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Security-TTP-Mapping

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SUNBURST used DNS for C2 traffic designed to mimic normal SolarWinds API communications.
['T1071.004']
ShadowPad has used DNS tunneling for C2 communications.
['T1071.004']
Shark can use DNS in C2 communications.
['T1071.004']
Sliver can support C2 communications over DNS.
['T1071.004']
SombRAT can communicate over DNS with the C2 server.
['T1071.004']
TEXTMATE uses DNS TXT records for C2.
['T1071.004']
Variants of Kevin can communicate over DNS through queries to the server for constructed domain names with embedded information.
['T1071.004']
APT32 compromised McAfee ePO to move laterally by distributing malware as a software deployment task.
['T1072']
Threat Group-1314 actors used a victim's endpoint management platform, Altiris, for lateral movement.
['T1072']
Kevin can create directories to store logs and other collected data.
['T1074']
Kobalos can write captured SSH connection credentials to a file under the "/var/run" directory with a ".pid" extension for exfiltration.
['T1074']
Shark has stored information in folders named `U1` and `U2` prior to exfiltration.
['T1074']
stages collected data in a text file.
['T1074', 'T1074']
ADVSTORESHELL stores output from command execution in a .dat file in the %TEMP% directory.
['T1074.001']
APT28 has stored captured credential information in a file named pi.log.
['T1074.001']
APT39 has utilized tools to aggregate data prior to exfiltration.
['T1074.001']
AppleSeed can stage files in a central location prior to exfiltration.
['T1074.001']
Astaroth collects data in a plaintext file named r1.log before exfiltration.
['T1074.001']
Attor has staged collected data in a central upload directory prior to exfiltration.
['T1074.001']
AuTo Stealer can store collected data from an infected host to a file named `Hostname_UserName.txt` prior to exfiltration.
['T1074.001']
BADNEWS copies documents under 15MB found on the victim system to is the user's "%temp%\SMB\" folder. It also copies files from USB devices to a predefined directory.
['T1074.001']
BackdoorDiplomacy has copied files of interest to the main drive's recycle bin.
['T1074.001']
BadPatch stores collected data in log files before exfiltration.
['T1074.001']
BoxCaon has created a working folder for collected files that it sends to the C2 server.
['T1074.001']
Calisto uses a hidden directory named .calisto to store data from the victim’s machine before exfiltration.
['T1074.001', 'T1564.001']
Carbon creates a base directory that contains the files and folders that are collected.
['T1074.001']
Chimera has staged stolen data locally on compromised hosts.
['T1074.001']
Data captured by RawPOS is placed in a temporary file under a directory named "memdump".
['T1074.001']
Dragonfly 2.0 created a directory named "out" in the user's %AppData% folder and copied files to it.
['T1074.001']
Dragonfly has created a directory named "out" in the user's %AppData% folder and copied files to it.
['T1074.001']
During Operation Honeybee, stolen data was copied into a text file using the format `From <COMPUTER-NAME> (<Month>-<Day> <Hour>-<Minute>-<Second>).txt` prior to compression, encoding, and exfiltration.
['T1074.001']
During Operation Wocao, threat actors staged archived files in a temporary directory prior to exfiltration.
['T1074.001']
DustySky created folders in temp directories to host collected files before exfiltration.
['T1074.001']
Dyre has the ability to create files in a TEMP folder to act as a database to store information.
['T1074.001']
Elise creates a file in "AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer" and stores all harvested data in that file.
['T1074.001']
Exaramel for Windows specifies a path to store files scheduled for exfiltration.
['T1074.001']
FLASHFLOOD stages data it copies from the local system or removable drives in the "%WINDIR%\$NtUninstallKB885884$\" directory.
['T1074.001']
FrameworkPOS can identifiy payment card track data on the victim and copy it to a local file in a subdirectory of C:\Windows\.
['T1074.001']
FunnyDream can stage collected information including screen captures and logged keystrokes locally.
['T1074.001']
GALLIUM compressed and staged files in multi-part archives in the Recycle Bin prior to exfiltration.
['T1074.001']
Gold Dragon stores information gathered from the endpoint in a file named 1.hwp.
['T1074.001']
Helminth creates folders to store output from batch scripts prior to sending the information to its C2 server.
['T1074.001']
Honeybee adds collected files to a temp.zip file saved in the %temp% folder, then base64 encodes it and uploads it to control server.
['T1074.001', 'T1560']
Indrik Spider has stored collected date in a .tmp file.
['T1074.001']
InvisiMole determines a working directory where it stores all the gathered data about the compromised machine.
['T1074.001']
Kazuar stages command output and collected data in files before exfiltration.
['T1074.001']
Kimsuky has staged collected data files under "C:\Program Files\Common Files\System\Ole DB\".
['T1074.001']
Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is saved in the %TEMP% directory, then compressed, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.
['T1074.001']
Leviathan has used C:\Windows\Debug and C:\Perflogs as staging directories.
['T1074.001']
LightNeuron can store email data in files and directories specified in its configuration, such as "C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\appdata\Local\Temp\".
['T1074.001']
MESSAGETAP stored targeted SMS messages that matched its target list in CSV files on the compromised system.
['T1074.001']
Machete created their own directories to drop files into.
['T1074.001']
Machete stores files and logs in a folder on the local drive.
['T1074.001']
Mis-Type has temporarily stored collected information to the files `“%AppData%\{Unique Identifier}\HOSTRURKLSR”` and `“%AppData%\{Unique Identifier}\NEWERSSEMP”`.
['T1074.001']
MoonWind saves information from its keylogging routine as a .zip file in the present working directory.
['T1074.001']
NETWIRE has the ability to write collected data to a file created in the "./LOGS" directory.
['T1074.001']
NOKKI can collect data from the victim and stage it in "LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\uplog.tmp".
['T1074.001']
ObliqueRAT can copy specific files, webcam captures, and screenshots to local directories.
['T1074.001']
Octopus has stored collected information in the Application Data directory on a compromised host.
['T1074.001']
OopsIE stages the output from command execution and collected files in specific folders before exfiltration.
['T1074.001']
Operation Wocao has staged archived files in a temporary directory prior to exfiltration.
['T1074.001']
PUNCHTRACK aggregates collected data in a tmp file.
['T1074.001']
Patchwork copied all targeted files to a directory called index that was eventually uploaded to the C&C server.
['T1074.001']
PoisonIvy stages collected data in a text file.
['T1074.001']
PowerLess can stage stolen browser data in `C:\\Windows\\Temp\\cup.tmp` and keylogger data in `C:\\Windows\\Temp\\Report.06E17A5A-7325-4325-8E5D-E172EBA7FC5BK`.
['T1074.001']
Prikormka creates a directory, "%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\SKC\", which is used to store collected log files.
['T1074.001']
Rover copies files from removable drives to "C:\system".
['T1074.001']
SPACESHIP identifies files with certain extensions and copies them to a directory in the user's profile.
['T1074.001']
STARWHALE has stored collected data in a file called `stari.txt`.
['T1074.001']
SUGARDUMP has stored collected data under `%<malware_execution_folder>%\\CrashLog.txt`.
['T1074.001']
Sidewinder has collected stolen files in a temporary folder in preparation for exfiltration.
['T1074.001']
SombRAT can store harvested data in a custom database under the %TEMP% directory.
['T1074.001']
TeamTNT has aggregated collected credentials in text files before exfiltrating.
['T1074.001']
Threat Group-3390 has locally staged encrypted archives for later exfiltration efforts.
['T1074.001']
Turian can store copied files in a specific directory prior to exfiltration.
['T1074.001']
USBStealer collects files matching certain criteria from the victim and stores them in a local directory for later exfiltration.
['T1074.001']
Ursnif has used tmp files to stage gathered information.
['T1074.001']
Zebrocy stores all collected information in a single file before exfiltration.
['T1074.001']
ccf32 can temporarily store files in a hidden directory on the local host.
['T1074.001']
APT28 has staged archives of collected data on a target's Outlook Web Access (OWA) server.
['T1074.002']
Chimera has staged stolen data on designated servers in the target environment.
['T1074.002']
During Night Dragon, threat actors copied files to company web servers and subsequently downloaded them.
['T1074.002']
FIN6 actors have compressed data from remote systems and moved it to another staging system before exfiltration.
['T1074.002']
FIN8 aggregates staged data from a network into a single location.
['T1074.002']
Leviathan has staged data remotely prior to exfiltration.
['T1074.002']
Threat Group-3390 has moved staged encrypted archives to Internet-facing servers that had previously been compromised with China Chopper prior to exfiltration.
['T1074.002']
UNC2452 staged data and files in password-protected archives on a victim's OWA server.
['T1074.002']
menuPass has staged data on remote MSP systems or other victim networks prior to exfiltration.
['T1074.002']
APT18 actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into external remote services.
['T1078', 'T1133']
APT28 has used legitimate credentials to gain initial access, maintain access, and exfiltrate data from a victim network. The group has specifically used credentials stolen through a spearphishing email to login to the DCCC network. The group has also leveraged default manufacturer's passwords to gain initial access to corporate networks via IoT devices such as a VOIP phone, printer, and video decoder.
['T1078']
APT29 used different compromised credentials for remote access and to move laterally.
['T1078']
APT34 has used valid administrator credentials to assist in lateral movement.
['T1078']
Carbanak actors used legitimate credentials of banking employees to perform operations that sent them millions of dollars.
['T1078']
Chimera has used a valid account to maintain persistence via scheduled task.
['T1078']
Dragonfly 2.0 compromised user credentials and used valid accounts for operations.
['T1078']
Dtrack used hard-coded credentials to gain access to a network share.
['T1078']
During Night Dragon, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems.
['T1078', 'T1133']
FIN10 has used stolen credentials to connect remotely to victim networks using VPNs protected with only a single factor.
['T1078']
FIN4 has used legitimate credentials to hijack email communications.
['T1078']
FIN5 has used legitimate VPN, RDP, Citrix, or VNC credentials to maintain access to a victim environment.
['T1078']