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| # Data Card: `fraudlab.synth` synthetic transaction data | |
| Datasheet-style documentation for the generator in `src/fraudlab/synth/` (version 0.1.0). Descriptive statistics for the `small` preset are in [`DATA_CARD_STATS.md`](DATA_CARD_STATS.md), regenerated by `experiments/data_card_stats.py`. | |
| > **This is synthetic data.** No real transactions, customers or institutions were used to build, fit or calibrate the generator. Its distributions are stylised from qualitative descriptions in the published literature (see [`../literature/REVIEW.md`](../literature/REVIEW.md)). Findings on this data are evidence about *mechanisms*, not about any real payment system. | |
| ## Motivation | |
| - **Purpose:** controlled experiments on fraud-detection models where the fraud mechanism, its timing (drift), label latency and relational structure are known and adjustable. Real data can't offer that (REVIEW §9, gap G9). | |
| - **Created by:** the `fraud-synth-bench` project, Apache-2.0. | |
| - **Not intended for:** estimating real-world fraud prevalence or losses, benchmarking vendor products, or training production models. | |
| ## Composition | |
| | File | Grain | Key columns | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | `transactions.parquet` | one row per transaction | `tx_id`, `timestamp`, `account_id`, `merchant_id` (null for transfers), `counterparty_id` (null for card payments), `device_id` (null for card-present), `amount`, `mcc`, `channel` (pos / online / transfer), `country` | | |
| | `labels.parquet` | one row per transaction | `is_fraud` (ground truth), `observed_label` (0 if never detected), `label_available_at` (null unless observed), `scenario`, `fraud_event_id` | | |
| | `accounts.parquet` | one row per account | `opened_at`, `home_country`, `segment`, `account_role` | | |
| | `merchants.parquet` | one row per merchant | `mcc`, `country`, `opened_at` | | |
| | `edges.parquet` | one row per (src, dst, type) | `pays` (account→merchant), `transfers` (account→account), `uses_device` (account→device), with `first_seen`, `last_seen`, `n_tx` | | |
| | `manifest.json` | per dataset | generator version, preset, seed, all parameters, content hash, summary stats, library versions | | |
| **Ground-truth-only columns.** `labels.is_fraud`, `labels.scenario`, `labels.fraud_event_id` and `accounts.account_role` reveal the answer. They exist for evaluation and analysis, and **must never be used as model features**. Models may use `observed_label` only where `label_available_at ≤` the training cutoff. The aggregated `edges` table spans the whole timeline, so time-respecting graph features must be built from `transactions` with a cutoff (Phase 4 does this). | |
| **Presets.** | |
| | Preset | Accounts | Days | ≈ Transactions | Used for | | |
| |---|---|---|---|---| | |
| | `tiny` | 2,000 | 30 | 20k | tests, `make quick` | | |
| | `small` | 20,000 | 30 | 200k | RQ1, RQ3, RQ5 | | |
| | `small_long` | 8,000 | 90 | 200k | RQ2, RQ4 | | |
| | `full` | 200,000 | 30 | 2M | documented and tested, not in the paper | | |
| On an M4 MacBook Air, `small` generates in about 0.2 s with a peak RSS of about 0.24 GB. `full` takes about 4 s with a peak RSS of about 1.2 GB. | |
| ## Collection process (simulation) | |
| **Legitimate behaviour** (`world.py`): | |
| - Account activity is heterogeneous: rate ~ Gamma(1.5) with mean `tx_per_account_day`. 3% of accounts open during the window. | |
| - Amounts are log-normal: an account-level location from the segment (standard / premium / student) plus noise, a category offset, and σ = 0.8. | |
| - Time of day follows a von Mises distribution (κ = 2.5) around each account's preferred hour (about N(14h, 3.5h)), with 10% uniform activity. | |
| - 65% of card payments go to one of five habitual merchants. The rest go to merchants drawn by Zipf-distributed popularity. | |
| - 5% of legitimate transactions are P2P transfers to one of three fixed contacts. | |
| - Card-present payments have no customer device. Online payments and transfers carry one. | |
| **Legitimate look-alikes, scaled by `noise`** (default 0.4, set by the D014 difficulty check). They exist so that no single raw field separates the classes: | |
| - trips abroad (10% × noise of accounts, 2–7 days); | |
| - devices shared within a household (15% × noise); | |
| - switching to a new phone mid-window (10% × noise); | |
| - one-off logins from a fresh device (2% × noise of online transactions); | |
| - unusually large purchases (1% × noise, 4–15× the usual amount). | |
| **Fraud** comes from eight injectors (`scenarios/`). Each has a docstring citing the pattern it imitates: | |
| | Scenario | Mechanism | Main signal | Structure | | |
| |---|---|---|---| | |
| | `card_testing` | 5–15 micro-charges at uniformly chosen online merchants in about 10 min; sometimes a large purchase follows | tiny amounts, sub-minute gaps | attacker device pool | | |
| | `account_takeover` | 2–6 high-value online purchases within 2 days from an attacker device, often abroad and at night | new device, amount ≫ norm | attacker device pool | | |
| | `velocity_abuse` | 8–25 purchases of $20–150 in 1–2 h at 1–3 merchants of one category | count per hour | individual | | |
| | `friendly_fraud` | the customer's own normal-looking purchase, later disputed | almost none (by design) | individual | | |
| | `bust_out` | an established account spends 3–10× its norm for 1–3 days, then goes dark | change against own history | individual (sequence) | | |
| | `mule_network` | victims → 5–12 young mule accounts → one collector, within hours | transfers, shared devices, fan-in | **ring** | | |
| | `merchant_collusion` | a new merchant charges 5–20 stolen cards round amounts | new merchant with no legitimate customers | **ring** | | |
| | `synthetic_identity` | 3–8 accounts opened in the window, sharing 1–2 devices, buying resellable goods | young accounts, shared devices | **ring** | | |
| **Fraud budget.** Within each drift segment, fraud transactions = `fraud_rate` × legitimate volume / (1 − `fraud_rate`). This is split across the active scenarios in proportion to their weights. Each injector generates whole events until its budget is met, then trims the time-ordered tail of the last event. The realised rate matches the target to within rounding (bust-out accounts going dark removes a few legitimate transactions afterwards). | |
| **Drift.** A drift schedule is a list of segments over [0, 1] of the timeline, each with its own scenario weights. `DRIFT_RQ2` switches from {card testing, ATO, velocity} to {bust-out, synthetic identity, mule network} at 60%. The legitimate behaviour doesn't drift. | |
| **Labels.** Each fraud event is detected with probability `detection_prob` (0.95). The delay is drawn once per event from Uniform(7, 30) days, plus up to 2 days of per-transaction jitter. For friendly fraud it's multiplied by 1.5, since disputes are filed late. Undetected fraud keeps `observed_label = 0` forever. | |
| **Determinism.** Every component uses its own named RNG stream (`numpy.random.default_rng([seed, crc32(name)])`). The output is a pure function of the config, and adding a scenario doesn't change legitimate traffic. `content_hash` is a SHA-256 over column names, dtypes and values of all tables. It doesn't depend on parquet writer metadata. Same seed, same hash: this is tested, and also checked across write and load. | |
| ## Validation (`tests/test_synth.py`) | |
| - Determinism: same seed gives the same hash, a different seed a different hash, and write → load preserves the hash. | |
| - Fraud rate within 5% (relative) of the target, at 0.1%, 0.5% and 1%. | |
| - Schema, temporal ordering, and the null structure of devices, merchants and counterparties. | |
| - Label-delay bounds, friendly-fraud delay > other fraud, detection rate. | |
| - The drift schedule switches the scenario set at the right time. Ring share 0 and 1 give disjoint scenario sets. | |
| - The noise knob adds look-alikes: card-present payments abroad, shared devices, devices per account. | |
| - **One signature test per injector.** Each passes on seeds 0–4. | |
| ## Known limitations and differences from real data | |
| 1. **Not calibrated to real data.** Distribution parameters are stylised. Real data has heavier tails, many more merchant categories, and seasonality (weekly or monthly cycles, holidays) that the generator doesn't model. | |
| 2. **Fraud is more mechanistic than in reality.** Each scenario has a clean signature, and in practice fraudsters mix tactics. Most scenarios are easier to detect than real fraud, except `friendly_fraud`, which is close to undetectable by design. Absolute AUPRC values shouldn't be compared with published numbers on real data. Only *relative* comparisons under controlled conditions are meaningful. | |
| 3. **Few events for ring scenarios.** At `small` with a 0.5% fraud rate, ring scenarios contribute only about 4–8 events each (about 120 transactions). Per-scenario results therefore have high variance, and results are reported over 5 seeds. | |
| 4. **No adaptive adversary.** Drift is scheduled, not a reaction to the deployed model, and there's no feedback loop (FUTURE_WORK, G10). | |
| 5. **Legitimate behaviour is stationary.** There are no customer life events or holiday spikes, and only fraud drifts. | |
| 6. **Single currency, abstract countries** (`C00`–`C11`). There are no real geographies, merchants or identifiers, and therefore no PII. | |
| 7. **The edge table is aggregated over the whole timeline.** Using it directly as a feature source leaks future information. | |
| ## Maintenance | |
| Versioned with the package (`generator_version` in each manifest). Any change that alters the output for a given config must bump the version and be noted in `docs/DECISIONS.md`. | |