text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Disable or block remotely available services that may be unnecessary. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has used Scheduled Tasks for persistence and to load and execute a reverse proxy binary.[64][65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Before exfiltration, Okrum's backdoor has used hidden files to store logs and outputs from backdoor commands.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro has been used to execute the ipconfig /all command on a victim system.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0522
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exobot
Exobot can open a SOCKS proxy connection through the compromised device.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear can receive and load executables from remote C2 servers.[468] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER persists through a scheduled task that executes it every minute.[132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used compromised Office 365 accounts in tandem with Ruler in an attempt to gain control of endpoints.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz contains functionality to acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has commonly created Web shells on victims' publicly accessible email and web servers, which they used to maintain access to a victim network and download additional malicious files.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0530
ATT&CK Technique Name:Melcoz
Melcoz has the ability to steal credentials from web browsers.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can inject into a target process using process doppelgänging.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has used a 30 minute delay after execution to evade sandbox monitoring tools.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0343
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Windows
The Exaramel for Windows dropper creates and starts a Windows service named wsmprovav with the description "Windows Check AV."[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0398
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperBro
HyperBro can run shellcode it injects into a newly created process.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0405
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exodus
Exodus Two attempts to elevate privileges by using a modified version of the DirtyCow exploit.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerLess
PowerLess can use base64 and AES ECB decryption prior to execution of downloaded modules.[175] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Writing Your Own Ticket to the Cloud Like APT: A Deep-dive to AD FS Attacks, Detections, and Mitigations
Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) is Microsoft's cloud-based identity and access management solution used by Microsoft 365, Azure, and thousands of third-party service providers. Almost all Fortu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to block processes created by PsExec from running. [71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0630
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nebulae
Nebulae can create a service to establish persistence.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Modules can be pushed to and executed by Duqu that copy data to a staging area, compress it, and XOR encrypt it.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal makes their malware look like Flash Player, Office, or PDF documents in order to entice a user to click on it.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0953
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Backup
Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [8], including the management of go... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0270
ATT&CK Technique Name:RogueRobin
RogueRobin collects the victim’s username and whether that user is an admin.[160] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can inject code into system processes including notepad.exe, svchost.exe, and vbc.exe.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0147
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pteranodon
Pteranodon schedules tasks to invoke its components in order to establish persistence.[134][135] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption property is set to disabled unless there are application requirements.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete has sent data over HTTP if FTP failed, and has also used a fallback server.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0407
ATT&CK Technique Name:Monokle
Monokle can be controlled via phone call from a set of "control phones."[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has utilized AutoIt and custom scripts to perform internal reconnaissance.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET builds a malicious application bundle to resemble Safari through using the Safari icon and Info.plist. [47] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Achieving Linux Kernel Code Execution Through a Malicious USB Device
How robust is the security of a fully updated, widely used and locked-down Linux-based device without any known rooting methods? Where the only non-trusted code being executed is heavily sandboxed JavaScript? Which has almost no us... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork has used BITS jobs to download malicious payloads.[20] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Denial of Service with a Fistful of Packets: Exploiting Algorithmic Complexity Vulnerabilities
How many bytes do you need to take down a web server? The answer might be fewer than you think. Algorithmic complexity (AC) vulnerabilities allow an attacker to submit a small amount of input to an algori... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Real Eyes, Realize, Real Lies: Beating Deception Technologies
Recent advancements have reinvented deception technologies and their use as a security layer of defense, making them no longer passé but so effective and believable that they are fast-becoming widespread in mature organizations. Many secu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
gh0st RAT has encrypted TCP communications to evade detection.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor can copy cmd.exe into the system temp folder.[323] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0229
ATT&CK Technique Name:Orz
Some Orz versions have an embedded DLL known as MockDll that uses process hollowing and Regsvr32 to execute another payload.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0623
ATT&CK Technique Name:Siloscape
Siloscape searches for the Kubernetes config file and other related files using a regular expression.[276] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Use strong passwords to increase the difficulty of credential hashes from being cracked if they are obtained. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0018
During C0018, the threat actors downloaded additional tools, such as Mimikatz and Sliver, as well as Cobalt Strike and AvosLocker ransomware onto the victim network.[86][87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0221
ATT&CK Technique Name:Umbreon
Umbreon creates valid local users to provide access to the system.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0626
ATT&CK Technique Name:P8RAT
P8RAT has the ability to "sleep" for a specified time to evade detection.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0920
ATT&CK Technique Name:SSL/TLS Inspection
If it is possible to inspect HTTPS traffic, the captures can be analyzed for connections that appear to be domain fronting. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0538
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crutch
Crutch can persist via DLL search order hijacking on Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, or Microsoft OneDrive.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Squirrelwaffle
Squirrelwaffle has collected the victim’s external IP address.[217] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent has the ability to download and execute additional payloads.[205] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor encrypts collected data with a custom implementation of Blowfish and RSA ciphers.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0353
ATT&CK Technique Name:NOKKI
NOKKI can collect the current timestamp of the victim's machine.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can create a Launch Agent with the RunAtLoad key-value pair set to true, ensuring the com.apple.GrowlHelper.plist file runs every time a user logs in.[18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emissary
Emissary has the capability to create a remote shell and execute specified commands.[113] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
An APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can fingerprint architecture, computer name, and OS version on the compromised host. Bazar can also check if the Russian language is installed on the infected machine and terminate if it is found.[51][52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0133
ATT&CK Technique Name:Miner-C
Miner-C copies itself into the public folder of Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices and infects new victims who open the file.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0512
ATT&CK Technique Name:FatDuke
FatDuke has the ability to execute PowerShell scripts.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon can switch to an alternate C2 domain when a particular date has been reached.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has created new email accounts for targeting efforts.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK
An older version of CHOPSTICK has a module that monitors all mounted volumes for files with the extensions .doc, .docx, .pgp, .gpg, .m2f, or .m2o.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy has run a keylogger plug-in on a victim.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0495
ATT&CK Technique Name:RDAT
RDAT can process steganographic images attached to email messages to send and receive C2 commands. RDAT can also embed additional messages within BMP images to communicate with the RDAT operator.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0586
ATT&CK Technique Name:TAINTEDSCRIBE
TAINTEDSCRIBE uses a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) algorithm for network encryption.[135] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
A module in Prikormka collects information from the victim about its IP addresses and MAC addresses.[182] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mivast
Mivast creates the following Registry entry: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Micromedia.[163] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 1
At the end of day one, join Black Hat Founder Jeff Moss and Review Board members Sharon Conheady, Meadow Ellis, Matt Suiche and Stefano Zanero for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This Locknote wi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium has the ability to use DNS in communication with C2.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0512
ATT&CK Technique Name:FatDuke
FatDuke can turn itself on or off at random intervals.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0481
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ragnar Locker
Before executing malicious code, Ragnar Locker checks the Windows API GetLocaleInfoW and doesn't encrypt files if it finds a former Soviet country.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0488
ATT&CK Technique Name:CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec can collect DNS information from the targeted system.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0259
ATT&CK Technique Name:InnaputRAT
Some InnaputRAT variants establish persistence by modifying the Registry key HKU\\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run:%appdata%\NeutralApp\NeutralApp.exe.[123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1555
ATT&CK Technique Name:Credentials from Password Stores
Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applicatio... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal can check the system time set on the infected host.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0028
ATT&CK Technique Name:SHIPSHAPE
SHIPSHAPE achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the Startup folder.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0686
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuietSieve
QuietSieve can identify and search removable drives for specific file name extensions.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has a command to launch a keylogger and capture keystrokes on the victim’s machine.[115][116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo requires the user to double-click the executable to run the malicious HTA file or to download a malicious installer.[144][145] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 The 8th Annual Black Hat USA NOC Report
Back with another year of soul-crushing statistics, the Black Hat NOC team will be sharing all of the data that keeps us equally puzzled, and entertained, year after year. We'll let you know all the tools and techniques we're using to set up, stabilize, and se... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Practical Approach to Automate the Discovery and Eradication of Open-Source Software Vulnerabilities at Scale
Over the last decade, there has been steady growth in the adoption of open-source components in modern web applications. Although this is generally a good trend for the industry, there are p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Net
Commands such as net use and net session can be used in Net to gather information about network connections from a particular host.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shark
Shark can use encrypted and encoded files for C2 configuration.[215][293] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0066
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elderwood
Elderwood has packed malware payloads before delivery to victims.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can check for existing stratum cryptomining information in HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\spreadCpuXmr – %stratum info%.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deep Panda
Deep Panda has used PowerShell scripts to download and execute programs in memory, without writing to disk.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic can obtain the OS version and build, computer name, and processor architecture from a compromised host.[194] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has been observed leveraging a module that can scrape email addresses from Outlook.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa’s shellcode attempted to find the process ID of the current process.[124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0288
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyRaider
Most KeyRaider samples search to find the Apple account's username, password and device's GUID in data being transferred.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0634
ATT&CK Technique Name:EnvyScout
EnvyScout contains JavaScript code that can extract an encoded blob from its HTML body and write it to disk.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has maintained persistence using the startup folder.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0237
ATT&CK Technique Name:GravityRAT
GravityRAT has used HTTP over a non-standard port, such as TCP port 46769.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors discovered the local disks attached to the system and their hardware information including manufacturer and model, as well as the OS versions of systems connected to a targeted network.[265] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1098
ATT&CK Technique Name:Account Manipulation
Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also inclu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1062
ATT&CK Technique Name:S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. can silently intercept and manipulate notifications. S.O.V.A. can also inject cookies via push notifications.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can use a .lnk shortcut for the Control Panel to establish persistence.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used compromised identities to access networks via VPNs and Citrix.[7][8] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Your Voice is My Passport
Financial institutions, home automation products, and hi-tech offices have increasingly used voice fingerprinting as a method for authentication. Recent advances in machine learning have shown that text-to-speech systems can generate synthetic, high-quality audio of subject... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs uses rundll32.exe in a Registry value added to establish persistence.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0488
ATT&CK Technique Name:CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec can discover active sessions for a targeted system.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has used procdump to dump the LSASS process memory.[36][1][37] | secon |
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