func string | target int64 | cwe list | project string | commit_id string | hash float64 | size int64 | message string |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
static void netns_put(struct ns_common *ns)
{
put_net(to_net_ns(ns));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | 21b5944350052d2583e82dd59b19a9ba94a007f0 | 53,963,076,859,469,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id()
(I can trivially verify that that idr_remove in cleanup_net happens
after the network namespace count has dropped to zero --EWB)
Function get_net_ns_by_id() does not check for net::count
after it has found a peer in netns_ids idr.
It may dereference a... |
int flac__encode_file(FILE *infile, FLAC__off_t infilesize, const char *infilename, const char *outfilename, const FLAC__byte *lookahead, unsigned lookahead_length, encode_options_t options)
{
EncoderSession encoder_session;
size_t channel_map[FLAC__MAX_CHANNELS];
int info_align_carry = -1, info_align_zero = -1;
i... | 1 | [] | flac | c06a44969c1145242a22f75fc8fb2e8b54c55303 | 176,424,321,219,533,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 550 | flac : Fix for https://sourceforge.net/p/flac/bugs/425/
* flac/encode.c : Validate num_tracks field of cuesheet.
* libFLAC/stream_encoder.c : Add check for a NULL pointer.
* flac/encode.c : Improve bounds checking.
Closes: https://sourceforge.net/p/flac/bugs/425/ |
int tcp_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int nonblock,
int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int copied = 0;
u32 peek_seq;
u32 *seq;
unsigned long used;
int err;
int target; /* Read at least this many bytes */
long timeo;
struct task_struct *user_recv = NULL;
... | 0 | [
"CWE-399",
"CWE-835"
] | linux | ccf7abb93af09ad0868ae9033d1ca8108bdaec82 | 155,299,069,314,770,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 336 | tcp: avoid infinite loop in tcp_splice_read()
Splicing from TCP socket is vulnerable when a packet with URG flag is
received and stored into receive queue.
__tcp_splice_read() returns 0, and sk_wait_data() immediately
returns since there is the problematic skb in queue.
This is a nice way to burn cpu (aka infinite l... |
void slice_set_user_psize(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int psize)
{
int index, mask_index;
unsigned char *hpsizes;
unsigned long flags, lpsizes;
unsigned int old_psize;
int i;
slice_dbg("slice_set_user_psize(mm=%p, psize=%d)\n", mm, psize);
VM_BUG_ON(radix_enabled());
spin_lock_irqsave(&slice_convert_lock, ... | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux | 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb | 185,161,232,349,873,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 49 | mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas
Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage ... |
void g_dhcp_client_clear_values(GDHCPClient *dhcp_client)
{
g_hash_table_remove_all(dhcp_client->send_value_hash);
} | 0 | [] | connman | a74524b3e3fad81b0fd1084ffdf9f2ea469cd9b1 | 313,662,562,458,745,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | gdhcp: Avoid leaking stack data via unitiialized variable
Fixes: CVE-2021-26676 |
Event_queue_element::~Event_queue_element()
{
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284"
] | server | 0b5a5258abbeaf8a0c3a18c7e753699787fdf46e | 230,522,737,040,104,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | MW-416 DDL replication moved after acl checking
galera_events test shows a regression with the original fix for MW-416
Reason was that Events::drop_event() can be called also from inside event
execution, and there we have a speacial treatment for event, which executes
"DROP EVENT" statement, and runs TOI replication i... |
vte_sequence_handler_ta (VteTerminal *terminal, GValueArray *params)
{
VteScreen *screen;
long newcol, col;
/* Calculate which column is the next tab stop. */
screen = terminal->pvt->screen;
newcol = col = screen->cursor_current.col;
g_assert (col >= 0);
if (terminal->pvt->tabstops != NULL) {
/* Find the ne... | 0 | [] | vte | 58bc3a942f198a1a8788553ca72c19d7c1702b74 | 170,385,890,350,014,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 97 | fix bug #548272
svn path=/trunk/; revision=2365 |
TEST_P(Http2CodecImplTest, Invalid103) {
initialize();
TestRequestHeaderMapImpl request_headers;
HttpTestUtility::addDefaultHeaders(request_headers);
EXPECT_CALL(request_decoder_, decodeHeaders_(_, true));
request_encoder_->encodeHeaders(request_headers, true);
TestResponseHeaderMapImpl continue_headers{{... | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
] | envoy | 0e49a495826ea9e29134c1bd54fdeb31a034f40c | 175,302,932,495,752,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | http/2: add stats and stream flush timeout (#139)
This commit adds a new stream flush timeout to guard against a
remote server that does not open window once an entire stream has
been buffered for flushing. Additional stats have also been added
to better understand the codecs view of active streams as well as
amount o... |
void rose_del_loopback_node(const rose_address *address)
{
struct rose_node *rose_node;
spin_lock_bh(&rose_node_list_lock);
rose_node = rose_node_list;
while (rose_node != NULL) {
if ((rose_node->mask == 10) &&
(rosecmpm(address, &rose_node->address, 10) == 0) &&
rose_node->loopback)
break;
ros... | 0 | [] | linux | 148ca04518070910739dfc4eeda765057856403d | 156,793,770,833,774,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | net: rose: fix UAF bug caused by rose_t0timer_expiry
There are UAF bugs caused by rose_t0timer_expiry(). The
root cause is that del_timer() could not stop the timer
handler that is running and there is no synchronization.
One of the race conditions is shown below:
(thread 1) | (thread 2)
... |
static const char *flac_dmx_probe_data(const u8 *data, u32 size, GF_FilterProbeScore *score)
{
if ((size>4) && !strncmp(data, "fLaC", 4)) {
*score = GF_FPROBE_SUPPORTED;
return "audio/flac";
}
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | gpac | da69ad1f970a7e17c865eaec9af98cc84df10d5b | 238,741,404,747,319,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | fixed 1718 |
static int vidioc_qbuf(struct file *file, void *private_data, struct v4l2_buffer *buf)
{
struct v4l2_loopback_device *dev;
struct v4l2_loopback_opener *opener;
struct v4l2l_buffer *b;
int index;
dev = v4l2loopback_getdevice(file);
opener = file->private_data;
if (buf->index > max_buffers)
return -EINVAL;
if... | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | v4l2loopback | 64a216af4c09c9ba9326057d7e78994271827eff | 144,339,761,294,084,910,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 | add explicit format specifier to printf() invocations
CWE-134 |
xfs_destroy_percpu_counters(
struct xfs_mount *mp)
{
percpu_counter_destroy(&mp->m_icount);
percpu_counter_destroy(&mp->m_ifree);
percpu_counter_destroy(&mp->m_fdblocks);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | c9fbd7bbc23dbdd73364be4d045e5d3612cf6e82 | 257,528,967,458,296,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | xfs: clear sb->s_fs_info on mount failure
We recently had an oops reported on a 4.14 kernel in
xfs_reclaim_inodes_count() where sb->s_fs_info pointed to garbage
and so the m_perag_tree lookup walked into lala land.
Essentially, the machine was under memory pressure when the mount
was being run, xfs_fs_fill_super() fa... |
void ConnectionManagerImpl::ActiveStreamDecoderFilter::requestDataTooLarge() {
ENVOY_STREAM_LOG(debug, "request data too large watermark exceeded", parent_);
if (parent_.state_.decoder_filters_streaming_) {
onDecoderFilterAboveWriteBufferHighWatermark();
} else {
parent_.connection_manager_.stats_.named_.... | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] | envoy | afc39bea36fd436e54262f150c009e8d72db5014 | 150,269,293,956,892,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.
Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the Heade... |
void Parser::parse_charset_directive()
{
lex <
sequence <
quoted_string,
optional_spaces,
exactly <';'>
>
>();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | libsass | eb15533b07773c30dc03c9d742865604f47120ef | 120,517,485,642,054,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | Fix memory leak in `parse_ie_keyword_arg`
`kwd_arg` would never get freed when there was a parse error in
`parse_ie_keyword_arg`.
Closes #2656 |
_cairo_image_scaled_glyph_fini (cairo_scaled_font_t *scaled_font,
cairo_scaled_glyph_t *scaled_glyph)
{
CAIRO_MUTEX_LOCK (_cairo_glyph_cache_mutex);
if (global_glyph_cache) {
pixman_glyph_cache_remove (
global_glyph_cache, scaled_font,
(void *)scaled_glyph->hash_entry.hash);
}
CAIRO_MUT... | 0 | [] | cairo | 03a820b173ed1fdef6ff14b4468f5dbc02ff59be | 264,360,802,399,277,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | Fix mask usage in image-compositor |
dns_zone_verifydb(dns_zone_t *zone, dns_db_t *db, dns_dbversion_t *ver) {
dns_dbversion_t *version = NULL;
dns_keytable_t *secroots = NULL;
isc_result_t result;
dns_name_t *origin;
const char me[] = "dns_zone_verifydb";
ENTER;
REQUIRE(DNS_ZONE_VALID(zone));
REQUIRE(db != NULL);
if (dns_zone_gettype(zone) !=... | 0 | [
"CWE-327"
] | bind9 | f09352d20a9d360e50683cd1d2fc52ccedcd77a0 | 232,655,103,617,155,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 | Update keyfetch_done compute_tag check
If in keyfetch_done the compute_tag fails (because for example the
algorithm is not supported), don't crash, but instead ignore the
key. |
zcurrenthsbcolor(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
int code, depth;
code = validate_spaces(i_ctx_p, &istate->colorspace[0].array, &depth);
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = zcurrentcolor(i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* Set up for the continuation procedure which will do the work */
... | 0 | [] | ghostpdl | b326a71659b7837d3acde954b18bda1a6f5e9498 | 255,040,908,768,657,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 | Bug 699655: Properly check the return value....
...when getting a value from a dictionary |
static struct mount *clone_mnt(struct mount *old, struct dentry *root,
int flag)
{
struct super_block *sb = old->mnt.mnt_sb;
struct mount *mnt;
int err;
mnt = alloc_vfsmnt(old->mnt_devname);
if (!mnt)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (flag & (CL_SLAVE | CL_PRIVATE | CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE))
mnt->mnt_group_id = ... | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | 427215d85e8d1476da1a86b8d67aceb485eb3631 | 254,566,228,386,377,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 68 | ovl: prevent private clone if bind mount is not allowed
Add the following checks from __do_loopback() to clone_private_mount() as
well:
- verify that the mount is in the current namespace
- verify that there are no locked children
Reported-by: Alois Wohlschlager <alois1@gmx-topmail.de>
Fixes: c771d683a62e ("vfs: ... |
void _cgsem_init(cgsem_t *cgsem, const char *file, const char *func, const int line)
{
int flags, fd, i;
if (pipe(cgsem->pipefd) == -1)
quitfrom(1, file, func, line, "Failed pipe errno=%d", errno);
/* Make the pipes FD_CLOEXEC to allow them to close should we call
* execv on restart. */
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++... | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-703"
] | sgminer | 910c36089940e81fb85c65b8e63dcd2fac71470c | 76,636,689,525,457,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this. |
void Binary::shift(size_t value) {
Header& header = this->header();
// Offset of the load commands table
const uint64_t loadcommands_start = is64_ ? sizeof(details::mach_header_64) :
sizeof(details::mach_header);
// +------------------------+ <---------- __TEXT.st... | 1 | [] | LIEF | 4937a24a0bd6a4eefdc2a10e0bde37445d87c065 | 338,093,093,696,300,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 77 | Fix #765 |
static void lsr_read_fill(GF_LASeRCodec *lsr, GF_Node *n)
{
Bool has_fill;
GF_LSR_READ_INT(lsr, has_fill, 1, "fill");
if (has_fill) {
GF_FieldInfo info;
lsr->last_error = gf_node_get_attribute_by_tag(n, TAG_SVG_ATT_fill, GF_TRUE, GF_FALSE, &info);
lsr_read_paint(lsr, info.far_ptr, "fill");
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | gpac | faa75edde3dfeba1e2cf6ffa48e45a50f1042096 | 20,694,632,772,394,663,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | fixed #2213 |
void CClientAuth::AcceptedLogin(CUser& User) {
if (m_pClient) {
m_pClient->AcceptLogin(User);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | znc | 2390ad111bde16a78c98ac44572090b33c3bd2d8 | 46,189,277,144,488,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | Fix null pointer dereference in echo-message
The bug was introduced while fixing #1705. If a client did not enable
echo-message, and doesn't have a network, it crashes.
Thanks to LunarBNC for reporting this |
bgp_prepare_capabilities(struct bgp_conn *conn)
{
struct bgp_proto *p = conn->bgp;
struct bgp_channel *c;
struct bgp_caps *caps;
struct bgp_af_caps *ac;
if (!p->cf->capabilities)
{
/* Just prepare empty local_caps */
conn->local_caps = mb_allocz(p->p.pool, sizeof(struct bgp_caps));
return;
}
... | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | bird | 8388f5a7e14108a1458fea35bfbb5a453e2c563c | 45,272,346,105,422,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 71 | BGP: Fix bugs in handling of shutdown messages
There is an improper check for valid message size, which may lead to
stack overflow and buffer leaks to log when a large message is received.
Thanks to Daniel McCarney for bugreport and analysis. |
my_decimal *val_decimal(my_decimal *to) { return cached_time.to_decimal(to); } | 0 | [
"CWE-617"
] | server | 807945f2eb5fa22e6f233cc17b85a2e141efe2c8 | 86,522,328,970,489,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | MDEV-26402: A SEGV in Item_field::used_tables/update_depend_map_for_order...
When doing condition pushdown from HAVING into WHERE,
Item_equal::create_pushable_equalities() calls
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL) for constant items.
Then, Item::cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor() checks for this flag
to see ... |
static inline int udp6_csum_init(struct sk_buff *skb, struct udphdr *uh,
int proto)
{
int err;
UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov = 0;
UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->cscov = skb->len;
if (proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE) {
err = udplite_checksum_init(skb, uh);
if (err)
return err;
}
if (uh->check == 0) {
/* RFC 2460 sectio... | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
] | linux-2.6 | c377411f2494a931ff7facdbb3a6839b1266bcf6 | 135,036,228,653,260,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | net: sk_add_backlog() take rmem_alloc into account
Current socket backlog limit is not enough to really stop DDOS attacks,
because user thread spend many time to process a full backlog each
round, and user might crazy spin on socket lock.
We should add backlog size and receive_queue size (aka rmem_alloc) to
pace writ... |
static int coolkey_rsa_op(sc_card_t *card,
const u8 * data, size_t datalen,
u8 * out, size_t max_out_len)
{
int r;
const u8 *crypt_in;
u8 **crypt_out_p;
size_t crypt_in_len, *crypt_out_len_p;
coolkey_private_data_t * priv = COOLKEY_DATA(card);
coolkey_compute_crypt_params_t params;
u8 key_number;
size... | 0 | [
"CWE-415"
] | OpenSC | c246f6f69a749d4f68626b40795a4f69168008f4 | 33,284,796,606,960,594,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 104 | coolkey: Make sure the object ID is unique when filling list
Thanks to oss-fuzz
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=19208 |
void cli_bytecode_context_setctx(struct cli_bc_ctx *ctx, void *cctx)
{
ctx->ctx = cctx;
ctx->bytecode_timeout = ((cli_ctx*)cctx)->engine->bytecode_timeout;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-189"
] | clamav-devel | 3d664817f6ef833a17414a4ecea42004c35cc42f | 299,594,874,326,538,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | fix recursion level crash (bb #3706).
Thanks to Stephane Chazelas for the analysis. |
smb2_validate_and_copy_iov(unsigned int offset, unsigned int buffer_length,
struct kvec *iov, unsigned int minbufsize,
char *data)
{
char *begin_of_buf = offset + (char *)iov->iov_base;
int rc;
if (!data)
return -EINVAL;
rc = smb2_validate_iov(offset, buffer_length, iov, minbufsize);
if (rc)
retu... | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-200"
] | linux | 6a3eb3360667170988f8a6477f6686242061488a | 117,696,844,921,989,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_write
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_write+0x1342/0x1580
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b6a8e450 by task ln/4196
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 de... |
bool SELECT_LEX_UNIT::set_lock_to_the_last_select(Lex_select_lock l)
{
if (l.defined_lock)
{
SELECT_LEX *sel= first_select();
while (sel->next_select())
sel= sel->next_select();
if (sel->braces)
{
my_error(ER_WRONG_USAGE, MYF(0), "lock options",
"SELECT in brackets");
... | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | server | 39feab3cd31b5414aa9b428eaba915c251ac34a2 | 249,435,051,115,956,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | MDEV-26412 Server crash in Item_field::fix_outer_field for INSERT SELECT
IF an INSERT/REPLACE SELECT statement contained an ON expression in the top
level select and this expression used a subquery with a column reference
that could not be resolved then an attempt to resolve this reference as
an outer reference caused... |
static int oidc_authenticate_user(request_rec *r, oidc_cfg *c,
oidc_provider_t *provider, const char *original_url,
const char *login_hint, const char *id_token_hint, const char *prompt,
const char *auth_request_params) {
oidc_debug(r, "enter");
if (provider == NULL) {
// TODO: should we use an explicit re... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | mod_auth_openidc | 612e309bfffd6f9b8ad7cdccda3019fc0865f3b4 | 314,715,815,918,697,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 109 | don't echo query params on invalid requests to redirect URI; closes #212
thanks @LukasReschke; I'm sure there's some OWASP guideline that warns
against this |
_dbus_exit (int code)
{
_exit (code);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-404"
] | dbus | 872b085f12f56da25a2dbd9bd0b2dff31d5aea63 | 293,798,661,776,207,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | sysdeps-unix: On MSG_CTRUNC, close the fds we did receive
MSG_CTRUNC indicates that we have received fewer fds that we should
have done because the buffer was too small, but we were treating it
as though it indicated that we received *no* fds. If we received any,
we still have to make sure we close them, otherwise the... |
String *val_str() { return val_str(&str_value); } | 0 | [
"CWE-617"
] | server | 2e7891080667c59ac80f788eef4d59d447595772 | 152,239,510,805,881,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | MDEV-25635 Assertion failure when pushing from HAVING into WHERE of view
This bug could manifest itself after pushing a where condition over a
mergeable derived table / view / CTE DT into a grouping view / derived
table / CTE V whose item list contained set functions with constant
arguments such as MIN(2), SUM(1) etc.... |
ike_sub0_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_char np, const struct isakmp_gen *ext, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase, uint32_t doi, uint32_t proto, int depth)
{
const u_char *cp;
struct isakmp_gen e;
u_int item_len;
cp = (const u_char *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
/*
... | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | tcpdump | 396e94ff55a80d554b1fe46bf107db1e91008d6c | 122,171,083,598,065,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14469/ISAKMP: Add a missing bounds check
In ikev1_n_print() check bounds before trying to fetch the replay detection
status.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). |
ignore_enhanced(TBOOLEAN flag)
{
ignore_enhanced_text = flag;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | gnuplot | 963c7df3e0c5266efff260d0dff757dfe03d3632 | 91,918,863,463,687,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Better error handling for faulty font syntax
A missing close-quote in an enhanced text font specification could
cause a segfault.
Bug #2303 |
freelist_insert(SSL_CTX *ctx, int for_read, size_t sz, void *mem)
{
SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list;
SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
list = for_read ? ctx->rbuf_freelist : ctx->wbuf_freelist;
if (list != NULL &&
(sz == list->chunklen || list->chunklen == 0) &&
list->len < ctx-... | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | openssl | 9c00a950604aca819cee977f1dcb4b45f2af3aa6 | 32,831,573,332,948,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | Add and use a constant-time memcmp.
This change adds CRYPTO_memcmp, which compares two vectors of bytes in
an amount of time that's independent of their contents. It also changes
several MAC compares in the code to use this over the standard memcmp,
which may leak information about the size of a matching prefix.
(cher... |
xps_parse_linear_gradient_brush(xps_document *doc, const fz_matrix *ctm, const fz_rect *area,
char *base_uri, xps_resource *dict, fz_xml *root)
{
xps_parse_gradient_brush(doc, ctm, area, base_uri, dict, root, xps_draw_linear_gradient);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | mupdf | 60dabde18d7fe12b19da8b509bdfee9cc886aafc | 48,887,609,552,158,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | Bug 694957: fix stack buffer overflow in xps_parse_color
xps_parse_color happily reads more than FZ_MAX_COLORS values out of a
ContextColor array which overflows the passed in samples array.
Limiting the number of allowed samples to FZ_MAX_COLORS and make sure
to use that constant for all callers fixes the problem.
T... |
static bool verify_start_hooks(struct lxc_conf *conf)
{
struct lxc_list *it;
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
lxc_list_for_each(it, &conf->hooks[LXCHOOK_START]) {
char *hookname = it->elem;
struct stat st;
int ret;
ret = snprintf(path, MAXPATHLEN, "%s%s",
conf->rootfs.path ? conf->rootfs.mount : "", hookname);
i... | 0 | [
"CWE-59",
"CWE-61"
] | lxc | 592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be | 95,094,116,574,750,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. Howev... |
template<typename tp, typename tf, typename tc, typename tz>
CImg<T>& draw_object3d(const float x0, const float y0, const float z0,
const CImg<tp>& vertices, const CImgList<tf>& primitives,
const CImgList<tc>& colors,
const unsigne... | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | CImg | ac8003393569aba51048c9d67e1491559877b1d1 | 157,877,358,216,042,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | . |
BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreateFromGd2Ctx (gdIOCtxPtr in)
{
int sx, sy;
int i;
int ncx, ncy, nc, cs, cx, cy;
int x, y, ylo, yhi, xlo, xhi;
int vers, fmt;
t_chunk_info *chunkIdx = NULL; /* So we can gdFree it with impunity. */
unsigned char *chunkBuf = NULL; /* So we can gdFree it with impunity. */
int chu... | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-189",
"CWE-681"
] | libgd | 2bb97f407c1145c850416a3bfbcc8cf124e68a19 | 28,504,957,142,277,593,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 163 | gd2: handle corrupt images better (CVE-2016-3074)
Make sure we do some range checking on corrupted chunks.
Thanks to Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com> for indepth report
and reproducer information. Made for easy test case writing :). |
static void copy_flags(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *p)
{
unsigned long new_flags = p->flags;
new_flags &= ~PF_SUPERPRIV;
new_flags |= PF_FORKNOEXEC;
new_flags |= PF_STARTING;
p->flags = new_flags;
clear_freeze_flag(p);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | linux-2.6 | 2d5516cbb9daf7d0e342a2e3b0fc6f8c39a81205 | 50,605,479,015,865,390,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | copy_process: fix CLONE_PARENT && parent_exec_id interaction
CLONE_PARENT can fool the ->self_exec_id/parent_exec_id logic. If we
re-use the old parent, we must also re-use ->parent_exec_id to make
sure exit_notify() sees the right ->xxx_exec_id's when the CLONE_PARENT'ed
task exits.
Also, move down the "p->parent_ex... |
GF_Box *twrp_box_new()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_TextWrapBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_TWRP);
return (GF_Box *) tmp;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | gpac | d527325a9b72218612455a534a508f9e1753f76e | 292,077,537,652,210,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | fixed #1768 |
static void __do_user_fault(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
unsigned int esr, unsigned int sig, int code,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct siginfo si;
if (show_unhandled_signals) {
pr_info("%s[%d]: unhandled page fault (%d) at 0x%08lx, code 0x%03x\n",
tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk), sig, a... | 0 | [] | linux | 1d18c47c735e8adfe531fc41fae31e98f86b68fe | 116,723,250,594,065,410,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | arm64: MMU fault handling and page table management
This patch adds support for the handling of the MMU faults (exception
entry code introduced by a previous patch) and page table management.
The user translation table is pointed to by TTBR0 and the kernel one
(swapper_pg_dir) by TTBR1. There is no translation inform... |
static bool tcp_shifted_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tcp_sacktag_state *state,
unsigned int pcount, int shifted, int mss,
bool dup_sack)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *prev = tcp_write_queue_prev(sk, skb);
u32 start_seq = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq; /* start of... | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | net | 75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758 | 311,191,526,088,233,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 78 | tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
s... |
ip6t_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_hook_state *state,
struct xt_table *table)
{
unsigned int hook = state->hook;
static const char nulldevname[IFNAMSIZ] __attribute__((aligned(sizeof(long))));
/* Initializing verdict to NF_DROP keeps gcc happy. */
unsigned int verdict = NF_DROP;
const... | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | nf-next | d7591f0c41ce3e67600a982bab6989ef0f07b3ce | 319,298,422,376,847,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 141 | netfilter: x_tables: introduce and use xt_copy_counters_from_user
The three variants use same copy&pasted code, condense this into a
helper and use that.
Make sure info.name is 0-terminated.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> |
void ElectronBrowserHandlerImpl::ReceivePostMessage(
const std::string& channel,
blink::TransferableMessage message) {
api::WebContents* api_web_contents = api::WebContents::From(web_contents());
if (api_web_contents) {
api_web_contents->ReceivePostMessage(channel, std::move(message),
... | 1 | [] | electron | e9fa834757f41c0b9fe44a4dffe3d7d437f52d34 | 328,329,797,632,801,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | fix: ensure ElectronBrowser mojo service is only bound to appropriate render frames (#33344)
* fix: ensure ElectronBrowser mojo service is only bound to authorized render frames
Notes: no-notes
* refactor: extract electron API IPC to its own mojo interface
* fix: just check main frame not primary main frame
... |
int snd_seq_get_port_info(struct snd_seq_client_port * port,
struct snd_seq_port_info * info)
{
if (snd_BUG_ON(!port || !info))
return -EINVAL;
/* get port name */
strlcpy(info->name, port->name, sizeof(info->name));
/* get capabilities */
info->capability = port->capability;
/* get port type */
info-... | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-362"
] | linux | 71105998845fb012937332fe2e806d443c09e026 | 327,878,105,085,424,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwh... |
static BIGNUM *SRP_gN_place_bn(STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache) *gN_cache, char *ch)
{
int i;
if (gN_cache == NULL)
return NULL;
/* search if we have already one... */
for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_cache_num(gN_cache); i++) {
SRP_gN_cache *cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_value(gN_cache, i);
if (strcm... | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
] | openssl | 380f18ed5f140e0ae1b68f3ab8f4f7c395658d9e | 339,600,262,656,648,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | CVE-2016-0798: avoid memory leak in SRP
The SRP user database lookup method SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had confusing
memory management semantics; the returned pointer was sometimes newly
allocated, and sometimes owned by the callee. The calling code has no
way of distinguishing these two cases.
Specifically, SRP servers t... |
static int read_int32_info (WavpackStream *wps, WavpackMetadata *wpmd)
{
int bytecnt = wpmd->byte_length;
char *byteptr = (char *)wpmd->data;
if (bytecnt != 4)
return FALSE;
wps->int32_sent_bits = *byteptr++;
wps->int32_zeros = *byteptr++;
wps->int32_ones = *byteptr++;
wps->int32_d... | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | WavPack | bba5389dc598a92bdf2b297c3ea34620b6679b5b | 174,236,346,748,823,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | issue #54: fix potential out-of-bounds heap read |
static void enable_service(const char *name, int ena)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(daemon_service); i++) {
if (!strcmp(daemon_service[i].name, name)) {
daemon_service[i].enabled = ena;
return;
}
}
die("No such service %s", name);
} | 0 | [] | git | 73bb33a94ec67a53e7d805b12ad9264fa25f4f8d | 182,712,847,377,604,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | daemon: Strictly parse the "extra arg" part of the command
Since 1.4.4.5 (49ba83fb67 "Add virtualization support to git-daemon")
git daemon enters an infinite loop and never terminates if a client
hides any extra arguments in the initial request line which is not
exactly "\0host=blah\0".
Since that change, a client m... |
static long do_splice_from(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out,
loff_t *ppos, size_t len, unsigned int flags)
{
ssize_t (*splice_write)(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct file *,
loff_t *, size_t, unsigned int);
if (out->f_op->splice_write)
splice_write = out->f_op->splice_write;
else
splice_... | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | 8d0207652cbe27d1f962050737848e5ad4671958 | 67,838,332,301,770,310,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@z... |
xmlTextReaderValidityError(void *ctxt, const char *msg, ...)
{
va_list ap;
int len = xmlStrlen((const xmlChar *) msg);
if ((len > 1) && (msg[len - 2] != ':')) {
/*
* some callbacks only report locator information:
* skip them (mimicking behaviour in error.c)
*/
v... | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
] | libxml2 | 213f1fe0d76d30eaed6e5853057defc43e6df2c9 | 79,999,602,382,471,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | CVE-2015-1819 Enforce the reader to run in constant memory
One of the operation on the reader could resolve entities
leading to the classic expansion issue. Make sure the
buffer used for xmlreader operation is bounded.
Introduce a new allocation type for the buffers for this effect. |
void evbuffer_file_segment_add_cleanup_cb(struct evbuffer_file_segment *seg,
evbuffer_file_segment_cleanup_cb cb, void* arg)
{
EVUTIL_ASSERT(seg->refcnt > 0);
seg->cleanup_cb = cb;
seg->cleanup_cb_arg = arg;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-189"
] | libevent | 841ecbd96105c84ac2e7c9594aeadbcc6fb38bc4 | 308,706,324,945,562,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | Fix CVE-2014-6272 in Libevent 2.1
For this fix, we need to make sure that passing too-large inputs to
the evbuffer functions can't make us do bad things with the heap.
Also, lower the maximum chunk size to the lower of off_t, size_t maximum.
This is necessary since otherwise we could get into an infinite loop
if we ... |
static size_t float_to_size_t(float x) {
if (x < 0.0f || zend_isnan(x)) {
return 0;
} else if (x > (float) SIZE_MAX) {
return SIZE_MAX;
} else {
return (size_t) x;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | php-src | 0c77b4307df73217283a4aaf9313e1a33a0967ff | 254,448,070,048,383,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | Fixed bug #79282 |
int cil_resolve_devicetreecon(struct cil_tree_node *current, void *extra_args)
{
struct cil_devicetreecon *devicetreecon = current->data;
struct cil_symtab_datum *context_datum = NULL;
int rc = SEPOL_ERR;
if (devicetreecon->context_str != NULL) {
rc = cil_resolve_name(current, devicetreecon->context_str, CIL_SYM... | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | selinux | 340f0eb7f3673e8aacaf0a96cbfcd4d12a405521 | 128,449,483,494,410,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | libsepol/cil: Check for statements not allowed in optional blocks
While there are some checks for invalid statements in an optional
block when resolving the AST, there are no checks when building the
AST.
OSS-Fuzz found the following policy which caused a null dereference
in cil_tree_get_next_path().
(blockinherit ... |
int blkid_partition_set_type_uuid(blkid_partition par, const unsigned char *uuid)
{
blkid_unparse_uuid(uuid, par->typestr, sizeof(par->typestr));
return 0;
} | 0 | [] | util-linux | 50d1594c2e6142a3b51d2143c74027480df082e0 | 278,121,090,060,537,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | libblkid: avoid non-empty recursion in EBR
This is extension to the patch 7164a1c34d18831ac61c6744ad14ce916d389b3f.
We also need to detect non-empty recursion in the EBR chain. It's
possible to create standard valid logical partitions and in the last one
points back to the EBR chain. In this case all offsets will be ... |
RGWOpType get_type() override { return RGW_OP_OPTIONS_CORS; } | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | ceph | ab29bed2fc9f961fe895de1086a8208e21ddaddc | 295,012,234,330,036,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | rgw: fix issues with 'enforce bounds' patch
The patch to enforce bounds on max-keys/max-uploads/max-parts had a few
issues that would prevent us from compiling it. Instead of changing the
code provided by the submitter, we're addressing them in a separate
commit to maintain the DCO.
Signed-off-by: Joao Eduardo Luis <... |
static int nr_info_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return seq_open(file, &nr_info_seqops);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux-2.6 | f6b97b29513950bfbf621a83d85b6f86b39ec8db | 220,211,200,476,118,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | netrom: Fix nr_getname() leak
nr_getname() can leak kernel memory to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
TABLE *find_table_for_mdl_upgrade(THD *thd, const char *db,
const char *table_name, int *p_error)
{
TABLE *tab= find_locked_table(thd->open_tables, db, table_name);
int error;
if (!tab)
{
error= ER_TABLE_NOT_LOCKED;
goto err_exit;
}
/*
It is not safe to upgrad... | 0 | [] | server | 0168d1eda30dad4b517659422e347175eb89e923 | 88,193,507,950,640,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 46 | MDEV-25766 Unused CTE lead to a crash in find_field_in_tables/find_order_in_list
Do not assume that subquery Item always present. |
execute_pipeline (command, asynchronous, pipe_in, pipe_out, fds_to_close)
COMMAND *command;
int asynchronous, pipe_in, pipe_out;
struct fd_bitmap *fds_to_close;
{
int prev, fildes[2], new_bitmap_size, dummyfd, ignore_return, exec_result;
int lstdin, lastpipe_flag, lastpipe_jid;
COMMAND *cmd;
stru... | 0 | [] | bash | 955543877583837c85470f7fb8a97b7aa8d45e6c | 56,200,140,463,909,690,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 178 | bash-4.4-rc2 release |
date_initialize(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self)
{
VALUE vy, vm, vd, vsg, y, fr, fr2, ret;
int m, d;
double sg;
struct SimpleDateData *dat = rb_check_typeddata(self, &d_lite_type);
if (!simple_dat_p(dat)) {
rb_raise(rb_eTypeError, "Date expected");
}
rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "04", &vy, ... | 0 | [] | date | 3959accef8da5c128f8a8e2fd54e932a4fb253b0 | 179,339,772,773,952,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 60 | Add length limit option for methods that parses date strings
`Date.parse` now raises an ArgumentError when a given date string is
longer than 128. You can configure the limit by giving `limit` keyword
arguments like `Date.parse(str, limit: 1000)`. If you pass `limit: nil`,
the limit is disabled.
Not only `Date.parse`... |
int unit_merge_by_name(Unit *u, const char *name) {
_cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL;
Unit *other;
int r;
assert(u);
assert(name);
if (unit_name_is_valid(name, UNIT_NAME_TEMPLATE)) {
if (!u->instance)
return -EINVAL;
... | 0 | [
"CWE-269"
] | systemd | bf65b7e0c9fc215897b676ab9a7c9d1c688143ba | 315,408,283,284,907,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | core: imply NNP and SUID/SGID restriction for DynamicUser=yes service
Let's be safe, rather than sorry. This way DynamicUser=yes services can
neither take benefit of, nor create SUID/SGID binaries.
Given that DynamicUser= is a recent addition only we should be able to
get away with turning this on, even though this i... |
static int ebb_get(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
{
/* Build tests */
BUILD_BUG_ON(TSO(ebbrr) + sizeof(unsigned long) != TSO(ebbhr));
BUILD_BUG_ON(TSO(ebbhr) + sizeof(unsigned long) != TSO(besc... | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | c1fa0768a8713b135848f78fd43ffc208d8ded70 | 57,592,001,359,957,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
th... |
stronger_key_check ( RSA_secret_key *skey )
{
gcry_mpi_t t = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
gcry_mpi_t t1 = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
gcry_mpi_t t2 = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
gcry_mpi_t phi = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
/* check that n == p * q */
mpi_mul( t, skey->p, skey->q);
if (mpi_cmp( t, skey->n) )
log_info ... | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | libgcrypt | 8725c99ffa41778f382ca97233183bcd687bb0ce | 101,813,939,371,985,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 59 | rsa: Add exponent blinding.
* cipher/rsa.c (secret_core_crt): Blind secret D with randomized
nonce R for mpi_powm computation.
--
Co-authored-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
The paper describing attack: https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/627
Sliding right into disaster: Left-... |
gnutls_priority_set(gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_priority_t priority)
{
if (priority == NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
return GNUTLS_E_NO_CIPHER_SUITES;
}
memcpy(&session->internals.priorities, priority,
sizeof(struct gnutls_priority_st));
/* set the current version to the first in the chain.
* This w... | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | gnutls | 21f89efad7014a5ee0debd4cd3d59e27774b29e6 | 218,284,707,728,061,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | handshake: add FALLBACK_SCSV priority option
This allows clients to enable the TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV mechanism during
the handshake, as defined in RFC7507. |
dns_resolver_match(const struct key *key,
const struct key_match_data *match_data)
{
int slen, dlen, ret = 0;
const char *src = key->description, *dsp = match_data->raw_data;
kenter("%s,%s", src, dsp);
if (!src || !dsp)
goto no_match;
if (strcasecmp(src, dsp) == 0)
goto matched;
slen = strlen(src);
... | 1 | [
"CWE-476"
] | linux | c06cfb08b88dfbe13be44a69ae2fdc3a7c902d81 | 163,477,518,912,972,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 | KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key descripti... |
static int rbd_obj_method_sync(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev,
struct ceph_object_id *oid,
struct ceph_object_locator *oloc,
const char *method_name,
const void *outbound,
size_t outbound_size,
void *inbound,
size_t inbound_size)
{
struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = &rbd... | 0 | [
"CWE-863"
] | linux | f44d04e696feaf13d192d942c4f14ad2e117065a | 171,025,840,000,160,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 52 | rbd: require global CAP_SYS_ADMIN for mapping and unmapping
It turns out that currently we rely only on sysfs attribute
permissions:
$ ll /sys/bus/rbd/{add*,remove*}
--w------- 1 root root 4096 Sep 3 20:37 /sys/bus/rbd/add
--w------- 1 root root 4096 Sep 3 20:37 /sys/bus/rbd/add_single_major
--w------- 1 ro... |
static void __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
u32 msr, int type)
{
int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
return;
/*
* See Intel PRM Vol. 3, 20.6.9 (MSR-Bitmap Address). Early manuals
* have the write-low and read-high bitmap offsets the wrong way round.
... | 0 | [] | kvm | a642fc305053cc1c6e47e4f4df327895747ab485 | 177,889,719,618,907,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 | kvm: vmx: handle invvpid vm exit gracefully
On systems with invvpid instruction support (corresponding bit in
IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP MSR is set) guest invocation of invvpid
causes vm exit, which is currently not handled and results in
propagation of unknown exit to userspace.
Fix this by installing an invvpid vm exit ... |
bool AudioOutputSpeech::needSamples(unsigned int snum) {
for (unsigned int i=iLastConsume;i<iBufferFilled;++i)
pfBuffer[i-iLastConsume]=pfBuffer[i];
iBufferFilled -= iLastConsume;
iLastConsume = snum;
if (iBufferFilled >= snum)
return bLastAlive;
float *pOut;
bool nextalive = bLastAlive;
while (iBufferFi... | 0 | [
"CWE-189"
] | mumble | d3be3d7b96a5130e4b20f23e327b040ea4d0b079 | 193,745,319,485,110,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 243 | mumble: fix Mumble-SA-2014-002 (CVE-2014-0045). |
virtual bool ms_verify_authorizer(Connection *con, int peer_type,
int protocol, bufferlist& authorizer,
bufferlist& authorizer_reply,
bool& isvalid, CryptoKey& session_key,
std::unique_ptr<AuthAuthorizerChallenge> *challenge) {
/* always succeed */
isvalid = true;
return tr... | 0 | [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-284"
] | ceph | 5ead97120e07054d80623dada90a5cc764c28468 | 62,722,346,706,035,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | auth/cephx: add authorizer challenge
Allow the accepting side of a connection to reject an initial authorizer
with a random challenge. The connecting side then has to respond with an
updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge
and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific ... |
static void gfar_free_rx_queues(struct gfar_private *priv)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < priv->num_rx_queues; i++)
kfree(priv->rx_queue[i]);
} | 0 | [] | linux | d8861bab48b6c1fc3cdbcab8ff9d1eaea43afe7f | 161,933,618,529,576,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | gianfar: fix jumbo packets+napi+rx overrun crash
When using jumbo packets and overrunning rx queue with napi enabled,
the following sequence is observed in gfar_add_rx_frag:
| lstatus | | skb |
t | lstatus, size, flags | first | len, data_len, *... |
generate_keytag_query(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id,
struct trust_anchor* ta)
{
/* 3 bytes for "_ta", 5 bytes per tag (4 bytes + "-") */
#define MAX_LABEL_TAGS (LDNS_MAX_LABELLEN-3)/5
size_t i, numtag;
uint16_t tags[MAX_LABEL_TAGS];
char tagstr[LDNS_MAX_LABELLEN+1] = "_ta"; /* +1 for NULL byte */
size_t ta... | 0 | [
"CWE-613",
"CWE-703"
] | unbound | f6753a0f1018133df552347a199e0362fc1dac68 | 263,122,036,018,363,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 | - Fix the novel ghost domain issues CVE-2022-30698 and CVE-2022-30699. |
static void nlmclnt_locks_copy_lock(struct file_lock *new, struct file_lock *fl)
{
spin_lock(&fl->fl_u.nfs_fl.owner->host->h_lock);
new->fl_u.nfs_fl.state = fl->fl_u.nfs_fl.state;
new->fl_u.nfs_fl.owner = nlm_get_lockowner(fl->fl_u.nfs_fl.owner);
list_add_tail(&new->fl_u.nfs_fl.list, &fl->fl_u.nfs_fl.owner->host->h... | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-399",
"CWE-703"
] | linux | 0b760113a3a155269a3fba93a409c640031dd68f | 305,054,862,216,870,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasi... |
ssize_t tcp_sendmsg(conn *c, struct msghdr *msg, int flags) {
assert (c != NULL);
return sendmsg(c->sfd, msg, flags);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | memcached | 554b56687a19300a75ec24184746b5512580c819 | 205,680,294,717,276,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | fix strncpy call to avoid ASAN violation
Ensure we're only reading to the size of the smallest buffer, since
they're both on the stack and could potentially overlap. Overlapping is
defined as ... undefined behavior. I've looked through all available
implementations of strncpy and they still only copy from the first \0... |
next_state_class(CClassNode* cc, CClassNode* asc_cc,
OnigCodePoint* vs, enum CCVALTYPE* type,
enum CCSTATE* state, ScanEnv* env)
{
int r;
if (*state == CCS_RANGE)
return ONIGERR_CHAR_CLASS_VALUE_AT_END_OF_RANGE;
if (*state == CCS_VALUE && *type != CCV_CLASS) {
if (*type == CCV_SB) {
BITSET_S... | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | Onigmo | 00cc7e28a3ed54b3b512ef3b58ea737a57acf1f9 | 247,088,716,993,857,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 | Fix SEGV in onig_error_code_to_str() (Fix #132)
When onig_new(ONIG_SYNTAX_PERL) fails with ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME,
onig_error_code_to_str() crashes.
onig_scan_env_set_error_string() should have been used when returning
ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME. |
static size_t local_strnlen(const char *s, size_t n)
{
const char *p = (const char *)memchr(s, 0, n);
return(p ? p-s : n);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] | LibRaw | d13e8f6d1e987b7491182040a188c16a395f1d21 | 189,703,961,136,527,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | CVE-2017-1438 credits; fix for Kodak 65000 out of bounds access |
dequeue_load_avg(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se) { } | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703",
"CWE-835"
] | linux | c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0 | 117,947,935,434,113,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) re... |
GF_Err flac_dmx_process(GF_Filter *filter)
{
GF_FLACDmxCtx *ctx = gf_filter_get_udta(filter);
GF_FilterPacket *pck, *dst_pck;
u8 *output;
u8 *start;
Bool final_flush=GF_FALSE;
u32 pck_size, remain, prev_pck_size;
u64 cts = GF_FILTER_NO_TS;
FLACHeader hdr;
//always reparse duration
if (!ctx->duration.num)
f... | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | gpac | da69ad1f970a7e17c865eaec9af98cc84df10d5b | 181,202,795,714,431,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 226 | fixed 1718 |
static void
mysql_ssl_free(MYSQL *mysql MY_ATTRIBUTE((unused)))
{
struct st_VioSSLFd *ssl_fd= (struct st_VioSSLFd*) mysql->connector_fd;
DBUG_ENTER("mysql_ssl_free");
my_free(mysql->options.ssl_key);
my_free(mysql->options.ssl_cert);
my_free(mysql->options.ssl_ca);
my_free(mysql->options.ssl_capath);
my_... | 0 | [
"CWE-319"
] | mysql-server | 0002e1380d5f8c113b6bce91f2cf3f75136fd7c7 | 65,329,555,067,277,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | BUG#25575605: SETTING --SSL-MODE=REQUIRED SENDS CREDENTIALS BEFORE VERIFYING SSL CONNECTION
MYSQL_OPT_SSL_MODE option introduced.
It is set in case of --ssl-mode=REQUIRED and permits only SSL connection.
(cherry picked from commit f91b941842d240b8a62645e507f5554e8be76aec) |
int netif_receive_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct packet_type *ptype, *pt_prev;
struct net_device *orig_dev;
int ret = NET_RX_DROP;
unsigned short type;
/* if we've gotten here through NAPI, check netpoll */
if (skb->dev->poll && netpoll_rx(skb))
return NET_RX_DROP;
if (!skb->tstamp.off_sec)
net_timestam... | 0 | [] | linux | e89e9cf539a28df7d0eb1d0a545368e9920b34ac | 332,526,754,256,340,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 91 | [IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach
Attached is kernel patch for UDP Fragmentation Offload (UFO) feature.
1. This patch incorporate the review comments by Jeff Garzik.
2. Renamed USO as UFO (UDP Fragmentation Offload)
3. udp sendfile support with UFO
This patches uses scatter-gather feature of skb to generate l... |
char *jas_image_fmttostr(int fmt)
{
jas_image_fmtinfo_t *fmtinfo;
if (!(fmtinfo = jas_image_lookupfmtbyid(fmt))) {
return 0;
}
return fmtinfo->name;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-189"
] | jasper | 3c55b399c36ef46befcb21e4ebc4799367f89684 | 138,666,556,250,389,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | At many places in the code, jas_malloc or jas_recalloc was being
invoked with the size argument being computed in a manner that would not
allow integer overflow to be detected. Now, these places in the code
have been modified to use special-purpose memory allocation functions
(e.g., jas_alloc2, jas_alloc3, jas_realloc... |
void ConnectionManagerImpl::doEndStream(ActiveStream& stream) {
// The order of what happens in this routine is important and a little complicated. We first see
// if the stream needs to be reset. If it needs to be, this will end up invoking reset callbacks
// and then moving the stream to the deferred destructio... | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
] | envoy | 0e49a495826ea9e29134c1bd54fdeb31a034f40c | 299,326,547,091,840,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | http/2: add stats and stream flush timeout (#139)
This commit adds a new stream flush timeout to guard against a
remote server that does not open window once an entire stream has
been buffered for flushing. Additional stats have also been added
to better understand the codecs view of active streams as well as
amount o... |
static bool nested_vmx_exit_reflected(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason)
{
u32 intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(kvm_rip_read(vcpu), exit_reason,
vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION),
vmx->idt_ve... | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-617"
] | linux | 3a8b0677fc6180a467e26cc32ce6b0c09a32f9bb | 52,868,690,290,016,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 167 | KVM: VMX: Do not BUG() on out-of-bounds guest IRQ
The value of the guest_irq argument to vmx_update_pi_irte() is
ultimately coming from a KVM_IRQFD API call. Do not BUG() in
vmx_update_pi_irte() if the value is out-of bounds. (Especially,
since KVM as a whole seems to hang after that.)
Instead, print a message only o... |
readScanline(T& in, bool reduceMemory , bool reduceTime)
{
bool threw = false;
try
{
const Box2i &dw = in.header().dataWindow();
int w = dw.max.x - dw.min.x + 1;
int dx = dw.min.x;
if (reduceMemory && w > (1 << 10))
{
return false;
}
F... | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | openexr | ae6d203892cc9311917a7f4f05354ef792b3e58e | 142,090,164,996,402,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 69 | Handle xsampling and bad seekg() calls in exrcheck (#872)
* fix exrcheck xsampling!=1
Signed-off-by: Peter Hillman <peterh@wetafx.co.nz>
* fix handling bad seekg() calls in exrcheck
Signed-off-by: Peter Hillman <peterh@wetafx.co.nz>
* fix deeptile detection in multipart files
Signed-off-by: Peter Hillma... |
GF_Err gf_bifs_dec_field(GF_BifsDecoder * codec, GF_BitStream *bs, GF_Node *node, GF_FieldInfo *field, Bool is_mem_com)
{
GF_Err e;
u8 flag;
// if (codec->LastError) return codec->LastError;
assert(node);
// if (field->fieldType == GF_SG_VRML_UNKNOWN) return GF_NON_COMPLIANT_BITSTREAM;
if (gf_sg_vrml_is_sf_field... | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | gpac | 55a183e6b8602369c04ea3836e05436a79fbc7f8 | 40,320,934,957,051,332,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 59 | fixed #2153 |
static void io_req_drop_files(struct io_kiocb *req)
{
struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->inflight_lock, flags);
list_del(&req->inflight_entry);
if (waitqueue_active(&ctx->inflight_wait))
wake_up(&ctx->inflight_wait);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->inflight_lock, flag... | 0 | [] | linux | 0f2122045b946241a9e549c2a76cea54fa58a7ff | 256,166,038,032,363,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | io_uring: don't rely on weak ->files references
Grab actual references to the files_struct. To avoid circular references
issues due to this, we add a per-task note that keeps track of what
io_uring contexts a task has used. When the tasks execs or exits its
assigned files, we cancel requests based on this tracking.
W... |
int base64_encode_blockend(char *code_out, struct base64_encodestate *state_in)
{
char *codechar = code_out;
switch (state_in->step) {
case step_B:
*codechar++ = base64_encode_value(state_in->result);
*codechar++ = '=';
*codechar++ = '=';
break;
case step_C:
*codechar++ = base64_encode_value(state_in->re... | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | frr | ac3133450de12ba86c051265fc0f1b12bc57b40c | 113,598,025,835,490,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | isisd: fix #10505 using base64 encoding
Using base64 instead of the raw string to encode
the binary data.
Signed-off-by: whichbug <whichbug@github.com> |
comp_distance_value(MinMaxLen* d1, MinMaxLen* d2, int v1, int v2)
{
if (v2 <= 0) return -1;
if (v1 <= 0) return 1;
v1 *= distance_value(d1);
v2 *= distance_value(d2);
if (v2 > v1) return 1;
if (v2 < v1) return -1;
if (d2->min < d1->min) return 1;
if (d2->min > d1->min) return -1;
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | php-src | c6e34d91b88638966662caac62c4d0e90538e317 | 9,213,640,705,011,468,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | Fix bug #77371 (heap buffer overflow in mb regex functions - compile_string_node) |
struct section_t* MACH0_(get_sections)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
struct section_t *sections;
char segname[32], sectname[32];
int i, j, to;
if (!bin) {
return NULL;
}
/* for core files */
if (bin->nsects < 1 && bin->nsegs > 0) {
struct MACH0_(segment_command) *seg;
if (!(sections = calloc ((bin->nsegs +... | 0 | [
"CWE-415",
"CWE-125"
] | radare2 | 60208765887f5f008b3b9a883f3addc8bdb9c134 | 203,019,831,334,248,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 71 | Fix #9970 - heap oobread in mach0 parser (#10026) |
void t_cpp_generator::generate_service_async_skeleton(t_service* tservice) {
string svcname = tservice->get_name();
// Service implementation file includes
string f_skeleton_name = get_out_dir() + svcname + "_async_server.skeleton.cpp";
string ns = namespace_prefix(tservice->get_program()->get_namespace("cpp"... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | thrift | cfaadcc4adcfde2a8232c62ec89870b73ef40df1 | 217,808,115,783,615,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 63 | THRIFT-3231 CPP: Limit recursion depth to 64
Client: cpp
Patch: Ben Craig <bencraig@apache.org> |
GF_Err gf_isom_svc_config_del(GF_ISOFile *the_file, u32 trackNumber, u32 DescriptionIndex)
{
return gf_isom_svc_mvc_config_del(the_file, trackNumber, DescriptionIndex, GF_FALSE);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-401"
] | gpac | 0a85029d694f992f3631e2f249e4999daee15cbf | 168,918,050,226,863,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | fixed #1785 (fuzz) |
static CURLcode imap_parse_url_options(struct connectdata *conn)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
struct imap_conn *imapc = &conn->proto.imapc;
const char *ptr = conn->options;
imapc->sasl.resetprefs = TRUE;
while(!result && ptr && *ptr) {
const char *key = ptr;
const char *value;
while(*ptr && *p... | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | curl | 13c9a9ded3ae744a1e11cbc14e9146d9fa427040 | 158,799,059,129,608,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 | imap: if a FETCH response has no size, don't call write callback
CVE-2017-1000257
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter and 0xd34db347
Also detected by OSS-Fuzz: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=3586 |
static bool i40e_is_any_channel(struct i40e_vsi *vsi)
{
struct i40e_channel *ch, *ch_tmp;
list_for_each_entry_safe(ch, ch_tmp, &vsi->ch_list, list) {
if (ch->initialized)
return true;
}
return false;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] | linux | 27d461333459d282ffa4a2bdb6b215a59d493a8f | 263,714,320,503,308,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | i40e: prevent memory leak in i40e_setup_macvlans
In i40e_setup_macvlans if i40e_setup_channel fails the allocated memory
for ch should be released.
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com> |
dns_zone_clearqueryonacl(dns_zone_t *zone) {
REQUIRE(DNS_ZONE_VALID(zone));
LOCK_ZONE(zone);
if (zone->queryon_acl != NULL)
dns_acl_detach(&zone->queryon_acl);
UNLOCK_ZONE(zone);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-327"
] | bind9 | f09352d20a9d360e50683cd1d2fc52ccedcd77a0 | 222,696,136,627,865,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | Update keyfetch_done compute_tag check
If in keyfetch_done the compute_tag fails (because for example the
algorithm is not supported), don't crash, but instead ignore the
key. |
static bool ParseDracoExtension(Primitive *primitive, Model *model,
std::string *err,
const Value &dracoExtensionValue) {
(void)err;
auto bufferViewValue = dracoExtensionValue.Get("bufferView");
if (!bufferViewValue.IsInt()) return false;
auto attr... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | tinygltf | 52ff00a38447f06a17eab1caa2cf0730a119c751 | 271,572,420,994,255,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 97 | Do not expand file path since its not necessary for glTF asset path(URI) and for security reason(`wordexp`). |
decodeFields(CtxJson *ctx, ParseCtx *parseCtx, DecodeEntry *entries,
size_t entryCount, const UA_DataType *type) {
CHECK_TOKEN_BOUNDS;
size_t objectCount = (size_t)(parseCtx->tokenArray[parseCtx->index].size);
status ret = UA_STATUSCODE_GOOD;
if(entryCount == 1) {
if(*(entries[0].f... | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-787"
] | open62541 | c800e2987b10bb3af6ef644b515b5d6392f8861d | 21,382,593,634,957,190,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 64 | fix(json): Check max recursion depth in more places |
store_tabletExecute(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t count)
{
struct aiptek *aiptek = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
/* We do not care what you write to this file. Merely the action
* of writing to this file triggers a tablet reprogramming.
*/
memcpy(&aiptek->curSetting, &aiptek... | 0 | [
"CWE-476",
"CWE-401"
] | linux | 8e20cf2bce122ce9262d6034ee5d5b76fbb92f96 | 218,458,700,899,343,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching on... |
void luaD_hook (lua_State *L, int event, int line,
int ftransfer, int ntransfer) {
lua_Hook hook = L->hook;
if (hook && L->allowhook) { /* make sure there is a hook */
int mask = CIST_HOOKED;
CallInfo *ci = L->ci;
ptrdiff_t top = savestack(L, L->top);
ptrdiff_t ci_top ... | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] | lua | 6298903e35217ab69c279056f925fb72900ce0b7 | 43,560,996,598,612,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 | Keep minimum size when shrinking a stack
When shrinking a stack (during GC), do not make it smaller than the
initial stack size. |
void zend_init_opcodes_handlers(void)
{
static const opcode_handler_t labels[] = {
ZEND_NOP_SPEC_HANDLER,
ZEND_NOP_SPEC_HANDLER,
ZEND_NOP_SPEC_HANDLER,
ZEND_NOP_SPEC_HANDLER,
ZEND_NOP_SPEC_HANDLER,
ZEND_NOP_SPEC_HANDLER,
ZEND_NOP_SPEC_HANDLER,
ZEND_NOP_SPEC_HANDLER,
ZEND_NOP_SPEC_HANDLER,
... | 0 | [] | php-src | ce96fd6b0761d98353761bf78d5bfb55291179fd | 267,555,238,317,998,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3,857 | - fix #39863, do not accept paths with NULL in them. See http://news.php.net/php.internals/50191, trunk will have the patch later (adding a macro and/or changing (some) APIs. Patch by Rasmus |
void dbus_handler_manager1_init(GDBusConnection *connection)
{
GError *error = NULL;
TCMUService1HandlerManager1 *interface;
gboolean ret;
interface = tcmuservice1_handler_manager1_skeleton_new();
ret = g_dbus_interface_skeleton_export(
G_DBUS_INTERFACE_SKELETON(interface),
connection,
"/org/kernel/TCMUS... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | tcmu-runner | e2d953050766ac538615a811c64b34358614edce | 72,086,924,720,948,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | fixed local DoS when UnregisterHandler was called for a not existing handler
Any user with DBUS access could cause a SEGFAULT in tcmu-runner by
running something like this:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.... |
static void bnx2x_pf_init(struct bnx2x *bp)
{
struct bnx2x_func_init_params func_init = {0};
struct event_ring_data eq_data = { {0} };
if (!CHIP_IS_E1x(bp)) {
/* reset IGU PF statistics: MSIX + ATTN */
/* PF */
REG_WR(bp, IGU_REG_STATISTIC_NUM_MESSAGE_SENT +
BNX2X_IGU_STAS_MSG_VF_CNT*4 +
(CHIP_MOD... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux | 8914a595110a6eca69a5e275b323f5d09e18f4f9 | 224,637,987,524,681,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 | bnx2x: disable GSO where gso_size is too big for hardware
If a bnx2x card is passed a GSO packet with a gso_size larger than
~9700 bytes, it will cause a firmware error that will bring the card
down:
bnx2x: [bnx2x_attn_int_deasserted3:4323(enP24p1s0f0)]MC assert!
bnx2x: [bnx2x_mc_assert:720(enP24p1s0f0)]XSTORM_ASSERT... |
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