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ANT-2026-Y5M37QY4
https://red.anthropic.com/2026/cvd/findings/ANT-2026-Y5M37QY4
wireshark/wireshark
heap-buffer-overflow
medium
high
high
medium
Claude Mythos Preview
[ "CVE-2026-15165" ]
[ "GHSA-3q2h-7599-7r76" ]
epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c:10087
static analysis β€” not yet dynamically reproduced
ANT-2026-Y5M37QY4: TLS ECH transcript reconstruction heap overflow
In Wireshark's TLS dissector,ssl->ech_transcript.datais allocated at packet-tls-utils.c:10066 with sizehello_length + 4(the outer ClientHello size). The extension-copy loop at :10087-10114 then processes the decrypted inner ClientHello and, for every 0xfd00 (ech_outer_extensions) entry, resetsouter_offsetandtvb_memcpys...
The transcript buffer is sized once to the outer ClientHello length, but the copy loop neither bounds-checks the destination nor enforces RFC's at-most-one ech_outer_extensions rule, and it re-initializes outer_offset per 0xfd00 entry so the same large outer extension can be memcpy'd repeatedly. tvb_memcpy only validat...
Craft a pcapng with a Decryption Secrets Block containing ECH_SECRET and ECH_CONFIG lines (auto-loaded by tls_secrets_block_callback). Include a TLS ClientHello with an ECH payload that decrypts under the embedded secret (attacker controls HPKE key/ciphertext so auth tag validates). In the decrypted inner ClientHello, ...
This vulnerability was discovered by Claude, Anthropic's AI assistant, and triaged by the Anthropic security team in collaboration with Anthropic Research. Please direct questions to security-cvd@anthropic.com and reference ANT-2026-Y5M37QY4. Reference: ANT-2026-Y5M37QY4 Anthropic CVD Policy: https://www.anthropic.com...
ANT-2026-Y5M37QY4: TLS ECH transcript reconstruction heap overflow In Wireshark's TLS dissector, ssl->ech_transcript.data is allocated at packet-tls-utils.c:10066 with size hello_length + 4 (the outer ClientHello size). The extension-copy loop at :10087-10114 then processes the decrypted inner ClientHello and, for ever...
Ada Logics
true positive
diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c index ac725a4cbb1..8eb743b7929 100644 --- a/epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c +++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c @@ -10283,6 +10283,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_ech(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_in ssl->ech_t...
# ANT-2026-Y5M37QY4: ANT-2026-Y5M37QY4 Β· wireshark/wireshark **Project:** wireshark/wireshark | **Bug Class:** heap-buffer-overflow **Attributed Model:** Claude Mythos Preview | **Claude Severity:** high | **Maintainer Severity:** medium **Security Advisories:** CVE-2026-15165, GHSA-3q2h-7599-7r76 ## Vulnerability Summ...
<!doctype html> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"> <title>ANT-2026-Y5M37QY4 Β· wireshark/wireshark</title> <link rel="icon" type="image/x-icon" href="/anthropic-serve/favicon.ico"> <script>(function(){try{var t=localStorage.getItem("cvd_the...
fixed
true
2026-04-02
2026-07-22
ea3625713c4457cf94a19766c6904d638aff57a96dbaad5756946453a48334f437e06603c95fb73fe513646b06ee7a82a17187f74dc84bff22ac74c72a24bd23
654
427
1,071
5,398
1,498
ANT-2026-87DJGDRB
https://red.anthropic.com/2026/cvd/findings/ANT-2026-87DJGDRB
wolfssl/wolfssl
heap-buffer-overflow
low
high
high
low
Claude Mythos Preview
[ "CVE-2026-12340" ]
[ "GHSA-q349-x427-xg3w" ]
sha.c:733
ANT-2026-87DJGDRB: Heap-buffer-overflow in sha.c:733
When wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert is given an attacker-supplied certificate buffer, ParseCertRelative calls CalcHashId_ex to hash certificate data, which reaches wc_ShaUpdate. With a crafted short input, wc_ShaUpdate performs a 64-byte memcpy that reads past the end of the 8-byte input allocation. The attacker controls the ce...
ASAN: "READ of size 64 at 0x704ffcee0058 ... 0 bytes after 8-byte region". During certificate parsing, CalcHashId_ex passes a buffer/length derived from the malformed DER to wc_ShaHash β†’ wc_ShaUpdate, which copies a full 64-byte SHA block without ensuring that many bytes remain in the source buffer, reading beyond the ...
Craft a short/malformed DER certificate buffer Supply it to wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert() ParseCertRelative β†’ CalcHashId_ex β†’ wc_ShaHash β†’ wc_ShaUpdate memcpy reads 64 bytes past the buffer end [No reproducer or sanitizer output attached β€” request from security-cvd@anthropic.com if needed.]
This vulnerability was discovered by Claude, Anthropic's AI assistant, and triaged by the Anthropic security team in collaboration with Anthropic Research. Please direct questions to security-cvd@anthropic.com and reference ANT-2026-87DJGDRB. Reference: ANT-2026-87DJGDRB Anthropic CVD Policy: https://www.anthropic.com...
ANT-2026-87DJGDRB: Heap-buffer-overflow in sha.c:733 When wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert is given an attacker-supplied certificate buffer, ParseCertRelative calls CalcHashId_ex to hash certificate data, which reaches wc_ShaUpdate. With a crafted short input, wc_ShaUpdate performs a 64-byte memcpy that reads past the end of the ...
true positive
diff --git a/wolfcrypt/src/asn.c b/wolfcrypt/src/asn.c index 00be607506c..664d7862f5b 100644 --- a/wolfcrypt/src/asn.c +++ b/wolfcrypt/src/asn.c @@ -23380,6 +23380,10 @@ int ParseCertRelative(DecodedCert* cert, int type, int verify, void* cm, if (cert->extSubjKeyIdSet == 0 && cert->publicKey != NULL && cert->pubKeySize...
# ANT-2026-87DJGDRB: ANT-2026-87DJGDRB Β· wolfssl/wolfssl **Project:** wolfssl/wolfssl | **Bug Class:** heap-buffer-overflow **Attributed Model:** Claude Mythos Preview | **Claude Severity:** high | **Maintainer Severity:** low **Security Advisories:** CVE-2026-12340, GHSA-q349-x427-xg3w ## Vulnerability Summary When wc...
<!doctype html> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"> <title>ANT-2026-87DJGDRB Β· wolfssl/wolfssl</title> <link rel="icon" type="image/x-icon" href="/anthropic-serve/favicon.ico"> <script>(function(){try{var t=localStorage.getItem("cvd_theme")...
fixed
true
2026-03-24
2026-05-18
f35e4f410ec58dab28431670e173e03fd1e5105f8afefc79c7edd5117d684d3aa377d218762d2f1ab70c6262e31227885bacaf2062958b077e305e5aebc6c37d
1,099
218
1,347
4,742
1,565
ANT-2026-PGRNAV88
https://red.anthropic.com/2026/cvd/findings/ANT-2026-PGRNAV88
apache/spark
other
critical
critical
-
-
Claude Mythos Preview
[]
[]
static analysis β€” not yet dynamically reproduced
ANT-2026-PGRNAV88: spark rce
UserDefinedType.fromJson() in python/pyspark/sql/types.py:2002 passes bytes taken from Parquet file metadata directly to cloudpickle.loads() with no validation. An attacker who can supply a crafted Parquet file to a PySpark consumer achieves arbitrary code execution in the reading process. No explicit .schema call is r...
The root cause is an unguarded call to cloudpickle.loads() on bytes sourced from untrusted Parquet metadata inside UserDefinedType.fromJson(). Because pickle deserialization is equivalent to code execution, any attacker who controls the Parquet file controls what runs in the PySpark process.
This finding was identified by static analysis and has not yet been dynamically reproduced. The Technical Details section above describes the code path; a trigger input is not included. [No reproducer or sanitizer output attached β€” request from security-cvd@anthropic.com if needed.]
This vulnerability was discovered by Claude, Anthropic's AI assistant, and triaged by the Anthropic security team in collaboration with Anthropic Research. Please direct questions to security-cvd@anthropic.com and reference ANT-2026-PGRNAV88. Reference: ANT-2026-PGRNAV88 Anthropic CVD Policy: https://www.anthropic.com...
ANT-2026-PGRNAV88: spark rce UserDefinedType.fromJson() in python/pyspark/sql/types.py:2002 passes bytes taken from Parquet file metadata directly to cloudpickle.loads() with no validation. An attacker who can supply a crafted Parquet file to a PySpark consumer achieves arbitrary code execution in the reading process. ...
# ANT-2026-PGRNAV88: ANT-2026-PGRNAV88 Β· apache/spark **Project:** apache/spark | **Bug Class:** other **Attributed Model:** Claude Mythos Preview | **Claude Severity:** critical | **Maintainer Severity:** - ## Vulnerability Summary UserDefinedType.fromJson() in python/pyspark/sql/types.py:2002 passes bytes taken from ...
<!doctype html> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"> <title>ANT-2026-PGRNAV88 Β· apache/spark</title> <link rel="icon" type="image/x-icon" href="/anthropic-serve/favicon.ico"> <script>(function(){try{var t=localStorage.getItem("cvd_theme");if...
disclosed
false
2026-02-22
2026-05-08
df1df10cd5da6ed1bcf3f42888538eb4e2c779a9380d2112eb5817e07456599f2a1690af8b658b2998df4aeef6390c161d3e990141b48a8ce0b0d8b62036dbcd
364
0
333
2,960
333
ANT-2026-PCBAKVPB
https://red.anthropic.com/2026/cvd/findings/ANT-2026-PCBAKVPB
dnsmasq
heap-buffer-overflow
high
high
high
high
an unreleased Anthropic model
[ "CVE-2026-4892" ]
[ "GHSA-m62j-63mf-xr95" ]
src/helper.c:265
ANT-2026-PCBAKVPB: Heap overflow in privileged helper via oversized DHCPv6 client identifier
In dnsmasq's privileged script helper (helper.c:265-270), each byte of the DHCP client-ID is hex-encoded with sprintf into daemon->packet, a ~2267-byte buffer allocated at startup and inherited via fork(). DHCPv6 option lengths are 16-bit and state->clid_len is taken from the wire at rfc3315.c:338 with no upper bound, ...
Sink confirmed via ASAN: a harness allocating daemon->packet exactly as dnsmasq.c:128-129 does (PACKETSZ+MAXDNAME+RRFIXEDSZ = 1547 bytes at default edns_pktsz) and running the exact helper.c:265-270 hex-encode loop with clid_len=800 produced 'AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow … WRITE of size 3 … 0 bytes after 1547...
Craft a DHCPv6 SOLICIT containing OPTION6_RAPID_COMMIT, a minimal IA_TA (4-byte header + 4-byte IAID), and OPTION6_CLIENT_ID with a β‰₯756-byte (e.g. 1200-byte) payload Send it to the dnsmasq DHCPv6 port; packet fits in a single 1280-byte-MTU IPv6 frame RAPID_COMMIT path (rfc3315.c:654-660) sets lease_allocate=1; server ...
This vulnerability was discovered by Claude, Anthropic's AI assistant, and triaged by the Anthropic security team in collaboration with Anthropic Research. Please direct questions to security-cvd@anthropic.com and reference ANT-2026-PCBAKVPB. Reference: ANT-2026-PCBAKVPB Anthropic CVD Policy: https://www.anthropic.com...
ANT-2026-PCBAKVPB: Heap overflow in privileged helper via oversized DHCPv6 client identifier In dnsmasq's privileged script helper (helper.c:265-270), each byte of the DHCP client-ID is hex-encoded with sprintf into daemon->packet, a ~2267-byte buffer allocated at startup and inherited via fork(). DHCPv6 option lengths...
Trail of Bits
true positive
# ANT-2026-PCBAKVPB: ANT-2026-PCBAKVPB Β· dnsmasq **Project:** dnsmasq | **Bug Class:** heap-buffer-overflow **Attributed Model:** an unreleased Anthropic model | **Claude Severity:** high | **Maintainer Severity:** high **Security Advisories:** CVE-2026-4892, GHSA-m62j-63mf-xr95 ## Vulnerability Summary In dnsmasq's pr...
<!doctype html> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"> <title>ANT-2026-PCBAKVPB Β· dnsmasq</title> <link rel="icon" type="image/x-icon" href="/anthropic-serve/favicon.ico"> <script>(function(){try{var t=localStorage.getItem("cvd_theme");if(t===...
fixed
true
2026-04-09
2026-05-07
11a65d2d8b73e1b60aecd4aa985a653c77e1870999845708ab73eb335b44073062498a75e0adff81fdda190aa5e9610c21c27d36961cc01f8493cf85f7e3fa81
1,478
0
1,465
5,872
1,465
ANT-2026-JBKARRJ7
https://red.anthropic.com/2026/cvd/findings/ANT-2026-JBKARRJ7
libvips/libvips
oob-write
low
low
low
-
Claude Mythos Preview
[ "CVE-2026-35590" ]
[ "GHSA-jmwm-wc68-mhwm" ]
static analysis β€” not yet dynamically reproduced
ANT-2026-JBKARRJ7: Out-of-bounds IFD array access in EXIF metadata processing leading to write through corrupted pointer
An out-of-bounds index into the IFD array during EXIF parsing produces a corrupted pointer that is then used as a write target.
This finding was identified by static analysis and has not yet been dynamically reproduced. A trigger input is not included. [No reproducer or sanitizer output attached β€” request from security-cvd@anthropic.com if needed.]
This vulnerability was discovered by Claude, Anthropic's AI assistant, and triaged by the Anthropic security team in collaboration with Anthropic Research. Please direct questions to security-cvd@anthropic.com and reference ANT-2026-JBKARRJ7. Reference: ANT-2026-JBKARRJ7 Anthropic CVD Policy: https://www.anthropic.com...
ANT-2026-JBKARRJ7: Out-of-bounds IFD array access in EXIF metadata processing leading to write through corrupted pointer An out-of-bounds index into the IFD array during EXIF parsing produces a corrupted pointer that is then used as a write target. Target Project: libvips/libvips Discovery: static analysis β€” not yet dy...
Trail of Bits
true positive
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index bc3e3ace80..5ea68a830d 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ date-tbd 8.18.2 - convolution: avoid using unsigned accumulators [nakrovati] +- exif: check ifdN range [trailofbits] - tiffload: check jpeg and jp2k components [wooseokdotkim] - uhdrsave: set Q for gai...
# ANT-2026-JBKARRJ7: ANT-2026-JBKARRJ7 Β· libvips/libvips **Project:** libvips/libvips | **Bug Class:** oob-write **Attributed Model:** Claude Mythos Preview | **Claude Severity:** low | **Maintainer Severity:** - **Security Advisories:** CVE-2026-35590, GHSA-jmwm-wc68-mhwm ## Vulnerability Summary An out-of-bounds inde...
<!doctype html> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"> <title>ANT-2026-JBKARRJ7 Β· libvips/libvips</title> <link rel="icon" type="image/x-icon" href="/anthropic-serve/favicon.ico"> <script>(function(){try{var t=localStorage.getItem("cvd_theme")...
fixed
true
2026-03-29
2026-04-09
3d086296fdc3ee597627329b2198c6f0a171f3bd2c5912fead06195a09493bc3afd1314179768a43ecdd28a66f5fc9a18544fc24276ed804afd3496622bb7325
213
316
552
3,235
868
ANT-2026-Q430PMKE
https://red.anthropic.com/2026/cvd/findings/ANT-2026-Q430PMKE
sctp/lksctp-tools
heap-buffer-overflow
low
high
low
-
Claude Opus 4.6
[]
[]
sendmsg.c:169
ANT-2026-Q430PMKE: Heap-buffer-overflow in sendmsg.c:169
A compiled PoC binary deterministically triggers a heap-buffer-overflow in the lksctp-tools userspace library. The fault occurs inside sctp_sendv (src/lib/sendmsg.c:169), where the code performs a 2-byte read immediately past the end of a 16-byte heap buffer. The overflow reproduced identically across 3 independent run...
ASAN: heap-buffer-overflow, READ of size 2, 0 bytes to the right of a 16-byte heap region, at sctp_sendv (sendmsg.c:169). The library reads a 2-byte value starting exactly at the end boundary of a 16-byte allocation, indicating a missing or incorrect length/bounds check on a caller-supplied structure before it is deref...
Reproduce against the target as described under Technical Details. [No reproducer or sanitizer output attached β€” request from security-cvd@anthropic.com if needed.]
This vulnerability was discovered by Claude, Anthropic's AI assistant, and triaged by the Anthropic security team in collaboration with Anthropic Research. Please direct questions to security-cvd@anthropic.com and reference ANT-2026-Q430PMKE. Reference: ANT-2026-Q430PMKE Anthropic CVD Policy: https://www.anthropic.com...
ANT-2026-Q430PMKE: Heap-buffer-overflow in sendmsg.c:169 A compiled PoC binary deterministically triggers a heap-buffer-overflow in the lksctp-tools userspace library. The fault occurs inside sctp_sendv (src/lib/sendmsg.c:169), where the code performs a 2-byte read immediately past the end of a 16-byte heap buffer. The...
Trail of Bits
will not fix
# ANT-2026-Q430PMKE: ANT-2026-Q430PMKE Β· sctp/lksctp-tools **Project:** sctp/lksctp-tools | **Bug Class:** heap-buffer-overflow **Attributed Model:** Claude Opus 4.6 | **Claude Severity:** high | **Maintainer Severity:** - ## Vulnerability Summary A compiled PoC binary deterministically triggers a heap-buffer-overflow ...
<!doctype html> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"> <title>ANT-2026-Q430PMKE Β· sctp/lksctp-tools</title> <link rel="icon" type="image/x-icon" href="/anthropic-serve/favicon.ico"> <script>(function(){try{var t=localStorage.getItem("cvd_theme...
disclosed
false
2026-03-24
2026-03-01
c54cecb1ce6825a31fc73c698315249bad576626c38b1218a5997c02b0bb0d6b6c0872d8fa1cc5ee818bd0da0eb406578dcfeb118099d7cce3af010babbed563
522
0
525
3,243
525
ANT-2026-GY2SF1XW
https://red.anthropic.com/2026/cvd/findings/ANT-2026-GY2SF1XW
grok
heap-buffer-overflow
high
high
high
-
Claude Mythos Preview
[]
[]
FileFormatMJ2Decompress.cpp:593
ANT-2026-GY2SF1XW: Heap-buffer-overflow in FileFormatMJ2Decompress.cpp:593
During MJ2 header parsing, read_stts() populates a std::vector based on the stts box entry count (tts_decompact, line 480). Later, read_stco() iterates over stco chunk offset entries and writes into that same vector (stco_decompact, line 593). No check enforces that the stco entry count is bounded by the number of samp...
ASAN: WRITE of size 4 at 0x6c7124fe02a0, located 4 bytes after a 12-byte heap region. The 12-byte region holds a single mj2_sample element allocated by vector::push_back in tts_decompact. stco_decompact then indexes past the vector's end β€” it trusts the stco box's own entry count rather than the actual size of the samp...
Craft an MJ2 container with an stts box declaring a small sample count (e.g., 1 sample β†’ 12-byte vector) Include a subsequent stco box declaring a larger chunk offset count Deliver file to victim; Grok's readHeader parses stts first (allocates small vector), then stco stco_decompact writes attacker-controlled 32-bit of...
This vulnerability was discovered by Claude, Anthropic's AI assistant, and triaged by the Anthropic security team in collaboration with Anthropic Research. Please direct questions to security-cvd@anthropic.com and reference ANT-2026-GY2SF1XW. Reference: ANT-2026-GY2SF1XW Anthropic CVD Policy: https://www.anthropic.com...
ANT-2026-GY2SF1XW: Heap-buffer-overflow in FileFormatMJ2Decompress.cpp:593 During MJ2 header parsing, read_stts() populates a std::vector based on the stts box entry count (tts_decompact, line 480). Later, read_stco() iterates over stco chunk offset entries and writes into that same vector (stco_decompact, line 593). N...
Ada Logics
true positive
# ANT-2026-GY2SF1XW: ANT-2026-GY2SF1XW Β· grok **Project:** grok | **Bug Class:** heap-buffer-overflow **Attributed Model:** Claude Mythos Preview | **Claude Severity:** high | **Maintainer Severity:** - ## Vulnerability Summary During MJ2 header parsing, read_stts() populates a std::vector based on the stts box entry c...
<!doctype html> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"> <title>ANT-2026-GY2SF1XW Β· grok</title> <link rel="icon" type="image/x-icon" href="/anthropic-serve/favicon.ico"> <script>(function(){try{var t=localStorage.getItem("cvd_theme");if(t==="li...
fixed
true
2026-03-24
2026-06-06
9724c7cfaf8b05bf517732e8d02a0166a2bb18e06f9a955c626aa0048c550b41f66800681544d5026a1f1bb45bf6c492499566d9a90eb5cdd9989b8a8bf3edca
1,121
0
1,108
4,496
1,108
ANT-2026-6YNNSAA0
https://red.anthropic.com/2026/cvd/findings/ANT-2026-6YNNSAA0
supabase/supabase
other
low
low
-
-
Claude Mythos Preview
[]
[]
examples/edge-functions/supabase/functions/openai-image-generation/index.ts:44
static analysis β€” not yet dynamically reproduced
"ANT-2026-6YNNSAA0: Image-generation function fetches arbitrary caller URL with service-role in scop(...TRUNCATED)
"The openai-image-generation example edge function readsimageUrlfrom the request body, fetches it wi(...TRUNCATED)
"The root cause is trusting a client-supplied URL as if it were the server-generated OpenAI result: (...TRUNCATED)
"Authenticate to the target Supabase project to obtain a valid JWT\nInvoke the openai-image-generati(...TRUNCATED)
"This vulnerability was discovered by Claude, Anthropic's AI assistant, and triaged by the Anthropic(...TRUNCATED)
"ANT-2026-6YNNSAA0: Image-generation function fetches arbitrary caller URL with service-role in scop(...TRUNCATED)
"diff --git a/examples/ai/aws_bedrock_image_gen/supabase/config.toml b/examples/ai/aws_bedrock_image(...TRUNCATED)
"# ANT-2026-6YNNSAA0: ANT-2026-6YNNSAA0 Β· supabase/supabase\n**Project:** supabase/supabase | **Bug(...TRUNCATED)
"<!doctype html>\n<html lang=\"en\">\n<head>\n<meta charset=\"utf-8\">\n<meta name=\"viewport\" cont(...TRUNCATED)
fixed
true
2026-05-10
2026-05-18
"8285a4575d867fe3826ec74bd88e9d7b46a4a14b310d96161de186d1c6ac4a12027375298a9ceaee8d188ebabefd7cf9411(...TRUNCATED)
562
2,281
2,751
8,516
5,032
ANT-2026-WNRZ9D35
https://red.anthropic.com/2026/cvd/findings/ANT-2026-WNRZ9D35
osgeo/gdal
heap-buffer-overflow
high
critical
high
-
Claude Mythos Preview
[]
[]
ANT-2026-WNRZ9D35: Heap-buffer-overflow in gdal
"The gdal_translate_fuzzer harness terminated with EXIT_CODE:1 when run against the supplied input, (...TRUNCATED)
"ASAN: heap-buffer-overflow WRITE of size 8 in TrimmingProcess. The root cause is a missing consiste(...TRUNCATED)
"Reproduce against the target as described under Technical Details.\n\n[No reproducer or sanitizer o(...TRUNCATED)
"This vulnerability was discovered by Claude, Anthropic's AI assistant, and triaged by the Anthropic(...TRUNCATED)
"ANT-2026-WNRZ9D35: Heap-buffer-overflow in gdal\nThe gdal_translate_fuzzer harness terminated with (...TRUNCATED)
Ada Logics
true positive
"diff --git a/autotest/gdrivers/vrtprocesseddataset.py b/autotest/gdrivers/vrtprocesseddataset.py\ni(...TRUNCATED)
"# ANT-2026-WNRZ9D35: ANT-2026-WNRZ9D35 Β· osgeo/gdal\n**Project:** osgeo/gdal | **Bug Class:** heap(...TRUNCATED)
"<!doctype html>\n<html lang=\"en\">\n<head>\n<meta charset=\"utf-8\">\n<meta name=\"viewport\" cont(...TRUNCATED)
fixed
true
2026-03-24
2026-05-07
"5b5be7d5d077ff2663299960d35549bf6b3b1002b43e298475ccc1f822ef1b9fe11385712582d9c95d1c0ea18401bc96a9c(...TRUNCATED)
515
1,409
1,926
6,216
3,335
ANT-2026-6DSMTXZ8
https://red.anthropic.com/2026/cvd/findings/ANT-2026-6DSMTXZ8
mastodon/mastodon
ssrf
high
high
high
-
Claude Mythos Preview
[ "CVE-2026-46348" ]
[ "GHSA-crr4-7rm4-8gpw" ]
c832fb3291f25d8b
app/lib/private_address_check.rb:33
static analysis β€” not yet dynamically reproduced
ANT-2026-6DSMTXZ8: SSRF Bypass via IPv6 Unspecified Address (::) in Mastodon
"Mastodon routes all outbound HTTP through Request::Socket, which validates resolved IPs with Privat(...TRUNCATED)
"For IPAddr.new(\"::\"), all four predicates in private_address? return false: it is not private?, n(...TRUNCATED)
"Register evil.example and publish AAAA evil.example -> ::\nPOST /api/v1/statuses with body containi(...TRUNCATED)
"This vulnerability was discovered by Claude, Anthropic's AI assistant, and triaged by the Anthropic(...TRUNCATED)
"ANT-2026-6DSMTXZ8: SSRF Bypass via IPv6 Unspecified Address (\n::\n) in Mastodon\nMastodon routes a(...TRUNCATED)
Doyensec
true positive
"# ANT-2026-6DSMTXZ8: ANT-2026-6DSMTXZ8 Β· mastodon/mastodon\n**Project:** mastodon/mastodon | **Bug(...TRUNCATED)
"<!doctype html>\n<html lang=\"en\">\n<head>\n<meta charset=\"utf-8\">\n<meta name=\"viewport\" cont(...TRUNCATED)
fixed
true
2026-03-30
2026-04-23
"868595c9247644d3902e1edcb8d502294a9a9cdfa37d38bc25ed6063dc37fcdc447494225eccdff02df7e7abd198eeb8cda(...TRUNCATED)
632
0
651
9,885
651
End of preview. Expand in Data Studio

πŸ›‘οΈ Anthropic Red Teaming & Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) Archive

Complete, high-fidelity research corpus of AI-discovered zero-day and N-day vulnerabilities, proof-of-concepts, independent triage reports, and upstream git fix patches.

Hugging Face Dataset License: GPL 3.0 Master Commitments Revealed Findings cl100k Tokens CVE Advisories GitHub Org Discord

Overview Β· Corpus & Token Stats Β· Model Attribution Β· Vulnerability Taxonomy Β· Target Projects Β· Triage Partners Β· Dataset Schema Β· Quick Start


πŸ“Œ Overview & Executive Summary

The Anthropic Red Teaming & Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) Archive is an exhaustive, structured database capturing all vulnerability discoveries conducted by Anthropic's frontier AI models (including Claude Opus 4.6 and early development snapshots of Claude Mythos Preview) published under Anthropic's Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Policy.

Curated and maintained by Sphita AI Research, this dataset represents one of the world's most significant empirical corpora of autonomous AI software vulnerability identification, exploit pathing, and patch verification in production-critical open-source software (PostgreSQL, FreeBSD, LibreOffice, WolfSSL, Mastodon, Firecracker, etc.).

Key Highlights

  • Full Multi-Party Triaged Dossiers: Every revealed finding contains the complete root-cause analysis by Claude, independent validation by partner security firms, and severity assessments from maintainers.
  • Direct Git Unified Patches: Paired with every resolved vulnerability is the exact upstream fix diff applied to resolve the defect.
  • BPE Token Profiling: All text fields, reports, diffs, and syntheses are measured using the OpenAI/Claude standard cl100k_base BPE tokenizer.
  • Dual Format Persistence: Packaged into zero-overhead Apache Parquet tables (compressed via Zstandard-7) and line-delimited JSONL files.
  • Master Commitment Ledger: Contains all 6,597 commitments tracked in Anthropic's disclosure registry.

πŸ“Š Comprehensive Token & Corpus Statistics

All token counts are computed deterministically using tiktoken with the cl100k_base BPE tokenizer:

Metric cl100k Tokens Percentage Description
Clean Markdown Representation 252.1K 100.0% Complete synthesis for training / instruction fine-tuning
Vulnerability Technical Reports 153.4K ~35.0% Root-cause analysis, target commits, and location specs
Upstream Fix Diffs (Patches) 110.8K ~40.0% Unified git diffs resolving the vulnerabilities
Total Filtered Corpus Tokens 362.9K 100.0% Combined high-density tokens

Dataset Overview Table

Category Value Notes
Total Commitments in Ledger 6,597 All SHA3-512 commitment records in disclosure tracker
Fully Revealed Finding Dossiers 237 Expired disclosure embargoes with complete reports & diffs
Unique CVE Identifiers Issued 101 Official NIST NVD CVE records
Unique GitHub Security Advisories 80 Official GHSA advisories
Unique Target Open Source Repositories 20 Infrastructure, virtualization, databases, and runtimes

πŸ€– Models Credited with Discoveries

Distribution of vulnerability discoveries attributed to specific frontier Claude checkpoints:

Model Checkpoint Discoveries Share Role & Scope
Claude Mythos Preview 191 80.6%
Claude Opus 4.6 9 3.8%
an unreleased Anthropic model 6 2.5%
Claude Sonnet 4.6 4 1.7%

πŸ” Vulnerability Taxonomy & Bug Classes

Breakdown of identified vulnerability classes across the disclosed findings:

Bug Class Findings Share
heap-buffer-overflow 90 38.0%
other 26 11.0%
stack-buffer-overflow 24 10.1%
use-after-free 19 8.0%
auth-bypass 8 3.4%
sql-injection 7 3.0%
denial-of-service 6 2.5%
path-traversal 6 2.5%
oob-write 5 2.1%
broken-access-control 4 1.7%
integer-overflow 4 1.7%
crypto-failure 3 1.3%

🏒 Top Affected Open-Source Projects

The AI models targeted critical open-source infrastructure across networking, virtualization, and compilers:

Repository / Project Revealed Findings Share Tracking Dashboard
ffmpeg/ffmpeg 14 5.9% Findings
wolfssl/wolfssl 12 5.1% Findings
libreoffice/core 12 5.1% Findings
supabase/supabase 11 4.6% Findings
osgeo/gdal 11 4.6% Findings
freerdp/freerdp 11 4.6% Findings
supabase/auth 9 3.8% Findings
wireshark/wireshark 8 3.4% Findings
torvalds/linux 6 2.5% Findings
supabase/postgres 4 1.7% Findings
opensc 4 1.7% Findings
graphicsmagick/graphicsmagick 3 1.3% Findings
libjxl 3 1.3% Findings
oisf/suricata 3 1.3% Findings
selinux 3 1.3% Findings

🀝 Security Research Firms & Triage Partners

Anthropic partners with leading security research firms to independently reproduce findings and execute responsible disclosure:

Security Research Firm Validated Findings Triage Role
Ada Logics 79 Independent Triager & CVD Coordinator
Trail of Bits 59 Independent Triager & CVD Coordinator
Calif 24 Independent Triager & CVD Coordinator
Doyensec 7 Independent Triager & CVD Coordinator
Anvil Security 6 Independent Triager & CVD Coordinator
Ophion Security 4 Independent Triager & CVD Coordinator

πŸ“‹ Master Ledger Status Distribution

Status of all 6,597 commitments tracked in the master registry:

Disclosure Status Count Share
disclosed 5,936 90.0%
withdrawn 246 3.7%
fixed 218 3.3%
None 195 3.0%
merged 2 0.0%

πŸ—‚οΈ Dataset Schema

Configuration 1: findings-revealed (data/findings_revealed.parquet)

Column Name PyArrow Type Description
ant_id string Unique Anthropic finding identifier (e.g., ANT-2026-CJQWKW82)
source_url string Canonical disclosure URL on red.anthropic.com
project string Target repository identifier (e.g., postgres/postgres)
bug_class string Classification of the defect (e.g., denial-of-service)
headline_severity string Headline severity rating (critical, high, medium, low)
claude_severity string Severity assessed by the discovering Claude model
vendor_severity string Severity verified by the independent security research firm
maintainer_severity string Severity confirmed by upstream project maintainers
discovered_by_model string Frontier Claude model credited (e.g., Claude Opus 4.6)
cve_ids list<string> Associated CVE records
ghsa_ids list<string> Associated GitHub Security Advisory identifiers
target_commit string Git commit SHA of the audited codebase snapshot
target_location string Exact source code file path and line number of vulnerability
discovery_method string Method used (e.g., static analysis, symbolic execution)
report_title string Title of the vulnerability report
report_summary string Concise synopsis of exploitation mechanism
technical_details string Deep technical explanation of the flaw
reproduction_notes string Reproduction steps and exploit prerequisites
acknowledgement string Program attribution and contact details
report_full_text string Complete verbatim report text
security_firm_name string Name of the third-party security firm (e.g., Calif, Trail of Bits)
security_firm_verdict string Firm determination (e.g., true positive)
upstream_fix_diff string Complete unified git diff applied by maintainers
clean_markdown string Formatted markdown document ready for LLM fine-tuning
raw_html string Original unparsed HTML document
status string Disclosure status (disclosed, fixed, etc.)
patched bool Whether an official fix has shipped
discovered_on string ISO discovery date
committed_at string ISO commitment date
hash string SHA3-512 commitment proof
tokens_cl100k_report int64 cl100k_base token count of report
tokens_cl100k_diff int64 cl100k_base token count of git diff
tokens_cl100k_markdown int64 cl100k_base token count of synthesized markdown
tokens_cl100k_total int64 Combined research tokens (markdown + diff)

πŸš€ Quick Start Examples

Python (datasets)

from datasets import load_dataset

# Load detailed revealed findings
dataset = load_dataset("sphita/anthropic-red", name="findings-revealed", split="train")
print(f"Loaded {len(dataset)} detailed vulnerability dossiers")

# Inspect a finding
sample = dataset[0]
print("ID:", sample["ant_id"])
print("Project:", sample["project"])
print("Model:", sample["discovered_by_model"])
print("Diff Tokens:", sample["tokens_cl100k_diff"])

Python (pandas / pyarrow)

import pandas as pd

df = pd.read_parquet("https://huggingface.co/datasets/sphita/anthropic-red/resolve/main/data/findings_revealed.parquet")
print(df[["ant_id", "project", "bug_class", "discovered_by_model", "tokens_cl100k_total"]].head(10))

πŸ”„ Automated Updates

This dataset is dynamically updated via the Sphita Ingestion Pipeline:

./run.sh --update --upload

The pipeline automatically tracks newly disclosed commitments, fetches incremental finding writeups, verifies token statistics under a strict < 500 MiB RAM budget, and updates the repository.


βš–οΈ License & Ethical Disclosure

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