idx int64 | func_before string | Vulnerability Classification string | vul int64 | func_after string | patch string | CWE ID string | lines_before string | lines_after string |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
26,900 | struct page *shmem_read_mapping_page_gfp(struct address_space *mapping,
pgoff_t index, gfp_t gfp)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SHMEM
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
struct page *page;
int error;
BUG_ON(mapping->a_ops != &shmem_aops);
error = shmem_getpage_gfp(inode, index, &page, SGP_CACHE, gfp, NULL);
if (error)
page = ERR_PTR(error);
else
unlock_page(page);
return page;
#else
/*
* The tiny !SHMEM case uses ramfs without swap
*/
return read_cache_page_gfp(mapping, index, gfp);
#endif
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | struct page *shmem_read_mapping_page_gfp(struct address_space *mapping,
pgoff_t index, gfp_t gfp)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SHMEM
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
struct page *page;
int error;
BUG_ON(mapping->a_ops != &shmem_aops);
error = shmem_getpage_gfp(inode, index, &page, SGP_CACHE, gfp, NULL);
if (error)
page = ERR_PTR(error);
else
unlock_page(page);
return page;
#else
/*
* The tiny !SHMEM case uses ramfs without swap
*/
return read_cache_page_gfp(mapping, index, gfp);
#endif
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,901 | static void shmem_recalc_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
long freed;
freed = info->alloced - info->swapped - inode->i_mapping->nrpages;
if (freed > 0) {
struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo = SHMEM_SB(inode->i_sb);
if (sbinfo->max_blocks)
percpu_counter_add(&sbinfo->used_blocks, -freed);
info->alloced -= freed;
inode->i_blocks -= freed * BLOCKS_PER_PAGE;
shmem_unacct_blocks(info->flags, freed);
}
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static void shmem_recalc_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
long freed;
freed = info->alloced - info->swapped - inode->i_mapping->nrpages;
if (freed > 0) {
struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo = SHMEM_SB(inode->i_sb);
if (sbinfo->max_blocks)
percpu_counter_add(&sbinfo->used_blocks, -freed);
info->alloced -= freed;
inode->i_blocks -= freed * BLOCKS_PER_PAGE;
shmem_unacct_blocks(info->flags, freed);
}
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,902 | static int shmem_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(dentry->d_inode);
int err;
/*
* If this is a request for a synthetic attribute in the system.*
* namespace use the generic infrastructure to resolve a handler
* for it via sb->s_xattr.
*/
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN))
return generic_removexattr(dentry, name);
err = shmem_xattr_validate(name);
if (err)
return err;
return simple_xattr_remove(&info->xattrs, name);
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static int shmem_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(dentry->d_inode);
int err;
/*
* If this is a request for a synthetic attribute in the system.*
* namespace use the generic infrastructure to resolve a handler
* for it via sb->s_xattr.
*/
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN))
return generic_removexattr(dentry, name);
err = shmem_xattr_validate(name);
if (err)
return err;
return simple_xattr_remove(&info->xattrs, name);
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,903 | static int shmem_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = old_dentry->d_inode;
int they_are_dirs = S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode);
if (!simple_empty(new_dentry))
return -ENOTEMPTY;
if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
(void) shmem_unlink(new_dir, new_dentry);
if (they_are_dirs)
drop_nlink(old_dir);
} else if (they_are_dirs) {
drop_nlink(old_dir);
inc_nlink(new_dir);
}
old_dir->i_size -= BOGO_DIRENT_SIZE;
new_dir->i_size += BOGO_DIRENT_SIZE;
old_dir->i_ctime = old_dir->i_mtime =
new_dir->i_ctime = new_dir->i_mtime =
inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
return 0;
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static int shmem_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = old_dentry->d_inode;
int they_are_dirs = S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode);
if (!simple_empty(new_dentry))
return -ENOTEMPTY;
if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
(void) shmem_unlink(new_dir, new_dentry);
if (they_are_dirs)
drop_nlink(old_dir);
} else if (they_are_dirs) {
drop_nlink(old_dir);
inc_nlink(new_dir);
}
old_dir->i_size -= BOGO_DIRENT_SIZE;
new_dir->i_size += BOGO_DIRENT_SIZE;
old_dir->i_ctime = old_dir->i_mtime =
new_dir->i_ctime = new_dir->i_mtime =
inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
return 0;
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,904 | static int shmem_replace_page(struct page **pagep, gfp_t gfp,
struct shmem_inode_info *info, pgoff_t index)
{
struct page *oldpage, *newpage;
struct address_space *swap_mapping;
pgoff_t swap_index;
int error;
oldpage = *pagep;
swap_index = page_private(oldpage);
swap_mapping = page_mapping(oldpage);
/*
* We have arrived here because our zones are constrained, so don't
* limit chance of success by further cpuset and node constraints.
*/
gfp &= ~GFP_CONSTRAINT_MASK;
newpage = shmem_alloc_page(gfp, info, index);
if (!newpage)
return -ENOMEM;
page_cache_get(newpage);
copy_highpage(newpage, oldpage);
flush_dcache_page(newpage);
__set_page_locked(newpage);
SetPageUptodate(newpage);
SetPageSwapBacked(newpage);
set_page_private(newpage, swap_index);
SetPageSwapCache(newpage);
/*
* Our caller will very soon move newpage out of swapcache, but it's
* a nice clean interface for us to replace oldpage by newpage there.
*/
spin_lock_irq(&swap_mapping->tree_lock);
error = shmem_radix_tree_replace(swap_mapping, swap_index, oldpage,
newpage);
if (!error) {
__inc_zone_page_state(newpage, NR_FILE_PAGES);
__dec_zone_page_state(oldpage, NR_FILE_PAGES);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&swap_mapping->tree_lock);
if (unlikely(error)) {
/*
* Is this possible? I think not, now that our callers check
* both PageSwapCache and page_private after getting page lock;
* but be defensive. Reverse old to newpage for clear and free.
*/
oldpage = newpage;
} else {
mem_cgroup_replace_page_cache(oldpage, newpage);
lru_cache_add_anon(newpage);
*pagep = newpage;
}
ClearPageSwapCache(oldpage);
set_page_private(oldpage, 0);
unlock_page(oldpage);
page_cache_release(oldpage);
page_cache_release(oldpage);
return error;
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static int shmem_replace_page(struct page **pagep, gfp_t gfp,
struct shmem_inode_info *info, pgoff_t index)
{
struct page *oldpage, *newpage;
struct address_space *swap_mapping;
pgoff_t swap_index;
int error;
oldpage = *pagep;
swap_index = page_private(oldpage);
swap_mapping = page_mapping(oldpage);
/*
* We have arrived here because our zones are constrained, so don't
* limit chance of success by further cpuset and node constraints.
*/
gfp &= ~GFP_CONSTRAINT_MASK;
newpage = shmem_alloc_page(gfp, info, index);
if (!newpage)
return -ENOMEM;
page_cache_get(newpage);
copy_highpage(newpage, oldpage);
flush_dcache_page(newpage);
__set_page_locked(newpage);
SetPageUptodate(newpage);
SetPageSwapBacked(newpage);
set_page_private(newpage, swap_index);
SetPageSwapCache(newpage);
/*
* Our caller will very soon move newpage out of swapcache, but it's
* a nice clean interface for us to replace oldpage by newpage there.
*/
spin_lock_irq(&swap_mapping->tree_lock);
error = shmem_radix_tree_replace(swap_mapping, swap_index, oldpage,
newpage);
if (!error) {
__inc_zone_page_state(newpage, NR_FILE_PAGES);
__dec_zone_page_state(oldpage, NR_FILE_PAGES);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&swap_mapping->tree_lock);
if (unlikely(error)) {
/*
* Is this possible? I think not, now that our callers check
* both PageSwapCache and page_private after getting page lock;
* but be defensive. Reverse old to newpage for clear and free.
*/
oldpage = newpage;
} else {
mem_cgroup_replace_page_cache(oldpage, newpage);
lru_cache_add_anon(newpage);
*pagep = newpage;
}
ClearPageSwapCache(oldpage);
set_page_private(oldpage, 0);
unlock_page(oldpage);
page_cache_release(oldpage);
page_cache_release(oldpage);
return error;
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,905 | static int shmem_reserve_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo = SHMEM_SB(sb);
if (sbinfo->max_inodes) {
spin_lock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
if (!sbinfo->free_inodes) {
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return -ENOSPC;
}
sbinfo->free_inodes--;
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
}
return 0;
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static int shmem_reserve_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo = SHMEM_SB(sb);
if (sbinfo->max_inodes) {
spin_lock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
if (!sbinfo->free_inodes) {
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return -ENOSPC;
}
sbinfo->free_inodes--;
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
}
return 0;
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,906 | static pgoff_t shmem_seek_hole_data(struct address_space *mapping,
pgoff_t index, pgoff_t end, int whence)
{
struct page *page;
struct pagevec pvec;
pgoff_t indices[PAGEVEC_SIZE];
bool done = false;
int i;
pagevec_init(&pvec, 0);
pvec.nr = 1; /* start small: we may be there already */
while (!done) {
pvec.nr = shmem_find_get_pages_and_swap(mapping, index,
pvec.nr, pvec.pages, indices);
if (!pvec.nr) {
if (whence == SEEK_DATA)
index = end;
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < pvec.nr; i++, index++) {
if (index < indices[i]) {
if (whence == SEEK_HOLE) {
done = true;
break;
}
index = indices[i];
}
page = pvec.pages[i];
if (page && !radix_tree_exceptional_entry(page)) {
if (!PageUptodate(page))
page = NULL;
}
if (index >= end ||
(page && whence == SEEK_DATA) ||
(!page && whence == SEEK_HOLE)) {
done = true;
break;
}
}
shmem_deswap_pagevec(&pvec);
pagevec_release(&pvec);
pvec.nr = PAGEVEC_SIZE;
cond_resched();
}
return index;
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static pgoff_t shmem_seek_hole_data(struct address_space *mapping,
pgoff_t index, pgoff_t end, int whence)
{
struct page *page;
struct pagevec pvec;
pgoff_t indices[PAGEVEC_SIZE];
bool done = false;
int i;
pagevec_init(&pvec, 0);
pvec.nr = 1; /* start small: we may be there already */
while (!done) {
pvec.nr = shmem_find_get_pages_and_swap(mapping, index,
pvec.nr, pvec.pages, indices);
if (!pvec.nr) {
if (whence == SEEK_DATA)
index = end;
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < pvec.nr; i++, index++) {
if (index < indices[i]) {
if (whence == SEEK_HOLE) {
done = true;
break;
}
index = indices[i];
}
page = pvec.pages[i];
if (page && !radix_tree_exceptional_entry(page)) {
if (!PageUptodate(page))
page = NULL;
}
if (index >= end ||
(page && whence == SEEK_DATA) ||
(!page && whence == SEEK_HOLE)) {
done = true;
break;
}
}
shmem_deswap_pagevec(&pvec);
pagevec_release(&pvec);
pvec.nr = PAGEVEC_SIZE;
cond_resched();
}
return index;
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,907 | static int shmem_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(dentry->d_inode);
int err;
/*
* If this is a request for a synthetic attribute in the system.*
* namespace use the generic infrastructure to resolve a handler
* for it via sb->s_xattr.
*/
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN))
return generic_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
err = shmem_xattr_validate(name);
if (err)
return err;
return simple_xattr_set(&info->xattrs, name, value, size, flags);
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static int shmem_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(dentry->d_inode);
int err;
/*
* If this is a request for a synthetic attribute in the system.*
* namespace use the generic infrastructure to resolve a handler
* for it via sb->s_xattr.
*/
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN))
return generic_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
err = shmem_xattr_validate(name);
if (err)
return err;
return simple_xattr_set(&info->xattrs, name, value, size, flags);
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,908 | static bool shmem_should_replace_page(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp)
{
return page_zonenum(page) > gfp_zone(gfp);
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static bool shmem_should_replace_page(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp)
{
return page_zonenum(page) > gfp_zone(gfp);
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,909 | static inline void shmem_show_mpol(struct seq_file *seq, struct mempolicy *mpol)
{
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static inline void shmem_show_mpol(struct seq_file *seq, struct mempolicy *mpol)
{
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,910 | static int shmem_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root)
{
struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo = SHMEM_SB(root->d_sb);
if (sbinfo->max_blocks != shmem_default_max_blocks())
seq_printf(seq, ",size=%luk",
sbinfo->max_blocks << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - 10));
if (sbinfo->max_inodes != shmem_default_max_inodes())
seq_printf(seq, ",nr_inodes=%lu", sbinfo->max_inodes);
if (sbinfo->mode != (S_IRWXUGO | S_ISVTX))
seq_printf(seq, ",mode=%03ho", sbinfo->mode);
if (!uid_eq(sbinfo->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID))
seq_printf(seq, ",uid=%u",
from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, sbinfo->uid));
if (!gid_eq(sbinfo->gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID))
seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%u",
from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, sbinfo->gid));
shmem_show_mpol(seq, sbinfo->mpol);
return 0;
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static int shmem_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root)
{
struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo = SHMEM_SB(root->d_sb);
if (sbinfo->max_blocks != shmem_default_max_blocks())
seq_printf(seq, ",size=%luk",
sbinfo->max_blocks << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - 10));
if (sbinfo->max_inodes != shmem_default_max_inodes())
seq_printf(seq, ",nr_inodes=%lu", sbinfo->max_inodes);
if (sbinfo->mode != (S_IRWXUGO | S_ISVTX))
seq_printf(seq, ",mode=%03ho", sbinfo->mode);
if (!uid_eq(sbinfo->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID))
seq_printf(seq, ",uid=%u",
from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, sbinfo->uid));
if (!gid_eq(sbinfo->gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID))
seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%u",
from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, sbinfo->gid));
shmem_show_mpol(seq, sbinfo->mpol);
return 0;
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,911 | static int shmem_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf)
{
struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo = SHMEM_SB(dentry->d_sb);
buf->f_type = TMPFS_MAGIC;
buf->f_bsize = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
buf->f_namelen = NAME_MAX;
if (sbinfo->max_blocks) {
buf->f_blocks = sbinfo->max_blocks;
buf->f_bavail =
buf->f_bfree = sbinfo->max_blocks -
percpu_counter_sum(&sbinfo->used_blocks);
}
if (sbinfo->max_inodes) {
buf->f_files = sbinfo->max_inodes;
buf->f_ffree = sbinfo->free_inodes;
}
/* else leave those fields 0 like simple_statfs */
return 0;
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static int shmem_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf)
{
struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo = SHMEM_SB(dentry->d_sb);
buf->f_type = TMPFS_MAGIC;
buf->f_bsize = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
buf->f_namelen = NAME_MAX;
if (sbinfo->max_blocks) {
buf->f_blocks = sbinfo->max_blocks;
buf->f_bavail =
buf->f_bfree = sbinfo->max_blocks -
percpu_counter_sum(&sbinfo->used_blocks);
}
if (sbinfo->max_inodes) {
buf->f_files = sbinfo->max_inodes;
buf->f_ffree = sbinfo->free_inodes;
}
/* else leave those fields 0 like simple_statfs */
return 0;
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,912 | static int shmem_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *symname)
{
int error;
int len;
struct inode *inode;
struct page *page;
char *kaddr;
struct shmem_inode_info *info;
len = strlen(symname) + 1;
if (len > PAGE_CACHE_SIZE)
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
inode = shmem_get_inode(dir->i_sb, dir, S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO, 0, VM_NORESERVE);
if (!inode)
return -ENOSPC;
error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &dentry->d_name,
shmem_initxattrs, NULL);
if (error) {
if (error != -EOPNOTSUPP) {
iput(inode);
return error;
}
error = 0;
}
info = SHMEM_I(inode);
inode->i_size = len-1;
if (len <= SHORT_SYMLINK_LEN) {
info->symlink = kmemdup(symname, len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!info->symlink) {
iput(inode);
return -ENOMEM;
}
inode->i_op = &shmem_short_symlink_operations;
} else {
error = shmem_getpage(inode, 0, &page, SGP_WRITE, NULL);
if (error) {
iput(inode);
return error;
}
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &shmem_aops;
inode->i_op = &shmem_symlink_inode_operations;
kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
memcpy(kaddr, symname, len);
kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
SetPageUptodate(page);
set_page_dirty(page);
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
}
dir->i_size += BOGO_DIRENT_SIZE;
dir->i_ctime = dir->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
dget(dentry);
return 0;
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static int shmem_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *symname)
{
int error;
int len;
struct inode *inode;
struct page *page;
char *kaddr;
struct shmem_inode_info *info;
len = strlen(symname) + 1;
if (len > PAGE_CACHE_SIZE)
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
inode = shmem_get_inode(dir->i_sb, dir, S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO, 0, VM_NORESERVE);
if (!inode)
return -ENOSPC;
error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &dentry->d_name,
shmem_initxattrs, NULL);
if (error) {
if (error != -EOPNOTSUPP) {
iput(inode);
return error;
}
error = 0;
}
info = SHMEM_I(inode);
inode->i_size = len-1;
if (len <= SHORT_SYMLINK_LEN) {
info->symlink = kmemdup(symname, len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!info->symlink) {
iput(inode);
return -ENOMEM;
}
inode->i_op = &shmem_short_symlink_operations;
} else {
error = shmem_getpage(inode, 0, &page, SGP_WRITE, NULL);
if (error) {
iput(inode);
return error;
}
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &shmem_aops;
inode->i_op = &shmem_symlink_inode_operations;
kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
memcpy(kaddr, symname, len);
kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
SetPageUptodate(page);
set_page_dirty(page);
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
}
dir->i_size += BOGO_DIRENT_SIZE;
dir->i_ctime = dir->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
dget(dentry);
return 0;
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,913 | void shmem_truncate_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t lstart, loff_t lend)
{
shmem_undo_range(inode, lstart, lend, false);
inode->i_ctime = inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | void shmem_truncate_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t lstart, loff_t lend)
{
shmem_undo_range(inode, lstart, lend, false);
inode->i_ctime = inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,914 | void shmem_truncate_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t lstart, loff_t lend)
{
truncate_inode_pages_range(inode->i_mapping, lstart, lend);
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | void shmem_truncate_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t lstart, loff_t lend)
{
truncate_inode_pages_range(inode->i_mapping, lstart, lend);
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,915 | static inline void shmem_unacct_blocks(unsigned long flags, long pages)
{
if (flags & VM_NORESERVE)
vm_unacct_memory(pages * VM_ACCT(PAGE_CACHE_SIZE));
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static inline void shmem_unacct_blocks(unsigned long flags, long pages)
{
if (flags & VM_NORESERVE)
vm_unacct_memory(pages * VM_ACCT(PAGE_CACHE_SIZE));
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,916 | static inline void shmem_unacct_size(unsigned long flags, loff_t size)
{
if (!(flags & VM_NORESERVE))
vm_unacct_memory(VM_ACCT(size));
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static inline void shmem_unacct_size(unsigned long flags, loff_t size)
{
if (!(flags & VM_NORESERVE))
vm_unacct_memory(VM_ACCT(size));
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,917 | static void shmem_undo_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t lstart, loff_t lend,
bool unfalloc)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
pgoff_t start = (lstart + PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
pgoff_t end = (lend + 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
unsigned int partial_start = lstart & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
unsigned int partial_end = (lend + 1) & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
struct pagevec pvec;
pgoff_t indices[PAGEVEC_SIZE];
long nr_swaps_freed = 0;
pgoff_t index;
int i;
if (lend == -1)
end = -1; /* unsigned, so actually very big */
pagevec_init(&pvec, 0);
index = start;
while (index < end) {
pvec.nr = shmem_find_get_pages_and_swap(mapping, index,
min(end - index, (pgoff_t)PAGEVEC_SIZE),
pvec.pages, indices);
if (!pvec.nr)
break;
mem_cgroup_uncharge_start();
for (i = 0; i < pagevec_count(&pvec); i++) {
struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
index = indices[i];
if (index >= end)
break;
if (radix_tree_exceptional_entry(page)) {
if (unfalloc)
continue;
nr_swaps_freed += !shmem_free_swap(mapping,
index, page);
continue;
}
if (!trylock_page(page))
continue;
if (!unfalloc || !PageUptodate(page)) {
if (page->mapping == mapping) {
VM_BUG_ON(PageWriteback(page));
truncate_inode_page(mapping, page);
}
}
unlock_page(page);
}
shmem_deswap_pagevec(&pvec);
pagevec_release(&pvec);
mem_cgroup_uncharge_end();
cond_resched();
index++;
}
if (partial_start) {
struct page *page = NULL;
shmem_getpage(inode, start - 1, &page, SGP_READ, NULL);
if (page) {
unsigned int top = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
if (start > end) {
top = partial_end;
partial_end = 0;
}
zero_user_segment(page, partial_start, top);
set_page_dirty(page);
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
}
}
if (partial_end) {
struct page *page = NULL;
shmem_getpage(inode, end, &page, SGP_READ, NULL);
if (page) {
zero_user_segment(page, 0, partial_end);
set_page_dirty(page);
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
}
}
if (start >= end)
return;
index = start;
for ( ; ; ) {
cond_resched();
pvec.nr = shmem_find_get_pages_and_swap(mapping, index,
min(end - index, (pgoff_t)PAGEVEC_SIZE),
pvec.pages, indices);
if (!pvec.nr) {
if (index == start || unfalloc)
break;
index = start;
continue;
}
if ((index == start || unfalloc) && indices[0] >= end) {
shmem_deswap_pagevec(&pvec);
pagevec_release(&pvec);
break;
}
mem_cgroup_uncharge_start();
for (i = 0; i < pagevec_count(&pvec); i++) {
struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
index = indices[i];
if (index >= end)
break;
if (radix_tree_exceptional_entry(page)) {
if (unfalloc)
continue;
nr_swaps_freed += !shmem_free_swap(mapping,
index, page);
continue;
}
lock_page(page);
if (!unfalloc || !PageUptodate(page)) {
if (page->mapping == mapping) {
VM_BUG_ON(PageWriteback(page));
truncate_inode_page(mapping, page);
}
}
unlock_page(page);
}
shmem_deswap_pagevec(&pvec);
pagevec_release(&pvec);
mem_cgroup_uncharge_end();
index++;
}
spin_lock(&info->lock);
info->swapped -= nr_swaps_freed;
shmem_recalc_inode(inode);
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static void shmem_undo_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t lstart, loff_t lend,
bool unfalloc)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
pgoff_t start = (lstart + PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
pgoff_t end = (lend + 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
unsigned int partial_start = lstart & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
unsigned int partial_end = (lend + 1) & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
struct pagevec pvec;
pgoff_t indices[PAGEVEC_SIZE];
long nr_swaps_freed = 0;
pgoff_t index;
int i;
if (lend == -1)
end = -1; /* unsigned, so actually very big */
pagevec_init(&pvec, 0);
index = start;
while (index < end) {
pvec.nr = shmem_find_get_pages_and_swap(mapping, index,
min(end - index, (pgoff_t)PAGEVEC_SIZE),
pvec.pages, indices);
if (!pvec.nr)
break;
mem_cgroup_uncharge_start();
for (i = 0; i < pagevec_count(&pvec); i++) {
struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
index = indices[i];
if (index >= end)
break;
if (radix_tree_exceptional_entry(page)) {
if (unfalloc)
continue;
nr_swaps_freed += !shmem_free_swap(mapping,
index, page);
continue;
}
if (!trylock_page(page))
continue;
if (!unfalloc || !PageUptodate(page)) {
if (page->mapping == mapping) {
VM_BUG_ON(PageWriteback(page));
truncate_inode_page(mapping, page);
}
}
unlock_page(page);
}
shmem_deswap_pagevec(&pvec);
pagevec_release(&pvec);
mem_cgroup_uncharge_end();
cond_resched();
index++;
}
if (partial_start) {
struct page *page = NULL;
shmem_getpage(inode, start - 1, &page, SGP_READ, NULL);
if (page) {
unsigned int top = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
if (start > end) {
top = partial_end;
partial_end = 0;
}
zero_user_segment(page, partial_start, top);
set_page_dirty(page);
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
}
}
if (partial_end) {
struct page *page = NULL;
shmem_getpage(inode, end, &page, SGP_READ, NULL);
if (page) {
zero_user_segment(page, 0, partial_end);
set_page_dirty(page);
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
}
}
if (start >= end)
return;
index = start;
for ( ; ; ) {
cond_resched();
pvec.nr = shmem_find_get_pages_and_swap(mapping, index,
min(end - index, (pgoff_t)PAGEVEC_SIZE),
pvec.pages, indices);
if (!pvec.nr) {
if (index == start || unfalloc)
break;
index = start;
continue;
}
if ((index == start || unfalloc) && indices[0] >= end) {
shmem_deswap_pagevec(&pvec);
pagevec_release(&pvec);
break;
}
mem_cgroup_uncharge_start();
for (i = 0; i < pagevec_count(&pvec); i++) {
struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
index = indices[i];
if (index >= end)
break;
if (radix_tree_exceptional_entry(page)) {
if (unfalloc)
continue;
nr_swaps_freed += !shmem_free_swap(mapping,
index, page);
continue;
}
lock_page(page);
if (!unfalloc || !PageUptodate(page)) {
if (page->mapping == mapping) {
VM_BUG_ON(PageWriteback(page));
truncate_inode_page(mapping, page);
}
}
unlock_page(page);
}
shmem_deswap_pagevec(&pvec);
pagevec_release(&pvec);
mem_cgroup_uncharge_end();
index++;
}
spin_lock(&info->lock);
info->swapped -= nr_swaps_freed;
shmem_recalc_inode(inode);
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,918 | static int shmem_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
if (inode->i_nlink > 1 && !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
shmem_free_inode(inode->i_sb);
dir->i_size -= BOGO_DIRENT_SIZE;
inode->i_ctime = dir->i_ctime = dir->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
drop_nlink(inode);
dput(dentry); /* Undo the count from "create" - this does all the work */
return 0;
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static int shmem_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
if (inode->i_nlink > 1 && !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
shmem_free_inode(inode->i_sb);
dir->i_size -= BOGO_DIRENT_SIZE;
inode->i_ctime = dir->i_ctime = dir->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
drop_nlink(inode);
dput(dentry); /* Undo the count from "create" - this does all the work */
return 0;
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,919 | void shmem_unlock_mapping(struct address_space *mapping)
{
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | void shmem_unlock_mapping(struct address_space *mapping)
{
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,920 | int shmem_unuse(swp_entry_t swap, struct page *page)
{
struct list_head *this, *next;
struct shmem_inode_info *info;
int found = 0;
int error = 0;
/*
* There's a faint possibility that swap page was replaced before
* caller locked it: caller will come back later with the right page.
*/
if (unlikely(!PageSwapCache(page) || page_private(page) != swap.val))
goto out;
/*
* Charge page using GFP_KERNEL while we can wait, before taking
* the shmem_swaplist_mutex which might hold up shmem_writepage().
* Charged back to the user (not to caller) when swap account is used.
*/
error = mem_cgroup_cache_charge(page, current->mm, GFP_KERNEL);
if (error)
goto out;
/* No radix_tree_preload: swap entry keeps a place for page in tree */
mutex_lock(&shmem_swaplist_mutex);
list_for_each_safe(this, next, &shmem_swaplist) {
info = list_entry(this, struct shmem_inode_info, swaplist);
if (info->swapped)
found = shmem_unuse_inode(info, swap, &page);
else
list_del_init(&info->swaplist);
cond_resched();
if (found)
break;
}
mutex_unlock(&shmem_swaplist_mutex);
if (found < 0)
error = found;
out:
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
return error;
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | int shmem_unuse(swp_entry_t swap, struct page *page)
{
struct list_head *this, *next;
struct shmem_inode_info *info;
int found = 0;
int error = 0;
/*
* There's a faint possibility that swap page was replaced before
* caller locked it: caller will come back later with the right page.
*/
if (unlikely(!PageSwapCache(page) || page_private(page) != swap.val))
goto out;
/*
* Charge page using GFP_KERNEL while we can wait, before taking
* the shmem_swaplist_mutex which might hold up shmem_writepage().
* Charged back to the user (not to caller) when swap account is used.
*/
error = mem_cgroup_cache_charge(page, current->mm, GFP_KERNEL);
if (error)
goto out;
/* No radix_tree_preload: swap entry keeps a place for page in tree */
mutex_lock(&shmem_swaplist_mutex);
list_for_each_safe(this, next, &shmem_swaplist) {
info = list_entry(this, struct shmem_inode_info, swaplist);
if (info->swapped)
found = shmem_unuse_inode(info, swap, &page);
else
list_del_init(&info->swaplist);
cond_resched();
if (found)
break;
}
mutex_unlock(&shmem_swaplist_mutex);
if (found < 0)
error = found;
out:
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
return error;
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,921 | int shmem_unuse(swp_entry_t swap, struct page *page)
{
return 0;
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | int shmem_unuse(swp_entry_t swap, struct page *page)
{
return 0;
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,922 | static int shmem_unuse_inode(struct shmem_inode_info *info,
swp_entry_t swap, struct page **pagep)
{
struct address_space *mapping = info->vfs_inode.i_mapping;
void *radswap;
pgoff_t index;
gfp_t gfp;
int error = 0;
radswap = swp_to_radix_entry(swap);
index = radix_tree_locate_item(&mapping->page_tree, radswap);
if (index == -1)
return 0;
/*
* Move _head_ to start search for next from here.
* But be careful: shmem_evict_inode checks list_empty without taking
* mutex, and there's an instant in list_move_tail when info->swaplist
* would appear empty, if it were the only one on shmem_swaplist.
*/
if (shmem_swaplist.next != &info->swaplist)
list_move_tail(&shmem_swaplist, &info->swaplist);
gfp = mapping_gfp_mask(mapping);
if (shmem_should_replace_page(*pagep, gfp)) {
mutex_unlock(&shmem_swaplist_mutex);
error = shmem_replace_page(pagep, gfp, info, index);
mutex_lock(&shmem_swaplist_mutex);
/*
* We needed to drop mutex to make that restrictive page
* allocation, but the inode might have been freed while we
* dropped it: although a racing shmem_evict_inode() cannot
* complete without emptying the radix_tree, our page lock
* on this swapcache page is not enough to prevent that -
* free_swap_and_cache() of our swap entry will only
* trylock_page(), removing swap from radix_tree whatever.
*
* We must not proceed to shmem_add_to_page_cache() if the
* inode has been freed, but of course we cannot rely on
* inode or mapping or info to check that. However, we can
* safely check if our swap entry is still in use (and here
* it can't have got reused for another page): if it's still
* in use, then the inode cannot have been freed yet, and we
* can safely proceed (if it's no longer in use, that tells
* nothing about the inode, but we don't need to unuse swap).
*/
if (!page_swapcount(*pagep))
error = -ENOENT;
}
/*
* We rely on shmem_swaplist_mutex, not only to protect the swaplist,
* but also to hold up shmem_evict_inode(): so inode cannot be freed
* beneath us (pagelock doesn't help until the page is in pagecache).
*/
if (!error)
error = shmem_add_to_page_cache(*pagep, mapping, index,
GFP_NOWAIT, radswap);
if (error != -ENOMEM) {
/*
* Truncation and eviction use free_swap_and_cache(), which
* only does trylock page: if we raced, best clean up here.
*/
delete_from_swap_cache(*pagep);
set_page_dirty(*pagep);
if (!error) {
spin_lock(&info->lock);
info->swapped--;
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
swap_free(swap);
}
error = 1; /* not an error, but entry was found */
}
return error;
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static int shmem_unuse_inode(struct shmem_inode_info *info,
swp_entry_t swap, struct page **pagep)
{
struct address_space *mapping = info->vfs_inode.i_mapping;
void *radswap;
pgoff_t index;
gfp_t gfp;
int error = 0;
radswap = swp_to_radix_entry(swap);
index = radix_tree_locate_item(&mapping->page_tree, radswap);
if (index == -1)
return 0;
/*
* Move _head_ to start search for next from here.
* But be careful: shmem_evict_inode checks list_empty without taking
* mutex, and there's an instant in list_move_tail when info->swaplist
* would appear empty, if it were the only one on shmem_swaplist.
*/
if (shmem_swaplist.next != &info->swaplist)
list_move_tail(&shmem_swaplist, &info->swaplist);
gfp = mapping_gfp_mask(mapping);
if (shmem_should_replace_page(*pagep, gfp)) {
mutex_unlock(&shmem_swaplist_mutex);
error = shmem_replace_page(pagep, gfp, info, index);
mutex_lock(&shmem_swaplist_mutex);
/*
* We needed to drop mutex to make that restrictive page
* allocation, but the inode might have been freed while we
* dropped it: although a racing shmem_evict_inode() cannot
* complete without emptying the radix_tree, our page lock
* on this swapcache page is not enough to prevent that -
* free_swap_and_cache() of our swap entry will only
* trylock_page(), removing swap from radix_tree whatever.
*
* We must not proceed to shmem_add_to_page_cache() if the
* inode has been freed, but of course we cannot rely on
* inode or mapping or info to check that. However, we can
* safely check if our swap entry is still in use (and here
* it can't have got reused for another page): if it's still
* in use, then the inode cannot have been freed yet, and we
* can safely proceed (if it's no longer in use, that tells
* nothing about the inode, but we don't need to unuse swap).
*/
if (!page_swapcount(*pagep))
error = -ENOENT;
}
/*
* We rely on shmem_swaplist_mutex, not only to protect the swaplist,
* but also to hold up shmem_evict_inode(): so inode cannot be freed
* beneath us (pagelock doesn't help until the page is in pagecache).
*/
if (!error)
error = shmem_add_to_page_cache(*pagep, mapping, index,
GFP_NOWAIT, radswap);
if (error != -ENOMEM) {
/*
* Truncation and eviction use free_swap_and_cache(), which
* only does trylock page: if we raced, best clean up here.
*/
delete_from_swap_cache(*pagep);
set_page_dirty(*pagep);
if (!error) {
spin_lock(&info->lock);
info->swapped--;
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
swap_free(swap);
}
error = 1; /* not an error, but entry was found */
}
return error;
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,923 | shmem_write_end(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
loff_t pos, unsigned len, unsigned copied,
struct page *page, void *fsdata)
{
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
if (pos + copied > inode->i_size)
i_size_write(inode, pos + copied);
if (!PageUptodate(page)) {
if (copied < PAGE_CACHE_SIZE) {
unsigned from = pos & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
zero_user_segments(page, 0, from,
from + copied, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
}
SetPageUptodate(page);
}
set_page_dirty(page);
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
return copied;
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | shmem_write_end(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
loff_t pos, unsigned len, unsigned copied,
struct page *page, void *fsdata)
{
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
if (pos + copied > inode->i_size)
i_size_write(inode, pos + copied);
if (!PageUptodate(page)) {
if (copied < PAGE_CACHE_SIZE) {
unsigned from = pos & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
zero_user_segments(page, 0, from,
from + copied, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
}
SetPageUptodate(page);
}
set_page_dirty(page);
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
return copied;
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,924 | static int shmem_writepage(struct page *page, struct writeback_control *wbc)
{
struct shmem_inode_info *info;
struct address_space *mapping;
struct inode *inode;
swp_entry_t swap;
pgoff_t index;
BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
mapping = page->mapping;
index = page->index;
inode = mapping->host;
info = SHMEM_I(inode);
if (info->flags & VM_LOCKED)
goto redirty;
if (!total_swap_pages)
goto redirty;
/*
* shmem_backing_dev_info's capabilities prevent regular writeback or
* sync from ever calling shmem_writepage; but a stacking filesystem
* might use ->writepage of its underlying filesystem, in which case
* tmpfs should write out to swap only in response to memory pressure,
* and not for the writeback threads or sync.
*/
if (!wbc->for_reclaim) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(1); /* Still happens? Tell us about it! */
goto redirty;
}
/*
* This is somewhat ridiculous, but without plumbing a SWAP_MAP_FALLOC
* value into swapfile.c, the only way we can correctly account for a
* fallocated page arriving here is now to initialize it and write it.
*
* That's okay for a page already fallocated earlier, but if we have
* not yet completed the fallocation, then (a) we want to keep track
* of this page in case we have to undo it, and (b) it may not be a
* good idea to continue anyway, once we're pushing into swap. So
* reactivate the page, and let shmem_fallocate() quit when too many.
*/
if (!PageUptodate(page)) {
if (inode->i_private) {
struct shmem_falloc *shmem_falloc;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
shmem_falloc = inode->i_private;
if (shmem_falloc &&
index >= shmem_falloc->start &&
index < shmem_falloc->next)
shmem_falloc->nr_unswapped++;
else
shmem_falloc = NULL;
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
if (shmem_falloc)
goto redirty;
}
clear_highpage(page);
flush_dcache_page(page);
SetPageUptodate(page);
}
swap = get_swap_page();
if (!swap.val)
goto redirty;
/*
* Add inode to shmem_unuse()'s list of swapped-out inodes,
* if it's not already there. Do it now before the page is
* moved to swap cache, when its pagelock no longer protects
* the inode from eviction. But don't unlock the mutex until
* we've incremented swapped, because shmem_unuse_inode() will
* prune a !swapped inode from the swaplist under this mutex.
*/
mutex_lock(&shmem_swaplist_mutex);
if (list_empty(&info->swaplist))
list_add_tail(&info->swaplist, &shmem_swaplist);
if (add_to_swap_cache(page, swap, GFP_ATOMIC) == 0) {
swap_shmem_alloc(swap);
shmem_delete_from_page_cache(page, swp_to_radix_entry(swap));
spin_lock(&info->lock);
info->swapped++;
shmem_recalc_inode(inode);
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
mutex_unlock(&shmem_swaplist_mutex);
BUG_ON(page_mapped(page));
swap_writepage(page, wbc);
return 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&shmem_swaplist_mutex);
swapcache_free(swap, NULL);
redirty:
set_page_dirty(page);
if (wbc->for_reclaim)
return AOP_WRITEPAGE_ACTIVATE; /* Return with page locked */
unlock_page(page);
return 0;
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static int shmem_writepage(struct page *page, struct writeback_control *wbc)
{
struct shmem_inode_info *info;
struct address_space *mapping;
struct inode *inode;
swp_entry_t swap;
pgoff_t index;
BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
mapping = page->mapping;
index = page->index;
inode = mapping->host;
info = SHMEM_I(inode);
if (info->flags & VM_LOCKED)
goto redirty;
if (!total_swap_pages)
goto redirty;
/*
* shmem_backing_dev_info's capabilities prevent regular writeback or
* sync from ever calling shmem_writepage; but a stacking filesystem
* might use ->writepage of its underlying filesystem, in which case
* tmpfs should write out to swap only in response to memory pressure,
* and not for the writeback threads or sync.
*/
if (!wbc->for_reclaim) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(1); /* Still happens? Tell us about it! */
goto redirty;
}
/*
* This is somewhat ridiculous, but without plumbing a SWAP_MAP_FALLOC
* value into swapfile.c, the only way we can correctly account for a
* fallocated page arriving here is now to initialize it and write it.
*
* That's okay for a page already fallocated earlier, but if we have
* not yet completed the fallocation, then (a) we want to keep track
* of this page in case we have to undo it, and (b) it may not be a
* good idea to continue anyway, once we're pushing into swap. So
* reactivate the page, and let shmem_fallocate() quit when too many.
*/
if (!PageUptodate(page)) {
if (inode->i_private) {
struct shmem_falloc *shmem_falloc;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
shmem_falloc = inode->i_private;
if (shmem_falloc &&
index >= shmem_falloc->start &&
index < shmem_falloc->next)
shmem_falloc->nr_unswapped++;
else
shmem_falloc = NULL;
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
if (shmem_falloc)
goto redirty;
}
clear_highpage(page);
flush_dcache_page(page);
SetPageUptodate(page);
}
swap = get_swap_page();
if (!swap.val)
goto redirty;
/*
* Add inode to shmem_unuse()'s list of swapped-out inodes,
* if it's not already there. Do it now before the page is
* moved to swap cache, when its pagelock no longer protects
* the inode from eviction. But don't unlock the mutex until
* we've incremented swapped, because shmem_unuse_inode() will
* prune a !swapped inode from the swaplist under this mutex.
*/
mutex_lock(&shmem_swaplist_mutex);
if (list_empty(&info->swaplist))
list_add_tail(&info->swaplist, &shmem_swaplist);
if (add_to_swap_cache(page, swap, GFP_ATOMIC) == 0) {
swap_shmem_alloc(swap);
shmem_delete_from_page_cache(page, swp_to_radix_entry(swap));
spin_lock(&info->lock);
info->swapped++;
shmem_recalc_inode(inode);
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
mutex_unlock(&shmem_swaplist_mutex);
BUG_ON(page_mapped(page));
swap_writepage(page, wbc);
return 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&shmem_swaplist_mutex);
swapcache_free(swap, NULL);
redirty:
set_page_dirty(page);
if (wbc->for_reclaim)
return AOP_WRITEPAGE_ACTIVATE; /* Return with page locked */
unlock_page(page);
return 0;
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,925 | static int shmem_xattr_validate(const char *name)
{
struct { const char *prefix; size_t len; } arr[] = {
{ XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN },
{ XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN }
};
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(arr); i++) {
size_t preflen = arr[i].len;
if (strncmp(name, arr[i].prefix, preflen) == 0) {
if (!name[preflen])
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | static int shmem_xattr_validate(const char *name)
{
struct { const char *prefix; size_t len; } arr[] = {
{ XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN },
{ XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN }
};
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(arr); i++) {
size_t preflen = arr[i].len;
if (strncmp(name, arr[i].prefix, preflen) == 0) {
if (!name[preflen])
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,926 | int shmem_zero_setup(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct file *file;
loff_t size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
file = shmem_file_setup("dev/zero", size, vma->vm_flags);
if (IS_ERR(file))
return PTR_ERR(file);
if (vma->vm_file)
fput(vma->vm_file);
vma->vm_file = file;
vma->vm_ops = &shmem_vm_ops;
return 0;
}
| DoS +Priv | 0 | int shmem_zero_setup(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct file *file;
loff_t size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
file = shmem_file_setup("dev/zero", size, vma->vm_flags);
if (IS_ERR(file))
return PTR_ERR(file);
if (vma->vm_file)
fput(vma->vm_file);
vma->vm_file = file;
vma->vm_ops = &shmem_vm_ops;
return 0;
}
| @@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
+ config.mpol = NULL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
@@ -2510,8 +2511,13 @@ static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
- mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
- sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ /*
+ * Preserve previous mempolicy unless mpol remount option was specified.
+ */
+ if (config.mpol) {
+ mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
+ sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
+ }
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error; | CWE-399 | null | null |
26,927 | static void __net_exit diag_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
netlink_kernel_release(net->diag_nlsk);
net->diag_nlsk = NULL;
}
| +Priv | 0 | static void __net_exit diag_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
netlink_kernel_release(net->diag_nlsk);
net->diag_nlsk = NULL;
}
| @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
if (hndl == NULL)
err = -ENOENT; | CWE-20 | null | null |
26,928 | static int __net_init diag_net_init(struct net *net)
{
struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = {
.input = sock_diag_rcv,
};
net->diag_nlsk = netlink_kernel_create(net, NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG, &cfg);
return net->diag_nlsk == NULL ? -ENOMEM : 0;
}
| +Priv | 0 | static int __net_init diag_net_init(struct net *net)
{
struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = {
.input = sock_diag_rcv,
};
net->diag_nlsk = netlink_kernel_create(net, NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG, &cfg);
return net->diag_nlsk == NULL ? -ENOMEM : 0;
}
| @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
if (hndl == NULL)
err = -ENOENT; | CWE-20 | null | null |
26,929 | static void __exit sock_diag_exit(void)
{
unregister_pernet_subsys(&diag_net_ops);
}
| +Priv | 0 | static void __exit sock_diag_exit(void)
{
unregister_pernet_subsys(&diag_net_ops);
}
| @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
if (hndl == NULL)
err = -ENOENT; | CWE-20 | null | null |
26,930 | static int __init sock_diag_init(void)
{
return register_pernet_subsys(&diag_net_ops);
}
| +Priv | 0 | static int __init sock_diag_init(void)
{
return register_pernet_subsys(&diag_net_ops);
}
| @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
if (hndl == NULL)
err = -ENOENT; | CWE-20 | null | null |
26,931 | int sock_diag_put_meminfo(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype)
{
u32 mem[SK_MEMINFO_VARS];
mem[SK_MEMINFO_RMEM_ALLOC] = sk_rmem_alloc_get(sk);
mem[SK_MEMINFO_RCVBUF] = sk->sk_rcvbuf;
mem[SK_MEMINFO_WMEM_ALLOC] = sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk);
mem[SK_MEMINFO_SNDBUF] = sk->sk_sndbuf;
mem[SK_MEMINFO_FWD_ALLOC] = sk->sk_forward_alloc;
mem[SK_MEMINFO_WMEM_QUEUED] = sk->sk_wmem_queued;
mem[SK_MEMINFO_OPTMEM] = atomic_read(&sk->sk_omem_alloc);
mem[SK_MEMINFO_BACKLOG] = sk->sk_backlog.len;
return nla_put(skb, attrtype, sizeof(mem), &mem);
}
| +Priv | 0 | int sock_diag_put_meminfo(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype)
{
u32 mem[SK_MEMINFO_VARS];
mem[SK_MEMINFO_RMEM_ALLOC] = sk_rmem_alloc_get(sk);
mem[SK_MEMINFO_RCVBUF] = sk->sk_rcvbuf;
mem[SK_MEMINFO_WMEM_ALLOC] = sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk);
mem[SK_MEMINFO_SNDBUF] = sk->sk_sndbuf;
mem[SK_MEMINFO_FWD_ALLOC] = sk->sk_forward_alloc;
mem[SK_MEMINFO_WMEM_QUEUED] = sk->sk_wmem_queued;
mem[SK_MEMINFO_OPTMEM] = atomic_read(&sk->sk_omem_alloc);
mem[SK_MEMINFO_BACKLOG] = sk->sk_backlog.len;
return nla_put(skb, attrtype, sizeof(mem), &mem);
}
| @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
if (hndl == NULL)
err = -ENOENT; | CWE-20 | null | null |
26,932 | static void sock_diag_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
mutex_lock(&sock_diag_mutex);
netlink_rcv_skb(skb, &sock_diag_rcv_msg);
mutex_unlock(&sock_diag_mutex);
}
| +Priv | 0 | static void sock_diag_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
mutex_lock(&sock_diag_mutex);
netlink_rcv_skb(skb, &sock_diag_rcv_msg);
mutex_unlock(&sock_diag_mutex);
}
| @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
if (hndl == NULL)
err = -ENOENT; | CWE-20 | null | null |
26,933 | static int sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
int ret;
switch (nlh->nlmsg_type) {
case TCPDIAG_GETSOCK:
case DCCPDIAG_GETSOCK:
if (inet_rcv_compat == NULL)
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d-type-%d", PF_NETLINK,
NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG, AF_INET);
mutex_lock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
if (inet_rcv_compat != NULL)
ret = inet_rcv_compat(skb, nlh);
else
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
mutex_unlock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
return ret;
case SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY:
return __sock_diag_rcv_msg(skb, nlh);
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
| +Priv | 0 | static int sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
int ret;
switch (nlh->nlmsg_type) {
case TCPDIAG_GETSOCK:
case DCCPDIAG_GETSOCK:
if (inet_rcv_compat == NULL)
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d-type-%d", PF_NETLINK,
NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG, AF_INET);
mutex_lock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
if (inet_rcv_compat != NULL)
ret = inet_rcv_compat(skb, nlh);
else
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
mutex_unlock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
return ret;
case SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY:
return __sock_diag_rcv_msg(skb, nlh);
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
| @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
if (hndl == NULL)
err = -ENOENT; | CWE-20 | null | null |
26,934 | int sock_diag_register(const struct sock_diag_handler *hndl)
{
int err = 0;
if (hndl->family >= AF_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
if (sock_diag_handlers[hndl->family])
err = -EBUSY;
else
sock_diag_handlers[hndl->family] = hndl;
mutex_unlock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
return err;
}
| +Priv | 0 | int sock_diag_register(const struct sock_diag_handler *hndl)
{
int err = 0;
if (hndl->family >= AF_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
if (sock_diag_handlers[hndl->family])
err = -EBUSY;
else
sock_diag_handlers[hndl->family] = hndl;
mutex_unlock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
return err;
}
| @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
if (hndl == NULL)
err = -ENOENT; | CWE-20 | null | null |
26,935 | void sock_diag_register_inet_compat(int (*fn)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh))
{
mutex_lock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
inet_rcv_compat = fn;
mutex_unlock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
}
| +Priv | 0 | void sock_diag_register_inet_compat(int (*fn)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh))
{
mutex_lock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
inet_rcv_compat = fn;
mutex_unlock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
}
| @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
if (hndl == NULL)
err = -ENOENT; | CWE-20 | null | null |
26,936 | void sock_diag_save_cookie(void *sk, __u32 *cookie)
{
cookie[0] = (u32)(unsigned long)sk;
cookie[1] = (u32)(((unsigned long)sk >> 31) >> 1);
}
| +Priv | 0 | void sock_diag_save_cookie(void *sk, __u32 *cookie)
{
cookie[0] = (u32)(unsigned long)sk;
cookie[1] = (u32)(((unsigned long)sk >> 31) >> 1);
}
| @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
if (hndl == NULL)
err = -ENOENT; | CWE-20 | null | null |
26,937 | void sock_diag_unregister_inet_compat(int (*fn)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh))
{
mutex_lock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
inet_rcv_compat = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
}
| +Priv | 0 | void sock_diag_unregister_inet_compat(int (*fn)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh))
{
mutex_lock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
inet_rcv_compat = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
}
| @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
if (hndl == NULL)
err = -ENOENT; | CWE-20 | null | null |
26,938 | void broadcast_packet(const node_t *from, vpn_packet_t *packet) {
avl_node_t *node;
connection_t *c;
node_t *n;
if(from != myself)
send_packet(myself, packet);
if(tunnelserver || broadcast_mode == BMODE_NONE)
return;
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "Broadcasting packet of %d bytes from %s (%s)",
packet->len, from->name, from->hostname);
switch(broadcast_mode) {
case BMODE_MST:
for(node = connection_tree->head; node; node = node->next) {
c = node->data;
if(c->status.active && c->status.mst && c != from->nexthop->connection)
send_packet(c->node, packet);
}
break;
case BMODE_DIRECT:
if(from != myself)
break;
for(node = node_udp_tree->head; node; node = node->next) {
n = node->data;
if(n->status.reachable && ((n->via == myself && n->nexthop == n) || n->via == n))
send_packet(n, packet);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
| DoS Exec Code Overflow | 0 | void broadcast_packet(const node_t *from, vpn_packet_t *packet) {
avl_node_t *node;
connection_t *c;
node_t *n;
if(from != myself)
send_packet(myself, packet);
if(tunnelserver || broadcast_mode == BMODE_NONE)
return;
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "Broadcasting packet of %d bytes from %s (%s)",
packet->len, from->name, from->hostname);
switch(broadcast_mode) {
case BMODE_MST:
for(node = connection_tree->head; node; node = node->next) {
c = node->data;
if(c->status.active && c->status.mst && c != from->nexthop->connection)
send_packet(c->node, packet);
}
break;
case BMODE_DIRECT:
if(from != myself)
break;
for(node = node_udp_tree->head; node; node = node->next) {
n = node->data;
if(n->status.reachable && ((n->via == myself && n->nexthop == n) || n->via == n))
send_packet(n, packet);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
| @@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ static void receive_udppacket(node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *inpkt) {
void receive_tcppacket(connection_t *c, const char *buffer, int len) {
vpn_packet_t outpkt;
+ if(len > sizeof outpkt.data)
+ return;
+
outpkt.len = len;
if(c->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
outpkt.priority = 0; | CWE-119 | null | null |
26,939 | static length_t compress_packet(uint8_t *dest, const uint8_t *source, length_t len, int level) {
if(level == 0) {
memcpy(dest, source, len);
return len;
} else if(level == 10) {
#ifdef HAVE_LZO
lzo_uint lzolen = MAXSIZE;
lzo1x_1_compress(source, len, dest, &lzolen, lzo_wrkmem);
return lzolen;
#else
return -1;
#endif
} else if(level < 10) {
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
unsigned long destlen = MAXSIZE;
if(compress2(dest, &destlen, source, len, level) == Z_OK)
return destlen;
else
#endif
return -1;
} else {
#ifdef HAVE_LZO
lzo_uint lzolen = MAXSIZE;
lzo1x_999_compress(source, len, dest, &lzolen, lzo_wrkmem);
return lzolen;
#else
return -1;
#endif
}
return -1;
}
| DoS Exec Code Overflow | 0 | static length_t compress_packet(uint8_t *dest, const uint8_t *source, length_t len, int level) {
if(level == 0) {
memcpy(dest, source, len);
return len;
} else if(level == 10) {
#ifdef HAVE_LZO
lzo_uint lzolen = MAXSIZE;
lzo1x_1_compress(source, len, dest, &lzolen, lzo_wrkmem);
return lzolen;
#else
return -1;
#endif
} else if(level < 10) {
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
unsigned long destlen = MAXSIZE;
if(compress2(dest, &destlen, source, len, level) == Z_OK)
return destlen;
else
#endif
return -1;
} else {
#ifdef HAVE_LZO
lzo_uint lzolen = MAXSIZE;
lzo1x_999_compress(source, len, dest, &lzolen, lzo_wrkmem);
return lzolen;
#else
return -1;
#endif
}
return -1;
}
| @@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ static void receive_udppacket(node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *inpkt) {
void receive_tcppacket(connection_t *c, const char *buffer, int len) {
vpn_packet_t outpkt;
+ if(len > sizeof outpkt.data)
+ return;
+
outpkt.len = len;
if(c->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
outpkt.priority = 0; | CWE-119 | null | null |
26,940 | void handle_incoming_vpn_data(int sock) {
vpn_packet_t pkt;
char *hostname;
sockaddr_t from;
socklen_t fromlen = sizeof(from);
node_t *n;
pkt.len = recvfrom(listen_socket[sock].udp, (char *) &pkt.seqno, MAXSIZE, 0, &from.sa, &fromlen);
if(pkt.len < 0) {
if(!sockwouldblock(sockerrno))
logger(LOG_ERR, "Receiving packet failed: %s", sockstrerror(sockerrno));
return;
}
sockaddrunmap(&from); /* Some braindead IPv6 implementations do stupid things. */
n = lookup_node_udp(&from);
if(!n) {
n = try_harder(&from, &pkt);
if(n)
update_node_udp(n, &from);
else ifdebug(PROTOCOL) {
hostname = sockaddr2hostname(&from);
logger(LOG_WARNING, "Received UDP packet from unknown source %s", hostname);
free(hostname);
return;
}
else
return;
}
n->sock = sock;
receive_udppacket(n, &pkt);
}
| DoS Exec Code Overflow | 0 | void handle_incoming_vpn_data(int sock) {
vpn_packet_t pkt;
char *hostname;
sockaddr_t from;
socklen_t fromlen = sizeof(from);
node_t *n;
pkt.len = recvfrom(listen_socket[sock].udp, (char *) &pkt.seqno, MAXSIZE, 0, &from.sa, &fromlen);
if(pkt.len < 0) {
if(!sockwouldblock(sockerrno))
logger(LOG_ERR, "Receiving packet failed: %s", sockstrerror(sockerrno));
return;
}
sockaddrunmap(&from); /* Some braindead IPv6 implementations do stupid things. */
n = lookup_node_udp(&from);
if(!n) {
n = try_harder(&from, &pkt);
if(n)
update_node_udp(n, &from);
else ifdebug(PROTOCOL) {
hostname = sockaddr2hostname(&from);
logger(LOG_WARNING, "Received UDP packet from unknown source %s", hostname);
free(hostname);
return;
}
else
return;
}
n->sock = sock;
receive_udppacket(n, &pkt);
}
| @@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ static void receive_udppacket(node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *inpkt) {
void receive_tcppacket(connection_t *c, const char *buffer, int len) {
vpn_packet_t outpkt;
+ if(len > sizeof outpkt.data)
+ return;
+
outpkt.len = len;
if(c->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
outpkt.priority = 0; | CWE-119 | null | null |
26,941 | static void receive_packet(node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *packet) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Received packet of %d bytes from %s (%s)",
packet->len, n->name, n->hostname);
route(n, packet);
}
| DoS Exec Code Overflow | 0 | static void receive_packet(node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *packet) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Received packet of %d bytes from %s (%s)",
packet->len, n->name, n->hostname);
route(n, packet);
}
| @@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ static void receive_udppacket(node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *inpkt) {
void receive_tcppacket(connection_t *c, const char *buffer, int len) {
vpn_packet_t outpkt;
+ if(len > sizeof outpkt.data)
+ return;
+
outpkt.len = len;
if(c->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
outpkt.priority = 0; | CWE-119 | null | null |
26,942 | static void receive_udppacket(node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *inpkt) {
vpn_packet_t pkt1, pkt2;
vpn_packet_t *pkt[] = { &pkt1, &pkt2, &pkt1, &pkt2 };
int nextpkt = 0;
vpn_packet_t *outpkt = pkt[0];
int outlen, outpad;
unsigned char hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
int i;
if(!n->inkey) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Got packet from %s (%s) but he hasn't got our key yet",
n->name, n->hostname);
return;
}
/* Check packet length */
if(inpkt->len < sizeof(inpkt->seqno) + n->inmaclength) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Got too short packet from %s (%s)",
n->name, n->hostname);
return;
}
/* Check the message authentication code */
if(n->indigest && n->inmaclength) {
inpkt->len -= n->inmaclength;
HMAC(n->indigest, n->inkey, n->inkeylength,
(unsigned char *) &inpkt->seqno, inpkt->len, (unsigned char *)hmac, NULL);
if(memcmp(hmac, (char *) &inpkt->seqno + inpkt->len, n->inmaclength)) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Got unauthenticated packet from %s (%s)",
n->name, n->hostname);
return;
}
}
/* Decrypt the packet */
if(n->incipher) {
outpkt = pkt[nextpkt++];
if(!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&n->inctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)
|| !EVP_DecryptUpdate(&n->inctx, (unsigned char *) &outpkt->seqno, &outlen,
(unsigned char *) &inpkt->seqno, inpkt->len)
|| !EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&n->inctx, (unsigned char *) &outpkt->seqno + outlen, &outpad)) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Error decrypting packet from %s (%s): %s",
n->name, n->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return;
}
outpkt->len = outlen + outpad;
inpkt = outpkt;
}
/* Check the sequence number */
inpkt->len -= sizeof(inpkt->seqno);
inpkt->seqno = ntohl(inpkt->seqno);
if(replaywin) {
if(inpkt->seqno != n->received_seqno + 1) {
if(inpkt->seqno >= n->received_seqno + replaywin * 8) {
if(n->farfuture++ < replaywin >> 2) {
logger(LOG_WARNING, "Packet from %s (%s) is %d seqs in the future, dropped (%u)",
n->name, n->hostname, inpkt->seqno - n->received_seqno - 1, n->farfuture);
return;
}
logger(LOG_WARNING, "Lost %d packets from %s (%s)",
inpkt->seqno - n->received_seqno - 1, n->name, n->hostname);
memset(n->late, 0, replaywin);
} else if (inpkt->seqno <= n->received_seqno) {
if((n->received_seqno >= replaywin * 8 && inpkt->seqno <= n->received_seqno - replaywin * 8) || !(n->late[(inpkt->seqno / 8) % replaywin] & (1 << inpkt->seqno % 8))) {
logger(LOG_WARNING, "Got late or replayed packet from %s (%s), seqno %d, last received %d",
n->name, n->hostname, inpkt->seqno, n->received_seqno);
return;
}
} else {
for(i = n->received_seqno + 1; i < inpkt->seqno; i++)
n->late[(i / 8) % replaywin] |= 1 << i % 8;
}
}
n->farfuture = 0;
n->late[(inpkt->seqno / 8) % replaywin] &= ~(1 << inpkt->seqno % 8);
}
if(inpkt->seqno > n->received_seqno)
n->received_seqno = inpkt->seqno;
if(n->received_seqno > MAX_SEQNO)
keyexpires = 0;
/* Decompress the packet */
length_t origlen = inpkt->len;
if(n->incompression) {
outpkt = pkt[nextpkt++];
if((outpkt->len = uncompress_packet(outpkt->data, inpkt->data, inpkt->len, n->incompression)) < 0) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_ERR, "Error while uncompressing packet from %s (%s)",
n->name, n->hostname);
return;
}
inpkt = outpkt;
origlen -= MTU/64 + 20;
}
inpkt->priority = 0;
if(!inpkt->data[12] && !inpkt->data[13])
mtu_probe_h(n, inpkt, origlen);
else
receive_packet(n, inpkt);
}
| DoS Exec Code Overflow | 0 | static void receive_udppacket(node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *inpkt) {
vpn_packet_t pkt1, pkt2;
vpn_packet_t *pkt[] = { &pkt1, &pkt2, &pkt1, &pkt2 };
int nextpkt = 0;
vpn_packet_t *outpkt = pkt[0];
int outlen, outpad;
unsigned char hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
int i;
if(!n->inkey) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Got packet from %s (%s) but he hasn't got our key yet",
n->name, n->hostname);
return;
}
/* Check packet length */
if(inpkt->len < sizeof(inpkt->seqno) + n->inmaclength) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Got too short packet from %s (%s)",
n->name, n->hostname);
return;
}
/* Check the message authentication code */
if(n->indigest && n->inmaclength) {
inpkt->len -= n->inmaclength;
HMAC(n->indigest, n->inkey, n->inkeylength,
(unsigned char *) &inpkt->seqno, inpkt->len, (unsigned char *)hmac, NULL);
if(memcmp(hmac, (char *) &inpkt->seqno + inpkt->len, n->inmaclength)) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Got unauthenticated packet from %s (%s)",
n->name, n->hostname);
return;
}
}
/* Decrypt the packet */
if(n->incipher) {
outpkt = pkt[nextpkt++];
if(!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&n->inctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)
|| !EVP_DecryptUpdate(&n->inctx, (unsigned char *) &outpkt->seqno, &outlen,
(unsigned char *) &inpkt->seqno, inpkt->len)
|| !EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&n->inctx, (unsigned char *) &outpkt->seqno + outlen, &outpad)) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Error decrypting packet from %s (%s): %s",
n->name, n->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return;
}
outpkt->len = outlen + outpad;
inpkt = outpkt;
}
/* Check the sequence number */
inpkt->len -= sizeof(inpkt->seqno);
inpkt->seqno = ntohl(inpkt->seqno);
if(replaywin) {
if(inpkt->seqno != n->received_seqno + 1) {
if(inpkt->seqno >= n->received_seqno + replaywin * 8) {
if(n->farfuture++ < replaywin >> 2) {
logger(LOG_WARNING, "Packet from %s (%s) is %d seqs in the future, dropped (%u)",
n->name, n->hostname, inpkt->seqno - n->received_seqno - 1, n->farfuture);
return;
}
logger(LOG_WARNING, "Lost %d packets from %s (%s)",
inpkt->seqno - n->received_seqno - 1, n->name, n->hostname);
memset(n->late, 0, replaywin);
} else if (inpkt->seqno <= n->received_seqno) {
if((n->received_seqno >= replaywin * 8 && inpkt->seqno <= n->received_seqno - replaywin * 8) || !(n->late[(inpkt->seqno / 8) % replaywin] & (1 << inpkt->seqno % 8))) {
logger(LOG_WARNING, "Got late or replayed packet from %s (%s), seqno %d, last received %d",
n->name, n->hostname, inpkt->seqno, n->received_seqno);
return;
}
} else {
for(i = n->received_seqno + 1; i < inpkt->seqno; i++)
n->late[(i / 8) % replaywin] |= 1 << i % 8;
}
}
n->farfuture = 0;
n->late[(inpkt->seqno / 8) % replaywin] &= ~(1 << inpkt->seqno % 8);
}
if(inpkt->seqno > n->received_seqno)
n->received_seqno = inpkt->seqno;
if(n->received_seqno > MAX_SEQNO)
keyexpires = 0;
/* Decompress the packet */
length_t origlen = inpkt->len;
if(n->incompression) {
outpkt = pkt[nextpkt++];
if((outpkt->len = uncompress_packet(outpkt->data, inpkt->data, inpkt->len, n->incompression)) < 0) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_ERR, "Error while uncompressing packet from %s (%s)",
n->name, n->hostname);
return;
}
inpkt = outpkt;
origlen -= MTU/64 + 20;
}
inpkt->priority = 0;
if(!inpkt->data[12] && !inpkt->data[13])
mtu_probe_h(n, inpkt, origlen);
else
receive_packet(n, inpkt);
}
| @@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ static void receive_udppacket(node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *inpkt) {
void receive_tcppacket(connection_t *c, const char *buffer, int len) {
vpn_packet_t outpkt;
+ if(len > sizeof outpkt.data)
+ return;
+
outpkt.len = len;
if(c->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
outpkt.priority = 0; | CWE-119 | null | null |
26,943 | void send_mtu_probe(node_t *n) {
vpn_packet_t packet;
int len, i;
int timeout = 1;
n->mtuprobes++;
n->mtuevent = NULL;
if(!n->status.reachable || !n->status.validkey) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "Trying to send MTU probe to unreachable or rekeying node %s (%s)", n->name, n->hostname);
n->mtuprobes = 0;
return;
}
if(n->mtuprobes > 32) {
if(!n->minmtu) {
n->mtuprobes = 31;
timeout = pinginterval;
goto end;
}
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "%s (%s) did not respond to UDP ping, restarting PMTU discovery", n->name, n->hostname);
n->mtuprobes = 1;
n->minmtu = 0;
n->maxmtu = MTU;
}
if(n->mtuprobes >= 10 && n->mtuprobes < 32 && !n->minmtu) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "No response to MTU probes from %s (%s)", n->name, n->hostname);
n->mtuprobes = 31;
}
if(n->mtuprobes == 30 || (n->mtuprobes < 30 && n->minmtu >= n->maxmtu)) {
if(n->minmtu > n->maxmtu)
n->minmtu = n->maxmtu;
else
n->maxmtu = n->minmtu;
n->mtu = n->minmtu;
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "Fixing MTU of %s (%s) to %d after %d probes", n->name, n->hostname, n->mtu, n->mtuprobes);
n->mtuprobes = 31;
}
if(n->mtuprobes == 31) {
timeout = pinginterval;
goto end;
} else if(n->mtuprobes == 32) {
timeout = pingtimeout;
}
for(i = 0; i < 4 + localdiscovery; i++) {
if(i == 0) {
if(n->mtuprobes < 30 || n->maxmtu + 8 >= MTU)
continue;
len = n->maxmtu + 8;
} else if(n->maxmtu <= n->minmtu) {
len = n->maxmtu;
} else {
len = n->minmtu + 1 + rand() % (n->maxmtu - n->minmtu);
}
if(len < 64)
len = 64;
memset(packet.data, 0, 14);
RAND_pseudo_bytes(packet.data + 14, len - 14);
packet.len = len;
if(i >= 4 && n->mtuprobes <= 10)
packet.priority = -1;
else
packet.priority = 0;
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "Sending MTU probe length %d to %s (%s)", len, n->name, n->hostname);
send_udppacket(n, &packet);
}
end:
n->mtuevent = new_event();
n->mtuevent->handler = (event_handler_t)send_mtu_probe;
n->mtuevent->data = n;
n->mtuevent->time = now + timeout;
event_add(n->mtuevent);
}
| DoS Exec Code Overflow | 0 | void send_mtu_probe(node_t *n) {
vpn_packet_t packet;
int len, i;
int timeout = 1;
n->mtuprobes++;
n->mtuevent = NULL;
if(!n->status.reachable || !n->status.validkey) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "Trying to send MTU probe to unreachable or rekeying node %s (%s)", n->name, n->hostname);
n->mtuprobes = 0;
return;
}
if(n->mtuprobes > 32) {
if(!n->minmtu) {
n->mtuprobes = 31;
timeout = pinginterval;
goto end;
}
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "%s (%s) did not respond to UDP ping, restarting PMTU discovery", n->name, n->hostname);
n->mtuprobes = 1;
n->minmtu = 0;
n->maxmtu = MTU;
}
if(n->mtuprobes >= 10 && n->mtuprobes < 32 && !n->minmtu) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "No response to MTU probes from %s (%s)", n->name, n->hostname);
n->mtuprobes = 31;
}
if(n->mtuprobes == 30 || (n->mtuprobes < 30 && n->minmtu >= n->maxmtu)) {
if(n->minmtu > n->maxmtu)
n->minmtu = n->maxmtu;
else
n->maxmtu = n->minmtu;
n->mtu = n->minmtu;
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "Fixing MTU of %s (%s) to %d after %d probes", n->name, n->hostname, n->mtu, n->mtuprobes);
n->mtuprobes = 31;
}
if(n->mtuprobes == 31) {
timeout = pinginterval;
goto end;
} else if(n->mtuprobes == 32) {
timeout = pingtimeout;
}
for(i = 0; i < 4 + localdiscovery; i++) {
if(i == 0) {
if(n->mtuprobes < 30 || n->maxmtu + 8 >= MTU)
continue;
len = n->maxmtu + 8;
} else if(n->maxmtu <= n->minmtu) {
len = n->maxmtu;
} else {
len = n->minmtu + 1 + rand() % (n->maxmtu - n->minmtu);
}
if(len < 64)
len = 64;
memset(packet.data, 0, 14);
RAND_pseudo_bytes(packet.data + 14, len - 14);
packet.len = len;
if(i >= 4 && n->mtuprobes <= 10)
packet.priority = -1;
else
packet.priority = 0;
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "Sending MTU probe length %d to %s (%s)", len, n->name, n->hostname);
send_udppacket(n, &packet);
}
end:
n->mtuevent = new_event();
n->mtuevent->handler = (event_handler_t)send_mtu_probe;
n->mtuevent->data = n;
n->mtuevent->time = now + timeout;
event_add(n->mtuevent);
}
| @@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ static void receive_udppacket(node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *inpkt) {
void receive_tcppacket(connection_t *c, const char *buffer, int len) {
vpn_packet_t outpkt;
+ if(len > sizeof outpkt.data)
+ return;
+
outpkt.len = len;
if(c->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
outpkt.priority = 0; | CWE-119 | null | null |
26,944 | void send_packet(const node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *packet) {
node_t *via;
if(n == myself) {
if(overwrite_mac)
memcpy(packet->data, mymac.x, ETH_ALEN);
devops.write(packet);
return;
}
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_ERR, "Sending packet of %d bytes to %s (%s)",
packet->len, n->name, n->hostname);
if(!n->status.reachable) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "Node %s (%s) is not reachable",
n->name, n->hostname);
return;
}
via = (packet->priority == -1 || n->via == myself) ? n->nexthop : n->via;
if(via != n)
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "Sending packet to %s via %s (%s)",
n->name, via->name, n->via->hostname);
if(packet->priority == -1 || ((myself->options | via->options) & OPTION_TCPONLY)) {
if(!send_tcppacket(via->connection, packet))
terminate_connection(via->connection, true);
} else
send_udppacket(via, packet);
}
| DoS Exec Code Overflow | 0 | void send_packet(const node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *packet) {
node_t *via;
if(n == myself) {
if(overwrite_mac)
memcpy(packet->data, mymac.x, ETH_ALEN);
devops.write(packet);
return;
}
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_ERR, "Sending packet of %d bytes to %s (%s)",
packet->len, n->name, n->hostname);
if(!n->status.reachable) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "Node %s (%s) is not reachable",
n->name, n->hostname);
return;
}
via = (packet->priority == -1 || n->via == myself) ? n->nexthop : n->via;
if(via != n)
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "Sending packet to %s via %s (%s)",
n->name, via->name, n->via->hostname);
if(packet->priority == -1 || ((myself->options | via->options) & OPTION_TCPONLY)) {
if(!send_tcppacket(via->connection, packet))
terminate_connection(via->connection, true);
} else
send_udppacket(via, packet);
}
| @@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ static void receive_udppacket(node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *inpkt) {
void receive_tcppacket(connection_t *c, const char *buffer, int len) {
vpn_packet_t outpkt;
+ if(len > sizeof outpkt.data)
+ return;
+
outpkt.len = len;
if(c->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
outpkt.priority = 0; | CWE-119 | null | null |
26,945 | static void send_udppacket(node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *origpkt) {
vpn_packet_t pkt1, pkt2;
vpn_packet_t *pkt[] = { &pkt1, &pkt2, &pkt1, &pkt2 };
vpn_packet_t *inpkt = origpkt;
int nextpkt = 0;
vpn_packet_t *outpkt;
int origlen;
int outlen, outpad;
#if defined(SOL_IP) && defined(IP_TOS)
static int priority = 0;
#endif
int origpriority;
if(!n->status.reachable) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "Trying to send UDP packet to unreachable node %s (%s)", n->name, n->hostname);
return;
}
/* Make sure we have a valid key */
if(!n->status.validkey) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO,
"No valid key known yet for %s (%s), forwarding via TCP",
n->name, n->hostname);
if(n->last_req_key + 10 <= now) {
send_req_key(n);
n->last_req_key = now;
}
send_tcppacket(n->nexthop->connection, origpkt);
return;
}
if(n->options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY && inpkt->len > n->minmtu && (inpkt->data[12] | inpkt->data[13])) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO,
"Packet for %s (%s) larger than minimum MTU, forwarding via %s",
n->name, n->hostname, n != n->nexthop ? n->nexthop->name : "TCP");
if(n != n->nexthop)
send_packet(n->nexthop, origpkt);
else
send_tcppacket(n->nexthop->connection, origpkt);
return;
}
origlen = inpkt->len;
origpriority = inpkt->priority;
/* Compress the packet */
if(n->outcompression) {
outpkt = pkt[nextpkt++];
if((outpkt->len = compress_packet(outpkt->data, inpkt->data, inpkt->len, n->outcompression)) < 0) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_ERR, "Error while compressing packet to %s (%s)",
n->name, n->hostname);
return;
}
inpkt = outpkt;
}
/* Add sequence number */
inpkt->seqno = htonl(++(n->sent_seqno));
inpkt->len += sizeof(inpkt->seqno);
/* Encrypt the packet */
if(n->outcipher) {
outpkt = pkt[nextpkt++];
if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&n->outctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)
|| !EVP_EncryptUpdate(&n->outctx, (unsigned char *) &outpkt->seqno, &outlen,
(unsigned char *) &inpkt->seqno, inpkt->len)
|| !EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&n->outctx, (unsigned char *) &outpkt->seqno + outlen, &outpad)) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_ERR, "Error while encrypting packet to %s (%s): %s",
n->name, n->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
goto end;
}
outpkt->len = outlen + outpad;
inpkt = outpkt;
}
/* Add the message authentication code */
if(n->outdigest && n->outmaclength) {
HMAC(n->outdigest, n->outkey, n->outkeylength, (unsigned char *) &inpkt->seqno,
inpkt->len, (unsigned char *) &inpkt->seqno + inpkt->len, NULL);
inpkt->len += n->outmaclength;
}
/* Determine which socket we have to use */
if(n->address.sa.sa_family != listen_socket[n->sock].sa.sa.sa_family) {
for(int sock = 0; sock < listen_sockets; sock++) {
if(n->address.sa.sa_family == listen_socket[sock].sa.sa.sa_family) {
n->sock = sock;
break;
}
}
}
/* Send the packet */
struct sockaddr *sa;
socklen_t sl;
int sock;
sockaddr_t broadcast;
/* Overloaded use of priority field: -1 means local broadcast */
if(origpriority == -1 && n->prevedge) {
sock = rand() % listen_sockets;
memset(&broadcast, 0, sizeof broadcast);
if(listen_socket[sock].sa.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
broadcast.in6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
broadcast.in6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[0x0] = 0xff;
broadcast.in6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[0x1] = 0x02;
broadcast.in6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[0xf] = 0x01;
broadcast.in6.sin6_port = n->prevedge->address.in.sin_port;
broadcast.in6.sin6_scope_id = listen_socket[sock].sa.in6.sin6_scope_id;
} else {
broadcast.in.sin_family = AF_INET;
broadcast.in.sin_addr.s_addr = -1;
broadcast.in.sin_port = n->prevedge->address.in.sin_port;
}
sa = &broadcast.sa;
sl = SALEN(broadcast.sa);
} else {
if(origpriority == -1)
origpriority = 0;
sa = &(n->address.sa);
sl = SALEN(n->address.sa);
sock = n->sock;
}
#if defined(SOL_IP) && defined(IP_TOS)
if(priorityinheritance && origpriority != priority
&& listen_socket[n->sock].sa.sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
priority = origpriority;
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Setting outgoing packet priority to %d", priority);
if(setsockopt(listen_socket[n->sock].udp, SOL_IP, IP_TOS, &priority, sizeof(priority))) /* SO_PRIORITY doesn't seem to work */
logger(LOG_ERR, "System call `%s' failed: %s", "setsockopt", strerror(errno));
}
#endif
if(sendto(listen_socket[sock].udp, (char *) &inpkt->seqno, inpkt->len, 0, sa, sl) < 0 && !sockwouldblock(sockerrno)) {
if(sockmsgsize(sockerrno)) {
if(n->maxmtu >= origlen)
n->maxmtu = origlen - 1;
if(n->mtu >= origlen)
n->mtu = origlen - 1;
} else
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_WARNING, "Error sending packet to %s (%s): %s", n->name, n->hostname, sockstrerror(sockerrno));
}
end:
origpkt->len = origlen;
}
| DoS Exec Code Overflow | 0 | static void send_udppacket(node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *origpkt) {
vpn_packet_t pkt1, pkt2;
vpn_packet_t *pkt[] = { &pkt1, &pkt2, &pkt1, &pkt2 };
vpn_packet_t *inpkt = origpkt;
int nextpkt = 0;
vpn_packet_t *outpkt;
int origlen;
int outlen, outpad;
#if defined(SOL_IP) && defined(IP_TOS)
static int priority = 0;
#endif
int origpriority;
if(!n->status.reachable) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "Trying to send UDP packet to unreachable node %s (%s)", n->name, n->hostname);
return;
}
/* Make sure we have a valid key */
if(!n->status.validkey) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO,
"No valid key known yet for %s (%s), forwarding via TCP",
n->name, n->hostname);
if(n->last_req_key + 10 <= now) {
send_req_key(n);
n->last_req_key = now;
}
send_tcppacket(n->nexthop->connection, origpkt);
return;
}
if(n->options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY && inpkt->len > n->minmtu && (inpkt->data[12] | inpkt->data[13])) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO,
"Packet for %s (%s) larger than minimum MTU, forwarding via %s",
n->name, n->hostname, n != n->nexthop ? n->nexthop->name : "TCP");
if(n != n->nexthop)
send_packet(n->nexthop, origpkt);
else
send_tcppacket(n->nexthop->connection, origpkt);
return;
}
origlen = inpkt->len;
origpriority = inpkt->priority;
/* Compress the packet */
if(n->outcompression) {
outpkt = pkt[nextpkt++];
if((outpkt->len = compress_packet(outpkt->data, inpkt->data, inpkt->len, n->outcompression)) < 0) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_ERR, "Error while compressing packet to %s (%s)",
n->name, n->hostname);
return;
}
inpkt = outpkt;
}
/* Add sequence number */
inpkt->seqno = htonl(++(n->sent_seqno));
inpkt->len += sizeof(inpkt->seqno);
/* Encrypt the packet */
if(n->outcipher) {
outpkt = pkt[nextpkt++];
if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&n->outctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)
|| !EVP_EncryptUpdate(&n->outctx, (unsigned char *) &outpkt->seqno, &outlen,
(unsigned char *) &inpkt->seqno, inpkt->len)
|| !EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&n->outctx, (unsigned char *) &outpkt->seqno + outlen, &outpad)) {
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_ERR, "Error while encrypting packet to %s (%s): %s",
n->name, n->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
goto end;
}
outpkt->len = outlen + outpad;
inpkt = outpkt;
}
/* Add the message authentication code */
if(n->outdigest && n->outmaclength) {
HMAC(n->outdigest, n->outkey, n->outkeylength, (unsigned char *) &inpkt->seqno,
inpkt->len, (unsigned char *) &inpkt->seqno + inpkt->len, NULL);
inpkt->len += n->outmaclength;
}
/* Determine which socket we have to use */
if(n->address.sa.sa_family != listen_socket[n->sock].sa.sa.sa_family) {
for(int sock = 0; sock < listen_sockets; sock++) {
if(n->address.sa.sa_family == listen_socket[sock].sa.sa.sa_family) {
n->sock = sock;
break;
}
}
}
/* Send the packet */
struct sockaddr *sa;
socklen_t sl;
int sock;
sockaddr_t broadcast;
/* Overloaded use of priority field: -1 means local broadcast */
if(origpriority == -1 && n->prevedge) {
sock = rand() % listen_sockets;
memset(&broadcast, 0, sizeof broadcast);
if(listen_socket[sock].sa.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
broadcast.in6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
broadcast.in6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[0x0] = 0xff;
broadcast.in6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[0x1] = 0x02;
broadcast.in6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[0xf] = 0x01;
broadcast.in6.sin6_port = n->prevedge->address.in.sin_port;
broadcast.in6.sin6_scope_id = listen_socket[sock].sa.in6.sin6_scope_id;
} else {
broadcast.in.sin_family = AF_INET;
broadcast.in.sin_addr.s_addr = -1;
broadcast.in.sin_port = n->prevedge->address.in.sin_port;
}
sa = &broadcast.sa;
sl = SALEN(broadcast.sa);
} else {
if(origpriority == -1)
origpriority = 0;
sa = &(n->address.sa);
sl = SALEN(n->address.sa);
sock = n->sock;
}
#if defined(SOL_IP) && defined(IP_TOS)
if(priorityinheritance && origpriority != priority
&& listen_socket[n->sock].sa.sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
priority = origpriority;
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Setting outgoing packet priority to %d", priority);
if(setsockopt(listen_socket[n->sock].udp, SOL_IP, IP_TOS, &priority, sizeof(priority))) /* SO_PRIORITY doesn't seem to work */
logger(LOG_ERR, "System call `%s' failed: %s", "setsockopt", strerror(errno));
}
#endif
if(sendto(listen_socket[sock].udp, (char *) &inpkt->seqno, inpkt->len, 0, sa, sl) < 0 && !sockwouldblock(sockerrno)) {
if(sockmsgsize(sockerrno)) {
if(n->maxmtu >= origlen)
n->maxmtu = origlen - 1;
if(n->mtu >= origlen)
n->mtu = origlen - 1;
} else
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_WARNING, "Error sending packet to %s (%s): %s", n->name, n->hostname, sockstrerror(sockerrno));
}
end:
origpkt->len = origlen;
}
| @@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ static void receive_udppacket(node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *inpkt) {
void receive_tcppacket(connection_t *c, const char *buffer, int len) {
vpn_packet_t outpkt;
+ if(len > sizeof outpkt.data)
+ return;
+
outpkt.len = len;
if(c->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
outpkt.priority = 0; | CWE-119 | null | null |
26,946 | static node_t *try_harder(const sockaddr_t *from, const vpn_packet_t *pkt) {
avl_node_t *node;
edge_t *e;
node_t *n = NULL;
bool hard = false;
static time_t last_hard_try = 0;
for(node = edge_weight_tree->head; node; node = node->next) {
e = node->data;
if(e->to == myself)
continue;
if(sockaddrcmp_noport(from, &e->address)) {
if(last_hard_try == now)
continue;
hard = true;
}
if(!try_mac(e->to, pkt))
continue;
n = e->to;
break;
}
if(hard)
last_hard_try = now;
last_hard_try = now;
return n;
}
| DoS Exec Code Overflow | 0 | static node_t *try_harder(const sockaddr_t *from, const vpn_packet_t *pkt) {
avl_node_t *node;
edge_t *e;
node_t *n = NULL;
bool hard = false;
static time_t last_hard_try = 0;
for(node = edge_weight_tree->head; node; node = node->next) {
e = node->data;
if(e->to == myself)
continue;
if(sockaddrcmp_noport(from, &e->address)) {
if(last_hard_try == now)
continue;
hard = true;
}
if(!try_mac(e->to, pkt))
continue;
n = e->to;
break;
}
if(hard)
last_hard_try = now;
last_hard_try = now;
return n;
}
| @@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ static void receive_udppacket(node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *inpkt) {
void receive_tcppacket(connection_t *c, const char *buffer, int len) {
vpn_packet_t outpkt;
+ if(len > sizeof outpkt.data)
+ return;
+
outpkt.len = len;
if(c->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
outpkt.priority = 0; | CWE-119 | null | null |
26,947 | static bool try_mac(const node_t *n, const vpn_packet_t *inpkt) {
unsigned char hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
if(!n->indigest || !n->inmaclength || !n->inkey || inpkt->len < sizeof inpkt->seqno + n->inmaclength)
return false;
HMAC(n->indigest, n->inkey, n->inkeylength, (unsigned char *) &inpkt->seqno, inpkt->len - n->inmaclength, (unsigned char *)hmac, NULL);
return !memcmp(hmac, (char *) &inpkt->seqno + inpkt->len - n->inmaclength, n->inmaclength);
}
| DoS Exec Code Overflow | 0 | static bool try_mac(const node_t *n, const vpn_packet_t *inpkt) {
unsigned char hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
if(!n->indigest || !n->inmaclength || !n->inkey || inpkt->len < sizeof inpkt->seqno + n->inmaclength)
return false;
HMAC(n->indigest, n->inkey, n->inkeylength, (unsigned char *) &inpkt->seqno, inpkt->len - n->inmaclength, (unsigned char *)hmac, NULL);
return !memcmp(hmac, (char *) &inpkt->seqno + inpkt->len - n->inmaclength, n->inmaclength);
}
| @@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ static void receive_udppacket(node_t *n, vpn_packet_t *inpkt) {
void receive_tcppacket(connection_t *c, const char *buffer, int len) {
vpn_packet_t outpkt;
+ if(len > sizeof outpkt.data)
+ return;
+
outpkt.len = len;
if(c->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
outpkt.priority = 0; | CWE-119 | null | null |
26,948 | db_get_svc_princ(krb5_context ctx, krb5_principal princ,
krb5_flags flags, krb5_db_entry **server,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
ret = krb5_db_get_principal(ctx, princ, flags, server);
if (ret == KRB5_KDB_CANTLOCK_DB)
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE;
if (ret != 0) {
*status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
}
return ret;
}
| DoS | 0 | db_get_svc_princ(krb5_context ctx, krb5_principal princ,
krb5_flags flags, krb5_db_entry **server,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
ret = krb5_db_get_principal(ctx, princ, flags, server);
if (ret == KRB5_KDB_CANTLOCK_DB)
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE;
if (ret != 0) {
*status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
}
return ret;
}
| @@ -1057,6 +1057,8 @@ find_alternate_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_principal princ,
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
+ if (retval == 0 && server_ptr == NULL)
+ retval = KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY;
if (retval != 0)
*status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
@@ -1149,7 +1151,7 @@ find_referral_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *request,
goto cleanup;
}
/* Don't return a referral to the empty realm or the service realm. */
- if (realms == NULL || realms[0] == '\0' ||
+ if (realms == NULL || realms[0] == NULL || *realms[0] == '\0' ||
data_eq_string(srealm, realms[0])) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup; | CWE-20 | null | null |
26,949 | gen_session_key(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *req,
krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_keyblock *skey,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_enctype useenctype = 0;
/*
* Some special care needs to be taken in the user-to-user
* case, since we don't know what keytypes the application server
* which is doing user-to-user authentication can support. We
* know that it at least must be able to support the encryption
* type of the session key in the TGT, since otherwise it won't be
* able to decrypt the U2U ticket! So we use that in preference
* to anything else.
*/
if (req->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY) {
retval = get_2ndtkt_enctype(kdc_active_realm, req, &useenctype,
status);
if (retval != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (useenctype == 0) {
useenctype = select_session_keytype(kdc_active_realm, server,
req->nktypes,
req->ktype);
}
if (useenctype == 0) {
/* unsupported ktype */
*status = "BAD_ENCRYPTION_TYPE";
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, useenctype, skey);
if (retval != 0) {
/* random key failed */
*status = "RANDOM_KEY_FAILED";
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | gen_session_key(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *req,
krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_keyblock *skey,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_enctype useenctype = 0;
/*
* Some special care needs to be taken in the user-to-user
* case, since we don't know what keytypes the application server
* which is doing user-to-user authentication can support. We
* know that it at least must be able to support the encryption
* type of the session key in the TGT, since otherwise it won't be
* able to decrypt the U2U ticket! So we use that in preference
* to anything else.
*/
if (req->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY) {
retval = get_2ndtkt_enctype(kdc_active_realm, req, &useenctype,
status);
if (retval != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (useenctype == 0) {
useenctype = select_session_keytype(kdc_active_realm, server,
req->nktypes,
req->ktype);
}
if (useenctype == 0) {
/* unsupported ktype */
*status = "BAD_ENCRYPTION_TYPE";
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, useenctype, skey);
if (retval != 0) {
/* random key failed */
*status = "RANDOM_KEY_FAILED";
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
return retval;
}
| @@ -1057,6 +1057,8 @@ find_alternate_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_principal princ,
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
+ if (retval == 0 && server_ptr == NULL)
+ retval = KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY;
if (retval != 0)
*status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
@@ -1149,7 +1151,7 @@ find_referral_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *request,
goto cleanup;
}
/* Don't return a referral to the empty realm or the service realm. */
- if (realms == NULL || realms[0] == '\0' ||
+ if (realms == NULL || realms[0] == NULL || *realms[0] == '\0' ||
data_eq_string(srealm, realms[0])) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup; | CWE-20 | null | null |
26,950 | get_2ndtkt_enctype(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *req,
krb5_enctype *useenctype, const char **status)
{
krb5_enctype etype;
krb5_ticket *stkt = req->second_ticket[0];
int i;
etype = stkt->enc_part2->session->enctype;
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype)) {
*status = "BAD_ETYPE_IN_2ND_TKT";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
}
for (i = 0; i < req->nktypes; i++) {
if (req->ktype[i] == etype) {
*useenctype = etype;
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
| DoS | 0 | get_2ndtkt_enctype(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *req,
krb5_enctype *useenctype, const char **status)
{
krb5_enctype etype;
krb5_ticket *stkt = req->second_ticket[0];
int i;
etype = stkt->enc_part2->session->enctype;
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype)) {
*status = "BAD_ETYPE_IN_2ND_TKT";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
}
for (i = 0; i < req->nktypes; i++) {
if (req->ktype[i] == etype) {
*useenctype = etype;
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
| @@ -1057,6 +1057,8 @@ find_alternate_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_principal princ,
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
+ if (retval == 0 && server_ptr == NULL)
+ retval = KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY;
if (retval != 0)
*status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
@@ -1149,7 +1151,7 @@ find_referral_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *request,
goto cleanup;
}
/* Don't return a referral to the empty realm or the service realm. */
- if (realms == NULL || realms[0] == '\0' ||
+ if (realms == NULL || realms[0] == NULL || *realms[0] == '\0' ||
data_eq_string(srealm, realms[0])) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup; | CWE-20 | null | null |
26,951 | is_referral_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *request)
{
krb5_boolean ret = FALSE;
char *stype = NULL;
char *ref_services = kdc_active_realm->realm_host_based_services;
char *nonref_services = kdc_active_realm->realm_no_host_referral;
if (!(request->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE))
return FALSE;
if (request->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)
return FALSE;
if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) != 2)
return FALSE;
stype = data2string(krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 0));
if (stype == NULL)
return FALSE;
switch (krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server)) {
case KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN:
/* Allow referrals for NT-UNKNOWN principals, if configured. */
if (kdc_active_realm->realm_host_based_services != NULL) {
if (!krb5_match_config_pattern(ref_services, stype) &&
!krb5_match_config_pattern(ref_services, KRB5_CONF_ASTERISK))
goto cleanup;
} else
goto cleanup;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KRB5_NT_SRV_HST:
case KRB5_NT_SRV_INST:
/* Deny referrals for specific service types, if configured. */
if (kdc_active_realm->realm_no_host_referral != NULL) {
if (krb5_match_config_pattern(nonref_services, stype))
goto cleanup;
if (krb5_match_config_pattern(nonref_services, KRB5_CONF_ASTERISK))
goto cleanup;
}
ret = TRUE;
break;
default:
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
free(stype);
return ret;
}
| DoS | 0 | is_referral_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *request)
{
krb5_boolean ret = FALSE;
char *stype = NULL;
char *ref_services = kdc_active_realm->realm_host_based_services;
char *nonref_services = kdc_active_realm->realm_no_host_referral;
if (!(request->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE))
return FALSE;
if (request->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)
return FALSE;
if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) != 2)
return FALSE;
stype = data2string(krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 0));
if (stype == NULL)
return FALSE;
switch (krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server)) {
case KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN:
/* Allow referrals for NT-UNKNOWN principals, if configured. */
if (kdc_active_realm->realm_host_based_services != NULL) {
if (!krb5_match_config_pattern(ref_services, stype) &&
!krb5_match_config_pattern(ref_services, KRB5_CONF_ASTERISK))
goto cleanup;
} else
goto cleanup;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KRB5_NT_SRV_HST:
case KRB5_NT_SRV_INST:
/* Deny referrals for specific service types, if configured. */
if (kdc_active_realm->realm_no_host_referral != NULL) {
if (krb5_match_config_pattern(nonref_services, stype))
goto cleanup;
if (krb5_match_config_pattern(nonref_services, KRB5_CONF_ASTERISK))
goto cleanup;
}
ret = TRUE;
break;
default:
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
free(stype);
return ret;
}
| @@ -1057,6 +1057,8 @@ find_alternate_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_principal princ,
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
+ if (retval == 0 && server_ptr == NULL)
+ retval = KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY;
if (retval != 0)
*status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
@@ -1149,7 +1151,7 @@ find_referral_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *request,
goto cleanup;
}
/* Don't return a referral to the empty realm or the service realm. */
- if (realms == NULL || realms[0] == '\0' ||
+ if (realms == NULL || realms[0] == NULL || *realms[0] == '\0' ||
data_eq_string(srealm, realms[0])) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup; | CWE-20 | null | null |
26,952 | prepare_error_tgs (struct kdc_request_state *state,
krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_ticket *ticket, int error,
krb5_principal canon_server,
krb5_data **response, const char *status,
krb5_pa_data **e_data)
{
krb5_error errpkt;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_data *scratch, *e_data_asn1 = NULL, *fast_edata = NULL;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = state->realm_data;
errpkt.ctime = request->nonce;
errpkt.cusec = 0;
if ((retval = krb5_us_timeofday(kdc_context, &errpkt.stime,
&errpkt.susec)))
return(retval);
errpkt.error = error;
errpkt.server = request->server;
if (ticket && ticket->enc_part2)
errpkt.client = ticket->enc_part2->client;
else
errpkt.client = NULL;
errpkt.text.length = strlen(status);
if (!(errpkt.text.data = strdup(status)))
return ENOMEM;
if (!(scratch = (krb5_data *)malloc(sizeof(*scratch)))) {
free(errpkt.text.data);
return ENOMEM;
}
if (e_data != NULL) {
retval = encode_krb5_padata_sequence(e_data, &e_data_asn1);
if (retval) {
free(scratch);
free(errpkt.text.data);
return retval;
}
errpkt.e_data = *e_data_asn1;
} else
errpkt.e_data = empty_data();
if (state) {
retval = kdc_fast_handle_error(kdc_context, state, request, e_data,
&errpkt, &fast_edata);
}
if (retval) {
free(scratch);
free(errpkt.text.data);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, e_data_asn1);
return retval;
}
if (fast_edata)
errpkt.e_data = *fast_edata;
retval = krb5_mk_error(kdc_context, &errpkt, scratch);
free(errpkt.text.data);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, e_data_asn1);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, fast_edata);
if (retval)
free(scratch);
else
*response = scratch;
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | prepare_error_tgs (struct kdc_request_state *state,
krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_ticket *ticket, int error,
krb5_principal canon_server,
krb5_data **response, const char *status,
krb5_pa_data **e_data)
{
krb5_error errpkt;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_data *scratch, *e_data_asn1 = NULL, *fast_edata = NULL;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = state->realm_data;
errpkt.ctime = request->nonce;
errpkt.cusec = 0;
if ((retval = krb5_us_timeofday(kdc_context, &errpkt.stime,
&errpkt.susec)))
return(retval);
errpkt.error = error;
errpkt.server = request->server;
if (ticket && ticket->enc_part2)
errpkt.client = ticket->enc_part2->client;
else
errpkt.client = NULL;
errpkt.text.length = strlen(status);
if (!(errpkt.text.data = strdup(status)))
return ENOMEM;
if (!(scratch = (krb5_data *)malloc(sizeof(*scratch)))) {
free(errpkt.text.data);
return ENOMEM;
}
if (e_data != NULL) {
retval = encode_krb5_padata_sequence(e_data, &e_data_asn1);
if (retval) {
free(scratch);
free(errpkt.text.data);
return retval;
}
errpkt.e_data = *e_data_asn1;
} else
errpkt.e_data = empty_data();
if (state) {
retval = kdc_fast_handle_error(kdc_context, state, request, e_data,
&errpkt, &fast_edata);
}
if (retval) {
free(scratch);
free(errpkt.text.data);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, e_data_asn1);
return retval;
}
if (fast_edata)
errpkt.e_data = *fast_edata;
retval = krb5_mk_error(kdc_context, &errpkt, scratch);
free(errpkt.text.data);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, e_data_asn1);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, fast_edata);
if (retval)
free(scratch);
else
*response = scratch;
return retval;
}
| @@ -1057,6 +1057,8 @@ find_alternate_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_principal princ,
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
+ if (retval == 0 && server_ptr == NULL)
+ retval = KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY;
if (retval != 0)
*status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
@@ -1149,7 +1151,7 @@ find_referral_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *request,
goto cleanup;
}
/* Don't return a referral to the empty realm or the service realm. */
- if (realms == NULL || realms[0] == '\0' ||
+ if (realms == NULL || realms[0] == NULL || *realms[0] == '\0' ||
data_eq_string(srealm, realms[0])) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup; | CWE-20 | null | null |
26,953 | process_tgs_req(struct server_handle *handle, krb5_data *pkt,
const krb5_fulladdr *from, krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
krb5_keyblock * tgskey = 0;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry *server = NULL;
krb5_db_entry *stkt_server = NULL;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
int st_idx = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
krb5_transited enc_tkt_transited;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime = 0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
krb5_timestamp rtime;
krb5_keyblock *reply_key = NULL;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
krb5_principal cprinc = NULL, sprinc = NULL, altcprinc = NULL;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
int errcode;
const char *status = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part *header_enc_tkt = NULL; /* TGT */
krb5_enc_tkt_part *subject_tkt = NULL; /* TGT or evidence ticket */
krb5_db_entry *client = NULL, *krbtgt = NULL;
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *s4u_x509_user = NULL; /* protocol transition request */
krb5_authdata **kdc_issued_auth_data = NULL; /* auth data issued by KDC */
unsigned int c_flags = 0, s_flags = 0; /* client/server KDB flags */
krb5_boolean is_referral;
const char *emsg = NULL;
krb5_kvno ticket_kvno = 0;
struct kdc_request_state *state = NULL;
krb5_pa_data *pa_tgs_req; /*points into request*/
krb5_data scratch;
krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = NULL;
reply.padata = 0; /* For cleanup handler */
reply_encpart.enc_padata = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
session_key.contents = NULL;
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
return retval;
if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return KRB5_BADMSGTYPE;
}
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
kdc_active_realm = setup_server_realm(handle, request->server);
if (kdc_active_realm == NULL) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM;
}
errcode = kdc_make_rstate(kdc_active_realm, &state);
if (errcode !=0) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return errcode;
}
errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(kdc_active_realm,
request, from, pkt, &header_ticket,
&krbtgt, &tgskey, &subkey, &pa_tgs_req);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2)
cprinc = header_ticket->enc_part2->client;
if (errcode) {
status = "PROCESS_TGS";
goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
goto cleanup;
}
scratch.length = pa_tgs_req->length;
scratch.data = (char *) pa_tgs_req->contents;
errcode = kdc_find_fast(&request, &scratch, subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session, state, NULL);
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "kdc_find_fast";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Pointer to the encrypted part of the header ticket, which may be
* replaced to point to the encrypted part of the evidence ticket
* if constrained delegation is used. This simplifies the number of
* special cases for constrained delegation.
*/
header_enc_tkt = header_ticket->enc_part2;
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ALIAS_OK);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
}
errcode = search_sprinc(kdc_active_realm, request, s_flags, &server,
&status);
if (errcode != 0)
goto cleanup;
sprinc = server->princ;
/* XXX until nothing depends on request being mutated */
krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, request->server);
request->server = NULL;
errcode = krb5_copy_principal(kdc_context, server->princ,
&request->server);
if (errcode != 0) {
status = "COPYING RESOLVED SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(kdc_active_realm,
request, *server, header_ticket,
kdc_time, &status, &e_data))) {
if (!status)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!is_local_principal(kdc_active_realm, header_enc_tkt->client))
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM);
is_referral = krb5_is_tgs_principal(server->princ) &&
!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, tgs_server, server->princ);
/* Check for protocol transition */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_active_realm,
request,
header_enc_tkt->client,
server,
subkey,
header_enc_tkt->session,
kdc_time,
&s4u_x509_user,
&client,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION);
errcode = decrypt_2ndtkt(kdc_active_realm, request, c_flags,
&stkt_server, &status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
/* Do constrained delegation protocol and authorization checks */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_active_realm,
request,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2,
stkt_server,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
request->server,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION);
assert(krb5_is_tgs_principal(header_ticket->server));
assert(client == NULL); /* assured by kdc_process_s4u2self_req() */
client = stkt_server;
stkt_server = NULL;
} else if (request->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, stkt_server);
stkt_server = NULL;
} else
assert(stkt_server == NULL);
errcode = gen_session_key(kdc_active_realm, request, server, &session_key,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
/*
* subject_tkt will refer to the evidence ticket (for constrained
* delegation) or the TGT. The distinction from header_enc_tkt is
* necessary because the TGS signature only protects some fields:
* the others could be forged by a malicious server.
*/
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION))
subject_tkt = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
else
subject_tkt = header_enc_tkt;
authtime = subject_tkt->times.authtime;
if (is_referral)
ticket_reply.server = server->princ;
else
ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE);
/*
* Fix header_ticket's starttime; if it's zero, fill in the
* authtime's value.
*/
if (!(header_enc_tkt->times.starttime))
header_enc_tkt->times.starttime = authtime;
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ENC_PA_REP);
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_enc_tkt->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
reply_encpart.caddrs = 0;/* optional...don't put it in */
reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/*
* It should be noted that local policy may affect the
* processing of any of these flags. For example, some
* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
/*
* If S4U2Self principal is not forwardable, then mark ticket as
* unforwardable. This behaviour matches Windows, but it is
* different to the MIT AS-REQ path, which returns an error
* (KDC_ERR_POLICY) if forwardable tickets cannot be issued.
*
* Consider this block the S4U2Self equivalent to
* validate_forwardable().
*/
if (client != NULL &&
isflagset(client->attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* Forwardable flag is propagated along referral path.
*/
else if (!isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE must be set on the service requesting
* S4U2Self in order for forwardable tickets to be returned.
*/
else if (!is_referral &&
!isflagset(server->attributes,
KRB5_KDB_OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXY);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_POSTDATED);
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
krb5_deltat old_life;
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
kdc_time + old_life);
} else {
/* not a renew request */
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
kdc_get_ticket_endtime(kdc_active_realm, enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime,
header_enc_tkt->times.endtime, request->till,
client, server, &enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK) &&
(enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime < request->till) &&
isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE)) {
setflag(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE);
request->rtime =
min(request->till, header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till);
}
}
rtime = (request->rtime == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->rtime;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE)) {
/* already checked above in policy check to reject request for a
renewable ticket using a non-renewable ticket */
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE);
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till =
min(rtime,
min(header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till,
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime +
min(server->max_renewable_life,
max_renewable_life_for_realm)));
} else {
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = 0;
}
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS);
/*
* Set authtime to be the same as header or evidence ticket's
*/
enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = authtime;
/*
* Propagate the preauthentication flags through to the returned ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH);
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH);
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
altcprinc = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
} else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
altcprinc = subject_tkt->client;
} else {
altcprinc = NULL;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
encrypting_key = *(t2enc->session);
} else {
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Convert server.key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key, &encrypting_key,
NULL))) {
status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
/*
* Don't allow authorization data to be disabled if constrained
* delegation is requested. We don't want to deny the server
* the ability to validate that delegation was used.
*/
clear(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED);
}
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) == 0) {
/*
* If we are not doing protocol transition/constrained delegation
* try to lookup the client principal so plugins can add additional
* authorization information.
*
* Always validate authorization data for constrained delegation
* because we must validate the KDC signatures.
*/
if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U)) {
/* Generate authorization data so we can include it in ticket */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC);
/* Map principals from foreign (possibly non-AD) realms */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_MAP_PRINCIPALS);
assert(client == NULL); /* should not have been set already */
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, subject_tkt->client,
c_flags, &client);
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM))
enc_tkt_reply.client = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
else
enc_tkt_reply.client = subject_tkt->client;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context, c_flags, client, server, krbtgt,
subkey != NULL ? subkey :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
&encrypting_key, /* U2U or server key */
tgskey,
pkt,
request,
s4u_x509_user ?
s4u_x509_user->user_id.user : NULL,
subject_tkt,
&enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("TGS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
/* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_enc_tkt->transited;
} else {
/* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
/* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
if (header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_type !=
KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
status = "BAD_TRTYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
enc_tkt_transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_transited.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.data = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.length = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.transited = enc_tkt_transited;
if ((errcode =
add_to_transited(&header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_contents,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client,
request->server))) {
status = "ADD_TR_FAIL";
goto cleanup;
}
newtransited = 1;
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) {
errcode = validate_transit_path(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client,
server, krbtgt);
if (errcode) {
status = "NON_TRANSITIVE";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
errcode = kdc_check_transited_list (kdc_active_realm,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client),
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
if (errcode == 0) {
setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
} else {
log_tgs_badtrans(kdc_context, cprinc, sprinc,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents, errcode);
}
} else
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("not checking transit path"));
if (reject_bad_transit
&& !isflagset (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
* that the client for the second ticket matches the request
* server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
/*
* Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
* requested server.
*/
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
altcprinc = client2;
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_kvno = 0;
ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
st_idx++;
} else {
ticket_kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
&ticket_reply);
if (!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY))
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "TKT_ENCRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = ticket_kvno;
/* Start assembling the response */
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
krb5int_find_pa_data(kdc_context, request->padata,
KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER) != NULL) {
errcode = kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(kdc_context,
subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
s4u_x509_user,
&reply,
&reply_encpart);
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_S4U2SELF_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
}
reply.client = enc_tkt_reply.client;
reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;/* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
/* copy the time fields */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
reply_encpart.key_exp = 0;/* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state, request, &reply,
subkey ? subkey->enctype : header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype);
if (errcode !=0 ) {
status = "Preparing FAST padata";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode =kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state,
subkey?subkey:header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &reply_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "generating reply key";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, pkt, request,
reply_key, server, &reply_encpart,
is_referral &&
isflagset(s_flags,
KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE));
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
subkey ? 1 : 0,
reply_key,
&reply, response);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
assert(status != NULL);
if (reply_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
log_tgs_req(kdc_context, from, request, &reply, cprinc,
sprinc, altcprinc, authtime,
c_flags, status, errcode, emsg);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
if (errcode) {
int got_err = 0;
if (status == 0) {
status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
got_err = 1;
}
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = prepare_error_tgs(state, request, header_ticket, errcode,
(server != NULL) ? server->princ : NULL,
response, status, e_data);
if (got_err) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
status = 0;
}
}
if (header_ticket != NULL)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
if (request != NULL)
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
if (state)
kdc_free_rstate(state);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, client);
if (session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user);
if (kdc_issued_auth_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, kdc_issued_auth_data);
if (subkey != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
if (tgskey != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, tgskey);
if (reply.padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply.padata);
if (reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, e_data);
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | process_tgs_req(struct server_handle *handle, krb5_data *pkt,
const krb5_fulladdr *from, krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
krb5_keyblock * tgskey = 0;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry *server = NULL;
krb5_db_entry *stkt_server = NULL;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
int st_idx = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
krb5_transited enc_tkt_transited;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime = 0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
krb5_timestamp rtime;
krb5_keyblock *reply_key = NULL;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
krb5_principal cprinc = NULL, sprinc = NULL, altcprinc = NULL;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
int errcode;
const char *status = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part *header_enc_tkt = NULL; /* TGT */
krb5_enc_tkt_part *subject_tkt = NULL; /* TGT or evidence ticket */
krb5_db_entry *client = NULL, *krbtgt = NULL;
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *s4u_x509_user = NULL; /* protocol transition request */
krb5_authdata **kdc_issued_auth_data = NULL; /* auth data issued by KDC */
unsigned int c_flags = 0, s_flags = 0; /* client/server KDB flags */
krb5_boolean is_referral;
const char *emsg = NULL;
krb5_kvno ticket_kvno = 0;
struct kdc_request_state *state = NULL;
krb5_pa_data *pa_tgs_req; /*points into request*/
krb5_data scratch;
krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = NULL;
reply.padata = 0; /* For cleanup handler */
reply_encpart.enc_padata = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
session_key.contents = NULL;
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
return retval;
if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return KRB5_BADMSGTYPE;
}
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
kdc_active_realm = setup_server_realm(handle, request->server);
if (kdc_active_realm == NULL) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM;
}
errcode = kdc_make_rstate(kdc_active_realm, &state);
if (errcode !=0) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return errcode;
}
errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(kdc_active_realm,
request, from, pkt, &header_ticket,
&krbtgt, &tgskey, &subkey, &pa_tgs_req);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2)
cprinc = header_ticket->enc_part2->client;
if (errcode) {
status = "PROCESS_TGS";
goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
goto cleanup;
}
scratch.length = pa_tgs_req->length;
scratch.data = (char *) pa_tgs_req->contents;
errcode = kdc_find_fast(&request, &scratch, subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session, state, NULL);
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "kdc_find_fast";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Pointer to the encrypted part of the header ticket, which may be
* replaced to point to the encrypted part of the evidence ticket
* if constrained delegation is used. This simplifies the number of
* special cases for constrained delegation.
*/
header_enc_tkt = header_ticket->enc_part2;
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ALIAS_OK);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
}
errcode = search_sprinc(kdc_active_realm, request, s_flags, &server,
&status);
if (errcode != 0)
goto cleanup;
sprinc = server->princ;
/* XXX until nothing depends on request being mutated */
krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, request->server);
request->server = NULL;
errcode = krb5_copy_principal(kdc_context, server->princ,
&request->server);
if (errcode != 0) {
status = "COPYING RESOLVED SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(kdc_active_realm,
request, *server, header_ticket,
kdc_time, &status, &e_data))) {
if (!status)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!is_local_principal(kdc_active_realm, header_enc_tkt->client))
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM);
is_referral = krb5_is_tgs_principal(server->princ) &&
!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, tgs_server, server->princ);
/* Check for protocol transition */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_active_realm,
request,
header_enc_tkt->client,
server,
subkey,
header_enc_tkt->session,
kdc_time,
&s4u_x509_user,
&client,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION);
errcode = decrypt_2ndtkt(kdc_active_realm, request, c_flags,
&stkt_server, &status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
/* Do constrained delegation protocol and authorization checks */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_active_realm,
request,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2,
stkt_server,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
request->server,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION);
assert(krb5_is_tgs_principal(header_ticket->server));
assert(client == NULL); /* assured by kdc_process_s4u2self_req() */
client = stkt_server;
stkt_server = NULL;
} else if (request->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, stkt_server);
stkt_server = NULL;
} else
assert(stkt_server == NULL);
errcode = gen_session_key(kdc_active_realm, request, server, &session_key,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
/*
* subject_tkt will refer to the evidence ticket (for constrained
* delegation) or the TGT. The distinction from header_enc_tkt is
* necessary because the TGS signature only protects some fields:
* the others could be forged by a malicious server.
*/
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION))
subject_tkt = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
else
subject_tkt = header_enc_tkt;
authtime = subject_tkt->times.authtime;
if (is_referral)
ticket_reply.server = server->princ;
else
ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE);
/*
* Fix header_ticket's starttime; if it's zero, fill in the
* authtime's value.
*/
if (!(header_enc_tkt->times.starttime))
header_enc_tkt->times.starttime = authtime;
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ENC_PA_REP);
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_enc_tkt->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
reply_encpart.caddrs = 0;/* optional...don't put it in */
reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/*
* It should be noted that local policy may affect the
* processing of any of these flags. For example, some
* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
/*
* If S4U2Self principal is not forwardable, then mark ticket as
* unforwardable. This behaviour matches Windows, but it is
* different to the MIT AS-REQ path, which returns an error
* (KDC_ERR_POLICY) if forwardable tickets cannot be issued.
*
* Consider this block the S4U2Self equivalent to
* validate_forwardable().
*/
if (client != NULL &&
isflagset(client->attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* Forwardable flag is propagated along referral path.
*/
else if (!isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE must be set on the service requesting
* S4U2Self in order for forwardable tickets to be returned.
*/
else if (!is_referral &&
!isflagset(server->attributes,
KRB5_KDB_OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXY);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_POSTDATED);
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
krb5_deltat old_life;
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
kdc_time + old_life);
} else {
/* not a renew request */
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
kdc_get_ticket_endtime(kdc_active_realm, enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime,
header_enc_tkt->times.endtime, request->till,
client, server, &enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK) &&
(enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime < request->till) &&
isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE)) {
setflag(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE);
request->rtime =
min(request->till, header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till);
}
}
rtime = (request->rtime == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->rtime;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE)) {
/* already checked above in policy check to reject request for a
renewable ticket using a non-renewable ticket */
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE);
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till =
min(rtime,
min(header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till,
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime +
min(server->max_renewable_life,
max_renewable_life_for_realm)));
} else {
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = 0;
}
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS);
/*
* Set authtime to be the same as header or evidence ticket's
*/
enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = authtime;
/*
* Propagate the preauthentication flags through to the returned ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH);
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH);
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
altcprinc = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
} else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
altcprinc = subject_tkt->client;
} else {
altcprinc = NULL;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
encrypting_key = *(t2enc->session);
} else {
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Convert server.key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key, &encrypting_key,
NULL))) {
status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
/*
* Don't allow authorization data to be disabled if constrained
* delegation is requested. We don't want to deny the server
* the ability to validate that delegation was used.
*/
clear(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED);
}
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) == 0) {
/*
* If we are not doing protocol transition/constrained delegation
* try to lookup the client principal so plugins can add additional
* authorization information.
*
* Always validate authorization data for constrained delegation
* because we must validate the KDC signatures.
*/
if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U)) {
/* Generate authorization data so we can include it in ticket */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC);
/* Map principals from foreign (possibly non-AD) realms */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_MAP_PRINCIPALS);
assert(client == NULL); /* should not have been set already */
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, subject_tkt->client,
c_flags, &client);
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM))
enc_tkt_reply.client = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
else
enc_tkt_reply.client = subject_tkt->client;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context, c_flags, client, server, krbtgt,
subkey != NULL ? subkey :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
&encrypting_key, /* U2U or server key */
tgskey,
pkt,
request,
s4u_x509_user ?
s4u_x509_user->user_id.user : NULL,
subject_tkt,
&enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("TGS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
/* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_enc_tkt->transited;
} else {
/* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
/* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
if (header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_type !=
KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
status = "BAD_TRTYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
enc_tkt_transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_transited.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.data = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.length = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.transited = enc_tkt_transited;
if ((errcode =
add_to_transited(&header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_contents,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client,
request->server))) {
status = "ADD_TR_FAIL";
goto cleanup;
}
newtransited = 1;
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) {
errcode = validate_transit_path(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client,
server, krbtgt);
if (errcode) {
status = "NON_TRANSITIVE";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
errcode = kdc_check_transited_list (kdc_active_realm,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client),
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
if (errcode == 0) {
setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
} else {
log_tgs_badtrans(kdc_context, cprinc, sprinc,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents, errcode);
}
} else
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("not checking transit path"));
if (reject_bad_transit
&& !isflagset (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
* that the client for the second ticket matches the request
* server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
/*
* Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
* requested server.
*/
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
altcprinc = client2;
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_kvno = 0;
ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
st_idx++;
} else {
ticket_kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
&ticket_reply);
if (!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY))
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "TKT_ENCRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = ticket_kvno;
/* Start assembling the response */
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
krb5int_find_pa_data(kdc_context, request->padata,
KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER) != NULL) {
errcode = kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(kdc_context,
subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
s4u_x509_user,
&reply,
&reply_encpart);
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_S4U2SELF_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
}
reply.client = enc_tkt_reply.client;
reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;/* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
/* copy the time fields */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
reply_encpart.key_exp = 0;/* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state, request, &reply,
subkey ? subkey->enctype : header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype);
if (errcode !=0 ) {
status = "Preparing FAST padata";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode =kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state,
subkey?subkey:header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &reply_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "generating reply key";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, pkt, request,
reply_key, server, &reply_encpart,
is_referral &&
isflagset(s_flags,
KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE));
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
subkey ? 1 : 0,
reply_key,
&reply, response);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
assert(status != NULL);
if (reply_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
log_tgs_req(kdc_context, from, request, &reply, cprinc,
sprinc, altcprinc, authtime,
c_flags, status, errcode, emsg);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
if (errcode) {
int got_err = 0;
if (status == 0) {
status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
got_err = 1;
}
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = prepare_error_tgs(state, request, header_ticket, errcode,
(server != NULL) ? server->princ : NULL,
response, status, e_data);
if (got_err) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
status = 0;
}
}
if (header_ticket != NULL)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
if (request != NULL)
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
if (state)
kdc_free_rstate(state);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, client);
if (session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user);
if (kdc_issued_auth_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, kdc_issued_auth_data);
if (subkey != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
if (tgskey != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, tgskey);
if (reply.padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply.padata);
if (reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, e_data);
return retval;
}
| @@ -1057,6 +1057,8 @@ find_alternate_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_principal princ,
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
+ if (retval == 0 && server_ptr == NULL)
+ retval = KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY;
if (retval != 0)
*status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
@@ -1149,7 +1151,7 @@ find_referral_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *request,
goto cleanup;
}
/* Don't return a referral to the empty realm or the service realm. */
- if (realms == NULL || realms[0] == '\0' ||
+ if (realms == NULL || realms[0] == NULL || *realms[0] == '\0' ||
data_eq_string(srealm, realms[0])) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup; | CWE-20 | null | null |
26,954 | search_sprinc(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *req,
krb5_flags flags, krb5_db_entry **server, const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_principal princ = req->server;
krb5_principal reftgs = NULL;
ret = db_get_svc_princ(kdc_context, princ, flags, server, status);
if (ret == 0 || ret != KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY)
goto cleanup;
if (!is_cross_tgs_principal(req->server)) {
ret = find_referral_tgs(kdc_active_realm, req, &reftgs);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = db_get_svc_princ(kdc_context, reftgs, flags, server, status);
if (ret == 0 || ret != KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY)
goto cleanup;
princ = reftgs;
}
ret = find_alternate_tgs(kdc_active_realm, princ, server, status);
cleanup:
if (ret != 0 && ret != KRB5KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
if (*status == NULL)
*status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
}
krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, reftgs);
return ret;
}
| DoS | 0 | search_sprinc(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *req,
krb5_flags flags, krb5_db_entry **server, const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_principal princ = req->server;
krb5_principal reftgs = NULL;
ret = db_get_svc_princ(kdc_context, princ, flags, server, status);
if (ret == 0 || ret != KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY)
goto cleanup;
if (!is_cross_tgs_principal(req->server)) {
ret = find_referral_tgs(kdc_active_realm, req, &reftgs);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = db_get_svc_princ(kdc_context, reftgs, flags, server, status);
if (ret == 0 || ret != KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY)
goto cleanup;
princ = reftgs;
}
ret = find_alternate_tgs(kdc_active_realm, princ, server, status);
cleanup:
if (ret != 0 && ret != KRB5KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
if (*status == NULL)
*status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
}
krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, reftgs);
return ret;
}
| @@ -1057,6 +1057,8 @@ find_alternate_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_principal princ,
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
+ if (retval == 0 && server_ptr == NULL)
+ retval = KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY;
if (retval != 0)
*status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
@@ -1149,7 +1151,7 @@ find_referral_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *request,
goto cleanup;
}
/* Don't return a referral to the empty realm or the service realm. */
- if (realms == NULL || realms[0] == '\0' ||
+ if (realms == NULL || realms[0] == NULL || *realms[0] == '\0' ||
data_eq_string(srealm, realms[0])) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup; | CWE-20 | null | null |
26,955 | find_alternate_tgs(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_db_entry **server_ptr)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_principal *plist = NULL, *pl2, tmpprinc;
krb5_data tmp;
krb5_db_entry *server = NULL;
*server_ptr = NULL;
/*
* Call to krb5_princ_component is normally not safe but is so
* here only because find_alternate_tgs() is only called from
* somewhere that has already checked the number of components in
* the principal.
*/
if ((retval = krb5_walk_realm_tree(kdc_context,
krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, request->server),
krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1),
&plist, KRB5_REALM_BRANCH_CHAR)))
return retval;
/* move to the end */
for (pl2 = plist; *pl2; pl2++);
/* the first entry in this array is for krbtgt/local@local, so we
ignore it */
while (--pl2 > plist) {
tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2);
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2,
krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server));
retval = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, *pl2, 0, &server);
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
if (retval == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY)
continue;
else if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* Found it. */
tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2);
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2,
krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server));
retval = krb5_copy_principal(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmpprinc);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, request->server);
request->server = tmpprinc;
log_tgs_alt_tgt(request->server);
*server_ptr = server;
server = NULL;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY;
cleanup:
krb5_free_realm_tree(kdc_context, plist);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server);
return retval;
}
| DoS Overflow | 0 | find_alternate_tgs(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_db_entry **server_ptr)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_principal *plist = NULL, *pl2, tmpprinc;
krb5_data tmp;
krb5_db_entry *server = NULL;
*server_ptr = NULL;
/*
* Call to krb5_princ_component is normally not safe but is so
* here only because find_alternate_tgs() is only called from
* somewhere that has already checked the number of components in
* the principal.
*/
if ((retval = krb5_walk_realm_tree(kdc_context,
krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, request->server),
krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1),
&plist, KRB5_REALM_BRANCH_CHAR)))
return retval;
/* move to the end */
for (pl2 = plist; *pl2; pl2++);
/* the first entry in this array is for krbtgt/local@local, so we
ignore it */
while (--pl2 > plist) {
tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2);
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2,
krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server));
retval = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, *pl2, 0, &server);
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
if (retval == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY)
continue;
else if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* Found it. */
tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2);
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2,
krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server));
retval = krb5_copy_principal(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmpprinc);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, request->server);
request->server = tmpprinc;
log_tgs_alt_tgt(request->server);
*server_ptr = server;
server = NULL;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY;
cleanup:
krb5_free_realm_tree(kdc_context, plist);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server);
return retval;
}
| @@ -1141,7 +1141,8 @@ prep_reprocess_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_principal *krbtgt_princ)
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
- strlcpy(comp1_str,comp1->data,comp1->length+1);
+ if (comp1->data != NULL)
+ memcpy(comp1_str, comp1->data, comp1->length);
if ((krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_SRV_HST ||
krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_SRV_INST ||
@@ -1164,7 +1165,8 @@ prep_reprocess_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_principal *krbtgt_princ)
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
- strlcpy(temp_buf, comp2->data,comp2->length+1);
+ if (comp2->data != NULL)
+ memcpy(temp_buf, comp2->data, comp2->length);
retval = krb5int_get_domain_realm_mapping(kdc_context, temp_buf, &realms);
free(temp_buf);
if (retval) { | CWE-119 | null | null |
26,956 | prepare_error_tgs (struct kdc_request_state *state,
krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_ticket *ticket, int error,
krb5_principal canon_server,
krb5_data **response, const char *status,
krb5_pa_data **e_data)
{
krb5_error errpkt;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_data *scratch, *e_data_asn1 = NULL, *fast_edata = NULL;
errpkt.ctime = request->nonce;
errpkt.cusec = 0;
if ((retval = krb5_us_timeofday(kdc_context, &errpkt.stime,
&errpkt.susec)))
return(retval);
errpkt.error = error;
errpkt.server = request->server;
if (ticket && ticket->enc_part2)
errpkt.client = ticket->enc_part2->client;
else
errpkt.client = NULL;
errpkt.text.length = strlen(status);
if (!(errpkt.text.data = strdup(status)))
return ENOMEM;
if (!(scratch = (krb5_data *)malloc(sizeof(*scratch)))) {
free(errpkt.text.data);
return ENOMEM;
}
if (e_data != NULL) {
retval = encode_krb5_padata_sequence(e_data, &e_data_asn1);
if (retval) {
free(scratch);
free(errpkt.text.data);
return retval;
}
errpkt.e_data = *e_data_asn1;
} else
errpkt.e_data = empty_data();
if (state) {
retval = kdc_fast_handle_error(kdc_context, state, request, e_data,
&errpkt, &fast_edata);
}
if (retval) {
free(scratch);
free(errpkt.text.data);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, e_data_asn1);
return retval;
}
if (fast_edata)
errpkt.e_data = *fast_edata;
retval = krb5_mk_error(kdc_context, &errpkt, scratch);
free(errpkt.text.data);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, e_data_asn1);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, fast_edata);
if (retval)
free(scratch);
else
*response = scratch;
return retval;
}
| DoS Overflow | 0 | prepare_error_tgs (struct kdc_request_state *state,
krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_ticket *ticket, int error,
krb5_principal canon_server,
krb5_data **response, const char *status,
krb5_pa_data **e_data)
{
krb5_error errpkt;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_data *scratch, *e_data_asn1 = NULL, *fast_edata = NULL;
errpkt.ctime = request->nonce;
errpkt.cusec = 0;
if ((retval = krb5_us_timeofday(kdc_context, &errpkt.stime,
&errpkt.susec)))
return(retval);
errpkt.error = error;
errpkt.server = request->server;
if (ticket && ticket->enc_part2)
errpkt.client = ticket->enc_part2->client;
else
errpkt.client = NULL;
errpkt.text.length = strlen(status);
if (!(errpkt.text.data = strdup(status)))
return ENOMEM;
if (!(scratch = (krb5_data *)malloc(sizeof(*scratch)))) {
free(errpkt.text.data);
return ENOMEM;
}
if (e_data != NULL) {
retval = encode_krb5_padata_sequence(e_data, &e_data_asn1);
if (retval) {
free(scratch);
free(errpkt.text.data);
return retval;
}
errpkt.e_data = *e_data_asn1;
} else
errpkt.e_data = empty_data();
if (state) {
retval = kdc_fast_handle_error(kdc_context, state, request, e_data,
&errpkt, &fast_edata);
}
if (retval) {
free(scratch);
free(errpkt.text.data);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, e_data_asn1);
return retval;
}
if (fast_edata)
errpkt.e_data = *fast_edata;
retval = krb5_mk_error(kdc_context, &errpkt, scratch);
free(errpkt.text.data);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, e_data_asn1);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, fast_edata);
if (retval)
free(scratch);
else
*response = scratch;
return retval;
}
| @@ -1141,7 +1141,8 @@ prep_reprocess_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_principal *krbtgt_princ)
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
- strlcpy(comp1_str,comp1->data,comp1->length+1);
+ if (comp1->data != NULL)
+ memcpy(comp1_str, comp1->data, comp1->length);
if ((krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_SRV_HST ||
krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_SRV_INST ||
@@ -1164,7 +1165,8 @@ prep_reprocess_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_principal *krbtgt_princ)
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
- strlcpy(temp_buf, comp2->data,comp2->length+1);
+ if (comp2->data != NULL)
+ memcpy(temp_buf, comp2->data, comp2->length);
retval = krb5int_get_domain_realm_mapping(kdc_context, temp_buf, &realms);
free(temp_buf);
if (retval) { | CWE-119 | null | null |
26,957 | process_tgs_req(krb5_data *pkt, const krb5_fulladdr *from,
krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
krb5_keyblock * tgskey = 0;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry *server = NULL;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
int st_idx = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
krb5_transited enc_tkt_transited;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime = 0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
krb5_timestamp rtime;
krb5_keyblock *reply_key = NULL;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
char *cname = 0, *sname = 0, *altcname = 0;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
krb5_enctype useenctype;
int errcode, errcode2;
register int i;
int firstpass = 1;
const char *status = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part *header_enc_tkt = NULL; /* TGT */
krb5_enc_tkt_part *subject_tkt = NULL; /* TGT or evidence ticket */
krb5_db_entry *client = NULL, *krbtgt = NULL;
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *s4u_x509_user = NULL; /* protocol transition request */
krb5_authdata **kdc_issued_auth_data = NULL; /* auth data issued by KDC */
unsigned int c_flags = 0, s_flags = 0; /* client/server KDB flags */
char *s4u_name = NULL;
krb5_boolean is_referral, db_ref_done = FALSE;
const char *emsg = NULL;
krb5_data *tgs_1 =NULL, *server_1 = NULL;
krb5_principal krbtgt_princ;
krb5_kvno ticket_kvno = 0;
struct kdc_request_state *state = NULL;
krb5_pa_data *pa_tgs_req; /*points into request*/
krb5_data scratch;
krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
reply.padata = 0; /* For cleanup handler */
reply_encpart.enc_padata = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
session_key.contents = NULL;
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
return retval;
if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
return KRB5_BADMSGTYPE;
}
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
if ((retval = setup_server_realm(request->server))) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
return retval;
}
errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &header_ticket,
&krbtgt, &tgskey, &subkey, &pa_tgs_req);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2 &&
(errcode2 = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
&cname))) {
status = "UNPARSING CLIENT";
errcode = errcode2;
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(cname);
if (errcode) {
status = "PROCESS_TGS";
goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = kdc_make_rstate(&state);
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "making state";
goto cleanup;
}
scratch.length = pa_tgs_req->length;
scratch.data = (char *) pa_tgs_req->contents;
errcode = kdc_find_fast(&request, &scratch, subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session, state, NULL);
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "kdc_find_fast";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Pointer to the encrypted part of the header ticket, which may be
* replaced to point to the encrypted part of the evidence ticket
* if constrained delegation is used. This simplifies the number of
* special cases for constrained delegation.
*/
header_enc_tkt = header_ticket->enc_part2;
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ALIAS_OK);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
}
db_ref_done = FALSE;
ref_tgt_again:
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, request->server, &sname))) {
status = "UNPARSING SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(sname);
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, request->server,
s_flags, &server);
if (errcode && errcode != KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY) {
status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
tgt_again:
if (errcode == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY) {
/*
* might be a request for a TGT for some other realm; we
* should do our best to find such a TGS in this db
*/
if (firstpass ) {
if ( krb5_is_tgs_principal(request->server) == TRUE) {
/* Principal is a name of krb ticket service */
if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) {
server_1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context,
request->server, 1);
tgs_1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1);
if (!tgs_1 || !data_eq(*server_1, *tgs_1)) {
errcode = find_alternate_tgs(request, &server);
firstpass = 0;
if (errcode == 0)
goto tgt_again;
}
}
status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
} else if ( db_ref_done == FALSE) {
retval = prep_reprocess_req(request, &krbtgt_princ);
if (!retval) {
krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, request->server);
retval = krb5_copy_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt_princ,
&(request->server));
if (!retval) {
db_ref_done = TRUE;
if (sname != NULL)
free(sname);
goto ref_tgt_again;
}
}
}
}
status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(request, *server, header_ticket,
kdc_time, &status, &e_data))) {
if (!status)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!is_local_principal(header_enc_tkt->client))
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM);
is_referral = krb5_is_tgs_principal(server->princ) &&
!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, tgs_server, server->princ);
/* Check for protocol transition */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_context,
request,
header_enc_tkt->client,
server,
subkey,
header_enc_tkt->session,
kdc_time,
&s4u_x509_user,
&client,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION);
/*
* We pick the session keytype here....
*
* Some special care needs to be taken in the user-to-user
* case, since we don't know what keytypes the application server
* which is doing user-to-user authentication can support. We
* know that it at least must be able to support the encryption
* type of the session key in the TGT, since otherwise it won't be
* able to decrypt the U2U ticket! So we use that in preference
* to anything else.
*/
useenctype = 0;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY |
KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
krb5_keyblock * st_sealing_key;
krb5_kvno st_srv_kvno;
krb5_enctype etype;
krb5_db_entry *st_client;
/*
* Get the key for the second ticket, and decrypt it.
*/
if ((errcode = kdc_get_server_key(request->second_ticket[st_idx],
c_flags,
TRUE, /* match_enctype */
&st_client,
&st_sealing_key,
&st_srv_kvno))) {
status = "2ND_TKT_SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, st_sealing_key,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]);
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, st_sealing_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "2ND_TKT_DECRYPT";
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, st_client);
goto cleanup;
}
etype = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->session->enctype;
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype)) {
status = "BAD_ETYPE_IN_2ND_TKT";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, st_client);
goto cleanup;
}
for (i = 0; i < request->nktypes; i++) {
if (request->ktype[i] == etype) {
useenctype = etype;
break;
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
/* Do constrained delegation protocol and authorization checks */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_context,
request,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2,
st_client,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
request->server,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION);
assert(krb5_is_tgs_principal(header_ticket->server));
assert(client == NULL); /* assured by kdc_process_s4u2self_req() */
client = st_client;
} else {
/* "client" is not used for user2user */
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, st_client);
}
}
/*
* Select the keytype for the ticket session key.
*/
if ((useenctype == 0) &&
(useenctype = select_session_keytype(kdc_context, server,
request->nktypes,
request->ktype)) == 0) {
/* unsupported ktype */
status = "BAD_ENCRYPTION_TYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, useenctype, &session_key);
if (errcode) {
/* random key failed */
status = "RANDOM_KEY_FAILED";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* subject_tkt will refer to the evidence ticket (for constrained
* delegation) or the TGT. The distinction from header_enc_tkt is
* necessary because the TGS signature only protects some fields:
* the others could be forged by a malicious server.
*/
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION))
subject_tkt = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
else
subject_tkt = header_enc_tkt;
authtime = subject_tkt->times.authtime;
if (is_referral)
ticket_reply.server = server->princ;
else
ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE);
/*
* Fix header_ticket's starttime; if it's zero, fill in the
* authtime's value.
*/
if (!(header_enc_tkt->times.starttime))
header_enc_tkt->times.starttime = authtime;
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ENC_PA_REP);
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_enc_tkt->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
reply_encpart.caddrs = 0;/* optional...don't put it in */
reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/*
* It should be noted that local policy may affect the
* processing of any of these flags. For example, some
* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
/*
* If S4U2Self principal is not forwardable, then mark ticket as
* unforwardable. This behaviour matches Windows, but it is
* different to the MIT AS-REQ path, which returns an error
* (KDC_ERR_POLICY) if forwardable tickets cannot be issued.
*
* Consider this block the S4U2Self equivalent to
* validate_forwardable().
*/
if (client != NULL &&
isflagset(client->attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* Forwardable flag is propagated along referral path.
*/
else if (!isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE must be set on the service requesting
* S4U2Self in order for forwardable tickets to be returned.
*/
else if (!is_referral &&
!isflagset(server->attributes,
KRB5_KDB_OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXY);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_POSTDATED);
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
krb5_deltat old_life;
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
kdc_time + old_life);
} else {
/* not a renew request */
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
kdc_get_ticket_endtime(kdc_context, enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime,
header_enc_tkt->times.endtime, request->till,
client, server, &enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK) &&
(enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime < request->till) &&
isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE)) {
setflag(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE);
request->rtime =
min(request->till, header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till);
}
}
rtime = (request->rtime == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->rtime;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE)) {
/* already checked above in policy check to reject request for a
renewable ticket using a non-renewable ticket */
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE);
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till =
min(rtime,
min(header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till,
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime +
min(server->max_renewable_life,
max_renewable_life_for_realm)));
} else {
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = 0;
}
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS);
/*
* Set authtime to be the same as header or evidence ticket's
*/
enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = authtime;
/*
* Propagate the preauthentication flags through to the returned ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH);
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH);
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user->user_id.user,
&s4u_name);
} else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, subject_tkt->client,
&s4u_name);
} else {
errcode = 0;
}
if (errcode) {
status = "UNPARSING S4U CLIENT";
goto cleanup;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
encrypting_key = *(t2enc->session);
} else {
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Convert server.key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key, &encrypting_key,
NULL))) {
status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
/*
* Don't allow authorization data to be disabled if constrained
* delegation is requested. We don't want to deny the server
* the ability to validate that delegation was used.
*/
clear(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED);
}
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) == 0) {
/*
* If we are not doing protocol transition/constrained delegation
* try to lookup the client principal so plugins can add additional
* authorization information.
*
* Always validate authorization data for constrained delegation
* because we must validate the KDC signatures.
*/
if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U)) {
/* Generate authorization data so we can include it in ticket */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC);
/* Map principals from foreign (possibly non-AD) realms */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_MAP_PRINCIPALS);
assert(client == NULL); /* should not have been set already */
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, subject_tkt->client,
c_flags, &client);
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM))
enc_tkt_reply.client = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
else
enc_tkt_reply.client = subject_tkt->client;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context, c_flags, client, server, krbtgt,
subkey != NULL ? subkey :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
&encrypting_key, /* U2U or server key */
tgskey,
pkt,
request,
s4u_x509_user ?
s4u_x509_user->user_id.user : NULL,
subject_tkt,
&enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("TGS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (realm_compare(header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
realm_compare(header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
/* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_enc_tkt->transited;
} else {
/* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
/* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
if (header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_type !=
KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
status = "BAD_TRTYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
enc_tkt_transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_transited.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.data = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.length = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.transited = enc_tkt_transited;
if ((errcode =
add_to_transited(&header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_contents,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client,
request->server))) {
status = "ADD_TR_FAIL";
goto cleanup;
}
newtransited = 1;
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) {
errcode = validate_transit_path(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client,
server, krbtgt);
if (errcode) {
status = "NON_TRANSITIVE";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
unsigned int tlen;
char *tdots;
errcode = kdc_check_transited_list (kdc_context,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client),
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
tlen = enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.length;
tdots = tlen > 125 ? "..." : "";
tlen = tlen > 125 ? 125 : tlen;
if (errcode == 0) {
setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
} else if (errcode == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT)
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("bad realm transit path from '%s' "
"to '%s' via '%.*s%s'"),
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>", tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data, tdots);
else {
emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("unexpected error checking transit "
"from '%s' to '%s' via '%.*s%s': %s"),
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>", tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data, tdots,
emsg);
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
} else
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("not checking transit path"));
if (reject_bad_transit
&& !isflagset (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
* that the client for the second ticket matches the request
* server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
/*
* Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
* requested server.
*/
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, client2, &altcname)))
altcname = 0;
if (altcname != NULL)
limit_string(altcname);
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_kvno = 0;
ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
st_idx++;
} else {
ticket_kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
&ticket_reply);
if (!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY))
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "TKT_ENCRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = ticket_kvno;
/* Start assembling the response */
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
find_pa_data(request->padata, KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER) != NULL) {
errcode = kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(kdc_context,
subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
s4u_x509_user,
&reply,
&reply_encpart);
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_S4U2SELF_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
}
reply.client = enc_tkt_reply.client;
reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;/* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
/* copy the time fields */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
reply_encpart.key_exp = 0;/* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state, request, &reply,
subkey ? subkey->enctype : header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype);
if (errcode !=0 ) {
status = "Preparing FAST padata";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode =kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state,
subkey?subkey:header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &reply_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "generating reply key";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, pkt, request,
reply_key, server, &reply_encpart,
is_referral &&
isflagset(s_flags,
KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE));
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
subkey ? 1 : 0,
reply_key,
&reply, response);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
assert(status != NULL);
if (reply_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
log_tgs_req(from, request, &reply, cname, sname, altcname, authtime,
c_flags, s4u_name, status, errcode, emsg);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
if (errcode) {
int got_err = 0;
if (status == 0) {
status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
got_err = 1;
}
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = prepare_error_tgs(state, request, header_ticket, errcode,
(server != NULL) ? server->princ : NULL,
response, status, e_data);
if (got_err) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
status = 0;
}
}
if (header_ticket != NULL)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
if (request != NULL)
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
if (state)
kdc_free_rstate(state);
if (cname != NULL)
free(cname);
if (sname != NULL)
free(sname);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, client);
if (session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user);
if (kdc_issued_auth_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, kdc_issued_auth_data);
if (s4u_name != NULL)
free(s4u_name);
if (subkey != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
if (tgskey != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, tgskey);
if (reply.padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply.padata);
if (reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, e_data);
return retval;
}
| DoS Overflow | 0 | process_tgs_req(krb5_data *pkt, const krb5_fulladdr *from,
krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
krb5_keyblock * tgskey = 0;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry *server = NULL;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
int st_idx = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
krb5_transited enc_tkt_transited;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime = 0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
krb5_timestamp rtime;
krb5_keyblock *reply_key = NULL;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
char *cname = 0, *sname = 0, *altcname = 0;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
krb5_enctype useenctype;
int errcode, errcode2;
register int i;
int firstpass = 1;
const char *status = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part *header_enc_tkt = NULL; /* TGT */
krb5_enc_tkt_part *subject_tkt = NULL; /* TGT or evidence ticket */
krb5_db_entry *client = NULL, *krbtgt = NULL;
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *s4u_x509_user = NULL; /* protocol transition request */
krb5_authdata **kdc_issued_auth_data = NULL; /* auth data issued by KDC */
unsigned int c_flags = 0, s_flags = 0; /* client/server KDB flags */
char *s4u_name = NULL;
krb5_boolean is_referral, db_ref_done = FALSE;
const char *emsg = NULL;
krb5_data *tgs_1 =NULL, *server_1 = NULL;
krb5_principal krbtgt_princ;
krb5_kvno ticket_kvno = 0;
struct kdc_request_state *state = NULL;
krb5_pa_data *pa_tgs_req; /*points into request*/
krb5_data scratch;
krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
reply.padata = 0; /* For cleanup handler */
reply_encpart.enc_padata = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
session_key.contents = NULL;
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
return retval;
if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
return KRB5_BADMSGTYPE;
}
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
if ((retval = setup_server_realm(request->server))) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
return retval;
}
errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &header_ticket,
&krbtgt, &tgskey, &subkey, &pa_tgs_req);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2 &&
(errcode2 = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
&cname))) {
status = "UNPARSING CLIENT";
errcode = errcode2;
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(cname);
if (errcode) {
status = "PROCESS_TGS";
goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = kdc_make_rstate(&state);
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "making state";
goto cleanup;
}
scratch.length = pa_tgs_req->length;
scratch.data = (char *) pa_tgs_req->contents;
errcode = kdc_find_fast(&request, &scratch, subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session, state, NULL);
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "kdc_find_fast";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Pointer to the encrypted part of the header ticket, which may be
* replaced to point to the encrypted part of the evidence ticket
* if constrained delegation is used. This simplifies the number of
* special cases for constrained delegation.
*/
header_enc_tkt = header_ticket->enc_part2;
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ALIAS_OK);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
}
db_ref_done = FALSE;
ref_tgt_again:
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, request->server, &sname))) {
status = "UNPARSING SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(sname);
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, request->server,
s_flags, &server);
if (errcode && errcode != KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY) {
status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
tgt_again:
if (errcode == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY) {
/*
* might be a request for a TGT for some other realm; we
* should do our best to find such a TGS in this db
*/
if (firstpass ) {
if ( krb5_is_tgs_principal(request->server) == TRUE) {
/* Principal is a name of krb ticket service */
if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) {
server_1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context,
request->server, 1);
tgs_1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1);
if (!tgs_1 || !data_eq(*server_1, *tgs_1)) {
errcode = find_alternate_tgs(request, &server);
firstpass = 0;
if (errcode == 0)
goto tgt_again;
}
}
status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
} else if ( db_ref_done == FALSE) {
retval = prep_reprocess_req(request, &krbtgt_princ);
if (!retval) {
krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, request->server);
retval = krb5_copy_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt_princ,
&(request->server));
if (!retval) {
db_ref_done = TRUE;
if (sname != NULL)
free(sname);
goto ref_tgt_again;
}
}
}
}
status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(request, *server, header_ticket,
kdc_time, &status, &e_data))) {
if (!status)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!is_local_principal(header_enc_tkt->client))
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM);
is_referral = krb5_is_tgs_principal(server->princ) &&
!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, tgs_server, server->princ);
/* Check for protocol transition */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_context,
request,
header_enc_tkt->client,
server,
subkey,
header_enc_tkt->session,
kdc_time,
&s4u_x509_user,
&client,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION);
/*
* We pick the session keytype here....
*
* Some special care needs to be taken in the user-to-user
* case, since we don't know what keytypes the application server
* which is doing user-to-user authentication can support. We
* know that it at least must be able to support the encryption
* type of the session key in the TGT, since otherwise it won't be
* able to decrypt the U2U ticket! So we use that in preference
* to anything else.
*/
useenctype = 0;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY |
KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
krb5_keyblock * st_sealing_key;
krb5_kvno st_srv_kvno;
krb5_enctype etype;
krb5_db_entry *st_client;
/*
* Get the key for the second ticket, and decrypt it.
*/
if ((errcode = kdc_get_server_key(request->second_ticket[st_idx],
c_flags,
TRUE, /* match_enctype */
&st_client,
&st_sealing_key,
&st_srv_kvno))) {
status = "2ND_TKT_SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, st_sealing_key,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]);
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, st_sealing_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "2ND_TKT_DECRYPT";
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, st_client);
goto cleanup;
}
etype = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->session->enctype;
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype)) {
status = "BAD_ETYPE_IN_2ND_TKT";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, st_client);
goto cleanup;
}
for (i = 0; i < request->nktypes; i++) {
if (request->ktype[i] == etype) {
useenctype = etype;
break;
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
/* Do constrained delegation protocol and authorization checks */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_context,
request,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2,
st_client,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
request->server,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION);
assert(krb5_is_tgs_principal(header_ticket->server));
assert(client == NULL); /* assured by kdc_process_s4u2self_req() */
client = st_client;
} else {
/* "client" is not used for user2user */
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, st_client);
}
}
/*
* Select the keytype for the ticket session key.
*/
if ((useenctype == 0) &&
(useenctype = select_session_keytype(kdc_context, server,
request->nktypes,
request->ktype)) == 0) {
/* unsupported ktype */
status = "BAD_ENCRYPTION_TYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, useenctype, &session_key);
if (errcode) {
/* random key failed */
status = "RANDOM_KEY_FAILED";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* subject_tkt will refer to the evidence ticket (for constrained
* delegation) or the TGT. The distinction from header_enc_tkt is
* necessary because the TGS signature only protects some fields:
* the others could be forged by a malicious server.
*/
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION))
subject_tkt = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
else
subject_tkt = header_enc_tkt;
authtime = subject_tkt->times.authtime;
if (is_referral)
ticket_reply.server = server->princ;
else
ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE);
/*
* Fix header_ticket's starttime; if it's zero, fill in the
* authtime's value.
*/
if (!(header_enc_tkt->times.starttime))
header_enc_tkt->times.starttime = authtime;
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ENC_PA_REP);
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_enc_tkt->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
reply_encpart.caddrs = 0;/* optional...don't put it in */
reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/*
* It should be noted that local policy may affect the
* processing of any of these flags. For example, some
* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
/*
* If S4U2Self principal is not forwardable, then mark ticket as
* unforwardable. This behaviour matches Windows, but it is
* different to the MIT AS-REQ path, which returns an error
* (KDC_ERR_POLICY) if forwardable tickets cannot be issued.
*
* Consider this block the S4U2Self equivalent to
* validate_forwardable().
*/
if (client != NULL &&
isflagset(client->attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* Forwardable flag is propagated along referral path.
*/
else if (!isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE must be set on the service requesting
* S4U2Self in order for forwardable tickets to be returned.
*/
else if (!is_referral &&
!isflagset(server->attributes,
KRB5_KDB_OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXY);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_POSTDATED);
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
krb5_deltat old_life;
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
kdc_time + old_life);
} else {
/* not a renew request */
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
kdc_get_ticket_endtime(kdc_context, enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime,
header_enc_tkt->times.endtime, request->till,
client, server, &enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK) &&
(enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime < request->till) &&
isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE)) {
setflag(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE);
request->rtime =
min(request->till, header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till);
}
}
rtime = (request->rtime == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->rtime;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE)) {
/* already checked above in policy check to reject request for a
renewable ticket using a non-renewable ticket */
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE);
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till =
min(rtime,
min(header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till,
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime +
min(server->max_renewable_life,
max_renewable_life_for_realm)));
} else {
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = 0;
}
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS);
/*
* Set authtime to be the same as header or evidence ticket's
*/
enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = authtime;
/*
* Propagate the preauthentication flags through to the returned ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH);
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH);
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user->user_id.user,
&s4u_name);
} else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, subject_tkt->client,
&s4u_name);
} else {
errcode = 0;
}
if (errcode) {
status = "UNPARSING S4U CLIENT";
goto cleanup;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
encrypting_key = *(t2enc->session);
} else {
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Convert server.key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key, &encrypting_key,
NULL))) {
status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
/*
* Don't allow authorization data to be disabled if constrained
* delegation is requested. We don't want to deny the server
* the ability to validate that delegation was used.
*/
clear(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED);
}
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) == 0) {
/*
* If we are not doing protocol transition/constrained delegation
* try to lookup the client principal so plugins can add additional
* authorization information.
*
* Always validate authorization data for constrained delegation
* because we must validate the KDC signatures.
*/
if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U)) {
/* Generate authorization data so we can include it in ticket */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC);
/* Map principals from foreign (possibly non-AD) realms */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_MAP_PRINCIPALS);
assert(client == NULL); /* should not have been set already */
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, subject_tkt->client,
c_flags, &client);
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM))
enc_tkt_reply.client = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
else
enc_tkt_reply.client = subject_tkt->client;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context, c_flags, client, server, krbtgt,
subkey != NULL ? subkey :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
&encrypting_key, /* U2U or server key */
tgskey,
pkt,
request,
s4u_x509_user ?
s4u_x509_user->user_id.user : NULL,
subject_tkt,
&enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("TGS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (realm_compare(header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
realm_compare(header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
/* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_enc_tkt->transited;
} else {
/* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
/* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
if (header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_type !=
KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
status = "BAD_TRTYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
enc_tkt_transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_transited.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.data = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.length = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.transited = enc_tkt_transited;
if ((errcode =
add_to_transited(&header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_contents,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client,
request->server))) {
status = "ADD_TR_FAIL";
goto cleanup;
}
newtransited = 1;
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) {
errcode = validate_transit_path(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client,
server, krbtgt);
if (errcode) {
status = "NON_TRANSITIVE";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
unsigned int tlen;
char *tdots;
errcode = kdc_check_transited_list (kdc_context,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client),
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
tlen = enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.length;
tdots = tlen > 125 ? "..." : "";
tlen = tlen > 125 ? 125 : tlen;
if (errcode == 0) {
setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
} else if (errcode == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT)
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("bad realm transit path from '%s' "
"to '%s' via '%.*s%s'"),
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>", tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data, tdots);
else {
emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("unexpected error checking transit "
"from '%s' to '%s' via '%.*s%s': %s"),
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>", tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data, tdots,
emsg);
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
} else
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("not checking transit path"));
if (reject_bad_transit
&& !isflagset (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
* that the client for the second ticket matches the request
* server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
/*
* Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
* requested server.
*/
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, client2, &altcname)))
altcname = 0;
if (altcname != NULL)
limit_string(altcname);
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_kvno = 0;
ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
st_idx++;
} else {
ticket_kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
&ticket_reply);
if (!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY))
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "TKT_ENCRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = ticket_kvno;
/* Start assembling the response */
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
find_pa_data(request->padata, KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER) != NULL) {
errcode = kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(kdc_context,
subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
s4u_x509_user,
&reply,
&reply_encpart);
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_S4U2SELF_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
}
reply.client = enc_tkt_reply.client;
reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;/* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
/* copy the time fields */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
reply_encpart.key_exp = 0;/* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state, request, &reply,
subkey ? subkey->enctype : header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype);
if (errcode !=0 ) {
status = "Preparing FAST padata";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode =kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state,
subkey?subkey:header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &reply_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "generating reply key";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, pkt, request,
reply_key, server, &reply_encpart,
is_referral &&
isflagset(s_flags,
KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE));
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
subkey ? 1 : 0,
reply_key,
&reply, response);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
assert(status != NULL);
if (reply_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
log_tgs_req(from, request, &reply, cname, sname, altcname, authtime,
c_flags, s4u_name, status, errcode, emsg);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
if (errcode) {
int got_err = 0;
if (status == 0) {
status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
got_err = 1;
}
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = prepare_error_tgs(state, request, header_ticket, errcode,
(server != NULL) ? server->princ : NULL,
response, status, e_data);
if (got_err) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
status = 0;
}
}
if (header_ticket != NULL)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
if (request != NULL)
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
if (state)
kdc_free_rstate(state);
if (cname != NULL)
free(cname);
if (sname != NULL)
free(sname);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, client);
if (session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user);
if (kdc_issued_auth_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, kdc_issued_auth_data);
if (s4u_name != NULL)
free(s4u_name);
if (subkey != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
if (tgskey != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, tgskey);
if (reply.padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply.padata);
if (reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, e_data);
return retval;
}
| @@ -1141,7 +1141,8 @@ prep_reprocess_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_principal *krbtgt_princ)
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
- strlcpy(comp1_str,comp1->data,comp1->length+1);
+ if (comp1->data != NULL)
+ memcpy(comp1_str, comp1->data, comp1->length);
if ((krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_SRV_HST ||
krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_SRV_INST ||
@@ -1164,7 +1165,8 @@ prep_reprocess_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_principal *krbtgt_princ)
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
- strlcpy(temp_buf, comp2->data,comp2->length+1);
+ if (comp2->data != NULL)
+ memcpy(temp_buf, comp2->data, comp2->length);
retval = krb5int_get_domain_realm_mapping(kdc_context, temp_buf, &realms);
free(temp_buf);
if (retval) { | CWE-119 | null | null |
26,958 | create_identifiers_from_stack(STACK_OF(X509) *sk,
krb5_external_principal_identifier *** ids)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
int i = 0, sk_size = sk_X509_num(sk);
krb5_external_principal_identifier **krb5_cas = NULL;
X509 *x = NULL;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
int len = 0;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
*ids = NULL;
krb5_cas =
malloc((sk_size + 1) * sizeof(krb5_external_principal_identifier *));
if (krb5_cas == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
krb5_cas[sk_size] = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_size; i++) {
krb5_cas[i] = malloc(sizeof(krb5_external_principal_identifier));
x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("#%d cert= %s\n", i, buf);
/* fill-in subjectName */
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.magic = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.length = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.data = NULL;
xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
len = i2d_X509_NAME(xn, NULL);
if ((p = malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.data = (char *)p;
i2d_X509_NAME(xn, &p);
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.length = len;
/* fill-in issuerAndSerialNumber */
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.length = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.magic = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.data = NULL;
#ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT
if (longhorn == 0) { /* XXX Longhorn doesn't like this */
#endif
is = PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_new();
X509_NAME_set(&is->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(x));
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
is->serial = M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(x));
len = i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, NULL);
if ((p = malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.data = (char *)p;
i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, &p);
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.length = len;
#ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT
}
#endif
/* fill-in subjectKeyIdentifier */
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.length = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.magic = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.data = NULL;
#ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT
if (longhorn == 0) { /* XXX Longhorn doesn't like this */
#endif
if (X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, -1) >= 0) {
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ikeyid = NULL;
if ((ikeyid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL,
NULL))) {
len = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(ikeyid, NULL);
if ((p = malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.data = (char *)p;
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(ikeyid, &p);
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.length = len;
}
if (ikeyid != NULL)
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ikeyid);
}
#ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT
}
#endif
if (is != NULL) {
if (is->issuer != NULL)
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
if (is->serial != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is);
}
}
*ids = krb5_cas;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (retval)
free_krb5_external_principal_identifier(&krb5_cas);
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | create_identifiers_from_stack(STACK_OF(X509) *sk,
krb5_external_principal_identifier *** ids)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
int i = 0, sk_size = sk_X509_num(sk);
krb5_external_principal_identifier **krb5_cas = NULL;
X509 *x = NULL;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
int len = 0;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
*ids = NULL;
krb5_cas =
malloc((sk_size + 1) * sizeof(krb5_external_principal_identifier *));
if (krb5_cas == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
krb5_cas[sk_size] = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_size; i++) {
krb5_cas[i] = malloc(sizeof(krb5_external_principal_identifier));
x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("#%d cert= %s\n", i, buf);
/* fill-in subjectName */
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.magic = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.length = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.data = NULL;
xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
len = i2d_X509_NAME(xn, NULL);
if ((p = malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.data = (char *)p;
i2d_X509_NAME(xn, &p);
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.length = len;
/* fill-in issuerAndSerialNumber */
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.length = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.magic = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.data = NULL;
#ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT
if (longhorn == 0) { /* XXX Longhorn doesn't like this */
#endif
is = PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_new();
X509_NAME_set(&is->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(x));
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
is->serial = M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(x));
len = i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, NULL);
if ((p = malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.data = (char *)p;
i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, &p);
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.length = len;
#ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT
}
#endif
/* fill-in subjectKeyIdentifier */
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.length = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.magic = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.data = NULL;
#ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT
if (longhorn == 0) { /* XXX Longhorn doesn't like this */
#endif
if (X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, -1) >= 0) {
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ikeyid = NULL;
if ((ikeyid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL,
NULL))) {
len = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(ikeyid, NULL);
if ((p = malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.data = (char *)p;
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(ikeyid, &p);
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.length = len;
}
if (ikeyid != NULL)
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ikeyid);
}
#ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT
}
#endif
if (is != NULL) {
if (is->issuer != NULL)
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
if (is->serial != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is);
}
}
*ids = krb5_cas;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (retval)
free_krb5_external_principal_identifier(&krb5_cas);
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,959 | X509_NAME_oneline_ex(X509_NAME * a,
char *buf,
unsigned int *size,
unsigned long flag)
{
BIO *out = NULL;
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem ());
if (X509_NAME_print_ex(out, a, 0, flag) > 0) {
if (buf != NULL && (*size) > (unsigned int) BIO_number_written(out)) {
memset(buf, 0, *size);
BIO_read(out, buf, (int) BIO_number_written(out));
}
else {
*size = BIO_number_written(out);
}
}
BIO_free(out);
return (buf);
}
| DoS | 0 | X509_NAME_oneline_ex(X509_NAME * a,
char *buf,
unsigned int *size,
unsigned long flag)
{
BIO *out = NULL;
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem ());
if (X509_NAME_print_ex(out, a, 0, flag) > 0) {
if (buf != NULL && (*size) > (unsigned int) BIO_number_written(out)) {
memset(buf, 0, *size);
BIO_read(out, buf, (int) BIO_number_written(out));
}
else {
*size = BIO_number_written(out);
}
}
BIO_free(out);
return (buf);
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,960 | client_create_dh(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int dh_size,
unsigned char **dh_params,
unsigned int *dh_params_len,
unsigned char **dh_pubkey,
unsigned int *dh_pubkey_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
int dh_err = 0;
ASN1_INTEGER *pub_key = NULL;
if (cryptoctx->dh == NULL) {
if ((cryptoctx->dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((cryptoctx->dh->g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(cryptoctx->dh->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
switch(dh_size) {
case 1024:
pkiDebug("client uses 1024 DH keys\n");
cryptoctx->dh->p = get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
break;
case 2048:
pkiDebug("client uses 2048 DH keys\n");
cryptoctx->dh->p = BN_bin2bn(pkinit_2048_dhprime,
sizeof(pkinit_2048_dhprime), NULL);
break;
case 4096:
pkiDebug("client uses 4096 DH keys\n");
cryptoctx->dh->p = BN_bin2bn(pkinit_4096_dhprime,
sizeof(pkinit_4096_dhprime), NULL);
break;
default:
goto cleanup;
}
BN_set_word((cryptoctx->dh->g), DH_GENERATOR_2);
BN_rshift1(cryptoctx->dh->q, cryptoctx->dh->p);
}
DH_generate_key(cryptoctx->dh);
DH_check(cryptoctx->dh, &dh_err);
if (dh_err != 0) {
pkiDebug("Warning: dh_check failed with %d\n", dh_err);
if (dh_err & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
pkiDebug("p value is not prime\n");
if (dh_err & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME)
pkiDebug("p value is not a safe prime\n");
if (dh_err & DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR)
pkiDebug("unable to check the generator value\n");
if (dh_err & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR)
pkiDebug("the g value is not a generator\n");
}
#ifdef DEBUG_DH
print_dh(cryptoctx->dh, "client's DH params\n");
print_pubkey(cryptoctx->dh->pub_key, "client's pub_key=");
#endif
DH_check_pub_key(cryptoctx->dh, cryptoctx->dh->pub_key, &dh_err);
if (dh_err != 0) {
pkiDebug("dh_check_pub_key failed with %d\n", dh_err);
goto cleanup;
}
/* pack DHparams */
/* aglo: usually we could just call i2d_DHparams to encode DH params
* however, PKINIT requires RFC3279 encoding and openssl does pkcs#3.
*/
retval = pkinit_encode_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh->p, cryptoctx->dh->g,
cryptoctx->dh->q, dh_params, dh_params_len);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* pack DH public key */
/* Diffie-Hellman public key must be ASN1 encoded as an INTEGER; this
* encoding shall be used as the contents (the value) of the
* subjectPublicKey component (a BIT STRING) of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo
* data element
*/
if ((pub_key = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(cryptoctx->dh->pub_key, NULL)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
*dh_pubkey_len = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, NULL);
if ((buf = *dh_pubkey = malloc(*dh_pubkey_len)) == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, &buf);
if (pub_key != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
retval = 0;
return retval;
cleanup:
if (cryptoctx->dh != NULL)
DH_free(cryptoctx->dh);
cryptoctx->dh = NULL;
free(*dh_params);
*dh_params = NULL;
free(*dh_pubkey);
*dh_pubkey = NULL;
if (pub_key != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | client_create_dh(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int dh_size,
unsigned char **dh_params,
unsigned int *dh_params_len,
unsigned char **dh_pubkey,
unsigned int *dh_pubkey_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
int dh_err = 0;
ASN1_INTEGER *pub_key = NULL;
if (cryptoctx->dh == NULL) {
if ((cryptoctx->dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((cryptoctx->dh->g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(cryptoctx->dh->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
switch(dh_size) {
case 1024:
pkiDebug("client uses 1024 DH keys\n");
cryptoctx->dh->p = get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
break;
case 2048:
pkiDebug("client uses 2048 DH keys\n");
cryptoctx->dh->p = BN_bin2bn(pkinit_2048_dhprime,
sizeof(pkinit_2048_dhprime), NULL);
break;
case 4096:
pkiDebug("client uses 4096 DH keys\n");
cryptoctx->dh->p = BN_bin2bn(pkinit_4096_dhprime,
sizeof(pkinit_4096_dhprime), NULL);
break;
default:
goto cleanup;
}
BN_set_word((cryptoctx->dh->g), DH_GENERATOR_2);
BN_rshift1(cryptoctx->dh->q, cryptoctx->dh->p);
}
DH_generate_key(cryptoctx->dh);
DH_check(cryptoctx->dh, &dh_err);
if (dh_err != 0) {
pkiDebug("Warning: dh_check failed with %d\n", dh_err);
if (dh_err & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
pkiDebug("p value is not prime\n");
if (dh_err & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME)
pkiDebug("p value is not a safe prime\n");
if (dh_err & DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR)
pkiDebug("unable to check the generator value\n");
if (dh_err & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR)
pkiDebug("the g value is not a generator\n");
}
#ifdef DEBUG_DH
print_dh(cryptoctx->dh, "client's DH params\n");
print_pubkey(cryptoctx->dh->pub_key, "client's pub_key=");
#endif
DH_check_pub_key(cryptoctx->dh, cryptoctx->dh->pub_key, &dh_err);
if (dh_err != 0) {
pkiDebug("dh_check_pub_key failed with %d\n", dh_err);
goto cleanup;
}
/* pack DHparams */
/* aglo: usually we could just call i2d_DHparams to encode DH params
* however, PKINIT requires RFC3279 encoding and openssl does pkcs#3.
*/
retval = pkinit_encode_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh->p, cryptoctx->dh->g,
cryptoctx->dh->q, dh_params, dh_params_len);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* pack DH public key */
/* Diffie-Hellman public key must be ASN1 encoded as an INTEGER; this
* encoding shall be used as the contents (the value) of the
* subjectPublicKey component (a BIT STRING) of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo
* data element
*/
if ((pub_key = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(cryptoctx->dh->pub_key, NULL)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
*dh_pubkey_len = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, NULL);
if ((buf = *dh_pubkey = malloc(*dh_pubkey_len)) == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, &buf);
if (pub_key != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
retval = 0;
return retval;
cleanup:
if (cryptoctx->dh != NULL)
DH_free(cryptoctx->dh);
cryptoctx->dh = NULL;
free(*dh_params);
*dh_params = NULL;
free(*dh_pubkey);
*dh_pubkey = NULL;
if (pub_key != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,961 | client_process_dh(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *subjectPublicKey_data,
unsigned int subjectPublicKey_length,
unsigned char **client_key,
unsigned int *client_key_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
BIGNUM *server_pub_key = NULL;
ASN1_INTEGER *pub_key = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = NULL;
*client_key_len = DH_size(cryptoctx->dh);
if ((*client_key = malloc(*client_key_len)) == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
p = subjectPublicKey_data;
pub_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, (long)subjectPublicKey_length);
if (pub_key == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((server_pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(pub_key, NULL)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
compute_dh(*client_key, *client_key_len, server_pub_key, cryptoctx->dh);
#ifdef DEBUG_DH
print_pubkey(server_pub_key, "server's pub_key=");
pkiDebug("client computed key (%d)= ", *client_key_len);
print_buffer(*client_key, *client_key_len);
#endif
retval = 0;
if (server_pub_key != NULL)
BN_free(server_pub_key);
if (pub_key != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
return retval;
cleanup:
free(*client_key);
*client_key = NULL;
if (pub_key != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | client_process_dh(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *subjectPublicKey_data,
unsigned int subjectPublicKey_length,
unsigned char **client_key,
unsigned int *client_key_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
BIGNUM *server_pub_key = NULL;
ASN1_INTEGER *pub_key = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = NULL;
*client_key_len = DH_size(cryptoctx->dh);
if ((*client_key = malloc(*client_key_len)) == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
p = subjectPublicKey_data;
pub_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, (long)subjectPublicKey_length);
if (pub_key == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((server_pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(pub_key, NULL)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
compute_dh(*client_key, *client_key_len, server_pub_key, cryptoctx->dh);
#ifdef DEBUG_DH
print_pubkey(server_pub_key, "server's pub_key=");
pkiDebug("client computed key (%d)= ", *client_key_len);
print_buffer(*client_key, *client_key_len);
#endif
retval = 0;
if (server_pub_key != NULL)
BN_free(server_pub_key);
if (pub_key != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
return retval;
cleanup:
free(*client_key);
*client_key = NULL;
if (pub_key != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,962 | cms_contentinfo_create(krb5_context context, /* IN */
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, /* IN */
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, /* IN */
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, /* IN */
int cms_msg_type,
unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **out_data, unsigned int *out_data_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
unsigned char *p;
/* Pick the correct oid for the eContentInfo. */
oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plg_cryptoctx, cms_msg_type);
if (oid == NULL)
goto cleanup;
retval = create_contentinfo(context, plg_cryptoctx, oid,
data, data_len, &p7);
if (retval != 0)
goto cleanup;
*out_data_len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, NULL);
if (!(*out_data_len)) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to der encode pkcs7\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = ENOMEM;
if ((p = *out_data = malloc(*out_data_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* DER encode PKCS7 data */
retval = i2d_PKCS7(p7, &p);
if (!retval) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to der encode pkcs7\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (p7)
PKCS7_free(p7);
if (oid)
ASN1_OBJECT_free(oid);
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | cms_contentinfo_create(krb5_context context, /* IN */
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, /* IN */
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, /* IN */
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, /* IN */
int cms_msg_type,
unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **out_data, unsigned int *out_data_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
unsigned char *p;
/* Pick the correct oid for the eContentInfo. */
oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plg_cryptoctx, cms_msg_type);
if (oid == NULL)
goto cleanup;
retval = create_contentinfo(context, plg_cryptoctx, oid,
data, data_len, &p7);
if (retval != 0)
goto cleanup;
*out_data_len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, NULL);
if (!(*out_data_len)) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to der encode pkcs7\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = ENOMEM;
if ((p = *out_data = malloc(*out_data_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* DER encode PKCS7 data */
retval = i2d_PKCS7(p7, &p);
if (!retval) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to der encode pkcs7\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (p7)
PKCS7_free(p7);
if (oid)
ASN1_OBJECT_free(oid);
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,963 | cms_envelopeddata_create(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
krb5_preauthtype pa_type,
int include_certchain,
unsigned char *key_pack,
unsigned int key_pack_len,
unsigned char **out,
unsigned int *out_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
BIO *in = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL, *signed_data = NULL, *enc_data = NULL;
int signed_data_len = 0, enc_data_len = 0, flags = PKCS7_BINARY;
STACK_OF(X509) *encerts = NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
int cms_msg_type;
/* create the PKCS7 SignedData portion of the PKCS7 EnvelopedData */
switch ((int)pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
cms_msg_type = CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9;
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
cms_msg_type = CMS_ENVEL_SERVER;
break;
default:
goto cleanup;
}
retval = cms_signeddata_create(context, plgctx, reqctx, idctx,
cms_msg_type, include_certchain, key_pack, key_pack_len,
&signed_data, (unsigned int *)&signed_data_len);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to create pkcs7 signed data\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* check we have client's certificate */
if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
encerts = sk_X509_new_null();
sk_X509_push(encerts, reqctx->received_cert);
cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
switch (pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
prepare_enc_data(signed_data, signed_data_len, &enc_data,
&enc_data_len);
retval = BIO_write(in, enc_data, enc_data_len);
if (retval != enc_data_len) {
pkiDebug("BIO_write only wrote %d\n", retval);
goto cleanup;
}
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
retval = BIO_write(in, signed_data, signed_data_len);
if (retval != signed_data_len) {
pkiDebug("BIO_write only wrote %d\n", retval);
goto cleanup;
}
break;
default:
retval = -1;
goto cleanup;
}
p7 = PKCS7_encrypt(encerts, in, cipher, flags);
if (p7 == NULL) {
pkiDebug("failed to encrypt PKCS7 object\n");
retval = -1;
goto cleanup;
}
switch (pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->content_type =
OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed);
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->content_type =
OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
break;
break;
break;
break;
}
*out_len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, NULL);
if (!*out_len || (p = *out = malloc(*out_len)) == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = i2d_PKCS7(p7, &p);
if (!retval) {
pkiDebug("unable to write pkcs7 object\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(*out, *out_len, "/tmp/kdc_enveloped_data");
#endif
cleanup:
if (p7 != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7);
if (in != NULL)
BIO_free(in);
free(signed_data);
free(enc_data);
if (encerts != NULL)
sk_X509_free(encerts);
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | cms_envelopeddata_create(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
krb5_preauthtype pa_type,
int include_certchain,
unsigned char *key_pack,
unsigned int key_pack_len,
unsigned char **out,
unsigned int *out_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
BIO *in = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL, *signed_data = NULL, *enc_data = NULL;
int signed_data_len = 0, enc_data_len = 0, flags = PKCS7_BINARY;
STACK_OF(X509) *encerts = NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
int cms_msg_type;
/* create the PKCS7 SignedData portion of the PKCS7 EnvelopedData */
switch ((int)pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
cms_msg_type = CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9;
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
cms_msg_type = CMS_ENVEL_SERVER;
break;
default:
goto cleanup;
}
retval = cms_signeddata_create(context, plgctx, reqctx, idctx,
cms_msg_type, include_certchain, key_pack, key_pack_len,
&signed_data, (unsigned int *)&signed_data_len);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to create pkcs7 signed data\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* check we have client's certificate */
if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
encerts = sk_X509_new_null();
sk_X509_push(encerts, reqctx->received_cert);
cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
switch (pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
prepare_enc_data(signed_data, signed_data_len, &enc_data,
&enc_data_len);
retval = BIO_write(in, enc_data, enc_data_len);
if (retval != enc_data_len) {
pkiDebug("BIO_write only wrote %d\n", retval);
goto cleanup;
}
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
retval = BIO_write(in, signed_data, signed_data_len);
if (retval != signed_data_len) {
pkiDebug("BIO_write only wrote %d\n", retval);
goto cleanup;
}
break;
default:
retval = -1;
goto cleanup;
}
p7 = PKCS7_encrypt(encerts, in, cipher, flags);
if (p7 == NULL) {
pkiDebug("failed to encrypt PKCS7 object\n");
retval = -1;
goto cleanup;
}
switch (pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->content_type =
OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed);
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->content_type =
OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
break;
break;
break;
break;
}
*out_len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, NULL);
if (!*out_len || (p = *out = malloc(*out_len)) == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = i2d_PKCS7(p7, &p);
if (!retval) {
pkiDebug("unable to write pkcs7 object\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(*out, *out_len, "/tmp/kdc_enveloped_data");
#endif
cleanup:
if (p7 != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7);
if (in != NULL)
BIO_free(in);
free(signed_data);
free(enc_data);
if (encerts != NULL)
sk_X509_free(encerts);
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,964 | cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int cms_msg_type,
int include_certchain,
unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **signed_data,
unsigned int *signed_data_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL, *inner_p7 = NULL;
PKCS7_SIGNED *p7s = NULL;
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si = NULL;
unsigned char *p;
STACK_OF(X509) * cert_stack = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest_attr = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx2;
const EVP_MD *md_tmp = NULL;
unsigned char md_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], md_data2[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *digestInfo_buf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
unsigned int md_len, md_len2, alen, digestInfo_len;
STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) * sk;
unsigned char *sig = NULL;
unsigned int sig_len = 0;
X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest = NULL;
unsigned int alg_len = 0, digest_len = 0;
unsigned char *y = NULL, *alg_buf = NULL, *digest_buf = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL;
/* Start creating PKCS7 data. */
if ((p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed);
if ((p7s = PKCS7_SIGNED_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
p7->d.sign = p7s;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7s->version, 3))
goto cleanup;
/* pick the correct oid for the eContentInfo */
oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plg_cryptoctx, cms_msg_type);
if (oid == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (id_cryptoctx->my_certs != NULL) {
/* create a cert chain that has at least the signer's certificate */
if ((cert_stack = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
if (!include_certchain) {
pkiDebug("only including signer's certificate\n");
sk_X509_push(cert_stack, X509_dup(cert));
} else {
/* create a cert chain */
X509_STORE *certstore = NULL;
X509_STORE_CTX certctx;
STACK_OF(X509) *certstack = NULL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
unsigned int i = 0, size = 0;
if ((certstore = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
pkiDebug("building certificate chain\n");
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(certstore, openssl_callback);
X509_STORE_CTX_init(&certctx, certstore, cert,
id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs);
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&certctx, id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs);
if (!X509_verify_cert(&certctx)) {
int code = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&certctx);
const char *msg = X509_verify_cert_error_string(code);
pkiDebug("failed to create a certificate chain: %s\n", msg);
if (!sk_X509_num(id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs))
pkiDebug("No trusted CAs found. Check your X509_anchors\n");
retval = KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
_("Cannot create cert chain: %s"), msg);
goto cleanup;
}
certstack = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&certctx);
size = sk_X509_num(certstack);
pkiDebug("size of certificate chain = %d\n", size);
for(i = 0; i < size - 1; i++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certstack, i);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf);
sk_X509_push(cert_stack, X509_dup(x));
}
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&certctx);
X509_STORE_free(certstore);
sk_X509_pop_free(certstack, X509_free);
}
p7s->cert = cert_stack;
/* fill-in PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO */
if ((p7si = PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7si->version, 1))
goto cleanup;
if (!X509_NAME_set(&p7si->issuer_and_serial->issuer,
X509_get_issuer_name(cert)))
goto cleanup;
/* because ASN1_INTEGER_set is used to set a 'long' we will do
* things the ugly way. */
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(p7si->issuer_and_serial->serial);
if (!(p7si->issuer_and_serial->serial =
M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(cert))))
goto cleanup;
/* will not fill-out EVP_PKEY because it's on the smartcard */
/* Set digest algs */
p7si->digest_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1);
if (p7si->digest_alg->parameter != NULL)
ASN1_TYPE_free(p7si->digest_alg->parameter);
if ((p7si->digest_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
p7si->digest_alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
/* Set sig algs */
if (p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter != NULL)
ASN1_TYPE_free(p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter);
p7si->digest_enc_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption);
if (!(p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()))
goto cleanup;
p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9){
/* don't include signed attributes for pa-type 15 request */
abuf = data;
alen = data_len;
} else {
/* add signed attributes */
/* compute sha1 digest over the EncapsulatedContentInfo */
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, data, data_len);
md_tmp = EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_data, &md_len);
/* create a message digest attr */
digest_attr = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(digest_attr, md_data, (int)md_len);
PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(p7si, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest,
V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, (char *) digest_attr);
/* create a content-type attr */
PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(p7si, NID_pkcs9_contentType,
V_ASN1_OBJECT, oid);
/* create the signature over signed attributes. get DER encoded value */
/* This is the place where smartcard signature needs to be calculated */
sk = p7si->auth_attr;
alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *) sk, &abuf,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN));
if (abuf == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
} /* signed attributes */
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
/* Some tokens can only do RSAEncryption without sha1 hash */
/* to compute sha1WithRSAEncryption, encode the algorithm ID for the hash
* function and the hash value into an ASN.1 value of type DigestInfo
* DigestInfo::=SEQUENCE {
* digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
* digest OCTET STRING }
*/
if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 &&
id_cryptoctx->mech == CKM_RSA_PKCS) {
pkiDebug("mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS\n");
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx2);
/* if this is not draft9 request, include digest signed attribute */
if (cms_msg_type != CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx2, md_tmp, NULL);
else
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx2, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx2, abuf, alen);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx2, md_data2, &md_len2);
alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
if (alg == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1);
alg->parameter = NULL;
alg_len = i2d_X509_ALGOR(alg, NULL);
alg_buf = malloc(alg_len);
if (alg_buf == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
digest = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (digest == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(digest, md_data2, (int)md_len2);
digest_len = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(digest, NULL);
digest_buf = malloc(digest_len);
if (digest_buf == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
digestInfo_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)(alg_len + digest_len),
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
y = digestInfo_buf = malloc(digestInfo_len);
if (digestInfo_buf == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
ASN1_put_object(&y, 1, (int)(alg_len + digest_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
i2d_X509_ALGOR(alg, &y);
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(digest, &y);
#ifdef DEBUG_SIG
pkiDebug("signing buffer\n");
print_buffer(digestInfo_buf, digestInfo_len);
print_buffer_bin(digestInfo_buf, digestInfo_len, "/tmp/pkcs7_tosign");
#endif
retval = pkinit_sign_data(context, id_cryptoctx, digestInfo_buf,
digestInfo_len, &sig, &sig_len);
} else
#endif
{
pkiDebug("mech = %s\n",
id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 ? "CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS" : "FS");
retval = pkinit_sign_data(context, id_cryptoctx, abuf, alen,
&sig, &sig_len);
}
#ifdef DEBUG_SIG
print_buffer(sig, sig_len);
#endif
if (cms_msg_type != CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9 )
free(abuf);
if (retval)
goto cleanup2;
/* Add signature */
if (!ASN1_STRING_set(p7si->enc_digest, (unsigned char *) sig,
(int)sig_len)) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to add a signed digest attribute\n");
goto cleanup2;
}
/* adder signer_info to pkcs7 signed */
if (!PKCS7_add_signer(p7, p7si))
goto cleanup2;
} /* we have a certificate */
/* start on adding data to the pkcs7 signed */
retval = create_contentinfo(context, plg_cryptoctx, oid,
data, data_len, &inner_p7);
if (p7s->contents != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7s->contents);
p7s->contents = inner_p7;
*signed_data_len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, NULL);
if (!(*signed_data_len)) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to der encode pkcs7\n");
goto cleanup2;
}
retval = ENOMEM;
if ((p = *signed_data = malloc(*signed_data_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
/* DER encode PKCS7 data */
retval = i2d_PKCS7(p7, &p);
if (!retval) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to der encode pkcs7\n");
goto cleanup2;
}
retval = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT) {
print_buffer_bin(*signed_data, *signed_data_len,
"/tmp/client_pkcs7_signeddata");
} else {
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_SERVER) {
print_buffer_bin(*signed_data, *signed_data_len,
"/tmp/kdc_pkcs7_signeddata");
} else {
print_buffer_bin(*signed_data, *signed_data_len,
"/tmp/draft9_pkcs7_signeddata");
}
}
#endif
cleanup2:
if (p7si) {
if (cms_msg_type != CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 &&
id_cryptoctx->mech == CKM_RSA_PKCS) {
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx2);
free(digest_buf);
free(digestInfo_buf);
free(alg_buf);
if (digest != NULL)
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(digest);
}
#endif
if (alg != NULL)
X509_ALGOR_free(alg);
}
cleanup:
if (p7 != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7);
free(sig);
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int cms_msg_type,
int include_certchain,
unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **signed_data,
unsigned int *signed_data_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL, *inner_p7 = NULL;
PKCS7_SIGNED *p7s = NULL;
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si = NULL;
unsigned char *p;
STACK_OF(X509) * cert_stack = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest_attr = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx2;
const EVP_MD *md_tmp = NULL;
unsigned char md_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], md_data2[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *digestInfo_buf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
unsigned int md_len, md_len2, alen, digestInfo_len;
STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) * sk;
unsigned char *sig = NULL;
unsigned int sig_len = 0;
X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest = NULL;
unsigned int alg_len = 0, digest_len = 0;
unsigned char *y = NULL, *alg_buf = NULL, *digest_buf = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL;
/* Start creating PKCS7 data. */
if ((p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed);
if ((p7s = PKCS7_SIGNED_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
p7->d.sign = p7s;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7s->version, 3))
goto cleanup;
/* pick the correct oid for the eContentInfo */
oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plg_cryptoctx, cms_msg_type);
if (oid == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (id_cryptoctx->my_certs != NULL) {
/* create a cert chain that has at least the signer's certificate */
if ((cert_stack = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
if (!include_certchain) {
pkiDebug("only including signer's certificate\n");
sk_X509_push(cert_stack, X509_dup(cert));
} else {
/* create a cert chain */
X509_STORE *certstore = NULL;
X509_STORE_CTX certctx;
STACK_OF(X509) *certstack = NULL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
unsigned int i = 0, size = 0;
if ((certstore = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
pkiDebug("building certificate chain\n");
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(certstore, openssl_callback);
X509_STORE_CTX_init(&certctx, certstore, cert,
id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs);
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&certctx, id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs);
if (!X509_verify_cert(&certctx)) {
int code = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&certctx);
const char *msg = X509_verify_cert_error_string(code);
pkiDebug("failed to create a certificate chain: %s\n", msg);
if (!sk_X509_num(id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs))
pkiDebug("No trusted CAs found. Check your X509_anchors\n");
retval = KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
_("Cannot create cert chain: %s"), msg);
goto cleanup;
}
certstack = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&certctx);
size = sk_X509_num(certstack);
pkiDebug("size of certificate chain = %d\n", size);
for(i = 0; i < size - 1; i++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certstack, i);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf);
sk_X509_push(cert_stack, X509_dup(x));
}
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&certctx);
X509_STORE_free(certstore);
sk_X509_pop_free(certstack, X509_free);
}
p7s->cert = cert_stack;
/* fill-in PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO */
if ((p7si = PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7si->version, 1))
goto cleanup;
if (!X509_NAME_set(&p7si->issuer_and_serial->issuer,
X509_get_issuer_name(cert)))
goto cleanup;
/* because ASN1_INTEGER_set is used to set a 'long' we will do
* things the ugly way. */
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(p7si->issuer_and_serial->serial);
if (!(p7si->issuer_and_serial->serial =
M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(cert))))
goto cleanup;
/* will not fill-out EVP_PKEY because it's on the smartcard */
/* Set digest algs */
p7si->digest_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1);
if (p7si->digest_alg->parameter != NULL)
ASN1_TYPE_free(p7si->digest_alg->parameter);
if ((p7si->digest_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
p7si->digest_alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
/* Set sig algs */
if (p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter != NULL)
ASN1_TYPE_free(p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter);
p7si->digest_enc_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption);
if (!(p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()))
goto cleanup;
p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9){
/* don't include signed attributes for pa-type 15 request */
abuf = data;
alen = data_len;
} else {
/* add signed attributes */
/* compute sha1 digest over the EncapsulatedContentInfo */
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, data, data_len);
md_tmp = EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_data, &md_len);
/* create a message digest attr */
digest_attr = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(digest_attr, md_data, (int)md_len);
PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(p7si, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest,
V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, (char *) digest_attr);
/* create a content-type attr */
PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(p7si, NID_pkcs9_contentType,
V_ASN1_OBJECT, oid);
/* create the signature over signed attributes. get DER encoded value */
/* This is the place where smartcard signature needs to be calculated */
sk = p7si->auth_attr;
alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *) sk, &abuf,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN));
if (abuf == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
} /* signed attributes */
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
/* Some tokens can only do RSAEncryption without sha1 hash */
/* to compute sha1WithRSAEncryption, encode the algorithm ID for the hash
* function and the hash value into an ASN.1 value of type DigestInfo
* DigestInfo::=SEQUENCE {
* digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
* digest OCTET STRING }
*/
if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 &&
id_cryptoctx->mech == CKM_RSA_PKCS) {
pkiDebug("mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS\n");
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx2);
/* if this is not draft9 request, include digest signed attribute */
if (cms_msg_type != CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx2, md_tmp, NULL);
else
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx2, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx2, abuf, alen);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx2, md_data2, &md_len2);
alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
if (alg == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1);
alg->parameter = NULL;
alg_len = i2d_X509_ALGOR(alg, NULL);
alg_buf = malloc(alg_len);
if (alg_buf == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
digest = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (digest == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(digest, md_data2, (int)md_len2);
digest_len = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(digest, NULL);
digest_buf = malloc(digest_len);
if (digest_buf == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
digestInfo_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)(alg_len + digest_len),
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
y = digestInfo_buf = malloc(digestInfo_len);
if (digestInfo_buf == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
ASN1_put_object(&y, 1, (int)(alg_len + digest_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
i2d_X509_ALGOR(alg, &y);
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(digest, &y);
#ifdef DEBUG_SIG
pkiDebug("signing buffer\n");
print_buffer(digestInfo_buf, digestInfo_len);
print_buffer_bin(digestInfo_buf, digestInfo_len, "/tmp/pkcs7_tosign");
#endif
retval = pkinit_sign_data(context, id_cryptoctx, digestInfo_buf,
digestInfo_len, &sig, &sig_len);
} else
#endif
{
pkiDebug("mech = %s\n",
id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 ? "CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS" : "FS");
retval = pkinit_sign_data(context, id_cryptoctx, abuf, alen,
&sig, &sig_len);
}
#ifdef DEBUG_SIG
print_buffer(sig, sig_len);
#endif
if (cms_msg_type != CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9 )
free(abuf);
if (retval)
goto cleanup2;
/* Add signature */
if (!ASN1_STRING_set(p7si->enc_digest, (unsigned char *) sig,
(int)sig_len)) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to add a signed digest attribute\n");
goto cleanup2;
}
/* adder signer_info to pkcs7 signed */
if (!PKCS7_add_signer(p7, p7si))
goto cleanup2;
} /* we have a certificate */
/* start on adding data to the pkcs7 signed */
retval = create_contentinfo(context, plg_cryptoctx, oid,
data, data_len, &inner_p7);
if (p7s->contents != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7s->contents);
p7s->contents = inner_p7;
*signed_data_len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, NULL);
if (!(*signed_data_len)) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to der encode pkcs7\n");
goto cleanup2;
}
retval = ENOMEM;
if ((p = *signed_data = malloc(*signed_data_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
/* DER encode PKCS7 data */
retval = i2d_PKCS7(p7, &p);
if (!retval) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to der encode pkcs7\n");
goto cleanup2;
}
retval = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT) {
print_buffer_bin(*signed_data, *signed_data_len,
"/tmp/client_pkcs7_signeddata");
} else {
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_SERVER) {
print_buffer_bin(*signed_data, *signed_data_len,
"/tmp/kdc_pkcs7_signeddata");
} else {
print_buffer_bin(*signed_data, *signed_data_len,
"/tmp/draft9_pkcs7_signeddata");
}
}
#endif
cleanup2:
if (p7si) {
if (cms_msg_type != CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 &&
id_cryptoctx->mech == CKM_RSA_PKCS) {
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx2);
free(digest_buf);
free(digestInfo_buf);
free(alg_buf);
if (digest != NULL)
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(digest);
}
#endif
if (alg != NULL)
X509_ALGOR_free(alg);
}
cleanup:
if (p7 != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7);
free(sig);
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,965 | cms_signeddata_verify(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
int cms_msg_type,
int require_crl_checking,
unsigned char *signed_data,
unsigned int signed_data_len,
unsigned char **data,
unsigned int *data_len,
unsigned char **authz_data,
unsigned int *authz_data_len,
int *is_signed)
{
/*
* Warning: Since most openssl functions do not set retval, large chunks of
* this function assume that retval is always a failure and may go to
* cleanup without setting retval explicitly. Make sure retval is not set
* to 0 or errors such as signature verification failure may be converted
* to success with significant security consequences.
*/
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
BIO *out = NULL;
int flags = CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY;
int valid_oid = 0;
unsigned int i = 0;
unsigned int vflags = 0, size = 0;
const unsigned char *p = signed_data;
STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *si_sk = NULL;
CMS_SignerInfo *si = NULL;
X509 *x = NULL;
X509_STORE *store = NULL;
X509_STORE_CTX cert_ctx;
STACK_OF(X509) *signerCerts = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *intermediateCAs = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *signerRevoked = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *revoked = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *verified_chain = NULL;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL;
const ASN1_OBJECT *type = NULL, *etype = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING **octets;
krb5_external_principal_identifier **krb5_verified_chain = NULL;
krb5_data *authz = NULL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(signed_data, signed_data_len,
"/tmp/client_received_pkcs7_signeddata");
#endif
if (is_signed)
*is_signed = 1;
/* Do this early enough to create the shadow OID for pkcs7-data if needed */
oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, cms_msg_type);
if (oid == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* decode received CMS message */
if ((cms = d2i_CMS_ContentInfo(NULL, &p, (int)signed_data_len)) == NULL) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("%s: failed to decode message: %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
goto cleanup;
}
etype = CMS_get0_eContentType(cms);
/*
* Prior to 1.10 the MIT client incorrectly omitted the pkinit structure
* directly in a CMS ContentInfo rather than using SignedData with no
* signers. Handle that case.
*/
type = CMS_get0_type(cms);
if (is_signed && !OBJ_cmp(type, oid)) {
unsigned char *d;
*is_signed = 0;
octets = pkinit_CMS_get0_content_data(cms);
if (!octets || ((*octets)->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
_("Invalid pkinit packet: octet string "
"expected"));
goto cleanup;
}
*data_len = ASN1_STRING_length(*octets);
d = malloc(*data_len);
if (d == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
memcpy(d, ASN1_STRING_data(*octets),
*data_len);
*data = d;
goto out;
} else {
/* Verify that the received message is CMS SignedData message. */
if (OBJ_obj2nid(type) != NID_pkcs7_signed) {
pkiDebug("Expected id-signedData CMS msg (received type = %d)\n",
OBJ_obj2nid(type));
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, _("wrong oid\n"));
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* setup to verify X509 certificate used to sign CMS message */
if (!(store = X509_STORE_new()))
goto cleanup;
/* check if we are inforcing CRL checking */
vflags = X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL;
if (require_crl_checking)
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(store, openssl_callback);
else
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(store, openssl_callback_ignore_crls);
X509_STORE_set_flags(store, vflags);
/*
* Get the signer's information from the CMS message. Match signer ID
* against anchors and intermediate CAs in case no certs are present in the
* SignedData. If we start sending kdcPkId values in requests, we'll need
* to match against the source of that information too.
*/
CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, NULL, 0);
CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, idctx->trustedCAs, CMS_NOINTERN);
CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, idctx->intermediateCAs, CMS_NOINTERN);
if (((si_sk = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms)) == NULL) ||
((si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(si_sk, 0)) == NULL)) {
/* Not actually signed; anonymous case */
if (!is_signed)
goto cleanup;
*is_signed = 0;
/* We cannot use CMS_dataInit because there may be no digest */
octets = pkinit_CMS_get0_content_signed(cms);
if (octets)
out = BIO_new_mem_buf((*octets)->data, (*octets)->length);
if (out == NULL)
goto cleanup;
} else {
pkinit_CMS_SignerInfo_get_cert(cms, si, &x);
if (x == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* create available CRL information (get local CRLs and include CRLs
* received in the CMS message
*/
signerRevoked = CMS_get1_crls(cms);
if (idctx->revoked == NULL)
revoked = signerRevoked;
else if (signerRevoked == NULL)
revoked = idctx->revoked;
else {
size = sk_X509_CRL_num(idctx->revoked);
revoked = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
sk_X509_CRL_push(revoked, sk_X509_CRL_value(idctx->revoked, i));
size = sk_X509_CRL_num(signerRevoked);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
sk_X509_CRL_push(revoked, sk_X509_CRL_value(signerRevoked, i));
}
/* create available intermediate CAs chains (get local intermediateCAs and
* include the CA chain received in the CMS message
*/
signerCerts = CMS_get1_certs(cms);
if (idctx->intermediateCAs == NULL)
intermediateCAs = signerCerts;
else if (signerCerts == NULL)
intermediateCAs = idctx->intermediateCAs;
else {
size = sk_X509_num(idctx->intermediateCAs);
intermediateCAs = sk_X509_new_null();
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
sk_X509_push(intermediateCAs,
sk_X509_value(idctx->intermediateCAs, i));
}
size = sk_X509_num(signerCerts);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
sk_X509_push(intermediateCAs, sk_X509_value(signerCerts, i));
}
}
/* initialize x509 context with the received certificate and
* trusted and intermediate CA chains and CRLs
*/
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, x, intermediateCAs))
goto cleanup;
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&cert_ctx, revoked);
/* add trusted CAs certificates for cert verification */
if (idctx->trustedCAs != NULL)
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&cert_ctx, idctx->trustedCAs);
else {
pkiDebug("unable to find any trusted CAs\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_CERTCHAIN
if (intermediateCAs != NULL) {
size = sk_X509_num(intermediateCAs);
pkiDebug("untrusted cert chain of size %d\n", size);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(
sk_X509_value(intermediateCAs, i)), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf);
}
}
if (idctx->trustedCAs != NULL) {
size = sk_X509_num(idctx->trustedCAs);
pkiDebug("trusted cert chain of size %d\n", size);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(
sk_X509_value(idctx->trustedCAs, i)), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf);
}
}
if (revoked != NULL) {
size = sk_X509_CRL_num(revoked);
pkiDebug("CRL chain of size %d\n", size);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
X509_CRL *crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(revoked, i);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("crls by CA #%d: %s\n", i , buf);
}
}
#endif
i = X509_verify_cert(&cert_ctx);
if (i <= 0) {
int j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&cert_ctx);
reqctx->received_cert = X509_dup(cert_ctx.current_cert);
switch(j) {
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE;
break;
default:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE;
}
if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL)
strlcpy(buf, "(none)", sizeof(buf));
else
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(reqctx->received_cert),
buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("problem with cert DN = %s (error=%d) %s\n", buf, j,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
#ifdef DEBUG_CERTCHAIN
size = sk_X509_num(signerCerts);
pkiDebug("received cert chain of size %d\n", size);
for (j = 0; j < size; j++) {
X509 *tmp_cert = sk_X509_value(signerCerts, j);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(tmp_cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", j, buf);
}
#endif
} else {
/* retrieve verified certificate chain */
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT || cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&cert_ctx);
}
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&cert_ctx);
if (i <= 0)
goto cleanup;
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
flags |= CMS_NOATTR;
if (CMS_verify(cms, NULL, store, NULL, out, flags) == 0) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
switch(ERR_GET_REASON(err)) {
case PKCS7_R_DIGEST_FAILURE:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_SIGNED_DATA_NOT_ACCEPTED;
break;
case PKCS7_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
default:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG;
}
pkiDebug("CMS Verification failure\n");
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
goto cleanup;
}
} /* message was signed */
if (!OBJ_cmp(etype, oid))
valid_oid = 1;
else if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) {
/*
* Various implementations of the pa-type 15 request use
* different OIDS. We check that the returned object
* has any of the acceptable OIDs
*/
ASN1_OBJECT *client_oid = NULL, *server_oid = NULL, *rsa_oid = NULL;
client_oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, CMS_SIGN_CLIENT);
server_oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, CMS_SIGN_SERVER);
rsa_oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, CMS_ENVEL_SERVER);
if (!OBJ_cmp(etype, client_oid) ||
!OBJ_cmp(etype, server_oid) ||
!OBJ_cmp(etype, rsa_oid))
valid_oid = 1;
}
if (valid_oid)
pkiDebug("CMS Verification successful\n");
else {
pkiDebug("wrong oid in eContentType\n");
print_buffer(etype->data,
(unsigned int)etype->length);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "wrong oid\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* transfer the data from CMS message into return buffer */
for (size = 0;;) {
int remain;
retval = ENOMEM;
if ((*data = realloc(*data, size + 1024 * 10)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
remain = BIO_read(out, &((*data)[size]), 1024 * 10);
if (remain <= 0)
break;
else
size += remain;
}
*data_len = size;
if (x) {
reqctx->received_cert = X509_dup(x);
/* generate authorization data */
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT || cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) {
if (authz_data == NULL || authz_data_len == NULL)
goto out;
*authz_data = NULL;
retval = create_identifiers_from_stack(verified_chain,
&krb5_verified_chain);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("create_identifiers_from_stack failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers((const krb5_external_principal_identifier **)krb5_verified_chain, &authz);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)authz->data, authz->length,
"/tmp/kdc_ad_initial_verified_cas");
#endif
*authz_data = malloc(authz->length);
if (*authz_data == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
memcpy(*authz_data, authz->data, authz->length);
*authz_data_len = authz->length;
}
}
out:
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (out != NULL)
BIO_free(out);
if (store != NULL)
X509_STORE_free(store);
if (cms != NULL) {
if (signerCerts != NULL)
pkinit_CMS_free1_certs(signerCerts);
if (idctx->intermediateCAs != NULL && signerCerts)
sk_X509_free(intermediateCAs);
if (signerRevoked != NULL)
pkinit_CMS_free1_crls(signerRevoked);
if (idctx->revoked != NULL && signerRevoked)
sk_X509_CRL_free(revoked);
CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
}
if (verified_chain != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(verified_chain, X509_free);
if (krb5_verified_chain != NULL)
free_krb5_external_principal_identifier(&krb5_verified_chain);
if (authz != NULL)
krb5_free_data(context, authz);
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | cms_signeddata_verify(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
int cms_msg_type,
int require_crl_checking,
unsigned char *signed_data,
unsigned int signed_data_len,
unsigned char **data,
unsigned int *data_len,
unsigned char **authz_data,
unsigned int *authz_data_len,
int *is_signed)
{
/*
* Warning: Since most openssl functions do not set retval, large chunks of
* this function assume that retval is always a failure and may go to
* cleanup without setting retval explicitly. Make sure retval is not set
* to 0 or errors such as signature verification failure may be converted
* to success with significant security consequences.
*/
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
BIO *out = NULL;
int flags = CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY;
int valid_oid = 0;
unsigned int i = 0;
unsigned int vflags = 0, size = 0;
const unsigned char *p = signed_data;
STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *si_sk = NULL;
CMS_SignerInfo *si = NULL;
X509 *x = NULL;
X509_STORE *store = NULL;
X509_STORE_CTX cert_ctx;
STACK_OF(X509) *signerCerts = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *intermediateCAs = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *signerRevoked = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *revoked = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *verified_chain = NULL;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL;
const ASN1_OBJECT *type = NULL, *etype = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING **octets;
krb5_external_principal_identifier **krb5_verified_chain = NULL;
krb5_data *authz = NULL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(signed_data, signed_data_len,
"/tmp/client_received_pkcs7_signeddata");
#endif
if (is_signed)
*is_signed = 1;
/* Do this early enough to create the shadow OID for pkcs7-data if needed */
oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, cms_msg_type);
if (oid == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* decode received CMS message */
if ((cms = d2i_CMS_ContentInfo(NULL, &p, (int)signed_data_len)) == NULL) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("%s: failed to decode message: %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
goto cleanup;
}
etype = CMS_get0_eContentType(cms);
/*
* Prior to 1.10 the MIT client incorrectly omitted the pkinit structure
* directly in a CMS ContentInfo rather than using SignedData with no
* signers. Handle that case.
*/
type = CMS_get0_type(cms);
if (is_signed && !OBJ_cmp(type, oid)) {
unsigned char *d;
*is_signed = 0;
octets = pkinit_CMS_get0_content_data(cms);
if (!octets || ((*octets)->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
_("Invalid pkinit packet: octet string "
"expected"));
goto cleanup;
}
*data_len = ASN1_STRING_length(*octets);
d = malloc(*data_len);
if (d == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
memcpy(d, ASN1_STRING_data(*octets),
*data_len);
*data = d;
goto out;
} else {
/* Verify that the received message is CMS SignedData message. */
if (OBJ_obj2nid(type) != NID_pkcs7_signed) {
pkiDebug("Expected id-signedData CMS msg (received type = %d)\n",
OBJ_obj2nid(type));
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, _("wrong oid\n"));
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* setup to verify X509 certificate used to sign CMS message */
if (!(store = X509_STORE_new()))
goto cleanup;
/* check if we are inforcing CRL checking */
vflags = X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL;
if (require_crl_checking)
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(store, openssl_callback);
else
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(store, openssl_callback_ignore_crls);
X509_STORE_set_flags(store, vflags);
/*
* Get the signer's information from the CMS message. Match signer ID
* against anchors and intermediate CAs in case no certs are present in the
* SignedData. If we start sending kdcPkId values in requests, we'll need
* to match against the source of that information too.
*/
CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, NULL, 0);
CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, idctx->trustedCAs, CMS_NOINTERN);
CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, idctx->intermediateCAs, CMS_NOINTERN);
if (((si_sk = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms)) == NULL) ||
((si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(si_sk, 0)) == NULL)) {
/* Not actually signed; anonymous case */
if (!is_signed)
goto cleanup;
*is_signed = 0;
/* We cannot use CMS_dataInit because there may be no digest */
octets = pkinit_CMS_get0_content_signed(cms);
if (octets)
out = BIO_new_mem_buf((*octets)->data, (*octets)->length);
if (out == NULL)
goto cleanup;
} else {
pkinit_CMS_SignerInfo_get_cert(cms, si, &x);
if (x == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* create available CRL information (get local CRLs and include CRLs
* received in the CMS message
*/
signerRevoked = CMS_get1_crls(cms);
if (idctx->revoked == NULL)
revoked = signerRevoked;
else if (signerRevoked == NULL)
revoked = idctx->revoked;
else {
size = sk_X509_CRL_num(idctx->revoked);
revoked = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
sk_X509_CRL_push(revoked, sk_X509_CRL_value(idctx->revoked, i));
size = sk_X509_CRL_num(signerRevoked);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
sk_X509_CRL_push(revoked, sk_X509_CRL_value(signerRevoked, i));
}
/* create available intermediate CAs chains (get local intermediateCAs and
* include the CA chain received in the CMS message
*/
signerCerts = CMS_get1_certs(cms);
if (idctx->intermediateCAs == NULL)
intermediateCAs = signerCerts;
else if (signerCerts == NULL)
intermediateCAs = idctx->intermediateCAs;
else {
size = sk_X509_num(idctx->intermediateCAs);
intermediateCAs = sk_X509_new_null();
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
sk_X509_push(intermediateCAs,
sk_X509_value(idctx->intermediateCAs, i));
}
size = sk_X509_num(signerCerts);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
sk_X509_push(intermediateCAs, sk_X509_value(signerCerts, i));
}
}
/* initialize x509 context with the received certificate and
* trusted and intermediate CA chains and CRLs
*/
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, x, intermediateCAs))
goto cleanup;
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&cert_ctx, revoked);
/* add trusted CAs certificates for cert verification */
if (idctx->trustedCAs != NULL)
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&cert_ctx, idctx->trustedCAs);
else {
pkiDebug("unable to find any trusted CAs\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_CERTCHAIN
if (intermediateCAs != NULL) {
size = sk_X509_num(intermediateCAs);
pkiDebug("untrusted cert chain of size %d\n", size);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(
sk_X509_value(intermediateCAs, i)), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf);
}
}
if (idctx->trustedCAs != NULL) {
size = sk_X509_num(idctx->trustedCAs);
pkiDebug("trusted cert chain of size %d\n", size);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(
sk_X509_value(idctx->trustedCAs, i)), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf);
}
}
if (revoked != NULL) {
size = sk_X509_CRL_num(revoked);
pkiDebug("CRL chain of size %d\n", size);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
X509_CRL *crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(revoked, i);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("crls by CA #%d: %s\n", i , buf);
}
}
#endif
i = X509_verify_cert(&cert_ctx);
if (i <= 0) {
int j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&cert_ctx);
reqctx->received_cert = X509_dup(cert_ctx.current_cert);
switch(j) {
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE;
break;
default:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE;
}
if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL)
strlcpy(buf, "(none)", sizeof(buf));
else
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(reqctx->received_cert),
buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("problem with cert DN = %s (error=%d) %s\n", buf, j,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
#ifdef DEBUG_CERTCHAIN
size = sk_X509_num(signerCerts);
pkiDebug("received cert chain of size %d\n", size);
for (j = 0; j < size; j++) {
X509 *tmp_cert = sk_X509_value(signerCerts, j);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(tmp_cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", j, buf);
}
#endif
} else {
/* retrieve verified certificate chain */
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT || cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&cert_ctx);
}
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&cert_ctx);
if (i <= 0)
goto cleanup;
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
flags |= CMS_NOATTR;
if (CMS_verify(cms, NULL, store, NULL, out, flags) == 0) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
switch(ERR_GET_REASON(err)) {
case PKCS7_R_DIGEST_FAILURE:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_SIGNED_DATA_NOT_ACCEPTED;
break;
case PKCS7_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
default:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG;
}
pkiDebug("CMS Verification failure\n");
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
goto cleanup;
}
} /* message was signed */
if (!OBJ_cmp(etype, oid))
valid_oid = 1;
else if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) {
/*
* Various implementations of the pa-type 15 request use
* different OIDS. We check that the returned object
* has any of the acceptable OIDs
*/
ASN1_OBJECT *client_oid = NULL, *server_oid = NULL, *rsa_oid = NULL;
client_oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, CMS_SIGN_CLIENT);
server_oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, CMS_SIGN_SERVER);
rsa_oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, CMS_ENVEL_SERVER);
if (!OBJ_cmp(etype, client_oid) ||
!OBJ_cmp(etype, server_oid) ||
!OBJ_cmp(etype, rsa_oid))
valid_oid = 1;
}
if (valid_oid)
pkiDebug("CMS Verification successful\n");
else {
pkiDebug("wrong oid in eContentType\n");
print_buffer(etype->data,
(unsigned int)etype->length);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "wrong oid\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* transfer the data from CMS message into return buffer */
for (size = 0;;) {
int remain;
retval = ENOMEM;
if ((*data = realloc(*data, size + 1024 * 10)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
remain = BIO_read(out, &((*data)[size]), 1024 * 10);
if (remain <= 0)
break;
else
size += remain;
}
*data_len = size;
if (x) {
reqctx->received_cert = X509_dup(x);
/* generate authorization data */
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT || cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) {
if (authz_data == NULL || authz_data_len == NULL)
goto out;
*authz_data = NULL;
retval = create_identifiers_from_stack(verified_chain,
&krb5_verified_chain);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("create_identifiers_from_stack failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers((const krb5_external_principal_identifier **)krb5_verified_chain, &authz);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)authz->data, authz->length,
"/tmp/kdc_ad_initial_verified_cas");
#endif
*authz_data = malloc(authz->length);
if (*authz_data == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
memcpy(*authz_data, authz->data, authz->length);
*authz_data_len = authz->length;
}
}
out:
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (out != NULL)
BIO_free(out);
if (store != NULL)
X509_STORE_free(store);
if (cms != NULL) {
if (signerCerts != NULL)
pkinit_CMS_free1_certs(signerCerts);
if (idctx->intermediateCAs != NULL && signerCerts)
sk_X509_free(intermediateCAs);
if (signerRevoked != NULL)
pkinit_CMS_free1_crls(signerRevoked);
if (idctx->revoked != NULL && signerRevoked)
sk_X509_CRL_free(revoked);
CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
}
if (verified_chain != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(verified_chain, X509_free);
if (krb5_verified_chain != NULL)
free_krb5_external_principal_identifier(&krb5_verified_chain);
if (authz != NULL)
krb5_free_data(context, authz);
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,966 | compute_dh(unsigned char *buf, int size, BIGNUM *server_pub_key, DH *dh)
{
int len, pad;
len = DH_compute_key(buf, server_pub_key, dh);
assert(len >= 0 && len <= size);
if (len < size) {
pad = size - len;
memmove(buf + pad, buf, len);
memset(buf, 0, pad);
}
}
| DoS | 0 | compute_dh(unsigned char *buf, int size, BIGNUM *server_pub_key, DH *dh)
{
int len, pad;
len = DH_compute_key(buf, server_pub_key, dh);
assert(len >= 0 && len <= size);
if (len < size) {
pad = size - len;
memmove(buf + pad, buf, len);
memset(buf, 0, pad);
}
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,967 | create_contentinfo(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_crypto_context,
ASN1_OBJECT *oid, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,
PKCS7 **out_p7)
{
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
PKCS7 *inner_p7;
ASN1_TYPE *pkinit_data = NULL;
*out_p7 = NULL;
if ((inner_p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((pkinit_data = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
pkinit_data->type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
if ((pkinit_data->value.octet_string = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(pkinit_data->value.octet_string,
(unsigned char *) data, data_len)) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to add pkcs7 data\n");
goto cleanup;
}
if (!PKCS7_set0_type_other(inner_p7, OBJ_obj2nid(oid), pkinit_data))
goto cleanup;
retval = 0;
*out_p7 = inner_p7;
inner_p7 = NULL;
pkinit_data = NULL;
cleanup:
if (inner_p7)
PKCS7_free(inner_p7);
if (pkinit_data)
ASN1_TYPE_free(pkinit_data);
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | create_contentinfo(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_crypto_context,
ASN1_OBJECT *oid, unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,
PKCS7 **out_p7)
{
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
PKCS7 *inner_p7;
ASN1_TYPE *pkinit_data = NULL;
*out_p7 = NULL;
if ((inner_p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((pkinit_data = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
pkinit_data->type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
if ((pkinit_data->value.octet_string = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(pkinit_data->value.octet_string,
(unsigned char *) data, data_len)) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to add pkcs7 data\n");
goto cleanup;
}
if (!PKCS7_set0_type_other(inner_p7, OBJ_obj2nid(oid), pkinit_data))
goto cleanup;
retval = 0;
*out_p7 = inner_p7;
inner_p7 = NULL;
pkinit_data = NULL;
cleanup:
if (inner_p7)
PKCS7_free(inner_p7);
if (pkinit_data)
ASN1_TYPE_free(pkinit_data);
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,968 | create_issuerAndSerial(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char **out,
unsigned int *out_len)
{
unsigned char *p = NULL;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
int len = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
X509 *cert = req_cryptoctx->received_cert;
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
if (req_cryptoctx->received_cert == NULL)
return 0;
is = PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_new();
X509_NAME_set(&is->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(cert));
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
is->serial = M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(cert));
len = i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, NULL);
if ((p = *out = malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, &p);
*out_len = len;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is);
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | create_issuerAndSerial(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char **out,
unsigned int *out_len)
{
unsigned char *p = NULL;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
int len = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
X509 *cert = req_cryptoctx->received_cert;
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
if (req_cryptoctx->received_cert == NULL)
return 0;
is = PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_new();
X509_NAME_set(&is->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(cert));
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
is->serial = M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(cert));
len = i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, NULL);
if ((p = *out = malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, &p);
*out_len = len;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is);
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,969 | create_krb5_supportedCMSTypes(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_algorithm_identifier ***oids)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
krb5_algorithm_identifier **loids = NULL;
krb5_data des3oid = {0, 8, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x03\x07" };
*oids = NULL;
loids = malloc(2 * sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier *));
if (loids == NULL)
goto cleanup;
loids[1] = NULL;
loids[0] = malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier));
if (loids[0] == NULL) {
free(loids);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = pkinit_copy_krb5_data(&loids[0]->algorithm, &des3oid);
if (retval) {
free(loids[0]);
free(loids);
goto cleanup;
}
loids[0]->parameters.length = 0;
loids[0]->parameters.data = NULL;
*oids = loids;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | create_krb5_supportedCMSTypes(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_algorithm_identifier ***oids)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
krb5_algorithm_identifier **loids = NULL;
krb5_data des3oid = {0, 8, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x03\x07" };
*oids = NULL;
loids = malloc(2 * sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier *));
if (loids == NULL)
goto cleanup;
loids[1] = NULL;
loids[0] = malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier));
if (loids[0] == NULL) {
free(loids);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = pkinit_copy_krb5_data(&loids[0]->algorithm, &des3oid);
if (retval) {
free(loids[0]);
free(loids);
goto cleanup;
}
loids[0]->parameters.length = 0;
loids[0]->parameters.data = NULL;
*oids = loids;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,970 | create_signature(unsigned char **sig, unsigned int *sig_len,
unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
if (pkey == NULL)
return retval;
EVP_VerifyInit(&md_ctx, EVP_sha1());
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, data, data_len);
*sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if ((*sig = malloc(*sig_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, *sig, sig_len, pkey);
retval = 0;
cleanup:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | create_signature(unsigned char **sig, unsigned int *sig_len,
unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
if (pkey == NULL)
return retval;
EVP_VerifyInit(&md_ctx, EVP_sha1());
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, data, data_len);
*sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if ((*sig = malloc(*sig_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, *sig, sig_len, pkey);
retval = 0;
cleanup:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,971 | crypto_cert_free_matching_data(krb5_context context,
pkinit_cert_matching_data *md)
{
krb5_principal p;
int i;
if (md == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (md->subject_dn)
free(md->subject_dn);
if (md->issuer_dn)
free(md->issuer_dn);
if (md->sans) {
for (i = 0, p = md->sans[i]; p != NULL; p = md->sans[++i])
krb5_free_principal(context, p);
free(md->sans);
}
free(md);
return 0;
}
| DoS | 0 | crypto_cert_free_matching_data(krb5_context context,
pkinit_cert_matching_data *md)
{
krb5_principal p;
int i;
if (md == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (md->subject_dn)
free(md->subject_dn);
if (md->issuer_dn)
free(md->issuer_dn);
if (md->sans) {
for (i = 0, p = md->sans[i]; p != NULL; p = md->sans[++i])
krb5_free_principal(context, p);
free(md->sans);
}
free(md);
return 0;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,972 | crypto_cert_get_count(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int *cert_count)
{
int count;
if (id_cryptoctx == NULL || id_cryptoctx->creds[0] == NULL)
return EINVAL;
for (count = 0;
count <= MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED && id_cryptoctx->creds[count] != NULL;
count++);
*cert_count = count;
return 0;
}
| DoS | 0 | crypto_cert_get_count(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int *cert_count)
{
int count;
if (id_cryptoctx == NULL || id_cryptoctx->creds[0] == NULL)
return EINVAL;
for (count = 0;
count <= MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED && id_cryptoctx->creds[count] != NULL;
count++);
*cert_count = count;
return 0;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,973 | crypto_cert_get_matching_data(krb5_context context,
pkinit_cert_handle ch,
pkinit_cert_matching_data **ret_md)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
pkinit_cert_matching_data *md;
krb5_principal *pkinit_sans =NULL, *upn_sans = NULL;
struct _pkinit_cert_data *cd = (struct _pkinit_cert_data *)ch;
unsigned int i, j;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
unsigned int bufsize = sizeof(buf);
if (cd == NULL || cd->magic != CERT_MAGIC)
return EINVAL;
if (ret_md == NULL)
return EINVAL;
md = calloc(1, sizeof(*md));
if (md == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
md->ch = ch;
/* get the subject name (in rfc2253 format) */
X509_NAME_oneline_ex(X509_get_subject_name(cd->cred->cert),
buf, &bufsize, XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
md->subject_dn = strdup(buf);
if (md->subject_dn == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* get the issuer name (in rfc2253 format) */
X509_NAME_oneline_ex(X509_get_issuer_name(cd->cred->cert),
buf, &bufsize, XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
md->issuer_dn = strdup(buf);
if (md->issuer_dn == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* get the san data */
retval = crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(context, cd->plgctx, cd->reqctx,
cd->cred->cert, &pkinit_sans,
&upn_sans, NULL);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
j = 0;
if (pkinit_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; pkinit_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
j++;
}
if (upn_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; upn_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
j++;
}
if (j != 0) {
md->sans = calloc((size_t)j+1, sizeof(*md->sans));
if (md->sans == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
j = 0;
if (pkinit_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; pkinit_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
md->sans[j++] = pkinit_sans[i];
free(pkinit_sans);
}
if (upn_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; upn_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
md->sans[j++] = upn_sans[i];
free(upn_sans);
}
md->sans[j] = NULL;
} else
md->sans = NULL;
/* get the KU and EKU data */
retval = crypto_retieve_X509_key_usage(context, cd->plgctx, cd->reqctx,
cd->cred->cert,
&md->ku_bits, &md->eku_bits);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
*ret_md = md;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (retval) {
if (md)
crypto_cert_free_matching_data(context, md);
}
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | crypto_cert_get_matching_data(krb5_context context,
pkinit_cert_handle ch,
pkinit_cert_matching_data **ret_md)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
pkinit_cert_matching_data *md;
krb5_principal *pkinit_sans =NULL, *upn_sans = NULL;
struct _pkinit_cert_data *cd = (struct _pkinit_cert_data *)ch;
unsigned int i, j;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
unsigned int bufsize = sizeof(buf);
if (cd == NULL || cd->magic != CERT_MAGIC)
return EINVAL;
if (ret_md == NULL)
return EINVAL;
md = calloc(1, sizeof(*md));
if (md == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
md->ch = ch;
/* get the subject name (in rfc2253 format) */
X509_NAME_oneline_ex(X509_get_subject_name(cd->cred->cert),
buf, &bufsize, XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
md->subject_dn = strdup(buf);
if (md->subject_dn == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* get the issuer name (in rfc2253 format) */
X509_NAME_oneline_ex(X509_get_issuer_name(cd->cred->cert),
buf, &bufsize, XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
md->issuer_dn = strdup(buf);
if (md->issuer_dn == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* get the san data */
retval = crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(context, cd->plgctx, cd->reqctx,
cd->cred->cert, &pkinit_sans,
&upn_sans, NULL);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
j = 0;
if (pkinit_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; pkinit_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
j++;
}
if (upn_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; upn_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
j++;
}
if (j != 0) {
md->sans = calloc((size_t)j+1, sizeof(*md->sans));
if (md->sans == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
j = 0;
if (pkinit_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; pkinit_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
md->sans[j++] = pkinit_sans[i];
free(pkinit_sans);
}
if (upn_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; upn_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
md->sans[j++] = upn_sans[i];
free(upn_sans);
}
md->sans[j] = NULL;
} else
md->sans = NULL;
/* get the KU and EKU data */
retval = crypto_retieve_X509_key_usage(context, cd->plgctx, cd->reqctx,
cd->cred->cert,
&md->ku_bits, &md->eku_bits);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
*ret_md = md;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (retval) {
if (md)
crypto_cert_free_matching_data(context, md);
}
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,974 | crypto_cert_iteration_begin(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
pkinit_cert_iter_handle *ih_ret)
{
struct _pkinit_cert_iter_data *id;
if (id_cryptoctx == NULL || ih_ret == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[0] == NULL) /* No cred info available */
return ENOENT;
id = calloc(1, sizeof(*id));
if (id == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
id->magic = ITER_MAGIC;
id->plgctx = plg_cryptoctx,
id->reqctx = req_cryptoctx,
id->idctx = id_cryptoctx;
id->index = 0;
*ih_ret = (pkinit_cert_iter_handle) id;
return 0;
}
| DoS | 0 | crypto_cert_iteration_begin(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
pkinit_cert_iter_handle *ih_ret)
{
struct _pkinit_cert_iter_data *id;
if (id_cryptoctx == NULL || ih_ret == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[0] == NULL) /* No cred info available */
return ENOENT;
id = calloc(1, sizeof(*id));
if (id == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
id->magic = ITER_MAGIC;
id->plgctx = plg_cryptoctx,
id->reqctx = req_cryptoctx,
id->idctx = id_cryptoctx;
id->index = 0;
*ih_ret = (pkinit_cert_iter_handle) id;
return 0;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,975 | crypto_cert_release(krb5_context context,
pkinit_cert_handle ch)
{
struct _pkinit_cert_data *cd = (struct _pkinit_cert_data *)ch;
if (cd == NULL || cd->magic != CERT_MAGIC)
return EINVAL;
free(cd);
return 0;
}
| DoS | 0 | crypto_cert_release(krb5_context context,
pkinit_cert_handle ch)
{
struct _pkinit_cert_data *cd = (struct _pkinit_cert_data *)ch;
if (cd == NULL || cd->magic != CERT_MAGIC)
return EINVAL;
free(cd);
return 0;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,976 | crypto_cert_select(krb5_context context,
pkinit_cert_matching_data *md)
{
struct _pkinit_cert_data *cd;
if (md == NULL)
return EINVAL;
cd = (struct _pkinit_cert_data *)md->ch;
if (cd == NULL || cd->magic != CERT_MAGIC)
return EINVAL;
/* copy the selected cert into our id_cryptoctx */
if (cd->idctx->my_certs != NULL) {
sk_X509_pop_free(cd->idctx->my_certs, X509_free);
}
cd->idctx->my_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
sk_X509_push(cd->idctx->my_certs, cd->cred->cert);
free(cd->idctx->identity);
/* hang on to the selected credential name */
if (cd->idctx->creds[cd->index]->name != NULL)
cd->idctx->identity = strdup(cd->idctx->creds[cd->index]->name);
else
cd->idctx->identity = NULL;
cd->idctx->creds[cd->index]->cert = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
cd->idctx->cert_index = 0;
if (cd->idctx->pkcs11_method != 1) {
cd->idctx->my_key = cd->cred->key;
cd->idctx->creds[cd->index]->key = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
}
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
else {
cd->idctx->cert_id = cd->cred->cert_id;
cd->idctx->creds[cd->index]->cert_id = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
cd->idctx->cert_id_len = cd->cred->cert_id_len;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
| DoS | 0 | crypto_cert_select(krb5_context context,
pkinit_cert_matching_data *md)
{
struct _pkinit_cert_data *cd;
if (md == NULL)
return EINVAL;
cd = (struct _pkinit_cert_data *)md->ch;
if (cd == NULL || cd->magic != CERT_MAGIC)
return EINVAL;
/* copy the selected cert into our id_cryptoctx */
if (cd->idctx->my_certs != NULL) {
sk_X509_pop_free(cd->idctx->my_certs, X509_free);
}
cd->idctx->my_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
sk_X509_push(cd->idctx->my_certs, cd->cred->cert);
free(cd->idctx->identity);
/* hang on to the selected credential name */
if (cd->idctx->creds[cd->index]->name != NULL)
cd->idctx->identity = strdup(cd->idctx->creds[cd->index]->name);
else
cd->idctx->identity = NULL;
cd->idctx->creds[cd->index]->cert = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
cd->idctx->cert_index = 0;
if (cd->idctx->pkcs11_method != 1) {
cd->idctx->my_key = cd->cred->key;
cd->idctx->creds[cd->index]->key = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
}
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
else {
cd->idctx->cert_id = cd->cred->cert_id;
cd->idctx->creds[cd->index]->cert_id = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
cd->idctx->cert_id_len = cd->cred->cert_id_len;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,977 | crypto_cert_select_default(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
int cert_count = 0;
retval = crypto_cert_get_count(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, &cert_count);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("%s: crypto_cert_get_count error %d, %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, retval, error_message(retval));
goto errout;
}
if (cert_count != 1) {
pkiDebug("%s: ERROR: There are %d certs to choose from, "
"but there must be exactly one.\n",
__FUNCTION__, cert_count);
retval = EINVAL;
goto errout;
}
/* copy the selected cert into our id_cryptoctx */
if (id_cryptoctx->my_certs != NULL) {
sk_X509_pop_free(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, X509_free);
}
id_cryptoctx->my_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
sk_X509_push(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert);
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
id_cryptoctx->cert_index = 0;
/* hang on to the selected credential name */
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->name != NULL)
id_cryptoctx->identity = strdup(id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->name);
else
id_cryptoctx->identity = NULL;
if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method != 1) {
id_cryptoctx->my_key = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->key;
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->key = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
}
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
else {
id_cryptoctx->cert_id = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id;
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id_len;
}
#endif
retval = 0;
errout:
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | crypto_cert_select_default(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
int cert_count = 0;
retval = crypto_cert_get_count(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, &cert_count);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("%s: crypto_cert_get_count error %d, %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, retval, error_message(retval));
goto errout;
}
if (cert_count != 1) {
pkiDebug("%s: ERROR: There are %d certs to choose from, "
"but there must be exactly one.\n",
__FUNCTION__, cert_count);
retval = EINVAL;
goto errout;
}
/* copy the selected cert into our id_cryptoctx */
if (id_cryptoctx->my_certs != NULL) {
sk_X509_pop_free(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, X509_free);
}
id_cryptoctx->my_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
sk_X509_push(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert);
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
id_cryptoctx->cert_index = 0;
/* hang on to the selected credential name */
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->name != NULL)
id_cryptoctx->identity = strdup(id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->name);
else
id_cryptoctx->identity = NULL;
if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method != 1) {
id_cryptoctx->my_key = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->key;
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->key = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
}
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
else {
id_cryptoctx->cert_id = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id;
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id_len;
}
#endif
retval = 0;
errout:
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,978 | crypto_free_cert_info(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx)
{
int i;
if (id_cryptoctx == NULL)
return EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED; i++) {
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[i] != NULL) {
free_cred_info(context, id_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx->creds[i]);
id_cryptoctx->creds[i] = NULL;
}
}
return 0;
}
| DoS | 0 | crypto_free_cert_info(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx)
{
int i;
if (id_cryptoctx == NULL)
return EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED; i++) {
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[i] != NULL) {
free_cred_info(context, id_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx->creds[i]);
id_cryptoctx->creds[i] = NULL;
}
}
return 0;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,979 | crypto_load_cas_and_crls(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int idtype,
int catype,
char *id)
{
pkiDebug("%s: called with idtype %s and catype %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, idtype2string(idtype), catype2string(catype));
switch (idtype) {
case IDTYPE_FILE:
return load_cas_and_crls(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, catype, id);
break;
case IDTYPE_DIR:
return load_cas_and_crls_dir(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, catype, id);
break;
default:
return ENOTSUP;
break;
}
}
| DoS | 0 | crypto_load_cas_and_crls(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int idtype,
int catype,
char *id)
{
pkiDebug("%s: called with idtype %s and catype %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, idtype2string(idtype), catype2string(catype));
switch (idtype) {
case IDTYPE_FILE:
return load_cas_and_crls(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, catype, id);
break;
case IDTYPE_DIR:
return load_cas_and_crls_dir(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, catype, id);
break;
default:
return ENOTSUP;
break;
}
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,980 | crypto_load_certs(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_principal princ)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
switch(idopts->idtype) {
case IDTYPE_FILE:
retval = pkinit_get_certs_fs(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, idopts,
id_cryptoctx, princ);
break;
case IDTYPE_DIR:
retval = pkinit_get_certs_dir(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, idopts,
id_cryptoctx, princ);
break;
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
case IDTYPE_PKCS11:
retval = pkinit_get_certs_pkcs11(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, idopts,
id_cryptoctx, princ);
break;
#endif
case IDTYPE_PKCS12:
retval = pkinit_get_certs_pkcs12(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, idopts,
id_cryptoctx, princ);
break;
default:
retval = EINVAL;
}
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
cleanup:
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | crypto_load_certs(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_principal princ)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
switch(idopts->idtype) {
case IDTYPE_FILE:
retval = pkinit_get_certs_fs(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, idopts,
id_cryptoctx, princ);
break;
case IDTYPE_DIR:
retval = pkinit_get_certs_dir(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, idopts,
id_cryptoctx, princ);
break;
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
case IDTYPE_PKCS11:
retval = pkinit_get_certs_pkcs11(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, idopts,
id_cryptoctx, princ);
break;
#endif
case IDTYPE_PKCS12:
retval = pkinit_get_certs_pkcs12(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, idopts,
id_cryptoctx, princ);
break;
default:
retval = EINVAL;
}
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
cleanup:
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,981 | crypto_retieve_X509_key_usage(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgcctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqcctx,
X509 *x,
unsigned int *ret_ku_bits,
unsigned int *ret_eku_bits)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
int i;
unsigned int eku_bits = 0, ku_bits = 0;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage = NULL;
if (ret_ku_bits == NULL && ret_eku_bits == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (ret_eku_bits)
*ret_eku_bits = 0;
else {
pkiDebug("%s: EKUs not requested, not checking\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto check_kus;
}
/* Start with Extended Key usage */
i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
if (i >= 0) {
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *eku;
eku = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL);
if (eku) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku); i++) {
ASN1_OBJECT *certoid;
certoid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(eku, i);
if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, plgcctx->id_pkinit_KPClientAuth)) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_PKINIT;
else if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_ms_smartcard_login))) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_MSSCLOGIN;
else if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_client_auth))) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_CLIENTAUTH;
else if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_email_protect))) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_EMAILPROTECTION;
}
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_free(eku);
}
}
pkiDebug("%s: returning eku 0x%08x\n", __FUNCTION__, eku_bits);
*ret_eku_bits = eku_bits;
check_kus:
/* Now the Key Usage bits */
if (ret_ku_bits)
*ret_ku_bits = 0;
else {
pkiDebug("%s: KUs not requested, not checking\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto out;
}
/* Make sure usage exists before checking bits */
X509_check_ca(x);
usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL);
if (usage) {
if (!ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
ku_bits |= PKINIT_KU_DIGITALSIGNATURE;
if (!ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
ku_bits |= PKINIT_KU_KEYENCIPHERMENT;
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
}
pkiDebug("%s: returning ku 0x%08x\n", __FUNCTION__, ku_bits);
*ret_ku_bits = ku_bits;
retval = 0;
out:
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | crypto_retieve_X509_key_usage(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgcctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqcctx,
X509 *x,
unsigned int *ret_ku_bits,
unsigned int *ret_eku_bits)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
int i;
unsigned int eku_bits = 0, ku_bits = 0;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage = NULL;
if (ret_ku_bits == NULL && ret_eku_bits == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (ret_eku_bits)
*ret_eku_bits = 0;
else {
pkiDebug("%s: EKUs not requested, not checking\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto check_kus;
}
/* Start with Extended Key usage */
i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
if (i >= 0) {
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *eku;
eku = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL);
if (eku) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku); i++) {
ASN1_OBJECT *certoid;
certoid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(eku, i);
if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, plgcctx->id_pkinit_KPClientAuth)) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_PKINIT;
else if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_ms_smartcard_login))) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_MSSCLOGIN;
else if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_client_auth))) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_CLIENTAUTH;
else if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_email_protect))) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_EMAILPROTECTION;
}
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_free(eku);
}
}
pkiDebug("%s: returning eku 0x%08x\n", __FUNCTION__, eku_bits);
*ret_eku_bits = eku_bits;
check_kus:
/* Now the Key Usage bits */
if (ret_ku_bits)
*ret_ku_bits = 0;
else {
pkiDebug("%s: KUs not requested, not checking\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto out;
}
/* Make sure usage exists before checking bits */
X509_check_ca(x);
usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL);
if (usage) {
if (!ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
ku_bits |= PKINIT_KU_DIGITALSIGNATURE;
if (!ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
ku_bits |= PKINIT_KU_KEYENCIPHERMENT;
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
}
pkiDebug("%s: returning ku 0x%08x\n", __FUNCTION__, ku_bits);
*ret_ku_bits = ku_bits;
retval = 0;
out:
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,982 | crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
X509 *cert,
krb5_principal **princs_ret,
krb5_principal **upn_ret,
unsigned char ***dns_ret)
{
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
int p = 0, u = 0, d = 0, l;
krb5_principal *princs = NULL;
krb5_principal *upns = NULL;
unsigned char **dnss = NULL;
unsigned int i, num_found = 0;
if (princs_ret == NULL && upn_ret == NULL && dns_ret == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: nowhere to return any values!\n", __FUNCTION__);
return retval;
}
if (cert == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: no certificate!\n", __FUNCTION__);
return retval;
}
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert),
buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("%s: looking for SANs in cert = %s\n", __FUNCTION__, buf);
if ((l = X509_get_ext_by_NID(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, -1)) >= 0) {
X509_EXTENSION *ext = NULL;
GENERAL_NAMES *ialt = NULL;
GENERAL_NAME *gen = NULL;
int ret = 0;
unsigned int num_sans = 0;
if (!(ext = X509_get_ext(cert, l)) || !(ialt = X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext))) {
pkiDebug("%s: found no subject alt name extensions\n",
__FUNCTION__);
goto cleanup;
}
num_sans = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(ialt);
pkiDebug("%s: found %d subject alt name extension(s)\n",
__FUNCTION__, num_sans);
/* OK, we're likely returning something. Allocate return values */
if (princs_ret != NULL) {
princs = calloc(num_sans + 1, sizeof(krb5_principal));
if (princs == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (upn_ret != NULL) {
upns = calloc(num_sans + 1, sizeof(krb5_principal));
if (upns == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (dns_ret != NULL) {
dnss = calloc(num_sans + 1, sizeof(*dnss));
if (dnss == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < num_sans; i++) {
krb5_data name = { 0, 0, NULL };
gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(ialt, i);
switch (gen->type) {
case GEN_OTHERNAME:
name.length = gen->d.otherName->value->value.sequence->length;
name.data = (char *)gen->d.otherName->value->value.sequence->data;
if (princs != NULL
&& OBJ_cmp(plgctx->id_pkinit_san,
gen->d.otherName->type_id) == 0) {
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)name.data, name.length,
"/tmp/pkinit_san");
#endif
ret = k5int_decode_krb5_principal_name(&name, &princs[p]);
if (ret) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed decoding pkinit san value\n",
__FUNCTION__);
} else {
p++;
num_found++;
}
} else if (upns != NULL
&& OBJ_cmp(plgctx->id_ms_san_upn,
gen->d.otherName->type_id) == 0) {
/* Prevent abuse of embedded null characters. */
if (memchr(name.data, '\0', name.length))
break;
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, name.data, &upns[u]);
if (ret) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed parsing ms-upn san value\n",
__FUNCTION__);
} else {
u++;
num_found++;
}
} else {
pkiDebug("%s: unrecognized othername oid in SAN\n",
__FUNCTION__);
continue;
}
break;
case GEN_DNS:
if (dnss != NULL) {
/* Prevent abuse of embedded null characters. */
if (memchr(gen->d.dNSName->data, '\0',
gen->d.dNSName->length))
break;
pkiDebug("%s: found dns name = %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, gen->d.dNSName->data);
dnss[d] = (unsigned char *)
strdup((char *)gen->d.dNSName->data);
if (dnss[d] == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed to duplicate dns name\n",
__FUNCTION__);
} else {
d++;
num_found++;
}
}
break;
default:
pkiDebug("%s: SAN type = %d expecting %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, gen->type, GEN_OTHERNAME);
}
}
sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(ialt, GENERAL_NAME_free);
}
retval = 0;
if (princs)
*princs_ret = princs;
if (upns)
*upn_ret = upns;
if (dnss)
*dns_ret = dnss;
cleanup:
if (retval) {
if (princs != NULL) {
for (i = 0; princs[i] != NULL; i++)
krb5_free_principal(context, princs[i]);
free(princs);
}
if (upns != NULL) {
for (i = 0; upns[i] != NULL; i++)
krb5_free_principal(context, upns[i]);
free(upns);
}
if (dnss != NULL) {
for (i = 0; dnss[i] != NULL; i++)
free(dnss[i]);
free(dnss);
}
}
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
X509 *cert,
krb5_principal **princs_ret,
krb5_principal **upn_ret,
unsigned char ***dns_ret)
{
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
int p = 0, u = 0, d = 0, l;
krb5_principal *princs = NULL;
krb5_principal *upns = NULL;
unsigned char **dnss = NULL;
unsigned int i, num_found = 0;
if (princs_ret == NULL && upn_ret == NULL && dns_ret == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: nowhere to return any values!\n", __FUNCTION__);
return retval;
}
if (cert == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: no certificate!\n", __FUNCTION__);
return retval;
}
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert),
buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("%s: looking for SANs in cert = %s\n", __FUNCTION__, buf);
if ((l = X509_get_ext_by_NID(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, -1)) >= 0) {
X509_EXTENSION *ext = NULL;
GENERAL_NAMES *ialt = NULL;
GENERAL_NAME *gen = NULL;
int ret = 0;
unsigned int num_sans = 0;
if (!(ext = X509_get_ext(cert, l)) || !(ialt = X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext))) {
pkiDebug("%s: found no subject alt name extensions\n",
__FUNCTION__);
goto cleanup;
}
num_sans = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(ialt);
pkiDebug("%s: found %d subject alt name extension(s)\n",
__FUNCTION__, num_sans);
/* OK, we're likely returning something. Allocate return values */
if (princs_ret != NULL) {
princs = calloc(num_sans + 1, sizeof(krb5_principal));
if (princs == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (upn_ret != NULL) {
upns = calloc(num_sans + 1, sizeof(krb5_principal));
if (upns == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (dns_ret != NULL) {
dnss = calloc(num_sans + 1, sizeof(*dnss));
if (dnss == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < num_sans; i++) {
krb5_data name = { 0, 0, NULL };
gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(ialt, i);
switch (gen->type) {
case GEN_OTHERNAME:
name.length = gen->d.otherName->value->value.sequence->length;
name.data = (char *)gen->d.otherName->value->value.sequence->data;
if (princs != NULL
&& OBJ_cmp(plgctx->id_pkinit_san,
gen->d.otherName->type_id) == 0) {
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)name.data, name.length,
"/tmp/pkinit_san");
#endif
ret = k5int_decode_krb5_principal_name(&name, &princs[p]);
if (ret) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed decoding pkinit san value\n",
__FUNCTION__);
} else {
p++;
num_found++;
}
} else if (upns != NULL
&& OBJ_cmp(plgctx->id_ms_san_upn,
gen->d.otherName->type_id) == 0) {
/* Prevent abuse of embedded null characters. */
if (memchr(name.data, '\0', name.length))
break;
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, name.data, &upns[u]);
if (ret) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed parsing ms-upn san value\n",
__FUNCTION__);
} else {
u++;
num_found++;
}
} else {
pkiDebug("%s: unrecognized othername oid in SAN\n",
__FUNCTION__);
continue;
}
break;
case GEN_DNS:
if (dnss != NULL) {
/* Prevent abuse of embedded null characters. */
if (memchr(gen->d.dNSName->data, '\0',
gen->d.dNSName->length))
break;
pkiDebug("%s: found dns name = %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, gen->d.dNSName->data);
dnss[d] = (unsigned char *)
strdup((char *)gen->d.dNSName->data);
if (dnss[d] == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed to duplicate dns name\n",
__FUNCTION__);
} else {
d++;
num_found++;
}
}
break;
default:
pkiDebug("%s: SAN type = %d expecting %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, gen->type, GEN_OTHERNAME);
}
}
sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(ialt, GENERAL_NAME_free);
}
retval = 0;
if (princs)
*princs_ret = princs;
if (upns)
*upn_ret = upns;
if (dnss)
*dns_ret = dnss;
cleanup:
if (retval) {
if (princs != NULL) {
for (i = 0; princs[i] != NULL; i++)
krb5_free_principal(context, princs[i]);
free(princs);
}
if (upns != NULL) {
for (i = 0; upns[i] != NULL; i++)
krb5_free_principal(context, upns[i]);
free(upns);
}
if (dnss != NULL) {
for (i = 0; dnss[i] != NULL; i++)
free(dnss[i]);
free(dnss);
}
}
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,983 | crypto_retrieve_cert_sans(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
krb5_principal **princs_ret,
krb5_principal **upn_ret,
unsigned char ***dns_ret)
{
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: No certificate!\n", __FUNCTION__);
return retval;
}
return crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(context, plgctx, reqctx,
reqctx->received_cert, princs_ret,
upn_ret, dns_ret);
}
| DoS | 0 | crypto_retrieve_cert_sans(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
krb5_principal **princs_ret,
krb5_principal **upn_ret,
unsigned char ***dns_ret)
{
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: No certificate!\n", __FUNCTION__);
return retval;
}
return crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(context, plgctx, reqctx,
reqctx->received_cert, princs_ret,
upn_ret, dns_ret);
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,984 | free_cred_info(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
struct _pkinit_cred_info *cred)
{
if (cred != NULL) {
if (cred->cert != NULL)
X509_free(cred->cert);
if (cred->key != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(cred->key);
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
free(cred->cert_id);
#endif
free(cred->name);
free(cred);
}
}
| DoS | 0 | free_cred_info(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
struct _pkinit_cred_info *cred)
{
if (cred != NULL) {
if (cred->cert != NULL)
X509_free(cred->cert);
if (cred->key != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(cred->key);
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
free(cred->cert_id);
#endif
free(cred->name);
free(cred);
}
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,985 | get_cert(char *filename, X509 **retcert)
{
X509 *cert = NULL;
BIO *tmp = NULL;
int code;
krb5_error_code retval;
if (filename == NULL || retcert == NULL)
return EINVAL;
*retcert = NULL;
tmp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (tmp == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
code = BIO_read_filename(tmp, filename);
if (code == 0) {
retval = errno;
goto cleanup;
}
cert = (X509 *) PEM_read_bio_X509(tmp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (cert == NULL) {
retval = EIO;
pkiDebug("failed to read certificate from %s\n", filename);
goto cleanup;
}
*retcert = cert;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (tmp != NULL)
BIO_free(tmp);
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | get_cert(char *filename, X509 **retcert)
{
X509 *cert = NULL;
BIO *tmp = NULL;
int code;
krb5_error_code retval;
if (filename == NULL || retcert == NULL)
return EINVAL;
*retcert = NULL;
tmp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (tmp == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
code = BIO_read_filename(tmp, filename);
if (code == 0) {
retval = errno;
goto cleanup;
}
cert = (X509 *) PEM_read_bio_X509(tmp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (cert == NULL) {
retval = EIO;
pkiDebug("failed to read certificate from %s\n", filename);
goto cleanup;
}
*retcert = cert;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (tmp != NULL)
BIO_free(tmp);
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,986 | get_key(char *filename, EVP_PKEY **retkey)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
BIO *tmp = NULL;
int code;
krb5_error_code retval;
if (filename == NULL || retkey == NULL)
return EINVAL;
tmp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (tmp == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
code = BIO_read_filename(tmp, filename);
if (code == 0) {
retval = errno;
goto cleanup;
}
pkey = (EVP_PKEY *) PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tmp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (pkey == NULL) {
retval = EIO;
pkiDebug("failed to read private key from %s\n", filename);
goto cleanup;
}
*retkey = pkey;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (tmp != NULL)
BIO_free(tmp);
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | get_key(char *filename, EVP_PKEY **retkey)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
BIO *tmp = NULL;
int code;
krb5_error_code retval;
if (filename == NULL || retkey == NULL)
return EINVAL;
tmp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (tmp == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
code = BIO_read_filename(tmp, filename);
if (code == 0) {
retval = errno;
goto cleanup;
}
pkey = (EVP_PKEY *) PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tmp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (pkey == NULL) {
retval = EIO;
pkiDebug("failed to read private key from %s\n", filename);
goto cleanup;
}
*retkey = pkey;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (tmp != NULL)
BIO_free(tmp);
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,987 | load_cas_and_crls(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int catype,
char *filename)
{
STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *ca_certs = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *ca_crls = NULL;
BIO *in = NULL;
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
int i = 0;
/* If there isn't already a stack in the context,
* create a temporary one now */
switch(catype) {
case CATYPE_ANCHORS:
if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs != NULL)
ca_certs = id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs;
else {
ca_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
if (ca_certs == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
break;
case CATYPE_INTERMEDIATES:
if (id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs != NULL)
ca_certs = id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs;
else {
ca_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
if (ca_certs == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
break;
case CATYPE_CRLS:
if (id_cryptoctx->revoked != NULL)
ca_crls = id_cryptoctx->revoked;
else {
ca_crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
if (ca_crls == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
break;
default:
return ENOTSUP;
}
if (!(in = BIO_new_file(filename, "r"))) {
retval = errno;
pkiDebug("%s: error opening file '%s': %s\n", __FUNCTION__,
filename, error_message(errno));
goto cleanup;
}
/* This loads from a file, a stack of x509/crl/pkey sets */
if ((sk = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: error reading file '%s'\n", __FUNCTION__, filename);
retval = EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
/* scan over the stack created from loading the file contents,
* weed out duplicates, and push new ones onto the return stack
*/
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(sk); i++) {
X509_INFO *xi = sk_X509_INFO_value(sk, i);
if (xi != NULL && xi->x509 != NULL && catype != CATYPE_CRLS) {
int j = 0, size = sk_X509_num(ca_certs), flag = 0;
if (!size) {
sk_X509_push(ca_certs, xi->x509);
xi->x509 = NULL;
continue;
}
for (j = 0; j < size; j++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ca_certs, j);
flag = X509_cmp(x, xi->x509);
if (flag == 0)
break;
else
continue;
}
if (flag != 0) {
sk_X509_push(ca_certs, X509_dup(xi->x509));
}
} else if (xi != NULL && xi->crl != NULL && catype == CATYPE_CRLS) {
int j = 0, size = sk_X509_CRL_num(ca_crls), flag = 0;
if (!size) {
sk_X509_CRL_push(ca_crls, xi->crl);
xi->crl = NULL;
continue;
}
for (j = 0; j < size; j++) {
X509_CRL *x = sk_X509_CRL_value(ca_crls, j);
flag = X509_CRL_cmp(x, xi->crl);
if (flag == 0)
break;
else
continue;
}
if (flag != 0) {
sk_X509_CRL_push(ca_crls, X509_CRL_dup(xi->crl));
}
}
}
/* If we added something and there wasn't a stack in the
* context before, add the temporary stack to the context.
*/
switch(catype) {
case CATYPE_ANCHORS:
if (sk_X509_num(ca_certs) == 0) {
pkiDebug("no anchors in file, %s\n", filename);
if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs == NULL)
sk_X509_free(ca_certs);
} else {
if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs == NULL)
id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs = ca_certs;
}
break;
case CATYPE_INTERMEDIATES:
if (sk_X509_num(ca_certs) == 0) {
pkiDebug("no intermediates in file, %s\n", filename);
if (id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs == NULL)
sk_X509_free(ca_certs);
} else {
if (id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs == NULL)
id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs = ca_certs;
}
break;
case CATYPE_CRLS:
if (sk_X509_CRL_num(ca_crls) == 0) {
pkiDebug("no crls in file, %s\n", filename);
if (id_cryptoctx->revoked == NULL)
sk_X509_CRL_free(ca_crls);
} else {
if (id_cryptoctx->revoked == NULL)
id_cryptoctx->revoked = ca_crls;
}
break;
default:
/* Should have been caught above! */
retval = EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
break;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (in != NULL)
BIO_free(in);
if (sk != NULL)
sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(sk, X509_INFO_free);
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | load_cas_and_crls(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int catype,
char *filename)
{
STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *ca_certs = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *ca_crls = NULL;
BIO *in = NULL;
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
int i = 0;
/* If there isn't already a stack in the context,
* create a temporary one now */
switch(catype) {
case CATYPE_ANCHORS:
if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs != NULL)
ca_certs = id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs;
else {
ca_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
if (ca_certs == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
break;
case CATYPE_INTERMEDIATES:
if (id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs != NULL)
ca_certs = id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs;
else {
ca_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
if (ca_certs == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
break;
case CATYPE_CRLS:
if (id_cryptoctx->revoked != NULL)
ca_crls = id_cryptoctx->revoked;
else {
ca_crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
if (ca_crls == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
break;
default:
return ENOTSUP;
}
if (!(in = BIO_new_file(filename, "r"))) {
retval = errno;
pkiDebug("%s: error opening file '%s': %s\n", __FUNCTION__,
filename, error_message(errno));
goto cleanup;
}
/* This loads from a file, a stack of x509/crl/pkey sets */
if ((sk = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: error reading file '%s'\n", __FUNCTION__, filename);
retval = EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
/* scan over the stack created from loading the file contents,
* weed out duplicates, and push new ones onto the return stack
*/
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(sk); i++) {
X509_INFO *xi = sk_X509_INFO_value(sk, i);
if (xi != NULL && xi->x509 != NULL && catype != CATYPE_CRLS) {
int j = 0, size = sk_X509_num(ca_certs), flag = 0;
if (!size) {
sk_X509_push(ca_certs, xi->x509);
xi->x509 = NULL;
continue;
}
for (j = 0; j < size; j++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ca_certs, j);
flag = X509_cmp(x, xi->x509);
if (flag == 0)
break;
else
continue;
}
if (flag != 0) {
sk_X509_push(ca_certs, X509_dup(xi->x509));
}
} else if (xi != NULL && xi->crl != NULL && catype == CATYPE_CRLS) {
int j = 0, size = sk_X509_CRL_num(ca_crls), flag = 0;
if (!size) {
sk_X509_CRL_push(ca_crls, xi->crl);
xi->crl = NULL;
continue;
}
for (j = 0; j < size; j++) {
X509_CRL *x = sk_X509_CRL_value(ca_crls, j);
flag = X509_CRL_cmp(x, xi->crl);
if (flag == 0)
break;
else
continue;
}
if (flag != 0) {
sk_X509_CRL_push(ca_crls, X509_CRL_dup(xi->crl));
}
}
}
/* If we added something and there wasn't a stack in the
* context before, add the temporary stack to the context.
*/
switch(catype) {
case CATYPE_ANCHORS:
if (sk_X509_num(ca_certs) == 0) {
pkiDebug("no anchors in file, %s\n", filename);
if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs == NULL)
sk_X509_free(ca_certs);
} else {
if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs == NULL)
id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs = ca_certs;
}
break;
case CATYPE_INTERMEDIATES:
if (sk_X509_num(ca_certs) == 0) {
pkiDebug("no intermediates in file, %s\n", filename);
if (id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs == NULL)
sk_X509_free(ca_certs);
} else {
if (id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs == NULL)
id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs = ca_certs;
}
break;
case CATYPE_CRLS:
if (sk_X509_CRL_num(ca_crls) == 0) {
pkiDebug("no crls in file, %s\n", filename);
if (id_cryptoctx->revoked == NULL)
sk_X509_CRL_free(ca_crls);
} else {
if (id_cryptoctx->revoked == NULL)
id_cryptoctx->revoked = ca_crls;
}
break;
default:
/* Should have been caught above! */
retval = EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
break;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (in != NULL)
BIO_free(in);
if (sk != NULL)
sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(sk, X509_INFO_free);
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,988 | load_cas_and_crls_dir(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int catype,
char *dirname)
{
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
DIR *d = NULL;
struct dirent *dentry = NULL;
char filename[1024];
if (dirname == NULL)
return EINVAL;
d = opendir(dirname);
if (d == NULL)
return ENOENT;
while ((dentry = readdir(d))) {
if (strlen(dirname) + strlen(dentry->d_name) + 2 > sizeof(filename)) {
pkiDebug("%s: Path too long -- directory '%s' and file '%s'\n",
__FUNCTION__, dirname, dentry->d_name);
goto cleanup;
}
/* Ignore subdirectories and anything starting with a dot */
#ifdef DT_DIR
if (dentry->d_type == DT_DIR)
continue;
#endif
if (dentry->d_name[0] == '.')
continue;
snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s", dirname, dentry->d_name);
retval = load_cas_and_crls(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, catype, filename);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (d != NULL)
closedir(d);
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | load_cas_and_crls_dir(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int catype,
char *dirname)
{
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
DIR *d = NULL;
struct dirent *dentry = NULL;
char filename[1024];
if (dirname == NULL)
return EINVAL;
d = opendir(dirname);
if (d == NULL)
return ENOENT;
while ((dentry = readdir(d))) {
if (strlen(dirname) + strlen(dentry->d_name) + 2 > sizeof(filename)) {
pkiDebug("%s: Path too long -- directory '%s' and file '%s'\n",
__FUNCTION__, dirname, dentry->d_name);
goto cleanup;
}
/* Ignore subdirectories and anything starting with a dot */
#ifdef DT_DIR
if (dentry->d_type == DT_DIR)
continue;
#endif
if (dentry->d_name[0] == '.')
continue;
snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s", dirname, dentry->d_name);
retval = load_cas_and_crls(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, catype, filename);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (d != NULL)
closedir(d);
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,989 | openssl_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)
{
#ifdef DEBUG
if (!ok) {
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert = %s\n", buf);
pkiDebug("callback function: %d (%s)\n", ctx->error,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error));
}
#endif
return ok;
}
| DoS | 0 | openssl_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)
{
#ifdef DEBUG
if (!ok) {
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert = %s\n", buf);
pkiDebug("callback function: %d (%s)\n", ctx->error,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error));
}
#endif
return ok;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,990 | openssl_callback_ignore_crls(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)
{
if (!ok) {
switch (ctx->error) {
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
return ok;
}
| DoS | 0 | openssl_callback_ignore_crls(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)
{
if (!ok) {
switch (ctx->error) {
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
return ok;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,991 | openssl_init()
{
static int did_init = 0;
if (!did_init) {
/* initialize openssl routines */
CRYPTO_malloc_init();
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
did_init++;
}
}
| DoS | 0 | openssl_init()
{
static int did_init = 0;
if (!did_init) {
/* initialize openssl routines */
CRYPTO_malloc_init();
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
did_init++;
}
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,992 | pkcs7_dataDecode(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
PKCS7 *p7)
{
int i = 0;
unsigned int jj = 0, tmp_len = 0;
BIO *out=NULL,*etmp=NULL,*bio=NULL;
unsigned char *tmp=NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data_body=NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher=NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx=NULL;
X509_ALGOR *enc_alg=NULL;
STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk=NULL;
PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri=NULL;
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs,
id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
rsk=p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
enc_alg=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
data_body=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto cleanup;
}
if ((etmp=BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
goto cleanup;
}
/* It was encrypted, we need to decrypt the secret key
* with the private key */
/* Find the recipientInfo which matches the passed certificate
* (if any)
*/
if (cert) {
for (i=0; i<sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
int tmp_ret = 0;
ri=sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk,i);
tmp_ret = X509_NAME_cmp(ri->issuer_and_serial->issuer,
cert->cert_info->issuer);
if (!tmp_ret) {
tmp_ret = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(cert->cert_info->serialNumber,
ri->issuer_and_serial->serial);
if (!tmp_ret)
break;
}
ri=NULL;
}
if (ri == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_CERTIFICATE);
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* If we haven't got a certificate try each ri in turn */
if (cert == NULL) {
for (i=0; i<sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
ri=sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk,i);
jj = pkinit_decode_data(context, id_cryptoctx,
M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key),
(unsigned int) M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key),
&tmp, &tmp_len);
if (jj) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto cleanup;
}
if (!jj && tmp_len > 0) {
jj = tmp_len;
break;
}
ERR_clear_error();
ri = NULL;
}
if (ri == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_KEY);
goto cleanup;
}
}
else {
jj = pkinit_decode_data(context, id_cryptoctx,
M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key),
(unsigned int) M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key),
&tmp, &tmp_len);
if (jj || tmp_len <= 0) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto cleanup;
}
jj = tmp_len;
}
evp_ctx=NULL;
BIO_get_cipher_ctx(etmp,&evp_ctx);
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,evp_cipher,NULL,NULL,NULL,0) <= 0)
goto cleanup;
if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx,enc_alg->parameter) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (jj != (unsigned) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) {
/* Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key
* and effective key length. The key length is
* determined by the size of the decrypted RSA key.
*/
if(!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(evp_ctx, (int)jj)) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
PKCS7_R_DECRYPTED_KEY_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,NULL,NULL,tmp,NULL,0) <= 0)
goto cleanup;
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp,jj);
if (out == NULL)
out=etmp;
else
BIO_push(out,etmp);
etmp=NULL;
if (data_body->length > 0)
bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(data_body->data, data_body->length);
else {
bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio,0);
}
BIO_push(out,bio);
bio=NULL;
if (0) {
cleanup:
if (out != NULL) BIO_free_all(out);
if (etmp != NULL) BIO_free_all(etmp);
if (bio != NULL) BIO_free_all(bio);
out=NULL;
}
if (tmp != NULL)
free(tmp);
return(out);
}
| DoS | 0 | pkcs7_dataDecode(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
PKCS7 *p7)
{
int i = 0;
unsigned int jj = 0, tmp_len = 0;
BIO *out=NULL,*etmp=NULL,*bio=NULL;
unsigned char *tmp=NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data_body=NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher=NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx=NULL;
X509_ALGOR *enc_alg=NULL;
STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk=NULL;
PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri=NULL;
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs,
id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
rsk=p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
enc_alg=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
data_body=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto cleanup;
}
if ((etmp=BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
goto cleanup;
}
/* It was encrypted, we need to decrypt the secret key
* with the private key */
/* Find the recipientInfo which matches the passed certificate
* (if any)
*/
if (cert) {
for (i=0; i<sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
int tmp_ret = 0;
ri=sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk,i);
tmp_ret = X509_NAME_cmp(ri->issuer_and_serial->issuer,
cert->cert_info->issuer);
if (!tmp_ret) {
tmp_ret = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(cert->cert_info->serialNumber,
ri->issuer_and_serial->serial);
if (!tmp_ret)
break;
}
ri=NULL;
}
if (ri == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_CERTIFICATE);
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* If we haven't got a certificate try each ri in turn */
if (cert == NULL) {
for (i=0; i<sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
ri=sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk,i);
jj = pkinit_decode_data(context, id_cryptoctx,
M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key),
(unsigned int) M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key),
&tmp, &tmp_len);
if (jj) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto cleanup;
}
if (!jj && tmp_len > 0) {
jj = tmp_len;
break;
}
ERR_clear_error();
ri = NULL;
}
if (ri == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_KEY);
goto cleanup;
}
}
else {
jj = pkinit_decode_data(context, id_cryptoctx,
M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key),
(unsigned int) M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key),
&tmp, &tmp_len);
if (jj || tmp_len <= 0) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto cleanup;
}
jj = tmp_len;
}
evp_ctx=NULL;
BIO_get_cipher_ctx(etmp,&evp_ctx);
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,evp_cipher,NULL,NULL,NULL,0) <= 0)
goto cleanup;
if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx,enc_alg->parameter) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (jj != (unsigned) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) {
/* Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key
* and effective key length. The key length is
* determined by the size of the decrypted RSA key.
*/
if(!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(evp_ctx, (int)jj)) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
PKCS7_R_DECRYPTED_KEY_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,NULL,NULL,tmp,NULL,0) <= 0)
goto cleanup;
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp,jj);
if (out == NULL)
out=etmp;
else
BIO_push(out,etmp);
etmp=NULL;
if (data_body->length > 0)
bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(data_body->data, data_body->length);
else {
bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio,0);
}
BIO_push(out,bio);
bio=NULL;
if (0) {
cleanup:
if (out != NULL) BIO_free_all(out);
if (etmp != NULL) BIO_free_all(etmp);
if (bio != NULL) BIO_free_all(bio);
out=NULL;
}
if (tmp != NULL)
free(tmp);
return(out);
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,993 | pkcs7_decrypt(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
PKCS7 *p7,
BIO *data)
{
BIO *tmpmem = NULL;
int retval = 0, i = 0;
char buf[4096];
if(p7 == NULL)
return 0;
if(!PKCS7_type_is_enveloped(p7)) {
pkiDebug("wrong pkcs7 content type\n");
return 0;
}
if(!(tmpmem = pkcs7_dataDecode(context, id_cryptoctx, p7))) {
pkiDebug("unable to decrypt pkcs7 object\n");
return 0;
}
for(;;) {
i = BIO_read(tmpmem, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (i <= 0) break;
BIO_write(data, buf, i);
BIO_free_all(tmpmem);
return 1;
}
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | pkcs7_decrypt(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
PKCS7 *p7,
BIO *data)
{
BIO *tmpmem = NULL;
int retval = 0, i = 0;
char buf[4096];
if(p7 == NULL)
return 0;
if(!PKCS7_type_is_enveloped(p7)) {
pkiDebug("wrong pkcs7 content type\n");
return 0;
}
if(!(tmpmem = pkcs7_dataDecode(context, id_cryptoctx, p7))) {
pkiDebug("unable to decrypt pkcs7 object\n");
return 0;
}
for(;;) {
i = BIO_read(tmpmem, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (i <= 0) break;
BIO_write(data, buf, i);
BIO_free_all(tmpmem);
return 1;
}
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,994 | pkinit_C_Decrypt(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
{
CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
rv = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Decrypt(id_cryptoctx->session, pEncryptedData,
ulEncryptedDataLen, pData, pulDataLen);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("pData %p *pulDataLen %d\n", (void *) pData,
(int) *pulDataLen);
}
return rv;
}
| DoS | 0 | pkinit_C_Decrypt(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
{
CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
rv = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Decrypt(id_cryptoctx->session, pEncryptedData,
ulEncryptedDataLen, pData, pulDataLen);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("pData %p *pulDataLen %d\n", (void *) pData,
(int) *pulDataLen);
}
return rv;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,995 | pkinit_C_LoadModule(const char *modname, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR p11p)
{
void *handle;
CK_RV (*getflist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR);
pkiDebug("loading module \"%s\"... ", modname);
handle = dlopen(modname, RTLD_NOW);
if (handle == NULL) {
pkiDebug("not found\n");
return NULL;
}
getflist = (CK_RV (*)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR)) dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList");
if (getflist == NULL || (*getflist)(p11p) != CKR_OK) {
dlclose(handle);
pkiDebug("failed\n");
return NULL;
}
pkiDebug("ok\n");
return handle;
}
| DoS | 0 | pkinit_C_LoadModule(const char *modname, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR p11p)
{
void *handle;
CK_RV (*getflist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR);
pkiDebug("loading module \"%s\"... ", modname);
handle = dlopen(modname, RTLD_NOW);
if (handle == NULL) {
pkiDebug("not found\n");
return NULL;
}
getflist = (CK_RV (*)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR)) dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList");
if (getflist == NULL || (*getflist)(p11p) != CKR_OK) {
dlclose(handle);
pkiDebug("failed\n");
return NULL;
}
pkiDebug("ok\n");
return handle;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,996 | pkinit_C_UnloadModule(void *handle)
{
dlclose(handle);
return CKR_OK;
}
| DoS | 0 | pkinit_C_UnloadModule(void *handle)
{
dlclose(handle);
return CKR_OK;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,997 | pkinit_alg_agility_kdf(krb5_context context,
krb5_data *secret,
krb5_data *alg_oid,
krb5_const_principal party_u_info,
krb5_const_principal party_v_info,
krb5_enctype enctype,
krb5_data *as_req,
krb5_data *pk_as_rep,
krb5_keyblock *key_block)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
unsigned int reps = 0;
uint32_t counter = 1; /* Does this type work on Windows? */
size_t offset = 0;
size_t hash_len = 0;
size_t rand_len = 0;
size_t key_len = 0;
krb5_data random_data;
krb5_sp80056a_other_info other_info_fields;
krb5_pkinit_supp_pub_info supp_pub_info_fields;
krb5_data *other_info = NULL;
krb5_data *supp_pub_info = NULL;
krb5_algorithm_identifier alg_id;
const EVP_MD *(*EVP_func)(void);
/* initialize random_data here to make clean-up safe */
random_data.length = 0;
random_data.data = NULL;
/* allocate and initialize the key block */
key_block->magic = 0;
key_block->enctype = enctype;
if (0 != (retval = krb5_c_keylengths(context, enctype, &rand_len,
&key_len)))
goto cleanup;
random_data.length = rand_len;
key_block->length = key_len;
if (NULL == (key_block->contents = malloc(key_block->length))) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
memset (key_block->contents, 0, key_block->length);
/* If this is anonymous pkinit, use the anonymous principle for party_u_info */
if (party_u_info && krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(context, party_u_info,
krb5_anonymous_principal()))
party_u_info = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
if (0 != (retval = pkinit_alg_values(context, alg_oid, &hash_len, &EVP_func)))
goto cleanup;
/* 1. reps = keydatalen (K) / hash length (H) */
reps = key_block->length/hash_len;
/* ... and round up, if necessary */
if (key_block->length > (reps * hash_len))
reps++;
/* Allocate enough space in the random data buffer to hash directly into
* it, even if the last hash will make it bigger than the key length. */
if (NULL == (random_data.data = malloc(reps * hash_len))) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Encode the ASN.1 octet string for "SuppPubInfo" */
supp_pub_info_fields.enctype = enctype;
supp_pub_info_fields.as_req = *as_req;
supp_pub_info_fields.pk_as_rep = *pk_as_rep;
if (0 != ((retval = encode_krb5_pkinit_supp_pub_info(&supp_pub_info_fields,
&supp_pub_info))))
goto cleanup;
/* Now encode the ASN.1 octet string for "OtherInfo" */
memset(&alg_id, 0, sizeof alg_id);
alg_id.algorithm = *alg_oid; /*alias*/
other_info_fields.algorithm_identifier = alg_id;
other_info_fields.party_u_info = (krb5_principal) party_u_info;
other_info_fields.party_v_info = (krb5_principal) party_v_info;
other_info_fields.supp_pub_info = *supp_pub_info;
if (0 != (retval = encode_krb5_sp80056a_other_info(&other_info_fields, &other_info)))
goto cleanup;
/* 2. Initialize a 32-bit, big-endian bit string counter as 1.
* 3. For i = 1 to reps by 1, do the following:
* - Compute Hashi = H(counter || Z || OtherInfo).
* - Increment counter (modulo 2^32)
*/
for (counter = 1; counter <= reps; counter++) {
EVP_MD_CTX c;
uint s = 0;
uint32_t be_counter = htonl(counter);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
/* - Compute Hashi = H(counter || Z || OtherInfo). */
if (0 == EVP_DigestInit(&c, EVP_func())) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL,
"Call to OpenSSL EVP_DigestInit() returned an error.");
retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((0 == EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, &be_counter, 4)) ||
(0 == EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, secret->data, secret->length)) ||
(0 == EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, other_info->data, other_info->length))) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL,
"Call to OpenSSL EVP_DigestUpdate() returned an error.");
retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto cleanup;
}
/* 4. Set key = Hash1 || Hash2 || ... so that length of key is K bytes. */
if (0 == EVP_DigestFinal(&c, (unsigned char *)(random_data.data + offset), &s)) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL,
"Call to OpenSSL EVP_DigestUpdate() returned an error.");
retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto cleanup;
}
offset += s;
assert(s == hash_len);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
}
retval = krb5_c_random_to_key(context, enctype, &random_data,
key_block);
cleanup:
/* If this has been an error, free the allocated key_block, if any */
if (retval) {
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, key_block);
}
/* free other allocated resources, either way */
if (random_data.data)
free(random_data.data);
krb5_free_data(context, other_info);
krb5_free_data(context, supp_pub_info);
return retval;
} /*pkinit_alg_agility_kdf() */
| DoS | 0 | pkinit_alg_agility_kdf(krb5_context context,
krb5_data *secret,
krb5_data *alg_oid,
krb5_const_principal party_u_info,
krb5_const_principal party_v_info,
krb5_enctype enctype,
krb5_data *as_req,
krb5_data *pk_as_rep,
krb5_keyblock *key_block)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
unsigned int reps = 0;
uint32_t counter = 1; /* Does this type work on Windows? */
size_t offset = 0;
size_t hash_len = 0;
size_t rand_len = 0;
size_t key_len = 0;
krb5_data random_data;
krb5_sp80056a_other_info other_info_fields;
krb5_pkinit_supp_pub_info supp_pub_info_fields;
krb5_data *other_info = NULL;
krb5_data *supp_pub_info = NULL;
krb5_algorithm_identifier alg_id;
const EVP_MD *(*EVP_func)(void);
/* initialize random_data here to make clean-up safe */
random_data.length = 0;
random_data.data = NULL;
/* allocate and initialize the key block */
key_block->magic = 0;
key_block->enctype = enctype;
if (0 != (retval = krb5_c_keylengths(context, enctype, &rand_len,
&key_len)))
goto cleanup;
random_data.length = rand_len;
key_block->length = key_len;
if (NULL == (key_block->contents = malloc(key_block->length))) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
memset (key_block->contents, 0, key_block->length);
/* If this is anonymous pkinit, use the anonymous principle for party_u_info */
if (party_u_info && krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(context, party_u_info,
krb5_anonymous_principal()))
party_u_info = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
if (0 != (retval = pkinit_alg_values(context, alg_oid, &hash_len, &EVP_func)))
goto cleanup;
/* 1. reps = keydatalen (K) / hash length (H) */
reps = key_block->length/hash_len;
/* ... and round up, if necessary */
if (key_block->length > (reps * hash_len))
reps++;
/* Allocate enough space in the random data buffer to hash directly into
* it, even if the last hash will make it bigger than the key length. */
if (NULL == (random_data.data = malloc(reps * hash_len))) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Encode the ASN.1 octet string for "SuppPubInfo" */
supp_pub_info_fields.enctype = enctype;
supp_pub_info_fields.as_req = *as_req;
supp_pub_info_fields.pk_as_rep = *pk_as_rep;
if (0 != ((retval = encode_krb5_pkinit_supp_pub_info(&supp_pub_info_fields,
&supp_pub_info))))
goto cleanup;
/* Now encode the ASN.1 octet string for "OtherInfo" */
memset(&alg_id, 0, sizeof alg_id);
alg_id.algorithm = *alg_oid; /*alias*/
other_info_fields.algorithm_identifier = alg_id;
other_info_fields.party_u_info = (krb5_principal) party_u_info;
other_info_fields.party_v_info = (krb5_principal) party_v_info;
other_info_fields.supp_pub_info = *supp_pub_info;
if (0 != (retval = encode_krb5_sp80056a_other_info(&other_info_fields, &other_info)))
goto cleanup;
/* 2. Initialize a 32-bit, big-endian bit string counter as 1.
* 3. For i = 1 to reps by 1, do the following:
* - Compute Hashi = H(counter || Z || OtherInfo).
* - Increment counter (modulo 2^32)
*/
for (counter = 1; counter <= reps; counter++) {
EVP_MD_CTX c;
uint s = 0;
uint32_t be_counter = htonl(counter);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
/* - Compute Hashi = H(counter || Z || OtherInfo). */
if (0 == EVP_DigestInit(&c, EVP_func())) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL,
"Call to OpenSSL EVP_DigestInit() returned an error.");
retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((0 == EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, &be_counter, 4)) ||
(0 == EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, secret->data, secret->length)) ||
(0 == EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, other_info->data, other_info->length))) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL,
"Call to OpenSSL EVP_DigestUpdate() returned an error.");
retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto cleanup;
}
/* 4. Set key = Hash1 || Hash2 || ... so that length of key is K bytes. */
if (0 == EVP_DigestFinal(&c, (unsigned char *)(random_data.data + offset), &s)) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL,
"Call to OpenSSL EVP_DigestUpdate() returned an error.");
retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto cleanup;
}
offset += s;
assert(s == hash_len);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
}
retval = krb5_c_random_to_key(context, enctype, &random_data,
key_block);
cleanup:
/* If this has been an error, free the allocated key_block, if any */
if (retval) {
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, key_block);
}
/* free other allocated resources, either way */
if (random_data.data)
free(random_data.data);
krb5_free_data(context, other_info);
krb5_free_data(context, supp_pub_info);
return retval;
} /*pkinit_alg_agility_kdf() */
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,998 | pkinit_alg_values(krb5_context context,
const krb5_data *alg_id,
size_t *hash_bytes,
const EVP_MD *(**func)(void))
{
*hash_bytes = 0;
*func = NULL;
if ((alg_id->length == krb5_pkinit_sha1_oid_len) &&
(0 == memcmp(alg_id->data, &krb5_pkinit_sha1_oid,
krb5_pkinit_sha1_oid_len))) {
*hash_bytes = 20;
*func = &EVP_sha1;
return 0;
} else if ((alg_id->length == krb5_pkinit_sha256_oid_len) &&
(0 == memcmp(alg_id->data, krb5_pkinit_sha256_oid,
krb5_pkinit_sha256_oid_len))) {
*hash_bytes = 32;
*func = &EVP_sha256;
return 0;
} else if ((alg_id->length == krb5_pkinit_sha512_oid_len) &&
(0 == memcmp(alg_id->data, krb5_pkinit_sha512_oid,
krb5_pkinit_sha512_oid_len))) {
*hash_bytes = 64;
*func = &EVP_sha512;
return 0;
} else {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_ERR_BAD_S2K_PARAMS,
"Bad algorithm ID passed to PK-INIT KDF.");
return KRB5_ERR_BAD_S2K_PARAMS;
}
} /* pkinit_alg_values() */
| DoS | 0 | pkinit_alg_values(krb5_context context,
const krb5_data *alg_id,
size_t *hash_bytes,
const EVP_MD *(**func)(void))
{
*hash_bytes = 0;
*func = NULL;
if ((alg_id->length == krb5_pkinit_sha1_oid_len) &&
(0 == memcmp(alg_id->data, &krb5_pkinit_sha1_oid,
krb5_pkinit_sha1_oid_len))) {
*hash_bytes = 20;
*func = &EVP_sha1;
return 0;
} else if ((alg_id->length == krb5_pkinit_sha256_oid_len) &&
(0 == memcmp(alg_id->data, krb5_pkinit_sha256_oid,
krb5_pkinit_sha256_oid_len))) {
*hash_bytes = 32;
*func = &EVP_sha256;
return 0;
} else if ((alg_id->length == krb5_pkinit_sha512_oid_len) &&
(0 == memcmp(alg_id->data, krb5_pkinit_sha512_oid,
krb5_pkinit_sha512_oid_len))) {
*hash_bytes = 64;
*func = &EVP_sha512;
return 0;
} else {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_ERR_BAD_S2K_PARAMS,
"Bad algorithm ID passed to PK-INIT KDF.");
return KRB5_ERR_BAD_S2K_PARAMS;
}
} /* pkinit_alg_values() */
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
26,999 | pkinit_check_dh_params(BIGNUM * p1, BIGNUM * p2, BIGNUM * g1, BIGNUM * q1)
{
BIGNUM *g2 = NULL, *q2 = NULL;
int retval = -1;
if (!BN_cmp(p1, p2)) {
g2 = BN_new();
BN_set_word(g2, DH_GENERATOR_2);
if (!BN_cmp(g1, g2)) {
q2 = BN_new();
BN_rshift1(q2, p1);
if (!BN_cmp(q1, q2)) {
pkiDebug("good %d dhparams\n", BN_num_bits(p1));
retval = 0;
} else
pkiDebug("bad group 2 q dhparameter\n");
BN_free(q2);
} else
pkiDebug("bad g dhparameter\n");
BN_free(g2);
} else
pkiDebug("p is not well-known group 2 dhparameter\n");
return retval;
}
| DoS | 0 | pkinit_check_dh_params(BIGNUM * p1, BIGNUM * p2, BIGNUM * g1, BIGNUM * q1)
{
BIGNUM *g2 = NULL, *q2 = NULL;
int retval = -1;
if (!BN_cmp(p1, p2)) {
g2 = BN_new();
BN_set_word(g2, DH_GENERATOR_2);
if (!BN_cmp(g1, g2)) {
q2 = BN_new();
BN_rshift1(q2, p1);
if (!BN_cmp(q1, q2)) {
pkiDebug("good %d dhparams\n", BN_num_bits(p1));
retval = 0;
} else
pkiDebug("bad group 2 q dhparameter\n");
BN_free(q2);
} else
pkiDebug("bad g dhparameter\n");
BN_free(g2);
} else
pkiDebug("p is not well-known group 2 dhparameter\n");
return retval;
}
| @@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ return retval;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
@@ -3263,7 +3263,6 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
}
retval = 0;
-cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is); | null | null | null |
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