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In Eastern Europe the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the instability of the new states brought the rise of nationalist movements and the accusation against Jews for the economic crisis, taking over the local economy and bribing the government, along with traditional and religious motives for antisemitism such as blood libels. Writing on the rhetoric surrounding the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Jason Stanley relates these perceptions to broader historical narratives: "the dominant version of antisemitism alive in parts of eastern Europe today is that Jews employ the Holocaust to seize the victimhood narrative from the 'real' victims of the Nazis, who are Russian Christians (or other non-Jewish eastern Europeans)". He calls out the "myths of contemporary eastern European antisemitism – that a global cabal of Jews were (and are) the real agents of violence against Russian Christians and the real victims of the Nazis were not the Jews, but rather this group." Most of the antisemitic incidents in Eastern Europe are against Jewish cemeteries and buildings (community centers and synagogues). Nevertheless, there were several violent attacks against Jews in Moscow in 2006 when a neo-Nazi stabbed 9 people at the Bolshaya Bronnaya Synagogue, the failed bomb attack on the same synagogue in 1999, the threats against Jewish pilgrims in Uman, Ukraine and the attack against a menorah by extremist Christian organization in Moldova in 2009.
According to Paul Johnson, antisemitic policies are a sign of a state which is poorly governed. While no European state currently has such policies, the Economist Intelligence Unit notes the rise in political uncertainty, notably populism and nationalism, as something that is particularly alarming for Jews. 21st-century Arab antisemitism. Robert Bernstein, founder of Human Rights Watch, says that antisemitism is "deeply ingrained and institutionalized" in "Arab nations in modern times". In a 2011 survey by the Pew Research Center, all of the Muslim-majority Middle Eastern countries polled held significantly negative opinions of Jews. In the questionnaire, only 2% of Egyptians, 3% of Lebanese Muslims, and 2% of Jordanians reported having a positive view of Jews. Muslim-majority countries outside the Middle East similarly held markedly negative views of Jews, with 4% of Turks and 9% of Indonesians viewing Jews favorably. According to a 2011 exhibition at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, United States, some of the dialogue from Middle East media and commentators about Jews bear a striking resemblance to Nazi propaganda. According to Josef Joffe of "Newsweek", "anti-Semitism—the real stuff, not just bad-mouthing particular Israeli policies—is as much part of Arab life today as the hijab or the hookah. Whereas this darkest of creeds is no longer tolerated in polite society in the West, in the Arab world, Jew hatred remains culturally endemic."
Muslim clerics in the Middle East have frequently referred to Jews as descendants of apes and pigs, which are conventional epithets for Jews and Christians. According to professor Robert Wistrich, director of the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism (SICSA), the calls for the destruction of Israel by Iran or by Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, or the Muslim Brotherhood, represent a contemporary mode of genocidal antisemitism. 21st-century antisemitism at universities. After the 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel on 7 October, antisemitism and anti-Jewish hate crimes around the world increased significantly. Multiple universities and university officials have been accused of systemic antisemitism. On 1 May 2024, the United States House of Representatives voted 320–91 in favour of adopting a bill enshrining the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of antisemitism into law. The bill was opposed by some who claimed it conflated criticism of Israel with antisemitism, while Jewish advocacy groups like the American Jewish Committee and World Jewish Congress generally supported it in response to the increase in antisemitic incidents on university campuses. An open letter by 1,200 Jewish professors opposed the proposal.
Black Hebrew Israelite antisemitism. Extremist groups of Black Hebrew Israelites believe that Jewish people are "imposters", who have "stolen" Black Americans' true racial and religious identity. Some of these groups also promote the unsupported Khazar hypothesis of Ashkenazi ancestry. In 2022, the American Jewish Committee stated that the Black Hebrew Israelite claim that "we are the real Jews" is a "troubling anti-Semitic trope with dangerous potential". The perpetrators of several antisemitic attacks in the United States have expressed interest in the Black Hebrew Israelites. Between 2019 and 2022, individuals motivated by Black Hebrew Israelitism committed five religiously motivated murders. In September 2022, the Program on Extremism at George Washington University published a report which said the largest threat came from "individuals loosely affiliated with or inspired by the movement", rather than from formal members of Black Hebrew Israelite organizations. Antisemitism on the internet.
Causes. Antisemitism has been explained in terms of racism, xenophobia, projected guilt, displaced aggression, conspiracy theory, and the search for a scapegoat. Antisemitism scholar Lars Fischer writes that "scholars distinguish between theories that assume an actual causal (rather than merely coincidental) correlation between what (some) Jews do and antisemitic perceptions (correspondence theories), on the one hand, and those predicated on the notion that no such causal correlation exists and that 'the Jews' serve as a foil for the projection of antisemitic assumptions, on the other." The latter position is exemplified by Theodor W. Adorno, who wrote that "Anti-Semitism is the rumour about the Jews"; in other words, "a conspiratorial mentality that sees Jewish people as invisible and yet ubiquitous, as capable of pulling the strings of power from behind the scenes." As an example of the correspondence theory, an 1894 book by Bernard Lazare questions whether Jews themselves were to blame for some antisemitic stereotypes, for instance arguing that Jews traditionally keeping strictly to their own communities, with their own practices and laws, led to a perception of Jews as anti-social; he later abandoned this belief and the book is considered antisemitic today. As another example, Walter Laqueur suggested that the antisemitic perception of Jewish people as greedy (as often used in stereotypes of Jews) probably evolved in Europe during medieval times where a large portion of money lending was operated by Jews. Among factors thought to contribute to this situation include that Jews were restricted from other professions, while the Christian Church declared for their followers that money lending constituted immoral "usury", although recent scholarship, such as that of historian Julie Mell shows that Jews were not overrepresented in the sector and that the stereotype was founded in Christian projection of taboo behaviour on to the minority.
In "Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition" (2013), historian David Nirenberg traces the history of antisemitism, arguing that antisemitism should be understood not as a product of isolated historical events or cultural biases but is instead embedded within the very fabric of Western thought and society. Its foundation lies in the early claim of Jewish deicide and depictions of Jews as 'Christ-killers'. Throughout Western history, Jews have since been used as a symbolic 'other' to define and articulate the values and boundaries of various cultures and intellectual traditions. In philosophy, literature, and politics, Jewishness has often been constructed as a counterpoint to what is considered normative or ideal. One of the key insights from Nirenberg's work is that antisemitism has proven to be remarkably adaptable. It changes form and adapts to different contexts and times, whether in medieval religious disputes, Enlightenment critiques, or modern racial theories. Philosophers and intellectuals have often used 'Jewishness' as a foil to explore and define their ideas. For instance, in the Enlightenment, figures like Voltaire critiqued Judaism as backward and superstitious to promote their visions of reason and progress. Similarly, the Soviet Union frequently portrayed Judaism as linked with capitalism and mercantilism, standing in opposition to the ideals of proletarian solidarity and communism. In each case, Judaism or the Jews are portrayed as standing in tension with prevailing moral norms.
Author and scholar Dara Horn published an article in "The Atlantic" reflecting on her previous published doubts about the effectiveness of Holocaust education pedagogy and the rising antisemitism in the wake of the October 7th Massacre in Israel by Palestinians. In it, Horn argues that antisemitism functions by appropriating what has happened to Jews and recasting their experience as part of a broader, universal struggle, which always ends in ultimately redefining Jewish identity as incompatible with these ideals. She concludes that the attacks on Jews, often under the guise of anti-Zionism, follow the same ancient pattern of marginalization and vilification.This is the permission structure for anti-Semitism: claim whatever has happened to the Jews as one's own experience, announce a "universal" ideal that all good people must accept, and then redefine Jewish collective identity as lying beyond it. Hating Jews thus becomes a demonstration of righteousness. The key is to define, and redefine, and redefine again, the shiny new moral reasoning for why the Jews have failed the universal test of humanity.
Prevention through education. Education plays an important role in addressing and overcoming prejudice and countering social discrimination. However, education is not only about challenging the conditions of intolerance and ignorance in which antisemitism manifests itself; it is also about building a sense of global citizenship and solidarity, respect for, and enjoyment of diversity and the ability to live peacefully together as active, democratic citizens. Education equips learners with the knowledge to identify antisemitism and biased or prejudiced messages and raises awareness about the forms, manifestations, and impact of antisemitism faced by Jews and Jewish communities. Some Jewish writers have argued that public education about antisemitism through the prism of the Holocaust is unhelpful at best or actively deepening antisemitism at worst. Dara Horn wrote in "The Atlantic" that "Auschwitz is not a metaphor", arguing "That the Holocaust drives home the importance of love is an idea, like the idea that Holocaust education prevents anti-Semitism, that seems entirely unobjectionable. It is entirely objectionable. The Holocaust didn't happen because of a lack of love. It happened because entire societies abdicated responsibility for their own problems, and instead blamed them on the people who represented—have always represented, since they first introduced the idea of commandedness to the world—the thing they were most afraid of: responsibility."
Instead, she argues that perhaps "a more effective way to address anti-Semitism might lie in cultivating a completely different quality, one that happens to be the key to education itself: curiosity. Why use Jews as a means to teach people that we're all the same, when the demand that Jews be just like their neighbors is exactly what embedded the mental virus of anti-Semitism in the Western mind in the first place? Why not instead encourage inquiry about the diversity, to borrow a de rigueur word, of the human experience?" Geographical variation. A March 2008 report by the U.S. State Department found that there was an increase in antisemitism across the world, and that both old and new expressions of antisemitism persist. A 2012 report by the U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor also noted a continued global increase in antisemitism, and found that Holocaust denial and opposition to Israeli policy at times was used to promote or justify blatant antisemitism. In 2014, the Anti-Defamation League conducted a study titled "ADL Global 100: An Index of Anti-Semitism", which also reported high antisemitism figures around the world and, among other findings, that as many as "27% of people who have never met a Jew nevertheless harbor strong prejudices against him".
In August 2024, the Israeli Ministry of the Diaspora announced a new antisemitism monitoring project. The goal of the project is to measure levels of antisemitism in various countries, as well as identify instigators and trends. In the event that antisemitism in a given country gets bad, the Israeli government may reach out to the local government to try to rectify the situation. "Antisemitica" collections. There have been attempts to collect material deemed antisemitic, such as the "Felix Posen Bibliographic Project on Antisemitism", an electronic version of the "Antisemitism – An Annotated Bibliography" published by De Gruyter Saur from 1984 to 2013 and which lists some 50,000 items including books, dissertations, and articles from periodicals and collections from a diverse range of disciplines as well items from visuals arts such as films and caricatures. Apart from antisemitic material, including those pertaining to "Jewish self-hate", the project also contains Jewish responses to such polemical works and also philosemitic works. References. Sources. Attribution Further reading. Bibliographies, calendars, etc.
Economy of Azerbaijan The economy of Azerbaijan is highly dependent on oil and gas exports, in particular since the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline. The transition to oil production in the late 1990s led to rapid economic growth over the period 1995–2014. Since 2014, GDP growth has slowed down substantially. Large oil reserves are a major contributor to Azerbaijan's economy. Gas and oil make up two-thirds of Azerbaijan's GDP, making it one of the top ten most fossil fuel-dependent economies in the world. Gas and oil make up 90% of Azerbaijan's export revenues and 60% of its finances. Azerbaijan's economy is characterized by corruption and inequality. The country's oil wealth has significantly strengthened the stability of Ilham Aliyev's regime and enriched ruling elites in Azerbaijan. The country's oil wealth has enabled the state to host lavish international events, as well as engage in extensive lobbying efforts abroad. The national currency is the Azerbaijani manat. The private sector is weak in Azerbaijan, as the economy is dominated by state-owned enterprises. More than half of the formal labor force works for the government in Azerbaijan.
Economic history of Azerbaijan. Republic era. Oil and gas are the most prominent products of Azerbaijan's economy. More than $60 billion was invested into Azerbaijan's oil sector by major international oil companies in AIOC consortium operated by BP. Oil production under the first of these production sharing agreements (PSAs), with the Azerbaijan International Operating Company, began in November 1997 and was about 500,000 barrels per day in 2006. People visit petroleum spas (or "oil spas") to bathe in the local crude in Naftalan. A leading caviar producer and exporter in the past, Azerbaijan's fishing industry today is concentrated on the dwindling stocks of sturgeon and beluga in the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan shares all the problems of the former Soviet republics in making the transition from a command to a market economy, but its energy resources brighten its long-term prospects. Azerbaijan has begun making progress on economic reform, and old economic ties and structures are slowly being replaced. An obstacle to economic progress, including foreign investment, is the continuing conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
In 1992 Azerbaijan became a member of the Economic Cooperation Organization. In 2002, the Azerbaijani merchant marine had 54 ships. In 2010 Azerbaijan entered into the top eight biggest oil suppliers to EU countries with €9.46 billion. In 2011, the amount of foreign investments in Azerbaijan was $20 billion, a 61% increase from 2010. According to Minister of Economic Development of Azerbaijan, Shahin Mustafayev, in 2011, "$15.7 billion was invested in the non-oil sector, while the restin the oil sector". In 2012, because of its economic performance after the Soviet breakup, Azerbaijan was predicted to become "Tiger of Caucasus". In 2012, Globalization and World Cities Research Network study ranked Baku as a Gamma-level global city. In 2015, Turkey and Azerbaijan agreed to boost mutual trade to US$15 billion by 2023. Macroeconomic trend. The following is a chart of trend of gross domestic product of Azerbaijan at market prices with figures in USD. For purchasing power parity comparisons, the US dollar was exchanged at 1,565.88 Manats only. Currently, the new Manat is in use, with an exchange rate of about 1 manat = $0.59. Mean graduate pay was $5.76 per man-hour in 2010.
The following table shows the main economic indicators in 1980–2017. Source: IMF For more than a century the backbone of the Azerbaijani economy has been petroleum, which represented 50 percent of Azerbaijan's GDP in 2005, and is projected to double to almost 125 percent of GDP in 2007. Now that Western oil companies are able to tap deep-water oilfields untouched by the Soviets because of poor technology, Azerbaijan is considered one of the most important areas in the world for oil exploration and development. Proven oil reserves in the Caspian Basin, which Azerbaijan shares with Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, and Turkmenistan, are comparable in size to the North Sea, although exploration is still in the early stages. Sectors of the economy. Agriculture. Azerbaijan has the largest agricultural basin in the region. About 54.9 percent of Azerbaijan is agricultural lands. At the beginning of 2007 there were of utilized agricultural area. In the same year, the total wood resources counted . Azerbaijan's agricultural scientific research institutes are focused on meadows and pastures, horticulture and subtropical crops, leaf vegetables, viticulture and wine-making, cotton growing and medicinal plants. In some lands, it is profitable to grow grain, potatoes, sugar beets, cotton and tobacco. Livestock, dairy products, and wine and spirits are also important farm products. The Caspian fishing industry is concentrated on the dwindling stocks of sturgeon and beluga.
Some portions of most products that were previously imported from abroad have begun to be produced locally (among them are Coca-Cola by Coca-Cola Bottlers LTD, beer by Baki-Kastel, parquet by Nehir and oil pipes by EUPEC Pipe Coating Azerbaijan). A new program which is prepared by the European Union is aimed to supporting the economic diversification of Azerbaijan. Manufacturing. In 2007, mining and hydrocarbon industries accounted for well over 95 percent of the Azerbaijani economy. Diversification of the economy into manufacturing industries remains a long-term issue. As of the late 2000s, the defense industry of Azerbaijan has emerged as an autonomous entity with a growing defense production capability. The ministry is cooperating with the defense sectors of Ukraine, Belarus and Pakistan. Along with other contracts, Azerbaijani defense industries and Turkish companies, Azerbaijan will produce 40 mm revolver grenade launchers, 107 mm and 122 mm MLRS systems, Cobra 4×4 vehicles and joint modernization of BTR vehicles in Baku.
Financial and business services. The banking sector remains small in relation to the size of the Azerbaijani economy. Telecommunications. The Azerbaijan telecommunications sector is embroiled in corruption. Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev and his family own two of Azerbaijan's largest mobile providers (Azerfon and Azercell) through offshore companies and potentially control three-quarters of the mobile market in Azerbaijan. The third large mobile provider is Bakcell, which is registered as a company in an offshore tax haven and whose owners are unknown. Ownership of the mobile providers in Azerbaijan enables the ruling Aliyev family to monitor phone calls and internet activity. Investigative reporting revealed that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and his family made more than $1 billion when state shares of mobile operators were transferred to a purportedly "local partner" which was in reality owned by the Aliyev family's offshore companies. Azerbaijan has relatively expensive call rates relative to comparable countries. The high prices are possibly due to consolidated control of the mobile market and a lack of competition.
The Azerbaijan government has stated that it wants to create a high-tech sector in Azerbaijan. Tourism. Tourism is an important part of the economy of Azerbaijan. The country was a well-known tourist spot in the 1980s. However, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the First Nagorno-Karabakh War during the 1988–1994 period, damaged the tourist industry and the image of Azerbaijan as a tourist destination. It was not until the 2000s that the tourism industry began to recover, and the country has since experienced a high rate of growth in the number of tourist visits and overnight stays. In recent years, Azerbaijan has also become a popular destination for religious, spa, and health care tourism. During winter, the Shahdag Winter Complex offers skiing. The government of Azerbaijan has set the development of Azerbaijan as an elite tourist destination a top priority. It is a national strategy to make tourism a major, if not the single largest, contributor to the Azerbaijani economy. These activities are regulated by the State Tourism Agency and the Ministry of Culture.
The Formula One Grand Prix is held in Baku, the capital city, and has been held here for years. Currency system. The Azerbaijani manat is the currency of Azerbaijani, denominated as the manat, subdivided into 100 qapik. The manat is issued by the Central Bank of Azerbaijan, the monetary authority of Azerbaijan. The ISO 4217 abbreviation is AZN. The Latinised symbol is (). The manat is held in a floating exchange-rate system, managed primarily against the US dollar. The rate of exchange (Azerbaijani manat per US$1) for 28 January 2016, was AZN 1.60. There is a complex relationship between Azerbaijan's balance of trade, inflation, measured by the consumer price index and the value of its currency. Despite allowing the value of the manat to "float", Azerbaijan's central bank has decisive ability to control its value in relationship to other currencies. Infrastructure. Energy. Two-thirds of Azerbaijan is rich in oil and natural gas. The region of the Lesser Caucasus accounts for most of the country's gold, silver, iron, copper, titanium, chromium, manganese, cobalt, molybdenum, complex ore and antimony. In September 1994, a 30-year contract was signed between the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and 13 oil companies, among them Amoco, BP, ExxonMobil, Lukoil and Statoil. As Western oil companies are able to tap deep-water oilfields untouched by the Soviet exploitation, Azerbaijan is considered one of the most important spots in the world for oil exploration and development. Azeriqaz, a sub-company of SOCAR, intends to ensure full gasification of the country by 2021.
Transportation. The convenient location of Azerbaijan on the crossroad of major international traffic arteries, such as the Silk Road and the south–north corridor, highlights the strategic importance of the transportation sector for the country's economy. The transport sector in the country includes roads, railways, aviation, and maritime transport. Azerbaijan is also an important economic hub in the transportation of raw materials. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) became operational in May 2006 and extends more than 1,774 kilometers through the territories of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. The BTC is designed to transport up to 50 million tons of crude oil annually and carries oil from the Caspian Sea oilfields to global markets. The South Caucasus Pipeline, also stretching through the territory of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, became operational at the end of 2006 and offers additional gas supplies to the European market from the Shah Deniz gas field. Shah Deniz is expected to produce up to 296 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year. Azerbaijan also plays a major role in the EU-sponsored Silk Road Project.
In 2012, the construction of Kars–Tbilisi–Baku railway expected to provide transportation between Asia and Europe through connecting the railways of China and Kazakhstan in the east with Turkey's Marmaray to the European railway system in the west. Broad gauge railways in 2010 stretched for and electrified railways numbered . By 2010, there were 35 airports and one heliport. Regulation. Single window system shares needed information through a single gateway with all organizations serving in trade field, as well as abolishes useless processes and raises the effectiveness of cooperation among different parties. 73 economies implement single window system in the world. Azerbaijan started to implement this system in 2009. It implemented an E-Government portal as well. A single-window system was established by a decree of the Azerbaijani President issued in 2007, 30 April, in order to simplify export-import procedures, innovate customs services, and improve the trade environment. The president appointed the State Customs Committee as the leading body of controlling goods and transportation passing through the borders of the country in 2008. The State Migration Service issues appropriate permits for foreigners and stateless persons coming to Azerbaijan to live and work. The "single window" principle has been applied on migration management processes starting from 1 July 2009 according to the Decree. Other economic indicators. 17% of GDP (2011 est.) 1.1% (2012 est.) -3% (2011 est.)
Geography of Azerbaijan Azerbaijan is a country in the Caucasus region, situated at the juncture of Eastern Europe and West Asia. Three physical features dominate Azerbaijan: the Caspian Sea, whose shoreline forms a natural boundary to the east; the Greater Caucasus mountain range to the north; and the extensive flatlands at the country's center. About the size of Portugal or the US state of Maine, Azerbaijan has a total land area of approximately 86,600 km2, less than 1% of the land area of the former Soviet Union. Of the three Transcaucasian states, Azerbaijan has the greatest land area. Special administrative subdivisions are the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, which is separated from the rest of Azerbaijan by a strip of Armenian territory, and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, entirely within Azerbaijan. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh is disputed by Armenia, but is internationally recognized as territory of Azerbaijan. Located in the region of the southern Caucasus Mountains, Azerbaijan borders the Caspian Sea to the east, Georgia and Russia to the north, Iran to the south, and Armenia to the southwest and west. A small part of Nakhchivan also borders Turkey to the northwest. The capital of Azerbaijan is the ancient city of Baku, which has the largest and best harbor on the Caspian Sea and has long been the center of the republic's oil industry.
Topography and drainage. The elevation changes over a relatively short distance from lowlands to highlands; nearly half the country is considered mountainous. Notable physical features are the gently undulating hills of the subtropical southeastern coast, which are covered with tea plantations, orange groves, and lemon groves; numerous mud volcanoes and mineral springs in the ravines of Kobustan Mountain near Baku; and coastal terrain that lies as much as twenty-eight meters below sea level. Except for its eastern Caspian shoreline and some areas bordering Georgia and Iran, Azerbaijan is ringed by mountains. To the northeast, bordering Russia's Dagestan Autonomous Republic, is the Greater Caucasus range; to the west, bordering Armenia, is the Lesser Caucasus range. To the extreme southeast, the Talysh Mountains form part of the border with Iran. The highest elevations occur in the Greater Caucasus, where Mount Bazardüzü rises 4,466 meters above sea level. Eight large rivers flow down from the Caucasus ranges into the central Kura-Aras Lowlands, alluvial flatlands and low delta areas along the seacoast designated by the Azerbaijani name for the Mtkvari River (Kura) and its main tributary, the Aras. The Mtkvari, the longest river in the Caucasus region, forms the delta and drains into the Caspian a short distance downstream from the confluence with the Aras. The Mingechaur Reservoir, with an area of 605 square kilometers that makes it the largest body of water in Azerbaijan, was formed by damming the Kura in western Azerbaijan. The waters of the reservoir provide hydroelectric power and irrigation of the Kura-Aras plain. Most of the country's rivers are not navigable. About 15% of the land in Azerbaijan is arable.
Mountains. The country's highest peak, Bazardüzü, rises to 4,485 m in this range at the Azerbaijan-Russia border. Climate. Temperature. The climate varies from subtropical and humid in the southeast to subtropical and dry in central and eastern Azerbaijan, continental and humid in the mountains, and continental and dry in Nakhchivan. Baku, on the Caspian, enjoys mild weather that averages in January and in July. Precipitation. Physiographic conditions and different atmosphere circulations admit 8 types of air currents including continental, sea, arctic, tropical currents of air that formulates the climate of the Republic. The maximum annual precipitation falls in Lenkeran (1,600 to 1,800 mm.) and the minimum in Absheron (200 to 350 mm.). The maximum daily precipitation of 334 mm was observed at the Bilieser Station in 1955. Environmental problems. Air and water pollution are widespread and pose great challenges to economic development. Major sources of pollution include oil refineries and chemical and metallurgical industries, which in the early 1990s continued to operate as inefficiently as they had in the Soviet era. Air quality is extremely poor in Baku, the center of oil refining. Some reports have described Baku's air as the most polluted in the former Soviet Union, and other industrial centers suffer similar problems.
The Caspian Sea, including Baku Bay, has been polluted by oil leakages and the dumping of raw or inadequately treated sewage, reducing the yield of caviar and fish. In the Soviet period, Azerbaijan was pressed to use extremely heavy applications of pesticides to improve its output of scarce subtropical crops for the rest of the Soviet Union. The continued regular use of the pesticide DDT in the 1970s and 1980s was an egregious lapse, although that chemical was officially banned in the Soviet Union because of its toxicity to humans. Excessive application of pesticides and chemical fertilizers has caused extensive groundwater pollution and has been linked by Azerbaijani scientists to birth defects and illnesses. Rising water levels in the Caspian Sea, mainly caused by natural factors exacerbated by man-made structures, have reversed the decades-long drying trend and now threaten coastal areas; the average level rose 1.5 meters between 1978 and 1993. Because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, large numbers of trees were felled, roads were built through pristine areas, and large expanses of agricultural land were occupied by military forces.
Like other former Soviet republics, Azerbaijan faces a gigantic environmental cleanup complicated by the economic uncertainties left in the wake of the Moscow-centered planning system. The Committee for the Protection of the Natural Environment is part of the Azerbaijani government, but in the early 1990s it was ineffective at targeting critical applications of limited funds, establishing pollution standards, or monitoring compliance with environmental regulations. Early in 1994, plans called for Azerbaijan to participate in the international Caspian Sea Forum, sponsored by the European Union (EU).
Foreign relations of Azerbaijan The Republic of Azerbaijan is a member of the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO's Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the World Health Organization, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; the Council of Europe, CFE Treaty, the Community of Democracies; the International Monetary Fund; and the World Bank. List. List of countries which Azerbaijan maintains diplomatic relations with: Disputes. Nagorno-Karabakh/Azerbaijan. The frozen conflict over currently largely Armenian-populated region of Nagorno-Karabakh within the Republic of Azerbaijan began when in 1988 the Armenian majority of Nagorno-Karabakh demanded autonomy with demonstrations and persecutions against ethnic Azeris following in Armenia. This led to anti-Armenian rioting in Azerbaijan, with Azerbaijani militias beginning their effort to expel Armenians from the enclave. In 1992, a war broke out and pogroms of Armenians and Azeris forced both groups to flee their homes. In 1994, a Russian-brokered ceasefire ended the war but more than 1 million ethnic Armenians and Azeris are still not able to return. In 2023, an Azerbaijani offensive into Nagorno-Karabakh ended the conflict, with the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh conceding sovereignty to the government of Azerbaijan on January 1, 2024.
Caviar diplomacy. The European Stability Initiative (ESI) has revealed in a report from 2012 with the title "Caviar diplomacy: How Azerbaijan silenced the Council of Europe", that since Azerbaijan's entry into the Council of Europe, each year 30 to 40 deputies are invited to Azerbaijan and generously paid with expensive gifts, including caviar (worth up to 1,400 euro), silk carpets, gold, silver and large amounts of money. In return they become lobbyists for Azerbaijan. This practice has been widely referred to as "Caviar diplomacy". ESI also published a report on 2013 Presidential elections in Azerbaijan titled "Disgraced: Azerbaijan and the end of election monitoring as we know it". The report revealed the ties between Azerbaijani government and the members of certain observation missions who praised the elections. Azerbaijan's "Caviar diplomacy" at 2013 presidential elections sparked a major international scandal, as the reports of two authoritative organizations Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe/European Parliament and OSCE/ODIHR completely contradicted one another in their assessments of elections.
Non-governmental anti-corruption organization Transparency International has regularly judged Azerbaijan to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world and has also criticized Azerbaijan for the "Caviar diplomacy". At June 2016 the public prosecutor of Milan has accused the former leader of the (Christian) Union of the center and of the European People's Party of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Luca Volonte of accepting large bribes from representatives of the Azerbaijani government. Two people with high-level experience of the Council of Europe's parliamentary assembly (Pace) have told the Guardian they believe its members have been offered bribes for votes by Azerbaijan. Former Azerbaijani diplomat, Arif Mammadov, alleged that a member of Azerbaijan's delegation at the Council of Europe had €30m (£25m) to spend on lobbying its institutions, including the Council of Europe assembly. PACE ratified the terms of reference of an independent external investigation body to carry out a detailed independent inquiry into the allegations of corruption at the council involving Azerbaijan.
ESISC report. On 6 March 2017, ESISC (European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center) published a scandalous report called "The Armenian Connection" where it veraciously attacked human rights NGOs and research organisations criticising human rights violations and corruption in Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Russia. ESISC in that report asserted that "Caviar diplomacy" report elaborated by ESI aimed to create climate of suspicion based on slander to form a network of MPs that would engage in a political war against Azerbaijan. In the Second Chapter of the report called "The Armenian Connection: «Mr X», Nils Muižnieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights" that was published on 18 April 2017 ESISC asserted that the network composed of European PMs, Armenian officials and some NGOs: Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, "Human Rights House Foundation", "Open Dialog", European Stability Initiative, and Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, was financed by the Soros Foundation. According to ESISC the key figure of the network since 2012 has been Nils Muižnieks, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe and the network has served to the interests of George Soros and the Republic of Armenia.
"The report is written in the worst traditions of authoritarian propaganda, makes absurd claims, and is clearly aimed at deflecting the wave of criticism against cover-up of unethical lobbying and corruption in PACE and demands for change in the Assembly", said Freedom Files Analytical Centre. According Robert Coalson (Radio Free Europe), ESISC is a part of Baku's lobbying efforts to extend to the use of front think tanks to shift public opinion. European Stability Initiative said that "ESISC report is full of lies (such as claiming that German PACE member Strasser holds pro-Armenian views and citing as evidence that he went to Yerevan in 2015 to commemorate the Armenian genocide, when Strasser has never in his life been to independent Armenia)".
Azerbaijani Armed Forces The Azerbaijani Armed Forces () is the military of the Republic of Azerbaijan. It was re-established according to the country's Law of the Armed Forces on 9 October 1991. The original Azerbaijan Democratic Republic's armed forces were dissolved after Azerbaijan was absorbed into the Soviet Union as the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic from 28 April 1920. After the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991–92, Azerbaijan's armed forces were reformed based on the Soviet bases and equipment left on Azerbaijani soil. The armed forces have three branches: the Azerbaijani Land Forces, the Azerbaijani Air Forces and the Azerbaijani Navy. Associated forces include the Azerbaijani National Guard, the Internal Troops of Azerbaijan, and the State Border Service, which can be involved in state defense under certain circumstances. According to the Azerbaijani media sources, the military expenditure of Azerbaijan for 2009 was set at US$2.46 billion. However, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, only $1.473 billion was spent that year. IISS also suggests that the defence budget in 2009 was $1.5 billion. The Ministry of Defence Industry of Azerbaijan supervises the design, manufacturing, regulation and maintenance of military equipment. In the future, Azerbaijan hopes to start building tanks, armored vehicles, military planes and military helicopters.
Overview. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan has been trying to further develop its armed forces into a professional, well trained, and mobile military. Azerbaijan has been undergoing extensive modernization and capacity expansion programs, with the military budget increasing from around $300 million in 2005 to $2.46 billion in 2009. The total armed forces number 56,840 personnel in the land forces, 7,900 personnel in the air force and air defence force, and 2,200 personnel in the navy. There are also 19,500 personnel in the National Guard, State Border Service, and Internal Troops. In addition, there are 300,000 former service personnel who have had military service in the last 15 years. The military hardware of Azerbaijan consists of 220 main battle tanks, an additional 162 T-80 battle tanks were acquired between 2005 and 2010, 595 armored combat vehicles and 270 artillery systems. The air force has about 106 aircraft and 35 helicopters. Azerbaijan has acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state. Azerbaijan participates in NATO's Partnership for Peace. Azerbaijan joined the multi-national force in 2003. It sent 150 troops to Iraq, and later troops to Kosovo. Azerbaijani troops have also served in Afghanistan.
Despite the rise in Azerbaijan's defence budget, the armed forces were assessed in 2008 as not having a high state of battle readiness and being ill-prepared for wide scale combat operations. Azeri victory in the Second Karabakh War in late 2020 demonstrated how significantly Azerbaijan's military capabilities had grown. History of the Azerbaijani armed forces. Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. The history of the modern Azerbaijan army dates back to Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) in 1918, when the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan were created on 26 June 1918. First "de facto" Minister of Defense of ADR was Dr. Khosrov bey Sultanov. When the Ministry was formally established, Gen. Samedbey Mehmandarov became the minister, and Lt-Gen. Ali-Agha Shikhlinski his deputy. Chiefs of Staff of ADR Army were Lt-Gen. Maciej Sulkiewicz (March 1919 – 10 December 1919) and Maj-Gen. Abdulhamid bey Gaitabashi (10 December 1919 – April 1920). The Red Army invaded Azerbaijan on 28 April 1920. Although the bulk of the newly formed Azerbaijani army was engaged in putting down an Armenian revolt that had just broken out in Karabakh, the Azerbaijanis did not surrender their brief independence of 1918–20 quickly or easily. As many as 20,000 of the total 30,000 soldiers died resisting what was effectively a Russian reconquest. The national Army of Azerbaijan was abolished by the Bolshevik government, 15 of the 21 army generals were executed by the Bolsheviks.
Russian Civil War. After the Sovietisation of Azerbaijan, the newly formed Azerbaijani Red Army replaced the previous army, taking part in the Russian Civil War, and the invasion of Georgia. World War II. During World War II, Azerbaijan played a crucial role in the strategic energy policy of Soviet Union. Much of the Soviet Union's oil on the Eastern Front was supplied by Baku. By a decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in February 1942, the commitment of more than 500 workers and employees of the oil industry of Azerbaijan was recognised with orders and medals. Operation Edelweiss carried out by the German Wehrmacht targeted Baku because of the importance of its oil fields to the USSR. Some 800,000 Azerbaijanis fought within the ranks of the Soviet Army of which 400,000 died. Azerbaijani national formations of the Red Army included the 223rd, 227th, 396th, 402nd, and 416th Rifle Divisions. Azerbaijani Major-General Hazi Aslanov was awarded a second Hero of the Soviet Union after a long post-war fight for recognition of his accomplishments.
Dissolution of the Soviet armed forces. During the Cold War, Azerbaijan had been the deployment area of units of the Soviet 4th Army whose principal formations in 1988 included four motor rifle divisions (23rd Guards, 60th, 75th, and 295th). The 75th Motor Rifle Division was isolated in Nakhchivan. The 4th Army also included missile and air defense brigades and artillery and rocket regiments. The 75th Division's stores and equipment were apparently transferred to the Nakhchivan authorities. Azerbaijan also hosted the 49th Arsenal of the Soviet Main Agency of Missiles and Artillery, which contained over 7,000 train-car loads of ammunition to the excess of one billion units. The first president of Azerbaijan, Ayaz Mutallibov, did not wish to build an independent army, wanting to rely instead largely on Soviet troops. Even when the Parliament decided that an army should be formed in September 1991, disagreements between the government and the opposition Azerbaijani Popular Front Party impeded creation of a unified force. Around this time, the first unit of the new army was formed on the basis of the 18–110 military unit of mechanized infantry of the Soviet Ground Forces (probably part of the 4th Army) located in Shikhov, south of Baku. At the time of the parliamentary decision, Lieutenant-General Valeh Barshadli became the first Minister of Defense of Azerbaijan, from 5 September to 11 December 1991. Later from May to 4 September 1992 he served as Chief of General Staff of Azerbaijani Armed Forces.
Newly formed military. In summer 1992, the nascent Defense Ministry received a resolution by the Azerbaijani president on the takeover of units and formations in Azerbaijani territory. It then forwarded an ultimatum to Moscow demanding control over vehicles and armaments of the 135th and 139th Motor Rifle Regiments of the 295th Motor Rifle Division. In July 1992, Azerbaijan ratified the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which establishes comprehensive limits on key categories of conventional military equipment. The transfer of the property of the 4th Army (except for part of the property of the 366th Motor Rifle Regiment of the 23rd Guards Motor Rifle Division captured by Armenian armed formations in 1992 during the regiment's withdrawal from Stepanakert) and the 49th arsenal was completed in 1992. Thus, by the end of 1992, Azerbaijan received arms and military hardware sufficient for approximately four motor rifle divisions with prescribed army units. It also inherited naval ships. There are also reports that 50 combat aircraft from the disbanded 19th Army of the Soviet Air Defence Forces came under Azerbaijani control.
“Full-fledged work on the creation of a national army in Azerbaijan began only in November 1993, when the ..situation.. began to stabilize.” Articles for draft evasion and desertion were introduced. The Azerbaijani armed forces took a series of devastating defeats by Armenian forces during the 1992–1994 Nagorno-Karabakh War, which resulted in the loss of control of Nagorno-Karabakh proper and seven surrounding rayons, comprising roughly 20% of the territory of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani sources insist that Armenian victory was largely due to military help from Russia and the wealthy Armenian diaspora. Armenians partially deny the allegation, claiming that Russian side was equally supplying Armenian and Azerbaijani sides with weapons and mercenaries. During the war, the Azerbaijani armed forces were also aided by Turkish military advisers, and Russian, Ukrainian, Chechen and Afghan mercenaries. Azerbaijan approved the CFE flank agreement in May 1997. 21st century. A number of Azerbaijani human rights groups have been tracking non-combat deaths and have noted an upward trend in the early 2010s. Based on Defense Ministry statistics that had not been released to the public, the Group of Monitoring Compliance with Human Rights in the Army (GMCHRA) has recorded the deaths of 76 soldiers to date in non-combat incidents for 2011, and the injury of 91 others. In comparison, there were 62 non-combat deaths and 71 cases of injury in 2010. The string of non-combat deaths raises questions about the reform progress of the military. Factors behind the deaths include bullying, hazing, and the systemic corruption within the Azerbaijani Armed Forces (see Corruption in Azerbaijan).
In 2017, Azerbaijani authorities used large scale torture (the Tartar Case) on Azerbaijani military personnel accused of treason. Generals Nacmeddin Sadikhov and Hikmet Hasanov were accused of torturing Azerbaijani officers and soldiers and according to the authorities and human rights defenders, more than 400 people were subjected to torture in the course of the case. The Azerbaijani authorities claimed one person was killed as a result, while human rights defenders say the number is about 13, and many were wrongfully convicted and given hefty prison sentences. Second Karabakh War. The Second Karabakh War (also known in Azerbaijan as "The Patriotic War" or "Operation Iron Fist") began on the morning of 27 September 2020 when Azerbaijan launched an offensive along the Line of Contact. On the seventh day of the war, a major offensive was launched by the ground forces, advancing in the north, making some territorial gains while the fighting gradually shifted to the south. Following the capture of Shusha, the second-largest settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh, by Azerbaijani forces, a ceasefire agreement was signed between Azerbaijan, and Armenia, ending all hostilities in the area. Under the agreement, Armenia returned the surrounding territories it occupied in 1994 to Azerbaijan while Azerbaijan gained land access to its Nakhchivan exclave. Total casualties were in the low thousands.
During the war, the Azerbaijani army was widely accused of committing war crimes against Armenian soldiers and civilians. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International both condemned Azerbaijan's “indiscriminate” shelling of Armenian civilians, including the use of cluster munitions. In addition, videos of Azerbaijani soldiers mistreating or executing captive Armenians were circulated online and received widespread condemnation. On 10 December, a victory parade was held in honor of the Azerbaijani Army on Azadliq Square, with 3,000 soldiers marching alongside military equipment, unmanned aerial vehicles and aircraft. In August 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed deep concern regarding "severe and grave human rights violations committed during 2020 hostilities and beyond by the Azerbaijani military forces against prisoners of war and other protected persons of Armenian ethnic or national origin, including extrajudicial killings, torture and other ill-treatment and arbitrary detention as well as the destruction of houses, schools, and other civilian facilities."
Structure. Command. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there have been attempts in the defence ministry to reform the military to be more in line with the Turkish/NATO model, resulting in Soviet-legacy officers such as Rovshan Akbarov and Najmeddin Sadikov being removed from power. Azerbaijan periodically holds drills to improve interaction and combat coordination between the servicemen during operations, its military personnel's combat readiness, as well as to develop commanders' military decision-making and unit management skills. Land Forces. The Azerbaijani Land Forces number 85,000 strong, according to UK Advanced Research and Assessment Group estimates. The 2,500 men of the National Guard are also part of the ground forces. In addition, there are 300,000 former service personnel who have had military service in the last 15 years. Other paramilitary agencies consist of Interior Ministry Internal Troops of Azerbaijan, 12,000 strong, and the land component of the State Border Service, 5,000 strong. Azerbaijan has signed numerous contracts to strengthen its armed forces and to train its military with Turkey's assistance. Over the last 15 years, Azerbaijan has been preparing its military for possible action against Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Land Forces consist of five army corps: The Land Forces include 23 motor rifle brigades, an artillery brigade, a multiple rocket launcher brigade, and an anti-tank regiment. The IISS Military Balance reported in 2007 that the Land Forces had an estimated 40 SA-13 Gopher, SA-4 Ganef, and SA-8 Gecko air defence missile systems, with '80–240 eff.' to support the army in the battlefield. (IISS 2007, p. 157) The peacekeeping forces of Azerbaijan are mostly supplied from the Land Forces, though the Internal Troops of Azerbaijan do also supply some. As of March 2011, 94 peacekeepers were deployed with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In the past, it also actively supported the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo and Iraq. The Azerbaijani peacekeeping unit deployed in Iraq consisted of 14 officers, 16 sergeants and 120 privates, a total of 150 troops. The unit secured the hydroelectric power station and reservoir in Al Haditha from August 2003. In December 2008, Azerbaijan withdrew the unit from Iraq.
Reportedly in December 2014 Azerbaijan created the Separate Combined Arms Army in Nakhchivan. Karam Mustafayev became commander of the corps. The army was created based on the Nakhchivan 5th Army Corps to strengthen defense capability of Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, increase of combat capability of military units and formations of the Armed Forces, improve central control, reports quoting the Defence Ministry said. Air forces. The Azerbaijani Air and Air Defence Force is a single unified service branch. Some 8,000 men serve in the air force and air defence force. The Air and Air Defence Force has around 106 aircraft and 35 helicopters. The country has four major airbases. Nasosnaya (air base) has fighters, Kyurdamir Air Base a bomber regiment, Ganja Air Base transports, and Baku Kala Air Base the helicopter unit. There are also four other airbases which do not appear to have aircraft based there. These are Dollyar Air Base, Nakhchivan Airport, Sanqacal Air Base, and Sitalcay Air Base. The Azerbaijani Air Force using MiG-21, Su-24 and Su-25 aircraft, as well as the MiG-29 purchased from Ukraine in 2006 and Il-76 transport aircraft. The MiG-29 have been designated as the standard aircraft for the AzAF. Azerbaijan is holding talks with either the People's Republic of China or Pakistan to purchase JF-17 Thunder aircraft. MiG-25s previously in service have been retired seemingly in the 2007–09 period.
Azerbaijan's helicopter force is concentrated at Baku Kala Air Base and according to the IISS consists of a single regiment with around 14–15 Mi-24, 12–13 Mi-8 and 7 Mi-2. Jane's Information Group and the IISS give figures which agree with only a single aircraft's difference. Recently, end of 2010 Russian Rosvertol announced that Azerbaijan armed forces signed a deal for 24 pieces of Mi-35M (Hind-E) gunships what would further enhance the Azerbaijani ground attack formations. The Air Force has L-39 advanced training aircraft in store. The Azerbaijan Border Guard and Voluntary Society of Defense, Patriotism and Sport have Yakovlev light training aircraft. Azerbaijan has missile and radar systems intended to defend Azerbaijani airspace. There are at least 2 divisions of S-300PMU2. Thereby the country has one of the most capable SAM surface-to-air missile system in the region. Azerbaijan also operates two S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) batteries near Baku and Mingachevir; the S-300PMU-2 represents a logical replacement for these systems offering coverage of the majority of the nation. The country also has about 100 NATO designated SA-2 Guideline (original name S-75), SA-3 Goa (S-125 Pechora-2M), and the SA-5 Gammon (S-200) are in static installations. These may be around Baku and the central part to cover the whole Azerbaijani aerospace.
However, August 2011 investigations shows that after purchase of S-300 surface-to-air missiles, the largest apparent gap in Azerbaijan's air defense system may have been filled. Also in Azerbaijan there was a former Soviet early warning radar. The Gabala Radar Station was a bistatic phased-array installation, operated by the Russian Space Forces. The contract was signed in 2002 and was due to expire in 2012 where it was to be given back to the Azerbaijani government. The contract costed Russia $7 million per year. The radar station had a range of up to , and was designed to detect intercontinental ballistic missile launches as far as from the Indian Ocean. In December 2012 Russia announced that negotiations had been unsuccessful and that they had stopped using the radar station. The site was given back to Azerbaijan and all the equipment dismantled and transported to Russia. Nowadays, Russia covers the area from the Armavir Radar Station. Navy. The main naval base of the Soviet Union in the Caspian Sea was based in Baku. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Azerbaijan inherited the naval base and parts of the Caspian Sea Flotilla. The Azerbaijan Navy has about 2,200 personnel. In 2010, the navy had a Petya class light frigate, "Qusar" (G 121), and a number of patrol craft, including one Turk class, "Araz," P 223, one Brya (Project 722) class, P 218, one Shelon (Project 1388M) class, P 212, one Poluchat class (Project 368), P 219, one Luga class (Project 888), T 710, and four Petrushka (Polish UK-3 class), P 213, P 214, P 215, and P 216. There are four minesweepers consisting of 2 Sonya class minesweeper and 2 Yevgenya class minesweepers. (Jane's Fighting Ships 2010)
The Navy is also attributed with 5 landing craft, 3 Polnochny and 2 Vydra (IISS 2007), plus three research ships, 1 Project 10470, A 671, ex Svyaga, 1 Balerian Uryvayev class survey vessel (AG) and one Vadim Popov class survey vessel (AG). The U.S. Navy has helped train the Azerbaijani Navy. There is also an agreement to provide US support to refurbish Azerbaijani warships in the Caspian Sea. In 2006, the US Government donated 3 motorboats to the Azerbaijani Navy. In 2007, an agreement between the Azerbaijani Navy and a US military company was concluded, which stated that a part of the Azerbaijani Navy would be equipped with advanced laser marksmanship systems. The US company specialists were also to give training on the use of the new equipment. A number of separate U.S. programmes are underway under the Caspian Guard Initiative, focused mostly on enhancing Azerbaijani and Kazakh maritime border security. In May 2011, the president of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic Rovnag Abdullayev stated that Azerbaijan would start production of national warships after 2013.
The Naval Intelligence of Azerbaijan maintains the 641st Special Warfare Naval Unit. The special forces were trained by the U.S. Navy SEALs Unit 641 has several midget submarines such as Triton-1M and Triton 2 at their disposal as well as underwater tool motion for individual divers. The special unit is composed of 3 reconnaissance groups, 2 groups for mountainous warfare, and one diving group. Obligatory training includes parachute jumping day and night, on land and on water. Special forces. The Special Forces of Azerbaijan are part of the Ministry of Defence. It was established in April 1999 with officers and warrant officers who had participated in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War of 1991–1994. The Turkish Special Forces Command played a role in the formation of the unit. During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, personnel of the Special Forces reclaimed the city of Jebrayil and nine surrounding villages from the Armenian Army. On November 8, Aliyev congratulated the commander of the Special Forces on their "liberation of Shusha". The war was considered to be first time Azerbaijan has actively used all of its special forces units.
Defense industry. The Ministry of Defence Industry of Azerbaijan directs domestic military supplies for Azerbaijan. It was established in 2005. The Defence Industries Ministry subsumed the State Department for Military Industry and for Armaments and the Military Science Center, each of which was formerly a separate agency within the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry. The defense industry has emerged as an autonomous entity with a growing production capability. The ministry is cooperating with the defense sectors of Ukraine, Belarus and Pakistan. Along with other contracts, Azerbaijani defence industries and Turkish companies, Azerbaijan will produce 40mm revolver grenade launchers, 107mm and 122mm MLRS systems, Cobra 4×4 vehicles and joint modernization of BTR vehicles in Baku. The major military companies of Azerbaijan are: In early 2008, reports indicated that an agreement with Turkey had been signed which would lead to Azerbaijan producing armoured personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and small calibre artillery pieces.
International cooperation. Azerbaijan cooperates with about 60 countries in the military-technical sphere and has an agreement on military-technical cooperation with more than 30 countries. Turkey. In December 2009, an agreement on military assistance was signed by Turkey and Azerbaijan. The agreement envisions Ankara supplying Azerbaijan with weapons, military equipment, and, if necessary, soldiers in case war with Armenia over Karabakh resumes. Turkey has provided Azerbaijan with infantry weapons, tactical vehicles (jeeps, trucks, etc.) professional training, military organization, technology transfer, licensed military hardware production, and other services. Due to help from Turkish specialists and instructors, thousands of Azerbaijani officers have been trained to western standards. The military position as an area of international importance of Azerbaijan increased with an agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkey on the participation of an Azerbaijani peacekeeping platoon in the staff of the Turkish battalion in Kosovo.
Since 1992, Azerbaijan and Turkey have signed more than 100 military protocols, some of the major protocols include: In May 2011, Azerbaijan had discussed the purchase of long-range rockets from two Chinese companies, the minister of the defence industry has said. Other arms deals were signed with Turkey. Turkish Defence Minister Vecdi Gonul and Yaver Jamalov signed a protocol of intent on future joint production of two types of output – 107-mm rockets and the national rifle, possibly the Mehmetçik-1. A protocol of intent was signed the same day with the Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation MKEK on the joint production of 120-mm mortar launchers. This project will come into force in a few months time. Agreement has also been reached with Turkish company Aselsan on the production of some types of defence output in Azerbaijan, specifically the latest types of weapons' sights. These projects will probably happen in the near future too. Recently, Turkish defense industries secretariat told that an export version of the T-155 Firtina self-propelled howitser is almost done and could start production. T-155 has been powered by a German MTU power pack, which restricts the sale to some countries like Azerbaijan. The Turkish manufacturer MKEK, has announced that they have found an alternate supplier for the power pack where Azerbaijan showed interest to buy the high tech, more capable 155mm 52 caliber from Turkish authorities.
United States. Section 907 of the United States Freedom Support Act bans any kind of direct United States aid to the Azerbaijani government. Since a waiver was made in 2001 there has been extensive U.S. military cooperation with Azerbaijan. This has included Special Forces and naval aid, consultations with United States European Command, and linkages through the U.S. National Guard State Partnership Program. On 19 May 2006, Azerbaijani Defense Minister Safar Abiyev and the then commander of United States Air Forces in Europe General Tom Hobbins met in Baku to discuss military cooperation. He said the objective of his visit was to become familiar with the state of Azerbaijani armed forces. Hobbins pointed to the progress made in the NATO-Azerbaijan relations, saying that the successful implementation of the NATO Partnership for Peace program in Azerbaijan has brought the country even closer to the alliance. He said that the two countries' air forces will expand cooperation. The U.S. state of Oklahoma is linked with Azerbaijan through the U.S. National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP). Oklahoma National Guard troops have been sent on training and humanitarian missions to Baku.
Russia. Russia is one of Azerbaijan's main suppliers of arms. "As of today, military and technical cooperation with Russia is measured at $4 billion and it tends to grow further," President Ilham Aliyev said after meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Baku in 2013. Israel. Azerbaijan and Israel cooperate on numerous areas of the defense industry. Israel was Azerbaijan's largest weapon supplier with $4.85 billion in sales during 2016 alone. As of 2023, Turkey was Azerbaijan's largest weapon supplier. Azerbaijan has shown great interest in Israeli technology over the years. In particular, an agreement was reached over the construction of the factory of intelligence and combat drones in Azerbaijan. The Israeli defense company Elta Systems Ltd has had cooperation from Azerbaijan in building the TecSAR reconnaissance satellite system, which can take high-definition photos of ground surfaces in all weather conditions. According to Azerbaijani military experts, the TecSAR system will be indispensable for military operations in the mountainous terrains of Azerbaijan.
As of June 2009, Israel and Azerbaijan had been negotiating on the production of Namer armoured infantry fighting vehicles in Azerbaijan. There is no further information as to whether any agreement has been made. NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Azerbaijan cooperate. Azerbaijan's Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) and its Partnership for Peace (PfP) linkages lay out the programme of cooperation between Azerbaijan and NATO. The Azerbaijani government has however delayed implementing IPAP-recommended reforms, however, in part at least because no decision had been taken to seek NATO membership. This is because Azerbaijan's foreign policy 'seeks to balance interests with the U.S., EU, Russia and Iran.' According to a NATO diplomatic source some key officials at NATO headquarters in Brussels were pushing hard for engaging Azerbaijan on the membership question. "Turkey, Romania, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom and the Baltic states," are among the member-states also backing a fast track for Azerbaijan's NATO membership.
However, Azerbaijan made its policy of not being aligned with a geopolitical/military structure official when it became a full member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 2011. There is also a limited amount of military cooperation with the other countries of GUAM: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Personnel. Educational system. The purpose of Azerbaijani military education and training is to train soldiers, officers, and non-commissioned officers to have independent and creative thinking and commitment to the Azerbaijani people and the government. Military education in the Azerbaijani Armed Forces have been described as either being secondary education, further education, or higher education. Azerbaijani pilots were formerly trained in the Azerbaijan Air Force School, where they would then develop their skills in operational units. Azerbaijan has an experience exchange with Turkey, Ukraine, the United States and a number of NATO countries. The Turkish Air Force School has a great role in the training of Azerbaijani military pilots. Azerbaijani pilots are also trained in Ukraine's Pilot Training School.
The following is a list of educational institutions in the armed forces, under the auspices of the National Defense University: Military Justice. Military Courts act as courts of first instance deals. The Military Court is composed of a President and judges. The following military courts exist in Azerbaijan: Women and ethnic minorities in the armed forces. During the first war, Russians, who were a large minority in Azerbaijan at the time, served in the units of the Azerbaijani Army, many of whom formerly served in the Soviet Army. According to the Russian Ministry of Defence more than 300 officers of the 7th Army, based in the capital of Baku, refused to leave Azerbaijan at the outset of the war. During the Second Karabakh War, the death of an ethnic Russian Azerbaijani soldier, Dmitry Solntsev, was reported. There was also Denis Aliyev (born as Denis Pronin) from the Xətai raion, who was killed in Jabrayil. He was later posthumously awarded the Medal "For the Liberation of Jabrayil" in December. Cossacks, associated with the Association of Cossacks of Azerbaijan, often join the Azerbaijani Armed Forces.
Female military personnel in the military are generally involved in education, office work, medical care, and the development of international cooperation. They also serve in the rear, signal troops, and intelligence forces. Women are exempt from conscription, which means that female service is purely on a voluntary basis. There are currently 1,000 female personnel in the Azerbaijani military, accounting for 3% of the armed forces. During the Karabakh Conflict, 2,000 of the 74,000 Azerbaijani soldiers were women, and 600 of them directly took part in military operations, with a women's battalion being established in 1992. The enrollment of females in Azerbaijani higher military schools began in 1999. According to soldier Tehrana Bahruzi in her book, “Zakir Hasanov: the Ideal Minister", Defence Minister Zakir Hasanov was responsible for launching the first female unit in the Special Forces of Azerbaijan. In October 2020, the first female military casualty was reported, a combat medic who died while taking wounded soldiers from the battlefield.
Personnel medals and awards. Today 'National Hero of Azerbaijan' is the highest national title in the country, awarded for outstanding services of national importance to Azerbaijan in defense, as well as other deeds in other spheres. Traditions and military institutions. Military oath. The military oath () is taken by conscripts as a legal basis of the beginning of their military service. The oath is administered by the commanding officer of the unit. The following is the text for the current version of the oath: Battle flags and pennants. A battle flag for a military unit is a symbol of honor which remains forever in the unit unless it is dissolved. By military law, if the battle flag is lost in battle, the commander of the military unit and the servicemen under its command are brought to court, and the unit is abolished. Battle flags have the color of the State Flag, with the slogan "For Azerbaijan" being embroidered with golden silk on a blue stripe along the upper edge of the fabric. Outside the battle flag, the Azerbaijani military also utilizes the Turkish military tradition of pennants as symbols.
Military holidays. These are the military holidays observed by all service personnel of the Armed Forces: Azerbaijan Military History Museum. Azerbaijan Military History Museum is a structure under the Ministry of Defense. It was established on 10 December 1992 by the order of the Minister of Defense and in accordance with a decree signed on 29 October 1992 "On the transfer of the Museum of Combat Glory of the VI Army Garrison of the Commonwealth of Independent States". Today, the museum displays 5 tanks, 9 armored personnel carriers, 16 artillery pieces, 6 aircraft, 4 helicopters, 6 different military equipment of the Air Force. Currently, the number of exhibits totals 11,000. Republican Veterans Organization. After the Second World War, veterans movements were launched in Azerbaijan, with the Baku Veterans Committee being established on 10 June 1960. The activity of the committee was limited to Baku until the early 1970s. During the leadership of First Secretary Heydar Aliyev, there was a revival in the veteran movement, during which the committee gradually expanded to the republic. The establishment of the Republican Veterans Organization took place on 21 March 1987. Despite the official registration of the RVO with the Ministry of Justice, the activity of the organization was largely formal due to the tensions in the country with the Karabakh War, as well as the attitude of the government towards Red Army veterans in general. One of the first laws signed by the President Aliyev was the Law "On Veterans" (28 June 1994), which restored the mandate for the RVO.
Geography of Armenia Armenia is a landlocked country in the South Caucasus region of the Caucasus. The country is geographically located in West Asia, within the Armenian plateau. Armenia is bordered on the north and east by Georgia and Azerbaijan and on the south and west by Iran, Azerbaijan's exclave Nakhchivan, and Turkey. The terrain is mostly mountainous, with fast flowing rivers and few forests. The climate is highland continental: hot summers and cold winters. The land rises to above sea-level at Mount Aragats. Physical environment. Armenia is located in the southern Caucasus, the region southwest of Russia between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Modern Armenia occupies part of historical Armenia, whose ancient centers were in the valley of the Araks River and the region around Lake Van in Turkey. Armenia is bordered on the north by Georgia, on the east by Azerbaijan, on the south by Iran, and on the west by Turkey. In Armenia forest cover is around 12% of the total land area, equivalent to 328,470 hectares (ha) of forest in 2020, down from 334,730 hectares (ha) in 1990. In 2020, naturally regenerating forest covered 310,000 hectares (ha) and planted forest covered 18,470 hectares (ha). Of the naturally regenerating forest 5% was reported to be primary forest (consisting of native tree species with no clearly visible indications of human activity) and around 0% of the forest area was found within protected areas. For the year 2015, 100% of the forest area was reported to be under public ownership.
Topography and drainage. Twenty-five million years ago, a geological upheaval pushed up the Earth's crust to form the Armenian Plateau, creating the complex topography of modern Armenia. The Lesser Caucasus range extends through northern Armenia, runs southeast between Lake Sevan and Azerbaijan, then passes roughly along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border to Iran. Thus situated, the mountains make travel from north to south difficult. Geological turmoil continues in the form of devastating earthquakes, which have plagued Armenia. In December 1988, the second largest city in the republic, Leninakan (now Gyumri), was heavily damaged by a massive quake that killed more than 25,000 people. About half of Armenia's area of approximately has an elevation of at least , and only 3% of the country lies below . The lowest points are in the valleys of the Araks River and the Debed River in the far north, which have elevations of , respectively. Elevations in the Lesser Caucasus vary between . To the southwest of the range is the Armenian Plateau, which slopes southwestward toward the Araks River on the Turkish border. The plateau is masked by intermediate mountain ranges and extinct volcanoes. The largest of these, Mount Aragats, high, is also the highest point in Armenia. Most of the population lives in the western and northwestern parts of the country, where the two major cities, Yerevan and Gyumri, are located.
The valleys of the Debed and Akstafa rivers form the chief routes into Armenia from the north as they pass through the mountains. Lake Sevan, across at its widest point and long, is by far the largest lake. It lies above sea level on the plateau and is large. Other main lakes are: Arpi, , Sev, , Akna . Terrain is most rugged in the extreme southeast, which is drained by the Bargushat River, and most moderate in the Araks River valley to the extreme southwest. Most of Armenia is drained by the Araks or its tributary, the Hrazdan, which flows from Lake Sevan. The Araks forms most of Armenia's border with Turkey and Iran, while the Zangezur Mountains form the border between Armenia's southern province of Syunik and Azerbaijan's adjacent Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Climate. Temperatures in Armenia generally depend upon elevation. Mountain formations block the moderating climatic influences of the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea, creating wide seasonal variations with cold snowy winters, and warm to hot summers. On the Armenian Plateau, the mean midwinter temperature is to , and the mean midsummer temperature is to . Average precipitation ranges from per year in the lower Araks River valley to at the highest altitudes. Despite the harshness of winter in most parts (with frosts reaching and lower in Shirak region), the fertility of the plateau's volcanic soil made Armenia one of the world's earliest sites of agricultural activity.
Area and boundaries. Area:<br>"total:" 29,743 km2 "land:" 28,203 km2<br>"water:" 1,540 km2 Area comparative Land boundaries:<br>"total:" 1,570 km<br>"border countries:" Azerbaijan 566 km, Azerbaijan-Nakhchivan exclave 221 km, Georgia 219 km, Iran 44 km, Turkey 311 km Coastline: 0 km (landlocked) Elevation extremes:<br>"lowest point:" 375m<br>"highest point:" Mount Aragats 4,090 m Extreme points of Armenia:<br>"North:" Tavush ()<br>"South:" Syunik ()<br>"West:" Shirak ()<br>"East:" Syunik () Resources and land use. Natural resources: deposits of gold, copper, molybdenum, zinc, bauxite Armenia has significant deposits of copper, molybdenum and gold, as well as smaller deposits of zinc, lead and silver. Some copper-molybdenum and polymetallic ore deposits are rich in elements such as bismuth, tellurium, selenium, gallium, indium, thallium, rhenium and germanium. Land use: <br>"arable land:4.456 km²," 15.8%<br>"permanent crops:" 1.9%<br>"permanent pastures: 4.2%"<br>"forest (2018): 11.2%"<br>"other:" 31.2% (2011)
Irrigated land: 2.084 km2 (2018) Total renewable water resources: 7.77 m3 (2011) Armenia is considered to be a big water “supplier” in the Caspian basin; as a result, the country lacks water, especially in summer when the rate of evaporation exceeds the amount of precipitation. That is the main reason why since ancient times inhabitants have built water reservoirs and irrigation canals in the area. Lake Sevan contains the largest amount of water in the country. Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural):<br>"total:" 2.86 km3/yr (40%/6%/54%)<br>"per capita:" 929.7 m3/yr (2010)
Demographics of Armenia After registering steady increases during the Soviet period, the population of Armenia declined from its peak value of 3.633 million in 1992 to 3.075 million in 2025. Whilst the country's population increased steadily during the Soviet Union as a result of periods of repatriation and low emigration rates, it has declined in recent times due to the exodus of peoples following the Soviet break-up. The rates of emigration and population decline, however, have decreased in recent years, and there has been a moderate influx of Armenians returning to Armenia. Historical statistics. Citing Armenia's conquest and occupation by the Seljuks (11th century) and Mongols (13th–15th centuries), historians Edmund Herzig and Marina Kurkchiyan write "the combination of progressive Turkish (and Kurdish) immigration and Armenian decline, through massacre, famine and emigration, changed the demographic balance in a way that Arab immigration had never done". As a result of "deliberate relocation policies employed by both the Ottomans and Safavids" during the Ottoman–Safavid War, there was a large-scale displacement of Armenians; Armenians also emigrated "to escape the insecurity and hardship of life in war-torn Armenia". Whilst Shah Abbas I relocated Armenians to Isfahan and "Armenian colonies in other parts of Iran" in 1604–1605, "the Ottomans also removed Armenian artisans to their capital".
Following the Russian annexation, 45,000 Armenians from Persia and 100,000 from the Ottoman Empire migrated to Eastern Armenia, with another 25,000 migrating following the 1878 Russo-Turkish war. As a result of the repatriation, Armenians had regained a majority in their homeland "for the first time in several hundred years". As a result of persecution and massacres in the Ottoman Empire, some 100,000 Armenians immigrated to Eastern Armenia between 1870 and 1910. The areas with Armenian-majorities would later "form the nucleus in the twentieth century of an independent Armenian state". Historian Sen Hovhannisian writes that during the 80 years of peace during which Eastern Armenia was part of Russia, there was "unprecedented" population growth: it tripled from 161,700 to 496,100 between 1831 and 1873, and doubled in the following forty years until it reached 1,000,100 in 1913. The population between 1831 and 1913 increased 6.18 times, yielding an average annual growth rate of 10,200 people. Following the outbreak of World War I, the population, which was 1,014,300 in 1914, fell by 20,500 in 1916 due to the Christian population being drafted. As a result of "wars and civil clashes, hunger and diseases" of 1918–1920, 432,000 people (35.8 percent of the population) were "exterminated".
Upon its sovietisation, the territory of modern-day Armenia had a population of some 720,000, a decline of nearly 30 percent—"almost half" consisted of refugees. American historian Richard Pipes states that "according to Soviet estimates, the Armenian population of Transcaucasia declined between 1914 and 1920 by one half million: 200,000 in consequence of Turkish, and, presumably, Communist, massacres, and 300,000 from other causes, mostly famine and disease". The drastic decline of the population was addressed by the Soviet Armenian government by repatriating displaced Azerbaijanis to districts where they had formed a significant population in Armenia. The Azerbaijani population of Armenia which numbered some 10,000 in 1920 (attributed to the ARF government's expulsion of at least 200,000 Turks and Kurds) rose to 72,596 in 1922 as a result of the return of 60,000 refugees. In addition to this, the Soviet government welcomed 44,000 Armenian refugees from Greece, Iraq, Turkey, and elsewhere throughout the 1920s and 1930s. In 1946–1948, 86,000 Armenians were repatriated to Soviet Armenia to offset the country's wartime losses. At the same time, by agreement of Armenian and Azerbaijani Soviet leaderships, tens of thousands of Azerbaijanis in Armenia were resettled to Azerbaijan to make room for the repatriates.
Population size and structure. According to the 2018 HDI statistical update (with data for 2017), compared to all its neighbouring countries Armenia has: Since 1990, Armenia recorded steady growth of average annual HDI scores in every reported period (1990–2000, 2000–2010, 2010–2017). According to the 2016 Sustainable Society Index, Armenia has a higher rank of Human Wellbeing than all its neighbours. At the same time its Economic Wellbeing rank is below neighbouring countries. The 2011 census counted 539,394 persons (19.4 percent of the population above 6 years of age) with higher professional education. Structure of the population. The median age in 2020 was 36.6 years (male: 35.1, female: 38.3). 36.3 percent of women who gave birth in 2016 had higher education. Population by Sex and Age Group (Census 12.10.2011): Population Estimates by Sex and Age Group (01.VII.2019): In 2016, households with up to four members prevailed in urban areas throughout Armenia, with the share of such households coming to 70.2 percent in urban communities compared to 60.1 percent in rural communities.
Vital statistics. Life expectancy. According to the 2018 HDI statistical update, compared to all its neighbouring countries Armenia has the highest health expenditures as percentage of its GDP and the highest healthy life expectancy at birth. In 2016, the average life expectancy at birth for males was 71.6 years and for females was 78.3 years, with the average at 75.0 years. After a setback during 1986–1996, mostly due to the Spitak earthquake, and the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia regained its position and was consistently among the top three former Soviet republics during 1997–2016, topping the list in 2007. During the Soviet period, life expectancy was traditionally high in Armenia and topped all other republics of the USSR, and most other countries in Eastern Europe between 1978 and 1980. Source: UN Reproduction indicators. In 2016, natural increase of population comprised 12,366 persons and the crude rate of natural increase reached 4.1%, per 1000 population, decreasing by 0.4 percent compared to the previous year.
After double-digit crude natural increase rates between 1982 and 1992, rates did not exceed 5.5 after 1998. At a regional level, slightly better rates were recorded in the capital Yerevan, where the value of 5.5 is consistently being surpassed since 2009. Particularly weak is natural increase in Tavush and Syunik provinces, not much better off are Lori and Vayots Dzor provinces. Fertility Rate (TFR) (Wanted Fertility Rate) and CBR (Crude Birth Rate): Armenia's Total Fertility Rate at 1.6 was lowest in the Caucasus region in 2017. TFR is expected to stay at 1.6 between 2015 and 2020, less from 1.7 in years 2010–2015. The mean age of mothers at birth was 26.8 years and at first birth it was 24.7 years in 2016. Adolescent birth rate, as well as, share of women married aged 18 was lowest in Armenia compared to its neighbouring countries. In 2016, infant mortality rate (in the first year of their life) was 8.6%, per 1,000 live births. A study revealed that population growth rate "changes" were more favourable in Armenia than in its surrounding countries between 2005 and 2015.
Since the 1960s, Armenia has the highest share of urban population among South Caucasus countries. Vital statistics summary data. 1 The numbers of life births and deaths until 1959 were calculated from the birth rate and death rate, respectively 2 The high number of deaths in 1988 is related to the Spitak earthquake, while in the rest of the 20th century the death rate was equal to the rate of other European countries (excluding England). 3 The population estimate for 2012 has been recalculated on the basis of the 2011 Census. 2024: https://armstat.am/file/article/population_01_07_24.pdf Ethnic groups. In 2002, ethnic minorities included Russians, Assyrians, Ukrainians, Yazidis, Kurds, Iranians, Greeks, Georgians, and Belarusians. There were also smaller communities of Vlachs, Mordvins, Ossetians, Udis, and Tats. Minorities of Poles and Caucasus Germans also exist, though they are heavily Russified. Languages. Armenian is the sole official language. As per 2022 census data, Armenian is the most widely spoken language at 99%, Kurdish at 1%, Russian at 65% and English at 5%.
Armenia is a member of La Francophonie, and hosted its annual summit in 2018. The largest communities of the Armenian diaspora, are fluent in Russian and English. Religions. Most Armenians are Christians, primarily of the Apostolic Church rite. Armenia is considered the first nation to officially adopt Christianity, which was first preached in Armenia by two Apostles of Jesus, St. Bartholomew and St. Thaddeus in the 1st century. The Armenian Apostolic Church can trace its roots back to the 3rd and 4th centuries. The country formally adopted the Christian faith in 301 A.D. Over 90 percent of Armenians belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church. Armenia also has a population of Catholics and Evangelical Protestants. According to the 2022 Armenian census, number of adherents of primary religions in Armenia are the following: 2,793,042 (95.2%) Armenian Apostolic, 15,836 (0.5%) Evangelical, 14,349 (0.5%) Yazidism, 17,884 (0.6%) Armenian and Roman (Latin) Catholic, 6,316 (0.2%) Eastern Orthodox, 5,282 (0.2%) Jehovah's Witness, 2,000 (0.1%) Molokan (non-Orthodox Russians), 524 Assyrian Church of the East (Nestorian), 2,132 Paganism, 515 Islam, 118 Judaism. 17,501 (0.6%) people chose No Religion and 49,353 people chose (1.7%) No Response.
Emigration. Compared to its neighbouring countries, Armenia has the highest share of immigrants (6.5 percent of total population, 2017 data). The estimated number of population net migration is −24.8 thousand persons, according to the Integrated living conditions survey of households of 2016; for urban population −13.8 thousand and for rural population −11.0 thousand persons. 24.9% of households were involved in external and internal migration processes over the period of 2013– 2016. Migration directions were distributed as follows: 12% – internal, 10.5% – Republic of Artsakh, rest (76.4%) – international (of which 89.8% – Russia). Among household members of age 15 and above, who left their permanent residence in 2013–2016 for 3 months and longer and had not returned as of 2016, 11.9% were in Armenia, 13.0% in Artsakh, and 75.1% in other countries, predominantly in Russia. More than 54% of migrant household members of the age 15 years and above sent money and/ or goods to their families/relatives/friends within 12 months preceding the survey.
According to 2019 UN data, the emigration rate averaged annually around 1.7 per 1000 inhabitants in years 2015–2020 and is expected to remain the same until year 2045. These are below average emigration rate of 11.5 per 1000 in years 2000–2010 and even below the emigration rate of 3.2 per 1000 in years 1980–1985. Migration during post-Soviet period. It is estimated that 740,000-1,300,000 people left Armenia between 1988 and 2005. Economically recessed situation in Armenia during the 1990s enhanced the emigration of 125,000 refugees and displaced persons. Human and natural disasters also caused approximately 192,000 individuals to become internally displaced persons in Armenia. Among the disasters, the major impact was the 1988 Spitak earthquake. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, borders that were once formal, now assumed real significance. Nonetheless, increased political, inter-ethnic, and social tensions prompted more and more people to migrate between Armenia and its neighbouring countries. As a result, approximately 100,000 persons or 3 percent of the country's population emigrated during the beginning of 1990s.
Refugees and forcibly displaced persons started arriving to Armenia in spring 1988 and continued coming until late 1991. During this time, Armenia gave shelter to approximately 419,000 refugees and displaced persons, 360,000 of whom migrated from Azerbaijan. The rest immigrated from other regions of the former Soviet Union. Migration flows during the post-soviet period can be divided into 3 stages: According to government records, over 55 per cent of all emigrants are unmarried and 60 per cent are males between the ages of 20 and 44 (very few are children and even fewer are elderly people). Most have an educational level far higher than the national average and have no intention of returning to Armenia. Although no hard data exists, emigrant families appear to be even less likely to return. The emigration of the major part of the Armenian population has brought about important changes. For example, a decrease in the number of people of reproductive age in Armenia has led to a progressive drop in marriages and birth rates. There has also been a considerable change in the ethnic composition of the population in Armenia due to a higher rate of emigration among ethnic minorities.
Wealth and poverty. Inequality. Out of 41 emerging economies, Armenia was among only four, which recorded rising inequality (measured by Gini coefficient) in years 2007–2015. Wealth. According to Global Wealth Report, prepared by Credit Suisse, mean wealth per adult in Armenia in 2019 is estimated at $19,517 (rising 9 times from estimated $2,177 in year 2000). Mean wealth per adult in Armenia surpasses corresponding values for neighboring countries Georgia and Azerbaijan by over 50%, all CIS countries except Russia and Kazakhstan, and neighboring Iran. Growth rate of mean wealth per adult between 2000 and 2019 with the value of 9 times beats all neighboring countries, most of CIS countries as well as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Median wealth per adult is reported at $8,309 in 2019, above the world average, rising 9.6 times from $862 in year 2000. Between 2000 and 2019, average debts per adult grew 28.7 times to $1,261, or 6.5% of wealth per adult (below the 11.9% world average). 55% of adults own less than $10,000, 42.7% — $10,000–$100,000, 2.2% — $100,000–$1 million and 0.1% — over $1 million. The share of adults owning less than $10,000 with the value of 55% is less than corresponding value in each of CIS countries, neighboring Iran and Turkey, as well as the world average. Gini coefficient for wealth is reported at 66.3%, less than 82.4% the European average and 88.5% the world average.
Poverty. As much as 53.5% of the country's population was officially considered poor in 2004. Poverty fell significantly in the following years amid double-digit economic growth that came to an end with the onset of the global financial crisis in late 2008. It soared to almost 36% in 2010, one year after Armenia's Gross Domestic Product shrunk by over 14%. Afterwards, there was a decreasing trend throughout the last years reaching 23.5% in 2018, down from 25.7% in 2017. The poverty indicators in Shirak, Lori, Kotayk, Tavush and Armavir provinces are higher than the country average. The highest poverty rate in the country has been recorded in Shirak province, where 46% of the population is below the poverty line. To overcome poverty, Armenia would need AMD 63.2 billion, or an amount equal to 1.2% of GDP, in addition to the resources already allocated for social assistance, assuming that such assistance would be efficiently targeted to the poor. In terms of the international poverty line corresponding to US$1.25 in 2005 PPP, poverty in Armenia went down from 19.3% in the year 2001 to 1.5% in the year 2008 and remained nearly unchanged until the year 2015 moving in the range of 1.5% – 2.7%.
Politics of Armenia The politics of Armenia take place in the framework of the parliamentary representative democratic republic of Armenia, whereby the president of Armenia is the head of state and the prime minister of Armenia the head of government, and of a multi-party system. Executive power is exercised by the president and the Government. Legislative power is vested in both the Government and Parliament. History. Armenia became independent from the Russian Empire on 28 May 1918 as the "Republic of Armenia", later referred as First Republic of Armenia. About a month before its independence Armenia was part of short lived Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic. Suffering heavy losses during the Turkish invasion of Armenia and after the Soviet invasion of Armenia, the government of the First Republic resigned on 2 December 1920. Soviet Russia reinstalled its control over the country, which later became part of the Transcaucasian SFSR. The TSFSR was dissolved in 1936 and Armenia became a constituent republic of the Soviet Union known as the Armenian SSR, later also referred as the "Second Republic of Armenia".
During the dissolution of the Soviet Union the population of Armenia voted overwhelmingly for independence following the 1991 Armenian independence referendum. It was followed by a presidential election in October 1991 that gave 83% of the votes to Levon Ter-Petrosyan. Earlier in 1990, when the National Democratic Union party defeated the Armenian Communist Party, he was elected Chairman of the Supreme Council of Armenia. Ter-Petrosyan was re-elected in 1996. Following public discontent and demonstrations against his policies on Nagorno-Karabakh, the President resigned in January 1998 and was replaced by Prime Minister Robert Kocharyan, who was elected as second President in March 1998. Following the assassination of Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan, parliament Speaker Karen Demirchyan and six other officials during parliament seating on 27 October 1999, a period of political instability ensued during which an opposition headed by elements of the former Armenian National Movement government attempted unsuccessfully to force Kocharyan to resign. In May 2000, Andranik Margaryan replaced Aram Sargsyan (a brother of assassinated Vazgen Sargsyan) as Prime Minister.
Kocharyan's re-election as president in 2003 was followed by widespread allegations of ballot-rigging. He went on to propose controversial constitutional amendments on the role of parliament. These were rejected in a referendum the following May. Concurrent parliamentary elections left Kocharyan's party in a very powerful position in the parliament. There were mounting calls for the President's resignation in early 2004 with thousands of demonstrators taking to the streets in support of demands for a referendum of confidence in him. The Government of Armenia's stated aim is to build a Western-style parliamentary democracy. However, international observers have questioned the fairness of Armenia's parliamentary and presidential elections and constitutional referendum between 1995 and 2018, citing polling deficiencies, lack of cooperation by the Electoral Commission, and poor maintenance of electoral lists and polling places. Armenia is considered one of the most democratic nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the most democratic in the Caucasus region.
The observance of human rights in Armenia is uneven and is marked by shortcomings. Police brutality allegedly still goes largely unreported, while observers note that defendants are often beaten to extract confessions and are denied visits from relatives and lawyers. Public demonstrations usually take place without government interference, though one rally in November 2000 by an opposition party was followed by the arrest and imprisonment for a month of its organizer. Freedom of religion is not always protected under existing law. Nontraditional churches, especially the Jehovah's Witnesses, have been subjected to harassment, sometimes violently. All churches apart from the Armenian Apostolic Church must register with the government, and proselytizing was forbidden by law, though since 1997 the government has pursued more moderate policies. The government's policy toward conscientious objection is in transition, as part of Armenia's accession to the Council of Europe. Armenia boasts a good record on the protection of national minorities, for whose representatives (Assyrians, Kurds, Russians and Yazidis) four seats are reserved in the National Assembly. The government does not restrict internal or international travel.
Transition to a parliamentary republic. In December 2015, the country held a referendum which approved transformation of Armenia from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary republic. As a result, the president was stripped of his veto faculty and the presidency was downgraded to a figurehead position elected by parliament every seven years. The president is not allowed to be a member of any political party and re-election is forbidden. Skeptics saw the constitutional reform as an attempt of third president Serzh Sargsyan to remain in control by becoming Prime Minister after fulfilling his second presidential term in 2018. In March 2018, the Armenian parliament elected Armen Sarkissian as the new President of Armenia. The controversial constitutional reform to reduce presidential power was implemented, while the authority of the prime minister was strengthened. In May 2018, parliament elected opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan as the new prime minister. His predecessor Serzh Sargsyan resigned two weeks earlier following widespread anti-government demonstrations.
In June 2021, early parliamentary elections were held. Nikol Pashinyan's Civil Contract party won 71 seats, while 29 went to the Armenia Alliance headed by former President Robert Kocharyan. The I Have Honor Alliance, which formed around another former president, Serzh Sargsyan, won seven seats. After the election, Armenia's acting Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was officially appointed to the post of prime minister by the country's president Armen Sarkissian. In January 2022, Armenian President Armen Sarkissian resigned from office, stating that the constitution does no longer give the president sufficient powers or influence. On 3 March 2022, Vahagn Khachaturyan was elected as the fifth president of Armenia in the second round of parliamentary vote. Legislative branch. The unicameral National Assembly of Armenia ("Azgayin Zhoghov") is the legislative branch of the government of Armenia. Before the 2015 Armenian constitutional referendum, it was initially made of 131 members, elected for five-year terms: 41 members in single-seat constituencies and 90 by proportional representation. The proportional-representation seats in the National Assembly are assigned on a party-list basis among those parties that receive at least 5% of the total of the number of the votes.
Following the 2015 referendum, the number of MPs was reduced from the original 131 members to 101 and single-seat constituencies were removed. Political parties and elections. As of January 2025, there are 123 political parties registered in Armenia. The electoral threshold is currently set at 5% for single parties and 7% for blocs. Independent agencies. Independent of three traditional branches are the following independent agencies, each with separate powers and responsibilities: Corruption. Transparency International's 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Armenia 60th out of 180 in the world with 47 points. This has pushed the country up from being ranked at 60th in 2020 and 58th in 2021. According to Transparency International, Armenia has improved significantly on the Corruption Perception Index since 2012, especially since the 2018 revolution, the country has taken steps to counter corruption. Further mentioning that "Armenia has taken a gradual approach to reform, resulting in steady and positive improvements in anti-corruption. However, safeguarding judicial independence and ensuring checks and balances remain critical first steps in its anti-corruption efforts. The effectiveness of those efforts is additionally challenged by the current political and economic crisis as a result of the recent Nagorno Karabakh conflict and the subsequent protests against Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan over a ceasefire deal". In 2008, Transparency International reduced its Corruption Perceptions Index for Armenia from 3.0 in 2007 to 2.9 out of 10 (a lower score means more perceived corruption); Armenia slipped from 99th place in 2007 to 109th out of 180 countries surveyed (on a par with Argentina, Belize, Moldova, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu).
Economy of Armenia The economy of Armenia grew by 12.6% in 2022, according to the country's Statistical Committee and the International Monetary Fund. Total output amounted to 8.5 trillion Armenian drams, or $19.5 billion. At the same time, Armenia's foreign trade turnover significantly accelerated in growth from 17.7% in 2021 to 68.6% in 2022. GDP contracted sharply in 2020 by 7.2%, mainly due to the COVID-19 recession and the war against Azerbaijan. In contrast it grew by 7.6 per cent in 2019, the largest recorded growth since 2007, while between 2012 and 2018 GDP grew 40.7%, and key banking indicators like assets and credit exposures almost doubled. While part of the Soviet Union, the economy of Armenia was based largely on manufacturing industry—chemicals, electronic products, machinery, processed food, synthetic rubber and textiles; it was highly dependent on outside resources. Armenian mines produce copper, zinc, gold and lead. The vast majority of energy is produced with imported fuel from Russia, including gas and nuclear fuel for Armenia's Metsamor nuclear power plant. The main domestic energy source is hydroelectric. Small amounts of coal, gas and petroleum have not yet been developed.
The severe trade imbalance has been somewhat offset by international aid and remittances from Armenians abroad, and foreign direct investment. Armenia is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union and ties with Russia remain close, especially in the energy sector. Overview. Under the old Soviet central planning system, Armenia had developed a modern industrial sector, supplying machine tools, textiles, and other manufactured goods to sister republics in exchange for raw materials and energy. Since the implosion of the USSR in December 1991, Armenia has switched to small-scale agriculture away from the large agroindustrial complexes of the Soviet era. The agricultural sector has long-term needs for more investment and updated technology. Armenia began borrowing soon after declaring independence. In 2000, Armenian governmental debt reached its greatest level relative to GDP (49.3 percent of GDP). Armenia is a food importer, and its mineral deposits (gold and bauxite) are small. The ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan over the ethnic Armenian-dominated region of Nagorno-Karabakh and the breakup of the centrally directed economic system of the former Soviet Union contributed to a severe economic decline in the early 1990s. Political instability and the threat of war placed a significant strain on economic development. Despite robust growth in recent years, the problem of geopolitical uncertainty resurfaced during the 2020 war, contributing to a 7.2% drop in GDP. Armenia's public debt rose to 67.4% in 2020, but fell below 50% again in 2022.
Global competitiveness. In the 2020 report of Index of Economic Freedom by The Heritage Foundation, Armenia is classified as "mostly free" and ranks 34th, improving by 13 positions and ahead of all other Eurasian Economic Union countries and several EU countries including Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Belgium, Spain, France, Portugal and Italy. In the 2019 report (data for 2017) of Economic Freedom of the World published by Fraser Institute Armenia ranks 27th (classified most free) out of 162 economies. In the 2019 report of Global Competitiveness Index Armenia ranks 69th out of 141 economies. In the 2020 report (data for 2019) of Doing Business Index Armenia ranks 47th with 10th rank on "starting business" sub-index. In the 2019 report (data for 2018) of Human Development Index by UNDP Armenia ranked 81st and is classified into "high human development" group. In the 2021 report (data for 2020) of Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International Armenia ranked 49 of 179 countries. History of the modern Armenian economy.
At the beginning of the 20th century, the territory of present-day Armenia was an agricultural region with some copper mining and cognac production. From 1914 through 1921, Caucasian Armenia suffered from the genocide of about 1.5 million Armenian inhabitants in their own homeland which caused total property and financial collapse when all of their assets and belongings were forcibly taken away by the Turks, the consequences of which after 105 years to this day remain incalculable, revolution, the influx of refugees from Turkish Armenia, disease, hunger and economic misery. About 200,000 people died in 1919 alone. At that point, only American relief efforts saved Armenia from total collapse. Thus, Armenians went from being one of the wealthiest ethnic groups in the region to suffering from poverty and famine. Armenians were the second richest ethnic group in Anatolia after the Greeks, and they were heavily involved in very high productive sectors such as banking, architecture, and trade. However, after the mass killings of Armenian intellectuals in April 1915 and the genocide targeted towards the whole Armenian population left the people and the country in ruins. The genocide was responsible for the loss of many high-quality skills that the Armenians possessed.
The first Soviet Armenian government regulated economic activity stringently, nationalizing all economic enterprises, requisitioning grain from peasants, and suppressing most private market activity. This first experiment of state control ended with the advent of Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1921–1927. This policy continued state control of the large enterprises and banks, but peasants could market much of their grain, and small businesses could function. In Armenia, the NEP years brought partial recovery from the economic disaster of the post-World War I period. By 1926 agricultural production in Armenia had reached nearly three-quarters of its prewar level. By the end of the 1920s, Stalin's regime had revoked the NEP and re-established the centralised state monopoly on all economic activity. Once this occurred, the main goal of the Soviet economic policy in Armenia was to turn a predominantly agrarian and rural republic into an industrial and urban one. Among other restrictions, peasants now were forced to sell nearly all of their output to state procurement agencies rather than at the open market. From the 1930s through the 1960s, an industrial infrastructure has been constructed. Besides hydroelectric plants and canals, roads were built and gas pipelines were laid to bring fuel and food from Azerbaijan and Russia.
The state socialist command economy, in which market forces were suppressed and all orders for production and distribution came from the state authorities, survived in all its essential features until the fall of the Soviet regime in 1991. In the early stages of the communist economic revolution, Armenia underwent a fundamental transformation into a "proletarian" society. Between 1929 and 1939, the percentage of Armenia's work force categorised as industrial workers grew from 13% to 31%. By 1935 industry supplied 62% of Armenia's economic production. Highly integrated and sheltered within artificial barter economy of the Soviet system from the 1930s until the end of the communist era, the Armenian economy showed few signs of self-sufficiency at any time during that period. In 1988, Armenia produced only 0.9% of the net material product of the Soviet Union (1.2% of industry, 0.7% of agriculture). The republic retained 1.4% of total state budget revenue, delivered 63.7% of its NMP to other republics, and exported only 1.4% of what it produced to markets outside the Soviet Union.
Agriculture accounted for only 20% of net material product and 10% of employment before the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Armenia's industry was especially dependent on the Soviet military-industrial complex. About 40% of all enterprises in the republic were devoted to defense, and some factories lost 60% to 80% of their business in the last years of the Soviet Union, when massive cuts were made in the national defense expenditures. As the republic's economy faced the prospects of competing in world markets in the mid-1990s, the great liabilities of Armenia's industry were its outdated equipment and infrastructure and the pollution emitted by many of the country's heavy industrial plants. The economic downturn that began in 1989 worsened dramatically in 1992. According to statistics, the GDP declined by 37.5 percent in 1991 compared to 1990, and all sectors contributing to the GDP decreased in production. The collapse of industry in favor of agriculture, whose products were mostly imported throughout the Soviet period, changed the structure of sectoral contributions to GDP.
In 1991, Armenia's last year as a Soviet republic, national income fell 12% from the previous year, while per capita gross national product was 4,920 rubles, only 68% of the Soviet average. In large part due to the earthquake of 1988, the Azerbaijani blockade that began in 1989 and the collapse of the international trading system of the Soviet Union, the Armenian economy of the early 1990s remained far below its 1980 production levels. In the first years of independence (1992–93), inflation was extremely high, productivity and national income dropped dramatically, and the national budget ran large deficits. A period of chronic shortages, was the first stage of price deregulation, which allowed goods to stay in Armenia as opposed to being exported for better prices; the inflation rates were 10 percent in 1990, 100 percent in 1991, and 642.5 percent during the first four months of 1992, compared with the first four months of 1991. Thus, there were two opposing dynamics: price increases in response to shortages and falling incomes due to the recession and unemployment.
Post-communist economic reforms. Armenia introduced elements of the free market and privatisation into their economic system in the late 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev began advocating economic reform. To supply the country's basic needs, the first decision was land reform and the privatization of land. This allowed for the emergence of small-parcel agriculture supplying markets and supporting self-sustenance during the period of shortages. Cooperatives were set up in the service sector, particularly in restaurants, although substantial resistance came from the Communist Party of Armenia (CPA) and other groups that had enjoyed privileged position in the old economy. In the late 1980s, much of Armenia's economy already was opening either semi-officially or illegally, with widespread corruption and bribery. The so-called mafia, made up of interconnected groups of powerful officials and their relatives and friends, sabotaged the efforts of reformers to create a lawful market system. When the December 1988 earthquake brought millions of dollars of foreign aid to the devastated regions of Armenia, much of the money went to corrupt and criminal elements.
Beginning in 1991, the democratically elected government pushed vigorously for privatisation and market relations, although its efforts were frustrated by the old ways of doing business in Armenia, the Azerbaijani blockade, and the costs of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. In 1992, the Law on the Programme of Privatisation and Decentralisation of Incompletely Constructed Facilities established a state privatisation committee, with members from all political parties. In the middle of 1993, the committee announced a two-year privatisation programme, whose first stage would be privatisation of 30% of state enterprises, mostly services and light industries. The remaining 70%, including many bankrupt, nonfunctional enterprises, were to be privatised in a later stage with a minimum of government restriction, to encourage private initiative. For all enterprises, the workers would receive 20% of their firm's property free of charge; 30% would be distributed to all citizens by means of vouchers; and the remaining 50% was to be distributed by the government, with preference given to members of the labour organisations. A major problem of this system, however, was the lack of supporting legislation covering foreign investment protection, bankruptcy, monopoly policy, and consumer protection.
In the first post-communist years, efforts to interest foreign investors in joint enterprises were only moderately successful because of the blockade and the energy shortage. Only in late 1993 was a department of foreign investment established in the Ministry of Economy, to spread information about Armenia's investment opportunities and improve the legal infrastructure for investment activity. A specific goal of this agency was creating a market for scientific and technical intellectual property. A few Armenians living abroad made large-scale investments. Besides a toy factory and construction projects, diaspora Armenians built a cold storage plant (which in its first years had little produce to store) and established the American University of Armenia in Yerevan to teach the techniques necessary to run a market economy. Armenia was admitted to the International Monetary Fund in May 1992 and to the World Bank in September. A year later, the government complained that those organisations were holding back financial assistance and announced its intention to move toward fuller price liberalisation, and the removal of all tariffs, quotas, and restrictions of foreign trade. Although privatisation had slowed because of catastrophic collapse of the economy, Prime Minister Hrant Bagratyan informed the United States officials in the fall of 1993 that plans had been made to embark on a renewed privatisation programme by the end of the year.
Like other former states, Armenia's economy suffers from the legacy of a centrally planned economy and the breakdown of former Soviet trading patterns. Soviet investment in and support of Armenian industry has virtually disappeared, so that few major enterprises are still able to function. In addition, the effects of the 1988 earthquake, which killed more than 25,000 people and made 500,000 homeless, are still being felt. Although a cease-fire has held since 1994, the conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh has not been resolved. The consequent blockade along both the Azerbaijani and Turkish borders has devastated the economy, because of Armenia's dependence on outside supplies of energy and most raw materials. Land routes through Azerbaijan and Turkey are closed; routes through Georgia and Iran are adequate and reliable. In 1992–93, the GDP had fallen nearly 60% from its 1989 level. The national currency, the dram, suffered hyperinflation for the first few years after its introduction in 1993. Armenia has registered strong economic growth since 1995 and inflation has been negligible for the past several years. New sectors, such as precious stone processing and jewelry making and communication technology (primarily Armentel, which is left from the USSR era and is owned by external investors). This steady economic progress has earned Armenia increasing support from international institutions. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, EBRD, as well as other international financial institutions (IFIs) and foreign countries are extending considerable grants and loans. Total loans extended to Armenia since 1993 exceed $800 million. These loans are targeted at reducing the budget deficit, stabilizing the local currency; developing private businesses; energy; the agriculture, food processing, transportation, and health and education sectors; and ongoing rehabilitation work in the earthquake zone.
By 1994, however, the Armenian government had launched an ambitious IMF-sponsored economic liberalization program that resulted in positive growth rates in 1995–2005. The economic growth of Armenia expressed in GDP per capita was one of strongest in the CIS. GDP went from $350 to more than $800 on average between 1995 and 2003. Three principal factors explain this result: the credibility of the macroeconomic policies of stabilization, the correction effect following the depression, and the importance of external transfers, in particular since 2000. Armenia became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in January 2003. Armenia also has managed to slash inflation, stabilize its currency, and privatize most small- and medium-sized enterprises. Armenia's unemployment rate, however, remains high, despite strong economic growth. The chronic energy shortages Armenia suffered in the early and mid-1990s have been offset by the energy supplied by one of its nuclear power plants at Metsamor. Armenia is now a net energy exporter, although it does not have sufficient generating capacity to replace the Metsamor nuclear plant, which is under international pressure to close due to its old design. The European Union had classified the VVER 440 Model V230 light-water-cooled reactors as the "oldest and least reliable" category of all the 66 Soviet reactors built in the former Eastern Bloc. However the IAEA has found that the Metsamor NPP has adequate safety and can function beyond its design lifespan.
The country's electricity distribution system was privatized in 2002. Outperforming GDP growth. According to official preliminary data GDP grew by 7.6 per cent in 2019, largest recording growth since 2008. Nominal GDP per capita was approximately $4,196 in 2018 and is expected to reach $8,283 in 2023, surpassing neighbouring Azerbaijan and Georgia. With 8.3%, Armenia recorded highest degree of GDP growth among Eurasian Economic Union countries in 2018 January–June against the same period of 2017. The economy of Armenia had grown by 7.5% in 2017 and reached a nominal GDP of $11.5 billion per annum, while per capita figure grew by 10.1% and reached $3880. With 7.29% Armenia was second best in GDP per capita growth terms in Europe and Central Asia in 2017. Armenian GDP PPP (measured in current international dollar) grew total of 316% per capita in 2000–2017, sixth-highest worldwide. GDP grew 40.7% between 2012 and 2018, and key banking indicators like assets and credit exposures almost doubled. Regional GDP. This is a list of provinces of Armenia by nominal GDP shown in Armenian dram and US$. Statistics shown are for 2017. 2020 recession.
The Armenian economy performed poorly in 2020, and contracted by 7.2% after years of consecutive growth. The two biggest contributing factors were the COVID-19 recession and the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. In the first half of 2020, the Armenian economy was negatively impacted by the economic restrictions that were implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. These restrictions included a stay-at-home order, an indoor social distancing requirement, and a mask mandate. These restrictions had a negative impact on businesses; according to the World Bank, individual consumption dropped by 9% in the first six months of 2020 due to the stay-at-home order. The economy was further impacted by the war against Azerbaijan later in the year. Main sectors of economy. Agricultural sector. Armenia produced in 2018: In addition to smaller productions of other agricultural products. As of 2010, the agricultural production comprises on average 25 percent of Armenia's GDP. In 2006, the agricultural sector accounted for about 20 percent of Armenia's GDP.
Armenia's agricultural output dropped by 17.9 percent in the period of January–September 2010. This was owing to bad weather, a lack of a government stimulus package, and the continuing effects of decreased agricultural subsidies by the Armenian government (per WTO requirements). In addition, the share of agriculture in Armenia's GDP hovered around 17.9% until 2012 according to the World Bank. Then already in 2013 the share of it was a bit higher comprising 18.43%. Afterwards a declining trend was registered in the period of 2013-2017 reaching to around 14.90% in 2017. By comparing the share of agriculture as a component of GDP with the neighboring countries (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iran) one can notice that the percentage is highest for Armenia. As of 2017 the contribution of agriculture to the GDP for the neighboring countries was 6.88, 5.63, 6.08 and 9.05 respectively. In 2022, the industry with the highest number of companies registered in Armenia is Services with 1,907 companies followed by Wholesale Trade and Manufacturing with 510 and 408 companies respectively.
Mining. In 2017, mining industry output with grew by 14.2% to 172 billion AMD at current prices and run at 3.1% of Armenia's GDP. In 2017, mineral product (without precious metals and stones) exports grew by 46.9% and run at US$692 million, which comprised 30.1% of all exports. Construction sector. Real estate transactions count grew by 36% in September 2019 compared to September 2018. Also, the average market value of one square meter of housing in apartment buildings in Yerevan in September 2019 grew by 10.8% from September 2018. In 2017, construction output increased by 2.2% reaching 416 billion AMD. Armenia experienced a construction boom during the latter part of the 2000s. According to the National Statistical Service, Armenia's booming construction sector generated about 20 percent of Armenia's GDP during the first eight months of 2007. According to a World Bank official, 30 percent of Armenia's economy in 2009 came from the construction sector. However, during the January to September 2010 period, the sector experienced a 5.2 percent year-on-year decrease, which according to the Civilitas Foundation is an indication of the unsustainability of a sector based on an elite market, with few products for the median or low budgets. This decrease comes despite the fact that an important component of the government stimulus package was to support the completion of ongoing construction projects.
Energy. In 2017, electricity generation increased by 6.1% reaching 7.8 billion KWh. Digital economy. The digital economy is a branch of the economy based on digital computing technologies. The digital economy is sometimes referred to as the Internet economy or the web economy. The digital economy is often intertwined with the traditional economy, making it difficult to distinguish between them. Aimed at the sector's development on November 15, 2021, the Silicon Mountains Summit dedicated to introducing intelligent solutions in the economy was held in Yerevan. The main topic of the summit was the prospect of digitalization of the economy in Armenia. The main driving force of this sphere in Armenia is the banks. Digital transformation is a necessity for banks and financial institutions. At the moment, ACBA Bank is the leader․ Industrial sector. In 2017, industrial output increased by 12.6% annually reaching 1661 billion AMD. Industrial output was relatively positive throughout 2010, with year-on-year average growth of 10.9 percent in the period January to September 2010, due largely to the mining sector where higher global demand for commodities led to higher prices. According to the National Statistical Service, during the January–August 2007 period, Armenia's industrial sector was the single largest contributor to the country's GDP, but remained largely stagnant with industrial output increasing only by 1.7 percent per year. In 2005, Armenia's industrial output (including electricity) made up about 30 percent of GDP.

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