Dataset Preview
The full dataset viewer is not available (click to read why). Only showing a preview of the rows.
The dataset generation failed
Error code: DatasetGenerationError
Exception: ArrowInvalid
Message: JSON parse error: The document is empty.
Traceback: Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/packaged_modules/json/json.py", line 160, in _generate_tables
df = pandas_read_json(f)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/packaged_modules/json/json.py", line 38, in pandas_read_json
return pd.read_json(path_or_buf, **kwargs)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/pandas/io/json/_json.py", line 815, in read_json
return json_reader.read()
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/pandas/io/json/_json.py", line 1025, in read
obj = self._get_object_parser(self.data)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/pandas/io/json/_json.py", line 1051, in _get_object_parser
obj = FrameParser(json, **kwargs).parse()
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/pandas/io/json/_json.py", line 1187, in parse
self._parse()
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/pandas/io/json/_json.py", line 1403, in _parse
ujson_loads(json, precise_float=self.precise_float), dtype=None
ValueError: Expected object or value
During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1854, in _prepare_split_single
for _, table in generator:
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/packaged_modules/json/json.py", line 163, in _generate_tables
raise e
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/packaged_modules/json/json.py", line 137, in _generate_tables
pa_table = paj.read_json(
File "pyarrow/_json.pyx", line 308, in pyarrow._json.read_json
File "pyarrow/error.pxi", line 154, in pyarrow.lib.pyarrow_internal_check_status
File "pyarrow/error.pxi", line 91, in pyarrow.lib.check_status
pyarrow.lib.ArrowInvalid: JSON parse error: The document is empty.
The above exception was the direct cause of the following exception:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 1420, in compute_config_parquet_and_info_response
parquet_operations = convert_to_parquet(builder)
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 1052, in convert_to_parquet
builder.download_and_prepare(
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 924, in download_and_prepare
self._download_and_prepare(
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1000, in _download_and_prepare
self._prepare_split(split_generator, **prepare_split_kwargs)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1741, in _prepare_split
for job_id, done, content in self._prepare_split_single(
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1897, in _prepare_split_single
raise DatasetGenerationError("An error occurred while generating the dataset") from e
datasets.exceptions.DatasetGenerationError: An error occurred while generating the datasetNeed help to make the dataset viewer work? Make sure to review how to configure the dataset viewer, and open a discussion for direct support.
train dict |
|---|
{
"text": "They who have presumed to dogmatize on nature, as on some wel investigated subject, either from self-conceit or arrogance, and in th professorial style, have inflicted the greatest injury on philosophy an learning. For they have tended to stifle and interrupt inquiry exactly i proportion ... |
{
"text": "Our method, though difficult in its operation, is easily explained. I consists in determining the degrees of certainty, while we, as it were restore the senses to their former rank, but generally reject tha operation of the mind which follows close upon the senses, and open an establish a... |
{
"text": "Having premised so much, we lay down two points on which we would admonis mankind, lest they should fail to see or to observe them. The first o these is, that it is our good fortune (as we consider it), for the sake o extinguishing and removing contradiction and irritation of mind, to leav the honor a... |
{
"text": "We make no attempt to disturb the system of philosophy that now prevails or any other which may or will exist, either more correct or mor complete. For we deny not that the received system of philosophy, an others of a similar nature, encourage discussion, embellish harangues, ar employed, a... |
{
"text": "Let there exist then (and may it be of advantage to both), two sources and two distributions of learning, and in like manner two tribes, and a it were kindred families of contemplators or philosophers, without an hostility or alienation between them; but rather allied and united b mutual assi... |
{
"text": "We have still one request left. We have at least reflected and taken pain in order to render our propositions not only true, but of easy an familiar access to men’s minds, however wonderfully prepossessed an limited. Yet it is but just that we should obtain this favor from mankin (especially... |
{
"text": "[4][1] Because it was idle to draw a logical conclusion from fals principles, error being propagated as much by false premises, which logi does not pretend to examine, as by illegitimate inference. Hence, as Baco says further on, men being easily led to confound legitimate inferenc with truth,... |
{
"text": "I. Man, as the minister and interpreter of nature, does and understands a much as his observations on the order of nature, either with regard t things or the mind, permit him, and neither knows nor is capable of more."
} |
{
"text": "II. The unassisted hand and the understanding left to itself possess bu little power. Effects are produced by the means of instruments and helps which the understanding requires no less than the hand; and as instrument either promote or regulate the motion of the hand, so those that ar applied to ... |
{
"text": "III. Knowledge and human power are synonymous, since the ignorance of th cause frustrates the effect; for nature is only subdued by submission, an that which in contemplative philosophy corresponds with the cause i practical science becomes the rule."
} |
{
"text": "IV. Man while operating can only apply or withdraw natural bodies; natur internally performs the rest."
} |
{
"text": "V. Those who become practically versed in nature are, the mechanic, th mathematician, the physician, the alchemist, and the magician,[8][2] bu all (as matters now stand) with faint efforts and meagre success."
} |
{
"text": "[12]"
} |
{
"text": "VI. It would be madness and inconsistency to suppose that things whic have never yet been performed can be performed without employing som hitherto untried means."
} |
{
"text": "VII. The creations of the mind and hand appear very numerous, if we judg by books and manufactures; but all that variety consists of an excessiv refinement, and of deductions from a few well known matters—not of number of axioms.[9][3]"
} |
{
"text": "VIII. Even the effects already discovered are due to chance and experimen rather than to the sciences; for our present sciences are nothing mor than peculiar arrangements of matters already discovered, and not method for discovery or plans for new operations."
} |
{
"text": "IX. The sole cause and root of almost every defect in the sciences i this, that while we falsely admire and extol the powers of the human mind we do not search for its real helps."
} |
{
"text": "X. The subtilty of nature is far beyond that of sense or of th understanding: so that the specious meditations, speculations, an theories of mankind are but a kind of insanity, only there is no one t stand by and observe it."
} |
{
"text": "XI. As the present sciences are useless for the discovery of effects, s the present system of logic[10][4] is useless for the discovery of th sciences."
} |
{
"text": "[13]"
} |
{
"text": "XII. The present system of logic rather assists in confirming an rendering inveterate the errors founded on vulgar notions than i searching after truth, and is therefore more hurtful than useful."
} |
{
"text": "XIII. The syllogism is not applied to the principles of the sciences, an is of no avail in intermediate axioms,[11][5] as[14] being very unequal t the subtilty of nature. It forces assent, therefore, and not things."
} |
{
"text": "XIV. The syllogism consists of propositions; propositions of words; word are the signs of notions. If, therefore, the notions (which form the basi of the whole) be confused and carelessly abstracted from things, there i no solidity in the superstructure. Our only hope, then, is in genuin induction."... |
{
"text": "XV. We have no sound notions either in logic or physics; substance quality, action, passion, and existence are not clear notions; much les weight, levity, density, tenuity, moisture, dryness, generation corruption, attraction,[15] repulsion, element, matter, form, and th like. They ... |
{
"text": "XVI. The notions of less abstract natures, as man, dog, dove, and th immediate perceptions of sense, as heat, cold, white, black, do no deceive us materially, yet even these are sometimes confused by th mutability of matter and the intermixture of things. All the rest whic men have h... |
{
"text": "XVII. There is the same degree of licentiousness and error in formin axioms as in abstracting notions, and that in the first principles, whic depend on common induction; still more is this the case in axioms an inferior propositions derived from syllogisms."
} |
{
"text": "XVIII. The present discoveries in science are such as lie immediatel beneath the surface of common notions. It is necessary, however, t penetrate the more secret and remote parts of nature, in order to abstrac both notions and axioms from things by a more certain and guarded method."
} |
{
"text": "XIX. There are and can exist but two ways of investigating and discoverin truth. The one hurries on rapidly from the senses and particulars to th most general axioms, and from them, as principles and their suppose indisputable truth, derives and discovers the intermediate axioms. This i the way now... |
{
"text": "XX. The understanding when left to itself proceeds by the same way as tha which it would have adopted under the guidance of logic, namely, th first; for the mind is fond of starting off to generalities, that it ma avoid labor, and[16] after dwelling a little on a subject is fatigued b experiment.... |
{
"text": "XXI. The understanding, when left to itself in a man of a steady, patient and reflecting disposition (especially when unimpeded by receive doctrines), makes some attempt in the right way, but with little effect since the understanding, undirected and unassisted, is unequal to an unfit for t... |
{
"text": "XXII. Each of these two ways begins from the senses and particulars, an ends in the greatest generalities. But they are immeasurably different for the one merely touches cursorily the limits of experiment an particulars, while the other runs duly and regularly through them—the on from the ve... |
{
"text": "XXIII. There is no small difference between the idols of the human min and the ideas of the Divine mind—that is to say, between certain idl dogmas and the real stamp and impression of created objects, as they ar found in nature."
} |
{
"text": "XXIV. Axioms determined upon in argument can never assist in the discover of new effects; for the subtilty of nature is vastly superior to that o argument. But axioms properly and regularly abstracted from particular easily[17] point out and define new particulars, and therefore impar activity to... |
{
"text": "XXV. The axioms now in use are derived from a scanty handful, as it were of experience, and a few particulars of frequent occurrence, whence the are of much the same dimensions or extent as their origin. And if an neglected or unknown instance occurs, the axiom is saved by some frivolou distinction... |
{
"text": "XXVI. We are wont, for the sake of distinction, to call that huma reasoning which we apply to nature the anticipation of nature (as bein rash and premature), and that which is properly deduced from things th interpretation of nature."
} |
{
"text": "XXVII. Anticipations are sufficiently powerful in producing unanimity, fo if men were all to become even uniformly mad, they might agree tolerabl well with each other."
} |
{
"text": "XXVIII. Anticipations again, will be assented to much more readily tha interpretations, because being deduced from a few instances, and thes principally of familiar occurrence, they immediately hit the understandin and satisfy the imagination; while, on the contrary, interpretations being deduc... |
{
"text": "XXIX. In sciences founded on opinions and dogmas, it is right to make us of anticipations and logic if you wish to force assent rather than things."
} |
{
"text": "XXX. If all the capacities of all ages should unite and combine an transmit their labors, no great progress will be[18] made in learning b anticipations, because the radical errors, and those which occur in th first process of the mind, are not cured by the excellence of subsequen means and r... |
{
"text": "XXXI. It is in vain to expect any great progress in the sciences by th superinducing or ingrafting new matters upon old. An instauration must b made from the very foundations, if we do not wish to revolve forever in circle, making only some slight and contemptible progress."
} |
{
"text": "XXXII. The ancient authors and all others are left in undispute possession of their honors; for we enter into no comparison of capacity o talent, but of method, and assume the part of a guide rather than of critic."
} |
{
"text": "XXXIII. To speak plainly, no correct judgment can be formed either of ou method or its discoveries by those anticipations which are now in commo use; for it is not to be required of us to submit ourselves to th judgment of the very method we ourselves arraign."
} |
{
"text": "XXXIV. Nor is it an easy matter to deliver and explain our sentiments; fo those things which are in themselves new can yet be only understood fro some analogy to what is old."
} |
{
"text": "XXXV. Alexander Borgia[13][7] said of the expedition of the French int Italy that they came with chalk in their hands to mark up their lodgings and not with weapons to force their passage. Even so do we wish ou philosophy to make its way quietly into those minds that are fit for it and of goo... |
{
"text": "XXXVI. We have but one simple method of delivering our sentiments, namely we must bring men to particulars and their regular series and order, an they must for a while renounce their notions, and begin to form a acquaintance with things."
} |
{
"text": "XXXVII. Our method and that of the sceptics[14][8] agree in some respect at first setting out, but differ most widely, and are completely oppose to each other in their conclusion; for they roundly assert that nothin can be known; we, that but a small part of nature can be known, by th present met... |
{
"text": "XXXVIII. The idols and false notions which have already preoccupied th human understanding, and are deeply rooted in it, not only so beset men’ minds that they become difficult of access, but even when access i obtained will again meet and trouble us in the instauration of th sciences, ... |
{
"text": "XXXIX. Four species of idols beset the human mind,[20][15][9] to whic (for distinction’s sake) we have assigned names, calling the first Idol of the Tribe, the second Idols of the Den, the third Idols of the Market the fourth Idols of the Theatre."
} |
{
"text": "XL. The formation of notions and axioms on the foundation of tru induction is the only fitting remedy by which we can ward off and expe these idols. It is, however, of great service to point them out; for th doctrine of idols bears the same relation to the interpretation of natur as that of ... |
{
"text": "XLI. The idols of the tribe are inherent in human nature and the ver tribe or race of man; for man’s sense is falsely asserted to be th standard of things; on the contrary, all the perceptions both of th senses and the mind bear reference to man and not to the universe, and th human mind ... |
{
"text": "XLII. The idols of the den are those of each individual; for everybody (i addition to the errors common to the race of man) has his own individua den or cavern, which intercepts and corrupts the light of nature, eithe from his own peculiar and singular disposition, or from his education an intercourse... |
{
"text": "XLIII. There are also idols formed by the reciprocal intercourse an society of man with man, which we call idols of the market, from th commerce and association of men with each other; for men converse by mean of language, but words are formed at the will of the generality, and ther arises from... |
{
"text": "XLIV. Lastly, there are idols which have crept into[22] men’s minds fro the various dogmas of peculiar systems of philosophy, and also from th perverted rules of demonstration, and these we denominate idols of th theatre: for we regard all the systems of philosophy hitherto received o imagined, a... |
{
"text": "XLV. The human understanding, from its peculiar nature, easily supposes greater degree of order and equality in things than it really finds; an although many things in nature be sui generis and most irregular, will ye invent parallels and conjugates and relatives, where no such thing is Hence the f... |
{
"text": "XLVI. The human understanding, when any proposition has been once lai down (either from general admission and belief, or from the pleasure i affords), forces everything else to add fresh support and confirmation and although most cogent and abundant instances may exist to the contrary yet either ... |
{
"text": "XLVII. The human understanding is most excited by that which strikes an enters the mind at once and suddenly, and by which the imagination i immediately filled and inflated. It then begins almost imperceptibly t conceive and suppose that everything is similar to the few objects whic have taken ... |
{
"text": "XLVIII. The human understanding is active and cannot halt or rest, bu even, though without effect, still presses forward. Thus we canno conceive of any end or external[25] boundary of the world, and it seem necessarily to occur to us that there must be something beyond. Nor can w imagine how... |
{
"text": "XLIX. The human understanding resembles not a dry light, but admits tincture of the will[23][17] and passions, which generate their own syste accordingly; for man always believes more readily that which he prefers He, therefore, rejects difficulties for want of patience in investigation sobriety, ... |
{
"text": "L. But by far the greatest impediment and aberration of the huma understanding proceeds from the dulness, incompetence, and errors of th senses; since whatever strikes the senses preponderates over everything however superior, which does not immediately strike them. Henc contemplati... |
{
"text": "LI. The human understanding is, by its own nature, prone to abstraction and supposes that which is fluctuating to be fixed. But it is better t dissect than abstract nature: such was the method employed by the schoo of Democritus,[25][19] which made greater progress in penetrating natur than the re... |
{
"text": "[28]"
} |
{
"text": "LII. Such are the idols of the tribe, which arise either from th uniformity of the constitution of man’s spirit, or its prejudices, or it limited faculties or restless agitation, or from the interference of th passions, or the incompetence of the senses, or the mode of thei impressions... |
{
"text": "LIII. The idols of the den derive their origin from the peculiar nature o each individual’s mind and body, and also from education, habit, an accident; and although they be various and manifold, yet we will treat o some that require the greatest caution, and exert the greatest power i polluting t... |
{
"text": "LIV. Some men become attached to particular sciences and contemplations either from supposing themselves the authors and inventors of them, o from having bestowed the greatest pains upon such subjects, and thu become most habituated to them.[28][22] If men of this description appl themselves ... |
{
"text": "LV. The greatest and, perhaps, radical distinction between different men’ dispositions for philosophy and the sciences is this, that some are mor vigorous and active in observing the differences of things, others i observing their resemblances; for a steady and acute disposition can fi its thought... |
{
"text": "LVI. Some dispositions evince an unbounded admiration of antiquity, other eagerly embrace novelty, and but few can preserve the just medium, so a neither to tear up[30] what the ancients have correctly laid down, nor t despise the just innovations of the moderns. But this is very prejudicia to the scie... |
{
"text": "LVII. The contemplation of nature and of bodies in their individual for distracts and weakens the understanding; but the contemplation of natur and of bodies in their general composition and formation stupefies an relaxes it. We have a good instance of this in the school of Leucippus an Democritus ... |
{
"text": "LVIII. Let such, therefore, be our precautions in contemplation, that w may ward off and expel the idols of the den, which mostly owe their birt either to some predominant pursuit, or, secondly, to an excess i synthesis and analysis, or, thirdly, to a party zeal in favor of certai ages, or, ... |
{
"text": "LIX. The idols of the market are the most troublesome of all, those namel which have entwined themselves round the understanding from th associations of words and names. For men imagine that their reason govern words, while, in fact, words react upon the understanding; and this ha rendered ph... |
{
"text": "LX. The idols imposed upon the understanding by words are of two kinds They are either the names of things which have no existence (for as som objects are from inattention left without a name, so names are formed b fanciful imaginations which are without an object), or they are the name of actual ... |
{
"text": "There are, however, different degrees of distortion and mistake in words One of the least faulty classes is that of the names of substances particularly of the less abstract and more defined species (those then o chalk and mud are good, of earth bad); words signifying actions are mor faulty, as ... |
{
"text": "LXI. The idols of the theatre are not innate, nor do they introduc themselves secretly into the understanding, but they are manifestl instilled and cherished by the fictions of theories and depraved rules o demonstration. To attempt, however, or undertake their confutation woul not be cons... |
{
"text": "Our method of discovering the sciences is such as to leave little to th acuteness and strength of wit, and indeed rather to level wit an intellect. For as in the drawing of a straight line, or accurate circle b the hand, much depends on its steadiness and practice, but if a ruler o compass be ... |
{
"text": "LXII. The idols of the theatre, or of theories, are numerous, and may, an perhaps will, be still more so. For unless men’s minds had been no occupied for many ages in religious and theological considerations, an civil governments (especially monarchies), had been averse to novelties o that nature... |
{
"text": "In general, men take for the groundwork of their philosophy either to much from a few topics, or too little from many; in either case thei philosophy is founded on too narrow a basis of experiment and natura history, and decides on too scanty grounds. For the theoretic philosophe seizes vari... |
{
"text": "There are other philosophers who have diligently and accurately attende to a few experiments, and have thence presumed to deduce and inven systems of philosophy, forming everything to conformity with them."
} |
{
"text": "A third set, from their faith and religious veneration, introduce theolog and traditions; the absurdity of some among them having proceeded so fa as to seek and derive the sciences from spirits and genii. There are therefore, three sources of error and three species of false philosophy the sophist... |
{
"text": "LXIII. Aristotle affords the most eminent instance of the first; for h corrupted natural philosophy by logic—thus he formed the world o categories, assigned to the human soul, the noblest of substances, a genu determined by words of secondary operation, treated of density and rarit (by which ... |
{
"text": "[37]"
} |
{
"text": "LXIV. The empiric school produces dogmas of a more deformed and monstrou nature than the sophistic or theoretic school; not being founded in th light of common notions (which, however poor and superstitious, is yet i a manner universal, and of a general tendency), but in the confine obscurity o... |
{
"text": "LXV. The corruption of philosophy by the mixing of it up with superstitio and theology, is of a much wider extent, and is most injurious to it bot as a whole and in parts. For the human understanding is no less exposed t the impressions of fancy, than to those of vulgar notions. Th disputatiou... |
{
"text": "There is a clear example of this[38] among the Greeks, especially i Pythagoras, where, however, the superstition is coarse and overcharged but it is more dangerous and refined in Plato and his school. This evil i found also in some branches of other systems of philosophy, where i introduces ... |
{
"text": "LXVI. Having spoken of the vicious authority of the systems founded eithe on vulgar notions, or on a few experiments, or on superstition, we mus now consider the faulty subjects for contemplation, especially in natura philosophy. The human understanding is perverted by observing the power o mechanical ... |
{
"text": "A greater evil arises from the contemplation and investigation rather o the stationary principles of things from which, than of the active b which things themselves are created. For the former only serve fo discussion, the latter for practice. Nor is any value to be set on thos common diff... |
{
"text": "But if, neglecting these, any one were, for instance, to observe tha there is in bodies a tendency of adhesion, so as not to suffer the unit of nature to be completely separated or broken, and a vacuum[36][30] to b formed, or that they have a tendency to return to their natural dimension or tension,... |
{
"text": "Another considerable evil is, that men in their systems and contemplation bestow their labor upon the investigation and discussion of the principle of things and the extreme limits of nature, although all utility and mean of action consist in the intermediate objects. Hence men cease not t abstract n... |
{
"text": "LXVII. The understanding must also be cautioned against the intemperanc of systems, so far as regards its giving or withholding its assent; fo such intemperance appears to fix and perpetuate idols, so as to leave n means of removing them."
} |
{
"text": "These excesses are of two kinds. The first is seen in those who decid hastily, and render the sciences positive and dictatorial. The other i those who have introduced scepticism, and vague unbounded inquiry. Th former subdues, the latter enervates the understanding. The Aristotelia philosophy,... |
{
"text": "The school of Plato introduced scepticism, first, as it were in joke an irony, from their dislike to Protagoras, Hippias,[39][33] and others, wh were ashamed of appearing not[43] to doubt upon any subject. But the ne academy dogmatized in their scepticism, and held it as their tenet Although th... |
{
"text": "LXVIII. We have now treated of each kind of idols, and their qualities all of which must be abjured and renounced with firm and solem resolution, and the understanding must be completely freed and cleared o them, so that the access to the kingdom of man, which is founded on th sciences, m... |
{
"text": "LXIX. Vicious demonstrations are the muniments and support of idols, an those which we possess in logic, merely subject and enslave the world t human thoughts, and thoughts to words. But demonstrations are in som manner themselves systems of philosophy and science; for such as they are and accordi... |
{
"text": "LXX. But experience is by far the best demonstration, provided it adher to the experiment actually made, for if that experiment be transferred t other subjects apparently similar, unless with proper and methodica caution it becomes fallacious. The present method of experiment is blin and stupid;... |
{
"text": "Even when men build any science and theory upon experiment, yet the almost always turn with premature and hasty zeal to practice, not merel on account of the advantage and benefit to be derived from it, but i order to seize upon some security in a new undertaking of their no employing t... |
{
"text": "LXXI. The sciences we possess have been principally derived from th Greeks; for the addition of the Roman, Arabic, or more modern writers, ar but few and of small importance, and such as they are, are founded on th basis[47] of Greek invention. But the wisdom of the Greeks wa professiona... |
{
"text": "LXXII. Nor are those much better which can be deduced from the characte of the time and age, than the former from that of the country and nation for in that age the knowledge both of time and of the world was confine and meagre, which is one of the worst evils for those who rely entirely o experience—... |
{
"text": "LXXIII. Of all signs there is none more certain or worthy than that of th fruits produced, for the fruits and effects are the sureties and vouchers as it were, for the truth of philosophy. Now, from the systems of th Greeks, and their subordinate divisions in particular branches of th sciences du... |
{
"text": "The industry of the alchemists has produced some effect, by chance however, and casualty, or from varying their experiments (as mechanic also do), and not from any regular art or theory, the theory they hav imagined rather tending to disturb than to assist experiment. Those, too who have oc... |
{
"text": "LXXIV. Other signs may be selected from the increase and progress o particular systems of philosophy and the sciences; for those which ar founded on nature grow and increase, while those which are founded o opinion change and increase not. If, therefore, the theories we hav mentioned w... |
{
"text": "LXXV. There is yet another sign (if such it may be termed, being rather a evidence, and one of the strongest nature), namely, the actual confessio of those very authorities whom men now follow; for even they who decide o things so daringly, yet at times, when they reflect, betake themselves t complaints ... |
{
"text": "LXXVI. Nor should we omit the sign afforded by the great dissensio formerly prevalent among philosophers, and the variety of schools, whic sufficiently show that the way was not well prepared that leads from th senses to the understanding, since the same groundwork of philosoph (namely, th... |
End of preview.
README.md exists but content is empty.
- Downloads last month
- 5