type != &key_type_keyring)\\n\\t\\treturn -ENOTDIR;\",\n \"\\tdown_write(&keyring->sem);\",\n \"\\tedit = assoc_array_delete(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t &key->index_key);\\n\\tif (IS_ERR(edit)) {\\n\\t\\tret = PTR_ERR(edit);\\n\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t}\\n\\tret = -ENOENT;\\n\\tif (edit == NULL)\\n\\t\\tgoto error;\",\n \"\\tassoc_array_apply_edit(edit);\\n\\tkey_payload_reserve(keyring, keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);\\n\\tret = 0;\",\n \"error:\\n\\tup_write(&keyring->sem);\\n\\treturn ret;\\n}\\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(key_unlink);\",\n \"/**\\n * keyring_clear - Clear a keyring\\n * @keyring: The keyring to clear.\\n *\\n * Clear the contents of the specified keyring.\\n *\\n * Returns 0 if successful or -ENOTDIR if the keyring isn't a keyring.\\n */\\nint keyring_clear(struct key *keyring)\\n{\\n\\tstruct assoc_array_edit *edit;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tif (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)\\n\\t\\treturn -ENOTDIR;\",\n \"\\tdown_write(&keyring->sem);\",\n \"\\tedit = assoc_array_clear(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops);\\n\\tif (IS_ERR(edit)) {\\n\\t\\tret = PTR_ERR(edit);\\n\\t} else {\\n\\t\\tif (edit)\\n\\t\\t\\tassoc_array_apply_edit(edit);\\n\\t\\tkey_payload_reserve(keyring, 0);\\n\\t\\tret = 0;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tup_write(&keyring->sem);\\n\\treturn ret;\\n}\\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_clear);\",\n \"/*\\n * Dispose of the links from a revoked keyring.\\n *\\n * This is called with the key sem write-locked.\\n */\\nstatic void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring)\\n{\\n\\tstruct assoc_array_edit *edit;\",\n \"\\tedit = assoc_array_clear(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops);\\n\\tif (!IS_ERR(edit)) {\\n\\t\\tif (edit)\\n\\t\\t\\tassoc_array_apply_edit(edit);\\n\\t\\tkey_payload_reserve(keyring, 0);\\n\\t}\\n}\",\n \"static bool keyring_gc_select_iterator(void *object, void *iterator_data)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);\\n\\ttime_t *limit = iterator_data;\",\n \"\\tif (key_is_dead(key, *limit))\\n\\t\\treturn false;\\n\\tkey_get(key);\\n\\treturn true;\\n}\",\n \"static int keyring_gc_check_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)\\n{\\n\\tconst struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);\\n\\ttime_t *limit = iterator_data;\",\n \"\\tkey_check(key);\\n\\treturn key_is_dead(key, *limit);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Garbage collect pointers from a keyring.\\n *\\n * Not called with any locks held. The keyring's key struct will not be\\n * deallocated under us as only our caller may deallocate it.\\n */\\nvoid keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)\\n{\\n\\tint result;\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"%x{%s}\\\", keyring->serial, keyring->description ?: \\\"\\\");\",\n \"\\tif (keyring->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |\\n\\t\\t\\t (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))\\n\\t\\tgoto dont_gc;\",\n \"\\t/* scan the keyring looking for dead keys */\\n\\trcu_read_lock();\\n\\tresult = assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t keyring_gc_check_iterator, &limit);\\n\\trcu_read_unlock();\\n\\tif (result == true)\\n\\t\\tgoto do_gc;\",\n \"dont_gc:\\n\\tkleave(\\\" [no gc]\\\");\\n\\treturn;\",\n \"do_gc:\\n\\tdown_write(&keyring->sem);\\n\\tassoc_array_gc(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops,\\n\\t\\t keyring_gc_select_iterator, &limit);\\n\\tup_write(&keyring->sem);\\n\\tkleave(\\\" [gc]\\\");\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Garbage collect restriction pointers from a keyring.\\n *\\n * Keyring restrictions are associated with a key type, and must be cleaned\\n * up if the key type is unregistered. The restriction is altered to always\\n * reject additional keys so a keyring cannot be opened up by unregistering\\n * a key type.\\n *\\n * Not called with any keyring locks held. The keyring's key struct will not\\n * be deallocated under us as only our caller may deallocate it.\\n *\\n * The caller is required to hold key_types_sem and dead_type->sem. This is\\n * fulfilled by key_gc_keytype() holding the locks on behalf of\\n * key_garbage_collector(), which it invokes on a workqueue.\\n */\\nvoid keyring_restriction_gc(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *dead_type)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key_restriction *keyres;\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"%x{%s}\\\", keyring->serial, keyring->description ?: \\\"\\\");\",\n \"\\t/*\\n\\t * keyring->restrict_link is only assigned at key allocation time\\n\\t * or with the key type locked, so the only values that could be\\n\\t * concurrently assigned to keyring->restrict_link are for key\\n\\t * types other than dead_type. Given this, it's ok to check\\n\\t * the key type before acquiring keyring->sem.\\n\\t */\\n\\tif (!dead_type || !keyring->restrict_link ||\\n\\t keyring->restrict_link->keytype != dead_type) {\\n\\t\\tkleave(\\\" [no restriction gc]\\\");\\n\\t\\treturn;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* Lock the keyring to ensure that a link is not in progress */\\n\\tdown_write(&keyring->sem);\",\n \"\\tkeyres = keyring->restrict_link;\",\n \"\\tkeyres->check = restrict_link_reject;\",\n \"\\tkey_put(keyres->key);\\n\\tkeyres->key = NULL;\\n\\tkeyres->keytype = NULL;\",\n \"\\tup_write(&keyring->sem);\",\n \"\\tkleave(\\\" [restriction gc]\\\");\\n}\"\n]","isConversational":false},"labels":{"kind":"list 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\"security/keys/big_key.c\", \"security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c\", \"security/keys/gc.c\", \"security/keys/key.c\", \"security/keys/keyctl.c\", \"security/keys/keyring.c\", \"security/keys/proc.c\", \"security/keys/process_keys.c\", \"security/keys/request_key.c\", \"security/keys/request_key_auth.c\", \"security/keys/trusted.c\", \"security/keys/user_defined.c\"], \"fixing_code_end_loc\": [380, 228, 283, 858, 155, 1000, 904, 603, 253, 734, 601, 77, 1070, 166], \"fixing_code_start_loc\": [139, 227, 250, 857, 132, 405, 769, 417, 185, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], \"message\": \"The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the \\\"negative\\\" state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.\", \"other\": {\"cve\": {\"cisaActionDue\": null, \"cisaExploitAdd\": null, \"cisaRequiredAction\": null, \"cisaVulnerabilityName\": null, \"configurations\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"4397FA2C-1EE8-4F42-9823-2D85B8C20976\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.4.95\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.4\", \"vulnerable\": true}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"D6690C73-23A3-4475-97D0-8CB96812E2FB\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.9.59\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.5\", \"vulnerable\": true}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"86038BA0-0886-479E-AD71-D78363937D66\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.13.10\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.10\", \"vulnerable\": true}], \"negate\": false, \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": null}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the \\\"negative\\\" state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.\"}, {\"lang\": \"es\", \"value\": \"El subsistema KEYS en el kernel de Linux en versiones anteriores a la 4.13.10 no sincroniza correctamente las acciones de actualizaci\\u00f3n con las de detecci\\u00f3n de una clave en el estado \\\"negative\\\" para evitar una condici\\u00f3n de carrera, lo que permite que los usuarios locales provoquen una denegaci\\u00f3n de servicio (DoS) o, posiblemente, cause otro impacto no especificado mediante llamadas al sistema manipuladas.\"}], \"evaluatorComment\": null, \"id\": \"CVE-2017-15951\", \"lastModified\": \"2023-01-19T15:45:25.270\", \"metrics\": {\"cvssMetricV2\": [{\"acInsufInfo\": false, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"cvssData\": {\"accessComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"accessVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"authentication\": \"NONE\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"baseScore\": 7.2, \"confidentialityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"integrityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"vectorString\": \"AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C\", \"version\": \"2.0\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 3.9, \"impactScore\": 10.0, \"obtainAllPrivilege\": false, \"obtainOtherPrivilege\": false, \"obtainUserPrivilege\": false, \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\", \"userInteractionRequired\": false}], \"cvssMetricV30\": null, \"cvssMetricV31\": [{\"cvssData\": {\"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"baseScore\": 7.8, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"integrityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"LOW\", \"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\", \"version\": \"3.1\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 1.8, \"impactScore\": 5.9, \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\"}]}, \"published\": \"2017-10-28T02:29:00.217\", \"references\": [{\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Issue Tracking\", \"Patch\", \"Third Party Advisory\"], \"url\": \"http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Release Notes\", \"Vendor Advisory\"], \"url\": \"http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/ChangeLog-4.13.10\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Third Party Advisory\", \"VDB Entry\"], \"url\": \"http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101621\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Issue Tracking\", \"Patch\", \"Third Party Advisory\"], \"url\": \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}], \"sourceIdentifier\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"vendorComments\": null, \"vulnStatus\": \"Analyzed\", \"weaknesses\": [{\"description\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CWE-20\"}], \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\"}]}, \"github_commit_url\": \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}, \"type\": \"CWE-20\"}"},"index":{"kind":"number","value":836,"string":"836"}}},{"rowIdx":4992,"cells":{"prompt":{"kind":"string","value":"Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not."},"completions":{"kind":"list like","value":["/* procfs files for key database enumeration\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version\n * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.\n */","#include <linux/module.h>\n#include <linux/init.h>\n#include <linux/sched.h>\n#include <linux/fs.h>\n#include <linux/proc_fs.h>\n#include <linux/seq_file.h>\n#include <asm/errno.h>\n#include \"internal.h\"","static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);\nstatic void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos);\nstatic void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos);\nstatic void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v);\nstatic int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);","static const struct seq_operations proc_keys_ops = {\n\t.start\t= proc_keys_start,\n\t.next\t= proc_keys_next,\n\t.stop\t= proc_keys_stop,\n\t.show\t= proc_keys_show,\n};","static const struct file_operations proc_keys_fops = {\n\t.open\t\t= proc_keys_open,\n\t.read\t\t= seq_read,\n\t.llseek\t\t= seq_lseek,\n\t.release\t= seq_release,\n};","static int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);\nstatic void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos);\nstatic void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos);\nstatic void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v);\nstatic int proc_key_users_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);","static const struct seq_operations proc_key_users_ops = {\n\t.start\t= proc_key_users_start,\n\t.next\t= proc_key_users_next,\n\t.stop\t= proc_key_users_stop,\n\t.show\t= proc_key_users_show,\n};","static const struct file_operations proc_key_users_fops = {\n\t.open\t\t= proc_key_users_open,\n\t.read\t\t= seq_read,\n\t.llseek\t\t= seq_lseek,\n\t.release\t= seq_release,\n};","/*\n * Declare the /proc files.\n */\nstatic int __init key_proc_init(void)\n{\n\tstruct proc_dir_entry *p;","\tp = proc_create(\"keys\", 0, NULL, &proc_keys_fops);\n\tif (!p)\n\t\tpanic(\"Cannot create /proc/keys\\n\");","\tp = proc_create(\"key-users\", 0, NULL, &proc_key_users_fops);\n\tif (!p)\n\t\tpanic(\"Cannot create /proc/key-users\\n\");","\treturn 0;\n}","__initcall(key_proc_init);","/*\n * Implement \"/proc/keys\" to provide a list of the keys on the system that\n * grant View permission to the caller.\n */\nstatic struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct seq_file *p, struct rb_node *n)\n{\n\tstruct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p);","\tn = rb_next(n);\n\twhile (n) {\n\t\tstruct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);\n\t\tif (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, key->user->uid))\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tn = rb_next(n);\n\t}\n\treturn n;\n}","static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\n{\n\treturn seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops);\n}","static struct key *find_ge_key(struct seq_file *p, key_serial_t id)\n{\n\tstruct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p);\n\tstruct rb_node *n = key_serial_tree.rb_node;\n\tstruct key *minkey = NULL;","\twhile (n) {\n\t\tstruct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);\n\t\tif (id < key->serial) {\n\t\t\tif (!minkey || minkey->serial > key->serial)\n\t\t\t\tminkey = key;\n\t\t\tn = n->rb_left;\n\t\t} else if (id > key->serial) {\n\t\t\tn = n->rb_right;\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tminkey = key;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t}\n\t\tkey = NULL;\n\t}","\tif (!minkey)\n\t\treturn NULL;","\tfor (;;) {\n\t\tif (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, minkey->user->uid))\n\t\t\treturn minkey;\n\t\tn = rb_next(&minkey->serial_node);\n\t\tif (!n)\n\t\t\treturn NULL;\n\t\tminkey = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);\n\t}\n}","static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)\n\t__acquires(key_serial_lock)\n{\n\tkey_serial_t pos = *_pos;\n\tstruct key *key;","\tspin_lock(&key_serial_lock);","\tif (*_pos > INT_MAX)\n\t\treturn NULL;\n\tkey = find_ge_key(p, pos);\n\tif (!key)\n\t\treturn NULL;\n\t*_pos = key->serial;\n\treturn &key->serial_node;\n}","static inline key_serial_t key_node_serial(struct rb_node *n)\n{\n\tstruct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);\n\treturn key->serial;\n}","static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)\n{\n\tstruct rb_node *n;","\tn = key_serial_next(p, v);\n\tif (n)\n\t\t*_pos = key_node_serial(n);\n\treturn n;\n}","static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)\n\t__releases(key_serial_lock)\n{\n\tspin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);\n}","static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)\n{\n\tstruct rb_node *_p = v;\n\tstruct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node);\n\tstruct timespec now;\n\tunsigned long timo;\n\tkey_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;\n\tchar xbuf[16];","","\tint rc;","\tstruct keyring_search_context ctx = {\n\t\t.index_key.type\t\t= key->type,\n\t\t.index_key.description\t= key->description,\n\t\t.cred\t\t\t= m->file->f_cred,\n\t\t.match_data.cmp\t\t= lookup_user_key_possessed,\n\t\t.match_data.raw_data\t= key,\n\t\t.match_data.lookup_type\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,\n\t\t.flags\t\t\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK,\n\t};","\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);","\t/* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can\n\t * skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it\n\t */\n\tif (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) {\n\t\tskey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(&ctx);\n\t\tif (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {\n\t\t\tkey_ref_put(skey_ref);\n\t\t\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\n\t\t}\n\t}","\t/* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key */\n\trc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW);\n\tif (rc < 0)\n\t\treturn 0;","\tnow = current_kernel_time();","\trcu_read_lock();","\t/* come up with a suitable timeout value */\n\tif (key->expiry == 0) {\n\t\tmemcpy(xbuf, \"perm\", 5);\n\t} else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {\n\t\tmemcpy(xbuf, \"expd\", 5);\n\t} else {\n\t\ttimo = key->expiry - now.tv_sec;","\t\tif (timo < 60)\n\t\t\tsprintf(xbuf, \"%lus\", timo);\n\t\telse if (timo < 60*60)\n\t\t\tsprintf(xbuf, \"%lum\", timo / 60);\n\t\telse if (timo < 60*60*24)\n\t\t\tsprintf(xbuf, \"%luh\", timo / (60*60));\n\t\telse if (timo < 60*60*24*7)\n\t\t\tsprintf(xbuf, \"%lud\", timo / (60*60*24));\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tsprintf(xbuf, \"%luw\", timo / (60*60*24*7));\n\t}\n","","#define showflag(KEY, LETTER, FLAG) \\\n\t(test_bit(FLAG,\t&(KEY)->flags) ? LETTER : '-')","\tseq_printf(m, \"%08x %c%c%c%c%c%c%c %5d %4s %08x %5d %5d %-9.9s \",\n\t\t key->serial,","\t\t showflag(key, 'I', KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED),","\t\t showflag(key, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED),\n\t\t showflag(key, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD),\n\t\t showflag(key, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA),\n\t\t showflag(key, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT),","\t\t showflag(key, 'N', KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE),","\t\t showflag(key, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED),\n\t\t refcount_read(&key->usage),\n\t\t xbuf,\n\t\t key->perm,\n\t\t from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->uid),\n\t\t from_kgid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->gid),\n\t\t key->type->name);","#undef showflag","\tif (key->type->describe)\n\t\tkey->type->describe(key, m);\n\tseq_putc(m, '\\n');","\trcu_read_unlock();\n\treturn 0;\n}","static struct rb_node *__key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n)\n{\n\twhile (n) {\n\t\tstruct key_user *user = rb_entry(n, struct key_user, node);\n\t\tif (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, user->uid))\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tn = rb_next(n);\n\t}\n\treturn n;\n}","static struct rb_node *key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n)\n{\n\treturn __key_user_next(user_ns, rb_next(n));\n}","static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_root *r)\n{\n\tstruct rb_node *n = rb_first(r);\n\treturn __key_user_next(user_ns, n);\n}","/*\n * Implement \"/proc/key-users\" to provides a list of the key users and their\n * quotas.\n */\nstatic int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\n{\n\treturn seq_open(file, &proc_key_users_ops);\n}","static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)\n\t__acquires(key_user_lock)\n{\n\tstruct rb_node *_p;\n\tloff_t pos = *_pos;","\tspin_lock(&key_user_lock);","\t_p = key_user_first(seq_user_ns(p), &key_user_tree);\n\twhile (pos > 0 && _p) {\n\t\tpos--;\n\t\t_p = key_user_next(seq_user_ns(p), _p);\n\t}","\treturn _p;\n}","static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)\n{\n\t(*_pos)++;\n\treturn key_user_next(seq_user_ns(p), (struct rb_node *)v);\n}","static void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)\n\t__releases(key_user_lock)\n{\n\tspin_unlock(&key_user_lock);\n}","static int proc_key_users_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)\n{\n\tstruct rb_node *_p = v;\n\tstruct key_user *user = rb_entry(_p, struct key_user, node);\n\tunsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?\n\t\tkey_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;\n\tunsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?\n\t\tkey_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;","\tseq_printf(m, \"%5u: %5d %d/%d %d/%d %d/%d\\n\",\n\t\t from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), user->uid),\n\t\t refcount_read(&user->usage),\n\t\t atomic_read(&user->nkeys),\n\t\t atomic_read(&user->nikeys),\n\t\t user->qnkeys,\n\t\t maxkeys,\n\t\t user->qnbytes,\n\t\t maxbytes);","\treturn 0;\n}"],"string":"[\n \"/* procfs files for key database enumeration\\n *\\n * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\\n *\\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\\n * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version\\n * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.\\n */\",\n \"#include <linux/module.h>\\n#include <linux/init.h>\\n#include <linux/sched.h>\\n#include <linux/fs.h>\\n#include <linux/proc_fs.h>\\n#include <linux/seq_file.h>\\n#include <asm/errno.h>\\n#include \\\"internal.h\\\"\",\n \"static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);\\nstatic void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos);\\nstatic void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos);\\nstatic void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v);\\nstatic int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);\",\n \"static const struct seq_operations proc_keys_ops = {\\n\\t.start\\t= proc_keys_start,\\n\\t.next\\t= proc_keys_next,\\n\\t.stop\\t= proc_keys_stop,\\n\\t.show\\t= proc_keys_show,\\n};\",\n \"static const struct file_operations proc_keys_fops = {\\n\\t.open\\t\\t= proc_keys_open,\\n\\t.read\\t\\t= seq_read,\\n\\t.llseek\\t\\t= seq_lseek,\\n\\t.release\\t= seq_release,\\n};\",\n \"static int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);\\nstatic void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos);\\nstatic void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos);\\nstatic void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v);\\nstatic int proc_key_users_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);\",\n \"static const struct seq_operations proc_key_users_ops = {\\n\\t.start\\t= proc_key_users_start,\\n\\t.next\\t= proc_key_users_next,\\n\\t.stop\\t= proc_key_users_stop,\\n\\t.show\\t= proc_key_users_show,\\n};\",\n \"static const struct file_operations proc_key_users_fops = {\\n\\t.open\\t\\t= proc_key_users_open,\\n\\t.read\\t\\t= seq_read,\\n\\t.llseek\\t\\t= seq_lseek,\\n\\t.release\\t= seq_release,\\n};\",\n \"/*\\n * Declare the /proc files.\\n */\\nstatic int __init key_proc_init(void)\\n{\\n\\tstruct proc_dir_entry *p;\",\n \"\\tp = proc_create(\\\"keys\\\", 0, NULL, &proc_keys_fops);\\n\\tif (!p)\\n\\t\\tpanic(\\\"Cannot create /proc/keys\\\\n\\\");\",\n \"\\tp = proc_create(\\\"key-users\\\", 0, NULL, &proc_key_users_fops);\\n\\tif (!p)\\n\\t\\tpanic(\\\"Cannot create /proc/key-users\\\\n\\\");\",\n \"\\treturn 0;\\n}\",\n \"__initcall(key_proc_init);\",\n \"/*\\n * Implement \\\"/proc/keys\\\" to provide a list of the keys on the system that\\n * grant View permission to the caller.\\n */\\nstatic struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct seq_file *p, struct rb_node *n)\\n{\\n\\tstruct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p);\",\n \"\\tn = rb_next(n);\\n\\twhile (n) {\\n\\t\\tstruct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);\\n\\t\\tif (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, key->user->uid))\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\tn = rb_next(n);\\n\\t}\\n\\treturn n;\\n}\",\n \"static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\\n{\\n\\treturn seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops);\\n}\",\n \"static struct key *find_ge_key(struct seq_file *p, key_serial_t id)\\n{\\n\\tstruct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p);\\n\\tstruct rb_node *n = key_serial_tree.rb_node;\\n\\tstruct key *minkey = NULL;\",\n \"\\twhile (n) {\\n\\t\\tstruct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);\\n\\t\\tif (id < key->serial) {\\n\\t\\t\\tif (!minkey || minkey->serial > key->serial)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tminkey = key;\\n\\t\\t\\tn = n->rb_left;\\n\\t\\t} else if (id > key->serial) {\\n\\t\\t\\tn = n->rb_right;\\n\\t\\t} else {\\n\\t\\t\\tminkey = key;\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t\\tkey = NULL;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tif (!minkey)\\n\\t\\treturn NULL;\",\n \"\\tfor (;;) {\\n\\t\\tif (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, minkey->user->uid))\\n\\t\\t\\treturn minkey;\\n\\t\\tn = rb_next(&minkey->serial_node);\\n\\t\\tif (!n)\\n\\t\\t\\treturn NULL;\\n\\t\\tminkey = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);\\n\\t}\\n}\",\n \"static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)\\n\\t__acquires(key_serial_lock)\\n{\\n\\tkey_serial_t pos = *_pos;\\n\\tstruct key *key;\",\n \"\\tspin_lock(&key_serial_lock);\",\n \"\\tif (*_pos > INT_MAX)\\n\\t\\treturn NULL;\\n\\tkey = find_ge_key(p, pos);\\n\\tif (!key)\\n\\t\\treturn NULL;\\n\\t*_pos = key->serial;\\n\\treturn &key->serial_node;\\n}\",\n \"static inline key_serial_t key_node_serial(struct rb_node *n)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);\\n\\treturn key->serial;\\n}\",\n \"static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)\\n{\\n\\tstruct rb_node *n;\",\n \"\\tn = key_serial_next(p, v);\\n\\tif (n)\\n\\t\\t*_pos = key_node_serial(n);\\n\\treturn n;\\n}\",\n \"static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)\\n\\t__releases(key_serial_lock)\\n{\\n\\tspin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);\\n}\",\n \"static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)\\n{\\n\\tstruct rb_node *_p = v;\\n\\tstruct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node);\\n\\tstruct timespec now;\\n\\tunsigned long timo;\\n\\tkey_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;\\n\\tchar xbuf[16];\",\n \"\",\n \"\\tint rc;\",\n \"\\tstruct keyring_search_context ctx = {\\n\\t\\t.index_key.type\\t\\t= key->type,\\n\\t\\t.index_key.description\\t= key->description,\\n\\t\\t.cred\\t\\t\\t= m->file->f_cred,\\n\\t\\t.match_data.cmp\\t\\t= lookup_user_key_possessed,\\n\\t\\t.match_data.raw_data\\t= key,\\n\\t\\t.match_data.lookup_type\\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,\\n\\t\\t.flags\\t\\t\\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK,\\n\\t};\",\n \"\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);\",\n \"\\t/* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can\\n\\t * skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it\\n\\t */\\n\\tif (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) {\\n\\t\\tskey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(&ctx);\\n\\t\\tif (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_ref_put(skey_ref);\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key */\\n\\trc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW);\\n\\tif (rc < 0)\\n\\t\\treturn 0;\",\n \"\\tnow = current_kernel_time();\",\n \"\\trcu_read_lock();\",\n \"\\t/* come up with a suitable timeout value */\\n\\tif (key->expiry == 0) {\\n\\t\\tmemcpy(xbuf, \\\"perm\\\", 5);\\n\\t} else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {\\n\\t\\tmemcpy(xbuf, \\\"expd\\\", 5);\\n\\t} else {\\n\\t\\ttimo = key->expiry - now.tv_sec;\",\n \"\\t\\tif (timo < 60)\\n\\t\\t\\tsprintf(xbuf, \\\"%lus\\\", timo);\\n\\t\\telse if (timo < 60*60)\\n\\t\\t\\tsprintf(xbuf, \\\"%lum\\\", timo / 60);\\n\\t\\telse if (timo < 60*60*24)\\n\\t\\t\\tsprintf(xbuf, \\\"%luh\\\", timo / (60*60));\\n\\t\\telse if (timo < 60*60*24*7)\\n\\t\\t\\tsprintf(xbuf, \\\"%lud\\\", timo / (60*60*24));\\n\\t\\telse\\n\\t\\t\\tsprintf(xbuf, \\\"%luw\\\", timo / (60*60*24*7));\\n\\t}\\n\",\n \"\",\n \"#define showflag(KEY, LETTER, FLAG) \\\\\\n\\t(test_bit(FLAG,\\t&(KEY)->flags) ? LETTER : '-')\",\n \"\\tseq_printf(m, \\\"%08x %c%c%c%c%c%c%c %5d %4s %08x %5d %5d %-9.9s \\\",\\n\\t\\t key->serial,\",\n \"\\t\\t showflag(key, 'I', KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED),\",\n \"\\t\\t showflag(key, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED),\\n\\t\\t showflag(key, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD),\\n\\t\\t showflag(key, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA),\\n\\t\\t showflag(key, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT),\",\n \"\\t\\t showflag(key, 'N', KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE),\",\n \"\\t\\t showflag(key, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED),\\n\\t\\t refcount_read(&key->usage),\\n\\t\\t xbuf,\\n\\t\\t key->perm,\\n\\t\\t from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->uid),\\n\\t\\t from_kgid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->gid),\\n\\t\\t key->type->name);\",\n \"#undef showflag\",\n \"\\tif (key->type->describe)\\n\\t\\tkey->type->describe(key, m);\\n\\tseq_putc(m, '\\\\n');\",\n \"\\trcu_read_unlock();\\n\\treturn 0;\\n}\",\n \"static struct rb_node *__key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n)\\n{\\n\\twhile (n) {\\n\\t\\tstruct key_user *user = rb_entry(n, struct key_user, node);\\n\\t\\tif (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, user->uid))\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\tn = rb_next(n);\\n\\t}\\n\\treturn n;\\n}\",\n \"static struct rb_node *key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n)\\n{\\n\\treturn __key_user_next(user_ns, rb_next(n));\\n}\",\n \"static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_root *r)\\n{\\n\\tstruct rb_node *n = rb_first(r);\\n\\treturn __key_user_next(user_ns, n);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Implement \\\"/proc/key-users\\\" to provides a list of the key users and their\\n * quotas.\\n */\\nstatic int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\\n{\\n\\treturn seq_open(file, &proc_key_users_ops);\\n}\",\n \"static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)\\n\\t__acquires(key_user_lock)\\n{\\n\\tstruct rb_node *_p;\\n\\tloff_t pos = *_pos;\",\n \"\\tspin_lock(&key_user_lock);\",\n \"\\t_p = key_user_first(seq_user_ns(p), &key_user_tree);\\n\\twhile (pos > 0 && _p) {\\n\\t\\tpos--;\\n\\t\\t_p = key_user_next(seq_user_ns(p), _p);\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\treturn _p;\\n}\",\n \"static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)\\n{\\n\\t(*_pos)++;\\n\\treturn key_user_next(seq_user_ns(p), (struct rb_node *)v);\\n}\",\n \"static void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)\\n\\t__releases(key_user_lock)\\n{\\n\\tspin_unlock(&key_user_lock);\\n}\",\n \"static int proc_key_users_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)\\n{\\n\\tstruct rb_node *_p = v;\\n\\tstruct key_user *user = rb_entry(_p, struct key_user, node);\\n\\tunsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?\\n\\t\\tkey_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;\\n\\tunsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?\\n\\t\\tkey_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;\",\n \"\\tseq_printf(m, \\\"%5u: %5d %d/%d %d/%d %d/%d\\\\n\\\",\\n\\t\\t from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), user->uid),\\n\\t\\t refcount_read(&user->usage),\\n\\t\\t atomic_read(&user->nkeys),\\n\\t\\t atomic_read(&user->nikeys),\\n\\t\\t user->qnkeys,\\n\\t\\t maxkeys,\\n\\t\\t user->qnbytes,\\n\\t\\t maxbytes);\",\n \"\\treturn 0;\\n}\"\n]","isConversational":false},"labels":{"kind":"list like","value":[1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1],"string":"[\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 0,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 0,\n 1,\n 1,\n 0,\n 1,\n 0,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1\n]","isConversational":false},"source":{"kind":"string","value":"PreciseBugs"},"other_info":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"buggy_code_end_loc\": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], \"buggy_code_start_loc\": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], \"filenames\": [\"include/linux/key.h\", \"net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c\", \"security/keys/big_key.c\", \"security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c\", \"security/keys/gc.c\", \"security/keys/key.c\", \"security/keys/keyctl.c\", \"security/keys/keyring.c\", \"security/keys/proc.c\", \"security/keys/process_keys.c\", \"security/keys/request_key.c\", \"security/keys/request_key_auth.c\", \"security/keys/trusted.c\", \"security/keys/user_defined.c\"], \"fixing_code_end_loc\": [380, 228, 283, 858, 155, 1000, 904, 603, 253, 734, 601, 77, 1070, 166], \"fixing_code_start_loc\": [139, 227, 250, 857, 132, 405, 769, 417, 185, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], \"message\": \"The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the \\\"negative\\\" state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.\", \"other\": {\"cve\": {\"cisaActionDue\": null, \"cisaExploitAdd\": null, \"cisaRequiredAction\": null, \"cisaVulnerabilityName\": null, \"configurations\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"4397FA2C-1EE8-4F42-9823-2D85B8C20976\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.4.95\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.4\", \"vulnerable\": true}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"D6690C73-23A3-4475-97D0-8CB96812E2FB\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.9.59\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.5\", \"vulnerable\": true}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"86038BA0-0886-479E-AD71-D78363937D66\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.13.10\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.10\", \"vulnerable\": true}], \"negate\": false, \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": null}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the \\\"negative\\\" state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.\"}, {\"lang\": \"es\", \"value\": \"El subsistema KEYS en el kernel de Linux en versiones anteriores a la 4.13.10 no sincroniza correctamente las acciones de actualizaci\\u00f3n con las de detecci\\u00f3n de una clave en el estado \\\"negative\\\" para evitar una condici\\u00f3n de carrera, lo que permite que los usuarios locales provoquen una denegaci\\u00f3n de servicio (DoS) o, posiblemente, cause otro impacto no especificado mediante llamadas al sistema manipuladas.\"}], \"evaluatorComment\": null, \"id\": \"CVE-2017-15951\", \"lastModified\": \"2023-01-19T15:45:25.270\", \"metrics\": {\"cvssMetricV2\": [{\"acInsufInfo\": false, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"cvssData\": {\"accessComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"accessVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"authentication\": \"NONE\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"baseScore\": 7.2, \"confidentialityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"integrityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"vectorString\": \"AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C\", \"version\": \"2.0\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 3.9, \"impactScore\": 10.0, \"obtainAllPrivilege\": false, \"obtainOtherPrivilege\": false, \"obtainUserPrivilege\": false, \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\", \"userInteractionRequired\": false}], \"cvssMetricV30\": null, \"cvssMetricV31\": [{\"cvssData\": {\"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"baseScore\": 7.8, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"integrityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"LOW\", \"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\", \"version\": \"3.1\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 1.8, \"impactScore\": 5.9, \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\"}]}, \"published\": \"2017-10-28T02:29:00.217\", \"references\": [{\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Issue Tracking\", \"Patch\", \"Third Party Advisory\"], \"url\": \"http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Release Notes\", \"Vendor Advisory\"], \"url\": \"http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/ChangeLog-4.13.10\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Third Party Advisory\", \"VDB Entry\"], \"url\": \"http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101621\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Issue Tracking\", \"Patch\", \"Third Party Advisory\"], \"url\": \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}], \"sourceIdentifier\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"vendorComments\": null, \"vulnStatus\": \"Analyzed\", \"weaknesses\": [{\"description\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CWE-20\"}], \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\"}]}, \"github_commit_url\": \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}, \"type\": \"CWE-20\"}"},"index":{"kind":"number","value":836,"string":"836"}}},{"rowIdx":4993,"cells":{"prompt":{"kind":"string","value":"Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not."},"completions":{"kind":"list like","value":["/* procfs files for key database enumeration\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version\n * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.\n */","#include <linux/module.h>\n#include <linux/init.h>\n#include <linux/sched.h>\n#include <linux/fs.h>\n#include <linux/proc_fs.h>\n#include <linux/seq_file.h>\n#include <asm/errno.h>\n#include \"internal.h\"","static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);\nstatic void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos);\nstatic void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos);\nstatic void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v);\nstatic int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);","static const struct seq_operations proc_keys_ops = {\n\t.start\t= proc_keys_start,\n\t.next\t= proc_keys_next,\n\t.stop\t= proc_keys_stop,\n\t.show\t= proc_keys_show,\n};","static const struct file_operations proc_keys_fops = {\n\t.open\t\t= proc_keys_open,\n\t.read\t\t= seq_read,\n\t.llseek\t\t= seq_lseek,\n\t.release\t= seq_release,\n};","static int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);\nstatic void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos);\nstatic void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos);\nstatic void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v);\nstatic int proc_key_users_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);","static const struct seq_operations proc_key_users_ops = {\n\t.start\t= proc_key_users_start,\n\t.next\t= proc_key_users_next,\n\t.stop\t= proc_key_users_stop,\n\t.show\t= proc_key_users_show,\n};","static const struct file_operations proc_key_users_fops = {\n\t.open\t\t= proc_key_users_open,\n\t.read\t\t= seq_read,\n\t.llseek\t\t= seq_lseek,\n\t.release\t= seq_release,\n};","/*\n * Declare the /proc files.\n */\nstatic int __init key_proc_init(void)\n{\n\tstruct proc_dir_entry *p;","\tp = proc_create(\"keys\", 0, NULL, &proc_keys_fops);\n\tif (!p)\n\t\tpanic(\"Cannot create /proc/keys\\n\");","\tp = proc_create(\"key-users\", 0, NULL, &proc_key_users_fops);\n\tif (!p)\n\t\tpanic(\"Cannot create /proc/key-users\\n\");","\treturn 0;\n}","__initcall(key_proc_init);","/*\n * Implement \"/proc/keys\" to provide a list of the keys on the system that\n * grant View permission to the caller.\n */\nstatic struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct seq_file *p, struct rb_node *n)\n{\n\tstruct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p);","\tn = rb_next(n);\n\twhile (n) {\n\t\tstruct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);\n\t\tif (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, key->user->uid))\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tn = rb_next(n);\n\t}\n\treturn n;\n}","static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\n{\n\treturn seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops);\n}","static struct key *find_ge_key(struct seq_file *p, key_serial_t id)\n{\n\tstruct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p);\n\tstruct rb_node *n = key_serial_tree.rb_node;\n\tstruct key *minkey = NULL;","\twhile (n) {\n\t\tstruct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);\n\t\tif (id < key->serial) {\n\t\t\tif (!minkey || minkey->serial > key->serial)\n\t\t\t\tminkey = key;\n\t\t\tn = n->rb_left;\n\t\t} else if (id > key->serial) {\n\t\t\tn = n->rb_right;\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tminkey = key;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t}\n\t\tkey = NULL;\n\t}","\tif (!minkey)\n\t\treturn NULL;","\tfor (;;) {\n\t\tif (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, minkey->user->uid))\n\t\t\treturn minkey;\n\t\tn = rb_next(&minkey->serial_node);\n\t\tif (!n)\n\t\t\treturn NULL;\n\t\tminkey = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);\n\t}\n}","static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)\n\t__acquires(key_serial_lock)\n{\n\tkey_serial_t pos = *_pos;\n\tstruct key *key;","\tspin_lock(&key_serial_lock);","\tif (*_pos > INT_MAX)\n\t\treturn NULL;\n\tkey = find_ge_key(p, pos);\n\tif (!key)\n\t\treturn NULL;\n\t*_pos = key->serial;\n\treturn &key->serial_node;\n}","static inline key_serial_t key_node_serial(struct rb_node *n)\n{\n\tstruct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);\n\treturn key->serial;\n}","static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)\n{\n\tstruct rb_node *n;","\tn = key_serial_next(p, v);\n\tif (n)\n\t\t*_pos = key_node_serial(n);\n\treturn n;\n}","static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)\n\t__releases(key_serial_lock)\n{\n\tspin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);\n}","static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)\n{\n\tstruct rb_node *_p = v;\n\tstruct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node);\n\tstruct timespec now;\n\tunsigned long timo;\n\tkey_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;\n\tchar xbuf[16];","\tshort state;","\tint rc;","\tstruct keyring_search_context ctx = {\n\t\t.index_key.type\t\t= key->type,\n\t\t.index_key.description\t= key->description,\n\t\t.cred\t\t\t= m->file->f_cred,\n\t\t.match_data.cmp\t\t= lookup_user_key_possessed,\n\t\t.match_data.raw_data\t= key,\n\t\t.match_data.lookup_type\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,\n\t\t.flags\t\t\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK,\n\t};","\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);","\t/* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can\n\t * skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it\n\t */\n\tif (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) {\n\t\tskey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(&ctx);\n\t\tif (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {\n\t\t\tkey_ref_put(skey_ref);\n\t\t\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\n\t\t}\n\t}","\t/* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key */\n\trc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW);\n\tif (rc < 0)\n\t\treturn 0;","\tnow = current_kernel_time();","\trcu_read_lock();","\t/* come up with a suitable timeout value */\n\tif (key->expiry == 0) {\n\t\tmemcpy(xbuf, \"perm\", 5);\n\t} else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {\n\t\tmemcpy(xbuf, \"expd\", 5);\n\t} else {\n\t\ttimo = key->expiry - now.tv_sec;","\t\tif (timo < 60)\n\t\t\tsprintf(xbuf, \"%lus\", timo);\n\t\telse if (timo < 60*60)\n\t\t\tsprintf(xbuf, \"%lum\", timo / 60);\n\t\telse if (timo < 60*60*24)\n\t\t\tsprintf(xbuf, \"%luh\", timo / (60*60));\n\t\telse if (timo < 60*60*24*7)\n\t\t\tsprintf(xbuf, \"%lud\", timo / (60*60*24));\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tsprintf(xbuf, \"%luw\", timo / (60*60*24*7));\n\t}\n","\tstate = key_read_state(key);\n","#define showflag(KEY, LETTER, FLAG) \\\n\t(test_bit(FLAG,\t&(KEY)->flags) ? LETTER : '-')","\tseq_printf(m, \"%08x %c%c%c%c%c%c%c %5d %4s %08x %5d %5d %-9.9s \",\n\t\t key->serial,","\t\t state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED ? 'I' : '-',","\t\t showflag(key, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED),\n\t\t showflag(key, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD),\n\t\t showflag(key, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA),\n\t\t showflag(key, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT),","\t\t state < 0 ? 'N' : '-',","\t\t showflag(key, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED),\n\t\t refcount_read(&key->usage),\n\t\t xbuf,\n\t\t key->perm,\n\t\t from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->uid),\n\t\t from_kgid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->gid),\n\t\t key->type->name);","#undef showflag","\tif (key->type->describe)\n\t\tkey->type->describe(key, m);\n\tseq_putc(m, '\\n');","\trcu_read_unlock();\n\treturn 0;\n}","static struct rb_node *__key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n)\n{\n\twhile (n) {\n\t\tstruct key_user *user = rb_entry(n, struct key_user, node);\n\t\tif (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, user->uid))\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tn = rb_next(n);\n\t}\n\treturn n;\n}","static struct rb_node *key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n)\n{\n\treturn __key_user_next(user_ns, rb_next(n));\n}","static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_root *r)\n{\n\tstruct rb_node *n = rb_first(r);\n\treturn __key_user_next(user_ns, n);\n}","/*\n * Implement \"/proc/key-users\" to provides a list of the key users and their\n * quotas.\n */\nstatic int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\n{\n\treturn seq_open(file, &proc_key_users_ops);\n}","static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)\n\t__acquires(key_user_lock)\n{\n\tstruct rb_node *_p;\n\tloff_t pos = *_pos;","\tspin_lock(&key_user_lock);","\t_p = key_user_first(seq_user_ns(p), &key_user_tree);\n\twhile (pos > 0 && _p) {\n\t\tpos--;\n\t\t_p = key_user_next(seq_user_ns(p), _p);\n\t}","\treturn _p;\n}","static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)\n{\n\t(*_pos)++;\n\treturn key_user_next(seq_user_ns(p), (struct rb_node *)v);\n}","static void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)\n\t__releases(key_user_lock)\n{\n\tspin_unlock(&key_user_lock);\n}","static int proc_key_users_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)\n{\n\tstruct rb_node *_p = v;\n\tstruct key_user *user = rb_entry(_p, struct key_user, node);\n\tunsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?\n\t\tkey_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;\n\tunsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?\n\t\tkey_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;","\tseq_printf(m, \"%5u: %5d %d/%d %d/%d %d/%d\\n\",\n\t\t from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), user->uid),\n\t\t refcount_read(&user->usage),\n\t\t atomic_read(&user->nkeys),\n\t\t atomic_read(&user->nikeys),\n\t\t user->qnkeys,\n\t\t maxkeys,\n\t\t user->qnbytes,\n\t\t maxbytes);","\treturn 0;\n}"],"string":"[\n \"/* procfs files for key database enumeration\\n *\\n * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\\n *\\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\\n * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version\\n * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.\\n */\",\n \"#include <linux/module.h>\\n#include <linux/init.h>\\n#include <linux/sched.h>\\n#include <linux/fs.h>\\n#include <linux/proc_fs.h>\\n#include <linux/seq_file.h>\\n#include <asm/errno.h>\\n#include \\\"internal.h\\\"\",\n \"static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);\\nstatic void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos);\\nstatic void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos);\\nstatic void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v);\\nstatic int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);\",\n \"static const struct seq_operations proc_keys_ops = {\\n\\t.start\\t= proc_keys_start,\\n\\t.next\\t= proc_keys_next,\\n\\t.stop\\t= proc_keys_stop,\\n\\t.show\\t= proc_keys_show,\\n};\",\n \"static const struct file_operations proc_keys_fops = {\\n\\t.open\\t\\t= proc_keys_open,\\n\\t.read\\t\\t= seq_read,\\n\\t.llseek\\t\\t= seq_lseek,\\n\\t.release\\t= seq_release,\\n};\",\n \"static int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);\\nstatic void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos);\\nstatic void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos);\\nstatic void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v);\\nstatic int proc_key_users_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);\",\n \"static const struct seq_operations proc_key_users_ops = {\\n\\t.start\\t= proc_key_users_start,\\n\\t.next\\t= proc_key_users_next,\\n\\t.stop\\t= proc_key_users_stop,\\n\\t.show\\t= proc_key_users_show,\\n};\",\n \"static const struct file_operations proc_key_users_fops = {\\n\\t.open\\t\\t= proc_key_users_open,\\n\\t.read\\t\\t= seq_read,\\n\\t.llseek\\t\\t= seq_lseek,\\n\\t.release\\t= seq_release,\\n};\",\n \"/*\\n * Declare the /proc files.\\n */\\nstatic int __init key_proc_init(void)\\n{\\n\\tstruct proc_dir_entry *p;\",\n \"\\tp = proc_create(\\\"keys\\\", 0, NULL, &proc_keys_fops);\\n\\tif (!p)\\n\\t\\tpanic(\\\"Cannot create /proc/keys\\\\n\\\");\",\n \"\\tp = proc_create(\\\"key-users\\\", 0, NULL, &proc_key_users_fops);\\n\\tif (!p)\\n\\t\\tpanic(\\\"Cannot create /proc/key-users\\\\n\\\");\",\n \"\\treturn 0;\\n}\",\n \"__initcall(key_proc_init);\",\n \"/*\\n * Implement \\\"/proc/keys\\\" to provide a list of the keys on the system that\\n * grant View permission to the caller.\\n */\\nstatic struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct seq_file *p, struct rb_node *n)\\n{\\n\\tstruct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p);\",\n \"\\tn = rb_next(n);\\n\\twhile (n) {\\n\\t\\tstruct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);\\n\\t\\tif (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, key->user->uid))\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\tn = rb_next(n);\\n\\t}\\n\\treturn n;\\n}\",\n \"static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\\n{\\n\\treturn seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops);\\n}\",\n \"static struct key *find_ge_key(struct seq_file *p, key_serial_t id)\\n{\\n\\tstruct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p);\\n\\tstruct rb_node *n = key_serial_tree.rb_node;\\n\\tstruct key *minkey = NULL;\",\n \"\\twhile (n) {\\n\\t\\tstruct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);\\n\\t\\tif (id < key->serial) {\\n\\t\\t\\tif (!minkey || minkey->serial > key->serial)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tminkey = key;\\n\\t\\t\\tn = n->rb_left;\\n\\t\\t} else if (id > key->serial) {\\n\\t\\t\\tn = n->rb_right;\\n\\t\\t} else {\\n\\t\\t\\tminkey = key;\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t\\tkey = NULL;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tif (!minkey)\\n\\t\\treturn NULL;\",\n \"\\tfor (;;) {\\n\\t\\tif (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, minkey->user->uid))\\n\\t\\t\\treturn minkey;\\n\\t\\tn = rb_next(&minkey->serial_node);\\n\\t\\tif (!n)\\n\\t\\t\\treturn NULL;\\n\\t\\tminkey = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);\\n\\t}\\n}\",\n \"static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)\\n\\t__acquires(key_serial_lock)\\n{\\n\\tkey_serial_t pos = *_pos;\\n\\tstruct key *key;\",\n \"\\tspin_lock(&key_serial_lock);\",\n \"\\tif (*_pos > INT_MAX)\\n\\t\\treturn NULL;\\n\\tkey = find_ge_key(p, pos);\\n\\tif (!key)\\n\\t\\treturn NULL;\\n\\t*_pos = key->serial;\\n\\treturn &key->serial_node;\\n}\",\n \"static inline key_serial_t key_node_serial(struct rb_node *n)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);\\n\\treturn key->serial;\\n}\",\n \"static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)\\n{\\n\\tstruct rb_node *n;\",\n \"\\tn = key_serial_next(p, v);\\n\\tif (n)\\n\\t\\t*_pos = key_node_serial(n);\\n\\treturn n;\\n}\",\n \"static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)\\n\\t__releases(key_serial_lock)\\n{\\n\\tspin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);\\n}\",\n \"static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)\\n{\\n\\tstruct rb_node *_p = v;\\n\\tstruct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node);\\n\\tstruct timespec now;\\n\\tunsigned long timo;\\n\\tkey_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;\\n\\tchar xbuf[16];\",\n \"\\tshort state;\",\n \"\\tint rc;\",\n \"\\tstruct keyring_search_context ctx = {\\n\\t\\t.index_key.type\\t\\t= key->type,\\n\\t\\t.index_key.description\\t= key->description,\\n\\t\\t.cred\\t\\t\\t= m->file->f_cred,\\n\\t\\t.match_data.cmp\\t\\t= lookup_user_key_possessed,\\n\\t\\t.match_data.raw_data\\t= key,\\n\\t\\t.match_data.lookup_type\\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,\\n\\t\\t.flags\\t\\t\\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK,\\n\\t};\",\n \"\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);\",\n \"\\t/* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can\\n\\t * skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it\\n\\t */\\n\\tif (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) {\\n\\t\\tskey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(&ctx);\\n\\t\\tif (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_ref_put(skey_ref);\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key */\\n\\trc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW);\\n\\tif (rc < 0)\\n\\t\\treturn 0;\",\n \"\\tnow = current_kernel_time();\",\n \"\\trcu_read_lock();\",\n \"\\t/* come up with a suitable timeout value */\\n\\tif (key->expiry == 0) {\\n\\t\\tmemcpy(xbuf, \\\"perm\\\", 5);\\n\\t} else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {\\n\\t\\tmemcpy(xbuf, \\\"expd\\\", 5);\\n\\t} else {\\n\\t\\ttimo = key->expiry - now.tv_sec;\",\n \"\\t\\tif (timo < 60)\\n\\t\\t\\tsprintf(xbuf, \\\"%lus\\\", timo);\\n\\t\\telse if (timo < 60*60)\\n\\t\\t\\tsprintf(xbuf, \\\"%lum\\\", timo / 60);\\n\\t\\telse if (timo < 60*60*24)\\n\\t\\t\\tsprintf(xbuf, \\\"%luh\\\", timo / (60*60));\\n\\t\\telse if (timo < 60*60*24*7)\\n\\t\\t\\tsprintf(xbuf, \\\"%lud\\\", timo / (60*60*24));\\n\\t\\telse\\n\\t\\t\\tsprintf(xbuf, \\\"%luw\\\", timo / (60*60*24*7));\\n\\t}\\n\",\n \"\\tstate = key_read_state(key);\\n\",\n \"#define showflag(KEY, LETTER, FLAG) \\\\\\n\\t(test_bit(FLAG,\\t&(KEY)->flags) ? LETTER : '-')\",\n \"\\tseq_printf(m, \\\"%08x %c%c%c%c%c%c%c %5d %4s %08x %5d %5d %-9.9s \\\",\\n\\t\\t key->serial,\",\n \"\\t\\t state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED ? 'I' : '-',\",\n \"\\t\\t showflag(key, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED),\\n\\t\\t showflag(key, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD),\\n\\t\\t showflag(key, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA),\\n\\t\\t showflag(key, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT),\",\n \"\\t\\t state < 0 ? 'N' : '-',\",\n \"\\t\\t showflag(key, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED),\\n\\t\\t refcount_read(&key->usage),\\n\\t\\t xbuf,\\n\\t\\t key->perm,\\n\\t\\t from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->uid),\\n\\t\\t from_kgid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->gid),\\n\\t\\t key->type->name);\",\n \"#undef showflag\",\n \"\\tif (key->type->describe)\\n\\t\\tkey->type->describe(key, m);\\n\\tseq_putc(m, '\\\\n');\",\n \"\\trcu_read_unlock();\\n\\treturn 0;\\n}\",\n \"static struct rb_node *__key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n)\\n{\\n\\twhile (n) {\\n\\t\\tstruct key_user *user = rb_entry(n, struct key_user, node);\\n\\t\\tif (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, user->uid))\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\tn = rb_next(n);\\n\\t}\\n\\treturn n;\\n}\",\n \"static struct rb_node *key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n)\\n{\\n\\treturn __key_user_next(user_ns, rb_next(n));\\n}\",\n \"static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_root *r)\\n{\\n\\tstruct rb_node *n = rb_first(r);\\n\\treturn __key_user_next(user_ns, n);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Implement \\\"/proc/key-users\\\" to provides a list of the key users and their\\n * quotas.\\n */\\nstatic int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\\n{\\n\\treturn seq_open(file, &proc_key_users_ops);\\n}\",\n \"static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)\\n\\t__acquires(key_user_lock)\\n{\\n\\tstruct rb_node *_p;\\n\\tloff_t pos = *_pos;\",\n \"\\tspin_lock(&key_user_lock);\",\n \"\\t_p = key_user_first(seq_user_ns(p), &key_user_tree);\\n\\twhile (pos > 0 && _p) {\\n\\t\\tpos--;\\n\\t\\t_p = key_user_next(seq_user_ns(p), _p);\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\treturn _p;\\n}\",\n \"static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)\\n{\\n\\t(*_pos)++;\\n\\treturn key_user_next(seq_user_ns(p), (struct rb_node *)v);\\n}\",\n \"static void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)\\n\\t__releases(key_user_lock)\\n{\\n\\tspin_unlock(&key_user_lock);\\n}\",\n \"static int proc_key_users_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)\\n{\\n\\tstruct rb_node *_p = v;\\n\\tstruct key_user *user = rb_entry(_p, struct key_user, node);\\n\\tunsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?\\n\\t\\tkey_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;\\n\\tunsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?\\n\\t\\tkey_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;\",\n \"\\tseq_printf(m, \\\"%5u: %5d %d/%d %d/%d %d/%d\\\\n\\\",\\n\\t\\t from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), user->uid),\\n\\t\\t refcount_read(&user->usage),\\n\\t\\t atomic_read(&user->nkeys),\\n\\t\\t atomic_read(&user->nikeys),\\n\\t\\t user->qnkeys,\\n\\t\\t maxkeys,\\n\\t\\t user->qnbytes,\\n\\t\\t maxbytes);\",\n \"\\treturn 0;\\n}\"\n]","isConversational":false},"labels":{"kind":"list like","value":[1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1],"string":"[\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1\n]","isConversational":false},"source":{"kind":"string","value":"PreciseBugs"},"other_info":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"buggy_code_end_loc\": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], \"buggy_code_start_loc\": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], \"filenames\": [\"include/linux/key.h\", \"net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c\", \"security/keys/big_key.c\", \"security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c\", \"security/keys/gc.c\", \"security/keys/key.c\", \"security/keys/keyctl.c\", \"security/keys/keyring.c\", \"security/keys/proc.c\", \"security/keys/process_keys.c\", \"security/keys/request_key.c\", \"security/keys/request_key_auth.c\", \"security/keys/trusted.c\", \"security/keys/user_defined.c\"], \"fixing_code_end_loc\": [380, 228, 283, 858, 155, 1000, 904, 603, 253, 734, 601, 77, 1070, 166], \"fixing_code_start_loc\": [139, 227, 250, 857, 132, 405, 769, 417, 185, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], \"message\": \"The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the \\\"negative\\\" state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.\", \"other\": {\"cve\": {\"cisaActionDue\": null, \"cisaExploitAdd\": null, \"cisaRequiredAction\": null, \"cisaVulnerabilityName\": null, \"configurations\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"4397FA2C-1EE8-4F42-9823-2D85B8C20976\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.4.95\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.4\", \"vulnerable\": true}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"D6690C73-23A3-4475-97D0-8CB96812E2FB\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.9.59\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.5\", \"vulnerable\": true}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"86038BA0-0886-479E-AD71-D78363937D66\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.13.10\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.10\", \"vulnerable\": true}], \"negate\": false, \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": null}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the \\\"negative\\\" state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.\"}, {\"lang\": \"es\", \"value\": \"El subsistema KEYS en el kernel de Linux en versiones anteriores a la 4.13.10 no sincroniza correctamente las acciones de actualizaci\\u00f3n con las de detecci\\u00f3n de una clave en el estado \\\"negative\\\" para evitar una condici\\u00f3n de carrera, lo que permite que los usuarios locales provoquen una denegaci\\u00f3n de servicio (DoS) o, posiblemente, cause otro impacto no especificado mediante llamadas al sistema manipuladas.\"}], \"evaluatorComment\": null, \"id\": \"CVE-2017-15951\", \"lastModified\": \"2023-01-19T15:45:25.270\", \"metrics\": {\"cvssMetricV2\": [{\"acInsufInfo\": false, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"cvssData\": {\"accessComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"accessVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"authentication\": \"NONE\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"baseScore\": 7.2, \"confidentialityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"integrityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"vectorString\": \"AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C\", \"version\": \"2.0\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 3.9, \"impactScore\": 10.0, \"obtainAllPrivilege\": false, \"obtainOtherPrivilege\": false, \"obtainUserPrivilege\": false, \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\", \"userInteractionRequired\": false}], \"cvssMetricV30\": null, \"cvssMetricV31\": [{\"cvssData\": {\"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"baseScore\": 7.8, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"integrityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"LOW\", \"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\", \"version\": \"3.1\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 1.8, \"impactScore\": 5.9, \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\"}]}, \"published\": \"2017-10-28T02:29:00.217\", \"references\": [{\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Issue Tracking\", \"Patch\", \"Third Party Advisory\"], \"url\": \"http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Release Notes\", \"Vendor Advisory\"], \"url\": \"http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/ChangeLog-4.13.10\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Third Party Advisory\", \"VDB Entry\"], \"url\": \"http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101621\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Issue Tracking\", \"Patch\", \"Third Party Advisory\"], \"url\": \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}], \"sourceIdentifier\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"vendorComments\": null, \"vulnStatus\": \"Analyzed\", \"weaknesses\": [{\"description\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CWE-20\"}], \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\"}]}, \"github_commit_url\": \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}, \"type\": \"CWE-20\"}"},"index":{"kind":"number","value":836,"string":"836"}}},{"rowIdx":4994,"cells":{"prompt":{"kind":"string","value":"Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not."},"completions":{"kind":"list like","value":["/* Manage a process's keyrings\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version\n * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.\n */","#include <linux/module.h>\n#include <linux/init.h>\n#include <linux/sched.h>\n#include <linux/sched/user.h>\n#include <linux/keyctl.h>\n#include <linux/fs.h>\n#include <linux/err.h>\n#include <linux/mutex.h>\n#include <linux/security.h>\n#include <linux/user_namespace.h>\n#include <linux/uaccess.h>\n#include \"internal.h\"","/* Session keyring create vs join semaphore */\nstatic DEFINE_MUTEX(key_session_mutex);","/* User keyring creation semaphore */\nstatic DEFINE_MUTEX(key_user_keyring_mutex);","/* The root user's tracking struct */\nstruct key_user root_key_user = {\n\t.usage\t\t= REFCOUNT_INIT(3),\n\t.cons_lock\t= __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(root_key_user.cons_lock),\n\t.lock\t\t= __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(root_key_user.lock),\n\t.nkeys\t\t= ATOMIC_INIT(2),\n\t.nikeys\t\t= ATOMIC_INIT(2),\n\t.uid\t\t= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,\n};","/*\n * Install the user and user session keyrings for the current process's UID.\n */\nint install_user_keyrings(void)\n{\n\tstruct user_struct *user;\n\tconst struct cred *cred;\n\tstruct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;\n\tkey_perm_t user_keyring_perm;\n\tchar buf[20];\n\tint ret;\n\tuid_t uid;","\tuser_keyring_perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL;\n\tcred = current_cred();\n\tuser = cred->user;\n\tuid = from_kuid(cred->user_ns, user->uid);","\tkenter(\"%p{%u}\", user, uid);","\tif (user->uid_keyring && user->session_keyring) {\n\t\tkleave(\" = 0 [exist]\");\n\t\treturn 0;\n\t}","\tmutex_lock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);\n\tret = 0;","\tif (!user->uid_keyring) {\n\t\t/* get the UID-specific keyring\n\t\t * - there may be one in existence already as it may have been\n\t\t * pinned by a session, but the user_struct pointing to it\n\t\t * may have been destroyed by setuid */\n\t\tsprintf(buf, \"_uid.%u\", uid);","\t\tuid_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);\n\t\tif (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {\n\t\t\tuid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t cred, user_keyring_perm,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tKEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t NULL, NULL);\n\t\t\tif (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {\n\t\t\t\tret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}","\t\t/* get a default session keyring (which might also exist\n\t\t * already) */\n\t\tsprintf(buf, \"_uid_ses.%u\", uid);","\t\tsession_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);\n\t\tif (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {\n\t\t\tsession_keyring =\n\t\t\t\tkeyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,\n\t\t\t\t\t cred, user_keyring_perm,\n\t\t\t\t\t KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |\n\t\t\t\t\t\t KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,\n\t\t\t\t\t NULL, NULL);\n\t\t\tif (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {\n\t\t\t\tret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);\n\t\t\t\tgoto error_release;\n\t\t\t}","\t\t\t/* we install a link from the user session keyring to\n\t\t\t * the user keyring */\n\t\t\tret = key_link(session_keyring, uid_keyring);\n\t\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\t\tgoto error_release_both;\n\t\t}","\t\t/* install the keyrings */\n\t\tuser->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;\n\t\tuser->session_keyring = session_keyring;\n\t}","\tmutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);\n\tkleave(\" = 0\");\n\treturn 0;","error_release_both:\n\tkey_put(session_keyring);\nerror_release:\n\tkey_put(uid_keyring);\nerror:\n\tmutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);\n\tkleave(\" = %d\", ret);\n\treturn ret;\n}","/*\n * Install a thread keyring to the given credentials struct if it didn't have\n * one already. This is allowed to overrun the quota.\n *\n * Return: 0 if a thread keyring is now present; -errno on failure.\n */\nint install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)\n{\n\tstruct key *keyring;","\tif (new->thread_keyring)\n\t\treturn 0;","\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(\"_tid\", new->uid, new->gid, new,\n\t\t\t\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,\n\t\t\t\tKEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,\n\t\t\t\tNULL, NULL);\n\tif (IS_ERR(keyring))\n\t\treturn PTR_ERR(keyring);","\tnew->thread_keyring = keyring;\n\treturn 0;\n}","/*\n * Install a thread keyring to the current task if it didn't have one already.\n *\n * Return: 0 if a thread keyring is now present; -errno on failure.\n */\nstatic int install_thread_keyring(void)\n{\n\tstruct cred *new;\n\tint ret;","\tnew = prepare_creds();\n\tif (!new)\n\t\treturn -ENOMEM;","\tret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);\n\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\tabort_creds(new);\n\t\treturn ret;\n\t}","\treturn commit_creds(new);\n}","/*\n * Install a process keyring to the given credentials struct if it didn't have\n * one already. This is allowed to overrun the quota.\n *\n * Return: 0 if a process keyring is now present; -errno on failure.\n */\nint install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)\n{\n\tstruct key *keyring;","\tif (new->process_keyring)\n\t\treturn 0;","\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(\"_pid\", new->uid, new->gid, new,\n\t\t\t\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,\n\t\t\t\tKEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,\n\t\t\t\tNULL, NULL);\n\tif (IS_ERR(keyring))\n\t\treturn PTR_ERR(keyring);","\tnew->process_keyring = keyring;\n\treturn 0;\n}","/*\n * Install a process keyring to the current task if it didn't have one already.\n *\n * Return: 0 if a process keyring is now present; -errno on failure.\n */\nstatic int install_process_keyring(void)\n{\n\tstruct cred *new;\n\tint ret;","\tnew = prepare_creds();\n\tif (!new)\n\t\treturn -ENOMEM;","\tret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);\n\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\tabort_creds(new);\n\t\treturn ret;\n\t}","\treturn commit_creds(new);\n}","/*\n * Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the given credentials\n * struct, replacing the existing one if any. If the given keyring is NULL,\n * then install a new anonymous session keyring.\n *\n * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.\n */\nint install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)\n{\n\tunsigned long flags;\n\tstruct key *old;","\tmight_sleep();","\t/* create an empty session keyring */\n\tif (!keyring) {\n\t\tflags = KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN;\n\t\tif (cred->session_keyring)\n\t\t\tflags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA;","\t\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(\"_ses\", cred->uid, cred->gid, cred,\n\t\t\t\t\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,\n\t\t\t\t\tflags, NULL, NULL);\n\t\tif (IS_ERR(keyring))\n\t\t\treturn PTR_ERR(keyring);\n\t} else {\n\t\t__key_get(keyring);\n\t}","\t/* install the keyring */\n\told = cred->session_keyring;\n\trcu_assign_pointer(cred->session_keyring, keyring);","\tif (old)\n\t\tkey_put(old);","\treturn 0;\n}","/*\n * Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the current task,\n * replacing the existing one if any. If the given keyring is NULL, then\n * install a new anonymous session keyring.\n *\n * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.\n */\nstatic int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)\n{\n\tstruct cred *new;\n\tint ret;","\tnew = prepare_creds();\n\tif (!new)\n\t\treturn -ENOMEM;","\tret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);\n\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\tabort_creds(new);\n\t\treturn ret;\n\t}","\treturn commit_creds(new);\n}","/*\n * Handle the fsuid changing.\n */\nvoid key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)\n{\n\t/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */\n\tBUG_ON(!tsk->cred);\n\tif (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) {\n\t\tdown_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);\n\t\ttsk->cred->thread_keyring->uid = tsk->cred->fsuid;\n\t\tup_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);\n\t}\n}","/*\n * Handle the fsgid changing.\n */\nvoid key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)\n{\n\t/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */\n\tBUG_ON(!tsk->cred);\n\tif (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) {\n\t\tdown_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);\n\t\ttsk->cred->thread_keyring->gid = tsk->cred->fsgid;\n\t\tup_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);\n\t}\n}","/*\n * Search the process keyrings attached to the supplied cred for the first\n * matching key.\n *\n * The search criteria are the type and the match function. The description is\n * given to the match function as a parameter, but doesn't otherwise influence\n * the search. Typically the match function will compare the description\n * parameter to the key's description.\n *\n * This can only search keyrings that grant Search permission to the supplied\n * credentials. Keyrings linked to searched keyrings will also be searched if\n * they grant Search permission too. Keys can only be found if they grant\n * Search permission to the credentials.\n *\n * Returns a pointer to the key with the key usage count incremented if\n * successful, -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key or -ENOKEY if we only\n * matched negative keys.\n *\n * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the\n * returned key reference.\n */\nkey_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)\n{\n\tkey_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;","\t/* we want to return -EAGAIN or -ENOKEY if any of the keyrings were\n\t * searchable, but we failed to find a key or we found a negative key;\n\t * otherwise we want to return a sample error (probably -EACCES) if\n\t * none of the keyrings were searchable\n\t *\n\t * in terms of priority: success > -ENOKEY > -EAGAIN > other error\n\t */\n\tkey_ref = NULL;\n\tret = NULL;\n\terr = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);","\t/* search the thread keyring first */\n\tif (ctx->cred->thread_keyring) {\n\t\tkey_ref = keyring_search_aux(\n\t\t\tmake_key_ref(ctx->cred->thread_keyring, 1), ctx);\n\t\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\n\t\t\tgoto found;","\t\tswitch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {\n\t\tcase -EAGAIN: /* no key */\n\t\tcase -ENOKEY: /* negative key */\n\t\t\tret = key_ref;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\terr = key_ref;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t}\n\t}","\t/* search the process keyring second */\n\tif (ctx->cred->process_keyring) {\n\t\tkey_ref = keyring_search_aux(\n\t\t\tmake_key_ref(ctx->cred->process_keyring, 1), ctx);\n\t\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\n\t\t\tgoto found;","\t\tswitch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {\n\t\tcase -EAGAIN: /* no key */\n\t\t\tif (ret)\n\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tcase -ENOKEY: /* negative key */\n\t\t\tret = key_ref;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\terr = key_ref;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t}\n\t}","\t/* search the session keyring */\n\tif (ctx->cred->session_keyring) {\n\t\trcu_read_lock();\n\t\tkey_ref = keyring_search_aux(\n\t\t\tmake_key_ref(rcu_dereference(ctx->cred->session_keyring), 1),\n\t\t\tctx);\n\t\trcu_read_unlock();","\t\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\n\t\t\tgoto found;","\t\tswitch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {\n\t\tcase -EAGAIN: /* no key */\n\t\t\tif (ret)\n\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tcase -ENOKEY: /* negative key */\n\t\t\tret = key_ref;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\terr = key_ref;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\t/* or search the user-session keyring */\n\telse if (ctx->cred->user->session_keyring) {\n\t\tkey_ref = keyring_search_aux(\n\t\t\tmake_key_ref(ctx->cred->user->session_keyring, 1),\n\t\t\tctx);\n\t\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\n\t\t\tgoto found;","\t\tswitch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {\n\t\tcase -EAGAIN: /* no key */\n\t\t\tif (ret)\n\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tcase -ENOKEY: /* negative key */\n\t\t\tret = key_ref;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\terr = key_ref;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t}\n\t}","\t/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */\n\tkey_ref = ret ? ret : err;","found:\n\treturn key_ref;\n}","/*\n * Search the process keyrings attached to the supplied cred for the first\n * matching key in the manner of search_my_process_keyrings(), but also search\n * the keys attached to the assumed authorisation key using its credentials if\n * one is available.\n *\n * Return same as search_my_process_keyrings().\n */\nkey_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)\n{\n\tstruct request_key_auth *rka;\n\tkey_ref_t key_ref, ret = ERR_PTR(-EACCES), err;","\tmight_sleep();","\tkey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(ctx);\n\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\n\t\tgoto found;\n\terr = key_ref;","\t/* if this process has an instantiation authorisation key, then we also\n\t * search the keyrings of the process mentioned there\n\t * - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method\n\t */\n\tif (ctx->cred->request_key_auth &&\n\t ctx->cred == current_cred() &&\n\t ctx->index_key.type != &key_type_request_key_auth\n\t ) {\n\t\tconst struct cred *cred = ctx->cred;","\t\t/* defend against the auth key being revoked */\n\t\tdown_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);","\t\tif (key_validate(ctx->cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {\n\t\t\trka = ctx->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];","\t\t\tctx->cred = rka->cred;\n\t\t\tkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx);\n\t\t\tctx->cred = cred;","\t\t\tup_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);","\t\t\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\n\t\t\t\tgoto found;","\t\t\tret = key_ref;\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tup_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);\n\t\t}\n\t}","\t/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */\n\tif (err == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) || ret == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY))\n\t\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);\n\telse if (err == ERR_PTR(-EACCES))\n\t\tkey_ref = ret;\n\telse\n\t\tkey_ref = err;","found:\n\treturn key_ref;\n}","/*\n * See if the key we're looking at is the target key.\n */\nbool lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key,\n\t\t\t const struct key_match_data *match_data)\n{\n\treturn key == match_data->raw_data;\n}","/*\n * Look up a key ID given us by userspace with a given permissions mask to get\n * the key it refers to.\n *\n * Flags can be passed to request that special keyrings be created if referred\n * to directly, to permit partially constructed keys to be found and to skip\n * validity and permission checks on the found key.\n *\n * Returns a pointer to the key with an incremented usage count if successful;\n * -EINVAL if the key ID is invalid; -ENOKEY if the key ID does not correspond\n * to a key or the best found key was a negative key; -EKEYREVOKED or\n * -EKEYEXPIRED if the best found key was revoked or expired; -EACCES if the\n * found key doesn't grant the requested permit or the LSM denied access to it;\n * or -ENOMEM if a special keyring couldn't be created.\n *\n * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the\n * returned key reference.\n */\nkey_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,\n\t\t\t key_perm_t perm)\n{\n\tstruct keyring_search_context ctx = {\n\t\t.match_data.cmp\t\t= lookup_user_key_possessed,\n\t\t.match_data.lookup_type\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,\n\t\t.flags\t\t\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK,\n\t};\n\tstruct request_key_auth *rka;\n\tstruct key *key;\n\tkey_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;\n\tint ret;","try_again:\n\tctx.cred = get_current_cred();\n\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);","\tswitch (id) {\n\tcase KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:\n\t\tif (!ctx.cred->thread_keyring) {\n\t\t\tif (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;","\t\t\tret = install_thread_keyring();\n\t\t\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\t\t\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tgoto reget_creds;\n\t\t}","\t\tkey = ctx.cred->thread_keyring;\n\t\t__key_get(key);\n\t\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\n\t\tbreak;","\tcase KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:\n\t\tif (!ctx.cred->process_keyring) {\n\t\t\tif (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;","\t\t\tret = install_process_keyring();\n\t\t\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\t\t\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tgoto reget_creds;\n\t\t}","\t\tkey = ctx.cred->process_keyring;\n\t\t__key_get(key);\n\t\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\n\t\tbreak;","\tcase KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:\n\t\tif (!ctx.cred->session_keyring) {\n\t\t\t/* always install a session keyring upon access if one\n\t\t\t * doesn't exist yet */\n\t\t\tret = install_user_keyrings();\n\t\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t\tif (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE)\n\t\t\t\tret = join_session_keyring(NULL);\n\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\tret = install_session_keyring(\n\t\t\t\t\tctx.cred->user->session_keyring);","\t\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t\tgoto reget_creds;\n\t\t} else if (ctx.cred->session_keyring ==\n\t\t\t ctx.cred->user->session_keyring &&\n\t\t\t lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) {\n\t\t\tret = join_session_keyring(NULL);\n\t\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t\tgoto reget_creds;\n\t\t}","\t\trcu_read_lock();\n\t\tkey = rcu_dereference(ctx.cred->session_keyring);\n\t\t__key_get(key);\n\t\trcu_read_unlock();\n\t\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\n\t\tbreak;","\tcase KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:\n\t\tif (!ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring) {\n\t\t\tret = install_user_keyrings();\n\t\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t}","\t\tkey = ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring;\n\t\t__key_get(key);\n\t\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\n\t\tbreak;","\tcase KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:\n\t\tif (!ctx.cred->user->session_keyring) {\n\t\t\tret = install_user_keyrings();\n\t\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t}","\t\tkey = ctx.cred->user->session_keyring;\n\t\t__key_get(key);\n\t\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\n\t\tbreak;","\tcase KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING:\n\t\t/* group keyrings are not yet supported */\n\t\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);\n\t\tgoto error;","\tcase KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:\n\t\tkey = ctx.cred->request_key_auth;\n\t\tif (!key)\n\t\t\tgoto error;","\t\t__key_get(key);\n\t\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\n\t\tbreak;","\tcase KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:\n\t\tif (!ctx.cred->request_key_auth)\n\t\t\tgoto error;","\t\tdown_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);\n\t\tif (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,\n\t\t\t &ctx.cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {\n\t\t\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);\n\t\t\tkey = NULL;\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\trka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];\n\t\t\tkey = rka->dest_keyring;\n\t\t\t__key_get(key);\n\t\t}\n\t\tup_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);\n\t\tif (!key)\n\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\n\t\tbreak;","\tdefault:\n\t\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);\n\t\tif (id < 1)\n\t\t\tgoto error;","\t\tkey = key_lookup(id);\n\t\tif (IS_ERR(key)) {\n\t\t\tkey_ref = ERR_CAST(key);\n\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t}","\t\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);","\t\t/* check to see if we possess the key */\n\t\tctx.index_key.type\t\t= key->type;\n\t\tctx.index_key.description\t= key->description;\n\t\tctx.index_key.desc_len\t\t= strlen(key->description);\n\t\tctx.match_data.raw_data\t\t= key;\n\t\tkdebug(\"check possessed\");\n\t\tskey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);\n\t\tkdebug(\"possessed=%p\", skey_ref);","\t\tif (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {\n\t\t\tkey_put(key);\n\t\t\tkey_ref = skey_ref;\n\t\t}","\t\tbreak;\n\t}","\t/* unlink does not use the nominated key in any way, so can skip all\n\t * the permission checks as it is only concerned with the keyring */\n\tif (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK) {\n\t\tret = 0;\n\t\tgoto error;\n\t}","\tif (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL)) {\n\t\tret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);\n\t\tswitch (ret) {\n\t\tcase -ERESTARTSYS:\n\t\t\tgoto invalid_key;\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tif (perm)\n\t\t\t\tgoto invalid_key;\n\t\tcase 0:\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t}\n\t} else if (perm) {\n\t\tret = key_validate(key);\n\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\tgoto invalid_key;\n\t}","\tret = -EIO;\n\tif (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&","\t !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))","\t\tgoto invalid_key;","\t/* check the permissions */\n\tret = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, perm);\n\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\tgoto invalid_key;","\tkey->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;","error:\n\tput_cred(ctx.cred);\n\treturn key_ref;","invalid_key:\n\tkey_ref_put(key_ref);\n\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);\n\tgoto error;","\t/* if we attempted to install a keyring, then it may have caused new\n\t * creds to be installed */\nreget_creds:\n\tput_cred(ctx.cred);\n\tgoto try_again;\n}","/*\n * Join the named keyring as the session keyring if possible else attempt to\n * create a new one of that name and join that.\n *\n * If the name is NULL, an empty anonymous keyring will be installed as the\n * session keyring.\n *\n * Named session keyrings are joined with a semaphore held to prevent the\n * keyrings from going away whilst the attempt is made to going them and also\n * to prevent a race in creating compatible session keyrings.\n */\nlong join_session_keyring(const char *name)\n{\n\tconst struct cred *old;\n\tstruct cred *new;\n\tstruct key *keyring;\n\tlong ret, serial;","\tnew = prepare_creds();\n\tif (!new)\n\t\treturn -ENOMEM;\n\told = current_cred();","\t/* if no name is provided, install an anonymous keyring */\n\tif (!name) {\n\t\tret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, NULL);\n\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\tgoto error;","\t\tserial = new->session_keyring->serial;\n\t\tret = commit_creds(new);\n\t\tif (ret == 0)\n\t\t\tret = serial;\n\t\tgoto okay;\n\t}","\t/* allow the user to join or create a named keyring */\n\tmutex_lock(&key_session_mutex);","\t/* look for an existing keyring of this name */\n\tkeyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false);\n\tif (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {\n\t\t/* not found - try and create a new one */\n\t\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(\n\t\t\tname, old->uid, old->gid, old,\n\t\t\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_LINK,\n\t\t\tKEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);\n\t\tif (IS_ERR(keyring)) {\n\t\t\tret = PTR_ERR(keyring);\n\t\t\tgoto error2;\n\t\t}\n\t} else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {\n\t\tret = PTR_ERR(keyring);\n\t\tgoto error2;\n\t} else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) {\n\t\tret = 0;\n\t\tgoto error3;\n\t}","\t/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */\n\tret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);\n\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\tgoto error3;","\tcommit_creds(new);\n\tmutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);","\tret = keyring->serial;\n\tkey_put(keyring);\nokay:\n\treturn ret;","error3:\n\tkey_put(keyring);\nerror2:\n\tmutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);\nerror:\n\tabort_creds(new);\n\treturn ret;\n}","/*\n * Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children when\n * the target process is about to resume userspace execution.\n */\nvoid key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork)\n{\n\tconst struct cred *old = current_cred();\n\tstruct cred *new = container_of(twork, struct cred, rcu);","\tif (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) {\n\t\tput_cred(new);\n\t\treturn;\n\t}","\tnew-> uid\t= old-> uid;\n\tnew-> euid\t= old-> euid;\n\tnew-> suid\t= old-> suid;\n\tnew->fsuid\t= old->fsuid;\n\tnew-> gid\t= old-> gid;\n\tnew-> egid\t= old-> egid;\n\tnew-> sgid\t= old-> sgid;\n\tnew->fsgid\t= old->fsgid;\n\tnew->user\t= get_uid(old->user);\n\tnew->user_ns\t= get_user_ns(old->user_ns);\n\tnew->group_info\t= get_group_info(old->group_info);","\tnew->securebits\t= old->securebits;\n\tnew->cap_inheritable\t= old->cap_inheritable;\n\tnew->cap_permitted\t= old->cap_permitted;\n\tnew->cap_effective\t= old->cap_effective;\n\tnew->cap_ambient\t= old->cap_ambient;\n\tnew->cap_bset\t\t= old->cap_bset;","\tnew->jit_keyring\t= old->jit_keyring;\n\tnew->thread_keyring\t= key_get(old->thread_keyring);\n\tnew->process_keyring\t= key_get(old->process_keyring);","\tsecurity_transfer_creds(new, old);","\tcommit_creds(new);\n}","/*\n * Make sure that root's user and user-session keyrings exist.\n */\nstatic int __init init_root_keyring(void)\n{\n\treturn install_user_keyrings();\n}","late_initcall(init_root_keyring);"],"string":"[\n \"/* Manage a process's keyrings\\n *\\n * Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\\n *\\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\\n * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version\\n * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.\\n */\",\n \"#include <linux/module.h>\\n#include <linux/init.h>\\n#include <linux/sched.h>\\n#include <linux/sched/user.h>\\n#include <linux/keyctl.h>\\n#include <linux/fs.h>\\n#include <linux/err.h>\\n#include <linux/mutex.h>\\n#include <linux/security.h>\\n#include <linux/user_namespace.h>\\n#include <linux/uaccess.h>\\n#include \\\"internal.h\\\"\",\n \"/* Session keyring create vs join semaphore */\\nstatic DEFINE_MUTEX(key_session_mutex);\",\n \"/* User keyring creation semaphore */\\nstatic DEFINE_MUTEX(key_user_keyring_mutex);\",\n \"/* The root user's tracking struct */\\nstruct key_user root_key_user = {\\n\\t.usage\\t\\t= REFCOUNT_INIT(3),\\n\\t.cons_lock\\t= __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(root_key_user.cons_lock),\\n\\t.lock\\t\\t= __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(root_key_user.lock),\\n\\t.nkeys\\t\\t= ATOMIC_INIT(2),\\n\\t.nikeys\\t\\t= ATOMIC_INIT(2),\\n\\t.uid\\t\\t= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,\\n};\",\n \"/*\\n * Install the user and user session keyrings for the current process's UID.\\n */\\nint install_user_keyrings(void)\\n{\\n\\tstruct user_struct *user;\\n\\tconst struct cred *cred;\\n\\tstruct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;\\n\\tkey_perm_t user_keyring_perm;\\n\\tchar buf[20];\\n\\tint ret;\\n\\tuid_t uid;\",\n \"\\tuser_keyring_perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL;\\n\\tcred = current_cred();\\n\\tuser = cred->user;\\n\\tuid = from_kuid(cred->user_ns, user->uid);\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"%p{%u}\\\", user, uid);\",\n \"\\tif (user->uid_keyring && user->session_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tkleave(\\\" = 0 [exist]\\\");\\n\\t\\treturn 0;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tmutex_lock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);\\n\\tret = 0;\",\n \"\\tif (!user->uid_keyring) {\\n\\t\\t/* get the UID-specific keyring\\n\\t\\t * - there may be one in existence already as it may have been\\n\\t\\t * pinned by a session, but the user_struct pointing to it\\n\\t\\t * may have been destroyed by setuid */\\n\\t\\tsprintf(buf, \\\"_uid.%u\\\", uid);\",\n \"\\t\\tuid_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);\\n\\t\\tif (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {\\n\\t\\t\\tuid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t cred, user_keyring_perm,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tKEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t NULL, NULL);\\n\\t\\t\\tif (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t\\t}\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\t/* get a default session keyring (which might also exist\\n\\t\\t * already) */\\n\\t\\tsprintf(buf, \\\"_uid_ses.%u\\\", uid);\",\n \"\\t\\tsession_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);\\n\\t\\tif (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {\\n\\t\\t\\tsession_keyring =\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tkeyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t cred, user_keyring_perm,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t NULL, NULL);\\n\\t\\t\\tif (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error_release;\\n\\t\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\t\\t/* we install a link from the user session keyring to\\n\\t\\t\\t * the user keyring */\\n\\t\\t\\tret = key_link(session_keyring, uid_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error_release_both;\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\t/* install the keyrings */\\n\\t\\tuser->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;\\n\\t\\tuser->session_keyring = session_keyring;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tmutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = 0\\\");\\n\\treturn 0;\",\n \"error_release_both:\\n\\tkey_put(session_keyring);\\nerror_release:\\n\\tkey_put(uid_keyring);\\nerror:\\n\\tmutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = %d\\\", ret);\\n\\treturn ret;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Install a thread keyring to the given credentials struct if it didn't have\\n * one already. This is allowed to overrun the quota.\\n *\\n * Return: 0 if a thread keyring is now present; -errno on failure.\\n */\\nint install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key *keyring;\",\n \"\\tif (new->thread_keyring)\\n\\t\\treturn 0;\",\n \"\\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(\\\"_tid\\\", new->uid, new->gid, new,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tKEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tNULL, NULL);\\n\\tif (IS_ERR(keyring))\\n\\t\\treturn PTR_ERR(keyring);\",\n \"\\tnew->thread_keyring = keyring;\\n\\treturn 0;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Install a thread keyring to the current task if it didn't have one already.\\n *\\n * Return: 0 if a thread keyring is now present; -errno on failure.\\n */\\nstatic int install_thread_keyring(void)\\n{\\n\\tstruct cred *new;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tnew = prepare_creds();\\n\\tif (!new)\\n\\t\\treturn -ENOMEM;\",\n \"\\tret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);\\n\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\tabort_creds(new);\\n\\t\\treturn ret;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\treturn commit_creds(new);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Install a process keyring to the given credentials struct if it didn't have\\n * one already. This is allowed to overrun the quota.\\n *\\n * Return: 0 if a process keyring is now present; -errno on failure.\\n */\\nint install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key *keyring;\",\n \"\\tif (new->process_keyring)\\n\\t\\treturn 0;\",\n \"\\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(\\\"_pid\\\", new->uid, new->gid, new,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tKEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tNULL, NULL);\\n\\tif (IS_ERR(keyring))\\n\\t\\treturn PTR_ERR(keyring);\",\n \"\\tnew->process_keyring = keyring;\\n\\treturn 0;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Install a process keyring to the current task if it didn't have one already.\\n *\\n * Return: 0 if a process keyring is now present; -errno on failure.\\n */\\nstatic int install_process_keyring(void)\\n{\\n\\tstruct cred *new;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tnew = prepare_creds();\\n\\tif (!new)\\n\\t\\treturn -ENOMEM;\",\n \"\\tret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);\\n\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\tabort_creds(new);\\n\\t\\treturn ret;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\treturn commit_creds(new);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the given credentials\\n * struct, replacing the existing one if any. If the given keyring is NULL,\\n * then install a new anonymous session keyring.\\n *\\n * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.\\n */\\nint install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)\\n{\\n\\tunsigned long flags;\\n\\tstruct key *old;\",\n \"\\tmight_sleep();\",\n \"\\t/* create an empty session keyring */\\n\\tif (!keyring) {\\n\\t\\tflags = KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN;\\n\\t\\tif (cred->session_keyring)\\n\\t\\t\\tflags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA;\",\n \"\\t\\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(\\\"_ses\\\", cred->uid, cred->gid, cred,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tflags, NULL, NULL);\\n\\t\\tif (IS_ERR(keyring))\\n\\t\\t\\treturn PTR_ERR(keyring);\\n\\t} else {\\n\\t\\t__key_get(keyring);\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* install the keyring */\\n\\told = cred->session_keyring;\\n\\trcu_assign_pointer(cred->session_keyring, keyring);\",\n \"\\tif (old)\\n\\t\\tkey_put(old);\",\n \"\\treturn 0;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the current task,\\n * replacing the existing one if any. If the given keyring is NULL, then\\n * install a new anonymous session keyring.\\n *\\n * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.\\n */\\nstatic int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)\\n{\\n\\tstruct cred *new;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tnew = prepare_creds();\\n\\tif (!new)\\n\\t\\treturn -ENOMEM;\",\n \"\\tret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);\\n\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\tabort_creds(new);\\n\\t\\treturn ret;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\treturn commit_creds(new);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Handle the fsuid changing.\\n */\\nvoid key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)\\n{\\n\\t/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */\\n\\tBUG_ON(!tsk->cred);\\n\\tif (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tdown_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);\\n\\t\\ttsk->cred->thread_keyring->uid = tsk->cred->fsuid;\\n\\t\\tup_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);\\n\\t}\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Handle the fsgid changing.\\n */\\nvoid key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)\\n{\\n\\t/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */\\n\\tBUG_ON(!tsk->cred);\\n\\tif (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tdown_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);\\n\\t\\ttsk->cred->thread_keyring->gid = tsk->cred->fsgid;\\n\\t\\tup_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);\\n\\t}\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Search the process keyrings attached to the supplied cred for the first\\n * matching key.\\n *\\n * The search criteria are the type and the match function. The description is\\n * given to the match function as a parameter, but doesn't otherwise influence\\n * the search. Typically the match function will compare the description\\n * parameter to the key's description.\\n *\\n * This can only search keyrings that grant Search permission to the supplied\\n * credentials. Keyrings linked to searched keyrings will also be searched if\\n * they grant Search permission too. Keys can only be found if they grant\\n * Search permission to the credentials.\\n *\\n * Returns a pointer to the key with the key usage count incremented if\\n * successful, -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key or -ENOKEY if we only\\n * matched negative keys.\\n *\\n * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the\\n * returned key reference.\\n */\\nkey_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)\\n{\\n\\tkey_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;\",\n \"\\t/* we want to return -EAGAIN or -ENOKEY if any of the keyrings were\\n\\t * searchable, but we failed to find a key or we found a negative key;\\n\\t * otherwise we want to return a sample error (probably -EACCES) if\\n\\t * none of the keyrings were searchable\\n\\t *\\n\\t * in terms of priority: success > -ENOKEY > -EAGAIN > other error\\n\\t */\\n\\tkey_ref = NULL;\\n\\tret = NULL;\\n\\terr = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);\",\n \"\\t/* search the thread keyring first */\\n\\tif (ctx->cred->thread_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = keyring_search_aux(\\n\\t\\t\\tmake_key_ref(ctx->cred->thread_keyring, 1), ctx);\\n\\t\\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto found;\",\n \"\\t\\tswitch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {\\n\\t\\tcase -EAGAIN: /* no key */\\n\\t\\tcase -ENOKEY: /* negative key */\\n\\t\\t\\tret = key_ref;\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\tdefault:\\n\\t\\t\\terr = key_ref;\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* search the process keyring second */\\n\\tif (ctx->cred->process_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = keyring_search_aux(\\n\\t\\t\\tmake_key_ref(ctx->cred->process_keyring, 1), ctx);\\n\\t\\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto found;\",\n \"\\t\\tswitch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {\\n\\t\\tcase -EAGAIN: /* no key */\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\tcase -ENOKEY: /* negative key */\\n\\t\\t\\tret = key_ref;\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\tdefault:\\n\\t\\t\\terr = key_ref;\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* search the session keyring */\\n\\tif (ctx->cred->session_keyring) {\\n\\t\\trcu_read_lock();\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = keyring_search_aux(\\n\\t\\t\\tmake_key_ref(rcu_dereference(ctx->cred->session_keyring), 1),\\n\\t\\t\\tctx);\\n\\t\\trcu_read_unlock();\",\n \"\\t\\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto found;\",\n \"\\t\\tswitch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {\\n\\t\\tcase -EAGAIN: /* no key */\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\tcase -ENOKEY: /* negative key */\\n\\t\\t\\tret = key_ref;\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\tdefault:\\n\\t\\t\\terr = key_ref;\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\\n\\t/* or search the user-session keyring */\\n\\telse if (ctx->cred->user->session_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = keyring_search_aux(\\n\\t\\t\\tmake_key_ref(ctx->cred->user->session_keyring, 1),\\n\\t\\t\\tctx);\\n\\t\\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto found;\",\n \"\\t\\tswitch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {\\n\\t\\tcase -EAGAIN: /* no key */\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\tcase -ENOKEY: /* negative key */\\n\\t\\t\\tret = key_ref;\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\tdefault:\\n\\t\\t\\terr = key_ref;\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */\\n\\tkey_ref = ret ? ret : err;\",\n \"found:\\n\\treturn key_ref;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Search the process keyrings attached to the supplied cred for the first\\n * matching key in the manner of search_my_process_keyrings(), but also search\\n * the keys attached to the assumed authorisation key using its credentials if\\n * one is available.\\n *\\n * Return same as search_my_process_keyrings().\\n */\\nkey_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)\\n{\\n\\tstruct request_key_auth *rka;\\n\\tkey_ref_t key_ref, ret = ERR_PTR(-EACCES), err;\",\n \"\\tmight_sleep();\",\n \"\\tkey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(ctx);\\n\\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\\n\\t\\tgoto found;\\n\\terr = key_ref;\",\n \"\\t/* if this process has an instantiation authorisation key, then we also\\n\\t * search the keyrings of the process mentioned there\\n\\t * - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method\\n\\t */\\n\\tif (ctx->cred->request_key_auth &&\\n\\t ctx->cred == current_cred() &&\\n\\t ctx->index_key.type != &key_type_request_key_auth\\n\\t ) {\\n\\t\\tconst struct cred *cred = ctx->cred;\",\n \"\\t\\t/* defend against the auth key being revoked */\\n\\t\\tdown_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);\",\n \"\\t\\tif (key_validate(ctx->cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {\\n\\t\\t\\trka = ctx->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];\",\n \"\\t\\t\\tctx->cred = rka->cred;\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx);\\n\\t\\t\\tctx->cred = cred;\",\n \"\\t\\t\\tup_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);\",\n \"\\t\\t\\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto found;\",\n \"\\t\\t\\tret = key_ref;\\n\\t\\t} else {\\n\\t\\t\\tup_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */\\n\\tif (err == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) || ret == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY))\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);\\n\\telse if (err == ERR_PTR(-EACCES))\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = ret;\\n\\telse\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = err;\",\n \"found:\\n\\treturn key_ref;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * See if the key we're looking at is the target key.\\n */\\nbool lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key,\\n\\t\\t\\t const struct key_match_data *match_data)\\n{\\n\\treturn key == match_data->raw_data;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Look up a key ID given us by userspace with a given permissions mask to get\\n * the key it refers to.\\n *\\n * Flags can be passed to request that special keyrings be created if referred\\n * to directly, to permit partially constructed keys to be found and to skip\\n * validity and permission checks on the found key.\\n *\\n * Returns a pointer to the key with an incremented usage count if successful;\\n * -EINVAL if the key ID is invalid; -ENOKEY if the key ID does not correspond\\n * to a key or the best found key was a negative key; -EKEYREVOKED or\\n * -EKEYEXPIRED if the best found key was revoked or expired; -EACCES if the\\n * found key doesn't grant the requested permit or the LSM denied access to it;\\n * or -ENOMEM if a special keyring couldn't be created.\\n *\\n * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the\\n * returned key reference.\\n */\\nkey_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,\\n\\t\\t\\t key_perm_t perm)\\n{\\n\\tstruct keyring_search_context ctx = {\\n\\t\\t.match_data.cmp\\t\\t= lookup_user_key_possessed,\\n\\t\\t.match_data.lookup_type\\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,\\n\\t\\t.flags\\t\\t\\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK,\\n\\t};\\n\\tstruct request_key_auth *rka;\\n\\tstruct key *key;\\n\\tkey_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"try_again:\\n\\tctx.cred = get_current_cred();\\n\\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);\",\n \"\\tswitch (id) {\\n\\tcase KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\tif (!ctx.cred->thread_keyring) {\\n\\t\\t\\tif (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\",\n \"\\t\\t\\tret = install_thread_keyring();\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t\\t}\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto reget_creds;\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\tkey = ctx.cred->thread_keyring;\\n\\t\\t__key_get(key);\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\\n\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\tcase KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\tif (!ctx.cred->process_keyring) {\\n\\t\\t\\tif (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\",\n \"\\t\\t\\tret = install_process_keyring();\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t\\t}\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto reget_creds;\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\tkey = ctx.cred->process_keyring;\\n\\t\\t__key_get(key);\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\\n\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\tcase KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\tif (!ctx.cred->session_keyring) {\\n\\t\\t\\t/* always install a session keyring upon access if one\\n\\t\\t\\t * doesn't exist yet */\\n\\t\\t\\tret = install_user_keyrings();\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t\\tif (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tret = join_session_keyring(NULL);\\n\\t\\t\\telse\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tret = install_session_keyring(\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tctx.cred->user->session_keyring);\",\n \"\\t\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto reget_creds;\\n\\t\\t} else if (ctx.cred->session_keyring ==\\n\\t\\t\\t ctx.cred->user->session_keyring &&\\n\\t\\t\\t lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) {\\n\\t\\t\\tret = join_session_keyring(NULL);\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto reget_creds;\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\trcu_read_lock();\\n\\t\\tkey = rcu_dereference(ctx.cred->session_keyring);\\n\\t\\t__key_get(key);\\n\\t\\trcu_read_unlock();\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\\n\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\tcase KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\tif (!ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring) {\\n\\t\\t\\tret = install_user_keyrings();\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\tkey = ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring;\\n\\t\\t__key_get(key);\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\\n\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\tcase KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\tif (!ctx.cred->user->session_keyring) {\\n\\t\\t\\tret = install_user_keyrings();\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\tkey = ctx.cred->user->session_keyring;\\n\\t\\t__key_get(key);\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\\n\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\tcase KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\t/* group keyrings are not yet supported */\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);\\n\\t\\tgoto error;\",\n \"\\tcase KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:\\n\\t\\tkey = ctx.cred->request_key_auth;\\n\\t\\tif (!key)\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\",\n \"\\t\\t__key_get(key);\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\\n\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\tcase KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\tif (!ctx.cred->request_key_auth)\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\",\n \"\\t\\tdown_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);\\n\\t\\tif (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,\\n\\t\\t\\t &ctx.cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);\\n\\t\\t\\tkey = NULL;\\n\\t\\t} else {\\n\\t\\t\\trka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];\\n\\t\\t\\tkey = rka->dest_keyring;\\n\\t\\t\\t__key_get(key);\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t\\tup_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);\\n\\t\\tif (!key)\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\\n\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\tdefault:\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);\\n\\t\\tif (id < 1)\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\",\n \"\\t\\tkey = key_lookup(id);\\n\\t\\tif (IS_ERR(key)) {\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_ref = ERR_CAST(key);\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);\",\n \"\\t\\t/* check to see if we possess the key */\\n\\t\\tctx.index_key.type\\t\\t= key->type;\\n\\t\\tctx.index_key.description\\t= key->description;\\n\\t\\tctx.index_key.desc_len\\t\\t= strlen(key->description);\\n\\t\\tctx.match_data.raw_data\\t\\t= key;\\n\\t\\tkdebug(\\\"check possessed\\\");\\n\\t\\tskey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);\\n\\t\\tkdebug(\\\"possessed=%p\\\", skey_ref);\",\n \"\\t\\tif (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_put(key);\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_ref = skey_ref;\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* unlink does not use the nominated key in any way, so can skip all\\n\\t * the permission checks as it is only concerned with the keyring */\\n\\tif (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK) {\\n\\t\\tret = 0;\\n\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tif (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL)) {\\n\\t\\tret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);\\n\\t\\tswitch (ret) {\\n\\t\\tcase -ERESTARTSYS:\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto invalid_key;\\n\\t\\tdefault:\\n\\t\\t\\tif (perm)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto invalid_key;\\n\\t\\tcase 0:\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t} else if (perm) {\\n\\t\\tret = key_validate(key);\\n\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto invalid_key;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tret = -EIO;\\n\\tif (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&\",\n \"\\t !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))\",\n \"\\t\\tgoto invalid_key;\",\n \"\\t/* check the permissions */\\n\\tret = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, perm);\\n\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\tgoto invalid_key;\",\n \"\\tkey->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;\",\n \"error:\\n\\tput_cred(ctx.cred);\\n\\treturn key_ref;\",\n \"invalid_key:\\n\\tkey_ref_put(key_ref);\\n\\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);\\n\\tgoto error;\",\n \"\\t/* if we attempted to install a keyring, then it may have caused new\\n\\t * creds to be installed */\\nreget_creds:\\n\\tput_cred(ctx.cred);\\n\\tgoto try_again;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Join the named keyring as the session keyring if possible else attempt to\\n * create a new one of that name and join that.\\n *\\n * If the name is NULL, an empty anonymous keyring will be installed as the\\n * session keyring.\\n *\\n * Named session keyrings are joined with a semaphore held to prevent the\\n * keyrings from going away whilst the attempt is made to going them and also\\n * to prevent a race in creating compatible session keyrings.\\n */\\nlong join_session_keyring(const char *name)\\n{\\n\\tconst struct cred *old;\\n\\tstruct cred *new;\\n\\tstruct key *keyring;\\n\\tlong ret, serial;\",\n \"\\tnew = prepare_creds();\\n\\tif (!new)\\n\\t\\treturn -ENOMEM;\\n\\told = current_cred();\",\n \"\\t/* if no name is provided, install an anonymous keyring */\\n\\tif (!name) {\\n\\t\\tret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, NULL);\\n\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\",\n \"\\t\\tserial = new->session_keyring->serial;\\n\\t\\tret = commit_creds(new);\\n\\t\\tif (ret == 0)\\n\\t\\t\\tret = serial;\\n\\t\\tgoto okay;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* allow the user to join or create a named keyring */\\n\\tmutex_lock(&key_session_mutex);\",\n \"\\t/* look for an existing keyring of this name */\\n\\tkeyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false);\\n\\tif (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {\\n\\t\\t/* not found - try and create a new one */\\n\\t\\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(\\n\\t\\t\\tname, old->uid, old->gid, old,\\n\\t\\t\\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_LINK,\\n\\t\\t\\tKEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);\\n\\t\\tif (IS_ERR(keyring)) {\\n\\t\\t\\tret = PTR_ERR(keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error2;\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t} else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {\\n\\t\\tret = PTR_ERR(keyring);\\n\\t\\tgoto error2;\\n\\t} else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tret = 0;\\n\\t\\tgoto error3;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */\\n\\tret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);\\n\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\tgoto error3;\",\n \"\\tcommit_creds(new);\\n\\tmutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);\",\n \"\\tret = keyring->serial;\\n\\tkey_put(keyring);\\nokay:\\n\\treturn ret;\",\n \"error3:\\n\\tkey_put(keyring);\\nerror2:\\n\\tmutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);\\nerror:\\n\\tabort_creds(new);\\n\\treturn ret;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children when\\n * the target process is about to resume userspace execution.\\n */\\nvoid key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork)\\n{\\n\\tconst struct cred *old = current_cred();\\n\\tstruct cred *new = container_of(twork, struct cred, rcu);\",\n \"\\tif (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) {\\n\\t\\tput_cred(new);\\n\\t\\treturn;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tnew-> uid\\t= old-> uid;\\n\\tnew-> euid\\t= old-> euid;\\n\\tnew-> suid\\t= old-> suid;\\n\\tnew->fsuid\\t= old->fsuid;\\n\\tnew-> gid\\t= old-> gid;\\n\\tnew-> egid\\t= old-> egid;\\n\\tnew-> sgid\\t= old-> sgid;\\n\\tnew->fsgid\\t= old->fsgid;\\n\\tnew->user\\t= get_uid(old->user);\\n\\tnew->user_ns\\t= get_user_ns(old->user_ns);\\n\\tnew->group_info\\t= get_group_info(old->group_info);\",\n \"\\tnew->securebits\\t= old->securebits;\\n\\tnew->cap_inheritable\\t= old->cap_inheritable;\\n\\tnew->cap_permitted\\t= old->cap_permitted;\\n\\tnew->cap_effective\\t= old->cap_effective;\\n\\tnew->cap_ambient\\t= old->cap_ambient;\\n\\tnew->cap_bset\\t\\t= old->cap_bset;\",\n \"\\tnew->jit_keyring\\t= old->jit_keyring;\\n\\tnew->thread_keyring\\t= key_get(old->thread_keyring);\\n\\tnew->process_keyring\\t= key_get(old->process_keyring);\",\n \"\\tsecurity_transfer_creds(new, old);\",\n \"\\tcommit_creds(new);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Make sure that root's user and user-session keyrings exist.\\n */\\nstatic int __init init_root_keyring(void)\\n{\\n\\treturn install_user_keyrings();\\n}\",\n \"late_initcall(init_root_keyring);\"\n]","isConversational":false},"labels":{"kind":"list like","value":[1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1],"string":"[\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 0,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1\n]","isConversational":false},"source":{"kind":"string","value":"PreciseBugs"},"other_info":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"buggy_code_end_loc\": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], \"buggy_code_start_loc\": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], \"filenames\": [\"include/linux/key.h\", \"net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c\", \"security/keys/big_key.c\", \"security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c\", \"security/keys/gc.c\", \"security/keys/key.c\", \"security/keys/keyctl.c\", \"security/keys/keyring.c\", \"security/keys/proc.c\", \"security/keys/process_keys.c\", \"security/keys/request_key.c\", \"security/keys/request_key_auth.c\", \"security/keys/trusted.c\", \"security/keys/user_defined.c\"], \"fixing_code_end_loc\": [380, 228, 283, 858, 155, 1000, 904, 603, 253, 734, 601, 77, 1070, 166], \"fixing_code_start_loc\": [139, 227, 250, 857, 132, 405, 769, 417, 185, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], \"message\": \"The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the \\\"negative\\\" state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.\", \"other\": {\"cve\": {\"cisaActionDue\": null, \"cisaExploitAdd\": null, \"cisaRequiredAction\": null, \"cisaVulnerabilityName\": null, \"configurations\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"4397FA2C-1EE8-4F42-9823-2D85B8C20976\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.4.95\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.4\", \"vulnerable\": true}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"D6690C73-23A3-4475-97D0-8CB96812E2FB\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.9.59\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.5\", \"vulnerable\": true}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"86038BA0-0886-479E-AD71-D78363937D66\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.13.10\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.10\", \"vulnerable\": true}], \"negate\": false, \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": null}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the \\\"negative\\\" state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.\"}, {\"lang\": \"es\", \"value\": \"El subsistema KEYS en el kernel de Linux en versiones anteriores a la 4.13.10 no sincroniza correctamente las acciones de actualizaci\\u00f3n con las de detecci\\u00f3n de una clave en el estado \\\"negative\\\" para evitar una condici\\u00f3n de carrera, lo que permite que los usuarios locales provoquen una denegaci\\u00f3n de servicio (DoS) o, posiblemente, cause otro impacto no especificado mediante llamadas al sistema manipuladas.\"}], \"evaluatorComment\": null, \"id\": \"CVE-2017-15951\", \"lastModified\": \"2023-01-19T15:45:25.270\", \"metrics\": {\"cvssMetricV2\": [{\"acInsufInfo\": false, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"cvssData\": {\"accessComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"accessVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"authentication\": \"NONE\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"baseScore\": 7.2, \"confidentialityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"integrityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"vectorString\": \"AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C\", \"version\": \"2.0\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 3.9, \"impactScore\": 10.0, \"obtainAllPrivilege\": false, \"obtainOtherPrivilege\": false, \"obtainUserPrivilege\": false, \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\", \"userInteractionRequired\": false}], \"cvssMetricV30\": null, \"cvssMetricV31\": [{\"cvssData\": {\"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"baseScore\": 7.8, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"integrityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"LOW\", \"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\", \"version\": \"3.1\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 1.8, \"impactScore\": 5.9, \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\"}]}, \"published\": \"2017-10-28T02:29:00.217\", \"references\": [{\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Issue Tracking\", \"Patch\", \"Third Party Advisory\"], \"url\": \"http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Release Notes\", \"Vendor Advisory\"], \"url\": \"http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/ChangeLog-4.13.10\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Third Party Advisory\", \"VDB Entry\"], \"url\": \"http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101621\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Issue Tracking\", \"Patch\", \"Third Party Advisory\"], \"url\": \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}], \"sourceIdentifier\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"vendorComments\": null, \"vulnStatus\": \"Analyzed\", \"weaknesses\": [{\"description\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CWE-20\"}], \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\"}]}, \"github_commit_url\": \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}, \"type\": \"CWE-20\"}"},"index":{"kind":"number","value":836,"string":"836"}}},{"rowIdx":4995,"cells":{"prompt":{"kind":"string","value":"Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not."},"completions":{"kind":"list like","value":["/* Manage a process's keyrings\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version\n * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.\n */","#include <linux/module.h>\n#include <linux/init.h>\n#include <linux/sched.h>\n#include <linux/sched/user.h>\n#include <linux/keyctl.h>\n#include <linux/fs.h>\n#include <linux/err.h>\n#include <linux/mutex.h>\n#include <linux/security.h>\n#include <linux/user_namespace.h>\n#include <linux/uaccess.h>\n#include \"internal.h\"","/* Session keyring create vs join semaphore */\nstatic DEFINE_MUTEX(key_session_mutex);","/* User keyring creation semaphore */\nstatic DEFINE_MUTEX(key_user_keyring_mutex);","/* The root user's tracking struct */\nstruct key_user root_key_user = {\n\t.usage\t\t= REFCOUNT_INIT(3),\n\t.cons_lock\t= __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(root_key_user.cons_lock),\n\t.lock\t\t= __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(root_key_user.lock),\n\t.nkeys\t\t= ATOMIC_INIT(2),\n\t.nikeys\t\t= ATOMIC_INIT(2),\n\t.uid\t\t= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,\n};","/*\n * Install the user and user session keyrings for the current process's UID.\n */\nint install_user_keyrings(void)\n{\n\tstruct user_struct *user;\n\tconst struct cred *cred;\n\tstruct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;\n\tkey_perm_t user_keyring_perm;\n\tchar buf[20];\n\tint ret;\n\tuid_t uid;","\tuser_keyring_perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL;\n\tcred = current_cred();\n\tuser = cred->user;\n\tuid = from_kuid(cred->user_ns, user->uid);","\tkenter(\"%p{%u}\", user, uid);","\tif (user->uid_keyring && user->session_keyring) {\n\t\tkleave(\" = 0 [exist]\");\n\t\treturn 0;\n\t}","\tmutex_lock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);\n\tret = 0;","\tif (!user->uid_keyring) {\n\t\t/* get the UID-specific keyring\n\t\t * - there may be one in existence already as it may have been\n\t\t * pinned by a session, but the user_struct pointing to it\n\t\t * may have been destroyed by setuid */\n\t\tsprintf(buf, \"_uid.%u\", uid);","\t\tuid_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);\n\t\tif (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {\n\t\t\tuid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t cred, user_keyring_perm,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tKEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t NULL, NULL);\n\t\t\tif (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {\n\t\t\t\tret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}","\t\t/* get a default session keyring (which might also exist\n\t\t * already) */\n\t\tsprintf(buf, \"_uid_ses.%u\", uid);","\t\tsession_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);\n\t\tif (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {\n\t\t\tsession_keyring =\n\t\t\t\tkeyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,\n\t\t\t\t\t cred, user_keyring_perm,\n\t\t\t\t\t KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |\n\t\t\t\t\t\t KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,\n\t\t\t\t\t NULL, NULL);\n\t\t\tif (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {\n\t\t\t\tret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);\n\t\t\t\tgoto error_release;\n\t\t\t}","\t\t\t/* we install a link from the user session keyring to\n\t\t\t * the user keyring */\n\t\t\tret = key_link(session_keyring, uid_keyring);\n\t\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\t\tgoto error_release_both;\n\t\t}","\t\t/* install the keyrings */\n\t\tuser->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;\n\t\tuser->session_keyring = session_keyring;\n\t}","\tmutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);\n\tkleave(\" = 0\");\n\treturn 0;","error_release_both:\n\tkey_put(session_keyring);\nerror_release:\n\tkey_put(uid_keyring);\nerror:\n\tmutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);\n\tkleave(\" = %d\", ret);\n\treturn ret;\n}","/*\n * Install a thread keyring to the given credentials struct if it didn't have\n * one already. This is allowed to overrun the quota.\n *\n * Return: 0 if a thread keyring is now present; -errno on failure.\n */\nint install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)\n{\n\tstruct key *keyring;","\tif (new->thread_keyring)\n\t\treturn 0;","\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(\"_tid\", new->uid, new->gid, new,\n\t\t\t\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,\n\t\t\t\tKEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,\n\t\t\t\tNULL, NULL);\n\tif (IS_ERR(keyring))\n\t\treturn PTR_ERR(keyring);","\tnew->thread_keyring = keyring;\n\treturn 0;\n}","/*\n * Install a thread keyring to the current task if it didn't have one already.\n *\n * Return: 0 if a thread keyring is now present; -errno on failure.\n */\nstatic int install_thread_keyring(void)\n{\n\tstruct cred *new;\n\tint ret;","\tnew = prepare_creds();\n\tif (!new)\n\t\treturn -ENOMEM;","\tret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);\n\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\tabort_creds(new);\n\t\treturn ret;\n\t}","\treturn commit_creds(new);\n}","/*\n * Install a process keyring to the given credentials struct if it didn't have\n * one already. This is allowed to overrun the quota.\n *\n * Return: 0 if a process keyring is now present; -errno on failure.\n */\nint install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)\n{\n\tstruct key *keyring;","\tif (new->process_keyring)\n\t\treturn 0;","\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(\"_pid\", new->uid, new->gid, new,\n\t\t\t\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,\n\t\t\t\tKEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,\n\t\t\t\tNULL, NULL);\n\tif (IS_ERR(keyring))\n\t\treturn PTR_ERR(keyring);","\tnew->process_keyring = keyring;\n\treturn 0;\n}","/*\n * Install a process keyring to the current task if it didn't have one already.\n *\n * Return: 0 if a process keyring is now present; -errno on failure.\n */\nstatic int install_process_keyring(void)\n{\n\tstruct cred *new;\n\tint ret;","\tnew = prepare_creds();\n\tif (!new)\n\t\treturn -ENOMEM;","\tret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);\n\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\tabort_creds(new);\n\t\treturn ret;\n\t}","\treturn commit_creds(new);\n}","/*\n * Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the given credentials\n * struct, replacing the existing one if any. If the given keyring is NULL,\n * then install a new anonymous session keyring.\n *\n * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.\n */\nint install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)\n{\n\tunsigned long flags;\n\tstruct key *old;","\tmight_sleep();","\t/* create an empty session keyring */\n\tif (!keyring) {\n\t\tflags = KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN;\n\t\tif (cred->session_keyring)\n\t\t\tflags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA;","\t\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(\"_ses\", cred->uid, cred->gid, cred,\n\t\t\t\t\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,\n\t\t\t\t\tflags, NULL, NULL);\n\t\tif (IS_ERR(keyring))\n\t\t\treturn PTR_ERR(keyring);\n\t} else {\n\t\t__key_get(keyring);\n\t}","\t/* install the keyring */\n\told = cred->session_keyring;\n\trcu_assign_pointer(cred->session_keyring, keyring);","\tif (old)\n\t\tkey_put(old);","\treturn 0;\n}","/*\n * Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the current task,\n * replacing the existing one if any. If the given keyring is NULL, then\n * install a new anonymous session keyring.\n *\n * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.\n */\nstatic int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)\n{\n\tstruct cred *new;\n\tint ret;","\tnew = prepare_creds();\n\tif (!new)\n\t\treturn -ENOMEM;","\tret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);\n\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\tabort_creds(new);\n\t\treturn ret;\n\t}","\treturn commit_creds(new);\n}","/*\n * Handle the fsuid changing.\n */\nvoid key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)\n{\n\t/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */\n\tBUG_ON(!tsk->cred);\n\tif (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) {\n\t\tdown_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);\n\t\ttsk->cred->thread_keyring->uid = tsk->cred->fsuid;\n\t\tup_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);\n\t}\n}","/*\n * Handle the fsgid changing.\n */\nvoid key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)\n{\n\t/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */\n\tBUG_ON(!tsk->cred);\n\tif (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) {\n\t\tdown_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);\n\t\ttsk->cred->thread_keyring->gid = tsk->cred->fsgid;\n\t\tup_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);\n\t}\n}","/*\n * Search the process keyrings attached to the supplied cred for the first\n * matching key.\n *\n * The search criteria are the type and the match function. The description is\n * given to the match function as a parameter, but doesn't otherwise influence\n * the search. Typically the match function will compare the description\n * parameter to the key's description.\n *\n * This can only search keyrings that grant Search permission to the supplied\n * credentials. Keyrings linked to searched keyrings will also be searched if\n * they grant Search permission too. Keys can only be found if they grant\n * Search permission to the credentials.\n *\n * Returns a pointer to the key with the key usage count incremented if\n * successful, -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key or -ENOKEY if we only\n * matched negative keys.\n *\n * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the\n * returned key reference.\n */\nkey_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)\n{\n\tkey_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;","\t/* we want to return -EAGAIN or -ENOKEY if any of the keyrings were\n\t * searchable, but we failed to find a key or we found a negative key;\n\t * otherwise we want to return a sample error (probably -EACCES) if\n\t * none of the keyrings were searchable\n\t *\n\t * in terms of priority: success > -ENOKEY > -EAGAIN > other error\n\t */\n\tkey_ref = NULL;\n\tret = NULL;\n\terr = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);","\t/* search the thread keyring first */\n\tif (ctx->cred->thread_keyring) {\n\t\tkey_ref = keyring_search_aux(\n\t\t\tmake_key_ref(ctx->cred->thread_keyring, 1), ctx);\n\t\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\n\t\t\tgoto found;","\t\tswitch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {\n\t\tcase -EAGAIN: /* no key */\n\t\tcase -ENOKEY: /* negative key */\n\t\t\tret = key_ref;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\terr = key_ref;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t}\n\t}","\t/* search the process keyring second */\n\tif (ctx->cred->process_keyring) {\n\t\tkey_ref = keyring_search_aux(\n\t\t\tmake_key_ref(ctx->cred->process_keyring, 1), ctx);\n\t\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\n\t\t\tgoto found;","\t\tswitch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {\n\t\tcase -EAGAIN: /* no key */\n\t\t\tif (ret)\n\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tcase -ENOKEY: /* negative key */\n\t\t\tret = key_ref;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\terr = key_ref;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t}\n\t}","\t/* search the session keyring */\n\tif (ctx->cred->session_keyring) {\n\t\trcu_read_lock();\n\t\tkey_ref = keyring_search_aux(\n\t\t\tmake_key_ref(rcu_dereference(ctx->cred->session_keyring), 1),\n\t\t\tctx);\n\t\trcu_read_unlock();","\t\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\n\t\t\tgoto found;","\t\tswitch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {\n\t\tcase -EAGAIN: /* no key */\n\t\t\tif (ret)\n\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tcase -ENOKEY: /* negative key */\n\t\t\tret = key_ref;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\terr = key_ref;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\t/* or search the user-session keyring */\n\telse if (ctx->cred->user->session_keyring) {\n\t\tkey_ref = keyring_search_aux(\n\t\t\tmake_key_ref(ctx->cred->user->session_keyring, 1),\n\t\t\tctx);\n\t\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\n\t\t\tgoto found;","\t\tswitch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {\n\t\tcase -EAGAIN: /* no key */\n\t\t\tif (ret)\n\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tcase -ENOKEY: /* negative key */\n\t\t\tret = key_ref;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\terr = key_ref;\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t}\n\t}","\t/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */\n\tkey_ref = ret ? ret : err;","found:\n\treturn key_ref;\n}","/*\n * Search the process keyrings attached to the supplied cred for the first\n * matching key in the manner of search_my_process_keyrings(), but also search\n * the keys attached to the assumed authorisation key using its credentials if\n * one is available.\n *\n * Return same as search_my_process_keyrings().\n */\nkey_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)\n{\n\tstruct request_key_auth *rka;\n\tkey_ref_t key_ref, ret = ERR_PTR(-EACCES), err;","\tmight_sleep();","\tkey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(ctx);\n\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\n\t\tgoto found;\n\terr = key_ref;","\t/* if this process has an instantiation authorisation key, then we also\n\t * search the keyrings of the process mentioned there\n\t * - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method\n\t */\n\tif (ctx->cred->request_key_auth &&\n\t ctx->cred == current_cred() &&\n\t ctx->index_key.type != &key_type_request_key_auth\n\t ) {\n\t\tconst struct cred *cred = ctx->cred;","\t\t/* defend against the auth key being revoked */\n\t\tdown_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);","\t\tif (key_validate(ctx->cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {\n\t\t\trka = ctx->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];","\t\t\tctx->cred = rka->cred;\n\t\t\tkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx);\n\t\t\tctx->cred = cred;","\t\t\tup_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);","\t\t\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\n\t\t\t\tgoto found;","\t\t\tret = key_ref;\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tup_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);\n\t\t}\n\t}","\t/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */\n\tif (err == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) || ret == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY))\n\t\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);\n\telse if (err == ERR_PTR(-EACCES))\n\t\tkey_ref = ret;\n\telse\n\t\tkey_ref = err;","found:\n\treturn key_ref;\n}","/*\n * See if the key we're looking at is the target key.\n */\nbool lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key,\n\t\t\t const struct key_match_data *match_data)\n{\n\treturn key == match_data->raw_data;\n}","/*\n * Look up a key ID given us by userspace with a given permissions mask to get\n * the key it refers to.\n *\n * Flags can be passed to request that special keyrings be created if referred\n * to directly, to permit partially constructed keys to be found and to skip\n * validity and permission checks on the found key.\n *\n * Returns a pointer to the key with an incremented usage count if successful;\n * -EINVAL if the key ID is invalid; -ENOKEY if the key ID does not correspond\n * to a key or the best found key was a negative key; -EKEYREVOKED or\n * -EKEYEXPIRED if the best found key was revoked or expired; -EACCES if the\n * found key doesn't grant the requested permit or the LSM denied access to it;\n * or -ENOMEM if a special keyring couldn't be created.\n *\n * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the\n * returned key reference.\n */\nkey_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,\n\t\t\t key_perm_t perm)\n{\n\tstruct keyring_search_context ctx = {\n\t\t.match_data.cmp\t\t= lookup_user_key_possessed,\n\t\t.match_data.lookup_type\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,\n\t\t.flags\t\t\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK,\n\t};\n\tstruct request_key_auth *rka;\n\tstruct key *key;\n\tkey_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;\n\tint ret;","try_again:\n\tctx.cred = get_current_cred();\n\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);","\tswitch (id) {\n\tcase KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:\n\t\tif (!ctx.cred->thread_keyring) {\n\t\t\tif (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;","\t\t\tret = install_thread_keyring();\n\t\t\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\t\t\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tgoto reget_creds;\n\t\t}","\t\tkey = ctx.cred->thread_keyring;\n\t\t__key_get(key);\n\t\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\n\t\tbreak;","\tcase KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:\n\t\tif (!ctx.cred->process_keyring) {\n\t\t\tif (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;","\t\t\tret = install_process_keyring();\n\t\t\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\t\t\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tgoto reget_creds;\n\t\t}","\t\tkey = ctx.cred->process_keyring;\n\t\t__key_get(key);\n\t\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\n\t\tbreak;","\tcase KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:\n\t\tif (!ctx.cred->session_keyring) {\n\t\t\t/* always install a session keyring upon access if one\n\t\t\t * doesn't exist yet */\n\t\t\tret = install_user_keyrings();\n\t\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t\tif (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE)\n\t\t\t\tret = join_session_keyring(NULL);\n\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\tret = install_session_keyring(\n\t\t\t\t\tctx.cred->user->session_keyring);","\t\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t\tgoto reget_creds;\n\t\t} else if (ctx.cred->session_keyring ==\n\t\t\t ctx.cred->user->session_keyring &&\n\t\t\t lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) {\n\t\t\tret = join_session_keyring(NULL);\n\t\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t\tgoto reget_creds;\n\t\t}","\t\trcu_read_lock();\n\t\tkey = rcu_dereference(ctx.cred->session_keyring);\n\t\t__key_get(key);\n\t\trcu_read_unlock();\n\t\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\n\t\tbreak;","\tcase KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:\n\t\tif (!ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring) {\n\t\t\tret = install_user_keyrings();\n\t\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t}","\t\tkey = ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring;\n\t\t__key_get(key);\n\t\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\n\t\tbreak;","\tcase KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:\n\t\tif (!ctx.cred->user->session_keyring) {\n\t\t\tret = install_user_keyrings();\n\t\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t}","\t\tkey = ctx.cred->user->session_keyring;\n\t\t__key_get(key);\n\t\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\n\t\tbreak;","\tcase KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING:\n\t\t/* group keyrings are not yet supported */\n\t\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);\n\t\tgoto error;","\tcase KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:\n\t\tkey = ctx.cred->request_key_auth;\n\t\tif (!key)\n\t\t\tgoto error;","\t\t__key_get(key);\n\t\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\n\t\tbreak;","\tcase KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:\n\t\tif (!ctx.cred->request_key_auth)\n\t\t\tgoto error;","\t\tdown_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);\n\t\tif (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,\n\t\t\t &ctx.cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {\n\t\t\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);\n\t\t\tkey = NULL;\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\trka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];\n\t\t\tkey = rka->dest_keyring;\n\t\t\t__key_get(key);\n\t\t}\n\t\tup_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);\n\t\tif (!key)\n\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\n\t\tbreak;","\tdefault:\n\t\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);\n\t\tif (id < 1)\n\t\t\tgoto error;","\t\tkey = key_lookup(id);\n\t\tif (IS_ERR(key)) {\n\t\t\tkey_ref = ERR_CAST(key);\n\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t}","\t\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);","\t\t/* check to see if we possess the key */\n\t\tctx.index_key.type\t\t= key->type;\n\t\tctx.index_key.description\t= key->description;\n\t\tctx.index_key.desc_len\t\t= strlen(key->description);\n\t\tctx.match_data.raw_data\t\t= key;\n\t\tkdebug(\"check possessed\");\n\t\tskey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);\n\t\tkdebug(\"possessed=%p\", skey_ref);","\t\tif (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {\n\t\t\tkey_put(key);\n\t\t\tkey_ref = skey_ref;\n\t\t}","\t\tbreak;\n\t}","\t/* unlink does not use the nominated key in any way, so can skip all\n\t * the permission checks as it is only concerned with the keyring */\n\tif (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK) {\n\t\tret = 0;\n\t\tgoto error;\n\t}","\tif (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL)) {\n\t\tret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);\n\t\tswitch (ret) {\n\t\tcase -ERESTARTSYS:\n\t\t\tgoto invalid_key;\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tif (perm)\n\t\t\t\tgoto invalid_key;\n\t\tcase 0:\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t}\n\t} else if (perm) {\n\t\tret = key_validate(key);\n\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\tgoto invalid_key;\n\t}","\tret = -EIO;\n\tif (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&","\t key_read_state(key) == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED)","\t\tgoto invalid_key;","\t/* check the permissions */\n\tret = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, perm);\n\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\tgoto invalid_key;","\tkey->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;","error:\n\tput_cred(ctx.cred);\n\treturn key_ref;","invalid_key:\n\tkey_ref_put(key_ref);\n\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);\n\tgoto error;","\t/* if we attempted to install a keyring, then it may have caused new\n\t * creds to be installed */\nreget_creds:\n\tput_cred(ctx.cred);\n\tgoto try_again;\n}","/*\n * Join the named keyring as the session keyring if possible else attempt to\n * create a new one of that name and join that.\n *\n * If the name is NULL, an empty anonymous keyring will be installed as the\n * session keyring.\n *\n * Named session keyrings are joined with a semaphore held to prevent the\n * keyrings from going away whilst the attempt is made to going them and also\n * to prevent a race in creating compatible session keyrings.\n */\nlong join_session_keyring(const char *name)\n{\n\tconst struct cred *old;\n\tstruct cred *new;\n\tstruct key *keyring;\n\tlong ret, serial;","\tnew = prepare_creds();\n\tif (!new)\n\t\treturn -ENOMEM;\n\told = current_cred();","\t/* if no name is provided, install an anonymous keyring */\n\tif (!name) {\n\t\tret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, NULL);\n\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\tgoto error;","\t\tserial = new->session_keyring->serial;\n\t\tret = commit_creds(new);\n\t\tif (ret == 0)\n\t\t\tret = serial;\n\t\tgoto okay;\n\t}","\t/* allow the user to join or create a named keyring */\n\tmutex_lock(&key_session_mutex);","\t/* look for an existing keyring of this name */\n\tkeyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false);\n\tif (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {\n\t\t/* not found - try and create a new one */\n\t\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(\n\t\t\tname, old->uid, old->gid, old,\n\t\t\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_LINK,\n\t\t\tKEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);\n\t\tif (IS_ERR(keyring)) {\n\t\t\tret = PTR_ERR(keyring);\n\t\t\tgoto error2;\n\t\t}\n\t} else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {\n\t\tret = PTR_ERR(keyring);\n\t\tgoto error2;\n\t} else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) {\n\t\tret = 0;\n\t\tgoto error3;\n\t}","\t/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */\n\tret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);\n\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\tgoto error3;","\tcommit_creds(new);\n\tmutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);","\tret = keyring->serial;\n\tkey_put(keyring);\nokay:\n\treturn ret;","error3:\n\tkey_put(keyring);\nerror2:\n\tmutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);\nerror:\n\tabort_creds(new);\n\treturn ret;\n}","/*\n * Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children when\n * the target process is about to resume userspace execution.\n */\nvoid key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork)\n{\n\tconst struct cred *old = current_cred();\n\tstruct cred *new = container_of(twork, struct cred, rcu);","\tif (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) {\n\t\tput_cred(new);\n\t\treturn;\n\t}","\tnew-> uid\t= old-> uid;\n\tnew-> euid\t= old-> euid;\n\tnew-> suid\t= old-> suid;\n\tnew->fsuid\t= old->fsuid;\n\tnew-> gid\t= old-> gid;\n\tnew-> egid\t= old-> egid;\n\tnew-> sgid\t= old-> sgid;\n\tnew->fsgid\t= old->fsgid;\n\tnew->user\t= get_uid(old->user);\n\tnew->user_ns\t= get_user_ns(old->user_ns);\n\tnew->group_info\t= get_group_info(old->group_info);","\tnew->securebits\t= old->securebits;\n\tnew->cap_inheritable\t= old->cap_inheritable;\n\tnew->cap_permitted\t= old->cap_permitted;\n\tnew->cap_effective\t= old->cap_effective;\n\tnew->cap_ambient\t= old->cap_ambient;\n\tnew->cap_bset\t\t= old->cap_bset;","\tnew->jit_keyring\t= old->jit_keyring;\n\tnew->thread_keyring\t= key_get(old->thread_keyring);\n\tnew->process_keyring\t= key_get(old->process_keyring);","\tsecurity_transfer_creds(new, old);","\tcommit_creds(new);\n}","/*\n * Make sure that root's user and user-session keyrings exist.\n */\nstatic int __init init_root_keyring(void)\n{\n\treturn install_user_keyrings();\n}","late_initcall(init_root_keyring);"],"string":"[\n \"/* Manage a process's keyrings\\n *\\n * Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\\n *\\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\\n * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version\\n * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.\\n */\",\n \"#include <linux/module.h>\\n#include <linux/init.h>\\n#include <linux/sched.h>\\n#include <linux/sched/user.h>\\n#include <linux/keyctl.h>\\n#include <linux/fs.h>\\n#include <linux/err.h>\\n#include <linux/mutex.h>\\n#include <linux/security.h>\\n#include <linux/user_namespace.h>\\n#include <linux/uaccess.h>\\n#include \\\"internal.h\\\"\",\n \"/* Session keyring create vs join semaphore */\\nstatic DEFINE_MUTEX(key_session_mutex);\",\n \"/* User keyring creation semaphore */\\nstatic DEFINE_MUTEX(key_user_keyring_mutex);\",\n \"/* The root user's tracking struct */\\nstruct key_user root_key_user = {\\n\\t.usage\\t\\t= REFCOUNT_INIT(3),\\n\\t.cons_lock\\t= __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(root_key_user.cons_lock),\\n\\t.lock\\t\\t= __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(root_key_user.lock),\\n\\t.nkeys\\t\\t= ATOMIC_INIT(2),\\n\\t.nikeys\\t\\t= ATOMIC_INIT(2),\\n\\t.uid\\t\\t= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,\\n};\",\n \"/*\\n * Install the user and user session keyrings for the current process's UID.\\n */\\nint install_user_keyrings(void)\\n{\\n\\tstruct user_struct *user;\\n\\tconst struct cred *cred;\\n\\tstruct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;\\n\\tkey_perm_t user_keyring_perm;\\n\\tchar buf[20];\\n\\tint ret;\\n\\tuid_t uid;\",\n \"\\tuser_keyring_perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL;\\n\\tcred = current_cred();\\n\\tuser = cred->user;\\n\\tuid = from_kuid(cred->user_ns, user->uid);\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"%p{%u}\\\", user, uid);\",\n \"\\tif (user->uid_keyring && user->session_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tkleave(\\\" = 0 [exist]\\\");\\n\\t\\treturn 0;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tmutex_lock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);\\n\\tret = 0;\",\n \"\\tif (!user->uid_keyring) {\\n\\t\\t/* get the UID-specific keyring\\n\\t\\t * - there may be one in existence already as it may have been\\n\\t\\t * pinned by a session, but the user_struct pointing to it\\n\\t\\t * may have been destroyed by setuid */\\n\\t\\tsprintf(buf, \\\"_uid.%u\\\", uid);\",\n \"\\t\\tuid_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);\\n\\t\\tif (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {\\n\\t\\t\\tuid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t cred, user_keyring_perm,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tKEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t NULL, NULL);\\n\\t\\t\\tif (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t\\t}\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\t/* get a default session keyring (which might also exist\\n\\t\\t * already) */\\n\\t\\tsprintf(buf, \\\"_uid_ses.%u\\\", uid);\",\n \"\\t\\tsession_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);\\n\\t\\tif (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {\\n\\t\\t\\tsession_keyring =\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tkeyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t cred, user_keyring_perm,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t NULL, NULL);\\n\\t\\t\\tif (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error_release;\\n\\t\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\t\\t/* we install a link from the user session keyring to\\n\\t\\t\\t * the user keyring */\\n\\t\\t\\tret = key_link(session_keyring, uid_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error_release_both;\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\t/* install the keyrings */\\n\\t\\tuser->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;\\n\\t\\tuser->session_keyring = session_keyring;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tmutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = 0\\\");\\n\\treturn 0;\",\n \"error_release_both:\\n\\tkey_put(session_keyring);\\nerror_release:\\n\\tkey_put(uid_keyring);\\nerror:\\n\\tmutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = %d\\\", ret);\\n\\treturn ret;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Install a thread keyring to the given credentials struct if it didn't have\\n * one already. This is allowed to overrun the quota.\\n *\\n * Return: 0 if a thread keyring is now present; -errno on failure.\\n */\\nint install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key *keyring;\",\n \"\\tif (new->thread_keyring)\\n\\t\\treturn 0;\",\n \"\\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(\\\"_tid\\\", new->uid, new->gid, new,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tKEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tNULL, NULL);\\n\\tif (IS_ERR(keyring))\\n\\t\\treturn PTR_ERR(keyring);\",\n \"\\tnew->thread_keyring = keyring;\\n\\treturn 0;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Install a thread keyring to the current task if it didn't have one already.\\n *\\n * Return: 0 if a thread keyring is now present; -errno on failure.\\n */\\nstatic int install_thread_keyring(void)\\n{\\n\\tstruct cred *new;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tnew = prepare_creds();\\n\\tif (!new)\\n\\t\\treturn -ENOMEM;\",\n \"\\tret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);\\n\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\tabort_creds(new);\\n\\t\\treturn ret;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\treturn commit_creds(new);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Install a process keyring to the given credentials struct if it didn't have\\n * one already. This is allowed to overrun the quota.\\n *\\n * Return: 0 if a process keyring is now present; -errno on failure.\\n */\\nint install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key *keyring;\",\n \"\\tif (new->process_keyring)\\n\\t\\treturn 0;\",\n \"\\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(\\\"_pid\\\", new->uid, new->gid, new,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tKEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tNULL, NULL);\\n\\tif (IS_ERR(keyring))\\n\\t\\treturn PTR_ERR(keyring);\",\n \"\\tnew->process_keyring = keyring;\\n\\treturn 0;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Install a process keyring to the current task if it didn't have one already.\\n *\\n * Return: 0 if a process keyring is now present; -errno on failure.\\n */\\nstatic int install_process_keyring(void)\\n{\\n\\tstruct cred *new;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tnew = prepare_creds();\\n\\tif (!new)\\n\\t\\treturn -ENOMEM;\",\n \"\\tret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);\\n\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\tabort_creds(new);\\n\\t\\treturn ret;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\treturn commit_creds(new);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the given credentials\\n * struct, replacing the existing one if any. If the given keyring is NULL,\\n * then install a new anonymous session keyring.\\n *\\n * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.\\n */\\nint install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)\\n{\\n\\tunsigned long flags;\\n\\tstruct key *old;\",\n \"\\tmight_sleep();\",\n \"\\t/* create an empty session keyring */\\n\\tif (!keyring) {\\n\\t\\tflags = KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN;\\n\\t\\tif (cred->session_keyring)\\n\\t\\t\\tflags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA;\",\n \"\\t\\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(\\\"_ses\\\", cred->uid, cred->gid, cred,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tflags, NULL, NULL);\\n\\t\\tif (IS_ERR(keyring))\\n\\t\\t\\treturn PTR_ERR(keyring);\\n\\t} else {\\n\\t\\t__key_get(keyring);\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* install the keyring */\\n\\told = cred->session_keyring;\\n\\trcu_assign_pointer(cred->session_keyring, keyring);\",\n \"\\tif (old)\\n\\t\\tkey_put(old);\",\n \"\\treturn 0;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the current task,\\n * replacing the existing one if any. If the given keyring is NULL, then\\n * install a new anonymous session keyring.\\n *\\n * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.\\n */\\nstatic int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)\\n{\\n\\tstruct cred *new;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tnew = prepare_creds();\\n\\tif (!new)\\n\\t\\treturn -ENOMEM;\",\n \"\\tret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);\\n\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\tabort_creds(new);\\n\\t\\treturn ret;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\treturn commit_creds(new);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Handle the fsuid changing.\\n */\\nvoid key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)\\n{\\n\\t/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */\\n\\tBUG_ON(!tsk->cred);\\n\\tif (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tdown_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);\\n\\t\\ttsk->cred->thread_keyring->uid = tsk->cred->fsuid;\\n\\t\\tup_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);\\n\\t}\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Handle the fsgid changing.\\n */\\nvoid key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)\\n{\\n\\t/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */\\n\\tBUG_ON(!tsk->cred);\\n\\tif (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tdown_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);\\n\\t\\ttsk->cred->thread_keyring->gid = tsk->cred->fsgid;\\n\\t\\tup_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);\\n\\t}\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Search the process keyrings attached to the supplied cred for the first\\n * matching key.\\n *\\n * The search criteria are the type and the match function. The description is\\n * given to the match function as a parameter, but doesn't otherwise influence\\n * the search. Typically the match function will compare the description\\n * parameter to the key's description.\\n *\\n * This can only search keyrings that grant Search permission to the supplied\\n * credentials. Keyrings linked to searched keyrings will also be searched if\\n * they grant Search permission too. Keys can only be found if they grant\\n * Search permission to the credentials.\\n *\\n * Returns a pointer to the key with the key usage count incremented if\\n * successful, -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key or -ENOKEY if we only\\n * matched negative keys.\\n *\\n * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the\\n * returned key reference.\\n */\\nkey_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)\\n{\\n\\tkey_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;\",\n \"\\t/* we want to return -EAGAIN or -ENOKEY if any of the keyrings were\\n\\t * searchable, but we failed to find a key or we found a negative key;\\n\\t * otherwise we want to return a sample error (probably -EACCES) if\\n\\t * none of the keyrings were searchable\\n\\t *\\n\\t * in terms of priority: success > -ENOKEY > -EAGAIN > other error\\n\\t */\\n\\tkey_ref = NULL;\\n\\tret = NULL;\\n\\terr = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);\",\n \"\\t/* search the thread keyring first */\\n\\tif (ctx->cred->thread_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = keyring_search_aux(\\n\\t\\t\\tmake_key_ref(ctx->cred->thread_keyring, 1), ctx);\\n\\t\\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto found;\",\n \"\\t\\tswitch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {\\n\\t\\tcase -EAGAIN: /* no key */\\n\\t\\tcase -ENOKEY: /* negative key */\\n\\t\\t\\tret = key_ref;\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\tdefault:\\n\\t\\t\\terr = key_ref;\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* search the process keyring second */\\n\\tif (ctx->cred->process_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = keyring_search_aux(\\n\\t\\t\\tmake_key_ref(ctx->cred->process_keyring, 1), ctx);\\n\\t\\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto found;\",\n \"\\t\\tswitch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {\\n\\t\\tcase -EAGAIN: /* no key */\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\tcase -ENOKEY: /* negative key */\\n\\t\\t\\tret = key_ref;\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\tdefault:\\n\\t\\t\\terr = key_ref;\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* search the session keyring */\\n\\tif (ctx->cred->session_keyring) {\\n\\t\\trcu_read_lock();\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = keyring_search_aux(\\n\\t\\t\\tmake_key_ref(rcu_dereference(ctx->cred->session_keyring), 1),\\n\\t\\t\\tctx);\\n\\t\\trcu_read_unlock();\",\n \"\\t\\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto found;\",\n \"\\t\\tswitch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {\\n\\t\\tcase -EAGAIN: /* no key */\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\tcase -ENOKEY: /* negative key */\\n\\t\\t\\tret = key_ref;\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\tdefault:\\n\\t\\t\\terr = key_ref;\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\\n\\t/* or search the user-session keyring */\\n\\telse if (ctx->cred->user->session_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = keyring_search_aux(\\n\\t\\t\\tmake_key_ref(ctx->cred->user->session_keyring, 1),\\n\\t\\t\\tctx);\\n\\t\\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto found;\",\n \"\\t\\tswitch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {\\n\\t\\tcase -EAGAIN: /* no key */\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\tcase -ENOKEY: /* negative key */\\n\\t\\t\\tret = key_ref;\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\tdefault:\\n\\t\\t\\terr = key_ref;\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */\\n\\tkey_ref = ret ? ret : err;\",\n \"found:\\n\\treturn key_ref;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Search the process keyrings attached to the supplied cred for the first\\n * matching key in the manner of search_my_process_keyrings(), but also search\\n * the keys attached to the assumed authorisation key using its credentials if\\n * one is available.\\n *\\n * Return same as search_my_process_keyrings().\\n */\\nkey_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)\\n{\\n\\tstruct request_key_auth *rka;\\n\\tkey_ref_t key_ref, ret = ERR_PTR(-EACCES), err;\",\n \"\\tmight_sleep();\",\n \"\\tkey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(ctx);\\n\\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\\n\\t\\tgoto found;\\n\\terr = key_ref;\",\n \"\\t/* if this process has an instantiation authorisation key, then we also\\n\\t * search the keyrings of the process mentioned there\\n\\t * - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method\\n\\t */\\n\\tif (ctx->cred->request_key_auth &&\\n\\t ctx->cred == current_cred() &&\\n\\t ctx->index_key.type != &key_type_request_key_auth\\n\\t ) {\\n\\t\\tconst struct cred *cred = ctx->cred;\",\n \"\\t\\t/* defend against the auth key being revoked */\\n\\t\\tdown_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);\",\n \"\\t\\tif (key_validate(ctx->cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {\\n\\t\\t\\trka = ctx->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];\",\n \"\\t\\t\\tctx->cred = rka->cred;\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx);\\n\\t\\t\\tctx->cred = cred;\",\n \"\\t\\t\\tup_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);\",\n \"\\t\\t\\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto found;\",\n \"\\t\\t\\tret = key_ref;\\n\\t\\t} else {\\n\\t\\t\\tup_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */\\n\\tif (err == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) || ret == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY))\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);\\n\\telse if (err == ERR_PTR(-EACCES))\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = ret;\\n\\telse\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = err;\",\n \"found:\\n\\treturn key_ref;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * See if the key we're looking at is the target key.\\n */\\nbool lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key,\\n\\t\\t\\t const struct key_match_data *match_data)\\n{\\n\\treturn key == match_data->raw_data;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Look up a key ID given us by userspace with a given permissions mask to get\\n * the key it refers to.\\n *\\n * Flags can be passed to request that special keyrings be created if referred\\n * to directly, to permit partially constructed keys to be found and to skip\\n * validity and permission checks on the found key.\\n *\\n * Returns a pointer to the key with an incremented usage count if successful;\\n * -EINVAL if the key ID is invalid; -ENOKEY if the key ID does not correspond\\n * to a key or the best found key was a negative key; -EKEYREVOKED or\\n * -EKEYEXPIRED if the best found key was revoked or expired; -EACCES if the\\n * found key doesn't grant the requested permit or the LSM denied access to it;\\n * or -ENOMEM if a special keyring couldn't be created.\\n *\\n * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the\\n * returned key reference.\\n */\\nkey_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,\\n\\t\\t\\t key_perm_t perm)\\n{\\n\\tstruct keyring_search_context ctx = {\\n\\t\\t.match_data.cmp\\t\\t= lookup_user_key_possessed,\\n\\t\\t.match_data.lookup_type\\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,\\n\\t\\t.flags\\t\\t\\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK,\\n\\t};\\n\\tstruct request_key_auth *rka;\\n\\tstruct key *key;\\n\\tkey_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"try_again:\\n\\tctx.cred = get_current_cred();\\n\\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);\",\n \"\\tswitch (id) {\\n\\tcase KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\tif (!ctx.cred->thread_keyring) {\\n\\t\\t\\tif (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\",\n \"\\t\\t\\tret = install_thread_keyring();\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t\\t}\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto reget_creds;\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\tkey = ctx.cred->thread_keyring;\\n\\t\\t__key_get(key);\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\\n\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\tcase KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\tif (!ctx.cred->process_keyring) {\\n\\t\\t\\tif (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\",\n \"\\t\\t\\tret = install_process_keyring();\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t\\t}\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto reget_creds;\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\tkey = ctx.cred->process_keyring;\\n\\t\\t__key_get(key);\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\\n\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\tcase KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\tif (!ctx.cred->session_keyring) {\\n\\t\\t\\t/* always install a session keyring upon access if one\\n\\t\\t\\t * doesn't exist yet */\\n\\t\\t\\tret = install_user_keyrings();\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t\\tif (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tret = join_session_keyring(NULL);\\n\\t\\t\\telse\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tret = install_session_keyring(\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tctx.cred->user->session_keyring);\",\n \"\\t\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto reget_creds;\\n\\t\\t} else if (ctx.cred->session_keyring ==\\n\\t\\t\\t ctx.cred->user->session_keyring &&\\n\\t\\t\\t lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) {\\n\\t\\t\\tret = join_session_keyring(NULL);\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto reget_creds;\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\trcu_read_lock();\\n\\t\\tkey = rcu_dereference(ctx.cred->session_keyring);\\n\\t\\t__key_get(key);\\n\\t\\trcu_read_unlock();\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\\n\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\tcase KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\tif (!ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring) {\\n\\t\\t\\tret = install_user_keyrings();\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\tkey = ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring;\\n\\t\\t__key_get(key);\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\\n\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\tcase KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\tif (!ctx.cred->user->session_keyring) {\\n\\t\\t\\tret = install_user_keyrings();\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\tkey = ctx.cred->user->session_keyring;\\n\\t\\t__key_get(key);\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\\n\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\tcase KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\t/* group keyrings are not yet supported */\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);\\n\\t\\tgoto error;\",\n \"\\tcase KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:\\n\\t\\tkey = ctx.cred->request_key_auth;\\n\\t\\tif (!key)\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\",\n \"\\t\\t__key_get(key);\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\\n\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\tcase KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\tif (!ctx.cred->request_key_auth)\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\",\n \"\\t\\tdown_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);\\n\\t\\tif (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,\\n\\t\\t\\t &ctx.cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);\\n\\t\\t\\tkey = NULL;\\n\\t\\t} else {\\n\\t\\t\\trka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];\\n\\t\\t\\tkey = rka->dest_keyring;\\n\\t\\t\\t__key_get(key);\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t\\tup_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);\\n\\t\\tif (!key)\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);\\n\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\tdefault:\\n\\t\\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);\\n\\t\\tif (id < 1)\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\",\n \"\\t\\tkey = key_lookup(id);\\n\\t\\tif (IS_ERR(key)) {\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_ref = ERR_CAST(key);\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\tkey_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);\",\n \"\\t\\t/* check to see if we possess the key */\\n\\t\\tctx.index_key.type\\t\\t= key->type;\\n\\t\\tctx.index_key.description\\t= key->description;\\n\\t\\tctx.index_key.desc_len\\t\\t= strlen(key->description);\\n\\t\\tctx.match_data.raw_data\\t\\t= key;\\n\\t\\tkdebug(\\\"check possessed\\\");\\n\\t\\tskey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);\\n\\t\\tkdebug(\\\"possessed=%p\\\", skey_ref);\",\n \"\\t\\tif (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_put(key);\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_ref = skey_ref;\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* unlink does not use the nominated key in any way, so can skip all\\n\\t * the permission checks as it is only concerned with the keyring */\\n\\tif (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK) {\\n\\t\\tret = 0;\\n\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tif (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL)) {\\n\\t\\tret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);\\n\\t\\tswitch (ret) {\\n\\t\\tcase -ERESTARTSYS:\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto invalid_key;\\n\\t\\tdefault:\\n\\t\\t\\tif (perm)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto invalid_key;\\n\\t\\tcase 0:\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t} else if (perm) {\\n\\t\\tret = key_validate(key);\\n\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto invalid_key;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tret = -EIO;\\n\\tif (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&\",\n \"\\t key_read_state(key) == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED)\",\n \"\\t\\tgoto invalid_key;\",\n \"\\t/* check the permissions */\\n\\tret = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, perm);\\n\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\tgoto invalid_key;\",\n \"\\tkey->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;\",\n \"error:\\n\\tput_cred(ctx.cred);\\n\\treturn key_ref;\",\n \"invalid_key:\\n\\tkey_ref_put(key_ref);\\n\\tkey_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);\\n\\tgoto error;\",\n \"\\t/* if we attempted to install a keyring, then it may have caused new\\n\\t * creds to be installed */\\nreget_creds:\\n\\tput_cred(ctx.cred);\\n\\tgoto try_again;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Join the named keyring as the session keyring if possible else attempt to\\n * create a new one of that name and join that.\\n *\\n * If the name is NULL, an empty anonymous keyring will be installed as the\\n * session keyring.\\n *\\n * Named session keyrings are joined with a semaphore held to prevent the\\n * keyrings from going away whilst the attempt is made to going them and also\\n * to prevent a race in creating compatible session keyrings.\\n */\\nlong join_session_keyring(const char *name)\\n{\\n\\tconst struct cred *old;\\n\\tstruct cred *new;\\n\\tstruct key *keyring;\\n\\tlong ret, serial;\",\n \"\\tnew = prepare_creds();\\n\\tif (!new)\\n\\t\\treturn -ENOMEM;\\n\\told = current_cred();\",\n \"\\t/* if no name is provided, install an anonymous keyring */\\n\\tif (!name) {\\n\\t\\tret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, NULL);\\n\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\",\n \"\\t\\tserial = new->session_keyring->serial;\\n\\t\\tret = commit_creds(new);\\n\\t\\tif (ret == 0)\\n\\t\\t\\tret = serial;\\n\\t\\tgoto okay;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* allow the user to join or create a named keyring */\\n\\tmutex_lock(&key_session_mutex);\",\n \"\\t/* look for an existing keyring of this name */\\n\\tkeyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false);\\n\\tif (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {\\n\\t\\t/* not found - try and create a new one */\\n\\t\\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(\\n\\t\\t\\tname, old->uid, old->gid, old,\\n\\t\\t\\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_LINK,\\n\\t\\t\\tKEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);\\n\\t\\tif (IS_ERR(keyring)) {\\n\\t\\t\\tret = PTR_ERR(keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error2;\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t} else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {\\n\\t\\tret = PTR_ERR(keyring);\\n\\t\\tgoto error2;\\n\\t} else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tret = 0;\\n\\t\\tgoto error3;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */\\n\\tret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);\\n\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\tgoto error3;\",\n \"\\tcommit_creds(new);\\n\\tmutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);\",\n \"\\tret = keyring->serial;\\n\\tkey_put(keyring);\\nokay:\\n\\treturn ret;\",\n \"error3:\\n\\tkey_put(keyring);\\nerror2:\\n\\tmutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);\\nerror:\\n\\tabort_creds(new);\\n\\treturn ret;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children when\\n * the target process is about to resume userspace execution.\\n */\\nvoid key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork)\\n{\\n\\tconst struct cred *old = current_cred();\\n\\tstruct cred *new = container_of(twork, struct cred, rcu);\",\n \"\\tif (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) {\\n\\t\\tput_cred(new);\\n\\t\\treturn;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tnew-> uid\\t= old-> uid;\\n\\tnew-> euid\\t= old-> euid;\\n\\tnew-> suid\\t= old-> suid;\\n\\tnew->fsuid\\t= old->fsuid;\\n\\tnew-> gid\\t= old-> gid;\\n\\tnew-> egid\\t= old-> egid;\\n\\tnew-> sgid\\t= old-> sgid;\\n\\tnew->fsgid\\t= old->fsgid;\\n\\tnew->user\\t= get_uid(old->user);\\n\\tnew->user_ns\\t= get_user_ns(old->user_ns);\\n\\tnew->group_info\\t= get_group_info(old->group_info);\",\n \"\\tnew->securebits\\t= old->securebits;\\n\\tnew->cap_inheritable\\t= old->cap_inheritable;\\n\\tnew->cap_permitted\\t= old->cap_permitted;\\n\\tnew->cap_effective\\t= old->cap_effective;\\n\\tnew->cap_ambient\\t= old->cap_ambient;\\n\\tnew->cap_bset\\t\\t= old->cap_bset;\",\n \"\\tnew->jit_keyring\\t= old->jit_keyring;\\n\\tnew->thread_keyring\\t= key_get(old->thread_keyring);\\n\\tnew->process_keyring\\t= key_get(old->process_keyring);\",\n \"\\tsecurity_transfer_creds(new, old);\",\n \"\\tcommit_creds(new);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Make sure that root's user and user-session keyrings exist.\\n */\\nstatic int __init init_root_keyring(void)\\n{\\n\\treturn install_user_keyrings();\\n}\",\n \"late_initcall(init_root_keyring);\"\n]","isConversational":false},"labels":{"kind":"list like","value":[1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1],"string":"[\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1\n]","isConversational":false},"source":{"kind":"string","value":"PreciseBugs"},"other_info":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"buggy_code_end_loc\": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], \"buggy_code_start_loc\": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], \"filenames\": [\"include/linux/key.h\", \"net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c\", \"security/keys/big_key.c\", \"security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c\", \"security/keys/gc.c\", \"security/keys/key.c\", \"security/keys/keyctl.c\", \"security/keys/keyring.c\", \"security/keys/proc.c\", \"security/keys/process_keys.c\", \"security/keys/request_key.c\", \"security/keys/request_key_auth.c\", \"security/keys/trusted.c\", \"security/keys/user_defined.c\"], \"fixing_code_end_loc\": [380, 228, 283, 858, 155, 1000, 904, 603, 253, 734, 601, 77, 1070, 166], \"fixing_code_start_loc\": [139, 227, 250, 857, 132, 405, 769, 417, 185, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], \"message\": \"The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the \\\"negative\\\" state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.\", \"other\": {\"cve\": {\"cisaActionDue\": null, \"cisaExploitAdd\": null, \"cisaRequiredAction\": null, \"cisaVulnerabilityName\": null, \"configurations\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"4397FA2C-1EE8-4F42-9823-2D85B8C20976\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.4.95\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.4\", \"vulnerable\": true}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"D6690C73-23A3-4475-97D0-8CB96812E2FB\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.9.59\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.5\", \"vulnerable\": true}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"86038BA0-0886-479E-AD71-D78363937D66\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.13.10\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.10\", \"vulnerable\": true}], \"negate\": false, \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": null}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the \\\"negative\\\" state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.\"}, {\"lang\": \"es\", \"value\": \"El subsistema KEYS en el kernel de Linux en versiones anteriores a la 4.13.10 no sincroniza correctamente las acciones de actualizaci\\u00f3n con las de detecci\\u00f3n de una clave en el estado \\\"negative\\\" para evitar una condici\\u00f3n de carrera, lo que permite que los usuarios locales provoquen una denegaci\\u00f3n de servicio (DoS) o, posiblemente, cause otro impacto no especificado mediante llamadas al sistema manipuladas.\"}], \"evaluatorComment\": null, \"id\": \"CVE-2017-15951\", \"lastModified\": \"2023-01-19T15:45:25.270\", \"metrics\": {\"cvssMetricV2\": [{\"acInsufInfo\": false, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"cvssData\": {\"accessComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"accessVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"authentication\": \"NONE\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"baseScore\": 7.2, \"confidentialityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"integrityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"vectorString\": \"AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C\", \"version\": \"2.0\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 3.9, \"impactScore\": 10.0, \"obtainAllPrivilege\": false, \"obtainOtherPrivilege\": false, \"obtainUserPrivilege\": false, \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\", \"userInteractionRequired\": false}], \"cvssMetricV30\": null, \"cvssMetricV31\": [{\"cvssData\": {\"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"baseScore\": 7.8, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"integrityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"LOW\", \"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\", \"version\": \"3.1\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 1.8, \"impactScore\": 5.9, \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\"}]}, \"published\": \"2017-10-28T02:29:00.217\", \"references\": [{\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Issue Tracking\", \"Patch\", \"Third Party Advisory\"], \"url\": \"http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Release Notes\", \"Vendor Advisory\"], \"url\": \"http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/ChangeLog-4.13.10\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Third Party Advisory\", \"VDB Entry\"], \"url\": \"http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101621\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Issue Tracking\", \"Patch\", \"Third Party Advisory\"], \"url\": \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}], \"sourceIdentifier\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"vendorComments\": null, \"vulnStatus\": \"Analyzed\", \"weaknesses\": [{\"description\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CWE-20\"}], \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\"}]}, \"github_commit_url\": \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}, \"type\": \"CWE-20\"}"},"index":{"kind":"number","value":836,"string":"836"}}},{"rowIdx":4996,"cells":{"prompt":{"kind":"string","value":"Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not."},"completions":{"kind":"list like","value":["/* Request a key from userspace\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version\n * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.\n *\n * See Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst\n */","#include <linux/module.h>\n#include <linux/sched.h>\n#include <linux/kmod.h>\n#include <linux/err.h>\n#include <linux/keyctl.h>\n#include <linux/slab.h>\n#include \"internal.h\"","#define key_negative_timeout\t60\t/* default timeout on a negative key's existence */","/**\n * complete_request_key - Complete the construction of a key.\n * @cons: The key construction record.\n * @error: The success or failute of the construction.\n *\n * Complete the attempt to construct a key. The key will be negated\n * if an error is indicated. The authorisation key will be revoked\n * unconditionally.\n */\nvoid complete_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, int error)\n{\n\tkenter(\"{%d,%d},%d\", cons->key->serial, cons->authkey->serial, error);","\tif (error < 0)\n\t\tkey_negate_and_link(cons->key, key_negative_timeout, NULL,\n\t\t\t\t cons->authkey);\n\telse\n\t\tkey_revoke(cons->authkey);","\tkey_put(cons->key);\n\tkey_put(cons->authkey);\n\tkfree(cons);\n}\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(complete_request_key);","/*\n * Initialise a usermode helper that is going to have a specific session\n * keyring.\n *\n * This is called in context of freshly forked kthread before kernel_execve(),\n * so we can simply install the desired session_keyring at this point.\n */\nstatic int umh_keys_init(struct subprocess_info *info, struct cred *cred)\n{\n\tstruct key *keyring = info->data;","\treturn install_session_keyring_to_cred(cred, keyring);\n}","/*\n * Clean up a usermode helper with session keyring.\n */\nstatic void umh_keys_cleanup(struct subprocess_info *info)\n{\n\tstruct key *keyring = info->data;\n\tkey_put(keyring);\n}","/*\n * Call a usermode helper with a specific session keyring.\n */\nstatic int call_usermodehelper_keys(const char *path, char **argv, char **envp,\n\t\t\t\t\tstruct key *session_keyring, int wait)\n{\n\tstruct subprocess_info *info;","\tinfo = call_usermodehelper_setup(path, argv, envp, GFP_KERNEL,\n\t\t\t\t\t umh_keys_init, umh_keys_cleanup,\n\t\t\t\t\t session_keyring);\n\tif (!info)\n\t\treturn -ENOMEM;","\tkey_get(session_keyring);\n\treturn call_usermodehelper_exec(info, wait);\n}","/*\n * Request userspace finish the construction of a key\n * - execute \"/sbin/request-key <op> <key> <uid> <gid> <keyring> <keyring> <keyring>\"\n */\nstatic int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,\n\t\t\t\t const char *op,\n\t\t\t\t void *aux)\n{\n\tstatic char const request_key[] = \"/sbin/request-key\";\n\tconst struct cred *cred = current_cred();\n\tkey_serial_t prkey, sskey;\n\tstruct key *key = cons->key, *authkey = cons->authkey, *keyring,\n\t\t*session;\n\tchar *argv[9], *envp[3], uid_str[12], gid_str[12];\n\tchar key_str[12], keyring_str[3][12];\n\tchar desc[20];\n\tint ret, i;","\tkenter(\"{%d},{%d},%s\", key->serial, authkey->serial, op);","\tret = install_user_keyrings();\n\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\tgoto error_alloc;","\t/* allocate a new session keyring */\n\tsprintf(desc, \"_req.%u\", key->serial);","\tcred = get_current_cred();\n\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(desc, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,\n\t\t\t\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,\n\t\t\t\tKEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL, NULL);\n\tput_cred(cred);\n\tif (IS_ERR(keyring)) {\n\t\tret = PTR_ERR(keyring);\n\t\tgoto error_alloc;\n\t}","\t/* attach the auth key to the session keyring */\n\tret = key_link(keyring, authkey);\n\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\tgoto error_link;","\t/* record the UID and GID */\n\tsprintf(uid_str, \"%d\", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid));\n\tsprintf(gid_str, \"%d\", from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid));","\t/* we say which key is under construction */\n\tsprintf(key_str, \"%d\", key->serial);","\t/* we specify the process's default keyrings */\n\tsprintf(keyring_str[0], \"%d\",\n\t\tcred->thread_keyring ? cred->thread_keyring->serial : 0);","\tprkey = 0;\n\tif (cred->process_keyring)\n\t\tprkey = cred->process_keyring->serial;\n\tsprintf(keyring_str[1], \"%d\", prkey);","\trcu_read_lock();\n\tsession = rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring);\n\tif (!session)\n\t\tsession = cred->user->session_keyring;\n\tsskey = session->serial;\n\trcu_read_unlock();","\tsprintf(keyring_str[2], \"%d\", sskey);","\t/* set up a minimal environment */\n\ti = 0;\n\tenvp[i++] = \"HOME=/\";\n\tenvp[i++] = \"PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin\";\n\tenvp[i] = NULL;","\t/* set up the argument list */\n\ti = 0;\n\targv[i++] = (char *)request_key;\n\targv[i++] = (char *) op;\n\targv[i++] = key_str;\n\targv[i++] = uid_str;\n\targv[i++] = gid_str;\n\targv[i++] = keyring_str[0];\n\targv[i++] = keyring_str[1];\n\targv[i++] = keyring_str[2];\n\targv[i] = NULL;","\t/* do it */\n\tret = call_usermodehelper_keys(request_key, argv, envp, keyring,\n\t\t\t\t UMH_WAIT_PROC);\n\tkdebug(\"usermode -> 0x%x\", ret);\n\tif (ret >= 0) {\n\t\t/* ret is the exit/wait code */\n\t\tif (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags) ||\n\t\t key_validate(key) < 0)\n\t\t\tret = -ENOKEY;\n\t\telse\n\t\t\t/* ignore any errors from userspace if the key was\n\t\t\t * instantiated */\n\t\t\tret = 0;\n\t}","error_link:\n\tkey_put(keyring);","error_alloc:\n\tcomplete_request_key(cons, ret);\n\tkleave(\" = %d\", ret);\n\treturn ret;\n}","/*\n * Call out to userspace for key construction.\n *\n * Program failure is ignored in favour of key status.\n */\nstatic int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info,\n\t\t\t size_t callout_len, void *aux,\n\t\t\t struct key *dest_keyring)\n{\n\tstruct key_construction *cons;\n\trequest_key_actor_t actor;\n\tstruct key *authkey;\n\tint ret;","\tkenter(\"%d,%p,%zu,%p\", key->serial, callout_info, callout_len, aux);","\tcons = kmalloc(sizeof(*cons), GFP_KERNEL);\n\tif (!cons)\n\t\treturn -ENOMEM;","\t/* allocate an authorisation key */\n\tauthkey = request_key_auth_new(key, callout_info, callout_len,\n\t\t\t\t dest_keyring);\n\tif (IS_ERR(authkey)) {\n\t\tkfree(cons);\n\t\tret = PTR_ERR(authkey);\n\t\tauthkey = NULL;\n\t} else {\n\t\tcons->authkey = key_get(authkey);\n\t\tcons->key = key_get(key);","\t\t/* make the call */\n\t\tactor = call_sbin_request_key;\n\t\tif (key->type->request_key)\n\t\t\tactor = key->type->request_key;","\t\tret = actor(cons, \"create\", aux);","\t\t/* check that the actor called complete_request_key() prior to\n\t\t * returning an error */\n\t\tWARN_ON(ret < 0 &&\n\t\t\t!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags));\n\t\tkey_put(authkey);\n\t}","\tkleave(\" = %d\", ret);\n\treturn ret;\n}","/*\n * Get the appropriate destination keyring for the request.\n *\n * The keyring selected is returned with an extra reference upon it which the\n * caller must release.\n */\nstatic void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)\n{\n\tstruct request_key_auth *rka;\n\tconst struct cred *cred = current_cred();\n\tstruct key *dest_keyring = *_dest_keyring, *authkey;","\tkenter(\"%p\", dest_keyring);","\t/* find the appropriate keyring */\n\tif (dest_keyring) {\n\t\t/* the caller supplied one */\n\t\tkey_get(dest_keyring);\n\t} else {\n\t\t/* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we\n\t\t * find one that we actually have */\n\t\tswitch (cred->jit_keyring) {\n\t\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:\n\t\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:\n\t\t\tif (cred->request_key_auth) {\n\t\t\t\tauthkey = cred->request_key_auth;\n\t\t\t\tdown_read(&authkey->sem);\n\t\t\t\trka = authkey->payload.data[0];\n\t\t\t\tif (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,\n\t\t\t\t\t &authkey->flags))\n\t\t\t\t\tdest_keyring =\n\t\t\t\t\t\tkey_get(rka->dest_keyring);\n\t\t\t\tup_read(&authkey->sem);\n\t\t\t\tif (dest_keyring)\n\t\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t\t}","\t\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:\n\t\t\tdest_keyring = key_get(cred->thread_keyring);\n\t\t\tif (dest_keyring)\n\t\t\t\tbreak;","\t\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:\n\t\t\tdest_keyring = key_get(cred->process_keyring);\n\t\t\tif (dest_keyring)\n\t\t\t\tbreak;","\t\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:\n\t\t\trcu_read_lock();\n\t\t\tdest_keyring = key_get(\n\t\t\t\trcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring));\n\t\t\trcu_read_unlock();","\t\t\tif (dest_keyring)\n\t\t\t\tbreak;","\t\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:\n\t\t\tdest_keyring =\n\t\t\t\tkey_get(cred->user->session_keyring);\n\t\t\tbreak;","\t\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:\n\t\t\tdest_keyring = key_get(cred->user->uid_keyring);\n\t\t\tbreak;","\t\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tBUG();\n\t\t}\n\t}","\t*_dest_keyring = dest_keyring;\n\tkleave(\" [dk %d]\", key_serial(dest_keyring));\n\treturn;\n}","/*\n * Allocate a new key in under-construction state and attempt to link it in to\n * the requested keyring.\n *\n * May return a key that's already under construction instead if there was a\n * race between two thread calling request_key().\n */\nstatic int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,\n\t\t\t struct key *dest_keyring,\n\t\t\t unsigned long flags,\n\t\t\t struct key_user *user,\n\t\t\t struct key **_key)\n{\n\tstruct assoc_array_edit *edit;\n\tstruct key *key;\n\tkey_perm_t perm;\n\tkey_ref_t key_ref;\n\tint ret;","\tkenter(\"%s,%s,,,\",\n\t ctx->index_key.type->name, ctx->index_key.description);","\t*_key = NULL;\n\tmutex_lock(&user->cons_lock);","\tperm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;\n\tperm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;\n\tif (ctx->index_key.type->read)\n\t\tperm |= KEY_POS_READ;\n\tif (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring ||\n\t ctx->index_key.type->update)\n\t\tperm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;","\tkey = key_alloc(ctx->index_key.type, ctx->index_key.description,\n\t\t\tctx->cred->fsuid, ctx->cred->fsgid, ctx->cred,\n\t\t\tperm, flags, NULL);\n\tif (IS_ERR(key))\n\t\tgoto alloc_failed;","\tset_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);","\tif (dest_keyring) {\n\t\tret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, &edit);\n\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\tgoto link_prealloc_failed;\n\t}","\t/* attach the key to the destination keyring under lock, but we do need\n\t * to do another check just in case someone beat us to it whilst we\n\t * waited for locks */\n\tmutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);","\tkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx);\n\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\n\t\tgoto key_already_present;","\tif (dest_keyring)\n\t\t__key_link(key, &edit);","\tmutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);\n\tif (dest_keyring)\n\t\t__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit);\n\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\n\t*_key = key;\n\tkleave(\" = 0 [%d]\", key_serial(key));\n\treturn 0;","\t/* the key is now present - we tell the caller that we found it by\n\t * returning -EINPROGRESS */\nkey_already_present:\n\tkey_put(key);\n\tmutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);\n\tkey = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);\n\tif (dest_keyring) {\n\t\tret = __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key);\n\t\tif (ret == 0)\n\t\t\t__key_link(key, &edit);\n\t\t__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit);\n\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\tgoto link_check_failed;\n\t}\n\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\n\t*_key = key;\n\tkleave(\" = -EINPROGRESS [%d]\", key_serial(key));\n\treturn -EINPROGRESS;","link_check_failed:\n\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\n\tkey_put(key);\n\tkleave(\" = %d [linkcheck]\", ret);\n\treturn ret;","link_prealloc_failed:\n\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\n\tkey_put(key);\n\tkleave(\" = %d [prelink]\", ret);\n\treturn ret;","alloc_failed:\n\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\n\tkleave(\" = %ld\", PTR_ERR(key));\n\treturn PTR_ERR(key);\n}","/*\n * Commence key construction.\n */\nstatic struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,\n\t\t\t\t\t const char *callout_info,\n\t\t\t\t\t size_t callout_len,\n\t\t\t\t\t void *aux,\n\t\t\t\t\t struct key *dest_keyring,\n\t\t\t\t\t unsigned long flags)\n{\n\tstruct key_user *user;\n\tstruct key *key;\n\tint ret;","\tkenter(\"\");","\tif (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring)\n\t\treturn ERR_PTR(-EPERM);","\tuser = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());\n\tif (!user)\n\t\treturn ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);","\tconstruct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);","\tret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key);\n\tkey_user_put(user);","\tif (ret == 0) {\n\t\tret = construct_key(key, callout_info, callout_len, aux,\n\t\t\t\t dest_keyring);\n\t\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\t\tkdebug(\"cons failed\");\n\t\t\tgoto construction_failed;\n\t\t}\n\t} else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {\n\t\tret = 0;\n\t} else {\n\t\tgoto couldnt_alloc_key;\n\t}","\tkey_put(dest_keyring);\n\tkleave(\" = key %d\", key_serial(key));\n\treturn key;","construction_failed:\n\tkey_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL);\n\tkey_put(key);\ncouldnt_alloc_key:\n\tkey_put(dest_keyring);\n\tkleave(\" = %d\", ret);\n\treturn ERR_PTR(ret);\n}","/**\n * request_key_and_link - Request a key and cache it in a keyring.\n * @type: The type of key we want.\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\n * @callout_len: The length of callout_info.\n * @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.\n * @dest_keyring: Where to cache the key.\n * @flags: Flags to key_alloc().\n *\n * A key matching the specified criteria is searched for in the process's\n * keyrings and returned with its usage count incremented if found. Otherwise,\n * if callout_info is not NULL, a key will be allocated and some service\n * (probably in userspace) will be asked to instantiate it.\n *\n * If successfully found or created, the key will be linked to the destination\n * keyring if one is provided.\n *\n * Returns a pointer to the key if successful; -EACCES, -ENOKEY, -EKEYREVOKED\n * or -EKEYEXPIRED if an inaccessible, negative, revoked or expired key was\n * found; -ENOKEY if no key was found and no @callout_info was given; -EDQUOT\n * if insufficient key quota was available to create a new key; or -ENOMEM if\n * insufficient memory was available.\n *\n * If the returned key was created, then it may still be under construction,\n * and wait_for_key_construction() should be used to wait for that to complete.\n */\nstruct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,\n\t\t\t\t const char *description,\n\t\t\t\t const void *callout_info,\n\t\t\t\t size_t callout_len,\n\t\t\t\t void *aux,\n\t\t\t\t struct key *dest_keyring,\n\t\t\t\t unsigned long flags)\n{\n\tstruct keyring_search_context ctx = {\n\t\t.index_key.type\t\t= type,\n\t\t.index_key.description\t= description,\n\t\t.cred\t\t\t= current_cred(),\n\t\t.match_data.cmp\t\t= key_default_cmp,\n\t\t.match_data.raw_data\t= description,\n\t\t.match_data.lookup_type\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,\n\t\t.flags\t\t\t= (KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK |\n\t\t\t\t\t KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED),\n\t};\n\tstruct key *key;\n\tkey_ref_t key_ref;\n\tint ret;","\tkenter(\"%s,%s,%p,%zu,%p,%p,%lx\",\n\t ctx.index_key.type->name, ctx.index_key.description,\n\t callout_info, callout_len, aux, dest_keyring, flags);","\tif (type->match_preparse) {\n\t\tret = type->match_preparse(&ctx.match_data);\n\t\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\t\tkey = ERR_PTR(ret);\n\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t}\n\t}","\t/* search all the process keyrings for a key */\n\tkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);","\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {\n\t\tkey = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);\n\t\tif (dest_keyring) {\n\t\t\tconstruct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);\n\t\t\tret = key_link(dest_keyring, key);\n\t\t\tkey_put(dest_keyring);\n\t\t\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\t\t\tkey_put(key);\n\t\t\t\tkey = ERR_PTR(ret);\n\t\t\t\tgoto error_free;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t} else if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EAGAIN) {\n\t\tkey = ERR_CAST(key_ref);\n\t} else {\n\t\t/* the search failed, but the keyrings were searchable, so we\n\t\t * should consult userspace if we can */\n\t\tkey = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);\n\t\tif (!callout_info)\n\t\t\tgoto error_free;","\t\tkey = construct_key_and_link(&ctx, callout_info, callout_len,\n\t\t\t\t\t aux, dest_keyring, flags);\n\t}","error_free:\n\tif (type->match_free)\n\t\ttype->match_free(&ctx.match_data);\nerror:\n\tkleave(\" = %p\", key);\n\treturn key;\n}","/**\n * wait_for_key_construction - Wait for construction of a key to complete\n * @key: The key being waited for.\n * @intr: Whether to wait interruptibly.\n *\n * Wait for a key to finish being constructed.\n *\n * Returns 0 if successful; -ERESTARTSYS if the wait was interrupted; -ENOKEY\n * if the key was negated; or -EKEYREVOKED or -EKEYEXPIRED if the key was\n * revoked or expired.\n */\nint wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)\n{\n\tint ret;","\tret = wait_on_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT,\n\t\t\t intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);\n\tif (ret)\n\t\treturn -ERESTARTSYS;","\tif (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {\n\t\tsmp_rmb();\n\t\treturn key->reject_error;\n\t}","\treturn key_validate(key);\n}\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction);","/**\n * request_key - Request a key and wait for construction\n * @type: Type of key.\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\n *\n * As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key\n * to a keyring if found, new keys are always allocated in the user's quota,\n * the callout_info must be a NUL-terminated string and no auxiliary data can\n * be passed.\n *\n * Furthermore, it then works as wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the\n * completion of keys undergoing construction with a non-interruptible wait.\n */\nstruct key *request_key(struct key_type *type,\n\t\t\tconst char *description,\n\t\t\tconst char *callout_info)\n{\n\tstruct key *key;\n\tsize_t callout_len = 0;\n\tint ret;","\tif (callout_info)\n\t\tcallout_len = strlen(callout_info);\n\tkey = request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info, callout_len,\n\t\t\t\t NULL, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);\n\tif (!IS_ERR(key)) {\n\t\tret = wait_for_key_construction(key, false);\n\t\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\t\tkey_put(key);\n\t\t\treturn ERR_PTR(ret);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn key;\n}\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key);","/**\n * request_key_with_auxdata - Request a key with auxiliary data for the upcaller\n * @type: The type of key we want.\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\n * @callout_len: The length of callout_info.\n * @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.\n *\n * As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key\n * to a keyring if found and new keys are always allocated in the user's quota.\n *\n * Furthermore, it then works as wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the\n * completion of keys undergoing construction with a non-interruptible wait.\n */\nstruct key *request_key_with_auxdata(struct key_type *type,\n\t\t\t\t const char *description,\n\t\t\t\t const void *callout_info,\n\t\t\t\t size_t callout_len,\n\t\t\t\t void *aux)\n{\n\tstruct key *key;\n\tint ret;","\tkey = request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info, callout_len,\n\t\t\t\t aux, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);\n\tif (!IS_ERR(key)) {\n\t\tret = wait_for_key_construction(key, false);\n\t\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\t\tkey_put(key);\n\t\t\treturn ERR_PTR(ret);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn key;\n}\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_with_auxdata);","/*\n * request_key_async - Request a key (allow async construction)\n * @type: Type of key.\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\n * @callout_len: The length of callout_info.\n *\n * As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key\n * to a keyring if found, new keys are always allocated in the user's quota and\n * no auxiliary data can be passed.\n *\n * The caller should call wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the\n * completion of the returned key if it is still undergoing construction.\n */\nstruct key *request_key_async(struct key_type *type,\n\t\t\t const char *description,\n\t\t\t const void *callout_info,\n\t\t\t size_t callout_len)\n{\n\treturn request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info,\n\t\t\t\t callout_len, NULL, NULL,\n\t\t\t\t KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);\n}\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_async);","/*\n * request a key with auxiliary data for the upcaller (allow async construction)\n * @type: Type of key.\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\n * @callout_len: The length of callout_info.\n * @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.\n *\n * As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key\n * to a keyring if found and new keys are always allocated in the user's quota.\n *\n * The caller should call wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the\n * completion of the returned key if it is still undergoing construction.\n */\nstruct key *request_key_async_with_auxdata(struct key_type *type,\n\t\t\t\t\t const char *description,\n\t\t\t\t\t const void *callout_info,\n\t\t\t\t\t size_t callout_len,\n\t\t\t\t\t void *aux)\n{\n\treturn request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info,\n\t\t\t\t callout_len, aux, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);\n}\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_async_with_auxdata);"],"string":"[\n \"/* Request a key from userspace\\n *\\n * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\\n *\\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\\n * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version\\n * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.\\n *\\n * See Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst\\n */\",\n \"#include <linux/module.h>\\n#include <linux/sched.h>\\n#include <linux/kmod.h>\\n#include <linux/err.h>\\n#include <linux/keyctl.h>\\n#include <linux/slab.h>\\n#include \\\"internal.h\\\"\",\n \"#define key_negative_timeout\\t60\\t/* default timeout on a negative key's existence */\",\n \"/**\\n * complete_request_key - Complete the construction of a key.\\n * @cons: The key construction record.\\n * @error: The success or failute of the construction.\\n *\\n * Complete the attempt to construct a key. The key will be negated\\n * if an error is indicated. The authorisation key will be revoked\\n * unconditionally.\\n */\\nvoid complete_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, int error)\\n{\\n\\tkenter(\\\"{%d,%d},%d\\\", cons->key->serial, cons->authkey->serial, error);\",\n \"\\tif (error < 0)\\n\\t\\tkey_negate_and_link(cons->key, key_negative_timeout, NULL,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t cons->authkey);\\n\\telse\\n\\t\\tkey_revoke(cons->authkey);\",\n \"\\tkey_put(cons->key);\\n\\tkey_put(cons->authkey);\\n\\tkfree(cons);\\n}\\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(complete_request_key);\",\n \"/*\\n * Initialise a usermode helper that is going to have a specific session\\n * keyring.\\n *\\n * This is called in context of freshly forked kthread before kernel_execve(),\\n * so we can simply install the desired session_keyring at this point.\\n */\\nstatic int umh_keys_init(struct subprocess_info *info, struct cred *cred)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key *keyring = info->data;\",\n \"\\treturn install_session_keyring_to_cred(cred, keyring);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Clean up a usermode helper with session keyring.\\n */\\nstatic void umh_keys_cleanup(struct subprocess_info *info)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key *keyring = info->data;\\n\\tkey_put(keyring);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Call a usermode helper with a specific session keyring.\\n */\\nstatic int call_usermodehelper_keys(const char *path, char **argv, char **envp,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tstruct key *session_keyring, int wait)\\n{\\n\\tstruct subprocess_info *info;\",\n \"\\tinfo = call_usermodehelper_setup(path, argv, envp, GFP_KERNEL,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t umh_keys_init, umh_keys_cleanup,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t session_keyring);\\n\\tif (!info)\\n\\t\\treturn -ENOMEM;\",\n \"\\tkey_get(session_keyring);\\n\\treturn call_usermodehelper_exec(info, wait);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Request userspace finish the construction of a key\\n * - execute \\\"/sbin/request-key <op> <key> <uid> <gid> <keyring> <keyring> <keyring>\\\"\\n */\\nstatic int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t const char *op,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t void *aux)\\n{\\n\\tstatic char const request_key[] = \\\"/sbin/request-key\\\";\\n\\tconst struct cred *cred = current_cred();\\n\\tkey_serial_t prkey, sskey;\\n\\tstruct key *key = cons->key, *authkey = cons->authkey, *keyring,\\n\\t\\t*session;\\n\\tchar *argv[9], *envp[3], uid_str[12], gid_str[12];\\n\\tchar key_str[12], keyring_str[3][12];\\n\\tchar desc[20];\\n\\tint ret, i;\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"{%d},{%d},%s\\\", key->serial, authkey->serial, op);\",\n \"\\tret = install_user_keyrings();\\n\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\tgoto error_alloc;\",\n \"\\t/* allocate a new session keyring */\\n\\tsprintf(desc, \\\"_req.%u\\\", key->serial);\",\n \"\\tcred = get_current_cred();\\n\\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(desc, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tKEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL, NULL);\\n\\tput_cred(cred);\\n\\tif (IS_ERR(keyring)) {\\n\\t\\tret = PTR_ERR(keyring);\\n\\t\\tgoto error_alloc;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* attach the auth key to the session keyring */\\n\\tret = key_link(keyring, authkey);\\n\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\tgoto error_link;\",\n \"\\t/* record the UID and GID */\\n\\tsprintf(uid_str, \\\"%d\\\", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid));\\n\\tsprintf(gid_str, \\\"%d\\\", from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid));\",\n \"\\t/* we say which key is under construction */\\n\\tsprintf(key_str, \\\"%d\\\", key->serial);\",\n \"\\t/* we specify the process's default keyrings */\\n\\tsprintf(keyring_str[0], \\\"%d\\\",\\n\\t\\tcred->thread_keyring ? cred->thread_keyring->serial : 0);\",\n \"\\tprkey = 0;\\n\\tif (cred->process_keyring)\\n\\t\\tprkey = cred->process_keyring->serial;\\n\\tsprintf(keyring_str[1], \\\"%d\\\", prkey);\",\n \"\\trcu_read_lock();\\n\\tsession = rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring);\\n\\tif (!session)\\n\\t\\tsession = cred->user->session_keyring;\\n\\tsskey = session->serial;\\n\\trcu_read_unlock();\",\n \"\\tsprintf(keyring_str[2], \\\"%d\\\", sskey);\",\n \"\\t/* set up a minimal environment */\\n\\ti = 0;\\n\\tenvp[i++] = \\\"HOME=/\\\";\\n\\tenvp[i++] = \\\"PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin\\\";\\n\\tenvp[i] = NULL;\",\n \"\\t/* set up the argument list */\\n\\ti = 0;\\n\\targv[i++] = (char *)request_key;\\n\\targv[i++] = (char *) op;\\n\\targv[i++] = key_str;\\n\\targv[i++] = uid_str;\\n\\targv[i++] = gid_str;\\n\\targv[i++] = keyring_str[0];\\n\\targv[i++] = keyring_str[1];\\n\\targv[i++] = keyring_str[2];\\n\\targv[i] = NULL;\",\n \"\\t/* do it */\\n\\tret = call_usermodehelper_keys(request_key, argv, envp, keyring,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t UMH_WAIT_PROC);\\n\\tkdebug(\\\"usermode -> 0x%x\\\", ret);\\n\\tif (ret >= 0) {\\n\\t\\t/* ret is the exit/wait code */\\n\\t\\tif (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags) ||\\n\\t\\t key_validate(key) < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\tret = -ENOKEY;\\n\\t\\telse\\n\\t\\t\\t/* ignore any errors from userspace if the key was\\n\\t\\t\\t * instantiated */\\n\\t\\t\\tret = 0;\\n\\t}\",\n \"error_link:\\n\\tkey_put(keyring);\",\n \"error_alloc:\\n\\tcomplete_request_key(cons, ret);\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = %d\\\", ret);\\n\\treturn ret;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Call out to userspace for key construction.\\n *\\n * Program failure is ignored in favour of key status.\\n */\\nstatic int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info,\\n\\t\\t\\t size_t callout_len, void *aux,\\n\\t\\t\\t struct key *dest_keyring)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key_construction *cons;\\n\\trequest_key_actor_t actor;\\n\\tstruct key *authkey;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"%d,%p,%zu,%p\\\", key->serial, callout_info, callout_len, aux);\",\n \"\\tcons = kmalloc(sizeof(*cons), GFP_KERNEL);\\n\\tif (!cons)\\n\\t\\treturn -ENOMEM;\",\n \"\\t/* allocate an authorisation key */\\n\\tauthkey = request_key_auth_new(key, callout_info, callout_len,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t dest_keyring);\\n\\tif (IS_ERR(authkey)) {\\n\\t\\tkfree(cons);\\n\\t\\tret = PTR_ERR(authkey);\\n\\t\\tauthkey = NULL;\\n\\t} else {\\n\\t\\tcons->authkey = key_get(authkey);\\n\\t\\tcons->key = key_get(key);\",\n \"\\t\\t/* make the call */\\n\\t\\tactor = call_sbin_request_key;\\n\\t\\tif (key->type->request_key)\\n\\t\\t\\tactor = key->type->request_key;\",\n \"\\t\\tret = actor(cons, \\\"create\\\", aux);\",\n \"\\t\\t/* check that the actor called complete_request_key() prior to\\n\\t\\t * returning an error */\\n\\t\\tWARN_ON(ret < 0 &&\\n\\t\\t\\t!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags));\\n\\t\\tkey_put(authkey);\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tkleave(\\\" = %d\\\", ret);\\n\\treturn ret;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Get the appropriate destination keyring for the request.\\n *\\n * The keyring selected is returned with an extra reference upon it which the\\n * caller must release.\\n */\\nstatic void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)\\n{\\n\\tstruct request_key_auth *rka;\\n\\tconst struct cred *cred = current_cred();\\n\\tstruct key *dest_keyring = *_dest_keyring, *authkey;\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"%p\\\", dest_keyring);\",\n \"\\t/* find the appropriate keyring */\\n\\tif (dest_keyring) {\\n\\t\\t/* the caller supplied one */\\n\\t\\tkey_get(dest_keyring);\\n\\t} else {\\n\\t\\t/* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we\\n\\t\\t * find one that we actually have */\\n\\t\\tswitch (cred->jit_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:\\n\\t\\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\t\\tif (cred->request_key_auth) {\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tauthkey = cred->request_key_auth;\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tdown_read(&authkey->sem);\\n\\t\\t\\t\\trka = authkey->payload.data[0];\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tif (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t &authkey->flags))\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tdest_keyring =\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tkey_get(rka->dest_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tup_read(&authkey->sem);\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tif (dest_keyring)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\t\\tdest_keyring = key_get(cred->thread_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\tif (dest_keyring)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\t\\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\t\\tdest_keyring = key_get(cred->process_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\tif (dest_keyring)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\t\\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\t\\trcu_read_lock();\\n\\t\\t\\tdest_keyring = key_get(\\n\\t\\t\\t\\trcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring));\\n\\t\\t\\trcu_read_unlock();\",\n \"\\t\\t\\tif (dest_keyring)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\t\\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\t\\tdest_keyring =\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tkey_get(cred->user->session_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\t\\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\t\\tdest_keyring = key_get(cred->user->uid_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\t\\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\tdefault:\\n\\t\\t\\tBUG();\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t*_dest_keyring = dest_keyring;\\n\\tkleave(\\\" [dk %d]\\\", key_serial(dest_keyring));\\n\\treturn;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Allocate a new key in under-construction state and attempt to link it in to\\n * the requested keyring.\\n *\\n * May return a key that's already under construction instead if there was a\\n * race between two thread calling request_key().\\n */\\nstatic int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,\\n\\t\\t\\t struct key *dest_keyring,\\n\\t\\t\\t unsigned long flags,\\n\\t\\t\\t struct key_user *user,\\n\\t\\t\\t struct key **_key)\\n{\\n\\tstruct assoc_array_edit *edit;\\n\\tstruct key *key;\\n\\tkey_perm_t perm;\\n\\tkey_ref_t key_ref;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"%s,%s,,,\\\",\\n\\t ctx->index_key.type->name, ctx->index_key.description);\",\n \"\\t*_key = NULL;\\n\\tmutex_lock(&user->cons_lock);\",\n \"\\tperm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;\\n\\tperm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;\\n\\tif (ctx->index_key.type->read)\\n\\t\\tperm |= KEY_POS_READ;\\n\\tif (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring ||\\n\\t ctx->index_key.type->update)\\n\\t\\tperm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;\",\n \"\\tkey = key_alloc(ctx->index_key.type, ctx->index_key.description,\\n\\t\\t\\tctx->cred->fsuid, ctx->cred->fsgid, ctx->cred,\\n\\t\\t\\tperm, flags, NULL);\\n\\tif (IS_ERR(key))\\n\\t\\tgoto alloc_failed;\",\n \"\\tset_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);\",\n \"\\tif (dest_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, &edit);\\n\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto link_prealloc_failed;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* attach the key to the destination keyring under lock, but we do need\\n\\t * to do another check just in case someone beat us to it whilst we\\n\\t * waited for locks */\\n\\tmutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);\",\n \"\\tkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx);\\n\\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\\n\\t\\tgoto key_already_present;\",\n \"\\tif (dest_keyring)\\n\\t\\t__key_link(key, &edit);\",\n \"\\tmutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);\\n\\tif (dest_keyring)\\n\\t\\t__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit);\\n\\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\\n\\t*_key = key;\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = 0 [%d]\\\", key_serial(key));\\n\\treturn 0;\",\n \"\\t/* the key is now present - we tell the caller that we found it by\\n\\t * returning -EINPROGRESS */\\nkey_already_present:\\n\\tkey_put(key);\\n\\tmutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);\\n\\tkey = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);\\n\\tif (dest_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tret = __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key);\\n\\t\\tif (ret == 0)\\n\\t\\t\\t__key_link(key, &edit);\\n\\t\\t__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit);\\n\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto link_check_failed;\\n\\t}\\n\\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\\n\\t*_key = key;\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = -EINPROGRESS [%d]\\\", key_serial(key));\\n\\treturn -EINPROGRESS;\",\n \"link_check_failed:\\n\\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\\n\\tkey_put(key);\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = %d [linkcheck]\\\", ret);\\n\\treturn ret;\",\n \"link_prealloc_failed:\\n\\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\\n\\tkey_put(key);\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = %d [prelink]\\\", ret);\\n\\treturn ret;\",\n \"alloc_failed:\\n\\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = %ld\\\", PTR_ERR(key));\\n\\treturn PTR_ERR(key);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Commence key construction.\\n */\\nstatic struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t const char *callout_info,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t size_t callout_len,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t void *aux,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t struct key *dest_keyring,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t unsigned long flags)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key_user *user;\\n\\tstruct key *key;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"\\\");\",\n \"\\tif (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring)\\n\\t\\treturn ERR_PTR(-EPERM);\",\n \"\\tuser = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());\\n\\tif (!user)\\n\\t\\treturn ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);\",\n \"\\tconstruct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);\",\n \"\\tret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key);\\n\\tkey_user_put(user);\",\n \"\\tif (ret == 0) {\\n\\t\\tret = construct_key(key, callout_info, callout_len, aux,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t dest_keyring);\\n\\t\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\t\\tkdebug(\\\"cons failed\\\");\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto construction_failed;\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t} else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {\\n\\t\\tret = 0;\\n\\t} else {\\n\\t\\tgoto couldnt_alloc_key;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tkey_put(dest_keyring);\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = key %d\\\", key_serial(key));\\n\\treturn key;\",\n \"construction_failed:\\n\\tkey_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL);\\n\\tkey_put(key);\\ncouldnt_alloc_key:\\n\\tkey_put(dest_keyring);\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = %d\\\", ret);\\n\\treturn ERR_PTR(ret);\\n}\",\n \"/**\\n * request_key_and_link - Request a key and cache it in a keyring.\\n * @type: The type of key we want.\\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\\n * @callout_len: The length of callout_info.\\n * @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.\\n * @dest_keyring: Where to cache the key.\\n * @flags: Flags to key_alloc().\\n *\\n * A key matching the specified criteria is searched for in the process's\\n * keyrings and returned with its usage count incremented if found. Otherwise,\\n * if callout_info is not NULL, a key will be allocated and some service\\n * (probably in userspace) will be asked to instantiate it.\\n *\\n * If successfully found or created, the key will be linked to the destination\\n * keyring if one is provided.\\n *\\n * Returns a pointer to the key if successful; -EACCES, -ENOKEY, -EKEYREVOKED\\n * or -EKEYEXPIRED if an inaccessible, negative, revoked or expired key was\\n * found; -ENOKEY if no key was found and no @callout_info was given; -EDQUOT\\n * if insufficient key quota was available to create a new key; or -ENOMEM if\\n * insufficient memory was available.\\n *\\n * If the returned key was created, then it may still be under construction,\\n * and wait_for_key_construction() should be used to wait for that to complete.\\n */\\nstruct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t const char *description,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t const void *callout_info,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t size_t callout_len,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t void *aux,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t struct key *dest_keyring,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t unsigned long flags)\\n{\\n\\tstruct keyring_search_context ctx = {\\n\\t\\t.index_key.type\\t\\t= type,\\n\\t\\t.index_key.description\\t= description,\\n\\t\\t.cred\\t\\t\\t= current_cred(),\\n\\t\\t.match_data.cmp\\t\\t= key_default_cmp,\\n\\t\\t.match_data.raw_data\\t= description,\\n\\t\\t.match_data.lookup_type\\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,\\n\\t\\t.flags\\t\\t\\t= (KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK |\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED),\\n\\t};\\n\\tstruct key *key;\\n\\tkey_ref_t key_ref;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"%s,%s,%p,%zu,%p,%p,%lx\\\",\\n\\t ctx.index_key.type->name, ctx.index_key.description,\\n\\t callout_info, callout_len, aux, dest_keyring, flags);\",\n \"\\tif (type->match_preparse) {\\n\\t\\tret = type->match_preparse(&ctx.match_data);\\n\\t\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\t\\tkey = ERR_PTR(ret);\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* search all the process keyrings for a key */\\n\\tkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);\",\n \"\\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {\\n\\t\\tkey = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);\\n\\t\\tif (dest_keyring) {\\n\\t\\t\\tconstruct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\tret = key_link(dest_keyring, key);\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_put(dest_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tkey_put(key);\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tkey = ERR_PTR(ret);\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error_free;\\n\\t\\t\\t}\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t} else if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EAGAIN) {\\n\\t\\tkey = ERR_CAST(key_ref);\\n\\t} else {\\n\\t\\t/* the search failed, but the keyrings were searchable, so we\\n\\t\\t * should consult userspace if we can */\\n\\t\\tkey = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);\\n\\t\\tif (!callout_info)\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error_free;\",\n \"\\t\\tkey = construct_key_and_link(&ctx, callout_info, callout_len,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t aux, dest_keyring, flags);\\n\\t}\",\n \"error_free:\\n\\tif (type->match_free)\\n\\t\\ttype->match_free(&ctx.match_data);\\nerror:\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = %p\\\", key);\\n\\treturn key;\\n}\",\n \"/**\\n * wait_for_key_construction - Wait for construction of a key to complete\\n * @key: The key being waited for.\\n * @intr: Whether to wait interruptibly.\\n *\\n * Wait for a key to finish being constructed.\\n *\\n * Returns 0 if successful; -ERESTARTSYS if the wait was interrupted; -ENOKEY\\n * if the key was negated; or -EKEYREVOKED or -EKEYEXPIRED if the key was\\n * revoked or expired.\\n */\\nint wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)\\n{\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tret = wait_on_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT,\\n\\t\\t\\t intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);\\n\\tif (ret)\\n\\t\\treturn -ERESTARTSYS;\",\n \"\\tif (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {\\n\\t\\tsmp_rmb();\\n\\t\\treturn key->reject_error;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\treturn key_validate(key);\\n}\\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction);\",\n \"/**\\n * request_key - Request a key and wait for construction\\n * @type: Type of key.\\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\\n *\\n * As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key\\n * to a keyring if found, new keys are always allocated in the user's quota,\\n * the callout_info must be a NUL-terminated string and no auxiliary data can\\n * be passed.\\n *\\n * Furthermore, it then works as wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the\\n * completion of keys undergoing construction with a non-interruptible wait.\\n */\\nstruct key *request_key(struct key_type *type,\\n\\t\\t\\tconst char *description,\\n\\t\\t\\tconst char *callout_info)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key *key;\\n\\tsize_t callout_len = 0;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tif (callout_info)\\n\\t\\tcallout_len = strlen(callout_info);\\n\\tkey = request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info, callout_len,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t NULL, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);\\n\\tif (!IS_ERR(key)) {\\n\\t\\tret = wait_for_key_construction(key, false);\\n\\t\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_put(key);\\n\\t\\t\\treturn ERR_PTR(ret);\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\\n\\treturn key;\\n}\\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key);\",\n \"/**\\n * request_key_with_auxdata - Request a key with auxiliary data for the upcaller\\n * @type: The type of key we want.\\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\\n * @callout_len: The length of callout_info.\\n * @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.\\n *\\n * As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key\\n * to a keyring if found and new keys are always allocated in the user's quota.\\n *\\n * Furthermore, it then works as wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the\\n * completion of keys undergoing construction with a non-interruptible wait.\\n */\\nstruct key *request_key_with_auxdata(struct key_type *type,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t const char *description,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t const void *callout_info,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t size_t callout_len,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t void *aux)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key *key;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tkey = request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info, callout_len,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t aux, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);\\n\\tif (!IS_ERR(key)) {\\n\\t\\tret = wait_for_key_construction(key, false);\\n\\t\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_put(key);\\n\\t\\t\\treturn ERR_PTR(ret);\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\\n\\treturn key;\\n}\\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_with_auxdata);\",\n \"/*\\n * request_key_async - Request a key (allow async construction)\\n * @type: Type of key.\\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\\n * @callout_len: The length of callout_info.\\n *\\n * As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key\\n * to a keyring if found, new keys are always allocated in the user's quota and\\n * no auxiliary data can be passed.\\n *\\n * The caller should call wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the\\n * completion of the returned key if it is still undergoing construction.\\n */\\nstruct key *request_key_async(struct key_type *type,\\n\\t\\t\\t const char *description,\\n\\t\\t\\t const void *callout_info,\\n\\t\\t\\t size_t callout_len)\\n{\\n\\treturn request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t callout_len, NULL, NULL,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);\\n}\\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_async);\",\n \"/*\\n * request a key with auxiliary data for the upcaller (allow async construction)\\n * @type: Type of key.\\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\\n * @callout_len: The length of callout_info.\\n * @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.\\n *\\n * As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key\\n * to a keyring if found and new keys are always allocated in the user's quota.\\n *\\n * The caller should call wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the\\n * completion of the returned key if it is still undergoing construction.\\n */\\nstruct key *request_key_async_with_auxdata(struct key_type *type,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t const char *description,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t const void *callout_info,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t size_t callout_len,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t void *aux)\\n{\\n\\treturn request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t callout_len, aux, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);\\n}\\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_async_with_auxdata);\"\n]","isConversational":false},"labels":{"kind":"list like","value":[1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1],"string":"[\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 0,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1\n]","isConversational":false},"source":{"kind":"string","value":"PreciseBugs"},"other_info":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"buggy_code_end_loc\": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], \"buggy_code_start_loc\": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], \"filenames\": [\"include/linux/key.h\", \"net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c\", \"security/keys/big_key.c\", \"security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c\", \"security/keys/gc.c\", \"security/keys/key.c\", \"security/keys/keyctl.c\", \"security/keys/keyring.c\", \"security/keys/proc.c\", \"security/keys/process_keys.c\", \"security/keys/request_key.c\", \"security/keys/request_key_auth.c\", \"security/keys/trusted.c\", \"security/keys/user_defined.c\"], \"fixing_code_end_loc\": [380, 228, 283, 858, 155, 1000, 904, 603, 253, 734, 601, 77, 1070, 166], \"fixing_code_start_loc\": [139, 227, 250, 857, 132, 405, 769, 417, 185, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], \"message\": \"The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the \\\"negative\\\" state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.\", \"other\": {\"cve\": {\"cisaActionDue\": null, \"cisaExploitAdd\": null, \"cisaRequiredAction\": null, \"cisaVulnerabilityName\": null, \"configurations\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"4397FA2C-1EE8-4F42-9823-2D85B8C20976\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.4.95\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.4\", \"vulnerable\": true}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"D6690C73-23A3-4475-97D0-8CB96812E2FB\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.9.59\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.5\", \"vulnerable\": true}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"86038BA0-0886-479E-AD71-D78363937D66\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.13.10\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.10\", \"vulnerable\": true}], \"negate\": false, \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": null}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the \\\"negative\\\" state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.\"}, {\"lang\": \"es\", \"value\": \"El subsistema KEYS en el kernel de Linux en versiones anteriores a la 4.13.10 no sincroniza correctamente las acciones de actualizaci\\u00f3n con las de detecci\\u00f3n de una clave en el estado \\\"negative\\\" para evitar una condici\\u00f3n de carrera, lo que permite que los usuarios locales provoquen una denegaci\\u00f3n de servicio (DoS) o, posiblemente, cause otro impacto no especificado mediante llamadas al sistema manipuladas.\"}], \"evaluatorComment\": null, \"id\": \"CVE-2017-15951\", \"lastModified\": \"2023-01-19T15:45:25.270\", \"metrics\": {\"cvssMetricV2\": [{\"acInsufInfo\": false, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"cvssData\": {\"accessComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"accessVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"authentication\": \"NONE\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"baseScore\": 7.2, \"confidentialityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"integrityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"vectorString\": \"AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C\", \"version\": \"2.0\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 3.9, \"impactScore\": 10.0, \"obtainAllPrivilege\": false, \"obtainOtherPrivilege\": false, \"obtainUserPrivilege\": false, \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\", \"userInteractionRequired\": false}], \"cvssMetricV30\": null, \"cvssMetricV31\": [{\"cvssData\": {\"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"baseScore\": 7.8, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"integrityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"LOW\", \"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\", \"version\": \"3.1\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 1.8, \"impactScore\": 5.9, \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\"}]}, \"published\": \"2017-10-28T02:29:00.217\", \"references\": [{\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Issue Tracking\", \"Patch\", \"Third Party Advisory\"], \"url\": \"http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Release Notes\", \"Vendor Advisory\"], \"url\": \"http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/ChangeLog-4.13.10\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Third Party Advisory\", \"VDB Entry\"], \"url\": \"http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101621\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Issue Tracking\", \"Patch\", \"Third Party Advisory\"], \"url\": \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}], \"sourceIdentifier\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"vendorComments\": null, \"vulnStatus\": \"Analyzed\", \"weaknesses\": [{\"description\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CWE-20\"}], \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\"}]}, \"github_commit_url\": \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}, \"type\": \"CWE-20\"}"},"index":{"kind":"number","value":836,"string":"836"}}},{"rowIdx":4997,"cells":{"prompt":{"kind":"string","value":"Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not."},"completions":{"kind":"list like","value":["/* Request a key from userspace\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version\n * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.\n *\n * See Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst\n */","#include <linux/module.h>\n#include <linux/sched.h>\n#include <linux/kmod.h>\n#include <linux/err.h>\n#include <linux/keyctl.h>\n#include <linux/slab.h>\n#include \"internal.h\"","#define key_negative_timeout\t60\t/* default timeout on a negative key's existence */","/**\n * complete_request_key - Complete the construction of a key.\n * @cons: The key construction record.\n * @error: The success or failute of the construction.\n *\n * Complete the attempt to construct a key. The key will be negated\n * if an error is indicated. The authorisation key will be revoked\n * unconditionally.\n */\nvoid complete_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, int error)\n{\n\tkenter(\"{%d,%d},%d\", cons->key->serial, cons->authkey->serial, error);","\tif (error < 0)\n\t\tkey_negate_and_link(cons->key, key_negative_timeout, NULL,\n\t\t\t\t cons->authkey);\n\telse\n\t\tkey_revoke(cons->authkey);","\tkey_put(cons->key);\n\tkey_put(cons->authkey);\n\tkfree(cons);\n}\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(complete_request_key);","/*\n * Initialise a usermode helper that is going to have a specific session\n * keyring.\n *\n * This is called in context of freshly forked kthread before kernel_execve(),\n * so we can simply install the desired session_keyring at this point.\n */\nstatic int umh_keys_init(struct subprocess_info *info, struct cred *cred)\n{\n\tstruct key *keyring = info->data;","\treturn install_session_keyring_to_cred(cred, keyring);\n}","/*\n * Clean up a usermode helper with session keyring.\n */\nstatic void umh_keys_cleanup(struct subprocess_info *info)\n{\n\tstruct key *keyring = info->data;\n\tkey_put(keyring);\n}","/*\n * Call a usermode helper with a specific session keyring.\n */\nstatic int call_usermodehelper_keys(const char *path, char **argv, char **envp,\n\t\t\t\t\tstruct key *session_keyring, int wait)\n{\n\tstruct subprocess_info *info;","\tinfo = call_usermodehelper_setup(path, argv, envp, GFP_KERNEL,\n\t\t\t\t\t umh_keys_init, umh_keys_cleanup,\n\t\t\t\t\t session_keyring);\n\tif (!info)\n\t\treturn -ENOMEM;","\tkey_get(session_keyring);\n\treturn call_usermodehelper_exec(info, wait);\n}","/*\n * Request userspace finish the construction of a key\n * - execute \"/sbin/request-key <op> <key> <uid> <gid> <keyring> <keyring> <keyring>\"\n */\nstatic int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,\n\t\t\t\t const char *op,\n\t\t\t\t void *aux)\n{\n\tstatic char const request_key[] = \"/sbin/request-key\";\n\tconst struct cred *cred = current_cred();\n\tkey_serial_t prkey, sskey;\n\tstruct key *key = cons->key, *authkey = cons->authkey, *keyring,\n\t\t*session;\n\tchar *argv[9], *envp[3], uid_str[12], gid_str[12];\n\tchar key_str[12], keyring_str[3][12];\n\tchar desc[20];\n\tint ret, i;","\tkenter(\"{%d},{%d},%s\", key->serial, authkey->serial, op);","\tret = install_user_keyrings();\n\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\tgoto error_alloc;","\t/* allocate a new session keyring */\n\tsprintf(desc, \"_req.%u\", key->serial);","\tcred = get_current_cred();\n\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(desc, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,\n\t\t\t\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,\n\t\t\t\tKEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL, NULL);\n\tput_cred(cred);\n\tif (IS_ERR(keyring)) {\n\t\tret = PTR_ERR(keyring);\n\t\tgoto error_alloc;\n\t}","\t/* attach the auth key to the session keyring */\n\tret = key_link(keyring, authkey);\n\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\tgoto error_link;","\t/* record the UID and GID */\n\tsprintf(uid_str, \"%d\", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid));\n\tsprintf(gid_str, \"%d\", from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid));","\t/* we say which key is under construction */\n\tsprintf(key_str, \"%d\", key->serial);","\t/* we specify the process's default keyrings */\n\tsprintf(keyring_str[0], \"%d\",\n\t\tcred->thread_keyring ? cred->thread_keyring->serial : 0);","\tprkey = 0;\n\tif (cred->process_keyring)\n\t\tprkey = cred->process_keyring->serial;\n\tsprintf(keyring_str[1], \"%d\", prkey);","\trcu_read_lock();\n\tsession = rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring);\n\tif (!session)\n\t\tsession = cred->user->session_keyring;\n\tsskey = session->serial;\n\trcu_read_unlock();","\tsprintf(keyring_str[2], \"%d\", sskey);","\t/* set up a minimal environment */\n\ti = 0;\n\tenvp[i++] = \"HOME=/\";\n\tenvp[i++] = \"PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin\";\n\tenvp[i] = NULL;","\t/* set up the argument list */\n\ti = 0;\n\targv[i++] = (char *)request_key;\n\targv[i++] = (char *) op;\n\targv[i++] = key_str;\n\targv[i++] = uid_str;\n\targv[i++] = gid_str;\n\targv[i++] = keyring_str[0];\n\targv[i++] = keyring_str[1];\n\targv[i++] = keyring_str[2];\n\targv[i] = NULL;","\t/* do it */\n\tret = call_usermodehelper_keys(request_key, argv, envp, keyring,\n\t\t\t\t UMH_WAIT_PROC);\n\tkdebug(\"usermode -> 0x%x\", ret);\n\tif (ret >= 0) {\n\t\t/* ret is the exit/wait code */\n\t\tif (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags) ||\n\t\t key_validate(key) < 0)\n\t\t\tret = -ENOKEY;\n\t\telse\n\t\t\t/* ignore any errors from userspace if the key was\n\t\t\t * instantiated */\n\t\t\tret = 0;\n\t}","error_link:\n\tkey_put(keyring);","error_alloc:\n\tcomplete_request_key(cons, ret);\n\tkleave(\" = %d\", ret);\n\treturn ret;\n}","/*\n * Call out to userspace for key construction.\n *\n * Program failure is ignored in favour of key status.\n */\nstatic int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info,\n\t\t\t size_t callout_len, void *aux,\n\t\t\t struct key *dest_keyring)\n{\n\tstruct key_construction *cons;\n\trequest_key_actor_t actor;\n\tstruct key *authkey;\n\tint ret;","\tkenter(\"%d,%p,%zu,%p\", key->serial, callout_info, callout_len, aux);","\tcons = kmalloc(sizeof(*cons), GFP_KERNEL);\n\tif (!cons)\n\t\treturn -ENOMEM;","\t/* allocate an authorisation key */\n\tauthkey = request_key_auth_new(key, callout_info, callout_len,\n\t\t\t\t dest_keyring);\n\tif (IS_ERR(authkey)) {\n\t\tkfree(cons);\n\t\tret = PTR_ERR(authkey);\n\t\tauthkey = NULL;\n\t} else {\n\t\tcons->authkey = key_get(authkey);\n\t\tcons->key = key_get(key);","\t\t/* make the call */\n\t\tactor = call_sbin_request_key;\n\t\tif (key->type->request_key)\n\t\t\tactor = key->type->request_key;","\t\tret = actor(cons, \"create\", aux);","\t\t/* check that the actor called complete_request_key() prior to\n\t\t * returning an error */\n\t\tWARN_ON(ret < 0 &&\n\t\t\t!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags));\n\t\tkey_put(authkey);\n\t}","\tkleave(\" = %d\", ret);\n\treturn ret;\n}","/*\n * Get the appropriate destination keyring for the request.\n *\n * The keyring selected is returned with an extra reference upon it which the\n * caller must release.\n */\nstatic void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)\n{\n\tstruct request_key_auth *rka;\n\tconst struct cred *cred = current_cred();\n\tstruct key *dest_keyring = *_dest_keyring, *authkey;","\tkenter(\"%p\", dest_keyring);","\t/* find the appropriate keyring */\n\tif (dest_keyring) {\n\t\t/* the caller supplied one */\n\t\tkey_get(dest_keyring);\n\t} else {\n\t\t/* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we\n\t\t * find one that we actually have */\n\t\tswitch (cred->jit_keyring) {\n\t\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:\n\t\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:\n\t\t\tif (cred->request_key_auth) {\n\t\t\t\tauthkey = cred->request_key_auth;\n\t\t\t\tdown_read(&authkey->sem);\n\t\t\t\trka = authkey->payload.data[0];\n\t\t\t\tif (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,\n\t\t\t\t\t &authkey->flags))\n\t\t\t\t\tdest_keyring =\n\t\t\t\t\t\tkey_get(rka->dest_keyring);\n\t\t\t\tup_read(&authkey->sem);\n\t\t\t\tif (dest_keyring)\n\t\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t\t}","\t\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:\n\t\t\tdest_keyring = key_get(cred->thread_keyring);\n\t\t\tif (dest_keyring)\n\t\t\t\tbreak;","\t\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:\n\t\t\tdest_keyring = key_get(cred->process_keyring);\n\t\t\tif (dest_keyring)\n\t\t\t\tbreak;","\t\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:\n\t\t\trcu_read_lock();\n\t\t\tdest_keyring = key_get(\n\t\t\t\trcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring));\n\t\t\trcu_read_unlock();","\t\t\tif (dest_keyring)\n\t\t\t\tbreak;","\t\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:\n\t\t\tdest_keyring =\n\t\t\t\tkey_get(cred->user->session_keyring);\n\t\t\tbreak;","\t\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:\n\t\t\tdest_keyring = key_get(cred->user->uid_keyring);\n\t\t\tbreak;","\t\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tBUG();\n\t\t}\n\t}","\t*_dest_keyring = dest_keyring;\n\tkleave(\" [dk %d]\", key_serial(dest_keyring));\n\treturn;\n}","/*\n * Allocate a new key in under-construction state and attempt to link it in to\n * the requested keyring.\n *\n * May return a key that's already under construction instead if there was a\n * race between two thread calling request_key().\n */\nstatic int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,\n\t\t\t struct key *dest_keyring,\n\t\t\t unsigned long flags,\n\t\t\t struct key_user *user,\n\t\t\t struct key **_key)\n{\n\tstruct assoc_array_edit *edit;\n\tstruct key *key;\n\tkey_perm_t perm;\n\tkey_ref_t key_ref;\n\tint ret;","\tkenter(\"%s,%s,,,\",\n\t ctx->index_key.type->name, ctx->index_key.description);","\t*_key = NULL;\n\tmutex_lock(&user->cons_lock);","\tperm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;\n\tperm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;\n\tif (ctx->index_key.type->read)\n\t\tperm |= KEY_POS_READ;\n\tif (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring ||\n\t ctx->index_key.type->update)\n\t\tperm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;","\tkey = key_alloc(ctx->index_key.type, ctx->index_key.description,\n\t\t\tctx->cred->fsuid, ctx->cred->fsgid, ctx->cred,\n\t\t\tperm, flags, NULL);\n\tif (IS_ERR(key))\n\t\tgoto alloc_failed;","\tset_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);","\tif (dest_keyring) {\n\t\tret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, &edit);\n\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\tgoto link_prealloc_failed;\n\t}","\t/* attach the key to the destination keyring under lock, but we do need\n\t * to do another check just in case someone beat us to it whilst we\n\t * waited for locks */\n\tmutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);","\tkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx);\n\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\n\t\tgoto key_already_present;","\tif (dest_keyring)\n\t\t__key_link(key, &edit);","\tmutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);\n\tif (dest_keyring)\n\t\t__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit);\n\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\n\t*_key = key;\n\tkleave(\" = 0 [%d]\", key_serial(key));\n\treturn 0;","\t/* the key is now present - we tell the caller that we found it by\n\t * returning -EINPROGRESS */\nkey_already_present:\n\tkey_put(key);\n\tmutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);\n\tkey = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);\n\tif (dest_keyring) {\n\t\tret = __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key);\n\t\tif (ret == 0)\n\t\t\t__key_link(key, &edit);\n\t\t__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit);\n\t\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\t\tgoto link_check_failed;\n\t}\n\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\n\t*_key = key;\n\tkleave(\" = -EINPROGRESS [%d]\", key_serial(key));\n\treturn -EINPROGRESS;","link_check_failed:\n\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\n\tkey_put(key);\n\tkleave(\" = %d [linkcheck]\", ret);\n\treturn ret;","link_prealloc_failed:\n\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\n\tkey_put(key);\n\tkleave(\" = %d [prelink]\", ret);\n\treturn ret;","alloc_failed:\n\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\n\tkleave(\" = %ld\", PTR_ERR(key));\n\treturn PTR_ERR(key);\n}","/*\n * Commence key construction.\n */\nstatic struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,\n\t\t\t\t\t const char *callout_info,\n\t\t\t\t\t size_t callout_len,\n\t\t\t\t\t void *aux,\n\t\t\t\t\t struct key *dest_keyring,\n\t\t\t\t\t unsigned long flags)\n{\n\tstruct key_user *user;\n\tstruct key *key;\n\tint ret;","\tkenter(\"\");","\tif (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring)\n\t\treturn ERR_PTR(-EPERM);","\tuser = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());\n\tif (!user)\n\t\treturn ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);","\tconstruct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);","\tret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key);\n\tkey_user_put(user);","\tif (ret == 0) {\n\t\tret = construct_key(key, callout_info, callout_len, aux,\n\t\t\t\t dest_keyring);\n\t\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\t\tkdebug(\"cons failed\");\n\t\t\tgoto construction_failed;\n\t\t}\n\t} else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {\n\t\tret = 0;\n\t} else {\n\t\tgoto couldnt_alloc_key;\n\t}","\tkey_put(dest_keyring);\n\tkleave(\" = key %d\", key_serial(key));\n\treturn key;","construction_failed:\n\tkey_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL);\n\tkey_put(key);\ncouldnt_alloc_key:\n\tkey_put(dest_keyring);\n\tkleave(\" = %d\", ret);\n\treturn ERR_PTR(ret);\n}","/**\n * request_key_and_link - Request a key and cache it in a keyring.\n * @type: The type of key we want.\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\n * @callout_len: The length of callout_info.\n * @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.\n * @dest_keyring: Where to cache the key.\n * @flags: Flags to key_alloc().\n *\n * A key matching the specified criteria is searched for in the process's\n * keyrings and returned with its usage count incremented if found. Otherwise,\n * if callout_info is not NULL, a key will be allocated and some service\n * (probably in userspace) will be asked to instantiate it.\n *\n * If successfully found or created, the key will be linked to the destination\n * keyring if one is provided.\n *\n * Returns a pointer to the key if successful; -EACCES, -ENOKEY, -EKEYREVOKED\n * or -EKEYEXPIRED if an inaccessible, negative, revoked or expired key was\n * found; -ENOKEY if no key was found and no @callout_info was given; -EDQUOT\n * if insufficient key quota was available to create a new key; or -ENOMEM if\n * insufficient memory was available.\n *\n * If the returned key was created, then it may still be under construction,\n * and wait_for_key_construction() should be used to wait for that to complete.\n */\nstruct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,\n\t\t\t\t const char *description,\n\t\t\t\t const void *callout_info,\n\t\t\t\t size_t callout_len,\n\t\t\t\t void *aux,\n\t\t\t\t struct key *dest_keyring,\n\t\t\t\t unsigned long flags)\n{\n\tstruct keyring_search_context ctx = {\n\t\t.index_key.type\t\t= type,\n\t\t.index_key.description\t= description,\n\t\t.cred\t\t\t= current_cred(),\n\t\t.match_data.cmp\t\t= key_default_cmp,\n\t\t.match_data.raw_data\t= description,\n\t\t.match_data.lookup_type\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,\n\t\t.flags\t\t\t= (KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK |\n\t\t\t\t\t KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED),\n\t};\n\tstruct key *key;\n\tkey_ref_t key_ref;\n\tint ret;","\tkenter(\"%s,%s,%p,%zu,%p,%p,%lx\",\n\t ctx.index_key.type->name, ctx.index_key.description,\n\t callout_info, callout_len, aux, dest_keyring, flags);","\tif (type->match_preparse) {\n\t\tret = type->match_preparse(&ctx.match_data);\n\t\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\t\tkey = ERR_PTR(ret);\n\t\t\tgoto error;\n\t\t}\n\t}","\t/* search all the process keyrings for a key */\n\tkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);","\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {\n\t\tkey = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);\n\t\tif (dest_keyring) {\n\t\t\tconstruct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);\n\t\t\tret = key_link(dest_keyring, key);\n\t\t\tkey_put(dest_keyring);\n\t\t\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\t\t\tkey_put(key);\n\t\t\t\tkey = ERR_PTR(ret);\n\t\t\t\tgoto error_free;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t} else if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EAGAIN) {\n\t\tkey = ERR_CAST(key_ref);\n\t} else {\n\t\t/* the search failed, but the keyrings were searchable, so we\n\t\t * should consult userspace if we can */\n\t\tkey = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);\n\t\tif (!callout_info)\n\t\t\tgoto error_free;","\t\tkey = construct_key_and_link(&ctx, callout_info, callout_len,\n\t\t\t\t\t aux, dest_keyring, flags);\n\t}","error_free:\n\tif (type->match_free)\n\t\ttype->match_free(&ctx.match_data);\nerror:\n\tkleave(\" = %p\", key);\n\treturn key;\n}","/**\n * wait_for_key_construction - Wait for construction of a key to complete\n * @key: The key being waited for.\n * @intr: Whether to wait interruptibly.\n *\n * Wait for a key to finish being constructed.\n *\n * Returns 0 if successful; -ERESTARTSYS if the wait was interrupted; -ENOKEY\n * if the key was negated; or -EKEYREVOKED or -EKEYEXPIRED if the key was\n * revoked or expired.\n */\nint wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)\n{\n\tint ret;","\tret = wait_on_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT,\n\t\t\t intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);\n\tif (ret)\n\t\treturn -ERESTARTSYS;","\tret = key_read_state(key);\n\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\treturn ret;","\treturn key_validate(key);\n}\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction);","/**\n * request_key - Request a key and wait for construction\n * @type: Type of key.\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\n *\n * As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key\n * to a keyring if found, new keys are always allocated in the user's quota,\n * the callout_info must be a NUL-terminated string and no auxiliary data can\n * be passed.\n *\n * Furthermore, it then works as wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the\n * completion of keys undergoing construction with a non-interruptible wait.\n */\nstruct key *request_key(struct key_type *type,\n\t\t\tconst char *description,\n\t\t\tconst char *callout_info)\n{\n\tstruct key *key;\n\tsize_t callout_len = 0;\n\tint ret;","\tif (callout_info)\n\t\tcallout_len = strlen(callout_info);\n\tkey = request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info, callout_len,\n\t\t\t\t NULL, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);\n\tif (!IS_ERR(key)) {\n\t\tret = wait_for_key_construction(key, false);\n\t\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\t\tkey_put(key);\n\t\t\treturn ERR_PTR(ret);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn key;\n}\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key);","/**\n * request_key_with_auxdata - Request a key with auxiliary data for the upcaller\n * @type: The type of key we want.\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\n * @callout_len: The length of callout_info.\n * @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.\n *\n * As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key\n * to a keyring if found and new keys are always allocated in the user's quota.\n *\n * Furthermore, it then works as wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the\n * completion of keys undergoing construction with a non-interruptible wait.\n */\nstruct key *request_key_with_auxdata(struct key_type *type,\n\t\t\t\t const char *description,\n\t\t\t\t const void *callout_info,\n\t\t\t\t size_t callout_len,\n\t\t\t\t void *aux)\n{\n\tstruct key *key;\n\tint ret;","\tkey = request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info, callout_len,\n\t\t\t\t aux, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);\n\tif (!IS_ERR(key)) {\n\t\tret = wait_for_key_construction(key, false);\n\t\tif (ret < 0) {\n\t\t\tkey_put(key);\n\t\t\treturn ERR_PTR(ret);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn key;\n}\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_with_auxdata);","/*\n * request_key_async - Request a key (allow async construction)\n * @type: Type of key.\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\n * @callout_len: The length of callout_info.\n *\n * As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key\n * to a keyring if found, new keys are always allocated in the user's quota and\n * no auxiliary data can be passed.\n *\n * The caller should call wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the\n * completion of the returned key if it is still undergoing construction.\n */\nstruct key *request_key_async(struct key_type *type,\n\t\t\t const char *description,\n\t\t\t const void *callout_info,\n\t\t\t size_t callout_len)\n{\n\treturn request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info,\n\t\t\t\t callout_len, NULL, NULL,\n\t\t\t\t KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);\n}\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_async);","/*\n * request a key with auxiliary data for the upcaller (allow async construction)\n * @type: Type of key.\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\n * @callout_len: The length of callout_info.\n * @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.\n *\n * As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key\n * to a keyring if found and new keys are always allocated in the user's quota.\n *\n * The caller should call wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the\n * completion of the returned key if it is still undergoing construction.\n */\nstruct key *request_key_async_with_auxdata(struct key_type *type,\n\t\t\t\t\t const char *description,\n\t\t\t\t\t const void *callout_info,\n\t\t\t\t\t size_t callout_len,\n\t\t\t\t\t void *aux)\n{\n\treturn request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info,\n\t\t\t\t callout_len, aux, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);\n}\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_async_with_auxdata);"],"string":"[\n \"/* Request a key from userspace\\n *\\n * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\\n *\\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\\n * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version\\n * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.\\n *\\n * See Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst\\n */\",\n \"#include <linux/module.h>\\n#include <linux/sched.h>\\n#include <linux/kmod.h>\\n#include <linux/err.h>\\n#include <linux/keyctl.h>\\n#include <linux/slab.h>\\n#include \\\"internal.h\\\"\",\n \"#define key_negative_timeout\\t60\\t/* default timeout on a negative key's existence */\",\n \"/**\\n * complete_request_key - Complete the construction of a key.\\n * @cons: The key construction record.\\n * @error: The success or failute of the construction.\\n *\\n * Complete the attempt to construct a key. The key will be negated\\n * if an error is indicated. The authorisation key will be revoked\\n * unconditionally.\\n */\\nvoid complete_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, int error)\\n{\\n\\tkenter(\\\"{%d,%d},%d\\\", cons->key->serial, cons->authkey->serial, error);\",\n \"\\tif (error < 0)\\n\\t\\tkey_negate_and_link(cons->key, key_negative_timeout, NULL,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t cons->authkey);\\n\\telse\\n\\t\\tkey_revoke(cons->authkey);\",\n \"\\tkey_put(cons->key);\\n\\tkey_put(cons->authkey);\\n\\tkfree(cons);\\n}\\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(complete_request_key);\",\n \"/*\\n * Initialise a usermode helper that is going to have a specific session\\n * keyring.\\n *\\n * This is called in context of freshly forked kthread before kernel_execve(),\\n * so we can simply install the desired session_keyring at this point.\\n */\\nstatic int umh_keys_init(struct subprocess_info *info, struct cred *cred)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key *keyring = info->data;\",\n \"\\treturn install_session_keyring_to_cred(cred, keyring);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Clean up a usermode helper with session keyring.\\n */\\nstatic void umh_keys_cleanup(struct subprocess_info *info)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key *keyring = info->data;\\n\\tkey_put(keyring);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Call a usermode helper with a specific session keyring.\\n */\\nstatic int call_usermodehelper_keys(const char *path, char **argv, char **envp,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tstruct key *session_keyring, int wait)\\n{\\n\\tstruct subprocess_info *info;\",\n \"\\tinfo = call_usermodehelper_setup(path, argv, envp, GFP_KERNEL,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t umh_keys_init, umh_keys_cleanup,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t session_keyring);\\n\\tif (!info)\\n\\t\\treturn -ENOMEM;\",\n \"\\tkey_get(session_keyring);\\n\\treturn call_usermodehelper_exec(info, wait);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Request userspace finish the construction of a key\\n * - execute \\\"/sbin/request-key <op> <key> <uid> <gid> <keyring> <keyring> <keyring>\\\"\\n */\\nstatic int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t const char *op,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t void *aux)\\n{\\n\\tstatic char const request_key[] = \\\"/sbin/request-key\\\";\\n\\tconst struct cred *cred = current_cred();\\n\\tkey_serial_t prkey, sskey;\\n\\tstruct key *key = cons->key, *authkey = cons->authkey, *keyring,\\n\\t\\t*session;\\n\\tchar *argv[9], *envp[3], uid_str[12], gid_str[12];\\n\\tchar key_str[12], keyring_str[3][12];\\n\\tchar desc[20];\\n\\tint ret, i;\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"{%d},{%d},%s\\\", key->serial, authkey->serial, op);\",\n \"\\tret = install_user_keyrings();\\n\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\tgoto error_alloc;\",\n \"\\t/* allocate a new session keyring */\\n\\tsprintf(desc, \\\"_req.%u\\\", key->serial);\",\n \"\\tcred = get_current_cred();\\n\\tkeyring = keyring_alloc(desc, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tKEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tKEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL, NULL);\\n\\tput_cred(cred);\\n\\tif (IS_ERR(keyring)) {\\n\\t\\tret = PTR_ERR(keyring);\\n\\t\\tgoto error_alloc;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* attach the auth key to the session keyring */\\n\\tret = key_link(keyring, authkey);\\n\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\tgoto error_link;\",\n \"\\t/* record the UID and GID */\\n\\tsprintf(uid_str, \\\"%d\\\", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid));\\n\\tsprintf(gid_str, \\\"%d\\\", from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid));\",\n \"\\t/* we say which key is under construction */\\n\\tsprintf(key_str, \\\"%d\\\", key->serial);\",\n \"\\t/* we specify the process's default keyrings */\\n\\tsprintf(keyring_str[0], \\\"%d\\\",\\n\\t\\tcred->thread_keyring ? cred->thread_keyring->serial : 0);\",\n \"\\tprkey = 0;\\n\\tif (cred->process_keyring)\\n\\t\\tprkey = cred->process_keyring->serial;\\n\\tsprintf(keyring_str[1], \\\"%d\\\", prkey);\",\n \"\\trcu_read_lock();\\n\\tsession = rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring);\\n\\tif (!session)\\n\\t\\tsession = cred->user->session_keyring;\\n\\tsskey = session->serial;\\n\\trcu_read_unlock();\",\n \"\\tsprintf(keyring_str[2], \\\"%d\\\", sskey);\",\n \"\\t/* set up a minimal environment */\\n\\ti = 0;\\n\\tenvp[i++] = \\\"HOME=/\\\";\\n\\tenvp[i++] = \\\"PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin\\\";\\n\\tenvp[i] = NULL;\",\n \"\\t/* set up the argument list */\\n\\ti = 0;\\n\\targv[i++] = (char *)request_key;\\n\\targv[i++] = (char *) op;\\n\\targv[i++] = key_str;\\n\\targv[i++] = uid_str;\\n\\targv[i++] = gid_str;\\n\\targv[i++] = keyring_str[0];\\n\\targv[i++] = keyring_str[1];\\n\\targv[i++] = keyring_str[2];\\n\\targv[i] = NULL;\",\n \"\\t/* do it */\\n\\tret = call_usermodehelper_keys(request_key, argv, envp, keyring,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t UMH_WAIT_PROC);\\n\\tkdebug(\\\"usermode -> 0x%x\\\", ret);\\n\\tif (ret >= 0) {\\n\\t\\t/* ret is the exit/wait code */\\n\\t\\tif (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags) ||\\n\\t\\t key_validate(key) < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\tret = -ENOKEY;\\n\\t\\telse\\n\\t\\t\\t/* ignore any errors from userspace if the key was\\n\\t\\t\\t * instantiated */\\n\\t\\t\\tret = 0;\\n\\t}\",\n \"error_link:\\n\\tkey_put(keyring);\",\n \"error_alloc:\\n\\tcomplete_request_key(cons, ret);\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = %d\\\", ret);\\n\\treturn ret;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Call out to userspace for key construction.\\n *\\n * Program failure is ignored in favour of key status.\\n */\\nstatic int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info,\\n\\t\\t\\t size_t callout_len, void *aux,\\n\\t\\t\\t struct key *dest_keyring)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key_construction *cons;\\n\\trequest_key_actor_t actor;\\n\\tstruct key *authkey;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"%d,%p,%zu,%p\\\", key->serial, callout_info, callout_len, aux);\",\n \"\\tcons = kmalloc(sizeof(*cons), GFP_KERNEL);\\n\\tif (!cons)\\n\\t\\treturn -ENOMEM;\",\n \"\\t/* allocate an authorisation key */\\n\\tauthkey = request_key_auth_new(key, callout_info, callout_len,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t dest_keyring);\\n\\tif (IS_ERR(authkey)) {\\n\\t\\tkfree(cons);\\n\\t\\tret = PTR_ERR(authkey);\\n\\t\\tauthkey = NULL;\\n\\t} else {\\n\\t\\tcons->authkey = key_get(authkey);\\n\\t\\tcons->key = key_get(key);\",\n \"\\t\\t/* make the call */\\n\\t\\tactor = call_sbin_request_key;\\n\\t\\tif (key->type->request_key)\\n\\t\\t\\tactor = key->type->request_key;\",\n \"\\t\\tret = actor(cons, \\\"create\\\", aux);\",\n \"\\t\\t/* check that the actor called complete_request_key() prior to\\n\\t\\t * returning an error */\\n\\t\\tWARN_ON(ret < 0 &&\\n\\t\\t\\t!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags));\\n\\t\\tkey_put(authkey);\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tkleave(\\\" = %d\\\", ret);\\n\\treturn ret;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Get the appropriate destination keyring for the request.\\n *\\n * The keyring selected is returned with an extra reference upon it which the\\n * caller must release.\\n */\\nstatic void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)\\n{\\n\\tstruct request_key_auth *rka;\\n\\tconst struct cred *cred = current_cred();\\n\\tstruct key *dest_keyring = *_dest_keyring, *authkey;\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"%p\\\", dest_keyring);\",\n \"\\t/* find the appropriate keyring */\\n\\tif (dest_keyring) {\\n\\t\\t/* the caller supplied one */\\n\\t\\tkey_get(dest_keyring);\\n\\t} else {\\n\\t\\t/* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we\\n\\t\\t * find one that we actually have */\\n\\t\\tswitch (cred->jit_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:\\n\\t\\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\t\\tif (cred->request_key_auth) {\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tauthkey = cred->request_key_auth;\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tdown_read(&authkey->sem);\\n\\t\\t\\t\\trka = authkey->payload.data[0];\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tif (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t &authkey->flags))\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tdest_keyring =\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tkey_get(rka->dest_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tup_read(&authkey->sem);\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tif (dest_keyring)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tbreak;\\n\\t\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\t\\tdest_keyring = key_get(cred->thread_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\tif (dest_keyring)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\t\\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\t\\tdest_keyring = key_get(cred->process_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\tif (dest_keyring)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\t\\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\t\\trcu_read_lock();\\n\\t\\t\\tdest_keyring = key_get(\\n\\t\\t\\t\\trcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring));\\n\\t\\t\\trcu_read_unlock();\",\n \"\\t\\t\\tif (dest_keyring)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\t\\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\t\\tdest_keyring =\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tkey_get(cred->user->session_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\t\\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\t\\tdest_keyring = key_get(cred->user->uid_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\tbreak;\",\n \"\\t\\tcase KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:\\n\\t\\tdefault:\\n\\t\\t\\tBUG();\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t*_dest_keyring = dest_keyring;\\n\\tkleave(\\\" [dk %d]\\\", key_serial(dest_keyring));\\n\\treturn;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Allocate a new key in under-construction state and attempt to link it in to\\n * the requested keyring.\\n *\\n * May return a key that's already under construction instead if there was a\\n * race between two thread calling request_key().\\n */\\nstatic int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,\\n\\t\\t\\t struct key *dest_keyring,\\n\\t\\t\\t unsigned long flags,\\n\\t\\t\\t struct key_user *user,\\n\\t\\t\\t struct key **_key)\\n{\\n\\tstruct assoc_array_edit *edit;\\n\\tstruct key *key;\\n\\tkey_perm_t perm;\\n\\tkey_ref_t key_ref;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"%s,%s,,,\\\",\\n\\t ctx->index_key.type->name, ctx->index_key.description);\",\n \"\\t*_key = NULL;\\n\\tmutex_lock(&user->cons_lock);\",\n \"\\tperm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;\\n\\tperm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;\\n\\tif (ctx->index_key.type->read)\\n\\t\\tperm |= KEY_POS_READ;\\n\\tif (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring ||\\n\\t ctx->index_key.type->update)\\n\\t\\tperm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;\",\n \"\\tkey = key_alloc(ctx->index_key.type, ctx->index_key.description,\\n\\t\\t\\tctx->cred->fsuid, ctx->cred->fsgid, ctx->cred,\\n\\t\\t\\tperm, flags, NULL);\\n\\tif (IS_ERR(key))\\n\\t\\tgoto alloc_failed;\",\n \"\\tset_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);\",\n \"\\tif (dest_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, &edit);\\n\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto link_prealloc_failed;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* attach the key to the destination keyring under lock, but we do need\\n\\t * to do another check just in case someone beat us to it whilst we\\n\\t * waited for locks */\\n\\tmutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);\",\n \"\\tkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx);\\n\\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref))\\n\\t\\tgoto key_already_present;\",\n \"\\tif (dest_keyring)\\n\\t\\t__key_link(key, &edit);\",\n \"\\tmutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);\\n\\tif (dest_keyring)\\n\\t\\t__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit);\\n\\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\\n\\t*_key = key;\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = 0 [%d]\\\", key_serial(key));\\n\\treturn 0;\",\n \"\\t/* the key is now present - we tell the caller that we found it by\\n\\t * returning -EINPROGRESS */\\nkey_already_present:\\n\\tkey_put(key);\\n\\tmutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);\\n\\tkey = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);\\n\\tif (dest_keyring) {\\n\\t\\tret = __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key);\\n\\t\\tif (ret == 0)\\n\\t\\t\\t__key_link(key, &edit);\\n\\t\\t__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit);\\n\\t\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto link_check_failed;\\n\\t}\\n\\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\\n\\t*_key = key;\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = -EINPROGRESS [%d]\\\", key_serial(key));\\n\\treturn -EINPROGRESS;\",\n \"link_check_failed:\\n\\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\\n\\tkey_put(key);\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = %d [linkcheck]\\\", ret);\\n\\treturn ret;\",\n \"link_prealloc_failed:\\n\\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\\n\\tkey_put(key);\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = %d [prelink]\\\", ret);\\n\\treturn ret;\",\n \"alloc_failed:\\n\\tmutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = %ld\\\", PTR_ERR(key));\\n\\treturn PTR_ERR(key);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Commence key construction.\\n */\\nstatic struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t const char *callout_info,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t size_t callout_len,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t void *aux,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t struct key *dest_keyring,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t unsigned long flags)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key_user *user;\\n\\tstruct key *key;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"\\\");\",\n \"\\tif (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring)\\n\\t\\treturn ERR_PTR(-EPERM);\",\n \"\\tuser = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());\\n\\tif (!user)\\n\\t\\treturn ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);\",\n \"\\tconstruct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);\",\n \"\\tret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key);\\n\\tkey_user_put(user);\",\n \"\\tif (ret == 0) {\\n\\t\\tret = construct_key(key, callout_info, callout_len, aux,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t dest_keyring);\\n\\t\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\t\\tkdebug(\\\"cons failed\\\");\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto construction_failed;\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t} else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {\\n\\t\\tret = 0;\\n\\t} else {\\n\\t\\tgoto couldnt_alloc_key;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tkey_put(dest_keyring);\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = key %d\\\", key_serial(key));\\n\\treturn key;\",\n \"construction_failed:\\n\\tkey_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL);\\n\\tkey_put(key);\\ncouldnt_alloc_key:\\n\\tkey_put(dest_keyring);\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = %d\\\", ret);\\n\\treturn ERR_PTR(ret);\\n}\",\n \"/**\\n * request_key_and_link - Request a key and cache it in a keyring.\\n * @type: The type of key we want.\\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\\n * @callout_len: The length of callout_info.\\n * @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.\\n * @dest_keyring: Where to cache the key.\\n * @flags: Flags to key_alloc().\\n *\\n * A key matching the specified criteria is searched for in the process's\\n * keyrings and returned with its usage count incremented if found. Otherwise,\\n * if callout_info is not NULL, a key will be allocated and some service\\n * (probably in userspace) will be asked to instantiate it.\\n *\\n * If successfully found or created, the key will be linked to the destination\\n * keyring if one is provided.\\n *\\n * Returns a pointer to the key if successful; -EACCES, -ENOKEY, -EKEYREVOKED\\n * or -EKEYEXPIRED if an inaccessible, negative, revoked or expired key was\\n * found; -ENOKEY if no key was found and no @callout_info was given; -EDQUOT\\n * if insufficient key quota was available to create a new key; or -ENOMEM if\\n * insufficient memory was available.\\n *\\n * If the returned key was created, then it may still be under construction,\\n * and wait_for_key_construction() should be used to wait for that to complete.\\n */\\nstruct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t const char *description,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t const void *callout_info,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t size_t callout_len,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t void *aux,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t struct key *dest_keyring,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t unsigned long flags)\\n{\\n\\tstruct keyring_search_context ctx = {\\n\\t\\t.index_key.type\\t\\t= type,\\n\\t\\t.index_key.description\\t= description,\\n\\t\\t.cred\\t\\t\\t= current_cred(),\\n\\t\\t.match_data.cmp\\t\\t= key_default_cmp,\\n\\t\\t.match_data.raw_data\\t= description,\\n\\t\\t.match_data.lookup_type\\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,\\n\\t\\t.flags\\t\\t\\t= (KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK |\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED),\\n\\t};\\n\\tstruct key *key;\\n\\tkey_ref_t key_ref;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"%s,%s,%p,%zu,%p,%p,%lx\\\",\\n\\t ctx.index_key.type->name, ctx.index_key.description,\\n\\t callout_info, callout_len, aux, dest_keyring, flags);\",\n \"\\tif (type->match_preparse) {\\n\\t\\tret = type->match_preparse(&ctx.match_data);\\n\\t\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\t\\tkey = ERR_PTR(ret);\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* search all the process keyrings for a key */\\n\\tkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);\",\n \"\\tif (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {\\n\\t\\tkey = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);\\n\\t\\tif (dest_keyring) {\\n\\t\\t\\tconstruct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\tret = key_link(dest_keyring, key);\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_put(dest_keyring);\\n\\t\\t\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tkey_put(key);\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tkey = ERR_PTR(ret);\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tgoto error_free;\\n\\t\\t\\t}\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t} else if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EAGAIN) {\\n\\t\\tkey = ERR_CAST(key_ref);\\n\\t} else {\\n\\t\\t/* the search failed, but the keyrings were searchable, so we\\n\\t\\t * should consult userspace if we can */\\n\\t\\tkey = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);\\n\\t\\tif (!callout_info)\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error_free;\",\n \"\\t\\tkey = construct_key_and_link(&ctx, callout_info, callout_len,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t aux, dest_keyring, flags);\\n\\t}\",\n \"error_free:\\n\\tif (type->match_free)\\n\\t\\ttype->match_free(&ctx.match_data);\\nerror:\\n\\tkleave(\\\" = %p\\\", key);\\n\\treturn key;\\n}\",\n \"/**\\n * wait_for_key_construction - Wait for construction of a key to complete\\n * @key: The key being waited for.\\n * @intr: Whether to wait interruptibly.\\n *\\n * Wait for a key to finish being constructed.\\n *\\n * Returns 0 if successful; -ERESTARTSYS if the wait was interrupted; -ENOKEY\\n * if the key was negated; or -EKEYREVOKED or -EKEYEXPIRED if the key was\\n * revoked or expired.\\n */\\nint wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)\\n{\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tret = wait_on_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT,\\n\\t\\t\\t intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);\\n\\tif (ret)\\n\\t\\treturn -ERESTARTSYS;\",\n \"\\tret = key_read_state(key);\\n\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\treturn ret;\",\n \"\\treturn key_validate(key);\\n}\\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction);\",\n \"/**\\n * request_key - Request a key and wait for construction\\n * @type: Type of key.\\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\\n *\\n * As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key\\n * to a keyring if found, new keys are always allocated in the user's quota,\\n * the callout_info must be a NUL-terminated string and no auxiliary data can\\n * be passed.\\n *\\n * Furthermore, it then works as wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the\\n * completion of keys undergoing construction with a non-interruptible wait.\\n */\\nstruct key *request_key(struct key_type *type,\\n\\t\\t\\tconst char *description,\\n\\t\\t\\tconst char *callout_info)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key *key;\\n\\tsize_t callout_len = 0;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tif (callout_info)\\n\\t\\tcallout_len = strlen(callout_info);\\n\\tkey = request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info, callout_len,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t NULL, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);\\n\\tif (!IS_ERR(key)) {\\n\\t\\tret = wait_for_key_construction(key, false);\\n\\t\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_put(key);\\n\\t\\t\\treturn ERR_PTR(ret);\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\\n\\treturn key;\\n}\\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key);\",\n \"/**\\n * request_key_with_auxdata - Request a key with auxiliary data for the upcaller\\n * @type: The type of key we want.\\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\\n * @callout_len: The length of callout_info.\\n * @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.\\n *\\n * As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key\\n * to a keyring if found and new keys are always allocated in the user's quota.\\n *\\n * Furthermore, it then works as wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the\\n * completion of keys undergoing construction with a non-interruptible wait.\\n */\\nstruct key *request_key_with_auxdata(struct key_type *type,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t const char *description,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t const void *callout_info,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t size_t callout_len,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t void *aux)\\n{\\n\\tstruct key *key;\\n\\tint ret;\",\n \"\\tkey = request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info, callout_len,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t aux, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);\\n\\tif (!IS_ERR(key)) {\\n\\t\\tret = wait_for_key_construction(key, false);\\n\\t\\tif (ret < 0) {\\n\\t\\t\\tkey_put(key);\\n\\t\\t\\treturn ERR_PTR(ret);\\n\\t\\t}\\n\\t}\\n\\treturn key;\\n}\\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_with_auxdata);\",\n \"/*\\n * request_key_async - Request a key (allow async construction)\\n * @type: Type of key.\\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\\n * @callout_len: The length of callout_info.\\n *\\n * As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key\\n * to a keyring if found, new keys are always allocated in the user's quota and\\n * no auxiliary data can be passed.\\n *\\n * The caller should call wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the\\n * completion of the returned key if it is still undergoing construction.\\n */\\nstruct key *request_key_async(struct key_type *type,\\n\\t\\t\\t const char *description,\\n\\t\\t\\t const void *callout_info,\\n\\t\\t\\t size_t callout_len)\\n{\\n\\treturn request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t callout_len, NULL, NULL,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);\\n}\\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_async);\",\n \"/*\\n * request a key with auxiliary data for the upcaller (allow async construction)\\n * @type: Type of key.\\n * @description: The searchable description of the key.\\n * @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).\\n * @callout_len: The length of callout_info.\\n * @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.\\n *\\n * As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key\\n * to a keyring if found and new keys are always allocated in the user's quota.\\n *\\n * The caller should call wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the\\n * completion of the returned key if it is still undergoing construction.\\n */\\nstruct key *request_key_async_with_auxdata(struct key_type *type,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t const char *description,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t const void *callout_info,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t size_t callout_len,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t void *aux)\\n{\\n\\treturn request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t callout_len, aux, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);\\n}\\nEXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_async_with_auxdata);\"\n]","isConversational":false},"labels":{"kind":"list like","value":[1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1],"string":"[\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1\n]","isConversational":false},"source":{"kind":"string","value":"PreciseBugs"},"other_info":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"buggy_code_end_loc\": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], \"buggy_code_start_loc\": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], \"filenames\": [\"include/linux/key.h\", \"net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c\", \"security/keys/big_key.c\", \"security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c\", \"security/keys/gc.c\", \"security/keys/key.c\", \"security/keys/keyctl.c\", \"security/keys/keyring.c\", \"security/keys/proc.c\", \"security/keys/process_keys.c\", \"security/keys/request_key.c\", \"security/keys/request_key_auth.c\", \"security/keys/trusted.c\", \"security/keys/user_defined.c\"], \"fixing_code_end_loc\": [380, 228, 283, 858, 155, 1000, 904, 603, 253, 734, 601, 77, 1070, 166], \"fixing_code_start_loc\": [139, 227, 250, 857, 132, 405, 769, 417, 185, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], \"message\": \"The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the \\\"negative\\\" state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.\", \"other\": {\"cve\": {\"cisaActionDue\": null, \"cisaExploitAdd\": null, \"cisaRequiredAction\": null, \"cisaVulnerabilityName\": null, \"configurations\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"4397FA2C-1EE8-4F42-9823-2D85B8C20976\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.4.95\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.4\", \"vulnerable\": true}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"D6690C73-23A3-4475-97D0-8CB96812E2FB\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.9.59\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.5\", \"vulnerable\": true}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"86038BA0-0886-479E-AD71-D78363937D66\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.13.10\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.10\", \"vulnerable\": true}], \"negate\": false, \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": null}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the \\\"negative\\\" state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.\"}, {\"lang\": \"es\", \"value\": \"El subsistema KEYS en el kernel de Linux en versiones anteriores a la 4.13.10 no sincroniza correctamente las acciones de actualizaci\\u00f3n con las de detecci\\u00f3n de una clave en el estado \\\"negative\\\" para evitar una condici\\u00f3n de carrera, lo que permite que los usuarios locales provoquen una denegaci\\u00f3n de servicio (DoS) o, posiblemente, cause otro impacto no especificado mediante llamadas al sistema manipuladas.\"}], \"evaluatorComment\": null, \"id\": \"CVE-2017-15951\", \"lastModified\": \"2023-01-19T15:45:25.270\", \"metrics\": {\"cvssMetricV2\": [{\"acInsufInfo\": false, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"cvssData\": {\"accessComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"accessVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"authentication\": \"NONE\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"baseScore\": 7.2, \"confidentialityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"integrityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"vectorString\": \"AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C\", \"version\": \"2.0\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 3.9, \"impactScore\": 10.0, \"obtainAllPrivilege\": false, \"obtainOtherPrivilege\": false, \"obtainUserPrivilege\": false, \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\", \"userInteractionRequired\": false}], \"cvssMetricV30\": null, \"cvssMetricV31\": [{\"cvssData\": {\"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"baseScore\": 7.8, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"integrityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"LOW\", \"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\", \"version\": \"3.1\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 1.8, \"impactScore\": 5.9, \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\"}]}, \"published\": \"2017-10-28T02:29:00.217\", \"references\": [{\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Issue Tracking\", \"Patch\", \"Third Party Advisory\"], \"url\": \"http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Release Notes\", \"Vendor Advisory\"], \"url\": \"http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/ChangeLog-4.13.10\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Third Party Advisory\", \"VDB Entry\"], \"url\": \"http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101621\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Issue Tracking\", \"Patch\", \"Third Party Advisory\"], \"url\": \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}], \"sourceIdentifier\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"vendorComments\": null, \"vulnStatus\": \"Analyzed\", \"weaknesses\": [{\"description\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CWE-20\"}], \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\"}]}, \"github_commit_url\": \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}, \"type\": \"CWE-20\"}"},"index":{"kind":"number","value":836,"string":"836"}}},{"rowIdx":4998,"cells":{"prompt":{"kind":"string","value":"Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not."},"completions":{"kind":"list like","value":["/* Request key authorisation token key definition.\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version\n * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.\n *\n * See Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst\n */","#include <linux/module.h>\n#include <linux/sched.h>\n#include <linux/err.h>\n#include <linux/seq_file.h>\n#include <linux/slab.h>\n#include <linux/uaccess.h>\n#include \"internal.h\"\n#include <keys/user-type.h>","static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);\nstatic void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);\nstatic int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *,\n\t\t\t\t\tstruct key_preparsed_payload *);\nstatic void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);\nstatic void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *);\nstatic void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *);\nstatic long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t);","/*\n * The request-key authorisation key type definition.\n */\nstruct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = {\n\t.name\t\t= \".request_key_auth\",\n\t.def_datalen\t= sizeof(struct request_key_auth),\n\t.preparse\t= request_key_auth_preparse,\n\t.free_preparse\t= request_key_auth_free_preparse,\n\t.instantiate\t= request_key_auth_instantiate,\n\t.describe\t= request_key_auth_describe,\n\t.revoke\t\t= request_key_auth_revoke,\n\t.destroy\t= request_key_auth_destroy,\n\t.read\t\t= request_key_auth_read,\n};","static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)\n{\n\treturn 0;\n}","static void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)\n{\n}","/*\n * Instantiate a request-key authorisation key.\n */\nstatic int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key,\n\t\t\t\t\tstruct key_preparsed_payload *prep)\n{\n\tkey->payload.data[0] = (struct request_key_auth *)prep->data;\n\treturn 0;\n}","/*\n * Describe an authorisation token.\n */\nstatic void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,\n\t\t\t\t struct seq_file *m)\n{\n\tstruct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];","\tseq_puts(m, \"key:\");\n\tseq_puts(m, key->description);","\tif (key_is_instantiated(key))","\t\tseq_printf(m, \" pid:%d ci:%zu\", rka->pid, rka->callout_len);\n}","/*\n * Read the callout_info data (retrieves the callout information).\n * - the key's semaphore is read-locked\n */\nstatic long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key,\n\t\t\t\t char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)\n{\n\tstruct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];\n\tsize_t datalen;\n\tlong ret;","\tdatalen = rka->callout_len;\n\tret = datalen;","\t/* we can return the data as is */\n\tif (buffer && buflen > 0) {\n\t\tif (buflen > datalen)\n\t\t\tbuflen = datalen;","\t\tif (copy_to_user(buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen) != 0)\n\t\t\tret = -EFAULT;\n\t}","\treturn ret;\n}","/*\n * Handle revocation of an authorisation token key.\n *\n * Called with the key sem write-locked.\n */\nstatic void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key)\n{\n\tstruct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];","\tkenter(\"{%d}\", key->serial);","\tif (rka->cred) {\n\t\tput_cred(rka->cred);\n\t\trka->cred = NULL;\n\t}\n}","static void free_request_key_auth(struct request_key_auth *rka)\n{\n\tif (!rka)\n\t\treturn;\n\tkey_put(rka->target_key);\n\tkey_put(rka->dest_keyring);\n\tif (rka->cred)\n\t\tput_cred(rka->cred);\n\tkfree(rka->callout_info);\n\tkfree(rka);\n}","/*\n * Destroy an instantiation authorisation token key.\n */\nstatic void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)\n{\n\tstruct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];","\tkenter(\"{%d}\", key->serial);","\tfree_request_key_auth(rka);\n}","/*\n * Create an authorisation token for /sbin/request-key or whoever to gain\n * access to the caller's security data.\n */\nstruct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,\n\t\t\t\t size_t callout_len, struct key *dest_keyring)\n{\n\tstruct request_key_auth *rka, *irka;\n\tconst struct cred *cred = current->cred;\n\tstruct key *authkey = NULL;\n\tchar desc[20];\n\tint ret = -ENOMEM;","\tkenter(\"%d,\", target->serial);","\t/* allocate a auth record */\n\trka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL);\n\tif (!rka)\n\t\tgoto error;\n\trka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);\n\tif (!rka->callout_info)\n\t\tgoto error_free_rka;\n\trka->callout_len = callout_len;","\t/* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of\n\t * another process */\n\tif (cred->request_key_auth) {\n\t\t/* it is - use that instantiation context here too */\n\t\tdown_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);","\t\t/* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're\n\t\t * servicing is already instantiated */\n\t\tif (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,\n\t\t\t &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {\n\t\t\tup_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);\n\t\t\tret = -EKEYREVOKED;\n\t\t\tgoto error_free_rka;\n\t\t}","\t\tirka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];\n\t\trka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred);\n\t\trka->pid = irka->pid;","\t\tup_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);\n\t}\n\telse {\n\t\t/* it isn't - use this process as the context */\n\t\trka->cred = get_cred(cred);\n\t\trka->pid = current->pid;\n\t}","\trka->target_key = key_get(target);\n\trka->dest_keyring = key_get(dest_keyring);","\t/* allocate the auth key */\n\tsprintf(desc, \"%x\", target->serial);","\tauthkey = key_alloc(&key_type_request_key_auth, desc,\n\t\t\t cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,\n\t\t\t KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH |\n\t\t\t KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);\n\tif (IS_ERR(authkey)) {\n\t\tret = PTR_ERR(authkey);\n\t\tgoto error_free_rka;\n\t}","\t/* construct the auth key */\n\tret = key_instantiate_and_link(authkey, rka, 0, NULL, NULL);\n\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\tgoto error_put_authkey;","\tkleave(\" = {%d,%d}\", authkey->serial, refcount_read(&authkey->usage));\n\treturn authkey;","error_put_authkey:\n\tkey_put(authkey);\nerror_free_rka:\n\tfree_request_key_auth(rka);\nerror:\n\tkleave(\"= %d\", ret);\n\treturn ERR_PTR(ret);\n}","/*\n * Search the current process's keyrings for the authorisation key for\n * instantiation of a key.\n */\nstruct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)\n{\n\tchar description[16];\n\tstruct keyring_search_context ctx = {\n\t\t.index_key.type\t\t= &key_type_request_key_auth,\n\t\t.index_key.description\t= description,\n\t\t.cred\t\t\t= current_cred(),\n\t\t.match_data.cmp\t\t= key_default_cmp,\n\t\t.match_data.raw_data\t= description,\n\t\t.match_data.lookup_type\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,\n\t\t.flags\t\t\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK,\n\t};\n\tstruct key *authkey;\n\tkey_ref_t authkey_ref;","\tsprintf(description, \"%x\", target_id);","\tauthkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);","\tif (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {\n\t\tauthkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);\n\t\tif (authkey == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN))\n\t\t\tauthkey = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);\n\t\tgoto error;\n\t}","\tauthkey = key_ref_to_ptr(authkey_ref);\n\tif (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags)) {\n\t\tkey_put(authkey);\n\t\tauthkey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);\n\t}","error:\n\treturn authkey;\n}"],"string":"[\n \"/* Request key authorisation token key definition.\\n *\\n * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\\n *\\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\\n * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version\\n * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.\\n *\\n * See Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst\\n */\",\n \"#include <linux/module.h>\\n#include <linux/sched.h>\\n#include <linux/err.h>\\n#include <linux/seq_file.h>\\n#include <linux/slab.h>\\n#include <linux/uaccess.h>\\n#include \\\"internal.h\\\"\\n#include <keys/user-type.h>\",\n \"static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);\\nstatic void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);\\nstatic int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tstruct key_preparsed_payload *);\\nstatic void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);\\nstatic void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *);\\nstatic void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *);\\nstatic long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t);\",\n \"/*\\n * The request-key authorisation key type definition.\\n */\\nstruct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = {\\n\\t.name\\t\\t= \\\".request_key_auth\\\",\\n\\t.def_datalen\\t= sizeof(struct request_key_auth),\\n\\t.preparse\\t= request_key_auth_preparse,\\n\\t.free_preparse\\t= request_key_auth_free_preparse,\\n\\t.instantiate\\t= request_key_auth_instantiate,\\n\\t.describe\\t= request_key_auth_describe,\\n\\t.revoke\\t\\t= request_key_auth_revoke,\\n\\t.destroy\\t= request_key_auth_destroy,\\n\\t.read\\t\\t= request_key_auth_read,\\n};\",\n \"static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)\\n{\\n\\treturn 0;\\n}\",\n \"static void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)\\n{\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Instantiate a request-key authorisation key.\\n */\\nstatic int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tstruct key_preparsed_payload *prep)\\n{\\n\\tkey->payload.data[0] = (struct request_key_auth *)prep->data;\\n\\treturn 0;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Describe an authorisation token.\\n */\\nstatic void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t struct seq_file *m)\\n{\\n\\tstruct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];\",\n \"\\tseq_puts(m, \\\"key:\\\");\\n\\tseq_puts(m, key->description);\",\n \"\\tif (key_is_instantiated(key))\",\n \"\\t\\tseq_printf(m, \\\" pid:%d ci:%zu\\\", rka->pid, rka->callout_len);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Read the callout_info data (retrieves the callout information).\\n * - the key's semaphore is read-locked\\n */\\nstatic long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)\\n{\\n\\tstruct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];\\n\\tsize_t datalen;\\n\\tlong ret;\",\n \"\\tdatalen = rka->callout_len;\\n\\tret = datalen;\",\n \"\\t/* we can return the data as is */\\n\\tif (buffer && buflen > 0) {\\n\\t\\tif (buflen > datalen)\\n\\t\\t\\tbuflen = datalen;\",\n \"\\t\\tif (copy_to_user(buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen) != 0)\\n\\t\\t\\tret = -EFAULT;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\treturn ret;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Handle revocation of an authorisation token key.\\n *\\n * Called with the key sem write-locked.\\n */\\nstatic void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key)\\n{\\n\\tstruct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"{%d}\\\", key->serial);\",\n \"\\tif (rka->cred) {\\n\\t\\tput_cred(rka->cred);\\n\\t\\trka->cred = NULL;\\n\\t}\\n}\",\n \"static void free_request_key_auth(struct request_key_auth *rka)\\n{\\n\\tif (!rka)\\n\\t\\treturn;\\n\\tkey_put(rka->target_key);\\n\\tkey_put(rka->dest_keyring);\\n\\tif (rka->cred)\\n\\t\\tput_cred(rka->cred);\\n\\tkfree(rka->callout_info);\\n\\tkfree(rka);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Destroy an instantiation authorisation token key.\\n */\\nstatic void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)\\n{\\n\\tstruct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"{%d}\\\", key->serial);\",\n \"\\tfree_request_key_auth(rka);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Create an authorisation token for /sbin/request-key or whoever to gain\\n * access to the caller's security data.\\n */\\nstruct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t size_t callout_len, struct key *dest_keyring)\\n{\\n\\tstruct request_key_auth *rka, *irka;\\n\\tconst struct cred *cred = current->cred;\\n\\tstruct key *authkey = NULL;\\n\\tchar desc[20];\\n\\tint ret = -ENOMEM;\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"%d,\\\", target->serial);\",\n \"\\t/* allocate a auth record */\\n\\trka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL);\\n\\tif (!rka)\\n\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\trka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);\\n\\tif (!rka->callout_info)\\n\\t\\tgoto error_free_rka;\\n\\trka->callout_len = callout_len;\",\n \"\\t/* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of\\n\\t * another process */\\n\\tif (cred->request_key_auth) {\\n\\t\\t/* it is - use that instantiation context here too */\\n\\t\\tdown_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);\",\n \"\\t\\t/* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're\\n\\t\\t * servicing is already instantiated */\\n\\t\\tif (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,\\n\\t\\t\\t &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {\\n\\t\\t\\tup_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);\\n\\t\\t\\tret = -EKEYREVOKED;\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error_free_rka;\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\tirka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];\\n\\t\\trka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred);\\n\\t\\trka->pid = irka->pid;\",\n \"\\t\\tup_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);\\n\\t}\\n\\telse {\\n\\t\\t/* it isn't - use this process as the context */\\n\\t\\trka->cred = get_cred(cred);\\n\\t\\trka->pid = current->pid;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\trka->target_key = key_get(target);\\n\\trka->dest_keyring = key_get(dest_keyring);\",\n \"\\t/* allocate the auth key */\\n\\tsprintf(desc, \\\"%x\\\", target->serial);\",\n \"\\tauthkey = key_alloc(&key_type_request_key_auth, desc,\\n\\t\\t\\t cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,\\n\\t\\t\\t KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH |\\n\\t\\t\\t KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);\\n\\tif (IS_ERR(authkey)) {\\n\\t\\tret = PTR_ERR(authkey);\\n\\t\\tgoto error_free_rka;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* construct the auth key */\\n\\tret = key_instantiate_and_link(authkey, rka, 0, NULL, NULL);\\n\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\tgoto error_put_authkey;\",\n \"\\tkleave(\\\" = {%d,%d}\\\", authkey->serial, refcount_read(&authkey->usage));\\n\\treturn authkey;\",\n \"error_put_authkey:\\n\\tkey_put(authkey);\\nerror_free_rka:\\n\\tfree_request_key_auth(rka);\\nerror:\\n\\tkleave(\\\"= %d\\\", ret);\\n\\treturn ERR_PTR(ret);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Search the current process's keyrings for the authorisation key for\\n * instantiation of a key.\\n */\\nstruct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)\\n{\\n\\tchar description[16];\\n\\tstruct keyring_search_context ctx = {\\n\\t\\t.index_key.type\\t\\t= &key_type_request_key_auth,\\n\\t\\t.index_key.description\\t= description,\\n\\t\\t.cred\\t\\t\\t= current_cred(),\\n\\t\\t.match_data.cmp\\t\\t= key_default_cmp,\\n\\t\\t.match_data.raw_data\\t= description,\\n\\t\\t.match_data.lookup_type\\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,\\n\\t\\t.flags\\t\\t\\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK,\\n\\t};\\n\\tstruct key *authkey;\\n\\tkey_ref_t authkey_ref;\",\n \"\\tsprintf(description, \\\"%x\\\", target_id);\",\n \"\\tauthkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);\",\n \"\\tif (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {\\n\\t\\tauthkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);\\n\\t\\tif (authkey == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN))\\n\\t\\t\\tauthkey = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);\\n\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tauthkey = key_ref_to_ptr(authkey_ref);\\n\\tif (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags)) {\\n\\t\\tkey_put(authkey);\\n\\t\\tauthkey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);\\n\\t}\",\n \"error:\\n\\treturn authkey;\\n}\"\n]","isConversational":false},"labels":{"kind":"list like","value":[1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1],"string":"[\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 0,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1\n]","isConversational":false},"source":{"kind":"string","value":"PreciseBugs"},"other_info":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"buggy_code_end_loc\": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], \"buggy_code_start_loc\": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], \"filenames\": [\"include/linux/key.h\", \"net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c\", \"security/keys/big_key.c\", \"security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c\", \"security/keys/gc.c\", \"security/keys/key.c\", \"security/keys/keyctl.c\", \"security/keys/keyring.c\", \"security/keys/proc.c\", \"security/keys/process_keys.c\", \"security/keys/request_key.c\", \"security/keys/request_key_auth.c\", \"security/keys/trusted.c\", \"security/keys/user_defined.c\"], \"fixing_code_end_loc\": [380, 228, 283, 858, 155, 1000, 904, 603, 253, 734, 601, 77, 1070, 166], \"fixing_code_start_loc\": [139, 227, 250, 857, 132, 405, 769, 417, 185, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], \"message\": \"The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the \\\"negative\\\" state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.\", \"other\": {\"cve\": {\"cisaActionDue\": null, \"cisaExploitAdd\": null, \"cisaRequiredAction\": null, \"cisaVulnerabilityName\": null, \"configurations\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"4397FA2C-1EE8-4F42-9823-2D85B8C20976\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.4.95\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.4\", \"vulnerable\": true}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"D6690C73-23A3-4475-97D0-8CB96812E2FB\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.9.59\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.5\", \"vulnerable\": true}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"86038BA0-0886-479E-AD71-D78363937D66\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.13.10\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.10\", \"vulnerable\": true}], \"negate\": false, \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": null}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the \\\"negative\\\" state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.\"}, {\"lang\": \"es\", \"value\": \"El subsistema KEYS en el kernel de Linux en versiones anteriores a la 4.13.10 no sincroniza correctamente las acciones de actualizaci\\u00f3n con las de detecci\\u00f3n de una clave en el estado \\\"negative\\\" para evitar una condici\\u00f3n de carrera, lo que permite que los usuarios locales provoquen una denegaci\\u00f3n de servicio (DoS) o, posiblemente, cause otro impacto no especificado mediante llamadas al sistema manipuladas.\"}], \"evaluatorComment\": null, \"id\": \"CVE-2017-15951\", \"lastModified\": \"2023-01-19T15:45:25.270\", \"metrics\": {\"cvssMetricV2\": [{\"acInsufInfo\": false, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"cvssData\": {\"accessComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"accessVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"authentication\": \"NONE\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"baseScore\": 7.2, \"confidentialityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"integrityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"vectorString\": \"AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C\", \"version\": \"2.0\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 3.9, \"impactScore\": 10.0, \"obtainAllPrivilege\": false, \"obtainOtherPrivilege\": false, \"obtainUserPrivilege\": false, \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\", \"userInteractionRequired\": false}], \"cvssMetricV30\": null, \"cvssMetricV31\": [{\"cvssData\": {\"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"baseScore\": 7.8, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"integrityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"LOW\", \"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\", \"version\": \"3.1\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 1.8, \"impactScore\": 5.9, \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\"}]}, \"published\": \"2017-10-28T02:29:00.217\", \"references\": [{\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Issue Tracking\", \"Patch\", \"Third Party Advisory\"], \"url\": \"http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Release Notes\", \"Vendor Advisory\"], \"url\": \"http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/ChangeLog-4.13.10\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Third Party Advisory\", \"VDB Entry\"], \"url\": \"http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101621\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Issue Tracking\", \"Patch\", \"Third Party Advisory\"], \"url\": \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}], \"sourceIdentifier\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"vendorComments\": null, \"vulnStatus\": \"Analyzed\", \"weaknesses\": [{\"description\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CWE-20\"}], \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\"}]}, \"github_commit_url\": \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}, \"type\": \"CWE-20\"}"},"index":{"kind":"number","value":836,"string":"836"}}},{"rowIdx":4999,"cells":{"prompt":{"kind":"string","value":"Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not."},"completions":{"kind":"list like","value":["/* Request key authorisation token key definition.\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version\n * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.\n *\n * See Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst\n */","#include <linux/module.h>\n#include <linux/sched.h>\n#include <linux/err.h>\n#include <linux/seq_file.h>\n#include <linux/slab.h>\n#include <linux/uaccess.h>\n#include \"internal.h\"\n#include <keys/user-type.h>","static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);\nstatic void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);\nstatic int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *,\n\t\t\t\t\tstruct key_preparsed_payload *);\nstatic void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);\nstatic void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *);\nstatic void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *);\nstatic long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t);","/*\n * The request-key authorisation key type definition.\n */\nstruct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = {\n\t.name\t\t= \".request_key_auth\",\n\t.def_datalen\t= sizeof(struct request_key_auth),\n\t.preparse\t= request_key_auth_preparse,\n\t.free_preparse\t= request_key_auth_free_preparse,\n\t.instantiate\t= request_key_auth_instantiate,\n\t.describe\t= request_key_auth_describe,\n\t.revoke\t\t= request_key_auth_revoke,\n\t.destroy\t= request_key_auth_destroy,\n\t.read\t\t= request_key_auth_read,\n};","static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)\n{\n\treturn 0;\n}","static void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)\n{\n}","/*\n * Instantiate a request-key authorisation key.\n */\nstatic int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key,\n\t\t\t\t\tstruct key_preparsed_payload *prep)\n{\n\tkey->payload.data[0] = (struct request_key_auth *)prep->data;\n\treturn 0;\n}","/*\n * Describe an authorisation token.\n */\nstatic void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,\n\t\t\t\t struct seq_file *m)\n{\n\tstruct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];","\tseq_puts(m, \"key:\");\n\tseq_puts(m, key->description);","\tif (key_is_positive(key))","\t\tseq_printf(m, \" pid:%d ci:%zu\", rka->pid, rka->callout_len);\n}","/*\n * Read the callout_info data (retrieves the callout information).\n * - the key's semaphore is read-locked\n */\nstatic long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key,\n\t\t\t\t char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)\n{\n\tstruct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];\n\tsize_t datalen;\n\tlong ret;","\tdatalen = rka->callout_len;\n\tret = datalen;","\t/* we can return the data as is */\n\tif (buffer && buflen > 0) {\n\t\tif (buflen > datalen)\n\t\t\tbuflen = datalen;","\t\tif (copy_to_user(buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen) != 0)\n\t\t\tret = -EFAULT;\n\t}","\treturn ret;\n}","/*\n * Handle revocation of an authorisation token key.\n *\n * Called with the key sem write-locked.\n */\nstatic void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key)\n{\n\tstruct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];","\tkenter(\"{%d}\", key->serial);","\tif (rka->cred) {\n\t\tput_cred(rka->cred);\n\t\trka->cred = NULL;\n\t}\n}","static void free_request_key_auth(struct request_key_auth *rka)\n{\n\tif (!rka)\n\t\treturn;\n\tkey_put(rka->target_key);\n\tkey_put(rka->dest_keyring);\n\tif (rka->cred)\n\t\tput_cred(rka->cred);\n\tkfree(rka->callout_info);\n\tkfree(rka);\n}","/*\n * Destroy an instantiation authorisation token key.\n */\nstatic void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)\n{\n\tstruct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];","\tkenter(\"{%d}\", key->serial);","\tfree_request_key_auth(rka);\n}","/*\n * Create an authorisation token for /sbin/request-key or whoever to gain\n * access to the caller's security data.\n */\nstruct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,\n\t\t\t\t size_t callout_len, struct key *dest_keyring)\n{\n\tstruct request_key_auth *rka, *irka;\n\tconst struct cred *cred = current->cred;\n\tstruct key *authkey = NULL;\n\tchar desc[20];\n\tint ret = -ENOMEM;","\tkenter(\"%d,\", target->serial);","\t/* allocate a auth record */\n\trka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL);\n\tif (!rka)\n\t\tgoto error;\n\trka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);\n\tif (!rka->callout_info)\n\t\tgoto error_free_rka;\n\trka->callout_len = callout_len;","\t/* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of\n\t * another process */\n\tif (cred->request_key_auth) {\n\t\t/* it is - use that instantiation context here too */\n\t\tdown_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);","\t\t/* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're\n\t\t * servicing is already instantiated */\n\t\tif (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,\n\t\t\t &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {\n\t\t\tup_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);\n\t\t\tret = -EKEYREVOKED;\n\t\t\tgoto error_free_rka;\n\t\t}","\t\tirka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];\n\t\trka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred);\n\t\trka->pid = irka->pid;","\t\tup_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);\n\t}\n\telse {\n\t\t/* it isn't - use this process as the context */\n\t\trka->cred = get_cred(cred);\n\t\trka->pid = current->pid;\n\t}","\trka->target_key = key_get(target);\n\trka->dest_keyring = key_get(dest_keyring);","\t/* allocate the auth key */\n\tsprintf(desc, \"%x\", target->serial);","\tauthkey = key_alloc(&key_type_request_key_auth, desc,\n\t\t\t cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,\n\t\t\t KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH |\n\t\t\t KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);\n\tif (IS_ERR(authkey)) {\n\t\tret = PTR_ERR(authkey);\n\t\tgoto error_free_rka;\n\t}","\t/* construct the auth key */\n\tret = key_instantiate_and_link(authkey, rka, 0, NULL, NULL);\n\tif (ret < 0)\n\t\tgoto error_put_authkey;","\tkleave(\" = {%d,%d}\", authkey->serial, refcount_read(&authkey->usage));\n\treturn authkey;","error_put_authkey:\n\tkey_put(authkey);\nerror_free_rka:\n\tfree_request_key_auth(rka);\nerror:\n\tkleave(\"= %d\", ret);\n\treturn ERR_PTR(ret);\n}","/*\n * Search the current process's keyrings for the authorisation key for\n * instantiation of a key.\n */\nstruct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)\n{\n\tchar description[16];\n\tstruct keyring_search_context ctx = {\n\t\t.index_key.type\t\t= &key_type_request_key_auth,\n\t\t.index_key.description\t= description,\n\t\t.cred\t\t\t= current_cred(),\n\t\t.match_data.cmp\t\t= key_default_cmp,\n\t\t.match_data.raw_data\t= description,\n\t\t.match_data.lookup_type\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,\n\t\t.flags\t\t\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK,\n\t};\n\tstruct key *authkey;\n\tkey_ref_t authkey_ref;","\tsprintf(description, \"%x\", target_id);","\tauthkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);","\tif (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {\n\t\tauthkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);\n\t\tif (authkey == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN))\n\t\t\tauthkey = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);\n\t\tgoto error;\n\t}","\tauthkey = key_ref_to_ptr(authkey_ref);\n\tif (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags)) {\n\t\tkey_put(authkey);\n\t\tauthkey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);\n\t}","error:\n\treturn authkey;\n}"],"string":"[\n \"/* Request key authorisation token key definition.\\n *\\n * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\\n *\\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\\n * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version\\n * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.\\n *\\n * See Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst\\n */\",\n \"#include <linux/module.h>\\n#include <linux/sched.h>\\n#include <linux/err.h>\\n#include <linux/seq_file.h>\\n#include <linux/slab.h>\\n#include <linux/uaccess.h>\\n#include \\\"internal.h\\\"\\n#include <keys/user-type.h>\",\n \"static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);\\nstatic void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);\\nstatic int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tstruct key_preparsed_payload *);\\nstatic void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);\\nstatic void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *);\\nstatic void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *);\\nstatic long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t);\",\n \"/*\\n * The request-key authorisation key type definition.\\n */\\nstruct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = {\\n\\t.name\\t\\t= \\\".request_key_auth\\\",\\n\\t.def_datalen\\t= sizeof(struct request_key_auth),\\n\\t.preparse\\t= request_key_auth_preparse,\\n\\t.free_preparse\\t= request_key_auth_free_preparse,\\n\\t.instantiate\\t= request_key_auth_instantiate,\\n\\t.describe\\t= request_key_auth_describe,\\n\\t.revoke\\t\\t= request_key_auth_revoke,\\n\\t.destroy\\t= request_key_auth_destroy,\\n\\t.read\\t\\t= request_key_auth_read,\\n};\",\n \"static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)\\n{\\n\\treturn 0;\\n}\",\n \"static void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)\\n{\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Instantiate a request-key authorisation key.\\n */\\nstatic int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\tstruct key_preparsed_payload *prep)\\n{\\n\\tkey->payload.data[0] = (struct request_key_auth *)prep->data;\\n\\treturn 0;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Describe an authorisation token.\\n */\\nstatic void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t struct seq_file *m)\\n{\\n\\tstruct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];\",\n \"\\tseq_puts(m, \\\"key:\\\");\\n\\tseq_puts(m, key->description);\",\n \"\\tif (key_is_positive(key))\",\n \"\\t\\tseq_printf(m, \\\" pid:%d ci:%zu\\\", rka->pid, rka->callout_len);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Read the callout_info data (retrieves the callout information).\\n * - the key's semaphore is read-locked\\n */\\nstatic long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)\\n{\\n\\tstruct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];\\n\\tsize_t datalen;\\n\\tlong ret;\",\n \"\\tdatalen = rka->callout_len;\\n\\tret = datalen;\",\n \"\\t/* we can return the data as is */\\n\\tif (buffer && buflen > 0) {\\n\\t\\tif (buflen > datalen)\\n\\t\\t\\tbuflen = datalen;\",\n \"\\t\\tif (copy_to_user(buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen) != 0)\\n\\t\\t\\tret = -EFAULT;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\treturn ret;\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Handle revocation of an authorisation token key.\\n *\\n * Called with the key sem write-locked.\\n */\\nstatic void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key)\\n{\\n\\tstruct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"{%d}\\\", key->serial);\",\n \"\\tif (rka->cred) {\\n\\t\\tput_cred(rka->cred);\\n\\t\\trka->cred = NULL;\\n\\t}\\n}\",\n \"static void free_request_key_auth(struct request_key_auth *rka)\\n{\\n\\tif (!rka)\\n\\t\\treturn;\\n\\tkey_put(rka->target_key);\\n\\tkey_put(rka->dest_keyring);\\n\\tif (rka->cred)\\n\\t\\tput_cred(rka->cred);\\n\\tkfree(rka->callout_info);\\n\\tkfree(rka);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Destroy an instantiation authorisation token key.\\n */\\nstatic void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)\\n{\\n\\tstruct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"{%d}\\\", key->serial);\",\n \"\\tfree_request_key_auth(rka);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Create an authorisation token for /sbin/request-key or whoever to gain\\n * access to the caller's security data.\\n */\\nstruct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t size_t callout_len, struct key *dest_keyring)\\n{\\n\\tstruct request_key_auth *rka, *irka;\\n\\tconst struct cred *cred = current->cred;\\n\\tstruct key *authkey = NULL;\\n\\tchar desc[20];\\n\\tint ret = -ENOMEM;\",\n \"\\tkenter(\\\"%d,\\\", target->serial);\",\n \"\\t/* allocate a auth record */\\n\\trka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL);\\n\\tif (!rka)\\n\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\trka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);\\n\\tif (!rka->callout_info)\\n\\t\\tgoto error_free_rka;\\n\\trka->callout_len = callout_len;\",\n \"\\t/* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of\\n\\t * another process */\\n\\tif (cred->request_key_auth) {\\n\\t\\t/* it is - use that instantiation context here too */\\n\\t\\tdown_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);\",\n \"\\t\\t/* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're\\n\\t\\t * servicing is already instantiated */\\n\\t\\tif (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,\\n\\t\\t\\t &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {\\n\\t\\t\\tup_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);\\n\\t\\t\\tret = -EKEYREVOKED;\\n\\t\\t\\tgoto error_free_rka;\\n\\t\\t}\",\n \"\\t\\tirka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];\\n\\t\\trka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred);\\n\\t\\trka->pid = irka->pid;\",\n \"\\t\\tup_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);\\n\\t}\\n\\telse {\\n\\t\\t/* it isn't - use this process as the context */\\n\\t\\trka->cred = get_cred(cred);\\n\\t\\trka->pid = current->pid;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\trka->target_key = key_get(target);\\n\\trka->dest_keyring = key_get(dest_keyring);\",\n \"\\t/* allocate the auth key */\\n\\tsprintf(desc, \\\"%x\\\", target->serial);\",\n \"\\tauthkey = key_alloc(&key_type_request_key_auth, desc,\\n\\t\\t\\t cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,\\n\\t\\t\\t KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH |\\n\\t\\t\\t KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);\\n\\tif (IS_ERR(authkey)) {\\n\\t\\tret = PTR_ERR(authkey);\\n\\t\\tgoto error_free_rka;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\t/* construct the auth key */\\n\\tret = key_instantiate_and_link(authkey, rka, 0, NULL, NULL);\\n\\tif (ret < 0)\\n\\t\\tgoto error_put_authkey;\",\n \"\\tkleave(\\\" = {%d,%d}\\\", authkey->serial, refcount_read(&authkey->usage));\\n\\treturn authkey;\",\n \"error_put_authkey:\\n\\tkey_put(authkey);\\nerror_free_rka:\\n\\tfree_request_key_auth(rka);\\nerror:\\n\\tkleave(\\\"= %d\\\", ret);\\n\\treturn ERR_PTR(ret);\\n}\",\n \"/*\\n * Search the current process's keyrings for the authorisation key for\\n * instantiation of a key.\\n */\\nstruct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)\\n{\\n\\tchar description[16];\\n\\tstruct keyring_search_context ctx = {\\n\\t\\t.index_key.type\\t\\t= &key_type_request_key_auth,\\n\\t\\t.index_key.description\\t= description,\\n\\t\\t.cred\\t\\t\\t= current_cred(),\\n\\t\\t.match_data.cmp\\t\\t= key_default_cmp,\\n\\t\\t.match_data.raw_data\\t= description,\\n\\t\\t.match_data.lookup_type\\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,\\n\\t\\t.flags\\t\\t\\t= KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK,\\n\\t};\\n\\tstruct key *authkey;\\n\\tkey_ref_t authkey_ref;\",\n \"\\tsprintf(description, \\\"%x\\\", target_id);\",\n \"\\tauthkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);\",\n \"\\tif (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {\\n\\t\\tauthkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);\\n\\t\\tif (authkey == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN))\\n\\t\\t\\tauthkey = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);\\n\\t\\tgoto error;\\n\\t}\",\n \"\\tauthkey = key_ref_to_ptr(authkey_ref);\\n\\tif (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags)) {\\n\\t\\tkey_put(authkey);\\n\\t\\tauthkey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);\\n\\t}\",\n \"error:\\n\\treturn authkey;\\n}\"\n]","isConversational":false},"labels":{"kind":"list like","value":[1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1],"string":"[\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1,\n 1\n]","isConversational":false},"source":{"kind":"string","value":"PreciseBugs"},"other_info":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"buggy_code_end_loc\": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], \"buggy_code_start_loc\": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], \"filenames\": [\"include/linux/key.h\", \"net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c\", \"security/keys/big_key.c\", \"security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c\", \"security/keys/gc.c\", \"security/keys/key.c\", \"security/keys/keyctl.c\", \"security/keys/keyring.c\", \"security/keys/proc.c\", \"security/keys/process_keys.c\", \"security/keys/request_key.c\", \"security/keys/request_key_auth.c\", \"security/keys/trusted.c\", \"security/keys/user_defined.c\"], \"fixing_code_end_loc\": [380, 228, 283, 858, 155, 1000, 904, 603, 253, 734, 601, 77, 1070, 166], \"fixing_code_start_loc\": [139, 227, 250, 857, 132, 405, 769, 417, 185, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], \"message\": \"The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the \\\"negative\\\" state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.\", \"other\": {\"cve\": {\"cisaActionDue\": null, \"cisaExploitAdd\": null, \"cisaRequiredAction\": null, \"cisaVulnerabilityName\": null, \"configurations\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"4397FA2C-1EE8-4F42-9823-2D85B8C20976\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.4.95\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.4\", \"vulnerable\": true}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"D6690C73-23A3-4475-97D0-8CB96812E2FB\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.9.59\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.5\", \"vulnerable\": true}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"86038BA0-0886-479E-AD71-D78363937D66\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.13.10\", \"versionEndIncluding\": null, \"versionStartExcluding\": null, \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.10\", \"vulnerable\": true}], \"negate\": false, \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": null}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the \\\"negative\\\" state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.\"}, {\"lang\": \"es\", \"value\": \"El subsistema KEYS en el kernel de Linux en versiones anteriores a la 4.13.10 no sincroniza correctamente las acciones de actualizaci\\u00f3n con las de detecci\\u00f3n de una clave en el estado \\\"negative\\\" para evitar una condici\\u00f3n de carrera, lo que permite que los usuarios locales provoquen una denegaci\\u00f3n de servicio (DoS) o, posiblemente, cause otro impacto no especificado mediante llamadas al sistema manipuladas.\"}], \"evaluatorComment\": null, \"id\": \"CVE-2017-15951\", \"lastModified\": \"2023-01-19T15:45:25.270\", \"metrics\": {\"cvssMetricV2\": [{\"acInsufInfo\": false, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"cvssData\": {\"accessComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"accessVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"authentication\": \"NONE\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"baseScore\": 7.2, \"confidentialityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"integrityImpact\": \"COMPLETE\", \"vectorString\": \"AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C\", \"version\": \"2.0\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 3.9, \"impactScore\": 10.0, \"obtainAllPrivilege\": false, \"obtainOtherPrivilege\": false, \"obtainUserPrivilege\": false, \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\", \"userInteractionRequired\": false}], \"cvssMetricV30\": null, \"cvssMetricV31\": [{\"cvssData\": {\"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"baseScore\": 7.8, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"integrityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"LOW\", \"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\", \"version\": \"3.1\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 1.8, \"impactScore\": 5.9, \"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\"}]}, \"published\": \"2017-10-28T02:29:00.217\", \"references\": [{\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Issue Tracking\", \"Patch\", \"Third Party Advisory\"], \"url\": \"http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Release Notes\", \"Vendor Advisory\"], \"url\": \"http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/ChangeLog-4.13.10\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Third Party Advisory\", \"VDB Entry\"], \"url\": \"http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101621\"}, {\"source\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"tags\": [\"Issue Tracking\", \"Patch\", \"Third Party Advisory\"], \"url\": \"https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76\"}], \"sourceIdentifier\": \"cve@mitre.org\", \"vendorComments\": null, \"vulnStatus\": \"Analyzed\", \"weaknesses\": [{\"description\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CWE-20\"}], \"source\": 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Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * Performance events ring-buffer code:\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2008 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>\n * Copyright (C) 2008-2011 Red Hat, Inc., Ingo Molnar\n * Copyright (C) 2008-2011 Red Hat, Inc., Peter Zijlstra <pzijlstr@redhat.com>\n * Copyright � 2009 Paul Mackerras, IBM Corp. <paulus@au1.ibm.com... | [
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Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * Performance events ring-buffer code:\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2008 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>\n * Copyright (C) 2008-2011 Red Hat, Inc., Ingo Molnar\n * Copyright (C) 2008-2011 Red Hat, Inc., Peter Zijlstra <pzijlstr@redhat.com>\n * Copyright � 2009 Paul Mackerras, IBM Corp. <paulus@au1.ibm.com... | [
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1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [851, 483, 791, 587, 400, 187, 326, 531, 644, 521, 277, 163, 89, 1350, 648, 886, 334, 353, 67, 397, 669, 624, 218, 208, 1281, 342, 651, 806, 168, 188, 310, 442, 1343, 1007, 620, 974, 612, 532, 1169, 1148, 5236, 30, 131, 2224, 215, 45], "buggy_code_start_loc": [850, 482, 790, 254, 399, 186, 321, 5... | 819 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * kernel/sched.c\n *\n * Kernel scheduler and related syscalls\n *\n * Copyright (C) 1991-2002 Linus Torvalds\n *\n * 1996-12-23 Modified by Dave Grothe to fix bugs in semaphores and\n *\t\tmake semaphores SMP safe\n * 1998-11-19\tImplemented schedule_timeout() and related stuff\n *\t\tby Andrea Arcang... | [
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1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [851, 483, 791, 587, 400, 187, 326, 531, 644, 521, 277, 163, 89, 1350, 648, 886, 334, 353, 67, 397, 669, 624, 218, 208, 1281, 342, 651, 806, 168, 188, 310, 442, 1343, 1007, 620, 974, 612, 532, 1169, 1148, 5236, 30, 131, 2224, 215, 45], "buggy_code_start_loc": [850, 482, 790, 254, 399, 186, 321, 5... | 819 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
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1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [851, 483, 791, 587, 400, 187, 326, 531, 644, 521, 277, 163, 89, 1350, 648, 886, 334, 353, 67, 397, 669, 624, 218, 208, 1281, 342, 651, 806, 168, 188, 310, 442, 1343, 1007, 620, 974, 612, 532, 1169, 1148, 5236, 30, 131, 2224, 215, 45], "buggy_code_start_loc": [850, 482, 790, 254, 399, 186, 321, 5... | 819 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * Detect hard and soft lockups on a system\n *\n * started by Don Zickus, Copyright (C) 2010 Red Hat, Inc.\n *\n * this code detects hard lockups: incidents in where on a CPU\n * the kernel does not respond to anything except NMI.\n *\n * Note: Most of this code is borrowed heavily from softlockup.c,\n * so t... | [
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1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [851, 483, 791, 587, 400, 187, 326, 531, 644, 521, 277, 163, 89, 1350, 648, 886, 334, 353, 67, 397, 669, 624, 218, 208, 1281, 342, 651, 806, 168, 188, 310, 442, 1343, 1007, 620, 974, 612, 532, 1169, 1148, 5236, 30, 131, 2224, 215, 45], "buggy_code_start_loc": [850, 482, 790, 254, 399, 186, 321, 5... | 819 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
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1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [851, 483, 791, 587, 400, 187, 326, 531, 644, 521, 277, 163, 89, 1350, 648, 886, 334, 353, 67, 397, 669, 624, 218, 208, 1281, 342, 651, 806, 168, 188, 310, 442, 1343, 1007, 620, 974, 612, 532, 1169, 1148, 5236, 30, 131, 2224, 215, 45], "buggy_code_start_loc": [850, 482, 790, 254, 399, 186, 321, 5... | 819 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * data_breakpoint.c - Sample HW Breakpoint file to watch kernel data address\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify\n * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by\n * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or\n * (at your ... | [
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Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * data_breakpoint.c - Sample HW Breakpoint file to watch kernel data address\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify\n * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by\n * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or\n * (at your ... | [
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Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Copyright 2020 The TensorFlow Authors. All Rights Reserved.",
"Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the \"License\");\nyou may not use this file except in compliance with the License.\nYou may obtain a copy of the License at",
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Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
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Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
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] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [96, 2573, 285], "buggy_code_start_loc": [95, 2572, 204], "filenames": ["include/mruby/proc.h", "src/class.c", "src/proc.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [96, 2573, 285], "fixing_code_start_loc": [95, 2572, 204], "message": "mruby is vulnerable to NULL Pointer Dereference", "other": {"cve": {"cisaActi... | 821 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/**\n** @file mruby/proc.h - Proc class\n**\n** See Copyright Notice in mruby.h\n*/",
"#ifndef MRUBY_PROC_H\n#define MRUBY_PROC_H",
"#include \"common.h\"\n#include <mruby/irep.h>",
"/**\n * Proc class\n */\nMRB_BEGIN_DECL",
"struct REnv {\n MRB_OBJECT_HEADER;\n mrb_value *stack;\n struct mrb_context *c... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
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1,
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1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [96, 2573, 285], "buggy_code_start_loc": [95, 2572, 204], "filenames": ["include/mruby/proc.h", "src/class.c", "src/proc.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [96, 2573, 285], "fixing_code_start_loc": [95, 2572, 204], "message": "mruby is vulnerable to NULL Pointer Dereference", "other": {"cve": {"cisaActi... | 821 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n** class.c - Class class\n**\n** See Copyright Notice in mruby.h\n*/",
"#include <mruby.h>\n#include <mruby/array.h>\n#include <mruby/hash.h>\n#include <mruby/class.h>\n#include <mruby/numeric.h>\n#include <mruby/proc.h>\n#include <mruby/string.h>\n#include <mruby/variable.h>\n#include <mruby/error.h>\n#incl... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [96, 2573, 285], "buggy_code_start_loc": [95, 2572, 204], "filenames": ["include/mruby/proc.h", "src/class.c", "src/proc.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [96, 2573, 285], "fixing_code_start_loc": [95, 2572, 204], "message": "mruby is vulnerable to NULL Pointer Dereference", "other": {"cve": {"cisaActi... | 821 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n** class.c - Class class\n**\n** See Copyright Notice in mruby.h\n*/",
"#include <mruby.h>\n#include <mruby/array.h>\n#include <mruby/hash.h>\n#include <mruby/class.h>\n#include <mruby/numeric.h>\n#include <mruby/proc.h>\n#include <mruby/string.h>\n#include <mruby/variable.h>\n#include <mruby/error.h>\n#incl... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [96, 2573, 285], "buggy_code_start_loc": [95, 2572, 204], "filenames": ["include/mruby/proc.h", "src/class.c", "src/proc.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [96, 2573, 285], "fixing_code_start_loc": [95, 2572, 204], "message": "mruby is vulnerable to NULL Pointer Dereference", "other": {"cve": {"cisaActi... | 821 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n** proc.c - Proc class\n**\n** See Copyright Notice in mruby.h\n*/",
"#include <mruby.h>\n#include <mruby/class.h>\n#include <mruby/proc.h>\n#include <mruby/opcode.h>\n#include <mruby/data.h>\n#include <mruby/presym.h>\n#include <mruby/array.h>\n#include <mruby/hash.h>",
"static const mrb_code call_iseq[] ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
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0,
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1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [96, 2573, 285], "buggy_code_start_loc": [95, 2572, 204], "filenames": ["include/mruby/proc.h", "src/class.c", "src/proc.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [96, 2573, 285], "fixing_code_start_loc": [95, 2572, 204], "message": "mruby is vulnerable to NULL Pointer Dereference", "other": {"cve": {"cisaActi... | 821 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n** proc.c - Proc class\n**\n** See Copyright Notice in mruby.h\n*/",
"#include <mruby.h>\n#include <mruby/class.h>\n#include <mruby/proc.h>\n#include <mruby/opcode.h>\n#include <mruby/data.h>\n#include <mruby/presym.h>\n#include <mruby/array.h>\n#include <mruby/hash.h>",
"static const mrb_code call_iseq[] ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
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1,
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1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [96, 2573, 285], "buggy_code_start_loc": [95, 2572, 204], "filenames": ["include/mruby/proc.h", "src/class.c", "src/proc.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [96, 2573, 285], "fixing_code_start_loc": [95, 2572, 204], "message": "mruby is vulnerable to NULL Pointer Dereference", "other": {"cve": {"cisaActi... | 821 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"#================\n# FILE : KIWIRoot.pm\n#----------------\n# PROJECT : OpenSUSE Build-Service\n# COPYRIGHT : (c) 2006 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Germany\n# :\n# AUTHOR : Marcus Schaefer <ms@suse.de>\n# :\n# BELONGS TO : Operating System images\n# ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [934], "buggy_code_start_loc": [933], "filenames": ["modules/KIWIRoot.pm"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [934], "fixing_code_start_loc": [933], "message": "kiwi before 4.98.08, as used in SUSE Studio Onsite 1.2 before 1.2.1 and SUSE Studio Extension for System z 1.2 before 1.2.1, allows attackers to ex... | 822 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"#================\n# FILE : KIWIRoot.pm\n#----------------\n# PROJECT : OpenSUSE Build-Service\n# COPYRIGHT : (c) 2006 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Germany\n# :\n# AUTHOR : Marcus Schaefer <ms@suse.de>\n# :\n# BELONGS TO : Operating System images\n# ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [934], "buggy_code_start_loc": [933], "filenames": ["modules/KIWIRoot.pm"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [934], "fixing_code_start_loc": [933], "message": "kiwi before 4.98.08, as used in SUSE Studio Onsite 1.2 before 1.2.1 and SUSE Studio Extension for System z 1.2 before 1.2.1, allows attackers to ex... | 822 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"<?php",
"/*\n * This file is part of Twig.\n *\n * (c) Fabien Potencier\n *\n * For the full copyright and license information, please view the LICENSE\n * file that was distributed with this source code.\n */",
"namespace Twig\\Loader;",
"use Twig\\Error\\LoaderError;\nuse Twig\\Source;",
"/**\n * Loads t... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
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1,
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1,
1,
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1,
1,
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1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [226, 64], "buggy_code_start_loc": [224, 33], "filenames": ["src/Loader/FilesystemLoader.php", "tests/Loader/FilesystemTest.php"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [227, 70], "fixing_code_start_loc": [223, 34], "message": "Twig is a template language for PHP. Versions 1.x prior to 1.44.7, 2.x prior to 2.15... | 823 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"<?php",
"/*\n * This file is part of Twig.\n *\n * (c) Fabien Potencier\n *\n * For the full copyright and license information, please view the LICENSE\n * file that was distributed with this source code.\n */",
"namespace Twig\\Loader;",
"use Twig\\Error\\LoaderError;\nuse Twig\\Source;",
"/**\n * Loads t... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
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1,
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1,
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1,
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1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [226, 64], "buggy_code_start_loc": [224, 33], "filenames": ["src/Loader/FilesystemLoader.php", "tests/Loader/FilesystemTest.php"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [227, 70], "fixing_code_start_loc": [223, 34], "message": "Twig is a template language for PHP. Versions 1.x prior to 1.44.7, 2.x prior to 2.15... | 823 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"<?php",
"namespace Twig\\Tests\\Loader;",
"/*\n * This file is part of Twig.\n *\n * (c) Fabien Potencier\n *\n * For the full copyright and license information, please view the LICENSE\n * file that was distributed with this source code.\n */",
"use Twig\\Environment;\nuse Twig\\Error\\LoaderError;\nuse Twi... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
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1,
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1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [226, 64], "buggy_code_start_loc": [224, 33], "filenames": ["src/Loader/FilesystemLoader.php", "tests/Loader/FilesystemTest.php"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [227, 70], "fixing_code_start_loc": [223, 34], "message": "Twig is a template language for PHP. Versions 1.x prior to 1.44.7, 2.x prior to 2.15... | 823 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"<?php",
"namespace Twig\\Tests\\Loader;",
"/*\n * This file is part of Twig.\n *\n * (c) Fabien Potencier\n *\n * For the full copyright and license information, please view the LICENSE\n * file that was distributed with this source code.\n */",
"use Twig\\Environment;\nuse Twig\\Error\\LoaderError;\nuse Twi... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
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1,
1,
1,
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1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [226, 64], "buggy_code_start_loc": [224, 33], "filenames": ["src/Loader/FilesystemLoader.php", "tests/Loader/FilesystemTest.php"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [227, 70], "fixing_code_start_loc": [223, 34], "message": "Twig is a template language for PHP. Versions 1.x prior to 1.44.7, 2.x prior to 2.15... | 823 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later\n/*\n * Copyright (C) 2011 Instituto Nokia de Tecnologia\n *\n * Authors:\n * Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org>\n * Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org>\n *\n * Vendor commands implementation based on net/wireless/nl80211.c\n * whic... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
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1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [1264], "buggy_code_start_loc": [1247], "filenames": ["net/nfc/netlink.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [1264], "fixing_code_start_loc": [1247], "message": "There is a sleep-in-atomic bug in /net/nfc/netlink.c that allows an attacker to crash the Linux kernel by simulating a nfc device from user-space... | 824 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later\n/*\n * Copyright (C) 2011 Instituto Nokia de Tecnologia\n *\n * Authors:\n * Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org>\n * Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org>\n *\n * Vendor commands implementation based on net/wireless/nl80211.c\n * whic... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
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1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [1264], "buggy_code_start_loc": [1247], "filenames": ["net/nfc/netlink.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [1264], "fixing_code_start_loc": [1247], "message": "There is a sleep-in-atomic bug in /net/nfc/netlink.c that allows an attacker to crash the Linux kernel by simulating a nfc device from user-space... | 824 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"libexif-0.6.x:\n * New translations: ms\n * Updated translations for most languages\n * Fixed C89 compatibility\n * Fixed warnings on recent versions of autoconf",
"",
"\nlibexif-0.6.21 (2012-07-12):\n * New translations: en_AU, uk\n * Updated translations: cs, da, de, en_CA, nl, pl, sk, sv, vi\n * Adde... | [
1,
0,
1,
1,
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1,
1,
1,
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1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [5, 434], "buggy_code_start_loc": [5, 37], "filenames": ["NEWS", "libexif/exif-data.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [7, 463], "fixing_code_start_loc": [6, 38], "message": "An error when processing the EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY and EXIF_IFD_EXIF tags within libexif version 0.6.21 can be exploited to e... | 825 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"libexif-0.6.x:\n * New translations: ms\n * Updated translations for most languages\n * Fixed C89 compatibility\n * Fixed warnings on recent versions of autoconf",
" * Fix for recursion DoS CVE-2018-20030",
"\nlibexif-0.6.21 (2012-07-12):\n * New translations: en_AU, uk\n * Updated translations: cs, da,... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
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1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [5, 434], "buggy_code_start_loc": [5, 37], "filenames": ["NEWS", "libexif/exif-data.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [7, 463], "fixing_code_start_loc": [6, 38], "message": "An error when processing the EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY and EXIF_IFD_EXIF tags within libexif version 0.6.21 can be exploited to e... | 825 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* exif-data.c\n *\n * Copyright (c) 2001 Lutz Mueller <lutz@users.sourceforge.net>\n *\n * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public\n * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either\n * version 2 of the License, or ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
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1,
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1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
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1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
0,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [5, 434], "buggy_code_start_loc": [5, 37], "filenames": ["NEWS", "libexif/exif-data.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [7, 463], "fixing_code_start_loc": [6, 38], "message": "An error when processing the EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY and EXIF_IFD_EXIF tags within libexif version 0.6.21 can be exploited to e... | 825 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* exif-data.c\n *\n * Copyright (c) 2001 Lutz Mueller <lutz@users.sourceforge.net>\n *\n * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public\n * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either\n * version 2 of the License, or ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
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1,
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1,
1,
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1,
1,
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1,
1,
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1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [5, 434], "buggy_code_start_loc": [5, 37], "filenames": ["NEWS", "libexif/exif-data.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [7, 463], "fixing_code_start_loc": [6, 38], "message": "An error when processing the EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY and EXIF_IFD_EXIF tags within libexif version 0.6.21 can be exploited to e... | 825 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* radare2 - LGPL - Copyright 2016-2017 - Davis, Alex Kornitzer */",
"#include <r_util.h>",
"#include \"mdmp.h\"",
"ut64 r_bin_mdmp_get_paddr(struct r_bin_mdmp_obj *obj, ut64 vaddr) {\n\t/* FIXME: Will only resolve exact matches, probably no need to fix as\n\t** this function will become redundant on the opt... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [664], "buggy_code_start_loc": [365], "filenames": ["libr/bin/format/mdmp/mdmp.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [665], "fixing_code_start_loc": [365], "message": "The r_bin_mdmp_init_directory_entry function in mdmp.c in radare2 2.7.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based bu... | 826 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* radare2 - LGPL - Copyright 2016-2017 - Davis, Alex Kornitzer */",
"#include <r_util.h>",
"#include \"mdmp.h\"",
"ut64 r_bin_mdmp_get_paddr(struct r_bin_mdmp_obj *obj, ut64 vaddr) {\n\t/* FIXME: Will only resolve exact matches, probably no need to fix as\n\t** this function will become redundant on the opt... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [664], "buggy_code_start_loc": [365], "filenames": ["libr/bin/format/mdmp/mdmp.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [665], "fixing_code_start_loc": [365], "message": "The r_bin_mdmp_init_directory_entry function in mdmp.c in radare2 2.7.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based bu... | 826 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"Cacti CHANGELOG",
"1.1.16\n-issue#875: When modifying Realm permissions, realms that are listed multiple times don't stay in sync",
"",
"-issue: Address additional corner cases around get_order_string usage",
"1.1.15\n-issue: PHP Fatal Exception on upgrade from 1.1.11 or earlier\n-feature: Added test to de... | [
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [4, 1154, 74], "buggy_code_start_loc": [4, 1116, 46], "filenames": ["docs/CHANGELOG", "lib/html_form.php", "spikekill.php"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [6, 1154, 74], "fixing_code_start_loc": [5, 1116, 46], "message": "spikekill.php in Cacti before 1.1.16 might allow remote attackers to execute arbit... | 827 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"Cacti CHANGELOG",
"1.1.16\n-issue#875: When modifying Realm permissions, realms that are listed multiple times don't stay in sync",
"-issue#877: Improving resolution to issue#847 and one additional vulnerability",
"-issue: Address additional corner cases around get_order_string usage",
"1.1.15\n-issue: PHP... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [4, 1154, 74], "buggy_code_start_loc": [4, 1116, 46], "filenames": ["docs/CHANGELOG", "lib/html_form.php", "spikekill.php"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [6, 1154, 74], "fixing_code_start_loc": [5, 1116, 46], "message": "spikekill.php in Cacti before 1.1.16 might allow remote attackers to execute arbit... | 827 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"<?php\n/*\n +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n | Copyright (C) 2004-2017 The Cacti Group |\n | |\n | This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [4, 1154, 74], "buggy_code_start_loc": [4, 1116, 46], "filenames": ["docs/CHANGELOG", "lib/html_form.php", "spikekill.php"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [6, 1154, 74], "fixing_code_start_loc": [5, 1116, 46], "message": "spikekill.php in Cacti before 1.1.16 might allow remote attackers to execute arbit... | 827 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"<?php\n/*\n +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n | Copyright (C) 2004-2017 The Cacti Group |\n | |\n | This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [4, 1154, 74], "buggy_code_start_loc": [4, 1116, 46], "filenames": ["docs/CHANGELOG", "lib/html_form.php", "spikekill.php"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [6, 1154, 74], "fixing_code_start_loc": [5, 1116, 46], "message": "spikekill.php in Cacti before 1.1.16 might allow remote attackers to execute arbit... | 827 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"<?php\n/*\n +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n | Copyright (C) 2004-2017 The Cacti Group |\n | |\n | This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [4, 1154, 74], "buggy_code_start_loc": [4, 1116, 46], "filenames": ["docs/CHANGELOG", "lib/html_form.php", "spikekill.php"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [6, 1154, 74], "fixing_code_start_loc": [5, 1116, 46], "message": "spikekill.php in Cacti before 1.1.16 might allow remote attackers to execute arbit... | 827 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"<?php\n/*\n +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n | Copyright (C) 2004-2017 The Cacti Group |\n | |\n | This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [4, 1154, 74], "buggy_code_start_loc": [4, 1116, 46], "filenames": ["docs/CHANGELOG", "lib/html_form.php", "spikekill.php"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [6, 1154, 74], "fixing_code_start_loc": [5, 1116, 46], "message": "spikekill.php in Cacti before 1.1.16 might allow remote attackers to execute arbit... | 827 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"use strict;\nuse inc::Module::Install 0.92;",
"$|++;",
"name 'Module-Signature';\nlicense 'CC0';\nall_from 'lib/Module/Signature.pm';\nreadme_from 'lib/Module/Signature.pm';\nrepository 'http://github.com/audreyt/module-signature';\ninstall_script 'script/cpansign';\nbuild_r... | [
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [12, 252, 953], "buggy_code_start_loc": [12, 251, 2], "filenames": ["Makefile.PL", "README", "lib/Module/Signature.pm"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [14, 252, 969], "fixing_code_start_loc": [13, 251, 2], "message": "The PGP signature parsing in Module::Signature before 0.74 allows remote attackers to ... | 828 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"use strict;\nuse inc::Module::Install 0.92;",
"$|++;",
"name 'Module-Signature';\nlicense 'CC0';\nall_from 'lib/Module/Signature.pm';\nreadme_from 'lib/Module/Signature.pm';\nrepository 'http://github.com/audreyt/module-signature';\ninstall_script 'script/cpansign';\nbuild_r... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [12, 252, 953], "buggy_code_start_loc": [12, 251, 2], "filenames": ["Makefile.PL", "README", "lib/Module/Signature.pm"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [14, 252, 969], "fixing_code_start_loc": [13, 251, 2], "message": "The PGP signature parsing in Module::Signature before 0.74 allows remote attackers to ... | 828 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"NAME\n Module::Signature - Module signature file manipulation",
"SYNOPSIS\n As a shell command:",
" % cpansign # verify an existing SIGNATURE, or\n # make a new one if none exists",
" % cpansign sign # make signature; overwrites existing... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [12, 252, 953], "buggy_code_start_loc": [12, 251, 2], "filenames": ["Makefile.PL", "README", "lib/Module/Signature.pm"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [14, 252, 969], "fixing_code_start_loc": [13, 251, 2], "message": "The PGP signature parsing in Module::Signature before 0.74 allows remote attackers to ... | 828 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"NAME\n Module::Signature - Module signature file manipulation",
"SYNOPSIS\n As a shell command:",
" % cpansign # verify an existing SIGNATURE, or\n # make a new one if none exists",
" % cpansign sign # make signature; overwrites existing... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [12, 252, 953], "buggy_code_start_loc": [12, 251, 2], "filenames": ["Makefile.PL", "README", "lib/Module/Signature.pm"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [14, 252, 969], "fixing_code_start_loc": [13, 251, 2], "message": "The PGP signature parsing in Module::Signature before 0.74 allows remote attackers to ... | 828 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"package Module::Signature;",
"$Module::Signature::VERSION = '0.73_01';",
"\nuse 5.005;\nuse strict;\nuse vars qw($VERSION $SIGNATURE @ISA @EXPORT_OK);\nuse vars qw($Preamble $Cipher $Debug $Verbose $Timeout $AUTHOR);\nuse vars qw($KeyServer $KeyServerPort $AutoKeyRetrieve $CanKeyRetrieve);",
"use constant CA... | [
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
0,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [12, 252, 953], "buggy_code_start_loc": [12, 251, 2], "filenames": ["Makefile.PL", "README", "lib/Module/Signature.pm"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [14, 252, 969], "fixing_code_start_loc": [13, 251, 2], "message": "The PGP signature parsing in Module::Signature before 0.74 allows remote attackers to ... | 828 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"package Module::Signature;",
"$Module::Signature::VERSION = '0.74';",
"\nuse 5.005;\nuse strict;\nuse vars qw($VERSION $SIGNATURE @ISA @EXPORT_OK);\nuse vars qw($Preamble $Cipher $Debug $Verbose $Timeout $AUTHOR);\nuse vars qw($KeyServer $KeyServerPort $AutoKeyRetrieve $CanKeyRetrieve);",
"use constant CANNO... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [12, 252, 953], "buggy_code_start_loc": [12, 251, 2], "filenames": ["Makefile.PL", "README", "lib/Module/Signature.pm"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [14, 252, 969], "fixing_code_start_loc": [13, 251, 2], "message": "The PGP signature parsing in Module::Signature before 0.74 allows remote attackers to ... | 828 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/************************************************************\n * Copyright (c) 1994 by Silicon Graphics Computer Systems, Inc.\n *\n * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this\n * software and its documentation for any purpose and without\n * fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright\n ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [103], "buggy_code_start_loc": [103], "filenames": ["src/xkbcomp/expr.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [106], "fixing_code_start_loc": [104], "message": "Unchecked NULL pointer usage in LookupModMask in xkbcomp/expr.c in xkbcommon before 0.8.2 could be used by local attackers to crash (NULL pointer de... | 829 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/************************************************************\n * Copyright (c) 1994 by Silicon Graphics Computer Systems, Inc.\n *\n * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this\n * software and its documentation for any purpose and without\n * fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright\n ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [103], "buggy_code_start_loc": [103], "filenames": ["src/xkbcomp/expr.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [106], "fixing_code_start_loc": [104], "message": "Unchecked NULL pointer usage in LookupModMask in xkbcomp/expr.c in xkbcommon before 0.8.2 could be used by local attackers to crash (NULL pointer de... | 829 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"<?php\n$AVideoMobileAPP_UA = \"AVideoMobileApp\";\n$AVideoEncoder_UA = \"AVideoEncoder\";\n$AVideoStreamer_UA = \"AVideoStreamer\";\n$AVideoStorage_UA = \"AVideoStorage\";\n$mysql_connect_was_closed = 1;",
"function forbiddenWords($text) {\n global $global;\n if (empty($global['forbiddenWords'])) {\n ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [5822], "buggy_code_start_loc": [5785], "filenames": ["objects/functions.php"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [5822], "fixing_code_start_loc": [5786], "message": "Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in objects/function.php in function getDeviceID in WWBN AVideo through 11.6, via the yptDevice param... | 830 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"<?php\n$AVideoMobileAPP_UA = \"AVideoMobileApp\";\n$AVideoEncoder_UA = \"AVideoEncoder\";\n$AVideoStreamer_UA = \"AVideoStreamer\";\n$AVideoStorage_UA = \"AVideoStorage\";\n$mysql_connect_was_closed = 1;",
"function forbiddenWords($text) {\n global $global;\n if (empty($global['forbiddenWords'])) {\n ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [5822], "buggy_code_start_loc": [5785], "filenames": ["objects/functions.php"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [5822], "fixing_code_start_loc": [5786], "message": "Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in objects/function.php in function getDeviceID in WWBN AVideo through 11.6, via the yptDevice param... | 830 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Image Power, Inc. and the University of\n * British Columbia.\n * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Michael David Adams.\n * All rights reserved.\n */",
"/* __START_OF_JASPER_LICENSE__\n * \n * JasPer License Version 2.0\n * \n * Copyright (c) 2001-2006 Michael David Adams\n * Copyright (c... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
0,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [331, 289], "buggy_code_start_loc": [262, 232], "filenames": ["src/libjasper/ras/ras_dec.c", "src/libjasper/ras/ras_enc.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [349, 307], "fixing_code_start_loc": [263, 233], "message": "The ras_getcmap function in ras_dec.c in JasPer before 1.900.14 allows remote attackers ... | 831 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Image Power, Inc. and the University of\n * British Columbia.\n * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Michael David Adams.\n * All rights reserved.\n */",
"/* __START_OF_JASPER_LICENSE__\n * \n * JasPer License Version 2.0\n * \n * Copyright (c) 2001-2006 Michael David Adams\n * Copyright (c... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [331, 289], "buggy_code_start_loc": [262, 232], "filenames": ["src/libjasper/ras/ras_dec.c", "src/libjasper/ras/ras_enc.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [349, 307], "fixing_code_start_loc": [263, 233], "message": "The ras_getcmap function in ras_dec.c in JasPer before 1.900.14 allows remote attackers ... | 831 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Image Power, Inc. and the University of\n * British Columbia.\n * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Michael David Adams.\n * All rights reserved.\n */",
"/* __START_OF_JASPER_LICENSE__\n * \n * JasPer License Version 2.0\n * \n * Copyright (c) 2001-2006 Michael David Adams\n * Copyright (c... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
0,
1,
0,
1,
0,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [331, 289], "buggy_code_start_loc": [262, 232], "filenames": ["src/libjasper/ras/ras_dec.c", "src/libjasper/ras/ras_enc.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [349, 307], "fixing_code_start_loc": [263, 233], "message": "The ras_getcmap function in ras_dec.c in JasPer before 1.900.14 allows remote attackers ... | 831 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Image Power, Inc. and the University of\n * British Columbia.\n * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Michael David Adams.\n * All rights reserved.\n */",
"/* __START_OF_JASPER_LICENSE__\n * \n * JasPer License Version 2.0\n * \n * Copyright (c) 2001-2006 Michael David Adams\n * Copyright (c... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [331, 289], "buggy_code_start_loc": [262, 232], "filenames": ["src/libjasper/ras/ras_dec.c", "src/libjasper/ras/ras_enc.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [349, 307], "fixing_code_start_loc": [263, 233], "message": "The ras_getcmap function in ras_dec.c in JasPer before 1.900.14 allows remote attackers ... | 831 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * Copyright (C) 2001 Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify\n * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as\n * published by the Free Software Foundation.\n *\n * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be us... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [1438], "buggy_code_start_loc": [1333], "filenames": ["block/bio.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [1442], "fixing_code_start_loc": [1334], "message": "The bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user functions in block/bio.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.8 do unbalanced refcounting when a SCSI I/O vector has... | 832 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * Copyright (C) 2001 Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify\n * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as\n * published by the Free Software Foundation.\n *\n * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be us... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [1438], "buggy_code_start_loc": [1333], "filenames": ["block/bio.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [1442], "fixing_code_start_loc": [1334], "message": "The bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user functions in block/bio.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.8 do unbalanced refcounting when a SCSI I/O vector has... | 832 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"",
"2016-12-03 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com>",
"\t* tools/tiffcp.c: avoid potential division by zero is BitsPerSamples tag is\n\tmissing.\n\tReported by Agostino Sarubbo.\n\tFixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2607",
"2016-12-03 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com>",
"... | [
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [0, 1352], "buggy_code_start_loc": [0, 1166], "filenames": ["ChangeLog", "tools/tiffcp.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [8, 1352], "fixing_code_start_loc": [1, 1166], "message": "Integer overflow in tools/tiffcp.c in LibTIFF 4.0.7, 3.9.3, 3.9.4, 3.9.5, 3.9.6, 3.9.7, 4.0.0alpha4, 4.0.0alpha5, 4.0.0alph... | 833 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"2016-12-03 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com>",
"\t* tools/tiffcp.c: fix uint32 underflow/overflow that can cause heap-based\n\tbuffer overflow.\n\tReported by Agostino Sarubbo.\n\tFixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2610\n",
"2016-12-03 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com>",
... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [0, 1352], "buggy_code_start_loc": [0, 1166], "filenames": ["ChangeLog", "tools/tiffcp.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [8, 1352], "fixing_code_start_loc": [1, 1166], "message": "Integer overflow in tools/tiffcp.c in LibTIFF 4.0.7, 3.9.3, 3.9.4, 3.9.5, 3.9.6, 3.9.7, 4.0.0alpha4, 4.0.0alpha5, 4.0.0alph... | 833 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* $Id$ */",
"/*\n * Copyright (c) 1988-1997 Sam Leffler\n * Copyright (c) 1991-1997 Silicon Graphics, Inc.\n *\n * Revised: 2/18/01 BAR -- added syntax for extracting single images from\n * multi-image TIFF files.\n *\n * New syntax is: sourceFileName,image#\n *\n * image# ranges ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [0, 1352], "buggy_code_start_loc": [0, 1166], "filenames": ["ChangeLog", "tools/tiffcp.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [8, 1352], "fixing_code_start_loc": [1, 1166], "message": "Integer overflow in tools/tiffcp.c in LibTIFF 4.0.7, 3.9.3, 3.9.4, 3.9.5, 3.9.6, 3.9.7, 4.0.0alpha4, 4.0.0alpha5, 4.0.0alph... | 833 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* $Id$ */",
"/*\n * Copyright (c) 1988-1997 Sam Leffler\n * Copyright (c) 1991-1997 Silicon Graphics, Inc.\n *\n * Revised: 2/18/01 BAR -- added syntax for extracting single images from\n * multi-image TIFF files.\n *\n * New syntax is: sourceFileName,image#\n *\n * image# ranges ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [0, 1352], "buggy_code_start_loc": [0, 1166], "filenames": ["ChangeLog", "tools/tiffcp.c"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [8, 1352], "fixing_code_start_loc": [1, 1166], "message": "Integer overflow in tools/tiffcp.c in LibTIFF 4.0.7, 3.9.3, 3.9.4, 3.9.5, 3.9.6, 3.9.7, 4.0.0alpha4, 4.0.0alpha5, 4.0.0alph... | 833 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"Cacti CHANGELOG",
"1.1.16\n-issue#875: When modifying Realm permissions, realms that are listed multiple times don't stay in sync",
"",
"-issue: Address additional corner cases around get_order_string usage",
"1.1.15\n-issue: PHP Fatal Exception on upgrade from 1.1.11 or earlier\n-feature: Added test to de... | [
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [4, 1154, 74], "buggy_code_start_loc": [4, 1116, 46], "filenames": ["docs/CHANGELOG", "lib/html_form.php", "spikekill.php"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [6, 1154, 74], "fixing_code_start_loc": [5, 1116, 46], "message": "Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in aggregate_graphs.php in Cacti before 1... | 834 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"Cacti CHANGELOG",
"1.1.16\n-issue#875: When modifying Realm permissions, realms that are listed multiple times don't stay in sync",
"-issue#877: Improving resolution to issue#847 and one additional vulnerability",
"-issue: Address additional corner cases around get_order_string usage",
"1.1.15\n-issue: PHP... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [4, 1154, 74], "buggy_code_start_loc": [4, 1116, 46], "filenames": ["docs/CHANGELOG", "lib/html_form.php", "spikekill.php"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [6, 1154, 74], "fixing_code_start_loc": [5, 1116, 46], "message": "Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in aggregate_graphs.php in Cacti before 1... | 834 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"<?php\n/*\n +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n | Copyright (C) 2004-2017 The Cacti Group |\n | |\n | This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [4, 1154, 74], "buggy_code_start_loc": [4, 1116, 46], "filenames": ["docs/CHANGELOG", "lib/html_form.php", "spikekill.php"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [6, 1154, 74], "fixing_code_start_loc": [5, 1116, 46], "message": "Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in aggregate_graphs.php in Cacti before 1... | 834 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"<?php\n/*\n +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n | Copyright (C) 2004-2017 The Cacti Group |\n | |\n | This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [4, 1154, 74], "buggy_code_start_loc": [4, 1116, 46], "filenames": ["docs/CHANGELOG", "lib/html_form.php", "spikekill.php"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [6, 1154, 74], "fixing_code_start_loc": [5, 1116, 46], "message": "Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in aggregate_graphs.php in Cacti before 1... | 834 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"<?php\n/*\n +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n | Copyright (C) 2004-2017 The Cacti Group |\n | |\n | This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [4, 1154, 74], "buggy_code_start_loc": [4, 1116, 46], "filenames": ["docs/CHANGELOG", "lib/html_form.php", "spikekill.php"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [6, 1154, 74], "fixing_code_start_loc": [5, 1116, 46], "message": "Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in aggregate_graphs.php in Cacti before 1... | 834 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"<?php\n/*\n +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n | Copyright (C) 2004-2017 The Cacti Group |\n | |\n | This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [4, 1154, 74], "buggy_code_start_loc": [4, 1116, 46], "filenames": ["docs/CHANGELOG", "lib/html_form.php", "spikekill.php"], "fixing_code_end_loc": [6, 1154, 74], "fixing_code_start_loc": [5, 1116, 46], "message": "Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in aggregate_graphs.php in Cacti before 1... | 834 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * Copyright 2012-15 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.\n *\n * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a\n * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the \"Software\"),\n * to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation\n * the rights to use,... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "buggy_code_start_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "filenames": ["drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce100/dce100_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce112/dce112_resource.c", "drive... | 835 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * Copyright 2012-15 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.\n *\n * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a\n * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the \"Software\"),\n * to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation\n * the rights to use,... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "buggy_code_start_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "filenames": ["drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce100/dce100_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce112/dce112_resource.c", "drive... | 835 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * Copyright 2012-15 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.\n *\n * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a\n * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the \"Software\"),\n * to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation\n * the rights to use,... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "buggy_code_start_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "filenames": ["drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce100/dce100_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce112/dce112_resource.c", "drive... | 835 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * Copyright 2012-15 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.\n *\n * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a\n * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the \"Software\"),\n * to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation\n * the rights to use,... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "buggy_code_start_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "filenames": ["drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce100/dce100_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce112/dce112_resource.c", "drive... | 835 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n* Copyright 2012-15 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.\n *\n * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a\n * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the \"Software\"),\n * to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation\n * the rights to use, ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "buggy_code_start_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "filenames": ["drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce100/dce100_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce112/dce112_resource.c", "drive... | 835 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n* Copyright 2012-15 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.\n *\n * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a\n * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the \"Software\"),\n * to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation\n * the rights to use, ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "buggy_code_start_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "filenames": ["drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce100/dce100_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce112/dce112_resource.c", "drive... | 835 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n* Copyright 2012-15 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.cls\n*\n *\n * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a\n * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the \"Software\"),\n * to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation\n * the rights to... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "buggy_code_start_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "filenames": ["drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce100/dce100_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce112/dce112_resource.c", "drive... | 835 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n* Copyright 2012-15 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.cls\n*\n *\n * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a\n * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the \"Software\"),\n * to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation\n * the rights to... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "buggy_code_start_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "filenames": ["drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce100/dce100_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce112/dce112_resource.c", "drive... | 835 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * Copyright 2012-15 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.\n *\n * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a\n * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the \"Software\"),\n * to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation\n * the rights to use,... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "buggy_code_start_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "filenames": ["drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce100/dce100_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce112/dce112_resource.c", "drive... | 835 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * Copyright 2012-15 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.\n *\n * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a\n * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the \"Software\"),\n * to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation\n * the rights to use,... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "buggy_code_start_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "filenames": ["drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce100/dce100_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce112/dce112_resource.c", "drive... | 835 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n* Copyright 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.\n *\n * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a\n * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the \"Software\"),\n * to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation\n * the rights to use, cop... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "buggy_code_start_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "filenames": ["drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce100/dce100_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce112/dce112_resource.c", "drive... | 835 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n* Copyright 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.\n *\n * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a\n * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the \"Software\"),\n * to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation\n * the rights to use, cop... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "buggy_code_start_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "filenames": ["drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce100/dce100_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce112/dce112_resource.c", "drive... | 835 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n* Copyright 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.\n *\n * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a\n * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the \"Software\"),\n * to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation\n * the rights to use, cop... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "buggy_code_start_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "filenames": ["drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce100/dce100_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce112/dce112_resource.c", "drive... | 835 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n* Copyright 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.\n *\n * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a\n * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the \"Software\"),\n * to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation\n * the rights to use, cop... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "buggy_code_start_loc": [670, 716, 689, 502, 703, 788, 1079], "filenames": ["drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce100/dce100_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_resource.c", "drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce112/dce112_resource.c", "drive... | 835 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Authentication token and access key management\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004, 2007 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as publi... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Authentication token and access key management\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004, 2007 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as publi... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Key type used to cache DNS lookups made by the kernel\n *\n * See Documentation/networking/dns_resolver.txt\n *\n * Copyright (c) 2007 Igor Mammedov\n * Author(s): Igor Mammedov (niallain@gmail.com)\n * Steve French (sfrench@us.ibm.com)\n * Wang Lei (wang840925@gmail.com)\n *\t\tDa... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Key type used to cache DNS lookups made by the kernel\n *\n * See Documentation/networking/dns_resolver.txt\n *\n * Copyright (c) 2007 Igor Mammedov\n * Author(s): Igor Mammedov (niallain@gmail.com)\n * Steve French (sfrench@us.ibm.com)\n * Wang Lei (wang840925@gmail.com)\n *\t\tDa... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Large capacity key type\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.\n * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Large capacity key type\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.\n * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation\n * Copyright (C) 2010 Politecnico di Torino, Italy\n * TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it\n *\n * Authors:\n * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>\n * Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute i... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/*\n * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation\n * Copyright (C) 2010 Politecnico di Torino, Italy\n * TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it\n *\n * Authors:\n * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>\n * Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute i... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Key garbage collector\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2009-2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence\n * as published by the Free Software ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Key garbage collector\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2009-2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence\n * as published by the Free Software ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Basic authentication token and access key management\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004-2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Basic authentication token and access key management\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004-2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Userspace key control operations\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004-5 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published by the Free S... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Userspace key control operations\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004-5 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published by the Free S... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Keyring handling\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008, 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published by the Free So... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Keyring handling\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008, 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published by the Free So... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* procfs files for key database enumeration\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published by the... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
0,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* procfs files for key database enumeration\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published by the... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Manage a process's keyrings\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published by the Fr... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Manage a process's keyrings\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published by the Fr... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Request a key from userspace\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published by the Free So... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Request a key from userspace\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published by the Free So... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1... | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Request key authorisation token key definition.\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
0,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
Determine whether the {function_name} code is vulnerable or not. | [
"/* Request key authorisation token key definition.\n *\n * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.\n * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)\n *\n * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n * as published ... | [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
] | PreciseBugs | {"buggy_code_end_loc": [367, 228, 283, 858, 155, 991, 905, 603, 250, 734, 602, 77, 1070, 166], "buggy_code_start_loc": [138, 227, 250, 857, 131, 404, 769, 417, 184, 733, 598, 76, 1069, 117], "filenames": ["include/linux/key.h", "net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c", "security/keys/big_key.c", "security/keys/encrypted-keys/encry... | 836 |
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