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| Ed Schwartz Show on WGN Radio 720 AM | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| September, 27-28, 1988 | |
| Transcribed by Hatchet Molly | |
| Hello. In this special presentation of Phrack World News, we have the abridged | |
| transcripts from the Ed Schwartz Show, a late night talk show broadcast by | |
| WGN Radio 720 AM - Chicago, Illinois. | |
| The transcripts that appear here in Phrack have been edited for this | |
| presentation. For the most part, I have decided to omit the unrelated chatter | |
| as well as any comments or discussions that are not pertinent to the intent of | |
| Phrack World News. In addition to this, I have also edited the speech somewhat | |
| to make it more intelligible, not an easy task. However, the complete unedited | |
| version of this broadcast can be found on The Phoenix Project (512)441-3088, | |
| sysoped by The Mentor. | |
| :Knight Lightning | |
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | |
| The Cast; | |
| A = Anna (Self-proclaimed phone phreak in Kansas City, Missouri) | |
| AA = Sergeant Abagail Abraham (Illinois State Police; Computer Crime Section) | |
| B = Bob (A bulletin board system operator) | |
| BG = Bob Gates (Manager of Corporate Security for Ameritech) | |
| CM = Chuck Moran (Director of Internal Affairs; Ameritech Applied Technologies) | |
| D = Dan (A computer science major at DeVry Technical Institute in Chicago, IL) | |
| ES = Edward Schwartz (Our host) | |
| EZ = Ed Zahdi (A researcher from THE READER, a local publication in Chicago) | |
| G = Gordon (Hatchet Molly, a graduate student at Northern Illinois University) | |
| JM = John F. Maxfield (Our famous friend from BoardScan in Detroit, Michigan) | |
| K = Kevin (A BBS sysop) | |
| L = Louis (A caller) | |
| P = Penny (A victim) | |
| R = Robert (A legal hacker) | |
| R = Ray (A former software pirate) | |
| S = ?? (A consulting engineer) | |
| Also mentioned, but not on the show, was SHADOW HAWK of Chicago, Illinois, who | |
| was recently arrested for theft of software from AT&T, and TOM TCIMPIDIS, a | |
| famous sysop who was arrested for having, unknown to him, AT&T Calling Card | |
| numbers on his legal bulletin board. | |
| ^*^ | |
| ES: It's 12 minutes after the hour. The hour, of course, is eleven o'clock. We | |
| have a tremendous amount of commerce that goes on late at night and in the | |
| early morning. When I say commerce I'm talking about computer operations | |
| of all kind from keypunching to tabulating - you name it. | |
| We've done two programs with Ed Zahdi who is the researcher from THE READER | |
| (the weekly newspaper) from the "straight dope" column. Ed Zahdi does the | |
| research and on two appearances (on two Friday nights) within the last year | |
| or so on this program Ed Zahdi has received a number of phone calls... | |
| about computer hacking, about people whose telephones mysteriously ring in | |
| the middle of the night -- or almost any time of the day but constantly do | |
| so and they pick up the phone and there's nobody there. | |
| The last time Ed Zahdi was on, we were flooded with calls from people who | |
| claimed that; | |
| o There are all kinds of telemarketing people who are ringing telephones. | |
| o That the phone company is testing phones and you don't know it. | |
| o That the phone network gets tested every day and everybody's phone rings | |
| once or for half a ring and nobody's ever there. | |
| I was amazed at the number and type of calls that came in. We called the | |
| phone company and we asked for some cooperation and tonight we are having | |
| as guests not only Mr. Ed Zahdi from THE READER, but also Mr. Chuck Moran, | |
| the Director of Internal Affairs from Ameritech Applied Technologies. We | |
| also have Mr. Bob Gates, Manager of Corporate Security for Ameritech. | |
| We're gonna get into this whole thing as to whether or not people are using | |
| and abusing the phone networks. Whether or not computer hackers are | |
| ferreting out phone numbers with computers. Whether or not you can really | |
| program a computer to randomly ring every telephone in the city or not. | |
| If you're a computer person hang around. We're also going to talk about | |
| some of the things that the phone company and other allied businesses are | |
| doing to catch up with the computer hackers. | |
| JC: Well, that sounds interesting to me. | |
| ES: Well now are you ready for this? The Bureau of Criminal Investigation of | |
| the Illinois State Police has a computer fraud unit. | |
| JC: Uh-huh | |
| ES: And do you know what they like to do? | |
| JC: What do they like to do? | |
| ES: Lock up computer hackers. Tonight we're going have the computer hackers | |
| running for the hills! Well maybe I should say "typing for the hills" huh? | |
| JC: Probably! (chuckle) | |
| ES: Because they don't run...most of them are couch potatoes. | |
| JC: That's right! | |
| ES: Glad to see you here Ed. | |
| EZ: Glad to be here Ed. In In the "straight dope" we deal with all kinds of | |
| questions one of the questions we got onto was the question of ghost | |
| rings. People would hear these things primarily at night. | |
| ES: On their home phone? | |
| EZ: On their home phone. What would happen is that they'd be sitting at home | |
| and the telephone would ring for a half a ring or a whole ring or maybe | |
| even two rings. They would pick it up and nobody would be there. And I'd | |
| heard about this in the past. I thought it was some peculiarity of buying | |
| a phone from K-Mart or who knows where. | |
| We got easily a dozen calls in the course of the evening from people who | |
| had the same experience happen to them. And it would always, oddly | |
| enough, happen at the same time of the night or on the same day of the | |
| week at the same time of the night and it was pretty eerie. | |
| We got one woman, who I've spoken to several times since who said that she | |
| was an answering service operator and she had whole banks of phones and | |
| sets of these phones would jingle once at a certain time of the night and | |
| then the next day a different set would jingle at a certain time of the | |
| night and then the following week or the following whenever the pattern | |
| would repeat, but nobody was ever there. And so we decided there had to be | |
| some obvious solution to this problem and the speculation at the time was | |
| that it was some sort of a testing program that the phone company had to | |
| check out the trunk lines or something like that. | |
| So, I called up the phone company, Illinois Bell, I called up CenTel, | |
| called up Bell Labs, called up places like that to ask if they knew | |
| anything about it. I asked whether there was a testing program, if not | |
| what explanation could they offer. They said no, there was no testing | |
| program, they had no idea. They had some speculation they thought | |
| conceivably some sort of computer ringing service was involved, but they | |
| didn't have any really clear idea so we came back here a couple of months | |
| ago to talk about it again. | |
| ES: We were swamped with calls again. | |
| EZ: I asked for the woman, whose name is Pat, who was the answering service | |
| operator to give me a call. She did and she volunteered to help us out | |
| and see if we could use her phone system as a guinea pig and have the | |
| telephone company try and find out, if they had means of doing this, what | |
| the source of these ghost rings was. One of the things she pointed out | |
| was that during the Hinsdale fire or during the time that the Hinsdale | |
| switching system was out of operation after the fire there the ghost rings | |
| stopped. | |
| ES: Ahhhh! | |
| EZ: After it was repaired the rings started up again, but they were on a more | |
| irregular basis whereas before they were sort of like clockwork at a given | |
| time of the night. | |
| ES: Uh humm. | |
| EZ: Now the same sets of phones would ring on a given day, but at predictable | |
| times. And it would vary within an hour or so. So what I hoped to do at | |
| that point was to get together with Pat and try and get together with the | |
| phone company at her place and see what we could find out. Unfortunately | |
| she got sick, had a bad infection, so she was out of work for a long time. | |
| ES: Uh humm. | |
| EZ: She has just recently gotten back on the job and I spoke her today and our | |
| plan now is that I'll go over to her place of business on Thursday just to | |
| see for myself and at that point I'm going to call up probably your friend | |
| Ken Went at Illinois Bell. | |
| ES: Head of Security | |
| EZ: We'll see what we can find out and see if they'll do it for cheap 'cuz we | |
| haven't got a whole lot of resources yet. Now the problem is that the | |
| connection only lasts for a split second and I hope that they can find | |
| something out in that short of a period of time in terms of tracing but | |
| its not clear to me that its totally possible. | |
| ES: Now one of the things that we found out when you were here a few | |
| weeks ago on a Friday night was another element to all of this. | |
| Telemarketers have been known to, in terms of getting a hold of people, | |
| ring phones of people whose numbers they don't know. | |
| EZ: We got some real interesting things. There were two basic theories here | |
| that I guess that I should talk about. One is that computer hackers do | |
| this. One of the things that computer hackers do is program their | |
| computers to use their modems their modems to find other computers. When | |
| they find one, there will be a characteristic tone that will tell the | |
| computer on the other end that its reached another computer. If they | |
| don't find a computer they can disconnect real quickly before the | |
| connection is actually made and the charge is placed to their bills. So | |
| they can do this all for free basically. They'll do this routinely to | |
| try and find new locations of computers. | |
| ES: Right. | |
| EZ: So that was one theory. The drawback to that theory is well, why would | |
| they do this repeatedly with a given number? Because obviously if the | |
| computer isn't there Tuesday its not going to be there Friday afternoon. | |
| Why would they try this repeatedly every week. That was one problem. The | |
| second theory that was presented to us was that telemarketing firms do | |
| this to keep their files up to date. They want to find out if given | |
| numbers are still in use or something along those lines. | |
| ES: Cause people do move and people do change their phone numbers. | |
| EZ: Right, so what they do is they dial a number up real quick and hang up | |
| before you can answer it. At least they can detect whether the line is | |
| actually in use. This gives them apparently some useful information. So | |
| these were the two main theories and there were several elaborations on | |
| these that we'll probably hear more about tonight, but those were the | |
| theories that we had. he problem of course as I say is its not clear | |
| exactly what the advantage of doing this on a routine basis, weekly or | |
| whenever would be to the person who is doing it. | |
| ES: There there are some very important elements to all of this. First of all | |
| there was a guy on yesterday morning who apparently filed some lawsuits | |
| against companies that do telemarketing for disturbing him and he is going | |
| to set a precedent that if you are bothered at home by telemarketers that | |
| you can sue them and collect damages. | |
| Not often a lot of money but enough to make them uhh sit up and take | |
| notice and he is trying to teach other people how to sue telemarketing | |
| people. | |
| (Break for commercial followed by re-introductions) | |
| CM: Thank you, Ed. It is our pleasure to be here. | |
| ES: It's a pleasure to have you here. Ameritech Applied Technologies is a | |
| division of Ameritech the phone company, right? | |
| CM: Right. We're a subsidiary of Ameritech that that deals with information | |
| technology needs of the Ameritech family which includes Illinois Bell. | |
| ES: What are some of the things you work on or are responsible for? | |
| CM: I'm responsible for computer security for the Ameritech companies. I also | |
| happen to have auditing for Ameritech Applied Technologies, physical | |
| security for our company. That kind of stuff. | |
| ES: Big job! | |
| CM: Yes. We are involved with hackers regularly all the time. | |
| ES: Good to have you here tonight Chuck. Also I would like to introduce Mr. | |
| Bob Gates, manager of Corporate Security also with Ameritech Applied | |
| Technologies. | |
| BG: Good Morning. | |
| ES: And a good morning to you. Bob previously was a police officer. You have | |
| been in Corporate Security at Ameritech for how long now Bob? | |
| BG: Since divestiture which was in January 1984. Its a much more specialized | |
| field and you deal with one particular aspect of the whole scenario. | |
| ES: Is it correct, are our callers correct? Do you ring people's phones at | |
| various hours of the day and night? Are there "ghost" rings? Are there | |
| people out there playing around? Is it the phone company or is it others? | |
| What's going on? | |
| CM: Well, I've been in this telephone business for 22 years now. | |
| ES Okay now this is the Director of Internal Affairs for Ameritech Applied | |
| Technologies, Mr. Moran, go ahead. | |
| CM: In my days at Illinois Bell, we very often heard these complaints. We | |
| kept trying to find out what it was some of the things the we've | |
| discovered is the computer hackers! They love to scan a prefix and look | |
| for a computer tone. They want a computer to talk to, so it'll ring a | |
| phone. Their computer will ring your phone. | |
| ES: Now this can be done from the bedroom of a thirteen year of a computer | |
| phreak right? Or anybody else for that matter. | |
| CM: If he has got a semi-good computer mind he can do it while he is asleep. | |
| He can program his PC to use his modem to dial your number. | |
| ES: Is most of the computer hacking and unauthorized use of computers done in | |
| the off hours? In other words its not people in business during the day, | |
| right? Would that be basically your computer hacker description? | |
| CM: People still have to live, they still have to have jobs to feed themselves, | |
| and they still have to go to school or go to classes and so your going to | |
| find that since hacking is a hobby, it is going to done during their free | |
| time. Which is typically evenings, weekends, and vacation periods. | |
| ES: I guess what I'm getting at here is I'm trying to establish most of the the | |
| computer related misbehavior comes more from private homes than from | |
| business offices. | |
| CM: No. The studies seem to indicate that 80% of computer abusers are in fact | |
| people in business and are abusing their own company, but that is not going | |
| to cause your phone to ring. The people who are using the network to call | |
| and look for computers are the people which we typically call hackers, | |
| which amount for 15-25% of the computer abuse that goes on in the world. | |
| ES: How concerned is Ameritech and the other technology and phone | |
| companies around the country about all of this? | |
| CM: Well just as any business Ameritech is highly dependent upon information | |
| systems to survive. So we are concerned with whatever risks go with | |
| computer usage. | |
| ES: Did you both see the film WarGames with Matthew Broderick? | |
| CM and BG: Yeah. | |
| ES: Now while the plot is pretty far-out, the theory is workable, correct? | |
| BG: The natural inquisitiveness of the youthful mind, the need to explore. | |
| ES: We've heard stories about computer hackers who have gotten into computers | |
| in government offices, high schools, colleges, and universities. They've | |
| changed grades, added and subtracted information from formulas, and done | |
| all kinds of things. | |
| Payroll records have been changed and we've got a thing now called the | |
| computer virus. We've got a conviction of a guy who is going to jail for | |
| literally destroying a computer program two days after he left the company | |
| and apparently that is something that computer people are very worried | |
| about. | |
| Are we going to end up with a huge number of people called "computer | |
| police" here at some point? To get a handle on all of this, is that what | |
| we need? | |
| BG: I think computer security is just a natural extension of using your | |
| computers to ensure that they are used in a secure manner. That they | |
| aren't tampered with and they aren't abused. To do that you have to take | |
| some degree of effort to protect your computer system. | |
| ES: Is law enforcement geared up to deal with the kinds of crimes that you guys | |
| are working on, investigating and trying to deal with? | |
| BG: Law enforcement does have experts with them. They also have to investigate | |
| everything else that occurs. So it becomes a priority item to private | |
| companies to make a commitment to look at it themselves to protect their | |
| systems and include law enforcement if appropriate. | |
| ES: Is there a naivety on the part of a lot of people that just left computer | |
| systems unguarded. | |
| BG: Yes. In reference to the law enforcement, in our current criminal justice | |
| system I know that in the states that we deal with and the federal agencies | |
| that I have dealt with part of the problem is finding a prosecutor, a | |
| judge, and a jury that understands what a computer crime is, Because they | |
| are not computer literate. | |
| ES: Well stealing information and stealing time are crimes. How about the | |
| stories of computer hackers breaking into computers at nuclear laboratories | |
| like Lawrence Livermore Laboratories in California. This is where they do | |
| the research on nuclear weapons and God knows what else. Think of the | |
| potential of this kind of misbehavior it's frightening. | |
| BG: That's why computer security has become a hot job. | |
| EZ: I'm still trying to focus on my immediate problem here which was the | |
| question of the ghost rings. What I'm hearing you say is that you think | |
| that the ghost rings are primarily the work of hackers. | |
| CM: I think its a very plausible cause. | |
| EZ: The question that people raise about this of course is that you can see it | |
| happening once in a while, but why all the time on a regular basis? | |
| CM: The computer hacker scans prefixes and will set his dialer look for | |
| computer tones. He may find a few numbers and tell two or three friends. | |
| Those two or three friends will now tell two or three other friends. They | |
| will see these numbers and then they will go and scan that whole thousand | |
| number group again. | |
| EZ: I still don't quite see why the ghost rings occur at exactly the same time | |
| all of the time. | |
| CM: I can't answer that. | |
| ES: I respond to that by saying the times are most likely approximate. Most | |
| people's watches aren't perfect and neither are their memories. However | |
| if the majority of the hackers are in high school, then they are probably | |
| going to sleep at about the same time every night and setting their dialers | |
| to run while they are asleep, therefore hitting the same numbers at roughly | |
| the same time every night. | |
| Is it correct to say that they can program these computers to do this work | |
| without any billing information being generated? And how can they do this? | |
| Or is that an area we should stay away from, I don't want to compromise | |
| you guys. | |
| BG: You're talking toll fraud and that's really not my area of expertise. Toll | |
| fraud is a fact of life, but I'm not a toll fraud person. | |
| CM: The presumption is that the billing doesn't kick in for a split second | |
| after the phone is picked up and that is what enables these guys to get | |
| away with this. | |
| BG: Talk to Ken. | |
| ES: Ken will tell you things that you'll never be able to talk about on the | |
| radio or write about I'm afraid. We're going to get into some other | |
| elements of all of this. Are the penalties for computer hackers set to | |
| meet the crime these days? I mean do we catch many of them do they get | |
| punished and does the punishment fit the crime? | |
| CM: The computer hackers that usually get caught are juveniles, which means the | |
| most you can do is keep them in jail until they are 21 and confiscate their | |
| computer equipment. The U.S. Attorneys Office in the Northern District for | |
| Illinois did in fact return a juvenile indictment against a hacker who used | |
| the code name SHADOW HAWK. It made the front page of the Chicago Tribune. | |
| ES: What did he do? Can you tell us? | |
| CM: According to the Tribune, he stole software from AT&T. | |
| ES: This proves that as smart as some of these hackers are, some of them get | |
| caught, maybe even a lot of them get caught. So as hard as they're working | |
| to defy the system apparently you people are working from inside the system | |
| to foil what they are doing and catch them. | |
| CM: Exactly | |
| ES: If you don't prosecute them when you catch then then it will not mean a | |
| thing so does that mean that the various phone companies and their | |
| subsidiaries have got a very serious mood about prosecuting if you catch | |
| people? Is that the way of the future? | |
| CM: Every case is different. Prosecution is always an option. | |
| ES: Are we a couple of years late in dealing with this problem? | |
| BG: The laws typically catch up to the need. You have to identify a problem | |
| before you can really address it. | |
| ES: We have made arrangements thanks to our guests tonight to speak to an | |
| Illinois State police detective sergeant who works on computer fraud; | |
| Sergeant Abagail Abraham. | |
| AA: Good morning I appreciate being here. | |
| ES: Have you been listening to the radio prior to our call? | |
| AA: I've been glued to the radio yes. | |
| ES: Okay. Your unit is called Computer Crime Section? | |
| AA: Sure. | |
| ES: How long have you been in existence? | |
| AA: Since February 1986. | |
| ES: There obviously was a need for it. Do we have enough state laws or state | |
| statutes for you to do what you have to do? | |
| AA: I think so. At the time that the section came into existence, the laws | |
| were not very good. Most computer crimes were misdemeanors until a few | |
| months later when the attorney general held hearings in which we | |
| participated and thus they drafted a law. | |
| ES: Sergeant, is it handled better at the state level as opposed to the federal | |
| level? The gentlemen here from Ameritech mentions that the US Attorneys | |
| Office has recently brought a prosecution here in Northern Illinois. Is | |
| his office going to be doing much more of this or do you see it being done | |
| at a state level? | |
| AA: I think it depends upon the kind of case. Certain cases are probably | |
| better handled at the federal level and certain cases are handled best at | |
| the local. When dealing with the federal agencies, the jurisdiction for | |
| computer fraud is shared between the FBI and the Secret Service. So it | |
| depends upon the nature of the case as to which agency would take it, but | |
| many cases are not appropriate for the federal government to take part in. | |
| ES: Let's say we have a student who changes a grade in a school computer | |
| system. That would be more a state case I would presume than a federal | |
| case right? | |
| AA: Certainly it would be likely to be a state case, we had a case like that. | |
| ES: If you were able to develop a case like that and have evidence, are you | |
| liable to get a conviction? Our guests were saying that the courts don't | |
| necessarily understand all of this. When you go into state court on this | |
| kind of a thing are you getting judges and/or juries who understand what | |
| you're talking about? | |
| AA: Well we have had no cases go to jury trials. As a matter of fact, no cases | |
| have even gone to bench trials because as like the vast majority of cases | |
| in the system they are plead out. | |
| ES: They plead guilty? | |
| AA: We have a 100% conviction rate. | |
| ES: Really! | |
| AA: Our success is based very good cooperation from state's attorneys offices. | |
| We've had no problems bringing our cases to them. | |
| ES: Your data is so good that by the time you make your pinch there is no way | |
| they can talk their way out of it. You've got them dead to rights. | |
| AA: Yeah, we haven't had a problem with that. | |
| ES: What kind of penalties are you getting Sarg? | |
| AA: All of our cases have had a 100% conviction rate, be we haven't had that | |
| many finally adjudicated. They are in various stages because the law is so | |
| new. | |
| ES: I presume that you're going to continue working very hard put more people | |
| in jail. | |
| AA: Yes, it's a growth industry. | |
| ES: Is Director Margolis supportive of what you are doing? | |
| AA: I think so. Our unit came into existence under the prior director, Zegal, | |
| but Director Margolis has been very supportive of our efforts and I suspect | |
| that he will become even more so. | |
| ES: Do people who are victims of computer crime know who to report it to? If | |
| you operate a business and your computer has been violated or anything at | |
| all has been done to you, does the average computer owner know who to | |
| report it to? | |
| AA: No. That's a really easy question! | |
| BG: I would, but only because I'm in the industry. However, the average small | |
| business man would probably be somewhat at a loss. | |
| AA: He might not even realize that is is a crime. | |
| BG: That's exactly true and fortunately Illinois has had the foresight to put | |
| together a unit such as the Sergeant's. | |
| ES: Let's say there is a medium size company that uses computers. I'll invent | |
| a company. My name is Mr. X and I own a a fairly nice real estate company | |
| in the neighborhood of Chicago. I've got maybe a dozen employees and a | |
| couple of years ago we went to computers to keep track of our listings, and | |
| all of our accounting and our bookkeeping, our past customers, and all our | |
| contactees. I mean we've got a lot of data. We communicate with some | |
| other real estate agencies and so we use modems, telephone lines and let | |
| computers talk to computers. Since some of this work is done when our | |
| office is closed, we leave our system hooked up. I came in yesterday | |
| morning and low-and-behold somebody got into our computer and erased all of | |
| our data, or part of it, or changed something. I am the victim of a crime | |
| should I pick up the phone and call the Illinois State Police | |
| AA: Sure. | |
| ES: You'll show up and you'll investigate? | |
| AA: Sure. | |
| ES: Okay. | |
| AA: There are several ways in which a case can get to us. One of them is that | |
| you as the victim could contact us directly and another way would be to | |
| contact the local police and hope that they would call us. | |
| ES: There's the key word...hope. Does the Chicago Police, the Wilmette | |
| police, the Joliet police, do they know enough to refer these cases to you? | |
| AA: I don't know if Joliet does, but Chicago and Wilmette certainly do. For | |
| any of the police that are out there listening at this point let me add | |
| that if we were to get a case referred to us, we will handle the case in | |
| any one of a number of ways. If the local agency brings it to us and wants | |
| nothing to do with the case because they have too much on their own we will | |
| take the case over. If they would just like to either work cooperatively | |
| or have us go with them on an interview or two to translate what the victim | |
| may be saying we'd be happy to do that too. So we have enough work to do | |
| now that we need not take cases over. We are happy to work with any | |
| agency. | |
| CM: I think one thing worth pointing out here is that we're focusing on on a | |
| crime via telephone. Computer crime is done from afar where the victim | |
| doesn't know the offender. | |
| AA: That's true. | |
| CM: The majority of cases probably don't involve telephones at all. They | |
| involve companies' own employees who are committing what amounts to | |
| embezzlement using computers. Either transferring money by computer to | |
| their own accounts or somehow playing with the books and the employer might | |
| not realize for a long time until some auditing process occurs that the | |
| crime has even occurred. | |
| AA: You're right. There are a number of cases like that. What happens very | |
| often in a case like that when it is somebody in-house is that the company | |
| will choose to not call it to the attention of the police they will choose | |
| instead to take disciplinary action or fire the person. Their argument | |
| most times is that they don't want the embarrassment. We do not go out and | |
| seek headlines unless our victim is interested in having headline sought. | |
| We don't choose to publicize cases and embarrass our victim. The stuff is | |
| simply not reported that much. | |
| EZ: I was talking to a computer consultant once who said that the higher you | |
| are up in the company if you're involved with something like this the less | |
| likelihood there is of not only you never doing time, but even getting any | |
| sort of penalty involved. I was there was one particular case of a guy who | |
| was an executive vice president for a bank who I think stole some | |
| phenomenal amount of money was in the millions who was discovered after | |
| some period of time and they didn't want it to get out that one their | |
| trusted employees was a crook so they gave threw this guy a retirement | |
| banquet | |
| ES: Hahahahahaha. | |
| EZ: They retired him from the company and he left with honors. | |
| AA: I like this.... | |
| EZ: The consultant said he was there and it was the most hypocritical thing he | |
| ever saw, but they will do it to avoid the unfavorable publicity. | |
| ES: I believe it. | |
| AA: Certainly if you are high in the organization and you control things then | |
| you can control various procedures so that you are less likely to be caught | |
| and you are probably in control of enough money that you are able to come | |
| up with creative ways to embezzle it with less suspicion aroused. I'm not | |
| sure why, but the more money you take the less likely you are to get | |
| prosecuted. | |
| ES: People admire these kinds of crime. | |
| (Commercial Break and then reintroductions including...) | |
| ES: I want to welcome a new player to our game tonight, Mr. John Maxfield. | |
| John Maxfield owns a corporate security consulting company. John...are you | |
| there? | |
| JM: Yes I am, good morning. | |
| ES: Good morning I guess you are outside of Chicago and are you close enough to | |
| have been listening to our program? | |
| JM: Well ahhhhh, unfortunately ahhhh I'm ahhh a bit to the east of you and I | |
| had a little trouble listening in on the radio so uhhh I've been listening | |
| the last few minutes on the telephone. | |
| ES: We've gotten into all kinds of data here. Have you and the sergeant ever | |
| talked before? | |
| JM: I don't believe so. I may have talked to somebody in the Illinois State | |
| Police ummmm maybe a year or so ago, but it was not the sergeant. | |
| ES: Sergeant Abraham you're still there, correct? | |
| AA: Yes. I'm here | |
| ES: I presume John that you know Chuck Moran and Bob Gates. | |
| JM: Yes I ahhh am acquainted with ah Bob Gates. | |
| ES: What does a private computer security company do? | |
| JM: Well uhhh we get involved with ahhhhhh ahhhhh the cases that perhaps don't | |
| make the headlines. Ummmmm and my role is more of kind of in counseling | |
| clients as to how they should secure their systems and to acquaint them | |
| with the risks and the kind of the nature of the enemy what they are up | |
| against. | |
| ES: We were talking earlier about a movie called WarGames which I'm sure you | |
| must be familiar with. My guests have been telling us a little bit about | |
| some of the things that go on. I suspect that the computer hacking problem | |
| and related behaviors is probably very severe isn't it? | |
| JM: Yes ahhh it certainly is a growing problem The movie WarGames kind of put | |
| out into the public eye what had been going on very quietly behind the | |
| scenes for a number of years. And uhhh of course as a result of WarGames I | |
| think there was an increase in hacking activity because now a lot of the | |
| uhhh hackers suddenly realized that it was something that maybe something | |
| they should do and achieve notoriety. | |
| ES: I have a question here that may or may not have an answer. Why is that the | |
| legitimate use of the computer isn't enough to satisfy its user or owner. | |
| In other words, why hack? Why misbehave? Why break the law? Why cost | |
| people a fortune? I mean there are so many fascinating things you can do | |
| with a computer without breaking the law why are so many people into this | |
| anti-social, anti-business behavior? | |
| JM: Well that's a difficult question..ahhhhhh you could say "why do we have | |
| criminals?" You know when you know there's plenty of gainful employment out | |
| there. Ahhhhh the thing with the computer hackers uhhh most of them are | |
| thrill seekers. ahhh they are not the kind of people that are going to be | |
| ahhhh good achievers with computers they're really only know how to do the | |
| destructive things. They're kind of the analog of the vandal. Ahhhh | |
| they're not really ahhh some of them are very bright but they're very | |
| misguided. Misdirected. And uhhh it's it's kind of hard to make a | |
| generalization or a stereotype because they do kind of cover a wide | |
| spectrum. We've got a one end of the spectrum a lot of these young kids | |
| ahhh teenagers. And they mostly seem to be boys there is very few female | |
| hackers out there. | |
| ES: really? | |
| JM: Yeah that's an interesting phenomenon. I would say that maybe there is one | |
| girl for every ten thousand boys. But ahhh anyway at the one end of the | |
| spectrum we have these kids that are just kind of running loose they really | |
| don't know how to do very much but ahhhh when they do manage to do it they | |
| do a lot of damage. Just by sheer numbers. And then on the other end of | |
| the spectrum you perhaps got a the career criminal whose chosen to commit | |
| his crimes over the telephone line. Instead of you know holding up people | |
| with guns uhhh he robs banks by telephone. So you've got this wide | |
| spectrum and it's very hard to put a stereo type to it, but most of the | |
| hackers start out because there's kind of a thrill there's sort thrill of | |
| ripping off the phone company or breaking into a bank computer and | |
| destroying data or something. There's a ahhhh kind of a power trip | |
| involved. | |
| ES: Now what you're trying to do is advise your clients how to avoid this | |
| before it happens. Do most of them end up getting burned before they come | |
| to you or are people smart enough to invest early? | |
| JM: Security unfortunately in the business world tends to take kind of a back | |
| seat because it doesn't generate profits, it doesn't generate any revenue. | |
| It's an expense uhhh if if you're worried about burglars and you live in a | |
| big city like I do or like Chicago. Then you know you've got to spend | |
| extra money for locks and burglar alarms and it's a nuisance you've gotta | |
| unlock your door with three different keys and throw back all these dead | |
| bolts and stuff and turn the burglar alarm off and back on again when you | |
| leave so it's a big nuisance. So security tends to be left sort of as the | |
| last thing you do. And uhhh of course after a corporations been hit their | |
| data's been damaged or stolen or destroyed or whatever. Then they can't | |
| spend enough money, you know, to keep it from happening again. | |
| ES: We have been told there is not premise that is burglar proof, there is no | |
| person regardless of their importance in this world who is totally | |
| protectable. Is a computer or a computer system totally protectable? I | |
| mean can you teach somebody how to secure the system so the hacker just | |
| can't get at it? | |
| JM: Quite frankly you're you're correct. I think the only secure computer is | |
| one that is unplugged. Or you change all the passwords and don't write | |
| them down so no one can log on. Like any other form of security if you put | |
| enough locks and bars on your doors and windows the burglar's going to go | |
| somewhere else where its easier pickings. The same is true with computer | |
| security. You can secure your system from all but the really ummmm you | |
| know intense organized attack. Now obviously in industry we've got certain | |
| segments that are targets, if you will. Banks obviously are a target, | |
| that's where the money is. | |
| ES: If computers are so capable and so smart, can't we say to a computer "Okay | |
| Computer, protect yourself"? | |
| JM: The computer actually is fairly capable of defending itself, the only | |
| problem is it's not intelligent. Uhh and it doesn't really care you see | |
| whether somebody breaks in or not. You see there's no human in the loop, if | |
| you will. So you have to have you have to have a human someplace that | |
| looks at the exception report that the computer generates and says "hey! | |
| What's all these two o'clock in the morning logons...those accounts are | |
| supposed to be active at that time of night." Now you can program a | |
| computer to do some of that, but you still need a human auditor to | |
| scrutinize the workings of the system ever now and then just to be sure | |
| that the computer is protecting what its supposed to protect. | |
| ES: John, what's the name of your company? | |
| JM: My company is called BoardScan and we're in Detroit Michigan | |
| ES: We have some callers, first up is young lady by the name of Penny. Are you | |
| there Penny? | |
| P: Yes I am Ed, how are you? | |
| ES: Good. Are you enjoying the program? | |
| P: Yes! I'm a victim! | |
| ES: A victim! Tell us how. | |
| P: We moved in about three months ago, two of our phones are rotary service | |
| and one of them is a cheapy touch-tone that you go from touch to pulse or | |
| something on it. When somebody dials out on one of the rotary phones, this | |
| cheapy phone beeps back at us. Well I don't mind it too much because I've | |
| got little kids and I get to know who's using the phone. Except, 10:38 at | |
| night when my kids are sleeping and I'm sitting in the family room, my | |
| little touch-tone phone beeps at me. Twice. | |
| JM: Oh I think I can explain that, perhaps. Now it just beeps... | |
| P: Twice! | |
| JM: It does it every night about the same time? | |
| P: Just about, yeah. | |
| JM: Well there's an automatic scanner in every telephone exchange that runs at | |
| night testing lines. | |
| ES: Oh no! Now wait a minute! | |
| P: Now wait a minute! They said that doesn't happen! No no no no. | |
| ES: The phone company all right. This is the one thing that everybody we've | |
| talked to in the telephone industry has denied! | |
| EZ: We, ahh, yeah.... | |
| ES: Go ahead Ed! Take over, take over | |
| EZ: We talked to a number of people at the phone company and the original | |
| thought was the phone company was doing some sort of testing, but the | |
| people at the phone company we talked to said "no...they don't." That | |
| testing occurs only when the actual connection is made in a routine phone | |
| call. This is part of the on-going sort of testing program. There is no | |
| additional testing, however, they said. Now does it work differently in | |
| Michigan? | |
| JM: Well I don't know. I know I have a phone that ahhh will ahh...it's got | |
| like a little buzzer in it and it will go "tick- tock" at about 1:30am | |
| every night. And ummmm if you're on a if you're on one of the older | |
| electro-mechanical exchanges uhh then I dare say there is a scanner that | |
| does scan all the lines at night. And it it only stops on each line for | |
| about oh a 1/2 second...just long enough to make your phone go beep-beep. | |
| And I'm sure that's what the explanation is. I am pretty qualified, before | |
| I got computer security work I used to install telephone exchanges. | |
| P: Okay, I have a home computer. It's a Commodore I do not have a modem. Is | |
| there anyway that I could get one and verify this? | |
| JM: Ahhhhh I don't what a modem would have to do with the telephone company | |
| testing your line at 10:30 at night. I don't see the connection there. | |
| P: What would verify it? Could I verify that I'm being used as a test or | |
| would it verify that I'm being scanned by some other computer someplace? | |
| JM: Well no. If you were being scanned by a hacker, you'd be getting an actual | |
| ring, you wouldn't get just say a short beep. | |
| EZ: Penny where do you live? | |
| P: Oaklawn. | |
| EZ: Would you be willing to participate in a little experiment? | |
| P: Sure, it happens pretty regularly. | |
| EZ: Okay. Well is it every night or just some nights? | |
| P: 6 nights out of 10. More than 50-50. It happened tonight as a matter of | |
| fact. | |
| EZ: Okay well tell you what. | |
| P: It happened last night as a matter of fact! | |
| ES: Penny, we'll get your name and your number and Ed is going to | |
| call you during the day and do a little work with you, okay? | |
| P: Sounds good. | |
| ES: Thanks Penny. Hold on a minute okay? | |
| P: Thank you. | |
| ES: You see now, Mr Maxfield is telling us something that every source we've | |
| gone to has denied. There's no such thing they tell us as of random | |
| testing of the phone network either by the local phone company or by AT&T | |
| they say to us "what for?" There's no need to do it. There's no reason to | |
| do it. Let me ask our guests in the studio here from Ameritech. Has | |
| either one of you ever heard of anything like this? Is it the kind of | |
| thing that either one of you can address? I know that you're computer | |
| guys, but what about this? | |
| CM: I know who you've talked to over at Illinois Bell Security and at one time | |
| historically they used to do testing, but they stopped that when I was | |
| still at Illinois Bell. | |
| ES: So this is some years ago. | |
| CM: Yeah. | |
| EZ: Now did it only apply to the electro-mechanical systems? | |
| CM: The only offices I ever worked out of were electro-mechanical, so yes. | |
| JM: Well I don't know. That would be my first guess because I know when I was | |
| on electro-mechanical exchange here in Detroit that's what would happen | |
| every night. | |
| ES: It's a different phone company. | |
| JM: Well I know, it's the same equipment though. Now on two electronic | |
| switching systems the line is tested every time you make a call. So there | |
| isn't any scanner like that. I think the mystery would be solved by just | |
| verifying what kind of equipment you know she was being served out of. | |
| EZ: It never dawned on us that that would make a difference. | |
| (Commercial Break and then reintroductions including...) | |
| ES: I've got a call coming in here long distance from Missouri. Anna are you | |
| there? | |
| A: Yes I am. | |
| ES: Where in Missouri are you? | |
| A: I'm in Kansas City. | |
| ES: And you're listening to us tonight? | |
| A: Yes. | |
| ES: Okay now my producer tells me that when you called up you identified | |
| yourself as a computer hacker, is that correct? | |
| A: I am a female phone hacker and computer hacker, Yes. | |
| ES: One of the few because apparently mostly males are into this. | |
| A: Uh-huh. | |
| ES: Anna, talk up a little bit louder. How old are you? | |
| A: I'm 27. | |
| ES: Twenty seven years old and do you have a job? | |
| A: No. | |
| ES: You don't?! | |
| A: No I have a lot of idle time. | |
| ES: And you're a computer hacker. By definition what do you do | |
| with your computer that makes you a hacker? | |
| A: Well I scan out codes that residents and companies have with US Sprint and | |
| different companies and I've used about fifteen thousand dollars worth of | |
| free long distance. | |
| ES: Are you calling free right now? | |
| A: Yes I am. I am not paying for this call. | |
| ES: Your computer has allowed you to make an illegal long distance call? | |
| A: Through the computer I obtain the codes and then I dial codes with the | |
| touch-tone. | |
| ES: Sergeant, should I be talking to her since she's committing crime right | |
| now. Am I aiding and abetting her? No wait..no. I've got a police officer | |
| on here....Sarge? | |
| AA: Yes. | |
| ES: What do you think? Should we continue with this? | |
| AA: I'd be real curious to know what her justification is for her behavior. | |
| ES: How about that Ann, how about giving us an answer for this? | |
| A: Well I have a lot of idle time and very little money and I like to talk to | |
| a lot of my friends. I have a suggestion for companies and residents out | |
| there who might have remote access codes. You might make them difficult, | |
| not not easy where hackers could, you know the first things they try are | |
| like 1-2-3-4, etc. | |
| ES: Well let me ask you a question Anna. Have you found your computer hacking | |
| to be relatively easy to do? | |
| A: Yes I have. | |
| ES: So you're saying that the computer people of the world have not tried hard | |
| enough to keep you out? | |
| A: No they haven't. I would suggest as far as the phone companies who use | |
| remote access codes to make the codes more difficult. | |
| ES: When we run into people like Anna who obviously have some intuitive talent | |
| and some success at this, why don't we hire some of these people and put | |
| their knowledge to work? | |
| AA: No! | |
| ES: No? | |
| JM: No. No. I'd have to say no to that also. | |
| A: Why not? | |
| JM: You have to understand the the technical side of it. Just knowing how to | |
| hack out a code doesn't qualify you as knowing how to change they system so | |
| you can't hack codes anymore. | |
| AA: There's a perception that these people are all whiz-kids and I don't think | |
| that's the case. | |
| ES: Are you a whiz-kid Anna? | |
| A: No, I don't always use the computer to find these codes I have a lot of | |
| friends and I also do some hacking of my own and there are a lot of | |
| different methods. What you figure out is what how many digits are in the | |
| codes and different things like that so it does require some brains. | |
| Unless you have friends of course and that's all you rely on. | |
| ES: Do you not understand that what you are doing is illegal? Does that not | |
| even enter into the equation? | |
| A: Of course I understand that! Yes. | |
| ES: That what you are doing somebody else ultimately has to pay for Doesn't | |
| that bother you? I mean if you were the victim of a thief or a burglar, I | |
| presume you would call the police and you'd scream and yell until they did | |
| something about it. And yet you and so many thousands of other people think | |
| nothing of committing thievery and fraud by wire and God knows what other | |
| crimes and because your victim is not sitting in the same room with you it | |
| just doesn't seem to bother you. | |
| A: Well I haven't I haven't physically bodily hurt anybody and it's mostly | |
| companies you know that I've dealt with. | |
| ES: That makes it okay? Companies are made up of people. Sometimes they're | |
| privately owned and sometimes they're made up of stockholders, but | |
| companies are people and so you're hurting people. | |
| CM: I don't know what service she's coming through on, but you gotta remember | |
| its costing that company money right now to enable her to talk and they've | |
| got to recover those costs from their legitimate customers. | |
| A: Don't they just use it as a tax write-off? | |
| BG: No. | |
| JM: There's been some of the smaller long distance companies, some of the | |
| people that resell service provided by AT&T or Sprint, some of these | |
| smaller companies have actually been bankrupted by people like Anna. | |
| A: Well I happen to know the person who bankrupted one of them. | |
| AA: I don't see why that's something that would make anybody proud. | |
| A: I'm not proud to know this person. | |
| AA: Why would you be proud to do what you're doing because you're doing the | |
| exact same thing, just perhaps not at the same scale. | |
| A: Well I don't I don't deal with small time companies. | |
| AA: So, you and many people like you are costing large companies a enormous sum | |
| of money. You're the people you're the reason that a company like Sprint | |
| is not profitable and could in fact bankrupt or could have to lay people | |
| off and could put people out of work. | |
| A: They're not profitable? | |
| JM: Sprint has been losing money almost since the beginning. | |
| CM: Or just make a basic rate increase which makes phone service less | |
| affordable. | |
| EZ: My long distance company is All-Net which has had to change access codes | |
| three times in the last year. Primarily because of hackers and I don't | |
| think it's ever been profitable. | |
| CM: Which is inconvenient to you as a customer. | |
| EZ: Sure | |
| ES: I think what bothers me the most out of this whole thing with Anna is the | |
| fact that she is, committing crime literally every day and just doesn't | |
| acknowledge that as either morally offensive. | |
| JM: Yes you've hit on the crux of the problem here. Ahhh these phone phreaks | |
| and hackers really don't see themselves as criminals and the crime here is | |
| totally anonymous it's as simple as dialing some numbers on a telephone | |
| that belong to someone else. Okay and so there is no victim. I mean the | |
| hacker or the phone phreak doesn't even know the victim that ahh they're | |
| billing the call to. In most cases. | |
| ES: Like the burglar who burglarizes during the day when nobody is home he | |
| doesn't see the faces of his victims and so its a very impersonal crime. | |
| Anna how would you feel if someday you get a knock on the door and it's | |
| the FBI or the Secret Service and they have finally tracked you down and | |
| the US Attorney for Kansas City decides to indict you and they've got a | |
| good case and you end up going to prison. How would you feel then? | |
| A: My original reason for taking an interest in this particular hobby is that | |
| someone got hold of my AT&T calling card and ran up my phone bill to | |
| several thousand dollars and I took an interest in it to find out | |
| originally what was going on with it. Now I have had contact with the | |
| Secret Service and the FBI and they didn't do anything about the person who | |
| offended me. They didn't do anything at all. | |
| AA: That doesn't answer the question. | |
| ES: Well what's going to happen if they come back and grab you? How would you | |
| feel if you ended up having to go to prison? | |
| A: I guess those are the breaks. | |
| ES: Are you married or single? | |
| A: I'm single. | |
| ES: Does your family know that you're involved in all this? | |
| A: Yes they do. | |
| ES: I mean how would they react if you ended up being arrested? | |
| A: I guess they wouldn't get anymore free long distance. | |
| ES: They're using it too!? | |
| A: They have me place the calls for them. | |
| ES: You know what disturbs me. You know don't sound like a stupid person, but | |
| you represent a lack of morality that disturbs me greatly. You really do. | |
| I think you represent a certain way of thinking that is morally bankrupt. | |
| I'm not trying to offend you, but I'm offended by you! | |
| A: Well I appreciate your time and you giving me air time an everything. I | |
| thought I'd let some of you know that we are out there and look out for us. | |
| Change those remote access codes to more difficult codes and... | |
| BG: Is that to make the challenge more difficult for you? | |
| A: Possibly for some of us, but to also those hackers who don't have the | |
| intelligence or don't have the friends or don't have the computers or | |
| whatever they're using. | |
| BG: Or the idle time. | |
| A: Right, the idle time. There you go. | |
| ES: How do you pay your rent Anna? Or do you live at home with your folks? | |
| A: I live with my parents. | |
| ES: Oh...okay. | |
| AA: Why not take that time and do something constructive or socially useful? | |
| A: Well I went out and applied for a job with US. Sprint and didn't get hired. | |
| AA: That's good! | |
| EZ: Is it any wonder?! | |
| ES: Anna, do you listen to this program very often? I don't believe you've | |
| ever called before have you? | |
| A: No. | |
| ES: Do you listen every once in a while? | |
| A: Yes. I had just happened to hear through a friend that it was coming on. | |
| ES: Okay. I tell you what Anna. A little something for all new callers. I've | |
| got very fancy WGN T-shirts. If you give my producer your name and address | |
| we'll send one to you. Okay? | |
| A: Okay | |
| ES: We'll be right back. (Click!) She hung up. I have to tell you the truth. | |
| I thought we had her there for a minute. | |
| AA: Well done! | |
| JM: She hung up on you? | |
| ES: The minute we went in on the line to get her address to send her the prize | |
| she hung up. | |
| JM: Yeah, I don't doubt that. | |
| ES: I'm not trying to make an enemy out of the woman, but I really am disturbed | |
| by her lack of moral fiber. I got another person on the phone claiming to | |
| be a computer hacker. Dan, are you there? | |
| D: Yes | |
| ES: Are you a computer hacker? | |
| D: No. I'm a computer science major. | |
| ES: Oh, okay. | |
| D: I'd like to ask your security experts what types of risk avoidance is | |
| involved in providing unauthorized people into corporation's computer | |
| systems? | |
| BG: What you're asking us is what we do to try to keep unauthorized people out | |
| and for me to answer that, would give away the store. | |
| AA: Besides it would take about two days. | |
| JM: I think you can answer that in generalities. As a number we're talking | |
| about I guess, telephone dial-up access to computers. | |
| BG: I think he's asking generically. Just computing. I don't think it would | |
| be appropriate for me to discuss. There is enough literature out there, | |
| you're a computer science major you read the literature and I think your | |
| answer lies there. | |
| EZ: Just to give you an example I know in terms not so much as computers, but | |
| misuse of long distance credit card numbers, the All-Net people who I deal | |
| with made their numbers longer which is the simplest thing you can do. | |
| It's harder to find one that's working. | |
| JM: When protecting your computers, the first line of defense is the password. | |
| Obviously you don't want to use trivial passwords. Ahhh that's the first | |
| line of defense. After that you add on other things like dial-back, | |
| encryption and various other techniques to rule out anyone with just a | |
| casual ahhh attempt at access that is just not going to get through. | |
| ES: Dan, where are you going to school? | |
| D: Right across the street from WGN, the Devry institute. | |
| ES: What is your feeling when you hear somebody else talk about, you just heard | |
| Anna, what what's your feeling about what she's doing? | |
| D: I'm not really familiar with the hackers. | |
| ES: Don't you see things being stolen? Does that bother you at all? I mean | |
| you see the illegality of it? The immoral...morality of it? | |
| D: I think it's very unethical because a lot of the companies have billions of | |
| dollars in equipment. | |
| ES: It's not something you're into? Correct? | |
| D: That's correct, yes. | |
| ES: I'm glad. Thanks for your call Dan. | |
| D: Okay. | |
| ES: Hello Louis are you there? | |
| L: Yes I'm here. | |
| ES: Okay you're on with all of our panel members Louis. | |
| L: Thank you very much. I heard a story that had to do with a certain hacker | |
| who had gotten inside the computer system of a let's say a large oil | |
| company. We'll leave the names out of it. They had set up a security | |
| system which automatically traces the call directly back to wherever the | |
| originating connection is made and this goof called from his home. Two or | |
| three days later, he found FBI agents on his front door step. | |
| AA: I'm not familiar with the case, but it's certainly is within the realm of | |
| possibility. | |
| JM: This happens quite a bit. A person like Anna for example might use a long | |
| distance service that is subscribing to a service from the originating | |
| telephone company of identification of calling number. When the fraudulent | |
| bill is generated the number that placed the call is also there and working | |
| it backwards is very trivial at that point. | |
| L: They simply did something like putting a trap on the line. | |
| JM: On some of the systems, the trap is already there. It's just part of the | |
| system, it's not really a trap at all. | |
| ES: There are ways to catch people and the computer hackers like to play the | |
| odds. All right Louis thank you. | |
| L: Hopefully this will teach a lot of people who are considering doing | |
| something like this to keep their hands off. | |
| ES: I hope so, good point. Thanks for the call. | |
| L: Thank you very much | |
| ES: We've got a call here. Hello Bob! | |
| B: I'd like to make a few comments on computer law. I live in Oaklawn and | |
| they've got the most modern exchanges that Illinois Bell has to offer. My | |
| son lives in that area and I know they offer features that are only | |
| available on the newer switches out there. I go back with computers to | |
| before Apple and IBM sold PC's, I had a couple sitting here at home. | |
| ES: Uh-humm. | |
| B: I bought my first modem about 1978. I consider myself somewhat a hacker, | |
| but I've never really tried to get into anybody else's system, not so much | |
| that I considered it illegal, simply because there wasn't that much of | |
| interest to me available. As far as computers go, if I sit here and dial | |
| random phone numbers in some states, now that is illegal. It's illegal if | |
| your 14 year old is sitting at home at a computer, but it's not illegal if | |
| your using a computerized phone system for generating sales leads. | |
| ES: We call it tele-marketing. | |
| B: Tele-marketing is essentially what some hackers have been hassled for and n | |
| some states it is illegal now. I've accidentally accessed systems I did | |
| not intend to access. | |
| CM: You didn't pursue that right? | |
| B: No, I've never used it. I've never used a computer for theft of services. | |
| I am not about to try and defend somebody that uses a computer to as a tool | |
| for theft of service from a telecommunications company. However, there are | |
| certain computer laws that never should have been passed. The case of the | |
| fellow out in California two or three years back that had a bulletin board, | |
| somebody had posted access codes on his bulletin board. He has an | |
| automated machine that answers his telephone. The telephone line is in his | |
| name, the Secret Service came and confiscated his equipment Its not right | |
| that this happened because of third party theft of service. | |
| BG: I think the rationale is over simplistic. | |
| B: Am I responsible for what you say when I answer my phone is essentially the | |
| question. | |
| BG: No, I think the question is, is the bulletin board operator responsible for | |
| what is posted on his bulletin board. | |
| B: Well that literally makes no sense. If a telemarketer calls me am I | |
| responsible for anything he says after I pick up the phone? | |
| BG: A bulletin board is used to disseminate information further. When a person | |
| posts something, in this case a code, the bulletin board is used to further | |
| spread that information. | |
| JM: I believe that is the Tom Tcimpidis case that you're referring to and I'm | |
| quite familiar with it. It was not quite as you put it. The stolen AT&T | |
| calling card that was posted was posted anonymously one minute and one | |
| minute after the AT&T card being posted by the anonymous party, Tom | |
| Tcimpidis, the sysop, the operator of the bulletin board himself had been | |
| on-line and had posted other messages. So there was reason to believe | |
| perhaps that the anonymous person was actually the system operator. There | |
| was a further complication that arose in that the stolen AT&T card belonged | |
| to a former employer of the system operator. Ultimately there was not | |
| enough evidence with which to charge anybody and the whole thing was | |
| quietly dropped, but it did raise some interesting questions as to | |
| responsibilities of the system operator because Mr. Tcimpidis said that he | |
| didn't know the code was there and yet his own equipment log showed that he | |
| had been on-line. | |
| B: Let's take that a little further then. Let's say there was an answering | |
| machine connected to his phone and we know he listened to the answering | |
| machine. Let's say somebody with a voice message left him half a dozen | |
| stolen credit card numbers. Would the action of the law enforcement | |
| agencies have been the same? | |
| JM: No...no, you're | |
| B: I think you must look at a situation where over the years an unnecessary | |
| fear has grown of some of the hackers. The phone phreaks scare me to an | |
| extent. I've got bogus calls on my US. Sprint and All-Net bills, never got | |
| one on my AT&T bill. I can see this is a definite problem, the phone | |
| phreaks do scare me, and I realize that real problem is that nobody seems | |
| to reconcile every call or even read their long distance bills. | |
| AA: If I have an answering machine on my phone and somebody calls up and leaves | |
| me information that were I to use it it would be illegal and I either erase | |
| the information or turn that other person in. I have no intent to use it | |
| and there is no law enforcement officer that I can imagine who is going to | |
| take action and no prosecutor who would take the case. | |
| ES: In other words if a guy sets up a computer bulletin board for the express | |
| purpose of exchanging information he is not supposed to have when other | |
| people have information their not supposed to have, I don't think there's | |
| any doubt about what their intent is and about the fact that they are | |
| violating the law. | |
| Sarge, if you went after somebody like Anna for what she admitted doing, | |
| stealing $15,000 dollars worth of long distance and you were able to handle | |
| the investigation, come up with the evidence, and bust her, what kind of | |
| penalty might she get? | |
| AA: A very difficult question to answer because it depends upon her prior | |
| criminal history. Most of these hackers do not have a history. In Anna's | |
| case the crime would be a class four felony which would result in probably | |
| simple felony probation. | |
| ES: She admitted to stealing $15,000! | |
| AA: I'm sure that her estimate is wildly off on the low end. if she is | |
| disseminating codes then she is also somewhat responsible for other | |
| people's use of the same codes. | |
| ES: Could we charge someone like her with conspiracy? | |
| AA: Sure! | |
| ES: She is generating a continuing criminal enterprise. | |
| AA: It depends again on whether you choose to prosecute her federally or at the | |
| state level. She would be looking here at a class three or class two | |
| felony depending upon the sum of money that she had stolen. | |
| ES: The bottom line here is if the punishment doesn't fit the crime, its not | |
| going to stop the criminals. | |
| AA: You have to remember that these are the people who have not been processed | |
| in the criminal justice systems and even to hold them over the weekend in | |
| Cook County would not be an experience I'd care to repeat. | |
| ES: Many of them are pretty arrogant sounding it seems. | |
| (Commercial Break And Reintroductions) | |
| ES: We've got an interesting new telephone law here; Chapter 38 of the Illinois | |
| Criminal Code. A person can be prosecuted, arrested and convicted for | |
| bothering somebody even if the person doesn't answer the phone. Just | |
| ringing a persons phone now is against the law, it's harassing them. | |
| JM: I might add, since we're discussing harassment by phone... the hackers | |
| don't like me too well and I'll get about a death threat a week from a | |
| hacker. | |
| ES: Really. | |
| JM: Oh yeah and every now and then I figure out who it was and I call them back | |
| and that kind of shakes up a little bit. | |
| ES: There was this reporter here that was being harassed like crazy in the news | |
| department here by a hacker who had a computer that was ringing the phone. | |
| He was ringing the phones like crazy and I didn't know about. Finally the | |
| reporter asked what I could recommend. I made a phone call and the | |
| Illinois Bell Security did what it had to do and then the Chicago Police | |
| were brought in and one night when I was on the air the officers went to | |
| guys home, knocked on the door, and this kid was shocked! He was a | |
| telemarketing representative for a major magazine and apparently he was | |
| working at home he had some of their equipment at home including a rapid | |
| dialer. He's got two detectives at the front door and he had literally | |
| just gotten off the phone. We've got all the data and so now comes the | |
| decision what do you want to do. Take him to court? Lock him up? Go to | |
| his boss? I went back to the reporter in our news room and asked him what | |
| he wanted to do about it? | |
| JM: What did he say? | |
| ES: Write a 500 word essay on why he was never going to do it again. | |
| JM: Ha Ha! We had one 14 year old one hacker who was on the bulletin boards | |
| and posting messages about how to make pipe bombs, different types of | |
| poison, long distance codes, and computer passwords, etc. On the bulletin | |
| boards he would come across like Ghengis Khan or or Joseph Stalin or | |
| something. I mean his language was all four letter words and yet face to | |
| face he was a very meek, mild mannered, well behaved youngster. However, | |
| get him behind the keyboard and he just sort of changes personality. What | |
| do you do to a 14 year old? He is much too young to really be put through | |
| any of the the serious criminal prosecutions so his penalty was that he had | |
| to read out loud to his parents all of the messages that he'd posted on the | |
| bulletin boards, four letters words and all. And that cured him... hahaha. | |
| In most of the cases I've worked on it's rare that someone goes to jail. I | |
| think the longest sentence that I've been involved with was probably like | |
| 30 days. I think there was one fellow down in Virginia, if I recall | |
| correctly, that got 90 days. You don't necessarily want to put these | |
| folks in jail because then they'll meet the real crooks and teach them all | |
| these nifty tricks. | |
| ES: God help us. Lets grab a call real quick here from Gordon. Hello Gordon, | |
| where are you calling from? | |
| G: Hello, I'm calling from DeKalb, Illinois. | |
| ES: You have a question for our panel...go ahead. | |
| G: Yeah I do. I'm a graduate student in Criminology up here at Northern | |
| Illinois University and I'm kinda involved in some field research with the | |
| types of people that you're discussing tonight. I've heard a lot of terms | |
| flying back and forth between phreakers and hackers and things like that. | |
| I'd like to hear some input from the people on the panel as far as how they | |
| define these types of activities, if they draw and distinctions between the | |
| two, and secondly, if anybody can add any insight into maybe just how many | |
| people are currently active in this type of activity. | |
| JM: I could take that because one of my specialties is identification and | |
| gathering data about how many perpetrators there are. To answer the first | |
| question, a computer hacker would be someone who concentrates mainly on | |
| breaking into computer systems. The phone phreak would be someone who, | |
| like Anna we heard earlier tonight, just makes long distance calls for | |
| free. The problem is you can't really separate them. The hacker needs to | |
| know the phone phreak tricks in order to break into computers in other | |
| states or other countries. Certainly the phone phreak perhaps needs some | |
| computer aids in obtaining stolen codes. It is hard to separate them. You | |
| can call them phreakers or you can call them hackers or you can just call | |
| them criminals. | |
| As to how many, this is a tough one because at what point to you draw the | |
| line? Do you say somebody that makes fifteen thousand dollars worth of | |
| calls in a year is a phone phreak and somebody that makes $14,900 is not? | |
| The problem is that its been a tradition to rip off the phone company ever | |
| since day one. There has been phone phreaks for twenty-five or thirty | |
| years at least. Ever since we've had long distance dialing. | |
| BG: The phone companies not the only one under siege either. | |
| JM: There are thousands of hackers, I would say just in the state of Illinois | |
| there are several thousand active computer hackers. | |
| G: Those hackers are the active ones? Would you say that most of them are | |
| involved in communicating via the bulletin board systems and voice | |
| mail-boxes and things like that or is this pretty much a solitary activity. | |
| JM: There are a few solitary hackers, in fact the beginnings of hacking, 25-30 | |
| years ago, it was a solitary activity. The bulletin boards have changed | |
| all that. Now the hackers no longer really operate in solitude. | |
| AA: One thing also about the criminal element here, the hacker and the | |
| phreakers, my experience has been that we have had very few "clean" if you | |
| will, computer frauds. We have had some people who are only into | |
| multi-level marketing of codes, which ends up being enormous sums of money, | |
| but very often we've found that hackers are involved in other things too. | |
| For example, credit card frauds, we have done search warrants and found a | |
| reasonable quantities of illegal substances, of weapons, of other evidence | |
| of other offenses. We have probably easily 50% of our warrants turn up | |
| other things besides computer fraud. Which I think is an interesting point | |
| to keep in mind. | |
| ES: Very good point. | |
| (Break For Commercial and re-introductions) | |
| R: Hello, I just wanted to call up and clarify something concerning computer | |
| hackers. I'm a hacker, but I'm not a criminal. | |
| ES: We'll be the judge of that Bobby. | |
| R: I think you will be. The reason I say that is, you're confusing things. | |
| The hacker is term that you could apply or compare more or less to "ham." | |
| It's a computer hobbyist, whether he does it just on his machine at home or | |
| he accesses legitimate services throughout the country and pays for his | |
| services he's a hacker. There are a lot of people who are irresponsible, | |
| mostly teenagers, who are quite impressed with the power of this machine | |
| and get carried away with it and do criminal acts. They happen to be | |
| hackers, but they're also criminals. I think that distinction. | |
| CM: I think the point is well taken I think originally the hacker was a very | |
| positive term historically and for whatever reasons the word hacker has | |
| taken on some negative connotations. | |
| R: Yes and that is unfair because I know legions of people who are hackers. | |
| JM: I consider myself to be a hacker, but I'm certainly not a computer criminal | |
| (No, at least not a COMPUTER criminal). I mean my business is catching the | |
| criminal hackers. If we go back to 1983 when hackers made headlines for | |
| the first time, that was the Milwaukee 414 gang, they called themselves | |
| hackers and so right away the good term, hacker being someone who could do | |
| wonderful things with a computer got turned into someone who could do | |
| criminal things with a computer. | |
| ES: I remember back to a time a few years ago when there was a group of | |
| criminals that got busted for coming up with a device called a black box | |
| which they used to circumvent paying the tolls you know on long distance | |
| phone charges. Was that kind of the beginning of this computer | |
| misbehavior? I mean was that a computer device? | |
| JM: There are several boxes; the black box, blue box, red box, silver box, etc. | |
| I must confess that back when I was a teenager, over thirty years ago, | |
| there were not any computers to play around with, but there was this | |
| wonderful telephone network called the Bell System. I was one of the | |
| original inventors of the device known as the black box and another device | |
| known as the blue box (Yeah right, YOU invented these). In those days the | |
| phone network was such that you could manipulate it with very simple tone | |
| signals. | |
| A black box essentially allows all calls to your phone to be received free | |
| of charge to the caller. In other words if somebody called you from a | |
| payphone they got their dimes back and if someone dialed you direct long | |
| distance they never got a bill. | |
| The blue box was a little more insidious. It allows you to actually take | |
| over the long distance lines and dial direct anywhere in the world. | |
| I got into it just out of curiosity as a true hacker and I found out that | |
| these things were possible and I told a friend of mine at the phone company | |
| about what I could do with their circuits and of course he turned me into | |
| the security people. | |
| It never really got started, but I do have sitting here in front of me a | |
| device that makes some of those tones. You could call it a blue box. I | |
| guess this is legitimate piece of test equipment, but let's see if it will | |
| pick up. (Beeeep!) | |
| ES: Came through loud and clear. | |
| JM: The blue box today is obsolete, it really doesn't work anymore. There, | |
| there are a few circuits that still us those kind of signals, but back | |
| 25-30 years ago that was the way to make your free phone calls. You didn't | |
| have Sprint and MCI to abuse. | |
| S: I'm a consulting engineer now but, I have been a communications manager for | |
| three Fortune 500 companies. One of the reasons I was hired was to put a | |
| stop to some long distance calling that had cost that company over a | |
| million and a half dollars in 27 months. We found the person that was | |
| doing it and he got a suspended sentence of six months. Then we turned | |
| around and sued him in civil court. | |
| ES: We've got to start treating these criminals like criminals. Suspended | |
| sentences are unacceptable, hard jail time is absolutely mandatory and | |
| unfortunately, and I think that sergeant you probably will agree with me, | |
| it must be very frustrating to spend all the hours you do chasing people | |
| and even when you get them to plead guilty seeing how easy sometimes they | |
| get away. | |
| AA: Oh sure. | |
| S: How many people do you have assigned to your unit here in this state sarge? | |
| AA: You're talking to 50% of the unit. | |
| (Break for commercials and re-introductions) | |
| ES: Okay Ray, go ahead. | |
| R: You would not believe how long I've been trying to get in touch with you. | |
| Since I was 14 years old, every time I've called, you've been busy. | |
| ES: So how old are you tonight? | |
| R: 18 | |
| ES: Four years!? What's on your mind? | |
| R: I used to pirate games when I was younger. As a matter of fact when I was | |
| 14. I mean my Dad had just bought me a computer and modem and I was | |
| pumped. People are always complaining about it, but it's so easy for a 14 | |
| year old kid to do this, don't you think that they should make it a little | |
| bit harder? Do you understand what I'm trying to say? | |
| ES: Yes, but Ray it's easy to steal a car. If your neighbor leaves his car in | |
| the driveway with the key in the ignition does that give you the right to | |
| take it? | |
| R: I know I did wrong, but there is no way I can give it back. Its just | |
| stupid because when you get older you feel guilty about things. | |
| ES: What did you used to do? | |
| R: I used to call up certain places and I would like break in and take their | |
| games and then just keep them for myself. | |
| BG: It was more entertainment for you? | |
| R: It kept me occupied and it was so easy that I began to think that maybe it | |
| was meant to be easy so they could get publicity. | |
| JM: There is perhaps a difference because when you copy a a computer program | |
| you can't tell it from an original, but if you make a copy of a tape or a | |
| record it doesn't sound quite the same. | |
| CM: When you're 14 years old it's something new, right? | |
| R: I got the biggest pump out of it. | |
| CM: I think you did something for your ego and it gave you a sense of power. | |
| ES: Okay Ray | |
| R: Bye | |
| ES: I've really enjoyed this program, but we're out of time. John, I want to | |
| thank you for staying up and I have a feeling that we'll do more radio | |
| because you're an interesting guy. | |
| JM: Thank you. It's been interesting talking with you. By the way, I think I | |
| know who Anna is, but we'll keep that a secret from our listeners. | |
| ES: Oh. Well why don't you just tell the FBI? | |
| JM: The Secret Service, yes. | |
| ES: Right and I want to thank everyone else for being on the show tonight. | |
| Everyone: Its been our pleasure. Lets do it again some time. | |
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