advised us he would listen to the 'tapes' and look at the data and may send this to the FSDO. He didn't know at the time if this was a pilot deviation or not. I have called the tower numerous times to obtain more information; but they have been too busy to talk about it.Retracing what led up to this is as follows: Upon handoff to ZZZ TRACON; three attempts were made to contact them before an acknowledgement was received. This was; in my opinion; due to the controller being saturated with additional aircraft transitioning through TRACON's airspace due to storms and buildups. The controllers initial response was curt and sounded annoyed. Earlier in the flight we had momentary trouble communicating with ZZZ Center; which I believe was due to the electrical storms; and may have contributed to requiring three attempts to contact ZZZ TRACON? After checking in with TRACON; we were given multiple lower altitudes and headings and eventually given direct to ZZZZZ; an IF/IAF fix for the ILS XX and an altitude of 4000 feet and then eventually 3000 feet. The altitudes were not given with adequate distance out to allow us to be at an altitude we could join the approach for a landing. Another company aircraft arriving from the west were not given adequate descent clearances as well; causing for pilot requests for lower altitudes and then in our case; being taken through the final approach course for the ILS RWY XX. The controller opted then to bring in the other aircraft first and gave us a heading of 320 and a 'descend to 4000 feet.' My co-pilot put 2000 feet in our altitude selector and I bugged us to a heading of 320. I didn't catch/see he lowered the altitude to 2000 feet rather than 4000 feet. After listening to the transcripts of liveATC; my co-pilot only replies with 'vectors Aircraft X.' ATC did not query us to verify we received the correct heading and altitude. I don't know if we had radio reception/interference again or my SIC was saturated with additional changes to our routing and altitudes along with reloading the FMS and running checklists? Or both? I don't recall specifically hearing '2000 feet' stated. Our company policy is for the pilot who adjust the altitude selector to leave their hand on it until the other acknowledges the correct change. My contract SIC did not do that. What took place is very concerning. In my XX+ years of flying I have never had a possible altitude deviation. My co-pilot and I debriefed and talked about this at length. One of the discussion points was to keep his hand on the altitude selector until the other has a chance to verify. He is a former military helicopter pilot with many years of experience in a variety of challenging and demanding environments. He is a professional and also rattled by this! As mentioned earlier; he was acting in capacity as a contract pilot and therefore the synergies of flying with one of my company co-workers was missing and believe that may have been a contributing factor. In addition; the weather and possible radio interference and TRACON saturation were contributing factors I believe as well. I have tried to piece this together with the best of my recollection and along with listening to the ATC tape transcript from liveATC. I have flown into ZZZ1 over XXX times and feel I know the area and system well anddesire to have a thorough understanding so this never happens again. Hopefully ATC will take my call to help me piece this together so I can learn from it and make necessary changes. Thank You!' | 9humanfactors |
1,785,691 | Narrative 1 - 'At approximately XA:45; I realized it seemed to have been sometime since I had heard from the Controller. This is not entirely unusual. Due to the pandemic; there are times of much less radio chatter. In fact; several times a week; there are periods where nothing is said by anyone on frequency for lengths of time as long as 20-40 minutes save the occasional 'You still there?' It seemed to have been a bit longer than normal; so we called on our last assigned frequency. We heard nothing so I tried Guard and heard nothing. Unbeknownst to me the volume of the radio receiving Guard was accidentally turned down. As I was trying Guard my copilot found a frequency on the chart; made radio contact and was given the proper frequency we should be on. We re-established communication with ZZZ Center. All seemed fine; until the hand-off came with a phone number for possible pilot deviation.Upon arrival at our destination I called the number I had been given. The Controller I spoke with asked if I knew why I was given the number to call. I told him I believed it was due to lost radio contact. He said it was. We then discussed how this might have happened and things to do to re-establish radio contact. He then said it seemed to him we had never been given a hand-off. He also said that sector was very busy at the time the incident occurred. I have no doubt they were. I suspect they were even a bit understaffed due to the pandemic. we concluded our conversation and thanked each other.My copilot and I spent considerable time discussing how this might have happened and how to prevent it in the future. But it must be noted there is no recourse for pilots that find themselves in this situation. There is also no sure way of completely preventing this type of situation. Pilots have no way of knowing when a hand-off should occur or when they have reached a specific time limit. Sometimes we check on; only to be immediately handed off with 'short stay; contact center on XYX.AB'. Other times we listen for long periods time listening to a completely silent radio. Those long periods of silence do not help at all. They only make the silence seem normal. Maybe controllers should be required to inform us; at check-on; how long or how many miles we can expect to be with them. They always seem to have an idea how long we will be in contact with them.'
Narrative 2 - 'At approximately XA:45 local; at FL360; in cruise; we noticed that we hadn't heard from Center in quite some time. During these times of COVID; it has become commonplace to go for long periods of time without hearing anything from Center or other traffic; especially in remote portions of the US. With the frequent occurrence that the only radio traffic heard is a pilot asking 'Still on?' just to make sure someone is still out there; it is impossible for a pilot to determine at what time/distance interval; he should be expecting contact; a hand-off; or any other instruction from ATC.This was the case on date. During a long cross-country flight; we went for what seemed a long time without hearing anything from Center. We acknowledged the fact and I keyed the mic to interrogate Center. There was no response. I tried again and even switched to the previous frequency; just in case. Still no joy. Pulled up the sectional to find the nearest Center and discovered ZZZ Center; Area X on frequency. Called out to this Controller who brusquely inquired who we were; where we were; and informed us that we were on the wrong frequency; providing us with the correct one. We immediately switched to the appropriate frequency; received a response and continued on our way. Shortly thereafter; we received a call from Center that we had a possible pilot deviation and they had a number for us. Number was copied; remainder of the flight continued without incident.Upon landing; we reached out to the Center phone number; who informed us that; after reviewing the recordings; we had not been handed off to the next sector; and it was no fault of ours. Easy enough. Controller called back a few minutes later; stating that the previous sector had filed a report on the incident; and needed pilot license number; etc.; for the reports.This brings me to the point where I ask; what can be done in this situation? There is clearly no exact location where an aircraft is handed off to another sector/center/controller. There is no exact amount of time flying through a sector before a switch is made. What can we; as pilots; do to help with this situation? Obviously; I cannot do my job as a pilot AND do the job of the controllers on the ground; so where is the happy medium? Is there a guideline of the appropriate amount of time to go without hearing from ATC before inquiring? Should we set a timer after each hand-off; or create a GPS way-point a certain distance down the line?It can be argued that 'I have a number for you to call; advise when ready to copy' are the most stressful 13 words heard in a pilot's day. It generates fear; concern; trepidation and second guessing of the skills and abilities that we spend years honing and decades perfecting. When we make mistakes; that is a definite way to bring attention to the problems and help find a solution. What recourse do we have when a controller makes the mistake? We spent the remainder of the flight and; arguably; the next 24 plus hours; stressing over what we should have done; when we should have checked in; how were we supposed to know; etc.' | 7environment-nonweatherrelated |
1,854,765 | Narrative 1 - 'Flew my plane from ZZZ to ZZZ1 to have lunch and get the plane washed.After lunch and wash; preflighted plane; filed to fly to ZZZ2 at FL270 (Note: It was in the mid 90sF at ZZZ and the low 80s in ZZZ1).Departed ZZZ1 and activated autopilot.Conditions were clear and at FL180 I turned the pitot heat on per check list.I did note that when I turned the pitot heat on; OAT temps were already -10c and thought nothing further.As we approached FL240 the plane began to pitch up nose high and airspeed dropped to zero.I disconnected autopilot; hand flew the plane and began to trouble shoot the issue. Since the pitot heat was on from FL180 to FL240 (2 mins?) I incorrectly assumed that the heat caused an issue. ATC cleared me for FL270 and my copilot correctly told them unable.We checked in with ATC and told them we lost airspeed and altitude indications. ATC said MODE C was reporting an altitude that we knew was what the airplane was showing but no longer correct. We knew we had a Pitot static issue but needed to determine why.My pilot/passenger correctly suggested that the appropriate action was to actually leave the pitot heat on and he was ultimately correct. We got a little airspeed indication on the instruments but was not enough to feel comfortable so co-pilot requested priority handling with ATC. We received vectors to an arrival procedure back to ZZZ. After about 5 mins all instruments returned to normal and we cancelled the priority handling. I landed without incident. ZZZ Airport Fire and Operations met us at my parking space to make sure we were OK. We suspect that the cause of the incident was water in the pitot tube from getting the plane washed at ZZZ1 exacerbated by me not turning on the pitot heat before the water in the pitot tube froze.Consider always flying with pitot heat on. Make OAT a more regular part of my scan' | 9humanfactors |
1,849,117 | Narrative 1 - 'My student and I were doing touch and goes at ZZZ; on departure on the crosswind to downwind leg at approximately 1;000 feet AGL; I reduced the power to idle and simulated an engine failure. I told my student to make a power off landing and make it a full stop. He glided the aircraft back to the runway and landed normally. Immediately after landing my student started to lose directional control of the aircraft and started to oscillate on the rudder pedals. I then instructed my student to regain control by applying equal and consistent pressure on the rudder pedals; I was also on the pedals assisting him. We started to approach the halfway point on the runway and I told my student he needed to start braking. He then pulled on the handbrake excessively hard which caused the wheels to lock up. While the wheels were locked up; he proceeded to start oscillating again with the rudder pedals. I took controls and audibly told him 'my controls'. When I pushed on the handbrake forward to release the brakes; he bumped into the throttle and advanced it; at this point we started to accelerate towards the end of the runway; I immediately pulled the throttle back; regained directional control and applied the brakes consistently/smoothly. I was able to safely exit the runway at the last taxiway. After this incident; I had a meeting with the owner of the flight school and we decided to drop this student from the program. This was not the first 'incident' with this student. He had flown previously with the assistant chief pilot and other senior instructors; after they hit a 'wall' with him in training and he was no longer progressing; I took over. Of the approximately 6 flights I had with this student; 3 had 'incidents' where the student had loss of control and if I did not take controls I believe it could have led to a fatal accident. [The student is in the] pre-solo phase of training with about 105 hours of dual received. The next day we did a debrief on the flight and when I brought up the events; he interrupted me and said he disagreed with it; when I asked him what he meant by it; he stated that if I wasn't there he would have recovered safely and that I was making him nervous.' | 9humanfactors |
1,789,632 | Narrative 1 - 'On IFR flight plan I was cleared for an RNAV Approach. I was monitoring the CTAF while still with ATC. There was someone ahead of me on the RNAV Approach; so I was second to land. With the airport in sight; I canceled IFR and changed frequency; kept transponder number. Another plane announced it would enter downwind and land after me. Another plane announced in area and would be number four. With each new plane arriving to the area; the Fixed Base Operator announced winds and preferred runway. The plane ahead of me cleared the runway. On short final; I saw a headlight at the far end of runway rapidly approaching. I announced that I was going around for plane on opposite side of runway. I climbed and turned slightly right. The plane from the other direction was rolling on the ground and about midfield took off and turned slightly right. I then announced that I would be staying in the pattern. I then landed uneventfully. He came and found me to apologize. He said that he had keyed in the wrong frequency and had been announcing his intentions to land on the opposite direction runway.' | 9humanfactors |
2,100,261 | Narrative 1 - 'The day started by working a late sequence and ground stops; for that reason we had to shut down our engines to save fuel and during one of our flight control test we had negative feedback and troubleshot the issue; at the same time we were focus on monitoring the ground delays and making sure we had enough fuel for our flight. At the end by repeating this process multiple times; I end up getting distracted and failed to double check the door was secured. For this reason; the door opened during take off roll. On the second flight of the sequence; we realized the magnetic lock wasn't securing properly and we had to troubleshoot until door was secure. Although I don't want to blame the magnetic lock for the incident on the initial flight; I think it contributed to the door opening during takeoff; as well as the ground stops; bad weather and the late sequence. We had multiple distractions due to ground delays; bad weather; issues with flight control test contributed on task saturation. Late sequence; flight control test issues; and the magnetic lock not working properly contributed to the door opening during takeoff.I think making this part of our departure briefing can help on being more alert during times of potential task saturation.'
Narrative 2 - 'Flight started late due to late arrival of previous flight. Further delays were encountered after pushback due to issues with flight control test. Added delays due to weather in ZZZ lead to concerns about minimum fuel for the trip being adequate. All contributing to added workload for crew during the taxi out. I observed the Captain doing the standard door close/lock procedure before pushback and considered the matter checked; the door was not a consideration beyond that point due to the added issues and concerns the crew was addressing from engine start to taxi out. Cockpit door apparently did not secure properly and opened late in the take-off roll; too close to V1 callout. Door was secured after take-off and flight continued without incident. Multiple delays; and distractions compounded to up the workload on the crew while getting the aircraft out for departure. Focus on addressing issues lead to distraction from physically double checking that door was secured before take off. On second leg of flight; crew noticed before gate pushback that door lock solenoid was cycling unreliably and had to repeatedly cycle the electronic lock switch to properly secure the door.Captain and FO are in agreement that in consideration of the potential for unreliable lock solenoids on the electronic locking system that a physical check of the door after securing should be a written checklist item; rather than a flow pattern step. Adding a visual check and a verbal confirmation between crew members could ensure that malfunctioning door solenoids do not result in a potential security situation. For personal development; FO will brief with future Captains the need to double check door is secured and verbally confirm before take off.' | 9humanfactors |
2,222,769 | Narrative 1 - 'This report is to advise that there seems to be a chronic issue with the hardware on the Boeing 787 Main Landing Gear Shock Strut Door getting loose and backing off. Aircraft X is the 3rd aircraft that has been found with this problem. Aircraft X was found with one bolt backing off on D; and another (no number) aircraft with the same loose hardware. Somehow; the safety wire is breaking and somehow; the hardware is backing off. Suspect vibration causing the bolts to back off. Need to have all the Boeing 787 Main Landing Gear Shock Strut Door inspected on the pedestal fittings for loose hardware and broken safety wire.' | 0aircraft |
2,021,777 | Narrative 1 - 'During arrival we briefed the terrain for a right downwind to a visual approach backed up with the ILS to land to the north on the airfield. ATC vectored us in a left downwind; once the airport was in sight we were cleared the visual approach from the left downwind. Once established on the left base we started a slow decent 2 nm from intercepting the approach course. We quickly realized the terrain below us was rising so we began correcting back to 4100 ft. As we corrected we got the 1000 ft. foot call and ATC called us to have us check our altitude. We corrected back to 4100 ft. and intercepted the final approach course and descended to a landing. Cause: Vectored for a left downwind after briefing a right downwind; rising terrain in the base leg area. Suggestions: Briefing both downwinds and the surrounding terrain for both sides of airport. Could also request the ILS approach instead of doing a visual approach with the surrounding terrain.' | 14procedure |
1,866,051 | Narrative 1 - 'We taxied out from the ramp to Runway XX at [Taxiway] 1 via [Taxiway] 2 and held short for landing fixed winged traffic. As the aircraft was landing; there was CTAF call for Aircraft Y taxiing from [Taxiway] 3 across Runway XY and we visually acquired it. As the landing traffic turned off the runway; we made a CTAF call for taking the runway and proceeded to taxi onto Runway XX and began hover checks. As we were finishing the hover checks another CTAF call was heard broken but understood 'MEDEVAC....' My Copilot suggested a clearing turn to identify the traffic and I saw distant bright lights in my side rear view mirror. As we made a clearing turn to investigate; we saw the fixed winged traffic that was taxiing earlier taking off towards us. We immediately landed from our 10ft hover and the plane passed over head us by approximately 150/200ft. No other CTAF call was heard. This took place at approximately XX32 local. It was unknown by the first CTAF call heard by the taxiing Aircraft Y that it was MEDEVAC otherwise we would have continued to hold and yielded the runway to them. Weather factors should not have precluded the other aircraft from seeing us on the runway and we never heard anything after their broken takeoff call.' | 9humanfactors |
2,097,500 | Narrative 1 - 'Summary: During maneuvers at altitude; we lost fuel pressure to the right engine. After troubleshooting and securing the engine; we [advised ATC] and landed back safely at ZZZ.My student was completing his last MEI flight before his end of course check. Aircraft X came back early from maintenance and we made a same-day reservation to complete the flight. I arrived at the aircraft about XA:45 after the preflight was completed by my student. Before engine start; I confirmed that the aircraft documents were onboard; we had over 6 qts of oil in both engines; visually confirmed we had fuel in both tanks (gauges showed about 40-45 gallons per side). My student completed the run-up and preflight checklists with no anomalies. Holding short of the runway; I took the flight controls and we did three simulated engine failures using the mixtures on the runway with me acting as the student. After the third simulated failure; we exchanged flight controls; and the student completed a short-field takeoff with about 4;000 feet remaining. At 2;000 feet on upwind; we departed with a climbing right turn to east and later turned south towards ZZZ1.My student leveled off at 6;500MSL and completed the pre-maneuver checklist about halfway between ZZZ and ZZZ1. I let him choose the first maneuver and he chose to do a steep turn. About halfway through the first steep turn (going left); I noticed that the fuel pressure to the right engine was dropping. I let him complete the turn and I announced that I was taking flight controls. I completed a quick engine kill flow and confirmed that we had lost fuel pressure and fuel flow to the right engine. I turned us back towards ZZZ and had my student complete the engine failure checklist. He was unable to restart the engine; so I had him take flight controls and tried a few additional steps myself; namely trying crossfeed on the fuel selector. I was unable to restart the engine; so I ran the securing checklist while my student feathered the engine. While he remained on flight controls; I communicated with the ZZZ Unicom and FBO Ops that we had an engine failure and that we were returning to ZZZ. I then switched over to ZZZ Approach to [request priority handling]; I mainly did this because I was concerned about conflicts with traffic coming into ZZZ2 or ZZZ1. By this point we had descended down to about 5;500 MSL and were five miles southeast of ZZZ. We noticed traffic to the southwest on ADS-B; so I asked the student to complete a right 360 turn. After the turn; I took back flight controls and descended to do a mid-field crossover for the downwind of Runway XX. My student ran the approach and before landing checklists. One error during this time is I had used an excessive amount of rudder trim at altitude; I noticed this and asked my student to help retrim the rudder while we were crossing over the field which he did.From the midfield downwind; we completed the single-engine pattern successfully. On the base to final turn; I dropped to about 80kts and was slightly low but was able to correct. We touched down a couple of hundred feet past the thousand-foot bars. We turned to exit at [Taxiway] 1; but I was unable to complete the turn with just the left engine. I stopped short of clearing the runway; shut down the aircraft; and notified UNICOM. FBO Maintenance came out and towed us back to the maintenance hangar while my student called ZZZ ATC to inform them we were safe on the ground. At the Maintenance hangar; we did a quick fuel pressure check with Maintenance and were unable to get fuel flow or fuel pressure on the right engine.The FBO fleet maintenance investigated the issue and found that it was an abnormal failure of the electric fuel pump that cut off fuel flow to the engine. The fuel pump has been replaced and it will test flown before it is returned to service. I called ZZZ ATC and they did not require any other paperwork for the [priority handling].' | 0aircraft |
2,193,112 | Narrative 1 - 'We were operating flight XXXX on Aircraft X from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2. We got an ECAM for ENG 1 STALL; despite the fact that all systems appeared to be operating normally. We ran the QRH procedure; which called for disconnecting the autothrust and retarding THR 1 to IDLE; which we did; with slightly erratic engine 1 indications. I [requested priority handling] with ATC and requested immediate descent; which we received. After activating the Eng Anti Ice (as per the directions for the current engine option in the QRH); we gradually began applying power to Eng 1. The ENG 1 STALL ECAM appeared again; and the Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) and Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) gauges gave mildly erratic readings. Flight Attendant (FA) 3 reported that she heard unusual noises from that side of the aircraft; but FA 2 did not hear; see; or feel anything unusual.We returned THR 1 to idle and continued with the QRH; which dictated a shutdown and to land ASAP. Coordinating with Dispatch via satphone that we were overhead ZZZ in VMC; they advised us to divert to ZZZ; which we did. I communicated with the Inflight crew the nature of the situation and that we would be landing in ZZZ in 20 minutes. I then made an announcement to the passengers that we had a significant mechanical problem; and were making a precautionary landing in ZZZ. The First Officer (FO) and I set up for and briefed the approach to ZZZ; and ran the appropriate checklists. ATC vectored us for descent and the approach; which concluded in a safe landing. We stopped on the runway so that Crash Fire Rescue (CFR) could inspect the aircraft. After making a 'remain seated' announcement; I further explained to the passengers that the firefighters would check the aircraft; after which we would park at gate XX to examine the options for getting them to their destinations. CFR reported no damage or leaks visible from their inspection; and we taxied to the gate and parked the aircraft. The passengers disembarked without injury or incident.' | 0aircraft |
2,273,774 | Narrative 1 - 'At approximately XA35 on Day 0 at ZZZ; I made a CTAF call on XXX.X that I was taking the runway XX for departure to the NE. I taxied my aircraft from taxiway 2 to line up on the numbers on the departure end. As I stopped; my instructor and I observed a group of ATVs or off-road vehicles along the edge of the runway in vicinity of taxiway 1. We recognized these vehicles as a group of personnel working to prepare the airport grounds for the upcoming airshow. The vehicles did not have flags. I only recall one of them had a flashing amber warning light. As we stopped on the runway; one of the vehicles crossed (left to right) in front of us. We paused our takeoff until we both confirmed the runway was clear. We saw one vehicle stopped on the right of the runway and 2 or 3 stopped on the left side. We assessed all stopped vehicles were at the distance they would be if they were behind the hold short line of taxiway 1 and runway XY/XX intersection. We did not hear any other radio communication from ground vehicles. With runway clear; I asked the instructor to 'keep an eye on them' and began my takeoff run. Power and engine gauges were normal. I made my airspeed callouts as normal. As I was confirming ROTATE speed; I observed one of the vehicles from the left of the runway begin to cross in front of us. With no time or space to stop; I proceeded with a normal takeoff; mindful not to over rotate. I estimate we cleared the vehicle that incurred the runway by 50-100 feet. We continued the flight with no other incidents. Prior to flight we conducted a full pre-flight brief to include weather and local NOTAMs. We noted the future NOTAM for ZZZ for the Airshow; but nothing active. After this incident; we verified again that the ZZZ airport NOTAM for runway XY/XX closure is not active until Day 7 at XA00 thru Day 19 at XF00.I have reason to believe the individuals on the ATV/off-road vehicles were volunteers and not familiar with proper airport operations and procedures and not actively monitoring or announcing their ground movements on CTAF. This could have been prevented if all personnel operating ground vehicles in the airport movement environment had proper markings and; for a pilot controlled airport such as ZZZ; actively monitor and announce their movements on CTAF.' | 3ambiguous |
2,096,340 | Narrative 1 - 'On final approach to Runway XXL at ZZZ at approximately 700 ft. AGL; multiple bird strike encountered. The visual approach was continued; and landed uneventfully. Upon slowing to taxi speed there was no nose wheel steering and Crew observed leak in hydraulic fluid on SYS page of the MFD (Multi-Function Flight Display). Aircraft stopped on the runway; and eventually towed to the gate.'
Narrative 2 - 'On short final to [Runway] XXL in ZZZ at approximately 700 ft. AGL we had multiple bird strikes. We continued the visual approach to an uneventful landing and rollout. I was PF; at approximately 60 kt. transferred control to the Captain. While attempting to vacate the runway she realized there was no nose wheel steering. Aircraft was stopped on the runway and a hydraulic leak was found caused by the damage from the bird strike. Aircraft was eventually towed to the gate after the line was caped and passengers deplaned normally. I don't believe this event could have been prevented.' | 7environment-nonweatherrelated |
1,840,593 | Narrative 1 - 'In the vicinity of ZZZZZ intersection power was reduced to idle as aircraft intercepted descent path on the ZZZZZ 5 arrival. Master Caution; Fuel; and Filter Bypass light on #1 Engine illuminated. Flying duties were transferred to First Officer and QRH procedure was accomplished. Only the #1 Engine Filter Bypass was illuminated and the engine was operating normally. Decision was made to continue to ZZZ and request priority handing as a precaution and to avoid any unnecessary delays. ATC controllers were very helpful with one exception. When we checked in with Approach Control (I believe the frequency was X) the controller immediately issued us a 40 knot reduction in airspeed to sequence another aircraft in front of us. This would have created an unstable approach and was the exact situation we were trying to avoid by asking for priority handling. We reminded him that we were a priority aircraft and were beginning to slow as we configured. Normal landing was uneventful with Tower and Ground controllers again very helpful. Dispatch; FODO [Flight Officer Duty Officer] and line maintenance in ZZZ were contacted and briefed. Flight Attendants were debriefed.Brief Approach controller on importance of assisting Emergency Aircraft.' | 0aircraft |
1,872,724 | Narrative 1 - 'Due to dirty musty odor Captain decided to refuse airplane. Entry made. Unknown heavy odor throughout the Aircraft Cabin. Since unsure if odor was toxic; Captain decided to refuse airplane.'
Narrative 2 - 'During preflight duties working a flight from ZZZ to ZZ1 I noticed a distinct smell when walking into the flight deck. My Captain walked in behind me and noticed the same smell. At first we thought nothing of it and we continued with the preflight. I put my bags away and started preflighting the Flight Deck. While my Captain completed the exterior walk around. As we continued the preflight duties the smell did not dissipate. My Captain walked in from the preflight and noticed the smell was not gone. Our flight attendants noticed the same smell. We tried to turn off the APU bleed air and wait for the smell to dissipate. There was no change. The entire crew was concerned with our health and the Captain decided to remove the entire crew from the aircraft. The aircraft was refused for flight and an entry was made. A new aircraft was assigned. Unknown cause at this time. I am unaware of the causes of these events and this was my first occurrence. The smell was possibly comparable to a dirt sock or musty odor.' | 0aircraft |
1,806,517 | Narrative 1 - 'While on the ENDEE 6 Arrival to MDW we encountered a near midair collision and the following is a narrative of that event. Time stamps are from 'Flightaware' app and may not be 100% accurate. I added these to recreate the event to the best of my knowledge.I was the Pilot Flying on this leg. At about XX:26Z ATC began to vector us off the arrival for spacing. During these vectors we were cleared to descend to lower altitudes. I had even made the comment jokingly that we were being 'over-controlled' by ATC after several heading; altitude and speed changes. At approximately XX:45Z we were cleared to descend to 5000 feet. Our flight path at the time was approximately over top of Morris Muni airport (C09) about 6.6 miles southwest of STKNY on the arrival. Crossing altitude at STKNY is published is 6000 feet. We were then cleared direct to ALQUE for the ILS 4R at MDW. While still level at 5000 feet at approximately XX:47Z we had a TCAS TA (solid amber) showing an aircraft in front of us and +100 feet above our altitude. I do not remember the scale set at the time on my navigation display but it was very 'close'. This was this first time we had seen a Traffic Advisory of any kind on the display (no open white diamond) and had not been advised of traffic from ATC. One second later ATC told us we had 'glider traffic' ahead and to 'deviate as necessary' to avoid the traffic. I immediately began a right hand descending turn. About two seconds later we received a Resolution Advisory RA to descend and the First Officer told ATC we were responding to an RA. At about 4500 feet; I saw the glider slightly higher and to our left. Once clear of the conflict; ATC cleared us to descend to 4000 feet and stated he was not in contact with the glider and asked if it was clear of clouds. ATC warned aircraft behind us on the arrival about the glider and it's altitude. We estimated the distance from the glider was 150-200 feet as it passed to our left. The event happened in the proximity of Channahon; IL Glider Club (IL59) south of STKNY on the arrival.The takeaway from this event:The TCAS did not operate as we would expect in time regarding a TA caution providing 40 seconds warning and an RA providing 25 seconds warning. It's hard to tell if the glider had just turned on its transponder or if the slow speed of the glider had an impact on our TCAS. The glider was in Class E airspace and outside the 30 mile equipment requirement (transponder) from the ORD Class B. What rules apply to gliders here; to me; is unknown to be honest.ATC had vectored us off the arrival and was assigning altitudes lower than published crossing restrictions by 1000 feet (5000 feet abeam STKNY).Vectors took us almost directly over a glider airpark with no warning about that on any chart we would ever use readily available. Some warning symbology or quick access information would assist considering the low altitudes we fly over these areas.In hindsight; I would have made clear to ATC we experienced a near mid air collision in that language as described in our FOM.' | 3ambiguous |
2,131,123 | Narrative 1 - 'Chain of Events:I am a newly rated Private pilot as of Day 0. I was doing a solo cross country from ZZZ1 to ZZZ in a Cessna 172 M that is owned by my flight school located in City X. I was using flight following on my way over. I obtained the weather and the winds were favoring runway XX; if I remember correctly winds were from 260 @ 4 knots. I communicated on the CTAF my intentions. I did one touch and go on runway. I maintained centerline and control of the aircraft. I wanted to do a second touch and go to make a softer landing. I came into land the second time for runway XX; I touched down on centerline and completely landed the plane. I felt much happier with that landing. I failed to use right rudder to directionally control the airplane after touch down to maintain centerline and started veering to the left of runway XX. I became frightened and my first instinct was to go-around. I put in full power with 20 degrees of flaps without right rudder correction and unfortunately created more left turning tendency; which in turn created a sharp left turn. I took off the runway on the left side of runway XX; I had just lifted off the ground when a few seconds later I heard a bump near the aft underside of the aircraft. I incorrectly assumed the noise was from the tires spinning still from take off. I departed ZZZ toward ZZZ2 for fuel and then ultimately back to my home airport of ZZZ1. The flight performance and controls felt normal per usual.I did not report the incursion originally because I did not believe there was an issue with the aircraft. The next day I received a text message from an employee who sent me a photo of the right underside of the elevator with a small puncture and yellow paint on the normally white surface; asking if I knew anything of the damage. The damage was discovered from a CFI doing a preflight on the plane the morning after my flight. I realized that something more serious occurred from that bump than my poor assumption that the wheels were just turning. Especially since I did not identify damage in my preflight the previous day from the elevator departing ZZZ1. After the damage was discovered from the instructor the plane was immediately grounded. Fortunately; after I returned the plane no flight occurred with the damaged elevator.After seeing that text message I immediately called my flight instructor and told her the situation; she informed me it would be best to talk to one of our assistant chief pilots. I did so immediately and explained the situation. I filled out an insurance form claim for the airplane. Our chief pilot was informed. After discussion with maintenance and the assistant chief pilot; since I was unsure of the exact cause of the damage; it was speculated that FOD played a factor.On day 1; I received a call from our Chief Pilot; Assistant Chief Pilot; and another person of importance; who informed me that I came in contact with and damaged a runway light at ZZZ and that the City Y will be sending me a bill to replace the light. In order to fly solo again with my flight school at ZZZ1; I was to go up for one flight with cross winds and do touch and go's with a CFI who is not my primary CFI. That was completed today on Day 3 and I was found to be proficient in total winds of 26 gusting to 29 with a crosswind factor of 11-13 knots. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS:I was extremely shaken up by this event and after discussing it with several CFI's we found a variety of factors that played a role in this situation.1. Failure to maintain directional control upon roll out and counteract the left turning tendency of the plane.2. The incorrect to decision to attempt a Go-around when the plane had fully landed with 20 degrees of flaps.3. Complacency - This is not continuing to keep a checkride standard a few weeks after my PPL checkride4. Psychological Defense Mechanism-In this instance I knew deep down something had occurred but I kept trying to convince myself that the bump I heard was from my wheels turning from take off. I kept trying to push the reality and gravity of the situation out of my head and convinced myself it was okay. It was not okay. I should have not flown the plane. I should have reported immediately if I heard an unknown noise once I was at my flight school so the plane could be grounded and checked out. Even if there was not any external damage to the plane I could have damaged something internally. Not only that someone else could have flown the plane after me unknowingly the plane was damaged and could have cause serious injury. It was selfish act in order to protect my own ego.5. Get there it.I was scared and wanted to be back home at ZZZ1.6. Invulnerability hazardous attitude I learned on the ground the different types of accidents that occurred and I tried to be as humble as possible. If I am honest with myself though I thought I would be able to react properly in a situation such as this; I thought that I had a higher standard because I just came from a checkride despite being a low time pilot. I realized and accepted that I have the invulnerability hazardous attitude.7. Previous experiences with lack of right rudder usage.- There had been two previous experiences in my formal PPL training with two different instructors that that lacked enough right rudder usage on touch down; fortunately in those instances they took controls and there was a wide enough runway to correct. I thought I had moved on from these instances but obviously I did not.Overall; what happened on this takeoff was minimal in consideration of what could have occurred. I am extremely grateful to be safe and unharmed and walk away; with a small puncture in the elevator and a damaged runway light. I fully understand and realize that this could have been a terrible accident and a possibly fatal mistake. I realize the extreme gravity of the situation and have a deep remorse of the event that occurred in City Y. I knew that general aviation can be unforgiving. However; on that day I was able to internalize how extremely unforgiving general aviation is.WHAT I AM DOING TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:1. I am currently rewriting my personal minimums form for short and narrow runways.2. I did my primary training in a 160 HP 172 N model. This is a 180 HP M model C172. Not to make an excuse; but I was not mentally prepared for touch and go's in this model because it does act slightly different. Before this flight I only had 2 hours in the M model.3. I will be continuing to train with a CFI who is not my primary instrument CFI every other week to two weeks on touch and go's and ensuring I am not becoming complacent in my rudder usage. 4. I am rereading aerodynamics in the PHAK and will be doing more in depth research on touch and go's and 'the point of no return' for a touch and go. 5. The next solo flight I take I will be talking out my intentions with an instructor and do warm up touch and go's at my primary airport to prime my brain. 6. God forbid this were to happen again but if there is any unknown noise; and I question it for a second I will be landing the plane as immediately and safely as possible to do a high quality check; if there is any doubt I will ground myself and the plane immediately.' | 9humanfactors |
1,870,111 | Narrative 1 - 'This event occurred during Takeoff roll on Runway 27R in ATL. Captain and First Officer received a predictive wind shear warning between 80-100 kts; during calm wind conditions. Other weather conditions/reports did not constitute a wind shear event ie: convective activity; strong winds or microbursts. The ATIS was reporting calm winds and no other aircraft that were taking off or landing reported any type of wind shear activity. We believed this to be an erroneous alert because the message lasted approximately 3 seconds and then extinguished. We continued the takeoff and experienced no wind shear during climb out. We believed the message to be erroneous because the weather conditions were not conducive for wind-shear activity. There could've been a glitch in the system. Also being very new to the aircraft and it's systems could've played a part. During training were only trained on wind shear events during poor weather conditions. We have a flow chart that we use to determine if wind shear conditions exist. There were no conditions that even led us to the chart nor any weather reports or ATC/Pilot reports of any kind of possible wind-shear. The AOM (Aircraft Operating Manual) states we must reject the takeoff for any predictive wind shear message prior to V1. However; due to the fluid nature of the situation we deemed it safer to continue the take-off. Perhaps understanding our own human factors and incorporating guidance found in the AOM in a more timely manner; this could've been prevented.' | 0aircraft |
1,863,806 | Narrative 1 - 'Aircraft X from ZZZZ; blocked in at ZZZZ1. We were met by two Civil Aviation Authority Inspectors for a ramp inspection. Using the Ramp Inspection Job Aid in the iPad Secure Content locker. We escorted inspectors in the cockpit and supernumerary area while answering questions and providing requested documents. Inspectors noted Dangerous Goods paperwork in the Aircraft X's cargo envelope for a shipment of lithium ion batteries. We showed the inspector Aircraft DG Manifest stating 'NO DG ON BOARD '; that we received at ZZZZ. I informed the Duty Officer; the Flight Safety Duty Officer [of Inspection Team name] Senior Manager for Flight Operations of the inspection and report. Had the ZZZZ1 ramp send out DG specialist to also help answer the DG issue. The Inspectors wrote up the DG discrepancy and departed the aircraft at XB:54. [The issue was] DG paperwork errors.' | 14procedure |
1,781,064 | Narrative 1 - 'A little while after reaching cruise altitude; the flight attendants contacted us to let us know that there was a passenger who was not complying with the mask policy. They were handling it per their guidance and keeping us informed. Later in the flight there had been some other problems that they had informed us about. The First Officer and I had completed a bathroom rotation just before starting down into ZZZ when we got a call from the flight attendants informing us they were [having problems with this passenger]. They just wanted to be sure we knew this. I asked them to let us know if there were any problems. Several minutes later; we received a call that this passenger had not taken kindly to the warning and had become 'verbally combative.' I thanked them for letting us know; and asked if everyone was okay. They replied yes; they were. I asked them to keep us informed if there were any changes of if anything escalated; they said they would. At this point we had begun the descent on the arrival into ZZZ; the First Officer had been flying the whole leg. He had been managing the radios as well while I was talking to the flight attendants. I considered that while the situation currently was Level 1; I felt it was most prudent to get the aircraft on the ground to protect my crew and the other passengers. Additionally; felt it would reduce my workload as well as my First Officer's if we requested priority handling. I told the First Officer what I was considering and why; and asked if he had any considerations. He agreed that was a good choice. I then requested priority handling with ZZZ approach and informed them of SOB and fuel remaining. I had sent an ACARS message to Dispatch informing them of our situation. I called ZZZ ops and informed them of the same. I then checked in with the flight attendants to ensure things were okay; which they were. I informed them we were accepting priority handling and would be on the ground as soon as possible. As we passed through 10;000 feet we kept the speed up around 315 knots to expedite our arrival. We were given radar vectors to a visual Runway X and landed uneventfully. We had to wait a few minutes for our gate as it was occupied. We pulled into the gate. The passenger disembarked and the situation was over. There were no injuries. After the plane was empty the crew got together in the front of the airplane for a debrief of the situation. At the end of the debrief I asked the flight attendants if they were okay and would be comfortable with continuing. They all felt that they were okay to continue. When the First Officer and I debriefed; I asked him the same and he was good. I took a moment to assess myself and determined I was good to continue as well.It is worth noting that the flight attendants did a very good job of keeping us informed as to the status of the situation. This was helpful and good crew CRM. They were clear in their communication; calm and professional. My First Officer also was a model of CRM and performed exceptionally to include his aircraft handling to expedite our arrival.'
Narrative 2 - 'Passenger wasn't complying with mask usage after being repeatedly requested to by flight attendants. Flight attendants issued warning after which passenger became verbally aggressive.' | 7environment-nonweatherrelated |
1,859,878 | Narrative 1 - 'During initial climb through 8;000 ft. out of IAH en-route to ZZZ on the LURIC8 departure northbound; we were informed by ATC that there had been a previously reported sighting of a drone quadcopter on our route. We were told its last reported position was at our 10 o'clock and within five miles. I was hand flying the airplane and the Captain maintained a close watch outside. As we accelerated through 10;000 ft. the Captain suddenly saw it visually off the nose. We continued our climb and it went under us at a high rate of speed. The Captain reported to ATC that we had seen it and it went under us. They asked for an estimate of how close it came to us. It was hard to determine; as we are so used to seeing certain size targets (other airplanes) and I had no idea how big this one was so initially the Captain said we cleared it by maybe 1;000 ft. or less. I never was able to see it; as I was focused on flying the airplane.'
Narrative 2 - 'During initial climb through 8;000 ft. out of IAH en-route to ZZZ on the LURIC8 departure northbound; we were informed by ATC that there had been a previously reported sighting of a drone quadcopter on our route. We were told its last reported position was at our 10 o'clock and within five miles. The First Officer was hand flying the airplane and I maintained a close watch outside. As we accelerated through 10;000 ft. I suddenly saw it visually off the nose. We continued our climb and it went under us at a high rate of speed. I reported to ATC that we had seen it and it went under us. They asked for an estimate of how close it came to us. It was hard to determine; as we are so used to seeing certain size targets (other airplanes) and I had no idea how big this one was so initially I said we cleared it by 1;000 ft. but on hindsight there is really no way to know for sure and my feeling is that it was probably quite a bit closer.' | 3ambiguous |
1,901,569 | Narrative 1 - 'Assigned heading 180 when cleared for takeoff ORD Runway 22L. Previous A320 departed. We departed with minimum separation. Airplane banked to 20-30 degrees uncommanded right and then left. I intervened by correcting aircraft bank angle. Flight continued as normal. [Inadequate] wake turbulence separation trailing an A320.' | 7environment-nonweatherrelated |
1,803,869 | Narrative 1 - 'Aircraft X [was] cleared for an RNAV GPS Runway 32 approach into MIC and [I] instructed [the] aircraft to cross a fix at 3;000 ft. I checked [the] chart twice on this new approach and was not comfortable with 3;000 ft. and climbed the aircraft to 3;500 ft. until [I] passed the obstruction of some antennas. Upon further review; the aircraft should have crossed WAKUD at 3;400 ft. for [the] MVA of 3;500 ft. by the chart. I have reviewed the chart and SOP's to become familiar with this new approach as well as obstructions in airspace for currency. [I] also reviewed IFR chart legends and procedures in general to make sure [I was] reading them correctly.' | 9humanfactors |
2,084,407 | Narrative 1 - 'At the end of the Quervo1 arrival approaching XLANT; we were told to go direct TRSMO and cleared the ILS 31L. Had to quickly load that into the FMC. We set 2200 for FAF altitude since we were cleared for the approach. We were also in icing conditions and had to slow down to 170 or less. Once inside TRSMO; I saw we were VNAV Path so we could set touchdown zone with Approach Mode on. After putting on the engine anti ice and putting out flaps to slow down; I look up and saw we were low and that our RA was reading just above 1200. I told the First Officer to pull up and we leveled off and caught the glide slope around 1200 at our final approach speed. Then continued for a normal landing.' | 9humanfactors |
1,912,260 | Narrative 1 - 'I just wanted to bring something to your attention that is a potential safety issue associated with the RNP 5L in RDU. I have been working RDU flights all month and the first couple of times that I flew this approach I thought that it was my flying skill; but after having done this all month I can safely say that it is how the approach is built. When arriving into RDU; I have been requesting this approach via the HEAVE transition which dumps you off the ALDAN STAR onto the RNP approach course. The LNAV portion of this particular approach brings you in well left of runway centerline; so much so that if you do not make any corrections when crossing the threshold; the right mains will also touchdown well left of centerline. I have flown this approach several times this month in 800s; and two other aircraft types which leads me to believe that this is how the actual approach is built. I have triple checked the RNP values several times and the aircraft has always been performing within RNP requirements. I have also flown the RNP 23R and that approach works as it should. Nothing additional to include. Reevaluate the RNP 5L approach course.' | 3ambiguous |
2,287,094 | Narrative 1 - 'Approximately 3.5 hours into our ZZZ1-ZZZ Flight we received an ACARS message to contact Dispatch. We received another message to call Dispatch on the crew phone shortly thereafter but we were in the vicinity of a Missile Range and were intermittently losing GPS and WIFI due to jamming. We communicated this to Dispatch via ACARS and attempted to contact Dispatch by Dispatch Direct VHF via ZZZ [Flight Service Station] but were unable to make contact. Dispatch then sent the following message via ACARS CONSIDER LOWER ALTITUDE TO BURN FUEL; INCORRECT MEL INFO APPLIED; CURRENTLY APPROX 3K OVER MAX LANDING." At that moment we were on track to land with the Performance Data planned arrival fuel of 7.8 thousand pounds which would have resulted in a landing weight around 144.6 thousand pounds.We were then patched through to Dispatch from Center and the dispatcher explained that the correct weight penalty was not applied on the Performance Data we departed with. The Performance Data we departed with was a adjusted Performance Data and did state the correct MEL (27-XXX Flight Spoiler Systems) and also stated "TAKEOFF PERF PENALTY APPLIED IAW (In Accordance With) MEL 27-XXX). The dispatcher explained that the takeoff penalty had not been correctly applied because the specific spoiler pair (2/11) was not listed in the Logbook entry. This specific spoiler pair warrants additional weight limitations per the MEL DP (Departure Procedure) procedures. I had reviewed the MEL and briefed the Operator procedures with the FO before flight. I had also looked at the DP procedures and thought that our Performance Data had adequately adjusted our takeoff and landing weights per the MEL.Dispatch advised that we land with 4.8 thousand pounds and select the longest active runway. We calculated a conservative landing distance of 6600 ft and mentioned that we would likely land with more fuel than that to balance our available options in case of go-around etc. We coordinated with Center and Approach Controllers to descend early; take delay vectors; and enter holding. I kept the FAs (Flight Attendants); passengers; and dispatcher informed of our plan and we landed flaps 40; brakes 3 without any issue. FOB at landing showed 5.0 thousand pounds.CauseAfter landing I called the Maintenance Control and Dispatch to discuss the problem. My understanding is that the original MEL entry was not performed correctly. Maintenance Control added the correct spoiler pair note while we were in flight. Dispatch informed me that they only became aware of the issues because the dispatcher I spoke with was planning the next flight for our aircraft and began working the problem backwards to realize that we had departed 12K pounds over the correct MEL weight and were going to land heavier than required by the MEL as well. It is not clear to me if the original dispatcher was ever aware of the mistake. I believe that greater awareness of the major weight penalties of this specific MEL would have prompted me to reach out to maintenance and Dispatch before the flight if the spoiler pair was not listed. The operator procedures of the MEL do not make a note of this however and because the lights are disabled by the maintenance procedure there is no way of seeing which spoilers have been deactivated. During preflight we reviewed the operator procedures; had what we thought was a valid Performance Data that accounted for the MEL; and were aware that we would conduct a landing assessment for ZZZ. Although we resolved this situation without major issues; it did place us in a position of having to very closely manage our fuel burn - if we kept too much fuel we would increase our landing distance unacceptably and if we kept too little we would be using reserves."' | 0aircraft |
2,290,868 | Narrative 1 - 'We were cleared for takeoff; began our takeoff roll; and at some point after 80 knots and prior to 100 knots; we were directed to cancel takeoff clearance due to crossing traffic down field. We performed the rejected takeoff procedure; taxied clear of the runway; parked in the holding pad to coordinate a return to the gate for a maintenance inspection. Crossing traffic downfield created an unsafe condition for our departure; tower cancelled our takeoff clearance.'
Narrative 2 - 'ATC initiated rejected takeoff. We were cleared for takeoff (above 80kias and below 100 kias). Tower canceled takeoff clearance due to crossing traffic downfield. Upon receiving this radio call we executed a rejected takeoff procedure; cleared the active runway; and returned to the gate for maintenance inspection.No suggestions; the event was ATC initiated. We performed the rejected takeoff procedure; took necessary precautions; called dispatch and maintenance; were told to return to gate for hot brakes inspection. After inspection; both the captain and I conducted fit for duty self inspections; determined we were still safe to fly; and we proceeded with scheduled flight.' | 0aircraft |
1,990,170 | Narrative 1 - 'Aircraft Y entered Runway XX when I was on the takeoff roll on Runway XY. The wind favored Runway XY. Another aircraft had departed prior to my takeoff on Runway XY. This runway has a blind spot because it is not level. I entered Runway XY for takeoff. There is not a blind spot in this position. Aircraft Y was on the taxiway holding short of Runway XX. The aircraft entered Runway XX when I was 1/2 through my takeoff roll. I continued the takeoff because I would not be able to stop without hitting the other aircraft. This was the safest course of action given the aircraft entered the active runway in the wrong direction during my takeoff roll. I announced my position and intentions multiple times but later realized I was transmitting on the Center frequency instead on the Unicom frequency.' | 9humanfactors |
2,176,670 | Narrative 1 - 'Our airplane was holding short of Runway XXR at Taxiway 1; per ZZZ Tower's instruction. After a short period of time; the pilot monitoring and I believe we heard the Tower Controller clear our airplane to line up and wait Runway XXR. The pilot monitoring replied to the Tower Controller on the Tower frequency with our tail number and that we would line up and wait Runway XXR. Just after advancing our airplane over the hold short lines; the pilot monitoring and I noticed another airplane on the opposing taxiway in front of us taxiing past its respective hold short lines onto Runway XXR. I immediately took evasive action by depressing the brakes and bringing our airplane to a complete; safe; and abrupt stop. A near collision was not a factor here; our aircraft had only moved a few feet past the hold short lines before stopping. The pilot monitoring immediately asked the Tower Controller to confirm whether the line up and wait clearance was for our tail number. The Tower Controller replied negative. The pilot monitoring asked the Tower Controller for further instructions on how we should proceed provided the current situation and our position. Now clear of the opposing airplane as it taxied into position for takeoff; the controller instructed our crew to taxi straight ahead off Runway XXR; make a three-hundred sixty degree turn; and hold short of Runway XXR. We immediately complied. Reflecting upon this event; the pilot monitoring and I believe we heard that our tail number had been cleared to line up and wait Runway XXR. Additionally; after the pilot monitoring replied to the Tower Controller that our tail number was cleared to line up and wait Runway XXR; the Tower Controller never corrected our read back; had it been erroneous. The Tower Controller may have actually said that the tail number of the opposing airplane was cleared to line up and wait Runway XXR. As both airplanes had taxied past the respective hold short lines; I noticed the other airplane had a similar tail number to ours. While it is understandable that confirmation bias and/or lack of absolute radio clarity may have led the pilot monitoring and I to believe the Tower Controller said our tail number; there are some things that could have changed the outcome of this event. First; our crew should slow down and ensure and actively agree with each other that we heard the full clearance for our tail number. Second; we should be more situationally aware that there was another airplane of the same type on the opposing taxiway and that it may have a similar call sign. As a result of this; I completed a WINGS course about preventing runway incursions to be better educated as a pilot. It is also now more thoroughly engrained in me that if uncertain of any part of an instruction; stop and ask ATC. ATC may not be able to immediately correct an erroneous read back if; as an example; they are prioritizing something else. Further; I recognize that both pilots and controllers make mistakes; and it is our collective duty to be proactive with mitigating and eliminating mistakes. I appreciate all the hard work our ATC controllers do every day to keep everyone safe.' | 9humanfactors |
1,968,529 | Narrative 1 - 'I took over sector ZZZ (mid configuration). Aircraft X was on a vector for the localizer at ZZZ in sector XX. There was higher than normal ZZZ arrival traffic in sector XY. In mid configuration we are operating with this combined sector on a 180-210 mile range. Aircraft X was on a heading that took him through a 11000 ft. area east of the ILS. I was trying to split my attention between him and numerous potential conflicts between arrival and departure traffic in sector XY; which is also difficult to work at over twice the normal range. I turned Aircraft X back prematurely and he came in high on the localizer and did a 360 with tower to lose altitude. Combine XX at XH:00 prior to the mid shift coming in so that XY and XX can be worked at closer to a normal range. Staff for people on the XA00 to XI00 shift so that we aren't pressured to combine sectors early to get people out to go home. Rearrange sectors so that we don't have to do a logical to physical swap prior to the mid shift; which puts pressure to combine XX/XY/XZ before it is advisable to do so.' | 2airspacestructure |
1,870,312 | Narrative 1 - 'On departure on the SLEEK 2 RNAV Departure approximately at 7;000 feet turning toward KIDNG intersection lost GPS-L and then GPS-R momentarily. Not sure what had caused it (maybe 5G). Denver Departure was asking several questions to other aircraft about the loss of GPS. After a few seconds GPS was functioning appropriately without any issues on the flight to ZZZ1.' | 4atcequipment/navfacility/buildings |
2,259,579 | Narrative 1 - 'I was pilot flying. We were told to make a steep descent and cleared for the visual approach Runway 20 trying to beat a storm. We had a bad intercept angle to capture the localizer and passed it. I turned off autopilot to further correct back onto the approach. At this time we got a terrain callout in the turn as we were leveling off at the altitude for the approach. We also got a landing gear callout. We visually verified we were not in danger of terrain; verified we were at the correct altitude; and lowered the landing gear. We were stable before 1;000 ft on the approach and landed safely.Cause: Trying to avoid and beat storms in the vicinity of the airport. Getting fixated on certain things while preparing for the approach causing us to lose situational awareness. Steep descent rates at low altitudes and bad intercept angles to intercept localizer. We could have decided to not take a steep descent onto the approach to try to beat a storm. We should have lowered the landing gear earlier and lessened the descent rate as we got closer to the approach.' | 9humanfactors |
2,137,177 | Narrative 1 - 'On an IFR departure out of ZZZ; everything was running well. We climbed via the ZZZZZ 3 departure to 3000 feet; then got radar vectors and steps up to 5000 feet. At 5000 feet; we were level when an Alt 1 caution CAS Message showed up. At this point; we (my student and I) clicked over to the engine page to see zero amps on alt 1. I then attempted to load the alternator using the AC with no change. I did this as sometimes Alt 1 doesn't take much load so it will show up as a failure; though it shouldn't while in flight. My student then cycled Alt 1 with no change. I then took controls from my student and instructed him to read the Alt 1 CAS checklist. This checklist asks us to verify the circuit breaker and then cycle the alt. We did this two more times. each time; the alt would come online for about 10 seconds. During this time; the amperage would wildly fluctuate between about 4 and 10 amps before falling to zero again. During this; I was instructed to climb to 7000 feet. Upon reaching 7000 feet; I informed ATC of the failure and asked to divert back to ZZZ. In a Cirrus; the Alt 1 is the critical alternator; however; you still have 30 minutes before anything fails and nothing critical will fail. ATC asked me if I wanted to declare and because I knew this fact; I declined. At this point; I was given a vector back toward ZZZ. My student was finishing the checklist by turning off systems on main bus 2 and shutting off the alternator. This disconnected the yaw damper. At this point; ATC asked for my approach request. I hadn't had a chance to look yet; so I asked for the RNAV XX. He asked which RNAV so I told him to standby. After looking; I asked for the RNAV Z as it was an LPV. Right about this time; we got a essential bus warning CAS (indicating it was no longer on ALT 1 voltage and completely normal) and an essential bus warning CAS message. After pulling up the engine page; we saw that the essential bus was now on bat 2 voltage of 24.2 V. This is not supposed to happen. The essential bus should be on alt 2 voltage minus one volt; making it 27.75 volts. I asked my student to pull up the electrical diagram of the cirrus to verify. Once we verified this; we knew something else was wrong. I looked up and saw that we still had 17 minutes indicated to the airport if we went direct. Since we were still in IMC and needed to do an approach; we would be running close to the 30 minute reserve on batteries. This meant we could potentially lose all avionics. Even though alt 2 was still showing that it was working; something was clearly wrong. At this point; I told ATC I was [requesting priority handling] and they vectors me straight toward final. At this point; I told my student to continue running checklists for the CAS messages and I would continue to fly to the ground as he had only flown in IMC a couple times. From this point; I made my best forward speed of about 160 KIAS and followed ATC vectors and altitude for the RNAV Z XX approach. No further faults were indicated; however; the essential bus voltage slowly dropped to 23.9V by the time we landed. After landing; we taxied in and were met by the fire crew to make sure all was OK. That was the end. We shut the aircraft down; put it away and informed the flight school of the failure before grounding the aircraft for maintenance.' | 0aircraft |
2,280,202 | Narrative 1 - 'Right engine EGT exceeded parameters during climb out. Company notified. Decision to jettison fuel was made. Fuel was jettisoned over ZZZ VOR at 6000 ft. Uneventful 2 engine landing back at ZZZ at maximum landing weight.' | 14procedure |
2,112,114 | Narrative 1 - 'After push back from Gate XX and engine start; Ground Metering released us to Ground Control. Received clearance to taxi Runway XXL/ left on [Taxiway] 1; right on 2; left on 3...give way to air carrier from the left". After air carrier passed by; started to move forward. Nose was 8+ feet over non-movement line (into Taxiway 1). When seeing Aircraft Y northbound on [Taxiway] 1 approaching and passing 4 at fast pace; I stopped; flashed lights multiple times. FO attempted to contact Ground about conflict but frequency congestion prevented transmission. Aircraft Y (on separate frequency) never slowed--no nosegear strut compression whatsoever. Had I not stopped; I'm not sure Aircraft Y would have been able to prevent collision given speed at which they passed. After they passed; finally able to contact Ground Control who replied with a comment about not being able to transmit. No further discussion or comment."' | 9humanfactors |
1,880,596 | Narrative 1 - 'B FA (Flight Attendant) was called by our Captain before takeoff and told that there was a loud noise written in the log book; but the door seal had been checked and was fine. When I got to the aft galley after taking drink orders; above 10;000 ft.; it was VERY loud back there. I walked from door to door; but the sound seemed more like it was coming from the ceiling of the galley; not a door.While walking back to the aft galley from serving my first tray of drinks; I felt the right side of my head fill with pressure. It went all the way down into my lower right jaw. That is not normal for me during flying. I called the Captain then; and said; 'There is really something going on back here; the pressurization is hurting my head all the way into my jaw.' He said they would handle it in ZZZ. I also said; 'We don't feel safe or comfortable taking this plane back up again.' He said they would take care of it in ZZZ. That's the last we heard from or saw of him.Name was not doing well at all. She seemed disoriented and one of her eyes was bright red. I started feeling very irritable out of nowhere. One passenger came back to aft lav and vomited. Other passengers were pulling on their ears.After landing; a Mechanic came on and we tried to relay all of our information to him. We went out in the jet way; and spoke with our new set of pilots. I asked if we could give Name some O2 from the cockpit because she was having signs of hypoxia. They set her up with the O2 mask; and for several minutes she took oxygen.They told me my face and eyes were very swollen; I kept continuously trying to clear my head by holding my nose closed and blowing. It wasn't working; and my head was hurting very badly. At one point our new Captain called for EMT to come take a look at us.My blood pressure was 193 over 100 and something! I was feeling really loopy and goofy. A ZZZ supervisor came down while the EMT were there. Someone made the decision to take us to see a doctor at a hospital.The diagnosis was altitude sickness. My blood pressure was still very high; but coming down. We stayed overnight in ZZZ. Our 2 day trip turned into a 3 day trip.When flying back the next day; my head was making a lot of internal crackling noises. It seemed that the air had been trapped all that time- overnight. I was told by the ZZZ1 inflight department that if I wanted to get paid for the overnight and also the two flights home; then I would need to grieve it through the Union.You can imagine my disappointment. [A Manager] checked on us; but no one from ZZZ1 inflight ever did.'
Narrative 2 - 'Well we were boarding Aircraft X; Captain called me while I was in the aft galley. He let me know that the previous crew had stated there was an issue with the aft galley service door and that ZZZ2 Maintenance had checked it out. They said that everything looked fine. He also stated that the crew complained that there was still very loud noises coming from somewhere in the aft of the aircraft. Once we took off and hit about 10;000 ft. the noise started coming from somewhere in the aft galley. The noise was extremely loud the entire back of the cabin could hear it I called the Captain and let him know that the noise was worse than he was telling me. At that point I asked him if in fact it was the galley service door or if it was the entrance door because the noise seem to be coming more from the entrance door. He said he had no idea and that he would have to check the logbook. And then also asked him if he could hear the noise because it was very loud and I imagine that he could have heard it through the phone. He told me he did not hear it. At that point I went out and took drink orders; the passengers or myself could not hear each other. Everyone was using their fingers to rub their ears as if they were popping. My ears were popping constantly; also I felt like my sinuses were popping. Myself and the C Flight Attendant also called the Captain again and let him know of our symptoms. I vaguely remember passing out drinks; and felt lots of pressure in my head. There was a passenger that had been up a few times during the flight that was getting sick at the end. When we landed the Captain and First Officer exited the aircraft and didn't check on the crew or the problems that we encountered during flight.' | 0aircraft |
2,104,835 | Narrative 1 - 'Aircraft X was on the upwind for runway for runway 11 at 3DW. Aircraft Y made a radio call stating that he wound be entering the left downwind for runway 11. Aircraft X extended upwind for spacing between Aircraft Y. After an extended upwind Aircraft X turned crosswind and subsequently downwind. Aircraft Y made no additional radio calls after his initial call of entering the downwind. When Aircraft X rolled wings level in the left downwind for runway 11; Aircraft Y had made a 180 degree turn and was traveling in the opposite direction of the normal traffic pattern flow. Aircraft Y passed off Aircraft X left wing 200 feet below. Aircraft Y made no other radio calls regarding his intentions. Aircraft X had to climb to avoid traffic and continued in the traffic pattern and landed runway 11.' | 9humanfactors |
1,883,746 | Narrative 1 - 'During climb through FL340 level 2 Inertial Reference Unit 2FAIL illuminated followed by level 2 LSAS ALL FAIL and YAW [Maintenance Planner] ALL FAIL and an autopilot disconnect. Transferred control to Captain and coordinated a descent to FL270. Complied with all Quick Reference Handbook procedures. Called Dispatch and Maintenance on the SatPhone and with Dispatch concurrence coordinated an [Amended Release] for a return to ZZZ. Uneventful approach and landing at ZZZ.' | 0aircraft |
1,903,930 | Narrative 1 - 'On departure; I was the wing walker on the right side of the A/C. The A/C was connected; secured to the tow tractor. As the driver of the Tow Tractor was beginning to turn the A/C in the alley; the A/C broke free rolled back a few feet. The driver immediately radioed to the flight deck to set brakes to stop the roll away. Control; A/C Maintenance were both notified immediately. The A/C was hooked up to the tow tractor pulled back onto the gate where it was inspected and released. Maintenance said that the strap used to secure the A/C to the tow tractor was not working properly took the tractor [out of service].' | 8equipment/tooling |
2,035,634 | Narrative 1 - 'The flight initially departed from ZZZ; on an IFR flight plan. Onboard the aircraft were four passengers; one student training for Commercial Pilot Airplane Multi-Engine Land (CAMEL) certification; and myself instructing the CAMEL student. The purpose of the flight was to return all persons to ZZZ1; with the additional purpose of the CAMEL student to receive additional training on flight operations to build confidence and flight time.En route and over the ZZZ VOR; we began switching from the auxiliary fuel tanks to the main fuel tanks. The left tanks were switched first with no issue. The right tanks were switched several minutes later. During this switch; the right fuel selector required greater force than typical. Approximately one minute after the switch to the right main tank the right engine began to fail. I performed the Engine Failure checklist and the Engine Restart checklist shortly after; which resulted in a successful restart of the right engine. During this time; [priority handling requested] with Approach ; and assistance in navigation to the nearest field was requested.The rest of the flight was conducted without incident. We landed in ZZZ2 and called a number provided by Approach to let them know we were down and safe.A previous incident at ZZZ3 predeceased this incident. A CAMEL flight assessment (check-ride) was being conducted; and the engine was shut down by the Designated Pilot Examiner (DPE). Both pilots could not restart the engine; and [priority handling requested]. They returned to ZZZ3. The airplane's engines were runup and the flight school's mechanic and owner were consulted. No issues were found or could be perceived as the later flights would not deliberately shut down the engine. A risk assessment on the likelihood and severity of engine failure determined that failure was remote but would be critical if it occurred. This was evaluated to marginal risk; which was determined to be acceptable by the instructor and CAMEL student.In reflection; continuing to position the fuel selector after encountering increased resistance was abnormal and may have contributed to the engine failure. A review of the PA23's fuel system with another Multi-Engine Flight Instructor is planned and will be logged.' | 0aircraft |
2,009,164 | Narrative 1 - '30 miles from ZZZZZ waypoint we were leveling off at FL300. The autopilot was engaged and the weather radar was in auto mode. We were showing only green returns. As we began our level off we entered a cell and started to experience moderate rain and turbulence as well as lightning flashes around the aircraft. We entered an updraft and the autopilot was unable to maintain altitude. We began to climb rapidly to FL307. 1 advised ATC we were unable to maintain altitude due to weather. This event lasted 2 minutes and we quickly recovered to FL300. I advised ATC when we returned to our assigned altitude. Worst weather event I had experienced in 20 years. Nothing could have been done to prevent it. Nothing showing on radar but precip.' | 17weather |
2,095,110 | Narrative 1 - 'While on vectors with ZZZ Approach we received 10 thousand foot descent; the First Officer selected 10000 ft.; I remember verifying 10;000 ft. Shortly thereafter we received a low altitude alert from ATC. I took immediate corrective action by disconnecting the Autopilot and climbing back up to 10;000 ft while the First Officer re-selected 10;000 ft. in the window.We both remember seeing 10;000 ft. in the window. After debriefing what must have happened was his finger was on the knob; (to point at the altitude for my verification) and as he moved it of it rolled back one tick to 9;000 ft.'
Narrative 2 - 'While on the downwind vector to runway XX into ZZZ. ATC lowered us from 11;000 to 10;000. 10;000 was selected in the window and the verified by the pilot flying. ATC warned us of a low altitude warning . The autopilot was quickly disconnected and a climb back from 9;500 to 10;000 was initiated. We leveled off with no further issues.' | 9humanfactors |
2,300,854 | Narrative 1 - 'Location: on M688 between ULDUR and SIDADIn cruise; FL350; RNP 2.0; ANP 0.40; GPS updating had been switched off at least 20-30 minutes prior to this event due to interference. While in cruise and on the magenta line the airplane experienced a map shift. We went from being on course to the POS REF page showing we were 5.5 right of the course instantly. Even after this shift the RNP and the ANP did not change; they still showed 2.0/0.40 despite being off course. At this point we received headings from ATC. We stayed on headings from ATC until entering Bahrain airspace to ensure that the aircraft no longer experienced any difficulties. We were able to return to LNAV; experienced no further issues; and were able to complete the flight without further incident.Cause: I believe this was the result of either GPS spoofing or jamming.Suggestions: One possible way to prevent this in the future is to route the flights farther away from Iran.'
Narrative 2 - 'Location: cruise flight on M688 between ULDUR and SIDAD; FL350; RNP 2.0; ANP 0.40; with GPS updating switched off due to interference.At this time with the MFD's (Multi-function Flight Display) showing the airplane on the magenta line; a map shift occurred instantly and showed the airplane 5.5 miles right of course. The RNP/ANP values did not change from 2.0/0.40 despite the instant map shift. At this point we received headings from ATC until entering Bahrain airspace to ensure the aircraft no longer experienced any difficulties. We were able to return to LNAV; experienced no further issues; and completed the flight without further incident. Cause: Suspected jamming/spoofing' | 0aircraft |
1,903,037 | Narrative 1 - 'Aircraft X contact ZZZ LC (Local Control) approximately 12 NW ZZZ stating they were losing engine power and were going to be landing in a corn field. LC asked if the pilot would be able to make ZZZ airport; the pilot stated negative and was looking for a road or field. OJTI paged for additional help to the cab and the FLM (Front Line Manager)/DEV continued training on the combined GC position. LC asked for souls on board (SOB) and fuel remaining. The pilot responded. LC displayed the VFR map on the STARS TDW (Tower Display Workstation) and pointed out us [a highway] which the aircraft was directly over as which the pilot stated he turned on his fuel pump and was able to maintain altitude. FLM called an Alert 2 during this time. The pilot was issued winds and altimeter and stated he wanted to land Runway XX ZZZ. LC gave instructions to make approach strait in to Runway XX. LC coordinated with R2; the pilot then stated his desire to land Runway XY ZZZ. LC instructed the pilot to make approach strait in to Runway XY and issued a landing clearance to Runway XY and issued a wind check. CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) was standing by at the base of the ATCT and Taxiway 1. The aircraft was visually observed over the ZZZ VOR with gear appearing down. The aircraft landed Runway XY without incident and taxied to FBO under their own power. CFR performed a runway inspection and the emergency was terminated.' | 9humanfactors |
1,800,062 | Narrative 1 - 'Initial CPDLC clearance was SID La Guardia 7 Runway 13 Whitestone. During taxi out Ground changed SID to the GLDMN 7. When you select GLDMN 7 as the SID; numerous complex special engine out procedures are available. The first; and only engine out procedure; with GLDMN in it for 13 says 'GLDMN NTHNS.' My FO (First Officer) asked Ground if we were cleared the GLDMN7 NTHNS Departure because of that title listed in the engine out procedure list. Ground responded with 'It's just the GLDMN 7 RNAV Departure.' Our confusion was we were originally cleared La Guardia 7 Runway 13 WHITESTONE; so with the change to the GLDMN 7 we were expecting WHITESTONE; and if not; then another transition such as NTHNS. We set the parking brake and informed Ground we'd need a few minutes to brief the new departure. As we further investigated the GLDMN 7; if you select the 'COMPLEX Special EFP Runway 13 GLDMN NTHNS' engine out procedure; it shows the title as 'Runway 13: GLDMN Departure; NTHNS Departure.' This clearly shows GLDMN and NTHNS and separate departures; not GLDMN Departure with a NTHNS transition. There absolutely needs to be a Jeppesen title change there either adding a separating comma between GLDMN and NTHNS; or just list them in two separate lines. For such a simple punctuation mark missing; it took a radio call (which didn't clear up our confusion; and further investigating to clear things up for us). Either way; we set the brake to brief the change and accomplish the Departure Plan Checklist. We departed with no issues after that chart confusion. This report is to support that title change.'
Narrative 2 - 'During taxi out for departure from LGA; ATC assigned us a new departure from our original clearance of LA GUARDIA 7 WHITESTONE for Runway 13. The new clearance was to depart on the GLDMN 7 for Runway 13. Pulling up the procedure was easy to do; along with programming the FMC. But; the safety concern was that the emergency departure labeling in the Jeppesen Charts was confusing. We requested; for some time; for Ground Control to brief the procedure and to get clarification about the assigned departure. In the Jeppesen charts; it looks like the emergency procedure is with a NTHAN transition; which we were not assigned; because such a departure doesn't exist. We quickly realized that the NTHAN is a separate departure entirely. We noticed the confusion was because the separate departures were not differentiated with the usual ';' (comma); like at other airports. We then made sure we were on the same mental model and briefed the departure with the appropriate emergency procedure; ran the Departure Plan Checklist and continued on without incident.' | 5chartorpublication |
2,122,183 | Narrative 1 - 'Just after takeoff; landing gear horn and warning lights came on. On climbout; I accepted a vector from ZZZ tower and was instructed to contact ZZZ departure. Because the horn was still blaring; I asked tower if I could stay with local control until I could work out the issue with the landing gear. I offered to fly east of the airport to avoid interference with traffic in the pattern. After turning east; I was asked by the tower controller if I wanted to cancel my IFR clearance. I canceled IFR with the controller. After cycling the landing gear a couple of times; I thought that it was working correctly; but the horn and warning lights were not showing a safe condition. I asked tower for a low approach so that they could look at the state of the landing gear. My request was approved; and I was told I could overfly taxiway 1 to be closer to the tower. The tower controller said the landing gear appeared down; so I requested a landing on runway XX. The tower approved and rolled emergency equipment. I went around the traffic pattern and landed uneventfully.I taxied to the ramp and thanked the emergency responders and the tower controllers.' | 0aircraft |
2,112,925 | Narrative 1 - 'On climb-out from [Runway] 22R on the HYLND7 SID at about 1000 ft. AGL we encountered suspected wake turbulence and the aircraft rolled to about 35 degrees of bank. The 'BANK ANGLE' alert came on while we were reducing the bank angle.'
Narrative 2 - 'We were cleared for takeoff Runway 22R out of BOS shortly after a company Airbus. While on the HYLAND7 SID the aircraft quickly banked to about 35 degrees angle of bank at approximately 1000 ft. AGL due to suspected wake turbulence. The aircraft 'bank angle' alert sounded as the PF was reducing angle of bank. The remainder of the climb was uneventful.' | 3ambiguous |
2,209,947 | Narrative 1 - 'After turning left crosswind following departure on Runway 20 at RUQ; a near miss occurred when an aircraft; presumably piloted by an instructor with student; executed a steep spiral descent into the downwind leg. The aircraft was above me and never seen until after it had passed overhead; traveling from my right to left. My TCAS warning system alerted me to the aircraft proximity and evasive action was taken. Although the presumed instructor had called his intention to execute the practice steep spiral descent into the downwind leg earlier; some time had elapsed by the time I departed and turned crosswind and his position was unclear. In addition; there were 4 aircraft; including my own; in the pattern at this small airport; with one taking off behind me. My concern is that practicing steep spiral descents at this small; relatively busy; airport may place other aircraft in the pattern at risk for mid air collisions. Consequently the suitability of performing this procedure at this airport should be examined and perhaps restricted to times when the airport traffic is less dense.' | 9humanfactors |
1,817,878 | Narrative 1 - 'During climbout from ZZZ passing through approximately FL190 #2 HYD ISO VLV; #2 ENG HYD PUMP; and #2 RUD HYD Master Cautions illuminated in sequence with approx. 10 seconds between each annunciation. I (Captain; Check Pilot; Pilot Flying) identified; verbalized and canceled the Master Cautions after First Officer (Pilot Monitoring) acknowledged each Master Caution. Crew acknowledged that the #2 HYD QTY was approx. 10%; and #2 HYD PRESS was 0 psi. With all 3 Master Cautions illuminated I called for the #2 HYD PUMP caution checklist first. First Officer (FO) began E&A checklist and I took radios. I informed ATC of hydraulic system malfunction; return to field with vectors requested; informed number of souls and fuel onboard; [received priority handling] and advised we would be running checklists and would inform ATC when completed. After we completed the #2 HYD PUMP; and during the hydraulic systems failure checklist; when it states to complete descent and approach checklists; I informed FO to pause there so I could communicate to Dispatch and inform of situation; and have operational control congruency in plan to return to ZZZ. Amendment to Release to return to ZZZ was recorded at XA12Z via phone with Dispatcher Name. I then requested patch through to Maintenance (MX) Control and informed of situation; malfunction; and hydraulics system indications. Aircraft was flying with normal controllability.Flight Attendant (FA) brief was made to include normal landing in ZZZ at approximately XB50lcl. PAX were informed of system indication that required us to return to ZZZ; and to please pay close attention to FAs instructions as they prepare cabin for arrival; and as a standard precautionary measure Fire Department would be standing by with lights flashing. I informed FO of landing weight; FO derived landing bugs from E&A checklist. We completed the descent and approach procedures and checklist; planning RNAV Y RWY XXR; and proceeded with completion of hydraulic system failure landing checklist; followed by alternate gear extension checklist with no operational airspeed exceedance. FAs reported back cabin secure for landing; FO and Captain in agreement informed ATC aircraft was ready for return to land; and that it would be a slower than normal RWY exit and taxi due to inoperative nosewheel steering requiring taxiing with differential power and braking. After normal landing; ATC was informed that Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) [were] no longer needed. FO informed ZZZ OPS to chock main gear also due to emergency/park brake accumulator pressure only available. Taxi to spot was performed with shutdown. AML entry was made with communication with MX CONTROL.' | 0aircraft |
1,793,758 | Narrative 1 - 'On vectors from Houston Approach for the ILS 14 at GLS. Cleared to intercept the localizer from current heading maintain 2;000 feet. Tracking the localizer inbound at 2;000 feet was given a handoff to Tower. I wasn't cleared for the approach so I asked if I was cleared ILS. Was given clearance and switched to GLS Tower.The glideslope needle went active and I lowered the gear to follow the glide slope down. 400 feet later the glide slope needle flagged out and came in and out. I initiated a climb and realized I was outside of the final approach fix. This was a false glideslope.I climbed back to 1;800 feet and approached the FAF. The real glideslope came in and I completed the approach.I reported the issue via telephone to the Tower after landing.The late clearance from Center for the approach [was a contributing factor]. I didn't brief myself clearly enough on the minimum altitudes until the FAF. I had a big headwind so my internal timer felt right to be descending but the reduced ground speed I was still outside of the FAF.My reaction to realizing the issue was fast. I stopped my descent and started a climb quickly upon seeing the glideslope problems. I then identified the problem and what happened. Resumed the approach when everything was correct.' | 4atcequipment/navfacility/buildings |
1,851,508 | Narrative 1 - 'Enroute from HOU to ELP at cruising level (FL280) and monitoring Guard Freq of 121.5; we heard numerous chatter from various aircraft totally unrelated to the safety of flight. Uttering words such as '[political utterance];' '[another political utterance]' meowing like a cat; etc.Obviously this is not only very unprofessional; but dangerous to the safety of flight!' | 9humanfactors |
2,034,971 | Narrative 1 - 'I was initiated in the northwest hold outbound at 6 miles for SVFR arrival into PABE and heard the traffic call in for SVFR arrival about 10 miles from the airport and last transmission was Tower to traffic southwest hold; I was outbound and descended lower to visually scan for the traffic and waited till I was 9 miles out before I made turn inbound in the Northwest hold and inbound at about 7 miles out both planes made evasive action to avoid collusion. My plane is equipped with ADSB in and out and didn't see traffic near me. The traffic involved was a Aircraft X and Aircraft Y.' | 3ambiguous |
2,057,001 | Narrative 1 - 'Was talking to approach; getting vectored for the RNAV XX approach at ZZZ. Was initially at 3;000 feet and then assigned 1;600 feet by the controller. Apparently I made an error in setting the new altitude in the autopilot; which caused the plane to descend at over 1;200 FPM. This descent was not noticed until several seconds later; when I saw the GPS flashing a terrain alert. The altimeter showed 700 feet at this point; and I immediately gave full throttle and pulled back on the stick. I was low enough that I didn't near radio calls from the controller nor could he hear mine. Once I gained altitude we were able to communicate; I finished the approach and landed at ZZZ without incident.' | 9humanfactors |
1,828,673 | Narrative 1 - 'Visual approaches to Runway XXR were in use at ZZZ at the time. Due to heavy traffic in the vicinity of the airport; and terrain to the southwest; ATC kept us on a vector that aligned us with a roughly 2 mile final approach to XXR. The airport was extremely difficult to obtain visually; and neither the FO nor myself had it in sight until about 4 miles out. We called the airport in sight; and were cleared for visual approach. At that time; I turned the aircraft to the right to align the aircraft for a downwind in a left hand traffic pattern; and descended the aircraft to 6;500 feet; the appropriate altitude for the 5 mile visual fix. Reaching 6;500 feet; we began to feel uneasy; as the terrain south of the airport forms a bowl; with terrain reaching 8;000 feet in places. Once at the 6;500 feet altitude; we could visually see that there wasn't any room to maneuver the aircraft in the valley to align it with the final approach course (we had about a 3 mile wide; terrain-free swath to work with). At about the same time; ATC issued us a low altitude warning; with the accompanying 'check altitude immediately' instruction. At that time; while on a heading corresponding with base leg; we executed a climb to 7;500 feet; and told tower we were aborting the approach. We overflew the airport and executed a right hand turn to set up for right traffic for XXR; a visual approach which was completed successfully. [Cause was] ATC's vector that led us into a valley not wide enough to maneuver the aircraft on approach. Poor charting of terrain on VFR maps in company publications. I'm filling out a separate safety concern report recommending an additional alert page on the company charts advising pilots of the difficulty of shooting a close-in visual approach to runway XXR from the West.'
Narrative 2 - 'ZZZ was conducting visual approaches to runways XXR and XXL at the time of the event. ZZZ Approach was descending us for arrival and told us to expect the visual approach for Runway XXR. At about 20 miles from the airport; we were told to proceed direct to the airport and report the field in sight for the visual. At this time we were also told to maintain 9;000 feet for terrain and traffic in the area. We did not obtain visual contact with the airport until about 5 miles away; at which point we informed ZZZ Approach and they cleared us for the visual and told us to contact the tower. At this point the approach controller has us on a vector to intercept approximately 2 mile final for Runway XXR. The Captain made a turn to the right and began a descent to traffic pattern altitude of 6;500 feet to maneuver the aircraft for a stable approach and landing. This turn brought us toward gradually rising terrain northeast of the airport. As we continued to maneuver the aircraft; it became apparent that there was not enough room to safely align with the runway. We initiated a climb and turned back toward the airport. At this time tower issued a low altitude warning and told us to 'check altitude immediately' (we were climbing through 7;000 feet at this time). We responded and said that we were climbing and turning back toward to the airport and that we would need to abort the approach and turn right to re-enter right traffic for XXR. A safe approach and landing was then completed without further incident.ZZZ Approach kept us high due to terrain and traffic and issued a tight vector for a visual approach that only allowed for a 2 mile final for the landing runway. Contributing factors included a busy GA traffic environment and inability to see the airport visually until about 5 miles away.A better way to conduct this approach when arriving from the west would be to join the RNAV approach from vectors or an initial approach fix (especially if this were to be conducted at night) or to vector the aircraft over the airport and down the valley to enter a right downwind for XXR.' | 7environment-nonweatherrelated |
2,124,433 | Narrative 1 - 'Normal takeoff Runway 22L from MDW. At approximately 600 ft. AGL; both the FO and I saw something pass our left. I recognized it as a yellow and black drone. MDW was departing Runway 31c according to the current ATIS; but we were assigned 22L. I believe we were the first aircraft to depart 22L. We sent an ACARs to Dispatch. No evasive maneuvers. No TCAS alert.' | 9humanfactors |
2,116,750 | Narrative 1 - 'Aircraft X was a ZZZ departure going west who came out of ZZZ Approach. On initial check in he said he wanted to go as high as possible to get over icing. I climbed him to 170. I got a report from an airliner who departed ZZZ1 southbound that he broke out of the cloud layer at FL190. I relayed the report to Aircraft X and clarified what it meant as he was confused by the term 'breaking out'. A few minutes later I asked if he was getting icing in that area. He said 'a little bit on his windshield; a small amount'. I filled out a PIREP with this information. Several minutes go by and he then told me he had rime ice on his windshield. I described the precipitation areas on my scope which were approximately 80 miles east of him and 50 miles southeast of him. and I noticed that his climb had stalled out at 120. I asked him if he was still climbing or if he wanted to stay at 120. He replied that he could see some blue sky and wanted to continue climbing. About 30 seconds later he declared 'in an uncontrolled descent'. I told him about the MIA in that area; 090. I observed he was in a right turn and asked if he was able to maintain any control; he said 'negative'. He came back a short time later and had control. I told him to maintain at or above 090. He responded he was out of control again. He was able to regain control and said he had icing on the wings. I suggest two nearby airports; he opted to go to ZZZ2. Over the course of the next few minutes I gave him an initial vector to ZZZ2; followed by another vector after he veered off course. I gave him the airport weather; elevation; runway length and the three instrument approaches. He eventually descended to 090; and then to 080. By this point he said the icing was starting to melt from his windshield and he had control of the airplane enough to start the RNAV approach to Runway XX. After he passed the initial approach fix he began descending to 075. I gave a low altitude alert and reminded him the MIA was 080 in that area. I checked to see that he had pitot and carburetor heat turned on and he did. By this point he said the ice was melting and the temperature outside was 35 F. The rest of the flight was pretty normal all things considered other than he stayed at 075 despite the minimum IAF altitude of 080. He was well above the highest point in the area and he was between layers at the time. He ended up landing with no other issues.There were several things looking back now that could have tipped me off to the danger he was in. The first being the extremely slow climb in icing conditions combined with a gradual reduction in his groundspeed. It was shortly after I told him about the stopped climb that he lost control. I do question whether I caused him to try a steeper climb which resulted in him stalling and losing control. I think also having him descend back to 090 which was a safe altitude to get back into warmer air could have been helpful; despite him wanting to climb above the layers of icing. Also I was reminded several times by management that he was below the MIA; a fact which I had told the pilot already. I was extremely hesitant to give any indication to the pilot that he needed to immediately climb back to 080 out of fear that he would stall and lose control again.'
Narrative 2 - 'I will be discussing the Controller in Charge (CIC) role I had and actions made. Before and during the incident I had sector split out due to icing reports. It was not busy but we had sufficient staffing to have it open. Sector XX solicited for pireps and received a trace icing previous to the incident. At around XA:45 I was sitting right next to the controller when he advised that he had a situation. I immediately told the supervisor in the adjacent area to get the OM so I could immediately start working on the incident. Within 2 or 3 minutes the OM and the area supervisor were in the area to help. I plugged in with a handset so I could hear the situation and not have to have everything relayed to me. I made sure the sector had a D side staffed to help. After the pilot gained control of the aircraft again I went over to sector XY empty scope and started to look at the weather at all the surrounding airports to see if anywhere was reporting VFR. They were all similar with IFR reports. The aircraft was closest to ZZZ2 so we determined that was his best option. Unfortunately; the aircraft could not maintain altitude and was flying under the MIA. I listened to a Low Altitude Alert to the aircraft. After the aircraft decided to go to ZZZ2 I relayed that information to the OM so they could have the vehicles ready at the airport. I then coordinated with sector XZ (sector above XX) to have an aircraft turn the lights on at the ZZZ2 airport for the pilot. We were constantly looking at the terrain chart and although the pilot was at 7;600 ft (MIA 8;000) the actual terrain underneath him was 5;600. The terrain was not an immediate threat and making sure the pilot was keeping the aircraft under control and navigating the correct course seemed most important. I made sure the D side pulled up the NOTAMs for ZZZ2 to make sure nothing was going to restrict his approach. Throughout the process we had to 2 pilots come help from another area to help with any additional information that would be helpful. I had sector XZ put an aircraft on the Unicom frequency to help relay any information from Aircraft X. We eventually got a 'safe on the runway' report from the relay aircraft. The radar controller did a great job helping the pilot get on the ground safely. The OM kept asking us to keep issuing Low Altitude Alert warnings to the aircraft. The pilot was well aware of his situation and telling an iced up pilot on a procedure turn inbound to the airport a Low Alt Alert was not a helpful idea. We knew the terrain and knew the pilot had icing and was aware he was under the MIA. The aircraft was already slowed to 76 kts. If we told him another time 'Low Alt Alert suggest you climb immediately' during this critical phase of flight he might have pulled back and stalled the aircraft.' | 17weather |
1,941,811 | Narrative 1 - 'In cruise; holding at the ZZZZZ on the ZZZZZ1 3 arrival we had a Dual Multifunction Flight Display (MFD) failure. We were approximately 17;000 ft. being vectored towards the airport when my MFD and the First Officer's (FO) MFD went blank. We [requested priority handling]/malfunction and requested Vectors for the duration of the flight.We had a dual MFD failure in Cruise. Captain and FO MFD failed in cruise and for the duration of the flight.Simply an aircraft non normal. We had all primary instruments.' | 0aircraft |
1,949,549 | Narrative 1 - 'MMQT 10-9 airport diagram is not up to date. There are additional taxiways that are open and useable not depicted on the diagram. Also; they use a Ground Control frequency that is not depicted.' | 5chartorpublication |
2,207,353 | Narrative 1 - 'We were coming into land on runway XX with a gusty right crosswind with too much left rudder applied. We landed facing slightly toward the left side of runway XX and immediately began skidding toward the right side of the runway. I took controls and straightened the aircraft out. We were veered about 30-40 degrees right of runway centerline. We could have remained on the runway but risked damaging a runway light. I stopped the aircraft straight ahead and departed the runway by around 15 feet on the right side. I then began to taxi back toward the runway and brought the aircraft back to the school ramp. There were not any injuries or damage to the aircraft or airport environment. I believe that after landing too much right rudder and or right brake was applied resulting in the initial skid. Less rudder pressure after landing needed until airspeed is greatly reduced.' | 9humanfactors |
1,850,160 | Narrative 1 - 'I was on my third revised assignment of the day. Scheduling changed my schedule and gave me approximately 50 minute notice for [a long] flight. I was rushed; in preflight; cockpit setup; etc. was completed normally. We were delayed approximately one hour due to passenger connection issues; baggage and other reasons I'm sure. Normal start up and taxi out. I was the Pilot Monitoring and we were cleared for takeoff. Everything was normal until shortly after rotation. The A-Flight Attendant called us and informed us of an unusual odor in the cabin. They said it was worse in back. The Captain notified ATC we needed to level off and work through some issues. I reduced temperature on packs. The flight crew also started detecting the unusual odor. It was different than a warm pack odor; but didn't smell like electrical; pneumatic; or hydraulic type fires. At that point a deadheading First Officer (F/O) got up and went to the rear Flight Attendant (F/A) station and was feeling around for a fire. The smell was getting worse; but the deadheading F/O spoke with me and thought it smelt like a warm pack. Passengers were looking around in a concerned manner also we were informed. Discussed situation with the Captain and at this point we had used enough fuel that we would be short fuel at our ETP (Equal Time Point); so we elected to return to ZZZ. We were overweight and discussed holding to burn off fuel; but were concerned if indeed there was a fire in an unmonitored space; we could aggravate the situation; so we would return for an overweight landing. I asked the F/A if an evacuation was needed upon return to ZZZ and informed me yes; but the A-F/A said no. We did not [request priority handling] or request equipment; but Tower rolled the equipment as a precaution. We ran checklists; reviewed QRH for overweight landing information and performed a normal landing. Landing configuration was AB2; flaps 30. Normal landing using reverse thrust and no brakes applied until approximately 60 knots. Upon rollout; I ran a QRH brake cooling and it returned a no special procedures result; The emergency equipment followed us to the gate. We asked if they noticed any smoke and they replied negative smoke. Proceeded to the gate with a normal shutdown. When Maintenance arrived; they performed a brake temperature check and said brakes were extremely cool.'
Narrative 2 - 'On takeoff from ZZZ; shortly after rotation; the First Officer (F/O) and I noticed a burning odor. At 1;000 ft. AGL we got a call from the Flight Attendants telling us about this same odor. She told the F/O that it was really bad and the passengers were looking worried. At about 5;000 ft. we told ATC about the odor and we asked for a vector and a level off to give us time to assess the situation before continuing over water. We continued southeast bound and leveled off at 8;000 ft. MSL. The odor was strong; was apparent throughout the cabin and not the normal smell that sometimes comes from the packs. The Flight Attendants and a deadheading pilot checked around the cabin and galleys and didn't find any indications of fire; smoke; or fumes. Because of this we did not run the QRH. The odor was slowly going away. I spoke to Dispatch on Company frequency while trying to decide if we can continue on; but then the odor was returning; just not as strong. At that point I realized we had burned through the 1;072 pounds of our ETP fuel and the F/O and I decided the safest plan was to return to ZZZ. I told this to Dispatch and ATC; and we got vectors back to the ILS XX. We briefed the approach; the F/O got the ATIS and the landing data for an overweight landing; and we completed the Descent and Approach Checklists. Because we were unsure of the origin of the odor; we felt a little urgency to get the aircraft on the ground. There was lots of rain and wind; and we were IMC the entire flight; so we were busy. After landing; the F/O got the brake cooling data for autobrakes 2; and it said to continue to the gate as normal. ZZZ Tower had the fire trucks standing by. They did a visual inspection and found no indications of fire or smoke. We didn't have a chance to talk to the Passengers until we arrived at the gate; but I believe the Flight Attendants did in flight. I still don't know what the odor was from or if it was normal; but I would still make the same decision to return; instead of continuing on [a long] flight with an unknown odor in the cabin.' | 0aircraft |
2,216,134 | Narrative 1 - 'About 55 minutes from ETA in ZZZ; we got R HYD SYS PRESS and R HYD QTY EICAS. We ran the appropriate checklist and contacted Maintenance Control. We [requested assistance] and landed at ZZZ without any issues. We had the fire department check the main gear after landing and then continued to the gate.' | 0aircraft |
2,299,144 | Narrative 1 - 'Parked aircraft at Gate G6 and all widebody aircraft tail hang over the Vehicle Service Road (VSR). This is a safety hazard as to complete a full walkaround the agent must walk into the VSR where there are active vehicles driving.'
Narrative 2 - 'At the G terminal all widebody aircraft tail hang over the Vehicle Service Road (VSR); meaning completing a walkaround is a safety hazard because you are walking into a VSR with active vehicles driving.' | 9humanfactors |
2,008,212 | Narrative 1 - 'I approached to land at ZZZ on Runway XX upon reaching a hover I sidestepped left to hover taxi over the taxiway. There was an old crop-dusting plane being fueled at the pump. I passed the plane approximately 80 ft. to the south of the plane over the taxiway hovering between 4 and 8 ft. I proceeded to land next to the ambulance waiting at the ramp. As we passed the plane one of my crew members stated that the small plane began to turn on its own. I landed at the H and shut down. After I shut down; I spoke with the pilot of the plane. I told him that I was sorry for his inconvenience. I told him that I gave him plenty of space when I hover taxied past him. I asked does your plane have a parking brake - he replied no; it is not equipped with one. The plane also did not have wheel chocks in place. I took pictures of the plane and called Person A. I gave the man Person A's contact information and my own. In my professional opinion as a dual rated pilot; the damage to this man's plane occurred purely out of his own negligence; one for not having a parking brake and two not having his wheels chocked. His plane would not have been affected by my rotor wash; if he had secured his plane properly. Have all airplane pilots that are fueling their aircraft with no brakes; to place chocks on the wheels.' | 14procedure |
1,782,493 | Narrative 1 - 'Flying aircraft owner and their family from ZZZ to ZZZ1 with stop in ZZZ2 for fuel. The aircraft has a history of both alternators needing work to maintain operation. Everything at startup and the run-up were normal; with no sign of issues. About 30 minutes into the flight the alternator 1 annunciator light started flickering. I noted the annunciator and checked all the other gauges; both steam and digital. At this point the battery; main bus; and essential bus were all showing 28 volts. Even the ammeter showed almost neutral on the battery; alternator 1; and alternator 2. So despite the flickering annunciator I decided to continue. I monitored the annunciator to see if it would get any worse. At this point we were roughly 1 hour and 30 minutes from ZZZ2.About 25 N.M. north of ZZZ3 I was talking to Approach. This is when I noticed that the digital display of the Main Bus started dropping from 28 Volts down to 20 Volts. The alternator 1 charges this bus. Simultaneously; the alternator 1 annunciator light illuminated and stayed on. I then utilized the POH page 3A-10 to make the corrective actions to fix the alternator. I followed each step in the POH including resetting the alternator 1 circuit breaker. Nothing worked and the digital display indicated the main bus voltage continued to drop to 16 volts. This is when I decided to divert and return back to ZZZ. If I could not make it to ZZZ then I would use one of the many airports under me.I notified approach that I do not need to declare an emergency yet; but I would like to update my destination for ZZZ. I also told them that a loss of radio communications could be possible (since the avionics are on the main bus). The controller cleared me direct to ZZZ. The controller wanted to verify that we were having an alternator/generator failure. I affirmed that it was an alternator failure and that I was unsure how long we would have left with the battery. He then asked me if I would like to cancel IFR and go VFR. Since it was clear skies and excellent visibility I decided to cancel IFR. The controller received my IFR cancellation and started to ask me about the aircraft. I was unable to receive the latter part of this transmission. All the avionics; the transponder; the MFD; the autopilot; all the steam engine gauges; the fuel gauges went completely inoperative. The only instruments that remained operational were the PFD; backup steam airspeed indicator; backup steam attitude Indicator; and backup steam altimeter. I realized that the electric trim was now inoperative; as well as the flaps. At this point I turned off all switches; and both master battery power switches. The engine continued to run due to the magnetos.I used my EFB applications to navigate with pilotage and dead reckoning northbound to ZZZ4. I chose this airport for the long runway. After losing the fuel gauges I did not want to risk extending the range back to ZZZ since my calculations showed we would be below VFR fuel minimums. I verified the landing distance with no flaps. I verified I had plenty of fuel to divert to ZZZ4. I verified the weather; altimeter setting; and NOTAMs. I approached the airport above pattern altitude to spiral and search for traffic. Once I verified there was no traffic in the pattern I entered the left downwind for runway XX. I made a successful no-flap landing using only three quarters of the available runway.Once I parked and shutdown the aircraft on the ramp I called Approach. They had called the flight school owner to see where I was and if I was okay. I returned their call and assured them we had landed successfully. I do believe proper maintenance action needs to be taken for a healthy electrical system on the aircraft. This is purely a mechanical issue; and can be resolved with detailed mechanical inspection and labor to address the issue. I believe all my actions taken; regarding aircraft systems; navigation; aircraft control; performance calculations; airspace; were all completed in a very timely manner; with efficiency; and good ADM.' | 0aircraft |
2,194,599 | Narrative 1 - 'We showed up at ZZZ1 Gate X with the aircraft warmed up for the passengers to board. The FO conducted a preflight walk around; the flight attendants prepared the cabin for boarding; and I conducted all of the first flight of day checks. We prepared the aircraft for departure; verified the flight plan; briefed and entered all of the performance information necessary for the flight. We also decided to deice the aircraft due to the freezing temperatures and a drizzle was starting. We complied with all checklist and procedures during preflight; before start; deice; taxi; take off and climb.Shortly before our level off at 34;000 ft.; an aural alert informed us that our auto throttle had failed.We immediately took control of the aircraft and attempted to reconnect it but failed it again. We looked at the EICAS and it showed an amber 'AT (Auto Throttle) FAIL and FD (Flight Director) VERT MODE OFF'. FMS speeds; AT; VNAV were unavailable and not working. We disconnected the Auto pilot and auto throttles and requested to exit the RVSM airspace and flew the aircraft with conventional navigation and manual speeds. We notified ATC and Dispatch that we might have a computer issue. We leveled off at 28;000 ft. After further scanning the aircraft systems; we noticed an incredibly high green dot which represented our L/Dmax with our speed bug below it. We decided to run the unreliable airspeed checklist. We informed the flight attendants of the situation and continued our scan in the cockpit. We found out that the FMS had dropped all of our performance numbers and vertical performance information in our flight plan. We figured this was the reason why FMS speeds and auto throttles didn't work. We requested ATC that we fly with heading and altitude assignments for the rest of the flight. We reengaged the auto pilot and it worked with basic functions like heading; ALT; and manual speed.We attempted to reenter the flight information in the FMS several times; however the FMS rejected the entries. Upon further review of the FMS; we found that both FMS 1 and FMS 2 sensors had failed.The message read on the maintenance section of the FMS; FMS 1 & 2 MAINTENANCE FAILED SENSORS'. We also noticed an erroneous fuel indication in the fuel management page; at one point indicating more than 28;529lbs of fuel. We crosschecked this information with the fuel indication on the EICAS and determined the information on the EICAS was correct.We decided to continue to ZZZ and began planning our landing into the airport. We had about 1.5-2.0hrs of fuel left with about 30-45min left to our destination. Using all of our available printouts and other resources; we determined we would have enough fuel to fly to the airport; be under max landing weight; and have enough for a go around or an alternate if necessary. We were also periodically crosschecking our airspeed; heading; and altitude with ATC.After reading and discussing the emergency section in the FOM; we decided to [request priority handling]. The flight attendants were notified of the situation and informed them not to evacuate until further instructed; we would taxi into the gate like normal. We attempted to contact Dispatch through ACARS but determined the signal was unreliable. We also attempted to contact them but was unlucky after trying 2 frequencies. We [requested priority handling] with ATC and were prioritized direct ZZZ. We had about 30min. to our destination.We verified that our ILS frequency was identifiable and reliable and informed approach that we will be able to conduct the approach. We landed the aircraft safely; followed SOP; and complied with FAA regulations. We were met and followed by emergency vehicles to Gate XX and deplaned the passengers. There were no injuries; no physical aircraft damage; the landing was conducted within limits. Cause: FMS 1 MAINTENANCE FAILED SENSORS and FMS 2 MAINTENANCE FAILED SENSORS. These sensors failed shortly before level off at 34;000ft and dropped all of the performance numbers and VNAV information in the FMS. FMS fuel management was giving erroneous fuel readings reading more than 28;529lbs of fuel at one point making the green dot unreliable. Because of this; none of the FMS autopilot functions worked and certain information were erroneous and unreliable. Flew the aircraft raw data with conventional navigation.Suggestions: If this situation happens in the future; we suggest to fly the plane by conventional navigation. Don't discard any useful printed information that will help you calculate information manually. This definitely helped us having it quick and accessible. I thank my FO for doing a phenomenal job as a pilot. I thank the company for preparing us and providing us with all the resources used to conduct this flight safely. It would be wise to include an FMS failure situation in the simulator. Do not get rid of land-based navigation like ILSs and VORs. this helped us with the absence of the FMS and GPS functions.It's better to have 2 pilots than one. There was a period where the autopilot was not available and needed one pilot to fly while the other pilot dug into the systems and checklist to figure out the issue.Always fly the aircraft first we have precious souls on board."'
Narrative 2 - 'Enroute; before leveling off at 34;000 ft; auto throttles disengaged. Immediately taking control staying stable; we attempted to reconnect; but it disengaged again. With EICAS messages of AT (Auto Throttle) FAIL and FD (Flight Director) VERT MODE OFF. After running checklist and trying to reset data it would either not take or completely drop information. At this point we went to all conventional navigation and disconnected auto throttles and auto pilot and requested out of RVSM. Descending to 28;000 ft.Observing all vertical guidance; performance numbers (either completely dropped or inaccurate); green dot was unreliable (showing L/Dmax). We crossed checked our position and altitude with ATC; and requested heading and altitude assignments. At this point we [requested priority handling]. Verifying conventional navigation was still reliable we flew vectors into ZZZ for landing on the ILS XXR.Cause: FMS 1&2 MAINTENANCE FAILED SENSORS. With these sensors failing before leveling off and losing the information that coincides (vertical navigation and performance data). Additionally; the FMS fuel management was calculating high fuel readings; resulting in green dot being unreliable. At this point we flew the aircraft raw data with conventional navigation. Suggestions: With this scenario; being able to work as a crew and taking in information a piece at a time without making big changes was vital. One pilot; running checklist; communicating and troubleshooting; and the other flying the aircraft. Captain did a great job of communicating and guiding through the process; which allowed us to work smoothly through the situation.' | 0aircraft |
2,191,427 | Narrative 1 - 'I was assigned Aircraft X ZZZ to ZZZ1. When I sign in; I see a Dangerous Good (DG) is assigned to the flight. When I see the load plan; I went into the building and assign the DG bin location as F2. As is our custom before loading the flight to deliver the DG notification to the Captain; I did just that. I later go down to inspect the freight cart to made sure it wasn't mixed with the freight boxes. I did not see or receive any DG for that flight. Ask the crew if they locate a dry ice container to notify me immediately. I continue to look for the DG; in the carts with bags. I continue to load the flight and there was no DG notification when I finalized the flight. They call me on the radio to ask if I had any DG inside the aircraft and I reply no DG was onboard. I was in leave for a year; I did forget how to refuse DG in the system; after it has been assigned. Aircraft returned to the gate to be offloaded to ensure no DG was on the cargo bin. Captain should ask me if DG was loaded; before beginning to ask Tower for pushback clearance.' | 9humanfactors |
2,076,928 | Narrative 1 - 'I and a student were performing a normal training flight. We had just picked up the plane from Maintenance and had gotten fuel. Upon departure; my student stated the airplane felt like it was not climbing very well. I agreed and started to investigate. Shortly thereafter ZZZ Tower advised we were low altitude. following the advisory they told us that they saw smoke coming from the plane. We immediately made a left turn and they cleared us to land [Runway] XXL which was the opposite runway at the time. We inspected the plane after and there were no visual cues of smoke or engine problems however the plane is going back to Maintenance to be looked at.'
Narrative 2 - 'I was flying as a student pilot with my CFI as the Pilot in Command. The plane is a personally owned 1966 Cessna 150F. It should be noted the plane had been with the mechanic for the week previous at which time a Garmin 430 was installed; front landing strut serviced; and full engine cleaning took place. This flight was the first flight after receiving the plane back from the mechanic.Prior to the flight the engine was turned on and idling at approximately 1000 RPM for approximately 15 minutes as my CFI instructed me on how to use the newly installed Garmin 430 system. After the ground instruction; a runup was conducted during which time no adverse items were noted. The total time on ground with engine running was approximately 25 minutes with all instruments reporting in the green.After our runup we were provided clearance for takeoff on Runway XR with a short delay approved. A short field takeoff maneuver was conducted to practice for upcoming checkride. During the climb I noticed unusually low climb rate at approximately 150 fpm. All engine indicators including oil temperature; oil pressure and RPM were normal however the plane was not climbing normally. Approximately 45 seconds after takeoff; Tower advised our altitude was low and asked if everything was ok with the airplane. Again checking all instruments no problem was detected which we indicated to the Tower. At this point the Tower advised they observed apparent smoke coming from our airplane and asked if we would like to return for landing.No smoke was observed by either myself or the CFI; our engine temperature gauge was showing normal; our oil pressure gauge was showing normal; and we had not loss any RPMs from our engine. However; hearing the warning of smoke from our airplane from Tower we advised we would like to return for landing. At this point the CFI took over controls of the airplane and Tower cleared us to land on [Runway] XXL. Additionally emergency service vehicles were activated as a precautionary measure. While the CFI was flying the airplane to land; I continually monitored the instruments and outside window for smoke. At no point did I observe any smoke nor did the instruments indicate anything outside of the normal range.Once landing on the [Runway] XXL we taxied to our assigned parking spot during which time again all instruments remained in the green. Upon parking; the fire department remained on scene as my CFI and myself observed the engine compartment and observed no smoke; no smell of fire or smoke; and located no evidence of a fire from the airplane. The plane has been parked and is waiting to be seen by a mechanic to confirm the plane may return to service.' | 0aircraft |
1,870,557 | Narrative 1 - 'The plan for today's flight was to do a ZZZ city tour. This was my first city tour. As part of preparation for the flight; I did some online research and learned what is typically done by pilots on the city tour. Planning an exact route for the tour is a little bit more difficult than other missions because it is not clear if or how you will be cleared before the flight. My research did not uncover FAA guidelines or FLY charts for the ZZZ city tour; these are available for other major cities like Los Angles; San Francisco; or New York; and would have been helpful in my preparation.The research indicated that the best way to initiate the tour was to fly to the Name Towers and contact ZZZ Approach. Flying at 1;800 feet to avoid the Class B shelf just east of the towers; I was handed off to ZZZ. On first contact; I was unable to hear ATC due to poor signal. I was able to make contact on subsequent calls and was cleared into the Class B for the tour.While changing radios; talking to ATC; and setting up my charts for the tour; my course had drifted further south than intended; and I realized that I would not be able to maintain a 2;000 lateral feet from the Name Towers. I initiated a climb and changed course slightly to the left to remain clear of the towers. I flew between the two northwest towers at 1;800 feet; choosing to stay closer to the tower on my left as it was the easier one to maintain visual separation from it with a low wing airplane. Review of GPS data after the flight shows that my course maintained over 2;000 feet from the right tower and approximately 1;250 feet laterally and 350 feet vertically from the left tower. After clearing the towers; I began a descent to 1;500 feet for the tour.At no point during this event was a collision with any tower imminent.For future tours; I have learned that it is best to stay clear of the Name Towers and will plan future flights to remain north of the towers. The towers close proximity to the Class B makes it difficult to maintain vertical separation; so it seems best to choose a route that maintains lateral separation.I have also noted the controller frequencies (ZZZ Approach/Departure; ZZZ Tower) to reduce the time required to copy and enter frequencies for future tours; a factor that may have contributed to the course deviation described above. I'm not sure what caused the poor signal on initial contact to tower; but maybe remaining further north of the towers would improve line of sight to ZZZ.Finally; I was extremely focused on the next phase of the flight; the city tour; at the time and need to remember to focus on the current situation. Better situational awareness would have allowed me to detect the towers earlier and allowed me to take corrective action further from the towers.' | 9humanfactors |
1,796,448 | Narrative 1 - 'While on visual approach to Runway XX and configuring; we had configured normally through gear down. The Captain called 'flaps 30' and I reached for the handle while looking at the speed. The trend indicator was well below 185 and I was too focused on the trend rather than the actual speed. I was too quick to move the flap handle. We were actually about 187 knots. We got the flap overspeed warning for about one to two seconds as our speed continued to dissipate. It was my first flight from furlough and recurrent training. I was allowing myself to rush; even though there was no need to rush at the time. I made an error of referencing the trend before the actual speed. I also need to refresh my habit of not touching the flap handle until I have stated 'speed checks.'' | 9humanfactors |
2,018,879 | Narrative 1 - 'I had just completed some confusing coordination with ZZZ Area regarding Aircraft Y and descended ZZZ inbound Aircraft X to 5000 ft. after it had cleared opposite direction 5500 ft. VFR traffic. I forgot I had taken a handoff on Aircraft X who was east on VXXX at 5000 ft.; opposite direction. When I realized this; I had to turn each of them to the south and north respectively but there is a 6000 ft. MVA to the north. I planned to turn Aircraft X progressively around the MVA border; but I errantly issued a 270 heading that turned Aircraft X into the 6000 MVA. When I realized my mistake; I turned them out quickly but forgot to issue a Low Altitude Alert. I was getting currency at the time. This was just a case of a Supervisor getting currency and maybe fighting a little bit of a headache. I meant to issue a 230 heading but instead uttered 270.' | 9humanfactors |
2,234,735 | Narrative 1 - 'I was departing ZZZ on a clear day but flying on an IFR flight plan. I picked up my clearance on the ground while holding at the hold short line for the runway. I received a void time and quickly changed to unicom and heard no traffic. I announce my take off intentions; looked for approaching traffic; and seeing none; and taxied onto the runway and began my takeoff roll. I then heard an aircraft state that the aircraft on the run should expedite take off for traffic on short final. I was already at full takeoff power. The aircraft then said he was going around and asked if I heard him say abort takeoff. I replied that I thought he said expedite take off. He said 'Oh; well; another day at the office.' There was no more communication. I never saw the aircraft and do not know what type is was.Contributing to this mishap was my rush to meet the void time. Also; because I was on the ground clearance frequency; I did not hear any announcements of pattern traffic. I did look for traffic down the approach corridor but saw none. I probably rushed the scan for traffic trying to meet the void time.I will spend proper time and not rush clearing the approach corridor before taking a runway. I will pause and listen for pattern traffic longer. I will not rush just because of a void time.' | 9humanfactors |
2,237,654 | Narrative 1 - 'Landing gear would not cycle up after departure. Significant vibration . Recycled and got gear up. When lowering gear; nose gear light was late to go green. Upon landing; when nose wheel hit ground; aircraft veered had right and off runway on to grass. Got back on runway but had no left rudder action. Got towed. No damage to airplane; runway; or debris on runway.' | 0aircraft |
1,962,176 | Narrative 1 - 'While conducting training on one of our newest First Officers we experienced an engine failure of our Number 2 Engine upon touchdown.The First Officer flew a normal approach to a normal landing on Runway XXL in ZZZ. Immediately upon touchdown the Number 2 Engine failed (as soon as we had weight on wheels). We observed that the N1 went to zero and the ITT immediately went into exceedance and was trending upwards in temperature.At 70 KIAS; I took control of the aircraft and exited on the first available high speed taxiway. We immediately stopped the aircraft and notified ATC. With the parking brake set; we ran the appropriate QRH to secure the engine. With the Start/Stop switch in the OFF position (we did not pull fire handle) we continued to assess and manage the situation. The ITT was now trending down and went into the normal range.ATC notified us that she had dispatched fire trucks. Another aircraft behind us alerted that they did not see any indication of something wrong. At this point we (as a crew) were confident that there was no fire. However; since she had already dispatched them; we decided it would be safer to just have ARFF evaluate the situation outside before we continued to move the aircraft.We called our Cabin Crew to alert them that we were 'not in an emergency; and an evacuation would not be required; but the fire trucks were coming just to make sure there was no damage'. We advised them we would make a PA to our Customers after the phone call.In an effort to prevent an unwarranted evacuation (due to multiple fire trucks on their way); we explained over the PA to our customers that we had experienced an abnormal engine indication on touchdown and that the fire trucks were coming to inspect our aircraft just as a precaution before we could continue taxing to the gate. We told our customers that 'everything was safe and to please remain seated'.A few minutes later; about 6 fire trucks arrived. We were able to communicate over a discreet frequency. ARFF told us that there appeared to be no damage or evidence of fire and that they would follow us to the gate.With 'an all clear'; we felt it was safe to began our taxi the gate and performed the After Landing Checklist. Once at the gate with all checklists completed; we then notified Maintenance Control and made a logbook entry. We then followed the Reporting Chain outlined in the FOM.' | 0aircraft |
1,783,017 | Narrative 1 - 'Descending into ZZZ on a visual approach to Runway XXL; but following the guidance of the ILS. A stable and uneventful approach. Upon landing we had a 6-7 knot tailwind. We landed longer than normal. I wouldn't say that we were outside of the touchdown zone; but it was very close. From my perspective the main wheels touched down prior to the end of the touchdown zone. We had floated a bit and I had to wait for the aircraft to lose that lift and start sinking into the runway before executing my landing flare. Elected not to go around and continue because nothing was unsafe we had a 10;996 foot runway and I elected to use max thrust reversers upon landing to slow us down safely.There was a few contributing factors. The main one being the tailwind on landing. Second was because of less travel due to COVID we sometimes have very light airplanes. Our landing weight was under 36;000 lbs being very light for the aircraft. So the lightweight along with the tailwind wasn't ideal. Lastly; company has recently within the last year or so updated our procedures where we add X knots to our straight in landing speeds regardless of the situation. Not having to add that extra X knots would have helped us carry less momentum into our final approach. We do bleed off the airspeed before touching down; although it's never perfect.The airport should have been landing in the other direction with the wind favoring the other runway; and it would also be more safe because of less terrain that we can't see at night. Also I should have thought about our extra light airplane and possibly requested the other runway. Also; It has been my opinion since it has started that airline go back to the normal landing numbers without adding extra 5 knots. And let the pilots decide when the extra airspeed is necessary depending on environmental factors.' | 3ambiguous |
1,929,764 | Narrative 1 - 'I was on active flight following SW bound towards ZZZ to intercept the ZZZZZ radial for my destination of ZZZ1. A departing Cirrus Jet had just left ZZZ2 and was on frequency with us. I heard him given an altitude restriction (I believe but can't recall that it was repeated). He ignored this and was climbing directly into me. My ADSB Traffic on my ipad went off and I pulled back as he passed closer to me than I've ever seen an airplane. I got on the radio and told the controller that 'that was way too close man!' he followed up telling the Cirrus he had a number for him to call over a deviation; the Cirrus pilot didn't respond.' | 9humanfactors |
2,239,561 | Narrative 1 - 'Flight ABC During Cruise ECAM. ElecGen 1 Fault ran procedure .but it was unsuccessful. Then another ECAM Wheel N/W Strg Fault;follow with Vent Blower Fault;and IDG 1 Oil Lo PR and IDG Oil Ovht. We [requested priority handling] with ATC.Diverted To the most suitable Airport for the situation in this case was ZZZZ Advised ATC. We had troubles communicating with them after communicating our intentions 4 times . We had to speak the language of that country. Just follow procedures SOPs make decisions soon and divert to the most suitable Airport.' | 0aircraft |
1,953,957 | Narrative 1 - 'During taxi out flight controls checked successfully. After takeoff from ZZZ Runway XX; we made a left turn to 270. Noticed yoke required almost full deflection in the opposite direction; to roll wings level. On 270 heading had to deflect yoke a significant amount to the right; to keep wings level. Shortly there after received a level 2 AIL Deflect Disagree message. We leveled off at 7;000 feet and completed the level 2 Aileron Deflect Disagree checklist. After completing the checklist and notifying the company; we [requested priority handling] and requested vectors for a return to ZZZ. Landed at ZZZ uneventfully.' | 0aircraft |
1,927,516 | Narrative 1 - 'Approaching CFO (Space Port); contacted Tower from 10NM E-SE. Tower instructed me to enter and report 5NM straight in final for 26. Approximately 1 or 2 Miles south of intercepting final at 5NM out on a NW heading; Tower instructed me to turn east (outbound) for sequencing. Almost immediately following that direction; they gave me a traffic alert. I reported 'Negative Contact' as I did not have traffic in sight. Seconds later; I acquired traffic immediately below me by ~100ft and less than .25 NM. Impact was narrowly missed. In review of ADS-B data on FlightRadar24; the traffic I nearly collided with did not show up anywhere near my vicinity. However my onboard avionics did pickup the Transponder Mode C signature for the traffic during the turn. I don't recall seeing that particular aircraft on my avionics until in mid-turn however lots of other traffic were depicted on in the pattern and around CFO. During the turn; my avionics began providing collision warnings.Tower was talking to the conflicting traffic throughout the entire duration. To me; Tower was saturated with only 1 person handling both Ground and Air frequencies. There were lots of planes in the pattern with little room between Class D and B airspaces.I believe the instruction to turn me >90 degrees right in such close proximity to traffic approaching quickly from behind and to the right left that plane obstructed from view until nearly to late to avoid. Compounding this was that the traffic alerts were not given with immediate concern nor were they given upon initial instruction to turn the aircraft towards a collision trajectory.' | 14procedure |
2,180,116 | Narrative 1 - 'Descending into ZZZ on a downwind leg passing roughly 2400 feet just as we were about to turn for a little more than a 5 mile base we received a caution terrain I called out the warning Person A started to stop the descent during that time we received an momentary terrain warning as Person A disconnected the Autopilot bringing the nose up. The terrain display was up on both of our Primary Flight Display (PFD) and no yellow or red displayed. once we were clear of warnings and leveled off no further conflict existed and finished landed without incident Cause: I believe that because it was a later night flight and we out of our typical sleep cycle our situational awareness was lower than normal. our descent rate looking back was a little higher than normal which was result of the delayed descent into the airport which could have caused the warning. Suggestions: Knowing that we are all at a level of fatigue that effects our situational awareness setting up and asking for the full approach would have been a better course of action.' | 9humanfactors |
1,872,645 | Narrative 1 - 'First Officer flying ILS approach to Runway 28L in FLL. Autopilot was off. At approximately 50 ft. AGL RA (Radio Altimeter) 1 fault appeared for approximately 3-5 seconds then went away. First Officer continued landing with no adverse effects. Possibly a 5G issue.' | 7environment-nonweatherrelated |
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