func string | target int64 | cwe list | project string | commit_id string | hash float64 | size int64 | message string |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
static int _nfs4_proc_getlk(struct nfs4_state *state, int cmd, struct file_lock *request)
{
struct inode *inode = state->inode;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
struct nfs_client *clp = server->nfs_client;
struct nfs_lockt_args arg = {
.fh = NFS_FH(inode),
.fl = request,
};
struct nfs_lockt_res ... | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9 | 99,693,777,226,494,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 | NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> |
void ConnectionHandlerImpl::ActiveTcpListener::onAccept(Network::ConnectionSocketPtr&& socket) {
onAcceptWorker(std::move(socket), config_.handOffRestoredDestinationConnections(), false);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-835"
] | envoy | c8de199e2971f79cbcbc6b5eadc8c566b28705d1 | 28,345,506,530,053,934,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | listener: clean up accept filter before creating connection (#8922)
Signed-off-by: Yuchen Dai <silentdai@gmail.com> |
PredictorEncodeTile(TIFF* tif, uint8* bp0, tmsize_t cc0, uint16 s)
{
static const char module[] = "PredictorEncodeTile";
TIFFPredictorState *sp = PredictorState(tif);
uint8 *working_copy;
tmsize_t cc = cc0, rowsize;
unsigned char* bp;
int result_code;
assert(sp != NULL);
assert(sp->encodepfunc !=... | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | libtiff | 6a984bf7905c6621281588431f384e79d11a2e33 | 266,725,444,363,520,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 48 | * libtiff/tif_predic.c: fix memory leaks in error code paths added in
previous commit (fix for MSVR 35105) |
const char *js_tostring(js_State *J, int idx)
{
return jsV_tostring(J, stackidx(J, idx));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | mujs | 77ab465f1c394bb77f00966cd950650f3f53cb24 | 282,691,684,833,098,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Fix 697401: Error when dropping extra arguments to lightweight functions. |
bgp_put_cap_rr(struct bgp_proto *p UNUSED, byte *buf)
{
*buf++ = 2; /* Capability 2: Support for route refresh */
*buf++ = 0; /* Capability data length */
return buf;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | bird | 1657c41c96b3c07d9265b07dd4912033ead4124b | 52,961,577,312,542,510,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | BGP: Fix bugs in handling of shutdown messages
There is an improper check for valid message size, which may lead to
stack overflow and buffer leaks to log when a large message is received.
Thanks to Daniel McCarney for bugreport and analysis. |
static int parse_unix_address(sd_bus *b, const char **p, char **guid) {
_cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL, *abstract = NULL;
size_t l;
int r;
assert(b);
assert(p);
assert(*p);
assert(guid);
while (!IN_SET(**p, 0, ';')) {
r = parse_address_... | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | systemd | 1068447e6954dc6ce52f099ed174c442cb89ed54 | 318,662,320,898,778,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 69 | sd-bus: introduce API for re-enqueuing incoming messages
When authorizing via PolicyKit we want to process incoming method calls
twice: once to process and figure out that we need PK authentication,
and a second time after we aquired PK authentication to actually execute
the operation. With this new call sd_bus_enqueu... |
void put_nfs_open_context(struct nfs_open_context *ctx)
{
__put_nfs_open_context(ctx, 0);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9 | 290,155,442,345,214,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> |
*/
int kvm_get_dirty_log(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_dirty_log *log,
int *is_dirty, struct kvm_memory_slot **memslot)
{
struct kvm_memslots *slots;
int i, as_id, id;
unsigned long n;
unsigned long any = 0;
/* Dirty ring tracking is exclusive to dirty log tracking */
if (kvm->dirty_ring_size)
return -E... | 0 | [
"CWE-459"
] | linux | 683412ccf61294d727ead4a73d97397396e69a6b | 204,937,669,882,632,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 | KVM: SEV: add cache flush to solve SEV cache incoherency issues
Flush the CPU caches when memory is reclaimed from an SEV guest (where
reclaim also includes it being unmapped from KVM's memslots). Due to lack
of coherency for SEV encrypted memory, failure to flush results in silent
data corruption if userspace is mal... |
void f2fs_set_inode_flags(struct inode *inode)
{
unsigned int flags = F2FS_I(inode)->i_flags;
unsigned int new_fl = 0;
if (flags & F2FS_SYNC_FL)
new_fl |= S_SYNC;
if (flags & F2FS_APPEND_FL)
new_fl |= S_APPEND;
if (flags & F2FS_IMMUTABLE_FL)
new_fl |= S_IMMUTABLE;
if (flags & F2FS_NOATIME_FL)
new_fl |= S... | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | linux | e34438c903b653daca2b2a7de95aed46226f8ed3 | 256,728,953,632,533,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | f2fs: fix to do sanity check with node footer and iblocks
This patch adds to do sanity check with below fields of inode to
avoid reported panic.
- node footer
- iblocks
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200223
- Overview
BUG() triggered in f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks() when un-mounting a mounted f2fs image ... |
static BROTLI_INLINE void GetBlockLengthPrefixCode(uint32_t len, size_t* code,
uint32_t* n_extra, uint32_t* extra) {
*code = BlockLengthPrefixCode(len);
*n_extra = kBlockLengthPrefixCode[*code].nbits;
*extra = len - kBlockLengthPrefixCode[*code].offset;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-120"
] | brotli | 223d80cfbec8fd346e32906c732c8ede21f0cea6 | 246,922,334,291,316,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | Update (#826)
* IMPORTANT: decoder: fix potential overflow when input chunk is >2GiB
* simplify max Huffman table size calculation
* eliminate symbol duplicates (static arrays in .h files)
* minor combing in research/ code |
static void opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0);
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
... | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-681",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 5b9fbeb75b6a98955f628e205ac26689bcb1383e | 138,824,663,641,295,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | bpf: Fix scalar32_min_max_or bounds tracking
Simon reported an issue with the current scalar32_min_max_or() implementation.
That is, compared to the other 32 bit subreg tracking functions, the code in
scalar32_min_max_or() stands out that it's using the 64 bit registers instead
of 32 bit ones. This leads to bounds tra... |
int x509_get_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
x509_buf *alg, x509_buf *params )
{
int ret;
if( ( ret = asn1_get_alg( p, end, alg, params ) ) != 0 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret );
return( 0 );
} | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | polarssl | 5d8618539f8e186c1b2c1b5a548d6f85936fe41f | 76,915,403,660,546,910,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | Fix memory leak while parsing some X.509 certs |
void free_tty_struct(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
if (!tty)
return;
put_device(tty->dev);
kfree(tty->write_buf);
tty->magic = 0xDEADDEAD;
kfree(tty);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-362"
] | linux | 5c17c861a357e9458001f021a7afa7aab9937439 | 247,384,538,930,546,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However... |
bool hfi1_mmu_rb_remove_unless_exact(struct mmu_rb_handler *handler,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
struct mmu_rb_node **rb_node)
{
struct mmu_rb_node *node;
unsigned long flags;
bool ret = false;
if (current->mm != handler->mn.mm)
return ret;
spin_lock_irqsave(&handler->lock, flags);... | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | 3d2a9d642512c21a12d19b9250e7a835dcb41a79 | 9,015,820,606,741,499,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | IB/hfi1: Ensure correct mm is used at all times
Two earlier bug fixes have created a security problem in the hfi1
driver. One fix aimed to solve an issue where current->mm was not valid
when closing the hfi1 cdev. It attempted to do this by saving a cached
value of the current->mm pointer at file open time. This is a ... |
win_free(
win_T *wp,
tabpage_T *tp) // tab page "win" is in, NULL for current
{
int i;
buf_T *buf;
wininfo_T *wip;
#ifdef FEAT_FOLDING
clearFolding(wp);
#endif
// reduce the reference count to the argument list.
alist_unlink(wp->w_alist);
// Don't execute autocommands while the ... | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | vim | 0f6e28f686dbb59ab3b562408ab9b2234797b9b1 | 81,527,960,353,991,110,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 153 | patch 8.2.4428: crash when switching tabpage while in the cmdline window
Problem: Crash when switching tabpage while in the cmdline window.
Solution: Disallow switching tabpage when in the cmdline window. |
static int RsaPad(const byte* input, word32 inputLen, byte* pkcsBlock,
word32 pkcsBlockLen, byte padValue, WC_RNG* rng)
{
if (input == NULL || inputLen == 0 || pkcsBlock == NULL ||
pkcsBlockLen == 0) {
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
... | 0 | [
"CWE-310",
"CWE-787"
] | wolfssl | fb2288c46dd4c864b78f00a47a364b96a09a5c0f | 216,956,232,379,550,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 47 | RSA-PSS: Handle edge case with encoding message to hash
When the key is small relative to the digest (1024-bit key, 64-byte
hash, 61-byte salt length), the internal message to hash is larger than
the output size.
Allocate a buffer for the message when this happens. |
int mp_cnt_lsb(fp_int* a)
{
return fp_cnt_lsb(a);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-326",
"CWE-203"
] | wolfssl | 1de07da61f0c8e9926dcbd68119f73230dae283f | 194,986,849,400,592,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Constant time EC map to affine for private operations
For fast math, use a constant time modular inverse when mapping to
affine when operation involves a private key - key gen, calc shared
secret, sign. |
static inline bool mnt_is_cursor(struct mount *mnt)
{
return mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_CURSOR;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | 427215d85e8d1476da1a86b8d67aceb485eb3631 | 182,525,214,303,456,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | ovl: prevent private clone if bind mount is not allowed
Add the following checks from __do_loopback() to clone_private_mount() as
well:
- verify that the mount is in the current namespace
- verify that there are no locked children
Reported-by: Alois Wohlschlager <alois1@gmx-topmail.de>
Fixes: c771d683a62e ("vfs: ... |
static int limit_list(struct rev_info *revs)
{
int slop = SLOP;
unsigned long date = ~0ul;
struct commit_list *list = revs->commits;
struct commit_list *newlist = NULL;
struct commit_list **p = &newlist;
while (list) {
struct commit_list *entry = list;
struct commit *commit = list->item;
struct object *obj... | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | git | fd55a19eb1d49ae54008d932a65f79cd6fda45c9 | 145,942,913,230,950,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 | Fix buffer overflow in git diff
If PATH_MAX on your system is smaller than a path stored, it may cause
buffer overflow and stack corruption in diff_addremove() and diff_change()
functions when running git-diff
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Potapov <dpotapov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> |
__sk_dst_reset(struct sock *sk)
{
__sk_dst_set(sk, NULL);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
] | linux-2.6 | c377411f2494a931ff7facdbb3a6839b1266bcf6 | 221,354,016,841,853,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | net: sk_add_backlog() take rmem_alloc into account
Current socket backlog limit is not enough to really stop DDOS attacks,
because user thread spend many time to process a full backlog each
round, and user might crazy spin on socket lock.
We should add backlog size and receive_queue size (aka rmem_alloc) to
pace writ... |
mrb_io_free(mrb_state *mrb, void *ptr)
{
struct mrb_io *io = (struct mrb_io *)ptr;
if (io != NULL) {
fptr_finalize(mrb, io, TRUE);
mrb_free(mrb, io);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-787"
] | mruby | b51b21fc63c9805862322551387d9036f2b63433 | 127,098,188,360,044,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | Fix `use after free in File#initilialize_copy`; fix #4001
The bug and the fix were reported by https://hackerone.com/pnoltof |
ProcRecordUnregisterClients(ClientPtr client)
{
RecordContextPtr pContext;
int err;
REQUEST(xRecordUnregisterClientsReq);
XID *pCanonClients;
int nClients;
int i;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRecordUnregisterClientsReq);
if (INT_MAX / 4 < stuff->nClients ||
(client->req_len << 2) - S... | 0 | [
"CWE-191"
] | xserver | 2902b78535ecc6821cc027351818b28a5c7fdbdc | 80,192,650,740,175,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 | Fix XRecordRegisterClients() Integer underflow
CVE-2020-14362 ZDI-CAN-11574
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> |
pgm_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int length,
register const u_char *bp2)
{
register const struct pgm_header *pgm;
register const struct ip *ip;
register char ch;
uint16_t sport, dport;
u_int nla_afnum;
char nla_buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
register const stru... | 0 | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] | tcpdump | da6f1a677bfa4476abaeaf9b1afe1c4390f51b41 | 85,708,393,798,506,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 693 | CVE-2017-13034/PGM: Add a bounds check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Move a return to make the code a bit cleaner (i.e., make it more o... |
deallocateCharacterClasses(CharacterClass **characterClasses) {
while (*characterClasses) {
CharacterClass *class = *characterClasses;
*characterClasses = (*characterClasses)->next;
if (class) free(class);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | liblouis | fb2bfce4ed49ac4656a8f7e5b5526e4838da1dde | 116,017,141,434,818,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | Fix yet another buffer overflow in the braille table parser
Reported by Henri Salo
Fixes #592 |
static int qh_echo(int sd, char *buf, unsigned int len)
{
int result = 0;
if (!strcmp(buf, "help")) {
nsock_printf_nul(sd,
"Query handler that simply echoes back what you send it.");
return 0;
}
result = write(sd, buf, len);
if (result == -1) {
logit(NSLOG_RUNTIME_ERROR, TRUE, "qh: qh_echo() error on ... | 1 | [
"CWE-476"
] | nagioscore | b1a92a3b52d292ccb601e77a0b29cb1e67ac9d76 | 230,626,202,673,111,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | merge accidental master PR (#553) into maint and fix changelog
merge conflict |
init_string(void)
/* initialize 'my_string', 'my_length' */
{
if (my_string == 0)
TYPE_MALLOC(char, my_length = 256, my_string);
*my_string = '\0';
return my_string;
} | 0 | [] | ncurses | 790a85dbd4a81d5f5d8dd02a44d84f01512ef443 | 140,563,213,768,961,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | ncurses 6.2 - patch 20200531
+ correct configure version-check/warnng for g++ to allow for 10.x
+ re-enable "bel" in konsole-base (report by Nia Huang)
+ add linux-s entry (patch by Alexandre Montaron).
+ drop long-obsolete convert_configure.pl
+ add test/test_parm.c, for checking tparm changes.
+ improve parameter-ch... |
CImgDisplay& assign() {
if (is_empty()) return flush();
Display *const dpy = cimg::X11_attr().display;
cimg_lock_display();
// Remove display window from event thread list.
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i<cimg::X11_attr().nb_wins && cimg::X11_attr().wins[i]!=this; ++i) {}
f... | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CImg | 10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb | 254,355,835,128,168,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 | Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'. |
static void wrap_nettle_mac_deinit(void *hd)
{
struct nettle_mac_ctx *ctx = hd;
zeroize_temp_key(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
gnutls_free(ctx);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | gnutls | 3db352734472d851318944db13be73da61300568 | 128,112,587,974,169,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | wrap_nettle_hash_fast: avoid calling _update with zero-length input
As Nettle's hash update functions internally call memcpy, providing
zero-length input may cause undefined behavior.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org> |
FakeStreamPtr waitForNextStream() {
FakeStreamPtr new_stream = nullptr;
auto wait_new_stream_fn = [this,
&new_stream](FakeHttpConnectionPtr& connection) -> AssertionResult {
AssertionResult result =
connection->waitForNewStream(*dispatcher_, new_stream, std::chro... | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | envoy | 18871dbfb168d3512a10c78dd267ff7c03f564c6 | 230,203,889,239,728,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | [1.18] CVE-2022-21655
Crash with direct_response
Signed-off-by: Otto van der Schaaf <ovanders@redhat.com> |
static void TIFFTagExtender(TIFF *tiff)
{
static const TIFFFieldInfo
TIFFExtensions[] =
{
{ 37724, -3, -3, TIFF_UNDEFINED, FIELD_CUSTOM, 1, 1,
(char *) "PhotoshopLayerData" },
{ 34118, -3, -3, TIFF_UNDEFINED, FIELD_CUSTOM, 1, 1,
(char *) "Microscope" }
};
TIFFMergeFieldInfo(... | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | ImageMagick | 803bc34ebe023f209f745baf8a112610ff77cc8c | 313,038,859,914,370,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | Prevent possible buffer overflow when reading TIFF images (bug report from Shi Pu of MS509 Team) |
dissect_kafka_delete_topics_response_topic_error_code(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
int offset, kafka_api_version_t api_version)
{
proto_item *subti;
proto_tree *subtree;
int topic_start, topic_len;
kafka_error_t error;
su... | 0 | [
"CWE-401"
] | wireshark | f4374967bbf9c12746b8ec3cd54dddada9dd353e | 144,810,859,644,596,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | Kafka: Limit our decompression size.
Don't assume that the Internet has our best interests at heart when it
gives us the size of our decompression buffer. Assign an arbitrary limit
of 50 MB.
This fixes #16739 in that it takes care of
** (process:17681): WARNING **: 20:03:07.440: Dissector bug, protocol Kafka, in pac... |
static X509 *make_cert(void)
{
X509 *crt = NULL;
if (!TEST_ptr(crt = X509_new()))
return NULL;
if (!TEST_true(X509_set_version(crt, 2))) {
X509_free(crt);
return NULL;
}
return crt;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | openssl | 97ab3c4b538840037812c8d9164d09a1f4bf11a1 | 333,607,776,338,694,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | Add a test for GENERAL_NAME_cmp
Based on a boringssl test contributed by David Benjamin
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> |
_pixman_image_add_traps (pixman_image_t *image,
int dst_x, int dst_y,
cairo_traps_t *traps)
{
cairo_trapezoid_t *t = traps->traps;
int num_traps = traps->num_traps;
while (num_traps--) {
pixman_trapezoid_t trap;
/* top/bottom will be clamped to surface bounds */
trap.top = _cairo_fixed_to_16_16 ... | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | cairo | c986a7310bb06582b7d8a566d5f007ba4e5e75bf | 306,586,446,900,566,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 43 | image: Enable inplace compositing with opacities for general routines
On a SNB i5-2500:
Speedups
========
firefox-chalkboard 34284.16 -> 19637.40: 1.74x speedup
swfdec-giant-steps 778.35 -> 665.37: 1.17x speedup
ocitysmap 485.64 -> 431.94: 1.12x speedup
Slowdowns
===... |
void ConnectDialog::onLanResolveError(BonjourRecord br, DNSServiceErrorType err) {
qlBonjourActive.removeAll(br);
qWarning()<<"Bonjour reported resolver error "<< err;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-59",
"CWE-61"
] | mumble | e59ee87abe249f345908c7d568f6879d16bfd648 | 339,956,954,457,057,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | FIX(client): Only allow "http"/"https" for URLs in ConnectDialog
Our public server list registration script doesn't have an URL scheme
whitelist for the website field.
Turns out a malicious server can register itself with a dangerous URL in
an attempt to attack a user's machine.
User interaction is required, as the ... |
is_secured_file (int fd)
{
#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
struct stat buf;
struct secured_file_item *sf;
if (fd == -1)
return 0; /* No file descriptor so it can't be secured either. */
/* Note that we print out a error here and claim that a file is
secure if something went wrong. */
if (fstat (fd, &b... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | gnupg | 2183683bd633818dd031b090b5530951de76f392 | 172,317,292,066,441,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 | Use inline functions to convert buffer data to scalars.
* common/host2net.h (buf16_to_ulong, buf16_to_uint): New.
(buf16_to_ushort, buf16_to_u16): New.
(buf32_to_size_t, buf32_to_ulong, buf32_to_uint, buf32_to_u32): New.
--
Commit 91b826a38880fd8a989318585eb502582636ddd8 was not enough to
avoid all sign extension on ... |
int xt_check_target(const struct xt_target *target, unsigned short family,
unsigned int size, const char *table, unsigned int hook_mask,
unsigned short proto, int inv_proto)
{
if (XT_ALIGN(target->targetsize) != size) {
printk("%s_tables: %s target: invalid size %Zu != %u\n",
xt_prefix[family], ... | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 9fa492cdc160cd27ce1046cb36f47d3b2b1efa21 | 305,692,222,185,100,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | [NETFILTER]: x_tables: simplify compat API
Split the xt_compat_match/xt_compat_target into smaller type-safe functions
performing just one operation. Handle all alignment and size-related
conversions centrally in these function instead of requiring each module to
implement a full-blown conversion function. Replace ->c... |
unsigned long __init __weak arch_syscall_addr(int nr)
{
return (unsigned long)sys_call_table[nr];
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-476",
"CWE-119",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | 086ba77a6db00ed858ff07451bedee197df868c9 | 32,039,282,787,325,645,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | tracing/syscalls: Ignore numbers outside NR_syscalls' range
ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
... |
usage(void)
{
printf("\
`T1disasm' translates a PostScript Type 1 font in PFB or PFA format into a\n\
human-readable, human-editable form. The result is written to the standard\n\
output unless an OUTPUT file is given.\n\
\n\
Usage: %s [OPTION]... [INPUT [OUTPUT]]\n\
\n\
Options:\n\
-o, --output=FILE Wr... | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | t1utils | 6b9d1aafcb61a3663c883663eb19ccdbfcde8d33 | 104,063,989,295,727,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | Security fixes.
- Don't overflow the small cs_start buffer (reported by Niels
Thykier via the debian tracker (Jakub Wilk), found with a
fuzzer ("American fuzzy lop")).
- Cast arguments to <ctype.h> functions to unsigned char. |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who)
{
struct task_struct *g, *p;
struct user_struct *user;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
long niceval, retval = -ESRCH;
struct pid *pgrp;
kuid_t uid;
if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS)
return -EINVAL;
rcu_read_lock();
read_lock(&tasklis... | 0 | [
"CWE-16",
"CWE-79"
] | linux | 2702b1526c7278c4d65d78de209a465d4de2885e | 142,349,315,549,231,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 63 | kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unne... |
static char* set_iovec_field(struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n_iovec, const char *field, const char *value) {
char *x;
x = strappend(field, value);
if (x)
iovec[(*n_iovec)++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(x);
return x;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-770"
] | systemd | 084eeb865ca63887098e0945fb4e93c852b91b0f | 258,789,848,175,241,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | journald: do not store the iovec entry for process commandline on stack
This fixes a crash where we would read the commandline, whose length is under
control of the sending program, and then crash when trying to create a stack
allocation for it.
CVE-2018-16864
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653855
The ... |
mono_alloc_special_static_data_free (GHashTable *special_static_fields)
{
mono_threads_lock ();
g_hash_table_foreach (special_static_fields, do_free_special, NULL);
mono_threads_unlock ();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399",
"CWE-264"
] | mono | 722f9890f09aadfc37ae479e7d946d5fc5ef7b91 | 164,430,195,263,833,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | Fix access to freed members of a dead thread
* threads.c: Fix access to freed members of a dead thread. Found
and fixed by Rodrigo Kumpera <rkumpera@novell.com>
Ref: CVE-2011-0992 |
static inline void fsnotify_inode_delete(struct inode *inode)
{
__fsnotify_inode_delete(inode);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362",
"CWE-399"
] | linux | 49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e | 139,668,836,038,028,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same st... |
void __hci_req_enable_advertising(struct hci_request *req)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = req->hdev;
struct adv_info *adv_instance;
struct hci_cp_le_set_adv_param cp;
u8 own_addr_type, enable = 0x01;
bool connectable;
u16 adv_min_interval, adv_max_interval;
u32 flags;
flags = get_adv_instance_flags(hdev, hdev->cur_a... | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | linux | e2cb6b891ad2b8caa9131e3be70f45243df82a80 | 157,666,315,364,590,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 75 | bluetooth: eliminate the potential race condition when removing the HCI controller
There is a possible race condition vulnerability between issuing a HCI
command and removing the cont. Specifically, functions hci_req_sync()
and hci_dev_do_close() can race each other like below:
thread-A in hci_req_sync() | th... |
ssize_t aac_get_serial_number(struct device *device, char *buf)
{
return aac_show_serial_number(device, &aac_serial_number, buf);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | f856567b930dfcdbc3323261bf77240ccdde01f5 | 207,480,999,975,472,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | aacraid: missing capable() check in compat ioctl
In commit d496f94d22d1 ('[SCSI] aacraid: fix security weakness') we
added a check on CAP_SYS_RAWIO to the ioctl. The compat ioctls need the
check as well.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torv... |
schedule_user_dirs_changed (void)
{
if (user_dirs_changed_tag == 0) {
user_dirs_changed_tag = g_idle_add (emit_user_dirs_changed_idle, NULL);
}
} | 0 | [] | nautilus | a0f7bb5f2e9af8ecb463b13da834fa8559b0a481 | 148,901,766,518,370,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | Use $XDG_DATA_HOME/.converted-launchers as marker for one-time desktop
2009-02-25 Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
* src/nautilus-application.c:
Use $XDG_DATA_HOME/.converted-launchers as marker for
one-time desktop file trust operation.
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file-utilities.[ch]:
Ad... |
void credssp_write_ts_password_creds(rdpCredssp* credssp, wStream* s)
{
int length;
length = credssp_skip_ts_password_creds(credssp);
/* TSPasswordCreds (SEQUENCE) */
length = ber_get_content_length(length);
ber_write_sequence_tag(s, length);
/* [0] domainName (OCTET STRING) */
ber_write_contextual_tag(s, 0, ... | 1 | [
"CWE-476"
] | FreeRDP | 0dc22d5a30a1c7d146b2a835b2032668127c33e9 | 305,315,726,435,241,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | Fixed a range of BER boundary encoding bugs which would occur when any NLA packet hit the 127 character mark. Removed ber#get_content_length as it was not behaving deterministically. |
int Field_float::store(const char *from,size_t len,CHARSET_INFO *cs)
{
int error;
Field_float::store(get_double(from, len, cs, &error));
return error;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] | server | 08c7ab404f69d9c4ca6ca7a9cf7eec74c804f917 | 25,846,060,292,419,074,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | MDEV-24176 Server crashes after insert in the table with virtual
column generated using date_format() and if()
vcol_info->expr is allocated on expr_arena at parsing stage. Since
expr item is allocated on expr_arena all its containee items must be
allocated on expr_arena too. Otherwise fix_session_expr() will
encounter... |
double Magick::Image::normalizedMeanError(void) const
{
return(constImage()->error.normalized_mean_error);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | ImageMagick | 8c35502217c1879cb8257c617007282eee3fe1cc | 62,774,897,822,370,610,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Added missing return to avoid use after free. |
sigchld_handler (sig)
int sig;
{
int n, oerrno;
oerrno = errno;
REINSTALL_SIGCHLD_HANDLER;
sigchld++;
n = 0;
if (queue_sigchld == 0)
n = waitchld (-1, 0);
errno = oerrno;
SIGRETURN (n);
} | 0 | [] | bash | 955543877583837c85470f7fb8a97b7aa8d45e6c | 289,288,180,838,395,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | bash-4.4-rc2 release |
void ConnectionImpl::StreamImpl::decodeHeaders() {
maybeTransformUpgradeFromH2ToH1();
decoder_->decodeHeaders(std::move(headers_), remote_end_stream_);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] | envoy | afc39bea36fd436e54262f150c009e8d72db5014 | 155,625,468,866,540,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.
Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the Heade... |
size_t oidc_curl_write(void *contents, size_t size, size_t nmemb, void *userp) {
size_t realsize = size * nmemb;
oidc_curl_buffer *mem = (oidc_curl_buffer*) userp;
/* check if we don't run over the maximum buffer/memory size for HTTP responses */
if (mem->size + realsize > OIDC_CURL_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE) {
oidc_err... | 0 | [
"CWE-79"
] | mod_auth_openidc | 55ea0a085290cd2c8cdfdd960a230cbc38ba8b56 | 28,089,597,376,823,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | Add a function to escape Javascript characters |
GF_Err stbl_GetSampleDepType(GF_SampleDependencyTypeBox *sdep, u32 SampleNumber, u32 *isLeading, u32 *dependsOn, u32 *dependedOn, u32 *redundant)
{
u8 flag;
assert(dependsOn && dependedOn && redundant);
*dependsOn = *dependedOn = *redundant = 0;
if (SampleNumber > sdep->sampleCount) {
return GF_OK;
}
flag = s... | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-401"
] | gpac | 2da2f68bffd51d89b1d272d22aa8cc023c1c066e | 129,154,241,460,964,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | fixed #1705 |
const char* oidc_get_redirect_uri(request_rec *r, oidc_cfg *cfg) {
char *redirect_uri = cfg->redirect_uri;
if ((redirect_uri != NULL)
&& (redirect_uri[0] == OIDC_CHAR_FORWARD_SLASH)) {
// relative redirect uri
redirect_uri = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, oidc_get_current_url_base(r),
cfg->redirect_uri, NULL);
... | 0 | [
"CWE-79"
] | mod_auth_openidc | 55ea0a085290cd2c8cdfdd960a230cbc38ba8b56 | 263,422,367,482,038,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | Add a function to escape Javascript characters |
int ip_mc_gsfget(struct sock *sk, struct group_filter *gsf,
struct sockaddr_storage __user *p)
{
int i, count, copycount;
struct sockaddr_in *psin;
__be32 addr;
struct ip_mc_socklist *pmc;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ip_sf_socklist *psl;
ASSERT_RTNL();
psin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&gsf->gf_g... | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | linux | 23d2b94043ca8835bd1e67749020e839f396a1c2 | 141,970,802,082,542,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 43 | igmp: Add ip_mc_list lock in ip_check_mc_rcu
I got below panic when doing fuzz test:
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 0 PID: 4056 Comm: syz-executor.3 Tainted: G B 5.14.0-rc1-00195-gcff5c4254439-dirty #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9... |
GF_Err mdat_box_read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_MediaDataBox *ptr = (GF_MediaDataBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
ptr->dataSize = s->size;
ptr->bsOffset = gf_bs_get_position(bs);
//then skip these bytes
gf_bs_skip_bytes(bs, ptr->dataSize);
return GF_OK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | gpac | 388ecce75d05e11fc8496aa4857b91245007d26e | 322,255,184,633,263,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | fixed #1587 |
void IntegrationCodecClient::sendData(Http::StreamEncoder& encoder, Buffer::Instance& data,
bool end_stream) {
encoder.encodeData(data, end_stream);
flushWrite();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] | envoy | afc39bea36fd436e54262f150c009e8d72db5014 | 70,221,085,426,367,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.
Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the Heade... |
mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head,
const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
const unsigned char *val,
size_t val_len )
{
mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur;
... | 0 | [] | mbedtls | 97b5209bc01ab8b3b519fdb46cefc04739433124 | 236,297,835,840,371,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 57 | Fix potential double free in cert writing code
In case an entry with the given OID already exists in the list passed to
mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data() and there is not enough memory to allocate
room for the new value, the existing entry will be freed but the preceding
entry in the list will sill hold a pointer to it.... |
auth_server_lookup_request(struct auth_server_connection *conn,
const char *id_arg, bool remove,
struct auth_client_request **request_r)
{
struct auth_client_request *request;
unsigned int id;
if (id_arg == NULL || str_to_uint(id_arg, &id) < 0) {
i_error("BUG: Authentication server input missing ID");... | 0 | [] | core | a9b135760aea6d1790d447d351c56b78889dac22 | 167,318,339,641,120,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | lib-auth: Remove request after abort
Otherwise the request will still stay in hash table
and get dereferenced when all requests are aborted
causing an attempt to access free'd memory.
Found by Apollon Oikonomopoulos <apoikos@debian.org>
Broken in 1a29ed2f96da1be22fa5a4d96c7583aa81b8b060 |
node_new_bag_if_else(Node* cond, Node* Then, Node* Else)
{
Node* n;
n = node_new_bag(BAG_IF_ELSE);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN(n);
NODE_BODY(n) = cond;
BAG_(n)->te.Then = Then;
BAG_(n)->te.Else = Else;
return n;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-399",
"CWE-674"
] | oniguruma | 4097828d7cc87589864fecf452f2cd46c5f37180 | 325,972,034,057,209,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | fix #147: Stack Exhaustion Problem caused by some parsing functions in regcomp.c making recursive calls to themselves. |
static void rtl8150_tx_timeout(struct net_device *netdev)
{
rtl8150_t *dev = netdev_priv(netdev);
dev_warn(&netdev->dev, "Tx timeout.\n");
usb_unlink_urb(dev->tx_urb);
netdev->stats.tx_errors++;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 7926aff5c57b577ab0f43364ff0c59d968f6a414 | 109,956,368,370,867,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | rtl8150: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net... |
long vorbis_book_decodevs_add(codebook *book,float *a,oggpack_buffer *b,int n){
if(book->used_entries>0){
int step=n/book->dim;
long *entry = alloca(sizeof(*entry)*step);
float **t = alloca(sizeof(*t)*step);
int i,j,o;
for (i = 0; i < step; i++) {
entry[i]=decode_packed_entry_number(book,b)... | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | vorbis | 667ceb4aab60c1f74060143bb24e5f427b3cce5f | 208,642,903,196,139,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | CVE-2018-5146: Prevent out-of-bounds write in codebook decoding.
Codebooks that are not an exact divisor of the partition size are now
truncated to fit within the partition. |
static int init_hdr(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
ut8 magicbytes[4] = {0};
ut8 machohdrbytes[sizeof (struct MACH0_(mach_header))] = {0};
int len;
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, 0, magicbytes, 4) < 1) {
return false;
}
if (r_read_le32 (magicbytes) == 0xfeedface) {
bin->big_endian = false;
} else if (r_read_be32 (... | 0 | [
"CWE-415",
"CWE-125"
] | radare2 | 60208765887f5f008b3b9a883f3addc8bdb9c134 | 229,440,261,174,036,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 62 | Fix #9970 - heap oobread in mach0 parser (#10026) |
g_file_real_append_to_async (GFile *file,
GFileCreateFlags flags,
int io_priority,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GAsyncReadyCallback callback,
... | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | glib | d8f8f4d637ce43f8699ba94c9b7648beda0ca174 | 79,799,312,871,342,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | gfile: Limit access to files when copying
file_copy_fallback creates new files with default permissions and
set the correct permissions after the operation is finished. This
might cause that the files can be accessible by more users during
the operation than expected. Use G_FILE_CREATE_PRIVATE for the new
files to lim... |
vmsWarningHandler(const char* module, const char* fmt, va_list ap)
{
if (module != NULL)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", module);
fprintf(stderr, "Warning, ");
vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
fprintf(stderr, ".\n");
} | 0 | [
"CWE-369"
] | libtiff | 3c5eb8b1be544e41d2c336191bc4936300ad7543 | 268,126,349,267,323,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does. |
static void nfs4_xdr_enc_readdir(struct rpc_rqst *req, struct xdr_stream *xdr,
const void *data)
{
const struct nfs4_readdir_arg *args = data;
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.minorversion = nfs4_xdr_minorversion(&args->seq_args),
};
encode_compound_hdr(xdr, req, &hdr);
encode_sequence(xdr, &args->seq_args, &h... | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | b4487b93545214a9db8cbf32e86411677b0cca21 | 146,239,345,636,901,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | nfs: Fix getxattr kernel panic and memory overflow
Move the buffer size check to decode_attr_security_label() before memcpy()
Only call memcpy() if the buffer is large enough
Fixes: aa9c2669626c ("NFS: Client implementation of Labeled-NFS")
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Mitchell <jeffrey.mitchell@starlab.io>
[Trond: clean u... |
static int fd_htab_map_alloc_check(union bpf_attr *attr)
{
if (attr->value_size != sizeof(u32))
return -EINVAL;
return htab_map_alloc_check(attr);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | bpf | c4eb1f403243fc7bbb7de644db8587c03de36da6 | 326,154,449,450,277,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | bpf: Fix integer overflow involving bucket_size
In __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), hash buckets are iterated
over to count the number of elements in each bucket (bucket_size).
If bucket_size is large enough, the multiplication to calculate
kvmalloc() size could overflow, resulting in out-of-bounds write
as repor... |
static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
if (!vmx->nested.vmxon)
return;
vmx->nested.vmxon = false;
free_vpid(vmx->nested.vpid02);
nested_release_vmcs12(vmx);
if (enable_shadow_vmcs)
free_vmcs(vmx->nested.current_shadow_vmcs);
/* Unpin physical memory we referred to in current vmcs02 */
if (vmx->nest... | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | 3ce424e45411cf5a13105e0386b6ecf6eeb4f66f | 334,978,603,274,885,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 | kvm:vmx: more complete state update on APICv on/off
The function to update APICv on/off state (in particular, to deactivate
it when enabling Hyper-V SynIC) is incomplete: it doesn't adjust
APICv-related fields among secondary processor-based VM-execution
controls. As a result, Windows 2012 guests get stuck when SynIC... |
set_search_match(pos_T *t)
{
t->lnum += search_match_lines;
t->col = search_match_endcol;
if (t->lnum > curbuf->b_ml.ml_line_count)
{
t->lnum = curbuf->b_ml.ml_line_count;
coladvance((colnr_T)MAXCOL);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-122",
"CWE-787"
] | vim | 85b6747abc15a7a81086db31289cf1b8b17e6cb1 | 95,401,006,386,760,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | patch 8.2.4214: illegal memory access with large 'tabstop' in Ex mode
Problem: Illegal memory access with large 'tabstop' in Ex mode.
Solution: Allocate enough memory. |
static int state_reserved_remote(nghttp2_session *session,
nghttp2_stream *stream) {
return stream->state == NGHTTP2_STREAM_RESERVED &&
!nghttp2_session_is_my_stream_id(session, stream->stream_id);
} | 0 | [] | nghttp2 | 0a6ce87c22c69438ecbffe52a2859c3a32f1620f | 208,977,280,394,235,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | Add nghttp2_option_set_max_outbound_ack |
static void add_server_options(GDHCPServer *dhcp_server,
struct dhcp_packet *packet)
{
g_hash_table_foreach(dhcp_server->option_hash,
add_option, packet);
} | 0 | [] | connman | 58d397ba74873384aee449690a9070bacd5676fa | 37,401,276,486,586,596,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | gdhcp: Avoid reading invalid data in dhcp_get_option |
(this requires 'cimg_use_zlib' been enabled).
\param header_size Reserve empty bytes as a starting header.
**/
CImg<ucharT> get_serialize(const bool is_compressed=false, const unsigned int header_size=0) const {
#ifndef cimg_use_zlib
if (is_compressed)
cimg::warn(_cimglist_instance
... | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | cimg | 619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90 | 83,191,994,984,267,110,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 65 | CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size. |
static SDL_INLINE int Render_Line(const render_mode_t render_mode, int subpixel, TTF_Font *font, SDL_Surface *textbuf, int xstart, int ystart, Uint8 fg_alpha)
{
/* Render line (pos_buf) to textbuf at (xstart, ystart) */
/* Subpixel with RENDER_SOLID doesn't make sense. */
/* (and 'cached->subpixel.transla... | 0 | [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-787"
] | SDL_ttf | db1b41ab8bde6723c24b866e466cad78c2fa0448 | 33,911,341,860,341,310,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 58 | More integer overflow (see bug #187)
Make sure that 'width + alignment' doesn't overflow, otherwise
it could create a SDL_Surface of 'width' but with wrong 'pitch' |
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
struct perf_event_attr __user *, attr_uptr,
pid_t, pid, int, cpu, int, group_fd, unsigned long, flags)
{
struct perf_event *group_leader = NULL, *output_event = NULL;
struct perf_event *event, *sibling;
struct perf_event_attr attr;
struct perf_event_context *ctx, *uninitialized_... | 1 | [
"CWE-362",
"CWE-125"
] | linux | 321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290 | 244,122,402,408,296,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 396 | perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx... |
void tr_variantInitReal(tr_variant* v, double value)
{
tr_variantInit(v, TR_VARIANT_TYPE_REAL);
v->val.d = value;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-284"
] | transmission | 2123adf8e5e1c2b48791f9d22fc8c747e974180e | 196,135,321,147,880,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | CVE-2018-10756: Fix heap-use-after-free in tr_variantWalk
In libtransmission/variant.c, function tr_variantWalk, when the variant
stack is reallocated, a pointer to the previously allocated memory
region is kept. This address is later accessed (heap use-after-free)
while walking back down the stack, causing the applic... |
int get_random_value(unsigned char *data, int length)
{
SECStatus rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(data,length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
DBG1("couldn't generate random number: %s", SECU_Strerror(PR_GetError()));
}
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? 0 : -1;
} | 1 | [] | pam_pkcs11 | cc51b3e2720ea862d500cab2ea517518ff39a497 | 201,479,463,342,046,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | verify using a nonce from the system, not the card
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problem. |
static int _onlyLUKS(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t cdflags)
{
int r = 0;
if (cd && !cd->type) {
if (!(cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET))
log_err(cd, _("Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?"));
r = -EINVAL;
}
if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type)) {
if (!(cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET))
log_e... | 0 | [
"CWE-345"
] | cryptsetup | 0113ac2d889c5322659ad0596d4cfc6da53e356c | 147,951,816,043,839,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | Fix CVE-2021-4122 - LUKS2 reencryption crash recovery attack
Fix possible attacks against data confidentiality through LUKS2 online
reencryption extension crash recovery.
An attacker can modify on-disk metadata to simulate decryption in
progress with crashed (unfinished) reencryption step and persistently
decrypt par... |
static void cleanup_timers_list(struct list_head *head)
{
struct cpu_timer_list *timer, *next;
list_for_each_entry_safe(timer, next, head, entry)
list_del_init(&timer->entry);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | linux | 78c9c4dfbf8c04883941445a195276bb4bb92c76 | 223,617,292,284,533,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callb... |
krb5_init_creds_get_error(krb5_context context,
krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
KRB_ERROR *error)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
ret = copy_KRB_ERROR(&ctx->error, error);
if (ret)
krb5_enomem(context);
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-320"
] | heimdal | 2f7f3d9960aa6ea21358bdf3687cee5149aa35cf | 238,844,347,692,859,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged... |
static int pfkey_send_notify(struct xfrm_state *x, const struct km_event *c)
{
struct net *net = x ? xs_net(x) : c->net;
struct netns_pfkey *net_pfkey = net_generic(net, pfkey_net_id);
if (atomic_read(&net_pfkey->socks_nr) == 0)
return 0;
switch (c->event) {
case XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE:
return key_notify_sa_expire(... | 0 | [] | linux | 096f41d3a8fcbb8dde7f71379b1ca85fe213eded | 291,691,961,027,405,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | af_key: Fix sadb_x_ipsecrequest parsing
The parsing of sadb_x_ipsecrequest is broken in a number of ways.
First of all we're not verifying sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len. This
is needed when the structure carries addresses at the end. Worse
we don't even look at the length when we parse those optional
addresses.
The migra... |
send_freshness_token(krb5_context context, krb5_kdcpreauth_rock rock)
{
rock->send_freshness_token = TRUE;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-617"
] | krb5 | 94e5eda5bb94d1d44733a49c3d9b6d1e42c74def | 148,625,339,275,386,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Remove incorrect KDC assertion
The assertion in return_enc_padata() is reachable because
kdc_make_s4u2self_rep() may have previously added encrypted padata.
It is no longer necessary because the code uses add_pa_data_element()
instead of allocating a new list.
CVE-2018-20217:
In MIT krb5 1.8 or later, an authenticat... |
static int aesni_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
int ret, mode;
EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
mode = ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE;
if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MO... | 0 | [] | openssl | 1a3701f4fe0530a40ec073cd78d02cfcc26c0f8e | 254,582,879,156,818,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 | Sanity check EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD
The various implementations of EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD expect a buffer of at
least 13 bytes long. Add sanity checks to ensure that the length is at
least that. Also add a new constant (EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) to evp.h to
represent this length. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) ... |
vim_iswordc(int c)
{
return vim_iswordc_buf(c, curbuf);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] | vim | 94f3192b03ed27474db80b4d3a409e107140738b | 126,898,792,101,195,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | patch 8.2.3950: going beyond the end of the line with /\%V
Problem: Going beyond the end of the line with /\%V.
Solution: Check for valid column in getvcol(). |
static int StreamTcpTest01 (void)
{
StreamTcpThread stt;
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return 0;
Flow f;
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
memset (&f, 0, sizeof(Flow));
FLOW_INITIALIZE(&f);
p->flow = &f;
int ret = 0;
StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_c... | 0 | [] | suricata | 843d0b7a10bb45627f94764a6c5d468a24143345 | 308,501,726,951,314,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 | stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's ... |
rl_bind_keyseq_if_unbound (keyseq, default_func)
const char *keyseq;
rl_command_func_t *default_func;
{
return (rl_bind_keyseq_if_unbound_in_map (keyseq, default_func, _rl_keymap));
} | 0 | [] | bash | 955543877583837c85470f7fb8a97b7aa8d45e6c | 50,759,602,098,437,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | bash-4.4-rc2 release |
BPF_CALL_3(bpf_skb_vlan_push, struct sk_buff *, skb, __be16, vlan_proto,
u16, vlan_tci)
{
int ret;
if (unlikely(vlan_proto != htons(ETH_P_8021Q) &&
vlan_proto != htons(ETH_P_8021AD)))
vlan_proto = htons(ETH_P_8021Q);
bpf_push_mac_rcsum(skb);
ret = skb_vlan_push(skb, vlan_proto, vlan_tci);
bpf_pull_m... | 0 | [
"CWE-120"
] | linux | 050fad7c4534c13c8eb1d9c2ba66012e014773cb | 52,856,186,330,095,310,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions
Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic:
[ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...]
[ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_ve... |
static uint64_t pxa2xx_cpccnt_read(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri)
{
PXA2xxState *s = (PXA2xxState *)ri->opaque;
if (s->pmnc & 1) {
return qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL);
} else {
return 0;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | qemu | caa881abe0e01f9931125a0977ec33c5343e4aa7 | 112,644,247,382,425,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | pxa2xx: avoid buffer overrun on incoming migration
CVE-2013-4533
s->rx_level is read from the wire and used to determine how many bytes
to subsequently read into s->rx_fifo[]. If s->rx_level exceeds the
length of s->rx_fifo[] the buffer can be overrun with arbitrary data
from the wire.
Fix this by validating rx_leve... |
file_regcomp(file_regex_t *rx, const char *pat, int flags)
{
#ifdef USE_C_LOCALE
rx->c_lc_ctype = newlocale(LC_CTYPE_MASK, "C", 0);
assert(rx->c_lc_ctype != NULL);
rx->old_lc_ctype = uselocale(rx->c_lc_ctype);
assert(rx->old_lc_ctype != NULL);
#endif
rx->pat = pat;
return rx->rc = regcomp(&rx->rx, pat, flags);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
] | file | 6f737ddfadb596d7d4a993f7ed2141ffd664a81c | 303,678,091,285,036,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | - reduce recursion level from 20 to 10 and make a symbolic constant for it.
- pull out the guts of saving and restoring the output buffer into functions
and take care not to overwrite the error message if an error happened. |
int slap_parse_user( struct berval *id, struct berval *user,
struct berval *realm, struct berval *mech )
{
char u;
assert( id != NULL );
assert( !BER_BVISNULL( id ) );
assert( user != NULL );
assert( realm != NULL );
assert( mech != NULL );
u = id->bv_val[ 0 ];
if ( u != 'u' && u != 'U' ) {
/* called w... | 1 | [
"CWE-617"
] | openldap | 6ed057b5b728b50746c869bcc9c1f85d0bbbf6ed | 240,815,173,300,498,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 75 | ITS#9406, #9407 remove saslauthz asserts |
static int flip_opcode(u32 opcode)
{
/* How can we transform "a <op> b" into "b <op> a"? */
static const u8 opcode_flip[16] = {
/* these stay the same */
[BPF_JEQ >> 4] = BPF_JEQ,
[BPF_JNE >> 4] = BPF_JNE,
[BPF_JSET >> 4] = BPF_JSET,
/* these swap "lesser" and "greater" (L and G in the opcodes) */
[BPF_... | 0 | [] | linux | 9b00f1b78809309163dda2d044d9e94a3c0248a3 | 155,097,953,454,334,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | bpf: Fix truncation handling for mod32 dst reg wrt zero
Recently noticed that when mod32 with a known src reg of 0 is performed,
then the dst register is 32-bit truncated in verifier:
0: R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
0: (b7) r0 = 0
1: R0_w=inv0 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
1: (b7) r1 = -1
2: R0_w=inv... |
static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
} | 0 | [] | linux-2.6 | ee18d64c1f632043a02e6f5ba5e045bb26a5465f | 67,128,471,358,132,810,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This
replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is... |
GF_Err mhap_box_size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_MHACompatibleProfilesBox *ptr = (GF_MHACompatibleProfilesBox *) s;
s->size += 1 + ptr->num_profiles;
return GF_OK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | gpac | 77510778516803b7f7402d7423c6d6bef50254c3 | 225,056,947,688,626,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | fixed #2255 |
void CWebServer::Cmd_GetPlanDevices(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
std::string idx = request::findValue(&req, "idx");
if (idx.empty())
return;
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "GetPlanDevices";
std::vector<std::vector<std::string> > result;
result = m_s... | 0 | [
"CWE-89"
] | domoticz | ee70db46f81afa582c96b887b73bcd2a86feda00 | 48,633,866,783,274,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 56 | Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!) |
CImg<T>& draw_text(const int x0, const int y0,
const char *const text,
const tc1 *const foreground_color, const tc2 *const background_color,
const float opacity, const CImgList<t>& font, ...) {
if (!font) return *this;
CImg<charT> tmp(... | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | cimg | 619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90 | 230,621,100,264,010,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size. |
int gnutls_x509_ext_import_key_usage(const gnutls_datum_t * ext,
unsigned int *key_usage)
{
ASN1_TYPE c2 = ASN1_TYPE_EMPTY;
int len, result;
uint8_t str[2];
str[0] = str[1] = 0;
*key_usage = 0;
if ((result = asn1_create_element
(_gnutls_get_pkix(), "PKIX1.KeyUsage", &c2)) != ASN1_SUCCESS) {
gnutls... | 0 | [
"CWE-415"
] | gnutls | c5aaa488a3d6df712dc8dff23a049133cab5ec1b | 167,466,886,901,302,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | gnutls_x509_ext_import_proxy: fix issue reading the policy language
If the language was set but the policy wasn't, that could lead to
a double free, as the value returned to the user was freed. |
AP4_HvccAtom::GetChromaFormatName(AP4_UI08 chroma_format)
{
switch (chroma_format) {
case AP4_HEVC_CHROMA_FORMAT_MONOCHROME: return "Monochrome";
case AP4_HEVC_CHROMA_FORMAT_420: return "4:2:0";
case AP4_HEVC_CHROMA_FORMAT_422: return "4:2:2";
case AP4_HEVC_CHROMA_FORMA... | 0 | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] | Bento4 | 53499d8d4c69142137c7c7f0097a444783fdeb90 | 246,975,046,324,332,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | fix for #188 |
static rx_handler_result_t bond_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
struct slave *slave;
struct bonding *bond;
skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!skb))
return RX_HANDLER_CONSUMED;
*pskb = skb;
slave = bond_slave_get_rcu(skb->dev);
bond = slave->bond;
if (... | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | 550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162 | 1,606,972,252,384,141,500,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 47 | net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There... |
static void vmx_hwapic_isr_update(struct kvm *kvm, int isr)
{
u16 status;
u8 old;
if (isr == -1)
isr = 0;
status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
old = status >> 8;
if (isr != old) {
status &= 0xff;
status |= isr << 8;
vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux | 54a20552e1eae07aa240fa370a0293e006b5faed | 306,964,954,776,859,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty qu... |
nvmet_fc_getassociationid(u64 connectionid)
{
return connectionid & ~NVMET_FC_QUEUEID_MASK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 0c319d3a144d4b8f1ea2047fd614d2149b68f889 | 247,003,222,625,441,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> |
MagickExport MagickBooleanType InvokeDynamicImageFilter(const char *tag,
Image **images,const int argc,const char **argv,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
name[MagickPathExtent],
path[MagickPathExtent];
ImageFilterHandler
*image_filter;
MagickBooleanType
status;
ModuleHandle
handle;
P... | 0 | [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-362"
] | ImageMagick | 01faddbe2711a4156180c4a92837e2f23683cc68 | 251,160,842,271,487,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 105 | Use the correct rights. |
PixarLogGuessDataFmt(TIFFDirectory *td)
{
int guess = PIXARLOGDATAFMT_UNKNOWN;
int format = td->td_sampleformat;
/* If the user didn't tell us his datafmt,
* take our best guess from the bitspersample.
*/
switch (td->td_bitspersample) {
case 32:
if (format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
guess = PIXARLOGDATAFMT... | 0 | [
"CWE-369",
"CWE-787"
] | libtiff | 391e77fcd217e78b2c51342ac3ddb7100ecacdd2 | 114,251,658,522,441,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix potential buffer write overrun in
PixarLogDecode() on corrupted/unexpected images (reported by Mathias Svensson) |
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